

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 2011

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

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NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

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SHERRY L. YOUNG, and TRACEY LATURNER, *Administrative Aides*

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 2011**

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010.

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET OVERVIEW FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2011**

WITNESSES

**HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
HON. ROBERT HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMP-
TROLLER)**

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order. This morning the committee will hold an open hearing on the fiscal year 2011 Department of Defense budget request. We are pleased to welcome Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, and the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Robert Hale.

More than anyone else, this group of people is qualified to speak for the Department regarding the content of the Department's budget request for fiscal year 2011. Secretary Gates has taken on a leading role in the budget formulation for his Department and has employed an extremely inclusive process in the development of the 2011 budget.

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale, thank you all for being here this morning. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are performing very well in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in many other hot spots around the globe. In typical United States Armed Forces fashion, despite the conditions they operate under, we hear very few complaints from these exceptional personnel.

However, the members of this committee are very concerned about providing the resources and equipment that these men and women require to continue to defend our great Nation. As the elected representatives of the citizens of the Nation, we owe it to our fellow citizens to ensure that our fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters are properly outfitted and cared for as they carry out their orders willingly and without question.

We are looking forward to hearing about how you have chosen to recommend allocating the Nation's precious resources to ensure the national security of the United States. From personnel and daily operations to equipment procurement and health care, you are all charged with an incredible responsibility while serving as

the caretakers of the Nation's Armed Forces. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to an informative question-and-answer session.

Now, before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on the Ranking Member and former Chairman of this subcommittee, my good friend Bill Young, for his comments.

Mr. Young.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to add my welcome to the Secretary and the Chairman and Under Secretary Hale.

We have a major challenge this year in that there are so many things that need to be done. The budget request does not really, in my opinion, provide enough to do all of the things that we need to do. The budget request could be amended by the time it gets to the subcommittee. When the 302(a) allocations are handed down to the 302(b) levels, we are not exactly sure where we will be, but I am satisfied that my friend Mr. Obey will see to it that the necessary funds for national defense is made available to the subcommittee.

We have talked so many, many times, but it is my opinion, and I think you all share that, that our defense needs should be based on threat; on the missions that we have to perform; on what our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines need in order to conduct the battle; and be based on threat rather than anything political. This subcommittee, since I have been a member of it, and that has been many, many years, has never been political.

Mr. DICKS. That is correct.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Dicks and I have worked together for many years on a lot of very important issues, as did Mr. Murtha and I. Mr. Murtha—he was Chairman, then I was Chairman, then he was Chairman, then I was Chairman, then he was Chairman again—and we always had just a tremendous working relationship where the needs of our military, the needs of our Nation were the priority in our minds.

So we are anxious to hear what you have to say to us today. We follow your activities, your visits to the troops on a regular basis, and we just appreciate the really good job that you do. As Mr. Dicks said, it is important that we make sure that our military, that our troops have whatever training they need to do their job, whatever equipment that they need to accomplish their mission, and whatever the best we can provide them for force protection to make sure that they stay as healthy as possible while they are conducting these important missions.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I look forward to the witnesses today.

Mr. DICKS. Well, I appreciate your comments. And I think that Secretary Gates has also been at the forefront of trying to meet every need and requirement that the troops have. I think of MRAPs and body armor and other things. So, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, we appreciate your continued leadership and stewardship.

I would like to call on the Ranking Member of the full committee Mr. Obey for any comments he would like to make.

Mr. OBEY. Did we lose the election?

Mr. DICKS. Excuse me, the Chairman of the committee Mr. Obey. We have not lost it yet.

REMARKS OF MR. OBEY

Mr. OBEY. We are not going to either. I am used to this kind of calumny from the other side of the aisle.

First of all, I simply would like to take a moment to note that this is the first overview hearing with DOD that is chaired by our new Chairman Norm Dicks. We are operating at somewhat of a disadvantage because he is very inexperienced. He has only been on this subcommittee 31 years, so he has a shortage of knowledge in terms of the issues at hand. But in all seriousness, I think people understand him to be a serious, dedicated, and tenacious Member of Congress, and I for one have a great deal of confidence in him.

I also have a great deal of confidence in Mr. Young. There is not a finer human being in Congress than Bill Young. I am looking forward to watching both of them work together.

Let me say, since I am going to have to leave in about 20 minutes for another problem-resolving session, I do just want to make one point. When the House approved the administration's request for Afghan funding last year, we focused on two things when Mr. Murtha was still subcommittee Chairman. We were both hugely concerned not so much about the policy that you were trying to follow in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but we were concerned about the adequacy of the tools that you had to implement that policy, the two tools being the Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government. While we seem to have made some progress on the Pakistani side, the government seems to have a new-found determination to actually focus on the right threat, nonetheless we have some problems.

Since I will not be here during the question period, I just want to put a series of questions to you now that I hope you will answer during the hearing. And then I would appreciate it if you would expand on those answers for the record before we deal with the supplemental.

We have a request for a significant amount of increased funding for the Afghan Police for the training program. We are making a lot more progress, it appears to me, on the army side than we are on the police side in providing that training. So I would simply appreciate it if you would describe the program that the Department of Defense has in place to train the Afghan Army and the police. Would you describe the training program as successful to this point? Why or why not? Does the low literacy rate among Afghans significantly affect the content of the training? And how do we overcome that? To what extent do Afghan Security Forces participate in military operations? To what extent do they lead these operations?

A September 2009 report by DOD inspector general found that the NATO training mission in Afghanistan led by General Caldwell only had about 51 percent of the field trainers needed to meet current requirements. Is that still the case? Commanders in theater indicate that developing indigenous leadership is key to foster unit

cohesion, and maintaining discipline, and reducing corruption and promoting the operational success of Afghan Security Forces. What leadership development training is available for ANA and ANP? How long do you anticipate it will take to develop a self-sustaining leadership cadre for Afghan Security Forces? And several other questions that I do not want to take the time to read right now.

But we have a serious decision to make coming up very shortly, and I think we need to have a full and detailed understanding of those issues before we move ahead on the supplemental.

With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding the time. And again, I congratulate you on chairing your first hearing.

Gentlemen, glad you are here.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY GATES

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, members of the committee, first let me offer the committee my condolences with respect to Chairman Murtha. I first started working with Chairman Murtha in 1984, 1985, and always had a great working relationship with him.

I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your selection. I suppose I should note, as an aside, that virtually all of my very many in-laws all live in the Chairman's district.

Mr. DICKS. We will treat them very respectfully.

Secretary GATES. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011. I first want to thank you for your support of the men and women of the United States military these many years. These troops are part of an extraordinary generation of young Americans who have answered their country's call. They have fought our wars, protected our interests and allies around the globe, and, as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of incomprehensible loss.

I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of the budget requests. My submitted statement includes many more details that I know are of interest to the committee. The requests being presented today include \$549 billion for the base budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or a 1.8 percent real increase after adjusting for inflation, reflecting the administration's commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real growth in defense spending. We are also requesting \$159 billion in 2011 to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus \$33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the President's new approach in Afghanistan.

The base budget request reflects the following institutional priorities: first, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation's commitment to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest strategic asset; second, rebalancing America's defense posture by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current conflicts while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in the future; and third, continuing the

Department's commitment to reforming how DOD does business, especially in the area of acquisitions.

Finally, the commitments made and the programs funded in the OCO and supplemental requests demonstrate the administration's determination to support our troops and commanders in combat so they can accomplish their critical missions and come home safely.

The budget continues the Department's policy of shifting money to the base budget for enduring programs that directly support our warfighters and their families, whether on the battlefield, recovering from wounds, or on the home front, to ensure that they have steady, long-term funding and institutional support.

The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which establishes strategic priorities and identifies key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and fiscal year 2011 budget build upon the substantial changes the President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the Department's processes. The fiscal year 2010 budget proposals cut, curtailed, or ended a number of programs that were either performing poorly or in excess of real-world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. was relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more funding.

The fiscal year 2011 budget submissions and QDR are suffused with two major themes. The first is continued reform, fundamentally changing the way this Department does business, the priorities we set, the programs we fund, the weapons we buy, and how we buy them. Building on the reforms of last year's budget, the fiscal year 2011 request takes additional steps aimed at programs that were excess or performing poorly. They include terminating the Navy EP(X) intelligence aircraft; ending the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance program; canceling the Next Generation Cruiser; terminating the Net Enabled Command and Control program; ending the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, due to cost overruns and performance concerns; completing the C-17 program and closing the production line, as multiple studies in recent years show the Air Force already has more of these aircraft than it needs; and ending the alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, as whatever benefits might accrue are more than offset by excess costs, complexity, and associated risks.

I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building C-17s and proceed with an alternate engine for the F-35, so let me be very clear. I will strongly recommend that the President veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of these two programs.

Before closing, I would like to provide an update on the F-35 fighter program, which I know is of great interest and concern to this committee. In response to what I consider to be unacceptable delays and cost overruns over the past year, this Department has taken a number of steps to fundamentally restructure this program.

First, the program is now based on numbers, costs, and schedules estimates from Joint Estimating Team, an independent body known for its rigorous and skeptical assessments. Based on the

new JET estimates, we reduced the number of aircraft being purchased concurrent with testing and development. While delaying full-scale production was not a welcome development, to put it mildly, it was important to avoid a situation where a problem discovered in testing would lead to expensive retrofits of aircraft, the most common reason for delays and cost overruns in these kinds of programs. Correspondingly, we have added more aircraft to the testing program, which we believe will reduce the projected delay from 30 months to 13. These changes amount to a brutally realistic assessment of cost and schedule, one that I believe should stand the test of time and the legitimate scrutiny of the Congress and the taxpayer.

Furthermore, with respect to accountability, I have replaced the Joint Strike Fighter program manager and elevated that position to a three-star billet, while withholding more than \$600 million in performance fees from the lead contractor. It is important to remember that the F-35's cost and schedule-related issues, and I regard them as serious to be sure, are problems primarily related to program administration and management, not the technology or capabilities of the aircraft. The Joint Strike Fighter will do everything the military services need it to do, and it will become the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation.

In closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider when assessing the U.S. investment in national defense. First, the requests submitted this week total more than \$700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7 percent of gross domestic product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to defense than was spent during most of America's previous wars. And the base budget represents about 3.5 percent of GDP.

Second, as you recently read, the President has exempted the defense budget from spending freezes being applied to other parts of the government. It is important to remember, however, that, as I mentioned earlier, this Department undertook a painstaking review of our priorities last year, and as a result cut or curtailed a number of major programs. These programs, had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the American taxpayer about \$330 billion.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this committee again for all that you have done to support our troops and their families, especially in light of unprecedented demands that have been placed upon them. I believe the choices made and priorities set in these budget requests reflect America's commitment to see that our forces have the tools they need to prevail in the wars we are in while making the investments necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.

Thank you.

[The statement of Secretary Gates follows:]

**STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE -- DEFENSE
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010**

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the president's budget requests for fiscal year 2011. I first want to thank you for your support of the men and women of the U.S. military these many years. I know they will be uppermost in your thoughts as you deliberate on these budget requests. Our troops are part of an extraordinary generation of young Americans who have answered their country's call. They have fought this country's wars, protected our interests and allies around the globe, and, as we've seen recently in Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of incomprehensible loss.

The budget requests being presented today include \$549 billion for the base budget – a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or 1.8 percent real growth after adjusting for inflation, reflecting this administration's commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real growth in defense spending. We are also requesting \$159 billion in FY 2011 to support Overseas Contingency Operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, plus \$33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the president's new approach in Afghanistan.

The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which establishes strategic priorities and identifies key areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and FY 2011 budget build upon the substantial changes that the president made in the FY 2010 budget request to allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the department's processes.

The base budget request reflects these major institutional priorities:

- First, reaffirming and strengthening the nation's commitment to care for the all-volunteer force, our greatest strategic asset;
- Second, rebalancing America's defense posture by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in the future; and
- Third, continuing the department's commitment to reform how DoD does business, especially in the area of acquisitions.

Finally, the commitments made and programs funded in the OCO and supplemental requests demonstrate this administration's determination to support our troops and commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq so they can accomplish their critical missions and return home safely.

At this point, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider when assessing the U.S. investment in national defense:

First, the requests submitted this week total more than \$700 billion – a massive number, to be sure. But, at 4.7 percent of gross national product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to defense than was spent during America's previous major wars.

Second, as you know, the president recently exempted the defense budget from spending freezes being applied to other parts of the government. It is important to remember, however, that this department already undertook a painstaking review of our programs and priorities last

year, and proposed to cut, curtail, or end a number of programs. These programs, had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the American taxpayer about \$330 billion.

Care for Our All-Volunteer Force

The FY 2011 budget request includes \$138.5 billion for military pay and allowances, an increase of \$3.6 billion – or 2.6 percent – over last year. This includes an increase of 1.4 percent for military basic pay, which will keep military pay increases in line with those in the private sector. This amount funds bonuses and other incentives to meet recruiting and retention quality and quantity goals – especially for our most critical skills and experience levels. The military deserves generous pay because of the stress and danger these jobs entail. In recent years, the Congress has added 0.5 percent to the administration's requested military pay raise – an action that adds about \$500 million a year to our budget now and in future years, and reduces the funds available for training and equipping the force. In this time of strong recruiting and retention, I urge the Congress to approve the full requested amount for the FY 2011 military pay raise but not to add to the request.

Wounded, Ill, and Injured

This budget supports the department's intense focus on care for our wounded, ill, and injured military members. As I've said before, aside from winning the wars themselves, this is my highest priority. Key initiatives include:

- Achieving a seamless transition to veteran status for members leaving the military and increased cooperation between the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs;
- Ensuring a high standard at facilities caring for wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and the Army's Warrior Transition Units;
- Enhancing case management of individuals transitioning to civilian life – especially those needing long-term care;
- Establishing a better Disability Evaluation System – to create a simpler, faster, more consistent process for determining which members may continue their military service and helping them become as independent and self-supporting as possible; and
- Working with the VA to create Virtual Lifetime Electronic Records to improve veteran care and services by improving the availability of administrative and health information.

The FY 2011 budget request includes \$2.2 billion for enduring programs for our wounded, ill, and injured. It also includes \$300 million to complete the Army's Warrior Transition complexes and new medical facilities in the Washington, D.C., capital region. The \$2.2 billion for these programs is \$100 million more than the FY 2010 enacted amount and is more than double the FY 2008 level of \$1 billion.

Military Health System

The FY 2011 budget includes \$50.7 billion for the Unified Medical Budget to support the Military Health System that serves 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries. Over the past decade, U.S. health-care costs have grown substantially, and defense health costs have been no exception, more than doubling between FY 2001 (\$19 billion) and FY 2010 (\$49 billion). These costs are

expected to grow from 6 percent of the department's total budget in FY 2001 to more than 10 percent in FY 2015.

Military Family Support Programs

The department remains fully committed to providing assistance to our troops and their families in light of the unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. As the president stated in the State of the Union Address last week, our men and women in uniform and their families have our respect, our gratitude, and our full support. The budget reflects the department's policy of shifting money to the base budget for enduring programs so that they will not disappear as war funding declines. The FY 2011 base budget includes \$8.1 billion for a variety of family-support programs vital to the morale and well-being of our military members and their families – an increase of \$450 million over last year. The OCO request includes \$700 million for family support – bringing the total to \$8.8 billion.

