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CHARTING THE COURSE FOR EFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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CHARTING THE COURSE FOR EFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 10, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 210, Capitol Visitors Center, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Good morning, and welcome to the sixth in a series of hearings on Officer in-Residence Professional Military Education, which we know throughout the military and here on the Hill as PME.

Our hearings thus far have explored various aspects of the service-specific and joint institutions that make up the current PME system. We have examined missions, curricula, and standards of rigor, the quality of staff, faculty, and students, and organization resourcing at the precommissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior PME levels.

Professional military education is an investment in the most important element of our military, our people. The primary purpose of PME is to develop military officers throughout their careers for the rigorous intellectual demands of complex contingencies and major conflicts. We can't afford to be complacent when it comes to producing leaders capable of meeting significant challenges whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As a matter of national security, we must invest wisely.

The PME system bears a special responsibility for staying relevant amid change. As a key mechanism for individual and force development, PME must both respond to present needs and anticipate future ones. The PME system must continually evolve in order to enable officers to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an increasingly complicated and constantly changing security environment.

For instance, we know that PME can empower officers to contribute to interagency and multinational operations and to effectively utilize foreign languages and cultural skills. We have heard from some of the schools that they are currently striving to embrace these and other important educational priorities. Are they doing a good enough job?

In short, the PME system must consistently improve. Twenty years ago, the Skelton Panel report on PME stated, "Although many of its individual courses, programs, and faculties are excellent, the existing PME system must be improved to meet the needs of the modern profession at arms."

That statement is true today. Twenty years ago, we were educating officers to engage against our Cold War adversaries. Clearly, much about our military and our world has changed since then. Much will continue to change as we look to the future.

With respect to PME, these questions should always apply: How well are we educating our officers presently, and what should we be doing to educate them more effectively in the future?

Our witnesses for this hearing are prominent former senior military and civilian academic leaders, each of whom has significant experience with the PME system. I look forward to hearing your views.

I now recognize Mr. Wittman for any comments he wants to make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor and privilege to be here today on this panel, and also I want to thank our witnesses for taking time out of your busy schedules to join us and give us your thoughts and ideas on what we can do to enhance our system of PME here in the United States.

This morning the subcommittee conducts its sixth and final scheduled hearing on Officer in-Residence Professional Military Education. We began the study with testimony from outside experts who posed issues for the subcommittee to consider, then conducted four sessions in which we heard from many Department of Defense (DOD) and military service witnesses, who discussed various components of the PME system and how it all fits together. We will conclude this final hearing with additional thoughts from you very well-qualified witnesses and your thoughts and ideas on what we can do to make sure we round out this PME experience for our men and women in uniform.

I think our approach as a committee is sound and hope that today's panel will put the issues in perspective for the subcommittee and suggest a path forward.

During the course of this study, I have come to respect and admire our professional military education system. There is nothing else in the rest of the Federal Government or, to my knowledge, private industry which begins to emulate the significant and continuous investment we make in educating and developing our military officers.

It is important for all of us to keep in mind that today's system produces quality, successful officers, who operate in a wide range of demanding and difficult positions. That does not mean that there aren't areas that need improvement, but we should not lose sight

of the fact that we have a system that, for the most part, serves us well.

Through this process I have had the opportunity to listen to witnesses, travel to PME institutions, and meet with senior leaders alongside Chairman Snyder. In fact, this past Friday I visited the U.S. Naval Academy and had the unique opportunity to observe some of the quality training our junior officers receive at the service academies.

By the way, I was there as the football team was leaving to go play Ohio State, and I can tell you it was an exciting Saturday for our midshipmen there, where they were almost victorious against Ohio State. Quite a great day for them.

From all of these visits and discussions, two recurring themes stand out in my mind as the most valuable aspects of PME. First, I heard mostly from the students is the value of interacting with fellow students of differing background, particularly those from the State Department, international students, and those from other military services.

The second most valuable skill these students can develop is critical thinking, as there is no way to anticipate the ever-changing situations officers face in today's world of continuous deployments.

Whatever we may suggest, I think it is imperative that we retain these aspects of today's PME system. It was time that we undertook this effort, and I am pleased to have been a participant in what I think is an extraordinary effort, and I want to thank Chairman Snyder for his leadership and all of his direction in pursuing this effort.

Over the past 20 years, the United States has significantly changed the way it employs its military forces, sending troops abroad to address regional issues with far greater frequency than we did during the Cold War. It is also apparent that the system, like any large system involving people, faces challenges in today's dynamic environment of high operational momentum. Even so, I think today's PME system, by and large, serves the Nation well; and we should carefully consider any potential recommendations from this committee.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership; and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.

Our witnesses today are Lieutenant General David Barno, U.S. Army Retired, Director of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies; Dr. John Allen Williams, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago, and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society; and Dr. Williamson Murray, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, the Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

We appreciate you all being here. Your written statements will be a part of the record. I have read your written statements, and I am excited about this discussion today.

We have mentioned our previous five hearings, the visits we have had. We have been doing a lot of wading down in the weeds,

as you know, when you get down talking about tenure of a professor, all those kinds of things that are important to academics. I think you all have backed us up a little bit higher to get a look at the broad views, which I think is very important as we go into the next phase of this.

The next phase of this, by the way, is now, with a whole lot of staff effort, to put together everything that we have learned on all their visits and travels and our meetings and our hearings and what recommendations can we make to the Congress and the military to move ahead on this. So your comments today are very helpful.

So, General Barno, do you have a light down there? We will put on the clock for you. If you see that red light, it means you have gone five minutes. If you still have some things to say, go ahead and do it, but it is just an idea to give you an idea where we are at.

General Barno.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID BARNO, USA (RET.), DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

General BARNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Wittman. Thanks to all of you and to the committee for the opportunity to appear here today and talk on an extremely important topic.

I feel a bit out of balance on the table here since I am, in one sense, probably the only nonacademic in terms of my overall background here. But I hope that, despite having gone through the entire professional military educational system and done some graduate school work in the civilian world as well, but that, combined with my time having commanded from lieutenant, as a company commander all the way to lieutenant general as a commander in Afghanistan, will provide a bit of a balanced outlook to what may become academic in some respects. But professional military education is a critical competency of the military.

I am involved in the academic world today. I have been for the last three years as the Director of the NESA Center at National Defense University, but I will give my comments today of my own personal views, as opposed to speaking for the government.

I would also highlight to the committee that I have got a personal stake in this, with two sons in uniform; two Army captains out there in the field, one who served a year in Afghanistan already. So I have a vested personal interest in ensuring that our long-term professional military education remains strong.

I think I would like to talk a bit about some of my characterizations of where we are today and some of the demands on the force today in terms of our leadership and then highlight in my opening comments here five recommendations for the committee to consider.

First, I would note that we are in an environment where warfare is changing at a very rapid pace. If we were to have this hearing just 10 years ago, in 1999, and we had some distinguished military officers up here to ask about what the future of war was going to look like, we would have heard them talk about rapid, decisive op-

erations and precision strike and focused logistics and information dominance; and they would have drawn their understanding of warfare from the 1999 Kosovo air war, which would have just concluded, which involved no ground combat troops at all.

And if we were to just move them forward a couple of years, they would have seen a lot of those ideas played out in the opening gambits in Afghanistan, where we were able to collapse the Taliban regime in about 90 days after a standing start, an important reminder this week with the anniversary of 9/11, and then a few years later in Iraq, where in a six-week lightning ground campaign we saw our military forces overwhelm an extraordinarily large and capable army by really shattering their ability to resist. That would have been their view of warfare.

Today, if we asked that same group what warfare looks like, we would have found a very different description of warfare. Today, we are clearly actively involved in two major irregular warfare conflicts—one in Iraq, one in Afghanistan—which have taken us down a very, very different road than our outlook on warfare just 10 years ago at the beginning of this decade.

So I highlight that fact because I think it describes the complexity of the challenge that face our military leaders today, all the way from the tactical level as platoon leaders and company commanders, all the way to our senior-most generals. The bloody, uncertain, chaotic nature of war has not changed, but the character of war, how it plays out, what the options are, are ever changing between irregular warfare, conventional warfare, and now what some are now calling hybrid warfare—a combination of the two—such as we saw Hezbollah fight in south Lebanon in 2006.

This is an extraordinarily more difficult environment to think about warfare than the environment I entered into in the Army in 1976, where the Cold War was very much still the centerpiece of our very predictable military confrontation. So we have set the bar higher for the requirements, I think, for our military leaders.

I would also I think characterize some of our decisionmaking and strategic thinking over the last 10 years as somewhat questionable. We have a number of pundits who would certainly ascribe to that view. There have been a number of books on the Iraq War that have cited what authors have described as a failure of strategic leadership.

I read recently a report by Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts here from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments that had this observation in it: "The ability of the U.S. national security establishment to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against intelligent adversaries at acceptable costs has been declining for some decades."

They went on to say that, "reversing this decline in U.S. strategic competence is an urgent issue for the American national security establishment in the 21st century."

I am not sure I would go as far as my friend Andy Krepinevich would in this, but I think he is onto an issue of concern, which is our ability to convert our current educational establishment and development of officers into effective strategic leadership.

We have seen articles, such as "A failure in generalship" by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, that have been very critical of America's military leadership.

Of course, all of our military leadership, myself included, have gone through our professional military schools. So I think it is appropriate to look at how we are teaching, how we are developing officers, and ask questions about whether we have got it fully correct or not.

I would say, however—and I think all the panelists would agree with me, as I heard already from the committee members this morning—that we have an amazing military. We have an incredible force. We have some of the best leadership we have ever had in the field, under the most difficult conditions; and I think that that is a hallmark of who we are.

Preserving that asymmetrical advantage we have and our intellectual capability in the military is extraordinarily important. And I would highlight that I think the majority of our investment in a lot of ways has been made at the tactical and operational level, and I look at the amount of time we are spending at the strategic level throughout our programs, especially as officers reach flag rank, and I have some question in my mind as to whether we have got that quite right.

Specifically, I think that our educational development for officers peters out. It diminishes to near nothing at the flag officer level, at the brigadier, at the one-star admiral level. Whereas, as a lieutenant I might go to a course for six months before I stood in front of a platoon of 40 soldiers, as a flag officer, the longest course I will go to is six weeks long. There is something perhaps not right about that, given the complexity and the impact of the demands at that level.

So, five brief recommendations.

First, I think we need to look at our civilian graduate programs and incentivize that for our highest-performing officers. There is no substitute for a civilian graduate degree to sharpen the thinking of our officers as they move up through the ranks and they become senior officers. That helped me more—my graduate schooling here at Georgetown University as a captain helped me more than perhaps any other developmental experience at the strategic level. Most officers today will not have that experience. The vast majority will not. They will have master's degrees, but they will get them from military schools. That is a major change from when I was a young officer.

Second, I think we need to make military intellectualism and military thinking and thinking warriors respectable again. We have been in a war now for the better part of nine years. We have a great muddy boots generation of leadership. We need to make sure they are thinking muddy boots leaders, and we need to incentivize with our senior leaders in how they speak about thinking about warfare, that being a military intellectual is an expectation of all of our leaders. To be a thinking warrior is what we are looking for.

Senior service college. Our senior service colleges, the Army War College, National Defense Universities are the last major investment we make in education for our officers. I think we have to look

very carefully at that curriculum to ensure it is rigorous enough, focused enough on strategy and that we don't outsource aspects of it to fellowships that don't have nearly the same degree of rigor, which is becoming a common practice, particularly in the U.S. Army.

Fourth, service officer personnel systems. Personnel systems drive the selection and development of senior leaders. I think we have to look very carefully at that. We now have, in effect, a 40-year career for our generals. We should invest more of that time in their education. The time is available. I cannot be convinced that we can't find time to invest in the most important part of an officer's education than at the senior and most strategic level.

Finally, the flag officer program, which reinforces that. I think our current six-week Capstone program has major shortfalls in it. It has been reduced from a nine-week program just a few years ago. It has very little educational rigor and is not representing the needs and requirements demanded of flag officers. I think we need to revisit that and look at how that might be improved.

So, again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to present these views. I look forward to following up in more detail during the questions. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Barno.

[The prepared statement of General Barno can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Williams.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO, PRESIDENT, INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

Dr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. I thank Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and the distinguished members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to be here today. It is a genuine honor.

Military success requires adaptive leaders and strategists who are able to deal with ambiguity, imagine the unimaginable, and handle the unruly strategic environment that is upon us. Studying theories about war must never make war itself a theoretical exercise, however. Military scholarship must contribute to the primary purpose of the force, which is to prevail in combat. The military education system must support, not subvert or detract from rigorous military training and the mindset that makes victory possible.

I propose two goals for the military PME system: first, to develop strategists and leaders to meet future complex and ambiguous challenges and, secondly, to strengthen civil-military relations.

During the Cold War, the prospective enemy was apparent. We knew how he would fight. We even knew the likely axis of attack. With the attacks of 9/11, however, a new, much less certain paradigm emerged. Unfortunately, traditional threats still remain and the major military mission became all of the above.

Domestically, militaries reflect the societies they serve, whether it is the Vietnam-era tolerance for drug use or the evolving comfort level with diversity of all kinds and with nontraditional roles for

women. Demands for the military to change accordingly will not be far behind. It will require the most educated and adaptive leadership to manage the military successfully as such changes inevitably occur.

The military might also be called upon to operate domestically in ways never envisioned, with posse comitatus restrictions waived in view of a civil emergency. This could be to restore order in the wake of some catastrophe or even to enforce a quarantine. We want the most broadly and humanely educated officers thinking about how to operate in this environment.

The military education system should encourage potential strategists, broaden their intellectual horizons, and help them develop the skills they need to be effective, and to do so as early in their careers as possible. It must also ensure that all officers form the habit of thinking strategically. Rigorous educational experiences will help students develop the intellectual capital they will need later in their careers. This applies to the increasingly professionalized enlisted ranks as well, the subject of further study, I think.

The mix of technical, social science, moral, and humanist components in curricula at all levels need to be rebalanced if we are training officers to lead people as opposed to machines. It is past time to reemphasize the importance of the humanities and social sciences, deemphasized in the Navy, for example, for at least three decades because of the presumed need for all officers to emphasize highly technical competence above all else.

We need to retain also a variety of commissioning sources. Many Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs at prestigious universities were lost in the Vietnam era. These are an important link with the civilian society, but there must also be sources of officer accession that are not subject to the political whims of university professors.

The service academies are repositories of service culture, a source of pride to the American people, and, by virtue of the appointment process through this Congress, ensure a wide representation of students. Their abandonment would be a serious mistake; and, once destroyed, they could never be rebuilt.

Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs can be expanded rapidly with no need for the government to fund the college education for the inductees.

More engagement with the civilian academic community would be beneficial to officer PME. Examples include accreditation programs for the military's master's degree programs; first-rank civilian professors at military residential schools; participation in rigorous scholarly professional societies, such as the one I have the privilege of heading, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces in Society; and enhanced civilian graduate education opportunities, especially at the mid-career level. As General David Petraeus noted, this experience helps bridge the gap between those in uniform and those who have had little contact with the military.

As the Congress considers these issues, I recommend that the following six items be included as important considerations: not to repair a broken system but to make an excellent system still better; enhancing the role of the humanities and social sciences, including language and cultural studies; considering the effect of the PME

system on the relations between the military and civil society; encouraging the flow of highly qualified civilian instructors into the academic portions of residential military PME programs, whether as visiting professors or permanent staff; encouraging the best officers to interact with civilian academic institutions and organizations; making performance in educational institutions a strong factor in subsequent assignments and promotions. Finally, focusing on the increasing professionalization of the enlisted force and considering how enlisted educational opportunities can better meet evolving security challenges.

Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion this morning.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Dr. Williams.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Williams can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Murray.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAMSON MURRAY, PH.D., PROFESSOR EMERITUS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Dr. MURRAY. Dr. Snyder, it is a great pleasure to address the committee and yourself.

I would begin by commenting that, as you well know, the medical profession takes its education of its future doctors very seriously. I would argue that the military is a profession, perhaps the most difficult of all the professions, not only because it is so physically demanding, but I would argue intellectually demanding. And it is intellectually demanding, I would suggest—and I don't want to go through my paper in great detail—but I think as a historian looking at the past 100 years, we are going to be surprised in the 21st century. We are going to fight opponents who we cannot conceive of today.

Maybe all one has to do is think back to the summer of 2001, and if I had lectured at one of the war colleges and suggested that we were going to send a large force to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan, I would have been laughed off the stage. But that kind of surprise is going to come out of the woodwork and bite us in the 21st century, and we have got to develop an intellectually adaptable officer corps that understands other cultures and other histories.

Let me—because I think most of you have read my general comments, let me just sort of run through suggestions that I have and gave considerable thought to.

First of all, I think Congress needs to fund a sufficient overage of officers at all grades to allow sufficient time for serious study without penalty either to their careers or to operational requirements. It is particularly acute now, but once the pressure is off I think it still will be useful and important for Congress to make available to the military the kind of latitude that allows officers to go to the best graduate courses and best graduate degrees in war studies, strategic studies, military history, international relations, not just in the United States but around the world.

I think there is another great difficulty—that was my second point—and that has to do with, of course, personnel systems, which Congress has given, I think, considerable greater latitude than was

true 20 years ago. But, by and large, personnel systems are not using that latitude, if you will, to encourage people to step outside of the normal career paths, like General Petraeus did and H.R. McMaster, being two specific examples in terms of the Army.

I would also suggest the professional military education is being underfunded. I think this shows in terms of the capacity of those institutions to reach out to bring in scholars from around the country.

The great advantage that the United Kingdom enjoys is that it just takes a train ticket to bring somebody from Edinburgh down to London. Here, if you want to bring somebody from Stanford, you will pay a ticket across the United States. And I think this is absolutely essential, that our military and its educational system not be confined too narrowly to the experts within Washington or the experts within particular educational systems.

The fourth point—and I think this is very important—is the presidents and the commandants of the various schools need to be far more carefully selected than in the past. I think the services themselves, the senior leadership, need to give far more support to those individuals.

If you look back at the history of the last 25, 30 years at major successful PME reforms—Stansfield Turner, the Naval War College, 1970, supported fully by the Chief of Naval Operations; Chuck Boyd at the Air University in the early 1990s, supported fully by the leadership in Washington; Paul Van Riper, establishing Marine Corps University, supported by General Gray; and the creation of School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), supported with three incredibly brilliant officers, Rick Senreich, Vasta Sager, and General Don Holder, fully supported by Army generals at the four-star level, Otis and Richardson in particular. We have simply got to be willing to do that and not treat these schools as a nice place for admirals and two-star admirals and two-star generals to retire in.

I think that the services need to focus more seriously on professional military education from the very beginning of an officer's career right through to the end; and having taught at the Naval Academy for 2 years—a wonderful experience, great midshipmen—I don't think they are prepared the way they should be across the board in issues dealing with military strategy and military history.

Finally, I just want to give the committee my compliment for—I discovered my last, seventh point, is overtaken by events. You have done precisely what I recommended. You go out to the institutions and talk to them.

Again, I think one of the ironies in looking at the landscape of professional military education is the Naval War College still remains, by far and away, a world-class institution for the study of strategy; and not to have an equivalent type of institution down in Washington, a national war college, I think, is a shame. But I think the gold standard should be met by the other war colleges.

Finally, General Barno's suggestion, I think, is a brilliant one. The Skelton Committee report of 1988 or 1989, whatever it was, the finest study on professional military education ever done anywhere, anyplace, recommended the creation of a strategic college for general officers. I would recommend that Capstone be turned into the equivalent of the British higher command and staff course,

which not only gives officers I think it is a four- or five-month course, very rigorous course, but they are ranked at it, and who gets the two- and three- and four-star joint assignments depends upon how you did in the higher command and staff course. I think it would focus the services a little more seriously on preparing the officers both for the course and then to more seriously and rigorously educate officers so that we don't have to make the kind of mistakes that were made in the Iraq War and the Afghan War post 2001, post 2003.

