[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-83]
OVERSIGHT OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM (EMALS)
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 16, 2009
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SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
RICK LARSEN, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GLENN NYE, Virginia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Elizabeth Drummond, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 16, 2009, Oversight of the Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMALS)................................. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 16, 2009.......................................... 33
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2009
OVERSIGHT OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM (EMALS)
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee......... 3
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee................. 1
WITNESSES
Antonio, Capt. Brian, USN, Program Manager for Future Aircraft
Carriers, U.S. Navy............................................ 7
Architzel, Vice Adm. David, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition), U.S. Navy........................................ 3
Mahr, Capt. Randy, USN, Program Manager for Aircraft Launching
and Recovery Equipment (ALRE), U.S. Navy....................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd........................................... 39
Architzel, Vice Adm. David, joint with Capt. Randy Mahr and
Capt. Brian Antonio........................................ 40
Taylor, Hon. Gene............................................ 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Taylor................................................... 53
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Taylor................................................... 57
OVERSIGHT OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM (EMALS)
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 16, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the
subcommittee meets in open session to receive testimony from
officials of the United States Navy on the current status of
the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, or EMALS. The EMALS
system is an electromagnetic catapult designed to use on the
Ford class aircraft carriers. If the system delivers its full
promised capability, Ford class carriers will have a catapult
system that is far superior to the steam catapults of the
Nimitz class.
The operational advantages are increased launch envelopes--
that is the ability to launch both heavier and lighter aircraft
than steam catapults--higher sortie rates, reduced weight,
reduced mechanical complexity, reduced maintenance and reduce
carrier manning. Unfortunately, what brings us together today
is that the development of the program is so far behind
schedule that it threatens the delivery date of the United
States Ford.
For the record, I would like to briefly summarize the
history of the program and the current status. EMALS was the
core capability in the design of the next generation aircraft
carrier, which the Navy called CVN-21 for the 21st century
technology, which eventually became the USS Ford, CVN-78.
In 1999, the Navy entered into technological demonstration
contracts with two different contractors, General Atomics and
Northrop Grumman Marine Systems, to develop prototypes for the
electromagnetic catapult. By 2004, the Navy down-selected to a
system proposed by General Atomics and entered into a system
design and development contract, or SDD contract, to build a
full-scale ship representative prototype at the Navy test
facility at Lakehurst, New Jersey.
That prototype was contracted to be completed in time for
testing to begin in 2007. Testing was to have concluded up to
two years. And presumably the results learned from the test
program would influence the final production system, which
would be shipped to the carrier construction yard for erection
into the ship. It is now July of 2009, and full-scale testing
is yet to begin at the Lakehurst facility.
The Navy is now faced with almost complete concurrency of
testing and production of the first ship set if they are to
meet the in-yard delivery dates to keep the USS Ford on
schedule. There are a number of subsystems in the complete
EMALS system. And each subsystem has different in-yard delivery
dates. But some of those dates are as early as the summer of
2011. And to meet those dates, the production of the
components, and at least the ordering of the material for the
components, must begin now before full-scale testing of the
prototype systems has begun.
To be fair, some testing has already occurred. The high-
cycle tests for energy source systems is well underway, as is
the highly accelerated life cycle testing of the launch motor
segments. Those tests have identified some minor redesign
issues, which can be incorporated into the production
components. But until a full-scale catapult launch of the
prototype occurs, questions will remain on the system's overall
performance.
I have been briefed, as I believe other members of this
subcommittee have been briefed, that the issues in completing
and delivering the SDD components were a result of the
contractor's inexperience managing a major production effort. I
find that answer unsettling because it is the Navy's
responsibility to oversee what their contractors are doing and
to identify problems before they become problems.
I will note that a little over a year-and-a-half ago, the
contractor did put in place an entirely new management and
engineering team. Hiring away proven production engineers from
both General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. This new team seems
to have righted the ship. But that ship is still on very
dangerous seas.
So what we have is a program that is so essential to the
carrier that if it does not work, the nation has paid billions
of dollars for an unusable ship. If the ship is delayed, the
carrier is automatically delayed. I am sorry. And every day of
delay will push the costs higher for the carrier.
This is the first in what I intend to be a series of
hearings on this program over the next few years. This is too
important not to have close congressional oversight. I intend
to continue close oversight of this program until it is
delivered, installed, tested, certified for launching EMALS
aircraft off the deck of the USS Ford.
I would also like to remind you gentlemen that when
Chairman Bartlett was the chairman of this committee and I was
the ranking member, on any number of occasions representatives
from the Navy visited him and me and said the littoral combat
ship system was on time and on schedule and on cost only to
have some time around November of 2006 one of those, ``aw,
shucks,'' moments that has resulted in a ship that is well over
twice the price it should be and 18 months late on each
version. We cannot afford that on this program.
And I do welcome you here today. And I do welcome you
taking these responsible jobs and hopefully seeing to it that
this program is back on track.
Our witnesses today are Vice Admiral David Architzel,
principal deputy to the Assistant Secretary Stackley; Rear
Admiral (Select) Randy Mahr, program manager for EMALS; and
Captain Brian Antonio, program manager for the Ford class
aircraft carrier. Vice Admiral Architzel is representing the
assistant secretary as the senior acquisition executive who is
ultimately responsible for all Navy and Marine Corps
acquisition programs. Admiral (Select) Mahr is the official
whose only responsibility will be this program. Captain Antonio
is responsible for building the entire carrier. He obviously
has an interest in the success of EMALS.
This year's National Defense Authorization Act directs the
Secretary of the Navy to keep Admiral (Select) Mahr in his
position until the completion of the system development testing
and the successful production of the first ship's set of
components. That means that the admiral select who has been
selected will be in place for a number of years and will have
the opportunity to visit again on this subject.
I would now like to call on my friend from Missouri, the
ranking member of the subcommittee, the Honorable Todd Akin,
for any opening remarks he may wish to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Akin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like
to submit my remarks for the record, if I could and welcome our
witnesses. My background was in engineering. And I used to work
for IBM. We did a lot of project management.
This is something that really has the attention, not only
of our subcommittee and committee, but the Chief of Naval
Operations, everybody else. This has got to work. And this is
an important hearing. I am looking forward to having a chance
to ask some questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Akin.
Vice Admiral Architzel, I understand that you will deliver
the combined opening statement. I also understand that you have
a short movie that will demonstrate how the EMALS system would
work on the ship. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. NAVY
Admiral Architzel. Thank you, Chairman Taylor, Ranking
Member Akin, and distinguished members of the committee. It is
our honor to be to appear before you today to report on the
development of the electromagnetic aircraft launching system,
EMALS for the Gerald R. Ford CVN-78 class aircraft carriers and
the Navy's plan for this effort.
I am joined by Captain Randy Mahr, the program manager for
aircraft launch and recovery equipment to my right and Captain
Brian Antonio, the program manager for the CVN-78 aircraft
carrier program to my left. I would like to submit our written
statement for the record.
Mr. Taylor. Without objection.
Admiral Architzel. Thank you, sir. As today's tactical
aircraft have evolved, the percentage of high-energy launches
for the embarked airwing has steadily increased as has the
attendant stress applied to those aircraft from today's steam
catapult system. Likewise, with the higher loads required, the
maintenance man-ours to maintain our carrier catapults has
increased.
The Navy recognized these trends and sought to replace
steam catapults on the Ford class aircraft carriers with EMALS,
electromagnetic aircraft launching systems, a system that is
designed to reduce manual requirements, increased operational
availability and give greater performance over legacy steam
systems. Similarly, EMALS supports the CVN-78 key performance
parameters such as sortie generation rate, reduced shipboard
manning and will support current and future airwing operation
requirements, which include the addition of the joint strike
fighter and Navy Unmanned Combat Air System, or N-UCAS, in the
future.
EMALS is a critically important capability for our future
carriers and embarked airwings. During its development over the
past year, we have made good progress. But as you are aware and
have pointed out, we have also had to overcome technical
issues, programmatic challenges and cost growth.
I want to leave this committee with two important
takeaways. First, we are here today to provide you with the
most up-to-date, straightforward answers as possible. And if we
don't have answers to your questions, we will get them. Second,
that the team--and that is the collective team on the
government's side and industry side--is committed to delivering
this capability with our principal industry partners, General
Atomics and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding.
We are working hard with our industry partners in this
critical program. And while we are making progress, concerns
remain. And we will no doubt have additional challenges during
the remaining test program.
We are collectively committed to meeting those challenges
head-on. The Navy understands the concerns you and your
subcommittee have expressed. And we are aggressively working to
improve performance.
Chairman Taylor, we are implementing your recommendations
to break EMALS' cost and performance data from CVN-78 for a
separate review by Congress.
Finally, I feel that we have two of the finest program
managers to lead both the EMALS program and the CVN-78 program
with us today. And we are taking steps to ensure stability in
the program's key technical and management teams. The
department is committed to delivering CVN-78 with EMALS on time
and on budget.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would now like to
provide the committee with a brief presentation on what
constitutes a catapult launch, as was requested, with the goal
of touching on some of the major components of the EMALS
system. And following that, I would like to hand over the
presentation to Captain Mahr, who will provide greater detail
on the program as well as the components involved and its
testing underway.
Finally, Captain Antonio will explain how EMALS is
integrated into the Ford class aircraft carrier and how he is
tracking progress to ensure the proper and timely integration
of the EMALS system into CVN-78. At the conclusion of our
presentation, our brief presentations, we will stand ready to
answer any and all questions, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Architzel, Captain
Mahr, and Captain Antonio can be found in the Appendix on page
40.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Admiral. If you would, please.
Admiral Architzel. Today's carriers in the fleet, the
Enterprise and the 10 Nimitz class carriers, the catapult
launches are accomplished through steam systems. Steam is
stored, if you will, in wet accumulators. For the stored energy
in the case of steam catapults is the steam system. And it is
stored in wet accumulators where you have steam pressure
available to launch aircraft.
When we commence a launch sequence, the aircraft is taxied
to the catapult. A launch bar on the nose gear of the
aircraft--we generally use all launched nose gear tow today--is
extended, which locks itself onto the catapult on the above-
deck space on the flight decks itself. Below decks, as you see,
are ready to go, the airplane is brought to full power. It is
being held by a trail bar.
