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NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION, AND LESSONS FROM SOUTHCOM AND AFRICOM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION, AND LESSONS FROM SOUTHCOM AND AFRICOM

WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Welch, Quigley, and Chu.

Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Talia Dubovi, counsel; Boris Maguire, clerk; Thomas Alexander, minority counsel; Justin LoFranco, minority clerk; Shang Yi, minority intern.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, and everyone else, as well. Mr. Flake is going to be here in a little bit. Point of order on that, but he has asked us to go ahead and proceed in his absence. Ordinarily we would not, except that he has expressed that clearly, rather than hold all of you up, and because we don't know quite what the voting schedule is going to be. I suspect we may find ourselves being interrupted at some point, again with our regrets on that.

The Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing entitled National Security: Interagency Collaboration and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM is now in order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Mr. Flake may certainly make his when he does get here, if he wishes.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for five business days so that all members of the subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record.

Again, without objection that is so ordered.

I want to again thank everybody for being here. This is a continuation of the oversight of the agencies that are charged with protecting national security interests and their ability to communicate and collaborate with each other.

In 1945, following the end of World War II, President Truman sent a message to Congress recommending the establishment of a Department of Defense to combine and coordinate the different

military branches in order to better face the challenges of the future. He wrote, "If there is ever going to be another global conflict, our combat forces must work together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the past." He urged Congress to, "Take stock to discard obsolete organizational forms and to provide for the future the soundest, the most effective, and the most economical kind of structure for our armed forces in which this most powerful Nation is capable." Congress agreed, and in 1947 the President signed the National Security Act.

Similar words could be spoken today. The threats and challenges currently facing our country are increasingly complex. Terrorism, drug violence, piracy, human trafficking, and the potential for nuclear proliferation, just to name a few, cut across the traditional lines between diplomacy, development, and defense.

As the problems become more multi-faceted, so, too, must our solutions. Terrorist and criminal organizations grow and flourish in weak and unstable countries, and effectively countering these organizations requires more than military might. Justice sector reform, police training, anti-corruption efforts, public health campaigns, and economic development programs are all necessary to routing out and neutralizing those who would do us harm.

The whole-of-government approach requires the skills and expertise of the full range of Federal agencies. Over the last two Congresses, this subcommittee has held numerous hearings that demonstrate how interconnected our government must be to effectively promote and safeguard U.S. security interests.

In hearings covering topics ranging from transnational drug enterprises to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, we have heard from witnesses representing the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development. Not one of these hearings would have presented a complete oversight picture without witnesses from multiple agencies.

Today we turn our attention to the Department of Defense's regional combatant commands. Specifically, we will hear about the results of two Government Accountability Office studies, one on the U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM], and the other on U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM].

In 2008 the Department of Defense directed these two commands to include interagency partners in their theater campaign and contingency plans, and both commands have worked to include interagency personnel within the commands, themselves. These experiences should prove instructive to continued interagency efforts within the Federal Government.

There are two different levels at which we must examine this issue. The first is mechanical. Are the correct systems and processes in place to facilitate interagency collaboration? We must ask how the State Department's bilateral structure can effectively coordinate with the Defense Department and USAID's regional setups. We need to examine whether technological systems at different agencies can communicate with each other and whether each agency is making its best effort to share information. We should evaluate whether personnel of these agencies understand the cul-

tures and functions of the agencies and whether the right incentives exist to encourage collaboration. These basic issues have profound on-the-ground effects that, if not fully addressed, significantly undermine the United States' missions abroad.

But we must also ask broader policy questions. As threats have changed, the concept of national security has broadened. As a result, the Department of Defense has taken on an expanding role in areas that have traditionally been allocated to the State Department and USAID, as well as others. We must work to find the right balance between the agencies and make sure that funding streams and personnel numbers reflect that balance. Failure to strike the right balance has consequences.

For example, AFRICOM's 2008 roll-out sent the message the that military would take the lead on all U.S. activities in Africa, which upset governments throughout the continent. We must ensure that the right agency takes the lead on each effort, that diplomacy is led by diplomats, that development projects are designed and implemented by development experts, and that military operations are planned and coordinated by the military.

Over 60 years ago, President Truman foresaw the challenges that confront us today. He argued that, "We should adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coordination between the military and the remainder of the government." I believe it is time that we follow his advice.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

Statement of John F. Tierney
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives

"National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM"

As Prepared for Distribution

July 28, 2010

Good afternoon and thank you all for being here. Today, the Subcommittee continues its oversight of the agencies charged with protecting U.S. national security interests and their ability to communicate and collaborate with each other.

In 1945, following the end of World War II, President Truman sent a message to Congress recommending the establishment of a Department of Defense to combine and coordinate the different military branches in order to better face the challenges of the future. He wrote, "If there is ever going to be another global conflict . . . [o]ur combat forces must work together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the past." He urged Congress to "take stock, to discard obsolete organizational forms and to provide for the future the soundest, the most effective and the most economical kind of structure for our armed forces of which this most powerful Nation is capable." Congress agreed, and in 1947 President Truman signed the National Security Act.

Similar words could be spoken today. The threats and challenges currently facing our country are increasingly complex: terrorism, drug violence, piracy, human trafficking, and the potential for nuclear proliferation, to name a few, cut across the traditional lines between diplomacy, development, and defense. As the problems become more multifaceted, so too must our solutions. Terrorist and criminal organizations grow and flourish in weak and unstable countries, and effectively countering those organizations requires more than military might. Justice sector reform, police training, anticorruption efforts, public health campaigns, and economic development programs are all necessary to routing out and neutralizing those who would do us harm. This whole-of-government approach requires the skills and expertise of the full range of federal agencies.

Over the last two congresses, this Subcommittee has held numerous hearings that demonstrate how interconnected our government must be to effectively promote and safeguard U.S. security interests. In hearings covering topics ranging from transnational drug enterprises to U.S efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to emerging technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles, we have heard from witnesses representing the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development.

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Today, we turn our attention to the Department of Defense's regional combatant commands. Specifically, we will hear about the results of two Government Accountability Office studies, one on U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, and the other on U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM. In 2008, the Department of Defense directed these two commands to include interagency partners in their theater campaign and contingency plans, and both commands have worked to include interagency personnel within the commands themselves. These experiences should prove instructive to continued interagency efforts within the federal government.

There are two different levels at which we must examine this issue. The first is mechanical: are the correct systems and processes in place to facilitate interagency collaboration? We must ask how the State Department's bilateral structure can effectively coordinate with the Defense Department and USAID's regional set ups. We need to examine whether technological systems at different agencies can communicate with each other and whether each agency is making its best effort to share information. We should evaluate whether personnel at each agency understand the cultures and functions of the agencies with which they must work and whether the right incentives exist to encourage collaboration. These basic issues have profound, on-the-ground effects that, if not fully addressed, significantly undermine U.S. missions abroad.

But we must also ask broader policy questions. As threats have changed, the concept of "national security" has broadened. As a result, the Department of Defense has taken on an expanding role in areas that have traditionally been allocated to the State Department and USAID, as well as others. We must work to find the right balance between the agencies and make sure that funding streams and personnel numbers reflect that balance. Failure to strike the right balance has consequences. For example, AFRICOM's 2008 rollout sent a message that the military would take the lead on all U.S. activities in Africa, which angered governments throughout the continent. We must ensure that the right agency takes the lead on each effort – that diplomacy is led by diplomats, that development projects are designed and implemented by development experts, and that military operations are planned and coordinated by the military.

Over 60 years ago, President Truman foresaw the challenges we confront today. He argued that "[w]e should adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coordination between the military and the remainder of the Government." I believe it is time that we follow his advice.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, before we move on to our witnesses, I want to note for the record that the process for receiving written statements for this hearing was, to be frank, unacceptable. Two of the agencies here today submitted testimony only after hours yesterday. The other submitted testimony to us less than 4 hours ago. And we still haven't received testimony from the fourth agency.

We know that preparing testimonies is a burden on the agencies. I understand that coordinating with the Office of Management and Budget is challenging. But we don't call these hearings lightly, and we call them because there are important issues to be discussed. Members need time to review those statements in advance to prepare for the hearings, and our staff does, as well.

We can't have situations, as we did last night, where the subcommittee staff had to wait around for testimony that never came. It is a matter of congressional prerogatives, and also a basic question of courtesy to our staff. So if the problem is with OMB, I would appreciate that discretely after the meeting somebody come up and tell me that with respect to your agency OMB was the problem and we will take care of it there. If the problem rests with you or your agency, I expect that you will correct that and that we won't have a repeat of this situation in the future. Thank you.

Now we are going to receive testimony from the witnesses. What I will do is introduce all of you at the outset, as some of you are familiar with it, and then we will proceed to go from my left to right in statements.

Mr. John Pendleton is the Director of Force Structure and Defense Planning Issues in the Government Accountability Office, Defense Capabilities and Management Team. His current portfolio includes ballistic missile defense, nuclear requirements, global military posture, interagency collaboration, stability operations, as well as reviews of Army and Navy conventional force structure plans. In one of his recent projects for this subcommittee, he oversaw a review of the efforts to establish the Africa Command. Mr. Pendleton also serves as GAO's strategic planner for defense issues. He holds a business degree from the University of Kentucky. He has attended national security courses at Syracuse, National Defense University, Naval Post-Graduate School, and Army Command and General Staff College.

Dr. James Schear is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations at the Department of Defense, where he advises the Department's leadership on matters pertaining to stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping efforts, and noncombatant evacuations.

Prior to assuming his current duties, Dr. Schear served as the Director of Research at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs. He assisted the United Nations with planning for the implementation of the Gulf War cease-fire resolutions, and served as an advisor to the leadership of U.N. missions in Cambodia and former Yugoslavia. For his efforts during the Kosovo Crisis, Dr. Schear received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

During 2007 he also served as a principal member of the Afghanistan Study Group.

He holds a B.A. from American University, an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mr. Thomas Countryman is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Policy Service and began his career as a consular and political officer in Belgrade. He later served as the political military officer at the American Embassy in Cairo during the first Gulf War and as a liaison with the U.N. Special Commission investigating Iraq's weapons program.

Afterward, he served as Director of the State Department's Office of South-Central European Affairs and the Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs at the American Embassy in Rome. He has also served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Athens, Greece, and as the Foreign Policy Advisor to General James Conway, the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Mr. Countryman received the Presidential Meritorious Service Citation in 2007 and the Superior Honor Award for each of his assignments in Rome and Athens. He graduated from Washington University in St. Louis and studied at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Ms. Susan Reichle is the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Ms. Reichle is a career Senior Foreign Service Officer who has served in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Russia as a Democracy Officer specializing in conflict and transition issues.

She recently served as the Mission Director at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, where she was part of one of the largest country teams in the world. For her service, Ms. Reichle received several awards from the Colombian Government, recognizing USAID's contribution under her leadership.

She holds an M.A. from the National War College at the National Defense University, two additional Master's degrees from the University of Pennsylvania, and she received her B.A. from James Madison University.

Again, thank all of you for being witnesses here today and for sharing your substantial expertise.

In addition to the witnesses on the panel before us, the subcommittee has invited a written statement for the record from Ms. Mariko Silver, the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. She is unable to attend today's hearing, but we are grateful for her written testimony, which will be put into the hearing record by unanimous consent.

It is the policy of the subcommittee to have all of the witnesses testifying before it to be sworn in, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. All of the panelists have answered in the affirmative.

Your written statements in full will be put on the record, so I ask if you can to try to keep your opening remarks to about 5 minutes.

You are all familiar with the light system here. It is green when it is a go, it is yellow when you get about a minute to go, and gets red when the floor opens and you all drop through. [Laughter.]

We appreciate your testimony today.

Mr. Pendleton, if you would, please.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; JAMES SCHEAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGIC AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND SUSAN REICHLE, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STATEMENT OF JOHN PENDLETON

Mr. PENDLETON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify about emerging lessons from our work at AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. I will briefly summarize the reports we issue today in the context of interagency collaboration, as well as provide some preliminary information from our ongoing work on counter-piracy efforts, work you also requested.

While both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have to be prepared for traditional military operations, these are not their focus. Day-to-day, both conduct a variety of activities, from fighting drugs to civil affairs projects like building schools and drilling water wells. They also have to be prepared to respond to disasters like the recent devastating earthquake in Haiti. Because such activities are not strictly military operations, they must work closely with other organizations like State and AID.

You will recall that the last time I testified before you I discussed some of the issues DOD faced in creating AFRICOM, including concerns inside the U.S. Government that getting DOD more involved in Africa would blur the lines between defense, diplomacy, and development. You asked us to look beyond the macro perceptions and fears to focus on the actual activities being conducted and the challenges being encountered on the ground.

In sum, we found a command that is maturing, one that has made progress but still has issues to overcome in leveraging relationships with other organizations. For instance, some AFRICOM activities could have unintended consequences or waste scarce resources, such as a planned musical caravan in Senegal. AFRICOM's task force in Djibouti built a school that was later found dilapidated, among other cultural missteps.

But AFRICOM has also had notable success stories, as described in our report. My team observed a large pandemic response exercise in Uganda that was actually headed up by an AID official who was assigned to AFRICOM headquarters. This and other activities like the Africa Partnership Station that promotes maritime security through activities coordinated with State, AID, and DHS are examples of positive interagency collaboration.

Our ongoing work on counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region also underscores the importance of interagency collaboration. Consensus exists that the piracy problem emanates from the ungoverned spaces of Somalia, which is in AFRICOM's area of responsibility.

But it is far from clear how the U.S. Government plans to address that. Prevention and interdiction efforts have shifted pirate attacks, but the problem is becoming more diffuse as the attacks are happening farther and farther from shore.

The National Security Council developed an action plan in 2008 to provide an over-arching strategy for countering piracy; however, the plan doesn't assign specific responsibilities, so it is unclear who is in charge of things like strategic communications, cutting off pirate revenue, and making sure captured pirates get prosecuted. Our full report on counter-piracy efforts will be published later this year, and it will detail these and other findings.

While AFRICOM is a relatively new command, SOUTHCOM has been in the interagency business for a long time and is widely regarded as good at it. The collaboration necessary to fight drug trafficking has given SOUTHCOM more than 20 years of experience in working with diplomatic, development, and law enforcement agencies. During our review, we heard many positive comments about how well the command involves other agencies in its planning and works with them during operations.

In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed a non-traditional organizational structure with non-DOD civilians in prominent roles. Other commands, including AFRICOM, have followed suit. However, after the earthquake struck Haiti earlier this year, SOUTHCOM struggled to make its structure work for the large-scale operation that followed. SOUTHCOM's headquarters structure lacked depth in its logistics staff, among other issues. The headquarters needed to quickly add hundreds of personnel, and the unusual structure complicated matters.

As a result, SOUTHCOM went back to a traditional military structure virtually overnight and has kept this structure since, while it studies how to balance day-to-day operations with the potential for a large-scale contingency.

In our reports issued today we have made multiple recommendations to address the challenges I have described at both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. Encouragingly, Mr. Chairman, DOD agreed with our findings and recommendations and plans to take steps to address it.

Thank you. That concludes my remarks. I look forward to taking any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pendleton follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, July 28, 2010

NATIONAL SECURITY

Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands

Statement of John H. Pendleton, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-10-962T

July 28, 2010

GAO
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Highlights

Highlights of GAO-10-962T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

NATIONAL SECURITY

Interagency Collaboration Practices and Challenges at DOD's Southern and Africa Commands

Why GAO Did This Study

Recognizing the limits of military power in today's security environment, the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal agencies to achieve its missions around the world. DOD's combatant commands, such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort. Both aim to build partner nation capacity and perform humanitarian assistance, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. As DOD's newest command, AFRICOM works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities such as maritime security and pandemic response efforts. Today GAO issued reports that the subcommittee requested on SOUTHCOM (GAO-10-801) and AFRICOM (GAO-10-794), which in part evaluated how each collaborates with U.S. interagency partners. This testimony summarizes that work and provides observations from ongoing work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts by focusing on 3 key areas essential for interagency collaboration.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made recommendations to the commands aimed at improving their capabilities to perform their missions through the development of plans and training. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

View GAO-10-962T or key components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found

GAO's work has shown that developing overarching strategies, creating collaborative organizations, and building a workforce that understands how to fully engage partners are key areas where agencies can enhance interagency collaboration on national security issues. GAO found that DOD's SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain collaboration, but areas for improvement remain.

- **Overarching strategies**: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies in creating their theater campaign plans, which outline command priorities, and for other strategies and plans. However, AFRICOM has not completed plans that detail its activities by country and that align with embassy strategic plans to ensure U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. Also, GAO's preliminary work indicates that a U.S. action plan provides a framework for interagency collaboration to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa region, but the plan does not assign agencies their roles or responsibilities for the majority of tasks in the plan.

- **Collaborative organizations**: Both commands have organizational structures that encourage interagency involvement in their missions. Each has a military deputy commander to oversee military operations and a civilian deputy to the commander from the State Department to oversee civil-military activities. Both commands also embed interagency officials within their organizations, but limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency personnel from participating at the numbers desired. However, AFRICOM has struggled to fully leverage the expertise of embedded officials. Moreover, while SOUTHCOM's organizational structure was designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation.