Build and Sustain Facilities

The FY 2011 budget includes \$18.7 billion to fund critical military-construction and family-housing requirements, including substantial funding to recapitalize many department schools for children of service members.

The FY 2011 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) investment funding of \$2.4 billion is less than prior years because most of the funding needed to implement the 2005 round of BRAC decisions has already been appropriated for 24 major realignments, 24 base closures, and 765 lesser actions – all of which must be completed by September 15, 2011, in accordance with statute.

We have requested \$14.2 billion to modernize the department's facilities; to support the recently completed growth in the Army and Marine Corps; to support the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam; and to recapitalize medical facilities and schools for servicemembers' children.

Rebalancing the Force – the Wars We Are In

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military's budgeting, policy, and program priorities. We now recognize that America's ability to deal with threats for years to come will largely depend on our performance in the current conflicts. The FY 2011 budget request took a number of additional steps aimed at filling persistent shortfalls that have plagued recent military efforts, especially in Afghanistan.

Rotary-Wing Aircraft

To increase these capabilities, this request includes more than \$9.6 billion for the acquisition of a variety of modern rotary-wing aircraft, including the creation of two Army combat aviation brigades by FY 2014. The goal is to train 1,500 new Army helicopter pilots per year by 2012.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The FY 2011 budget request continues efforts to increase ISR support for our fighting forces. The ISR Task Force was formed in April 2008 to generate critical operational ISR

capacity – primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, the department has worked to secure substantial funding to field and sustain ISR capabilities. In the FY 2011 budget, that includes:

- \$2.2 billion for procurement of Predator-class aircraft to increase the Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) available to deployed forces from 37 to 65 by 2013; and
- Doubling procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper over the next few years.

Electronic Warfare (EW)

The FY 2011 budget request supports the QDR's call for better EW capabilities for today's warfighters. The Navy procurement budget includes \$1.1 billion in FY 2011 and \$2.3 billion in FY 2012 for the addition of 36 EA-18G aircraft, with 12 procured in FY 2011 and 24 in FY 2012. These resources and capabilities will help fill an imminent EW shortfall that has been consistently highlighted by the combatant commanders as one of their highest priorities.

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

The FY 2011 budget requests \$6.3 billion for USSOCOM – nearly 6 percent higher than in FY 2010. The department plans to call for SOF funding to increase sharply over the next several years, including an increase of about 2,800 personnel in FY 2011.

Rebalancing the Force – Preparing for the Future

The FY 2011 budget includes \$189 billion for total procurement, research, and development. This investment reflects the fact that the United States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict, including conventional conflict with the technologically advanced military forces of other countries. To meet the potential threats to our military's ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners in environments where access to our forces may be denied, this budget request includes substantial funds for conventional and strategic modernization.

Tactical Aircraft – JSF

The FY 2011 budget funds programs to develop and buy superior aircraft to guarantee continued air dominance over current and future battlefields, most importantly the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The FY 2011 base budget includes \$10.7 billion for continued development of the F-35, and for procurement of 42 aircraft. An additional JSF is purchased in the OCO budget.

I know the JSF program is of great interest and concern to this committee. In response to what I consider to be unacceptable delays and cost overruns over the past year, this department has taken a number of steps to substantially restructure this program.

First, the JSF program is now based on numbers – cost and schedule estimates – from the Joint Estimating Team (or JET), an independent body known for its rigorous and skeptical assessments.

Based on the new JET estimates, we reduced the number of aircraft being purchased concurrent with testing and development. While delaying full-scale production was not a welcome development – to put it mildly – it was important to avoid a situation where a problem discovered in testing would lead to expensive retrofits of aircraft, the most common reason for

delays and cost overruns in these kinds of programs. Correspondingly, we have added more aircraft to the testing regime, which we believe will reduce the projected delay from 30 months to 13. These changes amount to a brutally realistic assessment of cost and schedule – one that I believe should stand the test of time and the legitimate scrutiny of the Congress and the American taxpayer.

Furthermore, with regard to accountability, I have replaced the JSF program manager and elevated that position to a three-star billet while withholding more than \$600 million in performance fees from the lead contractor. It is important to remember that the JSF's cost- and schedule-related issues – and I regard them as serious, to be sure – are problems primarily related to program administration and management, not the technology and capability of the aircraft. The Joint Strike Fighter will do everything the military services need it to do, and become the backbone of U.S. air combat for the next generation.

Mobility and Tanker Aircraft

The FY 2011 budget continues to support development of a new aerial refueling tanker. The KC-X, the first phase of KC-135 recapitalization, will procure 179 commercial derivative tanker aircraft to replace roughly one-third of the current aerial refueling tanker fleet at an estimated cost of \$35 billion. Contract award is expected in the summer of 2010 and procurement should begin in FY 2013. To support this long-range effort, \$864 million has been requested for research into the next-generation tanker.

The FY 2011 budget ends production of the C-17, supports shutdown activities for production of new aircraft, and continues the modification of existing C-17s. With the completion of the program, the United States will have 223 of these aircraft, more than enough to meet current and projected requirements.

Shipbuilding

The FY 2011 budget reflects the department's formulation of a realistic, executable shipbuilding plan through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Overall, the FY 2011 budget includes \$25.1 billion for FY 2011 procurement of new ships, equipment and research and development into future construction – including \$15.7 billion for Navy shipbuilding and conversion activities. It reinforces the ongoing transition to a naval force that can meet the needs of today's warfighters and reduce reliance on very costly and increasingly vulnerable large surface combatants in the future. The FY 2011 request and planned out-year funding would allow the department to:

- Build a new aircraft carrier every five years;
- Shift large-deck amphibious ship production to a five-year build cycle to maintain a long-term force structure of nine large-deck aviation ships to support amphibious operations;
- Stabilize near-term production quantities for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) to support irregular warfare operations;
- Produce two attack submarines per year beginning in FY 2011 and continue development of a new strategic deterrent submarine; and
- Build three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships – one ship per year in FY 2011, FY 2013, and FY 2015.

Ground Forces Modernization

The FY 2011 budget advances restructuring of the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS), principally through Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization. The FY 2011 request for BCTs is \$3.2 billion, mostly for research and development.

The FY 2011 budget also supports the development of a new ground-vehicle program to replace aging systems. The new program will take into account the hard battlefield lessons of recent years, especially with respect to threats posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and will include a role for the MRAP and M-ATV vehicles that have been so important in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Space & Cyber Capabilities

Just about all of our military forces – land, sea, and air – now depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. The role of space and satellites has never been more crucial to military operations – from GPS-guided munitions and navigation to missile defense and communications. The FY 2011 budget continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities in space, with \$599 million allocated to procure Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites instead of the Transformational Satellite, which was cancelled in the FY 2010 budget.

With cheap technology and minimal investment, adversaries operating in cyberspace can potentially inflict serious damage on our command and control, ISR, and precision strike capabilities. The FY 2011 budget continues to fund the recruiting and training of new experts in cyber warfare begun in FY 2010, and supports the stand up of a new U.S. Cyber Command.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The Department of Defense continues to pursue missile-defense systems that can provide real capability as soon as possible while taking maximum advantage of new technologies. In accordance with the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our goal is a missile-defense program that balances capabilities and risks in order to deter aggression; project power and protect U.S. and allied interests; and respond to warfighter requirements.

This year's base budget request includes \$9.9 billion total for missile defense – almost \$700 million more than last year, mostly for the Missile Defense Agency.

This includes funding for:

- Enhanced missile defenses for deployed forces, allies, and partners to defend against regional threats – including THAAD battery ground components and interceptors, as well as the conversion of additional Aegis ships.
- The "Phased Adaptive Approach" for missile defense: a flexible, scalable system to respond to developing threats. This has particular applicability to Europe, where the new approach allows us to adapt our systems more rapidly as new threats develop and old ones recede. In the short-term, we will be able to provide immediate coverage and protection by deploying current and proven systems such as the Aegis and SM-3.
- A viable homeland defense against rogue threats – including ground-based interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB, California.
- Expansion of the flight-test program to test capabilities against medium, intermediate, and long-range threats.
- Investments in break-through technologies to improve our ability to counter threats during the boost phase while focusing on the most promising new technologies.

Nuclear Weapons

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) being released in March will outline the policy framework for achieving the president's objectives to reduce nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of elimination; and maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal as long as these weapons exist. It will also provide steps to strengthen deterrence while reducing the role of nuclear weapons. While the NPR conclusions are still being developed, the president's budget requests for the Defense and Energy departments reflect several priorities already established in our review:

- Funding to sustain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers under the New START Treaty; and
- Increased National Nuclear Security Administration funding for infrastructure, warhead life extension, and science and technology.

Details of these and other elements of our nuclear posture will be presented in the final NPR report in March.

Building Partner Capacity

In a world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will emanate from failed and fractured states, building the security capacity of partners has emerged as a key capability – one that reduces the need for direct U.S. military intervention, with all of its attendant political, financial, and human costs. To provide more resources, predictability, and agility to this important mission, the department will seek an increase in Global Train and Equip authority in the FY 2011 budget to \$500 million – authority that includes coalition activities to support current operations.

Reforming How DOD Does Business

President Obama is committed to ending unneeded and troubled programs and achieving a better balance between capabilities needed to succeed in current conflicts and capabilities needed to prepare for the conflicts we are most likely to see in the future.

The FY 2011 budget request builds on the reforms of last year by ending a number of unneeded or troubled programs:

- Next Generation Cruiser CG(X): Cancelled due to concerns about costs and utility in future combat scenarios. Any resulting capability gap will be filled by an enhanced Navy destroyer program.
- Navy Intelligence Aircraft EP(X): This Navy-planned EP-3 replacement was cancelled because of cost and its redundancy with other technologies and systems.
- Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS): This sensor system was cancelled because there are better alternatives.
- The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS): DIMHRS has been in development for over 10 years and cost \$500 million – with little to show and limited prospects.
- Net Enabled Command and Control (NECC): This joint program has had cost overruns and performance shortfalls.

JSF Alternate Engine

One of the tougher decisions we faced during this budget process was whether or not to formally add the alternate engine to the Joint Strike Fighter program. It has been the position of this department since 2007 that adding a second JSF engine was unnecessary and too costly.

Over the past year, as part of our thorough review of the overall JSF program, we took a fresh look to determine whether the second engine option had reached a point in funding and development that supported a different conclusion. We considered all aspects of this question and, in the end, concluded that the facts and analysis simply do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program. There are several rationales for this conclusion:

First, even after factoring in Congress' additional funding, the engine would still require a further investment of \$2.5 billion over the next five years.

Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings generated through competition. Even optimistic analytical models produce essentially a break-even scenario.

Third, the solution to understandable concern over the performance of the Pratt & Whitney program is *not* to spend yet more money to add a second engine. The answer is to get the first engine on track. Further, the alternate engine program is three to four years behind in development compared to the current program, and there is no guarantee that a second program would not face the same challenges as the current effort.

Fourth, split or shared buys of items, particularly from only two sources, do not historically produce competitive behavior since both vendors are assured some share of the purchase. Another reality is that the JSF is designed to support a wide diversity of military customers, including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas buyers, many of whom are unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers.

For all these reasons, we are firm in our view that the interests of the taxpayers, our military, our partner nations, and the integrity of the JSF program are best served by not pursuing a second engine.

I believe most proponents of this program are motivated by the genuine belief that a second engine is the right thing to do. And I look forward to engaging the Congress in this discussion and sharing with them our facts and analysis. However, we have reached a critical point in this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the JSF is unnecessary, wasteful, and simply diverts precious modernization funds from other more pressing priorities. Accordingly, should the Congress add more funds to continue this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend that the president veto such legislation.

C-17

The FY 2011 request completes the C-17 program and begins shutting down the production line. At present, we have 194 C-17s (plus 111 C-5s) in our strategic airlift fleet. By the end of this fiscal year, the department will have procured 223.

Three department studies completed over the past five years have concluded that the U.S. military has more than enough strategic airlift capacity, and that additional C-17s are not required. Some factors to consider:

- In 2004, the Air Force Fleet Viability board determined that the fleet of C-5As – the oldest variant – will remain viable until at least 2025. The Air Force and the manufacturer believe that the C-5 fleet will remain viable until 2040. And ongoing modernization and refurbishment efforts are intended to increase the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the C-5 fleet;

- Despite the demands of the current military campaigns, the existing C-17 fleet is not being “burned up.” With the exception of 2003 – when there were only 111 aircraft in the fleet that were being surged to begin the Iraq war – the annual use of the C-17 inventory has been within program limits; and
- While it is true that the C-17 can land places where the C-5 cannot, of the 200,000 landings made by C-17s since 1997, less than 4 percent were in places that were not accessible to the C-5.

In summary, for these and other reasons, the department has concluded that the current C-17 is more than sufficient to meet the military’s airlift needs. Should Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly recommend a presidential veto.

Acquisitions

The department is implementing initiatives that will increase the numbers and capabilities of the acquisition workforce, improve funding stability, enhance the source-selection process, and improve contract execution. Our intent is to provide the warfighter with world-class capability while being good stewards of taxpayer dollars.

To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by an appropriately-sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the right skills and training to perform their jobs. To address these personnel deficiencies, DoD will increase the number of acquisition personnel by 20,000 positions – from about 127,000 in FY 2010 to about 147,000 by FY 2015. We will be making significant increases in training and retention programs in order to bolster the capability and size of the acquisition workforce.

Civilian Workforce

The FY 2011 budget funds a pay raise of 1.4 percent for DoD civilians – the same as the military pay raise. The request includes funding to transition out of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) – as directed by the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.

About 225,000 DoD employees are covered by NSPS. These employees must convert to a successor statutory personnel system. The FY 2011 budget includes \$23 million to implement NSPS transition and \$239 million for estimated higher civilian pay for employees transitioning out of NSPS.

The request supports the DoD plan, announced last year, to grow its civilian workforce by in-sourcing – replacing contractors with DoD civilian employees. DoD is on track to reduce the number of support service contractors from the current 39 percent of our workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace them with fulltime government employees. DoD will hire as many as 13,400 new civil servants in FY 2010, and another 6,000 in FY 2011, to replace contractors and up to 33,400 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years. This includes 2,500 acquisition personnel in FY 2010 and 10,000 through FY 2014.

FY 2010 Supplemental Request

As the president stated, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and to prevent its resurgence in both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of

Al Qaeda and its affiliates operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I believe the strategy announced by the president represents our best opportunity to achieve our objectives in a part of the world so critical to America's security.

In these efforts, Pakistan has provided critical support. We are working to expedite reimbursement to Pakistan for this assistance and will be coming to you with details of our plan.

The FY 2010 supplemental requests \$33.0 billion to support the president's buildup of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the rest of this fiscal year and fund other related requirements, including \$1 billion for Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense urges the Congress to approve this Supplemental by the spring to prevent disruption of funding for our troops in the field.

The FY 2010 Supplemental includes \$19.0 billion to support an average troop level in Afghanistan of 84,000 U.S. troops – 16,000 higher than the 68,000 assumed in the enacted FY 2010 budget. Troop levels are expected to reach 98,000 by September 30, 2010. The additional troops will consist of:

- Two Army counterinsurgency Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs);
- An Army Training BCT;
- A USMC Regimental Combat Team (RCT); and
- Enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams.

The supplemental also includes \$1.1 billion – on top of the \$11.3 billion already enacted – to field and sustain critically important lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for troops already there and for the additional forces being deployed this fiscal year.

FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations

To fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in FY 2011, we are requesting \$159.3 billion, comprised of these major categories:

- Operations (\$89.4 billion): Incremental pay for deployed troops, subsistence, cost of mobilizing Reserve Component personnel, and temporary wartime end-strength allowances.
- Force Protection (\$12.0 billion): Body armor, protection equipment, and armored vehicles to protect forces – including the rapid deployment and sustainment of MRAPs and M-ATVs.
- IED Defeat (\$3.3 billion): To develop, procure, and field measures to defeat improvised explosive devices threatening U.S. and coalition forces.
- Military Intelligence (\$7.0 billion): To enhance U.S. intelligence capabilities and operations including ISR.
- Afghan Security Forces (\$11.6 billion): To build and support military and police forces capable of conducting independent operations and providing for Afghanistan's long-term security.
- Iraqi Security Forces (\$2.0 billion): To continue building and sustaining Iraq's efforts to defend its people and protect its institutions as the U.S. removes troops by the end of 2011.
- Coalition Support (\$2.0 billion): Reimbursements and logistical sustainment for key cooperating nations supporting U.S. military operations.
- Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (\$1.3 billion): To provide flexible funds for commanders in the field to finance urgent humanitarian and

- reconstruction needs.
- Reconstitution/Reset (\$21.3 billion): To fund the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and munitions that have been consumed, destroyed, or damaged due to ongoing combat operations. This request includes funding to procure one Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to replace the combat loss of an F-15.
 - Military Construction (\$1.2 billion): To expand the logistical backbone and operational foundation for our fighting forces.
 - Temporary Military End Strength (\$2.6 billion): To support temporary end-strength increases in the Army and Navy for ongoing military operations.
 - Non-DoD Classified Programs (\$5.6 billion): To fund non-DoD classified activities that support ongoing military operations – the president’s counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Iraq Force Levels

This request supports the president’s goal of a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces and transfer to full Iraqi responsibility and control. Troop levels in Iraq are projected to decrease to 50,000 by August 31, 2010. Further reductions will occur in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The projected forces levels would be:

- Six Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) by August 31, 2010.
- Six AABs for the first part of FY 2011, decreasing to approximately four AABs (approximately 35,000 personnel) in Iraq by the end of FY 2011.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this committee for all that you have done to support our troops and their families. I believe the choices made and priorities set in these budget requests reflect America’s commitment to see that our forces have the tools they need to prevail in the wars we are in while making the investments necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon.

Thank you.

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Mr. DICKS. Admiral Mullen.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MULLEN

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to add my congratulations for your assumption of the chair of this critical committee.

Distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the chance to appear before you and discuss the state of our military as well as the President's fiscal year 2011 budget submission. I also thank you all for the extraordinary support you provide each and every day to our men and women in uniform as well as their families. That they are well equipped, well trained, well paid and enjoy the finest medical care anywhere in the world is testament in no small part to your dedication and your stewardship.

It is also, and I know you will agree, a testament to Chairman Murtha's leadership in this committee over the course of many years. In him our troops had no greater champion. For him and his family we still grieve, and we offer our condolences to all of you. We know you share his great concern and his profound respect for those who serve.

Speaking on their behalf, I can tell you that all they want right now is guidance on the mission before them and the tools to accomplish it. That is why I am here today, to talk about the guidance they are getting from this Department and to secure your continued support for the tools we want to give them.

Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major components of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the President's fiscal year 2011 defense budget submission, both of which, when combined with the new Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our Overseas Contingency Operations Fund requests, build upon the reform effort of last year and represent as comprehensive a look at the state of our military as I have seen in my more than 40 years of service. I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation, and I would ask you to accept without further comment my endorsement of the findings contained in each of these documents.

Let me leave you, rather, with three overarching things to consider as you prepare to debate this budget request. First, there is a real sense of urgency here. We have more than 190,000 troops deployed in harm's way right now, and that number includes only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Another 150,000 or so are meeting our security commitments elsewhere around the globe, and many of those missions are no less dangerous, certainly no less significant.

I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in Haiti, where more than 4,000 of your soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen are still pitching in to help alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people. It has been a truly interagency and an international mission. And as the capabilities of our partners increase, we would expect to continue assessing the need for U.S. forces on the ground. Decisions to redeploy will be made on a case-by-case basis, but we remain committed to doing what is required where and when it is required to support the Government of Haiti, USAID and the United Nations mission there.

We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we fight, and the one that needs fighting the most right now is in Afghanistan. You have seen the reports out of Marjah, where coalition and Afghan troops have made real headway against a stiffening Taliban resistance, and where General McChrystal has been steadfastly applying a populationcentric strategy of counterinsurgency warfare with great effect. We have also moved nearly 10,000 troops to Afghanistan in accordance with the President's strategy, and expect that about 18,000 of his December 1st commitment will be there by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a major contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 2010. Indeed, by the middle of this year, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the first time since 2003 as the location with the most deployed American forces.

Right now the Taliban still believe they are winning. Eighteen months from now, if we have executed our strategy, we will know they are not, and they will know that they cannot. Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, with whose leaders we are meeting this week. And it will more assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed. But the stakes are too high for failure. That is why we are asking you to fully fund our fiscal year 2010 supplemental and the fiscal year 2011 overseas contingency operations request. It is why we want a 6 percent increase for Special Operations Command. And it is why we need your support to develop and field a next-generation ground combat vehicle, to allow us to grow two more Army combat aviation brigades, and to continue rotary wing production, including nearly \$3 billion for the V-22 Osprey program.

In keeping with the Secretary's strong emphasis on ISR, an emphasis more than justified by our long experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are asking for more capability in unmanned aircraft and ground-based collection systems, including nearly \$3 billion to double the procurement rate of the MQ-9 Reaper by fiscal year 2012.

Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win the wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of today's conflicts will shape the global security environment for decades to come. I am very comfortable that we can and will finish well in Iraq, remaining on pace to draw down American forces to roughly 50,000, ending our combat mission there and transitioning to an advise-and-assist role. But without your continued support, we will not be able to show the meaningful progress in Afghanistan that the Commander in Chief has ordered, the American people expect, and the Afghan people so desperately need.

This is no mission of mercy; this is the place from which we were attacked in 2001, the place from which al Qaeda still plots and plans. The security of a great Nation, ours and theirs, rests not on good intentions, but on what ought to be a cold and unfeeling appraisal of self-interest and an equally cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools to protect that interest, ours and theirs.

That leads me to the second thing I would like you to consider, proper balance. Winning our current wars means investment in

hard-won irregular warfare expertise, a core competency that should be institutionalized and supported in coming years, and we are certainly moving in that direction. But we must also maintain conventional advantages. We still face traditional threats from regional powers who possess robust regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities. These cannot be ignored.

The freedom to conduct operations in support of joint, allied, and coalition efforts, assuring access and projecting combat power can only be preserved through enduring warfighting competencies. In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means having enough ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally and keep the sea lanes open. On the ground, it means accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and regiments. On the whole, it means never having to fight a fair fight.

Thus, the President's budget requests will buy another 42 F-35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base, and will fund development of a prompt global strike system, as well as efforts to upgrade our B-2s and B-52s. For ship construction, the spending plan totals some \$16 billion, procuring nine new ships in 2011, including two Arleigh Burke destroyers, two Virginia Class submarines, two Littoral Combat Ships, and a brand new Amphibious Assault Ship. It puts the Navy on track to maintain aircraft carrier production on a 5-year build cycle, resulting in a long-term force structure of 10 carriers by 2040.

Our budget requests also seek \$10 billion for ballistic missile defense programs, including 8.4 for the Missile Defense Agency. And it devotes ample resources to improving our cyberdefense capabilities.

Again, it is about balance, it is about deterring and winning the big and the small wars, the conventional and the unconventional; two challenges, one military. But where balance is probably most needed is in the programs and policies concerning our most important resource, our people. And that is my final point.

This QDR and this budget builds upon superb support you and this Department have provided our troops and their families for much of the last 8 years. Stressed and strained by nearly constant combat, many of them on their fifth, sixth and some even their seventh deployments, our men and women are without question, and almost inexplicably, the most resilient and battle-ready force in our history. On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits, so good is our attention and so attractive is our career opportunities. On the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming rise in suicides, marital problems, prescription drug addictions, and mental health problems.

Debra and I meet regularly with young troops and their spouses, and, though proud of the difference they know they are making, they are tired. Quite frankly, many of them are worried about their futures, their livelihoods, their children. And so you will see in this budget nearly \$9 billion for family support and advocacy programs. You will see child care and youth programs increased by \$87 million over the last year. And you will see a boost in warfighter and family services to include counseling to the tune of \$37 million. Military spouse employment will get a \$12 million plus-up, and we

will increase the budget to \$2.2 billion for wounded, ill, and injured members. In fact, the health care funding level for fiscal year 2011 is projected to provide high-quality health care for 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries.

Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number of mental health professionals on staff and advance our research in traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress. We know the strain of frequent deployments causes many problems, but we do not yet fully understand how or what or to what extent. So even as we work hard to increase dwell time, aided by the additional temporary end strength you approved last year for the Army, we will work equally hard to decrease the stress of modern military service. Indeed, I believe over time when these wars are behind us, we will need to look closely at the competing fiscal pressures that will dominate discussions of proper end strength and weapons systems. A force well suited for long-term challenges and not necessarily married to any current force planning construct will remain vital to our national security.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you again for your time and long-standing support to the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. They and their families are the best I have ever seen. On their behalf, I stand ready to answer your questions.

Mr. DICKS. Admiral, thank you for that comprehensive opening statement.

[The statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

Posture Statement of
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Before the 111th Congress
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense

Chairman Dicks, Representative Young, distinguished members of the Committee; it is my privilege to report on the posture of the United States Armed Forces.

I begin by thanking you for your support of our servicemen and women, their families, and the communities that do so much to help them. We can never repay them for their sacrifices, but we can support their efforts. As leaders, we necessarily debate the best course of action to secure our nation in a dangerous world. But our servicemen and women do not hesitate. When the decision is made, they go where they are needed most, where dangers must be confronted and adversaries defeated. I'm humbled as I visit them around the world, defending our nation in very trying conditions. They care deeply for this country, and they care most that they have the nation's clear backing. The support of the Congress and the American people remain essential to their strength and resolve. I am grateful for your unwavering recognition of the service of our forces and their families.

Today's Armed Forces are battle-hardened, capable, and ready to accomplish the nation's missions. They are the most combat experienced yet most compassionate force we have ever fielded, and continue to learn and adapt in ways that are truly remarkable. They are the best I have ever seen. I thank the Committee for taking the time to understand the stresses, strains and concerns of our service members. Your continuing legislative support of our Armed Forces makes all the difference.

Key Developments

Over this past year, our wartime focus has shifted to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As I have testified before the Congress on many occasions, the threats to our national security from al Qaeda and affiliated movements based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain real and persistent. We require a stable and reasonably secure Afghanistan and Pakistan - inhospitable to al Qaeda's senior leadership, capable of self defense against internal extremist threats, and contributors to regional stability.

Our increasing focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan confirmed the border region to be al Qaeda's center of gravity. It also showed the situation to be more dire than previously understood. The Afghan-Taliban's post-2005 resurgence produced a widespread paramilitary, shadow government and extra-judicial presence in a majority of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan Taliban) showed itself to be a bold and audacious enemy of the Pakistani people, ruthlessly seizing control of Swat in late spring. Nine Pakistani military operations against the Taliban that began last March have reversed their territorial gains. Throughout this year, we have constantly and carefully reviewed our objectives for the region. I concur completely with the President's strategy, and believe we have now matched the right strategy with the required resources. The decision to authorize an additional 21,500 American forces into Afghanistan in early 2009, followed by the President's commitment of additional forces in December set conditions to reverse Afghan-Taliban gains. It will also enable the government of Afghanistan to build the security and governance necessary to eliminate the insurgency as a threat. Setbacks marked much of 2009, but with a new leadership team, appropriate resources, improved organization, and a better strategy, we are confident of success against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Success will not come easily or swiftly, but we will succeed. The hardest work to achieve our regional aims remains ahead of us, especially in 2010-11.

Al Qaeda's central leadership has suffered significant losses over the past several years. Though its operational capacity has declined, al Qaeda's senior leaders remain committed to catastrophic terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our allies. Actions in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, in Iraq, and elsewhere have met with marked success. That said, al Qaeda successfully sought new approaches to plot attacks. The disrupted terrorist plot against New York City was planned in al Qaeda's Pakistani safe haven and intercepted in Denver. The failed Christmas Day bombing attempt over Detroit was crafted by and ordered from those in Yemen's growing safe havens. Both incidents demonstrate the resolve of al Qaeda and its ever-evolving strategy. While the danger remains real, like-minded governments and people around the world — especially those in the Muslim community — increasingly reject al Qaeda, its affiliates and what they stand for. Most want a brighter future for their children and grandchildren, not al Qaeda's endless war and intolerance. They see daily evidence that al Qaeda and its affiliates deliberately target and kill thousands of innocent Muslims in cold blood. They know al Qaeda continues a ruthless and deadly campaign against the people of Islam in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey and elsewhere. Continued progress against violent extremism will require enhanced, but prudent, partnerships with key governments and movements, including consistent efforts to counter al Qaeda's bankrupt message.

The behavior of the Iranian government is of grave and growing concern. Tehran's leadership remains on a trajectory to acquire a nuclear capability, in defiance of international demands and despite widespread condemnation. Iran's government continues to support international terrorist organizations, and pursues a coercive and confrontational foreign policy. These efforts exist alongside some of the greatest internal unrest Iran has faced since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. These events and conditions risk further destabilizing an already unstable region.

The unpredictable has also manifested itself in Haiti requiring a significant force commitment in Haiti, making it one of our most significant humanitarian missions in history. From port openings, to security and distribution of supplies, U.S. Southern Command's military Joint Task Force has delivered over 2 million bottles of water, two million meals and over one hundred thousand pieces of medical supplies to Haiti's earthquake survivors. Military medical teams also supplement the efforts of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and have already have seen over 10,000 patients and performed over 100 surgeries. The Haitians and our relief organizations will face a difficult few months with the rain and hurricane season fast approaching, but the security situation appears well in hand for now.

Several policy initiatives over the past year have provided the military with new direction. President Obama's June speech in Cairo set the stage for a new relationship between the U.S. and more than a billion people across the Muslim world. Throughout 2009, this Congress supported the rapid and necessary deployment of more forces to Afghanistan. We also began negotiations with Russia for a START follow-on treaty, which will reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles while maintaining U.S. deterrence. And, as mandated by the Congress, we have reviewed current and future threats and developed appropriate strategies in the Quadrennial Defense Review. We look forward to working with the Congress to forge a common understanding of the threats our nation faces, and how best to counter them.

Key alliances continue to matter greatly in our global security efforts. Our NATO allies and other non-NATO partners expanded support in Afghanistan over the past year. We now work there with 43 countries and nearly 40,000 international troops. Although the world avoided a widespread economic depression in 2009, many of our partners were financially challenged and may spend less on combined security and stabilization efforts. Other critical allies faced internal considerations that could adversely affect U.S. and regional security interests if not managed closely. Our close alliance with

Japan, in particular, suffered strain around basing rights in Okinawa. I am confident we will work through these and other issues, but it is a reminder that even our strongest allies cannot be taken for granted.

Against this backdrop, the strategic priorities for the military remain unchanged from my last annual testimony before Congress: defending our interests in the broader Middle East and South/Central Asia; ensuring the health of the Force, and balancing global strategic risk. With your ongoing help and support, we continue to address each of these priorities.

