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**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR
NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT
PROGRAMS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD
EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 5, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha, everybody. Thank you very much for coming today.

This is a very crucial meeting, from our standpoint, in this subcommittee. Some of us have had longstanding questions and observations with respect to the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG), both from the equipment perspective and personnel perspective as we have seen this transition going all the way back to Kosovo and Serbia and the whole redirection, if you will, of American military effort vis-a-vis the Guard and Reserve in terms of an operational force and the implications and consequences of that, over time.

And we are particularly well served, I think, by having Major General Raymond Carpenter, the acting deputy director of the Army National Guard and Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt, the Director of the Air National Guard, because I think both of you have a long-term perspective on precisely these questions and their implication.

Secretary Gates has adopted 82 recommendations from the congressionally mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. One of those recommendations was to equip and resource the Guard and Reserve component as an operational reserve rather than a Cold War model of a strategic reserve. When I say Cold War model, that is a popular way of putting it, whether it was a Cold War or no Cold War, the Guard and Reserves' mission mandate and the understanding of what that was precedes the Cold War.

And from my point of view, equipping and resourcing the Guard and Reserve as an operational reserve is not merely a logistical activity or a convenience for auditing purposes, economically or otherwise, but as a change in doctrine, fundamental doctrine, that deserves a much more extended conversation than we have had, inasmuch as virtually no conversation at all. And this hearing today I hope will provide at least some basis for that conversation because

of the nature of the requirements associated with the change in direction in terms of equipment.

The old strategic reserve model assumed very few mobilizations and assumed risk with inadequate equipping strategies, in my estimation. The change to an operational reserve status, coincident with the re-organization of the Army, has greatly increased the amount of equipment that the Guard and Reserve units are required to have, required not by us or a doctrine, per se, but required by the elements of the deployments to which the Guard and Reserve have been assigned, and are likely to be assigned in the near and distant future.

While the Department is making improvements and progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National Guard to enhance its role as an operational reserve, there are a significant number of units that do not have the required equipment. Sustaining this funding and having the necessary transparency and accountability to the equipment, however, remains a challenge.

That is a very mild way of saying that, while I think the Guard and Reserve can pretty well—and has pretty well calculated what its needs are, what its requirements are in terms of equipment, personnel, and training, I can't say the same for the Pentagon in terms of being able to even account for what it has done to this point. There have been tens-of-billions-of-dollars of additional funding over the baseline pre-change in doctrine, but whether that has trickled down to the Guard and Reserve is not an open question.

I believe that the record shows that it has not. The billions have dissipated, but not into the capacity of the Guard and Reserve to either have the equipment, have the personnel to complete training standards, let alone prepared to be deployed and redeployed.

So the purpose of today's hearing is to get a straightforward assessment of the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard now, and in the context that these components are to be there as an operational reserve.

The witnesses have been asked to lay out what equipment levels their organizations are required to have, how these requirements have changed, as well as what equipment levels they actually have on hand.

General Carpenter and General Wyatt have also been asked to provide their views on the adequacy of the fiscal year 2009 budget and, to the extent possible, given the constraints that prevail in the Pentagon today, to the extent possible the 2010 budget request for equipping their elements. And we have also asked our witnesses to be prepared to provide a status of equipment readiness.

Just having the equipment on paper or in reality does not necessarily coincide with the readiness component. There you have to include personnel as well as whether or not we are counting reset and depot or originated equipment, et cetera.

So with that in mind, that is quite a task. There obviously are many elements that the military considers when it judges a unit combat-ready, equipment being key to it.

Compared to other measures of readiness, equipment readiness is fairly straightforward. Either you have the equipment you need or you don't. Without the right type and amounts of equipment, even the most dedicated and experienced soldier or airman cannot

train for combat or provide adequate assistance when there is a domestic emergency.

So for a variety of reasons that today's hearing I hope will explore, the number of units in the National Guard that can report that they are at the highest level of equipment readiness has declined, at least in the judgment of the committee to this point. And it has declined since 2001.

We also learned this week that this continues to be a problem for the entire Army. It is not just the National Guard that is having this difficulty. And while most Guard units deployed overseas have all the equipment they require, many of those units don't get all that equipment until just before deployment, in some cases after they deploy, and whether or not this constitutes the kind of readiness that you feel as commanders are required is another question I hope you will explore.

At a minimum, it makes training to deploy difficult. Given the operational reserve equipage model, a large percentage of non-deployed Army National Guard units are far below Army standards for equipment on hand in terms of the statistics that I have seen to this juncture.

In addition, the Army National Guard forces that deployed to Iraq in 2002 and 2004 left much of their equipment in-theater for follow-on forces to use if that was, in fact, able to be done. I know you could leave it, but whether it was usable is another story. It is unclear whether that equipment will be replaced, and I hope you will be able to speak to the question of whether it was usable, or to the degree it was usable, and for how long.

This is particularly an important question, gentlemen, because we are now talking of redeploying forces and equipment to Afghanistan and perhaps other areas adjacent to Afghanistan.

Aging aircraft continue to be a critical issue for the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard aircraft are, on average, 28 years old, with the KC-135 tankers, need I say, averaging 48 years at this stage.

If the problems of equipment shortages and aging equipment persist, National Guard units, while dedicated and willing—and I take that as a stipulation we will have no trouble in sustaining—no matter how dedicated and willing, they may simply not be able to adequately respond to domestic emergencies, let alone trade in for combat.

And I don't want to underplay the domestic emergencies. You don't have to think of Katrina as being only a once-in-a-lifetime proposition to think about what domestic emergencies constitute—tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes. I suppose we are going to get the locusts soon.

At least what this new president is facing, that seems to be next. When you are re-naming flu, you know that you are at the crisis stage.

No amount of dedication or desire or willpower can overcome a lack of transportation, communication and construction equipment when a National Guard unit is trying to help people hit by one of those tornados or those hurricanes or floods, et cetera.

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment readiness shortfalls. For purposes of the record and for those who

are new members to the committee, this subcommittee, and subsequently the full committee, was instrumental in seeing a reallocation of funding, close to \$1 billion, in the last go-round, a reallocation within the Army of funds that could not usefully be spent in certain areas of research and development.

We were able to get that money transferred to the National Guard. But that was, in my judgment, the proverbial drop in the bucket compared to what was needed, but we were happy, nonetheless, to get at least that amount of money over to you.

So we have tried to address the readiness equipment shortfall, and since 2001, then, the Congress has provided almost \$11 billion above what was in the previous administration's budget for funding—\$50 billion altogether has been provided for equipment since 2001.

On the surface, that seems like an awful lot. But as I have indicated in the previous portion of my remarks, I hope you can account for where that \$50 billion went, because I don't see much of it showing up in your immediate equipment account.

We provided \$2 billion—Congress, that is to say, has provided \$2 billion to the Guard and Reserve in a separate dedicated funding account over the past two years. Again, please forgive me. Those of you who have been on the committee for a long time, you are well aware of that.

But as I say, we have new members here, and the public may not be entirely aware of what we are doing. That is the reason for the length and the depth of these remarks.

I say to both of you gentlemen not because I don't expect that you know it, but I want to make sure that it is on the record and people who may be observing are fully informed. So we have put \$2 billion in a separate dedicated funding account, and I have an idea that we are going to have to do a lot more of that upcoming.

So this funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both on this committee and throughout the Congress. I want to commend Mr. LoBiondo in particular for his attention in these areas. And I can tell you that it is good to have people on the committee who have sustained their interest over a long period of time, as he has.

So we made some progress then in terms of funding and re-organization, but I am hoping that, as a result of the testimony today, we are going to have the foundation to be able to come into this next defense bill and really concentrate on Guard and Reserve requirements, using equipment as the taking-off point for what we do.

So what we want to find out today, then, is exactly how equipment funding that has been provided has been used to address equipment shortfalls. Where did the money go? What progress has been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review?

That is what we have to do right now. You can be very helpful to us today. We have to be able to tell the committee as a whole, and then the appropriators and the Congress as a whole, exactly what we need to do to see to it that the Guard and Reserve are prepared to do what we have been requiring them to do up till now, and I have no doubt are going to require of them in the immediate future.

We need to be able to know what the funding allocation should be and, ultimately, how we should direct the distribution of equipment, if necessary, in the defense bill itself.

We want to know why equipment readiness rates continue to remain very low for many non-deployed units despite significant additional funds having been provided. No sense in us just putting the money out there, both authorized and appropriated, if it is not really getting to you in a way that proves useful.

So, for example, how much of the \$50 billion in funding since 2001 has actually been used to provide additional equipment for you in a way that is useful and immediate? Has the funding been used for the intended purposes, or has it dissipated?

Regardless of what the reasoning is, or was, has it been dissipated? And finally, then, for the 2010 budget, what needs to be done by this subcommittee, our full committee and the Congress, to address this problem either through legislation or funding?

I am grateful to you and to the members for this rather extended commentary at the beginning. I don't generally want to do it. But I thought it was so important that we have on the record, both for the new members and the public, exactly what was at stake that I took a little bit more time than I ordinarily would have liked.

And with that in mind, I am looking forward to the commentary and observations of my good friend and someone who has the long-term perspective on what this is about, because even though I have mentioned Mr. LoBiondo favorably, I can tell you that Roscoe Bartlett was on this issue.

I remember, very, very well when I was sitting way down at the other end of this podium now, and in fact, I think it was probably Curt Weldon and Roscoe Bartlett that first brought to everybody's attention on the committee what the implications for the National Guard and Reserve might be way back in the early 1990's.

Roscoe.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

And to our witnesses, welcome. And thank you very much for your service to our country, and we are happy you are with us today.

The Army National Guard predates the founding of our Nation and a standing military by almost a century and a half, and is therefore the oldest component of the United States Armed Forces. America's first permanent militia regiment among the oldest continuing units in history, were organized by the Massachusetts Bay Colonies 1636. Since that time, the Guard has participated in every U.S. conflict to include current deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Today's National Guard and Reserve personnel continue the long tradition of protecting our Nation, and they do so in a magnificent manner. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the National Guard is no longer considered a strategic reserve. It is now considered an operational reserve.