- **Well-trained workforce**: AFRICOM has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners. In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, some AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, which has resulted in some cultural missteps. Further, limited training is available to enhance personnel expertise. While GAO's work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on training, personnel from the command also expressed the need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an interagency environment.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the ways that the Department of Defense (DOD) is collaborating with other U.S. federal government agencies to carry out its missions around the world. Recent terrorist events and lessons learned from the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate that today's global security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War era. These new threats can be unconventional and ambiguous, requiring enhanced collaboration with interagency partners and other stakeholders. For its part, DOD recognizes the limits of traditional military power in today's security environment, which consists of a wide-range of challenges (e.g., terrorism, illicit trafficking, organized crime, piracy) that are often exacerbated by conditions of poverty and profound cultural and demographic tensions. The military's approach to these challenges requires increased collaboration with interagency partners such as the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with DOD often serving in a supporting role to other federal agencies.

Two of DOD's geographic combatant commands, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), play key roles in this effort outside of the United States. Both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM aim to build partner nation capacity and conduct humanitarian assistance projects, while standing ready to perform a variety of military operations, as directed. Among its missions, SOUTHCOM supports U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the Americas and the Caribbean in disrupting illicit trafficking and narco-terrorism. Having reorganized in 2008, in part to focus on interagency collaboration, SOUTHCOM has been viewed as having mature interagency processes and coordinating mechanisms. AFRICOM, as DOD's newest combatant command, works with U.S. diplomacy and development agencies on activities ranging from maritime security to pandemic response efforts on the African continent.[1] The 2008 *National Defense Strategy* cites both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM as pointing the way toward a whole-of-government approach to achieving common goals.

Today we issued the reports you requested on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, which in part evaluated how each command collaborates with

[1]DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008.

interagency partners.[2] In addition, last September we issued a report on key issues and actions needed to enhance interagency collaboration on national security for Congress and the administration to consider in their oversight and management agendas.[3] My statement today discusses findings from our SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM reviews in three areas essential for interagency collaboration. In addition, the statement provides some preliminary information from our ongoing review of counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region that was also requested by the subcommittee and will be completed later this year.

This statement is based largely on completed GAO work, which was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant documents, analyzed data, traveled to the regions, and interviewed officials from various agencies including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Additional information about our scope and methodology for our AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM work can be found within the full reports.

Key Areas for Interagency Collaboration

Our body of work on interagency collaboration has identified several key areas that are essential for collaboration among U.S. federal agencies in addressing security challenges. Three are particularly important for SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM: (1) developing and implementing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, and (3) building a well-trained workforce. Underlying the success of these key areas is committed and effective leadership.

- **Developing and implementing overarching strategies:** Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has found that strategic direction is required as a foundation for collaboration on national security goals. The means to operate across multiple agencies

[2]GAO, *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation*, GAO-10-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010), and *Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010).

[3]GAO, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).

and organizations—such as compatible policies and procedures that facilitate collaboration across agencies and mechanisms to share information frequently—enhances and sustains collaboration among federal agencies. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance measures for implementing those strategies. Moreover, a strategy defining organizational roles and responsibilities can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in activities, help organize their joint and individual efforts, facilitate decision making, and address how conflicts would be resolved.

- **Creating collaborative organizations:** Given the differences among U.S. government agencies—such as differences in structure, planning processes, and funding sources—developing adequate coordination mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated approaches. U.S. government agencies, such as DOD, State, and USAID, among others, spend billions of dollars annually on various defense, diplomatic, and development missions in support of national security. Without coordination mechanisms, the results can be a patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.

- **Developing a well-trained workforce:** Collaborative approaches to national security require a well-trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate the government's diverse capabilities and resources. A lack of understanding of other agencies' cultures, processes, and core capabilities can hamper U.S. national security partners' ability to work together effectively. However, training can help personnel develop the skills and understanding of other agencies' capabilities needed to facilitate interagency collaboration.

Effective leadership is essential to achieving success in each of these areas. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* states that by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential threats. In addition, the 2010 *National Security Strategy* calls for a renewed emphasis on building a stronger leadership foundation for the long term to more effectively advance U.S. interests.

Interagency Practices and Challenges at SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and with U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts

Our work on SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM found that both commands have demonstrated some practices that will help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, but areas for improvement remain. Moreover, our preliminary work on counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region suggests that U.S. agencies have made progress in leading and supporting international efforts to counter piracy, but implementation challenges exist.

Interagency Partners Have Helped Develop Strategies and Plans, but Some Remain Unfinished at AFRICOM and for Counterpiracy Efforts

SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have sought input from several federal agencies in developing overarching strategies and plans, but AFRICOM has not yet completed many specific plans to guide activities and ensure a U.S. government unity of effort in Africa. In addition, our preliminary work shows that a U.S. action plan has been developed which provides a framework for interagency collaboration, but the roles and responsibilities of the multiples agencies involved in countering piracy in the Horn of Africa region are not clearly assigned.

Commands Have Engaged Interagency Partners in Developing Strategies and Plans

In its *Guidance for Employment of the Force*,[4] DOD required both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, as prototype test cases, to seek broader involvement from other departments in drafting their theater campaign and contingency plans. To meet this requirement, SOUTHCOM held a series of meetings with interagency officials that focused on involving and gathering input from interagency partners. In developing its 2009 theater campaign plan, which lays out command priorities and guides its resource allocations, SOUTHCOM coordinated with over 10 U.S. government departments and offices, including the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, the Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (see fig. 1). According to both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners, this coordination helped SOUTHCOM understand the diverse missions of its interagency partners and better align activities and resources in the Americas and the Caribbean. As a result of this effort, SOUTHCOM's 2009 theater campaign plan includes 30 theater objectives, of which 22 are led by interagency partners with SOUTHCOM serving in a supporting role. SOUTHCOM also provides input into State's regional strategic plans. Both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners told us that this coordination has helped ensure that SOUTHCOM and interagency partner strategic goals were mutually

[4] *Guidance for Employment of the Force*, May 2008.

reinforcing and has helped align activities and resources in achieving broad U.S. objectives.

Figure 1: Partners from which SOUTHCOM Received Input during Development of the 2009 Theater Campaign Plan



Source: Joint Operational War Plans Division, Joint Staff.

Similarly, AFRICOM met with representatives from many agencies to gain interagency input into its theater campaign plan. We spoke with officials from State, USAID, and the U.S. Coast Guard who stated that they provided input into several additional strategy documents, including DOD's *Guidance for Employment of the Force* and AFRICOM's posture statement, and participated in activity planning meetings. Federal agency officials also noted progress in AFRICOM's interagency coordination since its establishment. State officials said that AFRICOM had made improvements in taking their feedback and creating an environment that is conducive to cooperation across agencies. Similarly, USAID officials said that AFRICOM had improved its coordination with their agency at the USAID headquarters level. Notwithstanding this collaboration, AFRICOM officials told us that aligning strategies among partners can be difficult because of different planning horizons among agencies. For example, AFRICOM's theater campaign plan covers fiscal years 2010 through 2014,

whereas the State/USAID strategic plan spans fiscal years 2007 through 2012.

Some AFRICOM Plans Remain Unfinished, Which Hinders Unity of Effort

While AFRICOM has collaborated with partners on overarching strategies, it has not yet completed some plans, which hinders planning and implementation efforts with partners. AFRICOM currently lacks regional engagement and country work plans for Africa, which are called for in its theater campaign plan and would provide specific information on conducting activities. One key requirement for the country work plans, for example, is to align them with embassy strategic plans to ensure unity of effort. Figure 2 shows AFRICOM's plans in the context of national strategies, guidance, and other federal agencies' planning efforts.

Figure 2: AFRICOM Strategic Guidance and Plans



Source: GAO presentation of DOD data.

AFRICOM's Army component stated that perhaps the greatest challenge to creating positive conditions in Africa is ensuring that U.S. defense efforts remain synchronized; if plans are not coordinated, their efforts could have unintended consequences, such as the potential for Africans to perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public opinion in a region sensitive to the military's presence. At the time we completed our audit work, AFRICOM's regional plans had not been approved by the command, and the country plans were still in the process of being developed. Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM to expedite the completion of its plans and to develop a process whereby plans are reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the command are complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of AFRICOM's mission.[5] DOD agreed with our recommendation, stating that some of the plans are in the final stages of review and approval by AFRICOM's leadership.

U.S. Government Has Action Plan to Counter Piracy, but Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Clearly Defined

Our preliminary work on U.S. counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa shows that the United States has an action plan that serves as an overarching strategy and provides a framework for interagency collaboration, but roles and responsibilities have not been clearly assigned. The action plan establishes three main lines of action for interagency stakeholders, in collaboration with industry and international partners, to take in countering piracy. These actions are (1) *prevent pirate attacks* by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2) *interrupt and terminate acts of piracy*, consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and (3) *ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions* by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and coastal states and, in appropriate cases, the United States.

[5]GAO-10-794.

Figure 3: Search and Seizure Team Boarding a Suspicious Boat in the Indian Ocean

Source: U.S. Navy.

While piracy in the Horn of Africa region emanates primarily from Somalia, a country located within AFRICOM's area of responsibility, most attacks are carried out in waters within U.S. Central Command's jurisdiction. Outside DOD, many other stakeholders are involved in counterpiracy efforts. Specifically, the action plan states that, subject to the availability of resources, the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall also contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives. Our preliminary work indicates that the National Security Council, which authored the plan, has not assigned the majority of tasks outlined in the plan to specific agencies. As of July 2010, only one task, providing an interdiction-capable presence, had been assigned to the Navy and Coast Guard. Roles and responsibilities for other tasks—such as strategic communications, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates—have not been clearly assigned. Without specific roles and responsibilities for essential tasks outlined in the action plan, the U.S. government cannot ensure that agencies' approaches are comprehensive, complementary, and effectively coordinated.

Commands Have Developed Structures to Facilitate Interagency Collaboration, but Organizational Challenges Remain at Both Commands

SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have developed organizational structures to facilitate interagency collaboration, but challenges include fully leveraging interagency personnel and maintaining the ability to organize quickly for large-scale military operations when necessary.

Commands Have Established Organizational Structures That Facilitate Interagency Collaboration

Both commands have established key leadership positions for interagency officials within their organizational structures. In addition to a deputy military commander who oversees military operations, each command has a civilian deputy to the commander from State who oversees civil-military activities. At SOUTHCOM, the civilian deputy to the commander—a senior foreign service officer with the rank of Minister Counselor at State—advises SOUTHCOM's commander on foreign policy issues and serves as the primary liaison with State and with U.S. embassies located in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. At AFRICOM, the civilian deputy to the commander directs AFRICOM's activities related to areas such as health, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and peace support operations.

Both commands have also embedded interagency officials throughout their organizations. As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it had embedded 27 interagency partners into its headquarters staff from several federal agencies (see table 1), and according to officials at AFRICOM and State, it plans to integrate five foreign policy advisors from State later this year. Moreover, DOD has signed memorandums of understanding with nine federal agencies to outline conditions for sending interagency partners to AFRICOM. As of July 2010, SOUTHCOM reported that it had 20 embedded interagency officials (see table 1), with several placed directly into key senior leadership positions. SOUTHCOM has also created a partnering directorate, which among its responsibilities, has the role of embedding interagency personnel into the command. Decisions to embed interagency officials at SOUTHCOM are made on a case-by-case basis, with most agencies sending a representative to SOUTHCOM on a short-term basis to discuss needs, roles, and responsibilities and to assess whether a full-time embedded official would be mutually beneficial.

Table 1: Reported Number of Embedded Interagency Personnel at AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM Headquarters

Agency	AFRICOM	SOUTHCOM
Department of State	5	5
U.S. Agency for International Development	2	3
Department of Homeland Security	6	5
Office of the Director of National Intelligence	4	3
Department of Justice	3	4
Department of the Treasury	2	-
Department of Energy	1	-
National Security Agency	4	-
Total	**27**	**20**
Percentage of command's headquarters staff[a]	2	3

Source: GAO presentation of SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM data.

Note: Data from AFRICOM are as of June 2010. Data from SOUTHCOM are as of July 2010.

[a] SOUTHCOM's total number of headquarters' personnel provided to us was approximate; thus, the 3 percent in this table is also approximate. Further, percentages in this table have been rounded

Both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have indicated that they currently do not have a specific requirement for the number of embedded interagency personnel at their commands but would benefit from additional personnel. However, limited resources at other federal agencies have prevented interagency personnel from participating in the numbers desired. In February 2009, we reported that AFRICOM initially expected to fill 52 positions with personnel from other government agencies.[6] However, State officials told us that they would not likely be able to provide employees to fill the positions requested by AFRICOM because they were already facing a 25 percent shortfall in midlevel personnel. Similarly, SOUTHCOM has identified the need for around 40 interagency personnel, but had only filled 20 of those positions as of July 2010. According to SOUTHCOM officials, it has taken about 3 years to fill its interagency positions because of lack of funding at the command or the inability of partners to provide personnel. Because many agencies have limited personnel and resources, SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners have, on occasion, developed other means to gain stakeholder input and perspectives. For example, in lieu of embedding a Department of the

[6] GAO, *Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009).

Treasury (Treasury) official at the command, SOUTHCOM and Treasury decided that providing a local Treasury representative with access to the command and establishing a memorandum of understanding would serve to improve communication and coordination among the organizations.

AFRICOM May Not Fully Leverage Expertise of Interagency Partners

While embedding interagency personnel into a DOD command can be an effective means of coordination, interagency personnel serving at AFRICOM may not be fully leveraged for their expertise within the organization. AFRICOM officials told us that it is a challenge to determine where in the command to include interagency personnel. For example, an embedded interagency staff member stated that AFRICOM initially placed him in a directorate unrelated to his skill set, and he initiated a transfer to another directorate that would better enable him to share his expertise. Moreover, several embedded interagency officials said that there is little incentive to take a position at AFRICOM because it will not enhance one's career position upon return to the original agency after the rotation.

Difficulties with leveraging interagency personnel are not unique to AFRICOM. We have previously reported that personnel systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish interest in serving in interagency efforts.[7] AFRICOM officials said that it would be helpful to have additional interagency personnel at the command, but they understand that staffing limitations, resource imbalances, and lack of career progression incentives for embedded staff from other federal agencies may limit the number of personnel who can be brought in from these agencies. Despite challenges, AFRICOM has made some efforts that could improve interagency collaboration within the command, such as expanding its interagency orientation process. Last fall, the command conducted an assessment of the embedded interagency process to analyze successes and identify lessons learned, including recommendations on how to integrate interagency personnel into command planning and operations. In July 2010, AFRICOM stated that it had established an interagency collaborative forum to assess, prioritize, and implement the recommendations from the assessment.

Haiti Response Revealed Weaknesses in SOUTHCOM's Organizational Structure

SOUTHCOM's recent experience in responding to the Haiti earthquake serves as a reminder that while interagency collaboration is important in addressing security challenges, DOD's commands must also be prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large-scale disaster

[7]GAO-09-904SP.

relief operations. While our work found that SOUTHCOM has taken significant steps in building partnerships to enhance and sustain collaboration, the command faces challenges preparing for the divergent needs of its potential missions. SOUTHCOM must have an organizational structure that is prepared for military contingencies and that is also effective in supporting interagency partners in meeting challenges such as corruption, crime, and poverty.

In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure to improve collaboration with interagency stakeholders, which included a civilian deputy to the vommander, interagency partners embedded into key leadership positions, and a directorate focused on sustaining partnerships. While SOUTHCOM's organizational structure was designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the 2010 Haiti earthquake response revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military operation. For example, the command's structure lacked a division to address planning for military operations occurring over 30 days to 1 year in duration. In addition, SOUTHCOM had suboptimized some core functions that were necessary to respond to large-scale contingencies. For example, SOUTHCOM's logistics function was suboptimized because it was placed under another directorate in the organizational structure rather than being its own core function. As a result, the command had difficulty planning for the required logistics support—including supply, maintenance, deployment distribution, health support, and engineering—during the large-scale Haiti relief effort, which SOUTHCOM reported peaked at more than 20,000 deployed military personnel, about 2 weeks after the earthquake occurred (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Reported Buildup of Military Forces Supporting Relief Efforts in Haiti as Part of Operation Unified Response in January 2010



Source: SOUTHCOM.

According to command officials, SOUTHCOM was able to integrate additional interagency and international partners into its headquarters as Haiti relief operations grew in scale; however, the command had not identified the military personnel augmentation required for a large contingency nor had it developed a plan to integrate military personnel into its headquarters structure. Ultimately, SOUTHCOM received 500 military augmentees to provide additional capabilities to its existing command staff of about 800, including an entire staff office from U.S. Northern Command, filling vital gaps in SOUTHCOM's ability to support operations in Haiti. However, augmented military personnel were not familiar with SOUTHCOM's organizational structure and did not initially understand where they could best contribute because many of the traditional joint staff functions were divided among SOUTHCOM's directorates. To address these challenges, SOUTHCOM's commander returned the command to a traditional joint staff structure while retaining

elements from its 2008 reorganization and plans to retain this structure for the foreseeable future.[8]

Our report made recommendations aimed at improving SOUTHCOM's ability to conduct the full range of military missions that may be required in the region, while balancing its efforts to support interagency partners in enhancing regional security and cooperation.[9] DOD acknowledged the challenges it had faced and agreed with our recommendations. In its response, the department noted that SOUTHCOM's ability to respond to the Haiti crisis quickly was in part a by-product of close, collaborative relationships developed with a range of U.S. government interagency partners over many years.

