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COUNTERINSURGENCY AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED

HEARING

BEFORE THE

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2009

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, May 7, 2009, Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, May 7, 2009 31

THURSDAY, MAY 7, 2009

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 2

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1

WITNESSES

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute 6

Kilcullen, Dr. David, Partner, Crumpton Group LLC, Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute, Member of the Advisory Board, Center for a New American Security 2

Lund, Dr. Michael S., Consulting Program Manager, Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson Center 10

Schirch, Dr. Lisa, Director, 3D Security Initiative, Professor of Peacebuilding, Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University 14

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W. 43

Kilcullen, Dr. David 37

Lund, Dr. Michael S., joint with Dr. Lisa Schirch 50

Miller, Hon. Jeff 36

Smith, Hon. Adam 35

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 7, 2009.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. I will call the committee to order. I apologize for being a little bit late. We were in back-to-back hearings this morning, from 9 to 10 and then from 10 forward. So there was a little transition time, but thank you very much for being here.

We are here this morning as part of our continuing discussion on irregular warfare and how we design our national security defense apparatus to deal with the changing threats that we face: the basic, principal threat being that we now are most likely to face our main threats from non-state actors and terrorist groups, and we are moving into the debate of the next defense budget which talks a great deal about where we should be spending our money to meet this threat.

As we evolve forward from the Cold War days and the notion that we should be prepared to fight two major conventional wars at the same time is the idea of how we can confront many different terrorist organizations in many different areas, principally interested in counterinsurgency tactics. But there are many, many implications for policy and budget that we need to work out as we go forward to confront this threat.

And we are very lucky today to have four experts in these fields to tell us a little bit about what they think we ought to be doing so that we can get ready for the budget cycle.

I have a full statement which I will submit for the record, but I will leave it at that so we can get to the witnesses as quickly as possible. And I turn it over to the Ranking Member, Mr. Miller, for any opening statement he may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Absolutely, we all await this budget cycle to see the details of Secretary Gates' vision in the fiscal year 2010 Defense budget. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and yield back. I would ask that my statement be entered in the record.

Mr. SMITH. We will do that, and thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]

Mr. SMITH. With that, we will turn over to the witnesses. I will introduce all four. We will work our way left to right. Try to keep your statements somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes. We will then get into questions after that.

First, we have Dr. David Kilcullen, who is a partner in the Crumpton Group, LLC, and a Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute and member of the Advisory Board, Center for a New American Security, also is very, very involved in the campaign that was developed in Iraq. Look forward to hearing your testimony.

Dr. Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute, also regularly testifies before the Armed Services Committee, has done so about Iraq and other national security policies as well. Always a pleasure to see you.

Dr. Michael Lund, Consulting Program Manager, Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, from the Woodrow Wilson Center. Good to see you as well.

Dr. Lisa Schirch, Director from the 3D Security Initiative, Professor of Peacebuilding, Center for Justice and Peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University.

Thank you all for being here. Look forward to your testimony.

Dr. Kilcullen.

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KILCULLEN, PARTNER, CRUMPTON GROUP LLC, SENIOR FELLOW, EASTWEST INSTITUTE, MEMBER OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Dr. KILCULLEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me. I would just like to take a moment to thank your professional staff for being so incredibly flexible over the past week while I have been sitting on my ass with flu, not swine flu, just regular old human kind.

Mr. SMITH. Did that make it better that it wasn't part of the great threat?

Dr. KILCULLEN. I would like to focus my opening remarks mainly on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, because there is a lot of expertise in other areas at the table, and I would like to just give the areas that I am most focused on.

Since 9/11, I have fought and worked alongside some incredibly professional and brave American men and women from the Department of Defense (DOD), from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), State, Justice, the Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, in theaters right away across the war on terrorism from Iraq, Afghanistan, Paki-

stan, the Horn of Africa, parts of Southeast Asia and even Latin America. So I am offering these comments as a non-American but one who has seen a really incredible process of adaptation and improvement across all the branches of the U.S. Government since 9/11, and I think that is something that you and they should be very proud of.

Regular army units—that is, conventional, standard infantry, artillery or cavalry units operating on the ground today have techniques and capabilities that only existed in certain Special Forces units in 2001, and special mission units have capabilities, as you well know, that only existed in Hollywood in 2001. So they have seen an incredible, development, adaptation and improvement.

We have learned a lot of lessons on the way, and we still have some lessons that I think we need to lock in as we go forward. So let me focus on two areas. One is best practices for counterinsurgency, and the other is surrogate forces in unconventional warfare.

In my written testimony, I have listed what I consider to be the eight key best practices, and I just want to run through them very quickly.

The first one, the most important, is that to be successful in counterinsurgency you need to have a political strategy that builds government effectiveness and legitimacy, while marginalizing insurgents, winning over their sympathizers, and coopting local allies. That is the most important thing. It was our most important weakness in Iraq and Afghanistan going in, and fixing that has been one of our most important successes.

Second key best practice is that you need a comprehensive approach that closely integrates civil and military efforts——

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry to interrupt. You said Afghanistan. Did you mean Iraq in terms of fixing it in this one of our most important successes, or did you mean Afghanistan?

Dr. KILCULLEN. I think actually both, much more so in the case of Iraq. But in Afghanistan I think we are on the right track to getting a viable political strategy in the sense of what kind of Afghan government do we want to see, how do we want that Afghan government to function, what are the steps we are going to take to put that government in place. That is what I mean by a political strategy, not so much a U.S. political strategy, but a strategy on the ground for standing up the government that we are trying to support.

So then the second best practice is a comprehensive approach that integrates civil and military efforts based on a common diagnosis of the situation and a solid long-term commitment to the plan. The third is continuity of key personnel and policies and people having sufficient authority and resources to do their jobs.

The fourth one is population-centric security which is based on presence, on local community partnerships, on making populations self-defending, and on small unit operations that keep the enemy off balance.

The fifth one is cueing and synchronization of development, governance and security efforts, so that the three work in parallel together to generate a unified effect.

The next one is close and coordinated and genuine partnerships between intervening coalition forces and the local communities on

the ground. The seventh one is strong emphasis on building effective and legitimate local security forces, with the emphasis on local.

And then the final one is a region-wide approach that not only deals with the insurgency in the country where it is manifesting but also tries to disrupt insurgent safe havens, control borders and frontiers, and undermine terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries.

We can expand on each of those if you would like to in Q and A, but my observation across all the theaters where we have been operating since 9/11 is that where we have applied those best practices we have done better than in places where we haven't. So I think there is some pretty good empirical evidence on that, that that is the way to go.

These are basically lessons we learned. We already knew this stuff in the sixties. We almost deliberately forgot it after Vietnam. But the next category is something that is a little different, which is the use of surrogate forces, and I guess as a cautionary point here, that we sometimes learn the wrong lessons from campaigns that we conduct.

I want to take you back to 2001 where we did the lightning-fast, seven-week campaign to topple the Taliban. After the end of that campaign, Secretary Rumsfeld said that we engaged in a transformational campaign that basically changed the rules of warfare, and he focused on the use of small, light-footprint Special Operations Forces (SOF) on the ground, backed by precision air power, and that was sort of his description of what the recipe was for success.

General Franks who commanded the force also said that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) coming from space-based and high altitude and also unmanned systems was critically important. And he said in his memoirs that he had the kind of godlike perspective that Homer gave to his heroes based on all that. He was obviously very pleased with his performance in Afghanistan.

I won't agree with both those points, but I think they weren't actually the main reason why we succeeded in Afghanistan. On 7 December, 2001 when the last Taliban stronghold fell, which is Kandahar, we only had 110 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers and about 300 U.S. Special Forces operating in that part of Afghanistan, but we had 50,000 Afghans fighting on our side against the Taliban. That, I think, is the real reason why we succeeded in 2001.

I have talked to hundreds of Afghans on the ground since I have been working in the field since 2006. None of them has ever described to me what happened in 2001 as an invasion. They always talk about we kicked out the Taliban and you assisted us, and I think that the use of surrogate forces and building partnerships with local communities was actually the critical element of our success in 2001.

Mr. SMITH. How did that happen so fast—sorry to interrupt—pre-9/11, these forces were out there but they really weren't making much progress. And then in a matter of, gosh, a month and a half after 9/11, was it as simple as, you know, the Afghan warlords saying, we see which way the wind is blowing and it is blowing

against the Taliban so we are going to go against them? What made that rapid change?

Dr. KILCULLEN. It was an extremely conscious approach, based on our CIA campaign plan of winning and generating partnerships with local commanders. And you know, I wasn't on the ground with those teams, but my boss was, and he has told me in detail and we have published accounts of how they operated where they essentially dropped in by helicopter, established relationships with people, identified what the critical requirements were, and were able to back them up rapidly, whether it be medical supplies, blankets, food aid and so on, on the one hand, or a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) to clear away a Taliban position on the other.

So a full spectrum approach of clearing the obstacles out of the way of our local partners and bringing them on our side led to basically a cascading series of defections from people that supported the Taliban, and groups in the civil society, coming alongside U.S. Forces, leading to that success.

I want to point also to al Anbar in 2007 where pretty much exactly the same thing happened, where we had enough forces on the ground finally to make people feel safe enough to turn against al Qaeda. And once we were able to enable that, we had the whole of civil society on our side, and we were able to push al Qaeda in Iraq out of that province relatively quickly, after years of failure, based on building a population alliance with people on the ground.

So the arithmetic of local security forces is actually very important here. We do not have and we will not ever have enough forces to generate that sort of dominant 20 counterinsurgents per thousand head of population, which is sort of the theoretical number that people talk about. But if you generate local alliances, you can really radically compensate for that lack of forces.

Let me give you an example, and then I will finish on this point. Imagine that we had had 50,000 U.S. troops to put into Iraq in 2007, extra troops. We didn't have those, but imagine we did. If we had put them in, we would have had a benefit for that 50,000 troops investment of about 10,000 out on the ground at any one time, because you have to run your headquarters, you have to look after your lines of communication. That takes about 20,000 troops out of your 50,000. And then the remaining 30,000 have to be on a rotation plan. They have got to be out patrolling but then resting and then preparing. So you only have about a third of those guys out on the ground at any one time. So the bang for the buck is 10,000 out of an investment of 50,000.

Now, let us put an alternate possibility. Instead of putting 50,000 U.S. troops in theater, we recruit and gain on our side 50,000 Iraqis, which is actually what we did. Instead of getting a benefit of your investment for 10,000, you get the full 50,000 out on the ground all the time. There is no headquarters, no lines of communication, no rotation plan. They live there. So you get a benefit of 50,000. But actually it is more than that, because those 50,000 guys who work for us used to be in the enemy's recruiting pool. They used to work for the enemy. So the benefit is a net benefit of 100,000. We gain 50, the enemy loses 50. So the benefit of recruiting and employing local security forces on our side is 10 times the benefit putting in American troops into the same environment.

When you look at the dollar cost as well, it is dramatically more cost-effective to work by, with, and through local partners. And as you know, that is what we talk about in terms of foreign internal defense. It is one of the areas that we have been weakest on in terms of our lessons learned since 9/11.

What I will do is stop there and let the other witnesses testify and then perhaps you may wish to pick at some issues.

Mr. SMITH. Certainly. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kilcullen can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Kagan.

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee; and thank you also, congressional staff, for being very gracious about the outrageous lateness of my testimony and I apologize.

Mr. KLINE. Did you have the flu?

Dr. KAGAN. I didn't even have that excuse, I am sorry, but I am sure I will have the flu now.

Customarily, when Dave and I do our traveling road show, we spend a lot of time saying, I agree with everything he said. In this case, I agree with almost everything that he said. But since there are actually a couple of things that I am not so sure I disagree with, but I would like to put a little bit sharper point on it, I would like to start with that.

First of all, the difference between surrogate forces and local security forces and I think it is very important to highlight that distinction which Dave made, but to bring that out. Surrogate forces are forces that you use instead of your own troops to fight on your behalf, pursuing your interests as well as their own, and that is what we did in Afghanistan in 2001.

I am less pleased with the outcome of that operation than a lot of other people have been, and I have always been less pleased with the outcome of that operation because the 50,000 Afghans that we had—and Dave is absolutely right about how that war was won, unquestionably true—but the 50,000 Afghans did not form a cohesive force, could not be allowed on their own to form a government because the government would not have been legitimate, and were not in fact able to hold the country on their own. And there was no way that you were going to build local security forces in that context rapidly enough to fill the security gap that was created by the collapse of what little government the Taliban had been providing in time to prevent what actually happened, which is sort of a fragmentation of the country and some renewed warlordism and, in general terms, creating conditions for some of the problems that we now face.

The answer to that, of course, is not to send 500,000 American troops into the country, but it was to send some American troops, and ideally international troops, into the country because the thing to take away here is that the 20-odd thousand population requirement for counterinsurgency is real, it is a real requirement. Dave is absolutely right that you have to count local security forces in

that mix, and it is not a question of we have to put 20 troops on the ground for every thousand of population, nor would it be desirable or sustainable in any sense for us to do that. But you do have to meet that requirement; otherwise you run the risk of real deep lawlessness that can set conditions for long-term failure, even after what looks like a very stunning success, which is what happened in 2001.

And so the question is, how do we initially fill the gap between whatever exists after we have helped someone else take down a government, or whatever we have done, and how long it takes actually to develop the local security forces that will be necessary. That is our exit strategy, if you will, is developing local security forces, legitimate government, civil society, and all those things that are necessary. But we do have to have a plan for filling the security gap with our own forces, with international forces, otherwise you can't get there from here.

And so I think that leads into the point that I tried to emphasize in my testimony, which is although we are engaged in wars against unconventional enemies fighting irregular warfare against us, what we need to fight those wars are the conventional true tools of state craft that we actually have. We need to apply them properly.

There is a lot of sort of search in this town and around this country for some sort of magic bullet that would allow us to fight our enemies without maintaining large, expensive, conventional forces, and without having to deploy our troops, and by using local proxies and so forth. And I know that that is not what Dave is advocating, but there are a lot of people who are advocating that. And it is distressing that a lot of arguments that we heard during the strategic pause of the 1990s about how to be a cheap hawk are resurfacing now with, really, virtually no changes made to them, as though the last eight years didn't happen. And that is very distressing to me because that didn't work. We tried that.

The problem is, it is not that we haven't tried that. We did try that. That is what we did in 2001. That is what we did in 2003 in Iraq. We experimented with this. Small footprint, high technology, blitzkrieg, get in, get out. And the problem is that it doesn't work.