From an equipment perspective, I absolutely agree that, if we are going to continue to expect so much from our Reserve forces, then we not only must—not only must we properly equip them, but we must equip them with modern equipment. Army National Guard equipment funding has increased substantially since the late 1990's, where it was in the hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars to billions-of-dollars today.

To be fair, the Army has made significant progress in equipping the Army National Guard, but more progress is needed. For example, in the early 2000s, the Guard had approximately 1,500 medium tactical vehicles. Today, almost 10,000.

While I certainly support the increasing equipment funding, I have two concerns. First although equipping accounts have increased, they have increased as a result of supplemental appropriation bills. The supplementals go away, we must ensure that the National Guard continues to get proper funding in the base budget.

Second, given the tremendous increase in funding for the Guard, Congress and our Chairman has really emphasized the importance of this—was that full transparency into how the Guard requirements are being met and clear processes in place in order to know where all this equipment is going.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I want to thank you again, for your service to our country and for appearing before us this afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. And for the record, you were not there originally, were you, when that was first formed? I know—

Mr. BARTLETT. My father was.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. All right.

So we will go to the panel now, and then go to questions. And we are going to do the questions in, I think it is reverse order of seniority today. But without objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will be included in the hearing record, so you need not read it word for word. And if you care to summarize and-or respond, even in part to some of the opening remarks, please do so.

And with that, I think we will go right to General Carpenter. And welcome.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, ARNG,
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General CARPENTER. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett and members of the committee for the opportunity for us to appear before you today. It is my honor and distinct pleasure to represent some 366,000 Army National Guardsmen, many of who are on point for our Nation as we speak today in this hearing.

I also have the pleasure of representing my retiring boss, soon to be retired boss, Lieutenant General Vaughn. I refer to him as a plain-speaking Missouri Guardsman, and to his credit, I think that he can take credit for a lot of what has happened here in the Army National Guard here in the past four years over his tenure.

If you will indulge me for a moment, sir, I would like to recognize someone that is sitting directly behind me. And that recognition is

in commitment to the service and willingness of the great sacrifices on behalf of our Nation that the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the Army and the Army National Guard make on a daily basis.

The Secretary of the Army has established 2009 as the Year Of The NCO. The U.S. Army's Non-Commissioned Officer Corps has distinguished itself as one of the world's most accomplished group of military professionals.

With me today is Staff Sergeant Marquez. She is a member of the NCO Corps of the Army National Guard. She joined the California Guard in 2000 at the age of 17. In 2004, she deployed to Camp Victory in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. She is currently a Virginia National Guardsman and, by the way, served in support of—most recently in support of the inauguration.

She is an NCO, Operations NCO in our operations division here in the Army National Guard. She has been married for a little over two months. She married a Marine Corps staff Sergeant, Sean Jeanus, who is currently deployed into Afghanistan. So, sir, I would like to have Sergeant Marquez stand and be recognized for her service as an NCO in the Army and the Army National Guard.

[Applause.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sergeant Marquez, aloha, and welcome. And I see you are still smiling. Two months of marriage, and you are not quitting yet. Good for you.

Sergeant MARQUEZ. It is perfect, sir. He is gone.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There are some people that wish the same thing about us.

General CARPENTER. Sir, thank you for your introductory remarks. We believe you are right on target.

Over the last four years, the Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve has set about the task of equipping the Reserve components and hopefully moving closer to what we call an operational reserve. And frankly, in many cases, that isn't an operational reserve. It is a strategic reserve on steroids, as my boss likes to refer to it.

We have been fortunate to have been the recipients of generous equipment funding that has been provided by this committee by Congress, and NGREA, National Guard Reserve Equipment Account, has been part and parcel and key to that equipping piece. We have used that account specifically to buy what we call Critical Dual-Use equipment, CDU equipment, and that equipment, by definition, is equipment that can be used in the war fight and can also be used for emergencies and disasters for our homeland defense and security mission.

We have seen some great strides here in equipping the Army National Guard. You may have read recently where the Secretary of Defense made some remarks in a number of war college locations a couple weeks ago. And one of the remarks that he made was that the Army National Guard had 70 percent of its equipment prior to 9/11, and we are striving to get back to 70 percent as we move forward.

But the difference is is that the type of equipment we had prior to 9/11 was, for the most part, cascaded equipment that came from the Army, not modernized, and much of it not deployable. To the Army's credit and to this committee's credit, we will retire our last

Huey helicopter this year. We have had that helicopter in our inventory for four decades.

And through the funding and process and modernization, that helicopter has been replaced by the Black Hawk helicopter and the light utility helicopter (LUH). And again, the success of that is those Huey helicopters will be gone from our inventory this year.

We have seen the deuce-and-a-half, the 2.5-ton truck that was the main staple for us in the Army National Guard for many years, will be retired out of our inventory by the year 2012. We have seen M60 machine guns, which is the legacy machine guns, transition to the M240 machine guns, the modernized version, and we will have those make up the bulk of our inventory by the close of this year.

The vehicular radio component (VRC-12) radio, which again is a Vietnam legacy radio, has been retired out of our inventory. So there have been some great strides made in the modernization piece for us as we go forward into the 21st century here and support not just the war fight, but also support our emergency and disaster mission. And that is critical to us.

Sir, as you know, courtesy of the recent storms in Hawaii, Hawaii Guardsmen responded to that, and they were on duty for almost a month in support of the citizens of Hawaii. In the Kentucky ice storm, we had soldiers—the entire Kentucky National Guard was mobilized and responded to that particular disaster. We had soldiers who came back from the 39th Brigade from Arkansas, got off the airplane, and in a relatively short period of time were assisting the citizens of Arkansas in that particular disaster.

And so, in the National Guard, our responsibility is to be able to fight tonight, and that fight is in the homeland. And that homeland mission has to do with responding to the needs of our citizens in emergencies and disasters, whether it happens to be a storm in Hawaii, a flood in North Dakota, a fire in California, or a hurricane in the hurricane states of Mississippi, Texas and Louisiana.

So, where are the holes at with regard to our equipping process right now? We have made, as I mentioned, huge strides, but we still have some work to do in the truck fleet, both in modernization and in filling the holes, battle command equipment, and a lot of the combat service support equipment we still have a requirement. Whether it be generators, material handling equipment, water purification systems, and even tactical ambulance that serve both a homeland mission and a war fight mission, these requirements remain unfilled in many cases.

You discussed briefly transparency. That has been a huge issue for us in the Army National Guard. And I think a little bit of that had to do with the frustration of what you just described in that money was appropriated, but we didn't see a response immediately with regard to the equipment that came to the National Guard.

Part of that has to do with the process that it takes in terms of equipment acquisition. Many times, the appropriation was at the end of the fiscal year, and it takes, in some cases, up to two and a half years to acquire some of these pieces of equipment, especially the more complex modernized truck fleet and some of the helicopters.

So even though the appropriation was, for instance, in a 2007 budget, we may not have seen, or may not see that piece of equipment in our inventory til perhaps mid-2009 or perhaps even as late as 2010.

And so the frustration was how do we keep track of what was appropriated and what was showing up in our bullpens and our vehicle storage areas in the Army National Guard? And as my boss is likened to say, he said, "It is like writing a check for \$100 in 2007 and then asking what did I buy in 2009," and you can't get an answer.

Well, thankfully, transparency has become a huge issue and has received a lot of emphasis. The Army has put forth a great effort in conjunction with the Reserve components in the Army National Guard, and we have a pilot program that involves 75 percent of the money that was appropriated in 2007, 2008 and 2009. And the effort here is to try and at least reconstruct what we can from those previous years' appropriations to identify what we think we have received and what we have yet to receive.

That pilot is to report out in July, and that pilot should give us a little bit of an indicator of exactly where we are at. We are pretty confident that it is headed in the right direction. It is not there yet, and I would encourage you to continue to ask questions about transparency as we go forward.

But suffice to say the Army and the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have made great strides in the right direction to account for the appropriated dollars that you all have been generous enough to make sure that that National Guard has the equipment that we are supposed to have.

The reset piece you mentioned earlier, our issue is to try and make sure that the equipment that comes back to us in fact is functional and operational. And to that extent, we have 15 brigade combat teams and 131 other units in the Army National Guard that require reset in fiscal year 2009. Right now, there is money programmed for us to be able to do that reset. It just needs to stay on track and to ensure that we have the funding for the work that has to be accomplished.

You also mentioned the equipment that was left behind in Iraq in 2003, 2004, 2005. Honestly, the reason that equipment was left behind, because it was the most modernized equipment that the Army National Guard had. And that was the reason why—it was the kind of equipment that was needed to continue the war fight over there. This is separate from the battle losses and the damaged equipment that we saw with regard to our units.

The amount of equipment that we left behind, the estimated value was somewhere around \$3 billion. We received an appropriation of \$1.7 billion to offset that, and we continue to work with the Army in terms of identification of what the requirement is and the future funding to replace that equipment.

Suffice to say, we still have a ways to go, and we are working through that. Our biggest concern, however, is what happens in Afghanistan, because we are about to face the same situation. We have a landlocked country where it is very expensive to haul the equipment in and out, and it makes more sense to leave equipment there.

And so we just need to make sure that there is a proper accounting for the Army National Guard equipment that we are required to leave behind in Afghanistan. And again, we are working with the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) to figure out the correct process and compliance with DOD instruction 1225.6 to meet that requirement.

Sir, that concludes my opening remarks. Thank you for indulging me with my NCO introduction. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

General Wyatt, welcome and aloha to you.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, ANG, DIRECTOR
OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

General WYATT. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today representing the men and women of the Air National Guard, some 106,752 strong.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comments opening the meeting today, and I would agree right on target. I also enjoyed the comment of Ranking Member Bartlett on the history of the National Guard. Thank you for recognizing the age of our institution.

Along those lines, if I could share a little history also with you, sir, in 1909, the U.S. Army Signal Corps purchased the world's first military aircraft, the Wright Military Flyer, for \$30,000. One hundred years have passed, and our aviation equipment has become more reliable, lethal, complex and, unfortunately, costly.

Even so, I cannot imagine our world today—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General Wyatt, excuse me. Was there a protest at the time?

General WYATT. No, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And did the Government Accountability Office (GAO) get into it?

General WYATT. I think there was only one manufacturer at the time, so probably not.