And at that point--if you would hold the video, I do
appreciate it. Thank you. If I could just for a second explain
what steam is first--and held in place by a trail bar. Full
power is applied. And when the deck edge operator touches the
deck to launch the airplane, steam is released to the pistons
below deck, which are accelerated and connecting to the
shuttler, which is on the airplane--accelerate the airplane
through about a 360-foot power stroke to reach the end speed
required for that airplane based on its type model series,
required wind speed, wind over deck and conditions that exist
on that day.
Once the airplane is airborne, the shuttle--this catapult
and the piston below decks is stopped physically mechanically
by a water brake system. A spear on the front of the piston
enters the water--physically enters a tank of water about 15
feet long. And the energy is absorbed in that water brake from
the launch with the--to stop the piston. That piston is then
retracted mechanically to set for another launch.
So, in essence, that is the steam system today. What is
different about EMALS would be the--well, different and several
similarities. But the biggest one would start with the concept
of stored energy now is electromagnetic energy that is stored
in the system. So power is drawn from the ship's electrical
distribution system and stored in electrical storage units, of
which there will be 12 on the Ford class. And that energy is
available for the launch.
The aircraft positioning on the catapult is the same as on
steam catapults. But once you get ready to launch and the deck
edge operator touches the deck to launch, that stored energy,
electrical energy is translated through a power conditioning
system to the linear motors that run the length of the
catapult, that 360-foot power stroke. And a moving magnetic
wave is in--is passed through the stators, which is the linear
motors.
In between those linear motors is a block of aluminum,
represented by what I have in my hand. And on top of that,
which is now the armature, is the shuttle I talked about, which
attaches to the airplane. And as that moving magnetic wave,
which is represented by this magnet, passes--this is
nonferrous, so it is aluminum and a magnet--that magnetic field
goes along.
It induces the current into the armature. The armature
generates its own magnetic field. The magnetic fields are
latched together, and it pulls down the track. If I put this on
my desk and just physically move the magnet over the aluminum,
you can see that I can stop or start this slide of aluminum
right in my hand. That is the fundamental principle behind what
is the electromagnetic launch system.
When the airplane reaches the end of the stroke and that
energy is provided again to--significant power, more power than
the steam catapults can provide--when it reaches the end, the
block of aluminum now, which is the armature, is stopped
electrically as well. There is no need for water brakes. It is
stopped electromechanically, if you will, just by changing the
frequencies induced into that field.
And then you can retract the shuttle without having to have
a retraction engine and the mechanics that go with that. So
there is several advantages to the system that go in with the
EMALS. And you end up with more uniform acceleration, positive
speed control throughout the length of the catapult stroke,
elimination of the labor-intensive systems, far less wear and
tear on the aircraft and the ship. And that is the goal behind
the fundamentals behind the EMALS system.
The video you are going to see now is essentially--if you
would run that, please--describes what I just went through and
discussed in terms of understanding what a catapult launch is.
So thank you.
[Begin video.]
The first part is positioning the aircraft on the catapult.
It is just taxiing forward. And as is the case with any topside
changes, really insignificant the--that portion of it is the
same, whether you go from EMALS or steam systems today--in the
Jet Blast Deflector (JBD) positions itself on the catapult.
You can see the storage device represented there below with
the energy storage. Aircraft is on the catapult. The next step
would be to--and it describes the major subsystems that go with
launching as I described them--power conditioning, launch
system, launch control and launch motor, as mentioned.
The aircraft comes forward, the launch part comes down. JBD
comes up, applies full power to the airplane. And as then you
take the moving magnetic field as the induced on the motors,
the airplane is shot off. And you would then retract and
continue with the second launch.
[End video.]
That is the fundamentals behind the launch sequencing. And
I will turn it over to Captain Mahr for a description of the
EMALS system in more detail.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. RANDY MAHR, USN, PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING AND RECOVERY EQUIPMENT (ALRE), U.S. NAVY
Captain Mahr. Sir, with your permission, I will stand and
point to the board, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Please, sir.
Captain Mahr. Mr. Chairman. (OFF MIKE)
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Admiral.
[The joint prepared statement of Captain Mahr, Admiral
Architzel, and Captain Antonio can be found in the Appendix on
page 40.]
Mr. Taylor. Captain.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. BRIAN ANTONIO, USN, PROGRAM MANAGER FOR
FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, U.S. NAVY
Captain Antonio. Good morning, Chairman Taylor, Ranking
Member Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity for me to talk about the--my exciting
program. It is certainly a great time to be a part of it.
Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned in your opening statement--
in your statement, I am very interested in EMALS's development
as I am, of course, of all the other developmental systems that
are going onboard CVN-78 and the 21 class. With your
permission, sir, I also have a couple slides that I would like
to speak to.
Mr. Taylor. Please, sir.
Captain Antonio. First and foremost, ship construction for
78 is on track. And that construction is being supported by the
design, including the 3-D product model. This is the first
aircraft carrier that will be completely designed three
dimensionally. That 3-D product model is 96 percent complete.
And the chart that I am showing here is a shot from a 3-D--the
completion of initial construction drawings for the ship stands
at 41 percent, about 6,600 of 16,000 construction drawings. And
those construction drawings are the product of the 3-D product
model.
The drawings are completed ahead of construction--so the
design is complete. The construction drawings are completed
prior to beginning any of the construction on the ship. And
those are--in order to take advantage of any--work done in the
yard.
The congressional approved advanced construction we
received--advanced construction authority we received for CVN-
78 allowed us to get a running start into the advanced
construction for the ship. And, in fact, since the time of
contract award in September of 2008, we had about 300 of the
whole units of the total number of about 1,204 structural units
completed. And for those of you that are not familiar, the
structural unit is similar to some of the building blocks you
see depicted in this chart--for a different purpose. But the
building blocks of the structural unit are depicted there.
For CVN-78 those units, structural units are built--there
is some initial outfitting and some load-out of equipment into
those units, especially large equipment. Some of them are
combined to form super lifts. Some of them come out of shop as
first and final and are loaded into the dock to build the ship.
On CVN-78 there is a total of 497 erectable lifts that will
go in and make up the Gerald R. Ford. Once in the dock,
additional outfitting and meeting with other units occurs until
the ship is capable of being launched from the dock. And then--
make sure the ship itself--the ship works.
As of today, the total number of 1,204 modules--the
shipyard has begun work on 571 of those modules and has
completed 450, or about one-third. About one-third of the ship
in terms of structural fabrication is complete--and it allows
us to prove out--that was brought online by the shipbuilder in
order to support CVN-78. This ship is coming together
incredibly well. And by any of the--to make a visit to the
shipyard. I would be more than happy to help arrange for a
tour. But every time I go down, I see more progress. And it is
incredibly impressive to see--coming together.
Our next construction model--that is when we join the first
units that are placed in the dock--join them together in the
dry dock. And that is on track for mid-November of 2009, so
only a few months away--I will get into a little bit about
EMALS integration--my boss, Rear Admiral McMahon, the--for
aircraft carriers and I visited Northrop Grumman shipbuilding
and reviewed the EMALS integration and construction plan with
the shipbuilder, including being able to don some 3-D glasses
and virtually walk in some of the places where some of the
arrangements are ongoing for EMALS----
From the construction perspective, the key EMALS activity
that is important to get us to launch, which is currently
scheduled in 2013, July of 2013, is going to be delivery of the
motor generator unit. You have heard the admiral mention the
energy storage system--with the motor generators. These are the
40-ton units that Captain Mahr showed earlier.
As I mentioned--and in particular, the first 8 of 12. And
what I have got shown on this particular chart--and you have it
on your desk as well--is two--these super lifts, as you see,
depict the relative location of the first eight. There will be
four loaded into each of these----
The ship is built completely different from the way a house
is built. A house is framed and then items are brought into the
house--the way a ship is built is they--around the dock or--
early as possible in the construction sequence to do as much
work as possible because it is the most efficient and least
costly way to build a ship.
In the case of the motor generators, these are very large
pieces of equipment. And to try to load them after we have
built the whole ship would mean--very inefficient movement
pattern throughout the ship.
And next is depicted as far as the load-out of the motor
generators. What I show here is the orientation of the first
four EMALS--generators loaded into the super lift that will
form that wall unit that you saw in the previous chart.
The shipyard will receive the motor generators, do some
preparatory work for it, bring it down to the unit, load it
in--will be loaded out with the equipment that needs to be put
in--put on. And then it will be loaded into the shop.
This shows how the--after ship's launch from July 2013 to
ship delivery in September of 2015, the--delivery of the ship
is going to be--linear motor subsystem. Installation of that
linear motor subsystem in the catapult across on the ship and
then the integrated testing of the entire EMALS system on the
ship leading to--launching to show that the system works.
So again, recapsulating--before launch I am looking to the
motor generator--after ship's launch--ship's loading I am
looking at delivery of the linear motor subsystem. These are
the two subsystems for the EMALS production--that have the
least amount of schedule float, least amount of slack, if you
will, between the time they are delivered--between the time of
construction completed to the time of delivery--to the
shipyard.
With that said, the current production integrated IMX--
integrated--for EMALS support CVN-78 on time delivery. All
required--are met. The amount of oversight that is in place--
mentioned the--Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
oversight--continue to manage and be in place to make sure that
EMALS is delivered--CVN-78. And we are ready to do that--that
is all I have.
[The joint prepared statement of Captain Antonio, Admiral
Architzel, and Captain Mahr can be found in the Appendix on
page 40.]
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
We are going to go--we are very fortunate to have a
physicist, an engineer, a retired Navy captain, and you and me.
So we are going to turn to our engineer to start the line of
questioning.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Captain, this whole area of project management has been
something that our committee has been paying attention to. We
have made some mistakes in other kinds of projects. One of the
things that concerned us particularly was changing project
managers all the way down the line. You change your horse not
once in a battle, but four or five times. And that doesn't work
very well.
And partly at the insistence of this committee, but perhaps
for other people, too, you were the unfortunate person that was
singled out because you have made a good reputation for
yourself to be chained to this project for a certain period of
time. And I think the first and the most important principle
that I am curious about is do you feel you have the authority
to basically manage this project and be in control of that?
Obviously, a lot of that time schedule is not in your control.
There is other vendors and different people.
But our concern is that there is one person that we are
looking at that we are counting on, particularly to bring EMALS
in. But I gather your responsibility is for the entire ship.
