[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DHS: THE PATH FORWARD
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-1
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Emanuel Cleaver, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Missouri:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
For the Record
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania:
Photo.......................................................... 22
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Photos......................................................... 29
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson....................... 51
Questions From Honorable Peter A. DeFazio........................ 52
Questions From Honorable Henry Cuellar........................... 53
Questions From Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr....................... 56
Questions From Honorable James A. Himes.......................... 62
Questions From Honorable Lamar Smith............................. 62
Questions From Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis........................ 78
Questions From Honorable Steve Austria........................... 78
DHS: THE PATH FORWARD
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Wednesday, February 25, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Harman,
DeFazio, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke,
Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Lujan, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green,
Himes, Titus, King, Souder, Lungren, Rogers, McCaul, Dent,
Bilirakis, Broun, Miller, Olson and Cao.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive
testimony from Secretary Janet Napolitano on ``DHS: The Path
Forward''.
I would like to, first of all, welcome Madam Secretary to
the Homeland Security Committee. We coordinated with your
office, as you know, this opportunity for our first hearing to
get an idea on where you see the Department going from this
point forward. So we appreciate you accommodating the committee
and we look forward to your testimony also.
Although you have been here in office for about a month,
you made yourself available to me and other Members of this
committee to discuss critical issues affecting the Department
and we thank you. Given the demands on your time, the interest
you have demonstrated in hearing congressional concerns is
commendable. I hope this dialog continues throughout your
tenure and that you tackle the challenges of moving DHS
forward.
However, I would be remiss, Madam Secretary, if I did not
point out that in the last 2 years, this committee's oversight
work has played a major role in developing the public record on
the shortcomings of the Department. Those shortcomings were not
exposed to play a Washington game of gotcha. On the contrary,
we raised questions about real problems and endeavored to work
with DHS to develop real solutions. Rest assured, we will
continue to have questions and look to your leadership for
answers.
We called this hearing this morning ``DHS: The Path
Forward'' because this Department cannot afford to remain stuck
in the same place doing things the same way and somehow
expecting a different outcome. But before moving forward, one
must first assess the condition of the road in one location on
the road. You now oversee a Department that has an annual
budget of over $40 billion and a work force of over 200,000
people. DHS is on the GAO high-risk list because of challenges
it faces in implementing and transforming 22 separate agencies
into 1 fully functional Department.
The Department's mission can be summed up as the duty to
keep dangerous people and dangerous things out of this country.
To fulfill this mission, it shoulders the responsibility for a
wide range of activities, including securing the borders;
responding to natural disasters and catastrophic events;
ensuring the capacity of passengers and cargo that rely on air,
surface and maritime transportation; safeguarding critical
infrastructure; and administering grants. Unlike many
Departments, at each step along the way this Department must
work closely with State and local and tribal governments to
accomplish its critical mission.
Your actions in the last month have indicated that you
understand the wide-ranging nature of the Department's
activities and the need to map a course to take this Department
forward. In your short tenure, Madam Secretary, you have
ordered an agency-wide efficiency review to eliminate wasteful
spending and required policy and program reviews in nine key
areas, including State and local intelligence sharing,
cybersecurity, risk analysis, national planning scenarios, and
Gulf Coast rebuilding efforts. After you complete your
assessment of DHS's performance in these three areas, I look
forward to hearing from you again about the Department's
response plan.
In closing, while you are in the process of charting a path
forward, be mindful that every path has some rough spots and
potholes. I hope you keep in mind the only way to achieve
progress is to keep moving forward despite obstacles. If you
forget, this committee will be here to remind you.
Again, thank you for the hearing here today, and I look
forward to your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
courtesy. Thank you for your work with the Secretary to have
her here this morning.
Secretary Napolitano, we want to congratulate you on your
appointment. We look forward to your service in office. I know
when I was Chairman of the committee, we had you testifying
here on border security. You did an outstanding job on that,
and I want to thank you for the meeting that you and I had. Not
that I want to get any of the other States or communities
jealous, but I want to thank you for being in New York last
weekend with Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly. It was a
very worthwhile meeting for them, and I want to thank you for
that.
As the Chairman said, the Department faces many problems.
This is a Department which is comprised of 22 former
departments, agencies, and 200,000 employees. I think much has
been achieved, but obviously more has to be done. I want to
assure you that on this side of the aisle we will work with you
in addressing the issues that you confront as you move the
Department forward.
Certainly we have the whole issue of FEMA, how that will be
run. Most of us on this side would support it staying within
the Department. You will be evaluating all of that, and again,
we look forward to working with you.
The issue of border security you have a particular interest
in and expertise in. That is a major issue which also has to be
dealt with. It is on-going and will go many years in the
future. We also look forward to working with you on that.
On the whole issue regarding terrorism, there is the issue
of visa waivers which really grows with each year as the list
of countries expands, also the threat expands. I know Secretary
Chertoff had concerns about that. Some of us on the committee
had maybe more concerns--maybe more than Secretary Chertoff
did. So we again want to work with you on the whole issue of
visa waivers.
The UASI funding and other homeland security funding. I
believe the Department has over the last 2 years reached a
level which I think is consistent with our national needs.
Obviously that will be reviewed by you, and I just ask that you
work with us on that.
We had several bad years with a lot of conflicts between
the committee and the Department. I think again over the last 2
years significant progress has been made, but again, I would
just ask that you work with us on that. In particular, probably
the worst problem the Department had on that was when they
dramatically changed the formula without advising anyone in the
Congress, without discussing it with us at all. It really
created some heated hearings, and I thank Chairman Thompson,
who at that time was the Ranking Member. We worked together on
that, and I think we were able to bring about considerable
progress.
The issue of Guantanamo, there is obviously different views
on that. The President has made his decision. I know, speaking
for myself and most on this side of aisle, we disagree with the
decision to close Guantanamo, but if it is going to be closed,
that is what is going to be happening. I know you will be on
the review committee, deciding on what is going to be
happening, what is going to happen with the detainees, how it
will be processed. I think it is a very significant homeland
security issue. We would again ask to be able to work with you
on that so we can be apprised, have our input as it goes along.
Especially with you being on that committee, it gives us direct
access to a key player in that final decision.
One final thing. I am not trying to get into semantics, but
I do notice in your prepared testimony the word ``terrorism''
is not even used. I know your absolute commitment to fighting
terrorism, and I know the President's commitment to that, the
Chairman's as well.
One concern I have had, and maybe Congressman Pascrell and
Congresswoman Clarke, coming from areas which have been hit so
hard, each day we go past September 11, it resets it into
people's memories. The terrible impact of that day, if not
forgotten, it is pushing it back.
I think it is important for us in positions of leadership
to constantly remind people how real that threat is and how it
is an on-going threat, and if we don't do it, it is going to be
harder to get legislative support for the measures that we
think have to be taken.
So I would just urge that on you and again assure you, as I
assured the President, we will not use this issue for partisan
purposes. It is too important. I think the Chairman and I have
worked very well together. As a committee we want to work
together. There will be specific differences we will have, but
this is one issue overall that we agree on, and that is to
protect our Nation from terrorism, to do all we can to avert
another situation like Katrina that becomes a natural disaster,
and also to secure our borders.
With that, Madam Secretary, I thank you for your career in
public service, and the best is yet to come.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may
be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Cleaver follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Emanuel Cleaver
February 25, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, subcommittee Chairs, and
Ranking Members; I would like to begin by expressing my great
excitement in joining the Committee on Homeland Security. I look
forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as we
come together to pursue the admirable goal of protecting our Nation.
Today, I am looking forward to hearing the testimony from Secretary
Napolitano. Secretary Napolitano has extensive background in the field
of homeland security, and I believe that her testimony today will give
this committee the much-needed overview on the direction that the
Department of Homeland Security will be taking in this new
administration.
The Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2003 by combining
resources from 22 agencies within the Federal Government.
Organizational shortcomings have clearly dampened the effectiveness of
this Department, and we can no longer allow this to occur. I am hopeful
that today this committee will have the opportunity for a frank
discussion with Secretary Napolitano where we can discuss the
challenges faced by DHS, as well as the steps that the Department is
taking the fix mistakes of the past. I am eager to hear how her newly
issued directives will pave the way for the Department's future, and as
a new Member of this committee, I am eager to work with the Secretary
to carry out our core mission of keeping Americans safe from harm.
Chairman Thompson. Again I welcome our witness today. Janet
Napolitano was sworn in on January 21, 2009, as the third
Secretary of Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining
the Obama administration, Secretary Napolitano was midway
through her second term as Governor of Arizona. As Governor she
implemented one of the first State homeland security strategies
in the Nation, opened the first State counterterrorism center,
and spearheaded efforts to transform immigration enforcement.
Secretary Napolitano previously served as attorney general
of Arizona and U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona.
Madam Secretary, I thank you for your service, for
appearing before the committee today. Without objection, the
witness's full statement will be inserted into the record.
Secretary Napolitano, I now recognize you to summarize your
statement for 5 minutes, thereabout, but since this is your
first time, we will allow you to come in your own way.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member King, Members of the committee. I appreciate the
invitation to be with you today to share with you my initial
thoughts on how we take a relatively new Department that you
have been an integral part of building and supporting and move
it forward to confront and prepare for threats that face this
Nation, be they man-caused--and terrorism, Representative King,
I believe, falls in that category and is central to that
category--or be they caused by nature. Then if a threat is to
develop, how do we respond and recover with efficiency and
resiliency?
Those issues really cover the broad continuum of this
Department. It is the protection of our borders. It is the
protection of our coasts. It is the protection of our
infrastructure, with all that entails, from pipelines and
electric power grids to the cyber infrastructure of this
country. It is the protection of our people, and it is the
ability to, as I said earlier, respond, recover with the
efficiency and resiliency the American people have demonstrated
time and time again.
Now, to do that requires lots of subsets and lots of
different areas of expertise within the Department of Homeland
Security. One of the things I have overall been pleased with is
the quality of the men and women who have been serving there.
Many of them came to the Department because of the events of 9/
11, and that is really the central motivating factor of the
Department every day. What I have encouraged our people to do
is to say to themselves when they wake up in the morning, what
are they going to do that day to improve the safety and
security of Americans, and, when they leave work that evening,
what did they accomplish that day to improve the safety and
security of Americans?
For my part, what we are doing is kicking the tires,
looking at some issues fresh, with a fresh set of eyes, and
thinking about, as you said, Mr. Chairman, as I title my
testimony, how we move forward. What should our immigration
enforcement policy be, and how will we carry it out? How will
FEMA interact with first responders, cities and States in the
event of a natural disaster?
By the way, let me just pause there and say one of the
things we need to do is to remind people that FEMA is not a
first responder. I think that is one of the myths perhaps that
grew out of Katrina-Rita. But emergency response starts with
cities, localities that have the police and the fire. They
bring in States when the circumstances require, and then FEMA
is there to back up and provide overall support. So lots of
issues there.
Third, intelligence and analysis: A very, very important
part of the overall work of this Department; how that occurs,
and, more importantly, how do we make sure that we have an
integrated intel ability that integrates with State and local
officials and that we are sharing information adequately and on
a real-time basis and getting information back adequately and
on a real-time basis. I believe that is one area that will be a
major focus of my tenure as the Secretary of the Department.
I could go on. I won't because I want to invite the time
for questions. But those are a few of the things that we are
doing.
Now, let me, if I might, pause with the committee and our
relations. My hope is that we have a very strong relationship.
I view this committee as a committee to help us accomplish
these myriad goals and the myriad tasks for the protection of
our people that the Department of Homeland Security is
assigned. We will be open. We will do everything in human power
to be timely, but I hope that we can have a relationship that
allows us to exchange information, ideas, and, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, move the Department forward. So that is my goal with
respect to congressional relations, as it were. So protection
of our people; protection of our lands; protection of our
property; and the ability to respond with efficiency,
resiliency; that is the umbrella goal with many subsets, but
that is what we in the Department are going to be focused on
every day.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. I thank you, Madam Secretary, for your
testimony.
[The statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Napolitano
February 25, 2009
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee: I am pleased to appear before the committee for the first
time as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and I thank
you for this opportunity to discuss how DHS will work in the future to
keep Americans safe.
At its core, I believe DHS has a straightforward mission: to
protect the American people from threats both foreign and domestic,
both natural and manmade--to do all that we can to prevent threats from
materializing, respond to them if they do, and recover with resiliency.
Government does nothing more fundamental than protecting its citizens.
But the execution of this mission can be very complex.
In a little more than a month as Secretary, I have found a
Department facing a number of challenges, many of which have been
documented by the committee. But I have also found a Department filled
with committed public servants. DHS faces the challenges of a young
Department, but this youth is also an advantage in undertaking the
changes needed to best achieve the DHS mission. My message to you today
is that I am confident that DHS--with the support and participation of
Congress--can make those changes, meet those challenges, and move down
``the path forward'' to build a more secure Nation.
action directives
Improving a Department as large and new as DHS requires a broad
look at the current state of its programs. As you know, the DHS
portfolio is extremely diverse. During my short term as Secretary, DHS
has helped respond to ice storms in the Midwest, rescued ice fishermen
on Lake Erie, helped secure the Super Bowl, and even assisted in
capturing pirates off the coast of Somalia--all since January 21.
In undertaking the leadership of the Department, I am setting
priorities that will be important to me as Secretary. We need to hold
people accountable, uphold professionalism across DHS, and act wisely
with taxpayer money. We have to dedicate ourselves to doing what works,
and frequently reassess the Department to make sure that we are
responding to threats as best as possible and making the kind of
progress that Americans expect and deserve. I promise to lead the
Department in a way that focuses intently on achieving results that
make Americans safer. To me, the process of producing results begins
with a prompt assessment of the state of DHS's programs.
We are performing that kind of review right now. In the several
weeks after I took office as Secretary, I issued a series of action
directives to assess the current functions of the Department and help
target areas for improvement. As part of this process, the different
components of DHS are reporting on their current operations and
detailing ways that we could improve programs in the future.
The committee and I have similar views of the Nation's homeland
security needs. I have reviewed the committee's eight platform
points,\1\ and the action directives I issued address all of those
areas. I agree with the need to prioritize each of the areas the
committee listed, and I see the action directives as the start of a
process by which the work of DHS and the committee will improve them.
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\1\ The Committee's platform items: (1) Improving the governance,
functionality, and accountability of the Department of Homeland
Security; (2) enhancing security for all modes of transportation; (3)
strengthening our Nation: response, resilience, and recovery; (4)
shielding the Nation's critical infrastructure from attacks; (5)
securing the homeland and preserving privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties; (6) connecting the dots: intelligence, information sharing,
and interoperability; (7) implementing common-sense border and port
security; and (8) inspiring minds and developing technology--the future
of homeland security.
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The action directives required DHS components to report back to me
in a short time frame, and I want to update the committee on the status
of the directives:
Efficiency Review.--Last week, I issued an action directive
calling for an Efficiency Review across DHS. In a young
Department that combines many processes previously scattered
across the Federal Government, this review will be critical to
improving the governance, functionality, and accountability of
DHS. Components will provide information on actions they are
taking to reduce costs, increase transparency, streamline
processes, eliminate duplication, and improve customer service.
State and Local Intelligence Sharing and Integration.--I
issued two action directives concerned with the Department's
partnerships and intelligence-sharing activities with State,
local, tribal, and territorial partners. As a result of the
directives, the Department is considering a possible future
assessment of all intelligence-sharing efforts within DHS with
an eye toward reducing duplication. DHS is also considering
ways to improve intelligence sharing by involving State and
local partners during the formulation of intelligence-sharing
policies and programs. The Department is looking to improve the
coordination of activities involving State and local partners
across DHS. I issued a separate action directive on FEMA
integration with State and local governments; FEMA presented
feedback based on 75 recommendations emerging from the candid
assessments of State and local homeland security and emergency
management officials.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.--I issued an action directive
regarding the Department's continued efforts in recovery from
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. As a result, FEMA will
establish and field a senior-level team to identify issues
related to--and review, assess, and identify--efficiencies that
will improve Hurricane Katrina and Rita recovery efforts. FEMA
will work to clarify and enhance the Government's role as a
more active and engaged facilitator of long-term community
recovery working across agencies, and will move quickly to
provide arbitration as an additional dispute resolution
mechanism, as per the direction of Congress.
Border Security, Immigration, Employment Verification, and
Enforcement.--I issued a number of directives related to border
security and immigration. Among the directives, I requested an
assessment of past border security assistance by National Guard
and Department of Defense assets. I issued a directive to
measure employer compliance and participation with the
Department's E-Verify program and ways that DHS has worked both
to reduce false negatives in order to protect the rights of
Americans and to strengthen the system against identity fraud.
I issued directives to assess the status of the Department's
work site enforcement programs, fugitive alien operations,
immigration detention facilities, removal programs, and the
287(g) program. I asked for an assessment of the situation of
widows and widowers of U.S. citizens who had petitioned for the
alien spouse's immigration, but whose petitions were not
adjudicated before the citizen spouse's death. I issued a
directive to assess Department programs to combat border
violence and drug smuggling, and as a result, DHS is
considering ways to better engage partners and increase the
effectiveness of these programs. I also issued a directive that
assessed our northern border strategy. Through that directive,
DHS is considering cases where, because of climate and
geography, some specialized technology may need to be developed
or modified in order to protect the northern border while
mitigating unnecessary impacts on our extensive trade with
Canada.
Transportation Security.--In an effort to assess security
across all forms of transportation, I directed the review of
transportation security in the surface, maritime and aviation
sectors. The review identified a number of areas where risks to
transportation security could be reduced. Resources such as
explosives detection systems and transit, rail, and port
security personnel contained in the recently passed American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will enable the
Department to accelerate the mitigation of risk in these areas.
Critical Infrastructure Protection.--I issued an action
directive to assess the status of the Department's efforts to
shield the Nation's critical infrastructure from attacks. The
response contained several steps DHS would take to inspect the
security of chemical plants and efforts DHS would participate
in to limit the availability of dangerous materials. I issued a
separate directive for an assessment of DHS's critical role in
cybersecurity.
Healthcare Surge Capacity.--I issued an action directive
that evaluated DHS's role in building capacity for a ``health
care surge''--the increase in people who might need medical
attention after an incident--including DHS's supporting role in
coordinating response to such an incident, and how the
Department's preparedness and public communications efforts
could better facilitate existing health care surge capacities.
This directive will help us move forward on a critical element
of our Nation's response capability.
Planning and Risk Management.--I issued an action directive
asking for a report on DHS's lead role in the interagency
effort to develop Federal operational plans for prevention,
protection, response, and recovery activities for the National
Planning Scenarios. The report will also discuss how DHS will
work with law enforcement partners inside and outside the
Federal Government in an integrated planning effort. I issued a
separate directive to assess DHS's uses of risk analysis. As a
result, several steps were identified that will assure DHS
provides risk-analysis information to a full range of
decisionmakers, and assure that the Department's strategies are
risk-based.
In addition to the action directives, I have also begun the process
of reaching out to new Cabinet officers. I have already met with
several of my fellow Cabinet officials about areas where our
Departments will cooperate and coordinate. We in the Cabinet work in
one administration, and we address problems together. In particular, I
am conducting this kind of outreach vis-a-vis the Department's
important role in the intelligence community. We are one of several
agencies that work together to identify security threats, and the
ability to cooperate and coordinate across departmental lines is
paramount.
priorities
The action directives process will help determine many of DHS's
particular priorities as we look to move forward. But there are a few
broad areas I can easily identify where DHS should focus in order to
better protect Americans.
State and Local Partnerships
First among these areas is the Department's relationship with State
and local governments. State and local law enforcement agencies are the
forces on the ground that represent, inhabit, and patrol America's
communities--the communities that DHS protects. We need strong
relationships with our State and local partners, and I am committed to
building them.
Partnerships with State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies
affect DHS's ability to identify threats and bolster preparedness
before an incident; they also affect our ability to work with first
responders and assist a community's recovery after an incident. The
information we gather, the funding we grant, and the training and
assistance we provide are all more valuable in securing our Nation if
DHS's relationships with the involved State and local agencies are
strong.
Information sharing between DHS and State and local governments is
particularly critical to our security. Over time, this topic has proven
easy to talk about and difficult to act upon--but we must move forward
on it if we are to strengthen our State and local partnerships. The
fusion of information between the Federal, State and local levels is
what makes the intelligence-gathering process critically valuable to
preventing threats from materializing. Information sharing is also what
makes response efforts effective. The creation of a seamless network we
can use to share this information among these levels of government is a
critical part of improving our partnerships.
Already in my time as Secretary, I have traveled to four different
States and met with State, local, and community leaders in each of them
about how DHS will continue to work with them. The range of topics we
met about--disaster response, community assistance, the development of
new technological capabilities for DHS, and preparedness--speaks to the
extent to which DHS must partner with State and local governments to
work effectively on any front.
When considering the action directives and the committee's eight-
point platform, it is also clear that many critical priorities--from
transit security to border security to infrastructure protection--can
only be achieved with strong State and local partnerships. Building
these partnerships will be an on-going priority throughout my time as
Secretary.
Science and Technology
Second, DHS should build on its science and technology portfolio.
Better science helps us understand emerging threats and how to
identify, counter and mitigate them. Better technology can expand our
capabilities and free our agents to spend their time where it is most
valuable, while at the same time protecting the interests of private
citizens by minimizing law enforcement's impact on lawful activities.
Technology can also aid us in consequence management, so that we are
better prepared to respond to any type of disaster.
It is difficult to think of an area of DHS operation where a
greater use of cutting-edge technology would not improve capabilities.
Our border security efforts, port screening, transportation security,
customs processes, immigration programs, and preparedness and
interoperability efforts could all benefit from a strong push to
develop new technologies and implement them in the field.
A good example of better technology leading to greater capability
is going live this week in San Diego. The port of entry at San Ysidro,
the largest land port in the Nation, is now equipped with radio
frequency identification (RFID) infrastructure--including software,
hardware, and vicinity technology--that allows Customs and Border
Protection Officers to identify travelers faster than ever. The
technology expedites the travel of law-abiding border crossers and
allows agents to focus on where they are most needed. The high-tech
RFID system works in tandem with RFID-enabled documents such as
passport cards, Customs and Border Protection's trusted traveler
programs, and enhanced driver's licenses. An RFID tag embedded in these
documents transmits a unique number to a secure CBP database as the
traveler approaches the border, allowing agents to identify the crosser
quickly. The high-tech system expands law enforcement capabilities
while improving the process for Americans.
Of course, amid the implementation of new technology, we will
continue to be diligent in honoring the rights of Americans and
addressing concerns raised about privacy. To this end, last week I
appointed an experienced new Chief Privacy Officer for the Department,
who will bolster a Privacy Office already recognized as a leader in the
Federal Government. homeland security and privacy need not be
exclusive, and the Department will look to include privacy in
everything we do.
Technologies such as the RFID system at San Ysidro are examples of
the potential of science and technology to make a great impact across
DHS. Especially as DHS works to stay ahead of developing threats, the
forward-thinking application of new technologies will be critical to
enhancing the protection of our country. That is a broad-reaching
priority I plan to pursue, and I look forward to working with the
committee on this effort.
Unifying DHS
To achieve its mission more effectively, DHS must not just operate
better as one Department--it must identify as one Department, where
many different people contribute in diverse ways to one paramount goal:
Securing our Nation. I am committed to building a unified DHS that is
better able to achieve its mission.
The unification of the Department is an issue deeply related to
DHS's operational capacity. It is important that we develop an identity
for DHS that is centered on the Department's mission and that we build
a ``one-DHS'' culture among the different components of the Department.
We also must uphold the morale of DHS workers, an effort that a unified
Department identity would support. Employees across the many DHS
components perform difficult work that, day in and day out, upholds the
security of our Nation. DHS employees should be proud of the public
service they perform, and we should help them in their work by building
a strong Department to support them. Low morale can lessen the ability
of an organization to achieve its goals--something that we cannot let
happen in homeland security.
The Department headquarters building will support our unification
efforts, and I am grateful for the funds for the St. Elizabeths
headquarters included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
But ultimately, our Department is not a building; it is the people in
the Department who will determine its success.
Achieving the goal of a unified Department will take time, but I am
dedicated to making progress on this goal, and I look forward to
working with the committee on furthering it.
conclusion
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
committee--thank you again for inviting me to testify. I am honored to
serve in my new role as Secretary. I am eager to become even further
immersed in the work of protecting our country. And I look forward to a
long, productive relationship with the committee as we work together to
improve homeland security in our Nation. I am happy now to answer any
questions you have.
Chairman Thompson. I will remind each Member that he or she
will have 5 minutes to question the Secretary. I will now
recognize myself to begin questioning.
Again, thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony. I am
glad to learn that you requested a review of the continuing
hurricane recovery efforts on the Gulf Coast. As you know, many
people in my home State of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and
Texas are still displaced. Recently FEMA reported to this
committee that only one-half of the $2.8 billion in Federal
disaster funds provided to Mississippi had been spent 3\1/2\
years after Katrina.
I would like for you to have your people report back to the
committee on why it is taking so long to spend the money for
those Katrina-affected areas. Some of us think it is a long
time. After you provide that information, if you can provide to
us how you think we can do a better job in helping citizens who
are impacted with any natural disaster, I would appreciate it.
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We would be
happy to provide that information. But I think as important is
how we are going to unclog these recovery efforts so that we
can begin to move those issues forward and close some of the
chapters out of Katrina/Rita and the Gulf Coast.
The Secretary of HUD and I are going there next week to do
not only site visits, but to look at what we need to do to
unclog some of the issues about housing. I have also directed
my staff to give me a process by which we can begin to resolve
the claims, the public assistance claims, that have been at
issue between the Federal Government and State and local
governments in the Gulf Coast for these many years. So that is
well under way, and I look forward to reporting back to you.
Actually I look forward to reporting back to you and saying
that we have a process to begin closing some of these claims
out.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
In light of that also, Madam Secretary, there is some
concern of no-bid contracts and other things that the
Department has been criticized for. If you can expand that to
see how we can limit the number of no-bid contracts, that also
would be appreciated for the committee.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Mr. Chairman, absolutely. In
fact, earlier this week President Obama held a fiscal summit.
Some of you were present. I actually was in the breakout group
on procurement, and I don't know how I got that assignment, but
it turns out that that is the nuts and bolts of how you make
Government more competitive, more efficient, how you make sure
that every vendor has a chance to compete for Federal tax
dollars. So that is an area of keen interest, and we are
looking at that and look forward to working with the committee
on that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Border violence. As you know, having been the Governor of a
border State, you have firsthand knowledge of so many of the
things that occur. One of the things we have as a committee and
as a Congress been very supportive of is providing resources.
Secretary Chertoff talked about a surge potential if violence
started moving in the wrong direction. Can you share with the
committee what efforts are under way or you think should be
under way to address this escalating border violence?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I only have 37
seconds left, but it may take me a little longer.
I have actually found a situation in Mexico, one of the top
priority items on my desk. It was on my desk when I was
Governor of Arizona, but as the Secretary of Homeland Security
I see it in a much broader way.
I believe our country has a vital relationship with Mexico,
and I believe that Mexico right now has issues of violence that
are of a different degree and level than we have ever seen
before. That is primarily the product of the President of
Mexico and his government going after these large drug cartels
so that we never run the risk, never run the risk, of Mexico
descending into, say, where Colombia was 15 years ago. As those
efforts have been on-going, it has increased the level of
violence within Mexico. Last year there were 6,000 drug-related
homicides in Mexico; since January, there have already been
1,000. They have been targeting in some of those homicides
public officials, law enforcement officers as a process of
intimidation.