And so I am worried that we are being led down a path again of trying to persuade ourselves that there is some way to do this that is less painful; and as usual, I am here to say, no, it is going to hurt. We need this capability to fight the kind of enemies that we face. We are going to have to pay for this capability, and there really isn't any alternative.

I would like to ask that my written testimony be submitted for the record. I don't want to recite it for you. What I would like to do instead is listen to the words of my favorite, the greatest novelist of all time, Leo Tolstoy, who said in describing his writing process, "The key is show, don't tell."

And so instead of sort of lecturing you about general principles, I would like to take you through the three map slides that I have given you to underline the point that I don't think you can actually have an abstract conversation about how to do this beyond what Dave has laid out, which is very solid and spot-on.

But if you are going to take it to the next level and really understand what we need to do, you actually have to put enemies on the ground in context and talk about what you are facing and how you have to deal with it. And since obviously the most significant intellectual challenge we face right now is in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I would just like to quickly take you through what the enemy set is and talk very, very briefly about what we need to be doing about this.

If you start with the first slide that is labeled Major Enemy Groups, the point that this slide attempts to make is that we are facing seven, eight, nine, ten significant enemy groups in Afghanistan right now, of which only about three actually have objectives within Afghanistan. And that would be the Quetta Shura Taliban of Mullah Omar, the Haqqani Network that is now based in Meydan Shahr in north Waziristan, and the Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's group which is much less significant than the other two and operates in the east.

These are the only groups that are actively trying to achieve objectives in Afghanistan, and these are the groups that are the principal threats to American mission failure or mission success in Afghanistan right now. If we don't, in conjunction with the Afghan government and while setting up civil society and a variety of other things, defeat these groups, then we are not going to succeed in Afghanistan.

The problem is these groups are very heavily focused on Afghanistan. That is really what they are focused on, and if you look at them and ask are these major threats directly to United States national security, are these groups going to attack us, the answer is no, that they are not. These are not global jihadist groups. These are not, right now, even regional jihadist groups. These are Afghan-focused groups. So why are we fighting them? We are fighting them because we need to succeed in Afghanistan. Why do we need to succeed in Afghanistan if these groups aren't trying to actively hurt us?

Well, part of the answer is because we know that Mullah Omar previously provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden, is certain to do so again. Jalaluddin Haqqani has personal friendships with Osama bin Laden; invited him to his territory in the eighties, would certainly do so again. So we could have the recurrence of a safe haven, but that is a secondary concern.

The real concern is that when you look across the border into Pakistan, what do you see? You see a collection of other groups that are playing in Afghanistan. They are sending fighters to Afghanistan, they are working on killing Americans in Afghanistan, but they don't actually have objectives in Afghanistan.

And those groups include the Tehrik-e Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) with Baitullah Mehsud's group. They include Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), Sufi Mohammad's group, and they include the Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) and, of course, al Qaeda.

Why are those guys fighting in Afghanistan? Well, it is a good place to kill Americans, and for those groups, it is always a good day when you can kill an American. It is live-fire training for their cadres. This is where they send their troops to experience war and get blooded. They are willing to accept much higher attrition rates

in training than we would be, and it is also a way for individual commanders to gain combat patches and then bid for participation in one of the shuras in Pakistan.

So it is a very strange dynamic. And you could say, well, if we pulled out of there wouldn't these guys stop fighting us? Well, if we weren't there, they wouldn't be fighting us, that is for sure, and they might well lose interest in Afghanistan to some extent.

But here is the thing. These are the groups that pose the principal threat to the stability of Pakistan, and, if you include Lashkar-e Tayyiba, to the stability of the entire region. Lashkar-e Tayyiba is commonly identified as a Kashmiri separatist group, which is the one thing it is not. It is not primarily Kashmiri. It is primarily Punjabi. Its headquarters are not in Kashmir. They are in a small town called Muridke which is near Lahore. It has something like 2,200 offices throughout Pakistan.

And if you flip to the next slide, I tried to give you some idea of the major LeT bases, which include a significant base in Karachi from which parts of the Mumbai attack were launched.

This is a very significant challenge to the region and global security order, because the objective of LeT is not to regain Kashmir but to destroy India; to destroy Hindu India and sort of make the world safe for India's Muslims. That is what LeT is all about. If it is allowed to proceed, it will destroy the subcontinent. That is its objective. This is a major problem for us.

TNSM and TTP are much more focused on Pakistan. I know that Baitullah Mehsud said he is going to blow up the White House, and I wish him luck with that; but fundamentally, these are groups that are a threat to Islamabad.

Mr. SMITH. You don't exactly wish him luck.

Dr. KAGAN. I don't exactly wish him luck. I don't wish him luck at all. I thank you for correcting me.

Mr. SMITH. Just for the record.

Dr. KAGAN. Just for the record I wish him failure, but I am not going to lay awake nights worrying about him doing that either. But if we succeed in Afghanistan, we have the opportunity not only to see these groups, as we now can, and to interact with them to some extent, as we now can, but also to influence the populations among which they exist, because the most important bases for these groups lie in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Balujistan and in the Northwest Frontier Province, a part of that which is another problem, and those populations are heavily influenced by what goes on in Afghanistan.

As an example, we have recently, working with the Afghans, succeeded in making something of a success out of the town of Khost. Khost is the home base of Jalaluddin Haqqani, and it is a major problem for Haqqani that Khost looks like it is succeeding in the context of American and Afghan efforts. Haqqani and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have said it is a priority to defeat our efforts in Khost, because if they don't defeat our efforts in Khost it delegitimizes their movement in their heartland. Their heartland extends into Waziristan.

Where am I working to with this? I reject the notion that there is some grand unified field theory of Pakistan that will get us magically to the solution of all of our problems there. I don't think

there is. I think it is a vital American national security interest to work toward the stability of Pakistan. I think we need to use the instruments and opportunities that are available to us to do that.

I think when you understand what the enemy laydown looks like and how the groups overlap and how the populations overlap, you can see how important it is to succeed in Afghanistan as something that we can affect directly in Pakistan, in contrast to the many, many things that we can't affect directly in Pakistan, to work toward Pakistani stability. And I think your successful Pakistani strategy, at best, will end up being a composite of a variety of things that we can do and leverage that we can generate, and pressures and incentives that we can apply, put together over a long period of time to move Pakistan in the right direction.

But that is why I think it is, in many respects, less useful to talk about general, how do we fight the unconventional war, how do we fight the global insurgency, if you will—even though I think that is a valid concept, and I think those principles are important—than it is to say let us look at the specific problem that matters most to us and let us talk about what the challenges are, what the enemies and the threats are, and what our capabilities are. And if we do that in a number of areas, including areas that I am not competent to talk about—like Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and so forth—that is the only way you can really figure out what your force requirement is. That is the only way that you can really figure out what your large strategy is going to be, because the solution set for each one of those problems is going to be different. It is going to be based on the principles that Dave identified and some other general principles, but it will be a unique solution, because each one of those problems is unique.

And so what I would like to leave you with is let us have the general conversation but let us also talk about specifics as we think about this defense budget. And I would encourage you to press Defense Department officials and the military officials who testify before your committee and your subcommittee to speak in detail and not just offer you general bromides about how they are going to address these problems.

I thank the committee.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Lund, I understand you are going to testify and then Dr. Schirch is going to be available for questions.

Dr. LUND. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. Please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL S. LUND, CONSULTING PROGRAM MANAGER, PROJECT ON LEADERSHIP AND BUILDING STATE CAPACITY, WOODROW WILSON CENTER

Dr. LUND. Thank you. Well, thank you all for this opportunity to present some insights and ideas about a phase of conflict which does not get as much attention as the active ones.

Basically, we are going to talk about what is actually going on in societies that are on early warning lists and are threatened with the potential for insurgencies and terrorism or other kinds of con-

flict, in terms of what we have learned from these experiences or what needs to be done to make them even more effective.

If you want to put it in military jargon terms, we have a chart on page three that came from DOD. We are talking about what is actually going on out there in phase zero, what is called the steady state, in terms of nonkinetic activities on the part of both civilian and military agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), and how can we use those activities, those programs, those tools, to avoid getting into phase II, III, IV and V altogether.

Let me say a little bit our own experience. Lisa and I have had the privilege, I think you might say, of going to lots of obscure, relatively obscure, remote places like Tajikistan, Guyana, rural Georgia, northern Kenya, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Serbia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and so on over the last several years, some of which are in active conflicts as you know, some of which at least show indicators of potential conflict.

What we would like to do is share some of our insights from both our direct observation, as well as our research. We are both sort of half practitioner and half analyst. So we try to take an independent position vis-a-vis the various clients that we may serve at various times.

The need for difficult, often deadly, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism campaigns, can be reduced to some extent, not completely, by targeted strategic efforts to preempt the ability of insurgent groups to capture the hearts and minds of the populations in these kinds of vulnerable societies. The typical conditions that the populations are motivated by or concerned about are lack of daily security, absent or corrupt government services, discrimination against certain regional groups or ethnic and sectarian groups, lack of job opportunities, especially for young men, lack of any political voice, and lack of unity and great factionalism at the higher levels of the governments, as well as the addition of extremist ideologies that seem to offer a way to remedy these grievances.

Addressing these factors in a very specific and targeted way, through close analysis done on the ground, and using a variety of actors with various kinds of programs addressing the various drivers of conflict, can avoid the need for getting involved in militarily internal wars or for humanitarian intervention to prevent a genocide like we have seen unfolding in Darfur, as well as save the money that is spent on many post-conflict reconstruction countries.

We cite some data from research that has compared the costs of wars of this type with the preventive efforts that were made in similar situations. Other countries where there were risk factors evident but preventive activities were taken, such as Macedonia, and the ratios between the costs of military efforts and other efforts compared to the preventive efforts are really incredibly great. The average in one study was 1:59; that is, the preventive activity costs, the ratio, 1:59, however you put that.

The good news is the thousands of low-visibility programs in mediation, governments, governance development, human rights, as well as track two diplomacy and so on in these countries from Azerbaijan to Zambia. For example, I did a study of what USAID has been doing in southern Serbia, in the Presevo Valley east of Kosovo, where as you know there was an Albanian insurgency in

2001, in terms of what kind of reconciliation, what kind of building of defense against a reemergence of conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs might occur.

And in Presevo city itself, town itself, there are several activities that are sort of working in tandem to create a more responsive budget process in Presevo, vis-a-vis that particular district, as well as at the village level, bringing together Serbs and Albanians in joint projects to do development.

Those are just a couple examples of thousands of projects and programs that are going on and being carried out not just by the U.S. Government but by the U.N., the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), some of the multilateral organizations, regional organizations like the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS).

In some ways what this hearing is bringing out is that there has not been a lot of conversation between the security communities and the development communities, so that this area called phase zero is basically zero. I mean, it is an unknown territory for the security community. But what I am saying is that those of us in the peacebuilding or development communities have been actually working with a number of these sorts of activities, programs, and there is just a lot going on there that we need to understand better and link up to a more coherent strategy: police training, microcredit, nonarmed protective accompaniment, election monitoring, civic education, disarmament, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) activities, civil society forums and so on.

And as I say, organizations like ECOWAS, for example, in West Africa have been quite active in mediating some of the election disputes coming up during the campaigns in places like Guinea-Bissau and so on. One doesn't read about this in the newspaper because it is not particular exciting information, but it is very important and it has had its definite effects.

Over these years since the middle nineties, a number of researchers have tried to collect some of the lessons from some of these situations. I will just mention a couple of them, and you will find that they are quite compatible, quite supplementary and corroborative of what has already been said by David and Fred.

Among the most successful examples in the Baltic, South Africa, Slovakia, Albania and, for example, Kenya last year, where there was fast-track diplomatic effort by the U.S. and U.N., most of them have been multidimensional in nature; that is, they are a short-term diplomatic effort that is brought to bear immediately on the behaviors, the most threatening activity by high-level leaders. But there is also effort at addressing reconciliation issues and so on at the lower level among the general population. So a combination of carrots and sticks, along with dialogue that is applied in a fairly concentrated and synchronized manner in both situations where there are threatening clouds on the horizon, and when that is best——

Mr. SMITH. Sorry, Doctor. Could I ask you a specific question about that? This is actually an area that this subcommittee, and myself in particular, are very interested in, the merger of sort of global development strategy with security strategy. And some of those conversations actually are starting a little bit, particularly

with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and State Department, and it is an awkward relationship. They have different sorts of viewpoints on the world, and to a certain degree don't trust each other. But it is beginning, and I think making that happen is absolutely critical to our security strategy; leveraging all of our national ability, you know, from State Department, Agriculture, whatever is necessary to do the development piece that you talked about, meshing that up with some of the stuff that DOD is doing. Particularly with SOCOM, because SOCOM does, what creeps up to being development in a lot of areas, and how they work together with the State Department I think is critical.

The two questions I have about that, that I would like you to try to address in the remainder of your testimony, is how can we better coordinate development strategy in our country. I have a very strong bias that it is hopelessly screwed up at the moment, but there are a lot of good things going on in isolation, but they are in no way coordinated and do not come together in any sort of cohesive strategy.

One little sub-piece of that is the degree to which that strategy is based on a general approach to reducing poverty, which would be a good place to start, but, on the other hand, meshing that with our security needs. That is where the development community tends to freak out a little bit. It is like you care more about poor people and devastating things happening in Pakistan because of security than you do in, say, somewhere in Latin America, because you don't think you have a security interest. But we have to care about our security in terms of how you put out that money, how do you mesh that.

And then beyond coordinating our global development strategy as a country, how do you see the meshing of security and global development happening? What would be the best way to develop an interagency process to make that happen so that we are working more in concert?

A big challenge there, of course, is dividing up responsibilities, you know, and trusting each other in terms of their talents. But I am curious, your thoughts on those two things.

This is me kind of cheating and working in one additional question to the question time that I will have when you are done, but if you could address that.

Mr. MARSHALL. You are not giving up your questions, then?

Mr. SMITH. No, I am actually not.

Dr. LUND. Would you like us to address those questions?

Mr. SMITH. If you can take a stab at it. I realize you could give an hour-long answer to that. It would probably be better if you could do two or three minutes.

Dr. LUND. Maybe Lisa has some things to add. I think you are right; the conversation has started, quite actively.

The particular mechanisms, formulas and so on haven't been arrived at yet. Among the recommendations we were going to make were certainly to push that process much further, more vigorously. And we both had the experience, along with David a couple of weeks ago, to be involved—and Mr. Natter addressed this group—a week-long simulation that was designed and organized by the Center for Irregular Warfare of the Marine Corps that focused on

a Horn of Africa scenario. And they brought together over 200 representatives, playing different roles, from DOD, State, USAID, multilateral organizations like the U.N., World Bank, France, Italy, U.K., and so on, to sort of ask the question, how would you behave in responding to this particular situation.