First of all, is your responsibility the ship?
Captain Antonio. Yes, sir. My particular role is the CVN-78
program manager. My responsibility is for the entire ship
working with the shipbuilder, Northrop Grumman shipbuilding
down in Newport News. Captain Mahr is the EMALS program manager
responsible for----
Mr. Akin. So you have the whole ship, and Captain Mahr has
got specifically the EMALS? Okay. And you are going to be
around long enough to stay on top of this? Okay.
Because that is our concern. We have seen other places
where everything is fine, everything is fine, everything is--we
are double over budget and two years late or whatever it is.
That is the kind of thing that we can't afford on this project.
Now, the EMALS itself, I think, is what the subject of our
hearing is. And it is particularly because you are saying it is
critical path to bring the project on time.
First of all, you have got something that you called
storage units which are motor generators. How do you consider a
motor generator to be a storage unit?
Captain Mahr. Sir, through the rotation of the motor
generator maintains roughly 4,000 revolutions per minute (RPM).
That is holding the electric kinetic energy, if you will.
Mr. Akin. So you get big flywheels in these suckers? Is
that what you are saying?
Captain Mahr. It is an electric flywheel, but, yes, sir. It
is a very good analogy.
Mr. Akin. But where is the electric energy stored?
Captain Mahr. It is in the generator itself. So the
generator is holding the energy. It is maintaining 4,000 RPM.
When a command discharge, the energy is commanded out of the
motor--or drawn out of that generator.
Mr. Akin. Okay. I have just been told it is a high-mass
rotor. In other words, it is like a flywheel?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. It is----
Mr. Akin. When you pull the trigger to launch, the motor
generator loses its velocity?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. It draws down some of that energy
and immediately starts trying to command it back up to speed.
So as soon as I command launch, we are trying to drive energy
back in to keep it at the max RPM.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Now, the electrical energy that you are
getting originally is coming from the ship's generators?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And that is in the form of alternating current
(AC) or direct current (DC) ?
Captain Mahr. AC, sir.
Mr. Akin. AC power? It is going to a motor, which is an AC
motor.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Which is then going to go to a generator, which
is a DC generator? Is it a modified AC?
Captain Mahr. You are talking about the motor generator
itself?
Mr. Akin. Right. The motor is an AC motor----
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. We transmit the energy via DC for
lower line law.
Mr. Akin. Okay, so you have AC power coming from the ship's
generator.
Captain Mahr. (OFF MIKE)
Mr. Akin. It goes to the motor.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. The motor is an AC motor. It is spinning at 4,000
RPM.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Driving a generator, which is a DC generator.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. The DC generator then is connected through a
series of cables to the actual track.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And you call them motors, which are really linear
motors on each side of the aluminum block is going to run down
these things?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Now, when the process of putting this
project together there is certain--obviously, there is new
technology. The whole thing is new. And so, whenever you do
something new, you are worried about bugs. So how much have you
actually tested of this entire system? Have you actually put
these motor generator full scale together and taken aluminum
block and done this? Or is this all being done just modeled? Or
do we actually have one that we have built?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. In the program definition and risk
reduction (PDRR) phase, the competitive phase where we looked
at both competitors we built a full-scale, half-length
prototype, which was--which included----
Mr. Akin. A full-scale, half-length?
Captain Mahr. Full scale, but half-length.
Mr. Akin. Okay, so----
Captain Mahr. That went to the catapult track.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Captain Mahr. And that was built up at----
Mr. Akin. So the amount of energy that you are transmitting
and the amount of force and everything is full scale? It is
just it is not running as long as the--okay.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. We demonstrated the ability to
launch at bedload, which is a non-manned--it is an unmanned
aerial aircraft, but it is something on wheels up to the speed
of 150.
Mr. Akin. Okay. And so, that is going through. Were there
any surprises and things we learned in that, or not
particularly?
Captain Mahr. From the physics point of view, no, sir. From
the engineering point of view, we did learn some things. We
took what we learned there and put it into the system we are
now developing. So from 2004 until now it has been maturing
that system into a ship-ready system. And we have----
Mr. Akin. Well, there have been some problems on it. Is
that right?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. What exactly were the problems? It is much more
expensive now. General Atomics did us a favor and charged a
whole lot more, right, because some things happened that made
it more expensive?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Where did we get off the track to start with?
Captain Mahr. From an engineering perspective, we have
found a lot of things. We have tested the--we have completed
one main phase of test, and we are in the process of finishing
the next two main phases of test. The motor generator, as we
have been talking about----
Mr. Akin. So the first test was you took motor generators,
the right size, and you demonstrated it half-length?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. And that is done. Was that the first phase?
Captain Mahr. That was done in 2004 in the--under the
current contract for development, we took--we built a full
motor generator that we intended the production representative
of what we put on the ship. We put that in Tupelo, Mississippi,
at General Atomics plant. And we ran that over a simulated
2,000-year output life.
So it is what we call 10,000 launch cycles on that. And we
completed that last September. And we proved that the motor
generator itself is capable of putting out the appropriate
amount of power over 10,000 times.
That same motor generator then we went into what we call--
that was high-cycle test, phase one. We are now in high-cycle
test, phase two. We are not quite 80 percent through that. For
the same motor generator I have accumulated about another
10,000 cycles on that one. And this time we have taken the
motor generator. We have added all of the other components up
to, but not including the linear motor. And so, I am putting
the electronic components and running power through those.
In those two tests we found out things about the motor
generator. We found that the vent--it vented oil mist into the
air. And so, we had to put a demister on it. We found out that
there were some oil leaks that we had to deal with. From a
performance perspective, the only significant thing we found
was that the motor generator shaft vibrated. It was the design
point that we thought we would--or the operating point we had
designed for was to have that--have a stable operating
condition of 4,200 RPM.
We encountered there are critical points--as you are aware,
there is critical points in any rotor where you will see some
vibration. We wound up seeing one above 4,200 RPM, and then we
started seeing some vibration near 4,200 RPM.
We identified the root cause of that to be associated with
the bearing cooling where the main shaft bearing. It is an
overhung mass on the bearing. It is cantilevered out. We
changed the bearing to what we call a fore load bearing to
provide additional cooling oil over the shaft. And the
vibration was taken care of.
We have now retrofitted the four motor generators that are
built and installed up in Lakehurst, New Jersey. Three of those
are currently retrofitted. The last one will be retrofitted
shortly. And that will be the configuration that we will take
to the ship.
Mr. Akin. Is that what cost us the extra money, was a
different bearing design and different cooling in the bearing?
Captain Mahr. That did increase the cost of the unit a
little bit. But it wasn't the cost--the cause of the overrun
that got us to where we are today. The cause of the overrun
where we got to today, sir, is--do you want me to go down that?
Mr. Akin. Just quickly.
Captain Mahr. Okay. Real quickly, we planned a test
schedule that was aggressive and optimistic. We were unable to
execute that test schedule. The cost of materials went up to
build some of the equipment. So that cost us.
Mr. Akin. Was it on the motor generator? Is that what was--
--
Captain Mahr. Part of it was on the motor generator. But we
use a fair amount of raw materials throughout the unit, so they
spread that across everything. And then the labor. We
identified that General Atomics and their--specifically and
their industry partners needed about another 80 work years of
engineering staffing. So we had to plus that up as well as we
found the same thing on the--Navy needed additional----
Mr. Akin. So what are you concerned about now?
Captain Mahr. What keeps me awake at night, that kind of a
question?
Mr. Akin. Yes, how do you make sure we are staying on
schedule? What are the key things you are really watching? And
do you have the authority that you need to make sure--do you
know this is your project? And do you feel like you own this
thing?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. And you going to be with it?
Captain Mahr. I have full responsibility for the EMALS
system.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Captain Mahr. If you are looking for that one belly button,
that belly button is me.
Mr. Taylor. If the gentleman would yield?
Mr. Akin. I yield.
Mr. Taylor. No, in this year's bill I would remind you that
we directed the secretary of the Navy to appoint someone--we
didn't name the officer--to take this from present through
testing. We encouraged him to have a six-month transition where
someone would right seat, left seat. And then we directed him
to have a second officer in charge from testing through
delivery. So----
Mr. Akin. Great. I just wanted to make sure because we have
been in hearings before. And somebody is theoretically
responsible, but it seemed like they weren't really. We just
want to make sure that you really feel like you have got--you
are on top of this and that you are going to be keeping an eye
on it.
Captain Mahr. Sir, I feel absolutely responsible for EMALS
delivery and development.
Mr. Akin. And you know where your critical paths and pieces
are all the way down the line?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So then what keeps you awake at night then?
I don't want to run too long, but----
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. The critical path right now to
system function administration, which is the major phase of
testing we do next where we start launching debt loads up at
Lakehurst, is getting those linear motors installed in the
trough at Lakehurst. The motor support structure is a key to
that. And it is--forward structure block 29 that will be
delivered to--from the manufacturer precision custom components
to Tupelo, Mississippi, in September. And then we have to
outfit it with the linear motors and ship that up to----
Mr. Akin. Let me try and get a mental picture then. What I
am really seeing is you have got--basically got these motor
generators, which are great, big hummers. And you have got to
make sure those are working. You are pretty comfortable now the
design on that is working okay.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir, no problem.
Mr. Akin. And you got some solid state controls that are
basically controlling the electricity that is the DC power that
is going to go from those to the motor in the launch system.
Are you pretty comfortable with that? Is that straightforward?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir, we are operating the control system
right now up at Lakehurst.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Then you have got the motors, which is
basically, I assume, big coils that run the entire length of
the track. Is that correct?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. They are more of an iron bar magnet
with coils of wire around it. But yes.
Mr. Akin. Yes, that is what I mean, coils with an iron. And
that is creating a magnetic field on both sides of the aluminum
plate?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Then the aluminum plate is going to slide
down this track of some kind, right?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Now, what is the tricky part of that?
Captain Mahr. The tricky part of making it work will be
controlling it. It is knowing where you are all the way along
the track so you can keep the force pulling it forward and you
don't retard the motion. And that will be part of the control
system. We have showed it works in the PDRR. We have to build
the catapult up at Lakehurst to prove it. There is
fundamentally no challenge that we haven't encountered before
that we--it will be a communication issue. It will be a closed
look control issue. But that is----
Mr. Akin. Now, these coils that are around this--the iron
core--are there all these things separate so that you basically
are energizing a whole series of them?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir, I have in each--I have--four-foot
section. In each four-foot section there are four individual
motors. And then I have 29 of the 12-foot sections.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Captain Mahr. So in each----
Mr. Akin. And you install that after the carrier is pretty
much built? Those come straight down from the deck?