Defend our Interests in the Broader Middle East and South / Central Asia

The Broader Middle East and South / Central Asia, remains the most dangerous region of the world.

Our main effort within the region has changed. The government of Iraq is taking firm control of its own security. We have shifted our priority to Afghanistan and Pakistan, long under-resourced in many ways. That shift in focus will take the movement of some quarter of a million troops and their equipment in and out of the CENTCOM theater over the next several months. This is a herculean logistics effort. By the middle of 2010, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the first time since 2003 as our location with the most deployed American forces.

Despite this surge, the security situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan remains serious. The Afghan-Taliban have established shadow governments – featuring parallel judicial, taxation and local security/intimidation systems — in a clear majority of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Attacks by the Taliban have become far more numerous and more sophisticated. We are now establishing conditions — with military forces and expanded civilian agency presence — to reverse the Taliban’s momentum. Yet we face both a resilient Taliban insurgency and an Afghan public skeptical of their government’s good will, capacity and capability.

As of mid-March 2010, we have already moved over 9,900 troops, and expect that 18,000 of the President's December 1st commitment will be in country by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a major contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 2010.

These forces are joining some 68,000 U.S. forces and more than 30,000 Coalition forces already in Afghanistan — all of which have undertaken a fundamental shift in *how* they are being employed across the country. Our troops are now focused on protecting key population centers — separating them from the intimidation and influence of the Taliban. Simultaneously, they are training and partnering with Afghan security forces to enable Afghans to assume lead security for their own country as soon as possible. The next 12-18 months must be the time to reverse insurgent momentum and assess partnership progress.

The brave men and women we charge to implement this fundamental shift in Afghanistan security strategy need the strong support of this Congress. We need your assistance in key areas like funding for Afghan National Security Forces, who will ultimately bring about success and security. In the short term, the Commander's Emergency Response Program is needed to adequately protect the population, and enhanced special construction authorities and equipment procurement accounts will be critical to putting enough force on the ground to make a difference.

The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter of global terrorism. This is where al Qaeda plans terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our partners — and from where the Taliban leadership targets coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan's ongoing military operations against extremists in these areas are critical to preventing al Qaeda and associated groups from gaining ground.

In Pakistan, the extremist threat, a fractious political system, economic weakness and long-standing tensions with India continue to threaten stability.

We are working to rebuild our relationship with Pakistan and re-establish trust lost between our two countries. We aim to demonstrate to Pakistan — in both our words and our actions — that we desire a long-term relationship. Our recent concerns with Pakistan’s approach to U.S. visa requests is further testimony to the challenges of the relationship; and, it will affect increased capacity for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to include support for development projects. The State Department’s Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund and the DOD’s Coalition Support Funds allocated for Pakistan are essential components of our support to this critical ally. Enhanced contact and engagement between Pakistan and the United States is a critical component of a maturing, long-term partnership. Thus, we are focusing on expanded military education exchange programs, joint training opportunities and especially Foreign Military Sales and Financing. The budget before you requests additional funds for these critical partnership endeavors.

South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional efforts. Yet India and Pakistan must both be our partners for the long term. Bilateral military relationships are an essential component in a wide array of cooperative activities. We must recognize this and address it as part of our policy. While we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that builds long-term stability across the wider region of South Asia. As part of our long-term regional approach, we should welcome all steps these important nations take to regenerate their ‘back channel’ process on Kashmir.

While Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the critical terrain, we must remain vigilant in denying al Qaeda unfettered physical safe havens elsewhere across the Broader Middle East and South Asia, including Northern and

Eastern Africa. These efforts will not require tens of thousands of American troops. Instead, we can work quietly and persistently with regional allies and Coalition partners to deny al Qaeda territory from which to plot, train, and project global terror operations. Similarly, we continue to undertake collaborative, supporting efforts with like-minded governments across the broader Middle East. We now work to help the Yemeni government build the information base and the military capacity necessary to combat the al Qaeda threat within its borders. We applaud Yemeni efforts to confront al Qaeda operatives, and continue to offer Sana'a the support necessary to achieve this aim. We have worked with the concerned neighbors of Somalia to contain the worst aims and objectives of the Islamic Courts Union and al Shabaab. This must continue. In these areas – as well as others including Indonesia and the Philippines – our military engages with willing partners in a manner detrimental to al Qaeda's aspirations. We undertake these partnerships in conjunction with those from American intelligence, diplomatic and economic organizations. I must stress that in today's environment, training and equipping partner security forces to defend and protect their own territory and coastal waters is a core military mission. We appreciate Congress' continuing support for these important undertakings.

The Iranian government continues to be a destabilizing force in the region. Tehran's leadership remains on a trajectory to acquire a nuclear capability, in defiance of its international obligations. A nuclear Iran could spark a regional arms race or worse. It will be profoundly destabilizing to the region, with far-ranging consequences that we cannot fully predict. Tehran also continues to provide a range of support to militant organizations, including HAMAS and Hizbollah, fomenting instability outside its borders. Its increasingly reckless nuclear and foreign policy agenda is now playing out against the backdrop of a slowing economy and profound internal turmoil. I remain convinced that exhaustive — and if necessary coercive — diplomacy with Iran remains the preferred path to prevent these grave outcomes. To this

extent, the Joint Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and I support all efforts to steer the government of Iran off of its hazardous course. However, as with any potential threats to our national security, we will have military options ready for the President, should he call for them.

Iraq continues to progress, although more is needed. U.S. partnership with Iraqi security forces has been fundamental to this progress since 2005. Last year's level of violence was the lowest since 2003, testifying to the success of our approach. Al Qaeda is still present and has carried out several large-scale attacks. But, Iraqi Security Forces and government leaders responded to them vigorously yet professionally. I believe Iraqis are now more focused on economic growth than domestic security threats. Holding legitimate and inclusive elections in March 2010 will be essential. Foreign direct investment and expanded political engagement by other regional powers are also important as more diplomatic and economic progress will spotlight Iraq's return to the world stage as a sovereign nation.

U.S. Forces – Iraq (USF-I) remains on track to draw down American forces to roughly 50,000 and end our combat mission by August 31, 2010. Our security partnership will then shift to training, advising, and supporting Iraqi security forces. More broadly - the U.S. military will transition from a supported to a supporting effort in Iraq as we normalize relations. The State Department and other civilian agencies will increasingly be the face of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The U.S. military will strongly support its leadership. We appreciate the inclusion of the Equipment Transfer Provision in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. These transfers are a critical component to America's continuing actions as a reliable partner in Iraq's assumption of a responsible and Baghdad-led security future.

Health of the Force

Our nation's security is founded upon a well-trained, well-equipped all volunteer force. We must care for our people and their families, reset and reconstitute our weapon systems, and take on new initiatives that increase wartime effectiveness.

Care for our People

Our servicemen and women, their families, and their communities are the bedrock of our Armed Forces. Their health, resilience and well-being are at the heart of every decision I make. Frankly, investing in our people remains the single greatest guarantee of a strong military. Competitive pay, selective bonuses, expanded access to mental health care, continued health benefits for tens of thousands of our Wounded Warriors—those with seen and unseen wounds—and their families are critical to this investment.

Our military families and communities continue to play a unique and growing role in our national security fabric, one not seen in more than a generation. They support us and sustain us in ways we do not yet fully understand. They deserve the admiration and support of a grateful nation. I applaud the efforts of this body's Military Family Caucus, and encourage significant attention and funding for their programs of greatest concern. My conversations with spouses and children around the world tell me these concerns center on caring for those affected by these wars, child care, education, health and deployment issues.

We remain competitive in attracting the country's best talent. For the first time in the history of the All Volunteer Force, the Active Duty, Guard and Reserve components all exceeded annual recruiting goals for 2009. This success was reflected in the quality of our recruits as well as their numbers. Ninety-six percent of our accessions earned a high school diploma or better. Each Service also met or exceeded its 2009 retention goals. Our ability to recruit and retain underscores the fact that this is the best military I have seen in my 42-year career. While competitive pay is a critical factor in this success, it does not stand alone. Other critical 'people' programs supported by the

Congress – like the new GI Bill, adequate housing, access to quality schooling for military children, and attractive family support centers – come together to make the harsh burdens of military life acceptable.

We must not forget the challenges that this excellent All Volunteer Force faces every day. More than eight years of wartime operations have come at a cost. Most Army brigade combat teams are preparing for their fourth major deployment since 9/11, with some of them preparing for their fifth -- unprecedented in our history. The Marines Corps is in the same boat—their deployments are shorter but more frequent, and their pace is grueling. Our people spend less time at home, and this shorter dwell time between deployments does not allow for respite or for training along the entire spectrum of military operations. Our irregular warfare expertise—hard won over the last eight years—has come at a price. Conventional war fighting skills have atrophied and will require attention. Yet this overdue attention will have to wait. The gains we anticipate from the coming draw-down in Iraq will be absorbed by our necessary efforts in Afghanistan for at least two more years. Resetting the force requires significant effort and sustained commitment now and post-conflict. We will continue to rely heavily on our Navy and our Air Force.

Dwell time—the ratio of time deployed to time home—remains a concern, and one we must manage closely this year and into 2011. Dwell time for the Army is at 1:1.2 and the Marine Corps is slightly better at 1:1.5. We will not see significant dwell time improvements across all services until 2012. Deployment rates for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other low-density, high-demand specialties also remain very high. While our force is strong and resilient, these trends cannot continue indefinitely.

The challenges remain significant, but are manageable thanks to the support of Congress for increased end-strengths in the Army and Marine Corps. We are only now starting to feel the positive impact from these 2007-authorized increases in the baseline force — stabilizing deployment rates and

dwelling times. Coupled with the additional temporary increase of 22,000 troops within the Army, Congressional support for our wartime military manning needs has been critical.

The stresses of protracted war extend beyond the deployments themselves. Our number of dead and wounded continues to rise, as does the strain on their families and their communities. Other social costs of war—divorce, domestic violence, depression, and post-traumatic stress syndrome—are unacceptably high and continue to increase. We have much more to do.

Suicide deserves special attention. Despite our best efforts, 2009 witnessed a record level of suicides, with increases in both the Active and Reserve components. We have not begun to study suicides among family members and dependents. While there is not one cause for increased service-member suicides, we know enough to be certain that better prevention training programs for leadership, for at-risk service members, and robust funding and attention toward sober study of the problem are absolutely necessary.

We should provide a lifetime of support to our veterans. I urge you to continue funding the programs supporting those that have sacrificed so much, including those aimed to reduce veteran homelessness and that focus on rural health care options. The demands on our active and veterans care services will continue to grow, and require the attention found in this budget. Yet we must conceive of Wounded Warrior Support in a manner that goes beyond the traditional institutions. Public, private, and individual sources of help represent a “sea of goodwill” towards our veterans. Our focus must be more on commitment than compensation; and more attuned to transition and ability than upon disability. Our veterans want the opportunity to continue to serve, and we should enable that opportunity.

Reset and Reconstitute

My concerns about the health of our force go beyond our people. Our systems and capabilities are under extraordinary stress as well. The high pace of operations is consuming our capital equipment much faster than programmed. The Air Force and Navy have been essentially performing non-stop, global operations for 19 years, since Operation Desert Storm. The Army and Marine Corps have had the majority of their combat forces and equipment in the combat theater of operations for nearly six years. The unforgiving terrain of Afghanistan and Iraq causes extensive wear and tear, especially on our ground vehicles, helicopters, and supporting gear.

The demands of the current fight mean we must increase capacity in several areas, including rotary wing, ISR, electronic warfare and SOF. We sustain necessary rotary wing capacity through the addition of two active Army Combat Aviation Brigades, continued production of the tilt-rotor V-22, as well as our helicopter force, and a seventh SOF helicopter company. I support this budget's rebalancing in favor of more commercial airborne ISR capabilities for Combatant Commanders. This budget continues increasing the number of unmanned combat air patrols, coupled with the ability to fully exploit the intelligence coming from these platforms. We should expand current technologies to fill electronic warfare shortfalls and develop next-generation technologies for manned and unmanned aircraft.

New initiatives

Too many of our processes and programs remain geared to a peacetime clock, but several new initiatives focused on supporting our war efforts show promise. I strongly support the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands program and ongoing initiatives that increase the number and skill of our civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. I also strongly back the USAF's initiative to use light aircraft for enhanced capacity building of key allies and partners for light mobility and attack.

Our current acquisition process remains too unwieldy and unresponsive. Adding 20,000 more acquisition experts by 2015 will help, as will increasing the rigor and efficiency of our internal processes. Stability in our programs, comprehensive design reviews, better cost estimates, more mature technology and increased competition will make the process more responsive. Once fielded, our systems are the finest in the world, because of the experienced and capable program managers and engineers building them. We need more of managers and engineers, and they need better support and leadership.

Finally, I am growing concerned about our defense industrial base, particularly in ship building and space. As fiscal pressures increase, our ability to build future weapon systems will be impacted by decreasing modernization budgets as well as mergers and acquisitions. We properly focus now on near-term reset requirements. However, we may face an eroding ability to produce and support advanced technology systems. Left unchecked, this trend would impact war fighting readiness. The Department, our industry leaders, and the Congress need to begin considering how to equip and sustain the military we require after our contemporary wars come to an end.

Balancing Global Strategic Risk

Balancing global risk requires sustained attention to resetting the force. It also means making prudent investments to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and challenging worldwide security environment. As the President recently noted, it is the United States that has helped underwrite global security with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our military. America's interests are global, and our military must secure these interests. Where possible, we will act first to prevent or deter conflict. When necessary, we will defeat our enemies. And whenever able, we will work in concert with our many allies and partners.

For many decades, but especially since 1989, U.S. conventional overmatch has guaranteed our security and prosperity, as well as that of our many allies and partners. We have helped protect expanding global commons. We have seen the likelihood of conventional war between states drop. And we have used the tools designed for war not against human adversaries, but instead to support humanitarian operations. Most recently in Haiti, but elsewhere over the past 60 years, the military's unmatched capacity to transport goods and services have provided relief in the face of tragic natural disasters. In short, many nations have benefited from an extraordinarily capable and ready U.S. military, even as we have defended our own interests.

That capability must continue to span the full range of military operations. But in this post-Cold War era – one without a military near-peer competitor – we should not be surprised that adversaries will choose asymmetric means to confront us. They will seek to use both old and new technology in innovative ways to defeat our advantages. Terrorism will remain the primary tactic of choice for actors to conduct warfare “on the cheap”. Both state and non-state actors will seek weapons of mass destruction through proliferation. Increasingly, states will attempt to deny our ability to operate in key regions, through the development and proliferation of ballistic missile systems, or by exploiting space and cyberspace. Taken together, these are diverse threats that require a broad set of means.

Winning our current wars means investment in our hard won irregular warfare expertise. That core competency must be institutionalized and supported in the coming years. However, we must also stay balanced and maintain our advantage in the conventional arena. In the air, this advantage requires sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of assuring air superiority and holding difficult targets at risk. At sea, we require sustained presence and capacity supported by a robust ship building program. On the ground, we must accelerate the modernization of our combat brigades and

regiments. Without question, these are expensive undertakings. But our present security challenges demand them.