It was an incredibly illuminating and, I thought, enlightened activity in terms of what has happened in this field so far. I have been working on conflict prevention for over ten years, and I thought this was the most coherent and on-the-case event that I have been at. And a number of recommendations came out of that which address exactly your concerns. So I would really advise——

Mr. SMITH. I will take a look at that, those recommendations.

Dr. LUND. I don't know how much I can get into the details of exactly whether a central direction should be in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCRS) in State Department or the National Security Council. Maybe the other panelists have specific ideas of that.

That event spent quite a bit of time working through obstacles and funding authorities and so on. I don't think there is a magic, clear—there is a consensus that that needs to be figured out. That was one of our main points. I don't think it would be that helpful for me to run through one approach or another.

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Lund and Dr. Schirch can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Schirch, do you have something quick you want to say? And then I think I will go to Mr. Miller and begin the questions, unless there was something else.

STATEMENT OF DR. LISA SCHIRCH, DIRECTOR, 3D SECURITY INITIATIVE, PROFESSOR OF PEACEBUILDING, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING, EASTERN MENNONITE UNIVERSITY

Dr. SCHIRCH. Thank you, Chairman Smith and committee members, for inviting us here today.

The field that we are talking about is conflict prevention, and this conference that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and the Marine Corps put on together was called "Whole of Government Conflict Prevention." And many of us in the NGO community are working actively now to try to figure out how to build a more comprehensive approach to the issues of terrorism. And for the NGOs, we have been working actively on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and we have many partner networks who are indigenous Iraqi NGOs and Afghan NGOs who have been sharing their perspective on counterterrorism and how best to prevent the spread of the kinds of insurgencies we see in these regions. And they very much want to be able to feed into the process.

And part of the challenge here is that the interagency coordination is so new here in Washington that there are really no points of contact for NGOs who are on the ground, who have cultural intelligence, information to share that would inform U.S. strategy.

Over the weekend, Dr. Kilcullen made some statements that were in the media about the drones flying over Pakistan, bombing villages, actually having a counter-effect to our national interests in the U.S.; that the drones ended up creating more fuel on the

ground for recruitment into Taliban, al Qaeda insurgencies. We have been hearing that in civil society and NGOs for several years, that this kind of drone activity is counter to U.S. interests.

So that is the kind of information civil societies want to give over and have conversations with the government. So it is actually very much in our interest as civil society to help to foster and think about what is the best way for the defense development, diplomacy tools of American power, how they are coordinated, because this impacts then how civil society can feed into the process.

Again, we don't take particular stands on whether it is the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction Stabilization, although we very much support that, or the National Security Council (NSC). There are a variety of models that I think we need to have more hearings on how is this best going to be done in this country, because it is very urgent.

The ratio of cost prevention versus response to terrorism is not met in terms of our U.S. budget in terms of national security. So several of us have argued for a unified security budget that would try to balance out more of these preventive responses because, right now, if you look at one tax dollar, less than half of a percent is going to all of our development activities abroad, whereas almost 60 percent of that dollar goes to defense approaches.

So this balance is off and makes coordination in this interagency process very difficult. For USAID at the simulation on conflict prevention, they couldn't really risk a lot of the staff time because they have so few staff to even give over to this conversation.

Mr. SMITH. It also pushes DOD into doing a lot more development work than they are actually qualified to do because they have the money.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Right. And there were comments at this conference that DOD is being forced to create its own internal USAID, its own civilian response corps, which is mirroring structures that also exist in the State Department and USAID, which is a waste of taxpayer dollars.

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Schirch and Dr. Lund can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. SMITH. I will yield to Mr. Miller to begin the questioning.

And the other piece of that is the NGO community just gets really freaked out about the DOD getting involved in that, a little bit of paranoia there. But part of it also is good reason that when you are trying to build the type of support within a community that you need, there is a perception of the U.S. military that is different than a perception of an NGO or USAID that in some ways makes that mission more difficult.

Dr. LUND. Another concrete answer to your question of how to move toward more coherent coordination is starting with a really good on-the-ground conflict assessment or field-state assessment and getting people on the same page in terms of what is going on in the situation, at the country level but then also at the Washington level region.

Mr. SMITH. Several of those have been done, Brookings and a few other folks. But with that, I really impinged upon the patience of my committee members here. So I will yield to Mr. Miller. We will stick to five minutes as we go around. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. You probably impinged on the patience of your colleague, Mr. Marshall, at the other end.

Mr. SMITH. He is always impatient. I am used to that.

Mr. MILLER. Dr. Kilcullen, would you care to expand on your comments regarding the drone activity?

Dr. KILCULLEN. Sure. In fact, the media report on the weekend was a quote from my congressional testimony in front of the House Armed Services Committee, which I think some committee members may already be aware of.

Since early 2006, we have conducted a number of drone strikes into Pakistani territory. In that time, we have killed 14 mid-level al Qaeda leadership and Taliban leadership targets in that area. In the same time frame, we have killed about 700 noncombatant Pakistani civilians. That is a hit rate of about two percent: 98 percent collateral damage, two percent accurate hits.

The strikes themselves, based on what we hear from community organizations in the FATA, actually are not particularly unpopular. There are people in the FATA who think it is actually a good thing that the bad guys have been struck. Where they are particularly unpopular is in the Punjab and Sind, and we have seen a very substantial rise in militancy in those parts of Pakistan over the time frame since 2006.

What I said to the committee last week, or the week before, was there is no doubt that the strikes are very, very tactically useful in disrupting al Qaeda and in hampering their operations. Right now, because of the situation in the rest of Pakistan, they also have a downside, which is they are contributing to political instability.

What I suggested to the committee was that right now our biggest problem is not the networks in the FATA but the fact that Pakistan may collapse if this political instability continues. And so I suggested that we may want to return to a much more narrow targeting approach of focusing only on al Qaeda senior leadership, only on targets that are in areas where the Pakistanis don't control the ground, and working with the Pakistanis rather than doing it unilaterally.

So that is just to expand on the comments. But if you look in the testimony record from last week, there is a lot more there in that discussion.

Mr. MILLER. I yield back my time and give a chance to other members.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Dr. Lund, the idea of an ounce of prevention is worth of pound of cure, the statistic of the relationship of $1 of prevention might equal $59 of cure is very tempting. I wonder, Dr. Kilcullen, if you agree with those statistics.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I certainly don't know. I don't have any data to prove or disprove the 59:1. But I think it is certainly true that in considering intervening in countries, we often underestimate how much time, money and blood is going to be involved. It is a consistent pattern. Overall, nations that get involved in counterinsurgency over the last 200 or 300 years have tended at the outset to underestimate the costs and the difficulty of the process.

I think where we can, we should most certainly be working to prevent rather than to treat conflict environments. I don't think

that is necessarily a sound basis for capability planning within the DOD, though. I think we need to be focusing on the military as the force of last resort and structuring it so that it can actually get—it is like the difference between fire prevention and firefighting. You have to structure the fire department to fight the fires.

Mr. MARSHALL. The problem that we—well, this is not new news. This has been a consistent worry of ours since World War II, actually——

Dr. KILCULLEN. Yes, and before.

Mr. MARSHALL [continuing]. When we put a lot more money into foreign aid than we do right now. And the reason we don't put as much money into foreign aid is, politically it is very difficult to sustain that in a country that has lots of many other needs, and many of those needs are internal. So sometimes it is quite difficult to justify sending a dollar to someplace remote that could have been spent right here on your folks. And that is an easy target for politicians.

We do routinely, however, spend huge dollars through DOD on preventive measures that may or may not be essential. For example, parking large numbers of soldiers in Europe and in Korea for extended periods of time, a cost of billions and billions of dollars.

And I wonder to what extent, as you think about how we get more money into prevention, you think also about how whatever is set up can be politically sustainable. And if you look at history, you might wonder to what extent this does need to go through what is classified as national security somehow, as opposed to State Department; because if it just goes to State Department, it is going to get ultimately viewed as feel-good, generous money that American taxpayers are sending elsewhere, when that feel-good, generous American money could be spent meeting needs here at home. And so in the long run, it is very difficult to sustain.

So that is just an observation I have been quite concerned about. We ought to take every opportunity we can to start putting more of this money through our security side as opposed to our State Department side, and if money goes to DOD and then somehow winds up in State, that is fine.

How do you know when you need to spend a dollar for prevention? It seems to me that a dollar spent for prevention at the right place might be this 1:59 return because we avoided having to take corrective action, but a dollar spent for prevention, where, in 100 different places around the globe? We don't really know which of those places is ultimately—if we don't spend that dollar, we are going to wind up being something where we are going to feel like we need to take corrective action.

So the ratio winds up being, really, when you think of the challenge of identifying where corrective action should be, it can't be 1:59. It is going to have to be a heck of a lot more than that.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Absolutely, these are important questions. Let me answer your first one in terms of the American public, because polls of Americans have consistently shown that they support foreign aid, and they assume that we are giving much larger quantities than we are. They assume that 25 percent of their tax dollar is going to foreign aid. They have no idea that it is less than one percent.

Mr. MARSHALL. It could well be that they assume that because they are outraged at the very thought.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Absolutely. When they are asked what percentage of their tax dollars should go to foreign aid, it is 10 percent, which is far above what we are even talking about in terms of prevention.

Mr. MARSHALL. So it is less than 25 percent, so they are basically communicating that they want less spent on foreigners.

Mr. SMITH. I have been down this road a thousand times, and that is not the best argument that I have heard. I respect it being made, but the bottom line is, Mr. Marshall is right. The public has no idea what goes into the budget. All they know is they think too much is going in, and so they want it cut. That is not as helpful as it first appears, and I am pro-foreign aid. I say it as a friendly comment.

Mr. MARSHALL. And me, too. It is just trying to figure how to do it in a sustainable way. But history shows it is unrealistic in a democratic political system to sustain it on just sort of feel-good stuff.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Although there is an assumption that we have of first resort, so that defense is our last resort. And I think if Americans understood how weak our first resort is in terms of State Department and USAID, and looking at the proportions of the budget—and I often speak to American audiences where I show them pie charts of where things are going, and they are stunned at that ratio.

The other thing is in terms of choosing where we spend those preventive dollars, there is an extensive network, global network of early warning systems to identify, narrow down, prioritize those areas, so there is a recognition that we have to make choices.

Mr. SMITH. We will have to come back to this, if we could. I want to get to Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am reluctant to jump into this particular piece of it, but our perception is that the perception of the people in our districts think we are spending way too much on foreign aid, and it is an easy target for them. So it is tough politically.

I am impressed by the number of NGOs that are around the world and the terrific work that they are doing. I remember being in Mogadishu back in the 1992–93 time frame. We were there for Operation Restore Hope and I was standing on the ramp out in front of my helicopter, getting ready to go do something. And this man walked up, and he was an NGO and he looked at my name tag and it said "Kline" on it. And he said, "Kline," he said, "are you any relation to Vicky Kline?"—who is my wife. They had served together. She was an Army nurse and they had served together some years ago. And so it is a small world thing, and they are everywhere, and there was no doubt that they have a good sense for what is going on.

I am interested in knowing how better to tap into that, but it seems to me the one thing we have here is a very serious indictment of the country teams. We have ambassadors, we have embassies, we have people, we have State Department and all manner of representation in these country teams who, in theory, should be able to tell us what is going on in that country, that should be able

to tell us if this is a country that maybe we need to intercede earlier. But somehow that is not connecting, and I am not sure exactly why that is. We have intelligence——

Mr. SMITH. Let me interrupt, just quickly. I think what the country team needs to tell you, they are telling you. And they know they only have the resources to deal with about five or so——

Mr. KLINE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. If they are, then they are ineffective in the telling, because we are obviously not interceding, perhaps, where we should. So the system, I guess, is what I would say, Mr. Chairman, isn't working as it should.

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely.

Mr. KLINE. I want to go very quickly, and anybody can feel free to comment on any of this stuff. But I want to in my couple of minutes left, I was very interested, of course, in Dr. Kilcullen's points. And I wrote down, I think, the numbers three, four, six and seven on your list that have to do with personnel, continuity, population-centric, local security and so forth.

And in going to the specifics that Dr. Kagan talked about in Afghanistan, we are in the process right now in putting in some 21,000 more U.S. Forces, and there are a number of issues here which aren't matching up with your list. For one thing, there are Marines going in, and the Marines on the ground are going to be there for seven months. Leadership will be there for a year, so we have got a little continuity problem going there. And the Commandant has told us he has big concerns about the other three that I went through there.

There are not Afghan partners. The Afghan National Army isn't there in big numbers. The Afghan police isn't there in big numbers. There isn't a local security force. And so I am wondering what your thoughts are about what can we do. I mean, we are in the process of this now. I think everybody from the Commandant of the Marine Corps and General Petraeus and McKiernan and everybody across the road would like to see more interagency, and they would certainly like to see faster development of the Afghans. So, a comment from anybody.

Dr. KILCULLEN. Well, I might make a brief comment but then defer to Dr. Kagan who knows a lot about this topic.

I think to a certain extent what we are doing in Afghanistan is filling in the gaps in the current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plan. So if you look at where the NATO allies were located before the Afghan surge, we are putting U.S. troops into areas where there were not a lot of European troops to kind of fill the gap.

I would argue that we ought, instead, to be identifying where the population lives primarily and focusing on securing the population as distinct from territory. That would be my first point.

And the second point would be we need to be taking a partnering role where a U.S. unit always operates with an Afghan military unit and an Afghan police unit.

Mr. KLINE. Excuse me, but that is the complaint right now from the Marines, is there isn't that partner unit available.

Dr. KILCULLEN. Yeah, that is right. And so those would be my two sort of points of concern about where I am seeing things develop in Afghanistan.

If I could just jump back very quickly to a previous point that you made, sir. There is a thing called the Regional Security Initiative that was created by the Counterterrorism Bureau in State precisely to address this question of reporting from posts and understanding the security environment. And there is a report, Country Report on Terrorism to Congress, that comes every year, which actually addresses all of those questions as well. You may be interested in holding a hearing on that issue because there has been some very substantial development inside State in the last few years on that.

One other final point is two big changes happened to the foreign assistance world under President Bush. Firstly, a very substantial expansion of the foreign assistance budget. In 2000 it was $11 billion; by 2008 it was $20 billion. So a lot more was being done in terms of foreign assistance.