Captain Mahr. The catapult pieces will come in from the
deck, yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. So that is pretty straightforward. As long
as you have got that working, you--that is top down kind of
thing, whereas the motor generators, that is built way down.
And that is what you have got to make sure that is in?
Captain Mahr. The motor generator is the earliest component
after delivery of the ship.
Mr. Akin. And then the aluminum plate piece--is that also a
top down kind of installation?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. So you are not as worried about that from a
critical path point of view, other than the fact it has to be
ready when you want the ship ready?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Now, how about getting the DC power from
your motor generators to those motors? Is that any particular
problem from a craft point of view or the kind of insulation
you need or cables? Or is that very straightforward?
Captain Mahr. I am hesitant about saying anything is very
straightforward. We are putting together a very complicated
system. But the technology within transformer rectifier--
transformer rectifier has been around for a long time, so we
understand what that is. We are talking on a fairly large
scale. So there are some complexities there.
When we look at the inverters and the rectifiers and
control circuits that we have to do, the process of tuning them
is understood. We have to take our time and go through it. In
fact, that is what we are doing right now down in Tupelo with
one of the circuits. We are doing that control.
If I can get back to the linear motors for a second. I
would be remiss if I didn't talk about--the challenge we are
facing right now with the linear motors is keeping the interior
of the motor drying so that I don't wind up with any short
circuits in there.
The--which I didn't mention earlier. But it is up at
Lakehurst, New Jersey. They are spraying it with a sodium
dioxide fog as well as a salt fog and raining water onto it. We
did find some moisture intrusion. We believe we know three
likely ways that that is getting into the motor.
One of them is in the test motor only. It won't exist in
production. The other two are where the cables connect into
each of the internal stators. And then we believe there may be
some coming in through some location.
Mr. Akin. What voltage are you running DC when you hit that
thing with full power?
Captain Mahr. I am sorry, sir. I can't remember that number
off the top of my head. About 10,000 amps.
Mr. Akin. But generally, you are talking a very high
voltage or--over 1,000?
Captain Mahr. It is roughly in the neighborhood of 1,000
volts and 10,000 max peak on each side.
Mr. Akin. So salt water doesn't work very well with that
kind of voltage?
Captain Mahr. No, sir. We have a floating ground built
inside that we are still operating it--we are operating the
motor wet in haul because we believe it is safe to operate. We
want to get the motor dry when we go to the ship. So we will
work our way through that one.
Mr. Akin. Yes.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and for your forbearance.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, for an excellent
line of questioning.
We now turn to Captain Massa.
Mr. Massa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to ask a few questions.
And, First Admiral and Captain, personally thank you for
your incredible focus on this very important issue and,
frankly, for the service of the thousands of men and women who
you represent here today whose life's passions are in
maintaining and building our Navy.
I fear I am at somewhat of a loss in that I know a couple
of you from many, many years ago. But I remind all that I am at
my soul just a country guy from upstate New York.
You obviously know a great deal about the nuts and bolts of
this system. And the Navy has focused incredible resources on
this.
Vice Admiral Architzel, a very blunt question, if I may.
What if this does not work?
Admiral Architzel. The technology now is critical to the
ship. So let me answer the question by saying the Navy
recognizes that first and foremost. In the past year, we have
done a number of steps--over the past several years--a number
of steps as outlined in my written testimony. But I want to
take a moment to--specifically asking you to use.
You started with a program assessment review, which began
when we first knew we potentially could have some issues then
with the system and where we were and where we thought we would
be, both in terms of cost and schedule and technical issues
that were going to come up. That program assessment review done
with accommodation of industry and--pointed to the fact that we
needed to increase both systems engineering, which is what
Captain Mahr spoke to, as well as our government oversight.
There were changes made in the General Atomics (G.A.) team,
General Conger's team. There were changes made within the
program management team. Coming out of those program assessment
review, it took a while to really analyze what recommendations
were and then incorporate those recommendations.
Many of those recommendations, Ranking Member Akin, were
what drove costs into the program because to take those
recommendations and implement them forward, drove manpower into
the programs and that brings with it attendant costs. And we
also identified some areas that needed corrected. And we
corrected them.
Following that, the Under Secretary of Defense, then Mr.
Young, directed that a DST, or defense support team, review be
conducted of the EMALS system. That was done. The findings of
that in summary were basically that we--recommendation
concurrence to proceed with this system, but pointed to the
fact that we needed to do some additional risk mitigation,
which was also incorporated going forward.
As we continue to move forward, we were not satisfied with
where the program was headed, so we initiated a three-star
level ex-com review, which is executive committee review, which
was made up of members of NAFC, the NAFC system commander
specifically, their system commander and representatives from
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD (AT&L)), a--myself as the chair. And we went to
review with--take a round turn on the program again with the
program managers, only this time to answer four basic
questions: were the requirements met, what were our
alternatives, what would those alternatives be, did we have the
right program management in place to proceed with this, both in
a government and in the industry team and what was our schedule
commitment and what was our cost, where would we stand with--
unit costs and average unit costs.
We took the findings of that committee to a series of
briefings which culminated with the CNO, the Chief of Naval
Operations to make a decision on whether to stay with EMALS or
to look at a different ship. CNO took the information, made a
decision. That decision made is now the path we are on, is the
path to come forward with the EMALS system.
So what I will tell you is we are committed to the EMALS
system.
Mr. Massa. Admiral? Admiral?
Admiral Architzel [continuing]. EMALS, then we--it is not--
we are past that.
Mr. Massa. Thank you. What happens if it doesn't work?
Admiral Architzel. Sir, I have every expectation this EMALS
system will, in fact, work.
Mr. Massa. I don't want to appear insistent. Indulge me and
allow me, please, to ask the question one more time. What
happens if this does not work?
Admiral Architzel. With all candor, sir, the--if that
system were not to work--it is a system that we are confident
will work. And we are going to make every effort we have to
make sure it does work.
Mr. Massa. I am a little rusty on engineering. And you guys
are very much active experts on this. Help me a little bit for
just a few moments.
In linear induction motors, by my calculations, yours has a
348-foot long throw length. As the stator which is stationary
imparts a large electromagnetic field. And we are talking in
something here of 10,000 amps amplified through a pipe of 1,000
volts. So your measuring goes in somewhere in the mega ranges.
As that electromagnetic pulse precedes the shuttle during
those 348 feet, one would suppose there is a peak spike of
initiation and a peak spike on braking. Has anyone measured
that in real-life terms? For any of you gentlemen.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir, during the PDRR phase that we
conducted up at Lakehurst we had on the front of the dead loads
during the launch--we had an M.I. measuring circuit so we----
Mr. Massa. Is that information in two- or three-dimensional
graphic format available in an unclassified manner that I could
be briefed on?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Massa. I would appreciate that. I would also like to
get some understanding of how specifically in Joint Direct
Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and other exceptionally sensitive
weaponized systems that electromagnetic interference (EMI) and
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is going to be grounded and
mitigated, even if it is so much as to precede the airplane by
nine feet, which by my calculations is where that pulse will
spike in front of the nose of the aircraft. The A/NSP-118 on
the F/A-18 is very sensitive, as you know. Any--to the point
where we during weapons handling on any conventional carrier
today shut down all electromagnetic interferences forward of
the island. Now we are introducing a tremendously new variable.
Is it a true statement--well, ask me this. Has this ever
been done outside of your half-length, full-power tests in any
navy anywhere?
Captain Mahr. If you just clarify, sir. Has what been done?
Mr. Massa. An all system been used?
Captain Mahr. No, sir.
Mr. Massa. So this is the first time?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Massa. And we are at the cutting edge of the
technology?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Massa. And if it works, we are it. We have saved 30
percent of the interior volume of the hull, a 20 percent
reduction in crew and associated lifetime costs. These are all
figures that are very, very attractive. I will state for the
record, gentlemen, first I was against the Navy shifting to the
construction of the Ford class and taking such a large leap of
technology simultaneously new propulsion systems, weapons
systems, electrical distribution systems, flight deck layouts,
et cetera. I think it is a bridge too far with exceptionally
high risk and very little mitigation capabilities.
Secondly and for the record, I am exceptionally concerned
about the inability to extract an answer to the simple question
of, ``What happens if it does not work.'' The reality is,
gentlemen, we will have just bought the world's largest
helicopter carrier.
And that will, in fact, so totally impact the future of the
Navy as to the reality that my limited imagination can't
express the overall results. This committee and myself will do
anything to help. But I am very, very worried about this leap
in technology. And I would like to have that reflected in the
record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Captain Massa, for an excellent line
of questioning.
For the record, Captain, Admiral, I would like to know
which of the weapons systems that the captain brought to your
attention have already been tested within the electromagnetic
pulse of these--this system.
Captain Mahr. Sir, what the Navy--the design of the weapons
accounted for pulses of this frequency. We are in the process--
the Navy has never had a source of energy in this frequency
before. So we are now in the process of working with naval air
warfare center weapons division, take those in and develop a--
go through the tests----
Mr. Taylor. When will those tests be conducted, and when do
you expect them to be completed?
Captain Mahr. They will be happening over the next year,
sir. So we will have periodic--we will take several weapons in
through the test----
Mr. Taylor. Yes, I would hope that you would stay in very
close touch with the committee----
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor [continuing]. With the results of that.
Mr. Wittman, were you here at the gavel? We turn to the
gentleman from Tidewater area, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Architzel, Captain Mahr, Captain Antonio, thank you
so much for joining us. I want to start out and just make a
comment. You know, we are kind of pushing the envelope. We are
during this span of time going to go from 11 to 10 carriers as
we phase in the Ford and phase out the Enterprise.
It kind of puts us in a position where if there are
challenges out there, we are going to be pushed to the max. I
am confident in the Navy's assurance that strategically we will
not let our guard down during that period of time. But it is
even more incumbent to make sure that systems such as EMALS and
the new systems on the Ford class carrier are functional and
that we stay on schedule. And obviously scheduling issues there
create larger problems for us down the road.
