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# HEARING

ON

# NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

AND

# OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

# BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

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HEARING HELD
APRIL 27, 2010

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# FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 27, 2010.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2117, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the Readiness Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2011 budget request for training for the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard.

Witnesses have also been asked to provide their views on current training operations and the future needs of their respective components. I thank our distinguished witnesses from the Army and Air Force for appearing before the subcommittee today, and thank you for your service and all the great things that you do for our country. All of them have had distinguished military careers and we just are so happy that you are with us this morning. We lack a few members but they will be coming in as we move along with the testimony.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, hundreds of thousands of Americans serving in these components of our military, the Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air National Guard, have been mobilized and deployed on missions both here, at home and overseas. Today more than 98,000 soldiers and airmen from these elements of our country are on active duty carrying out missions that cover the full range of military activities. Each one of them has left behind their families and put their civilian jobs on hold as they serve the Nation. Those soldiers and airmen not mobilized on active duty also continue to serve and stand ready to support domestic authorities in the event of a natural disaster or emergency.

Clearly the high number of troops mobilized today attest to the fact that the Reserve elements of our military are no longer a "strategic" Reserve intended to be rarely used. These Reserve Components are now clearly "operational," Operational Reserves that support, augment, and assist our active duty forces on a routine and continuing basis.

We look forward to hearing today just how this transformation was accomplished, and what it means to the soldiers and airmen who have served and continue to serve. We also look forward to hearing how the fiscal year 2011 budget request matches up with the expected missions and operations.

Finally, and most critically, we look forward to hearing how we maintain these components as an "Operational Reserve" in the future, and even as the war in Iraq begins to end. As of today, many questions on this issue remain unanswered, including: How much will it cost each year to maintain our Reserve forces at their current level of activity? How many Reserve soldiers and airmen can we expect to have mobilized in future years? If the Reserves return to a "Strategic Reserve" status, what will it mean for the quality of the force and for recruiting and retention? Over the long term is it possible that the size of our Reserve forces may need to grow? If so, in what way?

These are the issues we will be exploring today. And our witnesses today are Lieutenant General Jack Stultz—General, it is so good to see you again, sir. He is the United States Commanding General for the Army Reserve Command; Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt, III, Director for the Air National Guard; and Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, Acting Director for the Army National Guard.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks the he would like to make. Mr. Forbes.

**STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to echo your appreciation for our three witnesses today, their service to our country, and the great job that they do with our men and women.

We meet again to discuss the readiness of some of our Reserve Component forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to face budgetary pressures against the backdrop of the ongoing war on terror, continued high operations tempo, and a need to recapitalize much of its aging equipment.

There is no doubt that the challenges facing the Department of Defense are significant. Years of underfunded procurement accounts continue to manifest in aging fleets of aircraft ships and vehicles. This aging equipment is costly to maintain, offers reduced reliability, and requires increased manpower to keep it serviceable. Nowhere is this more evident than in the National Guard and the Reserves.

The Reserve Component has faced many additional challenges because it started this long war positioned as a Strategic Reserve. For decades we postured the National Guard with the Cold War mindset. We believed we could accept risk in equipping and training the Guard because we thought there would be a clear unambiguous signal to get them ready. We also believed there would be suf-

ficient time to field the equipment and get them trained before they would be needed on the battlefield.

We have learned many lessons since September 11, 2001. We have learned that there is not time to ready the Guard from a Strategic Reserve posture because the threat doesn't allow it, because the industrial base can't support it, and because natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina come with little or no warning.

The need for a trained, well-equipped, and integrated Reserve Component is clear. However, I believe we must be patient and thoughtful as we continue to transition from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. We knew this transition would take years and require substantial investment, even if there were no other operational demands on the National Guard and the Reserves. I also understand that reality gets a vote when you are at war. I am aware that in some cases, equipment slated for the Reserve Component was redirected to Afghanistan in support of the surge. That was the right thing to do in order to meet the deployment timeliness set by the combatant commander. And we must continue to balance strong support for our troops in harm's way in Afghanistan and Iraq with our efforts to modernize and fully equip the Reserve Components.

In a hearing on this matter in 2008, I remarked that in order to be successful in operationalizing the Reserve Component we must be patient, we must have a solid plan of action, and we must provide the funding stream necessary to make it happen. I still believe that to be true. Now that we are two years down the road, I hope our witnesses will be able to give us an update on how things are going.

I also look forward to a discussion on sufficiency of the fiscal year 2011 budget request and an opportunity to understand more about the comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component as proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Once again, thank you for being here, thank you for your service. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Before we go into the testimony, after consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous consent that Mr. Michael Castle be authorized to question the panel members at today's hearing. Mr. Castle will be recognized after all House Armed Services Committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to go ahead and listen to the testimony now. General Stultz you can begin, followed by General Wyatt and General Carpenter. Thank you, sir.

## STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY RESERVE

General STULTZ. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman Forbes, first and foremost thank you for the support that you and your committee and Congress has given to the Army Reserve over the past several years. As you indicated in your statement, we have been and continue to transition from what was a Strategic Reserve force into an

operational force. And it has, as Congressman Forbes indicated, been a slow, methodical process accelerated by the demand of the current conflicts and extended conflicts.

I think the good news that I can tell you is today the Army Reserve has authorized 205,000 soldiers, to grow to 206,000 by fiscal year 2013. Today in my ranks, I have 207,749 so I am almost 2,750 over my authorized strength.

Just last Friday here in the Capitol, I conducted a reenlistment ceremony for 60 Reserve soldiers representing all 50 states, plus the territories of Guam and American Samoa, and, by the way, did a virtual reenlistment with one soldier in Germany who was unable to be here because of the volcanic ash. But our retention rates are exceeding our goals; our recruiting rates are exceeding our goals. So the good news is the soldiers we have in our ranks today joined our Army, or reenlisted in our Army, since 9/11/2001. They know what they have gotten into, and so they are joining the Army Reserve knowing that they are going to be called upon in an operational context.

The challenge we have is we are still being funded or budgeted based on the old strategic model of one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. So we are dependent upon Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding to operate as an Operational Reserve.

We have implemented a training strategy using a regional training center concept where we position equipment and position training resources in various regions of the country. We bring our units into those locations prior to the mobilization cycle to give them the best training on the most modern equipment. That has resulted in a reduction in our post-mobilization training time from what used to be about 70 to 80 days to now about 30 to 40 days. So we are getting 10 to 11 months boots-on-the-ground time with our soldiers in theater. And the one thing the soldiers tell me is, "Don't waste my time. If you are going to use me, use me."

So we are making great progress. But again, our funding for those operations of those regional training centers depends on overseas contingency funds. We have got to get that training strategy and we have got to get that operational training model into our base budgets by fiscal year 2012. We are working diligently with the Chief of Staff the Army and others over the 1217 program to put the operational training strategy into the 1217 budget.

The other thing I would highlight is the equipment. While we send every soldier into theater, whether Iraq or Afghanistan, with the best trained and most modern equipment, we don't have that same level of equipment back home to train on in a lot of cases. And just as importantly, with the trained and combat-seasoned force we have now, with those soldiers who have done multiple deployments, it becomes a morale factor when a soldier who has been to Iraq or Afghanistan, or both places, operating the latest and greatest equipment, the highest technology available, but comes back home to look at a 35-year-old truck sitting in the motor pool. And so we have to continue to press for the equipment.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipping Accounts (NGREA) that we are dependent upon are so critical to us to give us the flexibility to buy the right equipment in prior times where we need to,

so that we can get that most modern equipment back home for those soldiers to train on.

Another area of focus for us is medical, dental readiness. We have made huge strides in that capacity, but, again, trying to get to a level of 80 percent or better in medical readiness, we are only funded to get to about 65 percent right now, and so it continues to be a challenge.

So I think in summary, what I would tell you is the good news is the Army Reserve is an operational force, the morale is high, our recruiting and our retention are at record levels, but we still need to press because we are dependent upon overseas contingency ops right now, funding, instead of getting that model put into a base program. So I look forward to your questions and, again, thank you for your support.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. ORTIZ. General Wyatt.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF, DIRECTOR, U.S. AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

General WYATT. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today and share information about the readiness posture of our Air National Guard.

As you know, our authorized end strength is 106,700. And I am proud to report today that our current end strength is 108,403, about 1,700 airmen over and above our end strength.

In my previous life as the Adjutant General (TAG) of Oklahoma, I had the opportunity to command Air and Army and National Guard units. And I will tell you that as I watched the Army National Guard become more of an operational force after 9/11, I couldn't help but make the comparisons between the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard. And from my current position, it is encouraging, and I think a key point of our readiness in the Air National Guard is we have about 30 percent of our force is full-time and resourced, which helps us maintain our readiness in the Air National Guard. I have watched the Army National Guard, from my perch as the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, get better through the years. But I am thankful that we get the support that we do from the Air Force as far as the support of our full-time force.

Obviously, the strength of the Air National Guard in addition to the full-time force is our drill-status guardsmen. We continue to deploy at unprecedented rates. Since 9/11 we have deployed over 146,000 Air National Guardsmen; this last year alone, we deployed 18,366 guardsmen to 62 countries, to every continent in the world, including Antarctica. We do that at about a 75 percent volunteerism rate, relying upon mobilization for only about 25 percent of the requested forces.

As we look to our readiness as far as quantities of equipment, we are in pretty good shape as far as quantities, but always struggle with the quality of our equipment, spending most of our NGREA on dual-use modernization, for dual-use equipment, state and fed-

eral. We look to the importance of that account to help modernize our equipment, because for us to remain operational it is important that we integrate fully into the total force. We would be able to fly the same equipment, operate the same systems, so that we can truly be an operational force.

We have been operational basically since the first Gulf War and have transitioned through the great support of the Air Force to an equal partner, I think, in the total Air Force. We provide about a third of the Air Force capability, for about 7 percent of the budget, which I think points out the efficiencies that we manage to practice in the Air National Guard and the value that we bring to America.

We continue to struggle as we move from sunset missions to emerging missions with training our force and converting from those old missions to the new missions. And so while the budget adequately funds our training and equipping, we share with the Air Force and with the Air Force Reserve limited seats in some of the emerging capabilities; capabilities like TACPs, Tactical Air Control Parties, and the individuals, especially the enlisted individuals who serve in that critical career field.

Even though we are above our end strength we do have some critical areas, especially in the officer corps, where we are 1,500 officers short. We have critical areas as far as chaplains, intelligence officers, engineers, air mobility air crews, individuals who take a high degree of education and also a lot of training to get them on the step and fully operational. And because of the limited numbers of training seats, we share equitably with the active duty and with the Air Force Reserve, but we are all struggling with trying to get the requisite number of our airmen through those training programs.

I would be happy to answer the questions of the committee as we get further into this morning's presentation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. ORTIZ. General Carpenter.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General CARPENTER. Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to represent more than 362,000 citizen soldiers in the Army National Guard, and, as I speak, 52,807 of our soldiers are serving in harm's way for this Nation. The sacrifice of those soldiers, their families, and their employers is something we must not only acknowledge but certainly appreciate.

The National Guard of today is dramatically different from the one I joined over four decades ago. The last eight years have seen the Guard transform to an operational force. The enablers for the Army National Guard have been provided by and sustained by congressional initiatives. We thank you for your continued support, and today I would like to talk to you a little bit about readiness.

As all of you know, the Army National Guard has had a significant evolution in the last eight years. The U.S. Army employs the

Army National Guard units as an operational force. Units mobilize and deploy from different states, territories, and provide support to overseas contingency operations and to the homeland defense missions. Our units maintain high levels of readiness, achieving outstanding results in both state and federal missions.

The key to the readiness of our operational National Guard is our personnel, equipment readiness, and facilities. We continue to emphasize and improve the quality of our force as we maintain our assigned strength. Today I am proud to report that the Army National Guard Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) qualification rate exceeds 90 percent, a historic figure. We also continue to strengthen our combat, maintenance, aviation, simulation, and qualification training centers.

The Army National Guard has made significant progress modernizing and converting to an operational force. As a result of transformation, the Army National Guard's structure was expanded to include 114 brigades. This includes 28 combat brigades, 38 functional brigades, and 48 multifunctional brigades across 54 states, territories and a district. The Army National Guard has moved along with the active Army from a division-centric force to a more flexible brigade-centric force and is restructuring to create units that are more stand-alone and alike while enhancing full-spectrum capabilities.

Despite equipment shortages, the Army National Guard met all mission requirements and continued to support overseas and domestic missions. The current equipment levels in the Army National Guard are 77 percent of all equipment on hand. Critical dual-use equipment, a subset of Army National Guard equipment that can be used for both the warfight, as well as emergencies and disaster operations, has reached an on-hand percentage of 83 percent with 66 percent of that available to the Governors in the states and territories.

During fiscal year 2009 the Army G8 released a new Army equipping strategy that establishes a goal of at least 80 percent equipment on hand for critical dual use for all Army National Guard units, regardless of their rotational cycle in the Army's fourth generation model.

The National Guard Reserve Equipment Account has been especially important in our pursuit of equipping the force. The Army National Guard via the National Guard Reserve and Equipment Account received $770 million in fiscal year 2006, 1.1 billion in fiscal year 2007, 1.3 billion in fiscal year 2008, and 779 million in fiscal year 2009. This funding has been used for critical dual-use items to support what we call the essential 10 capabilities provided to each state, those being command and control, communications, aviation, force protection, engineering, logistics, maintenance, medical security, and transportation.

Thanks to NGREA, for example, we will retire the venerable "deuce-and-a-half," the M35 deuce-and-a-half truck from our inventory in fiscal year 2011, a vehicle which was first introduced in 1949 and continued to be manufactured in 1950.

The continued support of Congress is critical in several other areas. We need the Congress to fully fund our budget request for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. These are critical to

readiness. When those funds are reduced or redirected to other priorities, unit readiness suffers directly.

For manning, we are asking the Armed Services Committee to improve an increase in the Army National Guard's civilian non-dual status technicians. These civilian technicians who do not deploy are critical to the continuous provision of administrative and financial functions needed to support our military personnel who do deploy. Please support that request, increasing from 1,600 to 2,520 in non-dual status technicians.

We are asking Congress's continued support for the National Guard facilities with military construction as well as sustainment funds. We have a lot of old Cold War buildings, no longer adequate for the operational force, so we need your help to modernize those facilities.

In closing I would like to say that I am confident that the Army National Guard will continue to be a full partner in the U.S. Army's total force. As an Operational Reserve, we need to maintain our readiness levels, provide full-time manning, equip and train our units to meet the combatant commanders' expectations in a recurrent, predictable cycle, while maintaining our capabilities to respond to the domestic mission.

We need Congress to continue to support, to properly maintain our readiness levels, and to be able to meet the expectations of our Nation and its citizens. Our goal is to achieve full-spectrum readiness for the Army National Guard units and full deployment readiness upon mobilization.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward to your questions and thank you for your support.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

Mr. ORTIZ. I am going to begin with a question from you, General Carpenter. Somebody just said the other day that your vehicles run on diesel fuel, jet fuel, but that this institution runs on rumors. What we have heard and it is my understanding that the Pentagon officials are considering using the Army National Guard for any funding in future years because they believe the Army cannot get access to the Army National Guard unit that is needed. I just want to know is this true or is this a rumor, and what are your thoughts on this issue?