We are working to support President Calderon in his
efforts. I believe this is going to require more than the
Department of Homeland Security, so that we are reaching out to
the National Security Adviser, to the Attorney General and
others about how we within the United States are making sure we
are doing all we can in a coordinated way to support the
President of Mexico. I have met with the Attorney General of
Mexico and the Ambassador already.
One of the things that I particularly am focused on is
southbound traffic and guns, specifically assault weapons and
cash. They are being used to funnel and fund these very, very
violent cartels. So working with Customs, working with ATF, we
are looking at ways we can help suppress that traffic. In my
view, from a Homeland Security standpoint, this is going to be
an issue working with Mexico that is going to be of real
priority interest over these coming months.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. I want to just put a footnote
there that the committee has real concern about this issue, and
to the extent that we can be helpful in addressing it, I want
you as Secretary to feel free to work with us.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee,
the gentleman from New York, Mr. King for questions.
Mr. King. Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary, you said you
looked forward to working with Congress. I don't know if you
will change your opinion over the next few years on that. We do
enjoy this level of cooperation. I think it is important,
though, and this is probably more our problem than yours that
you could end up testifying before 80, 90, 95 House and Senate
committees. So we want to do whatever we can to consolidate
that. We believe that the Committee on Homeland Security should
be the central committee not for any position of gaining turf,
but because I think it should be coordinated similar to the
Armed Forces relationship with the Defense Department. That
will be an on-going issue on Capitol Hill; any moral support
you can give us in that we would appreciate.
On the issue of UASI funding, Homeland Security funding,
one of the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is that
funding be risk-based. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
that has been an issue of some controversy over the last
several years. You have been in office less than 5 weeks. Do
you have any thoughts as to what can be done to ensure that we
do at least as good a job, if not a better job, in determining
how risk-based funding should be implemented?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. To your first point I asked the
question how many hearings the Department had with the House in
the last session, and the answer, within the last session there
were 269 hearings involving the Department of Homeland
Security, 126 involving this committee or its subcommittees,
111 involving other authorizing committees, 32 involving
Appropriations Committee or its subcommittees. So while it
would be presumptuous of me to recommend to Congress how it be
organized, I think that it is a fact that is relevant, and
indeed one of the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, the only one that hasn't been acted on, is the
need to now streamline and focus on the Department of Homeland
Security from a congressional oversight perspective.
With respect to UASI and risk base, we have now
consolidated 99 percent of the grants and grant funding. That
99 percent all comes under FEMA. What I have said is the way we
are approaching it is everywhere in the country has some sort
of risk. It can be interruption of the food chain supply by an
event happening in Kansas, it can be interruption of the
gasoline supply to the country because of the refineries
located in the Gulf Coast. It can be, as we tragically saw on
9/11, interruption of our markets and stock exchanges by a
terrorist act in New York City. So we have all kinds of risk.
So some base level of funding needs to accommodate that.
But above and beyond, there are areas of particular risk
and would have particular broader impacts on the country, and
that is where I think we need to focus our analysis and sharpen
what are those risks and what are the impacts to the country if
something untoward were to happen. So as we move forward, I
would be happy to work with and inform the committee about
this, but that is where I believe the analysis of the risk-
based work needs to be done. It is beyond kind of a base level
of risk that every area shares, although they are different.
There is a base level there. But beyond that, we know there are
certain areas where if risks were to materialize, there would
be an undue impact on the rest of the country.
Mr. King. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Another issue raised by the 9/11 Commission was the sharing
of intelligence at the Federal level, and, of course, part of
your response was to share that down to the local level. At the
Federal level itself, though, it was my impression the first
several years at the Department that DHS was sort of excluded,
or the other power players tried to keep DHS out of the
intelligence gathering and didn't share as much as they should
have with them. I think when Mr. Charlie Allen came on board,
that improved somewhat.
I ask that you do what you can to make sure that DHS does
get the intelligence it should be getting. You are in a better
position then to get that to the local governments. If you need
assistance, we would agree that the Department would have a
role to play as far as receiving the intelligence gathered from
the other intelligence agencies.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
I think one of the perhaps advantages I have is that this
is the first time there has actually been a transition of
administrations where you have a Department of Homeland
Security from Day 1 and indeed a Secretary from Day 1. I think
that helps with some of those issues that Secretary Ridge and
perhaps Secretary Chertoff experienced.
I believe that the Department right now is fully a partner
in intelligence sharing, and if it is not, I will be fighting
for that. I think at this point the key challenge we have, as I
said in my opening statement, is how do we better share with
State and locals and also get their information back, because
they have, quite frankly, more eyes and ears than the Federal
Government will ever have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair will now recognize other
Members for questions they may wish to ask the Secretary. Again
I urge Members to be mindful of the 5-minute rule and the
Secretary's limited time with the committee. In accordance with
our committee rules, I recognize Members who were present at
the start of the hearing based on seniority on the committee,
alternating between Majority and Minority. Those Members coming
in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California
for 5 minutes, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam
Secretary, for being before us.
I actually really look forward to this change in
administration and having you head our Department. Why?
Because, first of all, I am the Vice Chair of this committee,
and second, I chair the subcommittee that has much of what has
been happening in Homeland, which means that I have had to
oversee the TWIC program, Project 28, SBInet, Deepwater, US-
VISIT, Western Hemisphere, all of which have had major, major
problems. I look forward to talking to you about that and
figuring out how to get things under way at the Department.
In addition to that, I have the global counterterrorism or
the international aspect of all the intelligence gathering and
information, and I look forward to talking in a separate
meeting with you with respect to how we might incorporate that
better into the Department of Homeland Security.
Of course, the border violence, the drug trafficking, I am
not going to talk much about that, because I have a feeling
that my Ranking Member Mr. Souder, who has worked on these
issues for a long time, will probably ask you many questions
with respect to that.
Cybersecurity is--as a Californian, I think that will be
one of the biggest areas that we will have to look at. I also
sit on that subcommittee.
My first question is that in the last Congress I introduced
House Resolution 6869, which is the Border Security Search
Accountability Act. This has to do with being stopped entry
into the country and taking people's laptops and BlackBerrys or
what have you and not have a good policy with respect to why we
take them, how long they are gone, will we return them to
whomever, et cetera. It poses a lot of issues. You can imagine
if you had your work on your laptop, and you went to a country
and they took it away from you and might never return it.
Madam Secretary, during your Department's review of the
Bush-era policies, are you open to updating the border search
electronic seizure policies and working with me to adding
accountability to that process?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. Let me share with you on the
issue of laptops and laptop searches. The law here is very
straightforward and, quite frankly, very broad that at the
border the Federal Government possesses the ability to search.
But that doesn't answer the question should it search, and what
are the elements that should be incorporated into a decision to
search, and then what do you do after a search is complete with
respect to return of material?
We have now appointed a Chief Privacy Officer for the
Department, and there are a number of issues that we handle,
including the laptop issue, that have really key privacy
concerns, such as the ones you raised, inherent in them. So I
look forward--she reports to work in a week or 2--to putting
her to work and helping us develop further refinement of what
we are doing, and, of course, working with the committee about
what we are doing.
Ms. Sanchez. We intend to reintroduce some type of
legislation with respect to that, so I would like to work with
you to ensure that we know what we are doing and getting it
through the Congress.
The second issue I have is this April I plan to hold my
fourth hearing on the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, or the TWIC card. What plans do you have in place
to help workers obtain TWIC cards during these last 7 weeks
before the April 15 deadline? I just have a feeling a lot of
people haven't pulled them; there is going to be a mad rush to
try to get them. How will you ensure that people aren't out of
work after April 15 if they don't have this card to get on the
port system, et cetera? Would you consider temporary measures
like allowing unescorted access for 30 days for vehicles who
maybe did not get them or maybe had part of a background check
done? This is a train wreck waiting to happen, I believe.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, here is the status of TWIC
right now. It has been implemented in all but about seven or
eight ports. There are about 1.1 million workers who need a
TWIC card. Around 920,000 already have their cards, or their
cards are just about ready to be issued. So that process is
well under way. The ports that are left are some of our larger
ports, New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Long Beach, and so we
want to make very sure that the process goes smoothly at all
our ports, but particularly those that haven't yet fully
implemented TWIC.
All I can say is that it is not only on our radar, but the
subject of daily questions from me about how we are doing, who
has the cards, what problems we are experiencing, how we are
resolving those problems. But the point of fact is that TWIC
card and having identify about those who are getting into
secure areas at our ports I believe is a very important part of
homeland security and securing our country. So we want to move
this process along and move it and enforce it.
If there need to be exceptions, that is something I prefer
not to talk about in the committee because I don't want people
thinking that the deadline is going to move or something is
going to change. TWIC is where we are going; it is well under
way. The problems we have encountered so far have been dealt
with, and we are moving forward.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for
5 minutes, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations on your appointment, and it is nice to see
another former attorney general making good.
First of all, let me just say that I was not here serving
when Secretary Ridge was heading the Department. I have been
here for 4 years while Secretary Chertoff was here. I happen to
think he did a very good job in trying to amalgamate all of
those agencies and departments. I think there was much progress
made, but we all know a lot more needs to be done, and I
appreciate your dedication to doing that.
If I could just follow up on what Mr. King said about us
talking at least about the issue of terrorism. One of the
things that has struck me over the last 4-plus years is that it
is awfully easy to lose our sense of urgency in terms of the
public and this Congress. As a fellow westerner, since we were
so far away from 9/11, sometimes it is difficult to keep that
image in the minds of our people so that they understand that
it could happen anywhere. You and I know the potential for an
uncontrolled border for soft spots for terrorists to come
across, so I appreciate your dedication, and I particularly
appreciate what you said about Mexico.
I think there is misunderstanding about Mexico sometimes in
this body, and that is I think the current administration there
is doing precisely what we want them to do to fight
narcoterrorism. The increase in violence is not an indication
that they are not doing something, it is an indication that the
bad guys are pushing back, and that could very well spill over
into our sovereign territory, and that is why we need to work
so closely with that country. So I appreciate what you have
said, and I think your experience as Governor at one of the
border States will help us bring that issue to the fore even
more. So I thank you for that.
Let me just bring up a couple of things. One is now we are
doing a number of full-body imaging scans at a number of
different airports. I see that some in the privacy community
have raised issues. So let me throw out a very simple thing,
and I happen to be someone who has an artificial hip. It is
less an invasion of my privacy to go through full-body imaging
than it is to have people placing their hands on my body all
over the place.
I would say that if you run into a problem with respect to
privacy questions, think about creating an ``I don't care''
line. I happen to think--no, I am very serious about this--I
think if you had an ``I don't care'' line, many of us would
rather go through that. I think you would find some of the
privacy issues that might otherwise bubble up might be
alleviated by making it very clear that you can go through that
line, you are going to go through a full-body scanner, fully
knowing what is happening. I would just hope that you would
consider that, because I don't think we should lose that
technology. I see some articles coming up about some concerns
about that.
Second, cybersecurity. If I were to review all of the areas
that we have worked on, that is both the Congress and the
Department, over the last 4 years, the one area I think we have
done the least in is cybersecurity. I think that is a
reflection of our society at large. I know that you have
indicated that it is one of your concerns or top 12 or 20 or
whatever that list was. Could you talk a little bit about that
and what you think we need to do both as a governmental entity
and also to work with the private sector in that regard?
Secretary Napolitano. Certainly. With respect to the full-
body scans, we are piloting them. We began in Tulsa, I believe,
last week. There are four or five other airports, Albuquerque,
Salt Lake City, and so forth. We will be using them as a pilot
as well. We don't have an ``I don't care'' line. We actually
have an ``I care deeply'' line. There is always an option to
use a regular magnetometer for a passenger who doesn't want a
full-body scanner. I believe, as you do, it is less intrusive
to use the full-body scanner. I think the key question for us
is going to be can we make it more rapid so we don't develop
lines at the airports. So that is moving forward, and that
technology seems to be very, very good, very promising at the
least.
In terms of cybersecurity, the National Director of
Intelligence has begun a 60-day review of what we are doing
Federal Government-wide on cyber, and in particular what we are
doing to reduce portals of entry into the system, what we are
doing to respond to intrusions, but, more importantly, what we
are doing to implement technologies that would prevent
intrusions.
I believe, as you do, that the private sector has to be not
only our partner in that, but they are actually in a way key
consumers of what we are doing. So while I can't tell you right
now what the actual operative structure is going to be to make
sure the private sector is included, I have instructed our
cyber folks to make sure that we are reaching out to the
various private-sector groups.
Mr. Lungren. I think you will find that the Members of this
committee want to work very closely with you on that as a
priority. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California. It must be a California day today, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman, every day is a California day.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that President Obama has
selected a good personal friend and an able woman to head the
Department, and I would just point out to the Secretary that
this committee wants to be your partner. I know the Chairman
said that. We want to be your partner, and we have a strong
history of bipartisanship in this committee. We may be
jurisdictionally challenged, but we try to punch above our
weight. This issue couldn't be more critical.
Let me just put out a few things because time is very short
and invite your comment to all of them. First of all, I applaud
the new tone of the Department. As I have told you personally,
I think your role is to prepare, not scare the American public.
Yes, terrorism is a challenge; yes, we have more to do and much
to fear since 9/11. But if people are personally prepared for
what might come their way, first they will know what to look
for, but second of all, they will have that resilience that you
just talked about and not be terrorized. So appreciate what you
are doing.
No. 2, on the intelligence function, which is of keen
interest to me, I applaud your comment that your challenge is:
How do we share with the State and locals and get their
information back? I think that the INA function at Homeland
unfortunately, at least up to this point, is more of a
stovepipe than an information-sharing vehicle, and that is why
I have urged you and will continue to urge you to appoint a cop
to be the head of INA, because I think that that expertise is
critical.
I don't think the problem is getting information from the
Federal Government. I think the problem is forcing that
information down to the person who will actually uncover and
prevent, hopefully, or disrupt the next terror attack on our
soil.
Third, the National Application Office, which was stood up
by your predecessor and, I gather, still operating at some weak
level inside the Homeland Department, I think it is a mistake
to have an office at Homeland Security that could task military
satellites to conduct homeland security functions over the
United States. I think there is a posse comitatus problem. I
think existing law is adequate, and that is why Congressman
Norm Dicks, a former Member of this committee, and I sent you a
letter recently urging you to shut it down. I really think that
would be in our national interest.
Finally, I mentioned we are jurisdictionally challenged
here. I would just welcome any comments you have and invite
them for the record about how hard it is for Homeland Security
officials, especially the Secretary, to appear at 88 committees
and subcommittees in the U.S. Congress, and why it might make
more sense to put most of the jurisdiction in this committee.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you.
A few points, on the State and local information sharing.
Obviously as a former Governor and State attorney general, I
really appreciate that need. I will be giving an address in 2
weeks at the National Conference for Fusion Centers. We really
need to pump up that effort and make them a vital part of our
national security network in terms of information sharing. So
look for those comments.
With respect to the National Applications Office, that is
one of the issues that I am reviewing. They do have an
appropriation actually from the Congress, and so what I have
said is, look, I want to know what we are doing, what are the
issues impacting privacy and expectations of privacy that
should be taken into account, and I will be happy to report
back to you, to the committee and Congressman Dicks as we go
forward. So we have lots of issues to work on jointly, but I
look forward to that partnership.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman, I have 51 seconds remaining, so I
would invite the Secretary to put on the record how many
appearances her predecessor had to make before the Congress,
because I think it is useful for the audience tuning in to hear
about this.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. I should have done that in
response to your question. Last session it was 269 hearings in
the House, 126 before this committee or its subcommittees, 111
from other authorizing committees, 32 from the appropriations
side.
I would say Secretary Chertoff was a great partner to work
on on the transition from one administration to the next on
homeland security. It is a nonpartisan issue, it is a very
functional operational issue, it is nuts and bolts. But I think
one of his comments and strong feelings was work of the
Department was sometimes interrupted, unduly delayed, and lots
of hours spent on preparing for hearings and so forth, when, in
fact, better answers could have been prepared if more work
could have actually been done prior to a hearing.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here.
First there is talk in the last couple of years about
pulling FEMA out of the Department. What are your thoughts? I
will be up front; I am very opposed to that. This has become a
well-organized Department. It has taken several years to get
that way. We had some real rough spots when initially putting
the 22 agencies together, and things are starting to work
better now. I think it would be very disruptive. I am of the
opinion of given how well FEMA has performed over the last
couple of years, it is evidence that it is working. But what
are your thoughts on the effort to remove FEMA from the
Department?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. Several things. One is I
have not yet had the opportunity to speak about this with
President Obama, and should he wish to seek that statutory
change, he needs the space with which to do that. There are,
though, as you know, many efficiencies to be encountered where
FEMA is now. The issue, to me, is one of leadership and
operations. If FEMA is working well, responding well, backing
up State and locals--and again, the expectation that it is a
first responder, that is a public perception that is
inaccurate, and historically inaccurate. We need some help
changing that expectation. But if it is doing its job working
with State and locals in preparing and responding, if there is
good leadership and management, where it fits in the Federal
organizational chart becomes less of an acute issue.
So right now it is within the Department of Homeland
Security, it is part of my charter. I look forward to when the
President nominates an Administrator, but in the mean time we
keep working with the men and women in that Department, and
again, kind of a parallel of the State and local intel sharing
I talked about earlier, working with our first responders and
our State and locals. I will be speaking to the national NIMA
conference in the future, also an important part of FEMA's
work.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. We put quite an effort into raising
the number of Border Patrol agents from roughly 12,000 to now a
little over 18,000, which was the goal. I still think it is too
few. I think we should be over 20,000, but we hit that goal.
But I am concerned that we haven't done anything on the ICE
side; the number of agents has been flat for years. Do you have
any opinion as to when that is going to change, or have you
looked at that? Are you aware of any efforts to try to grow the
number of ICE agents to be more compatible with the growth that
we put on Customs?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. We are looking at staffing
levels across the Department, but also between Departments.
Immigration is a system. It begins with the apprehension of
someone illegal in our country and works not only through DHS,
but also through the Department of Justice; you have to have
marshals to transport detainees, because you have to have
facilities, you have to have courtrooms. So the Attorney
General and I have begun if I could say almost a joint review
of the immigration system and what the Federal Government needs
to do to support it.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Last I have the Center for Domestic
Preparedness in my district. It is a wonderful facility, only
one like it in the world to train first responders from all
over the world. It is a facility where they offered the
training free, they have to come. A fireman or -woman or police
officer or rescue department, they come and spend 2 weeks of
training. It is free.
The problem is my district is very rural, and most of the
first responders are volunteers, and they work during the day,
and they can't take 2 weeks and go to the center. So I have
been an advocate for the center to try to package more of that
training and take it out in increments, 3- and 4-hour training
for regional departments to come together. I would like to see
you push that some more, because most of us, if you look at our
districts, most of the first responders are, in fact,
volunteers, and their neighborhood will be able to take
advantage of the state-of-the-art training that we have at CDP.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. It is a wonderful
facility. I look forward to actually doing a site visit at some
time. That is an interesting idea. Let me pursue it, and we
will get back to you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We have some votes.
Mr. DeFazio. Ten minutes; could I do any of my set of
questions?
Chairman Thompson. Just as soon as I finish, I would be
happy to. The plan is to recess the hearing, take the three
votes and come back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr.
DeFazio for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
welcome.
When we created the Transportation Security Administration
at the insistence of the then Republican majority, there was a
provision that at the discretion of the then Secretary, which
would have been Secretary Mineta, that the employees could be
precluded from collective bargaining rights and unionization if
it was in the national interest. Unfortunately, Secretary
Mineta made that decision.
As you know from the surveys of the employees in Homeland
Security, there are morale problems. A lot of it goes to the
management of the Bush administration, the misdirection, but
some of it goes to the fact that they are denied these rights
which are made commonly available.
Do you have the authority to reverse that decision by then
Secretary Mineta, since it is now under your jurisdiction? I
was asked by a TSA employee on my way through 2 weeks ago
reminding me that we may have an administration now that might
be receptive to restoring their rights. If you don't have that
authority will you ask for it from this committee and Congress?
Secretary Napolitano. The answer to your question is that I
have asked our General Counsel's Office exactly that question,
and I don't have a response yet. But obviously, I appreciate
the valuable men and women who work and some of these jobs are
very difficult jobs in difficult settings and I appreciate what
they are doing.
So we are looking at this right now from both a legal and a
policy standpoint.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. They have to deal with grumpy Members
of Congress and others traveling through their checkpoints.
The second point would be on the equipment that they are
utilizing. I believe that the so-called stimulus package had
some equipment acquisition in there, and I believe some of it
was going to be dedicated to replacing the equipment at the
checkpoint. Because even though you would not have had to go
through it, everyone else in here went through superior
equipment that guards our buildings and all the other Federal
buildings in terms of having multidimensional capabilities so
they don't have to say can I take your bag and turn it and run
it through again, slowing down the line and trying to get a
look at something suspicious. Is that going to happen? Are we
going to get them the same equipment that is readily available
that we have here, or better?
Secretary Napolitano. I can't speak to precisely the
equipment that is going to be purchased, but the stimulus
package did include a generous share for TSA. So we will be
looking I am sure at a variety of different types of scanning
equipment.
The goal is obviously to be able to identify something that
requires a second look and to do it with a lot of speed and
accuracy. That is what we are asking the scanning--that is what
we are looking for in our scanning process. So that is what the
equipment needs to be purchased in order to accomplish.
Mr. DeFazio. I am glad that you recognize that. We had
trouble with the last administration on that issue.
Switching from aviation over to ports, I think that the
greatest single threat of a nuclear weapon is not someone
launching something at us; it is someone secreting it in a
container with a GPS or trigger device attached. We put
through, over the objections of the last administration,
shippers, and everybody else, a requirement that by 2012 that
everything be screened overseas. The last administration made
clear to us that they did not think this was doable and they
weren't going to really push for it.
What is the attitude of this administration regarding this
threat and the possibility of meeting the deadline in 2012 of
scanning all the containers before they depart foreign ports?
The last administration--they assured us they would scan all
the containers before they left our ports to go to the interior
in case they contained threats. I guess that made our ports
sacrifice zones. I never understood that position. Are we going
to do it overseas?
Secretary Napolitano. That is something that we have been
looking at. I must share with the committee my initial view is
that the 2012 deadline is not going to work and we are going to
have to work on what we do beyond that.
To do 100 percent scanning requires, for example,
agreements with many, many countries. There are lots of issues
with that. There is a difference between screening and scanning
in the lexicon of the cargo world.
Mr. DeFazio. I know.
Secretary Napolitano. I believe that we are close to 100
percent screening.
Mr. DeFazio. Which sometimes can be meaningless with the C-
TPAT program deficiencies and others.
Secretary Napolitano. That is right. That is something that
I am looking at right now more deeply. But my initial review is
that 2012 is a deadline that may not be reached under the
current state of the program.
Mr. DeFazio. We would love--and I think the Chairman
shares--we would love to discuss this issue further and see if
we could help move that along. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. I now recognize the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, for 5 minutes and that will be our last
questioner for this series, Madam Secretary. We plan to come
back around 20 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank
you for coming before this committee today. I would like to
start by first saying how appreciative I am of your efforts and
your staff's efforts and your prompt response to two recent
constituent inquiries from my office. Thank you for that.
The first one involved a constituent named George Boujadi,
a lawful permanent resident of Lebanese descent currently
living in my district and currently working in Iraq in support
of the U.S. Government. George is a bilingual security adviser
who has worked for the United States Department of State for 20
years, most of which has been overseas. Specifically he oversaw
the protective detail of Ambassador Ryan Crocker in both
Lebanon and now in Iraq. However, because his Government job
requires him to reside overseas it may take him another 5 years
to become a U.S. citizen. In fact, George has been working 4-
month deployments in Iraq with 20 days respite at home in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania since 2004 as a legal permanent
resident. I suspect that George's case may or may not be unique
but he is certainly deserving of citizenship.
What processes or procedures does the Department have in
place to assist or expedite citizenship applications from these
patriotic individuals serving U.S. security interests abroad
and in this case in a combat zone?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, and that is
something that goes to a department called Citizenship and
Immigration Services. One of the things we need to have the
flexibility to do is to deal with special cases, perhaps ones
such as the gentleman you reference.
So I don't know that a statutory or procedural change is
necessary. I think it needs to be a sensitivity change, if a
particular case comes forward that we could expedite it.
Mr. Dent. That would be appreciated. Would you oppose
making targeted amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act? You mentioned statutory changes may or may not be
necessary, but I would like to at least give you some
discretion with respect to citizenship requirements under
circumstances like this. In fact, I have a letter from
Ambassador Crocker urging that this man be made a citizen, even
stating that on more than a few occasions this individual
probably saved his life as well as others. So I would like to
give you that type of authority. How would you feel about that
type of discretion?
Secretary Napolitano. I am always glad to have discretion,
I think any Secretary would say the same on any matter but I
would be glad to work with you on that.
Mr. Dent. The second case, I recently brought to your
Department's attention, this involved a transportation worker's
identification credential, the TWIC card, and as the new
Ranking Member on the Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, this is an issue that I
look forward to exploring further in this Congress. There is
going to be a photo on the screen. I don't see it. There it is.
Okay.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Dent. I wanted you to see that. It is a boat called the
Josiah White II, being pulled by Hank and George along a canal.
To be very clear, Hank and George are the mules. This is part
of an exhibit at the National Canal Museum in my district in
eastern Pennsylvania. Now, Hank and George, while sometimes are
ornery, they are not terrorists. This much we are certain.
However, the current TWIC statute requires that the individuals
in colonial garb have TWIC cards.
While the photo is funny, the unintended consequences of
this particular statute are not. I have two questions: First,
Madam Secretary, do you believe that the mule tenders in this
photograph should be required to have terrorist watch list
background checks and TWIC cards? I know it is sort of
facetious but the at same time it is serious. They are
required.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, let me just say this. Obviously
this is a picture designed to say, hey, isn't this absurd that
they be required to have TWIC cards. Let's work with you on
this particular case if we might.
Mr. Dent. I would like to work with you on a more common-
sense approach to this, a risk-based approach to requiring TWIC
cards under circumstances like this. It is costly and obviously
it is common sense. It just does not involve this situation,
but it could involve a fishing boat and others who are taking a
few people off the coast for a few hours.
Finally, one other issue on which I have been working.
There are 139,000 people in this country awaiting removal, they
have removal orders against them. They come from about eight
countries, China, India, Vietnam, Laos, Jamaica and a few
others. Those countries will not repatriate their citizens. We
are trying to send them back but they will not accept them.
I have introduced legislation, and Senator Specter, Mike
Castle and others, to hold up visas from these countries until
those countries repatriate their citizens. Many of these
citizens are criminals--a large number of them are criminals
but they have removal orders against them and we would like to
have them sent back.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Madam Secretary, you can hold that. We
have to vote. The committee stands in recess for about 20
minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. We would like to reconvene the recessed
meeting.
The next person to be recognized, the gentlewoman from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, Madam Secretary, let me welcome you
and thank you so very much for the breath of fresh air in our
committee. I would like to echo some of the comments about
jurisdiction. I think it is enormously important. I know it
falls a lot to our resolution, this Congress. But I think it is
enormously important for this very important department to have
a focused jurisdiction.