But the other big shift was that as of the end of the Bush Administration, more than half of that foreign assistance was being delivered in conflict or post-conflict environments, and yet we have an aid organization that is primarily structured to do aid as a poverty alleviation tool and not necessarily well-organized or conceptually well-focused on operating in a conflict or post-conflict environment. I think we could do a lot to assist the USAID without necessarily spending a lot more money, with simply helping them get their heads around the new environment they are operating in.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Kagan, go ahead.

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you. I think the last point is really critical, and I want to emphasize it. Mr. Chairman, I was itching to make a comment on your question along those same lines.

The problem is exactly as Dave said. We have, you know, USAID, why is USAID in State? It is in State because of the Foreign Assistance Act. Why did we have the Foreign Assistance Act? Because we saw foreign assistance as being an aspect of our public diplomacy, and because we felt as a Nation that is very generous in their international giving, we felt that it was both in our interests and ethical for us to alleviate poverty.

If you ask the question, why is this system broken now, the answer is the system isn't broken from the standpoint of what it was designed to do. The system was designed to be an adjunct of our public diplomacy. It was never designed to be a major element of our national security policy. And what we have come to realize over the course of the last eight years—which, granted, we should have known before—is that this kind of assistance is a critical part of our national security policy, and it ranges from everything from phase zero engagement to try to avoid conflict—and by the way, that includes military components as well. As you know, when military talks about phase zero, it doesn't mean fighting, but it does mean things that military forces can and should be doing. And it continues through conflict and post-conflict. But when you start beating up the State Department about why the country teams aren't doing this sort of thing and why the State Department isn't able to do this, this is not the State Department's job. The State Department is American——

Mr. KLINE. Country team is much more than just State.

Dr. KAGAN. Absolutely. And I was referring only to your comment. There is a tendency to beat up State about this a lot and say we really need to pound State into doing this right. I question that.

The State Department is a diplomatic service, and we need to have a diplomatic service, and the purpose of a diplomatic service is to pass paper. That is what diplomats do—and have negotiations. Not only that, but primarily you don't have a diplomatic corps to conduct major operational planning and oversee the expenditure of huge amounts of money over large areas. That is not what a diplomatic corps does.

So if you are going to look for an aid organization that can be a player in national security policy, I am not at all convinced that that should be State, and I think we really need to revisit it. It is a very fundamental question you raised, sir, and I think it really merits a lot more discussion than it has had.

If I could beg your indulgence to comment briefly on the specifics in Afghanistan. I was last in Afghanistan in March of this year, and I had the opportunity to meet with the commander of the 205th Afghan Corps, who is based in Kandahar and has to fight in the south where the Marines are going to be going. And he raised a very interesting question. He said, "Are you Americans trying to create an expendable Afghan Army or an enduring Afghan Army?"

And what he meant by that was that we have been creating Afghan security forces, and the Afghans have been assigning them into combat without, as Dave says, rotational periods, which also means without rest periods, which also means without relief. There is no red, amber, green training cycle in that corps. If you are assigned to the 205th Corps, you are fighting all the time until you either retire or die, and that corps has been having some retention problems, and there are a variety of other things going on.

Although I supported the President's statement of his policy—and I do support it and I strongly support it and I think it is the right policy—I was very disappointed by one thing in his speech. He did not commit to increasing the size of the Afghan National Security Forces. And this is a big, big problem, because if you look at the 20 counterinsurgents on the 1,000 ratio that you need and you look at the population of Afghanistan, which by the way is an absolute swag, no one knows how many Afghans there actually are. We haven't had a census in 30 years. And this is a major problem, as Dave was alluding to.

But let us say there are about 30 million Afghans. You do the estimate and you would need about 600,000-some-odd counterinsurgents. Okay, let us cut it down and say that we are not fighting in parts of the country, although I don't find that persuasive, but okay. What are we aiming at?

With the current augmentation of U.S. Forces, with the current planned end state for Afghan national security forces, by the end of 2011 we will have 316,000 forces total on the ground. Now, there are two problems with that. First is it doesn't get you the counterinsurgency ratio; and second is, since that is right now the permanent end state of the Afghan National Army, it doesn't give us an exit strategy. Because if we pull out even 100,000 foreign troops out of there, then you have got 216,000.

So this is a problem, and it is really unfortunate that we have not focused enough on the expansion of the Afghan National Army, and I privilege that instead of the Afghan National Police for a reason. I think that we really need to consider the phasing of the development of security forces more than we have done hitherto. We want to get to an end state where you have police doing policing and not Army, but in the context of a war-torn society, with an ongoing counterinsurgency, right now that is not what we are focused on in the counterinsurgency area.

The Marines are not interested in local beat cops on crime. The Marines are interested in how many counterinsurgents are on the ground. If you are trying to raise a police force to beat counterinsurgents, then you are not raising them to be a police force; and if you can't raise them to be a police force because the situation doesn't permit it, then you should be raising more counterinsurgents, and that means Army.

So what we should be doing in Afghanistan, among other things—and I agree entirely with Dave also that we are seeing gap-filling with these soldiers and we have not seen a fundamental review or revision of American strategy in Afghanistan or international strategy in Afghanistan parallel to the review that accompanied the surge in Iraq in 2007. We have not yet seen that on the ground in theater, and I think we urgently need to.

Mr. SMITH. We could explore—but I am begging Mr. Thornberry's indulgence, and I want to give him a chance to ask his questions. We will follow up on that. We will try to come back to this, but Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate very much the work of each of you.

Dr. Kilcullen, one of the things this subcommittee has focused on a fair amount the past couple of years has been what we call strategic communications. I notice in your book you use a slightly different term, but as I recall, you put some importance on the government communicating in a clear, unified way as part of dealing with this accidental guerrilla, noting that what we do talks louder than what we say, admittedly. But I would be interested in your thoughts on where we are with that as a government and where we should go.

And I am reminded—I am little hazy about this, but I think the radio woke me up this morning talking about allegations that we killed a bunch of civilians in Afghanistan this morning. And the military was saying, well, it wasn't really us; it was Taliban who may have played a role. And we have looked into a number of instances in the past where bad guys get in a firefight with our folks, and then before we can get back to the base, they have made it look like the bad guys were in prayer and were shot in the back of the head. I mean, they are really sophisticated in this area, and it looks to me like we are playing catch-up. So I would be interested in your views.

Dr. KILCULLEN. Thank you, sir. I would just make two quick comments. One is that we place a different priority within the military on information operations to the priority that our enemy places.

The Taliban, as I have observed them in the field since 2006, put informational propaganda first. So the first thing they do is they decide what is the propaganda mission that we are trying to send. Then they figure out what operations to design and carry out to meet that propaganda objective. We do it the other way around. We design how we operate, and at the last minute we throw it to the information ops folks and say, hey, can you just explain this to the public. So we use our information operations to explain what we are already doing. The enemy uses their physical operations to send a message, and I think that is the fundamental mental shift that we need to make.

We have tended to treat information ops as a black art and as akin to artillery planning and of fixed targeting. So we have people looking at it as a targeting problem. It is actually not that. It is a political maneuver problem. And in the book, I get into a lot of detail about the political maneuver that we did that succeeded in eastern Afghanistan. The same would be true in Iraq. We carefully maneuvered to send a message in 2007.

So I think some people, notably General Petraeus and people associated with the surge in 2007, do get this; but it is not necessarily structurally built into the U.S. Government. Some people have talked about recreating the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), which as you know was disestablished in 1998, became the odd bureau within State. I think it certainly couldn't hurt. But the information environment has changed a lot since USIA was designed. It is a much more itemized and fragmented media marketplace out there. So I think civil society is actually a very key part of this message that we are trying to send, and I would emphasize that element.

And one final legislative issue. We had a lot of trouble in Iraq trying to counter al Qaeda in Iraq—propaganda—because of the Smith-Mundt Act, which meant that we couldn't do a lot of things online because if you put something on YouTube, and it is deemed to be information operations and there is a possibility that an American might load onto that page and read that and be influenced by that, that is technically illegal under the Smith-Mundt Act. And so we had to get a waiver, as you may recall, to be able to do that.

I think for Congress it might be worth looking at how that legislation may need to be relooked at or reexamined in a lot of the new media environment, so that it still has the same intent but doesn't necessarily restrict us from legitimate things we might want to do in the field.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Good point.

Dr. Kagan, could I just ask you, briefly, as my time runs out, I understand what you are saying about we need to look at each place individually. But don't we need to push increased capabilities, for example, taking this, that could be available to be tailored to each particular location?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, absolutely. And the thrust of my written testimony is anything we do anywhere, we draw from a pool of general purposes forces, both military and nonmilitary, that has to be adequately sized. And all I am trying to say on the specifics is the only

way to size it is to basically look at each of the specifics and sum them up, which is not what we do.

It is a question of we have always had this discussion about threat-based planning versus capabilities-based planning and so forth. Capabilities-based planning is just a way of deciding that you are not going to look at what the actual real-world requirement is, because it is budgetarily unpleasant. I don't think that is a good way to go in a world where we have active enemies who are actually shooting at us, trying to kill us every day.

And I think what we should be doing is looking at what the real-world requirement actually is by going place by place, and the military can do this and does this to some extent, although not, frankly, it doesn't sum this up in the way it should, again because it is budgetarily unpleasant.

I don't know the civilian side of things well enough, but I strongly doubt that this is done in that coherent fashion on the civilian side. So I don't think Congress is being presented with the information that it needs to understand what the real-world requirement is. You are not going to fund the real-world requirement at 100 percent, of course, because that would be tantamount to insuring everything, so you can never take a loss on anything, and it is unreasonable. You have to accept risk.

But until you have gone specific-by-specific and summed that all up and looked at what the real-world requirement is, you don't even know what risk you are accepting. And in the context of the current defense budget, where it has been made clear that we will be accepting risk, but where there has been virtually no public discussion anyway of how much risk we are actually accepting and where we are accepting it, I think this is a matter that Congress should interest itself in.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. A couple of observations and a couple of questions.

Smith-Mundt is something we have looked at and it absolutely needs to be fixed because of the way the Internet works, frankly. And the way other things work, you put any message out anywhere, it is going to get to an American, and Smith-Mundt did not contemplate that.

The problem we are going to have and as you are lobbying and talking about this issue, it is something we want to try to fix. The problem we are going to have is sort of the paranoia of the American public right now that the government is trying to manipulate them. It certainly didn't help when we had the incidents of the reporters being paid.

So if we open up the Smith-Mundt window—and I would love to be able to open it up, make that little tweak that you talked about, because I think it definitely needs to be done, maybe just expand the waiver ability, something—you are going to have a whole lot of folks on the other side who are going to come in and say, gosh, no, anything we need to do with Smith-Mundt, we need to strengthen it. We need to make sure the government is doing none of this. And I just worry that if we walk down that path we will wind up with more of a problem than we can handle.

On the country team thing and on whether or not it is the State Department job to sort of organize this, Mr. Kline was pointing out,

let us know what is going on in country, what the threat environment is. I think you are absolutely right, Mr. Kagan. State Department is supposed to be about diplomacy. I think they do more than push paper, but it is diplomacy that they are focused on.

Dr. KAGAN. I mean that with the greatest of respect.

Mr. SMITH. It is important paper that is being pushed. I think the problem we have discovered as we have gone around, just did a trip to Africa and sort of ran through a bunch of different countries with a bunch of different problems, Yemen, Kenya, Morocco, Egypt. The problem is the Ambassador, the Charge D'Affaires, whoever, the Chief of Mission is the person who is in charge of the country. And yes, there are a lot of other people there who do a lot of other things, but they all respond to him. We are having a little bit of a problem with that actually in SOCOM and Military Liaison Elements (MLEs), DOD chain of command versus State Department chain of command.

But I think Mr. Kline is essentially right; that if we are going to do this sort of holistic approach to a threat environment and take a walk through the messed-up world that we have and say, you know, where do we start at that zero point and how do we do that, the country team head has got to be the person who is, you know, this is where we are at, okay, and this is kind of what we would like to be done, and he is orchestrating it. Then you sort of move up from the country-by-country level, maybe a regional organization, however you do it. I think that needs to be done.

And I want to let Dr. Schirch comment on this, but ask an additional question, because the other thing that struck me as we look at this, the Brookings Institute did a study on failed states. Someone else did one about the same time. It is great. It is also like walking into your room where you haven't picked anything up in 15 years and going, where the hell do we start. There are so many countries with so many problems, rule of law, security, you know, if you put aside whether or not al Qaeda is in there trying to recruit, you know, just the basic governance issues. So how would we organize it both structurally, getting back to the State Department versus, you know, Chief of Mission issue, and then how would you prioritize when you are looking across one remarkably messed-up globe.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Absolutely. The challenge of addressing failed states, which many authors have been dealing with lately, has not taken into account something that Dr. Kilcullen noted; that the capacity for doing this is largely local in these countries, and it is strengthening and partnering from the U.S. to civil society, often, to build the capacity of their own state.

Mr. SMITH. Millennium Challenge Corporation, by the way, is outstanding, another change of the Bush Administration, that feeds into that local approach.

Dr. SCHIRCH. If I could just give an example, particularly on the strategic communication point as well that ties in with this one. I was in Iraq in 2005 working with Iraqi NGOs, and I took a lot of taxis. I talked with a lot of people. Overwhelmingly at that point, Iraqis felt that the U.S. was in Iraq for oil and to build permanent military bases. So, in terms of communicating what the U.S. interest was, there was a vast disconnect with what State Department

people were saying here and what Iraqis on the ground felt. There was a large gap. And largely that was Iraqis in civil society looking at what was being done in their country and saying, a lot of civilians are dying, it doesn't feel like it is about this population-centered security.

At that point, I was working with Iraqi NGOs to integrate reconciliation activities into their development. So when they are giving microcredit loans, they had a precondition for a Sunni-Shia business plan. They were doing very small-scale reconciliation, building security from the ground up and being very effective at it, going from village to village. And they were a mixed NGO group of Arab, Kurdish, Sunni, Shia people, all working together, going into different communities, unarmed, spoke the local language, operated on security based on their relationships with people, and they were doing fantastic work all over Iraq.

United States Institute of Peace, just in the last couple of years, has started to empower and build the capacity of local Iraqi NGOs and civil society to run the reconciliation workshops that are now happening across the country in Iraq.

Mr. SMITH. I am going to have to ask you to wrap up because I want to give my colleagues another chance. We have a 15-minute vote. We have another 10 minutes before we have to leave, but just give me another quick 10, 15 seconds.

Dr. SCHIRCH. Just in terms of the country teams, I think looking at the United States Institute of Peace and the NGO community as the resources for some of these challenges.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Jim, did you have anything more? I think everybody else is leaving.