General CARPENTER. Sir, we are having discussions about assured access to the Reserve Component and the National Guard, and they center around what happens when the demand in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) decline; will the Army have a continued access to the National Guard? The Chief of Staff of the Army has a model that says on a rotational basis there is a requirement in three bins for one corps, five divisions, 20 brigade combat teams, and 90,000 personnel enablers. And our part of that in the Army National Guard is to provide one division, five brigade combat teams, and somewhere around 40,000 of those enablers.

I would say that the best representation of assured access to the National Guard can be found in a couple of areas. The National Guard will be ready and will respond when required, regardless of

the environment, and the response that was provided in 9/11, I think, demonstrates that fairly well. Whether it be in New York or Pennsylvania or in the Pentagon, we will respond.

In terms of rotational and ready access, we are exceeding our recruiting requirements. Our retention rate is 115 percent, our soldiers are staying with us in this volunteer force after eight years. I think that as you look at that conceptually, if those soldiers were not willing to be part of an Operational Reserve, they would have left us a long time ago. And that is not happening.

The other connection here that is important for us to remember —and from my generation in Vietnam—the connection between the Army and the communities that generate our Army is important. And the National Guard provides that connection. We just had homecoming ceremonies for the 30th brigade, a brigade out of North Carolina. Half of North Carolina showed up to welcome that brigade home. We also had a homecoming ceremony for the 34th Division up in Minnesota. Again, half of St. Paul and Minneapolis showed up to welcome those soldiers home.

So I think there is a will on the part of the operational piece of our soldiers who sign up for this mission to want to be employed. The question is whether we will employ them and whether we will fund the Operational Reserve.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, when I severed in the Army, I came out and I was on a Reserve unit in Corpus Christi. And I think that, from my experience, you all do a heck of a job in defending our country and being ready to defend it in case that we might have to. All we have to do is look at what is happening to the south of us, and we need to give you what you need.

You know, maintaining an Army National Guard costs only a fraction of what an active duty unit costs. How can the Army take advantage of this efficiency in the years ahead of us? Maybe you can give us a little input into that.

General CARPENTER. Sir, the calculations that have been done by the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in this area show that it costs about 32 cents on the dollar to have a Reserve Component unit, a National Guard unit available for employment. Even when we are called to active duty and mobilize and deploy, we still are a bargain because we only represent 90 percent of what the active component soldier costs. And so in terms of a business case for the Army National Guard, I don't think there is any question that there are savings to be garnered in terms of investment in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve and the Air National Guard.

There is a balance, of course, in terms of how big the active component is and how big the Reserve Component is. And I think as we go forward in the future, that will be certainly a discussion item.

Mr. ORTIZ. I have one more question for General Stultz, and then I want to allow members to ask questions because this is a very important hearing. General, what kind of changes have you made to the Army Reserve's training system to accommodate the new demands in the Army Reserve and how could the system evolve into the future?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in the opening, one of the changes we made—first of all, we have gone to the fourth generation cycle, a five-year program with four years back home for every one year deployed. And in that every four-year buildup to that deployment, we have developed a training strategy that increases the number of training days in years three and four to accommodate building a higher level of readiness than what we were able to do in a Strategic Reserve.

In order to do that and as I indicated earlier, in order to make sure that the soldiers are training on the latest equipment, the most modern equipment, and getting the best training available, we have tried to develop a regional training approach. We have established regional training centers at our installations at Fort Hunter Liggett; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and other places. There we provided a cadre of trainers that are the experts. So all the warrior leader tasks that are required for any soldier deploying into Iraq or Afghanistan, they are able to go to those installations and get the top-of-the-line training. That saves a lot of time on the other side of mobilization, so that they are able to get more time in theater, boots-on-the-ground time.

But it also allows us, with the rapid fielding initiative (RFI), where they are getting the latest equipment, uniforms, helmets, sights, all those types of things that normally they wouldn't get until they get to a mobilization station, we can position that RFI at those locations. And when the soldier goes to do his weapons qualification, he qualifies with the right weapon, with the right sights, with the right helmet with everything, again, saving a lot of time. The feedback from the soldiers, they are telling us, "This is the best training I've ever had. Well worth my time. You are not wasting my time."

Our next level, we are establishing what we call the Combat Support Training Centers (CSTC). And our CSTCs, as we are calling them, are focusing on the collective training, those logistics-type or enabler-type units, again in that premobilization phase, so they can come in and train as a unit in a collective format and, again, save that time of, when you get mobilized you are not sitting in a mobilization station doing training, wasting time, you can get on to the mission in theater.

As I indicated earlier, those types of training activities are currently being funded by OCO. It is costing us around 250 million RPA and about 250 million O&M to run those types of operations. We are mobilizing, or keep mobilized, around 30,000 soldiers; so a significant number of soldiers going through that training every year at a significant expense, but well worth the dollar, just as General Carpenter indicated, when you look at what return on investment we are getting as a Nation from our Reserve forces.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir. The chair recognizes my good friend, Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, again thank you for your comments today.

I have two questions, would love to have your responses to both of those, and I will throw them both out so you can do them together. One of the concerns we always have and we recognize is that it is critical in developing a force that is ready and has strong

leadership throughout the ranks to have a good professional military education program. One of the things we always worry about is with the demands on the force, the unique structure of the Reserve Components may not allow individuals to pursue educational and professional development opportunities.

So my first question for any of you who care to respond is, What comments would you give us on that? Do you think that program is working well? Are we providing those opportunities? Is there something else that we need to do?

And then kind of a take-off of a little comment you made, General Carpenter, about simulation centers. How do the three of you see modeling and simulation now as an attribute that perhaps you can utilize in terms of training or even some of your operational functions; how important is that with reduced expenses and costs that we have and the utilization that you can make of those two components?

So, any of you in whatever order that you care to do.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. On the first question on professional education, it is a challenge. With the operational tempo and the fact that our soldiers are citizen soldiers, they have a civilian job as well as a military job, and trying to fit all the requirements plus a professional education in the amount of time they have got available is tough. We have made great use of distributed learning distance education to get our professional education requirements.

For instance, in the Army War College, we have most of our lieutenant colonels and colonels going through the distance learning program. A lot of them will tell you it is a lot tougher program than the residents face, because, one, they are trying to balance a civilian career but at the same time they are also doing a lot of coursework.

I think where we are struggling right now, where we need to focus is on the joint education. Our soldiers are getting joint experience in deployments, but in their joint professional education, there are limited opportunities because there is not as much available through a distributed or distance learning program.

Currently, if you go to the resident war college, you get credit for joint professional education. But if you take the distance learning course, you don't. There is not very much difference. So that is where we are pressing the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to say, "Let's get joint credit for our distance learning courses." We do have Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) through a distance course, but through the War College and other courses like that.

On the other question: Simulation, I think, is the future. Obviously we are using it now, but just what I said in the opening statement. Well, that soldier who has been in combat and he has worked on the latest techniques, tactics, procedures, he has worked with the latest equipment, the last thing I can do is bring him back home and say, "Go to your drill center next weekend and sit in a classroom and listen to somebody give you a lecture." He wants hands-on.

The problem is we can't put him in the same environment he just came from back in hometown America, but we can through simulations. There are a lot of great simulation systems out there for ve-

hicle operations, for watercraft operations, for light infantry operations, clearing buildings, things like that. But they cost money.

I am going down next Monday to Orlando, Florida to the Simulation Training Command and to a couple of other companies that are in that area just to look at their simulation systems that they have got. But they come with a price tag.

But I think we have to figure out a way of either making simulations available on a regional basis or being able to make them available on a mobile basis, so you can get it out there to that soldier and put him in the right training environment that is going to retain his skills but also going to retain him as a soldier.

General WYATT. Congressman Forbes, on behalf of the Air National Guard, professional military education is extremely important to all of our members, officers and enlisted. You kind of hit the nail on the head when you talked about the demands for acquiring that professional military education (PME), especially as it relates to our drill status guardsmen. We, like the Army National Guard, rely heavily upon the distributed learning system to afford access from homes or from the wing to the education systems. But it is imperative that we continually modify and improve those learning systems.

Just recently, as far as a commissioning program, an example of joining with the Air Force and with the Air Force Reserve, we have moved our commissioning from McGhee Tyson, Tennessee to partner up with the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force base and the Air Force Reserve. But because most of our members are prior service and have military experience before they are commissioned, the need for a lengthy commissioning program is not a requirement of ours, but the Air Force has allowed us to maintain our shorter commissioning program; but because we are at the same location as the Air Force and Air Force Reserve, we have a shared common experience that helps us to become more of the total force. So I like the progress in that area.

As far as resident seats, we see greater opportunities for guardsmen to access some of the resident seats. We are always asking for more. We see guardsmen who, as we become more operational, decide in their lives that they have more time to spend in residence, and so we are looking for increased resident seats to help us with our PME. We share the same concerns as the Army National Guard does with joint PME. We think that is necessary to develop our officer and enlisted corps for follow-on assignments in the joint world.

And to answer your modeling and simulation, I think that is an area that we need to invest in more heavily. The quality of the simulators is so much better today, the type of work that is required of air crew and even non-air crew can be very well simulated. We can now link up the live world, a live training world, a virtual world, and a simulation world through networking of all of our simulators. So I think it is critical that we invest in that.

When we talk about the expense of flying aircraft, which is necessary to do certain levels of training, there is a large block of training that can be accomplished very well in simulators; and the saved expenses and the saved wear and tear on the aircraft make that investment vital. And I think you will see, as we acquire new

weapons systems in the future, that, in addition to the platforms, that there will be great interest put into the simulators that go along with that to make us a better total force.

Thank you, sir, for the question.

General CARPENTER. Congressman, from the Army National Guard perspective, professional military education is absolutely essential for us to be able to conduct our business, whether it is education in the technical side of the house or whether it is leadership oriented. Very, absolutely important and critical for us.

We have seen a backlog now in Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) as a result of mobilization and deployments. We are in the midst of trying to work that particular backlog off. We have got about 40,000 soldiers that need to go to some level of NCOES out there, and we have a plan to mitigate that over the next couple of years.

From the Office of Professional Military Education, we have actually seen some successes there because we have been allocated slots in resident courses that were left vacant by our active component counterparts as they mobilized and deployed. And so that has provided a greater opportunity for us to send some of our officers to resident courses that they would not have otherwise had the opportunity to do.

We have also seen an increase in the number of what we call SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) graduates, which is an accelerated intermediate program at Fort Leavenworth that has allowed more National Guardsmen to participate in that particular program to round out their professional military education.

In the area of simulations and distance learning, we have 339 distance learning centers around the Army National Guard. And our challenge is now to be able to refresh those in the long term and, again, we have some funding issues there that we are working with the Army in terms of trying to make sure that we stay abreast of the latest technology in those distance learning centers.

We also spend a lot of time doing exercises related to those simulations. We have an exportable Combat Training Center package that we use as part of the deployment process to validate battalion- and brigade-level organizations before they deploy, as well as Battle Command Training Centers in Fort Leavenworth and Fort Indiantown Gap.

Probably the most successful simulator I have seen is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) simulator. I am not sure what the statistic is for us in the Army National Guard but the G3 of the Army says that 30 percent of the soldiers they enlist into the Army have never had a driver's license. And so when you take that 30 percent and you put them in an oversized, high-center-of-gravity vehicle and expect them to operate it safely, there is a fair amount of training that has to take place. If you put them in an MRAP simulator, it is a no-fault situation where you can roll that MRAP over and nobody gets hurt, and you get a chance to start at the beginning of the process and train.

So there are some excellent simulators out there that are provided by the technology we see around the country.

Mr. FORBES. We don't have time today because as the chairman said we want to get to some other questions, but I will leave you

maybe with a request that at some point in time—Chairman Ortiz and I both co-chaired the Modeling Simulation Caucus, and we would love if you have time—and I know you have a lot on your plate—at some point in time to get your thoughts of how we can coordinate better what we are doing with modeling and simulation for all of you to utilize; whether you submit that to us in writing or perhaps meet with us individually to do that, because I'm like you, I think that is kind of the wave of the future. We get a lot of bang for our buck and want to make sure we are not duplicative in what we are doing, and would love to chat with you further about that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ORTIZ. The chair recognizes Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for their testimony today.

Actually, in the state of Connecticut, in a short span of time in March and early April, the Connecticut National Guard demonstrated, again, their incredible importance in value to our state and Nation. At the end of March, we were hit by terrible floods, which actually President Obama just declared a disaster designation for the state of Connecticut in terms of the terrible weather that occurred there. The Connecticut National Guard was called out. They saved millions of dollars of property with the pumper trucks that were deployed.

There was a sewer treatment plant in the town of Jewett City that was literally about an inch away from just being totally overwhelmed by rising waters. A National Guardsman dove into the Quinnipiac River with the hose that was needed to set up the pumper and literally saved the day. And the people of that community are so grateful for the amazing talent and training, and obviously courage, that was displayed there.

On Easter Sunday, a convoy in Afghanistan carrying a number of Connecticut National Guardsmen was hit by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED); again, a couple of soldiers over at Walter Reed recovering from that terrible event.

And we now have the largest deployment of Connecticut National Guardsmen in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the largest since the Korean War. At every end of the spectrum, we are seeing the amazing contribution that these volunteer warriors are providing to our state.

And I guess the question I want to ask, it sort of touched on some of the earlier exchanges, was the event that occurred Easter Sunday, luckily the soldiers were in an MRAP vehicle. Again, Mr. Taylor's leadership in terms of increasing the size of MRAPs over the last few years has paid off in terms of saved lives over and over again. But, obviously, Afghanistan has posed a little bit of a challenge because of the roads there, and some of the guardsmen that I have spoken to have said that they are still in a situation where some use of Humvees is still a reality there because of the need to reconfigure the MRAP axle.

I am just sort of wondering if there is any issue at all in terms of guardsmen that are deployed in Afghanistan not having adequate use or access to the MRAP vehicles which obviously provide far greater protection than the Humvees.

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. The Army and the Department of Defense have expended a huge amount of effort and funding to get the new modern MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M–ATV) version of the MRAP into Afghanistan, and they have put forth Herculean efforts. It has taxed the air transportation piece of DOD and the commercial fleet almost to the breaking point. So there is a huge effort being applied towards that.

I know that we have had discussions with the Army with regard to the future of Humvees and the fact that they are not allowed off from the forward operating bases in Iraq. They are not supposed to be off from the operating bases in Afghanistan after the M–ATV is fully fielded.