I wanted to learn a little about the decision making
process and where we are. I understand about 18 months ago that
General Atomics put in place a new management and oversight
team. I wanted to learn a little bit about why that was
necessary and if we believe that the current problems that we
are--well, the problems that we had experienced there were
simply an issue of poor management or if there were other
issues there along the lines that have led to some of the
hiccups in the EMALS program.
Admiral Architzel, I will direct the question to you.
Admiral Architzel. I would like to begin, and I will send
it back over to Captain Mahr. But to directly address your
question, the program assessment review was specifically
designed to uncover what were our areas of concern and focused
on both the government and the industry side.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral Architzel. On the industry side we found that
General Atomics did not have the systems engineering in place,
personnel in place to really bring this from the development
stage into production. And working with General Atomics, we
agreed they have since hired a team in place to do this. We are
confident they have the right people in place to make that
happen.
And concurrent with that we also looked at the Navy program
offices, both program offices here. We looked at both Naval Sea
Systems Command (NAVSEA)--were they working together
technically enough to address many of the things we were
starting to discuss today about risk and were--could we--our
assurance to have that done.
Changes were made in our government structure within how we
go about doing technically to do the things. And a clear
articulation of who was responsible, which goes back to the
chairman's point about Captain Mahr and Captain Antonio,
specifically Mahr and EMALS. I think I would like to have
Captain Mahr continue the answer.
Captain Mahr. Sir, the brief answer to your question is
yes, the changes were required. And, yes, they have been
effective. In this case with management, it is always hard to
find the exact thing that didn't go well. But all together I
would say neither the Navy nor General Atomics appropriately
staffed where for the level of technology production we were
going to have to deliver. As a result of that, we got behind in
our development and design such that the critical design review
was pushed out by several months and then broken up into
incremental phases.
That is not necessarily bad by itself. In fact, it allowed
us to get a good look at each of the systems. But it was an
indicator we had a problem. General Atomics stepped forward,
brought in the appropriate level of management and as noted
earlier, have continued to hire additional experienced managers
and engineers from well-represented major industry
representatives.
And then on the Navy side, we brought in a significant
number of people and kept up over 50 work-years in Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) alone and about the same in----
Admiral Architzel. I think there is another piece that
Captain Antonio should answer, sir, also that goes to concerns
about ship integration and making sure that this system and the
ship are ready for that as well. Because there were changes
made on that side as well.
Captain Antonio. Yes, sir. The Production Assessment Review
(PAR) recommended--PAR recommendations were not just for
General Atomics or just for the Navy. In fact, there were
changes made at the shipbuilder as well. Northrop Grumman
implemented a--or put in place a specific project manager whose
sole function is EMALS integration. And so, we have an effort
funded through the shipbuilder to make sure that the
communication path is there, that they are a part of our
technical governance and part of our overall management of the
system through the development cycle in SDD so that those
lessons learned can be imported over into the ship.
An example of that is as the initial pieces of the linear
motor structure are being put in the trough in Lakehurst, we
had Northrop Grumman shipbuilder production folks onsite
watching how that install was going, making recommendations for
how things ought to happen on the ship.
So all of this was a part of the PAR findings that we
needed, different leadership and organization and different
design integration leading to production on the ship. So we
have addressed those.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Admiral Architzel. Mr. Chairman, could I just----
Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir, Admiral.
Admiral Architzel [continuing]. Correct one--I feel like we
should correct one thing, or at least I should. When we talked
about this technology all concerns--this is high-energy
electrical systems. And we do have a technology that is far
advanced. It was a competition between the Northrop Grumman
design and the General Atomics design.
The graham ring technology of the General Atomics design
was chosen, which is a core iron hull and a copper, well, u-
shaped outer coating. And then that is wrapped with litz wire.
And the current that goes through that linear motor is AC
current, three-phase AC that goes down that motor.
So I think we had said some things about DC, and I want to
make sure we don't have something that is misinterpreted here.
So just a technical aspect that when you end up with the linear
motor, you end up through the power conversion systems at the
linear motors you are sending three-phase AC through those
wrapped windings, which is what gives you that traveling
magnetic wave down the linear motor itself.
The second point was the AC system from the ship is 13 AVA
plus--wire, which sends 800 volts DC into the storage system
generator. It is just a couple things that were said that were
just to clarify.
Mr. Akin. You have thoroughly confused me now. Let us start
at the beginning. Okay? You start with the ship's generators.
They are generating what?
Admiral Architzel. Thirteen eight K AC power.
Mr. Akin. AC power?
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. That runs to the motor generator?
Admiral Architzel. Runs through a transformer rectifier
that comes up and rectifies it to 800 volts DC. And I will
let----
Mr. Akin. So it is converted before it even gets to the
motor generator to DC? It is a little more complicated than I
thought.
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Then you have got a DC motor spinning at 4,200
RPM.
Captain Mahr. There is an exciter on one end. And that is
where you get the electrical acceleration from. So we run it
into the exciter and that is what actually spins up the
generator on the other side.
Mr. Akin. Okay, so the motor is running from a converted AC
to a DC. So it is a DC motor.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. It is running. It is spinning a generator, which
is generating, what, DC power?
Captain Mahr. AC.
Mr. Akin. AC power?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay. It is generating AC power, which is a
three-phase AC, which is then going up to the actual static
motors that are running along the launch?
Captain Mahr. In the middle for the transmission lines we
transmit it as DC.
Mr. Akin. You transmit it as DC? So--solid state we can
flip it back whichever way we want at our convenience?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Admiral Architzel. And the reason you do that just for the
length of transmission on that.
Captain Mahr. You want more losses in the long line.
Mr. Akin. I would love to ask another question, but I think
I want to----
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, you are--I mean, Mr. Ranking
Member, have at it.
Mr. Akin. Well, one other thing. If you have got a large
pulse of magnetic force near the aircraft and you have already
tested this thing at half-length, have you ever stuck an F/A-
18, just sit it there, not to launch it, but just sit it there
and let that power go across it and see what had happened? The
reason I ask that years ago I was in charge of maintenance at a
steel mill. And we put some transformers in to power the
electric arc. For instance, they had carbon rods about the size
of telephone poles that you drop into--three of them that you
drop into scrap. And it makes lightening. And it uses a fair
amount of electricity.
Well, we had at a time where those transformers, there
would be eddy currents that would just vaporize a two or three-
inch bolt that, you know, that you didn't know where they were
going to go. So there is--when you start dealing with
tremendously high power kinds of things, that can have some
influence.
You have got a magnetic field anyplace you have got a wire
that is inducing. So I guess my question is can you stick an F/
A-18 there with its radar and all that kind of stuff and just
fire this thing off a few times and check? Because it would be
nice if we could launch them. It would be better if we could
launch them and have the thing working when it gets up in the
air, too, you know.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. In fact, that specific test is
planned as soon as we get the Lakehurst catapult operating. We
will sit an F/A-18 astride the trough, and we will move the
armature underneath it to see what the affects are. It will
be--airplanes, but we ought to be able to get a lot of good
data off of that. I don't expect there will be any problems.
Mr. Taylor. I apologize for interrupting again. The
timeline on that is what? On that test?
Captain Mahr. I will have to get back to you on the exact
date, sir. I don't know that date off the top of my head.
Mr. Akin. We are talking a year or two away? Or----
Captain Mahr. No, next year, sir.
Mr. Akin. Next year?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Captain Mahr. It will be during our system function
demonstration.
Mr. Akin. On paper what do we think from an engineering
point of view? Will it be okay?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. NAVAIR looked at that, and we--the
specific engineers for our EMI team have worked at it and it
does not seem an issue.
Mr. Akin. Okay.
Admiral Architzel. Ranking Member Akin, there is
significant data that--and we will get back with Representative
Massa and his request. I have done this before. We will come
back again to him to clarify.
In the production development and risk reduction phase,
which is the PDRR--was an acronym used, so I want to put that
one--that was the initial--in that phase, we had antennas
actually on the sleds that were pulled down to measure these
fields. And the fields were measured, both the magnetic fields
around and in the area of the--that data exists, sir.
And so, what the plan that Captain Mahr is talking about is
to further go through both looking at--although we don't expect
there to be Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
(HERO) or Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel (HERF)
or Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP).
Those are electromagnetic magnetic interference for ordnance or
fuel or personnel. That is in our test plan. And we are going
to continue to look at that. So it is not like we are adding
that to the plan. That plan exists. It has been throughout the
program.
Captain Mahr. And we have been doing component-level
testing down at Tupelo, Mississippi, on the actuated power
trains. We have had antennas down there gathering the M.I.
data. We have not seen anything abnormal outside of what we----
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Ranking Member.
We now want to recognize the previous chairman of this
committee, a physicist and our resident expert on
electromagnetic pulse, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. We have had a really
excellent discussion of the technical problems that resulted in
the cost overruns and the delays. But I would like to spend
just a couple moments of reflecting on how we got here and
lessons learned from that.
In a previous life I was privileged to work for the Navy
and then for a captive Navy contractor, the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Lab where we wrote requests for
proposals (RFPs). And then I moved to the industrial world. I
worked for eight years in IBM Federal Systems Division where we
responded to the kinds of RFPs that I helped write when I was
working for the Navy and for the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory.
And there is an interesting and unavoidable phenomenon. It
is characterized as optimistic assumptions of cost and
development by the staff who put together a little briefing for
us here. When I wrote for the IBM Corporation, that was kind of
characterized by the biggest and best liar won. The person can
be the best presenter for a very overly optimistic program of
cost and assumptions is going to win the contract.
So they wouldn't let us do that at IBM. We couldn't lie.
And so, we operated at a disadvantage in getting contracts. And
this is all not intentional. Obviously, the people working on
this are very optimistic about it, very confident in their
abilities and so forth.
But the Navy had in one sector of their development a real
advantage. And that was the applied physics lab. And they have
shepherded through many, many years now the fleet ballistic
missile system development through all of the fleet ballistic
missiles. And they were looking over the shoulder of people
like you in the Navy who are running the program, advising them
as to whether or not this proposal from industry was likely to
work.
And the applied physics lab is a unique organization. I
think it is the only one in the country that will not compete
with industry. And since it will not compete with industry,
industry will share with it its deepest, darkest proprietary
secrets so that the applied physics lab can be in a position to
advise the Navy in what is likely to work and what will not
work because the contractor is always going to be overly
optimistic about what he can do and about how quickly he can do
it and how low the costs will be.