Even so, I cannot imagine our world today had that event 100 years ago not taken place. As we meet today, your Air National Guard airmen are proudly and admirably protecting skies with more than 3,000 members and 16 of 18 air sovereignty alert sites. They are ready to respond to disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes and fires that the chairman referenced earlier.

They are volunteering at unprecedented rates to support worldwide contingencies. And the backbone of our force, our traditional Guard members, are providing a critical surge capability for our Air Force.

Our Air National Guard airmen would not be able to do any of this without the support that we have received from you, Chairman Abercrombie, and the members of this committee. Through your support of the National Guard and Reserve equipment appropriation, we have been able to seamlessly integrate into the total Air Force while providing critical capabilities to the Nation's governors.

Our top issues—I think these come as no surprise to the committee. First of all, modernize and recapitalize the aging Air National Guard fleet of aircraft to bridge the gap in mid-term Air Force capability and long-term expeditionary viability. An aging fleet requires more maintenance, which is one of our core competencies.

But it also requires more parts and more fuel. All eat away at already stressed readiness accounts, and perhaps some of that goes to answer the Chairman's question on declining readiness.

If we do nothing to accelerate our recapitalization, you can expect more safety issues, perhaps more failed inspections, less combat capability, and mission gaps. It is essential that Air National Guard recapitalization and modernization occur proportionately, concurrently, and in parallel with the total Air Force. Otherwise, mission gaps will cascade across our force, leaving many Air National Guard units without a mission.

Our Air National Guard aircraft are, on average, 28 years old. F-15s are 29 years old, C-5s are 36 years old, KC-135s, 48 years old, as the chairman referenced. And if the F-16 fleet is not recapitalized soon, 80 percent will begin to reach the end of their service life in less than 8 years.

You are well aware of the challenges that the U.S. Air Force has in modernizing and recapitalizing its fighter and refueling fleets. We have been working closely with the Air Force in their planning. But to date, there are no firm plans to replace the Air National Guard F-15 and F-16 fleets currently protecting our skies.

Past history would show that usually, when the Air Force recapitalizes its fleet, there is available for cascade legacy aircraft, or older aircraft, to the Air National Guard. That is no longer an option, as many of the aircraft in the active duty fleet are approaching the same ages as those in the Air National Guard. It is just that the Air National Guard has a greater percentage, and our aircraft are older.

Because of the characteristics of the Reserve component, our part-time force, it is essential that equipment changes be planned well in advance, a lesson learned during the base realignment and closure (BRAC) processes. Over the last several years, Congress has been very helpful in supporting the Air National Guard's Active Electronically Scanned Array, the AESA radar, modernization program. This program allows us to meet today's threats and bridge capabilities to the next generation of fighter aircraft.

AESA is important to improve both capability and sustainment. Recently, a Cessna 172 was stolen in Canada. That entered the U.S. through Canada, and entered U.S. airspace in a—had it entered in a high-traffic area, such as New York, it would have been very difficult for the older F-16s with their older radar to find, identify and track it with the equipment that they have on board today.

The aging KC-135 fleet, which was used from Alabama in this intercept, is an issue that the Chairman has referenced. But in addition to the aircraft, we need to recognize that Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) and many of the things that the Air National Guard does here in the United States of America is a system of systems, and all of the systems, each piece of those systems, shows its age.

As we equip our Air National Guard, we have to keep in mind the essential 10 capabilities that our governors need available to handle present and future threats. The National Guard Bureau is committed to the fundamental principle that each and every state and territory must possess these 10 core capabilities for homeland readiness.

We want to ensure that every governor has each of these 10 essential capabilities: command and control, civil support teams, engineering assets, communications, ground transportation, aviation, medical, security forces, logistics and maintenance. We continue to leverage approximately 98 percent of the equipment within the Air National Guard as critical dual-use equipment to make certain that these capabilities are available for not only the combatant commanders in our Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations, but also the governors.

Our expeditionary combat support capability has allowed our Air Force to sustain critical support to overseas contingency operations. We cannot allow their readiness and availability to degrade because of equipment challenges.

Some of the examples include our security forces have a shortage of weapons due to depot delays. Our communication networks need modernization. Civil engineers have shortfall of depot-funded emergency management equipment. And our 1950's vintage deployable air traffic control radars face significant challenges in procuring and replacing vintage test equipment and parts.

These shortages affect not only our readiness for war, but our readiness to respond to domestic crisis.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time and support of our Air National Guard, and I stand ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, General Wyatt.

We will go to questions in reverse order of seniority, with this observation: General Carpenter, Secretary Gates may take some comfort, or measure of comfort, in the observation about 70 percent equipment being available as compared to 9/11. I don't take comfort in that at all. That is what he has got to stretch for to try and come with a "positive" statement.

We have a real serious problem. Almost a decade has passed since then. That doesn't take into account recapitalization and modernization or what the status of the equipment was at that point pre-9/11. I only need to reference General Wyatt's last comment about radar equipment, let alone parts. And then, we are only at 70 percent.

So I think I am not—I suppose that was meant to comfort us, but it has had the opposite reaction on me. You needn't comment on it. I am just making that observation.

And we will move to Congressman Wilson, to be followed by Congressman Kissell, and then Mr. Hunter.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Carpenter, General Wyatt, thank you very much for being here. I am really proud of both your service, and the Guard in general. As a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard, I have really never been prouder of what the Guard's doing.

As I visit, the professionalism, the competence, capabilities, the dedication, esprit de corps has never been higher. I also am particularly grateful that my former brigade, the 218th Brigade, completed last year, a year serving in Afghanistan.

And I can report to you that my former colleagues are just so grateful for what they see as an opportunity to defeat the terrorists overseas to protect American families at home. And I am just so proud of what they have done.

And then, I am particularly grateful that my oldest son served in Iraq with the field artillery. He is now Judge Advocate General (JAG). My third son is a signal officer with the Army Guard, and he has just transferred to logistics. And then, our fourth son just joined the Army National Guard. He is simultaneous drilling with Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

And I know the reason that they joined, and I did have one son off-track. He is a doctor in the Navy who served in Iraq. But the reason that my wife was successful training these guys to do well is because we would meet Guard members at Army or wherever, and my sons were impressed by the people they met and wanted to serve with.

And I do have to point out, with the Air Guard, I was honored to be on a delegation for the 64th anniversary of the invasion at Iwo Jima. And General Wyatt, you would be very proud that, as we were coming into the Japanese air station, they had one picture taped to the window, and it was an F-16 of the Swamp Fox Squadron, Air National Guard McEntire Joint Air Base, signed by Dean Pennington. And so you are appreciated around the world.

I also want to point out how much the people of South Carolina depend and appreciate on the Guard for our annual concern that we have about hurricanes. And so the Guard has just been instrumental for evacuation, for recovery relief, and tornadoes. And then, General, you mentioned ice storms. On the rare occasion that we have snow or ice, the National Guard is there.

As I point this out, the equipment is always a concern. And I appreciated that you pointed out, General Carpenter, that there was the cascaded equipment, and that is what I used. And it was pretty good, but having served at the National Training Center nine years ago, I am very pleased that we have modern equipment now. Everything has been superseded by multiple generations of much better equipment.

But as we have equipment that is declared excess in Iraq or anywhere in the theater, do our adjutant generals have the ability to try to put in a bid for this?

General CARPENTER. First of all, sir, thank you very much for your service. The 218th Brigade, as you probably remember, we shared their farewell ceremony as they left to do the Task Force Phoenix mission in Afghanistan. And they were in a particular situation where the mission was being expanded from not just mentoring the Afghan National Army, but mentoring the Afghan National Police. And they just did an absolutely great job, and we are very proud of their service at a national level also.

With regard to your—excuse me, sir, what was your question again?

Mr. WILSON. The question would be as to equipment that could be declared excess, do our adjutant generals have the ability to at least make the request?

General CARPENTER. Sir, I have been involved in a couple of the sessions with regard to what is the strategy for equipment as we see the off-ramping in Iraq. And the Army's position across the board is that, if the equipment is not excess, the Army is adamant—and that means excess both to the Army and the Army National Guard across the entire Army—if it is not excess, we want it brought home, and we want it—if it is in some state that can be repaired, absolutely. And that equipment then is scheduled for distribution back to the Army units and back to the Army National Guard units, sir. So that is the position.

Now, understanding that what happens on the ground over there is going to be dictated by the situation, but, for the most part, that is the going in rule here as we off-ramp and deal with the equipment that is in Iraq.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have one minute, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. And a proverbial problem is maintenance of armories. And so often, that is dependent upon state general assemblies and state government funding. What can be done to help back up the proverbial “leaking roofs” of armories? Is there a plan to help fund renovation of armories?

General CARPENTER. Sir, the Army National Guard received upwards of \$200 million in the economic stimulus package recently, and that package was designed specifically to deal with those kinds of things, what we call maintenance and repair as well as environment upgrades for lighting, heating and those kinds of utility efforts there. So it is not going to solve the problem entirely, but we understand the requirement, and we continue to make the case to the Army.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. Kissell, five minutes.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Generals, for being here, but I especially want to recognize Sergeant Marquez for your service and just recognition that NCOs are certainly the backbone of the service. And thank you so much, and congratulations on your marriage. And hopefully you will get together here pretty soon.

The service that the Guard provides us is so important. On April the 14th, I had the opportunity to be in Fayetteville, North Carolina, to watch the 30th Heavy Tactical Brigade deploy, 4,000 soldiers, West Virginia, Colorado, but mostly from North Carolina. And I watched those men and women getting ready to go serve our country was just a special moment.

We worry about trying to figure out how to fight the next war instead of the last war. And I worry, based upon what we are looking at today in this hearing, that we may be trying to get ready to fight the next war using the last war's equipment, or no equipment at all.

As we look at these percentages, and we can get lost in percentages, but how much—what percentage of the equipment do we need, do we have now to train with? And roughly what percentage

of that would be modern equipment that would actually be something they could expect to use in theater?

General CARPENTER. Sir, from the Army National Guard, right now, the fill of equipment across the formations in the Army National Guard is 76 percent. Now, of that 76 percent, 13 percent of it is either deployed, in reset, or being prepared to deploy. And so available to the governors right now is 63 percent of all the equipment.