My impression is that we have almost completed the fielding of the M–ATV in Afghanistan. So if there are Humvees still being used in those operations, I would suggest to you it won't be much longer and they will be replaced. There is a time, space, and physics part of this when you introduce a new piece of equipment; and that is, to get the piece of equipment into theater to be used by our forces. So to the best of my knowledge, I believe that if there are Humvees being used there, they are being used in a limited manner. And I would say they won't be used much longer after the complete fielding of the M–ATVs.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Having spoken to the mother of one of the soldiers over at Walter Reed, she got a crash course in the value of the MRAP vehicle and wanted me to express the urgency to make sure that as many of our folks over there have that protection, and certainly wanted me to encourage the Congress to continue its efforts to make sure that we have a full fleet to make sure that transporting people and equipment is done in the safest manner possible.

Thank you for your follow-up on that effort. I yield back.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Mr. Castle.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just thank both you and the ranking member and the generals who are here for what is a nice hiatus in some of my committee meetings which tend to be a lot more political, not always in the best interest of the country. You all are serving our country well and we appreciate that tremendously.

General Wyatt, I would like to ask you a couple of questions of the transfers of the C–130s which affects our Delaware Air National Guard, because one of those planes would be from the National Guard. Just reading through all my notes, I am having trouble understanding exactly how many planes we are talking about here. I have anything from 12 to 18 to 16 to 21. So you can straighten me out on that.

But I understand, at least the press has reported, this may not be accurate. The press reported you have been tasked by the Air Force to develop an alternative plan to the proposed fiscal year Air National Guard budget. And that is where all this appeared, by the way, that would transfer the C–130H aircraft from several states to Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas. I just wanted to ask you questions about that. The Air Force's rationale for the planned transfer was based in part on Mobility Capabilities and Require-

ments Study (MCRS) 2016 that projects a decrease in the number of C–130s required that already been challenged.

Did the U.S. Air Force request the Air National Guard input or suggestions on developing courses of action prior to the President's budget being released to the Congress?

General WYATT. Congressman, thank you for the question. I am pretty familiar with the C–130 process. Basically what happened was as the Quadrennial Defense Review was released, as the Mobilities, Capabilities Requirement Studies was nearing completion, the headquarters staff had visibility into the preliminary findings of the MCRS. Now, this was back in the November-December time frame as we were preparing, helping prepare the Air Force budget.

As it turns out, the MCRS did not change much from that draft study. And what that told the Air Force was that there was excess capacity in the C–130 fleet.

Through the Air Force corporate process, a decision was made to reduce and retire some of the older C–130s, primarily the E models and some of the early Hs. The Air National Guard did participate up to a particular point in the process, but, you know, we don't have the tie-breaking vote. So when we saw what the proposal was, and the proposal was to retire Es and Hs that were primarily resident in the active component at Little Rock being used to train C–130 legacy training, legacy being the training for H 2s, 2.5s and 3s, whereas the J model, primarily owned and operated by the active component, most of that training was done by the active component.

So when the decision was made to retire the Es and Hs, there was a need at Little Rock to provide aircraft to do the legacy training that was done by an active component wing there. So the initial PB–11 (Presidents Budget for Fiscal Year 2011) to backfill the need to train provided the removal—permanent transfer of I think it was 12 Air National Guard tails from nine different states. In addition to that, there were six C–130E models in Puerto Rico that were not part of the training picture, but because they were E models—and the schedule to retire in 2014 that was accelerated to 2011.

And then there were three, I think, fighter support aircraft, earlier H models, that were actually Air Force Reserve airplanes but were being operated by the Air National Guard that were also to be retired.

As we neared the budget submissions the Reserve Component, myself, General Stenner, Commander of the Air Force Reserve, worked with the Headquarters Air Force staff representatives from Air Education Training Command, Air Mobility Command, and the headquarters Air Force staff to start looking at an alternative plan, did not have the opportunity to fully vet that alternative plan before the deadline approached for the submission. So the Air Force went ahead and submitted the transfer, permanent transfers of tails that I just mentioned, that included I think eight Air Force Reserve tails, too, as part of the PB–11, with the instruction to continue working an alternative plan. And we have continued to do that and in fact are nearing completion with the alternative plan.

The alternative plan complies with the President's budget as far as the savings generated to the Air Force and accomplishes the

goal of retiring some of the earlier Es and Hs, but instead of a permanent transfer of the tails from various National Guard units and various states to Little Rock, what it involves is not a transfer of personnel but a loan of those tails. In other words, the aircraft would remain on the books of the Air National Guard but temporarily be loaned to Little Rock for purposes of training. And we are setting up under the alternative plan an ARC (Army Reserve Command) association with the Guard and Reserve to handle the old legacy training, if you will. And then as the legacy C–130 training drops off in the 2014–2015 time range and as the C–130J training comes up, those tails that have been loaned by the states will be returned back to those states that had loaned those—and they won't be all at once, they will be as the training demand diminishes—then we will start distributing those back out to the states, because the states' units are primarily combat operational units, and to preserve their operational capability it is in the best interest of the Air Force that those tails, when they are no longer needed for training, be transferred back to the Air National Guard.

So that is kind of the alternative. Instead of a permanent take, it is a loan to address a rather short-term training need, but permanent ownership remains with the Air National Guard. And as early as we can, we will move those back out to the Adjutants General in the states.

I visited with General Vavala, the TAG at Delaware, and several of the TAGs involved. I think we have a consensus. I have another video teleconference (VTC) with the involved TAGs this afternoon, as a matter of fact, to bring them up to date. And then we will see where the Air Force goes. Right now we are massaging the numbers to make sure that this is doable and still accomplishes the objectives as set forth in the President's budget.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is up, my questions are not. I would ask permission perhaps to submit some questions to you in writing. I have a statement for the record, if I may, with the consent of the chair.

Mr. ORTIZ. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Castle can be found in the Appendix on page 34.]

Mr. ORTIZ. We try to stay within the 5-minute rule so that all members will have a chance to ask questions. Let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Reyes. Chairman Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for your service and leadership at this very critical time.

General Wyatt, just following up on my colleague's question, the issue of the C–130s you were just referring to was for training and not, as we have heard, the transfer of 12 C–130s from the Guard to the active component that covers shortage of airlift capacity. Are those two different issues?

General WYATT. Basically, they are related, sir.

Mr. REYES. They are related?

General WYATT. They are related. The aircraft that were located in the states primarily dedicated to airlift, and satisfied some of the requirements of Air Mobility Command. That is why they were involved in this alternative plan that we moved forward. But because the budget retired some of the older Es and Hs that were used pri-

marily for training at Little Rock, there was a need to backfill that training need, and so the transfer initially proposed under the budget as a permanent transfer was necessary.

As we work through the alternative plan—and we realize that the training demand was not steady state through the outyears, that it would be decreasing—it opened up the opportunity to consider an alternative and that would be a loan of the tails by the Air National Guard and the Adjutants General to Little Rock, to be flown by primarily Air Force Reserve pilots and crew to handle the training. And then as the training began to drop off, as the C–130J training ramped up, then we would pump those tails back out to the states. So they are airlift-dedicated airplanes being temporarily used for training, but then going back to the airlift mission. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. But doesn't that mean a loss of airlift capacity under Title 32? And if so, how much of that loss will these transfers, temporary transfers, represent? And the reason I ask is because oftentimes when we have humanitarian or disaster relief assistance required, C–130s are the backbone of that airlift capability. And I am a little bit concerned that there is going to be some degradation of Title 32 capacity here.

General WYATT. While the tails are loaned, yes, sir, there would be a degradation. There would not be a permanent degradation as there would be under the budget. But under the alternative plan while those aircraft are on loan, they would be lost to the particular states. We believe that there are sufficient C–130s in the Air National Guard that could be accessed by one state to another that may have an additional need for C–130 airlift through the Emergency Management Assistance Compacts that the states have with one another that the Adjutants General work out. So for the Title 32 state mission requirements that a Governor may need, we believe that it will take a little extra work, and it will take a lot more coordination, but barring a huge catastrophe, we think there would be adequate airlift while we do the training mission, with the intent to get that airlift that you mentioned back to the states as quickly as we can.

Mr. REYES. And what is the projected timeframe that this vulnerability will exist?

General WYATT. We will have a total of, right now, there is an Air National Guard nine, primary assigned aircraft (PAA), nine-aircraft unit at Little Rock that does training, and that Air National Guard unit will be there even after the loan situation resolves itself.

The additional airplanes that the Guard will bring in will be eight, I believe, and the Air Force Reserve will bring in 10, for a total of 27 on location for their training. And so as the C–130J draws down, that Air National Guard unit that is there and does the training mission will remain in place. And we will then be able to transfer individual tails back out to the Guard and the Reserve as quickly as we can. We think that we will initially begin a year or two after we initially get those tails in there. And then by the 2014, 2015 time frame, we think——

Mr. REYES. So it is basically about a five-year period?

General WYATT. About a four- to five-year period at the longest, and there will be some states that won't be affected that long. Some states will be affected for a much shorter period of time.

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for the service of those you lead. We appreciate that. I don't have so much a question as a comment and any kind of response that you would care to give as well.

Every time I hear my colleagues or others propose solutions to domestic issues that involve the Guard, whether it is border security or police action in Chicago, whatever it is, my antennae go up because I worry about the—now that you are a tactical element as opposed to a strategic element—that those demands on the team, on top of continuing demands to go to Afghanistan and other places, will be something that we would need to know.

If you get an order, you are going to make it happen, you are going to make it work. But to the extent that that requirement can't be fulfilled in the normal, annual training commitment, the normal annual work that you do, it goes beyond that. But it takes those folks away from jobs, away from families, and away from their lives in an unexpected way.

How can we as policymakers understand the impact of a broad border security initiative of some sort or, I don't think the folks in Chicago were really serious about bringing the National Guard in to stand in on the corners there, but how do we understand the impact that would have on your team, as it relates to the continuing, you know, one-year work and every five years, that rotation, which is where we want to get to. Can you give us some thoughts on when you hear policymakers talk about using the Guard for solutions that aren't in a traditional guard role, what kind of contingency plans or plan to do you have in place to look at that?

Any of the three. It probably doesn't affect the Air Guard as much but the other two.

General CARPENTER. Congressman, from the Army National Guard perspective, we have been living in this environment for the last nine years, whether it was an immediate requirement to provide airport security after 9/11, which we did for nine months without any incident and did it in an incredible manner thanks to soldiers we have inside our formations, or the Operation Jump Start, which was the border security piece that we completed about a year and a half ago. Those, although they are not the normal kinds of missions out there, those are missions that the National Guard in many cases was designed to respond to in a Title 32 status and to support the Governors out there as they go about their business.

I would tell you that if I am breaking dwell or unannounced kinds of requirements out there, that does present some problems for some soldiers inside of our formation. We rely on the Adjutants General and the commanders throughout the chain of command to identify those soldiers that have an absolute serious problem where they can't mobilize and deploy and cross-level other soldiers into those formations to be able to respond in that kind of a situation.

So there is a process in place inside the states to accommodate or mitigate some of the issues for people that have hardship situations.

General STULTZ. From the Army Reserve's perspective, first, you know, being a Title 10 force, we do not get, obviously, call for the Title 32.

However, I see that as probably a waste of resources in some cases. When we talk about homeland issues such as hurricanes or other disasters like that, quite often we use annual training as a mechanism because there is no other authority to call up the Army Reserve for those homeland events unless it is a weapons of mass destruction event.

Yet we have, for instance, in the state of Texas, I have 18,500 Army Reserve soldiers in the state of Texas, which are medical units, engineer units, logistics units, all types of capability, which in hurricanes go unused unless I take the initiative to use annual training as the mechanism.

We have been saying for some time we think there should be legislation to allow the use of those Title 10 resources, both Army, Air and Navy and Marine Corps in those resources, for those homeland events. Because, as a taxpayer, the taxpayer doesn't know this is a Title 10 resource versus a Title 32. All they know is there is a lot of equipment sitting there in an Army Reserve center that is not being used when we need it, and those soldiers who live in those communities want to help. In most cases, we do the right thing, but we do it using training dollars versus operational dollars.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us and thanks for all you do for our Nation and the men and women that you represent. Major General Carpenter, I am going to direct this to you.

I remain concerned that although the Army motto is "we train as we fight", that I don't really see a sufficient number of mine resistant vehicles at the training installations for the troops, particularly those who have not deployed once already, for them to get a good feel of the MRAP, getting in and out of it, driving that top-heavy vehicle around, the restrictions of the vehicle.

I will use Mississippi's Camp Shelby as an example. I think we have got about two dozen MRAPs to train as many as 5- or 6,000 troops at a time. That does not strike me as training as they fight. Keep in mind that if you have got two dozen on any given day, five or six are probably broken so that you really don't even have the two dozen.

Given the enormous amount of equipment that is being drawn down out of Iraq—and I realize, thank goodness, a lot of these single-axle vehicles are being modified in Kuwait to a dual suspension where that can be used off road in Afghanistan—but I have still got to believe that there is a significant number of MRAPs, single-axle MRAPs, that are surplus to the inventory. To what extent are you and the other services trying to get those to training installations?

General CARPENTER. Sir, first of all, I talked to Major General Freeman specifically the other day on this specific subject. And, of course, as you know, Camp Shelby is certainly within his sphere of interest. He told me that they had delivered 18 M–ATVs to Camp Shelby for training within the past week.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

General CARPENTER. Your description of the situation, even in spite of those 18, is fairly accurate. There are too few vehicles to train on, too little time at the mobilization station for us to be able to get everybody through those trainers and to be able to qualify them.

In the case of Iraq, the driver qualification for those vehicles happened primarily at Camp Buehring and that was done through a road test and a trainer course that was done there that required 70 hours of driving before the individual was licensed before they went up into Iraq and conducted operations. The Army is formulating a similar setup in Afghanistan to ensure that the drivers are qualified before, before they operate the vehicle.

A combination of the simulation, M–ATV simulation trainer that I mentioned earlier and fielding of the actual vehicles, M–ATVs, is going to be the solution. You do get some value in training on any MRAP vehicle because you get the feel of a high-profile vehicle that is certainly an overweight vehicle on narrow roads. But to actually qualify, you have to be qualified on that vehicle.

Again, as I mentioned earlier, the challenge here is that we have a limited number of vehicles and a limited amount of time, and our goal is to ensure that every driver that drives that vehicle and gets the license is qualified and validated no matter how much time it takes. But it is a problem.

Mr. TAYLOR. This would be a question for you and General Schultz. In a fairly recent trip to Iraq visiting the 155th, a Colonel Van told me that he had an amnesty day, turn it in, no questions asked. He had a line of vehicles two miles long, just everything under the sun.

I am curious, given that almost—after every conflict there seems to be some budget tightening, and with the Nation $13 trillion in debt that has got to happen at some point. To what extent do your commands take a look at those things that are available in Iraq, and even if they are not on your requirements list, make a case for, gee, you know what, I would like to have that thing, whether it is a generator, or whether it is a track hoe, a bulldozer, all those things you are going to use after a natural disaster or weapons of mass destruction—to what extent do you have the freedom to reach out and get those things that the taxpayers have paid for and bring them home at what I would think would be a bargain price as opposed to a new acquisition?