Thank you very much, sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Murray can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your comments.

We will put ourselves on the five-minute clock and have at least two, if not more, rounds.

The first question I wanted to ask you—I just wanted to give you each an opportunity. You all are involved in academic work in some way and are used to critiquing things. I would like to give each of you the opportunity to either critique or compliment what the other folks had to say.

Is there anything you want to amplify on, General Barno, that Dr. Williams or Mr. Murray said?

General BARNO. I don't hear too many things I disagree with with either of them. I think one of the benefits of this panel is that we are not required to defend a position which we may or may not agree with in public. I think all of us are free to speak from a lot of experience in this arena and a lot of commitment to where this goes.

I think, as I have noted down the comments from both my contemporaries here, I see little to quarrel with. I do think I would just reinforce that I think the senior-most level PME is the area where I have the greatest concern; and I think that, to a degree, is shared on my left.

We seem to have built a program that has created extraordinary tactical and operational officers, and a lot of that I think could be attributed to the fact that most of the program is at that level of their careers—lieutenant, captains, majors. We have done far less well, in most of our estimation—I think I heard that from each of the witnesses up here. We have done far less at the strategic level. We need to ask why and what can be done to rectify that.

I am not sure I would agree that that has to occur at the beginning of a career. I think we really have to look at the more senior levels and how we grow these people and develop those people when they become senior for those senior jobs.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Williams.

Dr. WILLIAMS. I am pleased to hear the General emphasizing the importance of civilian graduate education. I am sure Dr. Murray agrees as well. But I am more concerned about the junior and the mid-career.

General Petraeus wrote a great article for Armed Forces and Society when he was a major, back in 1989, on the military advice on the use of force and how effective it was, advice to the civilians. So I think there is a lot more spade work that can be done and development done early. But the time you are in war college, you are

going to be polishing some things up, but it is too late really to start anything, I think.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Murray.

Dr. MURRAY. I think we are 98 percent in agreement.

Let me just extend General Barno's comment. I think it begins to a certain extent at precommissioning. But the crucial point, I think, is the captain level. If you look at people like Don Holder and Petraeus and various other individuals who have gotten the mark as first rate strategists, they have gotten that mark really in terms of beginning to fill their gas tank at the captain level.

And here I think sending individuals out to graduate school for a couple of years to get a master's or Ph.D.—in fact, at Ohio State, we got a significant number of our officers through in two years, All But Dissertation (ABD), and able to write their dissertations at the next level.

So, again, I think this sort of education developing and opening officers' minds to the wider aspects of their profession is crucial.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Murray, I think you in your written statement referred to the challenge of the whole system educates in stages. Wasn't that your phrase? Early on, you compared PME with medical education as a family doctor.

But we don't educate in stages in medical school. You come right out of medical school, then you do your residency, then you may do an additional fellowship. So, for example, a cardiologist, four years of medical school, three years internal medicine residency, then probably a couple of years, at least, of a fellowship. But that is probably it for the career. For the next 50 years, they will practice based on their continuing medical education. But it is a different system, isn't it?

Dr. MURRAY. It makes it much more difficult. Because I think the crucial element—talking to people like Tony Zinni—the crucial element in developing I think great military leaders comes down to the willingness of the officers, with certain encouragement from their senior commanders, et cetera, to continue each stage the educational process. That it shouldn't be just you get something at the basic course, you get something at the captains' course, at the amphibious warfare school—or it's now called expeditionary warfare school. In fact, it should be a continuous process in which the officer is educating himself for the next level. And I think that is very difficult to do, particularly given the kinds of commitments our forces have today. But a significant number of officers do it, and they are the ones who should be rewarded, providing they are doing equally well.

Dr. SNYDER. There is an old line about what do you call the person who graduates last in a medical school class? Doctor. You don't call the person who graduates last at West Point General. I think that is the challenge we have.

Mr. Platts for five minutes.

I am not sure we have formally welcomed you to this subcommittee. It is great to have you. Todd and I have talked about some of the issues involving professional military education. He has had an interest in it for quite a few years now. We appreciate your being on this subcommittee and being here today.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to join you and all of the fellow members on the committee.

I am a new member to the Armed Services, all of about 3 months, although I have been trying to get on it for 8½ years. So delighted to be here with you.

I appreciate each of our witnesses' testimony and your important work, both civilian and in uniform.

General Barno, I had the pleasure a good many years ago. Although not on the committee, I have been to Iraq nine times now and Afghanistan five and continue to educate myself out there hands on and hopefully will be back in Afghanistan in about two weeks. So I appreciate your long service.

I guess the first question to all three of you is: In my interactions overseas, and especially in Afghanistan, I have seen the importance of our work between our military commanders and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Foreign Service officers, Department of State Foreign Service, but especially USAID; and in Afghanistan in one of my visits in the Jalalabad area that partnership was clearly critically important to the success we were having in the work of the civilian and military personnel.

Do you think we need to strengthen that in the training or the education programs, the PME opportunities, and have a greater presence of the Department of State Foreign Service officers or USAID Foreign Service officers as part of this education process and suggestions in what way or to what extent should that occur?

General BARNO. Great to see you again. I live on the edge of your district there in Dickinson Township. So I have spent a lot of time at the Army War College, and you have been a tremendous supporter of that great institution as well.

I think that we are seeing a very slow growth of players from across the U.S. interagency participating as students, and particularly the war colleges now to a lesser extent, the more junior schools such as command and staff college. I think that is very good.

What I find as the limiting factor, though, is that the other agencies—government and USAID, Department of State, Justice, and so on—simply don't have enough people to be able to spare any to go to school. In the military, as we alluded to earlier, we have a pool in the Army called the training transient holding and school account of people who are basically over-strength to allow a substantial number of officers to always be in school. So if I take someone out of a seat, I have got someone else that will take the job for the year the captain or major is gone. In the State Department, that is not true. In USAID, that is not true. So they are so tightly controlled with the number of oversees requirements they have that they simply can't get people to go to school. So perhaps that should be addressed.

But the benefit of that is huge for both their people that go to these schools, such as the Army War College or National War College, and it is equally huge for the military people that get exposed to this other thinking before they get to meet these people on the battlefield, which is not how you would like to see that evolve.

Dr. MURRAY. I think there is a larger issue here, which is that the other government agencies simply don't have the school system

that the military has. I think—not only that. One of our best graduate students at Ohio State in the late 1980s came to Ohio State, wanted to get a Ph.D. He asked for a leave from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and they said no. No interest in terms of the external world to that kind of broadening experience.

I think Congress—it is obviously beyond the purview of this committee, but I think the larger issue is that the other agencies of government need to have something along the lines similar to the military's broadening experience if we are going to have the kind of interagency cooperation in places like Afghanistan.

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think Congressman Platts raised an important question. It is difficult to do, get the services to come together and do joint education and work in everyone's career path. It becomes exponentially more difficult when you have the interagency process as well, with different career paths, different gates they have to go through as well. Plus, they are perhaps even less robustly staffed than the military. The military has enough problems.

To make it even more complicated in that environment, you are also dealing with nongovernmental organizations of various kinds that you have no control over, and they may not be American ones at that. So it becomes a very, very complex environment.

I accept the problem. I had no idea to how to solve it.

Mr. PLATTS. I appreciate all three of your perspectives.

Dr. Murray, your focus about the other agencies not emphasizing education or allowing for those opportunities I think is kind of the catch–22. Because they are not yet—they are expecting their Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to be out there right with military leaders hand-in-hand and not have that opportunity to build that relationship ahead of time.

With Lieutenant Colonel Linda Granfield and Michelle Parker, a USAID officer, it was an amazing partnership that I saw and actually have kept in touch with both of those individuals since they have come back and have taken on new assignments because of how impressed I was with their abilities.

I will save my additional questions until the next round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

Mr. Wittman for five minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I will ask all of you this question. In looking overall, we have heard a lot recently about the whole-of-government approach to our contingency operations. In taking that in perspective with the current PME system, how do you think this system can emphasize interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational aspects of our future military activities into the instructional efforts that we are currently undertaking now in our PME system?

General Barno, we will begin with you.

General BARNO. I think that is evolving and is under way as a result of the experiences that Congressman Platts described out in the field in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Now military officers are much different than 10 or 15 years ago, running into all these people and finding in many cases that they now have to have a partnership that works with these other parts of government in order for them to accomplish their military mis-

sion. That is a completely new environment than what anyone would have envisioned 10 or 15 years ago. So they have already brought that knowledge with them when they come to these military PME courses.

I think where we could probably add some more capacity is having instructional support at the colleges, the war colleges and the command and staff colleges, that are either from those agencies in the government or are retired members with experience in the field doing those types of things. It is not good enough for a colonel of infantry to talk about USAID operations and how they are structured and what their culture is and how they think and how they approach things. The credibility simply is not there. That is what we have to rely on because of how we are set up at some of our institutions. But having them on the staff and faculty, having more than the students, as we noted before, I think would be very, very valuable; and it is replicating what is already happening in the field. That's the irony in a way, is that the school system in some ways is behind best practices out there in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Dr. WILLIAMS. One of the purposes of the education system is to plan and game through things before you are in a crisis. The kinds of initiatives that the General is talking about are quite good. We open up as many opportunities for people from those other agencies and abroad to come and study in military colleges. If they need to increase their funding to be able to do that, I would hope that Congress would support that as well.

This tends to be something that builds on itself. Because as they become accustomed to working with one another and understanding the need to do it, it would become a higher priority for everyone. Plus, personal connections will be formed. I think this will benefit in the long run.

Dr. MURRAY. Let me put a caveat here. Because I think we have to realize that, for example, a year at the command and staff level or a year at the war college level is a very limited time in an academic sense. And these institutions have been created specifically to study war and strategy. I don't think in many cases they do enough of that to prepare officers for the complexity of the kinds of wars and the character of the wars that we are going to be involved in.

What we have seen over the past 20 years to a certain extent is not only stuffing more and more stuff into an officer's career, gates that they have to pass, but stuffing more and more various subjects into what are supposed to be graduate level programs. I absolutely believe they have to be graduate level programs. And we want to take two weeks away from the strategy and policy course at Newport, which is a world-class course, to teach something which 10 years from now our officers may not be involved in.

Again, I realize the importance of it, but I think we have to understand the difficulties inherent in terms of just getting our officers to the level that they need to be in terms of understanding war and the use of force.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask about an issue that came up at our very first hearing. And you all may not be able to have a comment on this.

The phrase was used in terms of how to help move this process forward. The comment was made by at least a couple of our opening panel witnesses, I believe it was, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs I think the word was "needs to take more ownership of PME" in terms of making sure that I guess it has a champion, that he or she knows what is going on, that they have a resource issue.

Do you all have any comments on that concept?

General Barno.

General BARNO. I think that is the case today, in talking with Admiral Rondeau, who is the new president of——

Dr. SNYDER. Which is the case?

General BARNO. That he is taking a greater role in this. I have seen here even recently with regard to at least National Defense University—I can't speak to whether he has that charter for the service schools or not. I would argue that for joint PME that he is the right point of contact, and he needs to be a visible champion of that. That is beginning I think to evolve from his relationship with the new National Defense University president.

I also think it is equally if not more important that the service chiefs are visible champions of their PME programs of their service colleges or their staff colleges. And that varies widely, as we would expect, given the demands that the service chiefs have, their personalities, their backgrounds, what schools they went to or didn't go to; and so that becomes rather erratic.

But I think the broader issue that I have got in my notes here is that we have to have four-star champions of military education. And I would argue that in a lot of ways all four-stars have to be champions of military education. They have to talk about it. They have to make it respectable. They have to convince up and coming officers this is part of their professional responsibility. Even though what we want to have individuals, service chiefs or the chairman have ownership, I think all senior leaders have got to spend a lot more time talking about the seriousness of study of this profession. During my time on active duty, I rarely, if ever, heard that, especially in the last five years or so. I think that is extremely important.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Williams.

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think it is important that the most senior officers of the services and, of course, the chairman himself do take ownership of this. Because at first it sets the culture. It becomes all right to be a strategist and be an intellectual. You can see examples of people who manage to be very effective warfighters who are also intellectuals as well.

Also, of course, in terms of resource acquisition, the higher your proponent, the more likely you are to get them. Also, the four-stars are in a uniquely good position to ensure that follow-on assignments and that promotion boards and such take the proper notice of these accomplishments of the officers and their education.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Murray.

Dr. MURRAY. I couldn't agree more with what has just been said.

I think a couple of additional points. One is in terms of promotion boards. I think an officer's record and standing performance in whatever PME school they have attended should be as important in terms of judging that officer for promotion as service in the field. I think that there has also been, unfortunately, as I said earlier, far too little—and General Barno obviously feels this way, too—far too little attention paid by four-stars to professional military education.

I can tell you the innumerable times I have heard, sitting in the various auditoriums of the war colleges, four-star generals say, have a great time here, play golf, get to know your family. And that is just the worst kind of irresponsibility. But it happens far too much. And only a few times have I heard somebody like Tony Zinni say, this is the most important year of your military career. And it is. I think it really is, given the kind of environment we confront in the 21st century.

Dr. SNYDER. I am going to run out of time. I want to spend some time talking about the issue of the civilian graduate degrees. Let me set myself up for the next five minutes.

But do you all have any hard numbers right now—because I don't; I don't know if staff does—on what percentage of our general officers have civilian—meet the standard that you are setting? Do you prefer they have a degree from a good civilian school? Does anybody have those numbers?

General BARNO. I don't have any with me. I know that Professor Leonard Wong at the Army War College did a study on this in the Army, one-star selects, just a couple of years ago; and he compared it with one-star selects about 10 years past. And that the number of officers plummeted to single-digit percentages in the newest group compared to 10 years ago because all the officers in the newer group had graduate degrees, but the vast, vast majority came from military institutions. Whereas 10 years ago there were a substantial number that came from civilian institutions.

I am sure we can get that study. That pertains only to the Army.

Dr. SNYDER. I would assume the number is fairly small.

Dr. MURRAY. Dr. Snyder, let me give you one figure which the committee might find interesting.

General Scales, when he was commandant at the Army War College and I was working for him as the Johnson Professor of Military History, came up with a figure which I think is truly astonishing in 1999. I can't vouch for it today, but it would be interesting the look at.

Basically, he discovered the PRC, the People's Republic of China, its officers, it had more officers in American graduate schools than the services had in American graduate schools.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry that I haven't been here for your remarks earlier, but I did want to ask you about an issue that I had a chance to go over and hear a number of people speak on the other day. There was a summit, if you will, held on sexual assault and prevention of that in the services, and different services presented, as well as a number of other experts. They met both Monday and Tuesday. And I am wondering if you believe that there is sufficient focus—is there

focus on these issues as it relates to military culture within the education of our men and women and the programs that you are very much engaged in? What are we doing at that level and what do you think about that education and where should the focus be?

Dr. WILLIAMS. Well, of course, the Tailhook scandal turned out to be a teachable moment for everyone. I think from that point on it was a very high priority of the Congress and therefore of the military, but also people inside the military who were horrified by the events and other things that occurred.

It became no longer part of the culture to regard women as the other rather than regard the women officers and enlisted as part of the us and part of the total force. You can't operate without them. They are absolutely vital. They need to be treated at all times with dignity and respect. And when those occasions occur that they are not, it is and should be a career-seeking missile to anyone who would behave inappropriately.

So I think—and even in the civilian world it doesn't ever reach perfection, but I think it is so much better, and I think it deserves continuing attention so it can continue to be a priority.

General BARNO. I am not sure I have visibility today currently on how that has evolved, since I left active duty three-plus years ago. I do know at that time it was an embedded part of all the training programs as well as a unit training requirement. There has been a tremendously larger emphasis placed in the three years since I last looked at it, but I can't give you any current information, particularly at the senior levels.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that.

One of the concerns that has been expressed is that, as people are looking at advancement, how our leadership handles those issues as part of their unit, that that should be considered as seriously as any other issues that would go before any panels. Would you concur with that? Do you think it should be an important metric, if you will, of whether or not somebody actually is seen as moving up in leadership?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I would hope anybody reaching senior levels would be sensitized to this issue. Obviously, there is always the possibility of someone having an undeserved bad reputation over some issues, because people differ on what happened and when and what was done. So as long as the standards of fairness are observed, obviously I quite agree with you that this does need to be a consideration.

General BARNO. I would look at it I think from the overall performance standpoint. This is an important part of their leadership responsibilities. Are they exercising it inappropriately or are they involved at the right level?

There is some risk that if we get too focused on individuals' performance in this area that we get across some legal thresholds, because most commanders have got legal responsibilities. I think we would be not well advised to intrude and make decisions or make judgments based upon what their legal decisions were in that system. But I do think it is clearly and I am very confident that all senior officers look at this as part of the leadership responsibilities that every officer has out there, and how they perform in that obviously will dictate their future promotion potential.

Dr. MURRAY. I would argue that it is a training issue that needs to be hammered home from the first class that an individual takes at a service academy or at a university in terms of ROTC. I am not sure it is an educational issue, because if they haven't gotten it by the time they are an O–3 then they shouldn't be wearing the uniform.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just first echo Congresswoman Davis's focus on the issue of sexual misconduct. In the Oversight and Government Reform Committee in the past session we have had hearings on the National Security Subcommittee specifically focused on the service academies. And, you know, thankfully there is more focus and attention to this issue, because I think it is at a critical stage where we do send that message that there will be zero tolerance for this type of misconduct and it will be treated.

Unfortunately, when we had that hearing and we had, I believe, all the commandants or the senior officials from the academies in the one hearing, and only one of them ever used the word "crime" in their remarks. Because that is what we are talking about here in the type of conduct being considered. And that message that this is a crime, whether you are in a service academy or wearing a uniform and you sexually assault another person, that is criminal, and that needs to be dealt with. And that message needs to be reinforced day one at the academy or the ROTC programs, wherever, so that they are not wearing the uniform if they engage in that conduct. So I appreciate the importance of that.

I think I know the answer, General Barno, to the question, based on your statements and written testimony. It is a little bit of a follow-up to where the chairman concluded. And that is on the issue of advanced degrees, Ph.D.s. My understanding is the service-specific schools and the joint PMEs are looking at increasing Ph.D. possibilities for their students. That seems to run contrary to your belief in the importance of getting our senior leaders into civilian institutions for those higher degrees and to have that education opportunity outside of the cocoon. Am I taking your remarks in the right context?

General BARNO. No, I think it is encouraging to see that there is movement forward to try to expand the number of Ph.D.s. But, in my judgment, that ought to occur in civilian educational institutions. To try and build that—again only my opinion—to try and build that inside our military educational establishment really deprives you of an existing world-class capability that the United States has that is recognized all around the globe and also, again, doesn't advantage the military officer by getting them into the civilian world and the thinking out there, nor does it provide access to the military officer around those civilian faculties and among those civilian students. We lose out in both regards there.

One footnote I would also I think add on. That is that I do have some concerns about the high-grade civilian educational opportunities both for master's and Ph.D.s if those military officers who go to those programs come back into our military and are then

marginalized and are no longer part of the command track in the military. There is some risk that as we expand these opportunities that we are specializing these officers into fields that don't any longer include command.

The Army has a wonderful program called Functional Area 59 Army Strategist. And, typically, at the senior captain/major level, a few lieutenant colonels, they go into this program, they get an educational experience at the Army War College, and they go out to the field and they serve on senior staffs as strategists. Wonderful program.

None of those people will ever command again. They are in a specialty now that they have been designated a strategist, and they will never be a commander because they are now single track in that specialty. I think that is very risky; and there is many more examples of that I think out there, particularly in the Army, from what I have seen.

Dr. MURRAY. It is worth noting that one of them has actually just been promoted to brigadier general, Bill Hix. Because nobody thought that anyone would ever be promoted to general but Bill Hix. He will not command.