I might offer as well a consideration on FEMA. No, I don't
believe it should be moved. I know the administration is
considering it. But an option may be if you look at the
schematic map of the Department, and I am sure you have, you
will find FEMA way down on the stair steps, maybe two steps
from the basement in terms of how it is framed. Possibly the
opportunity for it to be put where it is a direct report to the
Secretary at a level somewhat similar to the way USAID is in
the State Department. I only refer that to you for reference.
But I do believe that although FEMA is not a first
responder, as you well know, it is a lifeline for communities.
It is the direct contact that we have.
I am just going to put a number of things quickly on the
record and try and move as quickly as possible. I have been a
strong advocate for the rehabilitation of areas because of
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. We now have Hurricane Ike and we
were doubly collapsed because of the economic markets, the
attention to that area just did not continue. So we have a
charity hospital that is now closed, University of Texas MB
wondering where the money is. We have an issue of ineligibility
that is one of the highest when our applicants have not been
able to get FEMA recovery. Our contractors have not been paid.
Our housing director has just had a press conference yesterday.
He can't get any housing on the ground because of environmental
impact statements.
I would like to invite you to the region. I welcome what
you are doing in the Gulf region with the Secretary of HUD. I
would like to welcome you to the region to come with the same
package or team, because we are desperately in need of a fix. I
just want to know, can I welcome you to work with me on these
issues?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and with respect to the
schematic of the Department, you know the Department has seven
big operational components, FEMA, TSA, CIS, CBP, ICE, the
Secret Service, and the Coast Guard. The schematic, if you
actually trace it back, they do come right up into the
Secretary's office. I meet with the head of those components at
least once a week. We are closely involved there.
With respect to your invitation, I look forward to meeting
with you. I look forward to seeing what FEMA funds have already
gone into the Ike recovery and what we need to do to move that
process along.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I appreciate that it may require waivers
from your office. The housing issue is really at a crisis. We
have got the manufactured housing on the ground all ready to go
and can't move and people don't have housing.
Let me quickly put two other questions out. I am excited
about the Transportation Security Committee that I chair. The
importance of critical infrastructure I think is going to be
one of our greatest challenges, but I do want to just ask the
question dealing with the chemical facility security program
which has been a success. Can we--do you believe the program
could include wastewater, water, and I think maritime
facilities? I am just going to give you these questions.
Other one is we had a commitment from the administration to
train our employees, 9/11 included specific training mandates.
They never made them. So my question is whether we will see
security training mandates for our rail and bus workers and
transit workers, our port workers. Very important issue. I
really join in the professional development needs of our TSA
employees.
Last, I visited Guantanamo Bay. I said I was going to keep
an open mind. I am very glad that you on are the team to review
it. I believe it can be closed at the same time that we can
protect our national security.
If you could answer the questions dealing with training and
the chemical security issue.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we are obviously in the process
now of beginning to issue the categorization of chemical
facilities under the CFAS rules and that process will continue
through this spring. We will keep the committee apprised of our
progress there. We are now looking at the whole issue of waste
and wastewater treatment facilities with respect to their
coverage under the law and what needs to be done.
With respect to training, obviously training is a passion
with me. I believe for emergency preparedness and response and
for people just to know what they need to do under any
different type of circumstance, training is so very key. So,
yes, we are going to be reinvigorating our efforts in that
area.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Key issues. My subcommittee and this
committee looks forward to really working closely with you on
these issues. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. I think my
time has expired.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We now recognize
Mrs. Miller for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam
Secretary, we certainly welcome you to the committee as all of
my colleagues have said as well. We appreciate your service to
your State and looking forward to your service now of our
entire Nation. We certainly need it. It is a very challenging
time of course for our Nation and as you are being introduced,
your introductory meeting to the committee, I am going to take
most of my time to tell you a little bit about my region of the
world and how we look forward to working with you if I could.
I come from Michigan, which is a northern border State. I
am not minimizing all of the dynamics and the challenges that
we face on our southern border in our country, but on the
northern border we have some similar issues and dynamics as
well as some unique things as well. In my region in southeast
Michigan, just as an example, we have the Ambassador Bridge,
which is the biggest border crossing on the northern tier. The
tunnel from Windsor runs under the Detroit River there.
Incredibly busy artery as well.
The Blue Water Bridge in my district, 30 minutes to the
north of the Ambassador Bridge, is the second busiest border
commercial crossing on the northern tier, and of the two it is
the only one you can transit HAZMAT. We have some of those
issues. The CN rail runs under the St. Clair River.
I keep holding this up because in Michigan you have the map
of our State at the end of your arm. Here we have----
Secretary Napolitano. Which finger is it?
Mrs. Miller. The CN rail tunnel is the busiest rail entry
into the entire Nation. It runs under the St. Clair River
there. On the other side of the long liquid border that we
share with our wonderful neighbors of Canada in the immediate
area is something we call Chemical Valley, which I believe is
if not the largest, the second-largest concentration of
petrochemical plants in our hemisphere. Of course we have the
Great Lakes there, one-fifth of the fresh water drinking supply
of the entire Nation.
So there has been quite a bit more attention from the
previous administration and I certainly have followed closely
your comments about northern border security as we try to sort
of beef up. As we speak we are standing up with Customs and
Border Patrol a northern border wing at our Air National Guard
base there. They have got additional personnel, air assets,
both fixed and some Blackhawks--fixed-wing and Blackhawks. They
have some water assets that are coming there, too. We are
looking forward in 2010 to a UAV mission. I have some questions
and maybe we can follow up later about that on how that might
all work along the northern border. We obviously are not going
to put a fence around our entire Nation, but being able to
utilize essentially taxpayer funded off-the-shelf hardware that
has worked so well in theater for homeland security is a very
critical component.
My area is going to be a pilot program on the northern tier
for the CDINet. I think in the spring. Hopefully they are right
now doing--this is sort of what they told us but we are waiting
for a briefing as well, which would be 24/7 surveillance all
the way along the St. Clair River from the Blue Water Bridge to
Lake St. Clair. A number of different towers that they are
talking about building or utilizing existing towers. Our area
just recently got one of the Stone Garden grants. Really we
look at it as a force multiplier for CBP for our local law
enforcement, and we are blessed with--as everybody in the
Nation is, but we are always parochial about our own emergency
management teams and how fantastic and professional they are
and how they are looking forward to partnering with your agency
in every way that they possibly can.
As you might imagine because of our proximity, we have
regular meetings. On Friday I will be meeting with the three
Canadian MPs to talk about the border thickening issues, et
cetera. So I want to lay that out to you. We are obviously just
so delighted to have you at the helm here and looking forward
to working with you on all of these issues.
But since I have 51 seconds left, let me ask you if you
could, Secretary, to flesh out a bit some of your initial
comments about northern border issues and security.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and thank you. Your district
does include some very busy areas for trade and commerce
between our important neighbors to the north. It is
interesting, when I issued a request for information about what
we were doing on the northern border, that was immediately
interpreted as thickening the border.
Mrs. Miller. It is all they talk about.
Secretary Napolitano. My view is we need to have a security
strategy--we need have issues or protections at the northern
border that make sense for that area, for that topography and
the like, but fully take into account the balance that always
must be struck between security and trade and relationships
that are on-going.
But part of what I am doing now is trying to get an
analysis. What is up there? What is on the drawing board? So
what are the pilots that are contemplated for the next 6 months
to a year? Then I do plan myself to go to the border maybe when
it is a little warmer.
Mrs. Miller. Spring is on the way.
Secretary Napolitano. Exactly. Because I think there is
nothing better than seeing it with your eyes and then talking
with local mayors, sheriffs, police chiefs, to get their sense,
also our CBP and other employees who are stationed there, to
what is going on there and what really works. For both of our
borders our goal is a safe and secure border that allows us to
protect our sovereignty interests as a Nation but also
recognizes that we have key trade alliances and family
relationships to the north and indeed to the south.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you so much. We are delighted to have
you here and look forward to working with you.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. We now recognize the gentleman from
Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, it
is a pleasure to be with you. First of all, I congratulate you
and second of all, I would ask if you could have your staff
whenever you all develop your strategic, your performance
plans, your mission, your goals, your performance measures, I
know I asked that when I first got on the committee some years
ago, I never got it. I would appreciate if you could get us
your performance and your strategic plans for the Department.
No. 2, and I have a series of questions, one is ports of
entry. We have done a good job in putting men and women in
green, but we need men and women in blue. Not only ICE but the
ports of entry, because the wait lines are pretty long, as you
know.
We added the $720 million in the stimulus package, a part
going to you all, a part going to GSA. I would ask you all to
streamline the process to get that done. Because 88 percent of
all the goods coming to the United States come through land
ports. We have done a good job putting money into the airports
and the seaports, which we need to continue doing, but the land
ports, 88 percent of all the goods are coming in. In my
hometown of Laredo, which I am hoping that you will visit us
soon, 40 percent of all the trade between United States and
Mexico comes through the Port of Laredo. We get about 13,500
trucks going north- and southbound, 1,200 railcars every day.
This is just on a daily basis.
I would ask you to move on those ports' funding as soon as
possible to streamline the process on that. I would appreciate
your help.
The other thing I would ask you is--I asked the former
Secretary and I never got the response, and I think even the
Chairman asked him also. Could you give us, best case scenario,
how many personnel you would need for customs officials to man
all the ports north and south and what sort of infrastructure
needs you need. Because we have been estimated about $4.9
billion. We added $720 million, but if we could get those two
responses, because we never got it from the other Secretary. I
would ask you to provide that to us as soon as possible.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. Yes, and if I might speak
to the issue of the land ports of entry. Those ports are
absolutely key. I was delighted that the Congress did include
$720 million which will allow us to accelerate pre-identified
projects to enlarge and modernize those land ports. Many of
them have not been improved since the '70s and the amount of
trade that goes back and forth, as you know, has exploded in
the mean time.
So what we are doing to streamline actually is we are
putting together a joint GSA-Customs planning office for the
improvements in those ports. So that instead of going
sequentially, first Customs looks at it and says this is what
this port needs and then it goes to GSA which puts its imprint
on it and this goes back and forth. We actually have people in
one place--the people that operate the port, with the people
who have to do the contracting and the construction of the port
improvements. I am hoping that we will see some streamlining by
doing that.
Then with respect to what our analysis is of manpower and
building out for the outyears on those ports, we will be happy
to get information to you. I will say this, however. Part of
the manpower needs depends in part about how fast we improve
the ports. Because as we--theoretically as we add technology to
the ports, it may help us adjust downward our manpower needs.
So there is going to be some flexibility there as well.
Mr. Cuellar. A couple of quick questions. No. 1, whatever
you can do to streamline the grants, those grants that go out,
if we can streamline the paperwork and the time to get them
down to our firefighters, I would ask you to do that. If you
have any proposals to streamline the process, I would ask you
to do that. One quick question and one border question.
FEMA. Have you talked to--I know the question was asked
about FEMA, but I believe Chairman Oberstar has filed or will
be filing the legislation today. Could you give us what the
administration's position is on this? Because maybe if we got
some direction on this, this will prevent some of the
legislation from being filed.
Secretary Napolitano. The answer is no, I have not yet had
the opportunity to speak with the President about this. So it
would be premature for me to say what position they will take
on that legislation.
Mr. Cuellar. Last, I have 22 seconds. We, as you know, the
fence in Texas has been--Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
to enter into the record the document that I am distributing. I
think Members should have gotten some photographs that
reference the border fence project. I believe that has been
given out to the Members. Staff has talked to both sides.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection. I am not certain they
have it but we will get it to them.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Cuellar. Madam Secretary, down there in Texas we were
told--and this is the picture that was used for a fence in the
south Rio Grande Valley. They said if we put a fence more like
a levee, as a levee control, it would provide levee protection
and this was the picture that was given to us, that Secretary
Chertoff went down there and said this is what we are going to
have.
What we see now is actually this. There is a little
difference between what was given to us. I believe in ``truth
in fencing,'' if you want to use that. This is the southern
part. In other words, we still have the levee part of it but
instead of having this they put the fence on top of that. I
sold it to folks down there, our Governor, our mayors down
there, and I would ask you to look into it. I know we don't
have much time. But if somebody is going to say this is what
you are going to do, and then they provide you that and on top
of that, there is a little difference on that.
So I would ask you--I know that I am out of time but please
look at that, sit down with your staff, and if they said it was
in the fine print they should have told that to the people when
they had the public hearings.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I will do that. Just a question,
is the airport landing map part of the fence? Is it actually on
top of the structure or behind it?
Mr. Cuellar. It is on top of this. I actually went to go
see it myself. Pictures that we took when I was there. This is
the top part. So we are looking from here that way. So the
levee part is there, and then they added this. I can understand
the response that Border Patrol is going to give, tactical
reasons. I know all the buzz words. But I wish they would have
told us. Because in other words there would have been a
different type of opposition and they agreed--as you know, we
agreed to this levee fence but they did not tell us that on top
of this levee fence, the cement is on the other side, they
added this huge, huge fence. It is 18 feet tall or so.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I will look into that.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Broun.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
congratulations, and we are thankful for your coming here
today. In your testimony you state that Government does nothing
more fundamental than protecting its citizens, and I couldn't
agree with you more on that. We have some very serious problems
that we have either inadequately or failed to address and I am
looking forward to working with you and the Department on a
number of these issues, including counterintelligence,
radicalization, cybersecurity, securing our borders, oversight
of MBAT, reevaluating TSA's large aircraft security program,
and a whole host of other issues.
But first I would like you to know how disappointed I am
with the DHS's lack of transparency and accountability in the
MBAT site selection process. We are going to find out whether a
truly objective merit-based decision was reached. Today,
however, I would like to talk with you about
counterintelligence and radicalization.
DHS is not going to be a respected member of the
intelligence community unless it takes counterintelligence
seriously, and I know you have been very much involved in that
in Arizona. DHS is too large of a target for foreign
intelligence services and terrorist organizations to neglect a
vigorous counterintelligence program. I would like your
assurance that counterintelligence will be a priority for you
and the Department. I would like to see a fully implemented and
vigorous DHS counterintelligence program.
Are you working with FBI and counterintelligence to improve
your partnerships and coordinate your programs on a large
scale? What can this committee do to help you expand these
programs and protect your Department from foreign penetration
and collection activities?
Second, we have done a lot to prevent terrorist attacks and
protect our homeland, but we are still vulnerable to home grown
radicalization and violent Islamic extremism. Although not at
the levels in Europe, we have seen radicalization in prisons,
mosques, community centers, and even some schools.
As a leader in protecting the homeland, what do you see as
the Department's grand strategy in going forward and how will
you coordinate with other agencies? What tactics will you use?
Do you have any recommendations for our committee on ways that
we can help prevent or address radicalization on U.S. soil?
In asking those questions I just want to tell you that in
my own district there is a community that I have calls about
all the time, whether these people are becoming radicalized and
trying to create a problem in Georgia where I live. I see this
as a huge problem that we face as a Nation. I know there are
many other areas like this of communes or centers where
radicalization may or may not be occurring. So I am eager to
work with you and the Department on that issue as well as the
counterintelligence issue.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, thank you. Yes,
counterintelligence is a priority. We will be doing some things
moving forward I think in that area. I have already had very
substantive meetings with, for example, Director Mueller of the
FBI, Admiral Blair from the NDI and Mike Leiter from the
Counterintelligence Center about how we mold our efforts
together and make sure that not only are we coordinated, which
is a word that is thrown around a lot, but that the
coordination means that we are targeted and not overlapping but
yet sharing amongst ourselves, and again with State and locals,
what is going on.
With respect to radicalization, I agree with you that this
is an area where indeed we have some work to do. Again working
with the Counterterrorism Center, the FBI we actually have a
unit within the Department that I have tasked with looking at
the process of radicalization and then how it could be
interrupted and in what areas of the country would we best be
focusing some of those efforts. While I would rather not share
some of that in a public setting, it clearly is on my radar
screen.
Mr. Broun. Thank you so much. I encourage you to be very
aggressive in this endeavor. I get a lot of calls in my
district about concerns out there. I am sure other Members do
also.
Back to the intelligence and counterintelligence, I think
my perspective is that we need to have a very strong not only
intelligence community within the Department but a very
aggressive counterintelligence community within the Department,
and I for one want to work with you and for you and I am sure
many Members of this Congress--of this committee do to make
sure that those counterintelligence efforts are very
aggressively sought out and promoted within the Department.
So thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. For the benefit of those present, it is
the Chair's intention to continue the hearing. We have a Member
who has already gone to vote and will come back. So we will try
not to interrupt.
We now have Mr. Carney scheduled for 5 minutes. Other
individuals can go and come back if they wish. Mr. Carney for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, as
you know I chair the Oversight Subcommittee, so all of this is
of interest to me, soup to nuts. That is my purview.
I have a question on the discussions you are having with
the National Security Adviser on merger or somehow working in
parallel in terms of the Homeland Security Committee as opposed
to the National Security Committee. How are those talks coming?
Are you coming to any conclusions? Any new ideas or
arrangements?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I spoke actually before the
Inauguration about this analysis of the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and what needs to be
done. So what we are looking at is what functions are performed
and really taking a fresh set of eyes at all with the goal of
making sure that the President has the best advice for
security, both internationally and domestically, and also in
terms of response and recovery.
That process is under way. We told the President that it
would not be one of these 2-year study jobs, that we were
moving with all deliberate speed to get some recommendations to
him. We will be happy to let you and your staff know where we
are headed.
Mr. Carney. Please. It is our concern that the Homeland
Security Committee and National Security don't trip over each
other in doing these things. We want to make sure that there
are efficiencies and streamlining, too.
I am sure you are very aware of Project 28 down on the
border. I visited there a couple of times last year and I was
disappointed to see how progress wasn't made despite promises
from the prior team.
We want to kind of understand what you take as lessons
learned from Project 28 and how you are going to change the
result. You know, we are backed up in terms of what we are able
to do in the SBInet because of this. Various sections, the
Niajo section, for example, that is not up to speed and not
running the way it was supposed to. It has been years now and
millions of dollars. I would love to get your views on that,
please.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I am familiar with Project 28
given that it was in Arizona. Also given that in my view, a
border protection system requires boots on the ground and
technology. That is key. If we are going to require technology,
the technology has to work. It has to do what the vendors told
us it would do.
So I think an initial takeaway is what were the initial
contract representations made as to what this system would do.
I think a second takeaway is to make sure that in our bidding
process and our competitive bidding process, we really from the
get-go take into account the operational needs of the agents
who actually have to do the apprehension and interdiction. I
think that perhaps that was late to the table in terms of
actually looking at what that technology needed to empower.
Mr. Carney. You are exactly right. In fact, the very people
whose lives depended on that technology working were not part
of the process when it was being developed by contract, which
is utterly ridiculous. So we will see you or your staff a
number of times over the coming term. I look forward to being a
partner with you and making sure things work well as are
advertised and making sure this Nation stays safe and, I thank
you for your time today.
Secretary Napolitano. I look forward to working with you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Carney. What I would like
to do is expand that a little bit given your local experience.
To what extent did your office as Governor, to your knowledge,
communicate with the Department during Project 28? Was this a
stovepiped DHS project, to your knowledge, with little or no
State and local participation?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, I would have to go
back. I know there was some correspondence back and forth. But
I think it would be fair to say in terms of overall project
design, contract requirements, time, you know kind of the
length of the contract and so forth, that was a Federal job. So
the State was not really part of the process.
Chairman Thompson. I say that for a couple of reasons. In
talking to some of the local law enforcement along the border,
we were talking about towers being constructed where there was
some towers in the area already built that could have been
utilized and so we felt that the collaboration was essential
for State and locals on anything along the border if we are to
be successful. I think that is for going forward as well.
But I do have a question that I want to get on the record,
Madam Secretary. I understand that the DNI testified this
morning that al Qaeda remains determined to conduct a
spectacular attack in the homeland. Given the understanding of
that statement, have you been fully briefed on the current
threat picture? How is DHS coordinating with other agencies to
meet and mitigate the challenge from al Qaeda?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and, Mr. Chairman, if I might,
let me just--we talked earlier with the committee about
intelligence sharing among Federal agencies, but you know I
start early each morning with a briefing that includes not just
the Department of Homeland Security Intel Section but also the
FBI and the CIA. So I get that full daily briefing and then I
also receive the President's daily briefing. So from the get-go
every morning we have that level of exchange at the Federal--at
the very, very, very highest level.
We know, and I know, that there are risks out there. There
are people out there who quite frankly seek to harm the United
States. The issue for us always is who are they prepared to do
it, in what fashion, what are we doing to prevent, to
interdict, and the like. It is not just al Qaeda, but it can be
other groups as well.
So it is incumbent upon us as the Department of Homeland
Security to make sure that we are fully informed and doing what
we can in a universe where it is impossible to put the entire
United States under a bubble.
Chairman Thompson. So you are comfortable with the
information you are receiving and that entities responsible are
in fact sharing and coordinating to your satisfaction?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Ms. Harman will be
here shortly so we can continue. I don't want to impose on you,
I know you have an awful lot to do to keep us safe. So if I can
say we will recess no more than 5 minutes, and we will have you
complete by 12:45.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The committee stands in
recess.
[Recess.]
Ms. Harman [presiding.] The hearing will come to order,
again. Our apologies to the witness for the interruption of
votes, but we are doing the best we can.
The Chair will now recognize Ms. Clarke from New York for 5
minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Madam Secretary, we find ourselves in a unique moment in
American history. There are many difficult security challenges
before us, but we have strong new leadership at the White
House, here in Congress, and in you at the helm of the
Department of Homeland Security.
As the new Chair of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats,
Cybersecurity, Science, and Technology in the 111th Congress, I
am encouraged that one of your first acts in office you issued
an action directive on cybersecurity instructing specific
offices to gather information, review existing strategies and
programs, and to provide oral and written reports back to you
by mid-February. I look forward to reviewing those reports
about the authorities and responsibilities of DHS for the
protection of the Government and private sector domains, the
relationships with other Government agencies, especially the
Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Energy and NSA, and the
programs and time frames to achieve the Department's
responsibilities and objectives. I believe that you are asking
the right questions about DHS's role in the cybersecurity
mission.
I have a few questions about several issues that are near
and dear to my heart which are critical in DHS's mission. I am
from New York City, Brooklyn, New York, and so much of the
quality of lives of the people of my town and my district
relies on our success in meeting the challenges of your agency
head on. Recently, the House unanimously passed H.R. 559, a
bill I sponsored which requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to furnish the comprehensive cleared list to all DHS
components and to other Federal and State and local and tribal
authorities and others that use the terrorist watch list to
resolve misidentifications.
This we call the redress act, the fast redress act. Once
the bill becomes law, what steps will you take to ensure that
adequate and thorough passenger redress procedures are
integrated Department-wide?
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. Obviously, people who are
erroneously mistaken for someone on a watch list and the
ability to get that corrected quickly is part of the on-going
evolvement or evolution of the lists.
But we will work with you on implementation. We have
already began looking at some things that we can do in the
interim. But I share your concern, and we want to make sure
that that is implemented when it passes.
Ms. Clarke. Wonderful. I think at this stage it has become
an issue of civil liberties for Americans and certainly
visitors who come to our Nation. It is important that we sort
of evolve into a more proactive approach, because at a certain
point the saturation of that list becomes really something that
we can't use as an accurate tool to be able to address our main
concern, which is ID'ing those terrorists as they move about.
So thank you very much.
The other issue is with regard to immigration. There is a
squeeze play that is taking place in many communities and
communities like mine, and this has to do with the backlog that
takes place in terms of USCIS and the processing of individuals
seeking to receive their citizenship. They fall into the
nebulous area of being undocumented because they are in the
process of moving from a permanent--legal permanent resident
status to becoming citizens, and at the same time they are also
vulnerable because, for whatever reason, there are all kinds of
raids going on. Many of them are not in the workplace, as some
of my colleagues may have experienced, but in the households in
which individuals live.
It is my hope that as you talk about the immigration system
infrastructure and bureaucracy that we will get rid of this
antiquated system that is not really serving the American
people in our civil society in a way that it should. I was so
happy to hear that you are looking at that system, because
there are hard-working rank-and-file employees working for
USCIS, but they don't have the tools available to them to do
the processing in an expedient manner. It is costing a lot of
individuals who are seeking to adjust their status hundreds, if
not thousands, of dollars every time there is a problem there.
So I am going to wrap up and ask if you would just address that
issue.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Napolitano. If someone is here, and they are a
lawful permanent resident, I don't consider them undocumented.
They are not naturalized citizens, but they are not
undocumented.
Second, CIS, you are right there are wonderful men and
women who work there, and they are there because they want to
help those who have come into our country legally and who seek
to become and get the benefits of citizenship to get there.
We have been involved and they have been involved on a very
aggressive backlog reduction process. By June the average
processing time will be below 5 months, which is 50 percent of
what it has been. We are looking for other things as well that
we can do administratively to facilitate the process and make
it easier, more consumer friendly as it were, to help people
who seek to become citizens and enjoy the benefits of
citizenship to get there.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Olson of Texas is now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Olson. I thank the Chair.
Madam Secretary, welcome. Thank you for coming today. I
greatly appreciate your service to the home State of Arizona
and our Nation.
I have a particular question about the recovery from
Hurricane Ike. In your written testimony you mentioned that you
wished there was specific action directives in regards to
recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina and Rita, and yet made no
reference to Hurricane Ike. Ike was the third most destructive
hurricane ever to make landfall in the United States. Damages
of Ike in the U.S. coastal and inland areas are estimated to be
about $24 billion. Ninety-five percent of the constituents in
my district lost their power for a significant amount of time,
and about 112 Americans and counting lost their lives in this
storm.
As the recovery costs continue to rise, could you please
discuss what the Department is doing to help those people who
are affected by Hurricane Ike? Most importantly, can you ensure
that those populations affected by Hurricane Ike receive the
same attention in terms of recovery, funding and assistance
that the victims of Hurricane Katrina and Rita received?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, and I hope you don't
take from the fact that I did an action directive on Katrina/
Rita to mean I was ignoring Ike. Katrina/Rita is over 3 years
old. I was focusing on what needs to be done to complete or
move through some of the pending recovery issues. But I have
also spent some significant time looking at where we stand on
Ike. Literally hundreds of millions of dollars actually have
been sent from FEMA to the State of Texas. I need to understand
where those stand in the State process in terms of distribution
to the actual people in your district that need the help for
their recovery from Ike.
With regard to equivalent treatment between Katrina, Rita,
and Ike and the communities there, I would be happy to meet
with and have someone to meet with you and your staff about
where that stands in terms of the measurement of damage and the
flow of money, but my key concern, I think, is the one implicit
in your question, which is how to we make sure that the flow of
money is facilitated, and that claims that are issued are
resolved expeditiously for the communities and the individuals
who were involved in Ike.
Mr. Olson. Yes, ma'am. Anything we can do to streamline the
bureaucracy that is in the Department and get the assistance
back to the people as quickly as possible. I appreciate your
comments. We would be greatly appreciative down there. They are
still working very, very hard to recover their lives.
Changing course a little bit. I would just like to briefly
talk about immigration and the situation on the border down
there, particularly what is happening in Mexico. As some of my
colleagues alluded to earlier, we have a serious problem
happening in that country right now. The drug cartels are at
war, for lack of a better term, with the Federal Government. As
you mentioned earlier, there is a significant arms flow south
out of our country in very advanced, very capable arms,
including hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades. You being a
border Governor understand the great concerns that we have in
the State of Texas.