AFRICOM Staff Could Benefit from More Comprehensive Training or Guidance on Working with Interagency Officials in Africa

AFRICOM, as a relatively new command engaged in capacity-building efforts, has emphasized the need to work closely with U.S. embassies to ensure that activities are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and to contribute to a unity of effort among interagency partners (see fig. 5). In addition, the command has designated cultural awareness as a core competency for its staff. However, we found that some AFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, and the training or guidance available to augment personnel expertise in these areas is limited. While AFRICOM has efforts under way to strengthen staff expertise in these areas, the limited knowledge among some staff puts AFRICOM at risk of being unable to fully leverage resources with U.S. embassy personnel, build relationships with African nations, and effectively carry out activities.

[8]The traditional joint staff headquarters organization generally includes directorates for manpower and personnel (J1), intelligence (J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), plans (J5), communications system (J6), as well as additional directorates as deemed necessary.

[9]GAO-10-801.

Figure 5: AFRICOM Staff Work with Interagency and International Partners at a Pandemic Response Exercise in Uganda in 2009

Source: GAO.

AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its interagency partners, but some personnel's limited knowledge of working with U.S. embassies can impose burdens on embassies' staff who may be taken away from their assigned duties to help AFRICOM. For example, a U.S. embassy official in Uganda stated that AFRICOM personnel arrived in country with the expectations that the embassy would take care of basic cultural and logistical issues for them. Also, AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force personnel have, at times, approached the Djiboutian government ministries directly with concepts for activities rather than following the established procedure of having the U.S. embassy in Djibouti initiate the contact. Additionally, while cultural awareness is a core competency for AFRICOM, the limited knowledge of some personnel in the command and its military service components regarding Africa cultural issues has occasionally led to difficulties in building relationships with African nations—such as when AFRICOM's task force distributed used clothing to local Djibouti villagers during Ramadan, which offended the Muslim population, or proposed drilling a well without considering how its placement could affect local clan relationships.

While AFRICOM personnel and forces deploying for activities receive some training on working with interagency partners and on African cultural awareness—and efforts are under way to increase training for some personnel—our review of training presentations indicated that they were insufficient to adequately build the skills of its staff. AFRICOM officials told us that training includes Web courses and seminars, and that there are other training requirements for personnel deploying to Africa such as medical and cultural awareness training. Officials said, however, that while training is encouraged, it is not required, and that the command does not currently monitor the completion of training courses. Furthermore, officials from several AFRICOM components voiced a preference for more cultural training and capabilities.

In our prior work on AFRICOM's Horn of Africa task force, we similarly reported that the task force's training on working with U.S. embassies was not shared with all staff, and cultural awareness training was limited.[10] We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM to develop comprehensive training guidance or a program that augments assigned personnel's understanding of African cultural awareness and working with interagency partners. In addition, in our report on AFRICOM released today, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct AFRICOM, in consultation with State and USAID, to develop a comprehensive training program for staff and forces involved in AFRICOM activities that focuses on working with interagency partners and on cultural issues related to Africa.[11] DOD agreed with the recommendation, describing some efforts that AFRICOM was taking and stating that the command will continue to develop and conduct training to improve its ability to work with embassies and other agencies. While our work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on workforce training, command personnel have expressed the need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an interagency environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

[10]GAO, *Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force*, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

[11]GAO-10-794.

For future information regarding this statement, please contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this statement are listed in appendix I.

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Directors Stephen Caldwell and Jess Ford; Assistant Directors Patricia Lentini, Marie Mak, and Suzanne Wren; and Alissa Czyz, Richard Geiger, Dawn Hoff, Brandon Hunt, Farhanaz Kermalli, Arthur Lord, Tobin McMurdie, Jennifer Neer, Jodie Sandel, Leslie Sarapu, and Erin Smith made key contributions to this statement.

Related GAO Products

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Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. GAO-10-801. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Pendleton.
Dr. Schear.

STATEMENT OF JAMES SCHEAR

Dr. SCHEAR. Chairman Tierney, members of the committee, I am very grateful for this opportunity to join colleagues from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development in offering our perspectives on interagency collaboration within the U.S. combatant commands.

I would also like to take this occasion to commend the Government Accountability Office for its two very cogent, well-argued reports that serve as the focus of today's hearings.

To briefly summarize my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman, I think everyone here would agree that interagency collaboration is hugely important, in particular for my department, the Department of Defense. My boss, Secretary Gates, has observed that the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, sir, I believe you underscored that same theme, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th Century.

All the various stakeholders working in the international arena, military and civilian, government and private, have to learn to stretch outside their comfort zones to work together and achieve results.

I think Secretary Gates' point underscores an absolute reality, which is we have enormous incentives to collaborate, but we also face management challenges that remain very complex, both in terms of marshaling the necessary human and budgetary resources and aligning our capacities, our differing capacities, in a complementary way.

Given these challenges, I would like to offer a few guidelines that I think could be part of a more comprehensive road map to building a better future in this important area.

First of all, interagency coordination at the Combatant Command, COCOM, level needs to be tailored to the distinctive needs of the region. There is no "one size fits all formula" for scripting the whole-of-government coordination effort. Different missions, ranging from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and foreign consequence management, all the way to counter-terrorism and security force assistance, require different mixes of interagency participation and different roles and missions, different leading and supporting elements need to be included in that mix.

Second, planning can be a vital instrument for forging greater interagency coordination. Our regional commands develop campaign and contingency plans pursuant to DOD guidance, and they place strong emphasis on incorporating interagency perspectives. We on the DOD side through the commands also benefit from greater access and influence over the development of USAID regional development plans and the State Department's country level mission strategic and resource plans. The planning instruments are very useful. They need to be worked in tandem.

Third guideline: effective interagency coordination is human capital intensive. The integration of non-DOD perspectives at the combatant command level through embedded or liaison personnel can

both inform and influence the perspectives of our own service personnel at all levels, especially when it comes to understanding the socio-cultural landscape of the countries. But again, the job of aligning the supply of and demand for such talent is not to be taken lightly. It is a very difficult challenge.

Guideline No. 4: interagency coordination should always be supportive and harmonize with longstanding civil and military authorities. As Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, a former AFRICOM deputy, just recently emphasized, AFRICOM is a test platform for helping the military as an institution to better understand its role in supporting diplomacy and development.

Fifth, there is the issue of unintended consequences, and we must be careful to avoid those. I concur with my colleague from GAO on that point. Interagency coordination at the command level is not a substitute for coordination at the Washington or country team levels, but rather a complement to the overall process.

Finally, the sixth guideline: we should not discourage innovative approaches to engagement. We have a strong stake in encouraging our commands to experiment with new organizational models that better integrate efforts with our civilian partners, even though we may be accepting a certain amount of friction as the commands learn how to do this better.

Those are the six points I would like to emphasize. I am certainly prepared to give specific reactions on the analysis of SOUTHCOM and Operation Unified Response, as well as AFRICOM and its diverse challenges, but I see, sir, I am running out of time so I will curtail my remarks.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear follows:]

Statement of
James A. Schear
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
before the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
July 28, 2010

National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM

Introduction

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, distinguished members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to offer some perspective on interagency collaboration within the combatant commands. This is a timely issue given the challenges we face in addressing current conflicts and potential contingencies. The incentives favoring interagency collaboration are substantial. We are simply more effective in promoting U.S. national security interests when we coordinate our capacities, resources, and efforts, and sustain these habits of cooperation. Our collaboration creates synergies that would not be available if a single organization operated alone. Working together creates a mutually beneficial interdependence and improves the prospect for successful outcomes.

As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, I assist my department's leadership on policy matters pertaining to our international, interagency and host-nation partnerships, as well as to security sector assistance, stability operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and associated issues. I work closely with my fellow witnesses on these issues to ensure an effective interagency approach.

I understand that two draft reports on U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) serve as a foundation for this hearing. I also understand your committee is particularly interested in discussing our U.S.

Government response to the January 12th earthquake in Haiti. With those priorities in mind, I'd like to begin by offering a Department of Defense perspective on the ways and means of forging greater interagency collaboration at the combatant command level. I will then focus more specifically on USSOUTHCOM, our U.S. Government response to the earthquake in Haiti, and USAFRICOM.

Forging Interagency Partnerships

Interagency cooperation is essential for navigating a complex global landscape. Secretary Gates has summed it up very cogently: "In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena – military and civilian, government and private – have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to work together and achieve results."[1] His observation captures the complexity of the factors underlying interagency coordination in terms of the resource disparities between our respective organizations, our complementary capacities, and the requirements that drive us to collaborate.

Given these challenges, how then do we forge more enduring partnerships at the combatant command level? I can't pretend to be able to give a definitive answer here, but I'd offer the following six guidelines for your consideration:

- First, interagency coordination at the combatant command level should be tailored to the distinctive needs of the geographical regions in question. There is no "one size fits all" formula for scripting whole-of-government presence and coordination, especially at the combatant command level. Different missions – from disaster relief to counter-terrorism to security force assistance – require different mixes of interagency participation. In other words, given the mission, which agencies have the relevant authorities, resources, and capabilities to complete that mission, and how should these be synchronized with the combatant command's capabilities? To cite one example, the interdiction of illicit trafficking requires a certain set of capabilities. USSOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South), established in 1989, remains a good model for effective synchronization of interagency law enforcement and interdiction capabilities. Likewise, USAFRICOM's emphasis on building partner capacity is enhanced through the coordination with DoD partners. For instance, the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) draws on DoD funding to create a synchronized approach

[1] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, remarks at the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign Tribute Dinner, July 15, 2008.

to HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment in foreign militaries. USAFRICOM, through close coordination with USAID at the country team level, is able to target program activity to critical needs.

- Second, cross-agency planning is a vital instrument for forging greater interagency coordination. Combatant commanders develop campaign and contingency plans, guided by our planning guidance, which places strong emphasis on incorporating interagency perspectives. Integrated planning efforts have included strengthened interagency involvement in the development of Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans, USAID Regional Development Plans, and the State Department's country-level Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. We are in close dialogue with our interagency partners as we craft our planning guidance. We will not direct combatant commands to write an interagency plan if the other agencies do not agree to this effort. Nor can we execute activities such as civil support or security assistance in a given country without the approval of the U.S. Ambassador. The civilian agency representatives bring their subject matter expertise, as well as knowledge of their agencies, tools and authorities that can enable the military personnel at the COCOM to plan and execute our military mission more effectively. Likewise, the civilian agency representatives benefit from learning about potential civil-military opportunities for engagement. It is mutually beneficial to share perspective and knowledge of each others' capabilities to develop the best possible plan.

- Third, effective interagency coordination is human capital-intensive. Effective integration of non-DoD perspectives at the combatant command level through embedded personnel and participation in planning can both inform and influence the perspectives of our military professionals at all ranks, especially when it comes to the socio-cultural context of the countries within the Command's area of responsibility. However, the degree of effectiveness depends on a shared understanding of expectations among the organizations. We need to ensure that the interagency system rewards organizations for sending their best personnel, and that these assignments are career-enhancing. It goes without saying that even the best designed structure cannot overcome such basic factors such as competence and cooperativeness among the involved professionals. At the same time, DoD components must understand the very limited personnel resources of civilian agencies and be strategic about civilian staffing assignments – including participation in exercises and other training opportunities – so that both civilian and military agencies get the most benefit from these very limited resources.

- Fourth, interagency coordination at the combatant command level should be supportive of, and harmonized with, longstanding civil-military authorities and responsibilities. As Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, the former USAFRICOM deputy to the commander for military operations, emphasized in a recent article, USAFRICOM is a "military organization, we do not create policy." USAFRICOM is a "test platform for helping the military as an institution to better understand its role in supporting diplomacy and development."[2]

- Fifth, we must beware of unintended consequences. Interagency coordination at the combatant command level is not a substitute for coordination at the Washington or country team levels, but rather a complement to the overall process. We should not presume that the embedded representatives have decision-making authority, nor that just because coordination at the combatant command level exists, overall coordination has been achieved. As a corollary, it is incumbent upon the Combatant Commander to ensure that he or she has effective two-way communications with U.S. Ambassadors located in the combatant command's area of responsibility (AOR), as well as with the regional bureaus in Washington in both the Departments of State and Defense.

- Sixth, we should encourage innovation, seeking new authorities and appropriations, as warranted, to support innovative approaches to engagement. For any new or hybrid type of organization with interagency participants, it's a simple fact of life that DoD will not be in full control of all the factors (e.g., personnel, funding, authorities) that would determine success, nor may the U.S. Government despite its best whole-of-government efforts. We have a strong stake in encouraging our commands to experiment with new organizational models that better integrate our civilian partners, even if that means accepting a certain amount of friction as commands learn how to do this well. It would be unfortunate if the by-product of well-intentioned criticism was simply to pressure a command's leadership back toward its comfort zone of strictly military-to-military relations – a step that would diminish its utility in some military-to-civilian engagements. .

These considerations are worth bearing in mind as I share some observations of USSOUTHCOM and our U.S. Government response to the Haiti crisis, as well as implications for USAFRICOM.

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[2] "The Truth About Africom," Foreign Policy, July 21, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/21/the_truth_about_africom

USSOUTHCOM and Operation Unified Response

Within DOD, USSOUTHCOM is considered the model for interagency partnering due to its innovative organizational approach, coordination mechanisms, and sustained leadership. Although often dubbed as an "economy of force" combatant command, it's never been an "economy of ideas" organization. The command's approach to partnerships has been a success story that continues to grow. USSOUTHCOM's emphasis in this domain is epitomized by the creation of the partnering directorate and by having the interagency partners lead many of USSOUTHCOM's goals with USSOUTHCOM appropriately in a supporting role.

The year-long GAO review positively identified these initiatives. However, the crisis following the earthquake on January 12th in Haiti revealed overall organizational deficiencies that USSOUTHCOM is already addressing.

The U.S. Government response in Haiti, *Operation Unified Response*, was a major operation with great complexity. Our focus was on stabilizing a dire humanitarian situation. It included a wide range of traditional disaster relief activities – such as support for search and rescue operations, emergency medical care, and distribution of life-saving assistance – as well as the evacuation of U.S. citizens prior to the resumption of commercial flights; the processing of orphans for transport to the United States; the strengthening of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); and support to rebuilding the capacity of Haitian government ministries badly damaged by the earthquake.

One of the great characteristics of the U.S. Government response to Haiti was partnership. DoD has long partnered with USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). This formed the backbone of the U.S. Government response. Haiti also provided an opportunity to expand partnerships and create new ones. In addition to OFDA, DoD partnered with the whole of USAID across the relief and development spectrum. DoD also partnered with several critical offices in the State Department and with our partners at the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), who are not traditionally players in disaster response. Additionally, the magnitude of the disaster in Haiti enabled the mobilization of traditionally domestic U.S. Government partners, such as the Department of Homeland Security, including Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Department of Health and Human Services; as well as U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) within the Department of Defense. Partnership with non-governmental organizations and the private sector was also critical to our successes in Haiti.

From the information management standpoint, the decision to keep our Haiti operations within the unclassified domain enabled unprecedented information sharing across agencies. DoD and other organizations have to resist the default inclination to over-classify documents. As emphasized in our guidance, we are working to foster a "need to share" over a "need to know" information sharing ethic whenever possible in order to facilitate access by non-DoD partners.

On the ground, the manifestations of partnership played out in many different ways. In the Pétionville internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, for example, a contingent of Navy Seabees and military police (MPs) were collaborating with USAID and NGO partners to operationalize a drainage improvement program through cash-for-work programs. Camp residents were paid to perform work (guided by the military engineering plans) to prepare for the rainy season (digging drainage canals, stacking sandbags to stabilize hillsides, etc.).

After the drawdown of *Operation Unified Response*, Lieutenant General Keen indicated that the success of the operation could not have been achieved "without the strong partnerships that were shared and developed with the Government of Haiti, United Nations, United States Agency for International Development and nongovernmental organization counterparts." The mutually reinforcing relationship between USSOUTHCOM and MINUSTAH enabled the Joint Task Force (JTF) to support the delivery of food, water, and emergency medical care, with MINUSTAH ensuring the necessary security for these activities.

Partnering and burden sharing across the U.S. Government did not prevent the critical gaps that inevitably emerge in an operation on the scale of Haiti. For example, responsibility for the handling of the remains of U.S. citizens who died in the earthquake, including the repatriation of the remains and DNA identification, was an issue that did not have a distinct home in the U.S. Government. Ultimately, at the request of the President, DoD used its authorities and resources, in addition to those of other Federal departments and agencies, to accomplish this important work. Likewise, the destruction of the primary port in Haiti, coupled with the damage to the airport (as well as the airport's limited capacity to accept flights once restored), created tension as the U.S. Government devised a system from scratch to allocate landing time slots to enable the delivery of aid. The tremendous work done by the Joint Task Force to restore capacity to the transportation infrastructure is commendable. That said, in the early days of the response there was much confusion regarding the processes governing landing time slots. DoD could have done a better job in communicating these processes to the public, to the NGOs, within the U.S. Government, and to the media.