Countering weapons of mass destruction means investing in new research, securing nuclear materials, and preparing a layered defense. Improving our ability to neutralize and render safe critical targets is vital. We maintain the ability to respond to their use against our citizens. But while improving responsiveness to the use of such weapons is critical, more important is to counter their proliferation and deter their use. I advocate diverse investments in nuclear forensics and expanding our biological threat program, in addition to continuing investment in the highly effective counter-proliferation programs that are central to our success in this critical endeavor. These relatively small funds will have a disproportionately positive impact on our security.

The ability of potential adversaries to challenge our freedom of movement and the peaceful use of the global commons has grown in recent years. Anti access-technologies and capabilities are proliferating, which could prevent us from deterring conflict in some regions. We must preserve our ability to gain access even when political, geographical or operational factors try to deny us the same. This requires funding for improvements to our missile defense capabilities, expanded long range and prompt global strike systems, and hardened forward bases.

Threats in cyberspace are increasing faster than our ability to adequately defend against them. Cyber attacks can cripple critical infrastructure, impose significant costs, and undermine operational capabilities. Meanwhile, space-based systems critical to our global awareness and connectivity are aging and have proven vulnerable. A determined enemy could degrade existing space systems, significantly impacting our strategic intelligence and warning capabilities, as well as global positioning and communication. I ask the Congress to support the stand-up of U.S. Cyber-Command (CYBERCOM) and

provide funding for cyber and space initiatives to redress these growing and worrisome vulnerabilities.

Rising states present both a strategic challenges as well as strategic opportunities. China's economic strength, military capability, and global influence continue to grow. While our military relations continue to develop, we seek much more openness and transparency from China regarding the pace and scope of its conventional and nuclear force modernization. We also believe that China can — and should — accept greater responsibility for and partner more willingly to safeguard global prosperity and security. This necessitates that Beijing work more collaboratively when determining fair access to transportation corridors and natural resources. China also should demonstrate greater clarity in its military investments. Absent a more forthcoming China in these critical areas, our military forces must prudently consider and plan based on known Chinese capabilities and actions, in addition to its stated intentions. As we work with Beijing to establish a continuous military-to-military dialogue to reconcile uncertainties and generate confidence, we will pursue common interests in agreed upon areas such as counter-piracy, counter-proliferation, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As a Pacific Rim nation with longstanding interests throughout the area, we will continue to play a vigorous regional role.

Our present dialogue with Russia is multi-faceted. It acknowledges points of contention as well as opportunities to “reset” our relationship on a positive trajectory. We seek Moscow's cooperation in reducing the number and role of strategic nuclear weapons. These discussions have been constructive, and negotiations are near fruition. I believe the resulting treaty will benefit the United States, Russia, and the world. Moscow has also helped us establish a supplemental logistics distribution line into Afghanistan. Russia also helped our diplomats pressure Iran, and we look toward Moscow to do even more in this process. On the other hand, Russia continues to reassert a special sphere of influence with its neighbors. The Russian military is simultaneously

modernizing its strategic forces and many conventional forces. Our obligations under Article V of NATO remain clear and we remain poised to fulfill them.

North Korea continues to present a security challenge in Asia. Today, Pyongyang continues to pursue intercontinental ballistic missile technologies, develop nuclear technologies, and export weapons in contravention of international norms on nonproliferation, and of two United Nations Security Council resolutions. It also maintains an unfortunate and threatening posture toward our ally the Republic of Korea, and an unhelpful disposition toward our ally Japan.

Of course, we can best defend our interests and maintain global order when we partner with like-minded nations. By forging close military-to-military relations with an expanding number of nations - providing training, equipment, advice, and education - we increase the number of states that are interested and capable of partnering with us. While tending to long-term allies, we should also cultivate our relationships with other liked-minded powers around the world. Making a small investment now will pay dividends in reducing our security burden and global risk.

We need full funding of Defense Theater Security Cooperation programs, International Military Education and Training activities, and the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State. Preventative strategies require providing foreign partners with the capacity to promote stability and counter-terrorism. With your help, we have made considerable strides in adapting our tools for security force assistance, but more is needed. I urge your continued support of the Global Train and Equip initiatives (under 1206 authorities) as well as funding for special operations to combat terrorism (under 1208 authorities).

The majority of threats facing the U.S. require integrated interagency and international initiatives. Supporting interagency cooperation programs, to include expanding the number of exchanges between the Department of Defense and other Executive Agencies, will improve interagency capacity to

meet future security threats as well. Please urge your colleagues who oversee the Department of State to fully fund Secretary Clinton's requests. I ask the Congress to promote legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-military Executive Agencies. Our future security concerns require a whole of government effort, not just a military one.

Conclusion

This past year witnessed significant achievements by America's men and women in uniform. Their efforts and sacrifices - as part of a learning and adapting organization - have sustained us through more than eight years of continuous war. Thanks to them we are in position to finish well in Iraq. Thanks to them, we can begin to turn the corner in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In conjunction with our many partner nations, they've provided humanitarian relief assistance to millions, helped contain a threatening H1N1 pandemic, expanded support to national law enforcement for enhanced border security, and disrupted terrorist sanctuaries world-wide. And, thanks to them, we have a global presence protecting our national security and prosperity.

The demands of the present remain high, and our military role in national security remains substantial. This will continue for the foreseeable future. Yet as I have testified before this body in past appearances, the military serves America best when we support, rather than lead United States foreign policy.

On behalf of all men and women under arms, I wish to thank the Congress for your unwavering support for our troops in the field, their families at home, and our efforts to rebalance and reform the force to assure that we win the wars we are in and are poised to win those we are most likely to face in the future.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hale, do you have any?

Mr. HALE. I do not.

AFGHANISTAN THEATER

Mr. DICKS. All right. Secretary Gates, several members of this committee were on a recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This was at the time of the Marines' deployment in Marjah. Our impression was that went very well. We were concerned about the governance and the assistance to the people there in that area. Can you tell us how that is going?

Secretary GATES. I think that part of shaping the battlefield in the weeks and months before the operation began, a big part of the focus was on both our own civilian capacity and that of the Afghan Government to come in behind our troops in the hold and build phases of the operation. So I would say that this is one of those areas where first of all, we have a very good provincial governor in Helmand Province. And a lot of effort was made to bring in the right kind of people from Kabul and also from the provincial government so that they could follow in behind our troops. And my impression is that part of the operation has gone very well. I do not know if Admiral Mullen has anything to add.

Admiral MULLEN. I would reemphasize certainly the plan was to bring in—as it was actually last July to generate capability in another part of Helmand when the Marines went in—to bring in governance immediately behind the troops. That has happened in Marjah. I think we are still in the nascent stages of that. I know President Karzai has visited that area and has certainly heard the local people from Marjah and what they need from their government. And that has had a—from what I understand in discussions with General McChrystal—a very powerful impact on him. And we know that that is a very critical part of the long-term success here. So the people were ready to go. This was not just our military people, but on the civilian side there was a significant number of our civilians and international civilians who understand this and are pitching in to make this happen. I think it is early to really see how effective it is going to be.

AFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

Mr. DICKS. In Iraq we had a great difficulty of getting non-military people into positions of helping the government, working with the people. That seems to be going a lot better recently. Can you explain that, Secretary Gates?

Secretary GATES. As I recall the statistics, a year or so ago, although we had a formal civilian contingent in Afghanistan and the embassy of about 350, in fact there were only about 250 people on the ground in the embassy. That number has now been almost quadrupled. There are somewhere between 900 and 1,000 U.S. State Department, AID, Agriculture, other civilians in the embassy, in the PRTs now.

So to be honest, there will never be as many civilians as we need, just as no commander will ever have all the troops he feels he needs or wants. But there has been a dramatic increase in the number of civilians, and those increases are continuing.

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT

Mr. DICKS. The other thing that I was impressed with is the commitment of the Pakistan Government and military in the last 10 months and their military operations in Swat, in southern Waziristan. I was even impressed yesterday in a briefing from General Kiyani that they are doing a lot more in the northern part of Waziristan. I know that Admiral Mullen in particular has worked very closely with General Kiyani, and I know that McChrystal and Petraeus also have. But it seems like this is moving in the right direction. What is your take on that?

Secretary GATES. Let me just comment briefly and then turn to Admiral Mullen, because he has, I think, at this point made 16 or 17 trips to Pakistan in the last couple of years.

It has really been extraordinary, in my view, seeing what Pakistan has done over the last really more than a year in terms of becoming engaged, in terms of their operations, in terms of understanding that they now face an existential threat in this area of people who want to destabilize that government and overthrow the Government of Pakistan and replace it with an Islamic fundamentalist radical regime. They understand this. Their civilian government understands this. And their troops have paid a heavy price for these operations. They have suffered thousands of casualties in recent years in taking on these guys.

But the Pakistanis, in my view, in the last months not only have become much more aggressive and active on their side of the border, there is a developing partisanship or relationship with General McChrystal in terms of coordinating what is going on on both sides of that border that I think represents a hugely salutary development.

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I would only add that the Pak military has worked hard, first of all, to get the support of the Pakistani people, and that was very low a couple of years ago, and now it is exceptionally high. By most counts they have taken on nine separate campaigns over the last 12 to 18 months, most recently through South Waziristan and Swat. I have been through Swat with General Kiyani, spent all day there, and they truly turned that place around, I mean literally rid them of the insurgents.

The challenge now is to build. It is the same challenge you have in any counterinsurgency. His force is actually stationary there because he has got to hold until a government can come in behind him and start to build the institutions that will sustain the effort so far and meet the people's needs.

The strategic dialogue—you took a briefing yesterday, many Members of Congress did—the strategic dialogue that we are having this week, led by their Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Qureshi, is a huge step forward in terms of strengthening the partnership. And it is a partnership. General Kiyani has moved troops from east to west. He has trained his people in counterinsurgency. He has had a huge impact where they have fought. He has limits. He still has got an eastern front. They are very focused on India. Some of us may not think that is a priority. I assure you they do in Pakistan. And they get to choose; it is their country. So they

changed dramatically in the last couple of years. Still an awful long way to go. And it is an existential threat, and they recognize that.

And the only other thing I would emphasize is this synchronization across the border. When I have been asked historically, how do you eventually get at al Qaeda, it is this synchronization which Generals Kiyani and Petraeus and McChrystal have really started to move forward on. And we see the impact of that. It is not going to happen overnight, but it is a matter of us building trust in the relationship. We are working hard on that. It is coming back. And we have had an impact on that border area, and we will continue to do that.

Mr. DICKS. I am going to call on Mr. Young, but I just make this one point. I also think that our Intelligence Community has played a big role in this, and the going after al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Area. I just hope we can carry that further to Quetta, where there are still a number of people, Afghan leaders of the Taliban, who live in Pakistan. It is something that I did not fully appreciate. But that is an area that we have to deal with as well.

Mr. Young.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER SCHEDULE

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I think you might have anticipated some of my questions when you talked about the F-35. And you preempted some of my questions because you answered already. But I remember one of the very first hearings that I ever sat through on this subcommittee, and a Marine told me and he told the committee that he said, look, we will go anywhere you want us to go, we will fight any battle you want us to fight. Just make sure that the airplane overhead is an American airplane. And I think that is a reasonable request. An F-35, of course, is a very, very important part of that plan.

So I am curious. There have been delays and slips and IOC changes. How confident are you that the 2-year IOC we are talking about now, or the 1½ years for the Navy IOC, how confident are you that we will be able to maintain those projected dates?

Secretary GATES. Let me first, Mr. Young, talk about where we are in terms of the dates with taking into account the slips that we have talked about. First, the training squadron for the F-35s will still show up at Eglin in 2011. The Marines will get their F-35s in 2012 and will have IOC in 2012. The Air Force will begin getting its F-35s in 2013, and the Navy in 2014. Both would tell you today that their full IOC will be in 2016.

Mr. YOUNG. How confident are you that we are going to meet this? See, that is my question. How confident are you that we are going to meet those dates?

Secretary GATES. There are two things that I would say give me confidence. One is these cost estimates are now based on two successive Joint Estimating Team efforts. Frankly, part of the problem that we have faced in this program is overly rosy forecasts by the program office itself. So what our estimates are now based on is this independent estimating team that, in fact, that kind of independent costing role was part of the Acquisition Reform Act that

the Congress passed last year. Now that is required. So I think these estimates are much more realistic.

Second, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics took a considerable amount of time, a number of weeks, to go through this program chapter and verse and to figure out what needed to be done in terms of restructuring. And to tell you the truth, there are some aspects of monitoring these contracts that we have not done very well on. One of the things that I was briefed on that just drove me nuts is that we have a factory in which about 6 percent of the floor space is used by the F-35 program compared to other aircraft programs, and we are paying 70 percent of the overhead for that factory. I think we can fix that.

So I have confidence because of these estimates, but I also would say we have some history to go on here. With both the F-22 and the C-17, these both were aircraft that had significant development problems at the beginning of those efforts. What happened eventually in those programs is exactly what we are doing now. We cut the number of aircraft that we were going to full production on before the development program was completed, and we extended the development program itself. Both of those programs, I think everybody would agree those are great aircraft, and they both had similar problems. That is what you have when you have high-tech combat aircraft programs like this.

There are no guarantees in any of this, but based on everything that I have seen, I have confidence that the range of cost estimates and timing that is being described and presented to me today will, in fact, be executed.

Admiral MULLEN. Just one brief comment, sir. The individual who is nominated, or the name I know of to be nominated, to run that program is, at the three-star level—is an exceptional individual, one of the best program executives I have ever known. And from my perspective, there is additional confidence based upon his skill set.

Secretary GATES. I would also say, Mr. Young, between firing the program manager and holding out \$615 million from Lockheed, I think we got their attention.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT LIFE EXTENSION

Mr. YOUNG. We did take note of that. I thought that was a constructive step.

Now, with the extension of the IOCs, what about the F-15, F-16, F-18? Are we going to have to do anything on a service life extension program or any major changes other than regular maintenance for those aircraft?

Secretary GATES. Let me just speak to the F-18s. We have quite a bit of money in this budget for additional F-18s, particularly the G model.

Mr. YOUNG. New aircraft.

Secretary GATES. New aircraft. That line will remain open through 2013, and we will consistently be reassessing where we are in this. But with respect to the F-18s, we are continuing to buy. And my understanding is we are talking with the contractor.

One of the questions I got back in January was about why we did not go to multiyear contracts as opposed to single-year con-

tracts. And frankly, the costs were such that we did not see enough benefit from the long-term commitment of capital, if you will. The contractors come back to us with some interesting proposals, and we are now looking at a multiyear contract with respect to the F-18s.

Admiral MULLEN. We are very focused on what we can do to extend lives of airplanes in terms of modernization. On the F-18 side, there was at one point in time a desire to extend them out to upwards of 10,000 flight hours. Essentially, the analysis showed we could not get there. So we are going to maximize the opportunity to extend those.

The F-18 problem really does not get critical until 2015, 2016, 2017 time frame. So we will know a lot more about JSF at that particular point in time and can adjust.

As far as the F-16s are concerned, we are at a time where the Chief of the Air Force, General Schwartz, in order to recapitalize his fleet, he has really got to cash in, he has really got to decommission older airplanes, but also focus on getting as much out of the ones that we have as we possibly can. There is an extraordinary amount of attention being paid to this overall Strike Fighter issue across the Department.

Mr. DICKS. Just briefly, there was a center barrel replacement program, right, on the Marine Corps aircraft at one point?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. Not early in the overall program, but a few years ago there was, yes, sir, for F-18s.

Mr. DICKS. Is that still a problem?

Admiral MULLEN. Not to my knowledge. I mean, that program was done. It was done on the aircraft that we needed that had center barrel cracks, and those were replaced.