The subset, the critical dual-use equipment I talked to earlier, there is 65 percent of that equipment available for the Army National Guard and the governors for use in the homeland mission. Our goal is to get to 100 percent fill on the critical dual-use equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General. Just for everybody's information, you are talking about critical dual-use at this stage, right?

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. Critical dual-use equipment, the governors have in hand right now 65 percent as an average across all the states. And so there is still 35 percent of that equipment that is not available for them.

We are over our end strength of 100 percent. And so if you call a unit, like the 30th out of North Carolina, for instance, for an emergency and disaster mission and they have only got 65 percent of their equipment and 100 percent of their soldiers, it leaves you asking the question, what capability do you not have by not having that other 35 percent of the equipment.

So we do have those percentages available for use. Now, in the case of the 30th, when they got ready to deploy and went through the mobilization process, they were filled to 100 percent of the requirement that they needed to deploy overseas. And by the way, they go on mission in Iraq mid-month, and we are very proud of their accomplishments.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You still have a minute and a half.

General WYATT. Do you want me to answer that from the air? Yes, sir.

The Air National Guard has been, I think of all the seven Reserve components, has probably been integrated and resourced by our parent service perhaps a little bit better than the other Reserve components. We have been rotating overseas with the Air Force and AEF rotation since the early 1990's.

But when we talk about the critical-use equipment, you are right. The percentages are a little misleading because, in the Air National Guard side, even though our percentages are higher, 84 percent across the country of our critical-use equipment, dual-use equipment, a lot of that is very old.

Forty percent of our vehicles are past their service life, and it is only due to the great maintenance competencies of the Air National Guard that we are able to keep those vehicles running. The radar systems that we talked about earlier are old. They are decrepit, but because we have got some geniuses working the maintenance on those systems, we are able to keep them running.

But we are at that period of time where we have just about exhausted our capabilities to keep that equipment going. The war fighting equipment, the jets, the deployable equipment, we are

fielded at a pretty good rate. But again, a lot of that is extremely old.

We talk about some of the new emerging systems, like air support operation squadron's tactical air control party (TACP). We have not yet been fielded the equipment to the levels that make them combat ready. And without the proper amounts of equipment, we can't get them trained to the point where they can be deployable.

Same thing would be true of our air operation centers (AOCs). We need some more training equipment to make sure that, when a call comes, that we are able to answer the call of our country.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General Wyatt.

Gentlemen, perhaps you can give us a little bit more of a breakdown of what the 65 percent, or the 45 percent means. You may have a full complement of pens and pencils, but you may then have ten percent of what you need in vehicles or rifles or whatever.

So maybe we need a little bit more definition, if you will, as to how that breaks down within the percentages. As Mr. Kissell said, there are statistics, and then there is information.

Mr. Hunter left, so next will be Mr. LoBiondo. I am sticking to the five minutes, by the way, because I am told we are going to have votes coming up, and it is liable to be a long series.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and for your close attention to details.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our Nation.

General Wyatt, I was going to spend a few minutes in an opening statement talking about the ASA mission and the Air National Guard, but you did a good job, I think in your statement, covering this. And I, like my colleagues, and especially Mr. Wilson, are just amazed at the dedication and the incredible job the men and women of the Air Guard are performing.

You talked about the problem with equipment, and we call it a fighter gap. We call it a bathtub. There are a lot of different names. And you articulately used the numbers of the 80 percent, the number of years and the hours, but what is the plan? We have had hearing after hearing, year after year, where the problem is recognized by more and more people.

And I bothered the Chairman out in Hawaii during the break because we had gotten some additional information—and that is why I am especially appreciative, Mr. Chairman, of your doing this hearing—that we are just not getting any answers. So we are understanding the problem better, but each day, the clock ticks.

Is there an interim buy that is planned? At what level are the discussions taking place? What level of comfort can we as members take to when we will see a plan?

General WYATT. Mr. Abercrombie, I hope that when the budget is released, we will be able to give a little more detail and a little more fidelity to an answer.

My concern is this: we know the problem. We have recognized the problem. The position of the Air National Guard is that—I would like to refer to it as flying a cautious formation with the United States Air Force. The Air Force has a recapitalization plan that involves fifth-generation airplanes.

We think that if the United States Air Force, depending upon the analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense, we think that the solution rests with the United States Air Force. If they will write the Air National Guard in to their recapitalization plan early in sufficient numbers, we can address some, but not all, of the fighter gap. We will rely upon a cascade of some legacy aircraft from the active duty Air Force to the Air National Guard to help with the problem.

But we are flying a cautious wing formation in that we recognize that, in order for that plan to be successful, there would have to be sufficient numbers of jets purchased, fielded to the Air Guard early as opposed to the current plan, which is late. And if there are any delays in production or shortages of capability, we need to have a backup plan.

And the Air National Guard has been, and continues, to examine plans such as service life extension programs (SLEP) on our F-16s and, to some degree, our F-15s. Not just for the airframe, which is the immediate problem, but if you service life extend those jets, you need to also consider that we use these jets not just for ASA, for the Air Sovereignty Alert, but they are a critical part of the Nation's defense overseas and need to be fully integrated into the capabilities of the fifth generation.

So as you—airplanes, you also need to improve ASA radars, sensors, gateway communication systems so that you don't lose the dual use, if you will, of those jets, the ASA and the operations overseas. We are also keeping open our options to take a look at fourth-generation fighters.

But I would caution against a fleet separate and distinct from the Air Force, whichever way the Air Force decides to go.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, I certainly would agree with that.

Can you share with us your personal opinion about an interim buy of 4.5-generation aircraft? I mean, is this something you would advocate? I know there are some folks who believe that the F-35 ought to be the way to go, and that ought to be accelerated. Can you tell us what your personal beliefs would be, your personal opinion would be of the best way to solve the problem?

General WYATT. I guess if the question were asked of me, how would you ensure—

Mr. LOBIONDO. I am asking that question.

General WYATT. Okay. How would you ensure that the Air National Guard can continue to perform the number one mission of the entire Department of Defense, and that is defense of the homeland, I would tell you that the Air National Guard would do the mission with whatever resources we could get.

If the Air Force's plan does not cover the Air National Guard in recapitalization with fifth-generation fighters, we would turn to fourth-generation, 4.5-generation, as a possible alternative, recognizing that each of the options available has its pros, but it also has its down side, too. Service life extension programs would be an option. They are perhaps the cheapest option, but you never know what you are going to get into when you get inside of an airplane.

And if we are going to do the service life extension programs, we need to consider that that product needs to get us—it would only

be a bridging mission, or a bridging aircraft, if you would, to a future capability that we would need to get into.

When we talk about fourth-generation fighters, we need to look beyond the airframe cost and think about the capabilities that that particular jet would need not just to do the ASA mission, which is mission number one, but also to not lose the efficiencies that the Air Guard provides in doing the homeland security mission, the ASA mission, but also the overseas fight.

So if we do fourth generation buys, we would need to do that in conjunction with taking a look at the capability that a AESA radar offers, that the gateway communications comm, data link, making sure that the fourth-generation buy is compatible with the weapons systems of the fifth-generation fighter. And when you stack all of those together, we need to take a hard look at the cost of that platform and how it would compare to fifth-generation platforms.

And a lot of that depends upon how many of the fourth-gen, how many of the fifth-gen fighters you would buy, because they are dependent—the price is dependent upon the total number. So it is a difficult question to answer without knowing where the Air Force is going and without knowing the current budget situation and how that will affect the fifth-generation buy.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When the budget then—and Mr. Gates' presentation—which is imminent—is presented, could you reconsider your answer and then send it on to Mr. LoBiondo and to the subcommittee?

General WYATT. I would be happy to, sir, with a little more fidelity to where the Department of Defense is going, yes, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You have got the question in mind?

General WYATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And same, General Carpenter, if you have anything that you could add once Mr. Gates' proposal comes forward in the context that Mr. LoBiondo established, okay?

We will go to Mr. Kratovil now, to be followed by Mr. Coffman and Ms. Tsongas.

Mr. KRATOVIL. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today, and again, for your service to our country.

General Wyatt, I want to ask you a question that is a particular concern in Maryland. As you know, Maryland's eight C-130's are being relocated, and Maryland and five other states were slated to receive the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), but recent reports at least seem to indicate that that may not happen.

What is the plan for the National Guard in terms of maintaining the capability of Maryland and those other states if, in fact, that comes to fruition?

General WYATT. The situation in Maryland is that they are one of the states that is scheduled to receive the Air National Guard component of the Joint Cargo Aircraft as it currently exists. And I don't know what the future will hold. I haven't seen any announced details. But the existing plan program is for the Air National Guard to get 24 of the JCA. Four of those would be bedded down in Maryland at Martin State.

If that does not happen, we would look to, first of all, find some sort of bridge mission for the unit to keep the competencies of the pilots and the maintenance crews intact as long as possible. That is a perishable skill.

And my concern, whether that is in the context of JCA or the fighter bathtub or tankers, if we don't have iron on the ramp for these units to fly, we will lose those treasures, if you will, because it takes a lifetime—it takes a generation to develop the skills, the expertise, the maturity of the Air National Guard.

If we lose a platform at a particular location for a period of time, the unit atrophies. There is a possibility of other emerging missions that we could lay into Maryland, but without the acquisition of any additional iron, it might not be a flying mission. And when you lose those skill sets, it will literally take you a generation to develop it back to the level that it currently is.

Mr. KRATOVIL. What would some of those bridge missions be? What are some of the likely possibilities?

General WYATT. We are seeing a continued demand in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. We are seeing a continued demand in cyber. I think that is an area of great expansion: Irregular warfare. We are taking a look at different capabilities and perhaps platforms that might be attractive or necessary to fulfill our requirement for the United States Air Force.

The demand for capability across the Air Force exceeds the Air National Guard's ability to supply that capability. We would need to—obviously there is a great training tail that would attach to that as we convert from one capability to another, and there would be a requirement for equipment. And if it does involve a new flying platform, obviously we would need the iron on the ramp for the folks to train.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is it. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just before you do that, excuse me.

Obviously we are going to have to have votes. I know Mr. Bartlett has a question he needs to ask. If it is okay, is it all right that we do that? Because I think this will—I don't think we will come back. We appreciate you being here. If you have other questions, submit them to me and we will get them to both generals.

