- CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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APRIL 22, 2010

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Serial No. 111-92

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY
CRISISthe following is for the title page (inside)

CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

APRIL 22, 2010

__________

Serial No. 111-92

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
JIM MATHESON, Utah MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana PETE OLSON, Texas
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
VACANCY
------

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio VACANCY
KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member

C O N T E N T S

April 22, 2010

Page
Witness List..................................................... 2

Hearing Charter.................................................. 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 6
Written Statement............................................ 8

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee
on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives....... 17
Written Statement............................................ 18

Panel I:

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 21
Biography.................................................... 24

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science,
Department of Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 31

Panel II:

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation
Measurement Solutions, GE Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 42
Written Statement............................................ 43
Biography.................................................... 47

Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security and
Environment, ThruBit LLC
Oral Statement............................................... 47
Written Statement............................................ 49
Biography.................................................... 51

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics,
Northwestern University
Oral Statement............................................... 51
Written Statement............................................ 53
Biography.................................................... 57

Dr. Jason Woods, Assistant Professor, Washington University
Oral Statement............................................... 58
Written Statement............................................ 60
Biography.................................................... 75

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security........................ 84

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science,
Department of Energy........................................... 90

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation
Measurement Solutions, GE Energy............................... 96

Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security and
Environment, ThruBit LLC....................................... 99

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics,
Northwestern University........................................ 102

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Corrections to Statements by Dr. William Brinkman and Mr. Richard
Arsenault...................................................... 106

A Staff Report by the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science
and Technology to Subcommittee Chairman Brad Miller............ 107

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and
Oversight Subcommittee Prior to the April 22, 2010, Helium-3
Hearing........................................................ 131

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and
Oversight Subcommittee After the April 22, 2010, Helium-3
Hearing........................................................ 243

CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY
CRISIS

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THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad
Miller [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

hearing charter

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Caught by Surprise:

Causes and Consequences of

the Helium-3 Supply Crisis

thursday, april 22, 2010
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building

Purpose

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on April 22,
2010, to examine the causes and consequences of the Helium-3 supply
crisis. Helium-3 (He-3) is a rare, non-radioactive gas that has been
produced in both the United States and Russia as a by-product of
nuclear weapons development. Tritium, which helps boost the yield of
nuclear weapons, decays into Helium-3 gas after approximately 12 1/2
years. The gas was produced as a consequence of tritium production by
the defense programs of the Department of Energy (DOE). As a valuable
commodity, it was packaged, managed and sold through DOE's Isotope
Program in the Office of Nuclear Energy (though the Isotope program was
moved to the Office of Science in a reorganization during FY2009).

Background

Helium-3 has wide-ranging applications as a neutron detector for
nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and homeland security purposes
because it is able to detect neutron-emitting radioactive isotopes,
such as plutonium, a key ingredient in certain types of nuclear
weapons. Currently, almost 80 percent of its use is for safeguards and
security purposes worldwide. It is also broadly used in cryogenics,
including low-temperature physics; quantum computing; neutron
scattering facilities; oil and gas exploration; lasers; gyroscopes; and
medical lung imaging research.
During the Cold War, the U.S. had a steady supply of He-3 gas
resulting from weapons production, but tritium production was halted in
1988. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the desire
for radiation portal monitors and other nuclear detection equipment
exploded. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, initiated a
program to install more than 1,400 radiation portal monitors at ports
and border crossings and also to supply smaller detectors to state and
local governments. This enormous new demand came just as the available
supply of Helium-3 was diminishing because of a reduction in nuclear
weapons production. By early 2009, the total demand for helium was over
213,000 liters, and the supply was 45,000 liters.
The Department of Energy is the sole U.S. supplier of He-3 as part
of its management of the nuclear weapons stockpile. They are also a key
consumer of the gas because of their nuclear weapons detection program
(the DOE Megaports and Second Line of Defense programs distribute PVT
radiation portal monitors and other smaller detectors to nations around
the world) and because of their support for spallation neutron sources.
As the key supplier of He-3, as well as a consumer of the gas and a
partner with agencies such as DHS and DOD in nuclear security, DOE was
in a position to see the disconnect between an expanding demand and a
declining supply. However, DOE failed to see the problem until the He-3
stockpile was nearly expended. This guaranteed that the He-3 shortage
would become a crisis, rather than a smoothly managed transition to
conserving and allocating supply to the highest use and obtaining
alternative technologies.
It wasn't until late in 2008 that the Helium-3 supply shortage
began to be identified as an issue by DOE when DNDO suppliers of He3
and other non-safeguards users could not obtain enough He-3 for their
work. The last major allocation of He-3 had occurred in 2008 when DOE
set aside 35,000 liters for the Spallation Neutron Source, an advanced
neutron science research center at DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory
in Tennessee which the Department spent over $1 billion to construct.
By January of 2009, an inter-agency phone conference between DNDO
and DOE occurred in which DOE established restrictions on the use of
He-3. DNDO agreed to develop priorities for He-3 use and initiate a
working group on the issue; DOE said it would start investigating
alternatives. In the wake of that meeting, an interagency task force
developed with participation by DNDO, DOE and the Department of
Defense. That task force first met in March 2009. In the discussion
that ensued, total annual government and non-governmental demand for
FY2009 was projected as in excess of 213,000 liters. The total
available stockpile was, at that time, just 45,000 liters. Out years
show similar levels of demand while annual production was projected at
8,000 liters. As an appreciation of the scope of the problem developed
among the key participants, other agencies were invited to participate.
Work quickly began on allocation of He-3 for FY 09 and 10, research on
alternatives and investigation of possible sources of additional He-3,
such as obtaining tritium from Candu reactors in Canada, Argentina and
other countries to harvest He-3 and recycling and re-use of existing
He-3. The entire process was ``elevated'' to the National Security
Council when the DOD staffer heading up their He-3 effort was detailed
to the NSC.
This process continued under the new Interagency Policy Committee
(IPC), chaired by staff at the NSC. The Subcommittee has been told that
allocation decisions for 2010 have been completed; the gas is now being
processed and will soon be provided to those who have been approved to
receive it.

Impact of the Shortage

The domestic and global impact has been profound. The per-liter He-
3 have skyrocketed from $200 to in excess of $2,000 per liter. (The
Subcommittee has been told of one sale of Russian He-3 to a German firm
at a price of $5,700 a liter.) The U.S. has essentially halted all
exports of Helium-3 gas, and recently told the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) that they will no longer be able to rely solely on
the U.S. to provide them with He-3 gas for use in non-proliferation
enforcement and verification actions. The Canadian government had to
receive special permission from the U.S. prior to the Vancouver
Olympics to permit the export of a He-3 mobile neutron detector for use
at the Olympic Games.
For neutron scattering facilities that require tremendous amounts
of Helium-3 gas, the situation is very grim. At least 15 of these
multi-billion dollar research facilities are being or have been built
in at least eight countries, including the U.S., United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea and China. By 2015,
these facilities will require over 100,000 liters of He-3 gas,
according to estimates provided to the Subcommittee. Most of those
needs are unlikely to be met. There have been several international
meetings of scientists discussing possible alternatives to He-3 for
spallation neutron detection, but the research is in the very early
stages.
Within the U.S. government, no program appears to have been more
significantly affected than the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
(DNDO's) Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) radiation monitor program,
which relies on He-3 as its neutron detection source. The scale and
scope of the Helium-3 crisis, however, and its impact on the ASP
program in particular was not clearly known outside the government
until the Investigations & Oversight Subcommittee held its second
hearing on the ASP program on November 17, 2009. During that hearing,
Dr. William Hagan, acting director of DNDO, testified that the
Interagency Policy Committee had decided in September 2009 that He-3
would not be used radiation portal monitors. This was the first time
the Subcommittee and the public were informed of the extent of the
Helium-3 crisis. Surprisingly, even Raytheon, DNDO's prime contractor
on the ASP program, did not become aware that a decision had been made
to halt the supply of Helium-3 gas for their radiation portal monitors
until they heard Dr. Hagan's testimony.

Summary

The shortage of He-3 was an inevitable consequence of a declining
source from the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise and a growing demand.
However, the crisis and its jarring impacts were avoidable. With
foresight on the part of DOE, the kinds of prioritization efforts now
happening through the IPC could have started years ago. Research into
alternatives to He-3 could have been well along to success, with some
areas (such as portal monitor systems) lending themselves to
alternatives more readily than others (cryogenics). In short, the
stockpile could have been managed in a way that allowed for non-
disruptive impacts to industry, researchers and the national security
community. Instead, everyone is surprised and scrambling to identify
alternatives, suspending their research and their production lines
while hoping that a breakthrough in sources of He-3 or alternatives to
He-3 happens very, very rapidly. The failure to manage the stockpile
with an eye to demand, supply and future needs has had real
consequences for many, many fields. Once the shortage became clear to
all the key agencies, an interagency process that has laid out a
rational guide to allocation and policies has emerged very quickly and
appears to be well managed.

Witnesses

Panel I

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science, Department of
Energy (DOE)
(Dr. Brinkman will be accompanied by Dr. Steven Aoki, Deputy
Undersecretary of Energy for Counterterrorism and a Member of the White
House He-3 Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) Steering Committee.)

Panel II

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement
Solutions, GE Energy

Mr. Richard L. Arsenault, Director of Health, Safety, Security and
Environment, ThruBit LLC

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics, Department of
Physics, Northwestern University

Dr. Jason C. Woods, Assistant Professor, Radiology, Mallinckrodt
Institute of Radiology, Biomedical MR Laboratory, Washington University
in St. Louis and Program Director, Hyperpolarized Media MR Study Group,
International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine (ISMRM)
Chairman Miller. Good morning. This hearing will now come
to order.
Welcome to today's hearing called ``Caught by Surprise:
Causes and Consequences of the Helium-3 Supply Crisis.''
Five months ago, this Committee held a hearing that
examined technical problems in the development of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO's) new generation of radiation
portal monitors called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, or
mercifully, ASPs. Among the issues that the Subcommittee had
expressed an interest in or we had heard about as a potential
problem was the effect of a reported shortage of helium-3 and
whether that was affecting the ASP program, or might affect it,
and at that hearing, Dr. Bill Hagan, the Acting Director of
DNDO, who is with us again, testified that because of the
shortage of helium-3, that the White House two months earlier
had had barred DNDO from using helium-3 in radiation portal
monitors. We would have liked to have known that before the
hearing but we found out about it in the testimony at the
hearing, not the prepared testimony submitted in advance but
actually in the oral testimony at the hearing. It was a
surprise to us. Also, the principal contractor, Raytheon, had a
witness here who also was wondering about it in the oral
testimony at the hearing.
We have since learned that both the Department of Energy
and the Department of Homeland Security should have known
several years ago that it would be a disaster to rely on
radiation-based equipment that used helium-3 technology.
Helium-3 is a byproduct of tritium, and tritium's only purpose
is to enhance the capability of nuclear weapons. Until
recently, no tritium had been produced in this country since
1988, and the reduction in our stockpile of nuclear weapons
guaranteed a reduction in the stockpile of tritium and
therefore helium-3.
At the same time, or after 9/11, the demand for helium-3
grew exponentially because of the use in radiation detection
devices. DOE not only produces and sells helium-3, but is one
of its largest consumers through the Megaports and Second Line
of Defense programs and the Spallation Neutron Source at Oak
Ridge. DOE never warned anyone that there was no long-term
supply for all of these uses and everyone who used or counted
on helium-3 should begin to make other plans, look for
alternatives. In 2006, there was only 150,000 liters left in
the stockpile and DOE told Homeland Security that there was
enough for 120,000 liters then estimated for the first phase of
the ASP program. The result was that in mid-2008 when
commercial vendors began to warn of a helium-3 shortage, DHS
didn't appear to take it seriously. It took several more months
before there was a government-wide acknowledgement of the
severity of the problem.
The effects of the helium-3 shortage are real and painful
and not just for radiation detection. Helium-3 also plays a
crucial role in oil and gas exploration and in cryogenics
including low-temperature physics, quantum computing, neutron
scattering facilities and medical lung imaging research.
Important science is on hold in a wide range of fields and
commercial opportunities for American firms have been lost.
Over the past year the cost of obtaining helium-3 has risen
from around $200 per liter to more than $2,000 per liter.
For many applications there are potential alternatives for
some work, particularly the cryogenics. There is no known
alternative for helium-3, so today we will examine the causes
and the consequences of the helium-3 supply crisis with an eye
to learn lessons to guide future resource management. We also
want to hear about what we are now doing to manage the limited
supply of helium-3, to set priorities for access to that
stockpile and the search for alternative sources and
alternative gases. I understand the allocations for 2010 have
been determined, the gas is being processed and it will soon be
distributed.
Looking back, it is clear that the shortage was inevitable.
If DOE had noticed the disconnect between supply and demand,
they could have managed the stockpile with clear priorities
that would have allocated it to the most important, most
essential uses and led to an aggressive and timely search for
alternatives. That might have helped avoid the crisis or
mitigated the crisis.
Why did DOE not see this coming? And also, why did DNDO not
validate, ascertain that there was enough helium-3 for the ASP
program? A cautious and reasonable analysis should have sought
a complete accounting from DOE before wagering years of effort
of research and hundreds of millions of dollars into a
technology that depended upon a gas that would not be
available.
The current efforts of DNDO, DOE and DOD and other agencies
working with the National Security Council staff do appear to
be very well organized. Although there are many failures to get
to this point, it does appear that all the relevant agencies
are doing well now. They are identifying alternatives. They are
trying to identify other sources, international sources of
helium-3, and it really is a model, as I understand it, for
interagency crisis management but the best crisis management is
not to have a crisis, and I hope that DOE has learned and other
agencies will learn from this and lead to wiser management of
the unique isotopes they control and distribute.
Finally, obviously we were mildly annoyed to learn that the
technology that we had been investigating for some time was not
going to be used, to learn that in oral testimony. We are also
at least mildly annoyed that we had not gotten the documents
that we have asked for. The agencies appear to be going through
some extraordinary courtesies to each other of letting
everybody review everybody's else's documents and there is no
legal basis for that, and it may be a courtesy by each agency
to the other but it is discourteous to us and makes it very
difficult for us to do our job. We are not as well prepared
today for this hearing as we would like to be and should have
been had the documents that we requested in a timely way been
provided in a timely way, and I certainly took the last
Administration to task for their failures in that area and I
intend to take this Administration to task as well.
We are leaving--in consultation with Dr. Broun, we are
leaving the record of this hearing open today to add additional
documents that we receive, tardy production of documents, and
it is very possible that there are questions that we should
have asked had we had those documents that there will be
another hearing. I know it is not convenient for us either.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller

Five months ago, the Subcommittee held a hearing titled: The
Science of Security: Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing and
Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors. That hearing examined technical
problems in the development of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
(DNDO's) new generation of radiation portal monitors called Advanced
Spectroscopic Portals or ASPs. Among the issues the Subcommittee had
expressed an interest in was the impact a reported shortage of Helium-3
was having on the ASP program.
At that hearing, Dr. Bill Hagan, the Acting Director of DNDO, (who
joins us again today) testified that the shortage of Helium-3 was so
severe that two months earlier a White House Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC) had barred DNDO from using Helium-3 in radiation portal
monitors. Since the Department had not informed the Subcommittee of
this situation, and the written testimony submitted to the Subcommittee
also failed to make reference to the decision, we were surprised by the
testimony. We were not the only ones to be surprised, among others
taken by surprise was DNDO's the main ASP contractor, Raytheon.
What we have learned since is that both the Department of Energy
and the Department of Homeland Security should have known several years
ago that it would be a disaster to base radiation-detecting equipment
on helium-3 technology. Helium-3 is a byproduct of tritium, and
tritium's only purpose is to enhance the capability of nuclear weapons.
Until recently, no tritium had been produced in this country since
1988, and the reduction in the nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons
guaranteed a reduction in the stockpile of tritium--and helium-3.
After 9/11--at the same time the supply was significantly
decreasing--the demand for helium-3 grew exponentially for use in
radiation detection devices. It was also expanding for spallation
neutron facilities worldwide, cyrogenic and medical research, and oil
and gas exploration. The Department of Energy, which not only produces
and sells helium-3, but is one of its largest consumers through the
Megaports and Second Line of Defense programs and the Spallation
Neutron Source at Oak Ridge, never--not once--warned anyone that there
was no long-term supply for all of these uses, and they should begin
looking for alternatives. In fact, in 2006, when there was only 150,000
liters left in the stockpile and many other users lined up, DOE told
the Department of Homeland Security that there was enough for the
120,000 liters then estimated for the first phase of the ASP program.
The result was that in mid-2008 when commercial vendors began to warn
of a He-3 shortage, DHS didn't appear to have taken them seriously. It
took several more months before there was government-wide
acknowledgement of the severity of the problem.
The impacts of the helium-3 shortage are real and painful and
extend well beyond Megaports, the Second Line of Defense and the ASP
programs. Because of its unique physical properties, helium-3 plays a
crucial role in oil and gas exploration, cryogenics (including low-
temperature physics), quantum computing, neutron scattering facilities
and medical lung imaging research. Important science is on hold in a
wide range of fields and commercial opportunities for American firms
that sell products using helium-3 have been lost. Over the past year
the cost of obtaining Helium-3 has risen from around $200 per liter to
more than $2,000 per liter.
The ongoing crisis has drastically delayed the ability of
researchers and others to obtain helium-3 and prevented many firms and
researchers from acquiring helium-3 at all, at any price. For many
applications there are potential He-3 alternatives including boron-10
and lithium. For some work, particularly cryogenics-related
applications, however, there are no known alternatives to using Helium-
3 and these industries will need to continue to be supplied with He-3
if these industries and their scientific research programs are to
continue.
Today, we will examine the causes and consequences of the Helium-3
supply crisis with a desire to learn lessons to guide future resource
management. We also want to hear about the processes that are now in
place to manage the limited supply of helium-3, to set priorities for
access to that stockpile and the search for alternative sources and
alternative gases. It is my understanding that allocations for 2010
have been determined, the gas is being processed and it will soon be
distributed.
Looking back, it is clear that the shortage was inevitable. Helium-
3 has been captured by the Department of Energy from the decay of
tritium. With the end of the Cold War and the arms reduction agreements
going back all the way to the Reagan Administration, the stockpile of
tritium was not growing and so the production of Helium-3 would
inevitably decline. Since 1991, DOE has allocated over 300,000 liters
of helium-3, drawing the reserve down to a very low level by 2009. The
annual production of Helium-3 from the U.S. tritium stockpile is now in
the range of 8,000 liters per year and demand is orders of magnitude
higher.
At the same time that production was declining, the demand for
Helium-3 has been increasing since 9-11. Helium-3 has been a critical
component in the portal radiation monitor programs at DHS and
approximately 60,000 liters have been used in the current PVT systems
alone. The ASP systems that Raytheon designed would have required, if a
full acquisition had gone forward, approximately 200,000 liters of
helium-3. The Department of Energy has its own radiation detection
program in mega-ports with additional liters of helium-3 used in that
program. Handheld and backpack radiation detection systems at DHS, DOE
and also DOD are another ongoing source of expanded demand since 9-11.
In addition to this new security-related source of demand, the
Spallation Neutron Source project, also a DOE program was moving
towards conclusion, with its main detector requiring an additional
17,000 liters. With countries around the world all pushing to get into
SNS-style research, the global demand in coming years for Helium-3 from
these detectors alone is expected to exceed 100,000 liters.
Since the shortage was inevitable, does it matter that DOE failed
to see that their stockpile was evaporating? Yes, it absolutely does
matter. If DOE had noticed the disconnect between growing demand and
declining supply, they could have managed the stockpile with clear
prioritization for highest use, and led an aggressive and timely search
for alternatives to helium-3. These actions would have helped us avoid
this crisis. It is astonishing that DOE did not see this coming.
It also astonishes me that DNDO did not validate that sufficient
resources of helium-3 were available for the ASP program. A cautious
and reasonable analyst would have sought a complete accounting from DOE
before wagering years of effort and hundreds of millions of dollars.
Good crisis management is an inspiring thing to see in the
government and I have to say that the current efforts of DNDO, DOE, DOD
and other agencies under the orchestration of the National Security
Council staff appears to be very well organized. They have set out to
do a thorough survey of demand and have attempted to identify all
outlying sources of supply. They are identifying alternative gases and
locating international opportunities to temporarily expand the supply
of Helium-3. All of this is laudatory, and can serve as a nice model
for future interagency management of crises, but even better is to
avoid a situation requiring crisis management in the first place. I
hope that DOE has learned a lesson with Helium-3 that will lead to
wiser management of the unique isotopes they control and distribute.
The final lesson I hope the agencies and the White House learn is
that when a Subcommittee asks for your documents, you have to produce
them or explain why you cannot. The Subcommittee wrote to both the
Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security on March 8
requesting materials by March 29. Neither agency responded in a timely
fashion. Neither agency has produced all of their materials, nor
offered anything approaching a comprehensible explanation of the
situation. Allegedly, some small set of documents were originally
produced by White House staff and distributed to the agencies, and I
have been surprised at the difficulty of getting the White House and
the agencies to simply do the reviews that the precedents of
legislative-executive relations suggest should properly occur for these
documents, which do not appear to rise to the level of an executive
privilege claim. I am hopeful that we will break this impasse soon.
The implications of the situation are that the Subcommittee is not
as prepared for this hearing as we should properly be. The agencies
have gone through elaborate fictional inter-agency courtesies allowing
for duplicative, time-consuming reviews. There is no legal basis for
these reviews. This has not only wasted time but is discourteous to the
Committee. As a result, it is my intention to leave the hearing record
open and, in consultation with my Ranking Member, Dr. Broun, to include
in the record relevant materials that are responsive to my original
letter. I will not rule out a second hearing on this subject if the
documentary record contradicts testimony we receive today nor would I
rule out taking any other steps necessary to compel production of
agency records. I hope it won't come to that, but I had enough of
stonewalling and slow rolls by the last Administration to have much
patience with it from this Administration.