Mr. DICKS. I think we have given you multiyear authority, too, by the way. I think Congress has.

Admiral MULLEN. As the Secretary said, it is this issue of what is the value of that? If you have a 5-year—historically, if you have a 5-year contract, you really can generate unit savings. But if you are just doing it 1 or 2 years out, there just is not much there. I think that is really where we were with a goal to, quite frankly, end this production line at a certain time in the near future. And yet now it is really left open as a hedge as we—and one of the reasons as we move through this critical time in the development of JSF.

SHIPBUILDING

Mr. YOUNG. Along the same lines of the discussion of the aircraft, shipbuilding. We are determined to go to a 313-ship Navy, but it requires 10 to 11 ships a year in order to reach that goal by a certain time. This year's budget request is a little short on that 10 to 11. I think you are only including nine ships in the budget request this year. If we only do 9 ships compared to the 10 to 11 that are projected needed to get to the 313 ships, how long does that extend the time period before we achieve the 313-ship Navy?

Admiral MULLEN. In fact, when I was CNO, I did that study, and it was the floor. It was, in my view, the lowest number we need in our Navy to handle the global security interests that are out

there. And I think today we are at 283. Actually, when we were doing that, we were on a glide slope to be around 240, depending upon what your assumptions were, 240 ships. So I am actually pleased that we have been able to reverse that.

But this math, which you can do as you have done, Mr. Young, pretty clearly, you have got to have 10 to 11 a year if you are going to get to 300-plus. There is an awful lot of work to do that. In the end it is a matter of affordability and investment. And it is going to take—there is a significant amount of money, I think I said \$16 billion this year, and it is going to take—and I have looked at many ways to do this over the years—but it is going to take a significant amount of investment to reach that. And on balance, while I have talked about the balance in the budget, this year that is where the money went.

There is more production capacity in the industrial base, an industrial base that I have been concerned about for a long time, but to get to that it is going to take another 3- to 4- to \$5 billion a year investment to really generate that Navy. And that is a huge challenge.

Secretary GATES. I would just add one additional point, Mr. Young, because many of you will still be here in the latter part of this decade. But the Department of Defense and you and the Nation are going to face a very difficult choice toward the end of this decade. One of the new program starts in the fiscal year 2011 budget is for the next-generation ballistic missile submarine. And when that program really begins to ramp up in the latter part of this decade, it will suck all the air out of the Navy shipbuilding program. And so some tough choices are going to have to be made either in terms of more investment or choices between the size of surface fleet you want and the submarine fleet.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, just one more question, and that is are we still determined that a 313-ship Navy is necessary?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. We are. I mean, the analysis, extensive analysis, and Admiral Roughead after me, looked at this. And again, from my perspective that is the floor, that is the minimum to meet the security requirements that are out there.

Mr. YOUNG. We need to all work together to get ramped up to achieve that goal.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky.

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE REPLACEMENT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Chairman, thank you much.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. If I could follow up on Mr. Young's line of questioning. Mr. Secretary, right at the end you said Congress is going to have to make a decision as to the type of Navy and number of ships we want. Admiral Mullen has said several times this morning that 313 is the floor. Anticipating that if it is \$7 billion a copy that the boomers are going to suck the juice out of the Navy's budget, what is the administration doing this year to anticipate that and build that into their budget request for a 313-ship Navy?

Secretary GATES. Well, what the plans that we have been working on with the Navy would, in fact—and I cannot remember the

exact year, but around 2015 would ramp the Navy up to 10 or 11 ships a year. But as I say, we are looking well beyond the Future Year Defense Program that goes out to 2015, and some difficult choices are going to have to be made at that point in terms of either more investment when we start building these SSBNs.

Mr. HALE. We average 10 ships a year in the 5-year period in this budget, but as the Secretary said, the SSBN problem is really at the end of this decade.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. That is my question to the administration; are you anticipating that, how are you building that in? Because this year we are told we would hit our target in 2020. Two years ago we were told we would hit in 2019. The year before that, it was 2016. Now, you talk about whether any of us are going to be here at the end of the decade. I do not know the number in the administration's proposal in 2000, but I assume we were going to hit a 313-ship Navy sometime in this past decade. And my concern looking ahead, knowing that a sub is going to suck the air out of the Navy's budget and that we would have to ramp up, if the Navy believes they need—and I do not know what the right number is, but if the Navy—I am just very concerned that every year this subcommittee hears exactly the same testimony, and that chart keeps moving to the right every year.

Admiral MULLEN. I think, sir, you would see that not just in shipbuilding, but in a lot of other projections. It is always rosier in the outyears than the FYDP. In the end, and I think the Secretary laid it out very clearly, I think one way this budget starts to get at that is to lay in the money—the initial money for the SSBN. And I think that is really critical. I think doing that with this, literally, red flag, this warning, that should conditions sort of remain the same, it will end up eating a significant amount of the shipbuilding budget, and you trade—typically inside a fixed budget you trade that off against other submarines or other surface ships. You typically do not trade it off against the carriers and the big decks. So that is what we have done historically. And I think you pose a great question that we all have to figure out how we are going to answer. How big do we want our Navy to be? What do we want it to do? And we are a maritime power, have been for a long time. And then are we going to invest? And then the other piece of that that is important is this acquisition piece. Those shipbuilding programs have to perform as well.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I see. All right.

Secretary GATES. Could I just make two quick additional points? First of all, it is very important that the top-line number of the defense budget remain where it is. But with the cuts in the programs that we have made last year and have continued to propose this year, if we end up having to operate with a lower top-line number than we have now, I have no place to go but force structure.

Over the longer term, the only way we can sustain the force structure we have today is to have growth, net growth, real growth in the defense budget of 2 to 3 percent. That is just a fact of life. And we can make this work because of the program changes that we made last year on their merits. We were not trying to cut to a specific number by any means. I just tell you that in all honesty. But we have been able to make this work, shift some of these pro-

grams for Warriors and others into the base budget. But over the long term, if the Nation wants to sustain the force structure that it has today, it will require a minimum investment of 2 to 3 percent real growth.

Mr. DICKS. The lives of people are at stake, and it is the people who are in the military who have been stressed. And I completely concur with the Secretary's view on this, that if we do not find an answer to this, we are going to have to take force structure down. And this is the last time you would ever want to do that because we are in these two engagements. We have got to get through this.

I am sorry, if we are going to get everybody in, the Secretary has a hard stop time at 11:30.

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Can I ask one quick question on the Nuclear Posture Review? When is that going to be completed and released?

Secretary GATES. I think, Mr. Visclosky, it will be out probably within about 2 to 3 weeks. We are very close.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Just one quick question, because it is very important, because Mr. Frelinghuysen and I are on Energy, and we had this interchange last year. There is money built into the budget anticipating additional infrastructure investment at NNSA. And as a member of the Energy Subcommittee, I do not want to make that investment until we see what that strategy is.

Secretary GATES. I hear you.

Mr. DICKS. All right. Mr. Frelinghuysen. We have to keep this at 5 minutes, everybody, because to get everybody through, and the Secretary has got a hard 11:30 departure.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me thank you all for your extraordinary service and the men and women that you represent. I do not advertise it very often, but I spent a year in Vietnam in the Vietnam war. Of course, when I got back, they called it the Vietnam conflict.

I think words are important, and when you start talking about overseas contingency operations, I think we need to recognize we are fighting two wars, I think, as you said, Admiral Mullen, at one time. And one of those wars we are fighting is in Iraq.

We have today, as I can recount, about 96,000 troops, and that is going to be scaled down, I understand, Mr. Secretary, to 50,000, and then the President has said we will be out of any sort of a military posture by the end of 2011, by the end of December of 2011. I do not want to use the word "contingencies," but obviously the Defense Department is ready for every contingency. What if Prime Minister Maliki, while the election is somewhat unsettled and has not been determined, says to you, we need you here to provide, continue to provide, a degree of stability?

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, we do more contingency planning than probably anybody in the world. But I would say we are on track at this point. I think General Odierno is comfortable that we will meet the benchmarks that—not only the President's policy, but the security agreement that the Bush administration signed with the Iraqis pledging to have all of our troops out by the end of 2011.

We have contingency planning, but at this point we think that we can meet these benchmarks and frankly we anticipated all along there would be a stressful period after the Iraqi election. I did a video conference with General Odierno a few days before the election and he said if we get 50 to 55 percent turnout, that will be great. If we get 55 to 60 percent, that would be exceptional. We ended up with 62 percent turnout. The Iraqis are trying to solve their problems politically instead of shooting at each other. And frankly, I think we are modestly optimistic that this thing is going to go forward without any need for changing the plans.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Obviously, if the request comes, you will be making recommendations to the President?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And react to that?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

IRAN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Would you focus for a minute—there is talk of potential Marine interdiction off of Iran. That is another potential decision that would be on your plate. Can you tell the committee what we might anticipate in that area?

Secretary GATES. Well, we don't see the kind of behavior on the part of the Iranians that would make that necessary. But all of our Navy commanders who are operating in the Gulf have rules of engagement if they are attacked, if they are approached. So I think—I defer to Admiral Mullen, but I think we are pretty comfortable that we have both the capability and the rules of engagement that will allow us to protect our own forces.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Maybe to Admiral Mullen. Do we have the resources to do what we might need to do for interdiction purposes?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. They will.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Mr. Moran.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL POLICE

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me say, I think that all three of you are the right people in the right place, and it is nice to be able to say that. For several years, in the past, I couldn't say that. Certainly if I had, I wouldn't mean it. But you are doing a great job and thank you. We can't discuss—

Mr. DICKS. We are in an open session.

Mr. MORAN. That is the point. And since we are in an open session, we can't discuss anything that was discussed in closed session, let alone classified documents. So I am going to restrict my questions to this current issue of Newsweek and today's New York Times. The front page of The New York Times talks about a deal that President Karzai is putting together with Mr. Hekmatyar. As you know, Mr. Hekmatyar is a warlord. He is Pakistan's favorite warlord. And he is responsible for killing a whole lot of American and coalition forces, but they are working out a deal to withdraw within a year from Afghanistan. We gave him the green light to work out this deal a couple of years ago and so he is working it out with Mr. Karzai, and of course, his brother Wally, who is the principal opium drug lord in Afghanistan.

The reason I bring that up is it is consistent with this article, it says a scandal in Afghanistan, the exclusive story of how we have wasted \$6 billion on a corrupt and abusive police force that may cost us the war. I agree with your strategy. Obviously you capture a village, you hold it, you build. The problem is the transfer. And it is not a transfer to the Afghan national army, as deficient as they are, it is to the police. And as General Caldwell says in this article, and I repeat, in fact, when we met with him just a couple of weeks ago. It is inconceivable they are going to be ready. It is no reflection on our soldiers who are doing a phenomenal job. There has been 170,000 Afghans trained. There are only about 30,000 that remain on the force. We know that much of the ammunition that the Taliban uses against us is coming from Afghan police.

Mr. DICKS. Why don't we let them answer because you are going to use up your entire 5 minutes on your question.

Mr. MORAN. I know that. I am aware of that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. DICKS. Then they are not going to have a chance to answer.

Mr. MORAN. I will give them a chance. The police are not ready, and in fact in Marja, the elders of the village said it wasn't you that really liberated us, it was the Taliban from a corrupt police chief. And if we were going to stay, it would be fine. But if we turn it back over to the corrupt police, 90 percent of them—they are illiterate, they have got no where else to go and frankly they see it as an opportunity to extort money from local people, many of them.

Mr. DICKS. Let them answer. Jim, I am asking you to let them answer.

Mr. MORAN. I am asking you how we are going to deal with the problem of transfer to these Afghan police who are not ready?

Secretary GATES. We have known all along that the police were going to be a challenge. I think General McChrystal, if he were here, he would tell you that he was pretty satisfied with the progress of the Afghan national army and from being from a point a few months ago we were partnering eight or nine of us to one of them. In the current operation, it has been three of us to two of them. So we are getting to the place and partnering as more Afghans are trained that they are in the fight.

The police are a challenge. We are increasing the number of trainers for the police. I think that the local situation will be a combination of local security forces that are put together in the communities themselves as well as the police. General Caldwell is working this problem with the Afghans. We have a number of international partners on this. But we have known all along that the Afghan police will be a challenge. And until the Afghans can, in fact, be responsible for their own security, we will not transfer security. Now, where we are headed is really changing the word transfer to transition, which is what we did in Iraq, which, if you say transfer, that means that on the 30th of August, all of a sudden the support net and the safety net disappears and you are on your own if you are Afghan Army or the Afghan police.

So what we are looking at now is the kind of thing we did in Iraq where we are in the lead, then they are partnered with us and then they are in the lead and then we withdraw to a tactical

overwatch and then withdraw a little further. So they have got the support network and we will do that with the police. But clearly this is a problem we have got to work on.

TALIBAN RECONCILIATION

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Secretary, let me ask Admiral Mullen. Are you comfortable with the approach of a reconciliation with the Taliban, a type of collaborative government that they are working toward?

Admiral MULLEN. This is really to be an Afghan-led issue. So your comment on the first article is certainly one that has great relevance, and I just know that we and the international community are very engaged on that aspect of this thing. As far as I am concerned, our strategy still focuses on the security of the population, as well as—my view is we need to reconcile from a position of strength. We are not there yet.

Mr. MORAN. Do you think it will work?

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Tiahrt.

AERIAL REFUELING TANKER

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the committee. And I would note that even though your in-laws, Mr. Secretary, are from Washington, you were a graduate from Wichita East. So greetings from Wichita. I want to thank you and the Department for their staunch defense of the KC-X, the tanker requirements, consistently noting that the requirements were fair and balanced and focused on what the Air Force needs and not what benefits any particular company and I think we can all agree that military requirements ought to be specified by the warfighter, and it is up to protecting—it is up to prospective suppliers how best to meet those requirements. It appears that some Europeans disagree with this approach. There were some statements from European governments and their leaders and EADS that appear to suggest that the Pentagon should change the tanker requirements to fit what EADS is offering instead of changing what they have to offer to fit the valid requirements.

I believe that we can all agree that international politics should never impact requirements. But there is currently a consideration on a request for a 90-day delay, a slide to the due date of the request for proposal. We have waited a long time for this replacement air refueling tanker. If Chairman Dicks and I had our way back in 2002 with the proposal we made, we would have 80 airplanes already delivered.

So a further delay seems out of order. It has been around a long time. We know what the Air Force requirements are. And we know that a further delay is really unnecessary. Can you assure the committee that you and the Air Force plan to stick to the current requirements as defined by the final RFP?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you. With the current ruling, the final decision on the World Trade Organization in its case against—in our case, the USTRs case against the European Union regarding illegal subsidies provided to Airbus, these impacts of the subsidies has had a huge effect on U.S. industry. At one time, we had three

major aircraft suppliers in America, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and the Boeing Company. Today, there is only the Boeing Company because the other two were run out of business I believe by illegal subsidies. Under the current ruling, it says that the proposed aircraft that EADS has considering proposing—excuse me—there was a \$5 billion subsidy that has been ruled illegal.

Now, the tanker program is not the lowest price contract. But price is an important part of this competition. If EADS decides to bid, how can a fair competition be held when EADS has benefited from the billions of dollars in illegal subsidies?

Secretary GATES. First of all, my lawyers tell me that the WTO case, that it gives us no basis on which to make a judgment. As I indicated, we do not intend to change the requirements. I want to buy the aircraft that the Air Force thinks it needs and is convinced it needs. EADS has indicated an interest and has sent us a letter indicating that and we are considering it at this time.

PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, Air Force One is one of the most recognizable symbols of America around the world. Regardless of how well these aircraft are maintained, they are still 20 years old. And there are fewer than 27 747–200s, which is the model that Air Force One is based on in commercial passenger service today. I understand the aircraft is nearing the point where the operation and support costs will exceed the cost to recapitalize with state of art more efficient aircraft. Given that these aircraft are the President's flying headquarters and travel the world, what are the Department's plans to—and schedule to recapitalize the presidential 747 aircraft fleet?

Secretary GATES. We actually have some money in the budget in 2011 to begin looking at a new Air Force One. That money will clearly ramp up in the next few years as we move in that direction. There clearly is a need for a new presidential aircraft.

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Ms. Kaptur.

CONTRACTORS VS. INSOURCING

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for your service to our country and those under your command. Let me just express a general concern about our soldiers and the dwell time ratios that we have been given and the extraordinary burden on the force. I know you know that, but just know it is of deep concern to this Member. Number two, I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you could provide for the record a listing of coalition forces. I believe there are at least 30,000 that are assisting us in Afghanistan, and at least that is in the material we have, who they are, numbers and what roles they are performing and whether they are going up or going down and also money that is coming to assist us in these efforts from any other countries. That would be greatly appreciated.

Let me say a \$700 billion request is an extraordinary number by any measure of history, and I have to be concerned as a Member of the Congress on how we pay for this. And I was going to ask Mr. Hale if you could provide for the record in past wars means

by which the people of the United States have paid for these rather than putting these costs on future generations.

[The information follows:]

The Administration is committed to returning the federal government to a sustainable fiscal path—including the costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, the Administration believes that the costs for these operations should not be considered in isolation but rather in the context of the budget as a whole.

That is why the Budget does not simply assume that the cost of such operations will unrealistically disappear, as was the case under the budgets of the previous Administration. Instead, it includes about \$160 billion of funding per year in 2010 and 2011 for overseas contingency operations, and, as a placeholder, assumes an average of \$50 billion per year from 2012 through the end of the decade. Thus, the costs of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are accounted for as part of the total spending in each fiscal year.

The Budget takes us an important step toward achieving fiscal sustainability with these costs accounted for and includes more than \$1.2 trillion in deficit reduction over the next ten years. As a share of the economy, this represents more deficit reduction than proposed in any President's budget in over a decade. Achieving this deficit reduction requires Congress to enact the Administration's proposals, including a fee on the largest financial institutions and the expiration of most of the 2001/2003 tax cuts for families making more than \$250,000.

I am very interested in your suggestions there. Because this will be added to our debt. And I think we spent over close to \$1 trillion now in Iraq and moving up in Afghanistan now. And we have got to figure out how to pay for this. Let me ask about contractors.

Mr. Secretary, I am very interested in what steps your Department is taking to understand the impact of contractors on our operations. For instance, I have figures that show that in the operation and maintenance account, about \$100 billion is spent annually, \$43 billion of that is on contractors. Only the Army has responded back to us based on a bill that was passed in 2008 as to how these dollars are being spent, and I am very concerned that we could save money by insourcing a lot of these activities. What guidance have you given to the service secretaries and defense agency directors to collect actual contracted labor hours, and to give us a sense of where this money is going for contractors. I understand there are over 230,000 in theater now versus what we would be paying if we insourced those activities. What kind of guidance have you given to the services?

Secretary GATES. Well, for one thing, the contingency operation, the wars that we are in, for example, we have 10,000 Afghans—

Mr. DICKS. Is your mic on, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary GATES. We have 10,000 Afghans who will be performing security responsibilities guarding camps and equipment and things like that. If we insource, that would be 10,000 more U.S. soldiers. So a lot of the contracting that we do in the theater are for functions that we think can be performed by somebody other than a soldier. On the first part of your question. Let me ask Mr. Hale.

Mr. HALE. On the insourcing initiative in the base budget, Ms. Kaptur, we are on track. We have a goal, as I think you know, for 33,000 positions to be transferred from contractors to government personnel over the period fiscal year 2010 to 2015. We are tracking that. We are on track with the goal. And we have issued guidance to—

Ms. KAPTUR. Over 5 years, sir?

Mr. HALE. Yes.

Ms. KAPTUR. There are over 240,000?

Mr. HALE. We never would anticipate running the Department of Defense without some substantial contractor assistance. But we will make a major change in the support services area from about 39 percent contractors 2 years ago to about 26 percent back to about where we were in fiscal year 2000 with this initiative. So it is a major one. We are tracking the data.

Ms. KAPTUR. We have been provided with an estimate of contracted services but not an actual inventory, and therefore I would question your seriousness in really getting at this insourcing versus outsourcing issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

Mr. Kingston.

COST OF WAR

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen of the panel. I wanted to ask something about funding. I will just throw out a couple of questions. In terms of histories of financing wars, I know that we have had revenue bonds, we have had lotteries and so forth. Have we looked at some sort of mechanism for paying for this war, either offsets in the existing budget? That is sort of the general question. But also perhaps a Grace type commission within the Department of Defense itself to figure out what works, what doesn't work? I had a small contractor come to me last week and he built some sort of memory board when he was an employee of a large defense contractor. This is a memory board that is used in submarines and it has got a technical term that I am not sure what it is.

It was about this big. The technology has moved on though. And he said now your BlackBerry or cell phone has 10 times the memory of this memory board, but this is a multimillion dollar piece of property. This is several thousand dollars worth. If not for the earmarking process, the large defense contractors which, as you know, can work the Pentagon just as effectively as they can work Capitol Hill, the small contractor can't get in there, and what his point was not so much for himself, but in terms of this debate over procurement meets the earmarking process that the earmarking was a way for a small contractor to compete against the big guy, but also a way for the Pentagon to obtain better and more effective pieces of equipment and move quicker because you had the mandate from Congress to do it.

So I guess my question in terms of maybe a Grace type commission, looking at things like that, another article that caught my eye recently, and I know I am jumping around, but with the 5 minutes, March 8th Stars and Stripes had an article about where reconstructive surgery meets optional plastic surgery and how difficult that is for the Department of Defense to have a good determination except at the hospital.

Maybe sometimes this is vanity surgery, some of it is medically necessary and there was a big dust up about it. These sort of things that cost a lot of money and this committee certainly wants to be cooperative with you on the budget request. But we need to go back to the other Members of the Congress and the taxpayers to say there are a lot of reforms going on, and a lot of good things

going on and in order to make sure we are getting the best dollar that we can for the \$700 billion or whatever it is. I just want to talk to you about the big term philosophy on that.

Secretary GATES. I will tell you that last year we made program cuts in acquisitions and for programs that weren't working or that we felt were a waste of the taxpayers' money that, as I said in my opening statement, if built to completion, would have cost \$330 billion. I challenge anybody else in the government, proportionately to have that kind of record in terms of making changes. Congress passed acquisition reform last year. We are implementing that. We are enthusiastic about it. We are taking a much tougher view of the contracting that we are doing. I talked about the plant where we have 6 percent of the floor space and paying 70 percent of the overhead. We can fix those things.

I get 1,000 pages of advice from the authorizing committees every year, advice and direction. It is cumulative. I have lots of outside panels. Frankly, what it all boils down to is execution by the people who are given the responsibility for doing it. And if they won't execute or they can't execute then they should be replaced. I think I have a better record of doing that than just about anybody who has held this job. I think this is about management, it is about leadership, it is about acquisition reform. But at the end of the day, it is about execution and I think we do a better job of that. We always can do better. This business that has been on the front pages about information operations, I have got a group of people looking at that. So I think we can do this and I think we can do it inhouse.

Mr. DICKS. All right. Thank you very much. Yes, Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. For the record, I am not speaking about earmarks. But the issue that you raise, how do we get small, innovative companies to sustain themselves in this business is a critical issue. And my experience is the big contractors eat them alive. And I would urge, pressing those big contractors to show you exactly how they are doing it because that is possible, it is routinely possible in the commercial industry, as you have described, and we are paying too much money for some of the old stuff we can't get replaced.

So I don't know what the right way to do that is, but I think continued review and pressure and inside this acquisition reform structure is absolutely critical because that technology is out there and it will help us a great deal. And the only other point I would make is on the medical side, this committee has led in so many ways for us as a military. And I would just urge you to keep doing that. And these young people who suffered so much and sacrificed so much, I am not on the cosmetic versus the reconstructive aspect of that. They ought to get everything that they deserve and you have supported that and we need to continue that. And we lead in many areas now because of these injuries and because of your support. And we need to continue to do that.

Mr. DICKS. I just want to make one comment. The majority made a decision to end earmarking for private companies. One of the things I know that Mr. Obey and I discussed. And I have talked to Mr. Hale about this and Ash Carter about this. There is a small business innovation research program that exists already at the de-

fense department. We would like to put some additional money in because we think that these companies after they get through phase one and phase two need still a little bit more help to take their idea and bring it to fruition. And over the years, many of the most important thing, I just think of Predator being one of them.

Mr. Lewis wasn't here. He pushed us very hard. We have many, many innovations that came from the smaller companies. So we don't want to hurt the smaller companies. We want to work with you to figure out a way to do this and we will continue to do that. Mr. Rothman, I think you two are out of sync down there. Mr. Rothman.

SPACE PROGRAMS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, Mr. Hale. Thank you for your service. I only have 5 minutes. I am concerned about outer space and I would be interested in your gentlemen's view of the issues and risks to the United States that we presently face or that we might face in the near future in space or from space? Especially in light of NASA's retirement of the space shuttle program, the cancellation of the constellation Aries program.

I know you are looking at the EELV, evolved expendable launch vehicle, et cetera. But what are the national security risks that we might face from space? How does NASA's decision affect the industrial base and institutional knowledge of those who you will be calling upon to defend against threats from space?

Secretary GATES. I think that the biggest concern that I have with respect to our space systems is their vulnerability to anti-satellite capabilities as well as to potential electronic warfare, cyber warfare that would deny us access to those capabilities, both intelligence, communications, the whole array. We have a major space program review underway that will be done in a few months that from the standpoint at least of the Defense Department, looks at the full panoply of what is going on in space and what we need to do and the balance of programs that we need to have.

I think we have known this budget is to begin addressing some of these anti-access concerns that we have. Frankly unless the Admiral has something, I am not sure quite what the impact of NASA's decisions will be in terms of our capabilities. All I will say is that no one has come to me and indicated that it creates a problem for us.

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that I think it is an area of focus that we have to sustain. I talked about the shipbuilding industrial base, another industrial base that has badly weakened over the years is the space industrial base. I too, I am not familiar with NASA's decision in terms of its impact.

Mr. ROTHMAN. They may not be connected.

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield just to make a point? General Carlson, who is the head of the NRO, has testified up here just recently about his concerns about the industrial base. And also the lack of number of people who are actually there to do the launches. And Boeing and Lockheed have created this new entity. They have had an incredible record of success. But what he, I think, is worried about, that we have a backlog of satellites that

are going to be needed to launch. And we don't have the launchers to do it. And apparently, the NASA decision contributes to this. So I think this is something you ought—both ought to take a look at. Mr. Rothman.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to—thank you for having it in the budget and focusing some of your attention—serious attention on that issue. I also want to talk about missile defense. I think what the Obama administration did in Israel with operation Juniper, Cobra in October of 2009 in terms of coordination and integration of our missile defense forces was extraordinary and sent a tremendously powerful message to potential wrong doers in the region about what the U.S. and Israel are the strongest power in the region and our strongest most reliable ally in the region can accomplish together to defeat wrong doers in terms of missiles fired against our forces or our allies.

So congratulations on that. And I do support the continued funding of the joint Israel program, the Arrow 3, which is the exo-atmosphere anti-ballistic missile system. So congratulations on that. But China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, they are all working on intercontinental ballistic missiles. I know this is an open session. I know we have a robust defense capability already. But can you comment on the efforts reflected in this budget in terms of U.S. missile defense?

Secretary GATES. It has been the policy of several administrations now to try and defend the United States against rogue states, but acknowledging that we do not have the capability to defend ourselves against large-scale nuclear armed states such as either Russia or China, nor are we seeking that capability. We do have the capability to defend ourselves against North Korea and Iran. And this budget not only has significant increases as the Admiral talked about in terms of theater ballistic missile defenses, which I might add are growing in the Gulf area, but it also continues the ground-base interceptor program, both the 2 and 3 stage. We will build out this budget. It allows us to build out the second missile site at Fort Greely. It has in it a test program for the 2 stage ground based interceptor. And we will continue our development work on the 3 stage interceptor. Those would be used potentially against an Iranian threat. And frankly, the two will work together in ways that I think put us substantially ahead of where we were not too long ago.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Ms. Granger.

BORDER SECURITY

Ms. GRANGER. Yes. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I understand you just returned from Mexico and I am extremely concerned about the violence on the border as I know you are. This morning's press has an article about a town, a border town where the residents have been told by the cartels, we own this town. You are to get out or we will kill you and they are now showing up at the border asking for asylum. My question is several, and since I have got 5 minutes, I am going to ask them all at the same time and ask that you answer them. How the meetings went, any surprise, what

you would say this Congress, and especially this committee as far as what we need to do and are we giving the help that Mexico needs? I know that Governor Perry in February of 2009 submitted a formal request to the U.S. Government to deploy 1,000 Texas National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border under Title 32. That request is now over a year old. I would ask what the status of that request is.

Also as far as equipment, you know, Admiral Mullen, we worked together to break through the bureaucracy and ensure that key equipment after it is approved by this committee and this Congress is delivered, particularly to Mexico under the Merida Initiative. Unfortunately it has been brought to my attention that once again, AMCOM is—the contracting process is delaying delivery of helicopters to Mexico and now Pakistan.

So my third question having to do with that is how do we keep this from happening so we don't keep having that conversation where we are saying yes, we approve the help and the equipment, but then we have to intercede to get it done. Those are my questions having to do with Mexico, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.

Secretary GATES. First of all, I would say the meetings went very well, and I don't think there has ever been as broad array of senior officials on both sides of the border from the Federal governments that have come together to talk about the full array of issues, not just the security issues. I would tell you I have the same concern over the length of time that it is taking to get the aircraft and the helicopters to Mexico, and what I committed to them right now the delivery dates are, like, in 2012, 2013 and the leaders of the Mexican military made the point that the house is on fire now, having the fire truck show up in 2012 is not going to be particularly helpful.

So I committed to our counterparts that I would look at every possible option to give them some bridging capability to provide them that kind of capability as a temporary solution until these aircraft are delivered. Part of it is the kind of thing that they are after is in high demand and so the contractors are working full-time. I don't think there are any problems in the contracting. It is just that there is such a backlog because helicopters are in demand everywhere in the world, and we are obviously a big customer as Admiral Mullen pointed out, we are putting \$10 billion into more helicopters in this budget.

I would say that we are very sensitive to the need to get them capability just as quickly as possible. On National Guard equipment, I would say when I took this job, the equipment on hand was 40 percent across the Nation, it is now 77 percent. The historical norm is 70 percent. We are heading for 90 percent by 2015. So I think even when we met with the Council of Governors, they acknowledged that there had been a significant improvement in getting the equipment to the National Guard that they needed.