Mr. MARSHALL. Yeah, I do actually.

Dr. Kagan, I thought maybe I was seeing a reprise or sequel to "No Good Way" as you were describing what needs to happen with the Afghan Army. And frankly, it is hard for me to see how we are going to have an effective enduring Afghan institutional army without having an Afghan government that is in much better shape than the current Afghan Government is. And I don't see how the Afghan Government is going to get into a much better position right now. Just the corruption and other challenges that they have got are enormous.

But I am fascinated and would really like to explore your thoughts about this sort of divide between the appropriate responsibility given State historically, more than just pushing paper, and what we now recognize should be done, you know, in part because of repeated comments from folks like Dr. Lund and Dr. Schirch. I mean we all know this, that an ounce of prevention can really avoid a pound of cure; and that pound of cure comes with huge costs in terms of lives and limbs for Americans and others.

And I don't necessarily agree with the Chairman's sort of summary, that it has to all be controlled or that the driving force, the guiding light, has to be the country team, unless country teams wind up getting redefined—which seems to me.

And I would really like you to talk a little bit more about if you already had some thoughts concerning how we might reorganize. You have heard me say—I have said this many times—I am absolutely convinced we won't fund it as long as it stays in State and

it is described as the historic diplomacy mission. We are just not going to do that. It is unrealistic to think we will. Political history is completely against the notion that we will. So what is your alternative to get the appropriate funding to have the ounce of prevention?

Dr. KAGAN. Let me start by clarifying the remark that I know is going to come out of this meeting. Full disclosure: My sister-in-law is a former ambassador, and I am very familiar with what ambassadors do, and I did not—I actually wasn't trying to denigrate the State Department at all, but simply to say there are things that they are designed to do and things they are not designed to do.

And the issue isn't so much with the ambassador actually, and I want to make this point and I will give you the full disclosure. Ambassadors can—especially professional Foreign Service Officer ambassadors can be, and many of them are capable of thinking about these things and trying to do the right thing. What they rarely have is the right kind of staff to do the planning, you know, intelligence gathering, intelligence assessment, planning and so forth——

Mr. SMITH. Beyond their capability—sorry to interrupt here. I take Mr. Marshall's point. Beyond their capability, their responsibility within our flowchart, if we want to change that flowchart we can change it; but if the whole thing is by, through and with, okay, you work with the local population, whether it is on development or counterinsurgency. The ambassador is our representative in that country. If anything goes on in that country done by the United States of America that he doesn't know about, he or she is rightfully pissed off and completely undermined in their ability to do their job, the job that we have assigned that person to do. That is my only point. But go ahead.

Dr. KAGAN. So I think one of the questions is how are the missions staffed, and missions need to be staffed differently in different places. One of the things that sent shivers up my spine more than anything else are the discussions that you hear in the corridors of the new embassy complex in Baghdad about the need for the embassy to return to normalcy, by which is meant a normal diplomatic representation with some sort of foreign assistance. That is insane. It is not a normal situation, and the Ambassador in Iraq is going to continue to have to do things beyond the norm. But there is an institutional bias within State that drives against creating the structures that are necessary to do this.

How do we fix it? Look, in the short term, the reason this is going into the military is because the military is the only organization that is capable of doing this, for two reasons. One, and the most important, is because the military does have the capability to put together planning staffs to develop intelligence analysis, plan, conduct and execute operations on this scale, and we don't have country teams on the whole that can do that, with a handful of exceptions, and that is probably going to persist for some time. So, in the short term, I doubt that there is an alternative to putting this kind of resource through the military in areas where we have troops present, in countries where we have a very active military assistance program and so forth.

In the long term, I can't tell you what the structure should be. I can tell you what it shouldn't be. It shouldn't be what we have, nor is there going to be a simple fix like making USAID a Cabinet post or something, or pulling it out of the flowchart. Because what we have to do—look, we do want USAID to be a part of our public diplomacy. We do give foreign assistance for that reason. We do want to alleviate poverty. We do give assistance. We don't want to stop doing that. But we also can't have USAID as a national security tool beholden to those principles, as it is right now.

So I suspect that the long-term fix for this is going to require two separate organizational structures, either within one USAID organization—although I am skeptical of that—or in two separate organizations. And I would say I don't see that it matters whether this is housed at DOD or State or somewhere else. And I think that we need to get over the allergy to making this a DOD function. There are lots of things that are DOD functions that could be done elsewhere.

I agree with you that if you want to be funded—but I would say even more importantly, if you want this to be integrated well into our national security strategy and executed well as part of that, integrating it into DOD is probably the best long-term solution. But this is something that I think really merits very, very serious study and much more serious study than it has received. I am sorry I can't offer you more specific than that.

Mr. SMITH. I think the bottom line is it is an interagency approach. It has to be an interagency approach. No one agency is going to be in charge. The key is, how do they cross over.

Dr. LUND. There are definitely exceptions to how the country teams relate to these issues. It has been enough years so I can sort of say this.

In Zimbabwe, USAID was keeping its own sort of early warning grid for some years and not letting the ambassador know they were doing it because they felt that maybe, you know, he would want to take it over, he wouldn't do it right and so on, but this is seven, eight years ago, before the crisis really grew, and adjusting their programs as much as they could to these drivers of conflict.

In Mindanao, we have got the ambassador and U.S. administrator, just like this in the southern Philippines. A lot of programs pushed into Mindanao over the last seven, eight years, quite integrated, quite strategically targeted and so on. They need a little tweaking here and there, but linked up with the military aid to the Philippine marines, and in local areas, working in Basilan, for example, working in tandem with each other more or less.

So it really is where the leadership can be carried out. So I think maybe the security rubric is really important overall, but the fact that you can save money, I mean, doesn't that have some marketability these days?

Mr. MARSHALL. We have always known that. I am sorry. I mean, this is not new news. We have known this for generations, and we still have a problem politically sustaining it. So from a strategic perspective, that is all I am offering here, is sort of oversight; somebody needs to think through how this is sustainable, because this problem is not going away for the foreseeable future as weapons become more sophisticated and available retail.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Kilcullen.

Dr. KILCULLEN. I just wanted to answer your question.

One of the things that we did towards the end of the Bush Administration—which was actually signed off on by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Administrator of USAID just before the inauguration, and I believe has received support from the Obama Administration as well—was we produced an interagency counterinsurgency handbook designed for policymakers at the higher level in the legislative and executive branch.

And in that we talked about something called a mission augmentation team, which is a small team that goes into an embassy that has one of these situations of a developing insurgency or conflict prevention, and it is specifically tailored to support that country team in exercising the responsibilities that you are talking about. So we have approved a structure to actually do that. I don't know if the current State Department leadership plans to go ahead and develop that fully, but it is there, it is approved, and it is something that we may want to look at to build this capacity that you are talking about.

In writing that handbook, we went into a lot of detail on prevention, and we also now have interagency agreement on some of the prevention issues that are required. So a lot of the intellectual foundation is there.

The problem I would go back to is, State is the size of an Army brigade, you know, it is 6- to 8,000 people, and it is just not big enough to do a lot of this stuff. It needs to be bigger and better resourced. And I know Fred was being a little flippant, but you know, the reason that we managed to get the CIA into Afghanistan 27 days after 9/11 was the State Department, basing, overflight, fuel supply, diplomatic clearance, preventing the Russians and the Iranians from interfering. That was all State Department. State Department work, diplomacy is like air support. You don't walk down the street in Baghdad and look to your left and see an airman providing air superiority and to the right and see a diplomat. But you can't operate without those two guys.

Mr. SMITH. We have got to run, could talk about this for a great deal of time. You have all been very, very helpful. I think this is critical. I didn't even get into the questions about the budget, how we go forward on this and how we plan for implementing the strategy, but obviously, this has come out from our conversation here, and it is not just the DOD budget, it is the whole budget. And I like the idea of a sort of holistic security approach across agency lines in terms of how we put together the budget, and I think there are some good ideas there. And of course there are tough choices involved, and everyone is always very good in government at telling you where we should spend the money. It is getting the people to say this is where we shouldn't spend it that is always, always the challenge.

But thank you, and certainly this committee wants to stay in touch with all of you. I think you have very important knowledge and insights on this critical subject. So thank you for your testimony, and we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

May 7, 2009

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 7, 2009

Statement of Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Chairman Adam Smith
Hearing on Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned

May 7, 2009

"Today, the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee will meet, as a continued effort to improve our capabilities, to discuss issues surrounding our irregular warfare and counterinsurgency efforts. I'd like to build on past discussions as to the evolving nature of current and future threats our country faces and how we are equipped to counter those threats, and what lessons learned we can apply to improve our capabilities. I want to thank our witnesses for attending and lending their expertise to this important discussion. We welcome you and your thoughts.

"To ensure our national security apparatus is properly focused to confront the transnational threats that we face, we must apply lessons learned from past operations while remaining vigilant of the ever changing tactics of violent extremists. There is broad consensus that, while threats from states do still remain, the primary threats we face are not bound to specific borders – such as terrorism, WMD proliferation and economic instability.

"Many have expressed concern, which I share, that our military and entire national security apparatus is not properly equipped to effectively respond to the threats we face today and emerging threats in the future. Unquestionably, improvements have been made in the years since September 11th, but much of our national security structure maintains a Cold-War era approach.

"We must adjust our thinking and approach to meet these changing, irregular threats. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panelists today about how we can reform our national security system to more squarely face the threats we face today and better prepare for the threats of the future.

"Again, I thank the witnesses for being with us today and look forward to discussing this important issue."

Miller Opening Statement for Hearing on Lessons Learned from Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare

May 7, 2009

Washington, D.C. – U.S. Rep. Jeff Miller (R-FL), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, today released the following prepared remarks for the subcommittee's hearing on the lessons learned and issues associated with counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare:

"Today's hearing continues the subcommittee's examination of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Since our last hearing on Irregular Warfare, Secretary Gates held a press conference on April 6th during which he outlined his vision for the realignment of defense priorities, central among these is supporting the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other potential irregular campaigns. We have been waiting to see how his vision is articulated in the defense budget for Fiscal Year 2010, and, if press reports prove accurate, we should receive the Department's budget numbers today, although the detailed justification materials will not arrive along with the top-line figures.

"Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency and irregular warfare capabilities are of unquestionable importance to our national security strategy. In the last year, the Department released its Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept and Irregular Warfare Directive, and established the Joint Irregular Warfare Center at Joint Forces Command, all to better guide efforts to meet the varied threats of today's security environment where increasingly 'unconventional' and 'irregular' methods are leveraged to counter U.S. conventional capability.

"Meanwhile, the effective application of counterinsurgency doctrine, combined with a timely surge in forces, has borne fruit in Iraq as security has improved allowing the political process to advance and setting the conditions for a reasonable drawdown of troops. Accordingly, the military has aggressively adopted counterinsurgency as a mantra for its operations and training, and seeks to apply many of the hard lessons learned in Iraq to the Afghanistan fight as well as in other regions rife with instability.

"On the terrorism front, many observers have deemed the actions and goals of Al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations to fall within a global insurgency model, which calls for a corresponding use of counterinsurgency capability and strategy in response. Key to this struggle has been the strategic communications battle, the so called 'battle for the hearts and minds', which focuses on protecting audiences from the corrupting messages of Al Qaeda and its ilk and dissuading vulnerable populations from the siren call of violent extremist movements. This focus on the population is a central tenet of counterinsurgency strategy. Similarly, irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, along with the full range of military and other capabilities, to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

"Ultimately, our national security strategy must balance irregular and conventional capabilities. Secretary Gates also alluded to this point in his April 6th comments. Although Somalia, Yemen and other areas highlight the need for irregular and counterinsurgency strategies, a potential conventional engagement cannot be simply wished away and must be accounted for appropriately in strategy and budgeting. We look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today as we continue to examine how the Department can best meet today's security challenges and as we begin to see the details of Secretary Gates' vision in the Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget."

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Counterinsurgency: possible, not recommended

Best-Practice Counterinsurgency

The Afghanistan and Iraq examples demonstrate that if we *must* engage in large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns, then there are certain techniques that can work when properly applied in support of a well-considered political strategy. Indeed, drawing together our observations from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Timor, Thailand and Pakistan, it is possible to distill a series of principles for effective counterinsurgency. These are neither original, nor unique to current conflicts, or to the United States: historically, all successful counterinsurgencies seem to have included some variation on them. But current counterinsurgency campaigns are occurring in traditional, often tribal societies, and under resource constraints that make classical counterinsurgency methods (particularly the traditionally-recommended force ratio of 20 police or military personnel per 100 local people)[i] simply unrealistic. Nevertheless, the field evidence suggests that effectiveness improves exponentially when counterinsurgents apply eight "best practices" (discussed in more detail below):

1. A **political strategy** that builds government effectiveness and legitimacy while marginalizing insurgents, winning over their sympathizers and co-opting local allies;

2. A **comprehensive approach** that closely integrates civil and military efforts, based on a common diagnosis of the situation and a solid long-term commitment to the campaign;

3. **Continuity** of key personnel and policies, with sufficient authority and resources to do the job;

4. **Population-centric security** founded on presence, local community partnerships, self-defending populations, and small-unit operations that keep the enemy off balance;

5. **Cueing and synchronization** of development, governance and security efforts, building them in a simultaneous, coordinated way that supports the political strategy;

6. **Close and genuine partnerships** that put the host nation government in the lead and builds self-reliant, independently functioning institutions over time;

7. Strong emphasis by coalition forces on **building effective and legitimate local security forces**, balanced by a willingness to close with the enemy in direct combat while these forces are built; and

8. A **region-wide approach** that disrupts insurgent safe havens, controls borders and frontier regions, and undermines terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries.

Political Strategy. Building the political legitimacy and effectiveness of a government affected by an insurgency, in the eyes of its people and the international community, is fundamental. Political reform

and development represents the hard core of any counterinsurgency strategy, and provides a framework for all other counterinsurgency programs and initiatives. This requires a genuine willingness to reform oppressive policies, remedy grievances and fix problems of governance that create conditions extremists exploit. In parallel, the political strategy is designed to undermine support for insurgents, win over their sympathizers to the government side, and co-opt local community leaders to ally themselves with the government.

Comprehensive Approach. Best-practice counterinsurgency closely integrates political, security, economic and information components. It synchronizes civil and military efforts under unified political direction and common command-and-control, funding and resource mechanisms. This requires a shared diagnosis of the situation — agreed between civilian and military agencies, coalition and host nation governments, and updated through continuous, objective situational assessment.