I think there is another issue here, which is I have watched as a military historian over the past 25, 30 years of my career, and that is the significant decline of military history programs and strategic studies programs in the United States. It is worth noting in Canadian universities and in British universities there will always be one professor, and usually two or three, dealing with these issues. The number of major university programs in the United States dealing with military and strategic history is down to about two or three, and that is I think a significant weakness and a dangerous weakness.

Dr. WILLIAMS. General Petraeus talked about the importance of civilian education and the importance of the military going outside the cloister, close to what you said, Congressman Platts. I think he is right on that.

In terms of civil-military relations, I want our elite military officers meeting the brightest, most elite civilians, and I want them interacting with each other. I want them to put a human face on one another. I want the military to get how civilians think, and I want the civilians to get how the military thinks and not be lured into stereotypes. I think it would be beneficial for civil-military relations, especially since they don't really have to come together on many occasions.

Mr. PLATTS. I agree wholeheartedly. Because as we have a smaller percentage of the population having any tie directly or family to the military, and we are blessed with amazing military families, and having the privilege of representing the Army War College, where I see my senior officers that come through there and then their sons and daughters are the second lieutenants coming up, you know, it is an amazing commitment those families make. But it means we have a smaller percentage of people who understand the sacrifices being made.

I use my family as an example. My dad was one of nine children. He and his four brothers and all four of his brother-in-laws all were military. One generation later, one of us five boys and girls,

son or daughter or in-laws, one of five military service. And that is not good I think for that understanding of our history and the needs of our military and the important role. So the more interaction that we can promote, I agree, is critically important in whatever way we can do it.

Dr. WILLIAMS. The fact that reserve forces are actually mobilized and actually used and interact and are themselves so penetrating in the community, I think that fills in for some of it.

Mr. PLATTS. Yeah.

Dr. WILLIAMS. That is something that isn't often thought about in terms of reserve forces. But the civil-military dimension is crucial there.

Mr. PLATTS. In the current environment, you are right. That is, I guess, one of the silver linings of the demands we are putting on the Guard and the Reserve, is that the population as a whole maybe is getting better educated because of that level of deployment.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

We will begin another round of questions.

I wanted to talk more about the civilian degree issue, too. Give me some practical—your practical thoughts about how it would work if you are all recommending that that be increased. And I assume you mean increased in fairly large numbers. So, you know, what kind of numbers of people would you be talking about?

I assume this would primarily be master's degree levels, but some Ph.D.s. Would there be like a list of schools that would be considered acceptable? I think you all say civilian degree at high, you know, quality institutions. Would there be a list of kind of approved colleges, universities that the military would have? Would there be a list of fields that it would be in?

You all are advocating in terms of broadening of experience and visions and all. But there are some very narrow graduate fields, you know. You can get into a very specific field of advanced mathematics or chemistry or information technology. Give me your ideas—and we will start with you, Dr. Murray—on some of the specifics of how you would flesh out that in terms of numbers and expense and all.

Dr. MURRAY. The only place where I have real experience with that is the Army at West Point. Because Dr. Allan Millett and myself, running the military history and strategic studies program at Ohio State for a 20-year period, there was the history department at West Point had a very clear list of institutions that they regarded as being first class in military history or western European history or American history. And the officers were given latitude in picking which institution they went to, but they were constrained, and they had to get accepted at the institutions.

Given the quality of the officers—and here I think one isn't really talking about sending the entire cadre of Army captains to graduate school. I think it should be an elite program. I recommended to General Mattis when he was down at Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) that the Marines try a program for

captains, and maybe six or seven a year to go out to get a Ph.D. and then come back into the Marine Corps after two years.

Dr. SNYDER. The Ph.D. I think all of us would recognize would be a fairly small number. But if you are talking about master's degree programs—you are advocating master's degree programs at civilian institutions, I assume those would be in much greater numbers. What kind of numbers?

Dr. MURRAY. Again, I don't think you want to send a huge number out. And, again, the people who I would send out, I would send them all out to get master's, and some of them within the two-year confines of certain universities get the ABD when they walk out. And I think West Point is a wonderful example. They are then brought back to do a two- or three-year tour at West Point teaching their specialty. The services could bring these officers back to any number of institutions for a two- or three-year payback.

The crucial element General Barno mentioned is they absolutely must not be punished for—and there is an element in the service cultures that somebody who has gone out, gotten a Ph.D. or a master's degree for two years and then taught for three years is no longer qualified to be an outstanding officer. And, you know, H.R. McMaster is an example of how stupid that approach is.

Dr. SNYDER. Would you have some restrictions on what fields they could go out and get the master's—would that be a list of approved subject areas?

Dr. MURRAY. Yes. I think so. I think there are certain things that the military is interested in, should be interested in. And this, of course, includes hard sciences as well. I think it is absolutely essential that some officers go out and get master's or Ph.D.s in engineering and et cetera.

But, again, I think it should be guided by both the short-term interests of the service—and, for example, the Navy would right away say, well, we are to send everybody to get an engineering degree. And yet if you look at people like Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Blair, very clearly they are individuals who have gotten degrees in something other than hard sciences and profited by it.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Williams, do you agree that the numbers even for the master's degree program would be small?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I don't think it would have to be for everyone. And I think the nonresidential programs do serve a need. You can't send the whole military to graduate school. That is not feasible in a whole lot of dimensions.

I have no problem with outlining what courses of study would be most acceptable for the military to pay for or to give time off to do. And certain locations. Obviously, some of the great programs out there. And I think there would have to be some flexibility for someone who proposes something especially interesting and useful, to make exceptions. I mean, for a student to be able to go study with Charlie Moskos back in the day at Northwestern was a great idea, even though there are lots of places at Northwestern that would not at all be useful for a military person to go to.

In the case that Dr. Murray was talking about, if you know your follow-on assignment, they can have some impact on that. In the case of West Point, it is perfect. Because they know what they

want, they know where they have had success, and it works very well.

But I would reinforce the comments made. You can't punish these people because they were out playing at an educational institution rather than standing on the bridge of a ship at zero dark 30 with binoculars around their neck. Because every week you are at graduate school it is a week you are not doing that.

Dr. SNYDER. Any comments on that, General Barno?

General BARNO. I have got several thoughts on this. And I note in my written testimony that I think that it ought to be focused and probably incentivized for officers that are promoted early, that that should be an expectation maybe not the first time but from then on anyone who is promoted early ought to have gone to a civilian graduate school. And the service ought to design a program to do that.

Interestingly, the Army offered——

Dr. SNYDER. Excuse me for interrupting, but, by putting an incentive for that, that makes the numbers really, really high in conflict with Dr. Murray.

General BARNO. No, that is about five percent of each year group, roughly. It is quite small.

What is interesting to me in this is that the Army, to its immense credit, in my judgment, about five years ago, four years ago, put a program in place to offer top-notch up-and-coming Army captains a two-year option either to go to graduate school with no follow-on assignment to West Point that would take them away from the field for even more years. They could go out, they would go to graduate school, they would sign up for a little bit of additional required duty in the Army, but it was designed to retain high-quality officers.

And anecdotally is what I heard from that is that, after running it for three years, it was undersubscribed, and it was not attracting the top tier of candidates. Just the opposite of what you would expect.

And this gets into this issue of the muddy boots Army at war right now. And we all recognize that the Army is in a major fight. The Marine Corps, the services are all fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the expectation has been that I am either back here getting ready to go to Afghanistan as a captain or I am in Afghanistan or Iraq as a captain. And if I am out at graduate school in a time of war, this is even more debilitating for officers' careers than it would be under normal conditions. So we have got to again change the senior leadership mind-set of what is most valued.

And I note in my written testimony as well that, you know, in talking to some individuals that are involved in one-star selections here recently, those repeat operational tours are what counts.

Dr. SNYDER. A bias towards tactical——

General BARNO. Absolutely. Absolutely. When we take people out of the pipeline for even two years of graduate school in the midst of a war, and that is not really incentivized by a requirement that I can't get promoted to early promotion to my next rank if I don't do this, if we don't connect that as almost a requirement, then we really have devalued that in force.

A final note is that I think West Point assignments are—and I saw this even when I was a captain—are broadly looked down upon inside the operational career force. That those are viewed now as assignments that you will pay the five-year price to go there following graduate school, but you will come out of there and you won't be a commander any more. You will be a specialist. You will no longer be competitive for command. You won't be the Dave Petraeuses of the future or the Marty Dempseys of the future because the system simply isn't going to give you that latitude. Especially among your peers, again, who have spent the last five years rotating back and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan.

So we have created, particularly in the last 9 years or so, an absolute muddy boots force, the results of which may play out in some not happy ways for us 10 or 15 years down the road in terms of who is available to be our senior leaders.

Dr. MURRAY. Let me add something, because I think this is a very important point. There are some exceptions. H.R. McMaster is a very good exception who not only was the outstanding squadron commander at 73 Easting, destroying with his squadron an entire brigade of Iraqi tanks, went to the teaching program, graduate program at University of North Carolina, wrote a dissertation, wrote the finest book on how we got into Vietnam, a sad story indeed, and then went out to I think it was al-Anbar or one of those places out there—no, north of that—did an extraordinary job as cavalry regimental commander out there and had a very difficult time getting promoted to general even with this extraordinary record behind him.

So I think we are dealing here with a very difficult problem; and it goes across all the services, not just the Army, a cultural problem that somehow you haven't been doing the right thing if you have been out in school or teaching at West Point. And I think that is very, very deleterious; and I don't know what to do to change it.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in our last question we talked a little bit about how do we emphasize the interagency experience a little more in PME; and some of the feedback you all said was we want to make sure we get folks there from the different agencies, from State, from USAID there as instructors. And I think not only in addition to that, we probably ought to get them there also to study.

The question is, are there enough qualified people within those agencies to be instructors or to get to the PME experience to study? And, if not, what do we do within those agencies to create policies or initiatives to direct people into the PME system both to instruct and to study, to sort of round out that experience?

And I know we have heard from some other folks in the past that there is some inertia there within the agencies that say, hey, listen, that is outside of our bailiwick. We don't want to participate. They don't see value in it. But it seems like to me if we are going to really round out this experience we have to have that, and we have to find ways to make that work in a way that the agencies actually want to make that happen, rather than to say or internally to say, well, yeah, you can go that path, but, guess what, it is not going to help you professionally down the road?

General BARNO. Well, perhaps a couple thoughts.

My expertise in the other agencies is not deep at all. But having worked with them in the field, I think that one of the great benefits the military has that perhaps could be mandated in the other agencies of government is to at least establish a small schools account of officers, of 10, 15, 20, whatever the right number is, that that agency is required to keep in a school environment. And, theoretically, you could build their end strength, their resource end strength up to that level.

State Department actually did this when General Powell was Secretary of State a few years ago. But the immediate expansion of State requirements consumed all those people, and they went out right out to Iraq and Afghanistan. So they had the right idea, they got it all the way to fruition, and then they were consumed by a new, unexpected requirement.

And in many of these other agencies I think it could be a much smaller number. But the fact that the number today is zero gives them no incentive. Even if they were to establish a school float, if you will, of 10 people to attend schools on a regular basis, that would help give them the top cover to be able to do that.

On the instructional side, I tend to think that was almost too hard for them and that perhaps retired Foreign Service officers, retired AID employees at the senior level could be recruited in to do some of the school work. But I think from the student standpoint you have to build that institutionally into their organizations.

Dr. WILLIAMS. You know, we talk about how hard it is to get all the services on board and sending the best people to joint schools and then rewarding them when they get out of it. I mean, how much more difficult is it for people looking at their own career when they are outside of the military thinking, well, do I want to send this person here, and why would I want to go there? Because I am going to be hammered when I get home in my own agency. That is a problem. I don't know how to get into that one.

Dr. MURRAY. I would argue that the problem goes even more deeply than that. That, for example, the Army War College, which I have had the most recent experience with there, and there is an extraordinary number of colonels who come in or who eventually retire there, but who have been the West Point route or some other route and have a Ph.D. in military history or strategic studies or international relations, an outstanding academic background, and the problem is that if you bring people in from the CIA or from Treasury, whatever, they have no academic background at all. And so you are dealing with then you are almost making the interagency process look like a catastrophe.

Because the people who are brought in, unfortunately, my experience has been that the various war colleges—and maybe it has changed now—is that the agencies don't pick their best people to go there. Some of them do go there, but it is usually idiosyncratic or somebody just simply is interested and wants to do it.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Murray, we met a student at one of the colleges from the State Department who was there spending I think it was almost a full academic year, but he was a State Department security guy. And he was there and he was a good person, he was a

very good security guy, but they kept coming and asking him to comment on foreign policy. And he said, I am the security guy. But that was the problem that the State Department has currently with their lack of a float.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Maybe just following up on that question, because I think that one of the frustrations that we have certainly had is that when it came to the individuals serving over in Iraq and Afghanistan, the professional military education as well as the training that people had received put them at such a much higher level than State Department personnel and others that were coming from other agencies in terms of their, you know, their breadth of experience really at that level.

And what you are saying about the interagency, that in fact people coming from other agencies don't have the academic background to be able to actually fit in and to be able to make a contribution—I mean, I think that is what I heard you saying. And that is interesting. And I am just wondering, how do we mitigate that? What are your thoughts and ideas about that?

Dr. MURRAY. I am not sure there is an answer. I think there is an additional problem to the one you just raised, which is the fact that military officers from the beginning of their career are used to running things, running a large group of people. Even a platoon commander is going to have 40 or 50 people who he is responsible for. And he has got to organize his training. He has got to deal with seniors in a very complex environment.

And that is not simply true of the experience of officers in other agencies. They don't run large groups. And they are staff. They are part of a bureaucracy which is very important and essential, and so they are coming from a handicap from that point of view.

And it is very difficult. I don't have any answers. But it is well worth sort of underlining the difficulty, because somebody needs to start thinking about addressing the problem.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Anybody else have any thoughts?

General BARNO. I think it is a huge issue. The fact that we are having to put people there at all doesn't make it any better. The only mitigating possibility could be to try and either encourage or require those participants to have served in the field in that setting with military officers so that at least they have an experiential background, even if they don't have an academic background, to be able to contribute to the dialogue at the senior level that is going to go on at the War College. And there are going to be an increasing cohort of those people out there in all these agencies. So I think tapping them then for follow-on school assignments could be quite valuable.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Part of it is the openness of the services as well. Because I think that, again, this is really more at a different level rather than education, but clearly the military has a much deeper bench than the civilian community does, certainly than the State Department does, and so people can float more easily. You don't have as many people to pull.

And I thought your idea about trying to preserve a number of positions that actually are not just—it is almost not just for their own

education, but it is also for their opportunity to provide their perspective to others. I mean, they are in a very different role when they are doing that; and we need to try and facilitate that process. I am not sure of the answer either, but I think it is an important one.

I wanted to just ask you briefly about the role that professional military education has in ROTC. I mean, typically, that is a recruiting and perhaps a superficial level of training in some ways that ROTC has had a role in that way. I know just speaking from my own experience with a number of ROTC instructors, wonderful, wonderful people, but probably were not able to play a broader role in terms of the education of many of the men and women in ROTC.

Do you think that we should be focusing more on that? Should DOD and should the schools be trying to use that as a much stronger vehicle for helping to at least inspire young people, whether they actually go into the service or not, but learning more command and control structures, how to get things done, whether it is a national security, homeland security? Is that a role and would that be of benefit to you as you see young people coming into your schools as well?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I have a vested interest in this, I guess. I did teach at the Naval Academy, and I came from OCS myself. But I worked closely with the Navy ROTC (NROTC) program at Northwestern University, because Loyola students go up there on a crosstown arrangement. It is an excellent program, and the people that go through there are as fine as any I saw at Annapolis. They have a very rigorous and a very serious military component to their program; and they have required courses that put them in my classes, for example, and other classes at Northwestern that sort of meet the requirements I would hope that they would be doing. So it is an excellent program. I strongly support it. Plus it has the civil-military implications I discussed earlier.

Mrs. DAVIS. I am glad to hear the strength of the programs that you have seen. I suspect that is probably not the same throughout the country, although there are exceptional programs, yeah.

Dr. MURRAY. Let me just add something, too, because I think it is a rather interesting perspective. And it may well be out of date because I retired from Ohio State in 1996. What I think Allan Millett and I noticed over that span in terms of ROTC programs is there were outstanding officers sprinkled here and there throughout the various cadres. But the only service that consistently placed outstanding officers and only outstanding officers in positions of the ROTC was the Marine Corps. Consistently, Marine officers, the POIs were outstanding. In fact, sort of along those lines, with the huge number of officers that came through Ohio State to teach in ROTC, the only people who got advanced degrees in military history and strategic studies were the Marines, which I think says a great deal about the level of professionalism that the Marines—in terms of the selection of officers. And my sense is that in the other services it is not regarded as a crucial key billet, whereas I think very clearly the Marine Corps regards it. And it should be. It should be.

General BARNO. If I could just add, I think it absolutely needs to be reinforced. And it is the production mechanism for the major-

ity of officers. Although in the Army it is beginning to be outsourced or outcompeted by officer candidate school in the last couple of years. And this issue of the quality of the cadre who lead the ROTC detachments is absolutely essential. Those are the role models, those are the motivators, those are the recruiters that bring the best people into these programs. And in the environment we are in today, I can think of no better place for someone who has come out of combat in one or two or three tours to go and to mold young people and to have that experience and be with them for three years or so to be able to get them to come into these programs. Because that is going to be the future high-quality officers we are going to have.

Now, that, too, has been stressed by a variety of factors. In the Army, a number of ROTC detachments, I think most ROTC detachments now have at least one wearing a uniform on the detachment who is a contractor, that they have taken a lot of the deputy professors of military science and contracted those positions out. So that is probably not in a lot of ways a helpful development in terms of the ability for those people to be role models for young 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds. They are not in the force anymore. They are not going to be as energetic as someone who is a 32-year-old captain just out of two tours in Iraq. So I think we have to look very carefully at that.

And then keeping these people, keeping these quality graduates beyond that, we haven't really talked about that in the hearing today. But this issue of how we preserve this talent once it comes into the force, particularly the intellectual talent, and not let it leach out of the force at year six, year seven, year eight, year nine, I think that is something that is part of PME indirectly, it is part of this professional education system and the development system of officers that we don't want to have the wrong officers at the year 20 or 25 mark out there because all the real high-powered officers have gotten out because they have gotten discouraged because of their prospects.

Dr. SNYDER. Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here. Those buzzers are we have a series of votes going on. We may have some questions for the record, if you would respond to them in a timely manner.

Let me suggest to you, too, if there is anything additional, written comments that you would like to make, would you please send that to us. And we will consider this an open question for the record to amplify anything you would like to talk about today.

But thank you for your service here today and for all three of your long careers for helping our country.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009

Opening Statement of Chairman Vic Snyder
House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

"Charting a Course for Effective Professional Military Education"
September 10, 2009

This hearing will come to order.

Good morning, and welcome to the sixth in a series of hearings on officer in-residence, Professional Military Education, or "PME." Our hearings, thus far, have explored various aspects of the Service-specific and joint institutions that make up the current PME system. We have examined missions; curricula and standards of rigor; the quality of staff, faculty and students; and organization and resourcing at the pre-commissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior PME levels.

Professional military education is an investment in the most important element of our military – people. After all, the primary purpose of PME is to develop military officers, throughout their careers, for the rigorous intellectual demands of complex contingencies and major conflicts. We can't afford to be complacent when it comes to producing leaders capable of meeting significant challenges, whether at the tactical, operational or strategic levels. As a matter of national security, we must invest wisely. We must invest well.

The PME system bears a special responsibility for staying relevant amid change. As a key mechanism for individual and force development, PME must both respond to present needs and anticipate

future ones. The PME system must continuously evolve in order to enable officers to assume expanded roles and to perform new missions in an increasingly complicated and constantly changing security environment. For instance, we know that PME can empower officers to contribute to interagency and multinational operations, and to effectively utilize foreign languages and cultural skills. We have heard from some of the schools that they are currently striving to embrace these and other important educational priorities. Are they doing a good enough job?