And we are going to have another hearing. This is the preliminary. This is a hearing for the bill itself, I assure everybody. So we will go to Mr. Coffman, and then if it is all right, we will go to Mr. Bartlett, and we will close.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Carpenter, you had mentioned that when Guard units go to Afghanistan, that they will fall on the equipment of the unit left behind. And sometimes I suspect, if they are part of the buildup in Afghanistan that is going to be going on now, I suppose they may be first in with their gear, leaving their gear for—could be a Guard unit, could be a regular Army unit, could be an Army Reserve unit.

And you mentioned issues in accountability. What is the status now of Guard units? When are they going to get their gear back? How is that process going to work?

General CARPENTER. The process that we have in place right now in Iraq is something we call theater-provided equipment. And so the Guard unit deploys with not the full complement of equipment, but falls in on a set of equipment when it gets in theater, uses that equipment, and then, when they leave theater, they leave that theater-provided equipment in place.

We don't have that large a set of what we call TPE, Theater-Provided Equipment, in Afghanistan. And by the way, the way we got the TPE in Iraq was for units to leave their equipment behind for use of the follow-on unit.

Process for us in Afghanistan has been for a Guard unit to leave equipment for a Guard unit, and that has worked well. The issue for us, though, is that, when you transfer equipment between components, when you either leave equipment behind and lose possession of it or transfer it to an active Army unit, there is a DOD instruction called 1225.6, and that instruction requires that, before the equipment is transferred, that the equipment has to be directed to be left, and there has to be a payback plan in place, and that that agreement has to be signed off by the Secretary of Defense.

We have not done any of that since the early days of Iraq, and frankly, we have a little ways to go in terms of putting those procedures in place. But as I mentioned earlier, we are working together with the Army. We think we have got a solution for this in terms of both the agreement and the signature by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). And so we are anxious to implement that if it is required.

Mr. COFFMAN. Both General Wyatt and General Carpenter, in terms of aviation assets, where do you stand relative to your regular component in terms of modernization? I know, for instance, in the Colorado Air Guard, they are hoping to transition from the F-16 to the F-35.

I have no idea where that discussion is. And I think in the Army Guard, I think that we still have units with Hueys, I think, UH-1s out in Colorado. Where do we stand in terms of modernization relative to our active duty component?

General WYATT. Regarding your question in the F-35, the most current plan that I have seen, the official plan that the Air Force has on recapitalization of Air National Guard F-16 units, including Colorado with the F-35, has the fielding to the Air National Guard late to need, not coming to the Guard in time to solve the problem with Colorado and most of our other F-16 units. So it is late to need. We need to readjust the plan.

As far as modernization, the Air National Guard has historically relied upon the Air Force to help us with modernization of our existing fleets. But occasionally, oftentimes, those modernization requirements aren't funded, and we rely heavily upon the National Guard and Reserve equipment account appropriations to do that.

The targeting pods that your unit has in Colorado is a great example of that. Precision munitions delivery is a requirement of the combatant commands (COCOMS), and historically, the Air National Guard has not been funded for targeting pods. And so we

have basically built up our fleet of targeting pods through the National Guard Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) process.

And so we are very appreciative. That is an example of how we use that fund to modernize and become integrated with the active duty components. But I hope that answers your question, Congressman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. COFFMAN. One question, Mr. Chairman. What do you mean by the transition from the F-16 to the F-35 too late?

General WYATT. Yes, sir. I don't have the waterfall charts with me here, but most of our F-16 units, as I said, begin to lose their service life over the next eight years. And the last bed-down plan that I have seen from the United States Air Force regarding F-35, other than one unit in the first four bed-down plans—OFPs, we call them—there is only one Air National Guard unit in there.

The bulk of the Air National Guard recapitalization in the F-35 occurs in the out years, approaching 2022 and thereafter. Most of our units age out in the 2017 to 2018 timeframe. And so most of our units are uncovered under their current plan.

As I indicated at the beginning, the Air Force has the capability of covering that fighter gap by reworking their bed-down plan to include the Air National Guard earlier in the bed-down as they acquire airplanes. The numbers are extremely critical, and the rate of production is extremely critical.

So we will need to see what shakes out in that regard before I could more fully answer your question. But right now, under the current Air Force plan, the Air National Guard is basically uncovered.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, right on it.

I want to extend my gratitude to Mr. Fleming, Ms. Gifford and Ms. Tsongas, and we will go to Mr. Bartlett, and this will be the final question and observation.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief, because the vote clock is running.

As I remember history, I think that the Army and the Air Force both expressed the need for a small in-theater cargo aircraft. A decision was made that that should be a joint procurement, and the Air Force, more than a bit reluctantly, was kind of pulled kicking and screaming into this joint procurement of the Joint Cargo Aircraft with the Army.

Knowing that history, I was more than a bit confused when the Secretary in his press statement said that, from now on, that program was going to be totally an Air Force program, who didn't want the program to begin with, and that the Army is going to get much fewer aircraft.

My first question is, are you aware of any analysis that was done prior to making the decision to reduce the Army's stated need of 78 aircraft down to 38 aircraft? Was there a study that indicated that? If the answer is no, just say no.

General WYATT. You are right, sir. The requirement, as expressed by the JROC, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, is 78 C-27s. I am not aware of any other subsequent studies.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

With the retirement of the C-23 Sherpa, without the Joint Cargo Aircraft to support the Guard's mission in theater, what are you going to do?

General WYATT. The Air National Guard was not part of the Air Force that was kicking and screaming on avoiding this mission. We welcome the mission, and we will do it with whatever number of airplanes we are allowed.

But the question is not necessarily the color of service flying the airplane, but the question is how do you sustain the requirement, which I understand is currently 16 to 18 airplanes in theater, with a number less than 78. And in my opinion, you have to have 78 airplanes, as the JROC study indicated, to sustain the number of airplanes anticipated to be deployed continuously in theater regardless of who is flying it and who is maintaining it.

Mr. BARTLETT. So, without the 78, we really are going to be hard-pressed to meet our needs in theater.

Back home here, with the C-23 being retired, what are the plans without the C-27J to support the Guards at home, national homeland security and disaster preparedness relief missions? If we can't even meet our requirements over there, is there going to be nothing left here?

General CARPENTER. Sir, from an Army perspective, a couple items I would like to point out.

There are 42 C-23s within the Army National Guard right now, and the mission is in Iraq for the C-23s right now, performing the responsibility of getting the cargo to the last tactical mile. And over the last five years, that has been exclusively an Army National Guard mission.

We have hauled 180,000 soldiers, passengers, carried 62 million tons of cargo. And in Hurricane Katrina, we had almost all of our available C-23s were involved in that particular mission.

Our concern was is that the Joint Cargo Aircraft was the modernization program for the C-23s. We expect the C-23's lifespan to be over in about five years. And so we have got five years to solve this problem, is the bottom line, with regard to replacement for that capability within the United States, both in the homeland mission and in Iraq.

It is not a pressurized aircraft, so that aircraft is not available for use in Afghanistan. So we have got a couple problems we have got to face.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you for your answers. I was more than a bit confused, as I stated, when the Secretary made this statement. And I gather that there is some concern about our ability to meet our commitments in the future if this aircraft is not available.

And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

Obviously, the presentation to be made by the Secretary and the particular elements with which you are associated is going to be crucial to our decision-making on the defense bill.

So if you could take today's hearing as kind of a baseline for some of the answers and observations, if you could share them then at that point with us, we are going to send you some questions, as well, that have arisen as a result of this, including some from Ms. Giffords and others.

And if we could get that back perhaps—not necessarily tomorrow or the next day, but when you have had a chance to answer them in the context of Mr. Gates' presentation, then I think we will be able to have a very fruitful and beneficial effect on the defense bill. You have friends here in this subcommittee and on this committee, I can assure you.

And with that, I thank you all, and we will bring the hearing to a close.

[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 5, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 5, 2009

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STATEMENT BY

**MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND LAND FORCES**

FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

ON

ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS

MAY 5, 2009

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Opening Remarks

Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett and members of the subcommittee I wish to thank you for the opportunity to share information on the Army National Guard's equipment posture.

Army National Guard Current and Projected Equipping Levels & Shortfalls

The Army has made great progress toward improving equipping levels within the Army National Guard (ARNG) and in modernizing existing equipment. The historic fill rate for the ARNG has been about 70 percent (much of it not modernized). Fill rates declined to approximately 40 percent of equipment available to the Governors in 2006, due to cross leveling equipment to support immediate deployment requirements. As of September 2008, 76 percent of the ARNG Modified Table of Organization and Equipment the equipment is on hand, 63 percent of that equipment is in units which are not mobilized and is available to Governors. From 2006 to the present Department of the Army dedicated unprecedented levels of resources to ARNG equipment procurement and modernization. Army National Guard units are now being equipped to the same standard as their active duty counterparts. Moreover, if funding for ARNG equipment procurement and modernization is executed as planned in the current Future Years Defense Program, the ARNG of fiscal year 2015 will approach a 90 percent equipment-on-hand level and will be the best-equipped ARNG force in history.

Despite these successes, work still needs to be done to modernize the National Guard truck fleet, procure and field additional battle command equipment as requirements for these systems evolve and mature, and improve fill levels for a number of Combat Service Support items such as water purification systems, generators, material handling equipment, and field feeding systems, tactical ambulances, aviation ground equipment and battle command systems. All of these systems are considered "Critical Dual Use" items', they are critical to both domestic and war fighting missions. Improving modernization and level of fill for these Critical Dual Use items is a top priority for the Army National Guard and National Guard Bureau leadership.

It is also important to note that a significant quantity of "Critical Dual Use" equipment, while it may have been issued to ARNG units, is chronically unavailable to Governors in the States and Territories due to continuing rotational deployments. Many States have expressed concern about the resulting shortfalls of equipment for training and for domestic emergency response operations. The Army and Army National Guard continue to work together to refine requirements for Critical Dual Use equipment and to ensure that the States and Territories can adequately protect the lives and property of American citizens following a catastrophic event. The national average of Critical Dual Use equipment available to the Governors is 65percent.

During 2008, the Army has also made significant improvements to its equipment procurement and distribution processes to provide transparency and accountability of resources from request for funds through delivery of equipment to the unit level. The Army will demonstrate these improvements to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in

July 2009, when it fulfills its first quarterly reporting requirement on this topic. However, even with these marked improvements, work is still needed to automate many of the Army's process changes.