Continuity, Authority and Resources. Key personnel (commanders, ambassadors, political staffs, aid mission chiefs, key advisers and intelligence officers) in a counterinsurgency campaign should be there "for the duration". If this is not possible, they should serve the longest tour feasible. Key personnel must receive adequate authority and sufficient resources to get the job done while taking a long-term view of the problem, so that a consistent set of policies can be developed and applied over time.

Population-Centric Security. Effective counterinsurgency provides human security to the population, where they live, twenty-four hours a day. This, rather than destroying the enemy, is the central task. It demands continuous presence by security forces that protect population centers, local alliances and partnerships with community leaders, the creation of self-defending populations through local neighborhood watch and guard forces, and small-unit ground forces that operate in tandem with local security forces, developing pervasive situational awareness, quick response times and unpredictable operating patterns that keep the enemy off balance.

Synchronization of security, development and governance. Timeliness and reliability in delivering on development promises is critical in winning popular support. This requires careful cueing of security operations to support development and governance activities, and *vice versa*. In turn, counterinsurgents must synchronize all these activities to support the overall political strategy through a targeted information campaign.

Partnership with the host nation government. Best-practice strategy puts the host government genuinely and effectively in the lead, via integrated "campaign management" planning and consultation mechanisms. These apply coalition expertise to cover local gaps, build the host government's capacity, respect its sovereignty and leverage its local knowledge and "home-ground advantage".

Effective, legitimate local security forces. Effective counterinsurgency requires indigenous security forces that are legitimate in local eyes, operate under the rule of law, and can effectively protect local communities against insurgents. Building such forces takes vastly more time and resources than is usually appreciated. While these forces are being built, the coalition must be willing to close with the enemy in direct combat, thereby minimizing insurgent pressure on local institutions. Direct combat (not remote engagement) is essential to minimize collateral non-combatant casualties, ensure flexible responses to complex ground environments, and allow rapid political and economic follow-up after combat action.

Region-wide approach. Because of the active sanctuary insurgents typically rely on in neighboring countries, and the support they receive from trans-national terrorist organizations and cross-border criminal networks, an integrated region-wide strategy is essential. This must focus on disrupting insurgent safe havens, controlling borders and frontier regions, and undermining terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries, while building a diplomatic consensus that creates a regional and international environment inhospitable to terrorists and insurgents.

Necessary but not preferred

Iraq in 2007, and parts of the Afghan campaign in 2006-8, demonstrated that counterinsurgency can work when done properly. But we must recognize that, against the background of an AQ strategy specifically designed to soak us up in a series of large-scale interventions, counterinsurgency in general is a game we need to avoid wherever possible. If we are forced to intervene, we have a reasonably sound idea of how to do so. But we should avoid such interventions wherever possible, simply because the costs are so high and the benefits so doubtful.

In my view, as discussed already, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was an extremely serious strategic error. The task of moment is not to cry over spilt milk, but rather to help clean it up: a task in which the surge, the comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, and our troops on the ground are admirably succeeding as of late 2008. This method thus represents the best approach to ending the Iraq war. When I went to Iraq in 2007 (and on both previous occasions) it was to help end the war, by suppressing the violence and defeating the insurgency: to *end* the war, not abandon it half-way through, leaving the Iraqis to be slaughtered. When the United States and the coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, we took on a moral and legal responsibility for its people's wellbeing. Regardless of anyone's position on the decision to invade, those obligations still stand and cannot be wished away merely because they have proven inconvenient.

Still, like almost every other counterinsurgency professional, I warned against the war in 2002-3 on the grounds that it was likely to be extremely difficult, demand far more resources than our leaders seemed willing to commit, inflame world Muslim opinion making our counterterrorism tasks harder, and entail a significant opportunity cost in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This was hardly an original or brilliant insight. Rather, it was a view shared with the rest of the counterinsurgency community: one would be hard-pressed to find any professional counterinsurgent who thought the 2003/4 Iraq strategy was sensible.

The issue for practitioners in the field today is not to second-guess the decisions of 2003, but to get on with the job at hand, which is what both Americans and Iraqis expect of us. In that respect, the new strategy and tactics implemented in 2007, and which relied for their effectiveness on a population-centric strategy and the extra troop numbers of the surge, *are* succeeding and deserve to be supported. As described in Chapter 3, in 2006 a normal night in Baghdad involved 120 to 150 dead Iraqi civilians, and each month we lost dozens of Americans killed or maimed. In 2008, a bad night involves one or two dead civilians, U.S. losses are dramatically down—to levels not regularly seen since 2003—and security is beginning to be restored. Therefore, even on the most conservative estimate, in the eighteen months of the surge to date the new counterinsurgency approach has saved 12,000 to 16,000 Iraqis and hundreds of American lives. And we are now, finally, in a position to pursue a political strategy that will ultimately see Iraq stable, our forces withdrawn, and the whole sorry adventure of Iraq cleaned up to

the maximum extent possible so that we can get on with the fight in other theaters—most pressingly, Afghanistan.

On the ground, in both Iraq and Afghanistan over several years, I have fought and worked beside brave and dedicated military and civilian colleagues who are making an enormous difference in an incredibly tough environment. I salute their dedication —Americans, allies, Iraqis and Afghans alike— and I hold all of them in the highest possible regard. These quiet professionals deserve our unstinting support. Besides having the courage to close with and finish the enemy, (an enemy capable of literally unbelievable depravity and cruelty towards its own people) they have proven capable of great compassion and kindness toward the people they protect. The new tactics and tools they are now applying —protecting the people 24/7, building alliances of trust with local communities, putting political reconciliation and engagement first, connecting the people to the government, co-opting anyone willing to be reconciled and simultaneously eliminating the irreconcilables with precision and discrimination—these techniques are the best way out of a bad situation which we should never have gotten ourselves into.

My personal position on counterinsurgency in general, and on Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, could therefore be summarized as "never again, but..." That is, we should avoid any future large-scale, unilateral military intervention in the Islamic world, for all the reasons already discussed. But, recognizing that while our conventional warfighting superiority endures, any sensible enemy will choose to fight us in this manner, we should hold on to the knowledge and corporate memory so painfully acquired, across all the agencies of all the coalition partners, in Afghanistan and Iraq. And should we find ourselves (by error or necessity) in a similar position once again, then the best practices we have re-discovered in current campaigns represent an effective approach: effective, but not recommended.

The strategic arithmetic of local security forces

As mentioned, one of the ways in which current counterinsurgencies differ markedly from those of the classical era is in force ratio: that is, there are simply insufficient western troops available to conduct traditional counterinsurgency with anything like the necessary troop numbers. But the events of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq in 2007, and especially the tribal revolt against AQI, suggest a strategic arithmetic of local partnerships which could be very significant in future campaigns.

In Iraq in 2007, as already noted, we found ourselves with simply insufficient forces to secure the entire population and to be everywhere we needed to be. We did not have any additional U.S. troops available for the Iraqi theater, but even if we had, their impact would have been quite limited. For example, imagine we had possessed an additional 50,000 U.S. troops and inserted them into the Iraqi theater of operations at the beginning of 2007. Of those 50,000 troops, approximately 60% (30,000 personnel) would have been tied up in headquarters, forward operating base security, logistics, maintenance, communications, rear area security, guarding lines of communication, or other non-combat tasking. This would leave about 20,000 combat troops available for operations. On a 2:1 or 1:1 rotation model (since even combat troops need to rest, refit and recuperate between operations) this would translate into between 7,000 and 10,000 additional troops out on the ground, providing security or improving situational awareness, at any one time. The effect on the enemy's recruiting base and deployed forces would be nil, since all these troops would come from outside Iraq. Thus, overall, for an

investment of an additional 50,000 U.S. troops we would gain a net improvement of 7-10,000 personnel in the available force ratio. To summarize:

Option 1 – insert 50 000 U.S. troops into theater

FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking:	*30 000 troops*
Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model:	*20,000*
Force actually out on the ground at any time :	*7-10,000*
Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base:	*NIL*

NET EFFECT: 7-10,000 improvement in force ratio

Consider, however, an alternative approach. Instead of inserting an additional 50,000 U.S. troops into theater, we would attempt to win over 50,000 Iraqis into Local Security Forces such as neighborhood watch organizations, concerned citizens groups, local security guard forces, auxiliary police and the like. (In point of fact, as of mid-2008 there were approximately 95,000 Iraqis, mostly former Sunni insurgents or former members of local community or tribal militias, who were so employed by the coalition or the Iraqi government).[ii] In this approach, there is no requirement for headquarters personnel, FOB security, rear area or logistics support since all these recruits live and work out on the ground. For the same reason, there is no "rotation model" as such, since the full number of personnel are permanently in the field. Assuming a normal rate of sickness, absenteeism and rest, this means approximately 40,000 additional security personnel are out on the ground at any one time. Some coalition forces would clearly be needed for mentoring, supervision and support – approximately a one-in-ten ratio, worst case, giving an additional coalition overhead of 5,000 troops. But, most importantly, the act of recruiting these personnel has an enormous effect on the enemy's recruiting base and available manpower, denying 50,000 fighters to the insurgents, while putting all these fighters' families and local communities into the ledger on the government side. This gives a net benefit, in terms of force ratio, of 85-90,000, or eight to twelve times the benefit of inserting an equivalent number of western troops into theater. To summarize this option:

Option 2 – win over 50 000 Iraqis into LSFs

FOB security, logistics, HQ, rear area or other non-combat tasking:	*NIL*
Force available for combat tasking on a 1:1 or 2:1 rotation model:	*50,000*
Force actually out on the ground at any time (ie net effect):	*40,000*
Coalition forces required for partnering, mentoring and supervision:	*5,000*
Effect on enemy forces and recruiting base:	*-50,000*

NET EFFECT: 80-95,000 pax improvement in force ratio
(i.e. 8 to 12 times the value of inserting an equal number of coalition troops, even without counting families and local communities)

Clearly, there are issues of loyalty, motivation and reliability in recruiting so many local people into security forces, as discussed in Chapter 2. But these can be overcome through supervision, vetting, employment of forces on missions within their capabilities and skillset, and proper mentoring and advisory teams. Political measures to secure the loyalty of these personnel toward the national government are more difficult, but still feasible. And the strategic arithmetic of local partnerships is

inescapable: for an equivalent investment of personnel, the benefit gained by developing local partnerships with the community being protected is on the order of 10 times greater than what is achieved by inserting western troops into the environment. In addition to creating self-protecting communities, isolating extremists and vastly improving situational awareness by tapping into large-scale community networks, this approach dramatically reduces the number of coalition troops required to carry out a counterinsurgency mission. The 95,000 Iraqis now working with the coalition represent an improvement in force ratio of more than 200,000 personnel, an improvement without which the current security gains in Iraq would have been completely impossible.

Again: counterinsurgency is feasible, though definitely *not* preferred in the current strategic environment. But if we do need to engage in it, especially in traditional tribal societies, then an emphasis on local partnerships and local security forces that protect communities and guard against extremist presence is likely to be an essential component of such a campaign.

At a more strategic level, such local partnerships are also a key component in coping with the threat of transnational *takfiri* terrorism.

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[i] For a discussion of force ratios in counterinsurgency and nation-building see Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell and K. Jack Riley, *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict,* RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca, 2005.

[ii] Conversation with Iraq desk officer, National Security Council, September 2008.

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Testimony of Frederick W. Kagan,

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Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

"Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare: Issues and Lessons Learned"
May 7, 2009

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America and our allies today face an array of enemies and threats daunting in their number and, taken together, their scale. For the moment, all of our enemies prefer to fight us through unconventional or irregular warfare rather than through traditional force-on-force engagements. Many of the threats we and our allies face are also focusing on their unconventional capabilities—either in the form of terrorism and other types of irregular warfare or through the development of nuclear weapons capabilities or both. Only China appears now to be actively preparing to face us in a conventional conflict sometime in the future.

But if our enemies and challengers prefer to fight us or deter us through unconventional means, it does not follow that we can or should prefer to use such means against them. On the high end of the unconventional spectrum, our nuclear force is intended entirely to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which our president might use nuclear weapons other than in response to a WMD attack or to preempt an imminent WMD attack that could in no other way be prevented. On the low end of the unconventional spectrum, the United States cannot use terrorism. Since our aim is to support rather than undermine global security, we cannot use insurgency. Because we are bound by international law and morality, we cannot encourage religious, sectarian, ethnic, or tribal violence within or between states—as our opponents do and as many empires of the past did to direct resentment away from themselves. What remains? We can use the traditional tools of statecraft, which include diplomacy both public and private, military operations conducted in strict accord with laws of war crafted for conventional warfare, economic aid and sanctions, international criminal law, and so on. In other words, we are constrained not by our systems and procedures, but by our nature as a state that aspires to be upright, ethical, law-abiding, and contributing to global stability, to fight our unconventional enemies with largely conventional means.

We have been using all of these and other tools against our current enemies and vital threats since 9/11. Much has been made of the current administration's efforts to engage our adversaries and challengers diplomatically with the argument that the previous administration disdained diplomacy. Certainly the Bush administration did not engage extensively in negotiations with Iran, for which it has been castigated. But it did engage vigorously in diplomatic efforts within Iraq through multiple channels engaging an extraordinary variety of Iraq actors—and to very good effect. This political engagement, led by Ambassador Ryan Crocker but purposefully supported by Generals Petraeus and Odierno, has been as essential to the transformation in the Iraqi political scene as the surge of forces in 2007. By all accounts the current administration is dramatically less engaged politically with Iraq, a circumstance resulting not only from the absence of an ambassador in Baghdad for the past several months but also from the failure of this administration to maintain the high-level and direct engagements with key Iraqi leaders that its predecessor had. Diplomacy should not be a zero-sum game, where increasing activity in Tehran results in distraction in Baghdad.

We have also been using economic levers of all varieties in many combinations, ranging from traditional foreign assistance in large amounts to countries like Egypt and Pakistan to sanctions of various forms against Iran, North Korea, and, until recently, Cuba. We

have made skillful use of international law as well, seizing the assets of designated terrorists and targeting narco-traffickers and the terrorist beneficiaries of their profits. The Obama administration has continued in this tradition by bringing the surviving Somali pirate to New York for trial—precisely as provided for under international law. The use of these traditional instruments of statecraft is not controversial—the only arguments we have are about how to apply specific instruments in specific cases rather than whether or not to use them.