Chairman Miller. I am attaching for the record two letters
sent to the Subcommittee on the subject. One is from an oil and
gas industry representative and one is from a researcher at the
Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
[The information follows:]

Chairman Miller. The Chair now recognizes our Ranking
Member from Georgia, Dr. Broun, for his opening statement.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome our witnesses here today and thank you all
for attending. I wish I could say that I was glad that we are
holding this hearing, but unfortunately, I am not.
During a hearing last fall, as the Chairman has already
mentioned, the hearing was on the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office's ASP program, Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program.
This Subcommittee was notified of the state of the Nation's
helium-3 supply and the shortfall's effects on our national
security, particularly in nuclear detection. This by itself was
a troubling revelation, but the impact of insufficient helium-3
supplies is not limited to the national security sector.
Medical treatments, oil and gas exploration, cryogenics and
other research endeavors have all come to depend upon helium-3
because of its historical abundance as a byproduct of our
nuclear weapons program.
For years helium-3 was a cheap and plentiful resource that
was ideal for many applications because of its intrinsic
properties. Until only recently the United States was
continually building up its stockpile but a number of issues
combined to change that trend. The breakdown of our Nation's
nuclear weapon stockpile after the Cold War, the increased
priority on domestic nuclear detection brought about by
September 11, 2001, the demand created by neutron scattering
facilities and Russia's decision to cease exports all combined
to create the perfect storm for helium-3. DHS, DOE, DOD
initiated processes to limit demand, ration existing supplies
and find alternatives but these actions were after the fact. As
this Committee has seen before with rare earth elements,
medical isotopes and plutonium-238, mitigation efforts were
taken after the crisis has already emerged.
In the future, the Federal Government needs to do a better
job of projecting both the demand for isotopes in its control
and its own needs of those isotopes and elements that are not.
This becomes even more important with the President's recent
nuclear arms reduction pact with Russia.
I look forward to working with the Chairman to ensure that
the Federal Government does a better job of predicting and
mitigating these supply shortages. I congratulate the Chairman
on his efforts to help do just that.
To this end, I hope that the agencies assist this Committee
in meeting its oversight responsibilities in a more cooperative
fashion. To date, the documents provided to this Committee in
response to the Chairman's request contained unexplained
redactions. It is also my understanding that not all documents
have been provided. In order for this Committee to do its work,
the agencies and the Administration need to either provide the
documents requested or claim a legally recognized privilege so
that we can move forward. I hope we will see some radical
changes on that issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

Prepared Statement of Representative Paul C. Broun

Let me welcome our witnesses here today and thank them for
appearing. I wish I could say that I was glad we were holding this
hearing, but unfortunately I'm not.
During a hearing last fall on the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office's (DNDO's) Advance Spectroscopic Portal Program (ASP), this
subcommittee was notified of the state of the Nation's helium-3 supply
and the shortfall's effect on national security--particularly nuclear
detection. This by itself was a troubling revelation, but the impact of
insufficient helium-3 supplies is not limited to the national security
sector. Medical treatments, oil and gas exploration, cryogenics, and
other research endeavors have all come to depend on helium-3 because of
its historical abundance as a byproduct of our nuclear weapons program.
For years, helium-3 was a cheap and plentiful resource that was
ideal for many applications because of its intrinsic properties. Until
only recently, the U.S. was continually building up its stockpile, but
a number of issues combined to change that trend. The drawdown of our
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile after the cold war; the increased
priority on domestic nuclear detection brought about by September 11th,
2001; the demand created by neutron scattering facilities; and Russia's
decision to cease exports all combined to create the perfect storm for
helium-3.
DHS, DOE, and DOD initiated processes to limit demand, ration
existing supplies, and find alternatives, but these actions were after
the fact. As this committee has seen before with rare earth elements,
medical isotopes, and plutonium-238, mitigation efforts are taken after
the crisis has already emerged. In the future, the federal government
needs to do a better job of projecting both the demand for isotopes in
its control, and its own needs of those isotopes and elements that are
not. This becomes even more important with the President's recent
nuclear arms reduction pact with Russia.
I look forward to working with the Chairman to ensure that the
federal government does a better job of predicting and mitigating these
supply shortages. To this end, I hope that the agencies assist this
committee in meeting its oversight responsibilities in a more
cooperative fashion. To date, the documents provided to the committee
in response to the Chairman's requests contain unexplained redactions.
It is also my understanding that not all documents have been provided.
In order for this committee to do its work, the agencies and the
Administration need to either provide the documents requested, or claim
a legally recognized privilege so that we can move forward.
Thank you, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Broun.
All additional opening statements or any additional opening
statements submitted by Members will be included in the record.
Without objection now, I would enter a packet of documents into
the record.\1\ The majority of those materials were drawn from
the documents produced by the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Energy in response to the request, the
Subcommittee's request on March 8, 2010. As is our common
practice, those materials were shared between the majority and
minority staffs before the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Please see Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Panel I:

Chairman Miller. I am now pleased to introduce our
witnesses today. Dr. William Hagan is currently the Acting
Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, the
Department of Homeland Security. Dr. William Brinkman is the
Director of the Office of Science at the Department of Energy
and has been in his position at DOE since 2009.
As our witnesses should know, you each will have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will
be included in the record for the hearing. When you have all
completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions
and each member will have five minutes to question the panel.
It is our practice to receive testimony under oath. Do any
of you have any objection to taking an oath? The record should
reflect that all the witnesses nodded their head that they did
not. You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Do
any of you have counsel here? And the record should reflect
that all the witnesses nodded their head that they did not have
counsel present. If you would all please now stand and raise
your right hand? Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but
the truth?
Dr. Brinkman, would you introduce Dr. Aoki just quickly?
Dr. Brinkman. This is Dr. Steven Aoki, who is from the
NNSA, part of the DOE, and I want him to be here to represent
his half if you have questions.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Well, he has just taken the oath, so
not only will what you tell us be under oath but what he tells
you will be under oath as well. You should do that with your
staff all the time. I should try it with mine.
Mr. Broun. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that we
allow Mr. Rohrabacher to sit in on this hearing.
Chairman Miller. Without objection.
Okay. The record should reflect that all the witnesses and
the witnesses' helpers have taken the oath, and we will start
with Dr. Hagan. Dr. Hagan, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM HAGAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. Hagan. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Broun and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. On behalf
of DNDO, I would like to thank the Committee for the
opportunity to discuss the helium-3 supply. My testimony today
will address the following points: what was done at the
beginning of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program to
ensure there was adequate supply of helium-3, how we became
aware of the shortage of helium-3, how we responded to it, the
impact of the shortage on DNDO's programs and the status of the
work to identify alternative neutron detection technologies.
In the past, helium-3 was a relatively low-cost commodity
and its use has increased greatly in recent years. Its
increased demand was driven largely by the expanded use of
large radiation portal monitors that are being deployed around
the world. An RPM consists of a neutron detector using helium-3
gas in tubes and a gamma detector using a plastic scintillator.
In addition, helium-3 is used in scientific research and
medical and industrial applications.
Unfortunately, as the demand was rising, the supply was
declining. The current and future helium-3 supply will fail to
satisfy the demand of interagency partners and the commercial
sector.
In February 2006, as DNDO was planning for the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal program, program staff contacted DOE to
ensure adequate supplies of helium-3 for up to 1,500 systems
over five years. At that time there was no indication that the
supply of helium-3 would be problematic. Similarly, vendor
responses to the ASP request for proposals showed no concerns
over the availability of helium-3 to meet manufacturing needs.
DNDO first became aware of the potential problem with
helium-3 supply in the summer of 2008. However, it was unclear
whether the problem was a result of delays in the supply chain
or an actual shortage of helium-3. In the fall of 2008, DOE
issued a report verifying existence and seriousness of the
overall supply shortfall.
In February of 2009, DNDO took the lead in forming an
interagency helium-3 Integrated Product Team, or IPT, with
participation of major users of helium-3 for neutron detection
applications. The IPT aimed to assess the true impact of the
shortage and to ensure that the most crucial government and
commercial programs would receive helium-3. DNDO had
simultaneously begun negotiations in January 2009 to secure
helium-3 for its programs. The sale was finalized in June, but
one month later DNDO ceded control of the helium-3 to be
allocated in accordance with interagency determinations.
Further, in September, DNDO ceased to make any new
allocations of helium-3 for RPMs. Based on current funding and
guidance, however, the helium-3 shortage has had no appreciable
short-term impact on the deployment of RPMs. The program has a
sufficient inventory of systems to support deployments through
2011. Additionally, a number of technical and management
solutions are further reducing potential impacts. For instance,
if ASP units are certified, the helium-3 from the existing RPMs
that are being replaced can be reused in the ASP units.
Devices that utilize smaller volumes of helium-3 such as
handhelds and backpacks may also be impacted by this shortage.
To mitigate the impact, industry has been purchasing helium-3
from other sources and recycling gas from obsolete equipment.
However, a redesign of current equipment to utilize new neutron
technologies will eventually be necessary, and DNDO plans to
work with industry to catalyze this development. DNDO will also
request modest allocations from the government stockpile to
continue deployment of these systems until alternatives are
available.
DNDO has been funding programs to identify alternative
neutron detection technologies for several years. However,
because helium-3 was widely available until only recently,
alternatives are still somewhat early in their development.
DNDO is working with the commercial sector to identify
technologies that have potential for near-term
commercialization and recently tested several available
alternatives. DNDO has also accelerated exploratory research
projects to identify other potential materials suitable for
neutron detection. I brought a few examples here on the table
today if you would like to discuss later.
My testimony has outlined the course of action DNDO took to
initially ensure the availability of helium-3 when we became
aware of the shortage, the steps we took in response, the
impacts of the shortage and the alternative technologies under
development. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and Members
of the Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and we will
be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hagan follows:]

Prepared Statement of William K. Hagan

Introduction:

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. As Acting Director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity
to discuss the helium-3 (He-3) supply.
As requested, my testimony today will address the following points:

How we became aware of the shortage of He-3;

How we responded to it;

What was done at the beginning of the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program to ensure there was an
adequate supply of He-3 to meet the program's needs;

The impact of the shortage on DNDO's radiological and
nuclear detection programs; and

The status of the work we are doing to identify
alternative technologies to replace He-3 as a neutron detector.

Since National Security Staff has recently briefed the Committee
staff regarding the He-3 shortage, I have limited my remarks today to
DNDO actions related to He-3.

Helium-3 Supply

The United States' supply of He-3 has traditionally come from the
decay of tritium, which the nation previously produced in large
quantities as part of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise. The
suspension of U.S. production of tritium in the late 1980s, however,
resulted in a reduction in the amount of He-3 available for harvest.
Currently, a significant portion of He-3 is used for neutron detection
to aid in the prevention of nuclear terrorism. He-3 has become the
overwhelmingly predominant technology used for this purpose; the
Departments of Homeland Security, Defense (DoD), and Energy (DOE) each
have nuclear detection programs that use He-3-based sensors.
Additionally, He-3 is finding increasingly widespread use in areas
beyond homeland security, including scientific research, medical, and
industrial applications. Some of these applications may require
relatively large volumes of He-3 for which there may be no known
alternative. In the past, He-3 was a relatively low-cost commodity, and
its use increased particularly with the advent of large radiation
portal monitors both domestically and abroad. The limited supply of He-
3, which is based on the nation's current stores of tritium, has been
overwhelmed by this increase in demand. The current and future He-3
supply will fail to satisfy the demand of interagency partners and the
commercial sector. Only approximately one tenth of the current demand
for He-3 will be available from DOE/National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) for the foreseeable future, and neutron detectors
using He-3 are already becoming difficult to procure.
Since the inception of DHS in 2003, the majority of He-3 used was
for the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) program. An RPM consists of a
neutron detector, using He-3 gas in tubes, and a gamma detector, using
large slabs of plastic scintillator. When DNDO was established in 2005,
the RPM program was transferred from U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP). In FY 2006, when preparing to start a program for an advanced
portal system, called the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP), DNDO met
with DOE to discuss strategic resources that would be required for the
ASP. DOE gave no indication that the supply of He-3 would be
problematic, even with the amount of units we were envisioning.
Until recently, DHS acquired systems using He-3 by publishing an
RFP and then reviewing responses to select a vendor or vendors. The
bidders, in preparing their responses, would check the resources
required to fulfill the order, including He-3. When this process was
used at the beginning of the ASP program, none of the proposals
indicated any issue with He-3 supply.
In the summer of 2008, DNDO first became aware of a potential
problem with the He-3 supply through an email from a neutron detector
tube manufacturer. Although DNDO investigated this issue, it was
initially unclear whether the problem was a result of delays in the
supply chain or an actual shortage of He-3. DOE, which traditionally
has been responsible for managing and allocating the supply of He-3,
issued a report verifying the existence and seriousness of the overall
supply shortfall in the fall of 2008.
In February 2009, DNDO took the lead in forming the He-3
Interagency Integrated Product Team (IPT), with participation of DOE/
NNSA and DoD, to assess the true impact of the shortage and to ensure
that the most critical government and commercial programs would
preferentially receive He-3. The IPT also began exploring opportunities
to manage the existing He-3 stockpile; increase the supply of He-3;
account for the entire demand for He-3; investigate alternative
technologies to replace He-3 for neutron detection; adapt old
technologies for retrofit into existing equipment; and examine policy
issues that may impact the use, distribution, or production of He-3.
The IPT took steps to secure the He-3 necessary for high-priority
programs, which included the RPM Program. DNDO also began negotiations
in late January 2009 to secure He-3 for the ASP and other DNDO
programs. This He-3 sale, which would have covered initial deployments
of ASP, was finalized in June 2009. In July 2009, DNDO ceded control of
this He-3 purchase to the National Security Staff Interagency Policy
Committee to be allocated in accordance with interagency determinations
in order to optimally satisfy the competing needs of He-3 users. As the
He-3 is allocated to other agencies and departments, DNDO will be
financially reimbursed. DNDO has continued to coordinate with
interagency efforts to manage the He-3 shortage and actively
participates in interagency working groups to address He-3 supply,
demand, alternative technologies, and policy.

Impact of the Helium-3 Shortage

Because of the volume of He-3 required in the construction of RPMs
and the desire to make sure that He-3 was being used for the highest
interagency priorities, DNDO ceased to allocate any additional He-3 for
RPMs in September 2009. Based on current funding and guidance for the
RPM Program, the He-3 shortage has had no appreciable impact on the
deployment of systems in FY 2010. The program has a sufficient
inventory of RPM systems with He-3 tubes available to support
deployments through FY 2011. Additionally, a number of solutions--
including both the identification of new detector materials and
management solutions to most effectively utilize existing supplies--are
yielding results. If ASP units are certified for secondary scanning
applications, DHS can reuse the He-3 from the existing RPMs that are
being replaced and use it for the ASP units. Simultaneously, DNDO is
leading interagency efforts to identify alternative neutron detectors
that may eventually replace He-3 in these applications.
While other devices (for example, handheld radioisotope
identification devices and backpack detectors used by the U.S. Coast
Guard, CBP and the Transportation Security Administration) use smaller
volumes of He-3, they are also impacted by this shortage. To mitigate
the shortage and ensure supply to government customers, industry has
been purchasing He-3 from other sources, such as private companies that
have stored He-3, and recycling gas from obsolete equipment. This has
offset some of the shortfall in the near-term, but a redesign of
current equipment will be necessary over the next several years, once
new neutron detection technologies have been identified. As such, DNDO
plans to work with the device manufacturers to develop new
technologies, integrate them into systems, and test them for
suitability in the field. In the meantime, DNDO will also request
modest allocations from the government stockpile to continue deployment
of current human portable systems until alternatives are available.

Alternative Neutron Detection Technologies

As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. government is also exploring
options to resolve this situation through the development of new types
of neutron detectors. DNDO is at the forefront of these efforts and had
been funding programs to address alternative neutron detection
technologies as part of their mandate, prior to any knowledge of the
He-3 shortage. We are also working with the interagency to engage the
technical, commercial, and international communities to solicit ideas
to address alternative materials for neutron detection. We are
confident that the government, private industry, and international
stakeholders are making progress on a prudent path forward. At present,
we are working with the commercial sector to identify alternative
detection products that have potential for near-term commercialization.
Our DNDO Exploratory Research projects that address other detection
materials with neutron capabilities have also been accelerated.
DNDO recently tested many known commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and
near-COTS alternatives for neutron detection and remains committed to
working with the interagency to identify potential solutions. For RPMs
that require large volumes of He-3, four technologies have been
identified as being potentially viable candidates. Boron Trifluoride
(BF3)-filled proportional counters were widely used for
neutron detection before He-3-based detectors were available. DNDO
conducted testing at a national laboratory to compare the performance
of BF3 with the performance of He-3; while this testing
validated the neutron detection capabilities of BF3 as a low
cost replacement technology, we continue to seek additional
alternatives because the hazardous material classification of BF3
makes it less attractive for end users.
Other promising technologies under development include Boron-lined
proportional counters; Lithium-loaded glass fibers; coated non-
scintillating plastic fibers; and a new scintillating crystal composed
of Cesium-Lithium-Yttrium-Chloride, (Cs2LiYCl6)
or CLYC, commonly pronounced ``click'', that has both neutron and gamma
detection capabilities. Some of these new technologies may have neutron
detection capabilities that meet or even exceed the abilities of
current He-3-based detectors. Before any alternative is commercialized,
we will check the availability of the key components to avoid another
shortage issue.
Since He-3 was widely available and relatively inexpensive until
only recently, alternatives are still somewhat early in their
development, although these development efforts have been accelerated
in the last year or so. DNDO will continue funding of exploratory
research and early development, testing of new COTS and near-COTS
alternatives, and acquisition of samples of promising technologies for
more extensive testing and evaluation.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
answer your questions.

Biography for William K. Hagan

Dr. William Hagan is the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), a position he has held since December 2009.
Prior to this position, Dr. Hagan served as the Acting Deputy Director
from January through December 2009. Dr. Hagan was initially appointed
to the Senior Executive Service and joined DNDO in 2006 as the
Assistant Director for Transformational Research and Development (R&D),
where he was responsible for long-term R&D, seeking technologies that
can make a significant or dramatic positive impact on the performance,
cost, or operational burden of detection components and systems.
Prior to DNDO, Dr. Hagan had a long career with Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where he worked from
1977 through 2006. He served in many positions during his tenure with
SAIC, culminating with a position as the Senior Vice President and
Deputy Business Unit Manager for Operations of the Security and
Transportation Technology Business Unit (STTBU). Specifically, STTBU
focused on securing the supply chain by applying technologies such as
neutron interrogation, gamma- and x-ray imaging, passive radiation
detection, ultrasound, radio frequency resonance, and chemical agent
detection using data fusion of ion mobility spectrometry and surface
acoustic waves. The radiation portal monitors that are currently used
to screen 99% of all cargo entering the country were built by STTBU,
using technology from a company whose acquisition was led by Dr. Hagan
in 2003.
Previous positions with SAIC included work as a senior scientist,
operations manager, Group Manager of the Technology Development Group
(TDG) of the SAIC's Commercial Business Sector, and Senior Vice
President for Technology Commercialization and acting Chief Technical
Officer for SAIC's Venture Capital Corporation.
Dr. Hagan earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics in
1974, Master of Science in Physics in 1975, and Master of Science in
Nuclear Engineering in 1977 from the University of Illinois at Urbana.
He received his Ph.D. in Physics from the University of California-San
Diego in 1986. He holds three patents.

Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Dr. Brinkman, you are now recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM BRINKMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Dr. Brinkman. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Miller,
Ranking Member Broun and Members of the Committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to come before you and provide testimony on
DOE's action in response to the national helium-3 shortage.
Within the DOE, both NNSA and the Office of Science play a
role in helium-3 production. NNSA provides the helium-3 supply
and the Isotope program now within the Office of Science
distributes helium-3 from NNSA to the marketplace. Even before
the DOE Office of Science assumed responsibility for the
Isotope program in fiscal year 2009, we undertook measures to
educate the various communities of users including national
security, medical, industrial and research communities of
isotope shortages in general.
Our Office of Nuclear Physics within the Office of Science
organized a major workshop in August 2008. The purpose of this
workshop was to identify critical isotopes for the Nation that
are in short supply. Following this workshop, the community of
users became aware of the imminent shortage of helium-3 and the
DOE began coordinating future allocations of helium-3 with
other agencies. We and others in the government have reinforced
this message through presentations at major scientific
societies including the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, for example.
Since assuming responsibility for the Isotope program one
year ago, the Office of Science has worked very closely with
NNSA and other federal agencies to develop a coordinated
response. In March 2009, we joined NNSA, DOD and DHS to form an
interagency group with the purpose of identifying demand,
supply and R&D options for the future. Since July 2009, this
interagency effort has been under the auspices of an official
Interagency Policy Committee formed by the White House national
security staff.
Our approach has been straightforward. We have reached out
to the various communities that use helium-3 and asked them to
refine their needs in light of the shortage so that we can
allocate resources as rationally as possible across various
sectors. We also identified portal monitors as a vital but
disproportionate source of demand for helium-3 and recognized
the need for alternative detection technologies. These
alternative detectors, although not quite as good as helium-3,
will enable us to support these applications without the use of
helium-3 and will provide our country with a strong nuclear
detection program. We are cautiously optimistic that
alternative detection approaches can be evaluated and put into
production in the next few years, avoiding major disruption of
planned deployment of portal monitors as seen by the evidence
on the table here.
We worked hard to develop accurate needs for other
communities that use helium-3, cryogenic research, lung imaging
and other communities, and found that with recycling the
helium-3 we could further reduce the demand. The guidance
developed by the IPC for allocation of available helium-3
supply assigns high priority to scientific applications that
depend on the unique physical properties of the isotope.
Working on the supply side, we have developed a plan that
will allow us to keep in balance the supply and demand for the
next five to six years. To do this, we need to increase our
supply by one of two approaches. The first would be to use
helium-3 that results from heavy-water reactors that exist
around the world but particularly in Canada. The second would
be to produce commercial tritium using the current
infrastructure but separately from the weapons program and
harvest the helium-3 from tritium decay. We are currently
getting cost estimates, et cetera, for these two approaches. If
we can capture the helium-3 from Canada, we believe that we
have a balanced program over the next five to six years.
Another possibility is extracting helium-3 from helium
sources such as natural gas deposits. Since the fraction of
helium-3 captured from natural gas wells is only 200 parts per
billion, further study is needed to determine whether this
approach can be cost competitive. We believe we have organized
a well-defined proactive interagency approach to meeting this
challenge and mitigating its impact to the extent possible.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brinkman follows:]

Prepared Statement of William F. Brinkman

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to provide
testimony on the DOE's role and reaction to the national Helium-3
(³He) shortage. Both the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), and the DOE Isotope Development and Production
for Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program) recently
transferred to the Office of Science in the FY 2009 Appropriation, play
a role in Helium-3 production and distribution. I have served as the
Director of the Office of Science since June 2009, and I am pleased to
share with you my perspectives on the role of the DOE Isotope Program
in ³He production and distribution.

Overview of the Role of DOE in Helium-3 Production and Distribution

The DOE has supplied isotopes and isotope-related services to the
Nation and to foreign countries for more than 50 years. Since its
transfer to the Office of Science in 2009, the Isotope Program has
continued to produce a suite of isotopes for research and applications
that are in short supply, as well as technical services such as target
development, chemical conversions, and other isotope associated
activities. As part of this mission, the Isotope Program is responsible
for the sale and distribution of ³He on behalf of DOE, but
not for the production of ³He. ³He is a rare,
non-radioactive and non-hazardous isotope of helium. Due to its low
natural abundance, recovery from natural deposits has not been
economically viable thus far. Instead, the sole production of
³He in the United States results from the refurbishment and
dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The natural radioactive decay of
tritium used in these weapons creates ³He, which is
separated and stored during processing at the NNSA Savannah River Site
(SRS) in South Carolina. To date, the only other commercial source of
³He has been from the decay of tritium that was produced
within the former Soviet Union for its nuclear weapons program. Because
the primary, current source of ³He is the decay of tritium,
current supplies of this important gas are limited by the quantities of
tritium on hand and being produced. Without development of alternative
sources for ³He, use of this gas will be constrained
seriously in the foreseeable future as accumulated stockpiles are drawn
down.
The U.S. distribution of ³He for commercial consumption
started in 1980. ³He production for commercial use, has
never been a mission of the DOE. However, DOE made this byproduct of
its operations available to scientific and industrial users at a price
designed to recover extraction, purification, and administrative costs.
Currently, the need for ³He in the United States is
outpacing production.
The major application of ³He is for neutron detection,
principally for national security purposes, nuclear safeguards
measurements, oil and gas exploration, and in scientific
experimentation. It is the preferred detector material for these
applications because it is non-reactive/non-corrosive and it has the
highest intrinsic efficiency for neutron detection. It is also
important in low-temperature physics research and increasingly in
medical diagnostics. A major use of ³He in U.S. research is
for neutron detection in the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS), a one-of
-a-kind, accelerator-based neutron source that provides intense pulsed
neutron beams for scientific research, materials research, and
industrial development. ³He is also used in dilution
refrigeration in low-temperature physics experiments; there is no known
alternative for this use.
The U.S. Government ceased reactor-based production of tritium for
the nuclear weapons stockpile in 1988. Due to the downsizing of the
world's nuclear stockpiles and the increase in the demand for
³He, we have reached a critical shortage in the global
supply of ³He.

Realization of ³He Shortage

From 1980 to 1995, ³He collected by the NNSA at the
Savannah River Site (SRS) was purified at the Mound Laboratory along
with other stable isotope gases for distribution by the Isotope
Program. NNSA ceased operations at Mound, a laboratory used primarily
for weapons research during the Cold War, in 1995. Between 1980 and
2003, the SRS had accumulated about 260,000 liters of unprocessed
³He. For security purposes, this total was closely held, and
not known widely beyond DOE. Sales of this raw ³He by SRS
began in 2003 as a remediation test project with the commercial firm,
Spectra Gases (now named Linde LLC); Linde invested in excess of
$4,000,000 to establish purification capability of ³He. In
August of 2003, NNSA and the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, in which the
Isotope Program resided at that time, entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding for the sales of raw ³He derived from tritium
processing. On October 2, 2003, the first invitation to bid on the sale
of ³He was published in a FEDBIZOPS notice. There were three
competitive auctions from 2003 until 2006. Some of the 2006 shipment
occurred in 2007 and 2008. There were a total of 146,000 liters
supplied primarily to two vendors. During this time period, the Isotope
Program advised both vendors that the supply was limited to about
10,000 liters annually by NNSA. Between 2004-2008, an average of 25,000
liters of Russian ³He was entering the U.S. market annually.
Since 2003, DOE has sold over 200,000 liters of ³He, drawing
down a significant portion of the Department's inventory. In addition,
allocations totaling 58,000 liters were provided to SNS directly from
NNSA in 2001 and 2008 in support of the high priority neutron
scattering basic research program.
In March 2006, Isotope Program was briefed by Systems Development
and Acquisition, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) on the
development and acquisition of the deployment of their domestic
detection system. The goal was to award contracts by July 2006. There
was discussion that additional ³He would be required by
DNDO, but final quantities could not be provided at that time. Some
quantities were discussed prior to the meeting, particularly taking
into account the availability at the time of additional supply from
Russia. In the fall of 2007, vendors expressed interest to the Office
of Nuclear Energy Isotope Program about the timing of the next bid of
³He and the probability of increased needs, but actual
quantities were not known. While it was becoming apparent that a gap
between supply and demand was emerging the magnitude of the projected
demand was still unknown, as was the future availability of
³He gas from Russia. A combination of ³He loading
enhancements at SRS in 2007, which delayed ³He distribution
capabilities, and a lack of detailed information on demand caused the
planned 2007 bid to be delayed.
In 2008, concerned that the overall demand would surpass the
available supply, even though the U.S. was not the sole source at the
time, the Isotope Program delayed all further bid sales until
additional information could be obtained. The Office of Nuclear
Physics, in anticipation of the transfer of the Isotope Program from
the Office of Nuclear Energy to the Office of Science, organized a
workshop on the Nation's needs for isotopes for research and
applications. This August 2008 workshop was attended by national
laboratories, universities, industry, and federal agencies, including
the Department of Homeland Security, and NNSA. At the workshop, the
community discussed a demand for ³He approaching 70,000
liters annually'. The projected U.S. supply in the out years was
estimated, at that time, to be about 8,000 liters annually. The results
of the workshop were subsequently released in a report to the
interagency community. During the same time period, Russia ceased
offering ³He to the commercial market, informing U.S.
vendors that it was reserving its supplies for domestic use.