I would like to place USSOUTHCOM's re-organization during the response to the earthquake in Haiti in context. Prior to the Haiti crisis, USSOUTHCOM had three mission directorates (e.g., Partnering) and three functional directorates (e.g., Policy and Strategy) instead of the traditional, military staff J-code approach. Coupled with having a civilian deputy to the Commander, this organizational approach was designed to optimize USSOUTHCOM's approach to planning and executing partnering activities in close coordination with civilian agencies and other partners.

When the earthquake struck, USSOUTHCOM leadership determined that staff needed to be rapidly augmented to respond to the crisis. More than 500 augmentees descended upon USSOUTHCOM Headquarters to provide support, increasing the staff to about 1,300. These personnel came from USNORTHCOM, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and the Pentagon, all pulled from their normal assignments to provide surge capability to USSOUTHCOM. Within days of the earthquake, the Commander at USSOUTHCOM changed USSOUTHCOM to a traditional J-code organization so that surge staff could better function in a structure with which they were familiar. However, USSOUTHCOM's emphasis on partnering and related functions was not eliminated, it was just re-organized. USSOUTHCOM made adjustments during the response to the earthquake in Haiti to streamline operational capacity and continue its effective work in partnering.

AFRICOM: A Work in Progress

USAFRICOM is a relatively new organization – established in 2008 – that features an ambitious mission and an innovative organizational structure. USAFRICOM was designed as a command to achieve objectives focused on developing African military security capacity. The USAFRICOM staff is organized along thematic lines, much as USSOUTHCOM is organized, and features two deputy commanders. The Deputy Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) is a General or Flag officer of three-star rank. The Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) is a senior Foreign Service Officer at the ambassadorial level.

The DCMA directs the command's plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance and de-mining action, disaster response, security sector reform, and Peace Support Operations. He also directs outreach, strategic communications, and USAFRICOM's partner-building functions. Finally, the DCMA ensures that policy and program development and implementation include interagency perspectives and are consistent with U.S. foreign policy. All sections of the command report through a chief of staff and through both deputy

commanders, which ensures an integrated approach. The deputy commanders have spheres of influence with some constructive and deliberate ambiguity to avoid stove-piping perspectives.

The GAO report raises valid concerns about USAFRICOM during a particular period of the command's development. USAFRICOM has already undertaken a number of actions that address shortcomings raised in the GAO report. USAFRICOM is already providing additional training to USAFRICOM staff to help them better understand the dynamics of Africa, the security cooperation tools available to them, and the role of interagency personnel assigned to the command. The DCMA and DCMO ensure that interagency perspectives are included at the inception of the planning process. USAFRICOM is developing innovative ways to measure the long-term effectiveness of its activities in Africa. I'm pleased to say that USAFRICOM continues to explore innovative approaches with interagency colleagues to support U.S. Government objectives in Africa.

Given USSOUTHCOM's experience responding to the earthquake in Haiti, one might ask about the implications for USAFRICOM, particularly in its staff organization. In general, Combatant Commanders have the prerogative to organize their staffs as they deem necessary to carry out their responsibilities. This must be balanced with an understanding of risk in planning for potential contingencies. USSOUTHCOM's lessons are not necessarily directly transferrable. Given potential threats USAFRICOM faces and contingencies that it must be prepared to address, USAFRICOM is best positioned to review and apply relevant lessons, which we know they are doing.

Interagency coordination takes time and work to develop the appropriate habits of cooperation. The GAO reported that USSOUTHCOM Joint Interagency Task Force – South (JIATF-S) officials said it took twenty years for the organization to evolve to become the model of interagency collaboration. I am highly confident that USAFRICOM has the right leadership, motivation, and orientation to become a model of effective collaboration in its own right.

Concluding Observations

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM's innovative approaches to partnering epitomize DoD's commitment to improve our effectiveness in working together with interagency partners. Yes, experiments may lead to disappointments as well as surprises, and we always need to be ready to absorb hard lessons and rectify shortfalls when they occur. We also need to remember, as Secretary Gates once counseled, that everything we do must be

"suffused with strong doses of modesty and realism."[3] Bureaucratic myopia and stove-piping don't suddenly disappear. What we must do is find practical ways for working together on issues that span traditional civilian and military portfolios, while striving to optimize those factors that are within our control so as to improve our collective approach to national security.

Thank you again for this opportunity to speak. I welcome your questions.

[3] Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, The Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, February 24, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. Countryman.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS COUNTRYMAN

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to share State's perspectives on AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. We are very happy to be with these two colleagues, who are constant partners of Assistant Secretary Shapiro and the rest of our team in working on security assistance, policy, and reform.

In my 20 years of working with DOD in various capacities, I must say I have never seen a better level of communication and cooperation between Defense and State than I see today. This is not just led from the top by Secretaries Clinton and Gates, but it extends through all levels of both organizations and has been nurtured by our common experience on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the State Department lead on strategic policy issues with DOD, my Bureau has been intimately involved in the standup of AFRICOM and the transformation of SOUTHCOM into an interagency oriented organization. We co-chaired working groups with the Africa and Western Hemisphere Bureaus to help guide OSD on the impact of these changes to our institutional relationships, as well as to our regional policies.

State still needs to work out some complex issues with DOD concerning AFRICOM's mission and activities, but the combatant command is still young and is rapidly gaining experience and strength.

After General Ward took command, AFRICOM welcomed our input and developed a mission statement that aligns its military operations in unambiguous support of U.S. foreign policy.

One of our active Ambassadors serves as the deputy to the commander for civil-military activities, an unprecedented role that ensures high-level participation in AFRICOM's plans and partnering activities. And we have placed an additional, by the end of this year, 11 Foreign Service Officers to serve as POLADs, foreign policy advisors, or in the directorates of the commands.

We already see great success at the operational level. Within State, I lead the diplomatic efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, which AFRICOM has strongly supported. We worked together with AFRICOM on the African Partnership Station, and also their African maritime law enforcement partnership, which are developing our partner's maritime and legal enforcement capabilities.

While AFRICOM was forming, SOUTHCOM was reforming. Arguably, SOUTHCOM's interagency focus has been more forward leaning than the typical geographic command as they look to support State- and AID-led activities in rule of law, counter-narcotics, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. SOUTHCOM also turned the State POLAD into a civilian deputy to the commander, giving him responsibility over strategic planning, security cooperation, public affairs, strategic communications, and outreach to NGO's and business.

Again, we have 11 Foreign Service Officers by this fall assigned to SOUTHCOM. Their interagency outreach and cooperation was

critical to SOUTHCOM's ability to respond to Haiti's devastating earthquake.

We continue to work with all the combatant commands, to align their vast resources and capabilities behind policies and activities led by the State Department and other civilian agencies, including rule of law development, military assistance, and others. In the vast majority of cases it is not a problem, but, of course, as you see in the GAO study, there are times when foreign and defense policies and approaches do not rapidly and cleanly mesh. This doesn't alarm me; I am rather used to it. I might be more worried if our cultures were so identical that we agreed on everything instantly.

What we try to insure is that misinformation is not the cause of any misalignment in our policy approaches. We are doing all we can to encourage full and free exchange of information between the Department and combatant commands at all levels.

A key aspect is exchange tours, providing opportunities for State and DOD officers to fill positions in the other organizations. We have expanded the POLAD program from 20 officers 5 years ago to more than 80 today, and we look forward to signing a new MOU with the Defense Department that will set a new goal of exchanging 110 officers in each direction each year.

As Dr. Schear said, this is not a substitute, but it is a facilitator of interagency cooperation.

I will stop here, Mr. Chairman, and again thank you for the opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Countryman follows:]

Statement by
Thomas Countryman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State

before the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee Oversight and Government Reform

on
National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM

July 28, 2010

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, Distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) to share with you the Department of State's perspectives and direct experience with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). I am pleased to be seated next to colleagues from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense with whom our Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro meets almost weekly to review security assistance policy and reform.

Let me note that, in my 20 years of working with DoD in various capacities, I have never seen a better level of communication and cooperation between State and DoD. This is not only led from the top – by Secretaries Clinton and Gates – but extends through all levels of both organizations, nurtured by our common experience on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our Role and the GAO Report

As the Department of State lead on global strategic policy matters with the Department of Defense (DoD), the PM Bureau has been intimately involved in the stand-up of AFRICOM and the transformation of SOUTHCOM into what they were calling an "interagency oriented organization."

We co-chaired, with the African Affairs Bureau, an internal working group to offer guidance to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) well before AFRICOM officially was born. We later co-chaired with the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau a similar working group to work with SOUTHCOM on its reform issues. In both instances, we shared the chair with the regional bureaus so they could consider the impact of the Combatant Command changes on regional policies while PM reviewed the institutional consequences.

To support the GAO reports your subcommittee commissioned on AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, bureau representatives met with the GAO to provide early guidance on the assumptions and again before releasing its recommendations. Ultimately, we concurred with both reports, believing they captured the issues well.

First and foremost, allow me to say that we fully support the missions and efforts of AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM. These are outstanding institutions where we interact regularly with quality professionals who contribute to U.S. national security largely by helping our foreign partners bring security, stability, and even humanitarian assistance to Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

AFRICOM

In the case of AFRICOM, the GAO rightfully acknowledges that its report assesses the performance of a COCOM that is not even two years old. It documents challenges with AFRICOM's public rollout before the Combatant Command had clearly defined its mission or decided whether it should be headquartered in Africa.

After General Ward took command, AFRICOM welcomed the Department of State's input and furthered developed its mission statement to where it now states it will work with other U.S. government agencies through military programs, activities, and operations to support security engagement and U.S. foreign policy. On finding a permanent location for AFRICOM's headquarters, Secretary Gates opted to defer the decision until AFRICOM established itself, built its operations, and became more comfortably known to our African partners.

We believe AFRICOM has taken considerable strides to reach out to the interagency as it develops. In 2006, DoD invited a multifaceted team from various bureaus in State and USAID to help clarify the mission and structure of the newest command. In 2007, AFRICOM appointed one of our active ambassadors to serve

as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, an unprecedented role that ensures high-level State participation in planning activities aimed at partnering with African states to develop their security capacity. Since the assignment of the first Foreign Policy Advisor, or POLAD, to AFRICOM in 2008, we have provided eleven additional Foreign Service Officers to the Command and its components. Currently, State provides to AFRICOM a Deputy to the Commander, a POLAD to the Commander, five POLADS to component commanders, and – starting this year – five mid-level officers to work in various Directorates of the Command.

We already are beginning to see great success at the operational level. I lead, for the U.S. government, diplomatic efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. AFRICOM temporarily provided a ship to conduct operations off the Horn of Africa, which offered assistance in transferring pirate suspects as decided by interagency processes, and counter-piracy reconnaissance and surveillance with unmanned air assets (UAVs) based out of Seychelles. Also, CJTF-HOA facilities in Djibouti frequently are used to fulfill logistics requirements for operational units. Our POLADs at CENTCOM and AFRICOM have been coordinating closely on sensitive counter-piracy operational issues.

Our collaboration with AFRICOM in maritime security issues is a good example of a true partnership. We continue to work together to evolve U.S. maritime engagement in Africa from one of individual, isolated efforts to a more comprehensive and sustained approach. Early and close collaboration for programs such as the Africa Partnership Station and Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership contributes to a whole-of-government approach.

The Africa Partnership Station is a strategic program designed to build the skills, expertise, and professionalism of African militaries, coast guards, and mariners. We actively work with AFRICOM in all phases of this very successful and well received program, including planning and execution. AFRICOM also conducts the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, which is a combined operation between the U.S. Coast Guard and host nation law enforcement detachments that deploy from U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels to support enforcement of the host nation's maritime domain.

Our programs are developing our partners' maritime enforcement capabilities to: better respond to piracy, illegal fishing, illegal dumping, illegal immigration, terrorist activity, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and persons; protect their natural resources; and participate in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, and stability operation initiatives. Our collective efforts

continue to develop and support a comprehensive approach that encompasses maritime governance, criminal justice, defense, safety and security, response, and the economy.

AFRICOM is actively contributing to the Global Peace Operations Initiative, or GPOI, by providing military mentors and trainers on the African continent to supplement contract peacekeeping trainer teams provided under the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, as well as leading specialized training activities such as counter- improvised explosive device (IED) training for units deploying to Somalia. The range of AFRICOM-led training activities under GPOI is also expanding to include training and technical assistance to the African Union and regional standby brigades. Both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have full-time government personnel and full-time contractors dedicated to the planning, management, and execution of GPOI-funded programs.

Finally, AFRICOM is actively participating in broader USG efforts to combat sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and AFRICOM has provided funds for military training and construction of health facilities in DRC, complementing current State and AID efforts.

SOUTHCOM

While AFRICOM was forming, SOUTHCOM was reforming. Arguably, SOUTHCOM's interagency focus has been far more forward-leaning than AFRICOM's. SOUTHCOM looked to support State and USAID-led activities in rule of law development, and countering narcotics and criminal gangs, as well as in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

To genuinely empower his role, SOUTHCOM dual-hatted our POLAD into a Civilian Deputy to the Commander. His presence, as a senior diplomat with considerable regional expertise, enables SOUTHCOM to take into account a broader range of cross-cultural factors in its planning and implementation of activities. As Civilian Deputy, Ambassador Paul Trivelli has been tasked by the Commander with oversight of strategic planning, security cooperation policy, public affairs, strategic communications and outreach to the NGO and business communities.

The number of POLADs at SOUTHCOM has increased to eleven positions, expanding our ability to interact with SOUTHCOM headquarters and its Component Commands. Our POLADS are performing invaluable work – as both

"action officers" and advisors – in such areas as sensitizing their Commands to the cultural and political "pitfalls" of the countries of the region, aligning embassy and COCOM priorities and programs, and shaping the Combatant Command's humanitarian assistance programs. POLADs also help draw together diplomacy, development, and defense – the "3Ds"— by working collaboratively with USAID Senior Development Advisors on situations such as development, humanitarian crises, and peacekeeping operations. Their interagency outreach was critical to SOUTHCOM's ability to successfully undertake Operation Unified Response following Haiti's devastating January 2010 earthquake.

ADDRESSING CHALLENGES

As with all Combatant Commands, we continue to work to align SOUTHCOM's and AFRICOM's vast resources and capabilities behind policies and activities properly led by civilian agencies, whether rule of law development or even military assistance. In the vast majority of cases, combatant commands will support implementation of foreign policies by the State Department. But there are instances when our foreign and defense policies do not cleanly mesh. This is not necessarily an alarming occurrence as one should expect healthy differences between our mission sets, if not our culture. Indeed, I might be more worried if we agreed all the time!

In such cases, however, we do try to ensure that misinformation is not the cause of any misalignment. We encourage free and full exchanges of information between the State Department and Combatant Commands at all levels, recognizing that it is basic to any whole-of-government effort. When policy issues do arise, we ensure that OSD is looped in and leads for DoD so the issue can be properly settled here in Washington. We have seen this occur more frequently with AFRICOM, but we understand and appreciate that the Combatant Command is young and still gaining experience.

Exchange tours – i.e., opportunities for State and DoD officers to fill a position in the other organization – are valuable not only for the organizations in which they serve, but for the overall strength of both Departments, and for the professional development of the officers. We have expanded the POLAD program from 20 officers five years ago to more than 80 today. We have concluded a new MOU with DoD that sets a new goal of exchanging 110 officers in each direction each year; this has been signed at State, and we look forward to it being approved by DoD as soon as possible.

We must be careful to ensure that such assignments are not seen as a substitute for interagency coordination, but as a means to facilitate coordination and improve policy formulation. A mid-level State officer assigned to a component commander cannot give "State Department approval" to a particular proposal, anymore than a Colonel assigned to an office in State can give approval on behalf of all of DoD.

An enduring solution to de-conflicting policy differences is through interagency planning and increased State participation in DoD planning processes so we can all anticipate and address where our intent and activities might diverge. Robust participation in DoD planning processes helps to ensure we are aware of and address such differences early on. My Bureau coordinated State participation in the development of AFRICOM's and SOUTHCOM's Theater Campaign Plans, ensuring their strategic planning documents were fully informed of U.S. foreign policy objectives and State Department activities. The State Department has established planning relationships and joint exercises with AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and other Combatant Commands to ensure whole-of-government reconstruction and stabilization planning efforts. The Joint Staff has been very helpful in opening opportunities for State participation in combatant command planning processes.

I participated myself last year in AFRICOM's security assistance planning conference. As the GAO report notes, the range of funding sources for assistance is wide and complex; it can be confusing for military personnel as well as State personnel. I agree with the report that it is important to build up an expertise within the Command on the major security assistance programs managed by State (particularly FMF and IMET), and on the appropriate coordination and division of labor in areas such as counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, where State, DoD, and law enforcement agencies each have specific programs and responsibilities.

In conclusion, I would agree that the creation of AFRICOM was a very good idea. Our relationship and coordination with them continues to trend in a positive direction. With SOUTHCOM, we have always had an excellent relationship. If you were to ask me if much had changed since moving to directorates and then back to the J-code system, I would say not. That relationship steadily trends very positively. The big difference with SOUTHCOM is the increasing number of interagency personnel embedded in and helping to guide SOUTHCOM activities in support of State Department policies and activities. We see that continuing to improve as the program becomes more institutionalized.