What is the Department doing? Is there a contingency plan
if things continue to deteriorate in Mexico and we see a
massive influx of immigrants running away from a situation down
there? Do we have a plan to address that and make sure our
country is just not overrun in a very short time period?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Congressman. A few things.
Secretary Chertoff had developed a contingency plan, and I am
looking at that and evaluating that, making sure that we can
provide resources to State and local law enforcement in those
border areas should we see that kind of flow-over of the drug
war in Mexico at that level into the United States.
One of the things I am doing right now is making sure that
we are actually physically talking with the sheriffs in those
border counties. My experience is that the best intel sometimes
in a border county is that local sheriff, and I am going to
stay in regular touch with them to see what is happening on the
ground in the border communities that may be related to the
drug war in Mexico.
Then, as I said earlier, I think we need to all recognize
that within the country of Mexico, the President, the Federal
Government are really engaged in a serious, serious effort
against these drug cartels. It is having a big impact on a
level of violence within Mexico, and it is something that
deserves our immediate attention right now.
Mr. Olson. I thank you. Mr. Cuellar is not here, my
colleague; his brother is a sheriff. I assume he would share
your opinion of the border sheriffs. I just want to extend my
invitation as well with Congress, my fellow Texans here, we
would love to have you come down, tour the Ike area and go down
to the borders.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
Madam Secretary, I understand you have to leave in 15
minutes; is that correct?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, you are the committee, but it
would be helpful.
Ms. Harman. Well, if we could extend that just a bit. There
are seven people who have not asked questions, and we will
confine the questions and the answers to a strict 5 minutes so
that everyone gets a turn. Would that work for you?
Secretary Napolitano. That would be fine.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate that very much.
Ms. Richardson, another California woman on the committee,
is recognized for a strict 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Madam Secretary, I was very encouraged when I read your
hearing confirmation, your action directives. One of the things
you talked about is the risk analysis, and the report says that
you view determining the national priorities and taking
judicious distribution of resources are a major element of the
Department's mission. In fact, you said today, although we have
many risks, we have to focus the broader impact, focus the
analysis on risk that would result in an undue impact on this
country.
My concern is, and part of why we have independent bodies
and legislative separate, is we are going to hear a lot of
people. I heard discussions today of land ports and all that,
and that is fine, but there is only one port complex in this
country that is No. 1, and that is the port complex in Long
Beach and Los Angeles. There is only one port complex that is
No. 3 in the world, and that is the San Pedro complex. If we
are going to regain the trust and integrity that our President
talked about, we have got to see--in your, as you call it,
judicious distribution of resources, there has got to be a
bigger difference between 1 and 2 percent of a cargo of a port
that represents 45 percent of this Nation's cargo.
So my question to you is I like what I hear so far, but we
really need that commitment that the view is not going to be
that everything on the Christmas tree is of national
significance. It might be important, it might be a risk, but it
is not necessarily the No. 1.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, as I said, there is risk
everywhere, risks to life, mass casualties, always something to
be taken into account; risk to trade, risk to basic
infrastructure; risk to things like our gasoline supply system,
our food supply chain and all the rest. But beyond that we have
to be very--I will use the word ``judicious'' because that is
what I wrote, but we really have to be very acute about risks
that if they materialized would cause undue damages to lives,
casualties, commerce and the like, and the ports. The port that
you describe is a key critical port for our Nation. I look
forward to perhaps coming out to tour the port, the port area
with you so I can get a better scope of things, but clearly
there are some things that require more attention than others.
Ms. Richardson. We appreciate that.
Very briefly, the background in that port complex alone, if
you have a dirty bomb that comes in, you talk about losing
3,000 people in 9/11, talk about half a million people in
minutes? So when we talk about the things of the cargo, folks
coming in, we have people who are coming in who are being
smuggled in, and these are being identified weekly, monthly. So
we appreciate your interest, and we look forward to you coming.
The last part of my question has to do with
interoperability. In your directives we as a Congress talked
about the Office of Emergency Communications, which Congress
felt was a focal point to be included in your Department. I can
tell you right now we don't have local, State, and Federal
Government that has a clear interoperable channel so that if a
disaster happens, we can effectively communicate and
effectively work together.
You do talk about radio technology in your material, but
talk about your commitment of the Office of Emergency and
Communications with interoperability.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, OEC obviously requires a real
focus, and it is also a key issue with our relationships with
State and locals. I think we need a fresh look, and that is
interoperability among whom; is it the police officer and the
fire department who are responding, is it their commanders, is
it higher up? Because I think one of the problems has been this
paradigm that if everybody isn't interoperable all the time,
you don't have interoperability. Who needs to be talking with
whom and radio, but we also need to be looking at computer
interoperability or intersection, so other areas as well.
So I intend to focus on this. This was a key frustration
that I had as Governor. One of the things that I found was for
emergency response situations, we had--for example, we used
Homeland Security money to purchase vans that could be driven
anywhere, and they were mobile communication vans, and they
were a patch between different responders. I just saw one. I
was in Kansas last week and saw some of those vans that were
moved there, and I was in Kentucky and was moved there because
Kentucky in its ice storms, they lost their telecommunication
system. The vans were brought up and in hours were set up to
provide that sort of coverage.
So I think we need to really look at some of these other
methodologies that are available and say, okay, let's define
what we mean by interoperability, and what technologies we can
use, and whether we can do and get functional interoperability
more quickly than what we have been given so far.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You are a
welcome sight.
Ms. Harman. Mr. McCaul of Texas, Ranking Member on the
intelligence subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Madam Secretary, congratulations to you in your new
position. I think you bring a wealth of experience to this job.
I look forward to working with you.
Being a former U.S. attorney, State attorney general,
Governor of a border State, I feel like I have something in
common with you. I was a Federal prosecutor and worked in the
AG's office and worked in Texas in a border State, so I think
you have an appreciation for a lot of the same issues that we
have.
I appreciate your comments about the intelligence eyes and
ears on the ground being important, and that information coming
back to the Federal Government is an important piece.
Second, last year I was Ranking Member on the cybersecurity
subcommittee. We issued a report, a recommendation to the 44th
President Mr. Obama. Let me say the appointment of Melissa
Hathaway as the Cyber Director was a great choice. We look
forward to working with you and her on that issue as well. I
hope you will give that report that CSIS produced at least a
read.
Two quick issues. Mexico. The Governor of my State just
called today for 1,000 troops to be dispatched to the border.
The violence has increased; over 5,000 deaths last year, more
than Iraq and Afghanistan combined. It is a state of war. I
congratulate, commend President Calderon for his efforts to
bring the cartels to justice.
I hope you will consider, along with the merit initiative,
also a funding on our side of the border for increased Border
Patrol, ICE and the sheriffs that you alluded to, who I think
provide a vital role. If you would like to comment on that in
your response, I would love to hear that.
Last I would just like to mention Guantanamo. We had the
first delegation down in Guantanamo since the Executive Order
was signed to close the base. I know you were on the review
committee. I want to give you my observations, and I hope you
will take those to heart as you make this very difficult
decision.
We did go down there. What we saw was, I think, similar to
what the Pentagon's report issued pursuant to the President's
order, and that was no evidence of torture. They were in
compliance with the Geneva Convention, and the facility itself
is probably better than most Federal prisons I have seen in the
United States.
So having said that, we know in that facility there are
some very dangerous people. In fact, the top al Qaeda
leadership we know are down there, including Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed. That gives me grave concern as we decide how to go
forward with Guantanamo. I hope this administration will give
careful consideration and exercise caution on the decision as
to where to move these individuals. I am very concerned as a
former prosecutor that some of these individuals could, in
fact, get into--if they are moved into the United States, and
they go through the Federal court system, the Federal Rules of
Evidence would allow them to get released because of perhaps
relying on intelligence information to prosecute or relying on
confessions may not come into evidence, and then we would be
stuck with a situation where some of the very dangerous actors
would be released on to the streets into the United States.
That is a result I would like to avoid. I know you share that
concern, and I hope you take that into consideration as you
weigh how to deal with that challenge.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, yes, thank you, and pursuant to
an Executive Order by the President, I am part of a review
committee that is going case by case. As you recognized, there
are some difficult decisions that need to be made with respect
to the detainees in Guantanamo, and with respect to Governor
Perry's call for troops, I look forward to speaking with him
directly. I read about it as well in the clips.
In terms of what he is anticipating, is he asking for a
renewal of Operation Jump Start, for example? Are there
specific places he would like to see those troops placed as a
backup to civilian law enforcement? We always, with the balance
we are striking, and we do not want to militarize the border,
but what help does he think they can provide? So I look forward
to talking to Governor Perry about that.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Kirkpatrick, a new Member
from Arizona, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome,
Secretary.
I know as Governor you made securing our border one of our
top priorities, providing additional funding and even the help
of the National Guard to address this issue. However, it seems
like that has not been enough at the Federal level, and the
situation at the border is actually getting worse. A recent
report says that Arizona and other borders are seeing a record
number of abductions, including Americans taken right out of
their homes. Just last week several publications have reported
battles using machine guns and grenades are being waged near
the border, and that this may push north as well. We must do
whatever we can to prevent this and minimize the threat as best
we can. Now that you have the tools of the Federal Government
at your disposal, how do you see your Department addressing
this growing concern?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, and again, it is a
grave concern. It is at several levels. One is interaction with
Mexican law enforcement, particularly the Federal Government of
Mexico, and dealing--really addressing the fact that he has got
a drug war on his hands, and it is a big one; second, looking
Government-wide at what we can do to stop the southbound export
of weaponry, particularly assault-type weapons and grenades
being used in that drug war. The third is to stay in constant
touch with local law enforcement, sheriffs and the like along
that border, and should they identify gaps that they have or
they see, to identify what we can do to help fill those gaps.
Fourth is to have a contingency plan to deal with worst-case
scenarios.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Secretary. I look forward to
working with you on this committee.
Ms. Harman. I thank the Members for taking less time than
is allotted. That is appreciated.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick. We are brief and concise.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate that.
The very patient Mr. Souder of Indiana is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Souder. I thank you for your patience today and for
dealing with all the committees in Congress. One of the biggest
challenges that you have is the day-to-day operation of your
agency and that doesn't necessarily square with the reason why
your agency was created. The Coast Guard is trying to get
tipped-over sailboats and protect fisheries. The immigration is
a huge thing to the border control and to ICE. FEMA is running
around dealing with tornadoes, sometimes floods in my district.
Yet the reason FEMA is in your agency isn't because of
tornadoes and floods; it is there in case we have a
catastrophe, because only Homeland could coordinate something
like.
Coast Guard is there to interdict terrorists and narcotics
and things related to terrorism. Border Patrol, and ICE, the
same way. It is important that in what is perceived as a little
bit of a back-pedaling on focus on terrorism, that doesn't turn
into wholesale retreat and you are the only person. Even though
my district is the No. 1 manufacturing district in the United
States, each Silverado or Sierra pickup has 100 border
crossings in Canada. That is the No. 1 responsibility of the
Department of Commerce. You need to work with them, but at the
table, if something happens like a
9/11 incident or something else, they will turn to you and say,
what happened?
In our committee we need to make sure we back you up. That
is the No. 1 reason the Homeland Security Department is to
focus on terrorism in particular and not lose focus, even if
everybody else in the whole country starts to lose focus,
because it is our responsibility.
A couple of related issues that I raised some concerns
here, and, as you heard, I am Ranking Member on Border with
Congresswoman Sanchez. I am concerned that counternarcotics is
not as much in the administration plans or some of the
committee plans. We had 20,000 to 30,000 a year die because of
illegal narcotics in the United States, or 160,000 since 9/11.
You have the bulk of the agents who deal with this, Border
Patrol, Coast Guard, and ICE; that these things, and meeting
with President Calderon last week, and talking with him and the
Attorney General about the guns and the narcotics and the
kidnappings and the problems in Phoenix as well, Mexicali and
over in Texas, these things are very interrelated, and
counternarcotics is heavily focused in your agency.
Now, if you don't get enough time here to address my three
questions, I would appreciate a written response of what your
philosophy is toward: Are you committed to being even more
aggressive in counternarcotics, especially since it is the No.
1 border violence issue, No. 1 domestic violence issue, and is
largely the same groups as are doing other financing,
terrorism, kidnapping and any kind of smuggling, because these
different groups of cartels are controlling the different
sections of the border?
Second question. You were supportive of the National Guard
as Governor. You mentioned Operation Jump Start. We heard about
Governor Perry's request. Do you support--because rumor is
there is a hole here or there along the border, do you support
using the National Guard along that border?
Third, the REAL ID Act has been one of the most critical
parts of the ability to do intel tracking. If you don't know
who the person is, if you can't sort that basic thing out, it
is impossible to get good identification of who they are
hooking up with, who needs to be monitored for what risk level.
You expressed some concerns about the REAL ID Act in the past,
and I would be interested in how you see that moving forward.
Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you. In terms of
counternarcotics, dealing with these drug cartels as they are
organized in Mexico is really the organized crime fight of the
Southwestern United States. That is how I dealt with it as a
prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office, and as an attorney
general and Governor. You have to go after the money. Have to
interrupt that chain of money that goes in the millions of
dollars back and forth with these cartels. You have got to go
after the traffickers. You have to have the tools to work from
the low level to the high level and try to interrupt and
interdict their operations.
We have a demand-side issue on the United States side. The
drugs are coming in because of demand for illegal drugs. I look
forward to working with ONDCP, among others, to see what we can
do about that particular problem. It is a supply issue and is
also a demand issue.
With respect to the issue of terrorism, there is no one
more conscious than I am about the reason for this Department,
why it was stood up and what our fundamental responsibilities
are. It is something that guides our decisions and actions
every day.
With respect to REAL ID, the problems with REAL ID were
several-fold. One is it was stood up without adequate
consultation with Governors who actually deal with the nuts and
bolts of how you handle driver's licenses. So there were a lot
of just implementation issues. Second, there was no money put
behind it, and it was budgeted, and it is very expensive to do.
So what I am doing is working now with a group of the National
Governors Association to say what can we do and should we do
now, with the cooperation and consultation of Governors, of
both parties I might add, to convert REAL ID into something
that actually can happen on the ground and can happen on a
real-time basis.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
I hate to rush you or our questioners, but I am trying to
accommodate.
Secretary Napolitano. I will try to answer.
Ms. Harman. Three more people, starting with the very mild-
mannered Mr. Pascrell of New Jersey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Good luck to you. You had two good people
before you, two competent people. The problem is that they very
seldom presented things within the urgency of the time, and I
suspect that that was driven by an administration that was not
committed to the things that this committee was committed to on
both sides of the aisle.
I am glad that you are supportive of a bottom-up
intelligence, and I really support the U.K. model, which I
think is important and critical, and rather than a top-down
situation which we have experienced.
We have a very serious problem on the southern border, and
I believe, having been to Mexico with the Chairman and dealing
with these matters, there is no oversight, there is no
enforcement, there is no urgency, and there are very little
resources. It is very interesting that we did have the
beginning of resources 2 years ago, and they were cutoff when
they started to intercept weapons going from the States down to
Mexico.
I want you to please think about that. I know we are not
supposed to touch that issue on both sides of the aisle now,
apparently we declared a recess, but people are getting killed,
and it is affecting America. If we don't do something about
that situation, then--I can picture someday that situation
being equal to the murderers who are preparing themselves in
Pakistan at the epicenter of terror.
So I want to talk to you about first responders, very close
to my heart, obviously very close to your heart. Every year the
previous administration would submit a budget to the
Department--for the Department of Homeland Security that would
literally gut or try to zero-out critical programs that deliver
Homeland Security grants to local and State governments, to our
brave first responders. Year after year this committee on a
bipartisan basis would reject those cuts and have indeed
increased the budget allocations for these grants. I am talking
about the State Homeland Security Grant program; the Community-
Oriented Police Services, COPS, program; the Staffing for
Adequate Fire and Emergency Response, SAFER, Act; the grant
program; the assistance to the firefighters grant program. I am
very familiar with those, and I know you are, too. Every year
the same situation, every year, without exception.
So, Madam Secretary, with President's Obama's overview
budget plan coming out tomorrow, the overview of the budget
anyway, can you commit to this committee right now that this
administration will not try to gut or eliminate these vital and
successful, successful grant programs that go directly to our
local communities and first responders, circumvent the
bureaucracies and anybody trying to take off from the top? Can
you commit to this committee about that today?
Secretary Napolitano. You will find no one more supportive
of those grants than I am, and I can commit to you that we are
operating under that assumption. One of the things I want to do
and I will be happy to work with you on, I think now,
particularly on some of the first responder grants that were
used, for example, to purchase equipment, we need to be looking
at what we are doing to fund sustainability, replacement,
repairs, proper training of people to operate equipment. In
other words, all of these efforts need to be part and parcel of
the web and weave what we do for our homeland security not just
this year, but moving on forward. Sometimes I fear that grant
programs are not written or designed with long-term
sustainability in mind. So as now the 4-week Secretary of
Homeland Security, I will share with you that one of the things
I am looking at is what are we doing to make sure that we are
not just providing for the beginning of something, but really
for its long-term success.
Mr. Pascrell. In completion, Madam Chair, I wanted to say
this: Before we spend any money, increase personnel anyplace,
that we do what I think is suggested before, and that is have
concepts in place and policy in place so it makes sense. I
think this is what has gotten us in problems in the past.
Thank you so much, and good luck to you.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Cao of Louisiana.
Mr. Cao. First of all, I would like to thank you, Secretary
Napolitano, for being here. I am from the Second District of
Louisiana, which comprises mainly of New Orleans and part of
the west bank, and as you know, the district was very much
devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and the district remains
pretty much devastated 3\1/2\ years after Katrina. So one of my
main concerns, obviously, is the rebuilding of the district. We
have delved into the issues of efficiency of FEMA and
accountability at FEMA, so I am very much encouraged by your
statement today about looking at the leadership and the
transparency with respect to how FEMA operates.
We have done some investigations lately with respect to the
TRO offices down in New Orleans, and we found some very serious
problems there, allegations of cronyism, allegations of
nepotism, of ethics violations, of significant equal employment
opportunity abuses, of sexual harassment. I believe all of
these issues interfere with the rebuilding of the district. I
would like to know whether or not you are going to implement a
system to oversee some of these offices and to hold, if these
allocations are true, people accountable for these allegations.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I can't speak to those specific
allegations, because that is the first I have heard of some of
those, but we will obviously follow up. But, yes, my goal is to
have a process in place by which the Gulf Coast can continue
its rebuilding efforts by which we facilitate the resolution of
disputed claims and by which we take and use the opportunity to
have a fresh set of eyes to look at some of the disputes that
have clogged up the system, as it were, to see what we can do
to expedite people being housed, small businesses being
restarted, and people's lives being restored to the extent
possible. I will be traveling there, as you know, next week
with the Secretary of HUD in part so that we can not only
exchange information, but see with our own eyes what needs
further to be done.
Mr. Cao. I would love to accompany you on your trip.
I have one more question with respect to the Stafford Act.
Post-Katrina we have learned that the Stafford Act does not
adequately address the issue of devestations with respect to--
at the level of Katrina. Obviously maybe the Stafford Act might
be adequate for smaller disasters, but at the level of Katrina,
there are certain inadequacies and limitations to the Stafford
Act. Do you have plans to review the Stafford Act and look at
possible ways to amend the act in order to address disasters as
large as Katrina?
Secretary Napolitano. Once there is a new Administrator of
FEMA, I think one of the things we would seek to do is not look
at the Stafford Act, or not just look at the Stafford Act, but
regulations, policies and procedures that have been layered up
over time to carry out the Stafford Act. The goal obviously is
to see what needs to happen so that--not just for the immediate
emergency response, but really where the most complaints are
now is in the long-term recovery area, and what needs to be
done in terms of improving the process, the facilitation of
long-term recovery for areas--it can be Texas, it can be
Galveston, it can be the Gulf Coast--other areas that have been
devastated by disaster.
Mr. Cao. Thank you very much.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Himes of Connecticut for 5 minutes.
Mr. Himes. Thank you very much for being with us today. A
couple of quick questions for you. I am very interested--I come
from a State that doesn't have a county government, and so I am
very interested to hear you expand on your comments about
intraoperability and communications. It is a very serious issue
for my first responders, fire, police, et cetera. I appreciated
what you said about being very precise about who is talking to
whom and what we really mean when we are talking
intraoperability.
I wonder if you could provide a bit more detail on how you
were thinking or how the Department is thinking about
intraoperability as it affects first responders, particularly
in the areas of the country that don't have county or other
regional structures.
Secretary Napolitano. That is an interesting point. I
didn't recognize that Connecticut didn't have counties.
Mr. Himes. We do have counties, but there is no county
government.
Secretary Napolitano. You know, we live in a wonderful
country, lots of variations here. Rather than give a premature
answer, let me just say that as we put forward or really begin
looking at, relooking at intraoperability, I would be happy to
keep you and the committee apprised of our efforts.
Mr. Himes. Thank you. I appreciate that. It really is sort
of particularly sharp when we don't have regional governmental
structures as we don't in Connecticut. I promise I am coming in
under 5 minutes.
So my second question, it is my understanding you are
reviewing the Department's efforts to implement the 100 percent
maritime screening recommendations mandated by the implementing
resolutions around the 9/11 Commission Act. Can you give us a
sense of what you have learned so far and what you expect with
respect to completing your review?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. As I already shared with the
committee, I think the 2012 deadline for 100 percent screening
is difficult, if not possible to attain given where we are in
screening right now. There are many issues. For example, there
are literally hundreds of agreements that would have to be
reached with foreign countries to get to a 100 percent
screening regimen.
That being the case, what I am doing is really looking at
what needs to happen, how fast can it happen, and what it is
going to cost to happen, and what is the value added to our
security if it happens. How do we protect the lives and the
people of the United States? I cannot give you a timeline of
when that review will be complete. What I can tell you, I know
it is a key concern of this committee, so I have asked a number
of people to get involved in that so we can move it right
along.
Mr. Himes. Thank you, I appreciate that. I thank you on
behalf of the other people in my district for taking this job.
It is an enormous challenge, and hats off.
I yield the balance of my time.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Mr. Himes.
Madam Secretary, let me point out on intraoperability the
reason we are going through the DTV transition right now--some
folks listening in may wonder why this is happening--is to free
up analog spectrum, the 700 megahertz band, for a national
intraoperable communications capability. As one from a State
that has a lot of wildfires, I am not sure that that bridging
technology you mentioned, which is the flatbed trucks with the
ACU-1000 integrators, can get to the scene surrounding these
fires in time given all the blockages. So we really do need, I
believe, some additional bandwidth and some strategies beyond
just the switching technology.
We can pursue it later. I have abused the time of two final
Members. So let me first recognize Mr. Lujan of New Mexico for
5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Madam Secretary, it is great to see you again here. I can
tell you as a Governor who has a certain appreciation for my
great State of New Mexico, it is great to have you serving in
your capacity and appreciate your commitment to public service.
Madam Secretary, I share the concerns of many of my
colleagues with what is happening down in Mexico with the
battles we are having with the drug cartels. I would ask you
all to do not forget some of problems that we are also
encountering in some of the boundaries of our sovereign nations
around the country where they are seeing how they can exploit
some of the laws to be able to traffic in those areas; and that
we remember that when we are looking and we are bringing this,
the support that we need, to the border, that we also include
some of the leaders within our sovereign nations around the
country as well.
The passion that my friend and colleague Mr. Pascrell
shares for our first responders as well, to remember the work
that they truly do when we make the distinction between FEMA
and what our first responders do, that we do have the
commitment that they get the resources they need. They not only
keep us safe, but they get home safely to their families after
they put their lives on the line on a daily basis.
I would like to shift to an area where I know that we have
to pay some special attention as well with the multiple
interdependent infrastructures that we depend on daily. A
disruption of our transportation, energy, communication,
health, or economic networks would threaten the stability of
other networks around the country; of particularly notice, a
vulnerability of the smart grid system transmission systems of
the country communications and the cyber attacks that are seen
on a daily basis.
Los Alamos National Laboratories, Sandia National
Laboratories in my home State have leveraged existing research
and development activities to establish the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. The NISAC
utilizes simulation previously known, but unknown in some
areas, but in a secure, scientific computing environment to
discover previously unknown relationships to develop insights
about possible infrastructure vulnerability. The center will
also help policy makers like us to prepare for disasters or
terrorist attacks, but would also help first responders gauge
the extent of the damage as the incident was on-going.
We heard today concerns about--concerns that we have with
areas that are prone to natural disaster and where we can make
sure that we have some technology that exists today to be able
to fully deploy it. I was curious, Madam Secretary, if you
could comment on your plan about protecting our electric grid
from cyber attacks, what we will be doing in a specific area,
and if your Department has considered how it plans to implement
the NISAC program?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, thank you. New Mexico, of
course, is the State I grew up in, so I have a lot of fondness
for your State and your district.
In terms of the protection of the grid, this goes to the
larger question of protection of infrastructure, and we saw it
in dramatic fashion 3 weeks ago in Kentucky where the ice storm
took out the electric power for almost 50 percent of the
population and the total communications network because and the
towers all buckled under the ice. We did use the mobile trucks
there, by the way. I wasn't suggesting they be an exclusive
solution, but they are part and parcel of what we really need
with the broadband.
One of the things we are working on--and this is where we
need greater connectivity with the private sector. They own
these utilities. We need to work together on a protection plan.
Where some of this computer modeling is helpful is not just in
terms of protection, but in terms of consequence identification
and management so that we can better prepare our first
responders and so forth, because sometimes the consequences
themselves are inordinately complicated and involved, many
layers of the private sector and the public sector and the
like. That is an area we will very much be pursuing. We will
pursue it through the National Planning Office that you all
have helped build in the Department.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you. Madam Secretary, our time is short,
and I look forward to hearing you later on this week on some
other issues that we will have a chance to discuss. I know we
have so much phenomenal research that is taking place in
laboratories across the country, some of which is being tested
in airports. You mentioned Albuquerque, where we have some
technology which is currently on a trial run which is a
scanning machine that adapts magnetic resonance imaging
techniques to identify concealed liquids and substances. I want
to encourage you that we take advantage of this research
technology as we work to protect our Nation. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Lujan. Just so Members are
alerted, votes are coming up in 10 minutes, and we have one
more questioner, Ms. Lofgren from California, one of four
California women on this committee.
Secretary Napolitano. Wow.
Ms. Lofgren. Welcome, Madam Secretary. I come from Santa
Clara County. You, I am sure, already know people in Santa
Clara County are quite thrilled with your appointment. The
University of Santa Clara is especially proud that you are
where you are. I look forward to working with you on the many,
many issues that the Department faces.
I want to raise one issue today, and I don't expect that
you will necessarily know the answer, because I just found out
about it, and you may not know about it either. Although
immigration policy and nonborder enforcement are primarily the
jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, I want to raise it
here today to avoid having another appearance by you or someone
else.
The Constitution and the Immigration Nationality Act, as
you know, requires that the Government have a reasonable ground
to suspect that a person is not in the United States legally
before that person is detained, and there has been concern that
that requirement has not always been adhered to in the past
number of years. Yesterday--and I think this is the first time
this has happened since the Obama administration--I am advised
by reports as well as the Seattle Times that ICE agents did
raid a small company in Bellingham, Washington. Seventy-five
ICE agents in riot gear at 9 a.m. raided the plant and detained
126 workers, most of them United States citizens, and held them
for a number of hours.