DOE Response to ³He Shortage

With the estimated magnitude of the shortage becoming clear in
August 2008, the Isotope Program coordinated sales in 2008 among the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the NNSA Second Line of Defense
(SLD) program, and industry, and did not distribute ³He
through an open bid process. A briefing by the Isotope Program was held
at DHS, with attendance by Department of Defense, DHS and NNSA, to
discuss the projected ³He shortage. The DOE was instrumental
in the development of the self-formed interagency group that was
established in March 2009, with the objective of identifying the
³He demand and supply and R&D efforts on alternative
technologies.
DOE quickly implemented a number of actions. NNSA and Office of
Science agreed that no further ³He allocations would be made
without interagency agreement. Together with DHS, they decided not to
provide additional gas for portal monitor systems, which accounted for
up to 80 percent of projected future demand. DOE accelerated plans for
the development and deployment of alternative neutron detection
technology to reduce demand, with the aim to begin implementation
within the next few years. DOE started investigating the identification
of new sources of ³He from other countries, including
Canada, which could increase the domestic supply starting in two to
three years. Together with DHS, DOE also started examining additional
new ³He production from either natural gas distillation or
new reactor-based irradiation. These options were seen as a long-term
and expensive, but potentially necessary if demand continues to outpace
supply in the future.
A targeted public outreach campaign was instituted to help ensure
that the ³He user community was made aware of the current
shortage. The DOE Isotope Program published the Workshop Report, which
articulated the ³He shortage, and broadly disseminated the
report to stakeholders and interested parties in December 2008. Both
NNSA and the Office of Science made a formal inquiry in July 2009 to
national laboratories and universities supported by their programs,
explaining the shortage and asking for input on use, demand and
alternatives. The public outreach campaign included letters to
scientific associations involved in cryogenics, nuclear detection,
medicine, and basic research, alerting them and their members of the
shortage. Dedicated ³He sessions at technical association
meetings such as the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, National Academy of Sciences, American Nuclear Society,
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers were arranged. The Isotope Program posted a
fact sheet on the ³He shortage on both the Office of Nuclear
Physics Website and the Isotope Business Office website in August 2009,
notifying stakeholders of the shortage and informing them of the
interagency efforts.
In July 2009, the White House National Security Staff (NSS) formed
an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), with broad federal
representation, to investigate strategies to decrease overall demand
for ³He, increase supply, and make recommendations to
optimally allocate existing supplies. Both NNSA and the Office of
Science are members of the IPC and the working groups that subsequently
have been formed. The DOE, through its Isotope Program, presently is
distributing the 2010 allocations of ³He to federal and non-
federal entities, based on the recommendation of the IPC. The
allocation process gives priority to scientific uses dependent on
unique physical properties of ³He and to maintaining
continuity of activities with significant sunk costs. It also provides
some supply for non-government sponsored uses, principally oil and gas
exploration. The Isotope Program is working closely with ³He
industrial distributors to ensure that the available He is being
distributed in accordance with the Interagency Working Group decisions.
Preliminary results obtained by the interagency group, projected FY
2010 U.S. demand to be 76,330 liters, far outpacing the total available
supply of 47,600 liters or projected annual production of 8,000 liters.
Based on guidance developed by the group, agencies have reduced their
projected needs to 16,549 liters. A second review produced further
reductions to 14,557 liters for FY 2010. At a December 10, 2009
meeting, the task force agreed to allocate a portion of this revised
amount.
To achieve this reduction in demand, DHS and DOE have agreed to
make no new allocations of ³He for use in portal monitors,
which employ the largest quantities of this material in the allocation
process. The NNSA Second Line of Defense program will continue carrying
out its mission to deploy portal monitors, by using past allotments
that provide sufficient ³He to support SLD activities
through early FY 2011.

Impact of ³He Shortage

International Safeguards
The current shortage has had the most severe impact on U.S.
international safeguards efforts. Historically, due to the low cost of
³He, the U.S. has been the major supplier of ³He
in support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
efforts. ³He is the neutron detector material in systems
used for nuclear material accountancy measurements that help assure
that nuclear materials have not been diverted. Except for the U.S.
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) facility, which received its full request, all
other U.S. international safeguards support is currently on hold as a
result of the ³He supply shortage. Concern about undermining
the U.S. Government international safeguards efforts at the Japan MOX
(JMOX) facility resulted in further investigation of international
options for ³He supply and verification of the operational
timeline for JMOX. The IAEA is currently reaching out to Member States
requesting they support JMOX by making ³He available. The
U.S. has offered to work with potential ³He suppliers on
extraction processes. NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and
International Security also has been working with Japan on an updated
operational timeline. The original 2,800 liter request for FY 2010 has
been scaled back to 1,000 liters and approved.
In the case of international safeguards, it is DOE's view that the
shortage should not be viewed as just a U.S. problem, but rather one
that will require international cooperation to solve. The U. S. has met
with IAEA representatives, including Director General Amano, and has
obtained full and active IAEA support for outreach to potential
international suppliers. DOE also suggested that Russia provide
³He from its reserves in support of these international
safeguards efforts. The safeguards community both in the U. S. and
internationally has reexamined its ³He needs and the timing
of those needs, with a view to phasing in installation of detectors
that use non-³He technology, without negative impact to
safeguards requirements.

Second Line of Defense (SLD)
Portal monitors have been the largest use of ³He in the
past few years, accounting for about one-third of the total annual use.
Given that most of the alternative development work is focused portal
monitors, the IPC allocation process eliminated ³He
allocations for this use. Past FY 2011, this decision could potentially
impact the SLD program.
SLD has a sufficient number of ³He-loaded detection
tubes to complete its planned deployments through FY 2011. After that,
SLD would be dependent on alternative technology for neutron detection.
However, boron tri-fluoride (BF3), the neutron detection technology in
use before ³He became the preferred alternative, is toxic
when exposed to air, leading to difficulties with handling,
international shipping, and deployment of monitors in foreign
locations. Several new neutron detection technologies are currently
being tested by DHS and DOE. However, these need to be brought to full
deployment readiness, married with portal technology, and formally
tested by SLD for detection capability and robustness, in accordance
with the SLD mission and standards. It is estimated that two to three
more years of development will be required before detection systems
based on these technologies will be available for deployment.

Other users
³He is used in support of lung imaging research.
Constraining allocations or increased gas costs may have an impact on
future pulmonary research efforts, particularly long term studies that
use and provide historical data. For FY 2010, the medical community
received 1,800 liters of gas which supports current activities. The
medical research community is working with industry to recapture,
recover and recycle ³He used for pulmonary research.
³He is used as the refrigerant for ultra-low-temperature
coolers for physics research, such as nanoscience and the emerging
field of quantum computing. ³He is unique in that there are
no materials other than helium that remain liquid at temperatures
closely approaching absolute zero, and ³He's nuclear
properties provide a handle to do cooling that ⁴He doesn't
provide, allowing for cooling down to the milli-Kelvin level. In FY
2010, the full U.S. cryogenics request for 1,000 liters was approved.
The true impacts to both R&D and operational programs will be better
quantified in the upcoming months, as users with small volume
requirements place orders for their projects.
³He is a component of ring laser gyros, used in guidance
and navigation equipment utilized by the DoD for strategic and tactical
programs. These systems are utilized in guidance for smart munitions
and missiles and in military aircraft and surface vehicle and
navigation systems. They are also used in space guidance and navigation
systems. ³He is required until current testing and
qualification tests to assess an alternative gas are completed.
³He plays an important role in basic research. Neutron
scattering provides unique information about the structure and dynamics
at the atomic and molecular level for a wide variety of different
materials. Neutron scattering instruments have the requirements of high
efficiency, very good signal-to-background ratio, and high stability of
signal and background. Many neutron instruments depend on the use of
³He detectors because of their insensitivity to gamma rays,
which permits measurements spanning very large dynamic ranges. They
have high efficiency (>50%) for thermal neutrons, and their high
stability permits precise measurements over long periods of time or
with different sample conditions. No other detector technology
currently comes close to matching these capabilities. A number of the
neutron scattering instruments at the Office of Science High Flux
Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and the SNS at ORNL already use ³He-
based detectors. The shortage has not yet impacted the U.S. neutron
scattering research community. It is projected that their
³He allocation will support experiments through FY 2014.
In addition, the international neutron scattering community is
developing and installing new facilities that are projected to require
approximately 120,000 liters of new ³He over the course of
this decade. The U.S. neutron scattering community has been actively
engaged with their international counterparts in investigating ways to
reduce the total demand, make better use of available supply, and
develop alternative technologies. The U.S. has insisted that
international partners take responsibility for securing new sources of
³He, that the U.S. can no longer be the major supplier
satisfying these needs.

Alternative Sources of ³He

The DOE is pursuing multiple approaches to identify alternative
sources of ³He.

Reuse and recycle
In the medium term (1-3 years), the focus is on investigating ways
to increase and/or improve use of ³He supplies. DOE
programs, such as the Emergency Response Program which uses backpack-
sized ³He-based detection equipment for their nuclear search
mission, and the international safeguards program have instituted
recycle and recovery efforts. These efforts, have led to reductions in
their overall demands for new ³He by about 10 percent. Other
programs, such as SLD, have been able to reduce the total amount of
³He required in each system and still meet required
specifications. The Office of Science also has been developing
recycling approaches for its uses of ³He.
To help identify stray inventories of ³He, DOE/NNSA and
Office of Science have issued a call to the laboratories and plants,
directing that they inventory unused/excess bulk ³He
quantities and equipment containing ³He. This could be used
in the preparation of a DOE/NNSA recycling program that could be
expanded to other government agencies. The DOE laboratories are
analyzing the extraction process used to remove ³He from
tritium to determine if it can be further optimized. Savannah River
National Laboratory is developing a process to extract ³He
from retired tritium equipment that otherwise would have been
discarded. The process may provide as much as an additional 10,000
liters of ³He.

New supply
Tritium is produced by neutron capture in heavy-water-moderated
reactors, such as those used in Canada, Argentina and other countries.
Because tritium is radioactive, utilities using these types of reactors
often need to separate and store tritium in sealed containers, where it
decays to produce ³He. Typically these containers have been
designed to support permanent storage, not future extraction. DOE/NNSA
is discussing with these countries how much, if any, ³He
they have in storage and how best to secure and make available.
Investigations into possible ways to secure that material include
transporting the storage containers to the U.S. for extraction in the
U.S. or licensing the U.S. extraction process at the foreign facility.
These are on-going negotiations; additional details can be provided
once agreements have been reached with potential partners. Based on
preliminary estimates, DOE/NNSA believes it would be possible to
extract approximately 100,000 liters of ³He over a 7-year
period. The results of technical feasibility and cost studies are
expected to be available by early FY 2011 as a basis for decisions by
DOE and other interested agencies.
Over the longer term, it may be possible to produce ³He
rather than derive it as a byproduct of other activities. DOE/NNSA is
currently examining the feasibility of two possible pathways. However,
both of these options would require capital investment by DOE or
another agency, and would likely involve a substantial increase in the
cost of ³He to the end user.
First, it may be possible to extract ³He from natural
gas. A 1990 Department of Interior (DOI) Study entitled, ``Method and
Apparatus for Direct Determination of ³He in Natural Gas and
Helium'' found wide variations in the amount of ³He at
various drilling sites, ranging from less than 1 part per billion to
over 200 parts per billion.
Secondly, the NNA Office of Defense Programs is evaluating the cost
and feasibility of conducting reactor-based irradiations to produce
tritium for the primary purpose of subsequent ³He
harvesting. This approach would utilize the facilities currently
employed to generate tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Although the necessary infrastructure currently is in place, additional
costs would be incurred for target fabrication and subsequent
processing. Because of the 12.3-year half life of tritium, there would
be a delay of a number of years before any new ³He would
become available.

Non ³He based detectors
In FY 2009, NNSA initiated a program to address the shortage of
³He that focuses on non-³He replacement
technologies for neutron detectors in portal monitors deployed by the
SLD Program. The NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Verification
Research and Development has, for many years, been developing
alternative neutron detection technologies, but these efforts were not
focused on portal monitoring applications that require large-area
detectors. Since FY 2009, this application has become the principal
focus of this neutron detection R&D program. Several promising
technologies are being investigated that could supplement the use of
the older BF3 technology as substitutes for ³He
neutron detectors.

Current Actions and Allocation Process for Helium-3

The NSS IPC met in September 2009 and concurred on a strategy that
decreases overall demand for ³He, including conservation and
alternative technologies, increases supply through exploring foreign
supplies/inventories and recycling, and optimally allocates existing
supplies. Furthermore, the IPC agreed to defer all further allocation
of ³He for portal monitors, beginning in FY 2010, and would
not support allocating ³He for new initiatives that would
result in an expanding ³He infrastructure. The IPC
stipulated that ³He requests should be ranked according to
the following priorities:

1. programs requiring the unique physical properties of
³He have first priority.

2. programs that secure the threat furthest away from US
territory and interests have second priority.

3. programs for which substantial costs have been incurred
will have third priority.

Adoption of this approach for managing the U.S. ³He
inventory produces allocations for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2017 that
can be met by projected reserves. This is in contrast to the original
allocation approach, which would have resulted in large and increasing
shortages over the same period of time.
For FY 2010, allocations were as follows:

a. DOE (Safeguards)
b. DOE (Detection)
c. DOE (Emergency Response)
d. DOE (NIF/NNSA)
e. DOE-Science
f. NIST
g. Oil and Gas
h. NIH (Med Imaging)
i. Cryogenics
j. NASA
k. Environ Management
l. IC
m. DoD
n. DHS
o. DOS
800 liters (+1000 liters) *
1,520 liters
1,750 liters
80 liters
341 liters
832 liters
1,000 liters
1,800 liters
1,800 liters
80 liters
0 liters
0 liters
882 liters (+648 liters) **
772 liters
100 liters

* DOE requested and was approved for an additional 1000 liters for the
JMOX facility in FY10.
** DoD requested and was approved for an additional 648 liters in FY10.
325 liters will be used for the guidance and navigation systems, and
323 liters will be used by the DoD laboratories for cryogenic dilution
refrigeration.

Concluding Remarks

The DOE is committed to working with other agencies, the community
and the White House in reducing the demand of ³He,
increasing the supply of ³He, and distributing
³He in accordance to the Nation's highest priorities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for providing
this opportunity to discuss the national ³He shortage and
DOE's roles and reaction to the shortage. I'm happy to answer any
questions you may have.

Biography for William F. Brinkman

Dr. William F. Brinkman was confirmed by the Senate on June 19,
2009 and sworn in on June 30, 2009 as the Director of the Office of
Science in the U.S. Department of Energy. He joins the Office of
Science at a crucial point in the Nation's history as the country
strives toward energy security--a key mission area of the Department of
Energy.
Dr. Brinkman said during his confirmation hearing that he looked
forward to working ``tirelessly to advance the revolution in energy
technologies, to understand nuclear technologies and to continue basic
research in the 21st century.''
Dr. Brinkman brings decades of experience in managing scientific
research in government, academia, and the private sector to the post.
He leaves a position as Senior Research Physicist in the Physics
Department at Princeton University where he played an important role in
organizing and guiding the physics department's condensed matter group
for the past eight years.
He joined Bell Laboratories in 1966 and after a brief sojourn as
the Vice President of Research at DOE's Sandia National Laboratories,
where he oversaw the expansion of its computer science efforts, Dr.
Brinkman returned to Bell Laboratories in 1987 to become the executive
director of its physics research division. Dr. Brinkman returned to
Bell Laboratories in 1987 to become the executive director of its
physics research division. He advanced to the Vice President of
Research in Bell Laboratories in 2000, where he directed research to
enable the advancement of the technology underlying Lucent
Technologies' products. Brinkman led a research organization that
developed many of the components and systems used in communications
today, including advanced optical and wireless technologies.
He was born in Washington, Missouri and received his BS and Ph.D.
in Physics from the University of Missouri in 1960 and 1965,
respectively. Since this time, he has served as a leader of the physics
community. He has spent one year as a National Science Foundation
postdoctoral fellow at Oxford University. He has served as president of
the American Physical Society and on a number of national committees,
including chairmanship of the National Academy of Sciences Physics
Survey and their Solid-State Sciences Committee. He is a member of the
American Philosophical Society, National Academy of Sciences, and the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
He has worked on theories of condensed matter and his early work
also involved the theory of spin fluctuations in metals and other
highly correlated Fermi liquids. This work resulted in a new approach
to highly correlated liquids in terms of almost localized liquids. The
explanation of the superfluid phases of one of the isotopes of helium
and many properties of these exotic states of matter was a major
contribution in the middle seventies. The theoretical explanation of
the existence of electron-hole liquids in semiconductors was another
important contribution of Brinkman and his colleagues in this period.
Subsequent theoretical work on liquid crystals and incommensurate
systems are additional important contributions to the theoretical
understanding of condensed matter.

Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Brinkman.
We will now begin with our first round of questions and the
Chair now recognizes himself for five minutes.
Dr. Brinkman, I know that you joined in DOE in 2009 so the
obvious criticisms don't apply to you personally. I know that
you probably don't want to be harshly critical, publicly of the
people who now work for you but it does seem obvious with
benefit of hindsight that this was coming and that DOE not only
as the only domestic source for helium-3 but is a major
consumer of helium-3 should obviously have known what the
demand was and what the supply was and seen this coming, and
even apparently DHS, we might fault them for not being more
aggressive about assuring that there was a sufficient supply,
apparently did inquire and DOE said no problem. How did that
happen?
Dr. Brinkman. As you point out, I wasn't around to witness
that. The only thing I can say is that at the time the Russians
were putting a lot of helium-3 onto the market as well as the
DOE and I think that confused the picture somewhat as to what
was actually going on in the marketplace and it was only around
2008 when people started to really realize what was happening
and then the Russian source dried up and so there was a
sequence of events that happened there that--look, I don't want
to defend the situation because it is unfortunate that this
wasn't recognized earlier but there was a sequence of events
there that led to some confusion.
Chairman Miller. You mentioned earlier that you have now
had a conference on isotopes, rare isotopes. Although I know
that helium-3 was discussed at that, it doesn't appear that the
participants in the conference came away with an oh, crap kind
of feeling about it. There was an understanding that there was,
you know, some shortage but not quite a crisis. What are you
all doing now to identify whether there are other isotopes that
may have a supply or demand that greatly exceeds the supply and
that we aren't developing technologies that will depend upon a
material that is not there?
Dr. Brinkman. Well, first of all, the program has been
moved to the nuclear physics office rather than the nuclear
energy office. The nuclear energy organization is really
interested in reactors, not isotopes. However, the nuclear
physics organization is an organization which is very much
interested in isotopes, rare isotopes of various types to learn
more about nuclear physics and nuclear structure, and so it has
a much bigger presence in isotope development and now of course
manages all of our isotope development that we do internally.
So it is responsible for exactly what you are asking for, where
things will go wrong.
We of course, have had another crisis as you know in moly
99, and it was ameliorated again by an interagency office, and
we are working at looking very carefully for future ways of
generating that particular isotope and have made progress on
how to do that commercially.
Chairman Miller. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Broun for
five minutes.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Coming back to Dr. Brinkman, you mentioned moly 99 as a
problem. Helium-3 obviously from this hearing is a problem. How
about other isotopes? Have you identified other isotopes that
are susceptible to similar shortages, and if so, what other
technologies should we be utilizing to seek alternatives to
those isotopes?
Dr. Brinkman. Those are the only two known to me that we
have to worry about, but we have a workshop report in which we
have gone through all the different isotopes that are used
commercially and looked to see whether they are in short supply
and what we need to supply them. So we have a full report on
that, and we have gone through all of them. These two are the
ones that I know have created recent crises, anyway. I don't
believe we are in trouble on any others.
Mr. Broun. Are you continuing an inventory on an ongoing
basis of those just to make sure that we do not have a repeat
of what we are having on helium-3?
Dr. Brinkman. We sure try to.
Mr. Broun. I certainly hope so.
Dr. Brinkman, part of the reason we found ourselves in the
current situation is the drawdown of nuclear weapons after the
Cold War. What impact will the recently signed nuclear
agreement with Russia have on helium-3 supplies?
Dr. Brinkman. It is bound to reduce them further because
the weapons program will eventually draw down the tritium
supply that they need and so we really will have to find
alternative sources, and that is what we are working on right
now.
Mr. Broun. What other isotopes are potentially impacted by
that?
Dr. Brinkman. I don't think there are any other isotopes
impacted by the production of tritium, which is what you have
to produce to make helium-3.
Mr. Broun. All right, sir. Are we the only nation that
provides helium-3 for IAEA monitors?
Dr. Brinkman. Primarily, that is true.
Mr. Broun. Is the United States bound by international
agreements to supply helium-3 to the IAEA?
Dr. Brinkman. You will have to answer that.
Dr. Aoki. Well, the United States is not bound by
international agreement but traditionally we have been the
primary source of supply for the IAEA nuclear safeguards
program. One of the things that we have done as the magnitude
of the problem have become clear, we have encouraged the IAEA
to actually pursue supplies from other countries. In
particular, Russia would be one place they could go look,
possibly some other countries, but we have really made sure
that the IAEA is aware that we are probably not going to be in
a position that we have been in the past to be the primary
source of supply or sole source of supply for the material.
Mr. Broun. Very good.
Dr. Hagan, after helium-3 alternatives are developed for
neutron detection, do you believe that further testing will
need to be done at the Nevada test site?
Dr. Hagan. You are talking about alternatives to helium-3?
Mr. Broun. Yes, sir.
Dr. Hagan. Yes. I would think that we would do that. We are
testing a lot of--we tested some systems already at Los Alamos
using relevant sources. With the type of--some of these
detectors you can test them without having to actually use
special nuclear material. You can use other sources of neutron.
So it kind of depends on the particular technology. But if it
is appropriate, we would certainly do that.
Mr. Broun. And that will be an ongoing basis?
Dr. Hagan. Oh, yes.
Mr. Broun. How about the cost and schedule and impacts on
them?
Dr. Hagan. The cost of testing or cost of development of--
--
Mr. Broun. All of it.
Dr. Hagan. Well, I have got 47 seconds.
Mr. Broun. No, I have 47 seconds, so you can take what you
need.
Dr. Hagan. Good point. All right. The costing varies of
course with each technology so we have some that are more near
term than others, some are longer term, and so I can't really
give you an answer for all that we have approximately within
DNDO, and there are other projects going on elsewhere in the
government. But within DNDO, we have some two dozen projects to
develop alternatives. On the average, I would say those are
probably a million dollars now a--no, that is probably too
high, half a million dollars a year, in that range, for that
development. The testing, as I said, would depend on what type
of sources we would need. If we could get by with so-called
californium source to test for thermal neutron detectors, that
could be done relatively cheaply and quickly. If we have to go
to NTS or places where there is special nuclear material, that
is very expensive. That is multimillions of dollars and many
months.
Mr. Broun. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Broun.
The Chair recognizes Mrs. Dahlkemper for five minutes.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brinkman, how much money is the DOE spending to support
the work being done by DNDO for looking at substitutes or other
areas of research?
Dr. Brinkman. I don't know that we are spending so much
money on this. We are of course interested in alternative
detectors too and we have this Second Line of Defense but I
don't know the amount the Second Life of Defense program is
spending on alternative detectors at this time. I just don't
know that number. But that is one of the places where we are
spending money. In addition, you know, one of the major users
of helium-3 has been our neutron scattering and neutron
experimental program at SNS at Oak Ridge. There we see some
very big numbers that are needed but there is now an
international community of people to do those kind of
experiments and they are looking at alternative detectors too.
So there is a fair bit of activity on the alternative detectors
and a very broad base of work.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. So you don't have any idea what you are
spending? I mean, can you get back to me on that?
Dr. Brinkman. We can get back to you on that, but I think
Steve will have to an answer to that.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Mr. Aoki?
Dr. Aoki. There is a research and development program
within the National Nuclear Security Administration that
includes funding for nuclear detector development which is now
prioritized, the identification of new neutron detection
technologies that would provide a substitute for helium-3, and
I think I was told this morning that it is something like $7
million a year but I would want to confirm that and get back to
you.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. If you could confirm that and get back to
me, I would appreciate it.
[The information follows:]

There has been an ongoing research effort investigating non-He3
based detectors (prior to the issue's being raised in 2008-2009). The
level of funding in 2009 was increased to accelerate existing efforts,
address the problem of large-area detectors, and fund a more serious
look at possible longer term solutions. At this point, the researchers
believe that increases in research funds beyond what is planned would
experience diminishing returns on investment. Attached is a chart
outlining the funding. The funds directed towards non-He3-based
detectors were redirected from longer-term research and development
efforts addressing other nonproliferation technologies such as fast-
neutron detectors and systems for active interrogation.