Since we don't have in other parts of the Navy that kind of
a--and there are 3,800 people there, about half of them really
professional people. We don't have that anywhere else in the
Navy. What can we do so that--you know, if you came into this
program after the contract was let, you were handed a dog that
couldn't hunt. And, you know, what do we do to avoid that in
the future if we don't have other APLs to help us in other
parts of the--of our procurement in the Navy?
Admiral Architzel. Well, I think the--we absolutely do
value the work of APL and those laboratories and technology
assets we do have to apply to this. And going down in this
program, as we mentioned, some of the--one of the tasks was on
the defense support team, which included industry
representatives and also laboratory expertise, as you were
mentioning, to go back and tell us did we have this right as
well.
So Representative Bartlett, I just think I agree with you
that we need those--we need that both within our laboratories
as well as within our capability to know because that is where
the expertise resides. And so, I don't argue for a minute that
we need that kind of ability to call on because we need it to
know the experts in the field, if you will.
Mr. Bartlett. But neither you nor we have the depth of
experience and knowledge that an institution like Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Lab have. Wouldn't it be
advantageous if we had those in other parts of our procurement
so that we could have that kind of support and guidance?
Admiral Architzel. I can only agree. But I think they are
available to us to call on them through--as needed through--
when we have those kind of technical challenges. We can reach
out to industry or laboratories to have that brought in in
addition to our own field activities that have that expertise,
perhaps not as great as--because we have new technology and we
have to reach out to them to bring that as well. And I believe
we do.
Mr. Bartlett. I have been here nearly 17 years now. And the
story has never changed. Every program is late and over cost.
And, you know, what can we do to avoid repeating this in the
future? And it all comes from the honest assumption on the part
of the industry and those who are looking at the proposal that,
gee, we really can do that. We need to have that. We really can
do that.
And, you know, how do we avoid the problems that are
created by this overly optimistic assumptions of cost and
development, which apparently is the fundamental root cause of
the schedule overruns and the cost overruns in all of our
programs? How can we avoid that? Now, the APL helped the Navy
to avoid that by saying, you know, that is just overly
optimistic. They are not going to be able to do that.
Admiral Architzel. I believe what comes with this is proper
systems engineering. And I don't use that as a catch phrase. I
believe it. And we have come to that over the past year and-a-
half as we have in the Navy taken a round turn on our process
to come forward with program development and to take what it
means to take a requirement and then give it to industry and
say go build this.
When industry gets that, they don't understand enough of
what it takes to build that to give a realistic estimate at
times. So what we have to do is translate that requirement down
into a lot more detail, which goes into systems design
specification, that allows industry to know exactly what it is
we want them to build. And they can then properly price and
give us properly pricing to what it would be.
To your point sometimes this is not delivered or
intentional, some--it would just be a not understanding what
are the ``-ilities'' that go with this. What does it mean to
have to develop a system or a ship that will go 50 knots versus
one that may go 42 knots or to have this high-power, high-
energy system and be able to launch aircraft at 70 million foot
pounds to 150 knot end speed in a 360 power stroke, 360-foot
power stroke when the Key Performance Parameter (KPP) just says
make a sortie rate or reduce people.
And so, we have to really understand that industry can get
in and--we don't need just to say you can do this. But what
does it really take to get there? And that is the work we have
to do. We owe it to this committee. We owe it to the Navy. And
we are working diligently to make that happen across the board.
Unfortunately, a lot of our programs are well past this
stage. And we are living with the--what we didn't do in the
first. But I will tell you in future programs and forward that
is exactly our intent, to not replicate this in the future. But
I know that doesn't answer your question today because you
would like to see it in all programs that have happened in the
past.
And we needed to do that. And we need to do that as we go
forward. That is as straightforward an answer as I can give
you. I think you hit exactly on what we need to do. And we
intend to do that, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, again, with a great
line of questioning.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this was an
interesting lesson in acquisition reform. And I think the
committee has made great steps in terms of providing some
guidance in having one individual responsible for this project,
that is going to stay with the project.
Mr. Chairman, I am a simple Army, Marine Corps infantry
guy. And I would like to defer to some of the other members
that have expertise, technical expertise if they would like to
ask any other questions and defer my time.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
Any follow-up questions? I have a few myself, but I would
certainly want to let you gentleman go first.
Mr. Bartlett. I appreciate very much the hearing. I am
sorry I have got to run. I am now a half-hour late. But it was
so important I stay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. I can follow-up after
you.
Mr. Taylor. Gentlemen, a couple of quick things that I am
curious about. I will use the analogy we have a new generation
of turbine. You can look at a previous generation, look at the
new one and have some idea whether you are repeating a past
mistake or making improvements--diesel engines, bombs.
With so many of these technologies being new, I am curious
what you use as your benchmark to know if you are going in the
right direction. So I am going to ask a couple questions along
that line. With the motor generators, is there anything similar
to that commercially available anywhere of that size or
capacity right now?
Captain Mahr. There are commercially available motor
generators. They don't have the same power density that we do.
So we have----
Mr. Taylor. By a factor of what, Admiral?
Captain Mahr. I can get you that answer, sir. I have not
done an industry survey recently.
Mr. Taylor. Well, give me an idea. Is this twice as large,
10 times as large? It is something that you could go out and--
--
Captain Mahr. I will go back and get--I believe we are less
than twice as power dense as the commercial ones. We are not a
huge leap. And we have to go back a little bit in history.
In 2004, we were pretty far ahead. But commercial
technology has caught on.
Mr. Taylor. All right. Okay, your prime power interface
system, the one you are going to use for this program--is there
something similar to it that is on an existing Navy program? Is
this substantially larger than anything else you are using?
Captain Mahr. No, sir, it is comparable to what industry
uses.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. So you don't expect any surprises there?
Captain Mahr. No, sir. Transformer rectifiers have been
around for a long time. The control technology has been around.
So this is really tuning it for our circuit.
Mr. Taylor. And I realize there is not another
electromagnetic launch out there. But is that technology being
used, again, commercially in a different form but similar form?
And where would that be?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. Linear induction motors are used in
various applications in industry. We are at a larger scale,
obviously, than most of those. But the graham ring motor is a
well-understood technology.
Mr. Taylor. And it is used where, Admiral?
Captain Mahr. I will get you some examples. I don't have
any off the top of my head.
Mr. Taylor. Just for my information, your motor generator
is spinning at 4,200 RPM. How much does it drop with each
launch?
Captain Mahr. If I can just make a statement. It was 4,200
RPM--we are now operating at 4,000.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Captain Mahr. We lowered the operating point a little bit.
Over a sequence of launches if we launched a full deck of
aircraft, the motor generator will bottom out somewhere around
2,400 RPM.
Mr. Taylor. How much, sir?
Captain Mahr. Two thousand, four hundred.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Admiral Architzel. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Taylor. And the recovery time is what, sir, the
recovery time to get that----
Captain Mahr. It starts immediately, sir. So it comes back
up. Over a very brief period of time it will be back up to
4,000.
Mr. Taylor. I am sorry to cut you off, Admiral.
Admiral Architzel. No, sir. Pardon me for interrupting. I
think it might be helpful, sir, to answer that specific
question if Captain Mahr would walk us through what goes on
during these high-cycle testing of the generator because it
cuts right to your exact question.
Mr. Taylor. We would appreciate that, Admiral.
Admiral Architzel. And I think he can provide the answer,
both--in three different scenarios it will show you how these
are--this exact phenomenon is measured.
Mr. Taylor. Sure.
Please, Admiral.
Captain Mahr. What scenario?
Admiral Architzel. Carrier launches.
Captain Mahr. Okay.
Admiral Architzel. Cyclic ops.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. In the high-cycle test ongoing at
Tupelo right now we have three different scenarios, three main
scenarios. We have a carrier qualification launch scenario.
Carrier qualification in the Navy generally has a lighter
weight aircraft and we launch them more frequently. And we have
a cyclic ops scenario where you launch combat-weight aircraft,
so a fully loaded aircraft. But you only launch 24 at a time
for standard launch event.
And then mission capable, which is degraded launch mode
where we still want to launch the same number of aircraft for a
cyclic ops event but we understand that we lose some
capability, either motor generator is not available due to
maintenance or some other issue or we lose one of the motors
itself on the----
In the carrier qualification episode, when the launch is
commanded and the pulse is sent out, we have got a motor
generator operating at 4,200 RPM. There are 12 of those
throughout the ship. All 12 of them can supply energy to all
four catapults.
When the launch is commanded, the power system as a whole
starts drawing down. What we simulate in high-cycle tests is
that coming off of one generator. That generator starts to draw
down as soon as the generator power starts drawing down, the
setter side draws power off the ship's power and tries to bring
it back up. So even as I am pulling the RPM down, just like a
flywheel, on the other side I am trying to spin it back up.
So we are constantly feeding energy back into the system
and trying to keep it at in a static sense. Each time I launch
in between launches is about 45 seconds. The energy starts
coming back up and will not quite reach 4,200 RPM. And we will
command another launch. It comes back down again.
And we see this sawtooth curve. And sawtooth curve at the
bottom will bottom out at about 2,400 RPM before it starts
coming back up. We repeat that sequence, again, accumulate
close to 20,000 pulses on each of those three types of----
Mr. Taylor. It is my understanding that the A1B power plant
on the Ford class is designed to go the entire life of the ship
without refueling. Is that correct?
Captain Mahr. Sir, I defer to Captain Antonio.
Mr. Taylor. It is not?
Captain Antonio. No, sir, it is not. There will be a
refueling complex overhaul plan for the Ford at about mid-life.
Mr. Taylor. And mid-life is expected to be what?
Captain Antonio. At about the 25-year point. The ship's
life is being designed for 50 years.
Mr. Taylor. As a matter of curiosity, how much of that 25-
year life is used up in the launch of aircraft? What do you
envision?
Captain Antonio. Sir, I am not qualified to talk about the
propulsion plan. I would have to defer that question and get
back with you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 53.]
Mr. Taylor. Okay. I would be curious, obviously. It is
going to be a new draw on the power plant that was not there in
previous platforms.