I am concerned about obviously we need to enforce our laws,
no one disagrees with that, but there is concern that Americans
have repeatedly in the past years been held in some cases for
10 and 11 hours against their will, and it does not seem to
comport with the requirements of the law or the Constitution.
So if you have something to say on that now, I would welcome
it. If you want to research it, I would certainly understand,
but I would hope to get some information about that specific
instance and what our efforts are going to be to make sure that
as we enforce the law, we also live within the law.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. I was briefed about that action
early this morning, and I did not know about it beforehand, so
I have asked a number of questions about what was the predicate
for this. Now, there are a lot of different allegations going
around: Was it 70, 40 or 30; what they wearing? There were
earlier allegations that helicopters were used. They were not.
But I want to get to the bottom of this as well, so I have
already issued those directives to ICE to get me some answers.
Let me just close with this: In my view, we have to do
workplace enforcement. It needs to be focused on employers who
intentionally and knowingly exploit the illegal labor market.
That has impacts on American workers, it has impacts on wage
levels. It often has undue impacts on the illegal workers
themselves. Our ICE efforts should be focused on those sorts of
things. We should really have thought through the prosecutions
that are going to result and the deportations that will result
after any sort of work force action. That is the direction we
seek to move.
Ms. Lofgren. Let me mention quickly two other items--I know
you have other obligations, and we have a vote coming up--and
they really have to do with three things; No. 1, the national
infrastructure protection. I will tell you now, you don't have
to agree, the list is inadequate, and in order to adequately
protect our infrastructure, we really need to have a map of
what it is and also what vulnerabilities there are for
cascading failures across that infrastructure. We don't have it
and never had it.
I am just hoping that as you move forward in this very
important job, there are tremendous resources mentioned by Mr.
Lujan in the national laboratories to assist, and Lawrence is
one of them, as well as the lab in New Mexico which has them. I
have talked with them and worked with them, and they are way
ahead of what our Department is on some of this and are a
wonderful resource. I wanted to mention that to you, as well as
in the cybersecurity area where we have tremendous
vulnerabilities, and we, in my judgment, are not nearly where
we need to be.
A final note, I am so concerned, and you mentioned it,
about the arms flowing south into Mexico. We have met with
members of the Mexican Congress, with the Attorney General of
Mexico. I mean, they are at a point where the very existence of
civil society and government at Mexico is at risk. I think as a
priority for our Department--I mean, ICE has jurisdiction also
over that. I can't imagine the refugee crisis that will be at
our door if we don't do a more effective job of cutting off the
flow of arms. So I look forward to working with you on that.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much, Ms. Lofgren.
I would like to thank Secretary Napolitano for staying an
extra half-hour to accommodate Member questions and Ms. Titus
of Nevada for foregoing her questions in the interests of
promptly wrapping up and anticipating the next vote.
Let me observe, as one Member here said, ``She's a well-
trained lawyer, but she can speak to the general public.''
Those are usually inconsistent activities. As a lawyer myself,
I would observe that. We appreciate the fact that you came
ready to answer a range of questions and that you have a lot of
other issues under review. This will be an on-going process.
Sorry, Mr. Green, we are closing down the hearing.
But if the committee has additional questions for you, we
would ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those
questions. I assume that would be fine.
Having no further business, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for the
Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. This committee has had many discussions with GAO about
obstacles it faces when it attempts to meet with DHS employees and
obtain files and records necessary to carry out its oversight mission.
Will you examine the policies put in place by your predecessor and
assure that GAO will be able to have the kind of access it needs?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to
creating openness in Government to ensure the public trust, and
establish a system of transparency, public participation, and
collaboration. In DHS' first quarter report to Congress, the Department
provided a document to GAO within 20 days on average 79 percent of the
time. For scheduling interviews within 7 days, DHS was 95 percent. The
Department values its work with GAO and is committed to improving our
timeliness and to operate in a transparent manner. The Department will
continue to work toward improving our performance.
Question 2. This committee has closely watched the procurement and
contracting practices at the Department. Can you explain what you will
do to increase transparency and accountability in the contractor
selection process?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) follows the
requirements set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
which ensures transparency and accountability in the contractor
selection process to the maximum extent practicable without
jeopardizing proprietary information. DHS uses Federal Business
Opportunities extensively to disseminate Requests for Information and
Draft Requests for Proposals (RFP). The Department solicits industry
feedback holding Industry Day seminars and Pre-Proposal Conferences to
ensure requirements are communicated early in the process and the
criteria for evaluation are articulated clearly to all offerors. During
the selection process, the Contracting Office ensures the evaluation
and selection is conducted in accordance with the established
procedures and follows the same evaluation criteria presented to the
offerors in the RFP. As required by the FAR, both successful and
unsuccessful offerors are afforded the opportunity for a debriefing on
the strengths and weaknesses of their proposal against the evaluation
criteria. Finally, in the event a protest is filed, DHS follows the
applicable procedures outlined in the FAR to ensure a fair review of
the procurement and selection process.
Question 3. While the Department has met its small and
disadvantaged business goals, reviews by this committee and others have
found circumstances that call these numbers into question, such as
large companies posing as small businesses and double-counting small
disadvantaged businesses. While this is a Government-wide problem, have
you considered actions at the Department that will not only create more
opportunities for small, minority-, and women-owned businesses, but
will provide more accurate numbers on the actual utilization of these
companies?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is aware of the
issue, and follows the Government-wide guidelines for small business
contract reporting as outlined by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) which is reflected in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS)
small business goaling report. DHS will continue to work with SBA on
accurate procurement data for all small business categories. The Office
of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) will conduct a special
oversight review of FPDS data this fiscal year, including an
examination of the small business data fields. Additionally, the Office
of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization performs spot checks on
FPDS data during the year. The OCPO will continue collaboration with
the component contracting activities to identify opportunities for
small, minority-, and women-owned businesses through acquisition
planning, small business market research, and cooperation with the SBA.
Question 4. In January OPM released the results for its 2008
Federal Human Capital Survey. The survey showed that the Department is
ranked among the ``most improved'' in Leadership and Knowledge
Management, Results-Oriented Performance Culture, Talent Management,
and Job Satisfaction. While these trends are generally heading in a
positive direction, there is still much room for improvement. For
example, a review of the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity data
reveals a lack of minority representation in various civil service
categories, especially the Senior Executive Service. What measures will
you take to improve these numbers to achieve a work force that is more
reflective of the American public?
Answer. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
established a high-level Diversity Council and issued a Department-wide
Diversity Strategy. The Council is supported by a multi-component
subcouncil, co-chaired by executives from the Department's Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of the Chief Human
Capital Officer.
The Human Capital Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year 2009-2013 includes
diversity as one of four human capital strategic goals. This goal
identifies specific actions DHS plans to take to enhance the diversity
of its work force, as well as accountability for diversity. To that
end, all DHS executives' performance evaluations include a rating as
``Diversity Advocates''. This is the third rating cycle for this
competency, and last year DHS issued illustrative guidance on how to
effectively rate performance in this area. DHS is currently in the
process of identifying diversity initiatives, best practices, and
challenges across the Department. Later this year, we plan to establish
a DHS Diversity Advisory Forum composed of external stakeholders to
advise the Department on our Diversity plans, initiatives, and efforts.
As an example, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, in
collaboration with the established Councils, is working to identify
ways to create career paths for DHS employees across Components.
Through this effort, DHS can provide opportunities for employees to
transition from one DHS Component to another, e.g., Transportation
Security Officer (TSO) to Customs and Border Patrol Officer (CBPO).
In the Senior Executive Service (SES), DHS' strategy is two-fold;
recruiting a more diverse candidate pool of high performing
individuals, and enhancing current leadership development programs. In
the area of recruitment, DHS is pursuing partnerships with
organizations such as the African American Executive Association, the
National Association of Hispanic Federal Executives, and the Asian
American Executive Network to augment recruitment efforts. In the area
of leadership development, the Department is expanding executive
``feeder'' programs such as the SES Candidate Development Program and
the DHS Fellows Program.
Question From the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio of Oregon for the
Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question. I am interested in your views on the TSA prohibited items
list, the methodology used to determine what is prohibited, and whether
you will initiate an inquiry into whether the prohibition on pocket
utility tools from the passenger areas of commercial aircraft remains
appropriate.
Answer. With regard to methodology, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) periodically reviews the Prohibited Items list
based on the evolving aviation security environment. Improvements made
regarding airline cockpit security and other countermeasures enacted
since the 9/11 tragedy have provided opportunities to adjust the list
of threat objects relevant to the current environment. TSA will
continue to consider the Prohibited Items list when analyzing changes
in the security risk and implementing improvements in the layers of
security.
Currently, TSA allows tools 7 inches or smaller on-board aircraft
but has continued to prohibit knives of any length, including small
knives contained in pocket utility tools. If a passenger has checked
baggage, an always-available option is to place the pocket utility tool
inside the checked baggage, where it is not prohibited. TSA continually
works with our international partners to ensure that security rules and
procedures are as consistent as possible. In that light, the
International Civil Aviation Organization approved a revision to its
guidelines for prohibited items that recommends allowing the carriage
of small knives (blades shorter than 6 cm or 2.36 in.). While the
United States is interested in a standardized approach to prohibited
items with our partners around the world, any changes must be made with
the full input of our security partners.
TSA will continue to work with Congress, other Federal agencies,
and airline flight crew organizations on this issue. TSA will keep
Members of Congress and the traveling public informed of any changes to
the Prohibited Items list.
Questions From the Honorable Henry Cuellar of Texas for the Honorable
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. Madame Secretary, it is noted that none of the action
directives include the Office of Emergency Communication which Congress
created to be the focal office responsible for emergency communications
in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
Can we expect an action directive to address this vital issue?
Answer. While not its primary focus, my action directive on State,
local, Tribal, and territorial integration included interoperable
emergency communications outreach efforts. Although I have not at this
time issued an action directive focused specifically on comprehensive
emergency communications efforts, as I stated during my testimony, I am
taking a close look at interoperability, the role of the Office of
Emergency Communications within the Department, and other key aspects
of this critical issue.
Question 1b. Do you have any plans to elevate or move the Office of
Emergency Communication within the Department to reflect the
Department's commitment to improving the emergency communications for
the Nation's first responders?
Answer. The Office of Emergency Communication is committed to
fulfilling its statutory mandate to support and promote the ability of
emergency response providers and relevant government officials to
continue to communicate in the event of natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters.
Question 2a. Madame Secretary, nearly 8 years have passed since the
tragic attacks of 9/11 and 3 years since the devastating storms of
Hurricane Katrina. Despite efforts made by Congress, I remain very
concerned by the various components at the Department that have
indirect and direct influences on interoperability issues.
Can you explain to the committee how you intend to streamline
interoperable emergency communications issues at the Department and
within the Federal Government?
Answer. This question exemplifies why I initiated my Department-
wide Efficiency Review Initiative. As part of this review, the
Department is examining the common mission space on emergency
communications across a number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
components. This review will include an assessment of how DHS can
better implement Congress' intent for the Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) to coordinate improved interoperable emergency
communications capabilities Nation-wide.
OEC is committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate to support and
promote the ability of emergency response providers and relevant
Government officials to continue to communicate in the event of natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. The Office
works closely with its DHS partners, including the National
Communications System, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Office of Policy, as
well as with partners across the Federal Government, to present a
unified interoperable emergency communications policy. Through the
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), released in July 2008,
the Department has identified a clear strategic plan to improve
emergency communications Nation-wide. The NECP lays out 92 specific
milestones designed to achieve three overarching goals:
Goal 1.--By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas
designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)
are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications
within 1 hour for routine events involving multiple
jurisdictions and agencies.
Goal 2.--By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are
able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications
within 1 hour for routine events involving multiple
jurisdictions and agencies.
Goal 3.--By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able
to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 3
hours, in the event of a significant incident as outlined in
national planning scenarios.
Additionally, I would like to highlight the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC). Congressionally mandated by
Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, this
interagency group will be critical to increasing coordination and
reducing duplication of effort by the 11 Federal departments and
agencies that are members of the ECPC. The ECPC Charter is currently
undergoing final leadership review prior to the Center's stand up.
Question 2b. Can you detail for the committee your understanding of
day-to-day and operational interoperable emergency communications
means?
Answer. Interoperability is defined in the National Emergency
Communications Plan (NECP) as the ability of emergency responders to
communicate as needed, on demand, and as authorized at all levels of
government and across all disciplines. Responders need this capability
for all levels of incidents, from day-to-day/routine incidents (e.g.,
Customs and Border Protection coordination with local law enforcement
on an arrest at the border, and local police and emergency medical
services personnel responding to a traffic accident) to significant
natural or man-made incidents (e.g., Federal/State/local response to a
major natural disaster or a terrorist incident). Although much work
remains, through the NECP the Nation has made significant progress
toward this capability.
Question 2c. Can you explain your understanding of which component
at the Department is in charge of interoperability when the first
responder community needs technical assistance and guidance from the
Federal Government?
Answer. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) provides
Nation-wide strategic planning and policy, coordination, and technical
assistance across all levels of government. Additional Departmental
components have responsibility for addressing specific aspects of the
interoperability challenge, including:
Science and Technology Directorate, Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility.--Supports emergency
communications research, development, testing, evaluation and
standards.
National Communications System.--Ensures resilient,
continuous, and secure telecommunications for National
Security/Emergency Preparedness leadership.
Federal Emergency Management Agency.--Provides tactical and
operational support to temporarily restore communications when
commercial and private communications systems are impaired
during disasters.
Question 2d. Can you reassure this committee that the Department
will honor Congress' intent to elevate the importance of operability
and interoperability both at DHS and throughout the Federal Government?
Answer. Yes. I look forward to working with Congress on these key
interoperable emergency communications policy issues, including the
most effective means of meeting these challenges within the Department
and with our Federal partners.
state, local, and tribal coordination
Question 3a. Secretary Napolitano, as former Governor of Arizona
you understand that all disasters are local. In fact, you stated during
your Senate confirmation hearing that, ``the Federal Government can not
do homeland security alone.''
Can you explain your philosophy on how the Department intends to
better integrate State, local, and tribal governments in preparing for,
planning, and response to a catastrophic disaster along the Northern
and Southern borders?
Answer. As a former Governor of a Border State, I understand the
vital role that State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) entities
play in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic
disasters--both natural and manmade.
Successfully integrating SLTT input into the policy process will be
imperative for improving the cooperative and collaborative partnership
between the Department and SLTTs. If the Federal Government needs to
address a catastrophic incident, these partnerships will be essential.
I issued multiple Action Directives to a number of Department
entities specifically to gauge how Department programs and components
gather SLTT input and determine the status of this effort. I am in the
final stages of reviewing the information gathered in response to these
Action Directives. Once I complete my review, I will determine the
direction of the Department's efforts to ensure better integration of
our State, local, Tribal and territorial partners.
The Department is currently working on both a Southern and Northern
Border Strategy. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is
assessing and analyzing the threat Mexican Drug Trafficking
Organizations pose to the border. I&A is working closely with its
sister agencies within the Intelligence Community (IC) and other
Federal, State, local, and tribal partners to share the most current
information and analysis. Customs and Border Protection Headquarters
and field offices are coordinating with the IC and other Federal,
State, local, and tribal partners, to maintain situational awareness
along the U.S. Southwest Border.
To that end, I have directed the Office of Operations and Planning
(OPS) along with the Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other components to revise the current
Contingency Plan for the Southwest Border, which will result in key
changes to its critical considerations, assumptions, mission statement,
and essential tasks. OPS and the Components will work with the Office
of Intergovernmental Programs and the Office of State and Local Law
Enforcement (SLLE) to conduct outreach with the Department's critical
State, local, and tribal stakeholders along the Southwest Border. In
addition, I've sent the Assistant Secretary for SLLE, Ted Sexton, down
to the border, to go through that plan and make sure we have their
input. Our outreach will ensure that our State and local partners are
fully engaged in Southwest Border plans.
Question 3b. How do you intend for the Office of Emergency
Communications to implement the Border Interoperability Demonstrations
Projects, as authorized in Pub. L. 109-295?
Answer. The Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) is working
with Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Commerce, and the
Federal Communications Commission to implement the Border
Interoperability Demonstration Projects. OEC will conduct a competitive
application process to select and enter into cooperative agreements
with a minimum of six border communities to improve interoperable
communications along the border.
As a result of the Border Interoperability Demonstration Projects,
selected communities will benefit from improved interoperability, and
the approaches used will serve as repeatable models for other border
communities to achieve greater interoperability with domestic and
international agencies. OEC will document and share lessons learned,
best practices, and guidance tools for establishing cross-border
interoperability.
Question 3c. What metrics do you plan to implement to assess the
effectiveness of the homeland security grant dollars are funneled to
States, local, and tribal governments?
Answer. The metrics for building and assessing capabilities--
including a communications capability--are set forth by the National
Preparedness Guidelines and accompanying Target Capabilities List
(TCL). The 37 existing capabilities under the TCL cover prevention,
protection, response, and recovery mission areas for all hazards. Each
capability includes a definition and target outcome, a listing of the
major capability activities, and a series of tasks and performance
measures for each activity.
Efforts are currently under way to update the TCL to be more
measurable, risk-based, and user-friendly. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is working closely with the FEMA Disaster
Operations Directorate, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Emergency Communications, and the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate to update the communications capability and measures in
accordance with the metrics set forth in the National Emergency
Communications Plan.
The TCL is used to help synchronize the goals and management of the
preparedness programs, including grant programs. For example,
applicants under the Homeland Security Grant Program are required to
indicate in their investment justifications how their requested
projects will help achieve one or more of the capabilities. Applicants
are also required to indicate how requested projects further one or
more of the eight national priorities set forth in the National
Preparedness Guidelines.
The Cost-to-Capability Analysis Program is currently under
development to gain a better understanding of how grant dollars are
being spent by capability and to ascertain the return on investment of
grant dollars toward capability goals. The Comprehensive Assessment
System is also under development to provide a more holistic picture on
the state of national preparedness by capability, to include the grant
investment data supplied by the Cost-to-Capability Analysis program.
fema: in or out
Question 4a. On February 11, 2009, you received a memo from the
Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General that concluded that
FEMA should remain at DHS. Specifically, Inspector General Skinner
noted that ``removing FEMA from DHS at this point would cause
considerable upheaval, to both FEMA and the department.'' At your
confirmation hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee and then again at the February 25
hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security you testified
that you have not yet spoken to the President concerning whether FEMA
will remain at the Department.
When do you plan to meet with the President to specifically discuss
FEMA's future within the Department? (Please provide a date.)
Question 4b. What is your position on Chairman Obestar's bill (H.R.
1174) to remove FEMA from the Department? Please detail in your
response the impact of removing FEMA from the Department.
Question 4c. Will the memo from the Inspector General provide some
guidance on your recommendation to the President?
Question 4d. What is your assessment of the action directives that
you have received to date as it relates to FEMA's critical role within
the Department?
Question 4e. There are those who continue to argue that FEMA cannot
respond to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters. Can you
explain why FEMA, situated within the Department, strengthens DHS'
capability to respond to any type of catastrophic incident?
Answer. DHS officially began its operations in March 2003, when 22
Federal agencies, including FEMA, were merged. Since this time, FEMA
has been positioned as a vital component of our homeland security and
emergency management infrastructure. The DHS mission is to prevent and
deter terrorist attacks, and protect against and respond to threats and
hazards to the Nation. Our Nation faces threats from both natural and
man-made sources; therefore DHS takes an all-hazards approach to
emergency management that allows us to respond effectively to all
emergencies. FEMA is an integral part of the Department's all hazards
response.
I am currently in the process of reviewing the Inspector General's
memorandum on FEMA and the FEMA-related action directive responses I
have received to date. These sources will inform the discussion I have
with the President on the status of FEMA.
Questions From the Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr. of New Jersey for the
Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. As a member of both the Ways & Means Committee that
handles trade and this committee which handles port security I have
made it one of my top priorities to ensure that not only are our ports
secure but that we do not do so at the price of strangling commerce--I
firmly believe that is a balance we can achieve. To that end, I am
concerned about the misclassification of goods coming into the United
States. The need for importers to correctly classify their goods
according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System is
essential for revenue, regulatory and security compliance, yet the
quality of commodity data submitted to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
remains poor.
According to the CBP, commodity code classification errors result
in $1 billion a year in lost revenue due to duty underpayments. This is
a significant amount--especially in light of our current economic and
budgetary situation--but I fear that aside from the loss of revenue,
the security implications of this are enormous. After all, we need to
know precisely what is coming into the country--if we do not, we are
simply putting ourselves at greater risk.
Unfortunately, we have seen that CBP's resources devoted to
monitoring compliance have declined. In 2007, CBP officers conducted
approximately 68,000 post-entry compliance examinations, representing
just 0.06 percent of the estimated 100 million import entry lines
submitted per year.
It seems to me that an issue of this magnitude cannot be resolved
by simply increasing the numbers of CBP officers.
Has the CBP looked into specialized technology designed to flag
substandard reporting and Commodity Coding errors? My understanding is
that such technology exists and is being used by other governments to
great success. Why not us? The misclassification of goods coming into
the United States is a serious problem, and I would like to know what
CBP is doing to remedy this situation.
Answer. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) estimate of
undercollections is about $400 million annually, with a trade
compliance rate of about 98 percent, as estimated by our Entry Summary
Compliance Measurement Program. This estimated undercollection
represents about 1.09 percent of all duty and tax payments made to CBP.
Many of these errors are due to misclassification, but this estimate
also includes many errors related to anti-dumping and countervailing
duties, as well as false claims for trade preference programs.
CBP would like to clarify that it conducts hundreds of thousands of
compliance reviews each year, in addition to employing many other tools
and programs to address this estimated underpayment such as enforcement
analysis and targeting, operations and responses to allegations,
hundreds of audits on larger companies, partnerships with trusted
importers, and mechanisms such as prior disclosure. These functions are
performed by many ``revenue'' positions within CBP including
International Trade Specialists, Regulatory Auditors, Account Managers,
Import Specialists, and Entry Specialists. CBP applies risk principals
to prioritize this work to direct limited resources to the highest risk
areas. One of those principles includes the identification of trade
issues that cause significant revenue loss. Currently, CBP concentrates
on seven priority trade issues; one of which being revenue. The goal of
the revenue priority trade issue (PTI) is to maximize collection
efforts by ensuring strong controls over the revenue process and by
focusing on material revenue risks. CBP's strategic approach to trade
recognizes the sheer volume of millions of entries and the 100 million
entry lines transmitted each year, but takes into account an annual
estimated compliance rate of 98 percent for all import transactions.
The balance between facilitating legitimate cargo and focusing
enforcement on the areas of highest risk through a multilayered
approach is the cornerstone of CBP's trade strategy.
Question 2. Under the new ``10+2'' initiative, importers are
required to submit an HS Code to Customs prior to export so that CBP's
automated targeting systems can assess risk. The HS code may be a very
good targeting element, but only if you can rely on its accuracy. What
is Customs doing to insure that the HS codes that are being reported
under 10+2 are accurate?
Answer. The ``Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier
Requirements'' Interim Final Rule became effective on January 26, 2009.
CBP is currently in a 1-year delayed enforcement mode in order to
provide the trade sufficient time to adjust to the new requirements and
in consideration of the business process changes that may be necessary
to achieve full compliance. However, since the effective date, CBP has
already received in excess of 200,000 Importer Security Filings (ISFs)
containing more than 600,000 harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) codes.
CBP chose to require the 6-digit HTS code as one of the security
filing elements because it more accurately reflects the nature of the
items that are being imported into the United States versus the data
received under the customs manifest requirements. Additionally, the
importing community is already legally required to provide the HTS code
as part of the entry requirements.
CBP has taken great care to ensure that the HTS codes provided as
part of the ISF are accurate. When an ISF is submitted, CBP's automated
system checks to see if an HTS code has been provided as part of the
filing. If an HTS code has not been provided, the system will reject
the filing. Additionally, CBP's system also checks to see if a provided
HTS code is actually valid. If a provided HTS code is invalid, the
system will reject the filing.
To date, less than 1 percent of the total ISF filings have
been rejected due to a missing or invalid HTS code.
Also, the ISF Importers are required to update their ISF filings if
more accurate information becomes available or there are changes to the
information prior to vessel arrival in the United States.
To date, the HTS codes have been changed less than 1 percent
of the time.
As CBP enters the full compliance mode after January 26, 2010, the
trade community will have a very strong motivation to provide the
correct HTS data as part of the ISF. The trade community is aware that
CBP will be comparing the ISF data with the corresponding manifest and
entry data for validation purposes. Data that clearly does not match
will be flagged for further review, and any number of corrective
actions can be taken to ensure future compliance.
Question 3. Next year, the 2010 Olympics and Paralympics will be
held in Vancouver, British Columbia. Given the Games' proximity to the
United States, can you tell us what the Department of Homeland Security
is doing to ensure safe travel and border transit for international
visitors and the residents of the Pacific Northwest? Specifically, is
the Department investing in coordination, training, and exercise
efforts for emergency officials and first responders? Do communities
and their first responders--both Federal and local--have sufficient
interoperable communications equipment to effectively work with one
another? How can we help prepare the Department, Washington State, and
local community officials for the security requirements of this
historic event?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has identified several land border ports of
entry in the State of Washington which CBP believes will have the most
direct impact related to the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games. CBP
expects to see an impact and increase in vehicular traffic at the ports
of Blaine, Lynden, and Sumas. Additional workload increases are also
anticipated at the CBP's Preclearance Ports of Vancouver and Victoria,
British Columbia, Canada.
CBP projects a 25 percent increase in cross-border traffic over
typical summer volumes. Temporary duty (TDY) officers/agents will be
deployed along the land border ports of entry and between the ports of
entry identified above and at the Preclearance ports of Vancouver and
Victoria. These resources will: Supplement existing resources; ensure
that anticipated workload challenges and mission critical objectives
are met; and, assist in mitigating excessive wait times.
Specifically, CBP plans to temporarily assign staff and personnel
to be deployed to support primary and secondary processing of vehicles
entering the United States through specific ports of entry along the
border in the State of Washington. CBP staff assigned to ports of entry
will focus on increasing inbound Privately Owned Vehicle (POV)
processing capacity and enhancing port of entry security.
Additionally, CBP is planning to enhance its posture between ports
of entry by utilizing Border Patrol Tactical (BORTAC) and Border Patrol
Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) support for incident response
capability and medical support. CBP will focus resources on enhanced
border enforcement, intelligence and the Interagency Border
Enforcement/Intelligence Team (IBET/IBIT).
CBP plans to provide a flexible/responsive aviation law enforcement
force during the games by the interdiction of low and slow flights of
interest perceived as suspect. Additionally, it will provide aviation
support to Federal, State, and local partners in tactical airlift,
video downlink and maritime patrols. CBP will also provide a flexible/
responsive marine law enforcement force during the games with the
interdiction of maritime suspects and/or non-compliant vessels if
encountered. CBP will support other Federal, State, local and tribal
partners in officer/prisoner transport, covert vessel support,
surveillance and overt maritime patrols.