In our view, the Department of State and USAID are reaching levels of consultation, cooperation, and collaboration with the Department of Defense not seen previously. With the challenges we face today, effective collaboration is essential, and we will continue to develop and leverage improved means of communication to ensure our collective efforts are mutually supporting and reinforcing.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.
Ms. Reichle.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN REICHLE

Ms. REICHLE. Chairman Tierney, distinguished members of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this afternoon for this hearing with members who I collaborate on a daily basis with in the Department of State and Department of Defense, and also to really commend the work that the GAO has done. It is really outstanding to see the amount of work that went into a very intense review.

The purpose of my remarks is two-fold: first, to explain why we in the development community believe that an integrated U.S. Government approach to crisis prevention, humanitarian response, and instability is critical; and, second, to outline the steps that we have taken in the U.S. Agency for International Development to make such collaboration possible.

Within the three D's national security construct of diplomacy, development, and defense, USAID's collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense is essential to promoting and protecting national security. While the civ-mil relationship actually stretches back to the 1960's, it took on new urgency following major disasters.

USAID posted its first Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Advisor to PACOM back in 1994 at the request of the PACOM commander because of a cyclone that struck Bangladesh and the response. An OFDA advisor in a similar situation was assigned to SOUTHCOM following Hurricane Mitch, the response in 1998. And by 2008, USAID OFDA had advisors in each of the combatant commands, and I think that really represents, obviously, the ramp-up and the importance that we saw in coordinating with the combatant commands.

Soon after September 11th, the Agency also made a decision to significantly enhance its ability to influence the COCOMs. Although USAID's Senior Foreign Service Corps was shrinking actually at the time, USAID's leadership recognized the importance of creating new senior development advisor positions, SDAs, in each of the COCOMs. These were envisioned as officers who could address the nexus between defense and development required in addressing a range of issues.

Around this same time, the Agency recognized the importance of establishing an Office of Military Affairs. As this Military Affairs office began to staff up in 2006, one of its primary responsibilities was strengthening coordination between the COCOMs, USAID regional bureaus, and our missions around the world. As a result of these advances in recent years to strengthen civ-mil coordination, we are better placed to share lessons learned and leverage interagency expertise to further national security and improve development outcomes.

DOD's SOUTHCOM and Africa Command are two excellent examples of this partnership. I had the opportunity to witness firsthand the important role of SOUTHCOM in promoting interagency coordination while serving as the USAID Mission Director in Colombia. The Embassy's integrated approach was fully supported by

SOUTHCOM as we collectively worked across the interagency to tackle Colombia's illicit narcotics production and trafficking.

The interagency coordination was supplemented by a close working relationship within the entire interagency, but, most importantly, with our Colombian counterparts on a clear-hold-build strategy, to regain territory controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, often known as the FARC.

The statistics are impressive and it really demonstrates the impact of an integrated approach supported at all levels. Since 2002, kidnappings, homicides, and terrorist attacks decreased by 90, 45, and 71 percent respectively nationwide, and development indicators significantly increased.

The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th is another example of critical importance of interagency collaboration. The response effort represents the most broadly and deeply integrated humanitarian operation abroad in U.S. history. The Haiti earthquake response was built upon years of investing in developing existing processes for USAID-DOD collaboration. As the USAID administrator's coordinator of the Haiti disaster response effort, I can personally attest to the intense coordination that took place between SOUTHCOM and USAID in response to this earthquake, and I am happy to describe that in much more detail.

AFRICOM provides another example where strong interagency partnership from its inception has advanced U.S. national security interests. We support and emphasize this crucial core function of AFRICOM in the interagency. At the same time, there are many other areas where USAID and AFRICOM work closely and effectively together.

Perhaps the best example of USAID's affect upon the command, and I can talk extensively about how we were involved in the AFRICOM development, but there is one example I would like to share with you today that I think really does capture the essence of our relationship.

We had a representative in AFRICOM's humanitarian assistance office who helped reshape the provision of AFRICOM's assistance to be more effective. Her efforts were actually recognized when she won an award from the American Foreign Service Association for her contributions to dialog about the Defense Department programs in the area of women's health; therefore, she was able to help them strategically use their expertise in AFRICOM in a way that better served our overall national security interest.

While USAID has had to adopt new approaches to deal with stabilization activities, DOD has also begun to adopt many key approaches used by USAID. For example, the concepts of sustainability and capacity building are becoming central themes of DOD's efforts worldwide.

We still have a lot of work to do in this area but, in short, we all need to work together, as no one agency has the tools, resources, or approaches to deal alone with the emerging threats.

In conclusion, we have made tremendous progress and we have learned valuable lessons over these recent years, where I think each of our institutions have built up these capabilities, and this only reaffirms our commitment to continue interagency collaboration.

Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Reichle follows:]

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Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
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Before the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
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"National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM"

Introduction

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this timely hearing with my colleagues from the Department of Defense and Department of State whom I work with on a regular basis. The purpose of my remarks is twofold: First, to explain why we in the development community believe that an integrated U.S. Government approach to crisis prevention, humanitarian response and instability is critical; and second, to outline the steps we have taken at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to make such collaboration possible.

The Agency recognizes the limits of focusing on development alone, particularly in countries at risk of instability. As a result, we are directing more attention and resources to combat the threat of violent extremism, insurgency, and the effect of international criminal networks in order to promote peace and security. USAID plays a critical role with others in the U.S. Government interagency community to combat these challenges.

Within the "3Ds" national security construct of Diplomacy, Development and Defense, USAID's collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense is essential to promoting and protecting national security. Instability and conflict created by man-made and natural disasters are among the biggest obstacles to development. There is an enormous synergy to be

realized from combining USAID development expertise with Department of Defense capabilities to give leverage to the Department of State's diplomatic leadership

While the civilian-military relationship stretches back to the 1960s, it took on new urgency following major disasters. USAID posted its first Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) advisor to the Pacific Command (PACOM) in 1994 at the request of PACOM leadership, following a major cyclone response in Bangladesh. After the experience of coordinating USAID and DoD efforts in response to Hurricane Mitch in Central America, OFDA assigned a full-time advisor to the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in 1999, and by 2008, OFDA had advisors in each of the geographic combatant commands (COCOMs).

Soon after September 11th, the Agency made a decision to significantly enhance its ability to influence the COCOMs. During this period, I was at the National War College and saw first-hand the importance of our engagement with interagency colleagues particularly the Defense Department to ensure policy, operational, and tactical decisions were well informed. Although USAID's Senior Foreign Service corps was shrinking at the time, USAID leadership recognized the importance of creating new senior development advisor positions, or SDAs, in each of the combatant commands. These were envisioned as officers who could address the nexus between defense and development required in addressing a range of issues, including disaster response and threats to stability such as the corrosive effect of transnational criminal networks on stability and governance in the region.

Around the same time that some of us were pressing for increased USAID representation at the COCOMs and at the War Colleges, the Agency recognized the importance of establishing an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in USAID's Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau. As this Military Affairs Office began to staff up in 2006, one of its primary responsibilities was strengthening coordination between COCOMs, USAID regional bureaus, and our missions around the world. This greatly increased USAID's ability to influence theater campaign plans, the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and training USAID staff to work more effectively with DoD. Moreover, OMA has overseen the training of several thousand troops in conflict assessment, programming, and development principles to have a more holistic understanding of the

environment where they are deployed. Finally, OMA has provided DoD with a "one stop shop" for USAID engagement, which was strengthened through the assignment of DOD personnel to OMA.

As a result of these advances in recent years, both organizations are better placed to share lessons and experiences and leverage interagency expertise to further national security and improve development outcomes. DoD's Southern Command and Africa Command are two excellent examples of this partnership.

Southern Command

The challenges faced in Latin America and the Caribbean require a comprehensive interagency approach, and the link among DOD, USAID and the Department of State is critical. SOUTHCOM was among the first geographic commands to reshape itself as a combatant command with interagency presence and has since led the way in civilian–military coordination. By reorganizing itself along functional lines rather than the traditional military approach, it enabled USAID to engage more easily and effectively to achieve our joint goals in the hemisphere. While our first senior development advisor did not arrive at SOUTHCOM until 2008, USAID was an integral player at SOUTHCOM as the command was reorganized. USAID missions throughout the hemisphere worked closely with SOUTHCOM on a range of issues, from combating illicit transnational trafficking and crime to humanitarian missions and disaster preparedness. As U.S. Southern Command began reshaping itself as an interagency-oriented organization, both SOUTHCOM and USAID began to increase its joint engagement across Latin America, including Colombia.

I witnessed first-hand the important role of SOUTHCOM in promoting interagency coordination while serving as the USAID Director in Colombia. The Embassy's integrated approach was fully supported by SOUTHCOM as we collectively worked together and across the interagency to tackle Colombia's illicit narcotics production and trafficking. Recognizing the importance of this relationship, we established a position in the USAID mission to serve as a liaison with SOUTHCOM and ensure counternarcotics activities were integrated and sequenced with our interagency colleagues. The interagency coordination was supplemented by our close working relationship with our other interagency and Colombian partners on a "clear-hold-build" strategy to regain territory controlled by the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC. The statistics are impressive and demonstrate the impact of an integrated approach supported at all levels. Since 2002, kidnappings, homicides and terrorist attacks decreased by 90, 45 and 71 percent (based on Colombian Ministry of Defense statistics), respectively, nationwide and development indicators improved significantly. In the Macarena area where the strategy was first developed, coca cultivation has plummeted by 85 percent since 2005 with minimal replanting, 45,000 hectares of legal crops have been planted in secured zones to replace the illegal economy, and the local population increasingly believes that civilian institutions will remain. Moreover, nationwide statistics indicate that 60 percent of Colombians now support and respect political institutions.

The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th is another example of the critical importance of interagency collaboration. The response effort represents the most broadly and deeply integrated humanitarian operation abroad in U.S. history. SOUTHCOM's interagency orientation and the close cooperation between our organizations were pivotal to the U.S. Government response. The Haiti earthquake response was built upon years of investing in developing existing processes for USAID-DoD collaboration, as well as over a decade of working together in SOUTHCOM on humanitarian relief efforts. As the USAID Administrator's coordinator of the Haiti disaster response effort, I can personally attest to the intense coordination that took place between SOUTHCOM and USAID in response to the devastating earthquake. While I spoke to the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Fraser, several times a day for several months, colleagues at all levels were communicating to ensure coordination of SOUTHCOM's support operations. As SOUTHCOM surged the number of staff supporting *Operation Unified Response*, we increased USAID staff in the command. The Haiti earthquake response is an excellent example of the impact and critical nature of contributing to interagency collaboration through a combatant command. As a result of years of investment in greater civilian-military coordination, we were able to respond much more effectively.

While Colombia and Haiti demonstrate what can be achieved through an effective partnership, we recognize the need for a more consolidated USAID-SOUTHCOM approach to addressing stability targets in the region, such as in the Darien region of Panama and the tri-border area of Paraguay. USAID is working closely with SOUTHCOM to identify issues and countries for Section 1207 funding proposals this year and to review national

cooperation targets and assess feedback and lessons from past 1207 programs. Looking forward, USAID will engage similarly productive collaboration with SOUTHCOM to implement programs under the Complex Crises Fund, which replaces Section 1207 authorities in the FY 2011 Budget.

At the country team level within our embassies in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is now closer consultation between military representatives and USAID staff, particularly in the preparation of medical ship visits. This partnership ensures support for host government capacity building, and in the setting of medical readiness exercises to support USAID health sector objectives. In Colombia, I had the opportunity to participate in three medical ship visits and saw the tremendous impact of these visits when the planning is well coordinated with local partners long before the ship sets sail.

Africa Command

The Africa Command, or AFRICOM, provides another example of where strong interagency partnership from its inception has advanced U.S. national security interests. Beginning in 2007, USAID staff in Africa was engaged in helping DOD plan U.S. Africa Command. As AFRICOM developed from a concept similar to the SOUTHCOM model to an independent command, USAID was engaged with counterparts in the Defense Department at every step in the process. AFRICOM was intended to bring together U.S. military assets devoted to Africa's security in one unified command, but the mandate and operation of the command were the subject of lively interagency debate prior to its establishment. Our first senior development advisor, assigned to the European Command, or EUCOM, in 2007, was actively involved in the process. Other USAID officers, including senior career and political leadership, helped General Ward and his staff to define AFRICOM's mandate, coordination mechanisms, and civilian roles in the Command, as well as shaping the Command to focus on its central priority of building the capacity of African military institutions. This resulted in the establishment of a USAID senior development advisor position at the command as well as detailing two USAID representatives to the command, one to direct the Programs Division and the other to manage their Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programs and funds. Subsequently, a representative of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance was assigned to the command.

As AFRICOM has stood up and developed its relationships with interagency partners, and senior Command officials have sought to forge strong ties with USAID. Developing capable and rightly-structured militaries in Africa is absolutely essential for Africa's development and stability and AFRICOM plays an important role in enhancing the capacity of Africa's military. We support and emphasize this crucial core function of AFRICOM in the interagency and in discussions in Stuttgart. At the same time, there are other areas where USAID and AFRICOM work closely and effectively together.

AFRICOM leadership has pressed for significant participation and officer exchanges with USAID, in general, for more positions than our small agency can provide. USAID officers in AFRICOM -- at the level of the Commander, the Plans and Program Directorate, and Disaster Response unit -- have both helped "shape" this new Command and improved the Command's civil affairs and humanitarian programs and their intended audience, and interagency collaboration in strategic, conflict-prone areas, and in disaster response.

Perhaps the best example of USAID's effect upon the Command has been where AFRICOM's office overseeing funding for development projects or what the military refers to as "humanitarian assistance," our representative has repeatedly proven the value of having a development advisor in this position. That officer has reshaped the provision of AFRICOM humanitarian assistance to be more effective and sustainable based on AFRICOM's expertise in this area. Most recently, her efforts were recognized when she won a "dissent" award from the American Foreign Service Association for her contribution to the dialogue about the Defense Department's proposed programs in the area of women's health. USAID also actively participates in logistics cooperation training which illustrates a cohesive approach to coordination at all levels.

A number of country-specific examples of USAID and AFRICOM cooperation should be noted:

- In Sudan, we engaged in shared planning on post-referendum development including conflict and security assessment of roads and local government programs;
- In Liberia, we have collaborated with the Department of State and AFRICOM on a holistic approach to justice and security sector reform;

- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, USAID and DoD undertook joint planning of community-level development in the conflict-prone eastern region with a focus on areas around military bases;
- In Ethiopia, we have developed a collaborative working relationship between a USAID-funded conflict mitigation program and AFRICOM and a Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa civil affairs and humanitarian programs; and
- In Senegal and Cape Verde, we engaged in joint planning between the USAID and World Bank regional fisheries program and the AFRICOM maritime activities.

General Coordination

While USAID has had to adopt new approaches to deal with stabilization activities, DoD has also begun to adopt key approaches used by USAID. For example, the concepts of sustainability and capacity building are becoming central themes of DoD's efforts worldwide. We must aim to help countries build governments which promote democratic principles and can outlast, endure and dominate local threats. Indeed our recent analytical work identifying the drivers of violent extremism has been welcomed and widely used by interagency military and civilian partners. A USAID strategy, while enhancing legitimacy of a country's government must also empower the lowest levels of government, must be led by host country nationals, and must foster indigenous desire to open up societies. To be effective we must ensure that we:

1. Recognize that host country leadership is critical to our success;
2. Ensure that we have access to the kinds of resources that allow for flexible and robust responses, including Complex Crises Funding;
3. Ensure that there are adequate numbers of trained, flexible personnel in both USAID and DoD to respond to the wide variety of challenges that we face.

In addition, there are well-established development lessons that are key to success:

1. Strengthen the capacity of weak states to deliver services and build legitimate institutions;

2. Improve security locally by complementing military assistance with assistance to police and civilian oversight bodies, including the judiciary;
3. Focus on poverty reduction and employment creation programs, especially for young people and marginalized populations;
4. Understand the works and ideas of Muslim moderates; engage moderate Islamic parties and reformers who seek to promote democratic ideas based on social and political issues; and
5. Balance attention to immediate threats (Iraq and Afghanistan) with a longer-term view that addresses emerging threats (Horn of Africa, South Asia, Yemen, Sahel).

Our strategies must be implemented in an environment of learning and adaptation, and with an eye to increased collaboration and joint planning with our interagency partners, including the Department of Defense.

Since 2006, USAID has been an active participant in DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The congressionally mandated QDR directs DoD to undertake a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources. Participation in the QDR process gives USAID an opportunity to influence the reorientation of DoD's strategy and capabilities for addressing future challenges.

At the strategic level, USAID also participates in the development and review of DoD's Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the Pentagon's highest-level planning guidance document, first issued in 2008 and updated every two years.

USAID is moving to ensure our participation in the development of Combatant Commands' Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). USAID has contributed to the preparation of the plans for the peacetime activities of U.S. Southern Command, European Command, Africa Command, Pacific Command, Central Command, and Special Operations Command.