Army National Guard Reset

The ARNG home station reset program continues to improve the readiness and availability of returning combat equipment in an efficient, cost effective manner. The continued funding of this program is crucial to the restoration of unit readiness following combat operations. For fiscal year 2010, we will be seeking funding to restore the equipment from 15 Brigade Combat Teams and 131 other units from nearly every State and Territory. Most importantly, all of this work is done within the State, ensuring that the equipment is available to the Governor when needed. The benefits of the reset program will be lost if it is not funded beyond the last unit redeployment.

FY09 Budget Impact on the Army National Guard

In recent years the Army has made an unprecedented level of investment in Army National Guard equipment. While subject to change, the Army has programmed \$23.9 billion for ARNG equipment for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 to procure new equipment and modernize equipment currently on hand. We appreciate that support and also the strong interest of the Congress and the Department of Defense in closing the gap between our domestic requirements and the available equipment in our armories and motor pools.

Future Army National Guard Equipment Needs

Despite the level of funding programmed in the current Future Years Defense Program, ARNG equipping and modernization issues will remain. For instance, the ARNG is currently scheduled to receive about 21,000 of its 30,000 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs) by fiscal year 2015. Legacy vehicles are difficult and expensive to maintain and non-deployable to current theaters of operation. Other post-fiscal year 2015 shortfalls include the Critical Dual Use items as listed earlier.

I'm sure you have many concerns and relevant questions with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense budget. I will do my best to answer your questions on the current state of Army National Guard equipment. Once the President's budget is released, the Army National Guard leadership will address any additional issues.

Closing Remarks

To remain successful while accomplishing missions in homeland defense and in overseas contingency operations the Army National Guard must have modern equipment available. Procurement of new equipment is essential to continue as an operational force of the 21st century, while functioning as an integral part of the Army. In spite of the challenges the Army National Guard currently faces, the Army and the Congress continue to demonstrate their commitment to equip our organization. The mission of the Army National Guard is to provide combat ready units in support of the National Military Strategy; to meet this challenge, the Guard must be equipped 100 percent of its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowances equipment requirements based on the Army's modular force design. I

appreciate the constant support of the Congress during the past years. Without your support the Army National Guard would be limited in its ability to meet fielding, equipping, training and war fighting needs. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and invite your questions and comments.

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STATEMENT BY

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III
DIRECTOR OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND LAND FORCES**

FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

ON

ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT POSTURE

MAY 5, 2009

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**STATEMENT BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett, and members of the subcommittee, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to share information on the Air National Guard's equipment posture. As an integral and essential part of the Total Air Force, our units, along with the Air Force Reserve, have continued to be the best-trained and -equipped force of any of the Reserve Components. The Department of Defense and the Air Force are committed to ensuring no Airman goes to war ill-equipped or untrained. This level of commitment has allowed our Air National Guard to seamlessly integrate across the full spectrum of contingencies our Air Force supports.

In today's fight, your Air National Guard accounts for 30-percent of fighter, 40-percent of tanker, and 30-percent of airlift capability for the Total Air Force. We continue to operate 16 of 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sites, while transforming more than 20-percent of the force into new and emerging mission areas needed by our Combatant Commanders.

The Air National Guard could not succeed at these levels without the continued support of Congress, the American people, and the Air Force. We thank you for that support and hope you will continue to stand in our corner as we posture ourselves for the future.

Current Air National Guard Equipping Levels & Distribution Plans

The Air National Guard relies on its Strategic Planning System to link strategy to resourcing. Our process for strategic planning incorporates input from our Adjutants General, National Guard Bureau subject matter experts, and Air Force and Defense Strategy experts. We understand the need to maintain modernization plans, equipment levels, and a distribution plan that meets our responsibility for covering our dual federal and state roles. Because the preponderance of our capability to support the state role

is a derivative of our federal responsibilities, we consider modernization and recapitalization of major weapons platforms supporting the Combatant Commanders directly linked to the Essential Ten capabilities we offer the governors.

The Air Force is in the midst of modernizing and recapitalizing its major weapons platforms, and the Air National Guard is a full partner in this process. Our aging fleet of aircraft must be concurrently and proportionally recapitalized in order to avoid near- to mid-term "age out" of the majority of fighter force our Guard Airmen operate. To that end, we support the Air Force's recapitalization plan and have been working diligently to ensure all force structure roadmaps are inclusive of the Air National Guard as a hedge against this "age out."

The National Guard Bureau is committed to the fundamental principle that each and every state and territory must possess ten core capabilities for homeland readiness. Amidst the most extensive transformation of our Army and Air Forces in decades, we want to ensure that every governor has each of these "Essential 10" capabilities:

- A Joint Force Headquarters for command and control
- A Civil Support Team for chemical, biological, and radiological detection
- Engineering assets
- Communications
- Ground transportation
- Aviation
- Medical capability
- Security forces
- Logistics and maintenance capability

These "Essential 10" capabilities will ensure the nation's governors are well-equipped to handle present and future domestic operations. We continue to leverage approximately 98-percent of the equipment within the Air National Guard as "dual-use,"

to make certain that these capabilities are available for not only the Combatant Commanders, but also the governors.

In response to your question regarding National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation execution rates, we offer the following: 2007 = 73-percent; 2008 = 57-percent; and, 2009 = 1-percent. These execution rates are consistent with past years, and we are on a solid glide path to achieve 100-percent execution rates.

FY09 Budget Impact on the Air National Guard

Approximately 2,000 items categorized within the "Essential Ten" list may be used to support both federal and state missions. Our recent data indicates we have approximately 84-percent of this equipment on hand. Some of the critically equipped areas include vehicles, security, and communications.

Legacy vehicles are expensive to maintain and prone to mechanical failure. Forty-percent, or 5,520, of the Air National Guard's 13,800 vehicles have reached or exceeded the expected utility (life expectancy). We are working to reduce energy costs by 30-percent and attempting to infuse Low Speed vehicles into the vehicle inventory; additionally, we have a plan to procure vehicles that use alternative fuel. In the area of security, there is a shortage of 17,468 M4 rifles. Although the overall equipment availability rate is 84-percent, for critical assets like M4 rifles, the availability rate is approximately 70-percent. While in the communications area the Air National Guard is moving quickly to address challenges in Joint Incident Site Communications and Interim Satcom Incident Site Command Sets and modernization of our overall Information Technology network. Additionally, we continue to address shortfalls in cell phone restoral and wireless internet capability.

Shortfalls in equipment will impact the Air National Guard's ability to support the National Guard's response to disasters and terrorist incidents in the homeland.

Improved equipping strengthens readiness for both overseas and homeland missions and improves our capability to train on mission-essential equipment.

Future Air National Guard Equipment Needs

We are continually striving to modernize Air National Guard equipment to ensure we have the front-line capability needed to seamlessly integrate into the Air Expeditionary Force, as well as offer a critical surge capability. We try, through our modernization programs and working with the Air Force, to provide the capability that allows our systems to fuse with and become a relevant partner within the Total Air Force.

Air National Guard equipment readiness presents greater challenges as long-term costs in operating and maintaining older aircraft continue to rise due to more frequent repairs, fluctuations in fuel prices, and manpower requirements. The cost of aircraft maintenance continues to rise significantly as we struggle to extend the life of our aging fleet. These rising maintenance costs are not solely confined to aircraft.

One example would be the 1950s technology employed by our current air traffic control system, which has only received minor radar upgrades in the 1980s. Replacement parts are obsolete and no longer available on the market. Modifying and upgrading the old system would cost more than a new system. The Air National Guard provides 63-percent of the United States Air Force's air traffic control wartime mission. In support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Air National Guard deployed five mobile air traffic control Radar Approach Controls. Additionally, the Air National Guard supports the National Airspace System, providing critically needed air traffic control services at designated military/civil airports.

Some of our most critical aircraft modernization needs continue to be improved voice/data communications for enhanced situational awareness (ARC 210, SADL, etc.), self-protection equipment (such as the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures

System), missile warning systems (ALR- 47), upgrades to advanced targeting pods to give them fourth generation capabilities, and radar systems to distinguish targets from friendly aircraft in a dense air traffic environment.

For example, to maintain the F-15's air-to-air advantage in the beyond-visual-range arena, we are modernizing the fleet with the APG-63(v)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to provide the capability to detect, track, and kill asymmetric threats, such as cruise missiles and drones, and this ability is key in both the Homeland Defense and wartime roles. This state-of-the-art AESA radar is flexible enough to be continuously upgraded, allowing the ANG F-15s to meet future threats and new mission sets that were not previously possible. The APG-63(v)3 is performing very well in flight test and is only months from operational fielding. This upgrade would allow Air National Guard units to provide constant 24/7 Homeland Defense vigilance with AESA radars, while simultaneously seamlessly integrating into the Air and Space Expeditionary Force construct to meet wartime and Combatant Commander taskings.

The AESA radar is just one of many dual-use technologies we believe would provide an expanded capability to the Combatant Commanders and governors. There has also been an articulated requirement in both communities for additional manned Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets. Should resources become available, the Air National Guard is poised to expand its support to the Air Force in meeting this critical requirement.

Air Sovereignty Alert Mission

As previously stated, the Air National Guard operates 16 of 18 Air Sovereignty sites. However, Air Sovereignty Alert is not solely Air National Guard mission; it is a Department of Defense responsibility, and we should keep that in mind when discussing its origin and its future. The Air National Guard has fit well in this mission set because of the inherent cost-effectiveness of its force.

Historically, the Air Sovereignty Alert mission has faced funding challenges. As we approached 9/11, many in the defense community believed the Air Sovereignty Alert mission was no longer relevant. In fact, there were plans to reduce the number of sites to four. Our nation had become comfortable following the Cold War and assumed no peer competitor would have the ability to threaten our borders. So, in a "resource constrained environment," the reduction of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission became an "acceptable risk."

Following 9/11, we quickly expanded the number of sites to ensure there were no gaps in coverage and shifted from a temporary mission to a steady-state 24/7 mission. Even as we recognized this new reality, there still appeared to be a reluctance to accept Air Sovereignty Alert as an enduring mission and fund it as a steady-state mission. From 2006 through 2009, the program experienced funding shortfalls of 13- to 16-percent.