As a key stakeholder, CBP continues to work closely with the
Planning and Operations Workgroups within the Olympic Task Force
Security Committee to help in the development of Standard Operating
Procedures for a 2010 Olympic Coordination Center (OCC). Located at the
CBP facility in Bellingham, Washington, the OCC will facilitate the
coordination and synchronization of Federal, tribal, State, local,
private sector and Canadian security partners and resources in an
effort to provide a safe, secure Washington State and northern border
region in conjunction with the 2009 World Police and Fire Games and the
2010 Winter Olympics/Paralympics Games. DHS will be integrated into the
overall USG intelligence and security construct on both sides of the
border.
CBP will use the National Incident Management System's (NIMS)
Incident Command System (ICS) to enable effective incident management.
The OCC will have a communications center that will be the gateway for
phone and radio communication. A Communications Officer will route
calls appropriately, monitor radio communication, and significant
events.
The OCC will be staffed and operational immediately prior to the
opening ceremonies, through the closing ceremonies of the 2010 Winter
Olympic/Paralympics Games in Vancouver. The OCC will coordinate the
information-sharing, situational awareness, and activities of Federal
agencies to support State and local agencies that may be impacted by
the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games. The opportunity to test
interoperable communications and provide training on various protocols
and procedures will be during the 2009 World Police and Fire Games
schedule in Vancouver, Canada between July 31 and August 9, 2009.
Due to the proximity of the 2009 World Police and Fire Games venues
to the U.S. border, serious public safety and security issues may have
an impact on the Pacific Northwest. It is anticipated that calls for
service and emergency notifications will continue to be handled by
established methods through established protocols unless the incident
or event expands beyond regional geographic or political boundaries.
When an Olympic-related event expands beyond CBP boundaries, the OCC
will facilitate communications and resource acquisition in order to
assist CBP in getting what is needed to manage the event or incident.
CBP has participated in several operations-based exercises to date.
Specifically, these exercises have given CBP an opportunity to evaluate
proposed and current concepts, plans, and capabilities for responding
to incidents near the Canadian border in Whatcom County, Washington
during the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics Games.
Exercise Silver, a functional exercise to rehearse/practice plans
and procedures was held at Camp Murray, Washington in February 2009.
Exercise Silver tested and identified gaps in current capabilities and
focused efforts on identifying and developing priority capabilities and
tasks for the participating entities. The exercise provided an
opportunity to measure and validate performance of capabilities and
associated critical tasks in:
(1) Planning;
(2) Communications;
(3) Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination;
(4) Information Gathering;
(5) Incident Management;
(6) Emergency Operations Center Management;
(7) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Hazardous Materials
Response; and,
(8) Citizen Evacuation/Emergency Public Information and Warning.
Additionally, CBP participated in a Canadian 2010 Olympic
Preparation Exercise Series. The Canadian Government, through Public
Safety Canada, requested the U.S. Government's assistance to ensure
that exercises are realistic and have appropriate meaningful
interaction with U.S. counterparts. The FEMA/National Exercise Division
(NED) briefed the NEP Executive Steering Committee (ESC) on the
Canadian request. The NEP ESC approved the establishment of an
Interagency Working Group (IWG) to plan and organize U.S. exercise
support for exercises.
CBP's participation as a member of the Interagency Working Group
(IWG) to support Canada's exercise was accomplished through a pool of
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The SMEs were prepared to advise
Canadian exercise participants through the Department of State on CBP
capabilities and procedures for garnering assistance, and policies for
employing resources. The primary mission of the SME pool provided
exercise participants with timely and accurate information on, and
awareness of, CBP support/coordination mechanisms, policies and
procedures for garnering assistance, and reasonable expectations of CBP
response timelines and logistical considerations. The secondary mission
of the SME pool will be to discuss, coordinate, and document U.S.
response mechanisms and capabilities for a variety of scenarios, some
of which the Canadian exercise may not address. The IWG helped gain
mutual understanding of capabilities and procedures that could be
brought to bear in the event of a real-world incident.
CBP has taken measures to assure communication connectivity with
Federal, State, and local government agencies. CBP continues to develop
an Integrated Federal Support Plan for the 2010 Winter Olympic/
Paralympics Games designed to ensure a detailed security and public
safety concept of operations (CONOPS) is communicated with all
stakeholders.
A CBP Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will maintain contact with OCC
staff. The PAO will coordinate with agency staff to ensure a
coordinated flow of information.
CBP will take steps to ensure passengers and cargo will be able to
cross the U.S./Canadian border with minimal impact due to the 2009
Police and Fire Games as well as the 2010 Winter Olympic/Paralympics
Games. CBP will continue to assess and evaluate plans which clearly
define roles and responsibilities to assure interoperability and
address the inherent challenges while preparing for the Games.
In addition, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate's Command,
Control, and Interoperability (CCI) Division is preparing to loan
prototype Multi-Band Radios (MBR) to the State of Washington and the
Province of British Columbia in May/June 2009 for an initial testing
and evaluation of the radios. The MBR enables emergency responders to
communicate with partner agencies--regardless of the radio band. Also,
CCI has initiated coordination with the Washington State
Interoperability Executive Committee, the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, northwest emergency responders and Canadian government
agencies for potential technology pilots in support of security during
the games.
Question 4a. The Department's procurement and acquisition offices
have long been understaffed--something not unique to DHS, but a fact of
life across the Federal Government. What steps are you taking, or do
you envision taking over the next 6 months, to improve the procurement
processes at both the Department and its components?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues
improvements to the acquisition work force, improvements in managing
its programs, and strengthening specific contracting functions. DHS
will on-board approximately 50 additional interns to the Acquisition
Professional Career Program (APCP) during fiscal year 2009 to bring the
enrollment to 100 participants. Improvements in managing our programs
focus on the implementation of Directive 102-01 (Acquisition
Management). This Directive replaces Management Directive 1400, and
provides an enterprise framework for consistent and efficient
Departmental management, support, review and approval of DHS
acquisitions as they progress through the development and deployment
life cycle. By the end of fiscal year 2009, DHS will conduct more than
fifteen Acquisition Review Boards for major programs in accordance with
the new Directive. To administer this Directive, the Office of the
Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) has staffed the Acquisition Program
Management Division (APMD) and the Cost Analysis Division (CAD) with
experienced and highly regarded acquisition professionals from across
the Government. During fiscal year 2009, there will be an increased
emphasis on better planning of acquisitions to ensure DHS defines its
needs and enters into sound business deals. In addition, the Department
will continue emphasis on contract pricing, which includes providing
training and expert consultation in analyzing contractor proposed costs
and prices. In addition, the procurement oversight program will be
expanded to include special reviews of key areas such as Time and
Material (T&M) contracts and performance-based contracting. The
findings of these reviews are anticipated to lead to recommendations
that will yield savings through better and more efficient contracting
processes.
Question 4b. Are there any specific targeted efforts to bolster the
professional program management ranks within DHS and its componenets?
Answer. DHS is taking multiple steps to bolster the program
management ranks within the Department and across components. At the
entry level, the Acquisition Professional Career Program (APCP) is
being expanded beyond a contracting focus in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2009 to include technical disciplines. Approximately 25
percent of the APCP billets allotted to the program will focus on the
other acquisition career fields including program management, systems
engineering, test and evaluation and logistics.
In order to ensure that the acquisition career fields that comprise
the program offices have the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities
to successfully execute the DHS mission, the Department is aggressively
pursuing the expansion of the definition of the DHS acquisition work
force and the development of professional certification programs for
each additional career field. From the inception of the Department
though fiscal year 2008, the DHS acquisition work force was defined as:
contracting specialists, program managers, and contracting officers
technical representatives. Beginning in fiscal year 2009, three
additional career fields have been established, and efforts are
underway to develop professional certification programs for the
following fields: Test and Evaluation, Logistics, and Business Cost
Estimating and Financial Management. DHS anticipates the launch of the
Systems Engineering career field and certification program beginning in
fiscal year 2010.
A third area of focus is the enhancement of the centralized
acquisition work force training program to target training to those
specific competencies associated with the technical career fields. DHS
is partnering with the Defense Acquisition University to customize
currently validated certification training by incorporating DHS
policies and processes. The centralized acquisition work force training
program ensures consistency of training across all of DHS and ensures
transferability of professional certifications with Defense
counterparts as well as Civilian Agencies.
The Department has also taken steps to increase the number of
experienced Program Management staff in APMD. Once on-board, these
additional experts will expand APMD's ability to provide assistance to
DHS programs, in parallel with strongly supporting the Department's
governance processes for major acquisitions.
An additional effort that has been launched is the Coding of
Acquisition Billets and Certification levels of individuals filling
those positions. Knowing how many positions are in the acquisition work
force and analyzing the skill sets of personnel occupying those billets
is the first step in being able to effectively manage the acquisition
work force. In partnership with the Office of the Chief Human Capital
Officer, OCPO is testing the use of the existing National Finance
Center database to code and track the acquisition work force and
requisite training requirements.
Question 5. Last summer the Department announced the opening of a
new high-tech National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination
Center, which includes ICE and CBP resources to counter the global
threat of intellectual property rights violations. Unfortunately, we
have not seen much attention generated by the center's activities. In
addition, while thousands of new agents and officers have been added
and allocated to ICE and CBP, none have been given IP-specific
portfolios? Can we get a commitment that intellectual property
protection--both physical counterfeiting and on-line piracy--will be a
priority for the Department, ICE, and CBP? Will you consider
designating agents and officers to specifically deal with intellectual
property issues? What type of outreach can we expect to the private
sector, especially those in industries most impacted by intellectual
property violations?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to
protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) through both criminal and
administrative enforcement actions. The National Intellectual Property
Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center), led by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), focuses on criminal cases, while U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as the agency primarily
responsible for U.S. border enforcement, maintains a robust
administrative IPR enforcement program.
CBP has a dual mission of improving security and facilitating
legitimate trade and travel--which includes protecting America's
businesses, consumers and national security from the harms of
counterfeiting and piracy. IPR enforcement is a top trade enforcement
priority for CBP. Both the number and value of DHS IPR seizures doubled
in the last 5 years. In fiscal year 2008, DHS again achieved record-
breaking results with 14,992 IPR seizures totaling $272.7 million in
domestic value, an increase of 38 percent by value from the previous
year. CBP addressed more than 90 percent of these IPR violations
through seizure and destruction of the infringing goods and issuance of
penalties. CBP refers potential criminal cases to ICE and the IPR
Center, and CBP staff at the IPR Center provides targeting (selection
of shipments for inspection) support for criminal cases.
Personnel throughout CBP work together in an integrated IPR
enforcement process to protect American industries impacted by IPR
violations. Within its Office of International Trade, CBP has dedicated
international trade specialists in the IPR Policy and Programs Division
and the IPR National Targeting and Analysis Group, as well as attorneys
in the IPR and Restricted Merchandise Branch. This dedicated staff of
IPR experts provides expertise and guidance on IPR enforcement to
officers in ports of entry. Dedicating IPR expert personnel at each
port of entry would limit CBP's flexibility to deploy resources and
staff to respond to changing threats and priorities, and may also
result in less IPR enforcement generally as individuals ports may focus
only dedicated expert personnel to the task of IPR enforcement rather
than utilizing all CBP officers trained to assist with enforcement
efforts.
Last year, CBP established an IPR subcommittee under the Commercial
Operations Advisory Committee (COAC), which provides industries
affected by IPR violations a forum for discussing IPR issues and
providing advice and recommendations on IPR enforcement. CBP is in
daily contact with rights owners regarding sharing of information to
improve interdiction of counterfeit goods and training of officers to
identify IPR infringing goods. CBP has created web-based tools, e-
Recordation and e-Allegations, to make it easier for the private sector
to provide information on protected trademarks and copyrights and to
report suspected violations to CBP. Since the launch of e-Allegations
in June 2008, more than 150 allegations of suspected IPR violations
have been reported to CBP. In addition, CBP recently placed a link on
its web site to assist the private sector in requesting IPR speakers
from CBP.
The IPR Center, which was dedicated in July 2008, is a multi-agency
partnership that brings together core investigatory components to
combat intellectual property crime. Participating agencies include U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, with the Department of Commerce, Health and Human Services'
Food and Drug Administration, the FBI and the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service. The IPR Center has three units: Operations, Programs, and
Outreach & Training (OUT). Current staffing consists of 37 ICE special
agents, criminal research specialists, and related support staff
augmented by six special agents and officers from ICE's partner
agencies. In addition, although not a formal partner, the Department of
Justice, through the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section,
has provided substantial support to the IPR Center's development and
currently is working with the IPR Center on a number of on-going
investigations. ICE plans to increase staffing at the IPR Center by an
additional 19 special agents and criminal research specialists. These
added personnel will bring staffing to 56 designated special agents.
The dedication of the IPR Center and the increase in staff is an
acknowledgement by ICE that IPR crime is one of the major threats
facing the United States and that it has been recognized as a priority
for ICE.
The IPR Center's OUT is extremely active with both the public and
private sectors. Since July 2008, the OUT has, under the auspices of
Operation Joint Venture (Joint Venture), engaged in partnerships with
public and private sectors to combat the illegal importation and
distribution of hazardous, substandard and counterfeit goods, as well
as prevent the evasion of lawful duties. Through these partnerships,
the IPR Center provides information and identifies leads and contacts
to foster IPR Center enforcement initiatives, IPR and other commercial
fraud investigations. Through Joint Venture, the OUT has achieved the
following milestones related to outreach to the private sector:
OUT has conducted 172 outreach and training events.
In September 2008, OUT trained 24 domestic ICE agents to
serve as local Joint Venture points of contact and presenters.
These agents will serve as a force multiplier to augment the
OUT's staff in conducting the various events.
The OUT is publishing a quarterly newsletter, the IPR
Report, to highlight cases, trends, and events being conducted
by the IPR Center and its partner agencies, and will also
include articles submitted by industry and foreign law
enforcement counterparts.
The OUT has developed a new video being used at outreach and
training events to highlight the IPR Center, its initiatives,
and interactions with public and private sectors both domestic
and international.
The OUT is planning another session to train additional
Joint Venture points of contacts in both domestic and
international ICE offices. This training event will include a
day of interaction with private industry to update industry on
the status of the IPR Center and enable the industry
representatives to interact with the points of contact.
The OUT has initiated an advertising campaign, initially
targeting three industry sectors, to provide information and
contact information for the IPR Center to enable information
sharing and reporting of alleged infringements.
IPR CENTER STATISTICS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal
Year 2007 Year 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IPR/Commercial Fraud Cases Initiated.............. 1,395 1,385
IPR/Commercial Fraud Arrests (TOTAL).............. 416 446
IPR/Commercial Fraud Indictments.................. 241 189
IPR/Commercial Fraud Convictions.................. 232 214
IPR/Commercial Fraud Seizures (by count).......... 1,128 1,290
Industry Presentations............................ 95 130
Law Enforcement Training.......................... 204 254
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its field offices, ICE does not assign agents to specific
investigative program areas. Each Special Agent in Charge (SAC)
allocates resources based on the threat within their area of
responsibility. ICE agents target criminal violators in all ICE
programmatic areas and strive to levy criminal charges whenever
possible in order to send a strong message of deterrence.
We note that within DHS, CBP is specifically responsible for
enforcing IPR laws on tangible goods crossing U.S. borders while ICE
enforces laws related to on-line piracy in addition to investigating
criminal counterfeiting and piracy of tangible goods.
Question From the Honorable James A. Himes of Connecticut for the
Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question. Madam Secretary, I am interested in your views on the
TSA-prohibited items list and the methodology used to determine what is
prohibited. Currently, TSA allows 7-inch tools, scissors with pointed
metal blades up to 4 inches in length and knitting needles of all sizes
but prohibits small pocket utility tools. Would you support ending the
ban on small tools?
Answer. With regard to methodology, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) periodically reviews the Prohibited Items list
based on the evolving aviation security environment. Improvements made
regarding airline cockpit security and other countermeasures enacted
since the 9/11 tragedy have provided opportunities to adjust the list
of threat objects relevant to the current environment. TSA will
continue to consider the Prohibited Items list when analyzing changes
in the security risk and implementing improvements in the layers of
security.
Currently, TSA allows tools 7 inches or smaller on-board aircraft
but has continued to prohibit knives of any length, including small
knives contained in pocket utility tools. If a passenger has checked
baggage, an always available option is to place the pocket utility tool
inside the checked baggage, where it is not prohibited. TSA continually
works with our international partners to ensure that security rules and
procedures are as consistent as possible. In that light, the
International Civil Aviation Organization approved a revision to its
guidelines for prohibited items that recommends allowing the carriage
of small knives (blades shorter than 6 cm or 2.36 in.). While the
United States is interested in a standardized approach to prohibited
items with our partners around the world, any changes must be made with
the full input of our security partners.
TSA will continue to work with Congress, other Federal agencies,
and airline flight crew organizations on this issue. TSA will keep
Members of Congress and the traveling public informed of any changes to
the Prohibited Items list.
Questions From the Honorable Lamar Smith of Texas for the Honorable
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
worksite enforcement
Question 1a. I am extremely concerned about the perceptions that
have been created in the aftermath of DHS's worksite enforcement
operation in Washington State. The Hill quoted you as telling the
Hispanic Caucus that you had ``grave concerns'' about the manner in
which the action was carried out. The pro-amnesty advocacy group FIRM
stated that ``the day after the raid, after thousands of calls into the
White House and meetings on the Hill, Janet Napolitano called for an
investigation into the raid . . . We yelled and the administration
answered.''
What sort of message does this send to ICE officers simply trying
to do their job and enforce the immigration law?
Question 1b. That their bosses in Washington will not support them
for doing their jobs effectively?
Answer. Since the formation of the agency in 2003, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has developed a comprehensive work site
enforcement strategy utilizing all the tools available to disrupt and
deter those employers who make it their business practice to knowingly
hire undocumented workers. This strategy has raised employer awareness
to the importance of complying with the Nation's immigration laws and
serves as an overall deterrence to illegal immigration.
ICE continues to advance the multifaceted approach that prioritizes
those employers connected the Nation's critical infrastructure. In
these cases, ICE seeks to immediately remove unauthorized workers from
having access to sensitive facilities and then address how the alien
gained access to the facility through the investigation of the
employer. The ICE strategy also focuses on egregious employers who
knowingly hire undocumented workers as a business practice.
Investigations of egregious employers may take weeks, months or years
to complete and are complex in nature. Also, ICE has issued guidance to
all field offices which revised the development of an administrative
fine investigation and further emphasized its importance as a tool
against egregious employers of unauthorized workers.
Question 2a. Since the Washington State enforcement action, how
many requests for authorization for other worksite enforcement actions
have you received from the field?
Question 2b. How many have you approved?
Question 2c. Why should headquarters have to sign off on every
operation?
Question 2d. Isn't this micromanagement?
Question 2e. Doesn't this send the message that headquarters is
discouraging worksite enforcement?
Question 2f. Don't you run the risk of creating the perception that
political factors may be influencing law enforcement decisions?
Answer. Worksite operations, like other law enforcement operations
conducted by DHS components, are reported to my office. Additionally,
ICE policy requires that each SAC office report any planned Worksite
Enforcement (WSE) operation to ICE Headquarters (HQ) prior to the
planned activity using an ICE reporting module. This report is a
notification and not a request for approval. SAC offices are required
to assess all planned WSE operations to determine if the operation's
scale requires coordination at the ICE HQ level through the HQ WSE
Unit. Some factors requiring HQ coordination include: WSE operations
involving suspect employers who have multiple worksite locations
through the United States; WSE operations involving employers involved
in critical infrastructure, or who may produce items that affect
national security or military readiness; and/or WSE operations
involving worksites with significant economic impact to a geographical
area.
Question 3a. I applaud you for wanting to focus on employers who
hire illegal immigrants. Keep in mind, however, that critics of
worksite-enforcement operations often complain that complicit
management officials are too often not arrested. These critics fail to
understand that illegal workers have to be arrested first and
interrogated for the Government to build up sufficient evidence against
management officials to sustain their arrests and indictments. Usually,
those who knowingly hire illegal workers are not charged until after
the media frenzy over a worksite raid has faded. Many management
officials have been criminally charged following up on enforcement
operations.
How do you plan on targeting employers if you first don't build
evidence by arresting illegal workers?
Question 3b. Are you proposing that ICE agents simply ignore the
presence of illegal workers and allow them to continue to break the
law?
Answer. Investigations of egregious employers may take weeks,
months, or years to complete, are complex in nature and often involve
undercover activity, surveillance, witness/informant development,
enforcement actions, record checks, and subpoena material to establish
probable cause and consultation with the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO)
for plea negotiations and/or trial.
In some cases, arrested unauthorized/illegal workers provide
critical information after a worksite enforcement action that is later
used to pursue criminal as well as civil charges against the employers.
Investigative steps and techniques are coordinated with the Department
of Justice to ensure sufficient evidence is developed to ensure the
Government's burden of proof is met.
Additionally, ICE agents make arrests and exercise prosecutorial
discretion on custody conditions, on a case-by-case basis, when they
encounter unauthorized workers to ensure that evidence from witnesses
is obtained and preserved for trial.
Question 4a. A prime example of the lack of priority given to
enforcing the law against employing illegal immigrants is that the
total hours worked by investigators on employer sanctions cases fell
from almost 714,000 in 1997 to 135,000 in 2004, a drop of 81 percent.
Has the time DHS puts into these cases since recovered to anywhere
near the earlier levels?
Question 4b. Will the administration's 2010 budget contain any
increase in the number of ICE agents dedicated to worksite enforcement?
Answer. Since 2004, the amount of investigative hours that ICE
Office of Investigations has dedicated to enforcing the law against
employing illegal immigrants has risen each year, with the hours
totaling 746,642 in fiscal year 2008. The chart below shows the amount
of hours performed and the percent increase for each fiscal year.
Since the President's budget has not been released, it would be
premature to comment on the 2010 budget proposal.
border fence
Question 5a. The ``Secure Fence Act'' required DHS to gain
``operational control'' of the southwest U.S. border. As a means of
gaining ``operation control,'' the bill required over 800 miles of
fencing. The rise in border violence makes this fencing more important
than ever to prevent unauthorized access to the United States.
Completion of the border fence will help reduce illegal immigration,
thus saving American jobs for U.S. citizens and legal workers, and will
help prevent violent Mexican drug cartels from transporting drugs and
violence across the border.
How much pedestrian fencing is currently in place along the
southwest U.S. border? What are the locations of that pedestrian
fencing?
Question 5b. How much vehicle fencing is in place along the
southwest U.S. border? What are the locations of that vehicle fencing?
Question 5c. What are your plans to complete the more than 800
miles of southwest border fencing required by the ``Secure Fence Act?''
Answer. As of March 6, 2009, DHS has completed 611 miles of fence
along the southwest border (301 miles of vehicle fence and 310 miles of
primary pedestrian fence). The border fencing is located in strategic
locations along the southwest border from Imperial Beach, California
through Brownsville, Texas. The pedestrian fence is located within
Border Patrol Sectors San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso,
Marfa, Del Rio and Laredo and Rio Grande Valley. The vehicle fence is
located within five Border Patrol Sectors (San Diego, El Centro, Yuma,
Tucson and El Paso).
Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, as amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006
and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 requires DHS to
construct--in the most expeditious manner possible--the infrastructure
necessary to deter and prevent illegal entry on our southwest border,
including pedestrian and vehicle fencing, roads, and technology. As
amended, the Act mandates the completion of 700 total miles of fence.
It also mandates that the Secretary identify priority areas ``where
fencing would be the most practical and effective in deterring
smugglers and aliens attempting to gain illegal entry into the United
States.'' As of March 6, 2009, DHS has completed approximately 611 of
the 661 miles of fence identified by the Border Patrol as priority
areas. While fencing remains an important tool in achieving effective
control, it is only one element of our overall border security strategy
that incorporates the proper mix of technology personnel, and tactical
infrastructure. Currently, there are no immediate funded plans to
construct additional fencing.
Question 6. Some persons and organizations along the border are
philosophically opposed to a border fence. Should we give veto power
over the placement and construction of a border fence serving the
national interest to such local persons and organizations?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's decisionmaking
process pertaining to the placement and construction of border fence is
directly linked to a comprehensive National Border Patrol Strategy that
protects against and prevents terrorist attacks and other transnational
crimes between the ports of entry. Border fence and related tactical
infrastructure is one critical piece of this strategy that also
requires the right complement of technology and personnel to achieve
effective control of our Nation's borders.
There are four main factors that DHS uses to determine fence
location: (1) Initial Border Patrol operational assessments; (2)
engineering assessments, which include the cost to construct; (3)
environmental assessments; and (4) input from stakeholders. Initial
operational assessments by Border Patrol identify locations where fence
would provide the ``persistent impedance''--the continuous and constant
ability to deter or delay illicit cross-border incursions--necessary to
achieve effective control of the border. However, input from local
communities and organizations are always considered during the planning
process and accommodated when possible without jeopardizing operational
integrity. These consultations with communities and stakeholders and
the partnerships with State and local governments work toward
minimizing the adverse impacts on the local communities. This type of
input is critical in the fence placement decision process.
To ensure threats and vulnerabilities are addressed, Border Patrol
Sector Chiefs are best qualified to make informed decisions on fence
deployment. Local persons and organizations do not have awareness of
ever-changing law enforcement sensitive threat and vulnerability
assessments necessary in resource deployment decisions. Based on the
aforementioned, DHS cannot support giving veto power to external
entities over the tactical deployment of border fence.
Question 7. At a Homeland Security Committee hearing last year,
Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar stated that he was ``absolutely not''
satisfied with the progress of virtual fence construction at the
Project 28 site. The ``Secure Fence Act'' requires physical fencing,
not virtual fencing. Given the enormous setbacks with the virtual
fencing at the Project 28 site, isn't it a waste of American taxpayer
dollars to continue to push for virtual fencing?
Answer. Technology is an important component of border security,
and is most certainly not a waste of American taxpayer dollars.
Although some refer to technology as a ``virtual fence,'' technology
does not have the persistent impedance capability of a real fence. It
does, however, provide timely and accurate information that allows for
more efficient determination for response requirements. Technology
includes sensors, command and control systems, and communication
resources, and is a powerful force multiplier with the capability to
provide the situational awareness that is a precursor to effective
control. Sensors can ``watch'' the border continuously, guided by
appropriate command and control systems. These systems can also help
sort the data coming from sensors in order to provide adequate time for
responders to quickly access the most critical information. With
accurate information to identify and classify illicit incursions,
agents have many more options regarding how and when they will respond
to the incursion. Improved communications capability also supports U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) response forces by ensuring
agents can be properly directed and coordinated.
Pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Secure Fence Act, Public Law 109-
367, 120 Stat. 2638 (October 26, 2006), the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has worked to meet the requirement of providing
``systematic surveillance of the international land and maritime
borders of the United States through more effective use of personnel
and technology, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors,
satellites, radar coverage, and cameras and physical infrastructure
enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens into the United States
. . . ''. In accordance with this requirement, DHS has adopted a border
security strategy that incorporates the effective mix of personnel,
technology and tactical infrastructure to secure the Nation's borders.
This approach recognizes that the most important border security assets
are CBP's frontline personnel. To assist frontline CBP personnel with
their border security mission, force multiplier tools, i.e. technology
and infrastructure, are essential to improving the effectiveness and
safety of these agents and officers.
Question 8. So far, only 32 miles of double fencing have been built
along the entire southern border. How many miles of double-layer
fencing will DHS build along the border? Hasn't double-layer fencing
been extremely effective at slowing down illegal border crossings in
San Diego?