USAID continues to work closely with the Navy and the combatant commands in the design and effective implementation of medical missions and hospital ship visits -- for example, SOUTHCOM'S *Continuing Promise*, PACOM's *Pacific Partnership*, AFRICOM's *Africa Partnership Station* -- around the world, to ensure they focus on capacity building rather than just

the provision of direct medical services. Pacific Partnership 2009, for example, was developed in close collaboration with USAID Washington and overseas mission staff and treated a total of 22,037 patients, the medical team saw 11,248 patients and the dentists saw 4,487 patients. The biomedical repair team assessed 107 pieces of equipment, repairing 77 and performing preventive maintenance on 23.

USAID has a three-year interagency agreement with the Defense Department through which it provides $15 million to DoD for AFRICOM and PACOM to provide planning and training assistance to nations' militaries in their respective regions, in pandemic preparedness. DoD's assistance helps those militaries identify, develop, and execute more supportive and better coordinated roles in their nations' civilian-led multi-sector national pandemic and disaster response plans. USAID has integrated this military-to-military program effort into its larger pandemic preparedness program effort it supports that includes similar capacity-building efforts with developing countries' civilian sectors, nongovernmental organizations, as well as regional and international health and disaster organizations.

USAID is taking concrete steps to train its staff to operate in unstable environments, to adapt USAID programs to address the causes of instability, and to work effectively with the military in the field. In addition to training our own staff, USAID coordinates with interagency partners the training provided every nine months at Camp Atterbury, Indiana to members of future Afghanistan provincial reconstruction teams, focused on civilian-military integration, personal safety, stabilization, and reconstruction.

The challenges associated with conflict, fragile states, post-conflict reconstruction, disaster response, and peace-keeping call for assistance that satisfies immediate needs and simultaneously rebuilds or reinforces the policies, institutions, and infrastructure destroyed by war or natural calamity. Often the causes of instability transcend national borders and call for regional approaches which challenge bilateral donors' ability to develop and implement programs. In short, we all need to work together, as no one agency has the tools, resources or approaches to deal alone with emerging threats. Our aim is to establish the basic foundations so that programs aimed at promoting development and poverty reduction can be effective. To this end, we along with our colleagues at the Departments of Defense and State are engaged in development of new tools and tactics for operating in these environments. We have made progress and learned valuable lessons in

recent years that only reaffirm our commitment to continued interagency collaboration.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.

We have sort of a basic premise. It seems that everybody is pretty much in agreement that an integrated approach is a good thing, and we have talked about that in the past, but I keep going back to what troubles me. Maybe I am the only one it troubles, but I really would appreciate your efforts to help me work through it.

If we are going to have an integrated approach, why is the United States leading with the Department of Defense in charge as opposed to leading with diplomacy, having the Department of State or somebody else leading this integrated effort so that it then could bring in whatever agency might be appropriate, USAID, the military, Customs, whatever, and then put together their particular team.

I mean, you have to establish priorities. You have to have leadership that clearly defines the mission, and they will change, as Mr. Pendleton says, depending on what country you are in, what area you are in, which agencies from the United States or the international community might you want to involve, what indigenous groups or NGO's.

Including them all in the planning seems to be a good idea. Having constant transparency and sharing of information, communication, that all seems to be fine. Willingness to share responsibility, sometimes more difficult than others on that, but important. And enough personnel that has training and is up to the task and is up in numbers to get the job done and align all the capacities in complementary ways.

That is all great, but why is the Department of Defense the lead on this in non-contingency operation areas? I understand if we are in Afghanistan. I understand if we are in Iraq. But when we are going into a region like Africa or South America or some place like that where the United States is going out there, why are we leading with our fist as opposed with the diplomatic area and putting a different group in charge to do the same type of interagency planning?

I will give everybody a shot at that. We will start with Mr. Pendleton and work right across the board.

Mr. PENDLETON. I am not sure DOD is in charge literally. I think the fact that the Department of Defense swamps other agencies sometimes gives that perception. AFRICOM is 2 years old, and they already have 4,400 people assigned. Many of those are back in Italy and Germany doing planning.

But even after that we found that a lot of the supporting plans, things that would be at the country level, for example, are not done. That is where a lot of the coordination needs to occur, because all those different organizations have different approaches to planning. DOD tends to take a very broad look. There is a theater campaign plan in place. But the underlying plans are not there, and that is where a lot of that coordination has to happen.

I don't want to compare SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM too much directly because they are different. SOUTHCOM has been around a lot longer, for one thing. But they have 30 objectives in their theater campaign plan, 22 of which are led by agencies other than DOD. So you see, I think, a different level of maturity.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess my problem is what is this a military theater campaign for? We are not attacking Africa. We are not going in on a military basis to be an empire, or at least that is the general perception. But when you put Department of Defense in charge of putting together this interagency or whole-of-government team, certainly the appearance is you see this as some sort of a military campaign and everybody else just fits in somewhere along the line.

Dr. Schear, what is your perspective on that?

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I take your point that certainly in terms of both public perceptions and the centrality of the service delivery platform, if you will, that the fact that it is a DOD-led organization raises genuine questions. And that does cause us to be very careful, especially in what I would say are economy of force theaters, to ensure that everything we say and do supports the notion that we are a supporting, not a leading, organization in there.

Sir, quite frankly the problem we face is an overwhelming desire to be prepared for all contingencies. I will give you exactly the example that confronts us today in Haiti. Up to January 11th, SOUTHCOM, which is about 800 headquarters staff, had very few boots on the ground anywhere, operational boots on the ground, anywhere in its area of responsibility. Three to 4 weeks later it is up to 26,000 deployed in Haiti. That was a major stress test, to put it mildly, for the command. And the command, as GAO has reported, really had to make some major adjustments to cover shortfalls.

Now, the policy prescription I draw from that is that we should not have the 600-pound gorilla, if you will, man-powered up for all contingencies on the high end. The problem we face, though, is the balance between the steady state daily engagement in an economy of force theater versus these big plus-ups, and it is organizationally and, in terms of mission performance—people expect us to succeed at our mission—it is a big challenge to balance that. But that is not to gainsay your point.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think that begs the question. I understand what you are saying. It begs the basic question, sure, but if somebody else were in charge they could still call on the military to scale itself up and address that issue as part of an overall plan and a contingency plan for a larger operation and for going into a particular situation. But I hear what you are saying. I just think that it begs the question of why are we leading with our fist, why are we putting that in.

Whatever you say about wanting to make it look like you are supporting and not leading, you can't sell that to most people who see the way that we have structured this, the way it has been set up, and the way that we are operating it, so it just gets there.

I am going to come back to Mr. Countryman and Ms. Reichle, just in fairness to my colleagues who are here. I will give them their 5 minutes and we will do another cycle on that if I could.

Mr. Quigley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am reading the analysis of the GAO report released today. I am struck with this: AFRICOM's Army component stated that the greatest challenge to creating positive conditions in Africa is ensur-

ing that U.S. Defense efforts remain synchronized. If plans are not coordinated, their efforts could have unintended consequences such as the potential for Africans to perceive the U.S. military as trying to influence public opinion in a region sensitive to the military's presence.

I am curious if you see evidence of this so far, and, without taking it to an extreme, I am hoping this isn't the weaker distant cousin of what one professor calls the accidental gorilla syndrome, that our presence creates problems that overwhelm and create greater problems than we tried to solve.

Mr. PENDLETON. I think that points to two things. One is the lack of the supporting plans for the components. If you get below the Africa Command, each of the services, the Special Operations Command, have their own headquarters. There is also a joint task force in Djibouti. So the first thing DOD needs to do is make sure they know what each other is doing.

Then there is the question of, in some of these very complicated, potentially controversial activities, like there is a Web site that tries to provide objective information, news information. People are sensitive to that, and that requires very, very careful coordination, then, outside the Department. So it is a multi-layered problem.

Our report talks about the need to fill in that planning, but there are a couple of places where it can, I think, go wrong.

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I think I would just add to the point that the service that is provided does carry with it an obligation to make sure that we are appropriately postured in a supporting role. Now, the perceptions may vary considerably from country to country. If we, DOD, do something that has an unintended consequence, that is not sustainable—if we build a school which has no teachers in it 6 months or a year from now, or a road that leads to nowhere, or, you know, we drill a well that costs five times what it would cost a civilian relief provider—we are not doing our job. And we would take, I think, absolute guidance from the experts who know when and how we should perform these activities.

Now, in Capital X or Capital Y my guess is the U.S. Embassy country team is somewhat more visible in terms of U.S. presence than a combatant commander, say, in Miami or in Honolulu or Stuttgart, but I grant that, in terms of the operational level between the strategic Washington level and the tactical country level, there is this operational level which DOD inhabits. We try very much to inhabit it with other partners, and it is driven by operational concerns: the phone that rings in the morning and we have to go do a must-do mission.

Sorry for rambling, sir.

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Yes, sir. A couple comments. Perhaps having to work for the first time with the military, I like to tell them that there are two fantastic assets that working with the military can bring to an American embassy. First, that our military is creative and action oriented, and, second, that it can, depending upon the purpose, bring forward far greater resources of money and personnel than other civilian agencies are capable of doing. Neither of those is an unmixed blessing.

The energy and the creativeness is usually welcome. It has to be tempered with the realistic assessment of whether, to take the ex-

ample of AFRICOM, whether this particular creative idea that has some people and some resources behind it is appropriate in this particular country environment. There, the challenge is always to make sure that communication is flowing adequately between the Ambassador and his or her country team and the people in AFRICOM and Stuttgart or in a component command of AFRICOM who are working on that creative idea.

The vast majority of cases it works well, communication is flowing. You can find a couple of cases, and I believe they are mentioned in the GAO report, where that coordination was not sufficient in advance. I think we are getting to resolve those issues.

If I could, I will follow that thought with a response to the chairman's question that I don't believe all the action is in the regional combatant commands. Again, having led a large embassy overseas, we like to say and we truly believed that an embassy-country team is the place where the interagency process really works, because we are small enough, we know each other, we trust each other, we can integrate the roles of the different agencies represented in an embassy into an effective interagency process. And country by country we have well-integrated and well-understood plans that the Ambassador leads on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Now, that is a different level of planning than you see at CENTCOM or AFRICOM. It is a different level of planning than you see in State. But, in fact, if we are doing our job well, the CENTCOM regional plan should represent well the insights of the planning that is done country team by country team across the continent. That same should be true of the bureau by bureau regional plans produced in State as a summation of the country planning process that is done in each embassy.

So if you focus on a continent at a time, it is very easy to see or to say that AFRICOM has the lead rather than civilian agencies. If you look one country at a time, I think you might not have the same perception.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for your comments. I am going to move on to Ms. Chu. But I am telling you, that was, and I don't mean this in a disrespectful way, a lot of bureaucratic talk, but it is what it is. It can't be several different things and everybody can't be doing the same thing, but you are telling us it is happening differently, but I will get back to it when it is my turn.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I agree. I just want to say, and I thank you for your indulgence, it is what the public there perceives it to be.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Ms. Chu, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pendleton, you say in your report that the Haiti response revealed weaknesses in SOUTHCOM's organizational structure, and you give a couple of examples, but could you talk in more detail about that? And especially in how it affected the victims of Haiti.

Mr. PENDLETON. You know, we didn't find any evidence that it actually affected the victims. We thought it was instructive, though, because in 2008 the transformation of SOUTHCOM's headquarters away from the military's J-structure where they have J–1 personnel, J–2 intelligence, and the like, was one of DOD's top

transformation priorities. It was viewed as this was the way of the future. We were going to put interagency personnel in critical jobs and kind of change the way these COCOMs operated.

When the earthquake happened and the relatively small headquarters in Miami there had to go to 24-hour-day, 7-day-a-week operations, not only did they not have the people to man watch; they didn't have enough specialists in things like logistics and other things, and so they had to literally overnight revert back to a J structure because they brought 500 people in to help and they managed to make it work, but we thought it important.

Now, I also appreciate one of the comments made earlier. That doesn't necessarily mean they need to come back with a 1,500-person staff just in case something like that happens. What they need to do is look at the kinds of things they do day-to-day and then have a plan to augment the staff in case an emergency happens. But we found no evidence that it had an impact on the ground.

Ms. CHU. Ms. Reichle.

Ms. REICHLE. Thank you very much. I just wanted to make a couple comments, because I was the USAID Administrator's point person on the Haiti relief effort, and it was very interesting and really useful to see that the GAO found it had no implication, because for our people, who were the lead agency, with the supporting agency being DOD or other interagency players, whether they were in an interagency sort of function within SOUTHCOM or they switched to a J code, as we actually ramped up in SOUTHCOM it had absolutely no impact.

I think, getting to your question about what was the impact most importantly on the ground and the people we served, I think we can be very confident that did not have an impact on the people who were clearly in desperate need.

I just wanted to take an opportunity to address a couple of the questions that were mentioned earlier by the chairman, as well as Congressman Quigley.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don't want to interrupt you, but I will. I am going to give you an opportunity to do that, so if Ms. Chu has a different direction she wants to go in, I want to give her the opportunity to utilize her 5 minutes and then have you answer my question on different time.

Ms. REICHLE. OK.

Ms. CHU. Yes. I wanted to followup on that, because you are saying that there was somewhat of a delay, though, because the personnel wasn't there to perform those particular functions, so was there an issue in that could have affected the victims?

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes. I was involved when we did the work with the military response after Katrina, so I had some experience in hearing about this, and I actually went down myself to Miami to hear about this.

They acted fairly decisively. They were only a few days in when they realized that they just didn't have the people, and it was a fairly, I think, bold stroke to go back, even though they knew people like folks from the GAO might bring it up in a report or something, because it had been changed to great fanfare. But I think there was a realization that there was a mission to do and they needed to shift.

Also, it is important to note they brought 500 people in, people from NORTHCOM and other places. Unlike Katrina, where there was some delay where things were sorted out, we did not find that in this case, ma'am.

Ms. CHU. That is comforting to know, then.

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes.

Ms. CHU. Also, in your testimony you outline three key practices for successful interagency collaboration: developing and implementing over-arching strategies for addressing national security issues; creating mechanisms to facilitate coordination among agencies; and training personnel with interagency expertise. But the list doesn't include sharing information. Do you believe information sharing is important?

Mr. PENDLETON. Absolutely. Back in September we did a broader report, which I would be happy to provide to you, that looked across the government, dozens of our reports, and we bring up information sharing in that. That was mainly for brevity. Absolutely, information sharing is important. We were just picking the areas that we thought were most critical here.

Information sharing in terms of planning I think is very, very important so that the organizations know what each other is planning. You don't want to get in a situation where you are just deconflicting or people are showing up and you are not quite sure why, or having to train people in the local culture, or whatever. That comes back to planning, not only sharing information but planning, as well.

Ms. CHU. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Chu.

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is the budget for SOUTHCOM?

Dr. SCHEAR. We will have to take that and get back to you, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Any idea? Round numbers?

Dr. SCHEAR. Not immediately. No.

Mr. WELCH. What is the budget for AFRICOM?

Mr. PENDLETON. We know that. About 300 million.

Mr. WELCH. You said 300 million?

Mr. PENDLETON. About 300 million. That does not include the joint task force in Djibouti.

Mr. WELCH. And how much is it for AFRICOM?

Mr. PENDLETON. About 300 million.

Mr. WELCH. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are about the same?

Mr. PENDLETON. SOUTHCOM is a little smaller.

Mr. WELCH. So for 300 million we have about 800 personnel deployed in AFRICOM?

Mr. PENDLETON. They are at the headquarters in Stuttgart and with some back in an intel center in the U.K.

Mr. WELCH. And what discussion and consideration do you have about the presence of military-related force that is doing, in some cases, humanitarian work, and how that affects the host country where the work is being done, in terms of their perception of what our agenda is? Mr. Pendleton, we will start with you.

Mr. PENDLETON. We did a report for the subcommittee back in April talking about the efforts of the Combined Joint Task Force

Horn of Africa down in Djibouti, and that did provide some examples of mis-steps.

Mr. WELCH. Like what?

Mr. PENDLETON. For example, there were plans to have a medical event, but the local people were nomadic and there wasn't enough notice given. There were veterinary events that would have required driving cattle and other livestock a long distance. I mean, there are successes, too. I don't want that to drive everything.

Mr. WELCH. But what would you say is our mission in Djibouti, the AFRICOM mission? What is it that we will seek to get done there?

Mr. PENDLETON. Countering violent extremism. It started as a counter-terrorism task force.

Mr. WELCH. And what are the concrete things we do with AFRICOM?

Mr. PENDLETON. It is about 60 percent civil affairs activities now: building schools, drilling wells, that kind of thing. In our report in April, we recommended to the Department that there be some serious consideration given to the mission of the Task Force in Djibouti.

Mr. WELCH. And your recommendation would be that if there is consideration given to the mission, what should be the conclusion, based on your experience?

Mr. PENDLETON. I would leave it to the Department to decide how they want to use their Joint Task Force, but that is a non-doctrinal type of organization—sorry to fall into jargon there, but you don't typically have a joint task force that lasts for a long time.