In short, the PME system must consistently improve. Twenty years ago, the Skelton Panel Report on PME stated: "Although many of its individual courses, programs, and faculties are excellent, the existing PME system must be improved to meet the needs of the modern profession at arms." That statement rings just as true today. Twenty years ago, we were educating officers to engage against our Cold War adversaries. Clearly, much about our military and our world has changed since then, and we can rest assured that much will continue to change as we look to the future. With respect to PME, these questions should always apply: **How well are we educating our officers presently? And, what should we be doing to educate them more effectively in the future?**

Our witnesses for this hearing are prominent former senior military and civilian academic leaders, each of whom has significant experience with the PME system. I look forward to receiving the benefit of their insight. I especially look forward to discussing their views on what can and should be done to improve the PME system, now and in the future.

Statement of Ranking Member Rob Wittman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Professional Military Education—Charting the Course for Effective PME

September 10, 2009

Thank you, Chairman Snyder, and good morning to our witnesses. Thank you for being here today.

This morning, the subcommittee conducts its sixth and final scheduled hearing on officer in residence professional military education. We began this study with testimony from outside experts who posed issues for the subcommittee to consider; then conducted four sessions in which we heard from many DOD and military service witnesses who discussed various components of the PME system and how it all fits together. We will conclude this final hearing with additional thoughts from well qualified outside witnesses. I think our approach is sound, and hope that today's panel will put the issues in perspective for the subcommittee and suggest a path forward.

During the course of this study, I have come to respect and admire our professional military education system. There is nothing else in the rest of federal government or to my knowledge, private industry, which begins to emulate the significant and continuous investment we make in educating and developing our military officers. It's important for all of us to keep in mind that today's system produces quality, successful officers who operate in a wide range of demanding and difficult positions. That does not mean that there aren't areas that need improvement, but we should not lose sight of the fact that we have a system that, for the most part, serves us well.

Through this process I've had the opportunity to listen to witnesses, travel to PME institutions, and meet with senior leaders alongside Chairman Snyder. In fact, this past Friday I visited the U.S. Naval Academy and had the unique opportunity to observe some of the quality training our junior officers receive at the service academies. From all these visits and discussions, two recurring themes stand out in my mind as the most valuable aspects of PME. First, I heard mostly from the students, is the value of interacting with fellow students of differing backgrounds, particularly those from the State Department, international students, and those from other military services. The second most valuable skill these students can develop

is critical thinking; as there is no way to anticipate the ever-changing situations officers face in today's world of continuous deployments. Whatever we may suggest, I think it imperative that we retain these aspects of today's PME system.

It was time that we undertook this effort, and I am pleased to have been a participant. Over the last twenty years, the United States has significantly changed the way it employs its military forces, sending troops abroad to address regional issues with far greater frequency than we did during the Cold War. It's also apparent that the system, like any large system involving people, faces challenges in today's dynamic environment of high operational momentum. Even so, I think today's PME system by and large serves the nation well, and we should carefully consider any potential recommendations from this committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

David W. Barno
Lt. General, USA (Ret.)
Director

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

September 10, 2009

***Note – The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of Defense.**

Today's U.S. military is involved in what some describe as an "era of persistent conflict." American military forces have been at war continuously since 11 September 2001 -- a longer period of prolonged war than any conflict save the American Revolution. The U.S. military entered the decade focused on so-called "rapid decisive operations" and is leaving it heavily vested in irregular warfare. This is an unprecedented evolution -- with an inherent shift in knowledge, skills, doctrine and training.

Moreover, thoughtful analysts now are beginning to describe a merger between conventional and irregular warfare into a yet, and only partly understood, "hybrid war." Our understanding of warfare ten years ago was centered on war as short, sharp, high technology conflicts such as the 1999 Kosovo air war, the 2001 assault in Afghanistan, and the race to Baghdad in 2003. Today, our view of conflict today is molded heavily by the active counter-insurgency campaigns of Iraq and now Afghanistan.

Murky combinations of conventional and irregular warfare -- "hybrid wars" -- may involve something yet again, as discovered by the Israelis battling Hezbollah in south Lebanon in 2006 – chilling combinations of high tech weaponry in the hands of shadowy guerilla organizations well trained in both close combat and in-conflict social work and global media relations. Warfare has never been more complex.

Officer leadership in this era faces demands that may make the relative intricacy of soldiering during the Cold War simple in comparison. Indeed, a recent unpublished Army study attempting to define leader requirements described the characteristics of a future officer as: "An agile, adaptable, multi-skilled officer who leads in an era of complexity and global, persistent conflict." Consider just how different that definition is from what we sought in American military officers of 1950,

1970 or even 1990! By extension, the myriad of demands on senior officers – flag and general officers of one- to four- star rank -- dealing with regional and global complexities at the strategic level will be even more challenging.

Since the end of the Cold War, some have argued that American strategic thinking has suffered. Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts in their recent report "Regaining Strategic Competence" observe that "the ability of the U.S. national security establishment to craft, implement, and adapt effective long-term strategies against intelligent adversaries at acceptable costs has been declining for some decades." They further note that "reversing this decline in U.S. strategic competence is an urgent issue for American national security in the twenty-first century." Military officers – although by no means the only players in the realm of strategic thinking on national security – remain central actors and advisers in U.S. national security thinking, planning and execution.

General and flag officers serve at the most senior advisory positions of responsibility in the U.S. national security establishment, as well as commanding far-flung deployments of troops in the field. Yet a number of critics have begun to argue that both senior officer advice and command in the past decade has fallen short. The term "A Failure of Generalship" has been used to describe this assessment– a charge that I think has some merit and deserves close examination.

Books covering the Iraq War by Bob Woodward and Tom Ricks expose, at a minimum, some disturbing shortcomings in our civil-military relations at the most senior level during the last eight years. Colonel Paul Yingling's 2008 article Armed Forces Journal titled "A Failure of Generalship" sparked a firestorm of controversy inside the military, especially in the U.S. Army. Yet regardless of how we evaluate these accounts, few can seriously argue that major errors in strategic planning and thinking were absent in the planning and execution of our recent conflicts. As has recently been noted by Dr Janet Breslin-Smith and Colonel Cliff Krieger of the National Defense University, senior military

(and some civilian) leaders that both advised on the merits of and subsequently commanded our ongoing conflicts were the product of our post-1986 Professional Military Education (PME) program. Did we get something fundamentally wrong?

Despite some sharp critiques of recent U.S. military strategy, no nation in the world can approach the United States today in competing for sheer pre-eminence in conventional warfare. Many would argue that U.S. military pre-eminence over the last half century (setbacks in Vietnam and Iraq notwithstanding) rested upon our technological superiority in weaponry and communications; others will claim our innovative adaptation of maneuver warfare doctrine was the key to success.

Many argue that our unquestioned superiority rests firmly upon the quality of our people in uniform, while still others insist that success depends upon the superiority of our training and organizational interactions at all level – from combined arms between infantry, armor and artillery to interoperability or "jointness" between the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. In fact, most observers of the U.S. military today rightly assert that it conducts joint operations at levels of brilliance that would be nearly inconceivable to the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Today's mantra has moved beyond "jointness" to seeking even higher levels of coherence with interagency and international partners – a reflection of success.

I would contend that our military successes since Pearl Harbor – and in some measure our failures – have depended first and foremost on the intellectual capital of our military leadership – our ability to train, educate and develop officers skilled in understanding the ever-changing character of warfare, from tactical to grand strategic level. This intellectual and human capital was formed, nurtured and grown by the military educational establishment – what we today call "PME" or Professional Military Education.

It is important to remind ourselves that the American people and our civilian leadership fundamentally expect U.S. military officers – especially our Admirals and Generals – to be, simply put, unchallenged experts at war and conflict. Furthermore, or most senior military leaders must be the best at a very specialized career field: deterring conflicts in peacetime but prevailing in war at the least cost to the nation when required. No other segment of our society holds that charter, and no other competing corporate priority within the vast bureaucracy of the military should ever overshadow this core competency. The sine qua non of our military force is this: to fight and win the nation's wars. No other element of society holds that mission, and no other set of society's leaders owns this full responsibility. Military leaders spend lifetime thinking about war; we should expect them to be the best in the world at what we ask them to do.

Given the notable shortcomings many ascribe to U.S. strategic thinking over the last decade – some deeply involving senior military leaders – we must seriously question whether our program of PME today is on the right track. In my estimation, we are drifting off course, and if uncorrected, our marked advantage in the intellectual capital of warfare, in the face of an increasingly uncertain future, is at risk.

One risk to the intellectual capital of our military leadership is brilliantly examined by retired Colonel Lloyd Matthews in the July 2002 issue of ARMY magazine. Matthews's theme was "anti-intellectualism in the military." This well-known characteristic of our military culture – found in one form or another in each of our military services – denigrates the values of knowledge and reflection on war and promotes operational experience above all other attributes. In a time of war, this is certainly understandable and in many ways admirable, but may come at a future cost. The "muddy boots" soldier is still the most esteemed among peers – and promotion rates to flag rank and assignment to key commands leading to our most senior three and four star positions reflect this not-so-subtle bias. This is more than simply the preference for "men of action" over "men -- and now women – of reflection." It ultimately

directly affects the bench of flag officers available for selection as future strategic leaders at the three- and four-star level.

A conversation I've had with a recent member of a service flag officer selection board reflected the reality that final decisions in many cases rested not upon whether an officer had commanded well at every level, but commanded *in combat at each level of command* – an astonishing threshold to establish, and one given sheer chance opportunity has little or nothing to do with an officers potential for flag rank. "Muddy boots" experience in combat – quantity, not just quality – trumped all other factors in making the final call. This impetus to select the best tactical leaders for advancement to flag rank has the unintended consequence of creating a bench full of general officer tacticians where strategists are now required. This trend signals increased risk to our future strategic leadership capital if left unchecked.

Today's system of PME inadvertently reinforces this bias toward tactical leadership. PME includes no civilian graduate education as a requirement in any military service. All recognize civilian graduate degrees as desirable, but – much different than my experience twenty years ago – today a graduate degree is a guaranteed by-product of successful attendance at any military intermediate or senior level service college. Again, the law of unintended consequences – virtually 100% of the officer corps at the rank of Colonel or Navy Captain now sport advanced degrees, but the vast majority of those earn their degree while surrounded by the very same military students and professors with whom they share cultural, political, and social common traits in military educational institutions.

Degrees from the Ivy League or other highly reputable civilian schools are disappearing – or equally problematic – are being heavily directed toward "specialty" officers who will never again command; this is a particular problem in the Army, in my judgment. Future commanders – unlike today's Soldier-scholars like CENTCOM commander General Dave Petraeus or SACEUR Admiral Jim Stavridis -- simply put, are no

longer going to top-tier civilian graduate schools to broaden their thinking. This lost opportunity to be exposed to the intense sharpening of thinking and widening of perspective and reflection that attends two years away outside the "military cocoon" at a civilian graduate institution is irreplaceable. In some ways worse yet, civilian graduate students and faculty are not exposed to our most upwardly mobile future senior military leaders.

The U.S. military's career-long program of training and education of its leaders also reflects this "muddy boots" bias. PME is timed to deliver maximum benefit during the first twenty-five years of service and least benefit to officers entering the complexities of flag rank – and for the final ten to fifteen years of their careers spent exclusively at senior levels.

The hierarchy of U.S. Army PME for officers can be described as a triangle – at bottom, the tactical level, then operational, then strategic and ultimately grand strategic at the apex. This pyramid also represents the relative investment in officer education and development over the duration of an officer's career – the vast majority at the tactical and operational level, and almost all in the first twenty years of one's career of service. As officers matriculate to more senior levels, their educational development tapers off. The final substantial PME investment is made at about the twenty-year officer career mark at the senior service colleges. Here for ten months, senior Lt. Colonels and new Colonels study and reflect on a combination of operational, strategic and national security related topics. For the remainder of an officer's career – now up to twenty *more* years for senior general and admirals – the senior service college experience signals the end of extensive education and development.

Subsequent "PME" or developmental courses for flag officers (one- to four-stars) are measured in weeks or days, with the "Joint" JPME 6-week Capstone course for newly selected one-stars being by far the longest investment. This course has little educational component, and

even less rigor. Thus, for almost all senior officers – all our generals and admirals – the final fifteen to twenty years of their career is almost entirely largely lacking in extended developmental experiences. This fact becomes more troubling when correlated with the reality that decision-making and complexity at the senior levels -- especially regarding strategic and grand strategic issues – is immensely more complex and uncertain than the relatively simpler worlds of tactics and operations. So-called "wicked problems" unresponsive to set-piece solutions abound.

Senior officers who have in almost all cases spent the preponderance of their careers as tactical and operational leaders – the "muddy boots" environment" -- now are required to significantly change their leadership model and intellectual horizon, and often grow new skill sets. Yet our investment strategy to prepare them for these challenges effectively ends at about the twenty-year mark of a 35 to 40-year career. The most demanding strategic tasks found to be the province of flag officer ranks are the very ones for which our system has prepared them the least. A ten-month school at 20 years service may be a dim memory ten years later to a two- or three-star Admiral!

In many ways, our flag officer development model can best be described as one of "osmosis built upon hope." The "hope" reflects strong optimism that an officer five or more years removed from their senior service college experience will remember what they learned, and will then garner whatever else is needed from "osmosis" learning about strategic leadership through assignment, self-study and personal mentoring contacts with other flag officers. In a world where warfare looks nothing like what it did even ten years ago, this ad hoc senior leader development process may not be adequate to deliver the first rate strategic leaders required in this century.

Recommendations:

I propose five changes that would significantly enhance the current effectiveness of PME and specifically provide a deeper investment in producing strategic leader at flag and general officer rank:

1) **Incentivize civilian graduate schooling in the humanities for high-potential officers**. Identifying attendance at these programs as an attribute expected of officers considered for early promotion would stimulate much wider interest in these options for our highly competitive officers. Put another way, with few exceptions, no officer in a command track should be promoted below the zone to lieutenant colonel without a civilian graduate degree from a first tier institution. This exposure to the sharpest intellectual development in early years must become an essential step for our most competitive officers.

2) **Make military intellectualism respectable.** Senior leaders must create an environment where “”thinking warriors and “soldier-scholars” are showcased as the combat leader standard of excellence. General Al Grey as Marine Corps Commandant established this standard for the Corps in the 1980s, and changed the institution for a decade. Military commanders from battalion/squadron-level through 4-star combatant commanders and service chiefs must strongly and personally reinforce the importance of study and schooling to achieve mastery of the profession of arms. As our current conflicts diminish, units should once again institute officer professional development programs directed toward reading and thinking about military theory and history. Teaching assignments to service academies, and branch schools for the best officers should be encouraged and rewarded, along with commensurate civilian graduate schooling. Future commanders should be expected to come from these backgrounds.

3) **Senior Service College.** Senior Service Colleges (SSC) should invest more deeply in providing study of classical theory of war and history in their curricula. All operational officers (future commanders) should

attend a service or joint SSC with an established curriculum; fellowships (with very few exceptions) should not be a substitute for SSC, but an additive experiential development opportunity. The vast profusion of fellowships now used as a substitute for SSC means than increasing numbers of future senior leaders will miss the structured educational exposure of SSC and receive an often unstructured fellowship as a poor substitute. The educational impacts of this "rush to fellowships" must be closely examined.

4) **Service Officer Personnel Systems.** Career patterns for flag officers now extend to forty years, thereby providing significantly more time for both institutional development and broadening experiences for those who are destined to become our most senior leaders. Officers selected for early promotion should be differentiated by these extended educational and professionally broadening experiences. A new balance must be struck between repeat operational assignments and the value of other education and experience. Personnel systems should be scrutinized to ensure additional development time is fenced. Moreover, officer personnel policies that artificially separate the most educated portions of the officer corps from command assignments (such as the Army's single track operations career field) should be closely examined for negative second order impacts on the development of an adequate bench of future strategic leaders.

5) **Flag Officer Education.** Despite the recognized complexity and impact of decisions made the Flag level of senior leadership, little serious effort has been made to specifically educate flag officers in preparation for their new level of responsibility. Short courses such as six-week CAPSTONE for newly selected flag officers should be revamped to add rigor and measureable educational objectives. Consideration should also be given to a longer course of higher command and staff (perhaps modeled on the U.K. program) to focus a deep effort on educating future two-star (selects) in preparation for their final ten or more years of service. Given the impact these decision-

makers will have on national security, to fail to further invest in their senior development as flag officers seems irresponsible.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

CHAIR AND PRESIDENT

INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009

Statement of John Allen Williams
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
U.S. House Armed Services Committee.
September 10, 2009

I thank Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, and the distinguished members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to share some thoughts with you on professional military education. This is a subject of deep professional and personal interest to me, and I am honored to be asked to do so. The Chairman's letter of invitation requested that I "provide testimony that holistically assesses the professional military education system" and "how it should be improved in light of current and future demands." Accordingly, I will discuss some general considerations that should be borne in mind as decisions are made about officer education.

It is appropriate that these hearings examine the progress made in the professional military education system some two decades after Committee Chairman Skelton's "Report of the Panel on Military Education" to review the ability of the PME system "to develop professional military strategists, joint warfighters, and tacticians."[1] Three aspects of this report seem particularly noteworthy: the importance of developing strategists to plan for an uncertain future, the need to involve the civilian academic community, and an emphasis on quality. These remain relevant today. It seems clear from testimony to date that the various Service and Joint schools share this vision. The recommendations of the Skelton Report continue to influence the PME system in its planning and operations, evident most recently in a thoughtful memorandum of "President's Intent" by the President of National Defense University.[2]

My remarks this morning will consider three issues: developing strategists to meet future strategic challenges, PME and civil-military relations, and the engagement of military officers with the civilian academic community. My conclusion is that the maximum exposure to rigorous civilian academic standards will strengthen PME, better prepare the military to deal with future challenges, and strengthen the bonds between the military and society.

Developing Strategists to Meet Future Strategic Challenges

The strategic environment is evolving in ways that are not entirely predictable, although several trends are apparent. Strategic surprise is always possible, although in retrospect we should not have been so surprised by the events that occurred eight years ago tomorrow. Since it is difficult to plan for radical changes, predictions tend to be based on projections of currently observable trends and miss impending discontinuities in the pattern. As John Collins pointed out, "Modern military strategists ply their trade in volatile environments that are fraught with more uncertainties, complexities, and ambiguities than Clausewitz imagined."[3]

The international environment. An earlier project looked at the threat as it changed before, during, and after the Cold War – particularly the post Cold War period we called the "Postmodern" era – and the effect of the evolving threat on military professionalism and civil-

[1] Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, "Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress," April 21, 1989, p. v. (Hereafter, the Skelton Report)
[2] VADM Ann E. Rondeau, "NDU President's Intent," Memorandum for Senior Leaders, August 25, 2009. Her strong emphasis on quality and academic rigor is fully consistent with the recommendations of the Skelton Report.
[3] John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), p.9. This is a comprehensive and sophisticated introduction to military strategy that deserves a wide audience.

military relations.[4] The Postmodern era is marked by an increase in subnational threats such as ethnic violence and terrorism, in addition to traditional military threats emanating from troublesome nation-states. The dominant military professionals were the soldier-statesman or the soldier-scholar, operating in a small professional military.

With the attacks of September 11, 2001, it seemed to me that the threat shifted so significantly that a new paradigm was in order.[5] For want of a better name, I referred to this new period as the "Hybrid" era, given the wide range of threats at all levels: international, transnational, and subnational.[6] Unfortunately, the traditional threats did not go away, and the major military mission became the full spectrum of operations: "all of the above." In addition to the solder-warrior and manager and the soldier-statesman and scholar, there arose a new military professional: the soldier-constable, who operates not only abroad in peace operations, but at home in civil emergencies. The force structure retained its professional military core, but now with a more fully integrated reserve force – no longer called up only for major contingencies, but now as a constant part of the total force.