Answer. Currently, DHS has no plans to erect additional double
layer (secondary fence) along the border. Border Patrol continues to
assess all threats and vulnerabilities at both the local and national
levels. Secondary fence will continue to be an enforcement tool option
in certain situations and operational environments; however, it is not
operationally necessary--or effective--in other environments. San Diego
Sector has experienced operational gains as a result of the deployment
of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel. These are all
components of an enforcement model that provides the U.S. Border Patrol
with the capacity to detect, identify, classify, respond, and bring
events to an acceptable law enforcement resolution.
e-verify
Question 9a. On June 6, 2008, President Bush signed Executive Order
12989, which directed Federal agencies to require that Federal
contractors use E-Verify to ensure the employment eligibility of their
employees. The final rule for implementation was published on November
14, 2008 and was scheduled to take effect on January 15, 2009. Final
implementation of Executive Order 12989 has subsequently been postponed
until May 21, 2009.
On and after May 21, 2009, will Federal contractors be required to
use E-Verify to ensure the employment eligibility off their employees?
Question 9b. Why did President Obama postpone the final
implementation of the rule implementing Executive Order 12989?
Question 9c. What, if any, changes are planned to the rule
implementing Executive Order 12989?
Answer. The regulations remain under review within the
administration, but currently provide that they will become applicable
to Federal contractors on May 21, 2009. The E-Verify program has
invested significant resources in efforts to prepare for compliance
with the rule.
The administration wanted an adequate opportunity to review the
rule before it became applicable to Federal contractors to ensure that
the rule provisions are appropriate within the context of the new
administration's procurement and immigration enforcement policies.
The administration is currently reviewing the rule and will
announce any changes to the rule once that review is completed.
Question 10a. I am glad to see that the President's budget for 2010
calls for dedicating $100 million for E-Verify.
Does this signal that the new administration's commitment to the E-
Verify program?
Question 10b. Will you ask the Senate Democrats to allow for a
multi-year or permanent extension?
Question 10c. How can employers engage in long-term planning if
they do not know if E-Verify will exist a month from now?
Answer. When I was Governor of Arizona, I signed into law a
mandatory requirement for all employers to use E-Verify. Reducing
unauthorized employment is crucial for controlling the problem of
illicit migration. E-Verify holds real promise as a central element in
effective immigration enforcement that combines border efforts with
interior measures.
On January 30, 2009 I issued an Action Directive on Immigration and
Border Security that includes a request for an assessment of the E-
Verify program. I am currently reviewing that assessment.
DHS supports reauthorization of the E-Verify program in its current
state.
With sufficient system improvements to guard against false
negatives and false positives, to ensure an effective monitoring and
compliance unit, to ensure effective outreach to the U.S. work force,
and to address workplace rights and remedies for U.S. citizens and work
authorized aliens, and to ensure that the Social Security
Administration is funded and staffed to adequately process walk-ins who
seek to correct tentative non-confirmations and to make necessary
system upgrades, I would be open to proposals to require the use of E-
Verify by employers throughout the United States. I will work with
agency leaders to ensure it meets those expectations as we work to
build a reliable system ensuring that employers hire legal workers.
Originally set to expire in 2001, E-Verify has been extended four
times. Given its history, the fact that it is a free and easy-to-use
system, and that an average of over 1,000 new employers sign up to use
the system every week, it is probable that E-Verify will continue to
exist and grow as demand for system use and capabilities increases.
Question 11. What is the status of DHS's lawsuit against the State
of Illinois for its statute prohibiting Illinois employers from using
the basic pilot program?
Answer. On March 12, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of Illinois granted the Federal Government's motion for
summary judgment, declaring the Illinois statute invalid on the grounds
that it violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The
Court further issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the State of
Illinois from enforcing its statute. The State of Illinois has 60 days
to file an appeal.
data sharing
Question 12. Does it frustrate you that the Social Security
Administration and the Internal Revenue Service have information at
their fingertips that could greatly assist DHS in enforcing our
immigration laws and they don't, or claim that they can't, share it
with you?
Will you urge the administration to rewrite regulations as
necessary to allow for the sharing of information?
Answer.
The Social Security Administration has been sharing
information with DHS to support its immigration initiatives
through the Basic Pilot (E-Verify) program since the program's
inception, as mandated by the statute. DHS is currently working
with the Social Security Administration to improve this data
sharing initiative. We recognize that collaboration in data
sharing efforts could assist the Department in certain
immigration programs and other people screening purposes.
However, we must ensure that data sharing contains appropriate
privacy protections and redress procedures.
With respect to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) information,
USCIS would benefit from having access to certain IRS taxpayer
information when making immigration eligibility decisions,
e.g., determining whether a U.S. business sponsoring an
employment-based immigrant meets the requirements for financial
feasibility (ability to pay wages) or legitimacy (proof of
existence), or whether an employer registering for E-Verify is,
in fact, a legitimate entity. However, under Section 6103 of
the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS is not authorized to
disclose taxpayer information to USCIS absent consent from the
taxpayer to the IRS directly.
social security no-match letters
Question 13a. On August 14, 2007, DHS published the final rule
regarding a new process relating to Social Security no-match letters.
The rule proposed, as a ``safe harbor'' for employers, steps to be
taken when they receive a no-match letter from the Social Security
Administration. The rule was to take effect on September 14, 2007, but
litigation by the AFL-CIO and the ACLU stalled the rule's final
implementation. In March 2008, DHS issued a supplemental rule
addressing concerns raised by the Federal court.
Is DHS still seeking to have the Federal court injunction against
the regulations lifted, as was the prior administration?
Question 13b. Does the administration plan to issue no-match
letters to all employers with mismatches in order to alert them that
they have submitted Social Security tax withholdings based on Social
Security account numbers that do not match SSA records as to issued
numbers and corresponding names? If so, when does this administration
plan to start issuing such letters?
Answer. Because the no-match rule is the subject of on-going
litigation, I believe it is inappropriate to comment on it at this
time.
documentary requirements to board airplanes
Question 14. The 9/11 Commission taught us that ``At many entry
points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft,
sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that
people are who they say they are and to check whether they are
terrorists.'' Yet, DHS has not issued regulations setting forth
documents acceptable for boarding airplanes, even though the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required DHS to do by
July 2005. When will DHS finally be issuing the regulations?
Answer. Effective June 1, 2008, TSA began using a standardized list
of acceptable identification for airline travel. At the checkpoint,
adult passengers (18 and over) are required to show a U.S. Federal or
State-issued photo ID (or certain forms of foreign government, tribal
or Registered Traveler identification documents) that contains the
following: name, date of birth, gender, expiration date and a tamper-
resistant feature. TSA established a Standard Operating Procedure for
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) detailing the specific documents
acceptable at TSA checkpoints for travelers seeking to enter the secure
areas of the airport. TSA maintains a public list of acceptable
documents on its web site (http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/
acceptable_documents.shtm).
The standardization of acceptable documents complements the layer
of aviation security created when TSA assumed travel document checking
responsibilities from airline contractors beginning in 2007. Specially
trained TSOs are positioned in front of the checkpoint to check
passengers' boarding passes and identification. They use black lights
and magnifying loupes to examine security features and receive on-line,
classroom and on-the-job training that teaches them how to recognize
unique, fraud-prevention features embedded in Government-issued
identification documents. The training also includes discerning
behavioral cues and interview techniques that have proven successful in
identifying passengers whose behavior warrants additional screening.
Further, as of June 2008, TSA began denying entry into secure areas
of airports to passengers who willfully refuse to provide
identification. The change applies exclusively to individuals who
simply refuse to provide any identification or assist TSOs in
ascertaining their identity. It does not apply to passengers that may
have misplaced, lost or otherwise do not have ID but are cooperative
with officers. Cooperative passengers who cannot present an acceptable
ID will have to provide information to the TSO in order to verify their
identity. Passengers who are cleared through this process may also be
subject to additional screening. TSA can deny entry in cases where it
cannot verify the identity of a traveler.
287(g) agreements and cooperation with state and local law enforcement
Question 15. You only have at your disposal a few thousand ICE
officers to enforce the immigration laws throughout our Nation. Doesn't
the voluntary cooperation of State and local law enforcement officers
in immigration enforcement serve as a valuable force multiplier for
DHS?
Answer. Yes, the voluntary cooperation and partnerships with State
and local law enforcement agencies in 287(g) agreements allows for ICE
to successfully use State and local officers as force multipliers in
both detention facilities and task force settings.
There is a growing interest of individual State and local entities
in participating in the 287(g) program as well as congressional
interest in assisting State and local communities in addressing border
security and immigration enforcement issues.
The first 287(g) agreement was signed in 2002, and as of October
2008, participation in the 287(g) program had increased to 67 States
and local agencies.
Question 16. The 287(g) program was created by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. If you
look at the legislation, it provides that local law enforcement can
enter into 287(g) agreements to assist in the ``investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States.'' There is
no statutory requirement that illegal immigrants be ``serious
criminals'' before they can be picked up by local law enforcement, is
there? Will you agree not to impose such an extra-legal requirement on
local law enforcement and take this valuable and voluntary tool out of
their hands?
Answer. It is correct that there is no statutory requirement that
illegal immigrants be ``serious criminals'' before they can be picked
up by local law enforcement.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) values the assistance
from 287(g) State and local partners regarding immigration enforcement;
however ICE retains the discretion to set priorities in order to manage
its limited resources and meet the agency's mission requirements. To
ensure resources are managed effectively, ICE also requires its
partnering Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to also manage its resources
dedicated to 287(g) authority under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
entered into between ICE and the State or local agency. To that end,
the following list reflects the categories of aliens that are a
priority for arrest and detention with the highest priority being Level
1 criminal aliens. Resources should be prioritized to the following
levels:
Level 1--Individuals who have been convicted of major drug
offenses and/or violent offenses such as murder, manslaughter,
rape, robbery, and kidnapping;
Level 2--Individuals who have been convicted of minor drug
offenses and/or mainly property offenses such as burglary,
larceny, fraud, and money laundering; and
Level 3--Individuals who have been convicted of other
offenses.
Aliens who do not fall within these levels and are arrested by
287(g) officers in the regular course of enforcing State or local law
may be issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) before an immigration judge and
released on their own recognizance or on bond if they are not
determined to be a threat to safety and security of the community.
Question 17. I received a letter from DHS stating that since the
beginning of 2007, ICE had received 69 new applications from localities
to enter into 287(g) agreements. Yet ICE only intended to sign 33
memoranda of understanding because of limited funds. Does the
administration's budget for 2010 include enough funding to allow DHS to
enter into 287(g) agreements with all interested localities?
Answer. Since the President's budget for 2010 has not been
released, ICE is not in a position to comment on any 2010 budget
request under consideration.
The 287(g) program has received adequate funding to support the
program to date. However, funding is not the only factor when
considering a law enforcement agency's (LEA's) request for
participation in the 287(g) program. ICE also must consider a number of
other factors. First, a needs assessment must be completed. This
assessment helps to identify which ICE program would be best suited to
address the particular needs of an LEA.
In December 2007, ICE created an Office of State and Local
Coordination (OSLC), specifically to promote coordination and
cooperation between ICE and our many State and local partners. With
this new office, ICE hopes to develop stronger partnerships with State
and local agencies through strategic discussions and efforts in order
to maximize its mission of interior enforcement. As a result of the
widespread interest in ICE's programs, particularly the 287(g) program,
ICE has launched the Agreement of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance
Safety and Security (ACCESS) program. ICE ACCESS provides the vehicle
for both ICE and LEA to assess which ICE programs will provide the
greatest overall benefit to both parties.
The 287(g) program is not always the program best suited to meet
the LEA's needs. In addition to the needs assessment, ICE must consider
operational factors such as the proximity to an ICE office for
oversight, supervision, and support, existing ICE infrastructure,
available detention bed space, the type of criminal activity occurring
in the LEA's area of responsibility, and the number of anticipated
encounters with illegal immigrants. After evaluating the totality of
those factors, a final determination is made.
deportation of fugitive aliens
Question 18a. I am pleased to see that because of ICE's fugitive
enforcement teams, the overall number of fugitive aliens has finally
begun to decrease. However, it is still unacceptable that there are
more than half a million alien fugitives who have been ordered deported
by immigration judges.
What is the purpose of even having immigration courts if so many
deportation orders of the courts are flouted?
Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of
Detention and Removal Operations (DRO), established the first Fugitive
Operations Team (FOT) in 2003 in an effort to reduce a fugitive alien
backlog that had been growing by 10 percent annually. As the number of
FOTs increased to 79 FOTs Nation-wide in fiscal year 2007, the agency
was able to expand its efforts to locate, arrest, and remove ICE
fugitive aliens from the United States. Consequently, the first overall
reduction in the fugitive alien backlog occurred in fiscal year 2007.
The backlog has continued to decrease each year. This decline reflects
not only an elimination of old cases, but also includes efforts to
remove individuals with newly issued deportation orders. ICE continues
to explore strategies to reduce the fugitive population.
Question 18b. The last administration's goal was to eliminate the
backlog of fugitive aliens by 2012. Can you meet this goal?
Answer. With the establishment of FOTs Nation-wide, the Nation's
fugitive alien population declined for the first time in fiscal year
2007 and has continued to decrease as reflected below:
At the end of fiscal year 2006, the fugitive alien backlog
was 632,726;
At the end of fiscal year 2007, the fugitive alien backlog
was 594,756;
At the end of fiscal year 2008, the fugitive alien backlog
was 557,762;
As of March 17, 2009, the fugitive backlog was 551,915.
Whether the 2012 goal will be met depends on many factors such as
the number of new fugitives added to the backlog in the coming years,
any difficulties in locating such fugitives as well as the length of
time it takes for a country to agree to accept the alien.
Question 18c. Will you continue to seek the removal of all fugitive
aliens with orders of deportation, not just those who have committed
additional criminal offenses?
Answer. Yes. It is ICE/DRO Policy that Fugitive Operation Teams
prioritize cases according to the following standards: (I) Fugitives
that pose a threat to national security; (II) Fugitives that pose a
threat to the community; (III) Fugitives convicted of violent crimes;
(IV) Fugitives with criminal records; and (V) Fugitives that are non-
criminals.
The fugitive operation teams enforcement operations are planned
according to these criteria.
Question 18d. Will you continue to have ICE arrest, and not simply
ignore, illegal immigrants with whom they come into contact while
searching for fugitive aliens?
Answer. During the course of targeted operations, FOTs often
encounter other people in the presence of the ICE fugitive FOTs are
attempting to arrest. When appropriate, ICE agents and officers engage
these aliens in consensual encounters to determine alienage. If ICE
takes an enforcement action against a non-fugitive alien, ICE officers
exercise prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis.
temporary protected status
Question 19. It has become all too apparent that past
administrations have used temporary protected status as a de facto
amnesty for illegal immigrants from certain Central American countries.
TPS status was granted to Honduran and Nicaraguan nationals at the end
of 1998, following Hurricane Mitch. The last administration extended
TPS numerous times, long after any temporary dislocations caused by the
hurricane have long since ended. Will DHS under your leadership
continue to abuse temporary protected status in this way?
Answer. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a form of immigration
relief that I have the discretion to apply only insofar as conditions
in a country meet the statutory requirements delineated in the
Immigration and Nationality Act under 244. I take very seriously
Congress's intent, which is supported by the clear language of the
statute, for TPS to serve as a temporary immigration status to protect
nationals of designated foreign states in the United States who are
unable to return to their home country in safety. In order to preserve
the integrity of TPS as a viable form of temporary relief, the
designation must only be granted or extended where appropriate.
sanctuary cities
Question 20. On December 19, 2002, a 42-year-old mother of two was
abducted and forced by her assailants into a hideout near some railroad
tracks in Queens, New York. She was brutally raped before being rescued
by a New York Police Department canine unit. The NYPD arrested five
aliens in connection with that assault. Four of those aliens entered
the United States illegally. Three of those four had extensive arrest
histories in New York City. Despite the criminal histories of the
aliens, however, the NYPD did not inform the INS about these aliens
until after the December 19 attack. The only reason that the three
illegal immigrants were in the United States, despite their extensive
arrest histories, was because New York police officers had been barred
by New York's ``sanctuary city'' policy from contacting the INS. Do you
believe that sanctuary city policies have enhanced or reduced the
safety of American citizens?
Answer. It is important for Federal, State, and local governments
to work together to facilitate effective immigration enforcement and to
reinforce the rule of law. These are legitimate concerns for both
jurisdictions. I look forward to working with the White House, other
departments and agencies, the Department's senior leaders, Congress,
local and State elected officials, and law enforcement officials to
develop and implement an appropriate division of labor toward these
ends, while promoting the exchange of information required to ensure
that criminal aliens are prosecuted and removed from this country, and
recognizing that immigration enforcement is a Federal responsibility.
Question 21. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Enforcement Act of 1996 bars State and local officials from prohibiting
any of their employees from sending to DHS information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status of any individuals. Despite this ban,
many ``sanctuary cities'' in fact prohibit their law enforcement
agencies from providing the names of suspected illegal immigrants to
DHS. Do you believe that these sanctuary cities should be allowed to
violate Federal law?
Would you consider denying funding to communities that violate the
clear, unambiguous provisions of Federal law?
Answer. Section 642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Enforcement Act of 1996, which is codified at 8 U.S.C.
1373(a), prohibits a local Government from restricting any entity or
official of that local government from communicating with DHS regarding
the immigration status of any individual. I am advised by the DHS
Office of the General Counsel that the Department does not have the
legal authority to cut off all DHS funds to a city if the city violates
Section 642(a) or if the Department otherwise disagrees with the city's
policy on immigration.
issuance of visas to nationals of countries that do not accept the
return of their nationals
Question 22. DHS cannot deport more than 100,000 deportable aliens,
many of them criminals, because their countries refuse to take them
back. Your own Inspector General acknowledges that this problem has
created ``a mini-amnesty program'' and reports that ``thousands of
criminal aliens with final orders are released because of the
unwillingness of some countries to [accept back their nationals]''. The
Immigration and Nationality Act requires the Secretary of State to stop
issuing visas to all nationals of countries that you determine have
refused or delayed the return of their deported nationals. Yet,
previous Secretaries of Homeland Security have never carried out the
responsibility under this provision. Do you plan to exercise your
authority to enhance Americans' safety?
Answer. Discontinuing the issuance of visas to any foreign country
is a powerful tool with major foreign policy implications. Before
considering discontinuance, I would consult extensively with the
Secretary of State to determine whether there are other tools that
could overcome repatriation problems more effectively.
border patrol
Question 23. It has been alleged that Border Patrol agents are told
by their superiors to cease making apprehensions after they have
reached a daily quota. Is there any truth to these allegations?
Answer. The United States Border Patrol does not operate under a
quota, and there are no plans to do so in the future. No set number of
apprehensions is mandated.
detention of dangerous aliens
Question 24. The Supreme Court has ruled that under current law,
aliens ordered removed cannot be detained for more than 6 months if for
some reason they cannot be removed. Based on this decision, DHS has had
no choice but to release back onto the streets many hundreds of
criminal aliens. Jonathan Cohn, former Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, has testified that ``the government is [now] required to
release numerous rapists, child molesters, murderers, and other
dangerous illegal aliens into our streets . . . [V]icious criminal
aliens are now being set free within the United States.'' The House of
Representatives twice passed legislation in the 109th Congress allowing
for the continued detention of dangerous aliens and to keep them off
the streets of our communities. Will you call for Congress to pass such
legislation?
Answer. On January 30, 2009, I issued an Action Directive on
immigration and border security that requested a review of the
Department's immigration detention policies. (Additionally, on February
4, 2009, I announced the appointment of Dora Schriro as Special Advisor
on Detention and Removal Operations at ICE.) DHS will be taking a
comprehensive look at all aspects of detention policy, including the
issue of detention of aliens with final orders of removal, to assess
current conditions and devise and implement strategies that will bring
about substantive improvements to the system.
affidavits of support
Question 25. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 requires that U.S. citizens or permanent
residents sponsoring family members for immigrant visas sign legally
binding affidavits of support enforceable against the sponsor for the
cost of any means-tested public benefits provided to an alien. The Act
mandates that ``the appropriate entity of the Federal Government . . .
shall request reimbursement by the sponsor.'' Unfortunately, DHS has
never set up a mechanism to ensure that American taxpayers are
reimbursed. American taxpayers continue to be abused by sponsored
aliens receiving unreimbursed public benefits. Will you set up the
required mechanisms to ensure that sponsors are held to their
commitments?
Answer.
The Affidavit of Support, Form I-864, submitted by a
sponsoring U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, is a
requirement, in most cases, to establish eligibility for a
family-based immigrant visa. The sponsor must be able to
demonstrate that he or she has income of at least 125 percent
of the applicable Federal poverty guidelines. In the event that
the sponsor cannot meet such an income requirement, a joint
sponsor, who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,
may also submit an affidavit of support. Section 213A of the
Immigration & Nationality Act requires that the affidavit of
support be a legally enforceable contract between the sponsor
and the foreign national. Also, the Act requires that the
affidavit of support be a legally enforceable contract between
the sponsor and any Federal or State agency that may provide
means-tested public benefits to the sponsored immigrant.
The affidavit of support is a legally binding contract, and
the sponsored immigrant and any public agencies dispensing
means-tested benefits to the immigrant may sue the sponsor for
failure to meet the obligations assumed under it. Forms I-864A
signed by household members are also legally enforceable
contracts, and sponsors can sue to enforce those contracts.
Upon notification that a sponsored alien has received
designated means-tested benefits, the Federal, State, or local
entity that has provided the public benefit shall request
reimbursement from the sponsor for an amount equal to the cost
of the benefit. If the sponsor does not respond to the request
in 45 days, the agency may sue the sponsor in a Federal or
State court. There is a 10-year limit on actions to obtain
reimbursement.
Since the statute already authorizes public agencies to sue
the alien's sponsor for reimbursement of means-tested benefits,
DHS does not see a need at this time to create additional
mechanisms for public agencies to obtain reimbursement.
immigration detention beds
Question 26. It is well known that illegal immigrants who are not
detained rarely show up for their deportation proceedings. The
Department of Justice's Inspector General found that the INS was only
able to remove 13 percent of nondetained aliens with final orders of
removal, and only 6 percent of nondetained aliens from State sponsors
of terrorism who had final removal orders. Your own agency admits that
it will need over 33,000 detention beds just to detain and remove all
criminal aliens incarcerated in State and local jails. Congress in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 authorized an
increase in the number of immigration detention beds of 8,000 a year.
The past administration never budgeted for anywhere near this number of
additional detention beds.
What increase in immigration detention beds will be in the
President's 2010 budget?
Answer. Since the President's budget has not been released, it
would be premature to comment on a 2010 budget request.
Question 27. The DHS Inspector General has reported that the lack
of adequate detention space limits the effectiveness of the fugitive
operations teams. In fact, ``a field office director reported ceasing
fugitive operations for 6 weeks because of insufficient bed space and
another manager reported slowing team operations for the same reason .
. . Another supervisor indicated that a lack of adequate detention
space is the team's biggest limitation.'' Isn't this another reason why
all the detention beds authorized in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act should be funded?
Answer. Neither the Office of Detention and Removal Operations'
(DRO) field offices nor the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP)
have imposed a moratorium on fugitive enforcement activity. The
individuals that are targeted for arrest by the Fugitive Operations
Teams (FOTs) have been ordered removed and most are detained in ICE
custody until their removal from the United States can be affected.
Question 28. So-called ``alternatives to detention'' simply do not
work. Do you know that even under the highly touted Intensive
Supervision Appearance Program'', one-third of the ``supervised''
aliens who are ordered deported flout their deportation orders?
Answer. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of
Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) created the Alternatives to
Detention (ATD) Program in fiscal year 2002. The goal of the ATD
program is to develop and implement programs to improve aliens'
compliance with conditions of release, including their attendance at
immigration hearings and compliance with final court orders. These
programs have already shown tremendous promise in improving
accountability for aliens in removal proceedings, while helping the
agency to use detention space more efficiently for aliens who require
detention.
Currently, within the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
(ISAP) there is a maximum participant limit of 6,000. More than 5,700
aliens are actively participating in this program as a condition of
release from custody. Since inception, ISAP has served over 12,300
participants.
expedited removal
Question 29. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 created the mechanism of ``expedited
removal.'' Because of the success of expedited removal, our
international airports are no longer being deluged with aliens without
documents. The 1996 act provided the administration with the authority
to utilize expedited removal in the case of any alien who had entered
the United States illegally and had not been present here for 2 years.
Until recently, the INS and DHS had never made use of this power. In
the last 2 years, however, DHS has taken a tentative step toward using
expedited removal along the southern border. Will you use the full
authority given to you by Congress to use expedited removal against all
aliens who have entered illegally and have been here less than 2 years?
Answer. Expedited Removal (ER) is currently applied to aliens at
ports of entry and aliens encountered within 100 miles of the border
and within 14 days of their unlawful entry. Although Immigration and
Nationality Act 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)
(1996) provides statutory authority for Nation-wide implementation of
ER to all aliens encountered within 2 years of unlawful entry, the
initial regulation applying ER in practice limited its scope to
arriving aliens only, reserving the right to expand this application
through the issuance of further regulations. 62 F.R. 10312 (March 6,
1997). Two subsequent regulations were issued that expand the scope of
ER; however, the full scope of statutory authority has not yet been
implemented. DHS continues to examine the expansion of ER.
western hemisphere travel initiative
Question 30. In 2003, the Immigration Subcommittee held a hearing
that examined D.C. sniper John Muhammad's smuggling activities between
the Caribbean and the United States. Muhammad was able to make his
living by providing bogus American identification documents such as
driver's licenses and birth certificates to aliens seeking to
impersonate U.S. citizens and get through U.S. ports-of-entry. It is no
wonder that the 9/11 Commission found that ``Americans should not be
exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their
identities to be securely verified when they enter the United States.''
Do you believe it is important that DHS implement the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative by the June 2009 deadline so that these
abuses can no longer take place?
Answer. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) Land and
Sea requirements will go into effect on June 1, 2009, the earliest day
allowed by law. WHTI requires U.S. and Canadian citizens to present a
single, secure document that denotes identity and citizenship.
WHTI will strengthen border security by improving the ability to
confirm identity and citizenship while facilitating border crossing for
legitimate travelers. The 9/11 Commission noted that for terrorists,
travel documents are as important as weapons. By requiring secure
documents to enter the United States, the Department of Homeland
Security will make it harder for people to use fraudulent credentials
to cross our borders, and we will make it easier for our border
officers to separate real documents from fake, enhancing our security
and ultimately speeding up processing.
WHTI increases traveler facilitation by requiring certain documents
designed for land border include vicinity radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology. RFID technology allows traveler
information to be pre-positioned for the border officer and queried via
law enforcement databases as a vehicle approaches primary inspection at
land ports of entry. It also facilitates our ability to verify
automatically many of the documents presented with their issuing
agency. Border officers will be able to determine if the individual in
front of them is the person depicted on the document, and if that that
is the identity to whom the original document was issued.
Vicinity RFID technology conforms with DHS's future vision of the
border in a way that meets our national security needs, our economic
imperatives, and the public's trust.
2010 census
Question 31. It has been reported that the Census Bureau will ask
DHS to suspend enforcement of the immigration laws in 2010 during the
taking of the census. Does DHS have any plans to stop enforcing the
immigration laws in 2010?