I would like to allow other folks to talk about this as well, if you don't mind, but when you are doing 60 percent civil affairs and that is being led by the military, that is, I think, fraught with peril, honestly. And it is not inexpensive. It is $230 million or so to keep the base open there, and about $80 million a year for the Task Force, itself. So we just pressed the Department to think about, along with State and others, what is the best role for that Task Force.

Mr. WELCH. OK. Dr. Schear? Thank you.

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you, sir. JTF HOA, as you know, is quite closely connected in terms of both its presence, its mission, its ability to promote access to this region. It is very closely connected to our campaign against violent extremism in that part of Africa. For a definitive read, I think—and I would defer to colleagues at the embassies within the countries that are covered under JTF HOA's area of responsibility, as well as to our counter-terrorism colleagues. I think we would have to bring their perspectives to bear into this very complex discussion.

Humanitarian and civic assistance projects are a means to an end, and I will plead guilty that we are very instrumental in our approach. We have to meet sustainability and effectiveness criteria. If we are throwing money——

Mr. WELCH. With all due respect, I actually don't understand what you just said. If what we are talking about is humanitarian assistance that is going to be, let's say, a school——

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes.

Mr. WELCH [continuing]. If you are living in that village where the school is to be built, do you have some questions when the people who are building the school show up in military uniforms, armed, versus Peace Corps style volunteers who show up unarmed and with some equipment?

Dr. SCHEAR. There may be questions. I think that would depend on——

Mr. WELCH. There may be?

Dr. SCHEAR. It will depend on the civil military socio-culture within the country affected whether a local person views that as abnormal or not, sir. I am not——

Mr. WELCH. You don't have a conclusion about that?

Dr. SCHEAR. I don't have a definitive conclusion. I think it would depend very much on civil military relations within the affected country.

Mr. WELCH. OK. Ms. Reichle, how about you?

Ms. REICHLE. Thank you. I think in these environments it is really critical that we work together to make sure that our presence is actually much more in the background, because it is about developing the local capacity.

Mr. WELCH. That would suggest a light footprint.

Ms. REICHLE. Exactly. And I think that is one of the things that we have tried to do in our integrated approach. In my testimony I try to highlight, after my 4 years in Colombia, very much as we were working across the board of DOD, Department of State, USAID, and other interagency players, that we were in the background, and the most important thing is that the host country, as well as the change agents within the local society, were out in front. And so you are absolutely correct: it does make a difference whether or not we show up and whether we are in uniforms or whether we show up at all.

Mr. WELCH. Yes. I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Welch is color blind. He has a tendency not to see the red.

What I want to do is I want to go around again. Stick around. I am going to go around again. We are going to get as far into another round as we can, and then we will break so you don't have to come back afterwards.

I am sort of stunned at the willingness of the Department of State and USAID and all those people to just let DOD take away what always used to be civilian capacity on here. It looks like we have hollowed out State, we have hollowed out USAID, and we built up the Department of Defense.

So if you go into a country and you tell them that you want to help them with the development and you want to help them with the rule of law, their capacity for governance, civil society, all these things that we think we want, that used to be our way of diplomatically telling a country that we want to get in there and help them.

Now we go in and say, we are here to help, here is our military. These guys with guns are coming in because really it is a counterterrorism operation. We see this whole thing as we are in there for our own self-interest to protect us against the fact that maybe terror will establish a root here or something. It is a whole different

message. And who shows up wearing what uniform should matter to us.

One thing is the culture of the places where you are going, but it should matter to us, our culture. Our culture is not to be a military organization that goes out there and starts jumping into all these countries and saying we are going to do this military operation because it is us we are worried about. There is a place for that, but I don't think it is in the lead of going in there. That is the fundamental question I keep trying to get back to.

I know, Dr. Schear, you say you could make it work. Of course you could make it work. The question is: should we make that work or should we make the proper model work so that if your goal is to have a whole government thing put the right people in charge of it, and whatever the role for the military is, it is. You probably wouldn't need a base the size of the one you have in Germany and a base the size of the one you have in Djibouti. How many Department of Defense military and civilian employees in AFRICOM? And what is their ratio compared to all of the employees?

Dr. SCHEAR. I believe, sir, there are about 1,500 in the AFRICOM command. I don't know how the sizing was done, perhaps related to over 50 countries in the area of responsibility, as distinct from SOUTHCOM, which is about 30. But I can't give you a definitive answer.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, we have had that at previous hearings, overwhelming number of Department of Defense personnel versus personnel from any place else. Overwhelming. And that is why they are out there jumping around into everything and why they show up to do all the civil society stuff and the building, the development, the rule of law. Wrong team, wrong place, wrong approach.

We have to decide what we should be talking about here. We will probably have other hearings about it. Why aren't we building up the capacity for the people to go in there and do all those things non-militarily so that you have the military really playing the supporting role that, Doctor, you are saying you want appear that you are doing that, but, in fact, you are not doing that because, by attrition, the Department of Defense has had to stand up and do all of this because we, Congress, the White House, other policymakers and like that have hollowed out every other competing interest that could be doing it.

And then it is just self-fulfilling prophecy at that. Keep building up the one that is taking the action and narrowing down the ones that aren't. So that is, I guess, the fundamental point I was trying to make at the beginning, not that you are doing something nefarious or you are a bad person for doing it or the Department of Defense is bad. They are filling a gap, and they just keep reinforcing that filling instead of somebody saying, Wait a minute, is that what we want to do?

I will tell you from my travels, my involvement with other government people in different countries, they think we are trying to just go over there with the military and put a foothold in there and it is all about us and we don't give a Fig Newton for any of their concerns or any of their needs, and that is why we get involved in so many of these conflicts in such a bad way that things just fall apart.

So that is all I really want to say about that.

Your testimony, both written and here today, has been helpful for me to try to coalesce those ideas, but I do want your ideas, if you would, at some point. I am perfectly willing to take them afterwards in writing. How are we going to buildup that capacity, nonmilitary capacity, to get the things done that we need to do to reach out to these countries to address the needs that they have because we want to help them, not because we want to set up yet another counter-terrorism foundation?

And then, based on that, how do we restructure AFRICOM or SOUTHCOM, not that we want to do away with AFRICOM or SOUTHCOM. We want to lead them to their supporting role. So what would replace them in the lead role on this? If you would all do that, I would be extremely appreciative.

[The information referred to follows:]

CHARRTS No.: HOGR-06-001
House Government Reform Committee
Hearing Date: July 28, 2010
Subject: "National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM."
Congressman: Congressman Tierney
Witness: Dr. Schear
Question: #1

Question: During the hearing we discussed at some length how to strike the right balance between military and civilian agencies conducting development projects and diplomacy in foreign countries.How can the U.S. increase its non-military capacity to provide civilian aid and assistance to help developing nations?

Answer:

Building our government's civilian capacity to assist developing nations is critical to advancing the United States' security interests. In recognition of this reality, the civilian-led Department of Defense is expanding its capacity to deploy civilians across the globe. For example, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) program recruits, trains, and deploys civilians to assist in a variety of mission sets, such as civil engineering, contracting, and financial administration. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program uses the CEW to send DoD civilians to Afghanistan or Iraq as advisors for up to two years. MoDA provides enduring civilian-to-civilian linkages to assist the Afghan and Iraqi security ministries develop into effective and accountable institutions. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Warsaw Initiative Fund-Defense Institution Building (WIF-DIB) program also focus on building civilian capacity in partner defense institutions. DIRI and WIF-DIB use targeted engagements by subject matter experts, including retired government employees with relevant experience, to help partners in areas like national strategy development, policy, budgets, civil-military relationships, interagency coordination, human resources, logistics, and professional education.

As we discussed in the hearing, it is critical that other agencies be given the resources needed to engage effectively around the globe. DoD's efforts need to be complemented by other agencies with different core competencies to assist developing partners as they create effective and accountable government institutions.

CHARRTS No.: HOGR-06-002
House Government Reform Committee
Hearing Date: July 28, 2010
Subject: "National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM."
Congressman: Congressman Tierney
Witness: Dr. Schear
Question: #2

Question: Please provide the total number of contracting personnel working for SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, and a list of all of the companies that currently have contracts with each command and the jobs they are doing. Additionally, please provide a comparison between the contractors' pay scale and that of government employees working for the commands.

Answer:

The total number of contracted man-years supporting the USSOUTHCOM HQ is: 265

List of all Companies that currently have contracts:

Acquisition Engineering Consultants, Inc.
L3 Services
ARL
Booz Allen and Hamilton
Camber
American Systems
Lockheed Martin
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Jacobs Technology Inc
Northrop Grumman Information Technology
Raytheon Company
Teksouth Corp
MITRE Corp
System Research and Application (SRA)
Chenega Federal Systems
General Dynamics
Intelligence Software Solutions
Integrated Data Services, Inc. (IDS)
Harris Corporation

Jobs being performed by the contractors:

Engineering support
Information Technology support
Software and Website Support
Information Assurance/Computer Defense Support
Training Support
Intelligence system and graphics support
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance analytical support
Joint Intelligence Operations Center maintenance, integration and support
Modeling, Simulations and Analysis Support
Strategic planning and Science and Technology analytical and technical support
Historian support
Logistics and support planning
Financial management tool support

Comparison between the contractor's pay scale and that of government employees working for

the command:
Average cost per year per full-time employee for contract manpower is $130,400. Average comparable Government salary for these jobs (if all skill sets were available) is $137,169.00. (Note that DoD does not keep records on the actual salaries that contractors pay their employees. These figures represent an estimate based on the total contract cost divided by the total estimated work-years for the contracts.)

The total number of contracted man-years supporting the USAFRICOM HQ is: 203

List of all Companies that currently have contracts:

BAE Systems	SRA
Booz Allen Hamilton	Others (with small, individual orders, less than 10 employees each)
Lockheed Martin	

Jobs being performed by the contractors:

Intelligence Analysis	IT Architecture
Analysis & Planning	Network support

Comparison between the contractor's pay scale and that of government employees working for the command:
AFRICOM currently uses an estimate of $275,000 (for FY10) and $300,000 (for FY11) per year per full-time contractor. (This number includes the salary, overhead, housing allowance, school for dependents, transportation, travel, and fluctuations in foreign currency among other things.) Contractor costs range from $150,000-$600,000 per contractor depending upon requirements for currency, reach back, and special skill sets.

The average annual cost for GS employees is $196,110 per year.

Question#:	1
Topic:	balance
Hearing:	National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM
Primary:	The Honorable John F. Tierney
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: The question of how to strike the right balance between military and civilian agencies conducting development projects and diplomacy in foreign countries was discussed at some length during the hearing.

How can the U.S. increase its non-military capacity to provide civilian aid and assistance to help developing nations?

Response: Civil-security tasks like capacity building for disaster preparedness, countering illicit trafficking, and ensuring international border integrity have become increasingly important to the safety and security of the United States and other nations around the world. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) brings unique competencies and substantial capability and capacity to U.S. efforts to implement civil security assistance and training to foreign governments in areas such as: biometrics; border security; counter proliferation; intellectual property rights; document fraud; aviation security; port and maritime security; cargo security; combating bulk cash smuggling and child forced labor; customs enforcement; and fighting human smuggling and trafficking. At its core DHS leverages the Homeland Security enterprise to empower U.S. Agencies and foreign governments to ensure global networks are resilient, safe, and secure. DHS works with the Department of Defense to coordinate and integrate security assistance strategies, and also works with the Department of State to explore the expansion of international partnerships for homeland security-related activities.

Question#:	2
Topic:	nations
Hearing:	National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM
Primary:	The Honorable John F. Tierney
Committee:	OVERSIGHT & GOV RFORM (HOUSE)

Question: It was noted in your statement for the record that it is essential to the Department of Homeland Security mission that other nations have the capacity to carry out a number of civil security functions.

How does the Department of Homeland Security work with other U.S. government agencies to assist with this sort of capacity building for foreign partners?

Response: International engagement is critical to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission in order to identify, interdict, and mitigate threats or hazards at the earliest possible point. In order to deliver the international training and technical assistance critical to the security of our homeland, DHS works collaboratively with the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD). DHS is often prohibited by law from funding its own activities overseas and thus must engage with its interagency counterparts in order to engage and collaborate with our foreign partners.

DHS works with those agencies, as well as with Congress, to ensure adequate resources for DHS training and capacity-building priorities. As described in the Bottom-Up Review Report, DHS plans to coordinate a proposal with DOD to expand the posting of DHS liaison officers in each of the DOD geographic combatant commands to coordinate and integrate homeland security assistance relevant to DOD. DHS also consults and coordinates with the Department of State to explore the expansion of international partnerships for homeland security-related activities such as visa security, international law enforcement training, and many others. DHS works closely with USAID, DOD, and the Department of State, both in the United States and at U.S. embassies abroad; DHS is represented at over 70 U.S. embassies worldwide.

Further, DHS participates in the Department of State-led Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is an interagency enterprise designed to provide civilian reconstruction and stabilization assistance to other nations. The CRC contributes significantly to the capacity building of partner nations and the rebalancing of U.S. military and civilian roles.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. Reichle, do you want to comment now on that?

Ms. REICHLE. If I may start. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, because I think you are raising a really critical issue that we have dealt with at the field level at lots of different levels, and it is something that our agency has been intensely focused on.

Given that the USAID is smaller than the Marine Corps band, I think a lot of what you are illustrating here is that it is perception. Even though USAID was the lead agency on the disaster relief effort for Haiti, obviously we had many more boots on the ground with our colleagues in DOD, which we very much appreciated, in a supporting function, but whether it was the media or the press you would have thought that DOD——

Mr. TIERNEY. But you were the lead agency by designation of SOUTHCOM?

Ms. REICHLE. No. We were the lead agency because under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that authorization is delegated to the President. The President, since 1961, has always made USAID the lead——

Mr. TIERNEY. Then we have a real perception issue.

Ms. REICHLE. Sorry?

Mr. TIERNEY. Then we have a real serious perception issue here.

Ms. REICHLE. Absolutely. We have a perception issue, as well as we have a resource issue. While USAID, and with the support of Congress, has been able to staff up additional 500 Foreign Service Officers through our development leadership initiative over the last several years, it is, frankly, not enough, obviously.

Mr. TIERNEY. Not even close.

Ms. REICHLE. And in order for us to really play a lead role, as you are defining, as we are defining, as the President is defining that USAID is the premier development agency in the world, that requires resources.

Mr. TIERNEY. Used to be. Used to be and needs to get there again.

I will leave you with this thought on that, too. I would like to know, subsequently, how many contractors are involved in AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM and what are they doing and what are their pay schedules relative to that of the people that are on our team, please.

[The information referred to follows:]

CHARRTS No.: HOGR-06-002
House Government Reform Committee
Hearing Date: July 28, 2010
Subject: "National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM."
Congressman: Congressman Tierney
Witness: Dr. Schear
Question: #2

Question: Please provide the total number of contracting personnel working for SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, and a list of all of the companies that currently have contracts with each command and the jobs they are doing. Additionally, please provide a comparison between the contractors' pay scale and that of government employees working for the commands.

Answer:

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L3 Services
ARL
Booz Allen and Hamilton
Camber
American Systems
Lockheed Martin
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Jacobs Technology Inc
Northrop Grumman Information Technology
Raytheon Company
Teksouth Corp
MITRE Corp
System Research and Application (SRA)
Chenega Federal Systems
General Dynamics
Intelligence Software Solutions
Integrated Data Services, Inc. (IDS)
Harris Corporation

Jobs being performed by the contractors:

Engineering support
Information Technology support
Software and Website Support
Information Assurance/Computer Defense Support
Training Support
Intelligence system and graphics support
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance analytical support
Joint Intelligence Operations Center maintenance, integration and support
Modeling, Simulations and Analysis Support
Strategic planning and Science and Technology analytical and technical support
Historian support
Logistics and support planning
Financial management tool support

Comparison between the contractor's pay scale and that of government employees working for

the command:
Average cost per year per full-time employee for contract manpower is $130,400. Average comparable Government salary for these jobs (if all skill sets were available) is $137,169.00. (Note that DoD does not keep records on the actual salaries that contractors pay their employees. These figures represent an estimate based on the total contract cost divided by the total estimated work-years for the contracts.)

The total number of contracted man-years supporting the USAFRICOM HQ is: 203

List of all Companies that currently have contracts:

BAE Systems	SRA
Booz Allen Hamilton	Others (with small, individual orders, less than 10 employees each)
Lockheed Martin	

Jobs being performed by the contractors:

Intelligence Analysis	IT Architecture
Analysis & Planning	Network support

Comparison between the contractor's pay scale and that of government employees working for the command:
AFRICOM currently uses an estimate of $275,000 (for FY10) and $300,000 (for FY11) per year per full-time contractor. (This number includes the salary, overhead, housing allowance, school for dependents, transportation, travel, and fluctuations in foreign currency among other things.) Contractor costs range from $150,000-$600,000 per contractor depending upon requirements for currency, reach back, and special skill sets.

The average annual cost for GS employees is $196,110 per year.

CHARRTS No.: HOGR-06-001
House Government Reform Committee
Hearing Date: July 28, 2010
Subject: "National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM."
Congressman: Congressman Tierney
Witness: Dr. Schear
Question: #1

Question: During the hearing we discussed at some length how to strike the right balance between military and civilian agencies conducting development projects and diplomacy in foreign countries.How can the U.S. increase its non-military capacity to provide civilian aid and assistance to help developing nations?