The need for adaptive leaders is apparent in this new era. Not only is the threat evolving, the force structure is not sufficiently robust to permit much specialization. Forces and their leaders will need to adapt to a wide range of missions, sometimes at the same time. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak's concept of the "three block war" captures this well, as marines and soldiers need to be prepared to engage in high intensity operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations simultaneously – perhaps within three contiguous blocks.[7] Leaders at all levels must think strategically, even if they are not strategists, including in the increasingly professionalized enlisted ranks.[8]

The domestic environment. Domestic challenges are twofold. First, U.S. civil society provides the context in which the military is shaped. Civilians make the final decisions on the level of resources to be devoted to military purposes and determine the force structure by what they are willing to pay for. Civilian society increasingly expects the military to follow civilian mores in its social behavior. This became evident in the aftermath of the Tailhook scandal,[9] and the trend is still apparent. Also, potential recruits vote with their feet as they decide whether or not to enter the military.

Morris Janowitz frequently noted that militaries reflect the societies they serve. If the

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[4] Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[5] John Allen Williams, "The Military and Society Beyond the Postmodern Era," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 52, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp.199-216.

[6] For a discussion of the notion of hybrid wars, a notion closely related to the hybrid era, see Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December, 2007). http://www.potomacinstitute.org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf Accessed September 7, 2009

[7] Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine* (January 1999). http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm. Accessed September 5, 2009.

[8] While beyond the scope of this testimony, the increasing professionalism of the enlisted ranks has implications for enlisted education and contributes to a flattened military hierarchy based increasingly on ability and training rather than on formal rank structure. This has long been seen in the military medical communities and, perhaps counter intuitively, in the special operations forces. Inter-rank differences are further lessoned by the ease of electronic communication and its embrace by younger officers and enlisted personnel. This has further implications for the leaders needed in such a personnel environment.

[9] Those wishing to read a comprehensive overview of this incident and its immediate aftermath should consult William H. McMichael, with a foreward by Charles C. Moskos, *The Mother of All Hooks: The Story of the U. S. Navy's Tailhook Scandal* (Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997).

society tolerates drug use, as it did in the Vietnam War era, these problems will follow recruits into the military. If a society is becoming more comfortable with diversity of all kinds, demands for the military to change in that respect will not be far behind. Similarly, the ground combat exclusion for women will come under increasing assault. It will require the most gifted and well educated leadership to manage the military successfully as such changes occur.

Second, there are a number of easily imaginable scenarios that could cause the military to operate domestically, with *posse comitatus* restrictions waived in view of a civil emergency. This could be to preserve or restore order in the wake of some catastrophe. More controversially, it could also be used in ways citizens directly involved would not like, such as enforcing a quarantine. The Department of Defense wisely avoids being the lead agency in the wake of catastrophic incidents, preferring to operate in support of other agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Some operations could greatly reduce the affection and respect the American people have for their military, which will be much more popular when it is operating "over there" as opposed to "back here."

Developing strategists. Given the complexity of the future threat environment and the importance of the issues involved – military threats and the proper relation between the military and the society it serves –the Skelton Report's call for the development of strategists and the encouragement of strategic thinking is increasingly relevant. One should note that these are not quite the same thing. Only a small number of officers will develop into strategists of the first rank, but these are so important that the PME system must do as much as it can to encourage them to develop their talents to the maximum degree possible.[10]

This is a tall order. A recent study suggests that only a few individuals "possess the necessary cognitive skills and insight to be competent strategists.... Strategy may be a game anyone can play, but the evidence is strong that very few can play it well...." The need, therefore, is to identify those "with the mindset and talents to craft strategy competently."[11]

I have had the privilege of working with some outstanding strategists in my military and civilian careers.[12] Without exception they were highly intelligent, intellectually curious, widely read, hard workers, and independent thinkers comfortable with ambiguity. No military education system can create such strategists, but it should encourage them in their interests, broaden their intellectual horizons, and help them develop the skills they need to be effective. It can also help them recognize and develop strategic abilities in their associates. This cannot await their arrival

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[10] Note that strategic thinking goes beyond statements of goals or of simple cost-benefit analyses. Robert L. Goldich pointed out in a personal communication that strategic thinking also requires "a full comprehension of, and appreciation for, the role of passion, ideology, belief, and emotion in the conduct of human affairs."

[11] Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, *Regaining Strategic Competence* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) 2009, p. x-xi.

[12] I taught at the U.S. Naval Academy and Officer Indoctrination School (for staff corps officers) and served periods of active duty at the U.S. Naval War College and the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). I had the Navy officer billet codes of strategic plans officer and social science instructor, and served periods of active duty in the Pentagon with Joint, DOD, and Navy strategic planning staffs, most notably the Navy Strategy Branch (OP-603, then N513). In my civilian career I have written on professional military education, including a book analyzing the Army's civilian graduate education program. I work closely with the Navy ROTC program at Northwestern University, edit *The National Strategy Forum Review*, and am on the Board of Directors of the Pritzker Military Library. I have learned much from Admiral James Stavridis, Vice Admirals Ann Rondeau and Congressman Joe Sestak, Lieutenant General Wallace Gregson, Major General Thomas Wilkerson, Rear Admiral James Stark, Colonels Robert Killebrew and Joseph Collins, Captains Peter Swartz, Larry Seaquist, Joe Bouchard, Richard Diamond, Roger Barnett, and David Rosenberg, and – last but not least – Colonel John Collins and Mr. Richard E. Friedman.

at a senior service school – by then it is too late – but must begin as early in their careers as possible.

The PME system cannot be designed to educate only the top one or two percent of its students, the future grand strategists. It must also ensure that the balance of the officers in the system form the habit of thinking strategically. They will not all reach the pinnacle of their profession or become leaders in strategy development, but they will make valuable strategic contributions by their writing, staff work, teaching, and mentoring. The right educational experiences will help students develop the intellectual capital they will need later in their careers, even if its immediate relevance is not apparent. Although continuing professional education should be expected, demanding operational billets are not conducive to systematic thought and reflection – emphasizing the importance of a period of residential study.

PME and Civil-Military Relations

The decisions made about professional military education will have implications for civil-military relations in a society that has fewer links between the military and civilians since the advent of the all-volunteer force. This is not uncommon historically, but the need for a large Army kept conscription levels – and thus civil-military contacts – high throughout much of the Cold War. Each level of the PME system provides opportunities to enhance these links.

At the officer accession level, it is necessary to maintain a variety of commissioning sources The academies are repositories of service culture and by virtue of the appointment process guarantee a wide representation of students. (West Point, in particular, has a central place in the culture of its parent service.) These are also programs that the military can control. One occasionally hears calls for their abandonment, but this would be a big mistake. Once destroyed, they could not be rebuilt.[13]

One of the enduring legacies of Vietnam is the loss of Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at a number of prestigious universities. Given the historical disinclination of American elites[14] to participate personally in the defense of the society that grants them so many privileges, especially since the end of nearly universal conscription, this is particularly unfortunate. This experience showed the need for the military to have sources of officer accession training that are not subject to the political whims of university professors, a lesson reinforced by resistance to ROTC programs because of Congressionally-mandated policies on sexual orientation and the military.

OCS programs can be expanded rapidly, with no need for the government to fund the college education of the inductees, and now provide a high percentage of Army Second Lieutenants. The pedagogical issue at this level is the degree to which academic requirements should be so focused on engineering. Without underestimating the need for technically competent officers, the proper balance of technical, social scientific, moral, and humanist components in curricula needs to be reconsidered if we are training officers to lead people, as opposed to machines, in the most challenging and ambiguous environments. It is past time to reemphasize the importance of the humanities and social sciences, deemphasized in the Navy under the influence of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover and the presumed need for all officers to emphasize technical competence over all else. He "championed the cause of rigorous technical

[13] See the special issue of *Armed Forces & Society* devoted to U.S. and non- U.S. Academy education, edited by David R. Segal and Morten G. Ender: *Armed Forces & Society* 35, No. 1 (Fall 2008).

[14] This is a very general term, but it refers here to the most privileged members of American society.

education at the expense of broader education that line officers had been receiving at Annapolis and the war colleges."[15]

Civilian graduate education is primarily justifiable for its contribution to officer development, but it has the side effect of exposing military and civilian elites to one another in that setting. The interactions there will also put a human face on the military for the future civilian decision-makers. I note that all three Service Academies have partnership agreements with civilian universities for social science based Masters Degree programs for their incoming tactical officers to help them train their cadets or midshipmen.[16]

An earlier study of civilian graduate education for military officers found, "...civilian graduate education offers a channel to mutually beneficial interaction between the military profession and the academic community.... [F]or some, these contacts may provide an enduring source of intellectual growth and a link between the military community and the academic community."[17] As General David Petraeus noted, "Sending American military officers to graduate school also benefits our country as a whole by helping to bridge the gap between those in uniform and those who, since the advent of the all-volunteer force, have had little contact with the military."[18]

The intermediate and senior service schools seem attentive to the emphases on jointness and on the development of strategic thinkers. I am not close enough to those programs to assess the level of success they are having in this regard, but the statements by the leaders of these institutions in earlier Subcommittee hearings are encouraging. The process by which officers are assigned to the various war colleges and the criteria on which these selections are made need to be monitored robustly. Additionally, it would be valuable to know the degree to which their war college experiences were used in subsequent tours and the length of time graduates remained on active duty after graduation.

The case can be made for civilian graduate education as an optional alternative to war college attendance. As the best civilian programs are prestigious and academically challenging, the competition may improve the war colleges as they strive to attract the best students. General Petraeus lists several reasons why such schooling is important. These include taking officers out of their intellectual comfort zone, exposing them to a wider range of opinions, providing intellectual capital, improving communication skills, sharpening critical thinking, and imparting intellectual humility.[19] This experience also appears to result in attendees having a greater tolerance for a diversity of ideas, although we found that their fundamental values and beliefs were not altered.[20] This is especially likely if the program moves beyond the hard sciences. As soldier-scholar Josiah Bunting pointed out, "...it is the man who is both liberally and

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[15] Admiral James G. Stavridis and Captain Mark Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," *Naval War College Review* 62, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 27-41, at p. 32. The authors offer a compelling analysis of educational and assignment issues related to Navy officer development, noting the irony that Admiral Rickover was himself broadly educated.

[16] David R. Segal, personal communication, September 5, 2009. The universities are Columbia University, the University of Maryland, and the University of Colorado.

[17] Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B. Bryant, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 169, 175. The benefits noted do not apply only to lengthy doctoral programs. There are a number of masters programs of very high quality that would benefit the officers participating in them and be enriched themselves by such participation. Doctoral programs tend to take less time when they are undertaken by highly focused military officers with a limited career window in which to complete them.

[18] David H. Petraeus, "Beyond the Cloister," *The American Interest* (July/August 2007), p. 20.

[19] Petraeus, pp. 16-20.

[20] Sarkesian, *et al.*, p. 171.

professionally educated who will be the better soldier."[21]

Engagement with the Civilian Academic Community

There are several areas in which engagement with the civilian academic community would be beneficial to officer PME. One of these is the need to meet civilian standards for accreditation of the military's Masters Degree programs. This has had a positive effect on the institutions offering the programs and resulted in better academic experiences for the officers.

Another is the flow of civilian instructors into the academic portions of residential PME programs. Not only do these professors bring an outside perspective and, presumably, high academic standards into the schools, those who go back to civilian institutions will do so with a deeper understanding of the military and a stronger appreciation of the people who serve in it.

Third, the involvement of serving officers in the intellectual life of the country benefits both. Scholars and others differ on the degree to which officers should contribute to public discussions of the great issues of the day, even when not speaking in their official capacity, but it is imperative that advice given to the Congress be candid and complete. As soldier-scholar Sam C. Sarkesian noted, the military should not be "a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm."[22]

Officers who are able to do so would benefit from involvement with the most rigorous scholarly professional organizations. One of these is the organization I have the privilege of heading, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS).[23] I am pleased to report that participation in our organization by serving officers is strong, and they are making an outstanding contribution to our scholarly society, our journal, and our conferences. Although we have not coded our data specifically for military status (something that we are working on), it appears that about 16 percent of our U.S. IUS Fellows (our members) are active duty military officers. There are also many reserve component and retired military Fellows. A number of foreign military officers in all of these categories are also active Fellows.

Our journal, *Armed Forces & Society,* observes the highest academic standards. Despite the fact that military officers are not full time academics, their representation in our journal is strong. According to journal editor Patricia Shields, a sample of manuscripts submitted showed that 16 percent had at least one active duty officer as an author or coauthor. A sample of articles published showed that about half that, 8.2 percent, were authored or coauthored by at least one active duty officer. Other manuscripts are presently in the peer review process, so the numbers may understate the level of participation by active duty officers. Because our journal is highly theoretical and requires a thorough knowledge of the literature, being published there speaks well about the training and ability of those who succeed and shows competence in the kind of deep analysis and critical thinking needed to face the challenges ahead. Indeed, an active duty officer is a member of our editorial board and one of our book review editors has published two articles

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[21] Josiah Bunting, "The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional," in Lawrence J. Korb, ed., *The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.* (Pittsburgh, PA: International Studies Association, 1976), p. 158.
[22] Sam C. Sarkesian, "The U. S. Military Must Find Its Voice," *Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs* 42, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 423-437 at p. 426.
[23] The IUS (www.iusafs.org) was formed in 1960 by Morris Janowitz, founder of the field of military sociology. He was followed by Sam C. Sarkesian, Charles C. Moskos, David R. Segal, and myself. We are an interdisciplinary and international scholarly society of some 700 "Fellows." We hold a major biennial international conference in odd numbered years and publish the leading civil-military relations scholarly journal, *Armed Forces & Society,* edited by Professor Patricia Shields of Texas State University.

himself in our journal and just returned from Afghanistan. As an historical note, one of our most reprinted articles is a 1989 piece by David Petraeus earlier in his career on military influence on the use of force since Vietnam.[24] It is well worth rereading today.

Another indicator of active duty involvement with rigorous scholarship is participation in academic conferences such as the biennial international conference of the IUS. The centerpiece of these conventions is a series of panels where papers are summarized (much as is done in these hearings, although it is generally impossible for academics to limit themselves to five minutes). These conference papers are generally reports of works in progress and are the first step toward publication in our journal or elsewhere. The papers presented approximate the percentage of active duty publishing in *Armed Forces & Society*. For the 2005, 2007, and forthcoming 2009 conferences, the percentage of papers with at least one active duty military officer as an author or coauthor were 7.5 percent, 9.6 percent, and 6.8 percent, respectively.[25] In addition, they participate as panel chairs and discussants. At the risk of seeming to exaggerate the role of the organization I head, I include the following chart breaking down active duty officer participation in our conferences. We also typically have students from the U.S. Service Academies and the Royal Military College of Canada, many of whom participate on a well-attended "cadet panel."

U.S. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PARTICIPATION AT IUS BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

Source Dr Robert A Vitas, IUS Executive Director

	2005 IUS Conference			2007 IUS Conference			2009 IUS Conference		
	Paper	Chair/Discussant		Paper	Chair/Discussant		Paper	Chair/Discussant	
US Army War College	1	1	2	2	0	2	2	1	3
US Army Command & Staff College	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0
US Military Academy	1	4	5	2	3	5	4	0	4
Other US Army	6	3	9	5	2	7	4	3	7
Army Subtotal	8	8	16	10	6	16	10	4	14
US Air War College	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
US Air Command & Staff College	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	2
US Air Force Academy	2	1	3	2	0	2	3	0	3
Other US Air Force	2	0	2	2	0	2	1	0	1
Air Force Subtotal	5	1	6	6	0	6	7	0	7
US Naval War College	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
US Naval Academy	1	0	1	5	0	5	1	0	1
Navy Subtotal	2	0	2	5	0	5	1	0	1
US Marine Corps	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
Marine Corps Subtotal	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
US Coast Guard Academy	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	3
Coast Guard Subtotal	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	3
U.S. Active Duty Military Totals	15	10	25	24	7	31	21	6	27
TOTAL PAPERS PRESENTED	200			250			310		
PERCENT U.S. ACTIVE DUTY	7.5%			9.6%			6.8%		

[24] David H, Petraeus, "Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," *Armed Forces & Society* 15, No. 4 (Summer 1989), pp. 489-505.

[25] I thank IUS Executive Director Dr. Robert A. Vitas, *Armed Forces & Society* Editor Dr. Patricia Shields, and Secretariat Director Ms. Mary Frances Lebamoff for gathering these data for me.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The military leaders and strategists being developed today will have to deal with the most complex challenges imaginable, both internationally and domestically. They will also provide the shoulders upon which the next generation of leaders will stand. Accordingly, it is vital to provide them with a solid educational foundation to give them the knowledge and skills they will need and to develop their habits of mind to be able to deal with ambiguity, new challenges, and an evolving military personnel structure.

The PME system is based on so many considerations that it may be impossible to meet all requirements. It becomes necessary to prioritize among, for example, service specific versus joint requirements and technically focused versus broad curricula. The need to consider opportunity costs is ever present because the system is already so full that an increased emphasis on one priority will require the lessening of another.

As the Congress considers the issue of professional military education going forward, I recommend that the following be included as important considerations:

- Providing the right mix of PME opportunities, whether Service, Joint, or civilian – including overseas cultural immersion programs
- Ensuring that the right officers are selected for these programs and that they will have follow-on assignments that are appropriate for their education
- The need to instill flexible habits of mind, nurturing strategic thinkers who are reflective and able to deal with ambiguity
- Enhancing the role of the humanities and social sciences, especially in officer accession programs
- Considering the effect of the PME system on the relations between the military and the civil society from which it comes and which it is sworn to defend
- Encouraging the best officers to interact with civilian academic institutions, both as students and as participants in academic discourse
- Holding students accountable for academic rigor in their educational process, whether in civilian or military educational institutions
- Making performance in educational institutions, civilian and military, a strong factor in subsequent assignments and promotions
- Recognizing that coordination must include not only Service and Joint issues, but inter-agency, international, and multinational considerations, as well
- Focusing on the increasing professionalization of the enlisted force and considering how enlisted educational opportunities can better meet evolving security challenges

We must always bear in mind that the purpose of our military forces is to prevail in combat. I believe that the above considerations will facilitate that, but they are not a substitute for the most rigorous military training possible and should not detract from the military mindset that makes victory possible.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I hope these remarks will be of interest to the Subcommittee and useful to you in your important work.

Testimony[1]

House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittee on Professional Military Education

Williamson Murray

Professor Emeritus
The Ohio State University

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is a distinct honor to be asked for a second time to address a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the subject of professional military education. The first time was nearly a quarter of a century ago. Unfortunately, I am afraid that most of my concerns at that time are as relevant now as they were then. Yet, in my opinion, professional military education is even more important to the future success of America's military forces than it was twenty-five years ago.

Let me begin with the nature of the strategic environment that the United States confronts, because it is that framework which will place great stress on America's political and military leaders in the twenty-first century. Then I will turn to the nature of professional military

education and the crucial role that it must play in preparing those forces and their leaders to deal with the emerging strategic environment. And finally, I will end with some points that need coherent attention in attempting to move professional military education forward.

The Emerging Strategic Environment

At present the United States confronts the most complex and perhaps the most difficult challenges to its security that it has faced in its history. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, an economic and political competitor, the People's Republic of China, is emerging on the strategic horizon. It is entirely likely that within the next several decades the PRC will become a significant regional competitor in East Asia with its military forces. The Middle East remains in as much turmoil as it has over the past half century. To an even greater extent than was true in the past, the global economy depends on that region for much of its oil and energy supplies. The strategic and political outcomes of the American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan remain uncertain at present, as does their long-term impact on the region. Given its present economic problems and its pretensions Russia represents a power still capable of great mischief and fundamentally dissatisfied with its place in the international order. The Chavez regime as well as the dangerous rise in violence in Mexico's northern provinces suggests that Americans need to pay much greater attention to our southern neighbors. And finally, among other ills besetting the world, international terrorism casts its baleful gaze across the

[1] The opinions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not reflect those of any institutional affiliation he has had in the past or at present.

landscape.[2]

If the past is any indicator – and I certainly believe it is – the military forces of the United States will confront a diverse set of challenges in the future, ranging from the possibility of major conventional war to peacetime engagement and stabilization operations.[3] The causes of conflict will vary from cold political calculation to uncontrolled passion.[4] At the same time, enemy capabilities could range from relatively crude suicide bombers or other improvised explosive devices, to precision guided munitions and cyber attacks, and to the use of nuclear weapons and electromagnetic pulse weapons against U.S. forces or even the territory of the United States. It is impossible to predict precisely how such challenges might emerge, when they might occur, and what form they could take.