Answer. DHS is aware of the enormous challenges faced by the Census
Bureau, particularly in counting non-citizens, both documented and
undocumented, residing in the United States. DHS plans to consult with
the Census Bureau regarding the most appropriate ways in which the
Department and the Bureau can cooperate to make the taking of the 2010
census as efficient and accurate as possible.
citizenship usa
Question 32. Citizenship USA was the Clinton Administration's
politically motivated project to rush through the naturalization of
hundreds of thousands of aliens in time to vote in the 1996 elections.
This program led to a debacle in which about 180,000 aliens were
naturalized without having undergone FBI criminal history records
checks, resulting in the naturalization of an unknown number of people
who had potentially disqualifying criminal records. Do you agree that
DHS shouldn't respond to the current naturalization caseload backlog by
repeating the sorry history of Citizenship USA?
Answer.
In the summer of fiscal year 2007, there was a sudden surge
of naturalization applications. The fee increase that went into
effect in July 2007 was one cause of the surge, as some
applicants chose to file their applications and petitions
before the fee increase took effect. Filings of naturalization
applications more than doubled in June, and in July
naturalization filings were about eight times normal monthly
receipts.
USCIS developed a plan to deal with the surge of
applications within 2 years, by the middle of fiscal year 2010.
As a result, during fiscal year 2008 USCIS increased the
Adjudications Officer work force by 1,199; completed more than
1.17 million naturalization applications (up more than 50
percent from fiscal year 2007); and reduced naturalization
application processing times to 9-10 months, down from the 16-
18 months projected after the surge of applications in late
fiscal year 2007. During fiscal year 2009, USCIS plans to
achieve a 5-month processing time for naturalization
applications (N-400's).
Throughout this process of reduction of processing times all
appropriate security checks have been and continue to be
performed on benefits applicants. Security checks will not be
compromised for the sake of expediency. Indeed, all required
security checks noted below must be completed before a
naturalization applicant is scheduled for an interview.
The Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) Name
Check--IBIS combines information from multiple agencies,
databases and system interfaces to compile data relating to
national security risks, public safety issues and other law
enforcement concerns.
FBI Fingerprint Check--The FBI fingerprint check provides
information relating to criminal background within the
United States. Generally, the FBI forwards responses to
USCIS within 24-48 hours. If there is a record match, the
FBI forwards an electronic copy of the criminal history to
USCIS. In cases involving arrests or charges without
disposition, USCIS requires the applicant to provide court-
certified evidence of the disposition. Even expunged or
vacated convictions must be reported for immigration
purposes.
FBI Name Check--The records consulted in the FBI name
check process consist of administrative, criminal,
personnel and other files compiled by law enforcement. Even
after FBI has provided an initial response to USCIS
concerning a match, the name check is not complete until
full information is obtained and eligibility issues arising
from it are resolved.
real id
Question 33a. The ``REAL ID Act'' requires that in order for a
State's drivers' licenses and identification cards to be used for any
Federal Government ``official purpose,'' the cards must comply with the
standards set forth in REAL ID. Those standards are designed to prevent
fraudulent use of the card including its use for identity theft and to
establish false identities.
Final compliance regulations were issued on January 11, 2008. The
final rule allows a State to be considered REAL ID compliant if, by May
11, 2008, the State has: (1) Requested and obtained an extension of the
compliance date from DHS; or (2) have been determined by DHS to be in
compliance with the REAL ID Act and the final rule.
How many States are currently in compliance with REAL ID? Please
list those States.
Question 33b. How many, and which, States have indicated their
intention to comply with REAL ID?
Question 33c. How many, and which, States have indicated their
intention not to comply with REAL ID? What steps is the administration
taking to ensure that the States that have not yet indicated plans to
comply with REAL ID will comply?
Answer. All U.S. States and Territories have been granted an
extension until December 31, 2009, to meet the material compliance
requirements of the REAL ID Regulation. Forty-eight jurisdictions
sought and received grant funding to assist their efforts to improve
their driver's licenses consistent with REAL ID requirements in fiscal
year 2008.
The REAL ID ACT is not a mandatory program; it is a voluntary
program. As we have not yet reached the material or full compliance
deadlines and every State has been granted an extension, it is
difficult to quantify the number of States that will be compliant with
the REAL ID ACT by the required compliance deadlines.
Department of Homeland Security staff are in regular contact with
numerous States that have publicly stated they are near materially
compliant or are working to become materially compliant by December 31,
2009. A number of States have passed laws prohibiting compliance with
the REAL ID Act. Some States have enacted laws authorizing compliance.
The goal, however, is improvement of the security of driver
licenses and identifications. To the end, DHS has provided $140 million
in grant funding to assist State efforts to improve the integrity and
security of their processes consistent with REAL ID requirements. Also,
DHS allows States to use up to 20 percent of its State Homeland
Security Grant Program funds for REAL ID. Further, Congress provided
$50 million in fiscal year 2009 funding to build an information sharing
hub that will be operated by the States and assist them in meeting the
verification requirements of the Act. Specifically, this ``hub'' will
allow a State to share data with other States as well as verify
information against Federal databases.
Question 34. I know that as Governor of Arizona, you were concerned
about the cost to States of implementing REAL ID. Will DHS's 2010
budget include funds to help States with the costs of compliance?
Answer. For fiscal year 2008 and 2009 the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is providing $140 million in grant funding to assist
States' effort to improve the integrity and security of their driver's
license and identification card processes to become consistent with
REAL ID requirements. An additional $50 million in fiscal year 2009
funding will go toward the development of an information sharing hub
that will be operated by the States and help them meet the verification
requirements of the Act. Specifically, this ``hub'' will allow a State
to share data with other States as well as verify information against
Federal databases.
In fiscal year 2008, DHS informed States they could use up to 20
percent of State Homeland Security Grant Program funds to implement
REAL ID requirements. The fiscal year 2010 budget is being refined
within the administration.
Question 35. What statutory changes, if any, do you plan to seek
for REAL ID? Do you have any intentions of modifying REAL ID to allow
States to issue regular drivers' licenses to illegal immigrants?
Answer. The National Governors Association (NGA) established a
working group in which the Department of Homeland Security is
participating to make legislative recommendations for a workable path
forward.
There is nothing in the REAL ID Act that prohibits a State from
issuing non-REAL ID compliant driver's licenses to illegal immigrants.
The lawful presence provision only applies to driver's licenses issued
in compliance with the REAL ID Act and does not infringe on a States'
right to issue driver's licenses to individuals they determine to be
qualified.
``catch and release''
Question 36. One of the most important achievements of DHS over the
past few years has been the elimination of the practice of catch and
release of non-Mexicans picked up at the southern border. Can you
assure me that catch and release will not resume?
Answer. DHS has implemented a number of programs to reduce the flow
of undocumented aliens into the United States.
Since the implementation of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) in
November 2005, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
effectively ended ``catch and release'' for all nationalities along the
southern (U.S./Mexico) and northern (U.S./Canada) borders. This was
accomplished by increasing efficiencies within the immigration removal
process by:
Rapidly expanding detention facility capacity;
Modifying a U.S. District Court injunction from the 1980's
so that Expedited Removal could be fully implemented at the
border;
Reducing the time required to remove aliens; and,
Increasing use of DRO air transportation provided via ICE
leases, charters, and the Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation System (JPATS).
Efforts to maximize detention capacity have included working
closely with the Department of State and foreign governments to
streamline ICE repatriation efforts. ICE has made technological
advances, such as Video Teleconferencing (VTC) and the Electronic
Travel Document (eTD) program, available to foreign governments to
facilitate their issuance of travel document used in the removal
process, further increasing the efficiency of this process while
minimizing the length of stay in detention.
Additionally, ICE has created the Detention Operations Coordination
Center (DOCC). The DOCC transfers detainees from field office
jurisdictions with detention capacity shortages to jurisdictions with
surplus capacity, thus ensuring that aliens subject to removal
proceedings are not released solely due to lack of bed space.
ICE has added significant resources in support of the Criminal
Alien Program (CAP) and the National Fugitive Operations Program
(NFOP). The CAP, a cooperative effort with the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), within the Department of Justice, and
participating Federal and State correctional agencies, ensures that all
aliens serving criminal sentences are processed for removal prior to
their release from Federal, State and local custody. This greatly
decreases the detention time criminal aliens are in ICE custody.
Important to the success of the CAP is EIOR's ability to complete
immigration proceedings for criminal aliens while they are still
serving their sentences in prison for criminal convictions. The NFOP
implements interior enforcement initiatives that apply an organized and
methodical approach to the identification, location and arrest of ICE
fugitive aliens.
In addition to these efforts Border Patrol has reported that
increased enforcement resources have resulted in a decrease in
apprehensions of almost 20 percent. This administration has resources
to continue these programs that are in place today and does not foresee
the return of ``catch and release''.
us-visit
Question 37. How can we possibly solve the illegal immigration
problem when there is no system in place to track whether or not people
who enter the country on visas ever leave the country when those visas
expire?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) respectfully
disagrees that there is no system in place to track people who enter
the United States on visas but whose visas have expired before they
leave the country (referred to as overstays). DHS has invested
significantly in the recording and matching of biographic exit
information (which covers all aliens departing by air and sea), as well
as the analysis and determination based on those records of individuals
who have overstayed the terms of their admission.
Biographic Exit
DHS' US-VISIT program electronically receives biographic
information on individuals who have departed the United States from air
and sea carrier manifests. This information is matched to entry records
and changes to immigration status in the Arrival Departure Information
System (ADIS). After analysis, US-VISIT shares information on alien
overstays with the Department of State (DOS), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for further action concerning
visa renewals, future admissibility into the United States, and
interior enforcement.
In fiscal year 2008, US-VISIT provided overstay information to DHS
components and DOS that assisted:
ICE agents in the apprehension of 715 immigration violators
(individuals who overstayed the terms of their admission);
CBP officers in the interception of 891 immigration
violators attempting to re-enter the country at ports of entry;
and,
DOS officials in denying visas to 550 visa applicants at
U.S. consulates.
ADIS data are also used to support national security and Federal
law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations, as well as DOS
visa-validation studies and visa revocations.
DHS is also making strides toward implementation of biometric exit.
DHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking on April 24, 2008, for
the implementation of air/sea biometric exit. Pursuant to the direction
provided in the fiscal year 2009 Appropriations Act, DHS will be
conducting additional air pilots later this year. In addition, DHS also
published regulations last year describing an upcoming land border
biometric exit pilot for H2 visa holders. The information from these
pilots will be used to inform the administration's decisions for how
best to proceed toward implementation. We look forward to working with
the committee on this important issue.
Question 38. Will your 2010 budget include funds for the
implementation of exit procedures at land ports of entry?
Answer. The fiscal year 2010 budget is still being finalized by the
administration. As soon as the President's fiscal year 2010 budget is
released and provided to Congress, we will be happy to brief you and
your staff on the DHS request.
bomb prevention office
Question 39. In February 2009, the House passed H.R. 549, the
National Bombing Prevention Act of 2009. The Act establishes an Office
for Bombing Prevention (OBP) at DHS and gives it responsibility to
combat and respond to terrorist explosive attacks in the United States.
The Department of Justice had expressed concerns about a previous
version of this bill because the responsibilities and efforts of OBP
would appear to overlap with and duplicate the work of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in this area. If this bill passes the Senate and becomes
law, what steps will DHS take to ensure there is no duplication of
Federal efforts to combat and prevent the terrorist explosive attacks
and to minimize inter-agency jurisdictional disputes?
Answer. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD-19)
establishes that it is the policy of the U.S. Government to ``counter
the threat of terrorist explosive attacks aggressively by coordinating
Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal government efforts and
collaborating with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure
and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and
respond to explosive attacks . . . ''. HSPD-19 directs that Federal
efforts to combat terrorist use of explosives are the responsibility of
multiple agencies, while the Directive and its subsequent
Implementation Plan lay out the individual responsibilities of those
agencies to prevent duplication and inter-agency jurisdictional
disputes.
The Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) is part of the Department
of Homeland Security's Office of Infrastructure Protection within the
National Protection and Programs Directorate, and its primary focus
area is the protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure and key
resources from terrorist explosive attacks. This critical
infrastructure protection mission is unique to DHS. OBP has three
avenues of effort: coordination of DHS and certain national efforts;
gap analysis of counter-explosives capabilities; and information
sharing with State and local responders, and the private sector. OBP
works as the national coordinator at DHS to help ensure that there is
no duplication or inter-agency disputes. OBP staff includes senior
detailees from both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to assist in
daily coordination of DHS and DOJ activities.
ammonium nitrate regulations
Question 40. In December 2008, the Department of Homeland Security
announced new plans to regulate the selling and purchasing of Ammonium
Nitrate (AN), which can be used as an explosive. Under current Federal
law, the Department of Justice is authorized to regulate commerce and
investigate unlawful activities involving explosives--a duty the
Attorney General has delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Pursuant to that authority, ATF
regulates and inspects approximately 12,000 explosives licensees and
permittees, including those entities that use AN as explosives.
Considering the role that ATF already plays in regulating AN, what step
will DHS take to ensure that its new AN regulations will not result in
redundant Federal inspection activities, unnecessary expense to the
taxpayer, and additional burdens to the explosives industry? What steps
will DHS take to ensure that its new authority is actually useful in
preventing AN from falling into the wrong hands through theft,
diversion, or lawful means at every stage of the supply chain?
Answer. Section 563 of the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(``Section 563''), Congress requires the Department of Homeland
Security to ``regulate the sale and transfer of ammonium nitrate (AN)
by an AN facility . . . to prevent the misappropriation or use of AN in
an act of terrorism.'' To design regulations that effectively
accomplish Section 563's mission, the Department has established an AN
Task Force to evaluate the various potential approaches to
accomplishing the activities required by Section 563, such as
registration and screening of buyers and sellers of AN, and seller
verification of identity and authorization to purchase of prospective
buyers of AN.
To help gather information necessary to properly evaluate the pros
and cons of the various potential approaches, the AN Task Force will
continue to work with Federal and private-sector security partners and
will engage State and local groups as well. To date, the AN Task Force
has conferred with members of the Department's Office of Bombing
Prevention and the Department's Screening Coordination Office; an
explosives expert from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the U.S.
Department of Agriculture; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF). In the near future the AN Task Force also plans
to engage representatives from numerous State and local agriculture and
homeland security offices, and representatives from industry
associations representing the agricultural and explosives communities.
The AN Task Force is making a particularly concerted effort to
coordinate with ATF in light of ATF's regulatory authority to ensure
that the Department's regulations are complementary to, and not
redundant with, ATF regulations. Specifically, the Department is
working to learn more about specific aspects of ATF's explosives
regulatory program (such as inspection protocols, reporting
requirements, mixture rules, and recordkeeping requirements). This
consultation and analysis will inform the Department's decisionmaking
process as the regulations are developed, and will prevent redundant
activities and minimize the burden of any new regulations on the
explosives industry.
Question From the Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis of Florida for the
Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1a. In your Senate testimony prior to your confirmation,
you noted that there is a balance that needs to be struck between the
security implications of the Visa Waiver Program and its potential
public diplomacy benefits.
Would you please elaborate on that statement and share with us your
view of whether, on balance, you believe VWP helps or hinders our
Nation's security efforts?
Question 1b. Do you plan to pursue efforts by the previous
administration to expand the number of participating countries?
Answer. The modernized VWP supports U.S. security and law
enforcement interests, deepens bilateral cooperation, strengthens the
U.S. economy, and contributes to a safer international travel
environment for our citizens and those of our VWP allies. The security
and law enforcement implications of permitting foreign nationals from
selected countries to travel to the United States visa-free remain
paramount, but DHS properly takes into account both public diplomacy
efforts and the overall bilateral relationship with a member or
aspirant country when making VWP decisions.
The information-sharing agreements required by the 9/11 Act, in
particular, provide U.S. Government personnel with new tools to secure
our borders and help prevent terrorist and criminal activities in the
United States and in VWP partner nations. Additionally, the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization, required of all VWP travelers as of
January 12, 2009, allows for screening of passengers on an individual
basis prior to travel to the United States. DHS is committed to
ensuring that VWP members meet these enhanced security standards.
DHS and the Department of State (DOS) work closely together to
communicate and explain VWP initiatives and requirements to ensure that
our foreign partners are well informed. DHS, in consultation with DOS,
will continue to work with valued allies not currently in the program
to determine whether VWP admission is possible in the future. Any
decision to expand the program further would be taken after a careful
and comprehensive analysis of U.S. interests and that country's ability
to meet the statutory requirements for membership. There are issues
specific to each country interested in being included in the Visa
Waiver Program, including security and policy considerations, that must
be addressed on a case-by-case, bilateral basis.
Questions From the Honorable Steve Austria of Ohio for the Honorable
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Question 1. In your testimony, you mentioned your directive for an
assessment of DHS's critical role in cybersecurity. The interests of
DOD and DHS are closely tied when it comes to cybersecurity and each
are conducting their own measures in fighting this threat. In some
instances, their jurisdictions in dealing with cyber threats overlap;
what are your thoughts on how we ensure that we have effective
coordination and don't allow this overlap to cause a very serious
threat to fall between the cracks?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees that its
interests are closely tied to those of the Department of Defense (DOD)
when it comes to cybersecurity. DHS's National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD) focuses on cybersecurity with respect to non-national security
system sectors of the Federal Government, as well as critical
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sector networks. In pursuit of
its mission, NCSD works with Federal departments and agencies, State
and local governments, the private sector, academia, and international
partners. DOD is responsible for securing its own networks and the
Federal Government's classified and national security networks. As the
Defense Industrial Base's (DIB) Sector-Specific Agency under the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partnership framework,
DOD is also responsible for working with DIB private-sector partners on
cybersecurity and physical security matters.
In executing their cybersecurity missions, DHS and DOD encounter
common threats and vulnerabilities to public- and private-sector
critical information infrastructure. In addition, both Departments are
cognizant of the interdependencies among the CIKR sectors upon which
government and private-sector operations are dependent. DHS and DOD
continue to enhance their relationships and continue efforts to
maintain sufficient coordination mechanisms designed not only to
preclude missing cyber threats and vulnerabilities but also to mutually
support and enhance the cybersecurity of Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, and
international partners.
Several cybersecurity policy planning and coordination mechanisms
are used by DHS and DOD to improve the protection and preparedness of
Federal Government and CIKR sector networks. DHS and DOD also
coordinate on operational matters, such as threat and vulnerability
information sharing, cyber incident response, and the dissemination of
mitigation strategies.
From an operations perspective, NCSD's United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) has programs and processes in place
to facilitate communications with departments and agencies, including
DOD (e.g., Government Forum for Incident Responders and Security Teams,
weekly Federal coordination calls, and the National Cyber Alert
System). US-CERT leverages information and lessons learned to assist
agencies in better understanding the current impact of the threat
against the Federal Government networks on a classified level. The
Joint Agency Cyber Knowledge Exchange (JACKE) Program promotes sharing
and dissemination of knowledge across the entire Federal cybersecurity
community. The JACKE Program provides a biweekly interactive forum for
US-CERT to share classified threat analysis updates and serves as a
venue for participating agencies to share cyber activity detected
within their internal networks.
Additionally, US-CERT continues to work closely with other DHS and
Federal Operations Centers. DOD maintains a network of computer
emergency response centers, which operate at all times and are
coordinated by the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO)
to identify, mitigate, and respond as necessary to cyber attacks. DOD's
U.S. Strategic Command, the National Security Agency/Central Security
Service Threat Operations Center (NTOC), and JTF-GNO also provide
continuous intelligence analysis of cyber threats. In addition, the Law
Enforcement/Counter Intelligence Center, located at JTF-GNO,
consolidates DOD's law enforcement and counterintelligence
organizations with respect to cyber incidents. US-CERT works closely
with the Defense Cyber Crime Center, NSA, and JTF-GNO through routine
interaction and a liaison exchange program. Moreover, US-CERT
participates weekly in a telecommunications check with JTF-GNO to
ensure that secure communication mechanisms are operational.
Question 2. In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released its
report, World at Risk. The Commission determined that unless decisive
and urgent action is taken by the world community, terrorists will
perpetrate an attack with a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the
world by 2013, and the Commission believes this attack will most likely
be with a biological weapon. The Commission said that addressing
bioterrorism must become a higher priority for the Department and that
prevention must also be coupled with a robust system for public health
preparedness and response. Do you agree with the Commission's
assessment and how would you recommend the Department move forward in
addressing bioterrorism?
Answer. DHS agrees with many of the WMD Commission's
recommendations to address the threat of bioterrorism, and the
Department intends to move forward on three main priorities: (1)
Biosecurity: reviewing and updating existing Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism prevention measures; (2) Biodefense Readiness: preparing
the Nation to respond effectively to a potential attack or incident,
especially through engineering advances in early warning capability;
and (3) Biothreat Understanding: pursuing the best understanding of the
threat as it stands today as new science, intelligence, or technology
emerge.
1. Biosecurity.--The WMD Commission's charge was limited to
``prevention''. DHS is an active participant in the Working Groups
established by the Executive Order 13486 on Strengthening Laboratory
Biosecurity in the United States.
DHS entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in HHS, and the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, in USDA, to share
select agent information that has enabled DHS to begin site
vulnerability assessments at select agent registered entities
across the country, and DHS will make recommendations for
improving security at these facilities.
2. Biodefense Readiness.--DHS will move forward in addressing
bioterrorism by focusing on the most effective efforts to save lives by
improving early detection, providing accurate warning and rapid
response.
DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) operates biodetection
technology in over 30 cities with zero false positives to date
through its BioWatch program. In addition, the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) has been funding research to
engineer faster, better, and cheaper next-generation
biodetection systems that are fully automated. DHS biodetection
systems must be rigorously tested and have the full support and
confidence of our partners in the public health community. This
is being addressed by OHA and S&T in collaboration with our
Federal partners.
DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
have an effective working relationship to build a robust public
health preparedness and response system. DHS also has a robust
relationship with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to
coordinate against food and plant and agriculture terrorist
threats. DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will
continue to work closely with the State and local responder
community to understand their needs and capabilities. DHS also
solicits input from Homeland Security Advisors and the private
sector. The Department needs to pursue a resilient multi-
sectoral response to bioterrorism, as an entire city or region
may be impacted in the event of an attack. Law enforcement,
transportation, utilities, emergency management, and many other
sectors of society are essential partners in addition to the
public health community.
The public also must be a full partner in our efforts. While
there have been lessons learned for what to do in case of
hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes, most Americans have no
experience or education on how to protect themselves and their
families against a bioterrorist attack. DHS will continue to
increase resiliency within the civilian population. Working
with HHS, DHS will ensure the general public is educated,
informed, and empowered with clear and understandable guidance.
3. Biothreat Understanding.--DHS will advance the field of
biodefense understanding.
DHS is establishing a risk-based tiering of bioterror
threats, and fills the scientific knowledge gaps about specific
vulnerabilities we face today.
DHS is exploring options to address new biothreats, such as
a synthetic DNA that could be ordered on-line but misused to
build a controlled pathogen.
DHS is advancing the field of microbial forensics to assist
in criminal investigations for possible attribution.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mention the need for DHS to
evaluate its role in building capacity for a ``health care surge,''
including DHS's supporting role in coordinating response to such an
incident, and how the Department's preparedness and public
communications efforts could better facilitate existing health care
surge capacities.
In my district, Wright State University, in close cooperation with
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, is developing a self-sustaining, all-
hazard, actual conditions training environment for civilian and
military first responders and first providers (nurses, doctors, other
medical personnel). Its focus is to develop a Disaster Resilient
Healthcare Community based on the four themes of planning, preparation,
response, and recovery.
What are your thoughts on such a project and what are your plans at
DHS to ensure our communities are capable of dealing with a health care
surge caused by an attack that involves chemical, biological,
radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) weapons?
Answer. I appreciate the efforts of Wright State University and our
Nation's many other educational and training facilities that provide
our first responders and health care providers with the skills they
need to prepare for, respond to, mitigate the effects of, and recover
from all hazards. Wright State University should be commended on its
proactive approach to fostering an environment of resilience in the
health care sector. The availability of such training opportunities is
a critical element in the ability of our communities to deal with the
health and medical consequences of a CBRN event.
As you know, HHS is the Federal lead for public health emergencies,
including medical surge capacity after an emergency working with our
Federal partners. DHS has a number of activities underway to help build
medical surge capacity at the regional, State, and local levels. DHS is
one of the six Federal department signatories to the Federal Education
and Training Interagency Group (FETIG). This group, formed under the
direction from HSPD-21, is directed to provide guidance to the National
Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health which will be housed at
the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. The group is
chartered to provide guidance for standardization of training and
education for first responders. Ultimately, it will engage the public
sector, private sector and academia to develop suggested guidance by
which curricula can be developed and training centers accredited.
The DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is working with the
Community and Regional Resilience Initiative (CARRI) Program to promote
the concept of community resiliency to meet the challenges of any
health and medical stressor. The CARRI project is a regional program
that has national implications to promote resilience in both human and
physical resources to meet the challenges of health care surge.
OHA is also leading an interagency effort to develop a
Clearinghouse of Medical and Public Health Preparedness Allocation,
Skill Development, and Standards (CoMPASS). CoMPASS is a database that
will make it easier to find Federal health and medical training and
exercise opportunities, grant funding, and standards through an easy-
to-use web-based portal. The data will be aligned by national
priorities, target capabilities, and agency-specific preparedness
missions. This will allow medical and public health communities the
ability to locate training and funding opportunities, then connect
instantly to the host site.
OHA has been working to convene a meeting with a number of health
care entities, including Wright State University, that have
demonstrated similar successes as Wright State in order to assemble a
consortium of health care systems focused on providing hands-on
training and education to foster health care resiliency. This effort
will lead the way for a regional health and medical training approach
that builds upon successes like Wright State University by promoting
such activities through various grants and training opportunities for
all levels of government.
Finally, DHS has a number of facilities and resources that focus
full-time on providing training opportunities to our communities' first
responders. These include the U.S. Fire Academy, Emergency Management
Institute, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and the Noble Training
Center, which all have programs aimed at promoting resiliency of the
health care community.
Question 4. There are approximately 70 miles of planned fencing
along the southern border yet to be completed. What are your intentions
on finishing this span of fencing? Additionally, constructing the fence
is important, but it is equally critical that DHS have plans in place
to address maintenance just like with any infrastructure or technology
project. How will this be taken care of to ensure that the significant
investment made to deploy this physical infrastructure will not be lost
in the coming years due to lack of a maintenance strategy?
Answer. As of March 6, 2009, there are approximately 50 miles
remaining of the 661 miles of priority areas identified by the Border
Patrol to be constructed along the southwest border. Of the 50 miles,
34 are currently under construction, 13 miles in Rio Grande Valley are
under contract and awaiting real estate clearance and 3 miles in the
Tucson Sector are awaiting formal NEPA documentation required by the
Tohono O'Odham Nation. Current plans are to complete these fence
projects by October 2009.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has interim
maintenance contracts in place to provide tactical infrastructure (TI)
operations and maintenance (O&M) coverage until a long-term
Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair (CTIMR) contract is awarded.
The interim contracts are managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
utilizing their multiple award task order contracts. The long-term
CTIMR contract is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter of
calendar year 2010. These contracts will cover maintenance and repair
for fence and gates, roads and bridges, drainage structures and grates,
lighting and electrical systems, and vegetation and debris removal
within the seven Border Patrol sectors.