Answer:

Building our government's civilian capacity to assist developing nations is critical to advancing the United States' security interests. In recognition of this reality, the civilian-led Department of Defense is expanding its capacity to deploy civilians across the globe. For example, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) program recruits, trains, and deploys civilians to assist in a variety of mission sets, such as civil engineering, contracting, and financial administration. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program uses the CEW to send DoD civilians to Afghanistan or Iraq as advisors for up to two years. MoDA provides enduring civilian-to-civilian linkages to assist the Afghan and Iraqi security ministries develop into effective and accountable institutions. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Warsaw Initiative Fund-Defense Institution Building (WIF-DIB) program also focus on building civilian capacity in partner defense institutions. DIRI and WIF-DIB use targeted engagements by subject matter experts, including retired government employees with relevant experience, to help partners in areas like national strategy development, policy, budgets, civil-military relationships, interagency coordination, human resources, logistics, and professional education.

As we discussed in the hearing, it is critical that other agencies be given the resources needed to engage effectively around the globe. DoD's efforts need to be complemented by other agencies with different core competencies to assist developing partners as they create effective and accountable government institutions.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Welch, do you have further questions?

Mr. WELCH. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. You don't? I cut you off and you don't have questions? Thank you for your indulgence on that.

Are we leaving anything unasked that you really believe we ought to have for information? I will give each of you an opportunity to do that.

Mr. Countryman.

Mr. COUNTRYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to make just a couple comments on the last few excellent questions.

First, in terms of ceding to DOD State responsibilities, it is not in my nature and it is, believe me, not in the nature of the Department of State to do so. Dr. Schear's office and I are engaged weekly in a robust dialog about the proper division of security assistance authorities and processes between State and Defense. The difference is that a few years ago it was not robust, it was a nasty, mean-spirited conversation. Today it is a respectful and robust conversation. And we don't cede anything.

The second point I would like to make is that we have attempted to outline how we believe interagency process needs to work at three levels: at the policy level in Washington, and the characterization of that Dr. Schear made in his written statement I subscribe to fully; at the regional level, which involves not only the very high visibility of AFRICOM but the very low visibility regional bureaus of both State and AID, and there is more consonance among the regional strategies of those three than readily meets the eye because one of them is more visible in terms of resources and in terms of a public affairs mission that the other two agencies can't match.

And finally, at the country level where you can find examples of coordination among the interagency at the country level led by the Ambassador to be less than perfect, but you will find many more where it is working well and it is fully consonant with the policy direction at the national level and at the regional level.

Finally, if GAO did not go into the question of adequacy of resources for various agencies, I am reluctant to do so, as well. We are, however, in a situation where we need to do whole-of-government planning on national security strategy, and security, as we all agree, is much broader than military. We have to have a national security strategy combined among many different departments, not only the three represented here.

We don't have a national security budget. We have separate agency budgets. Rather than fight that particular windmill of changing the entire way that budgets are done by the administration and the Congress, which are deeply rooted in history, I am a little more realistic, and I think all of us have to be realistic.

We will do our work within the parameters that are given us, and I appreciate the opportunity only to touch on this issue. Another day, another time, and a better expert than me. We would look very much forward to the opportunity to talk about the adequacy of resources and the integration across agencies of our national security goals in a budget framework.

Thank you so much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Well, we do have to have that discussion about the adequacy of resources, and we have had several discussions in hearings here moving in that direction.

I will just tell you, I will feel a lot more comfortable and believe it more firmly when AFRICOM isn't the one that is doing all this work with the military persons at the top and your State people as sort of the subordinate officers.

When you flip that around, then I will feel more comfortable and think we are going about it the right way. That is what I hear all the time. You may disagree, but security is one aspect and interest of ours, but there is a lot of security that comes from having countries be firm and stable and developed and on their own. It isn't always about we have to get an outpost some place to worry about counter-terrorism or something.

That is the message we are sending: that it is all driven by our national security interests as opposed to the health and welfare and strength and stability of other countries who then maybe we wouldn't have to worry about something happening on that. If that is the case, then a little more focus on what you are doing for them as opposed to the military aspect of it would help.

I know that you are all somewhat comfortable, I guess, with running around under the military leadership on that or whatever. I am just not sure that it is healthy for us on that.

Anybody else want to comment? Dr. Schear.

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I would just emphasize that in the situations you are talking about our Embassy Chief of Mission has an absolute say on what goes on. So, again, in terms of lead and supporting roles, I grant there is a visibility issue, sir, and in terms of what I draw from your remarks as a prescription, which is more resources for State and AID, I fully, fully concur with that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I suspect you would.

Dr. SCHEAR. I would also ask that thought be given to the difference between and among combatant commands in places like the UCOM AOR, PACOM, and CENTCOM. We face different environments and a need, in particular, for access. In fact, I would point to Djibouti as a case within AFRICOM, but that is a critical important access hub for us for Central Command, and so we have actually——

Mr. TIERNEY. A military base.

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. I think we are not making the distinction. The military has to do what you have to do for your military purposes on that. That may not necessarily be true that is as significant for the whole-of-government approach on that. It may or may not be.

But nobody is saying here that there is not a military perspective to this; it is a question—and you can't raise it—you want to be in a supportive role, be in a supportive role. You say that the Ambassador participates, great, but it should be the military that is participating in the overall planning, as opposed to somebody else participating. But I think we have beat that horse pretty much to death by now.

Thank you. I appreciate all of your testimony and all of the information that you provide for us, as you are so willing to do.

With unanimous consent, there being no objection, Mr. Flake's opening statement will be entered onto the record in its entirety.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeff Flake follows:]

The Honorable Jeff Flake
National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
Hearing on "National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM"

- Today's hearing will continue the examination of ways in which U.S. agencies collaborate toward the goals of furthering U.S. national security interests.

- In this hearing, we will focus on interagency collaboration within the Department of Defense's AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM.

- Beyond important regional characteristics that separate them, these two combatant commands occupy extremes across a spectrum. SOUTHCOM has been operational for almost six decades and AFRICOM is a relative newcomer, having stood up just a few years ago.

- Nonetheless, with the changing face of national security threats, both new and old combatant commands face challenges as they seek to adapt to and accommodate present day challenges.

- With many seeking to launch the U.S. on a solitary mission to rid the globe of poverty, we have to be wary that the goal of protecting national security is not needlessly expanded to perhaps worthy but tangential goals at the expense of readiness.

- Reorganized in a structure that improved its ability to work with its partners, SOUTHCOM's response to the devastating earthquakes in Haiti apparently showed that it was not prepared to carry out a full scale military operation.

- Similarly, AFRICOM has integrated interagency coordination in its approach. Yet, it perhaps represents an opportunity for not only evaluating means of efficiently collaborating but also reviewing how extensive the role of the Department of Defense should be in traditional development activities.

- These are important questions which this subcommittee is perhaps uniquely suited to investigate.

- I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Again, thank you all very, very much. I appreciate your being here.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

Testimony

of

Mariko Silver

Acting Assistant Secretary
Office of International Affairs
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

before the

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security & Foreign Affairs

"National Security, Interagency Collaboration, and Lessons from SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM."

Washington, D.C.

July 28, 2010

Chairman Tierney and Ranking Member Flake, thank you for this opportunity to submit written testimony regarding the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) engagement with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. African Command (AFRICOM).

DHS's International Mission

The security environment within which DHS operates is characterized, among other elements, by a constantly shifting international system. The interconnected nature of world economies and international infrastructure means that seemingly isolated events often have transnational origins and global consequences. The accelerated flow of ideas, goods, and people around the world generally advances America's interests, but also creates security challenges that are increasingly borderless and unconventional.

Within this environment, DHS has a core responsibility to ensure the safety, security, and resiliency of the United States and the global movement and information systems upon which our nation relies. In order to fulfill its full range of missions, DHS builds international and interagency partnerships to enhance the Department's ability to identify threats and vulnerabilities, and to understand, investigate and interdict threats or hazards at the earliest possible point.

In both the recent Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and the subsequent Bottom-Up Review process, the need to strengthen the international aspects of the Department's mission have received focused attention. This includes strengthening relationships between domestic and international security leaders and institutions, enhancing mechanisms for international civil-security cooperation, and improving DHS's ability to provide coordinated civil-security capacity-building assistance to key foreign partners, consistent with the broad range of U.S. Government international priorities and in consultation and coordination with the Department of State and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission stationed in foreign countries.

DHS's Relationship with the Combatant Commands

In this context, SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM and the other geographic combatant commands of the Department of Defense (DoD) have been and continue to be key partners for DHS. We are working to develop mechanisms for expanded engagement with all of the combatant commands (COCOMs), including SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM. Our relationship with AFRICOM focuses on issues of terrorism, transnational crime, arms and strategic technology proliferation and contraband smuggling. Our relationship with SOUTHCOM focuses on drug trafficking, smuggling of special interest aliens (SIA), crime, gangs, natural disasters, document fraud, illicit arms, and terrorism.

Collaboration with these COCOMs is important to meeting DHS goals and objectives in these regions and around the world. DHS provides key law enforcement expertise and

information on emergent threats to the homeland, as well as operational and tactical support to the combatant commands.

We work with these COCOMs to develop aligned strategic approaches and to provide civilian security sector assistance where appropriate. It is essential to our mission that other nations have the capacity to manage their borders, effectively enforce customs regulations and interdict contraband, improve disaster preparedness, control immigration, secure cargo and enhance the security of the global aviation system, all while facilitating the legitimate trade and travel upon which our economies rely. In order to deliver training and technical assistance in these areas, and in line with the president's foreign policy priorities, DHS works with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

DHS Engagement with SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM

DHS and the COCOMs continue to work together to improve our strategic alignment and operational cooperation. Several components of DHS have particularly close relationships with SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, and a DHS liaison officer was recently stationed at SOUTHCOM. The following are just a few examples of the collaboration that exists.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

USCG has a total of 70 senior officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian personnel supporting SOUTHCOM at their headquarters, in the Coast Guard Reserve Unit, in the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), in embassies, and in other key locations. A USCG Rear Admiral serves as SOUTHCOM's Director of Operations, and the Director for JIATF-S is a USCG Rear Admiral as well. A USCG liaison is also stationed at SOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami. SOUTHCOM employs the Coast Guard's skill set to provide assistance and vital capabilities to developing partner nations in law enforcement and search and rescue areas, and USCG forces play an important role in JIATF-S by leading detection and monitoring efforts for illicit trafficking through the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Ocean. The Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, a full-service naval base for SOUTHCOM, serves as a critical steady-state forward operating location for Coast Guard operations in support of counter-drug, migrant interdictions, and search and rescue operations. Finally, SOUTHCOM and USCG undertake cooperative operations and exercises on a regular basis.

The USCG has eight personnel posted to AFRICOM. The USCG Office of International Affairs participates in AFRICOM's Security Assistance planning meetings, Theater Security Cooperation Conference, Security Cooperation Education & Training Working Group and other activities. The USCG also engages directly with AFRICOM regarding Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) operations, and provides law enforcement and cutter assets to DoD through the Request for Forces (RFF) process. Since 2008, in coordination with AFRICOM, the USCG has undertaken training

needs assessments and legal assistance reviews in Cape Verde and Sierra Leone, as well as participated in site visits to Morocco and Senegal for AMLEP planning.

The USCG has undertaken initiatives to negotiate permanent bilateral agreements for maritime law enforcement operations with Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, and short term agreements have been successfully negotiated with Cape Verde and Morocco. The USCG is continuing its efforts to help West African nations build capabilities, capacities and competencies in all aspects of maritime law enforcement including counterdrug operations, migrant interdiction operations, and fisheries enforcement.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

During the 2008 reorganization of SOUTHCOM to increase interagency collaboration, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was identified as an essential element in overall synchronization and coordination efforts with interagency partners in SOUTHCOM's area of focus. This resulted in the assignment of two ICE liaisons at SOUTHCOM headquarters, and one ICE liaison at JIATF-S, who worked to increase efficiency and collaborative practices by identifying existing gaps within mission objectives common to both DoD and ICE. HSI works to address the wide spectrum of criminality that can be categorized under illicit trafficking, and is continuing to find new and innovative ways to collaborate with SOUTHCOM. ICE also partners with JIATF-S.

One specific example of SOUTHCOM and ICE partnership is the Intelligence Support Exploitation Team (ISET) , in which Special Operations Command South forces provide analytical support to ICE Attaché offices through the identification, exploitation, and dismantling of transnational SIA smuggling networks. The ISET model of collaboration was deployed in Quito, Ecuador in January 2010, and has successfully identified several significant SIA smuggling nodes based in Ecuador, as well as numerous supporting elements in Central and South America.

Since Aug. 2, 2009, ICE has had two personnel embedded in AFRICOM's Counter-Narcotics and Law Enforcement Division, where they support efforts to assist in building African nations' law enforcement capabilities to combat transnational crimes that impact the safety of the United States. ICE representatives at AFRICOM receive Command support in developing initiatives to provide analysis on East African human smuggling, narcotics smuggling, and other transnational crimes. AFRICOM provided financial support to: ICE bulk cash smuggling training sessions in Nigeria; a senior intelligence officer collaboration seminar; participation in a border security survey in Sierra Leone; and in the development of the Maritime Illicit Trafficking Analysis Center in Italy. In FY 2011, AFRICOM has indicated it plans to provide financial support to various ICE capacity-building efforts and will support a multi-national symposium on special interest alien smuggling, as requested by ICE Attachés.

ICE personnel at AFRICOM have provided briefings on ICE capabilities to over 200 Command personnel and routinely engage the Command's components and participate in

Command staff meetings, intelligence collaboration meetings, and military planning sessions.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

CBP works through JIATF-S to disrupt the flow of illegal contraband moving toward the United States by providing air assets for these missions, along with other detection tools. In addition, CBP's Office of Border Patrol has three personnel who serve as liaison officers to SOUTHCOM. Over the past seven years, CBP has worked closely with SOUTHCOM, sharing capabilities concerning transnational threats in the Caribbean region. Most recently, CBP cooperated with SOUTHCOM during the Haiti earthquake relief efforts.

CBP has also been working indirectly with SOUTHCOM through biometric initiatives to identify smuggling trends throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In July, CBP Border Patrol hosted a teleconference to further discuss areas of collaboration in the area of biometrics and information exchange to more keenly address transnational threats in the region.

CBP is working with AFRICOM to expand collaboration on training and technical assistance provision, and has attended the last two AFRICOM planning conferences held in November 2009 in Frankfurt and in November 2008 in Garmisch, Germany. Additionally, CBP presented in Mauritania and Algeria at Border Security Seminars to discuss leadership, border security strategies, and partnership. CBP has been asked to complete an assessment with AFRICOM for Senegal, which could result in additional engagement with AFRICOM.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

TSA posted a Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR) to AFRICOM in November 2009. TSA has requested funding in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2011 for capacity building (training) at the international airport in Dakar, Senegal. In addition, the TSAR regularly attends joint planning team meetings and is an active participant in the Command Collaborative Forum. Furthermore, TSA's Office of Global Strategies meets regularly with AFRICOM staff.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA has supported SOUTHCOM initiatives, projects, exercises and knowledge exchanges related to strengthening of emergency management concepts and systems to mitigate the effects of disaster.

Office of Health Affairs (OHA)

The DHS Office of Health Affairs has engaged with SOUTHCOM in assisting in regional Pandemic Influenza planning and response efforts in the Caribbean, and has

engaged in regional exercises with emphasis on ensuring Panama Canal resilience to pandemic threats.

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

DHS S&T is working with JIATF-S to develop and deliver technical capabilities to detect, track, and interdict small, dark boats, to include self-propelled semi-submersibles and fully submersibles.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

I&A has supported numerous SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM initiatives, projects, and knowledge exchanges. These efforts are generally geared toward ensuring SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM receive intelligence and information from the Department pertaining to transnational threats operating in their respective areas of responsibility.

Recommendations for Enhanced DHS Cooperation with SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM

The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and the Bottom Up Review (BUR) have identified deeper coordination with the Department of Defense as valuable to the DHS international mission, important to the maturation of the DHS-DoD relationship, and central to the development of a more efficient and coherent set of security sector partnerships throughout the world. The exchange of DHS Component representatives has provided our COCOM partners with needed expertise in a variety of civil-security areas. It has also highlighted the need for a stronger partnership between DHS and the COCOMs at the policy-setting level to ensure that homeland security-related engagements and assistance are properly aligned.

To assist US Government (USG) efforts to combat emerging threats, DHS is engaging in civil-security tasks like capacity-building for disaster preparedness, countering illicit smuggling and trafficking, strengthening aviation, port and maritime security, and ensuring international border integrity. DHS's competencies in these areas are being effectively integrated with Combatant Command, Department of Defense, Department of State, and other USG security assistance strategies.

Our national security relies in part on the ability of foreign governments to effectively combat terrorism and other threats within their own borders. International engagement, in the form of long-term training and technical assistance projects, provides a level of assurance that foreign governments are taking actions that align with U.S. efforts and support shared security goals. By partnering with Latin American, Caribbean, and African nations, DHS, SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are supporting the enhancement of our shared security.

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this written statement. I am happy to provide any follow-up information you require.

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