While funding has primarily impacted personnel, their aging equipment is quickly becoming our principal concern. We are working with the Air Force and its major commands to find solutions to recapitalization of this critical fleet of aircraft charged with our nation's defense. Our primary concern is that 80-percent of the F-16s, the backbone of our Air Sovereignty Alert Force, will begin reaching the end of their service life in eight years. We need solutions for what we in the Air National Guard refer to as the "mid-term gap," and for long-term recapitalization. Neither of these can be sacrificed. If we sacrifice the mid-term, we risk uncovering a critical line of defense. If we sacrifice the long-term or fifth generation, we risk what can best be referred to as our children and grandchildren's critical edge. Everything has to be on the table. This infrastructure of equipment is not just fighters; it includes tankers, air traffic control, command and control, security, and communications—the entire system supporting and protecting our nation's last line of defense.

Closing Remarks

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. On behalf of the men and women of the Air National Guard, I thank you for the cooperation and support you have provided in the past and look forward to working with you as we meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Thank you.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MAY 5, 2009

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

General WYATT. Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) is not solely an Air National Guard (ANG) mission; it is a Department of Defense responsibility and we should keep that in mind when discussing its future. The Air National Guard has fit well in this mission set because of the inherent cost effectiveness of our force. That being said, the ANG will ultimately accept any solution that allows us to continue supporting ASA and our other Air Force missions in the most effective manner possible. Specifically for the ASA mission we see two primary ways to mitigate impending capability shortfalls—concurrent and proportional recapitalization with fifth generation aircraft, and/or service life extension and modernization programs for our current fleet.

Our first choice, for providing both ASA and interoperable capabilities to Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, would be to accelerate fielding in the ANG of fifth generation fighters. Our analysis predicts that if the ANG can recapitalize six units by FY17 we can minimize the impact of the fighter gap. While we would prefer all six of these units to be recapitalized by fifth generation aircraft, we recognize that planned procurement rates (80/year) make this unlikely. At a minimum, however, if three of those units were replaced with fifth generation aircraft and the remaining three received newer fourth generation fighters as the active component units receive the F-35, we could still provide world class capability at home and abroad with no interruption.

If fifth generation recapitalization is significantly delayed, our next course of action would be to extend the life of our current fleet and modernize its sensor and defensive systems. The goal of such a program would be to extend the life of our legacy fighters to better match the procurement schedule of the F-35. The magnitude of a service life extension program would be proportional to the magnitude of any fifth generation delays. A minor delay might only require the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and modernization of a small portion of the fleet, while major delays would necessitate the—much more costly—extension and modernization of a major portion of the fleet.

You specifically asked about my opinion with respect to a 4.5 generation solution. While I will not completely rule out that option, I ultimately feel that it must be considered only as a last resort if the previously mentioned options become impossible. As my time as an A-7 pilot—watching the Gulf War from Tulsa, Oklahoma—taught me, the interests of the nation are best served when the ANG and USAF operate and maintain the same equipment.

Based on the current budget picture and the Air Force's new basing process, I firmly believe that concurrent re-capitalization of ANG fighters with the F-35 or a SLEP to meet the F-35 production schedule are the most viable options. These options will offer both near-term and long-term solutions that ensure the ANG will have sufficient assets capable of defending the homeland and contributing to air expeditionary operations overseas. [See page 18.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 5, 2009

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted that the reserve components are now an operational reserve, although the Department of Defense's business processes and the Army's strategies for equipping and staffing its reserve components are not designed to support the new operational roles. a. Could you comment on what changes have been made in the way the Army equips reserve forces to accommodate the operational role. b. What is the status of the Army National Guard equipment inventory? Is it worse, about the same, or better than last year, and what was the reason for the change? c. Has any progress been made on improving visibility of tracking equipment requirements through budget preparation and review, appropriations, funding allocation and ultimately in the distribution of new equipment? d. Do the equipping and manning strategies for the National Guard's new operational role also take into consideration the strategic reserve role the National Guard has historically played? For example, do National Guard units that are not immediately deploying have sufficient equipment to perform domestic missions and serve as a strategic reserve should new global demands unrelated to the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge? Are there reserve units dedicated to a strategic reserve role and, if so, how are they equipped?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 1a. Under the strategic reserve construct, the Army National Guard (ARNG) was equipped using tiered-readiness. Little equipment trickled to the ARNG during this time. Under the operational force construct, the ARNG is equipped in parity with other components under the cyclic readiness paradigm.

Answer 1b. Army National Guard Equipment On Hand levels have increased approximately 2 percent over the past year. Although upon initial observation this may seem like a miniscule change in light of all of the resources provided for equipment it is not. The equipment inventory is not only being filled, but also being modernized-new equipment replacing legacy. Additionally, increased requirements due to a transforming and modularizing force gives the mistaken perception that the equipment position of the Army National Guard is not strengthening.

Answer 1c. The Army has made great progress in this area during the past year and they are now tracking large programs to the level of detail necessary for full transparency. However, the process is currently labor intensive and more work is needed to automate the process and expand it to all items of equipment. Furthermore, the Army's transparency effort uses FY09 as a baseline and there is very limited visibility of funds and equipment still in the pipeline from prior years. Therefore, it will likely be FY11 before the Director Army National Guard will be able to testify that he has full visibility based on budgeted programs.

Answer 1d. The Army National Guard has indicated that in order to train effectively, support the current warfight, surge when called upon, and provide a robust domestic response, it is absolutely critical to be equipped to 100 percent of its Critical Dual Use equipment requirement. The Army's new equipping strategy plans to procure enough equipment to fully equip all units, but recognizes that some of this equipment will not be available to these units due to "friction" (equipment in Reset, equipment in transit, Theater Provided Equipment, etc.). The Army National Guard equipping priorities have named/known deployers, CCMRF, CSA RESET Test Pilot, hurricane states and likely deployers at the top of the list. These units are the priority to receive equipment. Non-deploying Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowance units will receive equipment distributions only after the higher priority units have been fielded equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: To implement the Army's transition to an expeditionary force, the Army has adopted a cyclical readiness cycle, called the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) intended to put National Guard units through a structured cycle of increasing readiness that will enable forces to be ready and available for deployment on a predictable basis—with a goal of deployment availability 1 year out of six. The Army has yet to develop the specific training, staffing, and equipping standards for each phase of the model. Initially, the Army said that National Guard forces would have a minimum baseline set of equipment at all phases of the cycle for training and responding to domestic missions, and that additional

equipment sets would be available to units for training as they neared deployment. a. Has the Army identified the equipment that National Guard forces can expect in their baseline, training, and deployment sets of equipment? b. If not, what is the impact on the National Guard's ability to train for overseas missions and respond to domestic emergencies?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 2a. The Department of the Army and other stakeholders have discussed the baseline equipping requirements. All are in agreement that 100 percent equipping is the goal, but there are realities in certain types of operations that bridging strategies to address shortages must be developed under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) umbrella to mitigate those shortages. No fixed equipping level has been agreed upon, but we can expect that with the influx of projected equipment to the Army National Guard that equipping levels will increase for each of these pools of units.

Answer 2b. The Army National Guard has continued to support overseas contingency operation by mobilizing and deploying forces in the highest possible state of readiness to successfully carry out domestic and overseas missions. This is accomplished by managing and prioritizing limited resources using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in support of the National Military Strategy. The dual mission of the Army National Guard necessitates a level of continual readiness and employability unlike that of its active component counterparts. We have historically cross-leveled equipment between States to ensure that training and domestic response missions are accomplished. As our Equipment On Hand (EOH) improves, cross-leveling actions are minimized.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In accordance with the ARFORGEN model, the Department of Defense has changed its readiness strategy for the reserve from training to deployment standards after mobilization (mobilize-train-deploy) to increased training to make forces deployable before mobilization (train-mobilize-deploy). The Army has stated the goal of equipping reserve forces with 100 percent of their required equipment, but the timeline to reach that goal stretches past 2019. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) for FY 2009 included a cascade of \$11.6 billion in equipment from the regular Army to the Army National Guard as part of the National Guard's plan to reach 100% on hand by 2019.

a. How does the Army plan to equip National Guard forces for the new train-mobilize deploy concept?

b. Does the Army National Guard have the full time support needed to ensure that the increased training and equipment maintenance activities needed to increase readiness are completed before mobilization?

c. How much of the equipment does the National Guard have that is obsolete and cannot be deployed?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 3a. Named/known deployers and units likely to deploy are at the very top of the Army National Guard equipment prioritization list. A mix of new equipment fielding and equipment cross-leveling actions will be taken to prepare units for deployments.

Answer 3b. The Army National Guard's base budget funds 72 percent of our strategic reserve full time support requirements. The peacetime strategic reserve requirements do not take into consideration the increased readiness needed during the ARFORGEN model to support contingencies. Currently the Army National Guard is using Full time Equivalents (FTE), such as ADOS, Temporary Technicians, and Contractor support, to meet these pre-mobilization contingency mission requirements which are funded in the Overseas Contingency Operation Supplemental funding bill.

Answer 3c. Despite the level of funding programmed in the current Future Years Defense Program, ARNG equipping and modernization issues remain. Fielding of new equipment and cascading of newer equipment has improved the equipment inventory posture of the Army Guard and allowed displacement of the oldest systems. However, the requirement to be interoperable with modern communications and command and control systems and to protect the force leaves significant gaps in deployable equipment. The Army Guard has currently fielded only 22 percent of the Warfighters' Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T) equipment and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is critically short for deployments as well. Concurrently, significant portions of the Army Guard fleet are not capable of accepting uparmoring kits. The ARNG is currently scheduled to receive about 21,000 of its 30,000 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs) by fiscal year 2015, but only about 10,000 are on-hand today. The 9,000 vehicle 2015 shortfall alone equates to about a \$3.7 billion shortfall in funding. Concerning light tactical vehicles, the Army Guard has 84 percent of the 46K currently required, but 88 percent of the on-hand HMMWVs are generally of the original design and cannot accept armor kits.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: GAO reported that Army National Guard forces that deployed to the Iraq theater of operations in 2002 and 2004 were asked to leave their equipment in theater for follow-on forces to use. When the reserves are asked to transfer their equipment to the active Army, the Army is required by law to notify the reserve as to how and when their equipment will be replaced (called payback plans). As of last year, of the approximately 30 plans required, only 3 had been provided to the Army Guard. a. What is the status of the payback plans the Army is required to provide the reserve components? b. If the Army has not provided payback plans, what do the units who left the equipment overseas use for training? c. How have other Army initiatives, such as its reset activities, affected National Guard equipment readiness?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 4a. The Army National Guard left approximately \$3.1 B worth of equipment in theater. Of that, approximately \$300M is equipment that is now obsolete or excess due to changes in authorization documents. Army G8 submitted and received \$1.7 B in FY07 Supplemental to begin pay back to the Army National Guard. In FY08, the Army National Guard and the DA G8 agreed on a final \$1B which was to be included in FY10 Overseas Contingency Operation request. We believe that only about \$700M these funds were actually included in the request and only about \$455M of this was validated by OSD. Despite the inability to trace the funds through the procurement cycle, the Army National Guard continues to receive equipment at an unprecedented rate.