Going to Mr. Bartlett's excellent line of questioning, you
are can-do people. You do not come before Congress and say we
can't do it. That is a double-edged sword. And we do often find
ourselves with programs like the littoral combat ship (LCS)
where can-do people suddenly find out that the can-do attitude
wasn't enough to make up for a contractor that failed.
With that thought, I am particularly concerned with the
line of questioning that Captain Massa had as to what affect
this is going to have on the electronics systems of the
aircraft that you launch, on the weapons systems of those
craft. I would remind you that former governor, now Secretary
of the Navy Mabus actually used his power as governor of
Mississippi to prevent the Empress barge from being used off
our shores some 20 years ago.
So it is something that the secretary is aware of, the
electromagnetic pulse that goes back at--and what I would hope
is not the case is that in the Navy's effort to get what I
consider to be a great technology on this vessel that we are
intentionally downplaying the affects on some of these systems
and intentionally low-balling the cost of whatever changes
would have to come as a result of that, not so much to the
EMALS system, but all the other electromagnetic platforms that
are associated with that vessel, which goes to my line of
questioning about how quickly--and Mr. Wittman's line of
questioning and Mr. Akin's line of questioning. How quickly are
you going to test this in conjunction with all the other things
that are going on on that ship?
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. And I think the best way to answer
it is to come back, again, to the PDRR. I was able to locate
the data I had. The general limit right now would be 150
millivolts for HERO, hazardous emissions to ordnance.
In the testing we did with the full-scale, half-length
catapult we never exceeded 120 millivolts. It is typical to
work 40 to 80 millivolts. At the height above those troughs
where you would see the ordnance test fired aircraft pass by.
So we have got the field data from real tests that say we are
okay.
The challenge that you give us and we have already accepted
ourselves is go through that. And that is a process that can
take place over the next year. I am going to go validate that
in the laboratories. We are going to put the instrumented
aircraft over the catapult trough. We will continuously measure
it. We will be doing that in high-cycle tests at the component
level. And I will owe you a future brief on the data that comes
out of those tests.
Mr. Taylor. And whose job will it be to inform congress of
the unintended consequences and the affects that it has on
other systems?
Captain Mahr. Sir, I have responsibility----
Mr. Taylor. That is your job?
Captain Mahr [continuing]. For the EMALS program.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Mr. Courtney, do you have any questions?
Mr. Courtney. I am just taking a break from health care.
Mr. Taylor. This is probably a televised hearing. It is
probably the wrong place to hide, Mr. Courtney.
Anyone else?
Yes, Mr. Wittman?
Mr. Wittman. I just wanted to ask another additional
question and understand a little more about the administrative
aspects of the things that have gone on. If you could, if you
could explain the difference between what is in place now, the
undefinitized contract action that is there with General
Atomics on the EMALS for the USS Ford and the final contract
action that you are pursuing. Can you tell me: Are both of
those fixed price contracts?
And where do those two frameworks lead us if they are risks
that come up down the road? In other words, if there are things
that throw us off schedule if they are production issues, if
they are performance issues there. Who assumes the risk there,
both from a function standpoint and then also from a time
standpoint? Because as we know, if we get pressed on this, you
see the--we have seen the windows here are fairly small as far
as making sure all these pieces work.
Who assumes the risk there? Because we all, as Mr. Bartlett
said, we all get concerned about timing on this. And I brought
that up as far as the production schedule for the Ford in
relation to the Enterprise going out and that 3-year window
where we go from 11 to 10 and then also the cost considerations
on this. I just want to try to get you all to put that in
perspective on what the differences are between those two.
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. On the--contract action that the
Navy and General Atomics signed on June 30th is the not-to-
exceed price that will when we definitize the contract in the
standard for definitizing that contract is 180 days, which
would put it at the end of December. We definitize at or below
the not-to-exceed price.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Captain Mahr. And will be a fixed price contract.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Captain Mahr. So I believe your comparison is fair that----
Mr. Wittman. Okay. And the final contract action then is
going to be fixed price also?
Captain Mahr. Fixed price contract.
Mr. Wittman. Where is the risk assumed?
Captain Mahr. Any changes that come out of the systems
design and development test, as an example--so if--I have
talked about the wet motor. We have some moisture intrusion.
The changes that come out of that are included in the cost of
that contract. Any change I find in SDD I will fund SDD to
develop the nonrecurring engineering on that. And that will be
handed over to be included in the ship's--CVN-78 at no
additional cost to the government.
Mr. Wittman. And so, you will also have that reflected in
the final contract action? Also it is in the----
Captain Mahr. Yes, sir. That wording is currently in the
undefinitized contract. That is already there.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. All right, very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had a couple of just kind of, ``gee whiz'' questions here
to try and get a better perspective on what you are doing.
First of all, in terms of your energy storage, you decided to
go basically with a motor generators approach. Did you consider
using capacitors or something like that? Or is this way beyond
what we can do with a bank of capacitors?
Captain Mahr. There are other technologies out there that
may be applicable out in the future. At the time the total
contract was proposed, General Collins was proposing the motor
generator. So we did not look at changing that from the--
proposal. And----
Mr. Akin. That is an old tried and true kind of thing in a
way. But in terms of energy density, I suppose that is
something that you are thinking about is how much space is it
taking and all. But it does seem like it is--in a way, even
though it is old, it seems like a bank of capacitors or
something in a way are somewhat simpler. But----
Captain Mahr. There is battery technology. There is other
technology out there for future ships, again, beyond CVN-78
that the Navy is looking at--and to Representative Bartlett's
comments, that the labs are working on right now.
Mr. Akin. Okay. And then the second thing, I guess, is the
question is if you have this capacity to store up a lot of
electrical energy and discharge it, would this ever be used in
other kinds of weapons systems? Have you looked at that at all
or not particularly? Or is that classified?
Admiral Architzel. Well, it is being looked at other
systems. As an example, that would be the rail gun.
Mr. Akin. Say again.
Admiral Architzel. A rail gun technology, which uses the
same kind of technology. That is prototypical in development.
That kind of technology is used there, as an example. And you
mentioned----
Mr. Akin. Where would that be sort of an anti-missile type
of system or something or what?
Admiral Architzel. The technology is just to at this point
would be to accelerate a projectile, which can get to
significantly high speeds. I would like to end the
conversation--the discussion there because it does get into
other areas. But that is an example of one. And also using
technology like this can go into transportation systems as well
when you get into use of electromagnetics on rail transport.
Those kinds of things are being looked at, both commercially as
well as could be looked at----
Mr. Akin. I was thinking lasers because our chemical
airborne laser stores energy chemically to get a lot of energy
all stored up.
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. This is a different way of storing some energy.
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Akin. Yes. Just a couple of, you know, popular science
questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, I know that, again, going back that
you are an admiral because you are a can-do person. You accept
the challenge when you are given to it. You don't question
orders. But going back to Captain Massa's question, is it fair
to say that should this program, for whatever reason--its
affect on other weapons systems, its affect on other ships
nearby--for whatever reason failed to materialize, would the
delay be more than two years? And would the additional costs to
the taxpayers to finish this carrier be more than $2 billion?
Admiral Architzel. Mr. Chairman, to that question directly,
if we had to--yes, the answer would be most definitely more
than two years and would be a significant cost.
Mr. Taylor. So what do you think it would be, sir?
Admiral Architzel. I really don't have a cost estimate.
Although I do think that to go--in our discussions and come
forward, sir, this year about with the CNO and about taking
this to discussion--should we stay with EMALS--our discussion
should we stay with EMALS or revert back to steam, at that time
we looked at anywhere from 12 to 18 months delay if we had made
the decision, say, 6 months ago. So to make that decision in
the future would clearly be one, that when the decision was
made by the CNO, we looked at--he looked all of us in the eye
and particularly to the Systems Command (SYSCOM) commanders and
myself and Mr. Stackley and said now we need to deliver on this
system.
It clearly is a decision made. And without having that
would be at least a two-year delay. And the cost would be
significant.
Mr. Taylor. For stability purposes, is the size, weight and
placement of the EMALS system--if it had to be replaced with a
steam catapult--does that put you in a situation as far as
stability and your center of gravity, center of buoyancy where
you cannot finish the ship?
Captain Antonio. The last part of your question threw me
there, sir. I was going to say that the relative weights and
location of the steam system compared to the EMALS system are
not that significant. There is some weight difference in some
locations in terms of center of gravity which would require a
difference of the placement of some ballasts in the ship.
But it is not to the point where the ship design would not
be able to accept it if it were possible to do it if a decision
were made. It would just be extremely costly and time-
consuming.
Mr. Taylor. And just for the benefit of the committee
because particularly I know the gentleman from the Tidewater
area is very keenly aware of the delivery of carriers, as he
should be--but for the benefit of the committee, what is the
domino effect to our now 10-carrier fleet should this ship not
be delivered on time? Aren't there vessels that are fairly
close to retirement that we are planning on this vessel taking
the place of?
And doesn't that not put--I mean, again, just to give--make
the members aware of the gravity of this decision. Worst case
scenario, the vessel is delayed by three years. How many
carriers do we have then?
Admiral Architzel. Sir, the Enterprise is scheduled to
decom or deactivate in November of 2012. At that point, the
Ford will deliver, as mentioned, September of 2015. So the next
carrier--what you have remaining at that point is the Nimitz
class carriers.
So you have--to that is the Nimitz itself. And so, she will
run up towards 50 years. And I will have to get exactly when
that is. But she comes in around the time we would be, on the
current schedule, somewhere close to when we would be with the
next CVN-79 delivered. So that is about the timeframe--to put
you on the 2012, 2013 timeframe.
Mr. Taylor. This is a reminder we did give the Navy in this
year's bill temporary permission to dip down to, I believe, 10
carriers. And so, the failure for this ship to deliver on time
makes it, not just a three-year permission. It could extend it
out to six, seven years. And that is why, again, for all the
reasons that you have heard our concerns today that this has to
work.
I would like to tell the committee that I had a lengthy
conversation with the secretary of the Navy on this last
Friday, that he is very much onboard with our language to have
a clear line of authority as to who is responsible for this
program, a clear transition from one officer to another. And,
again, I very much appreciate you gentlemen being here today.
If there are no further questions, I would hope that on
those things that were unanswered today that you would get back
to us. Is two weeks a reasonable amount of time to get those
answers?