The more fundamental debate centers on the use of the military instrument. In particular, although most Americans agree that the U.S. must be prepared to use military force against its enemies, there is considerable disagreement about what kind of force to use and how to use it. It would be charitable to say that eight years of war have made us weary and therefore eager to follow the lures of those who claim to have found a silver-bullet solution to our problems either through technology or through our own use of irregular warfare. It would not be true, however. Advocates both of high-tech and low-tech alternatives to conventional military power dominated in the 1990s and many changed their dogmas only marginally after 9/11. It is distressing to hear today some of the same arguments we heard during the "strategic pause" of the Clinton years about the desirability of relying on technology to reduce the economic burden of defending America—despite the fact that it was an attempt to rely on precisely such theories in 2001 and 2003 that led us into near-disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is natural to want to find an alternative to the unpleasant requirement to use large numbers of ground forces in far-off lands, whether that be smart bombs, Special Forces, local troops, or sweet reason. In particular, the desire to pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan (and, to be sure, the resistance by some to invading those countries in the first place) has led to the search for some kind of "counter-terrorism" strategy that would allow us to defeat our most dangerous foes without using conventional military force. Alas, there is no reason to believe that such a strategy could work, and much reason to believe that it will not.

Let's start by defining the enemy more closely. An enemy is a group, state, or individual that is working actively to attack America, its citizens, or their property. Enemies are distinct from threats—groups, states, or individuals that may become enemies at some point in the future but are not now attacking us. China is a threat; al Qaeda is an enemy. Iran, interestingly, is both—it is an enemy in the sense that Iranian agents are working actively in Iraq and Afghanistan to help Iraqis and Afghans kill Americans and defeat our aims. But these efforts are less significant strategically to us than Iran's attempts to develop nuclear weapons and other activities around the region that are not being used to attack us or our allies now, but may be used for very significant attacks in the future.

Leaving Iran aside, the list of our enemies is lengthy. Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere aim at our complete destruction and work toward that goal every day. The Taliban group based in Quetta, Pakistan—the Mullah Omar or Quetta Shura Taliban—is one of our principal enemies in Afghanistan; the Haqqani network based in Miramshah, Pakistan is the other. Smaller and less significant enemy groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also fighting us, including the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), the Tora Bora Front, and numerous drug lords. A number of Pakistan-based groups are also fighting us in Afghanistan, although their main target and focus is Pakistan itself.

They include the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan (TTP), led by Beitullah Mehsud and based in South Waziristan; the Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), led by Sufi Mohammad and based in the area from Bajaur through Swat; and the Lashkar-e Toiba (LeT), which is based in Muridke, a small town near Lahore in Punjab, and operates throughout Pakistan as well as in Kashmir and India. In addition to these groups fighting us in Afghanistan, our Pakistani allies in their own country, and our strategic partner, India, we still face dangerous enemies in Iraq as well: former Baathists within Iraq and in Syria and Jordan; the Naqshbandi network; Ansar al Sunnah; various fragments of the Sadrist movement; and the Iranian Qods Force and its networks. Apart from the threat it poses to our Israeli allies, Lebanese Hezbollah has also been active in Iraq killing Americans.

One could lump all of these enemies together and speak of a global insurgency within the Muslim world, and there is considerable validity to that viewpoint. Taken together, these groups, both Sunni and Shi'i, form a small minority of the worlds 1.5 billion Muslims who wish to impose upon their co-religionists first (and then all of the world's non-Muslims) a peculiar and heretical interpretation of Islam that holds little popular appeal. For that reason, these groups have had to use force even against the Muslim populations where they hold sway to compel those people to adhere to an extremist ideology mostly alien to them, but cloaked in religious language. Thus Taliban rule in Afghanistan in the 1990s was brutal and inhumane. When al Qaeda in Iraq ran Anbar it committed unspeakable atrocities to keep the Anbaris in line—and ultimately facilitated its own destruction when the Anbaris "awoke" with the aid of the surge. TNSM installed itself in Swat through violence and has maintained itself there through violence, just as it had earlier established itself by force in Bajaur and Dir. The good news is that our problem is not convincing Muslims to reject this hideous ideology—the overwhelming majority of Muslims already do reject it. The bad news is that the enemy groups know how to take and hold power through force if they are not opposed, and the opposition of the local people is rarely enough to throw off these new tyrants.

For decades we have hoped that we could do enough damage to such groups by targeted strikes against their leaders to render them harmless, if not to defeat them outright. Ronald Reagan used airstrikes to respond to the Marine Barracks Bombing in Beirut and to Libyan terrorism. Bill Clinton used cruise missile strikes to respond to al Qaeda attacks against US embassies in Africa. The attacks against Libya—a state sponsor of terrorism—were relatively effective at deterring further Libyan terrorist attacks. The airstrikes against Hezbollah and al Qaeda were ineffective and neither deterred nor prevented either group from operating against us. After the withdrawal of US ground forces from Somalia in 1993, the US (and the international community) has done little to prevent Somalia from slipping further into chaos and serving as a base and breeding ground for extremists with ideologies similar to al Qaeda. After 9/11, the US responded by building up Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA), which relied on Special Forces and indigenous troops to achieve its aims. JTF-HOA was not able to prevent the extremists from overrunning Somalia and, after Ethiopia invaded and occupied Somalia briefly, has not been able to prevent them from returning. In Iraq between 2003 and 2007 we relied extensively on targeted raids against enemy leaders, supported by 150,000 troops. We killed the enemy leaders at a terrific pace, and even succeeded in killing Abu

Musaab al Zarqawi, the head of AQI, in June 2006. But the enemy replaced its lost cadres faster than we could kill them. To the argument that it was the very presence of US forces that facilitated that replacement one could point out that the surge of forces in 2007 and the change of strategy that accompanied it did what the targeted counter-terrorism approach could not do: it drove the terrorists out of their sanctuaries and rallied the support of the Iraqi people against them.
One could also point to our experiences in Pakistan, where the US has attempted to use a combination of targeted strikes and indigenous forces to combat al Qaeda and many of the other enemy groups named above—some of them direct threats to the Pakistani state. Where is the success to show for this strategy? One can hardly complain that it has not been sufficiently resourced—the US has given billions in aid to Pakistan since 9/11. Nor have we maintained a "large footprint"—on the contrary, there have been no conventional American forces in Pakistan. We are left only with the argument that we have not been applying the strategy correctly. But how credible is that argument? Four presidents have attempted to apply this strategy in various areas over the course of decades, and it has never succeeded against a terrorist group. Is it really likely that, although we have been trying this approach for more than a quarter of a century, no Democratic president, no Republican president, no military commanders, no Directors of Central Intelligence, have ever figured it out? And, if it really is that hard to figure out, why should we believe that we can do it now? The burden of proof is on those who claim that we should try again a strategy that has been tried repeatedly and failed to show some reason why it should succeed now.

So what is to be done? First, recognize that our challenge is not to find some magical way to beat the terrorists at their own game either in terms of propaganda or irregular warfare, but rather to find ways to use the tremendous capabilities at our disposal to maximum advantage in difficult circumstances. Our experience in Iraq suggests that this can be done, but different problems require different solutions. Our principal challenge in Afghanistan now is counter-insurgency and state-building. The cultural background, the economic situation, and the political climate all require significant modifications to the approaches that worked in Iraq. But the basic principles of counter-insurgency and state building apply, and we should not dismiss our experiences in applying those principles to Iraq simply because we rightly recognize that Afghanistan is different.

The key problem in Iraq in 2006 was the rising spiral of sectarian violence that threatened to engulf the country in full-scale sectarian civil war. Providing the population with security from that violence was the essential precondition for any sort of progress on any other front. Afghanistan faces different problems. There is virtually no ethno-sectarian violence in Afghanistan—almost all of the fighting occurs within Pashtun areas against international and Afghan forces. There is very little insurgent violence against civilians at all (although there is a great deal of criminality). We do need to provide security to the Afghan people, working together with Afghan Security Forces, but that is not enough. The key problem in Afghanistan today is that the government is widely seen to be illegitimate because of corruption, criminality, and its inability to provide justice, security, and rule of law to its people. US and international forces have not hitherto focused on the need to address the yawning legitimacy gap in Afghanistan. That must change. It must become the core objective of our strategy to which all others, including the establishment of security, are subordinated. This approach is as classic a counter-

insurgency strategy as the one implemented in Iraq—but suitably modified for different conditions. As with all counter-insurgency approaches, it will be difficult, costly, and time-consuming, but it can work if done right, as history shows. It has the advantage, among other things, of allowing us to use the conventional tools of statecraft at which we excel to best advantage against unconventional enemies.

So what of Pakistan? A counter-insurgency strategy is required there as well, but the balance of forces must be entirely different since we have neither the desire nor the means to send large numbers of American troops to fight there. Here the prospects are less promising. One problem, perhaps the greatest problem, is the unwillingness of the Pakistani government to engage in a serious counter-insurgency campaign. Its fitful efforts against TNSM first in Bajaur and now in Swat are exceptions that prove the rule—they are totally inadequate to the task at hand, but cost the state's leadership so much pain that they seem daunting in themselves. American efforts to coerce or incentivize successive Pakistani governments to engage in the necessary counter-insurgency campaign have failed repeatedly to change the equation.

I will not attempt to evolve here the strategy for "fixing" Pakistan because I do not believe that there is one. We should abandon the chimerical chase for a grand unified field theory of Pakistan strategy and focus on the problems we can usefully address. Succeeding in Afghanistan—by which I mean establishing a stable, secure, and legitimate Afghan state—will provide us with enormous leverage on Pakistan. Instead of continually begging Islamabad to help us defeat enemy groups that elements of the Pakistani military are actively supporting, we will be able to stand with a functioning Afghan state without Pakistan's "help." Success in Afghanistan will also provide us with the best possible vantage point for seeing the sanctuaries of our most dangerous foes in Pakistan and influencing the people among whom they live. In most areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border tribes cross the Durand Line. The tribal leaders living in Pakistan are not oblivious to what their fellows across the Durand Line are doing. On the contrary. As we and the Afghan government have made Khost—long the heartland of the Haqqani network—a success, both the Haqqani network and its Pakistani sponsors have made clear their determination to reverse our success, which poses the danger of undermining their credibility and authority over a large area.

But, above all, we must recognize that the conventional wisdom about Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan has it backward. The problem is not that Pakistanis fear that the US will abandon Afghanistan and they must therefore hedge their bets by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani. The problem is that they fear we will succeed. Pakistanis often speak of the need for "strategic depth" in discussing Afghanistan—and their support for the Taliban—leaving many Americans puzzled. Surely they do not mean to retreat into Afghanistan if the Indians invade? No, indeed. They fear that the Indians will establish strong ties with an Afghan government that is at the moment strongly inclined toward New Delhi. They watch Indian companies building roads and infrastructure and Indian investment flowing into Afghanistan, and they fear that they will be surrounded. And the elements within Pakistan that support the Taliban and Haqqani see the US as the Trojan Horse that is inserting Indian influence into Afghanistan. Convincing the Pakistanis that we will stay in Afghanistan is not enough. We must convince them that the proxies they are now supporting will fail. The only way Pakistan can have influence in Afghanistan in

the future is by working with the government in Kabul; if Islamabad persists in supporting insurgents, it will end up achieving all of its worst nightmares. Succeeding in Afghanistan is not tantamount to succeeding in Pakistan, but it is an essential precondition.

The bottom line is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems we face, even in the realm of counter-terrorism. Abstract discussions of the problem are fine within limits, but real answers can be found only in the context of real and specific problems. For that reason, among many others, maintaining strategic flexibility is absolutely essential. That flexibility requires not just flexibility of thought, but also the strong and broad mix of capabilities that our position as the preeminent state in the world brings. In particular, it requires large and capable armed forces that can face foes across the spectrum of conflict, as well as the ability to integrate those forces into a sound strategy using all other elements of statecraft to succeed. We do not need to become irregular warriors to defeat irregular warriors—and we could not do so in any case. We do need to continue creatively to apply our strengths against our enemies' weaknesses and to succeed by being ourselves, only better.

STATEMENT OF

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AND

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BEFORE

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS, AND CAPABILITIES

TOPIC:

THE ROLES OF NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE PREVENTIVE APPROACH TO TERRORISM AND INSURGENCIES

7 MAY, 2009

Chairman Smith and distinguished members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss with you the crucial and timely topic of how to address insurgencies and terrorism. In particular, our joint presentation this morning will focus on the range of non-military approaches, such as appropriately-implemented development aid, that are available to reduce the causes of terrorism and insurgencies, and what has been learned about their effectiveness as part of comprehensive, i.e., multi-dimensional strategies. In the current terminology in the defense community, our topic is: What can be done to "shape the environment" during the "steady state" that characterizes "phase zero", so as to prevent terrorism and insurgencies from arising and spreading? We offer four basic points:

1. **The most effective way to address terrorism and insurgencies is to prevent them from emerging in the first place by mitigating their proximate causes.**

As we have seen in Afghanistan and may be witnessing in Pakistan, fragile or weak and failed states provide vulnerable environments in which terrorists can gain sanctuary, recruits, and financial and moral support. Fragile and failed states also create conditions that can lead to ethnic, sectarian, secessionist, and other internal wars and thus insurgencies, which other terrorist and extremist groups can also exploit. The most effective way to address the problems of terrorism and insurgency is to reduce the initial conditions in these vulnerable societies that give rise to weak states and political instability, and thereby insurgencies and terrorism. The phase of instability in which such pre-emptive measures can be taken is indicated by the oval in the Defense Department graph below.[1]

[1] [1] Major Christina Schweiss, US Joint Forces Command, *Emerging Prevention Policies, Practices and Challenges: A DOD Perspective.* Powerpoint Presentation, U.S. Institute of Peace, September, 2007.



Figure IV-8. Notional Operation Plan Phases

This preventive action can be done through programs that pre-empt the ability of extremist groups from being able to mobilize support from the population. While a small percentage of extremists hold grand intentions of massive destruction, global disruption, and radical ideologies, most people who pick up a gun or strap on explosives are motivated by local and immediate issues such as daily security, discrimination, inadequate basic services, pervasive corruption and impunity for well-connected elites, denial of a political voice, inadequate justice, and lack of employment opportunities.[2] Preventive measures that are sufficiently targeted and comprehensive can address those proximate causes by alleviating the local populations' core grievances and other drivers that fuel support for extremism.

[2] Guilain Denoux, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*, Management Systems International, Inc., Prepared for USAID, February 2009.

2. **Preventing state failure and conflicts is more cost effective than having to intervene into internal wars once they have started.**

In addition to the lives that can be saved, the *cost-savings* of preventing internal wars have been documented, in relation to the expensive, complex military operations that may be needed to intervene into already-active civil wars, genocide, and other intra-state conflicts or fighting insurgencies. The cost differences are huge. An ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound of 'cure.'