I know it is just one base, so if that is going on at Balad, multiply that times 30 to 50 major installations around Iraq, I have got to believe that there is a lot of stuff over there that has been purchased by the taxpayers and what I don't want to see ends up at the black market in Syria or Baghdad or even Iran, for all we know.

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. After our last meeting here about a month and a half ago on this specific subject, and Colonel Van,

the situation that you identified, we went back and we did the research. And those vehicles that were being turned into the amnesty point at that day, in fact, were being reintroduced into the system and are being either redistributed into Afghanistan or are scheduled to return to the United States or a part of a foreign military sales program.

Sir, in addition to that, the discussion I had with you about having an individual in theater to be able to identify property that could be used by state and local governments for use in emergencies and disaster operations for their responsibilities, I think you will be happy to know—and I think the Army has notified you that they do have a person in theater right now who is doing that, and they are arranging for that property to be returned to the United States. And my—I believe the latest information I had was that there were state governments in Alabama that were going to have that equipment returned to them for their use.

And so I would be happy to report, and I think that General Stevenson from the G–4 of the Army has the more detailed information that your efforts to have that property returned for state and local government use is, in fact, happening.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I would welcome that report at your convenience, General.

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. Again, General, thank you for all you gentlemen for what you do in war and peace for our Nation.

Mr. ORTIZ. Before I go to Mr. Johnson how did that equipment get out of the system?

General CARPENTER. Sir, I am not sure I am in a position to really describe, other—other than the accountability process in a time of war is probably less than ideal. Other than that, I would have to refer you to the Army or the theater commander for more details, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, because we would like to avoid what has happened in the past, you know. We have a lot of hurricanes in our area, and we need those, the equipment, and Mr. Taylor has put it real well, maybe you might say that is equipment that can only be used for the next year.

Well, we have two hurricanes every year, and they would be used very professionally in our areas. So if we could just check into that, and we don't want to be losing any more equipment. We would like to have better accountability.

General CARPENTER. Sir, I would say that the equipment isn't necessarily lost, it is just the accountability of it isn't necessarily on the books, and so the equipment is in the hands of the U.S. forces and is being used by the U.S. forces. It is just that the documentation isn't necessarily accompanying all of the equipment and, again, that goes to some of the situations I described.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, back in the early 1980s, as a young man I considered going into the Army National Guard, and I was only looking at it from the standpoint of, you know, one weekend a month and two weeks during the summer, and the mission has changed drastically since that time. So I want to thank you and the people that you

lead and their families, and your families as well, for the sacrifice that the Reserves and the National Guard units have been called upon to fulfill over the last 10 years.

Lieutenant General Wyatt, were any of those C–130 aircraft transferred from Georgia units, state of Georgia units?

General WYATT. Sir, I believe they were probably talking about the Savannah unit. Under the President's budget, they were scheduled to lose one airplane, but they were also scheduled to transition into a different version of airplanes. Under the alternative plan, I believe Georgia would be asked again to loan an airplane instead of lose a tail so, yes, sir, they were affected.

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me ask another question, Lieutenant General Wyatt. The requirement for fighter aircraft has been reduced from 2,200 in 2008 to 2,000 for 2010. How will that reduction affect the Air National Guard's ability to perform the Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) mission?

General WYATT. Thank you, sir. The ASA mission, the Air Sovereignty Alert mission, currently flown by the Air National Guard at 16 locations nationwide out of a total of 18 locations. As you know, the 2010 combat Air Forces reduction, which you mentioned, took the total number of fighter aircraft in the combat forces from about 2,250 to 2,000. As we look at the air sovereignty mission in 2010 and in the outyears, we are okay right now. It did not affect our ability to carry on the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. But at those 16 locations, 10 and sometimes 11 of those locations are flown by some of the older Block 30 F–16 units, which do have a life expectancy concern. Those are older airplanes, they are reaching the end of their service life. We think most of that have fleet will age out about 2015 or 2016. So my concern is how do we cover the Air Sovereignty Alert mission in those outyears.

The Chief of Staff has indicated that there is a Department of Defense obligation, and he has pledged adequate resources to make sure that that mission is covered. There are ways to approach the requirements of that mission. We know that currently the Commander of NORTHCOM, General Renuart, is conducting a study on their current requirements, which will be the first one post-9/11, to determine if 18 is the required number or if it is perhaps more or a little bit less.

We should have that report out here pretty soon. And when that report is filed then we will be able to relook our ability to cover the Air Sovereignty Alert mission, especially as we approach the 2015, 2016 time period.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. With respect to the retirement or the accelerated retirement of the legacy aircraft, how involved was the Air National Guard in the analysis that led to the reduction?

General WYATT. You are talking about the 2010 reduction from 2,250 to 2,000, sir?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

General WYATT. We were involved, part of that process, the Air Force corporate structure allows participation by the Reserve Components all the way through the process. Again, there are debates, specifically how a particular reduction will be made, but reviewing how that was done, it was shared across all three components, all three components took reductions.

Mr. JOHNSON. Was that decision made before or after the Air National Guard's involvement?

General WYATT. The final decision was made after, with our input. And, like I say, the Air National Guard probably didn't get 100 percent of what we wanted. The same thing could be said about the Air Force Reserve. The same thing could probably be said about the Air Force. It was a collaborative effort. We all shared in the reduction to some degree.

There were some good things that came out of the reduction. For example, some of the older—we had a Block 25 unit in Duluth, Minnesota, for example, that was able to upgrade to Block 50, F–16s that were being drawn out of Spangdahlem Air Force Base, Germany. So we were able to upgrade some of the models at some of our units.

There were other fighter units that lost their airplanes, but we have been able to roll in new missions, emerging missions. The 150th Fighter Wing in New Mexico is an example, currently losing their F–16s, but they are transitioning into C–130 and HH–60 special operations training mission. And they are doing a great job in that transition, working with the active component.

And we seek to do that with all units that may be losing aircraft, either to upgrade the aircraft or transition them into an emerging mission that will take advantage of huge human capital, great experience and skills of our guardsmen, which remain in demand whether we are flying platforms or not.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your service, and we will take your recommendations very seriously. I think that they are very sound. We don't know where the next conflict is going to be. We are going to have to keep you well-funded, well-equipped and well-trained.

We have an excellent committee here, subcommittee, that wants to work with you.

Like I said, I had a chance to serve on the Army Reserve when I came out, and I think that what you see, the personnel that serves either on the Reserves or National Guard are cream of the crop. They are well trained. They joined because they love their country and they want to be of help and service, and we just want to say thank you so much for the great job that you do and we will keep working together.

If there are no further questions, some questions may be submitted later for the record. This hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

# A P P E N D I X

April 27, 2010

## PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 27, 2010

**Opening Statement by Chairman Solomon Ortiz**
**Readiness Subcommittee Hearing on**
**Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard training and operations**
**April 27, 2010**

**The subcommittee will come to order.**

**Today the Readiness Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2011 budget request for training for the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard.**

**Witnesses have also been asked to provide their views on current training operations and the future needs of their respective components.**

**I thank our distinguished witnesses from the Army and Air Force for appearing before the subcommittee today.**

**All of them have had distinguished military careers, and we are all grateful to them for their service.**

**Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, hundreds of thousands of Americans serving in these components of our military – the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard – have been mobilized and deployed on missions both here at home and overseas.**

**Today, more than 98,000 soldiers and airmen from these elements of our military are on active duty, carrying out missions that cover the full range of military activities.**

**Each one of them has left behind their families, and put their civilian jobs on hold, as they serve the nation.**

**Those soldiers and airmen not mobilized on active duty also continue to serve, and stand ready to support domestic authorities in the event of a natural disaster or emergency.**

**Clearly, the high number of troops mobilized today attests to the fact that the reserve elements of our military are no longer a "strategic" reserve intended to be rarely used.**

**These reserve components are now clearly "operational" reserves that support, augment, and assist our active duty forces on a routine and continuing basis.**

**We look forward to hearing today just how this transformation was accomplished, and what it means to the soldiers and airmen who have served and continue to serve.**

**We also look forward to hearing how the fiscal year 2011 budget request matches up with the expected missions and operations.**

**Finally, and most critically, we look forward to hearing how we maintain these components as an "operational reserve" in the future, even as the war in Iraq begins to end.**

**As of today, many questions on this issue remain unanswered, including:**

- **How much will it cost each year to maintain our reserve forces at their current level of activity?**
- **How many reserve soldiers and airmen can we expect to have mobilized in future years?**
- **If the reserves return to a "strategic reserve" status, what would it mean for the quality of the force, and for recruiting and retention?**
- **Over the long term, is it possible that the size of our reserve forces may need to grow? If so, in what way?**

**These are the issues we will be exploring today.**

**Our witnesses today are:**

**Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz**
**Commanding General**
**United States Army Reserve Command**

**Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III**
**Director, Air National Guard**

**and**

**Major General Raymond W. Carpenter**
**Acting Director, Army National Guard**

**The Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks he would like to make.**

Opening Statement by Ranking Member Randy Forbes
Readiness Subcommittee hearing on Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard operations
April 27, 2010

"Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We meet again to discuss the readiness of some of our reserve component forces. The Department of Defense continues to face budgetary pressures against the backdrop of the on-going war on terror, continued high operations tempo, and a need to recapitalize much of its aging equipment.

"There is no doubt that the challenges facing the Department of Defense are significant. Years of underfunded procurement accounts continue to manifest in aging fleets of aircraft, ships, and vehicles. This aging equipment is costly to maintain, offers reduced reliability, and requires increased man-power to keep it serviceable.

"Nowhere is this more evident than in the National Guard and Reserves. The reserve component has faced many additional challenges because it started this long war positioned as a strategic reserve. For decades we postured the National Guard with a Cold War mindset. We believed we could accept risk in equipping and training the Guard, because we thought there would be a clear, unambiguous signal to get them ready. We also believed there would be sufficient time to field the equipment and get them trained before they would be needed on the battlefield.

"We have learned many lessons since September 11, 2001. We've learned that there is not time to ready the Guard from a strategic reserve posture - because the threat doesn't allow it, because the industrial base can't support it, and because natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina come with little to no warning. The need for a trained, well-equipped and integrated reserve component is clear.

"However, I believe must we be patient and thoughtful as we continue to transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. We knew this transition would take years and require a substantial investment even if there were no other operational demands on the National Guard and the Reserves.

"I also understand that reality gets a vote when you are at war. I am aware that in some cases equipment slated for the reserve component was redirected to Afghanistan in support of the surge. That was the right thing to do in order to meet the deployment timelines set by the Combatant Commander and we must continue to balance strong support for our troops in harm's way in Afghanistan and Iraq with our efforts to modernize and fully equip the reserve components.

"In a hearing on this matter in 2008, I remarked that in order to be successful in operationalizing the reserve component "we must be patient, we must have a solid plan of action, and we must provide the funding stream necessary to make it happen." I still believe that to be true.

"Now that we are two years down the road, I hope our witnesses will be able to give us an update on how things are going. I also look forward to a discussion on sufficiency of the fiscal year 2011 budget request and an opportunity to understand more about the comprehensive review of the future role of the reserve component as proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Thank you for being here with us today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."

**Statement for the Record**
**Submitted by the House Armed Services Readiness Committee**
**Congressman Michael N. Castle (R-DE)**
**Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard**
**Training and Operations**
**April 27, 2010**

Thank you Chairman Ortiz and Ranking Member Forbes for allowing me to attend today's hearing. I appreciate this opportunity to express my support for the members of the Reserve components who are presently serving their Nation, have served in the past, or will serve in the future. To the uniformed leadership of the Reserve component, thank you for your support of our citizen soldiers, airman, Marines and Coast Guard who have faithfully and without fail answered the call to duty.

The high demands of the overseas contingency operations has transformed the all-volunteer reserve component into an operational force. Every day somewhere in the United States, the National Guard is also supporting a Governor in response to a natural or man-made emergency. We saw this just this week in response to tornadoes in the Southeast, and just a few months ago in response to blizzard conditions in my home state of Delaware. As a former Governor, I am thankful for the Guard's quick response under State control in support of Americans.

Given the duality of the National Guard with its state and federal mission and the cost advantages that dual mission entails, I am very concerned with the Department of Defense FY11 Air National Guard budget proposal that, if approved, would transfer Air National Guard C130 aircraft from several states to Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. To address these issues, I have sent a letter signed by the Congressional Delegation from Delaware to Secretary Donley and am awaiting a reply.

This most recent announcement of C-130 force structure changes is reminiscent of the 2005 BRAC, an effort that will reduce the number of aircraft from the ANG. I urge this Committee to carefully review alternative courses of actions that include the concerns of the Governors, Air National Guard leadership, the Chief of National Guard Bureau that will preserve the mobility capabilities for the Air National Guard's federal and state mission.

Although I was pleased to learn that the Director of the Air National Guard has been recently tasked to work on an alternative course of action, I am concerned about the likelihood of completing such action. Instead, I suggest the Committee consider not adopting the PB (President's Budget) FY 11 proposal related to transfer of ANG Aircraft and further suggest the issue be studied and reported back to the Congressional committee of jurisdiction prior to transferring these aircraft.

**RECORD VERSION**

**STATEMENT BY**

**LTG Jack Stultz**

**CHIEF, U.S. ARMY RESERVE**

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**ON**

**READINESS**

**SECOND SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS**

**27 APRIL 2010**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION**
**UNTIL RELEASED BY**
**THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

1 Against the backdrop of the second longest war in our nation's history and the longest
2 ever fought by an all-volunteer force, the Army Reserve continues to be a positive return on
3 investment for America. The FY 2009 $8.2 billion Army Reserve appropriation represented only
4 four percent of the total Army budget, yet we supply the Army seven to eight brigade-size
5 elements. Since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve mobilized 183,144 Soldiers, and now
6 has 29,000 deployed in support of Army missions. We supply the Army with 87 percent of its
7 Civil Affairs capability, 65 percent of its Psychological Operations, and 59 percent of its Medical
8 support - to highlight a few of our top contributing specialized functions. Compared to the cost
9 of expanding the full-time force, the small investment in the Army Reserve provides security at
10 home and fights terrorism abroad. We respond to domestic disasters and participate in security
11 cooperation operations while protecting national interests around the globe. In support of
12 contingency operations, we foster stability in underdeveloped nations where conditions are ripe
13 for terrorists to gain a foothold.
14
15 The events of September 11, 2001 forever changed the way in which the Army Reserve
16 provides combat support and combat service support to the Army and to the Joint Forces.
17 Operational demands for Army Reserve support have been heavy and enduring.
18 The reality is, current operations are consuming Army Reserve readiness as fast as we can
19 build it, but Congress' support for the Army Reserve in recent years has gone far toward both
20 meeting current demands and reshaping the Army Reserve for future national security
21 requirements.
22
23 As sustained operational demands on the Army Reserve became heavier after 9/11, it
24 became ever apparent we could no longer function as a part-time strategic reserve. Based on

1 the operational requirements outlined for the Army Reserve in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
2 Review, and while fighting two wars, we continue our efforts to fully transition from a strategic
3 reserve to an operational force, based on current resourcing and mission requirements. An
4 operational Army Reserve is a good return on investment for America because now we are in a
5 stronger position to provide the Army with predictable, trained, equipped, and ready forces to
6 meet global and contingency requirements. What remains is an ongoing effort to sustain an
7 operational posture, with a fully functioning Army Force Generation model - that receives full
8 funding.
9
10 Thanks to Congress' leadership, we have made great progress in a number of initiatives
11 required to complete Army Reserve transformation. We have re-organized operational
12 commands to better support theater requirements, opened new training centers, and
13 restructured training commands to support the total force. Through Base Realignment and
14 Closure, we have closed scattered facilities in favor of more efficient, multi-service reserve
15 centers. Through the Army Reserve Enterprise process, we are restructuring our strategic and
16 operational efforts to maximize productivity, efficiency, and responsiveness in four Enterprise
17 areas: Human Capital, Materiel, Readiness, and Services and Infrastructure.
18
We have identified "Five Imperatives" to facilitate Army Reserve continued transformation to a stronger and more capable operational force. They are Shaping the Force, Operationalizing the Army Reserve, Building the Army Reserve Enterprise, Executing BRAC, and Sustaining the Force.
19
20

Shaping the Force

As we look ahead, we know that building the right force is crucial for success. In 2010, we will leverage human capital management strategies to better *shape the force* into a more affordable and effective Army Reserve capable of supporting national security objectives and our combatant commanders' war-fighting needs. We are developing a more precise human capital strategy to meet our nation's future military needs by ensuring the *right* people, with the *right* skills, in the *right* units, are in place at the *right* time.