Answer 4b. To ensure units are trained and equipped for overseas missions, the Army National Guard continues to cross-level equipment to fill critical shortages.

Answer 4c. Overall, reset maintenance is working within the allotted 365 day reset period. There are issues working, but nothing that is critically detrimental to the reset program. Issues are mostly with systems or programs. One such issue is with the Automatic Reset Induction (ARI) requirement. When ARNG equipment is inducted into ARI above and beyond the authorized Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), Army Material Command (AMC) equipment managers are only willing to return the amount of equipment that is authorized by MTOE. ARNG units are almost exclusively deploying based off of Mission Essential Equipment Lists (MEEL) in lieu of MTOE authorization and often times the MEEL requires more equipment than the unit's MTOE which is cross-leveled from other units/States to fill the requirement DA G8 Synchronization Staff Officers (SSO) and AMC equipment managers use the MTOE to determine fill of equipment payback and will only return to the unit the amount of equipment that is authorized, thus, the extra equipment that was cross-leveled to fill the MEEL is lost to the ARNG.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Background: Army National Guard troops deploying since the build up of forces in Iraq have been counting on equipment that is already in theater to become deployment-ready. As the fight transitions to operations in Afghanistan, there is no equipment to fall in on, and the situation could be like the beginning of Iraq operations where reserve components were asked to leave their equipment. After a few years of improving equipment levels the National Guard has had to use for training and domestic missions, its domestic equipment readiness could begin to decline again. a. How does the Army intend to equip reserve forces for Afghanistan? b. How the shift to Afghanistan will affect equipping for domestic missions?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 5a. Equipment is being cross leveled in theater. The impact should be minimal. We believe the number of units may be constant. They will just be remissioned. The Army National Guard requested that the Army G3 and theater develop the requirement for "theater provided equipment," and let the Guard know their fair share. The Army should then follow the Department of Defense Directive 1225.6 process and get the Secretary of Defense approval with payback plan prior to establishing the pool.

Answer 5b. Thanks to the significant support of Congress, and the hard work done by the Army and the Army National Guard to fully equip and modernize our organization, our equipment levels have significantly improved. Until such time as we are equipped at 100 percent the Army National Guard will continue to cross-level equipment to ensure all missions are accomplished.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. GAO has reported that the National Guard's readiness for responding to large-scale domestic emergencies is unknown because of the lack of analytically-based requirements that would need to be developed by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security. The Army National Guard has taken the initiative to identify critical equipment items its units need for overseas missions that are useful for domestic missions. a. How did the National Guard develop this list and is it linked to the 15 national planning scenarios set out by the Homeland Security Council? b. Have the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security validated this list? c. Does the list take into

account capabilities that the states might have outside the National Guard or that are available in the region so that efficiencies can be achieved?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. Answer 6a. The Critical Dual Use equipment list is a list of the equipment that serves a critical role in both Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions and operations on the battlefield. The basis of this list was Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) documents of Army National Guard units. The equipment that comprises this list spans the wide spectrum of equipment in the Army National Guard to include trucks, command and control, and helicopters. It is linked to the 15 scenarios in as much as the equipment supports the full spectrum of Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civilian Authority missions from floods to pandemic flu to terrorist attacks.

Answer 6b. Department of Army approved the list in 2005. For 2009, the Army National Guard is once again staffing an updated proposed list. The Department of Defense and Joint Staff are aware of the list and we provide status of equipment on hand of critical dual use to them as required.

Answer 6c. The list of Critical Dual Use items was originally developed as a simple metric to assess the ability of the ARNG to perform domestic missions. The equipment on this list is based on the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and Table of Distribution and Allowance documents of the Army National Guard; therefore, it is not state/territory-specific. It is not additional equipment over and above authorization.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What analysis was done to ensure that U.S. Army and U.S. Air National Guard's needs are met in-theatre without the C-27J?

General WYATT and General CARPENTER. The Direct Support time sensitive/mission critical requirements are not adequately being met. The use of CH-47 rotary wing aircraft and contract airlift support aircraft is unsustainable over time and does not fully address the capability gap that exists for fixed wing in the theater direct support. Current projections are to have a C-27J Air Force capability in the theater in the early FY 11 timeframe. The Air Force overtime will increase C-27J capability to better meet the theater requirements. The insertion of C-27J aircraft will relieve the CH-47 fleet and aircrews and negate the need for contract airlift support.

The requirements process is driven by the Combatant Commanders and it is my understanding that the C-27J will enable the Air Force to provide our Combatant Commanders with critical Direct Support capability. The only studies I am aware of involving the procurement of the C-27J are the Army's 2005 Analysis of Alternatives and the Air Force's December 2007 Force Mix Analysis, and the 2009 Air Force Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Please provide the planned force structure, by base, unit, for approximately 190 F-22 aircraft.

General WYATT. The Air Force has publically stated the planned basing for the F-22 is Langley AFB, VA, Elmendorf AFB, AK, Holloman AFB, NM and Hickam AFB, HI. Training will be conducted at Tyndall AFB, FL.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. With the proposed reduced buy of aircraft, how does the U.S. Army National Guard plan to meet the increased Homeland Security and Disaster preparedness relief missions?

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard Aviation response to Homeland Security and disaster relief missions has increased over the last several years. Both Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing aircraft are used to ensure successful responses. The decision not to field 48 Joint Cargo Aircraft in the Army National Guard significantly reduces that response capability. To meet the increased Homeland Security and disaster relief missions the National Guard will use all available Air National Guard and Army National Guard airlift assets that are in a mission capable maintenance status and are not deployed. These include the Air National Guard C-130s, the 38 C-27Js programmed for the Air National Guard, and the Army National Guard CH-47s. The 42 Army National Guard C-23s also will provide response capabilities if the Army decides to retain that fleet. Adequate Rotary Wing Homeland Security and disaster relief response requires intensive management. While there are over 1300 helicopters in the ARNG, deployments and maintenance requirements reduce the number of helicopters available to the Governors to about 440 (325 modernized and 115 legacy) at any given time—an average of 6 modernized aircraft per State, Territory, and District.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If the reduced number of C-27Js are deployed what is available to backfill the National Guard's at-home requirements?

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard C-23 aircraft complemented by Air National Guard lift capability (such as the C-130) can meet the National Guard's at-home air lift requirements. However, the decision to transfer the Joint Cargo Aircraft program and the direct support mission to the Air Force leaves unan-

swered questions about the longevity of the Army National Guard C-23 aircraft. The Army National Guard at least in the near term (thru FY 12), expects to retain the C-23 aircraft, but future funding to extend the life of the C-23 or replace it has not been decided.

The C-27J will enable the Air Force to provide our Combatant Commanders with critical Direct Support capability. The Air National Guard believes this added capability is above and beyond our current airlift capacity and will have little impact on our availability to support “at-home” requirements. We will continue to work with the Services and with OSD to ensure there is adequate capability available to fulfill the nation’s domestic needs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the impact on the CH-47 fleet if there will now not be fixed wing asset replacement?

General CARPENTER. When CH-47s are diverted from traditional rotary wing tactical missions to direct support fixed wing airlift missions the impacts on the CH-47 fleet and aircrews are significant and unsustainable. The CH-47 helicopter is best suited for vertical take-off and landing missions with shorter operating ranges. Continued use of the CH-47 fleet to fill the direct support fixed wing mission gap is more expensive due to higher maintenance costs and operationally more complex because intermediate refueling stops are needed. The CH-47 fleet will not be relieved of the Direct Support airlift role in Afghanistan until the Air Force and Air National Guard can begin C-27J operations in Afghanistan in FY11 and then increase the C-27J presence to sufficient levels.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In your opinion, do the C-23B Sherpas need to be replaced? If the Army does not get the C-27J, what is the replacement plan for the C-23B?

General CARPENTER. Given the OSD decision to transfer the Joint Cargo Aircraft program to the Air Force, there is no replacement plan for the C-23B. Based on combat theater experiences since 2003 and the significant contribution of support provided by the C-23 fleet directly to the ground Commander and Soldiers, the Army National Guard believes the Army must reassess its future requirements for fixed wing capability. That reassessment would potentially include a modernization path for the C-23 mission and confirm the C-23 light cargo mission along with the fixed wing utility mission are a core Army Aviation competency.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Currently the ARNG is flying the C-23B Sherpas in direct support of Army units in Iraq—with the plus up of Army forces in Afghanistan, is the C-23 the right fixed wing STOL aircraft to provide direct support to those ground forces? Is the C27J?

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard’s C-23B is not the right aircraft to provide direct support to Army forces in Afghanistan. The aircraft is unpressurized and lacks the high altitude performance needed to operate in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The C-27J is the right aircraft to meet the STOL requirements in the mountainous Afghanistan theater and was specifically selected to fill the capability gap that currently exists with the C-23s. The STOL and direct support requirements related to Army missions being met by the CH-47 aircraft and contract airlift support are unsustainable over time.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What fixed wing STOL aircraft are currently supporting Army units in Afghanistan?

General CARPENTER. The Army is currently being supported by a combination of Army CH-47 helicopters and contract airlift support. The Air Force plans to deploy a C-27J capability into the Afghanistan theater in early FY 11 to meet the Army’s STOL aircraft requirements.