Above all, history suggests that however carefully Americans think about the future; however thorough their preparations; however thoughtful their concepts, training, and doctrine, *we will be surprised.* We will find ourselves caught out by radical changes in the political, economic, technological, strategic, and operational environments. We will find ourselves surprised by the nature and capabilities of our adversaries. In the end, it will only be our imagination and intellectual agility, or lack thereof, that will determine our success or failure in

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[2] For the nature and extent of those threats see Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment* (Norfolk, VA, 2008).

[3] For a general examination of the possible challenges U.S. forces might confront in the future see Joint Forces Command, "The Joint Operational Environment," November 2008,

[4] See Clausewitz's discussions of the nature of war and its relationship to political concerns in Book I of *On*

navigating an uncertain and dangerous future. Only an educational background that has prepared the senior military officers of the United States to understand the fundamental nature of war as well as the enormous variety of contexts within which it may take place can provide officers with the mental agility to adapt.

The challenge that will confront American military forces in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be to prepare for missions across the spectrum of conflict, ranging from deterrence at the high end to peace keeping and peace enforcement at the low end. They will confront the certainty of commitment to conflicts which involve the vital interests of the United States. But where, against whom, and when they will find themselves committed will remain uncertain and ambiguous, perhaps almost until the moment of commitment. Who could have predicted in summer 2001 that U.S. military forces would find themselves engaged in a major campaign deep in Afghanistan within six months?

The Importance of Professional Military Education

The great British military historian Sir Michael Howard has argued persuasively that the military profession is the most demanding of all the professions not only physically, but intellectually as well. The latter preparation requires the most serious attention to the military art, past and present, in preparing officers, and particularly senior officers, for the next conflict. In a seminal lecture delivered at the Royal United Services Institute in the 1970s, Professor

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War.

Howard commented:

> There are two great difficulties with which the professional soldier, sailor, or airman has to contend in equipping himself for command. First his profession is almost unique in that he may have to exercise it once in a lifetime... Second the complex problem of running a [military organization in peacetime] is liable to occupy his mind and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run *for*.[5]

The cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that the United States can no longer afford an approach resting on the comfortable assumption that commanders can acquire skills on the fly to deal with the new and different complexities that each conflict will bring in its wake. As General James Mattis suggested in an email to a professor at National War College, "We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of that experience. 'Winging it' and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of competence in our profession." The depressing story of our flawed efforts to handle a burgeoning insurgency during the post-invasion period in Iraq suggests that too many senior officers had never studied the lessons of Vietnam, much less the experiences of the British in their efforts to defeat the 1920 insurgency in Iraq.

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[5] Sir Michael Howard's lecture is in an easily accessible chapter in a collection of essays: Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA, 1983).

Moreover, one of the fundamental lessons of military history is that military organizations almost invariably get the next war wrong. What separates effective militaries from those which fail is the speed with which the effective ones adapt to the actual conditions they confront rather than attempting to force reality to fit their preconceived notions.

A 2006 Marine Corps panel on professional military education put the importance of preparing the future leaders of the American military succinctly:

> It appears likely that most of the wars and military interventions of the early [twenty-first] century will find the Marine Corps operating in many different parts of the world, among vastly different cultures and against a spectrum of threats. In some instances knowledge of local cultures and understanding of the cultural and religious motivations that animate the enemy will be essential in determining the success or failure of American efforts, especially in the era of omnipresent media and round-the-clock programming. American military leaders – from lieutenant to general – will have to appreciate not only their own cultural framework and history, but those of others as well.[6]

Only an intelligent and demanding program of professional military education can prepare America's future military leaders to meet the challenges of the future. It is well to

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[6] General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (ret.), chairman, "U.S. Marine Corps, Officer Professional Military Education, 2006 Study and Findings," Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 2006.

remember that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staffs, the service chiefs, and most of the general and flag officers of the 2030s are already on active duty today. Their education and preparation for higher command has already begun, and, if they are to be prepared in a fashion that the country will desperately need in that decade, then a serious reform of professional military education must begin today.

Above all, serious reform of professional military education absolutely depends on significant reform of the personnel and promotion systems to provide time for such education and to insure the promotion of the right officers. At present, the U.S. military possess an industrial age personnel system that rest for the most part on legislation drawn up in 1947 and 1954. Until that system is fundamentally reformed, major changes for the better in professional military education can only occur on the margins. Moreover, the service personnel systems taken individually tend to reinforce the lockstep approach of the legal framework rather than to take advantage of the exceptions that Congress has authorized or that are authorized.

The Purpose of PME

What should America's future military leaders study? The predecessors of your subcommittee in their extraordinarily intelligent report on professional military education were quite clear on what the place of professional military education should be:

Fundamental to the development of the U.S. officer corps is qualified professional

> military education. The education that officers should receive should be broad enough to provide new academic horizons for those who have been narrowly focused, but deep enough to ensure scholarship and challenge and whet the intellectual curiosity of all officers capable of developing strategic vision. Professional military education should broaden officers' perspectives, as well as service parochialisms. Because education is an investment in our country's future, the services must be willing to sacrifice some near-term readiness for the long-term intellectual development of their officers.[7]

The very title of the major PME institutions makes clear what their focus must be: strategy and war. The Skelton panel was clear also on the need for a broad education for those officers who are eventually to hold positions at the highest levels. Future strategists, it noted, "must be *broadly educated.* Thinking strategically requires individuals who are generalists rather than specialists. Given the potential impact of many different subject areas on strategic thinking – trends in political, technological, economic, scientific, and social issues, both domestic and international – strategists must have the broadest educational base."[8] The catch is that first the officers with such potential need to be identifies. At present, we have not done a terribly good job at that.

Later on in their examination, the authors of the Skelton subcommittee commented:

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[7] Skelton Panel, p. 133.

> The shift in focus for field grade officers, both in schools and units, is from skill training to education – improving officers' analytic capabilities and teaching them how to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity. They must shed the rigidity learned in drills and exercises as junior officers and become more flexible in their thinking because 'war eludes rules... and rewards the inventive mind... [and] ingenuity,' as General Paul Gorman, USA (Ret.)... reminded the panel.[9]

Therein lies the heart of the problem of professional military education. Educating officers in stages has the consequence that producing a mind that is able to grasp the strategic level of war requires the transition to a broader understanding of conflict from their earlier conditioning. Not many manage that transition, which is why real strategists are so rare. Improving the analytic capabilities of officers and teaching them how to deal "with uncertainty and ambiguity" should begin before commissioning and be pursued concurrently with training throughout the whole professional development process.[10]

The Skelton subcommittee was also explicit in what it regarded as the essential elements in the educational processes aimed at preparing officers to handle the larger issues involved in the policy and strategic worlds and the progression from the specific of the tactical world to the

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[8] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[9] Ibid., p. 58.

[10] I am indebted to General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) And Colonel Richard Sinnreich, USA (Ret.) For

complexities of higher command that officers must undergo as their careers develop:

> The first educational building block in the development of a strategist is a *firm grasp of an officer's own services, sister services, and joint commands.* To the extent such expertise can be obtained through education, it must be found in PME schools. Furthermore, officers seeking to develop their capacity for strategic analysis must remain professionally current, that is, keep up with the rapid pace of technological change.... The panel firmly believes, however, that some officers are capable of becoming competent in their warfighting skills *and* of developing the competencies required of a true strategist. For that reason, the panel believes that it is especially important to identify such officers as early as possible in their careers.[11]
>
> The second educational building block for strategists is a *clear understanding of tactics and operational art.* Knowledge in the employment of combat forces is a prerequisite to the development of national *military* strategy....
>
> The third educational building block is an *understanding of the relationship between the disciplines of history, international relations,...and economics.* Each of these disciplines is critical to the formulation of strategy.

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this point.

> *History*, or more specifically the lessons of history, provides insights into how nations have adapted their military and security strategies over time to deal with changing domestic and international environments. Strategy is, after all, dynamic. It must take into account changing realities and circumstances. Military history is particularly important. The history of combat operations, including why a commander chose a given alternative, is at the heart of education in strategy.[emphasis in the original][12]

There clearly exists a cleft between the training and educating of officers at the O-4 level for the immediate staff tasks they will confront in the next stages of their careers and the educational preparation required to meet the challenges of higher command.[13] Both approaches are necessary, but each requires different underlying philosophies of education. The first aims at training officers to perform the every-day, but important routine of staff work and procedures as well as the tactical world which their first years in the military have emphasized, while the second aims at preparing officers to handle the larger issues created by the nature of war – its uncertainty, its fog, and above all its frictions as well as the complexities and ambiguities involved in the interface between the demands of politics that drive conflict and the military necessities of the operational level.

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[11] This is particularly difficult to do when the prevailing culture is hostile to "elitism."

[12] Skelton Panel, p.

[13] One commentator on a draft of this paper noted: "the institutionalization of the 'cleft' represents a considerable part of the problem.

At the staff college level, if not earlier, schools must introduce officers to the problems and issues involved in strategy and grand strategy. Equally important, the initial schools of professional military education must develop the habits of inquiry and analysis. They must also encourage their officers to confront and understand history which essential to any understanding of the complexities and difficulties they will inevitably confront.[14] In fact, the best approach to professional military education would aim at moving officers across the continuum from the straight-forward demands of training at the tactical level to the ambiguities and uncertainties of operations and strategy. Clausewitz suggests the inherent difficulties in the intellectual preparation of officers:

> Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to. *Talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with reality.*[Italics in the original][15]

What then is the purpose of the professional study of the art of war? Here again,

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[14] Once again, I am indebted to Colonel Richard Sinnreich, USA ret., for this point.

[15] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1976), p. 140.

Clausewitz is explicit in a passage that is as relevant to the education of officers in our own time as it was in the early years of the nineteenth century:

> [The study of war represents] an analytic investigation leading to a close *acquaintance* with the subject; applied to experience – in our case military history – it leads to thorough *familiarity* with it. The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent... [Theoretical study] will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. [Theoretical study] then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.[16]

In those two brief quotations Clausewitz illuminates the basic problems and purposes of professional military education. The complexities of the present world and the issues U.S. military institutions confront only serves to underline the importance of his insights.

The Audience

Perhaps the most basic question confronting those who determine the future course of professional military education is that of whether professional military education should aim at the broad mass of officers, or at those who have already displayed the ability and interest in embarking on serious personal education. In other words is the purpose of PME to develop a general base of knowledge and understanding for the average officer or is it to develop the future George Marshalls, Dwight Eisenhowers, and Chester Nimitzes? The first approach limits the capacity for growth of the brightest officers, while the second will invariably lose the attention of those without intellectual curiosity about their profession.[17] Unfortunately, there is also a third question which impinged on American PME throughout the Cold War through to the present and which remains largely unspoken, but still influential through to the present: Isn't the purpose of PME to provide officers a rest in their busy careers?[18]

For the Germans in the interwar period, the answer as to the purpose of professional military education was clear: they selected only a small group of officers early in their careers

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[16] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 141.

[17] In the larger sense, this defines the problem: as long as professional military education follows a cookie-cutter approach, it will devolve to the lowest common denominator. The alternative, however, is a much earlier sorting out process.

[18] As late as the early 1990s the dean of the Army War College was quoted in the *Washington Times* as having said that he preferred his student colonels to be out on the golf course rather than in the library.

with the expectation that this cadre would provide most, if not all, of the army's future leaders.[19] In every respect the German approach was elitist. Moreover, it created an army wide culture that valued the serious study of the profession and where its ultimate "muddy boots" soldier wrote books.[20] Yet, there was also a systemic weakness in the German approach. While the *Wehrmacht* produced brilliant officers at the highest levels for the conduct of operations, its showing in the two crucial supporting pillars of logistics and intelligence was dismal. Even more debilitating was the fact that few, if any, of Germany's senior officers displayed the slightest indication that they understood strategy. For those reasons, all resulting from a failure to educate the officer corps, especially the elite of the general staff, more broadly, the German military led their nation to catastrophe, not in one, but in two world wars.[21]

The American system has consistently rejected the German approach, although there have been exceptions, usually idiosyncratic and accidental. George Marshall's tenure as the assistant commandant at the Infantry School saw him deliberately select and educate officers, both among the students and on the faculty, whom in turn he would pick for the key positions to lead American forces during the Second World War. Nevertheless, whatever the educational philosophy, throughout the interwar period officers regarded attendance at the various staff and

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[19] During the course of World War II every single field marshal, with the exception of Irwin Rommel, would be a graduate of the Kriegsakademie and thus a member of the general staff.

[20] In this case, Irwin Rommel, whose memoirs of his experience as an infantry officer in World War I, *Infantrie Greift an (Infantry Attacks)* remains a classic study in leadership at the small unit level. For Rommel as an intellectual leader as well as a driving leader see General Sir David Fraser's brilliant study: *Knight's Cross, The Life of Irwin Rommel* (New York, 199).

[21] The logistical and intelligence planning of Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June

war colleges as critical to their performance in the Second World War.[22]

In fact, there is no reason why professional military education writ large cannot achieve the larger goals of educating the broad mass of officers, while those who have the intellectual vigor and the prospect for higher command receive special attention.[23] To a certain extent that is already occurring. For example, Fort Leavenworth, Quantico Marine Base, and Maxwell Air Force Base are all serving a large student body of majors with a general curriculum, while at the same time teaching a select and self-selected group of majors in their second year in advanced schools. The Navy is the only service which at present does not possess a second-year school, nor has it been particularly eager to send its officers to the second-year schools that the other services have established. At the senior level, the Army War College has a generalized curriculum for the great majority of its students, while a select few attend the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) aimed at creating strategic thinkers.[24] Significantly, the Naval War College still remains the premier academic institution for the study and teaching of strategy *in*

1941 explains why the German troops showed up in front of Moscow with no winter clothing, summer weight oils and fuels, and with no winter supply dumps.

[22] It is clear that Dwight Eisenhower expended major effort to graduate first in his class, which he did, when he was a student at Leavenworth.

[23] The difficulty is that if we wait to decide whom to educate until we've decided who has the best career prospects, we'll always be too late. Raw talent and the desire to learn must be diagnosed long before we can be sure of an officer's future. That means being willing to see some advanced educational effort wasted.

[24] The ASAP program was created by the Army War College's Commandant at the time, Major General Robert Scales, who realized that a number of the best students at that institution were profoundly unhappy with the superficial nature of the curriculum.

the world.[25]

The selection processes for PME attendance reveal some considerable anomalies. Throughout the Cold War, board selection determined attendance at the war and staff colleges, with the exception of the Navy, which more often than not simply sent whomever the detailers could find.[26] Clearly the students at SAMS, SAW, SAAS, and ASAP self select *and* confront rigorous application processes for attendance in those programs. In the case of the attendance at the regular staff and war colleges, there have been some considerable changes over the past decade. The Army in the late 1990s decided to send all of its majors to a shortened career course at Leavenworth: the combat arms officers then stay to complete a full year at the staff colleges, while the others attend courses specifically designed to meet the needs of their career fields. Attendance at the staff college at Quantico was for a short period of time at the start of this decade entirely a matter of who volunteered and who the detailers saw fit to send.

Nevertheless, none of the selection processes in the U.S. military – except of course the elite programs – possess a means to determine the academic and intellectual qualifications of the prospective students. However, in almost every other First-World Military organization today, entrance to the system of professional military education comes only through written and oral

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[25] It has held that position since the early 1970s when Admiral Stansfield Turner fundamentally altered the curriculum and created a graduate level educational institution. Ironically, the other services, particularly the Marine Corps, have, for the most part, made better use of Newport's academic excellence in the education of their officers than has the Navy.

[26] In 1991-1992, the author was a Secretary of the Navy fellow at Newport. One of the two naval officers in his seminar was a senior captain with 29 years of distinguished service, while the other was a supply commander passed over for captain while attending the college.

examination in which the prospective students have to prove on paper their intellectual preparation and capabilities thus far in their military career for service at the higher levels of command. They are, of course, judged by their performance in the field as well for their suitability for attendance at their military's staff college. The one case where this is not true is the British Army, where class rankings at the junior staff college as well as officer efficiency reports determine who gains entrance into the Joint Service Staff College. In regards to the American military, Lieutenant General Don Holder, USA (Ret.) has suggested that the creation of an examination-based system for entrance into the staff college would fundamentally alter the anti-intellectual culture that exists among many of the Army's junior officers.[27]

The Nature of the Curriculum and Educational Philosophy

The great difficulty that institutions of professional military education confront is that they have only eleven months to achieve the goals with which their institution is charged. That in turn limits what they can teach in any depth, a reality that few in the world of professional military education have been willing to recognize. Here again in its summary report, the Skelton Panel explicitly stated what it believed the purposes of professional military education should be:

> The panel believes that the primary subject matter for PME schools and consequently, the underlying theme of the PME *framework*, should be the employment of combat forces, the conduct of war. The theme is the major reason

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[27] Holder and Murray, "Prospects for Military Education."

> for PME schools; their unique subject matter is the principal distinguishing element between the curricula of PME schools and civilian universities. Although other important subjects such as leadership, management, and executive fitness are taught at PME schools, they should be secondary to the study of war.[28]

Matters have improved considerably since the late 1980s. The advanced courses at the staff colleges – The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) – all are models for the deep and thorough examination of war. So too, the Naval War College has maintained its intellectual focus on war and strategy.[29] The Army War College's Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP), imbedded in the college, also provides an intellectual and rigorous approach to the study of the issues involved in strategy.[30] Nevertheless, it is available to only a selected few of the students who attend Carlisle – entrance gained only through competitive interviews.[31]

However, much of the rest of the landscape of professional military education displays

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[28] Skelton Panel, p. 101.

[29] The Navy, not surprisingly, has no second year course and allows few of its officers to attend the second year courses that the other services offer.

[30] The ASAP course pulls its students out of the regular curriculum in November and thereafter gives them a truly intensive course in joint operations, strategy, and the policy making world. Throughout its course, ASAP uses historical case studies extensively.

[31] What is interesting in terms of the hit and miss nature of the processes with which the Army selects brigade commanders is that in some years a significant number of members of each ASAP seminar are on the fast track to take over brigade, while in other years there are relatively few such officers.

less significant improvement in view of the Skelton Panel's criticisms.[32] A faculty member at the National War College indicated to the author that his institution could not possibly teach Thucydides, the most complete examination of war and strategy ever written, because of its complexity and the need to teach so many other subjects. George Marshall might have expressed considerable surprise and even replied that one cannot afford "not to teach Thucydides, if one were interested in strategy."[33]

In most cases, peripheral subjects, like management, leadership (of civilian corporations), international relations, and career and financial planning continue to dominate too large a portion of the curricula at staff and war colleges. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from examining what is actually occurring in the PME institutions, since no coherent, broad evaluation has occurred since the Skelton Panel nearly two decades ago. Only a detailed examination of the syllabi of PME institutions could make clear the extent to which the focus on the fundamental issues that such institutions are supposed to address has been diluted.[34] Thus, I would urge the committee to make as detailed an examination of the staff and war colleges as its

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[32] Here the author must warn those who read this document that his comments on the general landscape of PME reflect discussions with a number of graduates of those institutions as well as some faculty members, but do not rest on a thorough examination of the curricula, reading and writing assignments, and course design of the staff and war colleges. Much work in this regard needs to be done in this regard, before one can render an honest and thorough report on the general state of professional military education.

[33] In an address given at Princeton University in March 1947, General Marshall noted that he doubted "whether a man can think with full wisdom and with conviction regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens." Quoted in W. Robert Conner, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 3.