In today's competitive recruitment environment, incentives matter because they allow the Army Reserve to sustain and shape the force. We achieved our FY 2009 end strength due to the hard work and dedication of our recruiters and our Soldiers. We also attribute this success to the recruiting and retention initiatives that support the Army Reserve's manning strategy. These include the Army Reserve Recruiter Assistant Program that promotes strength from within by recognizing and rewarding those Soldiers, Family members, and Department of the Army Civilians working for the Army Reserve who bring talent to the team. The second is enlistment bonuses, which help us recruit the critically short/high demand Military Occupational Specialties. In FY 2009, our focused incentives increased Army Reserve End Strength. As we met the objective, it became evident that not all of our new Soldiers possessed the skill sets needed to support the Army Reserve structure while also fulfilling our wartime requirements.

Successful recruiting added an abundance of Soldiers in the lowest three pay grades, but recruiting new Soldiers as privates and second lieutenants cannot fill the thousands of mid-grade noncommissioned and commissioned officer vacancies that currently exist. Despite excellent retention results, these shortages continue.

1 United States Army Reserve authorizations for Medical Corps, Dental Corps, and the
2 Specialist Corps have not changed much materially for 2000-2009 (2614 vs. 2572), but the
3 inventory has decreased dramatically from 165% of authorized end strength in 2000 to the
4 current 89% in 2009. This attrition has come predominately at the expense of its senior
5 providers with more than 20 years of clinical experience in a military environment who now
6 represent only 9% of Medical Corps inventory, 17% of Dental Corps inventory and 11% of the
7 current Specialist Corps inventory. In the coming year, we must do more to retain these
8 uniquely qualified medical providers and seek to build a system that incentivizes these most
9 skilled clinicians.
10
11 Our recruitment efforts will focus on more prior-service recruits who are slightly older and
12 bring more experience than most first-term Soldiers. These experienced Soldiers can fill
13 shortages among mid-level commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Targeted incentives
14 have been crucial to rebuilding our end strength and addressing critical shortages in some
15 grades and job specialties. Continuing these incentives allows the Army Reserve to shape the
16 force to better meet the requirements of our national security strategy and to give Soldiers,
17 Families, and Employers stability and predictability.
18
19 Ensuring a Continuum of Service (COS) is a human capital objective that seeks to
20 inspire Soldiers to a lifetime of service. Active (full-time) and reserve (part-time) military service
21 are two elements of valuable service to the nation. Continuum of Service provides Active and
22 Reserve Components some of the means necessary to offer Soldiers career options while
23 maintaining capability for the operational force. COS also recognizes the tremendous cost of
24 accessing and training each service member and seeks to avoid unnecessary replication of

1 those costs. To reach our objective, it is our intention to work with Army to propose
2 recommended changes t current statutes and policies that will ease restrictions on statutes
3 limiting Reserve Component Soldiers from serving on active duty.
4
5 Operationalizing the Army Reserve
6 Our status as an operational force means that the Army Reserve is no longer a force in
7 waiting – we are an operational force in *being.* We can continue providing that positive return
8 on investment to the nation when the Army Reserve is given the proper resources to succeed.
9
10 The Army Reserve plays a vital operational role in overseas contingency operations and
11 will for the foreseeable future. Since 9/11, 185,660 Army Reserve Soldiers have mobilized in
12 support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); 33,754 have
13 mobilized more than once. In 2009, the Army Reserve mobilized 39,150 Soldiers to support
14 Combatant Commanders' requests for forces. We execute a readiness strategy to deploy
15 highly ready units and Soldiers to support OIF and OEF requirements. This readiness strategy
16 synchronizes those strategic planning and resourcing actions necessary to generate sufficient
17 manning, training, and equipping levels to meet combatant commander mission requirements.
18 The Army Force Generation process allows for a structured progression of increased unit
19 readiness over time, and provides the Army recurring access to Army Reserve trained, ready,
20 and cohesive units, which translates to predictability for Soldiers, their Families, and Employers.
21 In effect, ARFORGEN drives the battle rhythm of the Army Reserve.
22
23 ARFORGEN works for the Army Reserve. It has enduring qualities that have been
24 apparent in providing support to emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti

earthquake relief efforts, for training Soldiers in Afghanistan, to supporting the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program with training and equipment for selected militaries engaged in humanitarian or peace operations. The Army Reserve seeks continued support from Congress to be an effective responder to missions such as these.

Within the transformation process, we realigned our force structure to meet the Army's global mission requirements in both the Operational and Generating Force categories. The Army Reserve is ready to take on additional missions as the Department of Defense and US Army validate emerging requirements. Authorized growth in end strength will enable the Army Reserve to activate validated units to meet these emerging requirements and maintain the number of units we have in our ARFORGEN process. Plans reflect an increase of 1,000 to 205,000 spaces of Authorized End Strength (ESA) to provide the Army Reserve capability to meet emerging mission requirements within our ability to operate the force.

Full-time support personnel comprise a select group of people who organize, administer, instruct, recruit, and train our people; and who maintain supplies, equipment, and aircraft. They also perform other functions required on a daily basis to maintain readiness in support of operational missions. Without these critical Soldiers and Civilians, the Army Reserve could not function as an operational force.

Although resourced to the Department of the Army "High Risk" funding methodology (meets minimal acceptable risk in support of a strategic reserve force), it is imperative that future planning ensure full-time support is fully resourced as an operational reserve.

Adequate resourcing is critical in meeting the readiness requirements of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.

The current full-time support model remains a strategic reserve legacy. Key legislative and policy modifications are required to change personnel support processes. Manpower models and programming processes require review and modifications to provide flexibility and rapid response adjusting resources amid changing priorities across the ARFORGEN process.

Our Active Guard Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician (MT) programs provide the bulk of full-time support at the unit level. They provide the day-to-day operational support needed to ensure Army Reserve units are trained and ready to mobilize within the ARFORGEN process. The AGR and MT programs are vital to the successful transition to - and sustainment of - an operational reserve. The Army Reserve requires added flexibility in its hiring practices to sustain its commitments to ARFORGEN. We must take action to create a new category of Non-Dual Status Technician, which allows retention and direct hire of personnel from outside the Selected Reserve. This new capability will allow us to support non-mobilizing/deploying organizations while authorizing Dual Status Military Technicians to meet conditions of employment with a military assignment anywhere within the Selected Reserve. We are working with Army to relax legacy fulltime support policies in order to provide flexibility in the reallocation of resources within AFORGEN cycle.

As an operational force, the Army Reserve must have the most effective and sustainable equipment for Soldiers and units at the right place and at the right time. The Army Reserve

supports the Army Equipping Strategy of Cyclical Readiness, which means all units are equipped based on their position in the ARFORGEN process and their mission – regardless of Component. The Equipment Readiness levels increase as units move through the ARFORGEN process from the RESET to the Available Phase. Those units that are within the RESET phase will have a chance to reintegrate Soldiers and Families, then organize, man, equip, and train as a unit. As the units move to the Train/Ready phase, they will be resourced from 80% growing to 90%; and once the units enter the Available Phase, they are resourced to ensure 90% plus equipment readiness. To maximize collective and individual training opportunities for our units in the ARFORGEN process on high demand/low density systems, the Army Reserve must address the challenge with small pools of current generation systems. Additionally, while the Army Reserve units in the Reset Phase should have minimal specific equipping expectations; the Army Reserve is identifying equipment requirements that a unit can properly maintain at a Reserve Unit Home Station while sustaining Soldiers and training readiness. We are thankful to Congress for helping us meet this goal with National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding. These funds greatly add toward operationalizing the Army Reserve by supporting Army Modularity, Homeland Defense/Homeland Security, and the Army Force Generation cycle with a fully modern and interoperable force. With continued NGREA funding, we will be able to train our Soldiers on the latest combat equipment *before* they deploy into harm's way.

Sustaining the Force

The Warrior-Citizens of the Army Reserve and their Families embody a lasting commitment to serve America. The Army Reserve recognizes the strain of this era of persistent conflict on Soldiers and Families. We know Family readiness is inextricably linked to mission

readiness, recruitment, and retention. Operationalizing of the Army Reserve creates a requirement for an enduring level of support. As the Army Reserve transforms, so must Family Programs. Our way ahead includes realignment actions to: support the Army Reserve Enterprise management approach, sustain services to Soldiers and Families in the expeditionary force, standardize existing programs and services across the Army Reserve, and build partnerships with Army Families and communities. Our end state is to optimize programs and services to connect Soldiers and Families to the right service at the right time.

The cornerstone of our planning effort is to ensure the integration of Family Support services with the ARFORGEN process. By doing so, we ensure that our Warrior-Citizens and their Families have solid programs that are ready for execution any time during the training and deployment cycle. Appropriate resourcing will allow us to assess structure requirements, staffing needs, and develop effective processes that ensure the consistent delivery of programs and services that meet the needs of ARFORGEN and especially for those of our geographically dispersed customers.

The Army Reserve Family Programs Virtual Installation Program is an exciting new initiative that ensures the same services provided to active component Soldiers are available to all service members and their Families not living close to a military installation. Leveraging assets we have on hand is allowing us to test the program through a series of pilots located in selected communities. Funding for this priority will allow us to expand Virtual Installation within Army Strong Community Centers around the country and overseas.

We must continue to increase the quantity and quality of support for Army Reserve children and youth. We can increase opportunities for youth to develop leadership skills and

1 strategies for coping with separation. Teen panels provide forums for our youth to propose
2 solutions for concerns that affect their lives during mobilization and deployment. Additional
3 online teen deployment classes support youth living in the "new normal" of repetitive
4 deployments. With additional resources, we will work with our community partners to expand
5 childcare for geographically dispersed Families and respite care for mobilized Families.
6
7 This year we provided new opportunities for children of Army Reserve Families to attend
8 camps. While the Department of Defense (DoD) "Purple Camps" were a great initiative, they
9 distributed opportunities among all military communities in DoD. This resulted in fewer
10 opportunities for Army Reserve children than needed. Additionally, Army Reserve children are
11 usually unable to travel, and require activities located in areas near their homes. By operating
12 our own camps, we increased these opportunities to Army Reserve Families in their
13 communities and tailored them to our communities. The goal of the program is to prepare Army
14 Reserve Soldiers and their Family members for mobilization, sustain Families during
15 deployment, and reintegrate Soldiers with their Families, communities, and employers upon
16 release from active duty. The Army Reserve Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP)
17 provides information, services and support, referral, and proactive outreach to Army Reserve
18 Soldiers and their Families through all phases of the deployment cycle. The program includes
19 information on current benefits and resources available to help overcome the challenges
20 encountered with Army Reserve mobilization and reintegration.
21
22 The Army Reserve successfully launched its Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program. We
23 have coordinated with other military agencies, federal/state/local government agencies,
24 community organizations, and faith-based organizations to provide robust, preventive, proactive

1 programs for Soldiers and their Families. Elements of the program include promoting
2 preparedness through education, conducting effective Family outreach, leveraging available
3 resources, and supporting the All-Volunteer Force. During FY 2009, the Army Reserve
4 executed more than 250 Yellow Ribbon events, serving some 12,000 redeploying Soldiers and
5 12,000 Family members. In interviews conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
6 Soldiers and Family members reported positive experiences with the Army Reserve Yellow
7 Ribbon Reintegration Program.

8 The challenge to the Army Reserve remains to develop, improve, and sustain the
9 mental, spiritual, and emotional health that fosters resilient Soldiers and Families.
10
11 We are moving out aggressively to mitigate the effects of persistent conflict and build a
12 strong, resilient force. Multi-symptom conditions including those signature wounds not visibly
13 apparent (for example: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury
14 (TBI), exist for Soldiers with military service in Southwest Asia. We will work with Health Affairs
15 and the other Services to continue to provide the care necessary for the wounds from the
16 current conflicts.
17
18 We appreciate the resources that Congress has provided to date to further programs
19 such as the new GI Bill and TRICARE. The benefit of TRICARE Reserve Select provides our
20 Soldiers and Families peace of mind knowing that if a Soldier decides to better him/herself
21 career-wise with the skills gained while deployed, medical care will not be a worry if he or she
22 decides to change careers.
23

We are teaming with civilian industry to shape the Army Reserve into America's premier reservoir of shared military-civilian skills and capabilities through our Employer Partnerships programs. Through these mutually beneficial alliances with businesses that share our valuable human capital, we can strengthen Soldier-employees, Families, employers, and communities.

We seek to identify locations where our Soldiers can simultaneously add value to both the civilian workforce and the Army Reserve. This effort ties into our objective of achieving a continuum of service for Soldiers who want the option to transition from active and reserve components, and vice versa, to provide Soldiers flexibility with their career objectives, while allowing the Army Reserve to retain the best talent and critical skills capability.

Enterprise Transformation

Using an enterprise approach to managing our internal processes, we add value to the Army by applying a holistic approach to managing our resources and shape the force into what is beneficial for the Army Reserve and supports the needs of the Army. By "shape the force," I mean taking a fresh approach to how we recruit and retain the best and brightest, and positioning them in the right place, in the right job, and at the right time.