Admiral Architzel. Yes, sir, we can do that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
Any further questions? The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 16, 2009
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July 16, 2009
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 16, 2009
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Captain Antonio. The reactor energy needs projected for aircraft
launching is less than 2% of total energy budget for CVN 78 class ships
regardless of catapult system. Therefore, over the 25-year life, it is
projected that less than 2% will be used in the launching of aircraft.
[See page 28.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 16, 2009
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR
Mr. Taylor. ``Prior to committing to EMALS as the aircraft launcher
for CVN-21/CVN-78, what real-world tests, simulations, modeling,
calculations, etc., did the Navy perform to assure itself that EMI/EMP
from EMALS would not create a problem for aircraft, munitions, and
other shipboard systems? If the Navy performed real-world tests, were
these full-scale tests involving actual aircraft, munitions, other
shipboard systems, and full-scale, full-power EMALS technology?
Admiral Architzel. An EMALS Electromagnetic Environmental Effects
(E3) Working Group consisting of subject matter specialists was
established early in the EMALS program to examine E3 impacts to
personnel, aircraft, ordnance and equipment. The EMALS E3 program is
being conducted in accordance with the well established processes
described in the Department of Defense Handbook on Electromagnetic
Environmental Effects and Spectrum Certification Guidance for the
Acquisition Process (MIL-HDBK-237). The program includes early
characterization testing on full scale, full power hardware;
calculation, modeling and analysis using well established techniques to
assess compliance with requirements; and standard design techniques to
mitigate risks.
During the EMALS Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, the
Navy conducted Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) characterization testing using full scale, full power EMALS
technology. During this phase the Navy used instrumentation--including
Gauss Meters with 3-axis probes, Spectrum Analyzers, and loop
antennas--as surrogates for aircraft, munitions, and shipboard systems.
Testing examined EMI, magnetic, ordnance, and personnel risks at the
component and system levels to define the EMALS-generated E3
environments. The data was compared to previously conducted modeling
and simulation and aircraft, munitions, and shipboard design
specifications. The results of the testing were used to validate the
analytical models and refine the simulations used to establish the
EMALS design requirements prior to entering the System Development and
Demonstration phase.
The E3 characterization results were also used to support modeling
and analyses to predict emissions from the EMALS power components and
cable systems below deck. Standard practices for integration of high-
power shipboard machinery, including separation distances (e.g.,
isolation of equipment and cable arrangement), shielding, and
filtering, were then incorporated into the ship design and arrangement
to insure that safe stand-off requirements were provided.
Mr. Taylor. If the Navy, prior to committing to EMALS as the
aircraft launcher for CVN-21/CVN-78, did not employ real-world tests
involving actual aircraft, munitions, other shipboard systems, and
full-scale, full-power EMALS technology, what is the risk that the Navy
will discover at some point that EMI/AMP from EMALS does indeed create
a problem for aircraft, munitions, or other shipboard systems? Since
EMALS is critical to making the ship capable of supporting CTOL
aircraft operations, and since problems for aircraft, munitions, and
other shipboard systems created by EMI/EMP from EMALS could prevent the
Navy from using (or fully using) EMALS, was it wise for the Navy to
commit to EMALS without conducting such tests?
Admiral Architzel. The EMALS Electromagnetic Environmental Effects
(E3) program is being conducted in accordance with well established
processes described in the Department of Defense Handbook on
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects and Spectrum Certification
Guidance for the Acquisition Process (MIL-HDBK-237). The E3 program
consists of early characterization testing on full scale, full power
hardware; calculation, modeling and analysis, using well established
techniques to assess compliance with requirements; and standard design
techniques to mitigate risks. Analyses of the observed and projected
operational levels of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) show no
emission characteristics that require mitigation steps beyond the
standard techniques used to integrate high power electrical/electronic
systems in the ship.
E3 testing will continue through 2010 on full scale catapult
systems and subsystems using instrumentation, aircraft and weapons
firing circuits. If necessary, additional mitigation, including
adjustments to space arrangements, separation distances (isolation &
cable arrangement), shielding, and filtering will be incorporated.
Modeling, analysis, design mitigations, and testing throughout the
development of EMALS have provided an appropriate level of assurance
that the system will operate properly.
Mr. Taylor. If it turns out that EMI/EMP from EMALS creates
problems for aircraft, munitions, or other shipboard systems, what
would be the potential strategies for mitigating or working around
these problems?
Admiral Architzel. The Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) test results obtained during the EMALS
Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase were used to support
analyses characterizing the emissions from the EMALS power components
and cable systems below deck. Standard practices for integration of
high-power shipboard machinery--including separation distances (e.g.,
isolation of equipment and cable arrangement), shielding and
filtering--were then incorporated into the ship design and arrangement
to ensure that safe stand-off distances were provided. These techniques
will be applied if further mitigation is required.
Mr. Taylor. What elements of the EMALS development effort do the
Navy consider to be more than low risk (i.e., low-to-moderate,
moderate, moderate-to-high, or high risk)? What are the risk levels for
these elements? What are the dates when the Navy expects to learn
whether these elements of the EMALS development effort have been
successfully completed?
Admiral Architzel. The EMALS Risk Management Program assesses risk
levels on a monthly basis as low, moderate or high based on their
impact on performance, schedule and cost. Assessments are conducted by
senior personnel assigned to the EMALS program in accordance with the
PMA 251 Risk Management Process. The Navy, General Atomics and Northrop
Grumman participate in both the monthly EMALS Program Risk Assessment
Board and CVN 21 Program Risk Board meetings.
As of July 16, 2009, the program assessed nine risks at the
moderate level and none at the high level. Specifically:
If EMALS emissions exceed Hazardous Radiation to Ordnance
(HERO) limits, then shipboard ordnance handling may be affected,
requiring changes to ship design. This risk is moderate with a plan to
mitigate to low, via testing of EMALS components during 2010.
If EMALS equipment is damaged during storage at the Lead
Design Yard or during ship installation, then ship construction delays
or program cost increase may result. This risk is currently moderate
with a plan to mitigate it to low in early 2010.
If unanticipated shared Energy Storage Subsystem (ESS)
performance problems are observed during testing on the ship, the
catapult commissioning and testing schedule may be impacted. This risk
is currently moderate with a plan to mitigate it to low in mid-2011.
If the Prime Power Interface Subsystem (PPIS)
transformer/rectifier fails shock testing and correction requires a
significant design change to the enclosure, transformer or choke
design, the ship construction schedule may be impacted. This risk is
currently moderate with a plan to mitigate it to low by the end of
2010.
If Launch Motor Subsystem (LMS) stator assembly fails
Environmental Qualification Tests, the LMS production schedule may be
impacted to correct and retest the deficiencies. This risk is currently
moderate with a plan to mitigate it to low by the end of 2010.
If EMALS topside emissions exceed system interference or
Emissions Control (EMCON) thresholds, design changes may be needed to
EMALS or topside ship arrangements. This risk is currently moderate
with a plan to mitigate it to low by testing the EMALS components
during 2010.
If the motor support structure production rate observed
during the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase cannot be
improved during ship set production, the LMS may not meet Required In-
Yard Dates (RIYDs) for installation of the third and fourth catapult.
This risk is currently moderate with a plan to mitigate it to low by
the end of 2009.
If the Motor/Generator (M/G) production rate observed
during the SDD phase cannot be improved during ship set production,
some M/Gs may not meet the RIYDs. This risk is currently moderate with
a plan to mitigate it to low by the end of 2009.
If the development test program is unable to fully test
the Power Conversion Subsystem (PCS) shared inverter shipboard
configuration (3 Inverters per phase and a set of inverters being
shared between two launchers), ship integrated testing may be delayed.
This risk is currently moderate with a plan to mitigate it to low by
the end of July of 2009.
All other EMALS risks are currently assessed as low.
Mr. Taylor. How many months of additional delay, in which elements
of the EMALS development effort, can be absorbed without affecting the
construction schedule or construction cost of CVN-78?
Admiral Architzel. EMALS has specific Required In-Yard Dates (RIYD)
for each component. In general, the EMALS CVN 78 production delivery
schedule maintains at least six months of margin to the RIYD for all
components with the exception of some of the Launch Motor Subsystem
(LMS) trough components and Energy Storage Subsystem (ESS) Motor
Generators. LMS components have at least five months of margin, while
the two key ESS Motor Generators have approximately two months each.
Production of LMS and ESS components is ongoing and being closely
monitored.
Mr. Taylor. What has been the cost and schedule performance of the
EMALS development effort since the start of the year?
Admiral Architzel. The EMALS System Development and Demonstration
(SDD) Phase Cumulative Cost Performance Index declined slightly in
June, representing an increase in the existing cost variance. This
existing cost variance was due to the cost of delays initially
encountered in the delivery of equipment to the full scale test site at
Lakehurst in the last quarter of calendar year 2008. The Cumulative
Schedule Performance Index improved during the same period. Using a
critical path analysis, program execution, which was four months behind
the baseline schedule in January, has been reduced to three months
behind the baseline schedule.
Mr. Taylor. When the Navy originally awarded EMALS to General
Atomics, why did the Navy not immediately begin taking steps to help
General Atomics evolve from being an entity with a strength in research
and development into one that was also strong in manufacturing and
production?
Admiral Architzel. The Navy selected General Atomics (GA) in 2004
to design and produce the next generation Navy catapult following a
competitive prototyping effort. Based on successful prototype testing,
GA was chosen as the industry partner with the best capability to
provide this technology. The Navy has worked with GA since that time.
Early in the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, the Navy
emphasized the need for GA to strengthen its manufacturing and
production capability. The development of the GA Tupelo, Mississippi
manufacturing facility to produce the launch motor and power
conditioning systems for the System Design and Development (SDD) and
production phases resulted, in part, from these discussions. Lessons
learned during production of the SDD units have been used to improve
processes for ship set manufacturing. The Navy has strongly supported
GA's efforts to pursue appropriate industry certifications and increase
staffing in engineering, production planning and scheduling. In late
2007, GA and the Navy conducted joint production assessment reviews of
the EMALS program that resulted in specific recommendations for
processes and leadership improvements. Implementation of these
recommendations resulted in the addition of senior managers with
production experience at GA, and improved production planning utilizing
a resourced integrated master schedule. The Navy and GA continue to
work together to provide a manufacturing and production capability
using well defined Production Readiness Review processes and applicable
elements of the Navy's Flight Safe manufacturing and quality assurance
standards.