Mrs. Dahlkemper. And so as you make that a priority, what
happens to the funding for other pieces within that?
Dr. Aoki. Well, you know, clearly one has to make some
choices, and right now because of the time urgency, I think
there has been a decision by that office to try to accelerate
the work on the neutron detectors. Obviously there are possibly
other detection systems that may therefore receive some lower
priority.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. And do you see that as being any kind of
an issue going down the road similar to where we are at right
now with the helium-3 issue?
Dr. Aoki. I think, you know, clearly if one had no budget
constraints, it would be nice to do all these.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Well, we do have budget constraints.
Dr. Aoki. But since we do have budget constraints, we have
to make these choices and this is one choice we have made in
response to the current situation.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Dr. Hagan, I was interested in your
statement that DNDO is funding programs to look at alternative
neutron detection technology prior to even knowing of the
helium-3 shortage. I didn't see any--I guess there was no
evidence of this in the documents that we received here in the
Subcommittee. I am just wondering what funding of alternative
detection technologies you were engaged in prior to 2008, and
if you can tell me about those efforts, their purpose and the
amount that was being spent?
Dr. Hagan. I would have to get back to you on exact
numbers. I wouldn't want to--but it is on the order of a few
million dollars starting in probably 2007, 2008 time frame.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Okay.
Dr. Hagan. And the research was being done because it was--
you are always looking for better detectors and so even though
helium-3 was not thought to be in short supply, we tend to do
R&D to always make things better, or if not better, cheaper,
and so that was sort of the thrust of the early research, and
basically there are two ways--two common alternatives to
detecting thermal neutrons. Instead of using helium-3, you can
usually talk about using lithium-6 or boron-10 and so most of
the work that was funded early on--not all of it, there are
some other techniques.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Where was that funding coming from, I
guess is what I am more trying to get at here?
Dr. Hagan. It was form our transformational and applied
research directorate. We had total funding for that effort back
in 2006, I believe, was around $70 million and today is up
around 109. So it has grown with time. And back in----
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Where was this research being done at?
Dr. Hagan. Oh, I see. Various places, universities,
companies and laboratories, national laboratories, Los Alamos,
Livermore. I don't know the--I have got the stuff here but I
don't remember exactly.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. If you could get back to me on that, that
would be great. I would appreciate that. I know it is probably
more information than you can really--any of us could keep in
your heads. I appreciate that.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mrs. Dahlkemper.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Bilbray for five minutes.
Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, with your pleasure, I would like
to yield to the senior member of this panel, Mr. Rohrabacher,
from the great city of Huntington Beach.
Chairman Miller. Actually, Mr. Rohrabacher is not on this
panel but he is recognized, I think without objection.
Mr. Rohrabacher. He meant the senior member of the surfing
caucus, is what he really meant.
Chairman Miller. I think he just meant the oldest.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is good.
Mr. Bilbray. To be blunt, I want to be nice to him while he
is still around.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The demand that we are talking about for
helium-3 is how much per year now?
Dr. Brinkman. Demand seems to be around 20,000 liters.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Twenty thousand liters, and is that just
the United States or that worldwide?
Dr. Brinkman. That is the United States--well, pretty much
worldwide. It involves cryogenics internationally.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The entire demand for helium-3 worldwide
is 20,000 liters. Is that what I'm getting here?
Dr. Brinkman. That is roughly right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And what is the price per liter?
Dr. Brinkman. Well, that is very variable. We think it is
around between $350 and $400 a liter, but some of my friends
out in the world claim that it is higher than that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So----
Dr. Brinkman. But it is certainly not more than $1,000 at
this point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Not more than $1,000, not less than $300?
Dr. Brinkman. That is right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And how much does a liter of
helium-3 weigh?
Dr. Brinkman. A liter is roughly one-twentieth of a mole,
so it probably weighs three grams divided by 20, so what is
that, .06 grams or something like that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Tell me in pounds. I am sorry.
Dr. Brinkman. Pounds? Oh, my goodness. It weighs less than
an ounce.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Less than an ounce?
Dr. Brinkman. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Way less than an ounce? Does anyone here
have a more accurate figure on that in terms of the weight?
Dr. Aoki. A gram of helium-3 is seven liters.
Dr. Brinkman. A gram of helium-3, but he wants it in
ounces.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is what now?
Dr. Brinkman. A gram is--an ounce is several grams, so it
is very small.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When you say less than an ounce per
liter----
Dr. Brinkman. It is a gas after all.
Mr. Rohrabacher. A half an ounce or closer to----
Dr. Brinkman. It is probably less than a tenth.
Mr. Rohrabacher. A tenth of an ounce?
Dr. Brinkman. I am thinking in my head.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So I am trying to get a grip on----
Dr. Brinkman. Yes, it is very small, but, you know, it is--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. So a tenth of an ounce would be $1,000?
Dr. Brinkman. You are right. It is expensive.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, the reason why I am trying to get to
this is that we do know--and by the way, I have appreciated the
testimony talking about the alternatives that we have and
recycling and alternative approaches and et cetera, and also
the concept of maybe getting this out of natural gas and seeing
if we can explore that avenue, but one thing that we haven't
talked about today is the possibility of helium-3 from the
moon, which is something that has not escaped our international
competitors. Now, if we are talking about $1,000 for a tenth of
an ounce, and this is in what form at that point? Is it liquid
or is gas at that point?
Dr. Brinkman. At room temperature, it is obviously a gas.
It is only a liquid at extreme low temperatures of a few
Kelvin.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So it would be in gas form, so if we
actually had some type of system on the moon, you could
actually put this into a tank and then transport it. Is that
correct?
Dr. Brinkman. You have to remember though, a tank is 20,000
liters, so it is a fairly big tank, and it is a long way to the
moon.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right, but I am not thinking about
necessarily having the entire supply of helium-3 for the world
transported in one moon mission, just like you wouldn't have
one coal train providing all of the coal for the United States.
It would seem to me that what you have told me would be--we
right now have a group of entrepreneurs who are trying to
decide what space programs, projects they will invest in that
would have a future profit. It sounds like to me that that
might be penciled out.
Dr. Brinkman. Well, you could try that. You know, my own
guess would be that I would rather generate tritium at some
nuclear reactor and convert it into helium-3 than try to go all
the way to the moon to get it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Let me ask you this. What would the
cost of that be?
Dr. Brinkman. We don't really have an accurate number for
that yet. That is where we are.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could that also be up to $1,000----
Dr. Brinkman. A liter?
Mr. Rohrabacher. A liter.
Dr. Brinkman. It could well be.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I would just suggest that in
the world that we live in today, considering that we did go to
the moon all those many decades ago that we might actually have
a reason to go back to the moon if this can be done
successfully.
Dr. Brinkman. Well, let us be a little careful here.
Remember that $1,000 a liter, that is only $20 million a year
for the business, so that is not very big business.
Mr. Broun. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to have a CODEL
to go check that out, and I want to sign up.
Chairman Miller. And none of us weigh as much as what you
would be bringing back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you would say that the demand is
actually--when you were looking at the scenario that I am
creating here, that the demand is too low to actually justify
some kind of a mission that would cost----
Dr. Brinkman. My general impression, the mission is a
billion dollars, at least, right? I mean, probably more. A
billion dollars is one shuttle flight. And so if you----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is when the government is doing
it. The Administration is trying to privatize this now.
Dr. Brinkman. More power to them.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher's time is expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Chairman Miller. The Chair recognizes Mr. Davis for five
minutes.
Mr. Davis. We have one of the folks who will testify later
that I really wanted to introduce, so for that reason, I will
hang around but I would like to yield my time back to you or
any other member on the majority side.
Chairman Miller. I will accept that time just to ask one
question of Dr. Brinkman. You said that the whole supply of
helium was complicated by the fact that some was coming from
Russia. It seems odd, although we are now trying to develop a
better relationship than we had with the Soviet Union, a
subject near and dear to Mr. Rohrabacher's heart, they are
still not exactly our BFF. We are kind of natural competitors
with Russia, not best friends forever, and it seems odd that we
would rely upon Russian supply for something so obviously
critical to our national security needs.
Dr. Brinkman. I think they--I am sorry. I am not familiar
with all this but I believe they dumped their helium-3 onto the
market not through their government.
Chairman Miller. And did you have any idea of how much more
there was, how much more helium-3 there might be coming from
that source? I mean, obviously there was a mistake in not
seeing this coming, but it is odd that the supply from Russia
did in fact complicate the ability to see this coming quite so
much, particularly for something so obviously critical to
national security needs.
Dr. Brinkman. It is just one of the things. I would not
want to claim that that was the only driving factor in this
crisis at all, but it was certainly--it has played a role. Let
us put it that way.
Chairman Miller. Actually Mr. Rohrabacher used up Mr.
Bilbray's time and now you----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will yield to Mr. Bilbray.
Chairman Miller. All right.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would solicit comment from any one of the doctors for
this. I have been in government since I was 25 years old. I was
elected April of 1976, before Jimmy Carter. That is how long I
have been hanging around. And the one thing that has become
very obvious to me is, those of us in government in our quest
to try to stop people from doing wrong, we have legislated
ourselves into a position where so often we stop people from
doing good and correcting. My question to you is that, you talk
about this ability to somewhere in the future build and operate
a facility that can then provide the service after--remember,
we have 12 years we have to wait for a certain natural process
to occur. Do we have any plans? Have we sited? Do we permit?
What do we have online right now, Doctor, to be able to move
the agenda to build the facility to produce the components that
we need to keep the supply flowing?
Dr. Brinkman. Well, presently we still have the processing
capability that was part of the weapons program and probably
you could use that for the private purpose of creating helium-
3. The issue is where do you get the tritium that you could use
in that process. The process is available to us and so the big
issue is what the source is, and even in the case of the
source, we could go back to irradiating samples in reactors in
this country. That is the way it was done in the weapons
program, and create the tritium and let it decay and----
Mr. Bilbray. My question is, we could go back, but where
and has it been permitted? Is it legal for these facilities to
go back and do that now? Does the regulatory process allow them
to go back and are we--have we sited this? Because it is one
thing to say we need to do this or we should do it. It is
another thing when we sit there and say yeah, we ought to do it
and come the 11th hour we block it from getting a permit to go
into operation. We have seen that with this issue for the last
30 years.
Dr. Brinkman. I do not know of any legal blocking of this.
The issue we are--the main issue with this approach is just how
much it is going to cost because it looks like it is expensive.
Mr. Bilbray. How many facilities do we have in the country
that make it?
Dr. Brinkman. The way the process used to work, we used
various reactors to expose--to create the tritium and then
everything moved--was moved to Savannah River and Savannah
River did the processing.
Chairman Miller. The gentleman's time has expired. We do
have a second panel and we probably have votes at 11:30 or so.
Dr. Hagan, there seems to be something you were burning to
say.
Dr. Hagan. Thank you. I appreciate that. I just wanted to
comment that in addition to going back and making more helium-3
through other means, I also wanted to answer a question from my
own Congressman. I live in your district. I wanted to be able
to say that. But these other technologies in the past may not
have been as viable because of the cost but as the cost of
helium-3 rises, they become more and more viable, so I think it
may be quite likely in my mind that the future will lie with
these kinds of things, not going back and having to sort of
resurrect the helium-3 production through tritium decay. Thank
you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. We will now take a short break
and have our second panel, and I want to obviously thank this
panel for your testimony today. Thank you.
[Recess.]

Panel II:

Chairman Miller. We are back. It is now time to introduce
our second panel, and I will begin by recognizing Mr. Davis to
recognize or introduce Dr. Woods.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Our good
friend, John Tanner from West Tennessee, had other meetings and
could not stay to make the introduction. We certainly welcome
you here today and look forward to your testimony and look at
the work you have performed and your impact. Thank you for
being here and thank you for agreeing to join us today with
your testimony. Welcome.
Chairman Miller. Okay. I am now pleased to introduce the
balance of our panel. Mr. Tom Anderson is the Production
Manager at Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions at GE
Energy. Mr. Richard Arsenault is Director of Health, Safety,
Security and Environment at ThruBit LLC. And Dr. William
Halperin is the John Evans Professor of Physics at Northwestern
University of Illinois.
As all of you should know from having been here before, we
do allow five minutes for spoken testimony. Your written
testimony will be included in the record. After your spoken
testimony, each member will have five minutes to question the
panel.
It is our practice to take testimony under oath. Do any of
you have any objection to taking an oath? The record should
reflect that all of the witnesses shook their head to indicate
they had no objection to taking an oath. You also have the
right to be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel
here? And the record should reflect that all the witnesses
shook their heads that they did not have counsel here. If you
would now please now stand and raise your right hand, and if
anyone in the audience wishes to be sworn in, you may stand as
well. Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth?
The record should reflect that all the witnesses have now
taken the oath. We will start with Mr. Tom Anderson. Mr.
Anderson, you are recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF TOM ANDERSON, PRODUCT MANAGER, REUTER-STOKES
RADIATION MEASUREMENT SOLUTIONS, GE ENERGY

Mr. Anderson. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, my
name is Tom Anderson and I am the product line leader for GE
Energy's Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions. I
appreciate the opportunity to provide my perspective on the
helium-3 shortage.
GE Energy's Reuter-Stokes legacy dates back to the early
years of the nuclear industry. We manufacture in-core sensors
and accurately measure neutron power levels under the extreme
temperature and radiation conditions prevalent in boiling-water
reactors. We also design and manufacture a variety of products
that are used in oil and gas exploration including helium-3
neutron detectors, gamma sensors and systems to navigate and
locate oil and gas reservoirs thousands of feet under the
earth's surface. We also use helium-3 to manufacture neutron
detectors for homeland security, nuclear safeguards and neutron
scattering research facilities.
GE Energy's Reuter-Stokes facility in Twinsburg, Ohio, is
the largest manufacturer of helium-3 neutron detectors in the
world. In my written testimony, I described in detail the
important systems and applications that have come to rely on
GE's helium-3 neutron detectors. This morning I want to
emphasize two points. First, an adequate supply of helium-3
must be made available to support critical applications such as
nuclear safeguards and oil exploration while replacement
technologies are developed. Second, federal funding is
essential to accelerate development of alternate neutron
detection technologies.
The need to act is critical. The Department of Energy's
helium-3 reserves have been depleted to approximately 50,000
liters. To put this in perspective, GE has purchased over
100,000 liters of helium-3 from the DOE since 2003. Since 9/11,
GE has manufactured over 40,000 helium-3 detectors which
support homeland security and nuclear safeguards programs.
DNDO and the Integrated Project Team have played a key role
in responding to the helium-3 shortage. I believe DNDO is
exploring the most practical options available to produce
helium-3. Short of planning a trip to the moon, as was
discussed this morning, to mine helium-3, the most promising
near-term prospect is to accelerate work with the Canadian
government to harvest the helium-3 from the tritium storage
beds at Ontario Power Generation. Expeditious recovery and
processing of this gas could be used to sustain helium-3
detectors for applications such as oil exploration and nuclear
safeguards while replacement technologies are developed.
As we look for additional supplies, it is critical that the
Federal Government strengthen its support of research and
development for alternative technologies. There is currently no
drop-in replacement technology and as many as six different
technologies may be required to support the neutron detection
needs in the various applications I just described. GE is well
on the way to completing development of a boron-10 neutron
detection panel for radiation portals used in homeland
security. This required considerable investment by GE and will
involve significant facility and process modifications.
I have personally been involved in over 10 new technology
and product development programs during my time at GE. Not all
have been successful. If I leave you with one thought today, it
would be this: It is one thing to invent a technology to solve
our problem, but it is an entirely separate set of challenges
that industry faces to then take that science, craft it into a
product that is scalable in form, fit and function that can
operate over the full range of environmental extremes, a
product that is reliable with relatively long service life and
minimal maintenance requirements, a product which thousands or
even tens of thousands could be manufactured at a reasonable
cost with quality and consistent performance.
The magnitude of these challenges illustrates the need for
federal investment. We must develop new technologies and
maximize available helium-3 supplies to avoid being caught
again by surprise.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Thomas R. Anderson

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Tom
Anderson and I am the Product Line Leader for GE Energy's Reuter Stokes
Radiation Measurement Solutions. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before this Committee today.
I have been asked to speak about the impact the Helium-3 shortage
has had on our business and our customers, and to share with the
Committee our ideas on how to manage this problem in the future.
GE Energy's Reuter Stokes has over 50 years of experience supplying
radiation detectors. We design and manufacture detectors for Boiling
Water Reactors (BWR), neutron scattering instruments, oil and gas
exploration, homeland security and nuclear safeguards systems. Our BWR
in-core detectors monitor reactor power levels and provide signals to
initiate protective actions in the event of an abnormal condition. Our
Helium-3 gas-filled neutron detectors are used to accurately account
for nuclear materials during handling and processing. Over 35,000 GE
Helium-3 detectors are installed in systems deployed around the world
today to monitor for the illicit trafficking of smuggled nuclear
materials. I look forward to providing you with GE's perspective on the
consequences of the Helium-3 supply crisis.
According to information presented at the Helium-3 Workshop hosted
by the American Association for the Advancement of Science on April 6,
2010, the Department of Energy's Helium-3 reserves have been depleted
to approximately 50,000 liters, with future production rates expected
to be less than 10,000 liters per year. With global demand now on the
order of 70,000 liters per year, the total DOE reserve represents less
than a one-year supply of Helium-3. As a consequence, GE is confronting
the reality that Helium-3 for use in neutron detectors may soon no
longer be available.
In my testimony, I will address two points. First, a drop-in
replacement technology for Helium-3 does not exist today. Furthermore,
as many as six different neutron detection technologies may be required
to best address the performance requirements of the neutron detection
applications GE has served historically with technology using Helium3.
Significant research is required immediately, and Federal funding is
essential to accelerate development of new neutron detection
technologies, and thereby preserve the remaining Helium-3 supply for
other uses. Second, an adequate supply of Helium-3 must be made
available by DOE and the Interagency Project Team (IPT) to support
critical applications such as nuclear safeguards, homeland security and
oil exploration while alternate technologies are developed.

Background

GE Energy's Reuter Stokes business is located in Twinsburg, Ohio.
Beginning with our first gas-filled neutron detector in 1956, GE has
become a global leader in designing and manufacturing gamma and neutron
detection technologies for a wide variety of applications.
Many of the Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) in operation in the United
States today rely on GE detectors to measure and monitor reactor power
level. Several U.S. states, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, have
installed networks of Environmental Radiation Monitors manufactured by
GE to monitor low-level gamma radiation.
GE also manufactures a variety of products for use in the oil and
gas drilling and logging industry. These include sophisticated
instruments to navigate a drill string; gamma radiation detectors to
determine the type of rock and formation density; resistivity tools to
measure formation properties and Helium-3 neutron detectors to measure
formation porosity. The data from this full suite of detectors is
integrated to optimize oil exploration.
During its long history, GE has designed and manufactured an
assortment of BF3, Boron-10 lined, and Helium-3 gas-filled
neutron detectors. Over 100,000 of our Helium-3 neutron detectors have
been put in service during the past four decades. Our neutron detectors
have been utilized in a wide variety of neutron scattering research,
nuclear safeguards, oil and gas, and homeland security systems.
Recently in the media, there has been much excitement and
speculation about the presence of water on the Moon and on Mars. Our
Helium-3 detectors have been used for space exploration where the
unique properties of Helium-3 support water exploration at temperatures
approaching absolute zero.
GE purchases the majority of its Helium-3 gas from the Department
of Energy. The Helium-3 is processed and then used to manufacture
Helium-3 neutron detectors. Our company does not otherwise bottle or
package Helium-3 for sale.
The following sections provide background on four of the larger
applications that use Helium-3 neutron detectors.

Neutron Scattering Research

Neutron scattering facilities conduct fundamental science,
materials, electromagnetics, food and medical research by directing a
beam of conditioned neutrons at a test specimen and accurately
measuring the position and timing of the scattered neutrons. GE is the
industry leader in engineering and manufacturing Helium-3 gas-filled,
position-sensitive neutron detectors for neutron scattering research
facilities located around the globe. The three largest facilities in
the United States are the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) located at
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) in Gaithersburg,
MD and the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) located at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). International facilities include the
Japan Proton Accelerator Research Complex (JPARC), Rutherford Appleton
Laboratory (UK), and Institut Laue-Langevin (France) as well as
facilities located in Germany, South Korea, the Netherlands, Australia,
and China. The research conducted at neutron scattering facilities has
led to a long list of landmark discoveries including a better
understanding of neurological and genetic diseases such as Huntington's
disease, potential improvements in solar energy conversion, and
advances in superconducting materials, to name but a few.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional information is available on the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory website: http://neutrons.ornl.govJfacilities/SNS/history/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neutron scattering facilities represent a significant government
research investment. The majority of the construction budget is used to
build the neutron source, the accelerators and the infrastructure
needed to support the scattering instruments. The construction cost for
the SNS facility was $1.4 Billion.\2\ The design and construction of
the individual scattering instruments, including the Helium-3
detectors, is typically among the last tasks to be completed. The
instrument arrays vary in size from tens of detectors to over 1,000
Helium-3 detectors per instrument. Instrument construction at many
scattering facilities located outside the United States is currently on
hold due to the lack of Helium-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neutron scattering instruments require detectors with extremely
fast response, high neutron sensitivity and excellent gamma
discrimination. The detectors must provide accurate position and timing
information for the scattered neutrons.

Nuclear Safeguards

The purpose of nuclear safeguards programs is to prevent diversion
of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. Nuclear safeguards
systems are installed at facilities that process, handle, use and store
plutonium, uranium, nuclear fuel, spent fuel or nuclear waste.
Safeguards systems quantify and monitor nuclear material to enable
facilities to precisely account for plutonium and uranium during all
aspects of processing, storage and clean up. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) via the National Laboratories sponsor a number of international
safeguards programs such as the new reprocessing facility that is under
construction at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Complex in Japan.
Nuclear safeguards systems are typically compact. The detectors
must have high neutron sensitivity and excellent gamma discrimination
to enable accurate neutron measurements. The extremely fast response of
Helium-3 detectors makes certain measurements possible. Helium-3
detector performance can be further tailored to permit highly precise
nuclear material assay. This is a key element in accurately accounting
for nuclear materials.

Oil and Gas

Helium-3 neutron detectors are also widely used in oil and gas
exploration. These detectors are used in conjunction with a neutron
source to locate hydrogenous materials such as oil, natural gas, and
water. Neutron measurements in conjunction with inputs from other drill
string instruments are used to locate hydrocarbon reservoirs during
drilling, and to further delineate the reservoirs during logging
operations. The overwhelming majority of nuclear porosity tools used in
the oil and gas industry today depend on the unique properties of
Helium-3 neutron detectors.
Helium-3 neutron detectors have high neutron sensitivity, which
enables them to be packaged to fit inside the tool string. The
excellent gamma discrimination characteristic of Helium-3 means that
background gamma radiation levels do not interfere with the accuracy of
the neutron measurements. These detectors must also operate reliably
and survive at temperatures up to 200C under severe vibration and
shock levels up to 1,000 times the force of gravity. It is likely that
without Helium-3, exploration for new reserves, development drilling of
existing fields, and logging of both new and existing wells will be
severely curtailed until an alternative technology is developed.