The Army Reserve Enterprise consists of four core management areas: Human Capital, Readiness, Materiel, and Services & Infrastructure. To optimize the enterprise we must: Attract and retain the very best Warrior Citizens to serve our nation (Human Capital), Prepare, train, and equip Soldiers (Readiness); provide our Soldiers with the latest mission ready modular force equipment, (Materiel); provide for the well-being of our Soldiers, Families, Army Civilians, and employers while providing training and unit facilities and secure, redundant communications

1 (Services & Infrastructure). Working together, these core management areas enable the Army
2 Reserve enterprise to realize its ultimate goal: predictable, trained, and ready units - the
3 essential components that define CAPABILITY.
4
5 BRAC
6 We have facility responsibilities at more than 1,100 Reserve Centers and the
7 installations of Fort McCoy, Fort Buchanan, and Fort Hunter-Liggett installations. We also are
8 responsible for significant training areas at Jolliet, Devens Reserve Forces Training Area, and
9 Parks Reserve Forces Training Area. Moving toward completion of the current BRAC cycle of
10 2005, the Army Reserve military construction priority is to complete the remaining projects
11 budgeted at $357 million for FY 2010. In addition to BRA C, we will implement 26 construction
12 projects at a cost of $318 million supporting the transformation of the Army Reserve from a
13 Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. Our construction effort supports the realignment of
14 the field command organizations into Operational Supporting Commands. In FY 2011, the
15 Regional Support Commands will invest $577 million in base operations and $344 million in
16 maintenance and repair of facilities that allows mission accomplishment for the Operational
17 Commands.

18 We are committed to minimizing turbulence to Soldiers and their Families while providing
19 the most effective and efficient trained and ready units and forces to meet world-wide
20 requirements. We must maintain current levels of predictability while making plans to increase
21 it. The Army Force Generation process allows for a structured progression of increased unit
22 readiness over time, and provides the Army recurring access to Army Reserve trained, ready,
23 and cohesive units. While our commitment in Iraq may draw down, the requirement for forces to

commit to other global missions will only increase. In 2010, we will work with Congress to ensure we obtain the necessary resources to sustain a viable Army Force Generation cycle that supports global commitments and new missions.

**Thank you.**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**STATEMENT BY**

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III**
**DIRECTOR OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS**

**FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS**

**ON**

**ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT POSTURE**

**April 27, 2010**

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# STATEMENT BY
# LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III
# DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, and distinguished committee members, I thank you for this opportunity to provide a few remarks on behalf of the outstanding men and women serving in the Air National Guard. I would like to begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Committee for its tremendous support to the Air National Guard. Your work ensures America continues to have a ready and reliable Air National Guard, responsive to our domestic needs and homeland security as well as providing operational capabilities critical to the success of our Total Force in winning the fight overseas.

**America's Exceptional Force, Home and Away**

The Air National Guard anchors the Total Air Force team, providing trained and equipped units and personnel to protect domestic life and property; preserving peace, order, and public safety; and providing interoperable capabilities required for Overseas Contingency Operations. The Air National Guard, therefore, is unique by virtue of serving as both a reserve component of the Total Air Force and as the air component of the National Guard.

Upon founding in 1947, the Air Guard served primarily as a strategic reserve for the U.S. Air Force. Increasingly and dramatically, the Air National Guard has become more of an operational force, fulfilling U.S. Air Force routine and contingency commitments daily. Since 9/11, over 146,000 Guard Airmen have deployed overseas. A snapshot of U.S. forces at any time shows Air Guard members in all corners of the globe supporting joint and coalition forces in mission areas such as security; medical support; civil engineering; air refueling; strike; airlift; and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

By any measure, the Air National Guard is accessible and available to the Combatant Commanders, Air Force and our nation's governors. Currently, the nation

has over 13,000 Air National Guard members deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other overseas regions. At 16 alert sites, three air defense sectors, and Northern Command, 1,200 Guard Airmen vigilantly stand watch over America's skies. Amazingly, 75-percent of our deployed individuals are volunteers, and 60-percent are on their second or third rotations to combat zones. Percentages like these speak volumes about the quality and sense of duty of America's Air National Guard force!

The Air National Guard supports state and local civil authorities with airlift, search and rescue, aerial firefighting, and aerial reconnaissance. In addition, we provide critical capabilities in medical triage and aerial evacuation, civil engineering, infrastructure protection, and hazardous materials response with our Civil Support Teams and our Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs).

In the past year, Air Guard members helped their fellow citizens battle floods, mitigate the aftermath of ice storms, fight wild fires, and provide relief from the devastating effects of a tsunami. Early in the year, Guard members from Kentucky, Arizona, and Missouri responded to debilitating ice storms, which resulted in the largest National Guard call-up in Kentucky's history. Last spring, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota Air National Guard members provided rescue relief and manpower in response to Midwest flooding. In September, the Hawaii Air National Guard sent personnel from their CERFP, a command and control element, and a mortuary affairs team, to American Samoa in response to an 8.4-magnitude earthquake-generated tsunami. These are just a few examples of how the Air Guard provides exceptional expertise, experience, and capabilities to mitigate disasters and their consequences. Within the Total Force, the Air National Guard provides extraordinary value in terms of delivering the most immediately available capability for cost in meeting America's national defense needs. In its domestic role, the Air Guard provides capabilities to support local emergency responders with life and property saving capabilities and expertise in consequence management not usually found elsewhere in the Total Force.

**Best Value in Personnel, Operations, and Infrastructure**

During the past year, the Air National Guard has deployed 18,366 service members to 62 countries and every continent, including Antarctica. The Air National Guard provides a trained, equipped, and ready force for a fraction of the cost. We provide a third of Total Air Force capabilities for less than seven percent of the Total Force budget. In all three areas – personnel, operations, and facilities – the Air Guard provides the "Best Value for America."

A key Air National Guard efficiency is the part-time/full-time force structure mix. The predominantly part-time (traditional) force can mobilize quickly when needed for state disaster response missions, homeland defense, or when we need to take the fight overseas.

We have the ability to maintain a stable force with considerably fewer personnel moves than the Regular Air Force, which is a critical factor in our cost-effectiveness. Traditional National Guard members cost little, unless on paid duty status.

The Air National Guard is an operational reserve with surge potential, with 2,200 mobilized and 5,700 volunteering per day. If this force were full-time active duty, the military personnel budget would be $7.62 billion. Air National Guard military personnel pay in FY09, including military technician pay, was $4.77 billion, for a yearly cost savings of $2.85 billion, or a daily cost savings of $7.8 million.

Whether compared to another major Air Force command, or even to the militaries of other countries, the Air National Guard is an extraordinary value. In direct comparison with the militaries of France and Italy, for example, our Air National Guard members cost only $76,961 per member, while the bills of those countries respectively run to $128,791 and $110,787 per member. Further, compared to the US Air Force, cost per Air Guard member is less than a fifth of that of the Regular Air Force. Comparisons such as these illustrate well the cost savings realized with an operational reserve possessing surge potential.

Operational savings are due to the Air National Guard's experienced force and lean operating methods. An examination of the Air National Guard's F-16 maintenance by Rand Corporation last year highlighted the ability of our maintenance personnel to

generate double the amount of flying hours in a one-to-one comparison of full-time equivalents.

**Air National Guard Training**

As an operational force, the Air National Guard trains to the same standards as the Regular Air Force. The reliability and readiness of our personnel allows for a seamless, interchangeable capability for the Air Expeditionary Force and retains a ready force for our governors to call on when our communities are threatened by natural or man-made disasters.

Over the past several years, our Air Force has undergone a drastic transformation in an effort to sustain its contribution to today's contingencies while securing the capabilities needed to protect our nation from tomorrow's adversaries. This has placed a significant strain on our training pipelines and created backlogs for technical schools in some of our high-demand specialties.

One of the best examples would be our Tactical Air Command and Control specialists. These specialists are increasingly in demand in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of Tactical Air Control Parties, advising our ground commanders and directing air power for them in tactical situations. This critical area is currently 60-percent manned (195 of 324 on board) due in large part to the demands of the career field and the intensity of initial skills training. We face a serious challenge in getting training seats for these Tactical Air Command and Control specialists. In fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, the Air National Guard utilized 100-percent of its allocated training slots, yet the allocations are far below our requirements. Our Air National Guard Tactical Air Command and Control community has stepped in to help improve the training throughput; almost tripling training capacity in fiscal year 2010 and we are exploring other avenues to provide assistance.

Other skills such as aircraft maintenance, crew chiefs, and structures and pavements specialties, are experiencing a backlog of training slots. While we have made some progress in these areas, we expect the problem to persist until we get beyond the numerous aircraft conversions, mission and force structure changes.

Some recent shortages have been partially resolved with the help of the Air Force, but we continue to face hundreds of shortfalls in training slots for a number of reasons. First, I believe the Regular Air Force and Air Education and Training Command, despite their sincere attempts to make out-of-cycle adjustments and redistribute resources among the Total Force partners, are experiencing similar backlogs of their own. Increases in Air Force manning last fiscal year, the growth in emerging mission areas, and the increase in the course length of Basic Military Training from 6 to 8 ½ weeks have compounded the problem. Second, this problem is exacerbated by issues unique to the Guard, such as forecasting of requirements in a decentralized force management system more complex than the Regular Air Force system.

Last year we were able to work with Air Education and Training Command to secure 600 additional Basic Military Training slots for the Air National Guard. This helped immensely with the training backlog in this area, but we are still met with a persistent technical school pipeline problem. Despite the challenges, we will continue to find creative ways to address training resource management by offering various pipeline options to meet state mission needs, and ensure the Air National Guard remains ready.

**Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention**

Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention programs play a critical role in supporting today's fight and how we posture our force for the future. The commitment of our field commanders and their exceptional recruiters are key factors in recruiting successes. Their partnership with the National Guard Bureau has enabled us to remove barriers that traditionally prevented the ability to meet end strength. The Air National Guard continues to build on that success and has focused its efforts to target critical needs.

As of April 2010, Air National Guard end strength is 108,403. The challenge as we move forward is to strike a delicate balance of remaining close to end strength while strengthening "effective" recruiting. We show troubling signs in specific areas of officer recruiting (currently, 1,500 short) and critically manned mission areas including Health

Care Professionals, Chaplains, Engineers, Intelligence, and Mobility aviators. To compensate for lagging prior service numbers, the Air National Guard increased its emphasis on the non-prior service market. This required increases in advertising to the non-prior service market through radio, theatre, print media and web sites, as well as additional recruiters, community presence with store-front offices and additional advertising dollars. The continued support of the Air Force, Department of Defense, and Congress will undoubtedly shape the foundation of their success.

The quality of Air National Guard recruits has not declined and their retention rate remains strong at 96.9-percent. The Air National Guard saves on average $62,000 in training cost for every qualified member retained or recruited. Our focus in this area allows us to retain critical skills lost from the active component and save valuable training dollars.

In 2009, through the use of our 14 In-Service Air National Guard recruiters strategically placed at active duty bases, the Air National Guard garnered approximately 896 confirmed accessions of a total of 5,309 accessions. The bonuses and incentive programs are a key component to that success.

Our Air National Guard incentive program is a critical component in our Recruiting and Retention efforts and serves to motivate and support manning requirements in units with skills that are severely or chronically undermanned. It is established to encourage the reenlistment of qualified and experienced personnel. Stable funding for the Air National Guard Recruiting and Retention program is critical to our success.

Regarding incentives, I'd like to make an interesting point concerning the Tactical Air Command and Control specialists I referred to earlier. In a recent testimony before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, I introduced a traditional Guard member with the Washington Air National Guard, who recently returned from a fifth deployment overseas in Afghanistan. This Airman is a tactical air control party journeyman who directed close air support in Kunar Province.

He led 19 close air support missions for nine operations, spent more than 135 hours outside the wire on combat patrol, and successfully prosecuted 18 precision strikes on enemy positions that saved American lives under fire.

In the Air National Guard this skill set is in such great demand we offer a re-enlistment bonus of $15,000, but only for re-enlistments of six years. If the same skill set were to re-enlist in the Regular Air Force, it would qualify for a $90,000 bonus to re-enlist for three years.

This is just one example of how critical the incentive and bonus program is to Air National Guard recruiting.

**Airman and Family Readiness Programs**

In focusing on the readiness of our Airmen we must also focus on the most important people in their lives—their families. The Air National Guard is a Wing-centered organization. Our 92 Wing Family Program Coordinators around the nation are at the center of our efforts to ensure our Airmen and their families receive the support they need.

In past year we were successful in having these coordinator positions upgraded from GS-9 to GS-11. However, we still may not have enough resources devoted to this area for a force with our operational pace. Our coordinators are one-deep positions for us, so most of the effort is done through part-time support.

This is one area where we differ dramatically from our Regular Air Force counterparts. The Air National Guard does not have Airman and Family Readiness Centers as they have on active duty bases. In a culture that does not believe in saying "no," our program coordinators have more and more piled onto their plates, thereby threatening the overall quality of service. If the Air National Guard maintains its pace as an operational force, we will need to increase our investment in this critical area. Programs like Operation Military Child Care have been very helpful, so we should continue to fund them, and improve and add others. Also, military and community partners like Military OneSource, Military Family Life Consultants, and Operation Military Kids, just to name a few, are extremely beneficial in meeting the needs of Guard

Airmen, especially while deployed. Youth Development Camps like Air Force Teen Aviation, Air Force Space Camp, and the Air Force Reserve/Air National Guard Leadership Summits are huge successes as well. Additionally, this year we are conducting training such as Community Healing and Response Training, which is part of the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, and essential in our suicide prevention efforts.

For the Air National Guard, we believe maintaining strong family support programs are critical to ensuring the overall health of our force and our Guard Airmen.

**Training Facilities and Military Construction**

Training and personnel readiness are also impacted by facilities and equipment. The Air National Guard has four designated Combat Readiness Training Centers in Alpena, Michigan; Savannah, Georgia; Gulfport, Mississippi; and Volk Field, Wisconsin. These as well as several other specialty training sites operated by the Air National Guard allow us to provide integrated, realistic training environments critical to the readiness of our Total Force. We are always prepared and willing to offer additional training venues and opportunities to ensure our Total Force and the Air National Guard remain reliable and ready at all times.

In terms of Military Construction and Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Committee for recognizing the impact facilities has on training and supporting the budget request over the years. Last year, the budget request included $128 million for Air National Guard Military Construction. In addition to fully funding that request, House and Senate Military Construction appropriations conferees agreed to include in the fiscal year 2010 bill a unique "Guard and Reserve Initiative." This measure provided $200 million in additional funding to address urgent unfunded requirements in reserve component military construction. The flexibility of these additional funds was extremely helpful and allowed us to fund emerging critical project needs which otherwise might have been severely delayed or perhaps lost altogether. We are grateful to the Congress for this additional help for our reserve components.

We are equally appreciative of the $75.8 million Congress included as part of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. We have already begun putting this money to work in 20 different communities around the country. It is our view that all military construction funding for the Air National Guard is a direct stimulus to the American economy precisely because the Air National Guard is embedded in over 177 communities across our great nation.

The fiscal year 2011 budget request addresses critical requirements in recapitalizing our plants and facilities. Due to operational requirements of recent years, the Air Force has been accepting risk in infrastructure to invest in other areas of vital importance. The Air National Guard currently has over $14 billion in physical plant replacement value. With the average age of our facilities exceeding 35-years old, our Sustainment, Reconstruction, and Modernization has been critically important.