[34] On occasion members of the Joint Staff have examined the curricula of the war and staff colleges for their "jointness," but in such cases, their emphasis has been entirely on useless criteria such as the number of hours devoted to subjects such as joint operations rather than the content of what is being taught.

predecessor did in the late 1980s.

Since the Turner reforms, the Naval War College has maintained a graduate level curriculum. But to do so, it has limited the focus of the curriculum to three subjects: strategy and policy; joint operations; and national security defense management. In doing so, it reflects an approach that recognizes the fundamental basis of graduate education for the study of subjects in the liberal arts such as strategic studies, military history, and international relations: there are only a limited number of subjects that an individual can absorb and understand in depth over the course of an academic year. The Naval War College still remains the premier institution of all the institutions devoted to professional military education. Its strategy and policy course best represents the approach that graduate schools should follow in teaching courses on the subjects of war and strategy.

I would also suggest that one the most important aspects of professional military education must lie in a willingness to send our most outstanding officers to the major graduate schools of military history, war studies, and strategic studies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The intellectual excellence as well as outstanding operational performance of generals and admirals like Don Holder, James Stravidis, Dennis Blair, David Patreaus, and H.R. McMaster underlines the value of postgraduate education in forming the minds and perception of many of the most outstanding senior officers in the American military today.

It would seem that the services and their personnel systems should manifest a greater

willingness to provide such opportunities to their most outstanding officers. Admittedly, the pressures of ongoing operations and the many different gates, command, joint, training, etc., make it difficult for officers to seek and be selected for such educational assignments. Again, let me emphasize, a more effective system of professional education that allows such opportunities will require a fundamental rethinking and reform of a personnel system that rests on the philosophy of the industrial age legislation of 1947 and 1954. It would also demand some substantial changes in service cultures, because the present personnel laws do permit exceptions, which the services all too often are unwilling to utilize.

The Intrusion of the Real World

Let me end with several broad points on the problems that the education of America's officer corps confronts at present.

1) Above all Congress needs to fund a sufficient overage of officers at all grades to allow them sufficient time for serious study without penalty either to their careers or to operational requirements. It should also revisit mandatory retirement ages.

2) The enormous operational commitments of our military have created an enormous tension in the career progression that officers must follow. There are quite simply a plethora of hurdles that officers must follow that make it extremely difficult for officers to prepare themselves for the operational, much less the strategic and political challenges of the twenty-first

century. Congress needs to find mechanisms to allow the most outstanding officers greater and more demanding educational opportunities.

3) In many respects, the system of professional military is seriously underfunded. The schools need increases in funding to allow them to bring in a wider array of speakers and to insure the quality of faculty.

4) The presidents and commandants of the various schools need to be far more carefully selected than in the past. These academic leadership positions need to go to individuals with an outstanding background in operations and with serious educational and academic credentials. The situation that occurred a decade ago when a general officer with a doctorate in military history, extensive operational background, and three years as head of a war college was not selected to be the president of National Defense University is all too symptomatic of a system which regards the leadership of pme institutions as of little importance.

5) The services need to make professional military education integral to a greater extent than presently to each officer's career from pre-commissioning activities through to his or her last assignments.

6) The personnel systems as they are presently organized and run represent a major hurdle to the creation of an effective system of professional military education that allows some of the best officers in the American military to expand their intellectual horizons. The problems,

however, are often the result of service cultures rather than the legal framework. Here real reform cannot be legislated. Rather, it requires a real effort to change the prevailing culture within the American military.

7) In conclusion, I would urge that this committee carry out as thorough and complete an examination of the current systems of professional military education as Representative Ike Skelton's subcommittee executed in the late 1980s. And here you will have the advantage of possessing a first-class road map, the 1989 report, to examine what the services and the joint world have done, or not done in response to the report of that subcommittee.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 10, 2009

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. What lessons can be gleaned from current and foreseeable contingencies for educating officers? How should the PME schools vet lessons learned from current operations into their curricula?

General BARNO. There are a myriad of lessons that today's contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and globally can provide to our PME programs; likewise, the prospects of other "foreseeable" or unforeseen contingences should help us assess where we are today and how we can better prepare for an uncertain future. Army Colonel Joseph Buche, currently a fellow at the Center for New American Security has written that while training can play a central role in preparing us for well-understood threats, only education can help our leaders truly prepare properly for threats characterized by deep uncertainty—I wholly agree with this premise. Today's operations, especially in the field on counter-insurgency, have now been well captured in military doctrine (e.g., the Army-Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24). This "institutionalization" of COIN will now create spillover effects in many other military arenas, which in concert with focused deployment training for units about to embark to Afghanistan or Iraq, will instill a solid depth of understanding in these sorts of wars. I am confident that the military school system will rigorously incorporate the tactical (battlefield) lessons of current operations into their curricula; I am much less sanguine that they will even attempt to understand and incorporate the operational and strategic "lessons learned"—in fact, I have seen little to no effort in this arena. Even more troubling is the likelihood that today's wars will only partly resemble tomorrow's, and that leaders will not have sufficiently "opened the aperture" of minds strongly influenced by current experiences and training to the wider prospects for rapidly evolving forms of war. Broad and demanding educational experiences—either in civilian graduate institutions or in improved senior level military colleges—are essential prerequisites to future success in America's wars. Unfortunately, there is too little emphasis accorded to the vital importance of this level of military education. The efficacy of today's PME to produce skilled leaders comfortable not just in joint operations—the focus of the 1986 Goldwater Nichols legislation—but in national military and national security strategy has been largely unexamined.

Dr. SNYDER. Is the PME system doing enough to integrate PME curricula, emphasizing joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (HIM) concepts? How should lessons incorporating these concepts be extended to junior officers to best prepare them for engagement in combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction operations?

General BARNO. I believe that the PME system has done relatively well in attempting to integrate the concepts of JIM into today's curricula, particularly in light of the lack of structural or conceptual integration of these disparate entities in the real world! Increased civilian participation in PME establishments would significantly strengthen this exchange of ideas and experience, and might require some directed "educational float" within the civilian departments of government to support educating this population as well as connected them in PME to their military counterparts. We no longer have the luxury of sparing civilian leaders from the demands of working in these organizations and we need to address "junior" civilian education; however we should avoid adding additional JIM curricula into junior level officer schools that must continue to focus on tactical and operational unlikely subjects.

Dr. SNYDER. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel Report's recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) acculturation through in-residence education or should distance or blended learning opportunities be more broadly embraced by the Services?

General BARNO. Beyond in-residence education, I believe that providing more cross-departmental assignment possibilities would help each department's officers gain a better understanding of the challenges, capabilities and limitations of their colleagues across the government. These experiences should also have a structured educational component (such as visiting senior leaders, seeing different parts of the department's responsibilities) so that the experience is as broadening as possible.

Characterizing and structuring such assignments as "intergovernmental fellowships" might be a way to highlight their importance and encourage a selective application process.

Dr. SNYDER. In your testimony you stated that "fellowships (with very few exceptions) should not be a substitute for SSC [Senior Service Colleges], but an additive experiential development opportunity." Would you please elaborate as to why there shouldn't be substitutes?

General BARNO. The recent nearly unconstrained expansion of fellowships at the Senior Service College (War College) level—especially in the Army—diminishes the number of highly competitive Lt Colonels and Colonels who can attend the structured War College (Joint or Service) programs and sometimes provides little by way of a substitute in comparable fields. While all fellowship attendees must attend the JPME 12 week program at Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, this often occurs years later and does not in itself provide any educational exposure beyond planning joint operations; national military and security strategy is not included in any depth. The second-order effects of these proliferating programs is that the competitive quality of the officers attending service war colleges is declining; to fill slots left vacant by fellowships in the Army, for example, the service is dipping deeper into the reserve components and non-operational career fields with a resultant notable dearth of active duty combatant arms commanders in war college seminar groups this year. The quality and rigor of fellowships vary widely; certain fellowships (e.g., Harvard's program) have been in existence for years and are rigorous and productive, others (to include several inter-governmental) have little or no academic component and can become simply "work" programs using "borrowed military manpower" to fill a seat vacated by an absence. This approach in particular provides very little in the way of educational development for the "fellow" but simply offers the experience of how another organization works from within. These type of programs in particular ought to be separate developmental opportunities characterized as "experiential" rather than "educational" and be viewed as an additional opportunity above and beyond SSC schooling—not as a substitute. Broadly, one would expect that the threshold of educational achievement required to graduate from a senior service college-level program would be rigorous and demanding; and if so, a significant number of fellowships on the books today should be excluded. Unfortunately, there is no such threshold established as to what specific knowledge, skills and attributes attend to a graduate of SSC fellowships, so virtually anything goes.

Dr. SNYDER. How should officers be selected for in-residence PME and JPME? Would you use any kind of quality cut? How would you decide who goes to the joint PME institutions, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), in residence?

General BARNO. Selection for in-residence PME and JPME should be rigorous and competitive to reinforce the highly valued nature of these programs. Non-resident programs of continuing education should once again be employed primarily for those who were not as competitive for in-residence selection—as was the case at least for the Army until about 2004. Approximately 50% of each "year group" should be able to attend in-residence PME; this should perhaps be slightly higher for those in the command-track/operational career fields given the nature of both school curricula and the needs of that population. One would this reasonably expect as a result that nearly 100% of those that command at the Lt. Colonel level should have attended in-residence intermediate PME. The most significant aspect of returning to this system would be to increase the prestige and importance of attending full-time in-residence PME. Spending ten months devoted to education in the art and science of war at intermediate and senior levels alongside carefully selected peers from sister services and agencies creates an intellectually stimulating environment of shared learning with those very officers and civilian interagency leaders with whom one will spend the rest of a professional career. These officers at intermediate and senior levels should be identified by competitive selection boards similar to those used to screen for command today: again, this harkens back to the model used in the Army post-Vietnam until the mid-2000s with much success. The services could continue to "slate" attendance at both joint and service schools from within this overall competitive selection; that is, the board selects the individual and the service "slates" them to the appropriate service or joint school, based in part on individual preferences. The protections built into the quality thresholds extant in JPME schools would ensure those institutions continue to receive an exceptional quality of student; that has been an unchallenged outcome of establishing this requirement in the 1986 legislation and will remain so.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony asserted that: "no officer in a command track should be promoted below the zone to lieutenant colonel without a civilian degree from a first tier institution." How should the Services' personnel systems identify and select

the best candidates to pursue these civilian programs? How would you balance command potential versus intellectual qualifications?

General BARNO. One of the pernicious dangers of the current system, particularly in the Army, is that there is increasing potential for the most intellectually gifted officers, beginning at the rank of Captain, to be weaned away from the operational (or "command-track") career path in order to become specialists who will neither command nor in most cases ascend to senior rank. If this trend takes hold, many of our future commanders may become among the least broadly educated and the least intellectual members of the force—hardly a recipe for sustained military success. In some ways, this outlook harkens back to the rightfully maligned British interwar system wherein the "regimental officer" was seen to be most highly esteemed by his peers—in part, because of his utter lack of outside education and experience beyond "the regiment." The current Army Officer Personnel System inadvertently supports this type of model for combat arms and operational track officers. It is a "single track" system as opposed to the "dual-track" system that produced the current generation of Army leaders. Those in the single track operations career field today are expected to spend all of their time either in the field with troops or in operational or training staff billets, such observer controllers at the Army's Combat Training Centers. Despite the recent promise held out by the Army's so-called "Pentathlete" program under then CSA General Pete Schoomaker, graduate education for the most competitive operations career field officers has faltered. The "Pentathlete" concept posited that Army officers should aspire to be, must be multi-skilled warrior-diplomat scholars and seek out a broad diversity of career and academic experiences. Unfortunately, the demands of two wars and the competitive nature of repeat combat assignments have caused many of the most highly talented and competitive officers to avoid time "out of the line." Those that seek out civilian graduate schools are often en route to teaching assignments at West Point, a route that more and more commonly now leads officers to leave their basic branches and convert to "specialty" career fields. These deeply educated captains and majors thus often do not return to the operational force but become single-tracked as "Army Strategists" or "Information Operations" gurus. Incentivizing operations/command track officers to attend civilian graduate schooling must take many forms, including citing it as a waypoint institutionalized in officer career development roadmaps. But to put teeth in the system, it should also be written into selection board guidance as a pre-requisite for a second (not first) below the zone early promotion. This would provide additional time for officers to reach this goal—at least 12–14 years. Regarding "command potential" as intellectual qualification, I do not believe that command selection should be somehow tied to any set of intellectual criteria—performance and potential for future contributions in command of troops should remain the most important criteria. That said, we should strive to increase our numbers of well-educated commanders—this must be a talking point for senior leaders, and most importantly—must be a serious criterion for selection to flag rank. Education for strategic leadership and dealing with wicked problems may not be essential for battalion and brigade commanders, but it is vital for flag officers. Our system, paradoxically, will serve up the best tacticians to be selected for flag rank—where we will expect them to magically re-create themselves as strategic leaders. We must find, educate and retain intellectual talent in our commanders—for it is from this group that our senior-most leaders will derive.

Dr. SNYDER. How would you alter force development policies (in the Services' personnel management systems and in the PME system) to address the challenges associated with the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operational environment?

General BARNO. Given the increasing demand for officers to serve in developmental assignments and receive educational experiences, there may be a need to provide additional officer authorizations to ensure sufficient officers can receive these experiences without impacting the fill of operational billets in the force. This "buffer" of officers above unit and staff billets is absolutely essential to achieve the goals of dominating the intellectual battlefield; the uncertainty of the future environment argues for greater numbers available for schooling, not fewer. This is also manifestly needed at flag officer rank.

Dr. SNYDER. Considering the demands of the twenty-first century security environment, does the United States need more theoretical strategists (i.e., idea generators) than the few contemplated by the Skelton Panel Report? Do we need more applied strategists (i.e., practical implementers) than we did twenty years ago?

General BARNO. We need more of both, and we need far more of both to populate the ranks of our flag officers. Again, our system generates the very best tactical commanders to be teed up for selection to flag rank. We then continue to pick from this very small cohort for all of our flag positions—and ultimately, our three and

four-stars as well as other positions with a myriad of duties requiring strategic leadership understanding and skills. If a service picks forty brigadiers per year (Army) or ten (Marines), that is the entire bench from which their future four-stars are selected from. In the Army and Navy, that bench is further reduced by internal selections for division (Army) or battle group (Navy) command at the one/two-star level. From this limited pool comes virtually all of the service four-stars 5–8 years hence. Thus the importance of selection for the first star becomes overwhelming, as do the internal thresholds thereafter which may artificially constrain even among the broader flag officer population who may be competitive internally for four-star rank.

Dr. SNYDER. How might the PME system better enable strategists to become fluent in geopolitical trends and potential causes for conflict in the next quarter century?

- Trends in: demographics, globalization, comparative economics, energy supply and demand, food production and distribution, water scarcity, climate change and natural disasters, pandemics, cyber connectivity, and the utility of space; and
- Contexts for conflict like: competition with conventional powers, regional influences, weak and failing states, nonstate and transnational adversaries, the proliferation of WMDs, technological advancements, strategic communications, and rampant urbanization.

General BARNO. Strategists (either full-time specialists such as the Army's FA 59 program or future generals) absolutely need civilian graduate education to fully hone their skills and expand their thinking to the broadest dimensions of strategy in a non-military, intellectually diverse academic environment.

Dr. SNYDER. How should rigor be defined within the PME system in the future? Should the Skelton Panel Report's notions of rigor (i.e., challenging curricula, student accountability, and measurable student performance) be updated or expanded?

General BARNO. Rigor in PME at Command and Staff and War College programs should be re-examined. Some schools do this well through an environment more akin to a civilian graduate program with competitive grading and characteristic graduate programs (Naval War College, for example). In other programs, grading is pro forma and has no impact on the student for good or ill; no one can "fail" in effect, regardless of academic performance. There is also an argument to be made that academic performance ought to be a "plus" for future promotion (including early promotion) and assignments; today, it has little or no impact on either.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony asserted that we have not invested adequately in the education of our senior military leaders, especially with regard to strategic thinking. You essentially concluded that PME ends just as flag and general officers reach the apex of leadership responsibility. What "measurable educational objectives" should we apply to ensure that flag and general officers receive rigorous PME? In your testimony, you mentioned the United Kingdom's program for educating flag and general officers as a potential model for reform. Would you please describe the UK model and its potential benefits?

General BARNO. Given the fact that I am not an academic by trade, and that most of my time in uniform has been as a commander, I am ill-suited to define "measureable educational objectives" for any level of PME. That said, I believe that flag officers should be held to a high post-graduate level standard of writing and speaking; that their performance in one-on-one interviews and persuasive conversations should be evaluated; that their knowledge of war and warfare at the strategic level and underpinnings of conceptual understanding of war should be assessed; and that each of these objectives should be facilitated by a robust course content in an academically challenging higher command and staff course of 6–10 months duration, offered to Major General/Rear Admiral-selects before their first O–8-level assignment.

This course could be modeled upon the British Higher Command and Staff course. Although the British course is designed for brigadiers, the advantage of an O–8 select course in the U.S. would be a narrowing of focus and of students—no more than about sixty O–7s are selected for O–8 each year, thus creating a precise cadre of future three And four-star officers. The Higher Command and Staff Course conducted by the British Joint Services Command and Staff College, is a 14-week course for officers (O–6—O–7) destined for higher joint command and senior staff positions (O–8 and above). The course is primarily focused on the military-strategic and operational levels of war set in the wider strategic context. The course is intellectually demanding. Graded tests, exercises, and a written dissertation are required. Most importantly, future assignments and promotions are influenced by the official academic report produced by the college. In the final analysis, a more robust

program, based on the British Higher Level Staff College would be of great value to the US PME system.

Dr. SNYDER. In your testimony, you asserted that "it will only be our imagination and intellectual agility, or lack thereof, that will determine our success or failure in navigating an uncertain and dangerous future" and that "[o]nly an educational background that has prepared the senior officers of the United States to understand the fundamental nature of war as well as the enormous variety of contexts within which it may take place can provide officers with the mental agility to adapt." Would you please elaborate as to how the PME system should best support the breadth of knowledge and nimble adaptive qualities that you think are required of successful officers?

Dr. MURRAY. There are two clear parts to this question. First, I believe that the whole system from pre-commissioning through to war college in all the services needs to focus more clearly and effectively on the fundamental nature of war than is the case at present. Such an approach demands a deeper and more thorough emphasis on military and strategic history for those officers who are to rise to the senior ranks. Thus, study at the staff and war colleges must have war, its history, and its present dimensions at the heart of what they teach. At present, only the Naval War College and specialist programs like SAW, SAAS, and the Army War College's Advanced Strategic Arts Program have such a focus.

The second part of the question, as to how promote the qualities of intellect that lead to the nimbleness of mind and ability to adapt, is more difficult to answer. I believe that at its heart such an improvement in the PME system would demand a more careful selection of officers for command level billets—a selection process that would place performance in the school house as being *as important as service in the field* for command at all levels. Those officers who excel at the staff college level would then receive the opportunity for additional educational opportunities in civilian and military (such as SAW, SAMS, and SAAS) graduate schools to widen their intellectual horizons.[1] In addition, the services need to select a smaller number of officers at the O–3 level before they even reach the staff colleges for serious graduate study in strategic studies, military history, and area studies. Such changes would demand a fundamental shift in the cultural patterns of the services, particularly in their personnel systems as well as their career patterns.

To facilitate such a program I would urge Congress to increase the number of O–3, O–4, and O–6 slots (the last strictly for input to war college faculty) that each service is authorized with these additional slots specifically targeted for officers enrolled in Ph.D. programs dealing with military and strategic history or strategic and national strategic studies (such as Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School). Authorizing ten slots each year for each service (five for the Marine Corps) would result in a steady output of officers who were not only well educated, but who had intellectual contacts with some of the best minds in academic life outside of the military and produce future great military strategists like Admiral William J. Crowe and David Petraeus (both of whom earned doctorates at Princeton). One might designate these fellowships Congressional fellowships with serious competition for these places.