Homeland Security

The demand for Helium-3 neutron detectors has increased
significantly since 9/11. Helium-3 is used as a neutron detector
technology throughout the full spectrum of homeland security
instruments, ranging from small 3/8" diameter detectors installed in
pager-sized systems to six-foot long detectors installed in large area
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM). GE's Helium-3 detectors are widely
used in radiation pagers, handheld instruments, fission meters,
backpacks, mobile systems and RPMs that are deployed to search for and
detect the illicit trafficking of fissile radioactive materials.
Homeland security systems, particularly the RPMs, require a significant
amount of Helium-3.
GE's Helium-3 neutron detectors are installed in systems supporting
Customs and Border Protection (DHS), the Second Line of Defense (SLD)/
Megaports Program (DOE) and the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP)
Program (DHS). We have also manufactured thousands of Helium-3
detectors for other DHS, DOE (NNSA), Department of Defense (DoD),
Department of Justice (DOJ), and other local and state security
programs.

Helium-3 Supply Concerns

The Department of Energy has been selling isotopes for several
years. In December 2003, the DOE auctioned 95,800 liters\3\ of Helium-
3. An additional 50,848 liters were auctioned between 2005 and 2006.\4\
After the last auction sale of Helium-3 in July 2006, there were
repeated delays in the periodic auction process. In May 2008, GE met
with the DOE to request clarification on the next anticipated auction
date. It was during this May 2008 meeting that GE first became aware of
the potential shortage of Helium-3. In July 2008, the Department of
Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the
NNSA were briefed on the possibility that future supplies of Helium-3
might be inadequate to fully support their programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Invitation for Bids to Purchase He-3 gas, Amendment 2, posted
November 20, 2003.
\4\ US DOE Helium-3 (He-3) Sales Solicitations (2005, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE suspended the anticipated 2008 auction and in December 2008
made a direct allocation of approximately 23,000 liters of Helium-3 to
GE and Spectra Gases, Inc. Seventy percent of the Helium-3 sold to GE
was controlled by NNSA for the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program.
There has been no additional Helium-3 auctioned by the DOE, and since
2008, all DOE gas supplied to GE has been allocated to specific
projects or programs.
The impact of the Helium-3 shortage was immediate. GE was no longer
able to supply products to many programs and customers. The neutron
scattering community has been hardest hit, with programs in Japan and
Germany having the most immediate need. The construction of several
scattering instruments outside the United States will be delayed until
a source of Helium-3 can be identified or an alternate technology is
made available.
Upon learning of the Helium-3 shortage, GE designed and built
equipment to more efficiently reclaim Helium-3 from unused detectors.
Helium-3 is a stable gas, and therefore can be removed from old
detectors, reprocessed and used to build new detectors. Recycled
Helium-3 has been used over the past year to build neutron detectors
for some systems.

Alternative Technologies

A drop-in replacement for Helium-3 does not exist today. Federal
research funding is essential to supplement private sector efforts to
accelerate development of replacement technologies. I have discussed
four applications that currently rely on Helium-3 neutron detectors. I
have also briefly described the detector performance attributes
required in each. Many of the applications share similar attributes,
yet each has its own subtle differences. Up to six different neutron
detection technologies may be required to replace Helium-3 detectors in
these four applications.
Three different technologies may be needed to support homeland
security systems alone. The systems deployed for homeland security
today range in size from large area portal systems and lightweight
backpack instruments, to low-power pager-sized equipment. Neutron
scattering detectors are even more complex due to the speed, timing and
position measurement accuracies needed to support their research.
Alternate technologies for nuclear safeguards and the extremely
harsh conditions encountered during oil exploration also present unique
development challenges.
GE has been actively involved in developing alternate neutron
detection technologies. GE's initial efforts have been focused on
developing a replacement technology for portal monitors. RPMs have been
the largest consumer of Helium-3 during the past seven years. GE
recently completed development of a Boron-10 lined gas-filled neutron
detection technology that meets the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), ANSI N42.35-2006 performance requirements for
portals. This was an accelerated project, which from initial concept to
first production is on track to be completed in 18 months. For this
project, our Twinsburg team worked with scientists at the GE Global
Research Center and leveraged production processes based on best
practices from GE Consumer and Industrial businesses. GE is on schedule
to begin production of Boron-10 lined neutron detection portal panels
in July of this year.
The research and new product development programs for the four
neutron detection applications described will be challenging. Each new
technology must the reliable and consistently meet the performance
requirements needed for accurate neutron measurements under all system
operating conditions. The technology must be scalable to fit the
instrument and have a reasonable service life. Finally, the technology
must be practical to manufacture in sufficient quantities at a
reasonable cost, with consistent quality and performance.
GE is well qualified to research and develop new neutron detection
technologies. However, research and development programs of this scope
are very expensive. DNDO has released Broad Agency Announcements (BAA)
and a Request for Information (RFI) to seek information and provide
funding for alternate neutron detection technologies for homeland
security systems. I am not aware of similar programs at DOE. Nuclear
safeguards, oil exploration, and neutron scattering facilities fall
under different offices within DOE. Federal funding to support research
in each of these areas is needed if replacement technologies are to be
in place in time to avoid serious effects of the Helium-3 shortage.

Alternate Sources of Helium-3

Helium-3 is generated from the radioactive decay of tritium. During
the Cold War, both the United States and Russia produced tritium to
support nuclear weapons stockpiles. Most of the Helium-3 available
today was harvested from the tritium produced for the weapons program.
Tritium is also produced as a byproduct of generating power in
CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. Four such reactors are
located at Ontario Power Generation's (OPG) Darlington Generating
Station in Ontario, Canada. GE has investigated the possibility of
separating the Helium-3 from the tritium that is currently being stored
at the Darlington facility. GE has been informed that the U.S.
Government has initiated discussions with the Canadian government. If
such discussions lead to an agreement, this might provide some
additional Helium-3 to support critical applications while alternate
technologies are developed.

Conclusion

We have come to rely on Helium-3 for cutting-edge research, medical
lung imaging, cryogenic cooling, oil and gas exploration, and the
radiation monitors that protect our borders. The Department of Energy's
Helium-3 reserve is nearly depleted and there are no short-term
solutions available to rectify the shortage. An Interagency Project
Team has been established to manage the shortage and to make the
difficult decisions to allocate the remaining limited supply of Helium-
3.
DNDO has played a key role in addressing the shortage, however,
there is much more to be done. It is critical that the federal
government strengthen its support of research and development for
alternate technologies. Specifically, DOE funding of research and
development programs for oil and gas exploration, neutron scattering
and nuclear safeguards is essential. Funding and collaboration with the
National Laboratories could help accelerate technology development.
Also, additional funding from DNDO would help accelerate development of
technologies for homeland security. Finally, it is extremely important
that the Interagency Project Team allocate adequate supplies of the
remaining Helium-3 to support critical applications such as oil
exploration and nuclear safeguards while alternate technologies are
developed. Given the limited Helium-3 supply, the Federal government
should consider moving forward on negotiations with the Canadian
government so that Helium-3 can be produced from the tritium currently
being stored at the CANDU Darlington facility. This is not a long-term
solution, but it may help provide a supplemental supply of Helium-3
while alternative solutions are found.
Thank you for holding this hearing on this critical issue. I will
be glad to answer any questions you may have.

Biography for Thomas R. Anderson

Tom Anderson is the Product Line Leader for GE Energy's Reuter
Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions. In this capacity, he is
responsible for new product development, product quality, and all
aspects of engineering and manufacturing for neutron detection products
used in security and research applications. He reports to the General
Manager of GE Energy's Reuter Stokes.
From December 2000 until his current assignment in 2003, Tom served
as Product Line Leader for GE Reuter Stokes Harley Electrical Equipment
Group and GE's Silicon Carbide Gas Turbine Flame Sensor products.
Prior to joining GE, Tom served in the U.S. Navy. He retired as a
Commander in 2000. Tom served as Executive Office on the submarine USS
Benjamin Franklin (SSBN 640) (GOLD) and submarine tender USS L.Y. SPEAR
(AS 36). His shore assignments included a tour of duty at the On-Site
Inspection Agency where he led weapons inspection teams into the former
Soviet Union in support of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). Tom's naval career
culminated with his assignment as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
for the Nuclear Weapons Inspection Center on the staff of Commander
Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In this capacity, Tom was
responsible for submarine force nuclear weapons policy, safety and
security.
Tom graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976 with a Bachelor
of Science in Electrical Engineering. He later studied at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California where he earned a Master of
Science in Electrical Engineering. Tom is also a 1997 graduate of the
U.S. Army War College.

Chairman Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Arsenault is recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ARSENAULT, DIRECTOR, HEALTH, SAFETY,
SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT, THRUBIT LLC

Mr. Arsenault. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and
members of the Committee, my name is Richard Arsenault. I am
the Director of Health, Safety, Security and Environment along
with being the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer of ThruBit
LLC, which is a Shell Technology Ventures Fund I portfolio
company formed in 2005. Today we offer logging solutions based
on a unique patented through-the-bit deployment technique that
provides significant advantage in many applications. We are a
small company taking this new technology from proof of concept
to commercial introduction with aspirations to grow into a much
larger company. I have been involved in the oil well logging
industry since 1979 starting out as an open hole wireline
engineer in West Texas and later got involved in the early
stages of logging while drilling in 1982.
Neutron logging: Wells can be logged by wireline logging or
LWD logging, known as logging while drilling. There are a
number of formation measurements that are taken when a well is
logged. Neutron logging is one of the primary measurements
taken when a well is logged. The neutron measurement provides
the hydrogen located in the pore space of the formation and the
porosity is determined from neutron count rates in the
detectors within the logging tool. The neutron measurement is a
primary gas indicator which helps delineate gas and oil
producing zones along with providing the porosity of the
formation.
Both wireline and LWD tools will in most cases have a long
space and short space helium-3 detector which are located at
different distances from the radioactive sources mounted in the
logging tool. The helium-3 detectors are used with either
americium-241 beryllium or californium-252 radioactive sources.
The importance of helium-3 supply to the oil industry is
critical and crosses into numerous sectors of the industry.
Helium-3 is used in almost the entire neutron detectors
incorporated into downhole tools in our industry. The neutron
count rate measurement, from which the porosity measurement is
derived, is used in oil and gas reservoir evaluations. Even
small errors in the neutron measurement can make the difference
in whether a reservoir is commercially viable or not.
Oil and gas exploration within the United States is a vital
part of our national security and lessens our dependence on
foreign oil and gas. The shortage of helium-3 is starting to
impact our entire industry. As rig counts increase and the
request for well logging increases it will require more tools
to be in service ready to go. Large companies can take
stockpiles of tools not in service during the slowdown in the
last two years and put them back in service. Smaller companies
which have less of a stockpile of tools not in service to pull
from are unable to do so. With small companies such as ThruBit
trying to increase our market penetration, it creates an extra
hardship limiting our ability to grow and bring our new
technology to the marketplace. Large companies have financial
and human resources to pursue extensive research and
development in looking for potential alternatives in detector
technologies. Smaller companies are not as fortunate. They
cannot afford extensive research and development. Their
commercial viability comes into question along with their
ability to sustain their business. These smaller companies are
also in a situation where they cannot afford the extensive
research and development of looking at alternatives to their
current supply of tools.
I want to personally thank you for the opportunity to
discuss this important issue involving the oil and gas well
services industry today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Arsenault follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Arsenault

Introduction

Chairman Miller, Ranking member Broun, and members of the
Committee, my name is Richard Arsenault and I am the Director of
Health, Safety, Security and Environment along with being the Corporate
Radiation Safety Officer for ThruBit LLC (ThruBit Logging Solutions)
which is a Shell Technology Ventures Fund 1 BV Portfolio company formed
in 2005. Today we offer complete logging solutions based on a unique
patented ``through the bit'' deployment technique that provides
significant advantages in many applications. We are a small company
taking this new technology from proof of concept to commercial
introduction with aspirations to grow into a much larger company. I
have been involved in the Oil Well Logging industry since 1979 starting
out as an Open Hole Wireline Engineer in West Texas and later got
involved in the early stages of Logging While Drilling in 1982.

Well Logging

Every well requires formation evaluation; well logging is a key
part of this evaluation. The quality and accuracy of data is key to
decide and ascertain if the well is a producer or dry hole. This
evaluation supports and drives:

Production Estimations,

Well Economics,

Reserve calculations

Corporate and Government Energy Assets,

Overall market fundamentals

It supports ability to commit to long term projects with less than
certain payback. Provides support for filing Company's statement of
reserves. Helps value royalty payments back to state and federal
government and drives legislation.
The US is most affected:

1/2 of worlds activity

1/4 of world consumption

< 5% of world reserves

Greatest need for immediate continuity of supply

Neutron Logging

Wells can be logged by Wireline Logging or Logging-While-Drilling
(LWD). There are a number of formation measurements that are taken when
a well is logged. Neutron logging is one of the primary measurements
taken when a well is logged. The neutron measurement provides the
hydrogen located in the pore space of the formation and the porosity is
determined from neutron counting rates in the detectors within the
logging tool. The neutron measurement is a primary gas indicator which
helps delineate gas and oil producing zones along with providing the
porosity of the formation.
Both Wireline and LWD tools will in most cases have a ``Long
Space'' and ``Short Space'' Helium-3 Detector which are located at
different distances from the radioactive sources mounted in the logging
tool. The Helium-3 detectors are used with either an Americum-241
Beryllium or Californium-252 radioactive source.
The importance of Helium-3 supply to the oil and gas industry is
critical and crosses into numerous sectors of the industry. Helium-3
gas is used in almost the entire neutron detectors incorporated into
downhole tools in our industry. The neutron count rate measurement,
from which the porosity measurement is derived, is used in all oil and
gas reservoir evaluations. Even small errors in the neutron measurement
can make the difference in whether a reservoir is commercially viable
or not.
It is difficult for our industry to determine the number of neutron
detectors used in our course of business, especially since the neutron
detector is used in open and cased hole compensated neutrons, single
detector neutrons and other devices in our industry. There are numerous
large well logging companies in the U.S. that also operate
internationally along with medium to small size companies throughout
the U.S. Each of these companies incorporates the use of He-3 neutron
detectors in their tools. With the downturn in our industry over the
last two years, most existing companies have been able to utilize
existing tool stocks for replacement detectors and spare parts, which
have lessened the impact over these years, but will eventually deplete
the stock within those companies. They will be forced to buy additional
detectors as the industry expands, for both new tools and for
replacements in older tools. The detectors do have a limited life
expectancy on the average of about 5 years depending on the downhole
conditions they are exposed. So they do need to be replaced
periodically to keep the tools working correctly. Companies introducing
new technologies for logging wells, such as ThruBit, are limited to
what is already available in house to build tools and what they can
find available by the detectors suppliers with long leads time and a
substantially higher price.

Pricing and Availability of He-3 Detectors

We have personally seen almost a 3 times price increase and a
quoted lead time of almost 6 months for delivery in an order recently
placed this year. I have also received reports from others in the
industry of pricing increases reported on neutron detectors in the 3 to
10 times range due to the Helium-3 shortage. Pricing is not the only
issue, but availability is also key. Lead times of 6-8 months have been
reported. There have been reports of some detectors not being available
due to the lack of Helium-3.
There is a big difference in application of detector technology to
applications that are located on surface, exposed to ambient
temperatures and pressures and are not moved or exposed to conditions
involving shock and vibration. Detector technology used in down hole
tools used for well logging are subjected to more stringent
requirements just to survive the environment and meet the engineering
requirements of the design.
Wireline Tools are operated at high temperature, have limited
internal geometry to mount the detectors and experience medium shock
and vibration. In the case of LWD tools they have all the same factors,
but the shock and vibration is a lot higher. As result of the limited
internal geometry small reliable detector packages are a must. In our
particular case we have the smallest well logging tools in the industry
with a 2-1/8" diameter tool. Any type of alternative technology would
require the same or smaller foot print inside the tool. We could not go
larger since we limited to our 2-1/8" diameter specification. We do not
have the resources for an R&D effort to pursue another tool design with
potential alternative detector technology.

Impact

Being a small company bringing new technology to market is a
challenge. We are in transition from a commercial introduction phase to
commercialization with an aggressive plan to be a full blown viable and
sustainable Formation Evaluation Service Company. The Helium-3
detectors are all we have to put in our Neutron Porosity tools. We do
not have a substitute detector for use in these well logging tools. It
would take substantial development time (years) to pursue a substitute.
We have neither the financial resources or R&D staff to pursue this
effort. An extreme shortage or unavailability would be extremely
detrimental in our ability to provide formation evaluation services and
increase our tool fleet size allowing our company to grow. Other medium
and small companies are in the same situation with a finite amount
resources to pursue a pure R&D effort on alternatives. Some larger
companies are looking at alternatives, but are finding the Boron
Trifluoride with 1/7 the sensitivity of the Helium-3 type detectors
will require increasing the activity of the Californium-252 or
Americium-241 Beryllium source strengths.

Alternative to Helium-3

The substitute for Helium-3 detectors, Boron Trifluoride (BF3),
however it is much less sensitive to the thermal neutron detector as
required by our industry. The majority of the sources used with neutron
tools are Americium-241 Beryllium (Am-241Be), however, most recently
due to Americium supplies being limited; more companies are utilizing
Califorium-252 (Cf-252) in its place. Most all of these sources are in
the 5 Curie (with some older 3 Curie sources used in cased hole
operations) up to 20 Curies. With the decreased sensitivity of Boron
Trifluoride, the strength of these neutron sources would have to be
increased to achieve the statistical results needed for industry.
There are other concerns with Boron Trifluoride. The USDOT has
classified this gas has a hazardous material and cannot be shipped
without a US DOT special permit. Shipping by air in the US also
requires classifying it as Toxic Inhalation Class 2.3. For
international shipment it is restricted to Cargo Only Aircraft and
classified as Toxic Inhalation Hazard Class 2.3 and Corrosive Class 8.
This provides for some packaging and logistic challenges moving tools
with detectors with this type of gas in the detector. Not a good
solution with the mobility required for well logging tools.

Conclusion

Oil and gas exploration within the U.S. is a vital part of our
national security and lessens our dependence on foreign oil and gas.
The shortage of Helium-3 is starting to impact our entire industry. As
rig counts increase and the request for well logging increases it will
require more tools to be in service ready to go. Large companies can
take stock piles of tools not in service during the slowdown in the
last 2 years and put them back in service. Smaller companies will have
less of a stock pile of tools not in service to pull from. With small
companies such as ThruBit trying to increase our market penetration it
creates an extra hardship limiting our ability to grow and bring our
new technology to the market place.
Larger companies have the financial and human resources to pursue
extensive research and development to look at potential alternatives in
detector technologies. Smaller companies are not as fortunate--they
cannot afford extensive research and development. Their commercial
viability comes into question along with their ability to sustain their
business. These smaller companies are also in a situation where they
cannot afford the extensive research and development of looking at
alternatives to their current supply of tools.
I want to personally thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
important issue involving the Oil & Gas Well Services Industry today.

Biography for Richard L. Arsenault

Richard L. Arsenault, CSP is the Director of Health, Safety,
Security and Environment and Corporate Radiation Safety Officer for
ThruBit LLC (ThruBit Logging Solutions). ThruBit Logging Solutions is
an STV (Shell Technology Ventures) Fund 1 BV Portfolio company formed
in 2005. Our innovative logging technology was developed in 1998 to
provide market access to the benefits of Shell Oil Company proprietary
drill bit advances. Today we offer complete logging solutions based on
a unique ``through the bit'' deployment technique that provides
significant advantages in many applications.
Mr. Arsenault has been involved in the Oil & Gas Well Logging
Industry since March of 1979 as a Dresser Atlas Open Wireline Engineer
in West Texas and then got involved in May of 1982 with the Testing,
Development and Commercialization of the first generation of Sperry-Sun
Drilling Services Logging While Drilling (LWD) Tools. In addition led
the Field Testing effort and Commercialization of the first generation
Neutron Porosity and Density Porosity LWD Tools. Has also held
Technical Support, Regulatory Compliance, HSE and Corporate Radiation
Safety Officer Roles up to the fall of 1998. With the merger of Dresser
Industries and Halliburton he was appointed as the Global Radiation and
Explosive Safety Manager for Halliburton.
He holds a Masters in Business Administration from the University
of Houston and Bachelors Degree in Electrical and Electronic
Engineering from the University of South Florida. He is a Certified
Safety Professional holding a CSP Registration.
He has been involved in the following industry related activities
over the years:

Established in April 2003 and chaired the Oilfield
Services Industry Forum for Radiation and Security. This now
resides in the Association of Energy Services Companies (AESC).

Established in June 2005 and chaired the Oilfield
Services Subcommittee in the Institute of Makers of Explosives
(IME).

Established a partnership between DOE (PNWL) and
Oilfield Services Industry to establish a baseline with the
ultimate goal of establishing a recommended practice for the
security of radioactive material. This was recommendation was
published by the DOE in 2008.

Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Arsenault.
Dr. Halperin is recognized for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM HALPERIN, JOHN EVANS PROFESSOR OF
PHYSICS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Dr. Halperin. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify about the negative
impact on scientific research caused by the shortage of helium-
3.
I am a physics professor at Northwestern and I rely heavily
on helium-3 to carry out scientific research at low
temperatures. I have been involved in this kind of work since
1970. Low-temperature research is essential for studying
properties of materials such as superconductivity, magnetism
and developing various advanced materials. Low-temperature
research is also critical to future improvements in metrology
and high-speed computation including quantum information
technology. Shortages of helium-3 driven by increased homeland
security demands and decreased production capability are
already creating major difficulties in these areas of research.
Let me briefly summarize the salient points. From 2001 to
the present, the stocks of about 230,000 liters have been drawn
down at a rate far in excess of today's global production
estimated to be approximately 20,000 liters per year. The use
of helium-3 as a detector of radioactive materials at airports
and border crossings combined with the growth of medical,
commercial and scientific applications is responsible for this
extraordinary increase in demand.
Now, absent new production sources, it is now impossible to
serve the estimated need of 70,000 liters per year. It may be
possible to find alternatives to the use of helium-3 for some
applications but for others the unique physical properties of
helium-3 are essential. Scientific research at low temperatures
is the signature example of an area in which helium-3 is
irreplaceable. Without adequate supplies, such research will
cease entirely. To put the matter into context, I note that
eight Nobel laureates in physics in the past 25 years owe their
accomplishments in some important measure to the availability
of helium-3. Cases in which substitutes might be found for
helium-3 include neutron detection at facilities such as the
Spallation Neutron Source at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, oil
and gas well evaluation, building construction technology and
the improvement of lasers.
The issue perhaps is best illustrated by a personal
experience in October of 2008. I sought information about
availability and pricing from six well-known distributors of
helium-3 gas. Only Chemgas and Spectra Gas had any supply but
their prices were extraordinarily high, on the order of $2,000
a liter, five to 10 times higher than I had expected, and well
outside of my research budget.
The following summer I received more bad news. Oxford
Instruments, the largest supplier of low-temperature
refrigerators, contacted me to say that the company could not
obtain any helium-3 from their supplier, Spectra Gas.
Discussions among attendees at a subsequent international low-
temperature physics conference revealed that this shortage was
global. Although the shortage took many of us by surprise, I
later learned that some government officials had been aware of
this problem for some time but had not shared that information.
In the fall of 2009, Nobel laureates Doug Osheroff and Bob
Richardson, on behalf of a low-temperature working group of
which I was a member, wrote to Bill Brinkman, Director of the
Department of Energy's Office of Science, to express concern
about the shortage of helium-3 for low-temperature research.
Conversations with DOE ensued but to date, requests by
scientists and refrigerator companies often go unanswered or
unmet, and young scientists are especially vulnerable.
Many of us are concerned that cryogenic instrumentation
companies may soon be forced out of business. Janis Research is
an example. Janis has been guaranteed an allocation but helium
has not been delivered and sales interruptions place the
company at risk. Should Janis and other companies stop
providing refrigerators, low-temperature science will end.
Dr. Brinkman requested that our working group assess the
critical needs of low-temperature science, so I conducted a
survey with the following principal findings. In a ten-year
interval from 1999 to 2009, the purchase of helium-3 for low-
temperature science averaged 3,500 liters per year and was
growing at approximately 12 percent per year worldwide. The
details are in my written testimony.
Now, on a personal note, I have an immediate need in my
laboratory for 20 liters of helium-3. Spectra Gas, the sole
provider of helium-3 released by the Department of Energy, has
not responded in the five months since I made my request and my
National Science Foundation support is now in jeopardy.
In conclusion, we must recognize the diversity of needs for
helium-3 and adopt the following strategies: Explore
alternative technologies, establish effective communication
among all the stakeholders, implement recycling and
conservation, redesign critical need instrumentation to be more
efficient, and finally, develop new sources of helium-3.
I would be pleased to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]

Prepared Statement of William P. Halperin

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify about the negative impact on scientific research
caused by the shortage of helium-three. I am a physics professor at
Northwestern University, and I rely heavily on helium-three to carry
out scientific research at low temperatures and have been involved in
this work since 1970. Low-temperature research is essential for
studying properties of materials, such as superconductivity, and
magnetism, and for developing various advanced materials. Low-
temperature research is also critical to future improvements in
metrology and high-speed computation, including quantum information
technology. Shortages of helium-three, driven by increased homeland
security demands and decreased production capability, are already
creating major difficulties in these areas of research.
Let me briefly review the salient points. Helium-three is a gas and
a byproduct of the radioactive decay of tritium, an essential element
of nuclear weapons. Following the Second World War, as the nuclear
stockpile grew, stocks of helium-three grew commensurately, reaching
about 230,000 liters by the year 2000. From 2001 to the present, these
stocks have been drawn down at a rate far in excess of today's global
production, estimated to be approximately 20,000 liters/year. The use
of helium-three as a detector of radioactive materials at ports,
airports and border crossings, combined with the growth of medical,
commercial and scientific applications, is responsible for the
extraordinary increase in demand.
Absent new production sources, it is now impossible to serve the
estimated need of 70,000 liters/year. It may be possible to find
alternatives to the use of helium-three for some applications, but for
others the unique physical properties of helium-three are essential.
Scientific research at low temperatures is the signature example of
an area in which helium-three is irreplaceable. Without adequate
supplies, such research will cease entirely. To put the importance of
such research in context, I note parenthetically that twelve Nobel
Laureates in physics in the past 25 years owe their accomplishments in
some important measure to the availability of helium-three. Cases in
which substitutes might be found for helium-three include neutron
detection at facilities such as at the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS)
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, oil and gas well evaluation, building
construction technology and the improvement of lasers.
The issue perhaps is best illustrated by a personal experience. In
October 2008 I sought information about availability and pricing from
several well-known distributors of helium-three gas. I spoke with
representatives of Sigma Isotec, Cambridge Isotope Labs, Icon Isotope
Services, Isoflex USA, Chemgas, and Spectra gas (now Linde Electronics
and Speciality Gases) and learned that only the latter two had any
supply, but their prices were extraordinarily high: $800 to $2,000/
liter. It was 5 to 10 times higher than I had expected and well outside
of my research budget plan.
The following summer I received more bad news. Oxford Instruments,
the largest supplier of low temperature refrigerators, contacted me, to
say that the company could not obtain any helium-three from their
supplier, Spectra Gas. Discussions among attendees at a subsequent
international low-temperature physics conference revealed that the
shortage was global. Although the shortage took many of us by surprise,
I later learned that some government officials had been aware of the
problem for some time but had not shared this information.
In the fall of 2009, Nobel Laureates Doug Osheroff and Bob
Richardson, on behalf of a low-temperature working group of which I was
a member, wrote to Bill Brinkman, Director of the Department of
Energy's Office of Science, to express concern about the shortage of
helium-three for low temperature research. Conversations with DOE
ensued, but to date requests by scientists and refrigerator companies
often go unanswered or unmet. Young scientists, especially, find
themselves without access to this essential resource.
Many of us are also concerned that without adequate access to
helium-three, instrumentation companies may soon be forced out of
business. Janis Research is an example. Janis has been guaranteed an
allocation, but the helium has not been delivered and the sales
interruptions place the company at risk. Should Janis and other
companies stop providing refrigerators, low-temperature science will
end.
Dr. Brinkman requested that our working group assess the critical
needs in low temperature science. The principal finding of our recently
completed survey is the following: In a ten year interval, from 1999 to
2009, the purchase of helium-three for low temperature science averaged
3,500 liters/year and was growing at approximately 12%/year world-wide.
(Survey details are posted at http://www.qfs2009.northwestern.edu/
survey/ and attached to my written testimony.)
On a personal note, I have an immediate need in my laboratory for
20 liters of helium-three. Spectra Gas, the sole provider of helium-
three released by the Department of Energy, has not responded in the
five months since I made my request, and my National Science Foundation
supported research is now in jeopardy.
In conclusion, we must recognize the diversity of needs for helium-
three and adopt the following strategies: explore alternative
techn6logies; establish effective communication among all stake
holders; implement recycling and conservation; redesign critical-need
instrumentation to be more efficient; and develop new sources of
helium-three.
I would be pleased to answer your questions.

Biography for William P. Halperin

Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Halperin.
Dr. Woods for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF DR. JASON WOODS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY

Dr. Woods. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members
of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be asked to testify today.
My name is Dr. Jason Woods. I am Assistant Professor of
Radiology, Physics and Molecular Biophysics at Washington
University, where I am also Assistant Dean of Arts and
Sciences, and within the International Society for Magnetic
Resonance in Medicine, I am the Program Director for our
Hyperpolarized Media Study Group. I have been involved with
helium-3 magnetic resonance imaging since 1997. My education
and background are in nuclear-spin physics, helium-3 MRI, and
the use of imaging for pulmonary physiology and
pathophysiology. My research is focused on the use of helium-3
as a diagnostic imaging tool to precisely quantify lung
ventilation, lung microstructure, and to guide new
interventions that are being developed. In my testimony, I
attempt to represent the field of helium-3 MRI and the impact
of the shortage on our field.
Now, if we ask seasoned pulmonologists how much their field
has changed in 25 years, responses will be that largely not
much has changed. There are the same technologies for measuring
pulmonary function. There are largely the same treatments.
There are a few new drugs available but not much has changed,
and these people see a large number of patients. Approximately
35 million Americans suffer from obstructive lung disease. That
is asthma and COPD [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease]
together. And taken together, this is 35 million Americans.
COPD alone is the fourth leading cause of death and the only
major leading cause of death in the United States and in the
world that is significantly rising.
Helium-3 MRI is beginning to emerge as a new gold standard
biomarker for measuring pulmonary function and structure. Its
high signal creates extraordinarily detailed images of lung
ventilation, which I have shown you right here, a healthy
patient and a couple of volunteers with asthma and COPD.
[The information follows:]

And its physical properties allow the determination of
microstructure at the alveolar level. So here I have shown you
a couple of images which are maps of lung microstructure, again
at the alveolar level.
[The information follows:]

So this kind of sensitivity to lung structure and function
and the ability to get regional maps of lung microstructure are
allowing us to basically lead a renaissance in pulmonary
medicine, and I think that in the next ten years we are going
to see significant advances within this field. A lack of
helium-3 gas will stifle these advances.
Now, to be clear, the shortage affects my research acutely
and without any gas, my research as a young professor would be
completely shut down and I would likely join the ranks of the
unemployed. But I think the larger impact of helium-3 MRI is on
much easier determination of the effectiveness of new drugs and
devices and in guiding new minimally invasive interventions,
which is my most recent work.
The lack of big leaps forward in drugs and devices in
pulmonary medicine over the last 10 and 20 years is largely due
to the combination of two things: the exceptional cost to bring
a drug or device to market and the lack of a precise biomarker
to determine changes in lung function and structure, and one
recent example illustrates this well.
In 2007, GlaxoSmithKline released results of a study
entitled ``Toward a Revolution in COPD Health,'' or TORCH. The
total cost of the study was $500 million for 6,000 patients
with moderate and severe COPD, and in this case the endpoint
was final: It was death from all causes. It ranged from a high
of 16 percent to a low of 12.6 percent, and they wanted to
answer the question. Does Advair reduce mortality by as much as
20 percent? And unfortunately for GSK, the question remains
entirely unanswered because there was a 5.2 percent chance that
the difference between the groups occurred randomly and the
maximum accepted value is five percent. So by my calculation,
if we had used helium-3 diffusion MRI that our group has
developed as a biomarker and as an endpoint, then 6,000
patients would have turned into approximately 500 patients and
the $500 million study would have turned into a $50 million
study, saving $450 million and the question of efficacy would
likely have been answered. This is just one example of the
significant impact that I think that helium-3 MRI will have.
I firmly believe the helium that we use is 100 percent
recyclable and we can begin to do this in the next few years
with a commercially viable recycling scheme. From my
perspective, the most important thing that I want to
communicate to you today is that without approximately 2,000
liters of helium-3 for our imaging community per year, we will
basically curtail this revolution in pulmonary medicine which
is currently in progress.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Woods follows:]

Prepared Statement of Jason C. Woods

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee,
I'm honored to be asked to testify today. My name is Dr. Jason Woods; I
am an Assistant Professor of Radiology, Physics, and Molecular
Biophysics and Assistant Dean of Arts & Sciences at Washington
University and an the Program Director for the Hyperpolarized Media
Study group of the International Society for Magnetic Resonance in
Medicine. I have been involved with medical imaging--specifically
hyperpolarized ³He MRI--since 1997. My education and
background are in nuclear-spin physics, ³He MRI, and the use
of MR imaging for pulmonary physiology and pathophysiology. My research
has focused on the use of ³He as a diagnostic imaging tool
to understand regional lung ventilation, to precisely quantify lung
microstructure and acinar connectivity, and to use imaging to guide new
minimally-invasive interventions. In my testimony I attempt to
represent the field of ³He MRI and the
impact of the shortage on this field. I focus on the revolutionary
way that ³He MRI has illuminated pulmonary ventilation and
microstructure, how its physical properties make it unique and
irreplaceable in many instances, its potential for guiding
interventions and drug development, and how a developing recycling
technology can allow significant, sustained research into the future
with approximately 2000 liters per year. In so doing I specifically
address the questions outlined in your letter to me dated April 9,
2010.

SUMMARY

If we ask seasoned pulmonologists today how much the practice of
pulmonary medicine has changed in the last 25 years, responses will
largely be that very little has changed--a few new drugs are available,
but there is largely the same technology for measuring lung function
and for treatment. ³He MRI, however, is beginning to emerge
as a new ``gold standard'' and revolutionary biomarker for measuring
pulmonary function and structure. Its high signal creates detailed
images of lung ventilation and dynamics, and its physical properties
allow precise measurement of alveolar size, microstructure, and
regional lung function. This makes ³He MRI particularly
sensitive to changes in both global and regional lung function and
structure. We are at the cusp of leading pulmonary medicine to a
renaissance of new drug development and image-guidance of surgical
interventions for various lung diseases, such as asthma, fibrosis, and
COPD, which currently affect 11% of the US population. This imaging
technology, as I speak, is currently serving as a catalyst for
pulmonology to see significant advances in the next 10 years. A lack of
supply of ³He gas will stifle these advances.
This ³He shortage affects my research acutely; it
affects my employees and collaborators, and the research and livelihood
of MRI groups in at least 11 US universities and at least that many
universities abroad. For me personally, a lack of gas will likely mean
that my research is shut down, and I would join the ranks of the
unemployed. To be clear, however, I think the larger impact of this
technology is not on my research group but in drug development, in much
easier determination of the effectiveness of new pharmacologic agents,
and in guiding new minimally-invasive interventions (my most recent
work). The lack of big leaps forward in drugs to treat lung diseases--
asthma, COPD, pulmonary fibrosis--has largely been due to the
combination of the exceptional cost to bring drugs to market and the
lack of a precise biomarker to determine changes in the lung. Pulmonary
function tests, the decades-old standard in pulmonary medicine, have
notoriously high measurement errors. Obstructive lung diseases (asthma
and COPD), taken together, afflict approximately 35 million Americans;
COPD alone is the 4th leading cause of death and is the only major
cause of death that is steadily increasing [1, 2]. The financial and
human impacts of the shortage are significant.
One recent example of drug efficacy testing illustrates the lack of
a precise biomarker and its impact: in 2007 GlaxoSmithKline released
results of an Advair study, entitled ``Toward a revolution in COPD
health (TORCH).'' The total cost was estimated at $500 million dollars
for this study in over 6,000 moderate and severe COPD patients. The
study endpoint was death from all causes, which ranged from a high of
16% to a low of 12.6% for those on Advair. The key question was ``Does
Advair reduce mortality by as much as 20%?'' Unfortunately for GSK, the
question remained unanswered, because the statistical p-value of the
difference was 0.052. This means the difference in mortality had a 5.2%
chance of occurring randomly, whereas the generally accepted limit is
5%. This $500M thus was largely wasted; the company couldn't answer the
question about benefit, and patients and society received no benefit or
increased understanding from the study. If the ³He diffusion
MRI techniques that our group has developed, for example, were used as
a biomarker and endpoint (not possible when the study began), 6,000
patients could have turned into fewer than 500 patients, saving around
90% of the cost of the study, or $450M. And the question about efficacy
would likely have been answered. This is only one example of the type
of significant impact that I think ³He MRI is going to have
on pulmonary medicine.
There has been some discussion in the scientific literature about
using hyperpolarized ¹²⁹Xe instead of ³He gas for
specific future studies, and for some studies this may be a viable
alternative within the next 5-10 years [3], though the intrinsic
physical properties of ¹²⁹Xe reduce the signal by a factor
or 3-5 compared to ³He. Some damage to the field could be
tempered by outside assistance in developing this infrastructure and
technology. However, many studies, like my NIH-funded research, rely
upon ³He's large diffusion coefficient for large-distance
measurements, and for this xenon will not be an alternative [4]. On the
bright side, the ³He that we use is nearly 100% recyclable,
but we do not yet have the recycling technology in place to begin to do
this. I believe firmly that the development of efficient and
commercially viable recycling schemes will allow this important work to
continue, with a total allotment of around 2,000 Liters STP per year.
Lastly, I note that in 2009 an allocation of ³He was
made specifically for the NIH-funded medical imaging community. This
was offered through Spectra Gases (now Linde Gas) at $600/L STP--an
approximately 500% increase over previous years. Because the price of
³He increased so quickly and by so much, research groups
(who have strict budgets from federal or private grants) were not able
to plan for the cost increase and are now scrambling for supplementary
funding sources. This is the reason why all of the ³He
recently set aside for various medical imaging groups has not been
instantly purchased.

BACKGROUND

Conventional MRI relies upon a large magnetic field to generate a
net alignment of nuclear spins (generally within the hydrogen atoms of
water molecules), which can be manipulated to create images with high
contrast. The technology allows images to answer specific questions
about structure and function of the brain, joints, or other parts of
the body [5, 6]. MRI of gas is not generally used, since the density of
a gas is about 1000 times less than tissues, and there is not enough
signal to generate an image. The unique properties of the
³He atom allow us to align a large fraction of its nuclear
spins via a laser polarization technique with a magnetic field; this is
often called ``hyperpolarization'' [7, 8]. Hyperpolarized
³He gas has signals enhanced by a factor of 100,000 or
more--allowing detailed images of the gas itself to be generated in an
MRI scanner. Since helium gas (either ⁴He or ³He)
has a solubility of essentially zero and is arguably the most inert
substance in the universe, inhaled hyperpolarized ³He allows
the generation of exceptional quality, gas-MR images of ventilated lung
airspaces with no ionizing radiation or radioactivity [9]. Further,
traditional technologies for measuring pulmonary function (e.g.,
pulmonary function tests or nuclear ventilation scans) have either high
errors on reproducibility or low content of regional information. While
x-ray CT has some potential for quantifying lung structure (not
function), its large amount of ionizing radiation raises cancer risks
and prevents it from being used in longitudinal studies for drug
development or in vulnerable populations, such as children [10, 11].
³He is inert and has proven to be very safe in studies to
date (helium-oxygen mixtures[12] are used routinely in pulmonary and
critical care); it is, however, currently regulated as an
investigational drug by the US FDA.

THE REVOLUTION OF ³HE MRI ON PULMONARY IMAGING

Ventilation
Previous technologies for imaging pulmonary ventilation generally
involved the inhalation of radioactive gas over a period of one to
several minutes, and then detecting what parts of the chest emitted the
most radioactivity over several minutes. This technology (nuclear
ventilation scans) had low spatial and temporal resolution (Figure 1).
³He ventilation MRI represented a clear step forward in
depicting not only precise, 3-D regional ventilation, but also in
beginning to understand the regional dynamics of human ventilation in
health and disease.

At present, ³He ventilation imaging is being used in a
wide variety of studies and holds high promise in increasing our
understanding of the regional effects of asthma and its treatment [13-
16], in addition to COPD, and various types of lung fibrosis [17, 18].
For example, it was recently found (Figure 2) that many ventilation
defects persisted over time, opening the door to new regional
treatments for asthma--an idea not previously pursued [19]. Because
asthma is the most prevalent pulmonary disease in the US, improved
medical and interventional therapies, facilitated by ³He
MRI, can significantly improve care and lower health care costs.

Diffusion and In-vivo Morphometry
Three unique physical properties of ³He make it
particularly well suited for measuring lung airspace size, geometry,
and connectivity, by quantifying its restriction to thermal diffusion
in the lung. These properties are 1) its small size (and thus large
thermal diffusion coefficient), 2) its lack of solubility in tissue,
and 3) its long relaxation time, T1. Since ³He is
insoluble and has a large diffusion coefficient, collisions with airway
and alveolar walls restrict the movement of the gas. This restriction
can be measured and quantified using diffusion MRI. In fact, our group
in particular has had a focus on ³He diffusion MRI; we have
shown that the technique is extraordinarily sensitive to airspace
enlargement and has better discrimination than quantitative histology--
the gold standard for airspace quantification in lung parenchyma
(Figure 3). We have recently shown that the technique can be used to
measure the size and geometry of alveolar ducts--allowing regional
morphometry of the human lung, in vivo (Figure 4). These types of
measurements are not available by any other noninvasive technique and
represent a leap forward in our understanding of lung microstructure
and our ability to quantify early disease.

Airspace enlargement (emphysema) is a significant component of
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)--the only leading cause of
mortality with dramatic increases in the US and the world [2].
Quantifying this airspace enlargement in a reliable and precise way, as
³He MRI easily can, has enormous potential therapeutic
benefit for patients with COPD. No other measurement modality has such
potential to detect early disease, disease progression, or to quantify
microstructural parameters in the ³He MRI can. Figure 4
demonstrates this in two volunteers with normal lung function by
pulmonary function test and with normal CT scans; ³He MRI,
however, can distinguish early lung disease in the smoker at right.
This extraordinary sensitivity to early disease makes it a prime
biomarker for use in drug development and efficacy testing.
One particularly unique quality of ³He comes from the
combination of its large gas diffusion coefficient and insolubility in
tissue. This allows us to the diffusion of the gas over very long
distances (2-5 cm) and has been called ``long-range diffusion''.
Because these distances are larger than any acinar dimension, the
technique is sensitive to the extent of ``collateral'' or short-
circuits pathways other than the airway tree in the lung. These
collateral pathways are essential to quantify for two minimally-
invasive interventions that are being developed for end-stage COPD:
transbronchial stents (Broncus Technologies, Inc.; Mountain View, CA)
and one-way exit valves in segmental bronchi (Spiration, Inc.; Redmond,
WA). My most recent NIH-funded research involves the use of long-range
³He diffusion to guide and predict the efficacy of these
minimally-invasive interventions under development. Early results are
quite promising, and demonstrate that the imaging will do quite well at
guiding the therapy, but the shortage of ³He has had a
negative impact on the study.

Regional Pulmonary Oxygen Monitoring
The long relaxation time T1 of ³He and its
sensitive dependence on oxygen concentration allow us to measure the
regional partial pressure of oxygen in the lung. Maps of this partial
pressure (pAO2) in the lung can be used to understand
regional pulmonary blood flow and diffusion of oxygen into
capillaries--the essential purpose of the organ. Not only can pAO2
be used to measure deficiencies in the partial pressure of oxygen, but
it can be employed to understand the regional relationship between
structure and function in the lung, at its most fundamental level
(oxygen and CO2 transfer). Again, this is a technique only
possible via ³He MRI.

Partial List of Currently Funded ³He Imaging Projects in
North America
The following list of current ³He MRI research projects
is far from complete but represents the broad range of lung diseases
studied and research funded by both the NIH and by US-based private
industry:

Assessing drugs for treatment of cystic fibrosis: University of
Massachusetts (Dr. Albert, et al.)

Detecting early and preclinical COPD: Washington University (Dr.
Yablonskiy, et al.)

Detection of pulmonary metastases with ³He: Duke University
(Dr. Driehuys, et al.)

Detecting and treating pulmonary embolism: University of Massachusetts
(Dr. Albert, et al.)

Diffusion kurtosis imaging in asthma, COPD and in the lungs of 9/11 NYC
firefighters: New York University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

Drug Efficacy in preclinical models of asthma and COPD: Duke University
(Dr Driehuys, et al.)

Early detection of bronchiolitis obliterans syndrome in lung transplant
recipients: Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.)

Evaluation of endobronchial interventions for COPD: Washington
University (Dr. Woods, et al.), Robarts Imaging Institute (Dr.
Parraga, et al., University of Virginia (Dr. Altes, et al.)

Evaluation of a novel treatment for asthma: University of Virginia (Dr.
Altes, et al.)

Evaluation of a novel treatment for cystic fibrosis: University of
Virginia (Dr. Mugler, et al.)

Imaging of small-animal models of diseases: Duke University (Dr.
Johnson et al.), Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.)

In-vivo morphometry with ³He diffusion MRI: Washington
University (Dr. Yablonskiy, et al.)

Measuring regional pulmonary oxygen pressure by ³He MRI:
University of Pennsylvania (Dr. Rizi, et al)

Monitoring Progression of COPD: Duke University (Dr Driehuys, et al.),
Robarts Imaging Institute (Dr. Parraga, et al.), University of
Virginia (Dr. Mugler, et al.), Washington University (Dr.
Yablonskiy, et al.)

Neonatal ventilation and dynamics under mechanical ventilation: Harvard
University (Dr. Patz et al.), University of Virginia (Dr.
Miller, et al.)

Noninvasive methods for measuring alveolar surface area: Harvard
University (Dr. Patz, et al.), Washington University (Dr.
Yablonskiy, et al.)

Persistence of Ventilation Defects in patients with asthma: University
of Virginia (Dr. Altes, et al.), University of Massachusetts
(Dr. Albert, et al.)

Predicting ventilation changes caused by radiation therapy: Robarts
Imaging Institute (Dr. Parraga, et al.), University of Virginia
(Dr. Mugler, et al.)

Probing the fundamental limits of MRI resolution by diffusion: Duke
University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

Pulmonary Gas flow Measurements and Dynamic ³He MRI of the
Lungs: New York University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

A Specialized Clinically Oriented Center of Research for COPD: (Dr.
Holtzman and Dr. Woods, et al.)

THE ³HE SHORTAGE AND ITS EFFECTS

Timeline
Late in 2008 our research group and others became aware that there
was a supply issue with ³He gas, through conversations with
Spectra Gases, Inc. We immediately purchased some gas to continue
imaging studies in COPD patients. In March, 2009, we were told there
was no gas available for medical applications and that the price of
non-medical ³He had risen to near $400/L STP. Conversations
with colleagues at the University of Virginia, Harvard University, and
the University of Pennsylvania confirmed that others were also unable
to purchase ³He gas. In April-June of 2009, we worked with
Spectra Gases and other universities to state our ³He
requirements to continue NIH- and NSF-funded research in 2009; Spectra
Gases then met with the Department of Energy (DOE) in July and August
to make clear that US Government-funded research was being affected. In
August 2009, Spectra approached me and the other officers of the
Hyperpolarized Media Study Group of the International Society for
Magnetic Resonance in Medicine (the primary professional organization
for ³He MRI researchers) to write a letter to the Isotope
Work Group of the DOE, stating how ³He is unique in medical
imaging and that a significant amount of NIH-funded research would be
effectively shot down without access to the small amount of gas that
our community uses (2000 L STP/year, approximately). Dr. William
Hersman and I drafted this letter, dated September 4, 2009; it is
attached to the end of this written testimony. In October 2009 we were
notified by Spectra Gases that an algorithm for obtaining a small
amount of ³He gas for NIH-funded studies had been achieved.
In order to obtain any gas, we were to list each federally-funded
grant's title and number, and for each a requested amount of gas for
the subsequent 6 months of usage. ³He was offered to our
group for $600/L STP, an approximately 500% increase from previous
years. I also drafted a letter in support of Spectra's modification of
their permit for 3H (tritium) limits with ³He, in addition
to letters of support for allocation of ³He to two non-US
researchers who do important work; these are also attached to this
testimony. At a recent AAAS meeting (April, 2010), it was made clear
that the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) had
been diligently and actively pursuing a solution to this shortage by
facilitating discussions between DOE and DHS. My understanding is that
OSTP was helpful in (perhaps in large part responsible for) the 2009
and 2010 allocation of ³He gas to NIH-funded projects.