**Equipment Readiness**

Air National Guard equipment readiness presents greater challenges as long-term costs in operating and maintaining older aircraft continue to rise due to more frequent repairs, fluctuations in fuel prices, and manpower requirements. The cost of aircraft maintenance continues to rise significantly as we struggle to extend the life of our aging fleet. These rising maintenance costs are not solely confined to aircraft.

One example would be the Air Support Operations community. These activities are in the beginning stages of modernization, but continue to experience incompatibilities and lag behind their active duty counter parts in critical mission areas. The continual technological advances in vehicles resistant to improvised explosive devices have made the selection of a standardized tactical vehicle extremely difficult and the lack of a decision has led to a non-standard fleet. Shortfalls with the primary communications system leave many units unable to fill all mission requirements in support of Army mission areas. Lastly, industry-wide shortages of approved body armor have all organizations scrambling to equip their Tactical Air Command and Control Airmen with the best available protective equipment before deploying.

Some of our most critical aircraft modernization needs continue to be improved voice/data communications for enhanced situational awareness, self-protection equipment (such as the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures System), missile warning systems, upgrades to advanced targeting pods to give them fourth generation capabilities, and radar systems to distinguish small targets from friendly aircraft in a dense air traffic environment.

For example, to maintain the F-15's air-to-air advantage in the beyond-visual-range arena, we are modernizing the fleet with the Active Electronically Scanned Array radar to provide the capability to detect, track, and kill asymmetric threats, such as drones. This state-of-the-art radar is flexible enough to be continuously upgraded, allowing the Air National Guard operated F-15s to meet future threats and new mission sets that were not previously possible. The Active Electronically Scanned Array radar completed flight test, and fielding has begun; the first operational Air National Guard operated aircraft flew at the beginning of April. This upgrade allows Air National Guard units to provide constant 24/7 Homeland Defense vigilance, while simultaneously seamlessly integrating into the Air and Space Expeditionary Force construct to meet wartime and Combatant Commander taskings.

The age of the Air National Guard aircraft fleet is also a concern. Aircraft and equipment in both the regular Air Force and the Air National Guard are quickly wearing out. The average age of Air National Guard aircraft is now over 26-years, with KC-135s being the oldest at 50-years. The high operational tempo since 1990 has added flying hours that have accelerated this aging process.

Modernization of our equipment and training platforms is based on capabilities needed by the Air Force. As the Air National Guard moves increasingly into the worlds of command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, remotely-operated systems, and cyberspace, the process has expanded to include expert warfighters in these areas.

**Closing Remarks**

Changing the force structure and orientation of units away from airborne platforms to remotely-piloted systems and capabilities is a difficult, yet necessary transition. Our nation's Air National Guard is definitely up to the challenge, and with the continued support of the Committee and Congress in ensuring our personnel, training, and equipment are prepared for the fight—*Guarding America and Defending Freedom*.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. On behalf of the men and women of the Air National Guard I thank you for the genuine concern you have shown in training and equipping them to protect our citizens and defend our country at home and overseas. I am grateful for your support and look forward to working with you as we face the challenges of the 21st century.

1 **STATEMENT BY**

2

3 **MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER**

4 **ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

5

6 **BEFORE THE**

7

8 **HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

9 **SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS**

10

11 **FIRST SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS**

12

13 **ON**

14

15 **FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING FUNDING**

16 **APRIL 27, 2010**

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21 NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
22 THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
23 STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER
24 ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
25

1 **Opening Remarks**

2 Chairman Ortiz, Ranking Member Forbes, distinguished members of the
3 subcommittee; I am honored to represent more than 361,000 Citizen-Soldiers in
4 the Army National Guard. As I speak, 52,807 of our Soldiers are serving in
5 harm's way for this Nation. The sacrifice of those Soldiers, their Families, and
6 employers is something we must acknowledge and appreciate.

7 The National Guard of today is dramatically different from the one I joined
8 over four decades ago. The last 8 years have seen the Guard transform to an
9 operational force. The enablers for the Army National Guard have been provided
10 and sustained by Congressional initiatives. We thank you for your continued
11 support. Today I would like to address the status of our readiness.

12 **ARNG Readiness**

13 As all of you know, the Army National Guard has had a significant
14 evolution in the last eight years. The U. S. Army uses Army National Guard
15 (ARNG) units as an operational force. Units mobilized and deployed from
16 different states and territories provided support to overseas contingency
17 operations and to the Homeland Defense mission. Our units maintain high levels
18 of readiness achieving outstanding results in both state and federal missions.
19 The pillars of our readiness include personnel and equipment readiness. We
20 continue to emphasize and improve the quality of our force as we maintain our
21 assigned strength at our authorized level of 358,200 strong. We also continue to
22 strengthen our combat, maintenance, aviation, simulation, and qualification
23 training centers.

1 **Modular Force Conversion, Rebalance, and Transformation**

2 The Army National Guard has made significant progress modernizing and
3 converting to an operational force. As a result of Total Army Analysis, the Army
4 National Guard structure was expanded to include 114 brigades. This includes
5 28 brigade combat teams, 38 functional brigades, and 48 multi-functional
6 brigades across the 54 states and territories. The Army National Guard has
7 transformed along with the Active Army from a division-centric force to a more
8 flexible brigade-centric force and is restructuring to create units that are more
9 stand-alone and alike while enhancing full-spectrum capabilities.

10 **Combat Training Centers**

11 The Army National Guard hosted two planning conferences to prepare
12 brigades for future participation at both the National Training Center (NTC) and
13 the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Additionally, more than 3,000
14 Soldiers, representing three brigade combat teams, participated in the Brigade
15 Command and Battle Staff Training Program. One ARNG division of more than
16 1,000 Soldiers participated in a Battle Command Training Program Warfighter
17 exercise at the Battle Command Training Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

18 **National Maintenance Training Center**

19 The National Maintenance Training Center (NMTC) at Camp Dodge in
20 Iowa serves as one of the National Guard Bureau's National Sustainment
21 Centers of Excellence. In FY09, the NMTC trained more than 3,000 Soldiers
22 from 28 states. The NMTC provides collective level technical maintenance and
23 quartermaster training to component repair companies, field maintenance

1 companies, support maintenance companies, and maintenance platoons that are
2 located in the forward support company. Soldiers train with actual theater current
3 end-items and the components from the end-items. The NMTC also trained 11
4 brigade combat teams in FY09. The brigade support battalion and combat
5 sustainment support battalion commander and staff receive training on military
6 decision-making process planning, operation/operational order development, and
7 operations orders execution.

8 **Army National Guard Aviation Training Sites**

9 The four Army National Guard aviation training sites (AATS) provide both
10 ARNG-unique aviation training and augment the Army's overall aviation training
11 capacity to meet both surge and continuing training needs. The eastern facility is
12 in Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; the western facility is in Marana, Arizona;
13 the fixed-wing facility is in Bridgeport, West Virginia; and the high-altitude facility
14 is in Eagle, Colorado. At each location, instructors provide a wide range of
15 training for ARNG, Army Reserve, and Active Army aviators to include graduate-
16 level flight training, military occupation specialty/additional skill identifier-
17 producing courses, enlisted professional development courses, and training in
18 support of foreign military sales. During FY09, the aviation training sites trained
19 1,591 aviators and 1,123 enlisted crew members. The AATS performed over
20 15,000 flight hours during FY09 with an expected increase in FY10 due to the
21 continued fielding of the LUH-72 Lakota and the new fielding of the AH-64D
22 Longbow Apache.

23 **Innovative Readiness Training**

1 During FY09, the Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) program provided
2 excellent real-world training for Soldiers from more than 15 states, often in a joint
3 environment, while improving support to communities. The IRT is funded
4 through the states' training dollars for Annual Training and also through
5 Congressional authority to use up to $30 millionof Operation and Maintenance,
6 Defense-wide appropriations for training activities that support organizations
7 outside of the Department of Defense.

8 **Exportable Combat Training Capability**

9 Army National Guard units train at levels consistent with the Army Force
10 Generation (ARFORGEN) model to prepare for operational missions and reduce
11 post-mobilization training time. In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense
12 restricted Reserve Component unit mobilizations to 400 days, including 30 days
13 of post-mobilization leave and required post-mobilization training time.
14 Consequently, many training tasks previously conducted during post-mobilization
15 periods are now executed during pre-mobilization training. Additionally, any
16 training enablers required to support the restructured training strategy (for
17 example, additional training days, training support structures, or training facilities)
18 and accomplish pre-mobilization tasks are funded through the Overseas
19 Contingency Operations supplemental. In order to reduce post-mobilization
20 training time, the Army National Guard continues to develop the eXportable
21 Combat Training Capability (XCTC), along with associated training devices and
22 range complexes. The XCTC also provides critical, culminating company-level
23 collective training events, within a contemporary operating environment. This

1 combat training incorporates current tactics, techniques, procedures, and
2 theater-specific lessons learned during pre-mobilization training. XCTC provides
3 a means to certify ARNG units on company-level collective training tasks and
4 demonstrated battle staff proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC
5 incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training
6 technologies (deployable force-on-force instrumented range systems) to fully
7 instrument the training area, unit equipment and Soldiers, which facilitates two-
8 dimensional and three-dimensional after action reviews of training, as well as
9 video playback of the actual XCTC training exercise. Finally, Commanders and
10 Soldiers can see what occurred during the training exercise from every
11 perspective and share from the experience, further enhancing the training
12 experience and facilitating the development of unit level policies and procedures
13 critical to Soldier safety and success. In 2009, two brigade combat teams were
14 trained using the eXportable Combat Training Capability model for pre-
15 mobilization training, allowing more than 6,000 Soldiers to be trained. In the
16 future, the ARNG will expand this capability to train the critical requirements of
17 252 companies per year or approximately 26,400 Soldiers.

18 **Pre-Mobilization Training Assistance**

19 In 2007, in accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance directing the
20 Army National Guard to test new pre-mobilization training concepts and
21 techniques, the Army National Guard implemented the Pre-Mobilization Training
22 Assistance Element (PTAE) program. The result is an innovative and proven
23 capability that facilitates training certification to enable the reduction of post-

1 mobilization training days. The PTAE program is an enduring requirement that
2 directly supports the ARFORGEN model and is considered a key component of
3 the transformation from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. The PTAE
4 program provides an impartial and unbiased evaluation of home station training
5 to assist the Adjutants General with providing certified and ready forces. This
6 program enhances the ability of the Army National Guard to self-train and self-
7 certify pre-mobilization training.

8 **Battle Command Training Center-Leavenworth**

9 The Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP) provides
10 battle command and staff training, training support, and publications to Army
11 National Guard Soldiers and units, at each of its three facilities: Fort Indiantown
12 Gap, Pennsylvania, Camp Dodge, Iowa, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas or via
13 mobile training teams. The BCTCP provides training prior to mobilization to
14 prepare for full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
15 and multinational environment.

16 BCTC Dodge provides individual and sustainment training for Battle
17 Command systems. Distributed learning is provided using a server capable of
18 supporting 1,250 Soldiers simultaneously and virtualization technology to bring
19 the Battle Command systems to the Soldier. BCTC Dodge conducts resident
20 and home station training using mobile training teams.

21 BCTC Fort Indiantown Gap provides digital training environments
22 combining individual training and live, virtual, constructive, and gaming
23 (L-V-C-G) methodologies into collective training events. Live training is provided

1 with access to all range and maneuver facilities at Fort Indiantown Gap. The
2 Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) Entity
3 Resolution Federation constructive stimulation and simulation package provides
4 digital training capability for company-size to brigade-size units.
5 BCTC-Leavenworth (BCTC-LVN), a federal field operating agency of the
6 ARNG, consists of Battalion Staff Training Teams (BSTTs), which provide mobile
7 training teams to support home station battalion battle staff training Military
8 Decision Making Process-related staff exercises (STAFFEXs), simulations
9 exercises (SIMEXs), and the Training and Analysis Feedback Team (TAFT).
10 The Battle Command systems support team provides training, including
11 fielding set mobile training teams and over-the-shoulder exercise support as well
12 as supporting brigade and division-level Warfighter exercises, and seminars.
13 Infrastructure and training support is provided to ARNG units participating in
14 Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), the Brigade Combat Team Full
15 Spectrum Exercise (BCT FSX); two division seminars, two division Warfighter
16 exercises, and battle staff training for 10 Brigade Combat Teams. Training for 10
17 functional/sustainment brigades is conducted annually.
18 In FY09 the BCTP trained 10,500 personnel from 290 units at over 300
19 events at its facilities and via MTTs. This training significantly enhanced the
20 battle command capabilities of ARNG Soldiers, staffs, and commanders, better
21 preparing them for mobilization and deployment.
22 The keystone in the BCTP is the Distributed Battle Simulation Program
23 which provides a regional mission support capability enabling home station

1 training for ARNG units. The Distributed Battle Simulation Program is a
2 structured program that provides training enablers and a training infrastructure
3 designed to accommodate ARNG unique training requirements and
4 environments. Current BCTP funding provides Distributed Battle Simulation
5 Program support to units within 2.5 years of the Available phase of ARFORGEN.
6 Support to units in other ARFORGEN phases is provided as resources become
7 available.

8 **Professional Education Center**

9 The Laverne E. Weber Professional Education Center (PEC), located at
10 Camp Robinson in North Little Rock, Arkansas, is a centrally located training
11 center for the Army National Guard. PEC has been a full-service training and
12 conferencing facility since 1974. At the heart of the education center are seven
13 training centers: Human Resources and Readiness Training Center; Information
14 Technology Training Center; Installations, Logistics, and Environmental Training
15 Center; Organizational Readiness Training Center; Strength Maintenance
16 Training Center; Resource Management Training Center; and the Education
17 Support Center. All of these training centers continued to perform their goals and
18 objectives for another successful year; a few of these centers have had some
19 extraordinary accomplishments in FY09.