Dr. SNYDER. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel Report's recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) acculturation through in-residence education or should distance or blended learning opportunities be more broadly embraced by the Services?

Dr. MURRAY. Here, I would suggest that what is need is not more education, but better education. Thus, I would argue that sending more outstanding officers out to graduate schools early in their careers represents a major step in the right direction. Distance education can also improve the system of professional military education, but only if it is properly resourced, and the record of the services on this issue has not been uniformly good. But a first-class distance educational system that allowed for smaller, in-residence staff and war colleges would provide a substantial improvement both in the quality of the student bodies and the faculty at these institutions by allowing a more careful selection process of the very best.

Dr. SNYDER. You emphasized in your testimony that the Service's personnel system are both outdated and out of synch with the PME systems, and you have advocated "significant reform." What specific reforms would you recommend to ensure that PME becomes a higher priority in the promotion, command selection, and assignment processes?

Dr. MURRAY. In the largest sense what is needed is a detailed examination by the HASC of the whole personnel system of the services. Such an examination would

[1] Parenthetically, the Navy needs to create such a second year program as a follow-on to the Naval Staff College and *support* the second year programs of the other services with officers who are on the fast track to command.

need to go into the kind of detail that your committee is involving itself in with its examination of the PME system. I am not an expert on personnel systems; I am an educator. But there are several suggestions that I am willing to make.

First, as suggested above, the performance of officers in the various schools must play a major role not only in the selection of those for early promotion, but in the command selection processes. Those who do not measure up as outstanding academic performers in the staff and war colleges must be eliminated for command selection, just as those who do not measure up in performance in the field are eliminated from command selection.

Second, the attendance at staff and senior service schools must be by selection boards.

Finally, Congress must not only allow waivers to mandates, but demand that the service personnel systems utilize such exceptions.

Dr. SNYDER. The Skelton Panel Report considered faculty as *the* determinant factor in quality education. What policies would you suggest be implemented to ensure that the highest quality civilian and military faculty and senior leaders are assigned to the Services and joint PME institutions?

Dr. MURRAY. Faculty along with the nature of the curriculum is the basis of excellence in any academic program. Unfortunately, while there have been considerable improvements in the faculty over what was typical in the late 1980s, there remains considerable room for improvement. There are a number areas that need improvement:

First, there is too much emphasis on academic credentials instead of academic and teaching excellence in the selection of faculty. This has been driven by the desire to give students attending staff and war colleges master's degrees. This has added an entirely unnecessary burden on selecting outstanding faculty.

Second, the service personnel systems have consistently refused to give waivers to those applying for programs to earn a Ph.D. in a civilian institution in order to teach at a war college (and then have sufficient time for a pay back tour). Here the competition for such slots should be open to all O–6s regardless of the time they have remaining until retirement with the understanding that they will serve the necessary years beyond 30 to satisfy the requirements for pay back.

Third, a number of staff and war colleges have adjunct faculty not only to teach in distance-learning programs, but to augment special programs like ASAP at the Army War College. The whole payment system treats distinguished professors and academics (like Rick Atkinson and Eliot Cohen) as well as other serious contributors to PME from the outside as if they were making widgets for F–22s. Congress needs to give the war and staff colleges the latitude to pay such outside professors and augmentees as special cases.

Fourth, if the United States is going to possess world-class faculties at its PME institutions, then it needs to provide them not only with salaries above those in the Title 10, but the manning levels to allow their faculty to have sabbaticals to expand their knowledge and understanding of war and strategy which in turn will contribute to the knowledge of these difficult topics they impart to their students.

Finally, let me note that there is a serious impediment to the bringing on board of world-class faculty in the power that service and joint personnel offices exercise over the hiring of new professors and the setting of their salaries.

Dr. SNYDER. Will the future security environment require shifts in the way we formulate and execute military strategy? Will it require changes in how strategy is taught in PME institutions? If so, can you describe these shifts and changes?

Dr. MURRAY. Let me stress here that the fundamental approach to the study of strategy and policy that the Naval War College developed in the early 1970s under Admiral Stansfield Turner remains the clearest and deepest examination of strategy that has ever been developed. Some of our greatest academic institutions (Yale and Ohio State) have based their grand strategy courses on that of the Naval War College. What needs to change is that the other PME institutions should come up to the same benchmark. Humankind has always lived in a world of change; but the fundamentals of human behavior remain the same. We do not need new gimmicks in the study of strategy. What we need is not to forget the past. We have repeated all too often in my lifetime the mistakes that previous generations of civilian and military leaders have made. And we should not forget George Marshall's comment in an address at Princeton in 1947 that if you want to understand the strategic environment, read Thucydides.

Let me emphasize here that I am not advocating the teaching of academic history, but rather using academic history to examine and help in understanding the present as well as to think about future possibilities. The "Joint Operating Environment," published by Joint Forces Command in November 2008 represents an example of how history should be used to think about the future.

Dr. SNYDER. Considering the demands of the twenty-first century security environment, does the United States need more *theoretical* strategists (i.e., idea generators) than the few contemplated by the Skelton Panel Report? Do we need more *applied* strategists (i.e., practical implementers) than we did twenty years ago? If so, what percentage of the officer corps would need to exhibit these skills?

Dr. MURRAY. There is no way to measure the right number. One would be sufficient, if she or he were in the right position. The crucial issue is not necessarily to develop theoretical strategists, rather it is to insure that those at the highest levels in the American military have a *thorough intellectual grounding* in strategy. And they can only gain the insights necessary for such grounding in a deep education in war and strategy, gained through the study of history.

Dr. SNYDER. How might the PME system better enable strategists to become fluent in geopolitical trends and potential causes for conflict in the next quarter century?

Dr. MURRAY. I do not mean to be flippant here, but most of these can be readily grasped by a coherent reading program of the nation's great newspapers (readily available online) and by reading an intelligent selection of major news magazines. The hard part comes in understanding what such trends might mean. As Joint Forces Command's "Joint Operational Environment" makes clear, humankind has confronted throughout history an environment of constant change. We have been caught by surprise in the past and we will be caught by surprise again and again in the future. Only by having a grasp of what the past suggests can we begin the processes of preparing to adapt.

Dr. SNYDER. How should rigor be defined within the PME system in the future? Should the Skelton Panel Report's notions of rigor (*i.e.,* challenging curricula, student accountability, and measurable student performance) be updated or expanded?

Dr. MURRAY. The improvement in academic rigor in the staff and war colleges has been considerable since the late 1980s, but most of the other PME institutions have not come up to the standards of the Naval War College or the mark set by the Skelton Panel. Above all, intellectual rigor depends on the presence of a first-class faculty. The crucial issue to me, however, is that until performance at the staff and war colleges becomes a major player in promotion and selection for command billets, rigor will remain almost meaningless in the development of a military leadership with strategic and operational vision.

Dr. SNYDER. Are there elements of rigor that should be standardized among all PME institutions? How much discretion would you afford each individual institution in defining rigor?

Dr. MURRAY. Here I believe that the institutions must define their own approach to education. Having watched the services and the joint world operate for the past fifteen years, my sense is that should there be efforts to achieve uniformity in a common approach, standards would fall to the lowest common denominator. The crucial issue is that each staff and war college should render to each individual officer's service an academic report that has rests directly on the student's academic ranking in his class: A ranking that would delineate the top 10 percent; the second ten percent; and the rest with a clear, rigorous examination of each student's strengths and weaknesses.

Dr. SNYDER. You have asserted that the PME system is "seriously underfunded," and you have noted that this undermines the "quality of faculty" at PME institutions. Would you please describe how increased funding for PME might alleviate that problem and any other problem for which you think funding is the issue?

Dr. MURRAY. I believe there is a fundamental mismatch between the stated desire of possessing a world-class faculty and the reality.

First, if you want the best people, then you should be prepared to pay them. Equally important, if you expect them to do serious research in military or strategic history and issues, then these institutions must make sabbaticals available. This, in most cases, will not only involve fully paid leaves of absence, but travel funds so that faculty members can visit archives, attend conferences, and visit U.S. commanders and their staffs not only in the United States, but in other parts of the world.

Second, these institutions need to have the funding to sponsor major conferences of leading academics, theorists, strategists from around the world, not just from the immediate area, as is so typical of what passes for strategic conferences in this town. Travel is expensive, but the cost needs to be borne, especially in exposing the students to great thinkers from elsewhere than just the United States.

Third, greater funding is needed for inviting outside speakers to address the student body on fundamental issues of military and strategic history.

Finally, I believe that the National Defense University remains still part of the Army's budget. If this is so, it should receive its own funding line, independent of

any service within the Department of Defense. Moreover, it should be directly placed, if possible, under the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS.

Dr. SNYDER. What are your views on the current military and civilian leadership and academic requirements for: Presidents, Provosts, Commandants, Deans, CAOs, Deans of Students, and Chiefs of Staff? Should we adjust any of these requirements?

Dr. MURRAY. I can only give the most general of answers, because I have been an observer rather than a participant in the PME world for over a decade. But in general, I would suggest that most of the individuals who head up the staff and war colleges have received their appointment not because of their academic qualifications, or because of their intellectual interests. Instead, most have been selected on the basis of providing them a sinecure before they retire. Let me stress that this has not always been the case, but it has been the case too often, given the importance of these institutions.

Moreover, those who are qualified for the job because of their interest and qualification, rarely have the time to make major changes in the quality and culture of an academic institution. A three-year assignment, which is the consistent practice, is simply too short a time to make major changes in most cases. Here, it is not so much a matter of adjusting requirements, but rather encouraging the appointment of senior, qualified general and flag officers to these positions for sustained periods of time. And I would recommend that the position of president or commandant at the war colleges should be a three-star position rather that two stars.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that I have been honored to participate in your effort I would also like to express my admiration for your efforts to repair some of the deficiencies that exist in the current system of professional military education.

Dr. SNYDER. You concluded in your testimony that, "maximum exposure to rigorous civilian academic standards will strengthen PME, better prepare the military to deal with future challenges, and strengthen the bonds between the military and society." You also noted that the military will be increasingly called upon to perform its missions among civilian elements both at home and abroad in a new "hybrid" security environment, blending international, transnational, and sub-national threats. How should civil-military relations be taught within PME curricula to optimize preparedness for civil-military future requirements?

Dr. WILLIAMS. The best curriculum for teaching civil-military relations in both the military and civilian environments begins with a solid grounding in the classics of the discipline, starting with the works of Morris Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington. At the risk of omitting other scholars whose work I also admire, Charles C. Moskos, Sam C. Sarkesian, David R. Segal, James Burk, Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn, Eliot Cohen, Don Snider, Deborah Avant, Moshe Lissak, Bernard Boene, Christopher Dandeker, Anthony Forster, and many others come to mind as scholars who revised and supplemented this early work in important ways.

Most military officers are familiar with the theories of military professionalism of Samuel P. Huntington. These reinforce the dominant internal narrative of a professional military occupying a distinct and somewhat separate position with respect to civilian society. There should also be a deeper understanding of work of Morris Janowitz, especially his view that the military is closely related to society—growing out of it and sharing its values.

The discipline of civil-military relations is well developed and has a rich literature. Much of the best work is found in the pages of *Armed Forces & Society,* an interdisciplinary and international scholarly journal dedicated to the study of military professionalism and the relations between the military and society. (This journal, edited by Patricia Shields, is the official journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, which I have to privilege to chair.)

Prior to this detailed study, however, officers need to be educated in such a way that they are intellectually curious, able to analyze complex and ambiguous situations, understanding of foreign cultures, and capable of expressing themselves clearly. These are core competencies not only of budding strategists, but anyone who will conduct military operations in situations where the human terrain is a factor and victory is not based on firepower alone. These competencies are best developed in highly demanding academic programs based on the social sciences and humanities.

Dr. SNYDER. Is the only way to achieve the Skelton Panel Report's recommended joint (and now increasingly interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) acculturation through in-residence education or should distance or blended learning opportunities be more broadly embraced by the Services?

Dr. WILLIAMS. There is no substitute for in-residence educational experiences of the highest quality as early in an officer's career as feasible given the requirement for specialty training at that stage. Education and training go hand in hand, and in-residence training is irreplaceable for education. The acculturation recommended in the Skelton Panel Report requires face to face interactions with members of the

groups with whom officers will be called upon to serve. Only in that way can members of the various institutions get to know one another and understand their respective institutional cultures. It is not always true that "where you stand depends on where you sit," but institutional factors powerfully affect the attitudes and positions of otherwise similar individuals. It would be best for officers to have a visceral understanding of these before they work together in a crisis environment.

From a budgetary perspective, distance learning makes a great deal of sense; from an educational perspective, it makes less—especially in the humanities and social science courses required to develop critical analysis and communications skills. Whatever the budgetary implications, distance learning does facilitate access to the far-flung military population. One could imagine some kind of blended program in which fact acquisition—as opposed to acculturation and socialization—is performed outside the traditional classroom, but the ratio of in-class interaction to online actions should be as high as possible. Of course, a great deal of individual self-study is required for professional development before, during, and after formal educational experiences.

Dr. SNYDER. Your testimony was very encouraging of increased civil-military interaction, especially in the academic arena. Would you please elaborate on how specific types of scholarly interactions might benefit the PME system, and the officer corps as a whole?

Dr. WILLIAMS. There are many opportunities for the sort of civil-military interactions that would benefit both the PME system and the officer corps as a whole:

- Broadly based ROTC programs at our best universities are an important link with civil society and provide a diverse infusion of new officers.
- Civilian graduate education brings the most talented military and civilian students together in the most demanding educational settings; it also exposes high-potential officers to civilian academic ways of thoughts and to the highest intellectual standards and puts a human face on the military for future civilian leaders. It goes without saying that the selection process for these assignments must be based on individual merit and potential for distinguished future service.
- Highly qualified civilian instructors in military PME institutions, either on a permanent of rotating basis, bring a bit of the civilian education experience inside the military PME system.
- Participation in appropriate academic conferences promotes meaningful professional interactions between the civilian academic community and the military, to the advantage of both. It also stimulates officers to write papers and eventually publish their work.
- Membership in scholarly societies such as the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society provides important professional interactions and a network of professional contacts.
- Publication in rigorously reviewed scholarly journals ensures a wide audience of expert civilians for the authors' work and the publication process generates a great deal of useful intellectual feedback.

Dr. SNYDER. The Skelton Panel Report considered faculty as the determinant factor in quality education. What policies would you suggest be implemented to ensure that the highest quality civilian and military faculty and senior leaders are assigned to the Service and joint PME institutions?

Dr. WILLIAMS. Others are better positioned to comment on specific assignment policies, but I would note that training future strategists and implementers has implications for recruitment, future assignments, and promotion. The most appropriate officers must be selected for PME positions as both students and faculty. All must utilize the competencies they develop in their future careers, which must be long enough for the Services to benefit from their educational experiences. In addition, time spent in educational institutions must not be in itself a negative factor in subsequent promotion decisions.

Dr. SNYDER. Considering the demands of the twenty-first century security environment, does the United States need more theoretical strategists (i.e., idea generators) than the few contemplated by the Skelton Panel Report? Do we need more applied strategists (i.e., practical implementers) than we did twenty years ago? If so, what percentage of the officer corps would need to exhibit these skill sets?

Dr. WILLIAMS. As the question implies, both idea generators and practical implementers are needed in an increasingly complex and ambiguous security environment. Both benefit from highly rigorous training in a broad humanistic curriculum. This is especially useful because the future grand theorists may not be identifiable early on, but they will sort themselves out during the course of study proposed here.

What the precise ratio should be is impossible to predict in the abstract, but it is not possible to have too many idea generators. Those officers would likely also have the ability to implement policies, although the reverse cannot be assumed.

Dr. SNYDER. How might the PME system better enable strategists to become fluent in geopolitical trends and potential causes for conflict in the next quarter century?

- Trends in: demographics, globalization, comparative economics, energy supply and demand, food production and distribution, water scarcity, climate change and natural disasters, pandemics, cyber connectivity, and the utility of space; and
- Contexts for conflict like: competition with conventional powers, regional influences, weak and failing states, non-state and transnational adversaries, the proliferation of WMDs, technological advancements, strategic communications, and rampant urbanization.

Dr. WILLIAMS. Despite the importance of technological sophistication in the early part of some officers' careers, especially in the Navy and Air Force, there is no technical education that will produce strategists able to deal with the complexity described above. The only solution is a comprehensive education broadly based in the social sciences and humanities with an emphasis on history, such as Admiral Stansfield Turner instituted over great opposition at the U.S. Naval War College in the early 1970s.

This does not seem to be the path the Navy, at least, is taking. Recent Navy policy to require that 65 percent of midshipmen at the Naval Academy and in NROTC programs have technical majors seems shortsighted, especially in view of the heavy technical course requirements required of all midshipmen, regardless of major. Indeed, all USNA midshipmen graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree anyway. This is not a new trend in the Navy, and was accelerated under the otherwise beneficial influence of ADM Hyman G. Rickover and with the assumption that a high proportion of the U.S. Navy fleet would be nuclear powered. There does not seem to be a significant constituency inside the Navy (or perhaps the Air Force, which I know less well) to combat this trend successfully. Its reversal will not occur without outside inquiry and direction.

For a more detailed exposition of these points, the Subcommittee may wish to consult ADM James Stavridis and CAPT Mark Hagerott, "The Heart of an Officer: Joint, Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career Development," *Naval War College Review,* Spring 2009, pp. 27–41, and RADM (Ret.) Jacob Shuford, "Re-Education for the 21st Century Warrior," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* April 2009, pp. 14–19.

Dr. SNYDER. How should rigor be defined within the PME system in the future? Should the Skelton Panel Report's notions of rigor (*i.e.,* challenging curricula, student accountability, and measurable student performance) be updated or expanded?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I cannot improve upon the Skelton Panel Report's criteria for academic rigor. The challenge will be to operationalize these criteria so they can be the basis of an effective program. The most important student outcomes—developing innovative strategists and effective implementers—may not be apparent for years. I would offer the caveat that an overemphasis on achieving measurable outcomes will increase the focus on the technological issues that can be measured most easily but which contribute the least to developing strategists. Fitness/efficiency reports for periods of academic study should be used to help determine future assignments.

Dr. SNYDER. Are there elements of rigor that should be standardized among all PME institutions? How much discretion would you afford each individual institution in defining rigor?

Dr. WILLIAMS. Different programs should be alike to the extent that they provide a challenging and intellectually open environment in which officers can develop their cognitive and expressive skills as effectively as possible. They will differ in the ways in which they go about achieving this result. Too much standardization is not desirable, as it stifles initiative and experimentation. I would allow a great deal of discretion to the educators and administrators at the various PME institutions, subject to a common understanding on the importance of academic rigor as stated above.

Dr. SNYDER. Each PME school has a different internal organization. Is a unique organizational character necessary at each of the schools to optimize the PME mission? What, if anything, should be standardized among the schools with respect to their organization?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I can think of no particular organization of the schools in the PME system that would further the goals of the Skelton Committee Report most effectively. Standardization should be at the level of a common understanding of the

educational purpose and the seriousness with which it should be pursued, not at the level of organizational details. There is also much to be said for maintaining the unique character of the various schools.

Dr. SNYDER. What are your views on the current military and civilian leadership and academic requirements for: Presidents, Provosts, Commandants, Deans, CAOs, Deans of Students, and Chiefs of Staff? Should we adjust any of these requirements?

Dr. WILLIAMS. The leading academic officers of PME institutions must have strong administrative skills, but they must also understand the academic process and support its goals. I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of current statutory requirements or administrative regulations in this regard to have an informed opinion on specific guidance. It is imperative, however, that appointees to these key positions have strong academic qualifications and are committed to promoting a rigorous educational program in their institutions. Continued Congressional interest in this issue will be helpful to focus attention on these criteria and ensure that appointees are of the highest quality.

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