Impact of the Shortage upon Medical Imaging Research
While I have stated that I think the biggest impact of
³He MRI technology is in drug development, efficacy
monitoring, and in guiding new minimally-invasive interventions, the
impact of the shortage was most keenly felt by those of us in the
middle of performing NIH- and industry-funded research studies. Some of
us (like our group at Washington University) were able to continue to
perform studies at a lower rate and were able to purchase gas at $600/L
STP, once it became available. Other groups, such as the Robarts
Imaging Institute, have not been able to continue ³He
studies, even if these studies were funded by US companies. Even for
US, NIH-funded researchers, however, the price of ³He
increased so quickly and by so much that research groups were not able
to plan for the cost increase and are now scrambling for supplementary
funding sources. This is the reason why all of the ³He
recently set aside for various medical imaging groups has not been
instantly purchased. The shortage has had a significant negative impact
on the continued productivity of our research community and on the
probability of future research. Importantly, if sufficient
³He is not allocated to medical imaging at reasonable cost,
this will likely curtail the revolution in pulmonary medicine currently
in progress.

Financial and Scientific Impact
It is difficult to gauge the precise financial impact of the
³He shortage on the field of hyperpolarized-gas MRI. It is
clear that fewer studies are being conducted and planned as a result of
this shortage. It is probably safe to say that all studies mentioned
previously have been scaled back by a factor of 2 or more. By my count,
the National Institutes of Health are currently supporting at least 25
active projects requiring ³He, with over $4M allocated for
FY2010. If we assume similar funding for the past 8 years, with less
funding before that, this represents an investment of over $32M via NIH
funding alone. When added to the significant (but more difficult to
quantify) investment from the NSF, private and public universities, and
private industry, the total investment in ³He MRI is likely
between $60M and $100M over the past 10 years.
While the above numbers represent an enormous investment in
³He polarization and MRI infrastructure, it is my opinion
that the biggest financial impact of the shortage is on future drug
development, efficacy monitoring, and in guiding new surgical and
minimally-invasive interventions. Through the use of more precise
biomarkers, such as we have developed via ³He MRI, the
number of patients required to determine the true efficacy of a drug or
device can be reduced by large fractions (up to 90% by a recent
calculation from our techniques), which would translate directly into
proportionate cost savings. The GSK example of the TORCH study
mentioned in the Summary is illustrative. The key question was ``Does
Advair reduce mortality by as much as 20%?'' Unfortunately for GSK, the
question remained unanswered after studying 6000 patients and expending
$500M, because the statistical significance was not high enough to
determine an answer to the vital question. If the ³He
diffusion MRI techniques that have been discussed here were used as a
biomarker and endpoint (not possible when the study began), 6,000
patients could have turned into fewer than 500 patients, saving around
90% of the cost of the study, or $450M. The question about efficacy
would likely have been answered, and the company could have devoted its
efforts to the marketplace, if successful, or to newer and more
innovative solutions, if unsuccessful.
The scientific impact of the shortage is serious. Scientific
studies and investigations into lung physiology and pathophysiology and
new treatments are being scaled back; without a clear solution in
place, the revolution in pulmonary medicine will be at least partially
curtailed. In one case that I'm very familiar with, research has ceased
entirely because of a lack of ³He gas. The Robarts Research
Institute in London, Canada was established in part with capital
funding provided by and research partnerships with Merck Research
Laboratories (Imaging, Westpoint PA USA) and General Electric Health
Care (GEHC, Milwaukee WI). They have been performing ³He MRI
studies in animal models of respiratory disease, in healthy volunteers,
and patients with lung disease (COPD, asthma, cystic fibrosis,
radiation-induced lung injury). Their human studies are funded by
Merck, GEHC, the Canadian Lung Association and Canadian Institutes of
Health Research. Without a small allocation of ³He to this
institution, their entire pulmonary MRI operation will be shut down,
and further investment by US companies will be lost.

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO ³HE

Two noble gas isotopes (³He and ¹²⁹Xe) were
originally identified as having potential for use in pulmonary MRI,
since they could be hyperpolarized to 10% or more with sufficient laser
power (originally very expensive and technically complex). Other gases
(e.g. ⁸³Kr, ²¹Ne) have potential for low levels
of hyperpolarization, but their nuclear and physical properties will
prevent high polarizations in bulk gas or their widespread use in human
MRI. When high-power, low-cost diode laser technology became available
in the 1990s, these lasers were used to produce macroscopic quantities
of ³He at high polarization (50-60%), and ¹²⁹Xe
at much lower polarization (T 10%). The comparative physical properties
of the gases and early hyperpolarization technology led to near-
universal adoption of ³He as the gas of necessity for
pulmonary gas MRI. These properties are outlined below.
1. The magnetic moment of ¹²⁹Xe is only about 1/3 that
of ³He; this is directly related to the signal strength in
MRI. Further, the natural abundance of ¹²⁹Xe is only 26%;
both of these reduce the available signal in the hyperpolarized gas
intrinsically by a factor of 6. Enrichment of the isotope (at
significant cost, since ¹²⁹Xe is close in weight to the
abundant isotopes of Xe) can reduce this intrinsic signal reduction to
a factor of 3 below ³He. The achievable polarization with
xenon has also been historically lower than with ³He, and
the delivered dose of xenon gas is limited by its anesthetic activity.
In short, hyperpolarized xenon does not yield the high signal-to-noise
that ³He does, which means that xenon delivers poorer
quality images and less physiological information. The sum of the
effects of lower magnetic moment (gyromagnetic ratio), lower abundance,
lower polarization, and lower dose add up to an approximate reduction
in signal by a factor of 50. The efforts of Dr. William Hersman (XeMed,
LLC) have helped to increase ¹²⁹Xe polarizations, but this
new technology requires new, significant capital investment by each
hyperpolarized group wishing to switch to ¹²⁹Xe. Even with
``perfect'' new technology which achieves comparable polarization and
with isotopically enriched gas, the signal reduction is still
intrinsically limited by the magnetic moment and limited dose--a factor
of 3-5--and many experiments and clinical trials are not possible with
¹²⁹Xe. This is particularly true for measurements of lung
morphometry and connectivity.
2. The free diffusivity of ³He is extremely large,
because of its low mass and small collisional cross-section. This
property is crucial to measurements of long-range diffusivity in lungs,
which have been shown to be more sensitive to emphysema than short-
range diffusivity. By comparison, the much lower free diffusivity of
xenon greatly reduces the distances that can be explored with the long-
range technique. To our knowledge, no one has even reported long-range
diffusion measurements in lungs with hyperpolarized xenon for this
reason. Several of our NIH-funded projects rely upon a measurement of
long-range ³He diffusion and would not be completed without
the ³He isotope. Further, larger field gradients are
required even for short-range diffusion experiments; this may require
further capital costs.
3. The long T1 of ³He allows it to be shipped
by air freight. This has been demonstrated in Europe and the Mayo
Clinic (in addition to a current proposal by Dr. Hoffman's group at the
University of Iowa) as a feasible business-model for polarized gas use
in hospitals, removing the necessity of each hospital having its own
dedicated polarizer (a requirement that has so far limited the clinical
utilization of polarized gas). By comparison, the T1 of
xenon is shorter (of order 2 hours), making air shipment virtually
impossible to orchestrate.
³He will remain a necessity for MRI researchers because
of the physical properties mentioned above (specifically its high
diffusion coefficient). The intrinsic properties of ¹²⁹Xe
will necessarily limit the images to have a factor of 3 reduction in
signal compared to ³He images. The polarization of
¹²⁹Xe has seen significant improvement in the past 3-4
years, however, and some recent images of ventilation have had
acceptable contrast, even though the signals were not as high as for
³He. And while the relatively large solubility in tissue has
an anesthetic effect on animals and humans, this property can be
capitalized upon in an attempt to quantify diffusion across gas-tissue
barriers. There is thus a potential role for t29Xe in perhaps half of
the future hyperpolarized-gas MRI studies.

RECYCLING ³HE

Since helium is not soluble in the tissues of the body, it can be
very highly recoverable, yet most research groups do not have systems
currently in place to recapture and compress exhaled gas. The
hyperpolarized helium research community has demonstrated in the past
that inexpensive technologies can be assembled for easily solvable
problems within the field, and the technology for recycling of
³He is straightforward. (For example, since ³He
is a liquid at 4 K [4 degrees above absolute zero], all other gases,
particulate and biological matter can be frozen out by passing through
a liquid ⁴He bath at 4 K.) Both Washington University (Dr.
Woods, et al.) and the University of Virginia (Dr. Miller, et al.) are
currently collaborating with Walter Whitlock, of Conservation Design
Services, Inc., in North Carolina, to develop commercially-viable
recycling for wide use in the ³He MRI community. This
recycling collaboration is not yet funded but is currently underway. I
believe that the important and significant scientific research outlined
in this testimony can be sustained and performed with around 2,000
total STP liters of ³He per year, after development of good
recovery/recycling systems for ³He.

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Biography for Jason C. Woods
Dr. Jason C. Woods received an undergraduate degree from Rhodes
College in 1997 and his Ph.D. in physics from Washington University in
St Louis in 2002. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Radiology,
Physics, and Molecular Biophysics and Assistant Dean of Arts & Sciences
at Washington University. He is also the Program Director for the
Hyperpolarized Media Study group of the International Society for
Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, where much of the world's
hyperpolarized-gas MRI is reported. His internationally recognized,
NIH-funded research has focused on the production and application of
hyperpolarized gases (³He in particular) to the study of
lung ventilation, structure, and function in health and disease--COPD
in particular. This interdisciplinary work has involved national and
international collaborations with physicists, radiologists,
pulmonologists, and surgeons--most recently in using imaging to guide
new minimally-invasive interventions.
In his role as Assistant Dean within Arts & Sciences at Washington
University, his multidisciplinary research is mirrored by
multidepartmental administrative efforts in biomedically-related
science fields and in the retention and graduate-school pursuits of
STEM majors. He is Program Director for the MARC uSTAR program at
Washington University--an NIH-funded program intended to increase the
pipeline and diversity of biomedical scientists at the PhD level.

Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Woods.
I now recognize myself for the first round of questions.
All of you have described your uses for helium-3. All of you
obviously have relied upon technology or used or developed
technologies that assumed the availability of helium-3. The
only domestic supplier was the Department of Energy. Were any
of you advised by the Department of Energy, by DOE of any
future shortage? Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Chairman, we had discussions with the
isotope office who has been distributing helium-3 through the
years, going back to the first auction back in the 2003 time
frame. We were not aware of any shortages. At the time, we were
under the impression that to understand exactly how much
helium-3 was available might be, you know, sensitive
information because of the nature of the generation of it.
Chairman Miller. Anyone? Mr. Arsenault.
Mr. Arsenault. No, we were not notified. We rely on our
vendors to let us know if there are any supply problems.
Chairman Miller. Anyone else? Dr. Halperin.
Dr. Halperin. In the case of cryogenics, eight months ago,
speaking on behalf of that entire community summarized at a
recent conference, that there was no knowledge other than
anecdotal from the marketplace. Nothing from the DOE
specifically, and to the present date, nothing from the DOE.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Woods?
Dr. Woods. No, we were not notified by DOE. Our information
came directly from the marketplace.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Brinkman, we have heard that probably
the current use of helium-3 that is going to be the hardest to
find or substitute for is cryogenics. Is there any substitute
in your work in cryogenics? I am sorry, Dr. Halperin. That is
what I meant to say.
Dr. Halperin. There is absolutely no substitute. The reason
is, it depends on the very interesting physical properties of
helium-3, below one degree Kelvin. The range of materials and
applications below the temperature of one degree Kelvin are not
accessible unless you use refrigerators that depend on helium-3
and use helium-3.
Chairman Miller. I am assuming that none of you are in a
position to manufacture tritium or really to engage in any kind
of research for alternatives. Do you have a sense of whether
there should be research into manufacturing helium-3 if there
is no substitute or finding alternatives, whether that is
something that should be funded by some agency of the
government? Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Anderson. Mr. Chairman, we have responded to a request
for information from the DNDO with regard to processing helium-
3 from natural gas, so we have looked at it and we do have an
organization within GE that has the capability to explore that.
Chairman Miller. Anyone else? We can go down and have
everyone--Mr. Arsenault.
Mr. Arsenault. We are a small company, 70 employees, so we
don't have a very large R&D group so we cannot pursue that. We
have to use detectors and incorporate them in our tools. Our
tools are 2-1/8, the smallest in the industry, so we have
limited geometry, so we have to rely on technology that is
existing, and it is used throughout the whole industry.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Halperin.
Dr. Halperin. Yes. I had just mentioned that it turns out
in cryogenics there isn't an alternative based on quantum
mechanics, but the agencies could help extensively by
supporting communication among all of those who are involved
such that planning at the base level as well as in the agencies
can take place, and this does not exist at the present time,
and furthermore, the agencies, meaning the research agencies,
could help significantly in recycling and conservation or
funding suggestions for recycling and conservation.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Woods, you may answer. You are not
required to answer.
Dr. Woods. Well, Chairman Miller, thank you. By my
estimation, approximately 30 percent of the studies that are
currently underway with helium-3 may be replaced with xenon-129
but that technology is still under development and some grants
from the NIH or from NSF or development of xenon-129 would
facilitate the transition of some of those studies to xenon-
129.
Chairman Miller. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Broun for
five minutes.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Anderson, in your testimony you state that, ``Federal
research funding is essential to supplement private sector
efforts to accelerate development of replacement
technologies.'' Why is federal R&D essential when there is a
clear and sizable market demand ready to pay for alternative
technologies?
Mr. Anderson. It is a fairly significant endeavor to
research these products. The first one, the boron-10 solution
we are working on today, has come at quite a significant cost
to GE and there is a fairly large market there, but as you
start looking at the neutron scattering applications, the oil
and gas applications and the nuclear safeguards applications,
the technology development there is going to be very, very
significant. I don't even know at this point what that is going
to involve, and then again to commercialize it into a product
that can be fielded is going to be very significant. So without
funding, you know, we will do what we can do but it would
certainly help accelerate our development programs.
Mr. Broun. But in the private sector, isn't this part of
the cost of development? Why can't it be rolled into the cost
of just doing business, just roll it into the cost of what you
are doing?
Mr. Anderson. Again, we have to look at the cost-benefit
when we decide to engage in those programs, and for instance,
the nuclear safeguards program, although it is incredibly
important is still a relatively small program.
Mr. Broun. All right, sir.
Dr. Woods, in order to mitigate demand for helium-3,
guidance was issued to no longer allocate helium-3 for purposes
that would lead to further increases in helium-3 demand. As a
physician, I certainly appreciate the research that you are
doing and I treated a lot of patients with COPD and asthma and
other things that you are trying to find some better
diagnostics as well as treatment modalities. The use of helium-
3 for lung imaging was just beginning to take off. What would
happen if helium-3 became so effective for medical purposes
that demand increased?
Dr. Woods. Clearly, if helium-3 were used as a routine
diagnostic imaging tool in the clinic, then the total demand
for helium-3 within the medical imaging community would
increase. My opinion is that technology is more likely to be
used in efficacy testing and in saving money for bringing drugs
and devices to market and then in guiding interventions. And so
my estimate, our community can probably survive on
approximately 2,000 liters per year given that we would recycle
100 percent of the helium that is inhaled.
Mr. Broun. So you are saying that you don't foresee an
increase in demand above that level, the 2,000 liters, at this
point. Is that correct?
Dr. Woods. At this point, I do not foresee that increase.
Mr. Broun. Okay. So if you had that amount of supply, then
through recycling efforts it could be reutilized or recycled
and that you wouldn't need any further increase in the supply
of helium-3 as far as what you know right now. Is that correct?
Dr. Woods. Correct, assuming that we had the approximately
2,000 liters per year.
Mr. Broun. Okay. So if you were supplied that demand, we
would need not be searching for alternatives but you don't have
that demand. Is that correct?
Dr. Woods. Correct.
Mr. Broun. I mean, you don't have that demand met. So
should we be seeking alternatives at this point?
Dr. Woods. I think that we should be seeking alternatives
in the same way that we are always seeking alternatives for
diagnostic imaging. The main alternative, the only alternative
is xenon-129 and I see it as an alternative in only 30, 40, 50
percent of the studies that we can perform, and that is mainly
ventilation.
Mr. Broun. Okay. How about negative impacts of xenon?
Dr. Woods. They exist. Xenon has an anesthetic effect and
so you have to limit the dose. I don't think that that is going
to be a significant impediment to breathing in xenon, and the
fact that xenon absorbs in human tissue can be used to
advantage in certain scenarios.
Mr. Broun. All right, Mr. Chairman. My time is up and I
will yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Broun.
Mrs. Dahlkemper is recognized for five minutes.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Anderson, you testified that there is no drop-in
replacement technology for helium-3 detectors. In what
application do you think replacement is the easiest and which
areas are most difficult?
Mr. Anderson. Certainly the easiest is the radiation portal
monitors, and that is because you have a lot of space. For
measurement requirements are, you are just trying to detect
whether neutrons are there. As far as the most difficult, that
is going to be very difficult. It is going to come somewhere
between, I believe, between oil and gas potentially or neutron
scattering. Well, for oil and gas you have very high
temperatures, very high shock conditions and you have to have a
very good ability to detect the neutron signal. For neutron
scattering, you have to be able to do timing, and you have to
be able to do very precise location of where those neutrons
scattered into the array so that you can get the scientific
measurements that are needed.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. I also wanted to ask you a little bit
about the Russian supplies, and we were told yesterday that the
Japanese neutron scattering facilities intend to obtain their
future helium-3 needs from Russia. Is this a reliable long-term
source in your opinion?
Mr. Anderson. The information that I have is that there is
somewhere on the order of 8,000 to 10,000 liters per year
coming out of Russia. The information is very sketchy, though,
because there is a certain amount of it that becomes available
on the open market and that is kind of a historical perspective
on what has been released. I don't know what will be released
in the future. And the other thing I don't know, is how much of
it is actually being used within the former Soviet Union
countries at this point.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Mr. Arsenault, can helium-3 be recycled
from the old tools?
Mr. Arsenault. Yes. If the tube is intact, it can be sent
back and they can harvest the helium-3. The life expectancy in
the downhole conditions that we are running at, the life
expectancy is about five years and they have to be replaced.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. So they can be recycled but----
Mr. Arsenault. They can be recycled but if you are
increasing your tool build, you are going to have increased
supply of those tubes.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. I am from Pennsylvania. I am assuming this
will be used in the Marcellus shale.
Mr. Arsenault. Marcellus shale, yes, which is very active
right now.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Right. Exactly.
Dr. Halperin, I have a question for you. We have been
informed by the White House sources that helium-3 for research
purposes has been provided to Spectra Gas and is being purified
for release in May. Has this been conveyed to you? Are you
aware of this?
Dr. Halperin. Yes. However, the schedule that has been
established by Spectra Gas is that you sign up in a queue. That
is a one-way street. That is to say, no information back.
Occasionally there are releases. We know that from Spectra Gas,
so there have been some deliveries. Leiden Cryogenics has
received 100 liters or so. But the majority of those who are
users, including other cryogenic instrumentation supplies, also
including Leiden Cryogenics, do not have any word back as to
whether the helium-3 gas will be provided even when they are in
the queue. So this is--for a period of six months, this is a
very difficult situation, particularly for junior faculty
starting their research careers.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. So you have no idea if you will be
receiving a supply?
Dr. Halperin. No idea. No information, no status.
Mrs. Dahlkemper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Miller. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher
for five minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, let
me begin by suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that you are to be
complimented, as soon as he gets done getting it from Dr.
Broun. Mr. Chairman, you are to be complimented for bringing
this hearing today and bringing forth a great panel of
witnesses and discussing an issue that may be obscure to a lot
of people but obviously has tremendous implications, so thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for putting this together today.
About the oil and gas, how much do you use of this helium-
3? How much does the oil and gas industry use?
Mr. Arsenault. I don't have an exact amount of how much is
used. You know, a manufacturer would have to provide that. But,
you know, every neutron logging tool has two detectors and you
have got several small companies and four very large companies
that provide this service around the world, not only in the
United States, so it is a very large fleet of tools that are
being used. You know, manufacturing would have to provide the
number of tubes that are being sold and what volume of gas is
filled into each tube but I believe it is about less than a
liter per tube, if I remember right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, you say a liter per tube. Are we
saying per time you drill?
Mr. Arsenault. Well, no. Each detector is approximately a
liter of helium-3 per tube, as I recall. Each tool would have
two detectors, and typically when you go out to a well you will
have two tool strings you can bring to a well. So, you get two
tools, which means you have got four detectors per job on these
tools.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you are using at least four liters per
job?
Mr. Arsenault. Yeah, and the average life expectancy, we
are running at 300-plus degrees, harsh downhole conditions, a
lot of shock and vibration, so the best life you are typically
getting out of them is about five years and they have to be
swapped out.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So we are talking about nationally
and internationally?
Mr. Arsenault. Yeah, it is nationally and internationally.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is a very significant product to the
production of energy.
Mr. Arsenault. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And shale oil in particular. Is that what
you are involved in?
Mr. Arsenault. Well, Marcellus shale is very active right
now in drilling. There is a lot of drilling going up there.
There is a lot of shale places throughout the United States
that are very active right now. If they open up the Atlantic
continental shelf, Eastern gulf, you will see a very----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So we are talking about more and
more. Now, already we have noted that Dr. Halperin said that he
was buying it at $2,000 a liter. Now, I would like to go back
to my questions from the last panel. I think the--Mr. Chairman,
I think the cost factor that we have been given is dramatically
lower than the reality of what it costs to produce this
material and the value of the material. The fact is that the
$1,000 a liter may be based on what it costs right now, meaning
if they were trying to say how much does it cost to take
natural gas out of a landfill and all they did was calculate
the cost of putting the tubes down and the natural gas that is
coming up, well, that doesn't take into account the cost of
filling the landfill, all the trucks necessary to produce the
landfill, all the digging produced that made the landfill in
itself. What we are talking about is something which is a lot
more expensive if we are just taking a look at the cost of
actually producing this, than $1,000 a liter, I would suggest,
and especially as the demand goes up, and Dr. Woods is
suggesting to us that the demand, if we are going to save money
and we are going to do a job that is necessary to make our
health care--you cited one study where the cost went from $500
million to $50 million--that we have got a huge market for this
product and yet we are going through a shortage.
Now, I would suggest, and I know that everybody would like
to not make light of this but I have read, many people in the
field of space transportation suggest that we may have a market
here, if you are talking about not $1,000 a liter but $3,000 or
$4,000 a liter or even less than a liter what we are talking
about, this may well provide the incentive for the type of
private sector effort on the moon that would be necessary. Now,
I am saying that we can do that for today. In the meantime, we
have heard a lot of good evidence today and testimony about
recycling and other alternatives, and some of the things that--
other suggestions that have been right on target, but I don't
think we should leave out the potential that space-based assets
can be brought to use here on our planet for the very things
that we have heard about through testimony today.
And I know Dr. Halperin is doing wonderful work for the
benefit of humankind, as is Dr. Woods, and I think that
providing energy is certainly an important element to
prosperity and a good life for our people and we have private
sector companies trying to do that job, so thank you very much
again, Mr. Chairman. You have given us a very good perspective
on this issue.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, for only
exceeding your time by 25 seconds, a new record for Mr.
Rohrabacher.
I think the IAEA might have something to say about it if we
allowed commercial manufacturing of tritium, but certainly the
need is very much there.
We don't really have time for a second round, but without
objection, I do have a couple of questions without having an
entire second round of questions.
Mr. Anderson, you said you are recycling helium-3. Can you
tell us how much you have been able to recycle and do you have
a source of recycled helium-3, and if so, from whom are you
getting it and how much are you getting of recycled helium-3?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do recycle helium-3 and
it comes from a number of different places. In some cases it
would be a customer that may have some detectors that they are
not using that they would send in. We would recover the gas and
build a new detector for them to the design that they need.
Other than that, there are a lot of detectors that are in
inactive systems out at the national laboratories and several
different places, and we bring those in and recover the gas
from those detectors. Also, some of the oil and gas companies
have started sending in detectors to recover the gas, and we
have recovered well over 1,000 liters at this point. It is a
fairly significant amount of gas that is out there that is not
being used.
Chairman Miller. And you spoke also of identifying
substitutes. Do you have any idea at all where we can--what we
can substitute, when those substitutes will be available in a
sufficient quantity to make a difference?
Mr. Anderson. Well, for homeland security in the portal
area, I think that a substitute will come fairly quickly, which
is very important because it is the largest consumer and it is
a very, very important application to protect our borders.
Second, possibly some of the smaller homeland security
instruments, because again, you are just doing basic counting,
will probably be relatively straightforward. I think it is
going to become more difficult, much more difficult when we
start getting into oil and gas, neutron scattering and nuclear
safeguards-type instruments because those are performing very
specific functions.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Before we bring this hearing to
a close, I want to thank all of our witnesses, this panel and
the previous panel who I have already thanked. The record will
remain open as it usually does for two weeks for Members to
submit any additional statements and also remain open for
answers to any follow-up questions from the Subcommittee to any
of the witnesses, and somewhat unusually in consultation with
Dr. Broun, we are leaving the record open until the end of days
for the production of documents from the agencies that we have
requested. We will pursue that and assure that we receive the
documents to which Congress is entitled based upon a long
history on the topic.
So I thank you all for appearing, and the hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Appendix 1:

----------

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. After He-3 alternatives are developed for neutron detection, do
you believe further testing will need to be done at the Nevada Test
Site (NTS) to verify the system? What are the cost and schedule impacts
of returning to NTS?