20 **- Information Technology Training Center**

21 Modernization and transformation of the Army has resulted in a greatly
22 increased requirement for Soldiers trained as information technology (IT)
23 specialists, military occupational specialty (MOS) 25B. At the end of FY09, the

1 Army National Guard had more than 3,000 Soldiers who required this training.
2 To help alleviate this shortage, the Arkansas National Guard Regional Training
3 Institute, with the assistance of the Information Technology Training Center at the
4 Professional Education Center, stood up an information technology specialist
5 training program. This training is accredited by the U.S. Army Signal School at
6 Fort Gordon, Georgia. Utilizing the Arkansas National Guard Regional Training
7 Institute school structure and PEC's equipment and experience, the two
8 organizations trained more than 40 Soldiers in IT (MOS 25B) during FY09 and
9 are on track to train 100 Soldiers during FY10.
10 **- Installations, Logistics, and Environmental Training Center**
11 The Installations, Logistics, and Environmental Training Center attracted
12 more than 10,000 students in FY09 to resident, new equipment training and
13 distance learning courses. Programs of instruction for 75 courses included
14 Standard Army Management Information Systems, Geographic Information
15 Systems, Transportation of Hazardous Materiel, Support Operations Course,
16 Electronic Security Systems certification, Officer Professional Development,
17 Chief Facilities Management Office certification, and food service. Classes were
18 one or two weeks in duration and designed to train the most critical tasks
19 associated with specific duty positions.
20 **- GED Plus Program**
21 During its first year (in FY07), the General Educational Development
22 (GED) Plus Program trained 709 Soldiers, with a 73% success rate. In FY08 and
23 in FY09, the program trained 2,400 Soldiers with a 95% success rate each year,

1 which is significantly higher than the 69% national average success rate
2 achieved by typical civilian GED programs. In FY09, the National Guard also
3 began construction of an $18 million GED PLUS educational complex on the
4 PEC campus. Once complete, the GED PLUS Program will increase training to
5 more than 7,500 Soldiers per year.
6 In FY09, the Army National Guard began sending some Soldiers directly
7 from GED PLUS to basic training, without returning to their home stations; this
8 practice will continue into FY10. This will ensure that all GED PLUS graduates
9 attend basic training and improve the military occupational specialty qualification
10 rate for this group of Soldiers.
11 **- The Patriot Academy**
12 The Patriot Academy, a pilot program initiative, based at Muscatatuck
13 Urban Training Center in Butlerville, Indiana, enrolls qualifying initial entry
14 Soldiers that have not completed their high school education and provides them
15 with dedicated instruction to complete their studies toward earning a high school
16 diploma. This program is open to recruits across the nation and is the only
17 program of its kind administered by the military.
18 Soldiers/students receive full-time military pay and benefits as they
19 receive their education and military training. The Patriot Academy stood up
20 operations in June, 2009, with an initial enrollment of 46 Soldiers/students and
21 staff/cadre strength of 30. The Patriot Academy is designed to grow to a
22 throughput of 500 Soldiers/students per year.

1 The Patriot Academy received its Indiana educational accreditation in
2 September, 2009, in order to award a state of Indiana high school diploma. The
3 impact is that recruiters can now enlist Soldiers as tier 1 Soldiers and thus open
4 more opportunities throughout their military career. From a civilian perspective,
5 these students will be able to move into the work force and receive a higher
6 quality job.

7 **Training Ranges and Areas**

8 The Sustainable Range Program includes the Range and Training Land
9 Program and the Integrated Training Area Management Program. Together they
10 provide the necessary support for the operation and maintenance of ranges and
11 maneuver land. These programs fund support of operations and training on
12 approximately 2 million acres of land, 2,500 ranges, and more than 100 Army
13 National Guard Training Centers. As the focal point for pre-deployment training,
14 the ARNG maintains 31 major training centers in 27 states and 1 territory. In
15 FY09, the Army National Guard also invested in major range construction
16 projects in Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas,
17 Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming in support of the ARNG Army
18 Force Generation range strategy. At the end of FY09, the Army National Guard
19 had approximately 200 ranges that still required upgrades to meet Army
20 standards. Part of this investment continued to be the development of an
21 Advanced Urban Training Capability at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center
22 (MUTC), a sub-installation of Camp Atterbury, Indiana.

1 Muscatatuck is a self-contained training environment. This 974-acre site,
2 managed by the Indiana National Guard, is evolving into a full-immersion
3 contemporary urban training center. Units training at MUTC have access to a
4 180-acre reservoir and urban infrastructure consisting of 68 major buildings
5 including a school, hospital, dormitories, light industrial structures, single-family
6 dwellings, a dining facility, and administrative buildings totaling approximately
7 850,000 square feet of floor space; 46 of these buildings are instrumented to
8 increase the training experience and allow a greater and more efficient
9 evaluation of the training scenario. The training area also includes an extensive
10 underground utility tunnel system and more than nine miles of roads. The
11 buildings are concentrated in a tight geographical area which provides a dense
12 urban training area. The center is a consortium of governmental, public, and
13 private entities that pool their unique capabilities to provide the most realistic
14 training experience possible. Training can be tailored to replicate both foreign
15 and domestic scenarios and can be used by various civilian and military
16 organizations. More than 75,000 trainees from military, government, and private
17 agencies used the facilities in FY09; including Army National Guard troops,
18 firefighters, police officers, and other first responders.

19 **Individual Training**

20 The Army National Guard continues to plan, program, budget, and
21 execute schools funding for each state, the three territories, and the District of
22 Columbia based on the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT).
23 ARPRINT school costs are calculated based on the Individual Training Resource

1 Model and distributed to states according to the Army Training Requirements and
2 Resources System Funding Allocation Model with guidance from the ARNG
3 Directorate. In FY09, initial skills were funded at the highest levels since FY04 to
4 support duty military occupational skill qualification (DMOSQ). With the support
5 of supplemental funds, more than $522 million was allocated to the states and
6 territories to train Soldiers, allowing the Training Division to exceed the DMOSQ
7 goal of 85% by 4.5% (to 89.5%). The number of qualified Army National Guard
8 Soldiers is up 10,500 from a year ago. The 35,000 backlog of non-DMOSQ
9 Soldiers requiring reclassification in different or new military occupational skills
10 was brought in line at manageable levels with sustainment levels being
11 programmed for FY10 and beyond. The proactive management and involvement
12 at all levels within the states and U.S. territories proves that the proper resource
13 levels do equate to measured success.

14 **Army National Guard Distributed Learning Program**

15 The Army National Guard (ARNG) Distributed Learning Program currently
16 operates and sustains 339 fixed Distributed Learning Classrooms and related
17 distributed learning infrastructure throughout the states and U.S. territories.
18 Established in 1995, the ARNG Distributed Learning Program serves as a vital
19 component of the ARNG's operational training capability for meeting
20 ARFORGEN reset and pre- and post-mobilization training requirements in
21 addition to augmenting Command and Control capabilities during exercises and
22 disaster response.

1 The ARNG Distributed Learning Program is embarking on an ambitious
2 initiative to refresh the existing end-of-life Distributed Learning Classrooms and
3 related IT infrastructure with more agile, mobile technologies to continue the
4 ARNG's leadership in providing our soldiers access to cutting edge technology
5 and training.

6 **Access to the ARNG**

7 The Army has determined that it must rely on an Operational Reserve to
8 meet the demands of the Army in today's environment and will need to continue
9 to rely on an Operational Reserve to meet expected near term demands of the
10 Nation. The Soldiers in the Army National Guard also want to be part of an
11 operational force. Our Soldiers have each had to make a decision to enlist,
12 reenlist, or leave the Army National Guard during the current conflict, knowing
13 they will more than likely deploy at least once in their initial period of service. The
14 Army National Guard continues to meet its authorized end strength of 358,200.
15 Our current reenlistment rate is 116%. As long as our Soldiers are doing
16 meaningful missions and provided resources such as equipment and training
17 facilities to accomplish those missions, Army National Guard Soldiers continue to
18 be an operational part of the National Defense solution.

19 The Army National Guard is accessible and has met every request for
20 forces to date. A number of authorities exist that permit the Executive Branch to
21 access the Reserve Components. The Reserve organizations provide significant
22 capability to the Department of Defense at a very cost effective rate. The Army
23 with Congressional support has invested a significant amount to bring up the

1 readiness of the Army National Guard. It is important to maintain the capabilities
2 of that investment. The Army National Guard is better equipped, trained and
3 ready than it has ever been in its history. The 12-month mobilization policy
4 enacted by the Secretary of Defense goes a long way in protecting the Reserve
5 Component Soldiers and allowing more predictability for mobilizations. This is
6 key to our Soldiers. Our Nation was built on the strong shoulders of our state
7 militias and the Reserve Components link back to the communities we serve.
8 The Army National Guard has provided over 300 thousand Soldiers to
9 Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. At the height of the Operation
10 Iraqi Freedom surge when the Army National Guard had over 90 thousand
11 mobilized or deployed overseas, more than 50 thousand others responded to the
12 support Hurricanes Katrina and Rita recovery efforts.

13 **Closing Remarks**

14 The Army National Guard will continue supporting the U.S. Army's full
15 spectrum requirements. As an operational force we need to maintain our
16 readiness level providing fully manned, equipped and trained ready units to meet
17 combatant command requirements in a recurrent predictable cycle and able to
18 respond to domestic missions. We should field our units with modern equipment
19 on par with the Active Component to maintain interoperability on the battlefield
20 and for domestic support missions. We need continued support from the
21 Congress to properly maintain our readiness levels and to be able to maintain
22 ready units in support of both federal and state missions. Our goal is to achieve

1 full spectrum readiness for Army National Guard units and full deployment
2 readiness upon mobilization.
3 I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and invite your questions and
4 comments.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

April 27, 2010

## QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. You have been quoted in the press calling for as much as $1 billion in additional funding over the next five years in order to maintain the "operational" status of the Army Reserve. Is that still your view?

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. We are increasing funding for training time and equipment sets so that we can fund the train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model anticipating that the Army Reserve and Army National Guard will continue deploying every fifth year for sustained conflict. We are increasing this capacity even as we begin a massive drawdown of deployed Reserve forces in Iraq this year and Afghanistan next year. What will happen with this increased capacity after Iraq and Afghanistan?

General STULTZ. Given the fact that there will be a drawdown and Army will continue with train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model, the Army Reserve anticipates our increased operational capacity will be applied towards expanded Institutional Support missions, Domestic Support Operations (CCMRF), OCONUS Domestic Support Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events.

Mr. REYES. In 2008, the Air Force stated its requirement for fighter aircraft at approximately 2,200; this year, the Air Force reduced this requirement to 2,000. Previous witnesses from DOD and the Air Force have stated that this reduction is made possible, in part, because traditional fighter missions may be pushed to UAVs. Is this a realistic assertion concerning ASA missions? What ASA missions could be accomplished by UAVs?

General WYATT. Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) may have a role in the future of homeland defense, but not in the sense that a traditional manned fighter performs in the current environment. Our current RPA capabilities are best suited for surveillance and targeting fixed or slow moving ground targets. Our increased use of RPA capabilities has allowed us to transfer the other traditional requirements from fighters to these assets; however, the dynamic environment of ASA does not fit as one of those traditional mission sets.

Mr. REYES. I understand that the Air National Guard and Air Reserve fly the overwhelming majority of Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) missions in defense of the homeland. I also understand that you fly these missions with aging F–15 and F–16 aircraft which are nearing the end of their service. In light of continuing delays in the F–35, are you concerned with your ability to continue ASA missions? Do you have concerns about the apparent tension between planned aircraft retirements and the fielding of new aircraft to the Air Guard and Reserve?

General WYATT. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee and to highlight the significant role the Air National Guard (ANG) plays in providing for our Nation's homeland defense. The ANG operates 16 of the 18 Operation Noble Eagle ground alert locations. Many of these sites are operated by units equipped with some of the oldest aircraft in the Air Force (AF) inventory.

The AF has recently reassured Congress that defense of the homeland remains DOD's highest priority mission and that the AF will continue to steadfastly support Operation Noble Eagle through the Total Force concept as it has since 9/11. The ANG concurs with the AF assessment that under FY11 programmatic assumptions, along with small investments in the F–16 Block 30 fleet sustainment, the impact on the ANG Homeland Defense missions are minimal through the FYDP. Aggressive management of the F–35 program combined with 4th generation modernization and service life extension programs are being reviewed to reduce risk outside the FYDP. While I cannot speak to any F–35 program delays, the AF has acknowledged that additional 4th generation aircraft will become available to recapitalize older ANG fighters as the F–35 is fielded. We continue to work closely with the AF to ensure the ANG is a part of this process and included in any recapitalization plans.

Mr. REYES. We are increasing funding for training time and equipment sets so that we can fund the train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model anticipating that the

Army Reserve and Army National Guard will continue deploying every fifth year for sustained conflict. We are increasing this capacity even as we begin a massive drawdown of deployed Reserve forces in Iraq this year and Afghanistan next year. What will happen with this increased capacity after Iraq and Afghanistan?

General CARPENTER. The same capacity built over the course of the present conflict will be sustained, rather than increased, through the funding of the Guard and Reserves as an operational force. This sustained readiness level will maintain the National Guard's ability to continue the same capability to respond to both overseas and domestic requirements.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the DOD "requires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force" and that "our nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth." The train-mobilize-deploy-reset-train model (Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN,) is the result of this initiative.

Over the past eight years, the Guard and Reserves have made sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The additional funding for training time and equipment sets will allow the Guard and Reserve to sustain the Operational Readiness that has been built while supporting the current conflicts. Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledges that "using the National Guard and Reserves in this way will lower overall personnel and operating costs . . . "

Mr. REYES. How much less dedicated pre-deployment collective training at the brigade level do Reserve and Guard units receive than their active duty counterparts?

General CARPENTER.

Reserves:

The Army is unable to provide sufficient Live-Virtual-Constructive operational environment training experiences for Army Reserve CS and CSS forces. The Army Reserve has developed the Combat Support Training Center (CSTC) program to meet this requirement prior to mobilization station training. Army Reserve is synchronizing and integrating with Army this capability with its Combat Training Center and home station opportunities (e.g. CASCOM's Command Post Exercise – Sustainment) to off-set this deficit. The CSTC program is currently resourced by Overseas Contingency Operations funding. If the Reserve Components were no longer funded for this pre-mobilization training capability, more post-mobilization training time would be required to meet the same standard as their active duty counterparts.

Guard:

Active duty units train to brigade level proficiency while the Army National Guard trains to company level proficiency with staffs trained to level organized. The factors that limit our capability to attain company level proficiency have been tied to chronic under funding of our operational tempo accounts. Shortfalls in base training programs to include operational tempo accounts have been masked by the use of overseas contingency funds.

During the three year active duty Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle a unit is expected to receive two Battle Command Warfighter exercises and two Combat Training Center rotations (like the National Training Center). The Army National Guard five year ARFORGEN model only provides for one Battle Command Warfighter exercise and one Combat Training Center rotation. Currently, only brigade combat teams that are conducting full-spectrum operations are scheduled for Combat Training Center rotations.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL

Mr. KISSELL. Are there any concerns for recruitment and retention of Reserve doctors? Are there any plans to address the need for Reserve doctors to continue to pay their private practice expenses when deployed? Is deployment pay adequate to address the professional and personal expenses Reserve doctors must continue to address when deployed? Are there solutions outside of the Department of Defense to fix problems in the system?

General STULTZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. KISSELL. Is there a shortage of C–130s in the Air Force?

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. KISSELL. Are states affected by the C–130 restructuring and "loan" arrangement going to have a decreased ability to react to emergencies within the state? If so, how are the risks mitigated?

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. KISSELL. Are you working alongside Major General Byers to help determine the location of a fourth Silver Flag Exercise Site? What is the status of the selection committee? Have you considered Stanly Airport and the 145th Civil Engineer Squadron?

General WYATT. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. KISSELL. I recently sent a letter to General McKinley addressing my support of opening a second ChalleNGe Academy in North Carolina. Major General Ingram and the North Carolina National Guard do a wonderful job turning young lives around at their existing facility. Major General Ingram has a great plan to expand his capability and reach more of our at-risk youth. What is the timeline for a decision? What criteria are you basing your decision? I appreciated your response to my letter, but would like more details.

General CARPENTER. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

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