Quantitative research has been done to compare the costs of prevention with the costs of wars. The actual costs of military interventions into recent wars (e.g., Bosnia) were compared with the estimated costs if pro-active preventive action had been taken in those same settings. Also, where societies were vulnerable to conflicts but did not break out into wars (e.g. Macedonia), the costs of the preventive efforts that were actually taken were compared with the estimated costs had a war occurred in the same country. The cost ratios of prevention to war ranged from 1–1.3 to 1–479, an average of 1–59. In all the examined cases, "conflict prevention cost or would have cost the international community far less than the conflicts themselves… the cost difference in some case is truly enormous."[3]

3. **Preventive actions to strengthen fragile states and to avert conflicts are not only more cost-effective. They have been tried and have succeeded under certain conditions -- from which a number of lessons have been learned.**

It is not widely known that the number of intra-state (internal) conflicts has actually declined since the mid-1990s, as shown below.

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[3] (Michael Brown and Richard Rosecrance, eds. *The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* [Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999], pp. 224-226). In the estimate of Macedonia, for example, the actual cost of UNPREDEP was $255 million, or 0.02% of the estimated cost of $15 billion for a two-year conflict (p. 62). Another study finds all twelve of the retrospective and prospective conflict prevention packages that he estimated for the Balkans, Afghanistan (past and future), Rwanda, Sudan, and Uzbekistan were cost effective. (Malcolm Chalmers, *Spending to Save: Retrospective Case Studies*, Centre for International Cooperation and Security Working Paper #2. April, 2005; and *Spending to Save: Prospective Case Studies*, Centre for International Cooperation and Security Working Paper #3).

Global Trends in Violent Conflict: 1946-2004



--- Warfare Totals *(Societal +All Interstate)*

--- Intra-state Warfare

--- All Interstate Wars *(inc. colonial wars)*

--- Inter-state Wars *(pure)*

Since the early 1990's, the increase in international preventive diplomacy, diplomatic peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have made a significant dent in the amount of violent conflict globally.[4] Over the past 15 years or so, a large number of bilateral and multilateral development aid agencies as well as non-governmental organizations have been very active and working on the ground in unstable societies. They have carried out a wide variety of humanitarian, development, governance, human rights, conflict resolution and non-official diplomacy, and other programs. These programs perform such varied functions as strengthening legislatures; election monitoring; civic education; disarmament; demobilization and reintegration (DDR); psycho-social trauma healing; civil society forums; training police, promoting agriculture, micro-credit provision; and health services. These programs can help

[4] Simon Fraser University, *Human Security Report*, 2005, page 155.

reduce, directly or indirectly, the sources of state failure and of potential conflicts -- especially when they are specifically attuned to address the particular drivers of conflict in a country.

To mention one example, an Iraqi non-governmental organization (NGO) called REACH helps prevent insurgent groups coming into communities to recruit people by building wells and schools, offering micro-credit loans, providing training in leadership and peacebuilding, and other community development tasks. The micro-credit loans include a reconciliation component that requires a business plan that is jointly developed and submitted by Sunni and Shia entrepreneurs. Community leaders wanting help to build a well must first create a village counsel made up of diverse ethnic and religious leaders. Such programs thus address some of the key drivers fueling the insurgency by addressing public grievances related to water shortages, unemployment, and lack of educational opportunities.

In most of these countries, these programs operate on a fairly small scale and scattered way. In notable countries, however, a mix of U.S. and international policies and programs has combined to head off potential new violent conflicts before they start through a concerted preventive approach. As shown below, conflict prevention can be defined as "primary prevention" before new wars break out, and as "secondary prevention", meaning avoiding recurrence of conflict in post-conflict situations.



Thus, in a number of countries where typical risk indicators of new potential conflict were present, conflict has been successfully averted, such as South Africa, the Balkans, the Baltics, southern Georgia, and Crimea ("primary prevention"). For example:

- In Macedonia starting in 1992, the UN preventive deployment force including 500 US troops, continuous monitoring of potential ethnic incidents by the OSCE, leadership dialogue and training conducted by the UN, a variety of U.S. and other NGO grassroots and media initiatives, and the offer of potential membership in NATO and the EU, all provided powerful incentives to the country's ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian leaders to avoid escalation into inter-ethnic violent conflict.
- Since the mid-1990s, the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, has helped to head off inter-ethnic conflicts in several Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovakia, the Baltic states, Albania, as well as Macedonia through informal diplomacy and crafting minority rights legislation that were adopted by the governments.
- In late 2007 and early 2008, Kenya was kept from escalating into an internal war due to fast-track international diplomacy that presented carrots and sticks and arranged for power-sharing among the leading parties.

Also, in situations of simmering conflicts or post-conflict, arrays of programs have helped avoid escalation or a relapse into violence ("secondary prevention"). For example:

- In Mindanao in the southern Philippines, US government and other aid organizations since 2002 have supported a wide range of development, governance, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding programs that have significantly eroded the base of support for the Moros Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyef Group (ASG), as well as reduced the number of clashes between clans.[5]

This accumulating global experience since the 1990's in using such programs has been examined by researchers and formulated into a number of lessons as to what is most effective in preventing conflicts and avoiding post-conflict relapse.[6] Below are some key lessons from these experiences that have been identified by researchers and collected in conferences, such as the recent "Whole of Government Simulation of Conflict Prevention" organized by the Center for Irregular Warfare, U.S. Marine Corps:

- Diplomacy, security, development, institution-building, and other needed policy instruments need to be applied in a *concentrated* and *synchronized* manner, *where* and *when* countries are threatened by instability and rising violence. They need to comprise a multi-dimensional, comprehensive strategy that is tailored to the particular configuration of drivers of potential conflict in each country.
- Comprehensive approaches also require better communication channels between the U.S. government and international organizations like the United Nations, regional organizations like the OSCE, the African Union and ECOWAS; multilateral partners of the U.S.; national governments in the crisis regions, and international and local NGOs involved in development and conflict prevention.
- Such strategies should build upon and strengthen the moderating groups and institutions and other crisis management capacities that may exist in a society, which may be weak

[5] Michael Lund and Jennifer Ulman, *USAID/Philippines Mindanao Programs Evaluation: Impacts on Conflict and Peace Since 2000.* Prepared for USAID, Management Systems International, Inc., November 2008.
[6] For a review of research on primary prevention, see Michael Lund, "Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice," in William Zartman, Jacob Bercovitch, and Viktor Kremenyk, eds. *Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Sage Publications, 2008). For comparative post-conflict lessons, see Nicholas Sambanis and Michael W. Doyle, *Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations* Princeton University Press, 2006.

but can become bulwarks against instability. Established community institutions such as *shuras* traditionally have helped to resolve conflict and promote peace.[7] Strategies should not impose one-size-fits-all formal models of Western democratic or economic policies.

- Deciding on the respective roles, size of the footprint, and balance among civilian and military agencies and NGOs in the early stages of potential conflict should be determined largely by the extent to which violence has escalated and security is threatened. Differing combination of socio-economic development aid, diplomatic engagement, political brokering and institution-building, and security assurance are needed at different stages of conflict. Generally, where a modicum of security prevails, civilian agencies can be out in front in these phases. Priority should be given to strengthening legitimate and effective governing structures at the local and national levels. Inordinate use of armed force in those contexts may actually worsen or cause conflict.
- A proper balance needs to be struck between strengthening governments and empowering civil society. Stability is best achieved through *citizen-oriented* state. Often, there is too great an emphasis on building the state and little or no effort to foster an active civil society. In Iraq and Afghanistan, local civil society leaders have complained that the international community's efforts to support the new governments have tended to exclude and undermine local civil society.[8]
- Overall, conflict prevention in these early stages does not mean simply increasing standard development aid budgets to conduct business as usual through the usual stove-piped mandates and programs, such as fighting general poverty. Rather, it involves hammering out cross-agency strategies that are specially fitted to the particular configurations of drivers of potential conflict in a given country, based on analysis of those sources and triggers.

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[7] *Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: The Case for a National Strategy* by Matt Waldman . Oxfam International. February 2008. http://www.oxfam.ca/news-and-publications/publications-and-reports/community-peacebuilding-in-afghanistan-the-case-for-a-national-strategy/file

[8] Research has documented that the Global War on Terror often has undermined civil society's ability to hold governments accountable, as some fragile governments label any dissent from civil society as aiding extremism or terrorism. David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, Linda M. Gerber-Stellingwerf*Friend or Foe: Civil Society and the Struggle against Violent Extremism*, A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. October 27, 2008. http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=273

In short, prevention is not simply a high ideal, but a prudent option that sometimes works.

4. **To be able to head off future potential conflicts, the U.S. programs and analytical and decision-making tools that are already available need to be *brought together and applied more consistently and robustly* -- where and when threats are emerging, through coherent USG and multilateral strategies.**

In the coming years, potential conflicts are likely to emerge and break out in fragile and failed states, as the global economic crisis, globalization, population growth, fledgling democratic institutions, and extremism threaten to destabilize divided societies and weak governments. The good news is that many development agencies and non-government organizations are at the ready and in fact already active on the ground in the societies that are vulnerable to state failure and conflicts.

Moreover:

- The U.S., UN, and several regional entities have endorsed conflict prevention as an official policy goal.
- The typical causes of terrorism and internal conflict are known from mounds of quantitative and case-study conflict research.
- Early warning systems are operating at the global level to alert to the most stressed countries. Several unclassified early warning "watch lists" point to states that are most vulnerable to state failure and conflict. NGOs such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the International Crisis Group (CG) operate on the ground level in some regions to monitor trends for early warning of impending violence.
- Evidence-based analytical tools exist for assessing the drivers of particular conflicts (e.g., the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework), and to a lesser extent, for planning multi-actor strategies to target key drivers of conflict and for multi-program monitoring and evaluation.

- Conflict units in USAID, the World Bank, UN, and bilateral development agencies are producing some guides to how to re-set sectoral development and other programs to orient them to anti-conflict purposes.
- Though entities such as the U.S. Government's State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN's Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) the outlines of inter-agency decision-making infrastructures for preventive and crisis diplomacy are coming into being.

Hence, the problem is not lack of knowledge or techniques, but largely inter-organizational. What is still seriously missing is a more deliberate U.S. commitment to a strategic approach to preventing state failure and conflicts, using existing programs and agencies. The U.S. government requires an infrastructure for conflict prevention with a high-level director for early warning and conflict prevention that can activate procedures for inter-agency coordination and engaging partners on the ground. Authorities and procedures need to be mandated for using the existing tools and lessons learned. Within countries on watch lists threatened by violence, international activities and goals are too dispersed across diverse professions and overstretched governmental and nongovernmental international organizations. The problem is not mainly deploying the activities to crisis spots anew. The multiple existing activities are pursued with few procedures for galvanizing them into concerted prevention strategies.

In addition, more resources need to be shifted to non-military approaches. There is a huge resource imbalance between U.S. diplomatic, development, and non-governmental organizations that are active in potentially unstable areas and budgeting for military contingency purposes.

In conclusion, we recommend that Congress would do well to take these steps for improving the US Government's (USG) preventive capacity:

1. **Support Inter-agency Collaboration for Prevention:** Current lack of coordination for prevention results in inefficiency, waste, and/or misapplication of U.S. power. A

decisionmaking infrastructure for conflict prevention is needed with a center for coordination, such as the State Department's Officer of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization or clearer leadership and coordination at the National Security Council to harness the potential across agencies within and external to the USG through communication, coordination, joint assessment, shared planning, and other activities. The many diplomatic, development and other programs that already operate in developing countries could be re-engineered so that they serve conflict prevention objectives more directly and in a more concerted fashion.

a. Create a working group for weighing the options on how and where to institute an active infrastructure to support conflict prevention.
b. Resource regional coordinators to make rapid, reactive funding decisions.

2. Mandate country-specific fragile state and conflict assessments and planning:

Effective strategies must start with ground-level assessments, updated periodically. Insiders' local knowledge and insight need to be drawn on to ensure that conflict prevention and counterinsurgency efforts truly contribute and do not inadvertently detract from security and stabilization. The Congress could encourage cross-USG and multi-lateral country consultations to jointly assess country situations and devise and implement diagnosis-driven targeted strategies, both at the field and desk officer level. Such processes would (a) apply conflict sensitive indicators to identify systematically the most important short- and long-term risks in a country that are affecting the prospects for escalating conflict as well as its capacities for peaceful management of conflict; (b) identify what actions each actor can contribute within the strategy; and (c) consult the lessons learned from actual experience with various combinations of instruments. A continuous process of assessment and conflict risk mitigation and management will more likely serve U.S. national interests in stabilization and prevention of terrorism and insurgency than repeated *ad hoc* reactive responses to crises. Institutionalize workable consultations for multi-lateral as well as U.S. inter-agency assessments (an International ICAF) that includes not only USG inter-agency teams, but international and regional organizations, like-minded high-income countries, and local actors (governmental and nongovernmental) in host nations.

a. Collect lessons learned, best practices, and assess global preventive capacity from the extensive conflict prevention programs that have taken place over the last twenty years to ensure broad understanding of the preventive potential for mitigating risks and instability, particularly as it relates to U.S. national interests.
b. Support the development of an interagency planning guide for conflict prevention.

3. **Create budgetary flexibility to shift resource to early-stage, pro-active programs for security assurance and "conflict-sensitive" development**: Military and civilian resources are out of balance. The current budget process does not support sufficient civilian responses to emerging vulnerabilities and opportunities. Righting this balance by resourcing civilian agencies faces significant organizational, cultural and legislative obstacles. But modest reallocations for conflict prevention activities could obviate larger investments in responding to crises, violence and organized threats of terrorism, thus actually resulting in savings.
    a. Provide flexible financial vehicles such as discretionary funds to allow a budgetary surge capacity for civilian organizations to address nascent conflicts.
    b. Authorize "CERP-like" funds for USAID and the State Department for rapid and direct support for local civil society NGOs who are working to prevent instability and terrorism.

4. Build in support for local capacities for prevention: Conflict prevention is fundamentally about assisting, enabling local host governments and partners at the grassroots to shape their own environment to decrease the motivations for terrorism and build local institutional capacity and resilience to prevent instability. This indirect approach often works better if locals take the lead in preventing violence and extremism by building security from the ground up, is more cost-effective for U.S. interests, and is more politically, economically, and militarily sustainable.

a. Harness, partner with, and build the capacity of local institutions, organizations, and structures that already exist in failing and fragile states to prevent terrorism and instability. Local CSOs often have access to areas that government and military personnel find hard or impossible to reach, have greater legitimacy and trust with local populations, and are more flexible to changes in the local context.

Thank you kindly for your interest and attention.

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