A1. No alternative technology will be used for Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal (ASP), ASP deployments, when and if certified, will reuse the
He-3 gas currently deployed in the poly-vinyl toluene (PVT) systems
they would replace or from PVT units that are upgraded to use the
alternative technology. This will require a reduction of the number of
He-3 tubes used in ASP and a corresponding adjustment of configuration
parameters, which means that testing of the neutron counting
performance will be required, but not at NTS. This change will utilize
all of the existing ASP electronics and software meaning that there
will be only a slight impact to the schedule and cost. Moreover, since
the ASP program is only seeking to deploy units in secondary
inspection, the number of ASP units required is significantly reduced.
Alternative neutron technology used for other system, e.g. PVT
based systems operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
can be tested using surrogate sources at a variety of sites and do not
require testing at NTS for this purpose.

Q2. In your testimony you reassuringly state that ``before any
alternative is commercialized, we will check availability of the key
components to avoid another shortage issue.'' Will this effort be an
interagency review, or simply a DNDO exercise? Will this review be done
early in the development process, or simply prior to any procurement?
Will this review be based on current requirements, or projected needs?

A2. DNDO will continue to work through the interagency group in
examining alternative neutron detector technologies such as 6Lithium or
10Boron. Boron is widely known to be available in bulk but Lithium
comes from the nuclear weapons programs just like He-3. Through the
interagency group, DNDO has already requested and received assurances
that 8,000 Kg of 6Lithium has been set aside for any future 6Lithim
based neutron detector research or deployment. The allotment of 8,000
Kg of 6Lithium is anticipated to meet DHS needs for over 40 years
because only a few grams of 6Lithium is required per detector.

Q3. When was the decision made to stop all He-3 allocations for portal
monitors? Did DOE allocate 8,500 liters of He-3 in June of 2009 for the
ASP program in order to keep it on schedule? Was this allocation
rescinded? If so, was any of the allocation used prior to the
rescission?

A3. The decision to no longer allocate He-3 to portal monitors was made
by the interagency group on September 10, 2009. Although DHS/DNDO
requested 8,500 liters of He-3 from the DOE Isotope Program on January
29, 2009 to address the needs of several DHS projects, including ASP,
and subsequently procured the gas in June 2009, DNDO had made it clear
from the start that all He-3 gas, including the 8,500 liters, ought to
be available for use by the most critical programs across the USG,
commercial industry, and other users. DNDO also understood that the
relative criticality of programs must be determined by an interagency
body. Accordingly, DNDO ceded the allocation of the 8,500 liters to the
interagency group.

Q4. In your testimony you indicate that DNDO stopped all allocations
of He-3 for Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in September 2009 but that
you will continue to provide He-3 for Radioisotope Identification
Devices (RIIDs) until alternatives are available.

- Is the timeframe for RIID replacement technology truly open-
ended?

- If not, how long do you plan to provide He-3 for
RIIDs?

- If so, what incentives are there for companies and
agencies to seek alternatives?

- How much money do you plan on devoting to R&D for He-3
alternatives for RIIDs?

- Will you require that alternative technologies meet or
exceed the performance of He-3?

A4. Because handheld systems use very small He-3 tubes that contain
small amounts of the gas, most vendors buy these tubes in large
quantities to get a better price. Consequently, the commercial handheld
vendors that DHS typically orders from had purchased sufficient
quantities of He-3 tubes before the He-3 shortage was known, and have
enough He-3 tubes to last a few more years based upon current
procurement histories. Therefore, some backpack and new handheld (e.g.,
HPRDS) acquisitions will still need He-3 allocations, but DNDO
estimates that it can support its handheld and backpack requirements
with a few hundred liters of He-3 per year as allocated though the
interagency process for the next 3-5 years.
Notwithstanding, the first priority is to find an alternative
technology for portal monitor systems because no new He3 gas will be
made available for this use. In order to perform market research on
what is potentially available and to alert the commercial sector to the
need for alternative neutron detection technologies, DNDO released a
Request for Information (RFI) in July 2009, to identify alternative
neutron detection technologies for portals, backpacks, and handheld
radiation detectors.
DNDO has recently awarded several contracts to investigate
technologies that could be used in handheld and backpack type
applications. At this time there are a few promising technologies
emerging from the research laboratories, which are well suited to
backpack and handheld systems. For example, CLYC is a crystal
scintillator material that detects both gammas rays and neutrons
simultaneously. This material could be used as a single detector in a
handheld application or grouped together for a backpack application. We
anticipate that a minimum of 2-3 years will be needed to transition
suitable technology into deployable devices.
Some of these new technologies may have neutron detection
capabilities that meet or even exceed the abilities of current He-3-
based detectors.

Q5. Since 2008, Russia no longer exports He-3 internationally, but do
other former Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, or Georgia have
He-3? Does China?

A5. To date, helium-3 has been made available as a byproduct of tritium
decay. Only nuclear weapons States or States that use heavy water
reactors would have tritium. The U.S. Government intends to work with
the IAEA to contact countries with installed heavy water reactors, such
as Romania, South Korea, China and Argentina to identify other
potential suppliers of helium-3. However, we note that some countries,
including Argentina, do not currently detritiate their heavy water.
Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the
detritiation process is begun, it takes several years before the
tritium decays into an appreciable amount of helium-3. China's two
heavy water reactors were brought on-line in late 2003 and early 2004
and do not yet have significant amounts of helium-3.

Q6. What are the roadblocks to accessing He-3 sources in other nations
such as Argentina, India, and France?

A6. To obtain helium-3, it is necessary first to detritiate (or remove
the tritium from) the heavy water. Some countries, including Argentina,
do not currently detritiate their heavy water. Some countries, such as
France, that store tritium may allow helium-3 to vent. Even for
countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the detritiation
process is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays into
an appreciable amount of helium-3. The U.S. Government is working with
the IAEA to identify those countries that currently undertake all the
necessary steps for tritium production and capture, and to work with
them on how their tritiated water is handled. If needed, the United
States will consider requests for assistance in the helium-3 extraction
process by either licensing our helium-3 extraction technology or
transporting helium3/tritium mixtures to the United States for
extraction and use.

Q7. Dr. Hagan stated in his testimony DNDO first became aware of a
potential problem with He-3 supply through an email from a neutron
detector tube manufacturer in the summer of 2008, but that it was
unclear whether the problem was a result of delays in the supply chain
or an actual shortage of He-3. He also stated that DOE has
traditionally been responsible for managing and allocating the supply
of He-3, and that they issued a report verifying the seriousness of the
overall supply shortfall in the fall of 2008.

- What level of coordination and communication existed between
DNDO and DOE regarding the supply of He-3 prior to the
discovery of its shortfall?

- For an issue as important as the detection of nuclear
material at our borders and ports, why was there seemingly
insufficient coordination related to the supply of a crucial
component of this capability?

- What lessons can be learned going forward and what steps are
being taken to ensure this does not happen again?

A7. In February 2006, DHS/DNDO confirmed with the DOE Isotope Program
there was a sufficient supply of He-3 over the following five year
period for the ASP program to procure a total of 1500 portals (about
240,000 liters of He-3). Through discussions with DOE, DNDO learned
that He-3 was also supplied to the market by the Russians. Moreover, it
was widely understood from the ASP vendors that He-3 was widely
available on the open market (i.e., none of the ASP proposals indicated
any concern over the ability to obtain He-3 tubes in sufficient
number). Indeed, there was no indication of any He-3 supply issues
until more than 2 years later, June 2008, when a vendor emailed DNDO
indicating that there was a low stock of He-3. In August 2008, DOE held
an isotope workshop to address many different isotope issues, including
He-3. However, the workshop did not include supply information and
because much of the information pertaining to the supply of He-3 was
previously classified due to its connection to the tritium stockpile,
information about the supply of He-3 was not openly and commonly
discussed. It was not until a meeting between DOE and DHS on Jan 16,
2009, that it became clear that there was a real shortage in the USG
supply of He-3.
From that point on DHS/DNDO worked closely with the interagency
group to address the issue, and will continue to do so.

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science,
Department of Energy

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

The Future of the Second Line of Defense

Q1. In your testimony you state that past FY2011 the SLD program could
be impacted by the He-3 shortage, and that alternatives will not be
ready for 2 to 3 more years. What does DOE plan to do to fill this gap?
Do Russian contractors supply the SLD program as well? If so, would it
be possible to use Russian He-3 for these monitors?

A1. The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program has enough gas for its
planned deployments through FY 2011; after that, the program is
optimistic that alternative neutron detection technologies will be
available for deployment in portal monitors. Both the public and
private sectors are making significant investments in this new
technology; SLD is carefully watching these developments and plans to
test the most promising of these technologies in the field as soon as
they become available. SLD uses Russian-manufactured monitors for some
of its deployments, particularly in former Soviet Union countries, and
these monitors use Russian gas. If the Russians make helium-3 available
on the open market, it can also be used in U.S.-manufactured neutron
detection tubes. The U.S. Government has formally requested that Russia
provide, at reasonable cost, helium-3 in support of worldwide
safeguards use. DOE has also requested that the IAEA contact Russia in
this regard.

June ASP Allocation

Q1a. When was the decision made to stop all He-3 allocations for
portal monitors?

A1a. The predominant use of helium-3 has been in portal monitors; in
fact, approximately 25 percent of the total helium-3 demand is for
large portal monitors used to scan vehicles and pedestrians. Since
alternatives for these types of monitors have been used successfully in
the past, in spring 2009, the Interagency Working Group (IWG) agreed to
accelerate the effort to evaluate neutron detectors that do not rely on
helium-3. Based on early studies within NNSA and the IWG's Technology
Working Group, viable alternatives could become commercially available
within 1-2 years. In September 2009, the Executive Office-led
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) approved the IWG recommendation that
further allocation of helium-3 for portal monitors be deferred.

Q1b. Did DOE allocate 8,500 liters of He-3 in June of 2009 for the ASP
program in order to keep it on schedule?

A1b. DOE provided and sold 8,763 liters of unprocessed helium-3 in to
DHS March of 2009, primarily for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals
(ASP) program. The material was shipped to Spectra Gases (now Linde)
for purification. DHS paid for the gas and any associated costs, and
provided approval for any shipment from Spectra Gases. Concurrently,
the IWG began reviewing how best to use remaining stores of helium-3.
DHS and the IWG agreed on the need for a process to ensure that the
most critical programs were allocated helium-3, including these 8,763
liters. Once the IPC was set up and the allocation process became
operational, DHS transferred control of the 8,763 liters to the IPC in
late June 2009.

Q1c. Was this allocation rescinded? If so, was any of the allocation
used prior to the rescission?

A1c. DHS voluntarily submitted the 8,763 liters to the IPC for
allocation decisions. None of the gas was used for the ASP program, or
for any other DHS program, except through allocations via the IPC.
Those agencies that were allocated the gas reimbursed DHS for the
amount received.

Alternative Sources of He-3

Q1. In your testimony you state that a Dept. of Interior study from
1990 looked into the feasibility of acquiring He-3 from natural gas and
found wide variations in the amount of He-3 at various drilling sites.
Has any effort been made to further study this option? If yes, what
were the conclusions? If no, why not?

A1. The Bureau of Land Management plans to conduct further sampling and
analysis of the gas to better understand the helium-3 to helium-4
ratios. Specialized mass spectrometer instrumentation capable of
differentiating helium-3 from helium-4 has been identified. Sampling is
scheduled to be performed in May 2010, with analytical results expected
by early summer.

Q2. Since 2008, Russia no longer exports He-3 internationally, but do
other harmer Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, or Georgia have
He-3? Does China?

A2. To date, helium-3 has been made available as a byproduct of tritium
decay. Only nuclear weapons States or States that use heavy water
reactors would have tritium. The U.S. Government intends to work with
the IAEA to contact countries with installed heavy water reactors, such
as Romania, South Korea, China, and Argentina to identity other
potential suppliers of helium-3. However, we note that some countries,
including Argentina, do not currently detritiate their heavy water.
Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the
detritiation process is begun, it takes several years before the
tritium decays into an appreciable amount of helium-3. China's two
heavy water reactors were brought on-line in late 2003 and early 2004
and do not yet have significant amounts of helium-3.

Q3. What me the roadblocks to accessing He-3 sources in other nations
such as Argentina, India, and France?

A3. To obtain helium-3, it is necessary first to detritiate (or remove
the tritium from) the heavy water. Some countries, including Argentina,
do not currently detritiate their heavy water. Some countries, such as
France, that store tritium may allow helium-3 to vent. Even for
countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the detritiation
process is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays into
an appreciable amount or helium-3. The U.S. Government is working with
the IAEA to identify those countries that currently undertake all the
necessary steps for tritium production and capture, and to work with
them on how their tritiated water is handled. If needed, the United
States will consider requests for assistance in the helium-3 extraction
process by either licensing our helium-3 extraction technology or
transporting helium/tritium mixtures to the United States for
extraction and use.

Coordination

Q1. Dr. Hagen stated in his testimony DNDO first became aware of a
potential problem with HE-3 supply through an email from a neutron
detector tube manufacturer in the summer of 2008, but that it was
unclear whether the problem was a result of delays in the supply chain
or an actual shortage of He-3. He also stated that DOE has
traditionally been responsible for managing and allocating the supply
of He-3, and that they issued a report verifying the seriousness of the
overall supply shortfall in the fall of 2008.

a. What level of coordination and communication existed
between DNDO and DOE regarding the supply of He-3 prior to the
discovery of its shortfall?

A1a. During FY 2006, the DHS Domestic Nuclear Defense Office (DNDO) and
DOE had meetings and discussions on DNDO's needs for helium-3 through
FY 2011. DOE previously sold over 95,000 liters to DNDO's tube
manufacturers, and coupled with the Russian supply at that time, DOE
projected that there was sufficient material to cover DNDO's short- to
mid-term needs.
In August 2008, in anticipation of the transfer of the Isotope
Program from the Office of Nuclear Energy to the Office of Science's
Nuclear Physics (NP) program, NP organized a workshop among academic,
national laboratory, industrial, and federal isotope stakeholders to
identify shortages of isotopes important to the Nation. DNDO
representatives were invited and participated in this workshop, which
identified the seriousness of the helium-3 shortage.

b. For an issue as important as the detection of nuclear
materials at our borders and ports; why was there seemingly
insufficient coordination related to the supply of a crucial
component of this capability?

A1b. Several factors limited awareness of the full extent of the
shortfall: NNSA owned and allocated helium-3, a waste byproduct of
their weapons program, while DOE's Isotope Program was responsible for
vendor distribution of any helium-3 NNSA allocated to the Program; the
quantity of available helium-3 was not widely known for security/
classification reasons; the Isotope Program had limited contact with
helium-3 customers who instead interacted directly with the vendors;
and the Russian supply was variable and then declined abruptly. These
various factors made it difficult to assess projected demand and supply
for helium-3. All allocations are now being made through interagency
coordination.

c. What lessons can be learned going forward and what steps
are being taken to ensure this does not happen again?

A1c. All agencies involved in the helium-3 problem have learned the
importance of interagency cooperation and coordination. The Interagency
Working Group effort on helium-3 has been very effective and is
expected to continue.
Helium-3 is but one example of an important isotope where demand
exceeds supply; there are others. Since 2009, the Nuclear Physics (NP)
program has taken a number of steps to ensure effective planning and
interagency coordination. After organizing a national workshop on
isotope shortages, NP charged its federal advisory committee, the
Nuclear Science Advisory Committee, to develop a long range plan for
isotope production and to set priorities for research isotopes in
demand. NP also reached out to Federal agencies to identify their long-
term isotope needs and has established interagency working groups, such
as the DOE/NIH working group. While these efforts are focused on
isotopes in short supply that are or could be produced by the Isotope
Program, they also include discussion and forecast for those isotopes
which the Isotope Program distributes as a service.

Oil and Gas Alternatives

Q1. All He-3 user communities seem to be represented by a government
agency except for the oil and gas industry. Who is responsible for
assuring that their needs are represented when allocations are
determined?

A1. Representation of oil and gas industry needs in the He-3 allocation
process is a DOE responsibility.

Q2. Are there any programs or projects within DOE exploring He-3
alternatives for oil and gas exploration? If so, please breakdown
funding by year and office. If not, why not?

A2. There are currently no programs within DOE supporting helium-3
alternatives for oil and gas exploration. The needs of the oil and gas
industry are modest, and the majority of that demand is being met from
the existing supply. This community is only beginning to consider
alternatives, such as boron trifluoride and lithium-6.

Q3. Are there any other isotopes that are necessary (and limited) for
oil and gas exploration?

A3. Americium-241, like helium-3, is another byproduct material, and is
used for oil and natural gas well-logging purposes. The americium-241
domestic supply has been exhausted, and industry is currently importing
americium from Russia. Americium-241 is also used in smoke detectors,
moisture gauges in agriculture, and quality-control gauges in
construction and manufacturing. Legitimate commercial uses of
americium-241 are authorized by law, and subject to public safety and
security restrictions established by NRC and Agreement State
regulations. DOE is working toward the re-establishment of a domestic
supply of americium-241. Californium-252 is also a widely used isotope
in oil and gas exploration. This isotope is produced only in the United
States and Russia. In 2009, the domestic production ofcalifornium-252
was in jeopardy, but the Isotope Program worked with industry to ensure
a long-term supply.

Scientific Alternatives

Q1. What alternatives exist for He-3 in neutron scattering?

A1. The major use of helium-3 within the Office of Science is for the
Spallation Neutron Source (SNS). At present, there is no alternative
technique which could replace helium-3 filled detectors and still
provide all the capabilities of helium-3 without a loss in performance.
This is particularly true for large area detector systems consisting of
arrays of single counters. The SNS community has taken the lead within
the global neutron scattering research community to establish
international working groups to search for alternatives to helium-3, as
well as alternative detector technology. Some of the alternatives being
considered include boron trifluoride-filled neutron detectors, boron-10
lined proportional counters, gaseous detectors with solid lithium-6 or
boron-10 converters, and various scintillation detectors. The research
and development efforts for a new detector technology will take
approximately five years to complete. We anticipate meeting this
community's need until that time.

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation
Measurement Solutions, GE Energy

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. Both you and Mr. Arsenault point out in your testimony that unless
He-3 alternatives are found for the oil and gas industry, the
exploration for future fields, the development of existing, and logging
of new and existing wells will be severely curtailed. What efforts are
underway to develop alternative technologies for this sector?

A1. Several technologies are available for neutron detection. Each has
its favored scientific and industrial applications based on a variety
of performance, physical and mechanical characteristics, and
requirements. In the oil and gas industry, the neutron detector must be
able to accurately measure neutron levels for hundreds or thousands of
hours under high-temperature and high-shock operating conditions. For
these reasons, the industry long ago recognized the advantages of
Helium-3 tubes and to a lesser extent, Lithium-6 glass detectors. Both
provide adequate neutron sensitivity to allow for packaging and
installation within the limited space inside the drill string.
The annual consumption of Helium-3 for detectors used in oil and
gas applications routinely exceeds 2,500 liters. This represents a
major portion of the available supply. In response to the Helium-3
shortage, GE has resumed production of Lithium-6 glass neutron
detectors. However, only a limited number of drilling and logging
companies currently have tool strings designed to work with Lithium-6
detectors. Perhaps the biggest drawback to broader deployment of the
Lithium-6 detector is the fact that its performance deteriorates
significantly at the elevated temperatures experienced in many of
today's drilling and logging operations. GE is exploring ways to
improve the performance of Lithium-6 detectors at high temperatures,
but the technical hurdles are significant and feasibility is still
unknown.
GE is also reviewing a variety of other alternative technologies
but none of those alternatives presents a drop-in replacement
technology for oil and gas drilling applications. Considerable research
will be required to identify a feasible alternate technology and
develop a new sensor for oil exploration.
Although a key component of a drill string, the neutron detector
accounts for only a small percentage of the overall cost of the system.
With the decrease in oil prices over the past several months, the
Helium-3 shortage has not yet had a significant impact on the oil
industry. These factors, coupled with the urgent need to develop a
replacement technology for homeland security applications, where the
impact of the Helium-3 shortage has been felt more acutely, has led to
a situation where only limited action has been taken to develop an
alternate technology for oil drilling and logging.
Any new detector technology will take years to develop, test, and
prepare for manufacturing. Furthermore, the oil industry will have to
redesign its drilling and logging systems to retrofit any new detector
technology, and the operators will have to characterize and interpret
the data from the new detectors. We estimate that the time required to
deploy a new detector technology industry-wide may exceed ten years.
Federal funding is essential to facilitate parallel research efforts to
accelerate technology and product development for oil and gas
applications.

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security
and Environment, ThruBit LLC

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. Both you and Mr. Anderson point out in your testimony that unless
He-3 alternatives are found for the oil and gas industry, the
exploration for future fields, the development of existing fields, and
logging of new and existing wells will be severely curtailed. What
efforts are underway to develop alternative technologies for this
sector?

A1. At the present time there are no publically disclosed or presently
commercially available alternative technologies being developed by well
logging companies. Most small to larger medium size companies have to
continue their operations by using existing off the shelf detector
technology to incorporate in their neutron tool designs. While there
may be some existing well logging companies developing alternative
detector methods, those would be trade secret and proprietary
information not commercially available or publically disclosed. The
vast majority of companies that are being impacted by this shortage do
not have the funding for this type of research and development at their
disposal and would depend totally on a commercially available product.
Even in testimony from Mr. Anderson at Reuter Stokes, this is going to
require government funding for additional research and development,
which is not available at this time.

Q2. All He-3 user communities seem to be represented by a government
agency except for the oil and gas industry. Who is responsible for
assuring that their needs are represented when allocations are
determined?

A2. The Association of Energy Services Companies needs be the focal
point representing the companies who are using He-3 detectors for
neutron logging. They represent numerous well logging companies that
operate in the United States.

Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics,
Northwestern University

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Scientific Alternatives

Q1. What alternatives exist for He-3 in neutron scattering?

A1. There is no immediate substitute that can meet all the technical
specifications of He3 detectors for neutron scattering science.
However, a collaboration agreement has been reached between all major
neutron facilities, worldwide, to develop alternatives. Although these
alternatives are not immediately deployable, it is hoped that this
collaborative development effort will lead to realistic alternatives in
3-5 years. (This is a paraphrased response to this question from Ian S.
Anderson, Associate Laboratory Director for Neutron Sciences, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Tennessee)

Appendix 2:

----------

Additional Material for the Record

Correction to Statement by Dr. William Brinkman
On page 37, the witness requested that ``That is roughly right'' be
changed to ``About 20,000 liters is the mitigated domestic demand.''

Correction to Statement by Mr. Richard Arsenault
Mr. Arsenault clarified his testimony on page 80 by saying: ``Each
neutron tool will have a far and near He-3 detector. The volume of He-3
in each tube will be dependent on the model of tube, which are of
different sizes and volumes.''
A Staff Report by the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and
Technology to Subcommittee Chairman Brad Miller

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee Prior to the April 22, 2010, Helium-3 Hearing

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee After the April 22, 2010, Helium-3 Hearing