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that there has never been a stronger partnership, better relationship on the military side. And I would particularly commend NORTHCOM, General Renuart and his people who have worked very hard and very directly. I think what this committee can do can sustain the Merida Initiative. That

really has been the oil that put in the machine that really opened up a lot of opportunities. It is not the only answer, but it has had a huge impact. They are in a very difficult fight.

You described it as its own version of counterinsurgency, who is going to own this turf. They know that. And we are working with them to generate as much capability in that fight, in intelligence, it is the same thing. It is intelligence reconnaissance, surveillance. So more predators or global hawks. It is helicopters, it is how do you fuse the intelligence. What is the doctrine, the training, the leadership development. How do the Federal police work with the military? And the rest of their agencies and ours as well. Extraordinarily complex challenge, but one that everybody recognizes is deadly serious that has to continue to be addressed. We focus a great deal on the northern border. Their northern border, and I understand that.

But I can tell you that the southern border is equally of concern because so many of the weapons and the drugs, the cocaine is coming through the southern border. So it is not just Mexico and it is not just U.S. and Mexico, it is a regional issue that we have really got to continue to focus on.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. And I know you are focused.

Mr. DICKS. Your time has expired.

Ms. GRANGER. But he misunderstood one question. Secretary Gates, it wasn't the equipment. It was the troops of the National Guard that Governor Perry asked for a year ago and has not received a response.

Secretary GATES. Let me get you an answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

Regarding Governor Perry's request for Federal funding of National Guard personnel for use on the Texas-Mexico border, for over a year DoD has been monitoring the situation along the Southwest Border closely, along with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Security Staff.

The Federal Government also has developed options to respond when necessary. As I understand it, DHS and DOJ, in March 2009, launched several southwest border initiatives to crack down on Mexican drug cartels through enhanced border security, including additional law enforcement personnel, increased intelligence capability, and better coordination with Federal, State, local, and Mexican law enforcement authorities. Also last year, DoD worked with DHS to develop for the President an option for temporary, limited, and focused DoD support in the form of funding the use of National Guard personnel who would be operating at the direction of the Southwest Border State Governors.

Although Governor Perry's initial requests for Federal assistance were not sent to DoD, on September 1, 2009, Governor Perry sent a letter to DoD regarding his earlier requests to the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the use of National Guard personnel on the border. I want to assure you that DoD did respond to this letter. On September 18, 2009, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy sent a letter to Governor Perry outlining DoD's work with DHS to prepare a plan for the President for his consideration.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to you, gentlemen. Secretary Gates, has the irregular warfare priority that was established in the directive of December 2008 been reflected in your 2011 budget request? And for Admiral Mullen, tell

me what has the joint staff done to revise doctrine, organization planning material, leadership, personnel and facilities to reflect the sharpened focus on irregular warfare and how has the training curriculum been revised to address tank miles or flying hours given the new irregular warfare policy. And if it has been done, when was it done? And has the training curriculum been revised, moved away from two simultaneous major combat operations as it was recommended in the QDR? Secretary.

Secretary GATES. We mentioned four areas in which this budget, significant areas where this budget takes into account our needs in the irregular warfare area. First, rotary wing. We are increasing the budget this year by almost a billion dollars to \$10 billion for more helicopters. That will provide for, among other things, two new combat aviation brigades for the Army. Second, in the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance arena, we are increasing the money there from \$4.3 to \$4.7 billion and basically maximizing our buys of reapers, predators and other capabilities along those lines.

Third, as the Admiral indicated in his opening statement, we have significant increase in the budget for special operations command and we are also increasing our capabilities to carry on electronic warfare in—both of the theaters we are in, but elsewhere as well. In these areas and in others we have manifested in this budget meeting the need for irregular warfare.

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Secretary, in the fiscal year 2011 request for operation and maintenance, it doesn't seem to reflect those priorities and the tradeoffs. For example, the O&M request for the Air Force finances an additional 207 peacetime flying hours, along with the cost of fuel to fly these hours based on training curricula that have remained virtually unchanged since the Cold War.

Secretary GATES. A lot of this stuff is dual purpose. If you break down our budget, it breaks down in the following way. Even with all of the reallocation of the dollars that we have made in the last few years for irregular warfare, in the base budget and one of my objectives in this job has been to institutionalize these capabilities so that when Afghanistan and Iraq are gone, we still have these capabilities. It is still about 10 percent of the budget. About 50 percent of the budget is on modernization of sophisticated systems, and about 40 percent is dual use, things like C-17s. So a C-17 is going to be as applicable in a regular conventional conflict as like the first Gulf War as it is in irregular warfare. And that is a big chunk of the budget.

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that as I have seen—and I will give two examples. One is specifically Adnilis. In my visits there, I have watched them, the Air Force—the airmen turn lessons that used to take years to get into the manuals and into the training in weeks and months from these fights both in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I would argue that that omen is very focused, I mean, I don't know specifically, but on both aspects of this, irregular and conventional. And we need to do both to keep the balance.

And then secondly, on the ground side, special forces but also in the conventional forces, the Army and the Marine Corps. I have seen them incorporate lessons as rapidly, literally deployment to deployment. And, in fact, that training has been put in place over

the recent years. So I am actually very encouraged by the speed with which we are learning and incorporating it into our doctrine and into our training support of what we need.

Mr. BISHOP. You have revised the curriculum?

Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Admiral MULLEN. Just a target of opportunity. I really appreciate your leadership and standing up this military family caucus, which is a big deal. Those families are also absolutely critical in our ability to sustain these fights.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers.

TALIBAN RECONCILIATION

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. The administration has cited that a key element of our political strategy in Afghanistan will be supporting Afghan led efforts to reintegrate the Taliban, at least those who renounce al Qaeda, disarm and enter the political process. President Karzai announced this week that he is planning to convene what he calls a jurga beginning April 29th, to develop a plan for reconciling with Taliban members who renounce ties to al Qaeda and embrace the Afghan constitution.

General McChrystal recently told the chairman and members of the delegation that visited there, that he was open to that process but also concerned that President Karzai will make concessions to the Taliban that we and other coalition countries would be uncomfortable with. Am I accurate so far? And what are the concerns that we would have? Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, in principle, I think we all agree, General McChrystal, General Petraeus, Admiral Mullen, myself and the President that ultimately reconciliation will be a part of the conclusion to the war in Afghanistan just as it was in Iraq. Our concern is that the reconciliation take place on the terms of the Afghan government and that it be done from a position of strength where those who are reconciling who have been opposed to the Afghan government agree to put down their weapons, agree to abide by the Afghan constitution and agree to participate in the political process.

There are really two aspects of this. One is reconciliation, which is kind of at the top level if you will, the senior Taliban. And the other is reintegration. We believe that is a significant number. We don't know exactly what percentage, but a significant number of the foot soldiers of the Taliban fight for the Taliban either because they get paid and it provides a way for them to support their families or because they and their families have been intimidated.

We think as the tide turns, as the momentum shifts back toward the Afghan government and the international coalition, that we will see increasing numbers of these foot soldiers who will be willing to come back across the line, if you will, back into their villages. And the key is protect them against retribution by the Taliban and also find some way for them to support their families. That is already happening.

The numbers are relatively small, but we can already see increases in the number of those at that lower level. But I believe that for reconciliation to work, and it must be Afghan-led, but it must be on the Afghan government's terms and it must be from a position of strength. And I think those were probably the concerns that General McChrystal was reflecting.

Mr. ROGERS. So can we draw from your answer that there are certainly indications that this process will bear fruit?

Secretary GATES. I think at the reintegration level the evidence is already there. My personal opinion is that in terms of reconciliation with the larger groups, it is probably early yet or the more senior levels, that the shift of momentum is not yet strong enough to convince the Taliban leaders that they are in fact going to lose. And it is when they begin to have doubts about whether they can be successful that they may be willing to make a deal. And I don't think we are there yet.

Mr. ROGERS. Would the threat that we pose to the poppy crop in the countryside have any bearing on this process that we are talking of here?

Secretary GATES. I don't know. I would be interested in Admiral Mullen's view on that. I mean, the reality is that 98 percent of the poppy growth in Afghanistan is limited to seven provinces in the south and southwest. They happen to be where the Taliban is the strongest. But in terms of what impact it would have on reconciliation, frankly I hadn't thought about that. I don't know—

Admiral MULLEN. Just a couple of comments. First of all, I worry about the sort of hope that gets created immediately when you see a little light here that this is going to end rapidly. And I just don't see that. This is a very tough part of process.

Second, the Taliban is still the most unpopular people in that country. This is something the Afghan government is going to have to figure out with its own people. And thirdly, I do think that the opium, in the longer term, the money coming from that which fuels a significant part of the insurgency would have an impact. They have got a bunch stored. So having an impact on one crop 1 year or 2 years, but over a long period of time, it clearly will have an impact on, I think, I think in terms of their ability to execute their own strategy.

I just think it is going to take some time. I know there is a desire for this to work as rapidly as possible. It is an extraordinarily complex part of the process. And the Secretary, I think, has accurately reflected what General McChrystal was concerned about.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman's time has expired. I would like to make one comment on this. I think we are in a very difficult time right now with the operation in Marji and potentially in Kandahar. And I understand that there is a split of opinion on this poppy issue. I hope that we will, over time, be able to convince the people there that they have got to grow other crops. I know we have the Agriculture Department there. We are trying to work with them.

I think it is even in their constitution that this is illegal. And I know maybe for the short term, we are not going to deal with eradication. But I do not see how just looking the other way is sustainable and I hope that we can deal with this over time.

Secretary GATES. Let me just say, Mr. Dicks, first of all, it has been about 18 months since the coalition changed its rules of engagements so that not only U.S., but our allied partners could go after drug labs and drug lords and the major traffickers. The challenge of eradication is that you have to be there with a substitute crop and enough money for a farmer to support himself over the year or so it takes to get other crops going.

This is basically an agriculture country. This is a company that exported agricultural products until the Soviets invaded. Last year, the price of wheat for a period of time was on par with the price of opium or the price of poppy. So there is a way through this and there is a strategy in place for how we deal with this. But particularly when you are dealing with the small farmer, you go in and eradicate his crop, you have just recruited a family to the Taliban.

You have got to give them an alternative source of living and they are open to it as long as they are not being intimidated by the Taliban who, as the Admiral says, use this as a source of revenue and they make some of these farmers grow this stuff. So we give them security, we will also give them some alternatives.

Mr. ROGERS. Will the chairman yield briefly on this point? I would yield.

I was over there 25 years ago, and we were trying to pay farmers to stop growing poppy and start growing something else, including tobacco. And they took our money and continued to grow the poppy. Frankly, I don't have too much confidence in this scheme because we have been doing it for 25 years without avail.

Mr. DICKS. I think the gentleman has made his point. I want to get finished here. We have two more members left. Mr. Hinchey.

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Under Secretary Hale, for all of the excellent work that you are doing and all of the complicated issues that you are involved in. We deeply appreciate it. I wanted to ask a simple question about the presidential helicopter. As you know, we were deeply disappointed in that the existing program was not going to be followed through. We thought that there could be some kind of solution to that existing program and apparently it might have happened in the way that the joint strike fighter issue was being dealt with. But in any case, let us look at what is happening now in the future. Can you assure the committee that the new VXX program is going to move forward to an open and fair competition? And what is the status of the department's current efforts with regard to the VXX?

Secretary GATES. I will answer the first part of your question yes and ask Mr. Hale to talk about—

Mr. HALE. We are reviewing options right now, the acquisition community for follow on VXX. It is important to get the requirements right here. It is a part of what happened with the VH-71. So I think we need to take time to do that. And I will answer for the record as to the exact timing of that.

[The information follows:]

The Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which will address all feasible material and non-material options with a holistic assessment of require-

ments, capabilities, cost drivers, schedule implications, and risks. The AoA process is an independent and objective look across the entire helicopter industrial base, which is not expected to be completed until the 4th quarter of FY 2010. The Navy is confident this approach will result in a program that will benefit from lessons learned and leverage prior work where it is appropriate as we move to a more affordable program to meet this critical mission.

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Great. We would like to stay in touch with you on this. We think it is a very important thing to do. One other brief question on this. Given the sum costs of the failed VH-71 program—and as I understand it, that sum cost was about \$3.5 billion, can you give us an estimate—an estimation on what the total program costs of the VXX plus the VH-71 will be?

Secretary GATES. Let us do that for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which will address all feasible material and non-material options with a holistic assessment of requirements, capabilities, cost drivers, schedule implications, and risks. This approach will result in a program that will benefit from lessons learned and leverage prior work where it is appropriate as we move to a more affordable program to meet this critical mission. Preliminary cost estimates will be an output of the AoA process and are not expected to be completed until 4th quarter FY 2010. In addition, estimated termination costs for the VH-71 program are a matter of negotiations between the Government and Industry and cannot presently be released. The Department will make the termination cost estimate available to the Committee when that information is releasable.

CERP

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. I would like to follow up on a question that was asked by Mr. Moran with regard to the circumstances that are going on in Afghanistan with regard to the Taliban. We see that President Karzai announced this week that he is going to convene a peace operation, a jurga, beginning the end of next month to develop a plan for the reconciliation with the Taliban. So this looks like something obviously that is going to happen very seriously and the situation there is very questionable with regard to its outcome. He is going to make concessions to the Taliban and——

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey, we just went into this question in some detail. If you want to follow up——

Mr. HINCHEY. This is in a different detail, Mr. Chair. I am just curious what the situation is going to be like over there with regard to this. And the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the use of CERP funds to support the Afghan reintegration and reconciliation process. How do you envision these funds being used and what do you think that they will be? What is the cite that will be used in determining who will be eligible to receive those funds and how much is going to be involved? Is there any understanding about that yet at this point?

Admiral MULLEN. I think there is—there was an authorization of upwards of \$100 million to the specific effort. It would be used similar to how we have used it both there initially as well as in Iraq, and when you think about individuals who are reintegrating as we have discussed, it would be to provide them a way ahead so that they can actually put food on the table, if you will. And in terms of support and reintegration, there are also additional CERP funds—or CERP funds which are tied to projects—development projects to support the development aspect of the overall strategy as well, similar to what we did in Iraq. And the other is we are

going to great pains to oversee this money to make sure it is spent well and where we want it to be spent.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

Mr. HINCHEY. One last question on this. With regard to the Afghan national police, I understand that the training program for them now has been stopped. And I am just curious to know what the situation is going to be, what the intention is because that seems to be a very important part to maintaining the security and the strategy of that country.

Secretary GATES. It has not been stopped and, in fact, is being expanded.

Mr. HINCHEY. Is being expanded. We have information that it has been stopped. That is interesting.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey, we were just there. We met with General Caldwell. That is one of his highest priorities is dealing with the training of the national police. Mr. Boyd.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, gentlemen. It is great to see all of you. I know that, Mr. Secretary, that Congressman Young earlier asked a question, you talked about the delivery time lines before I got here and I apologize for being late. But I would like to follow up on that and I know that the Department of Defense has reduced the F-35 procurement quantities by, I think, 122 aircraft over the next 5 years or so.

And I know that the F-22 program has been capped at 187. You currently have plans being implemented to retire about 250 combat air fighters, Air Force fighters, about 50 from Tyndall Air Force, by the way. And Secretary Donley and General Schwartz have been wonderful in working with us to help us understand how that is going to work in mitigation and so on and so forth. But all of this seems to me it places the Air Force at some moderate risk.

Those are not my words. What are your reflections on those decisions now? And anticipating the JSF problems, do you think that the JSF will come on—be operational in time to fill this gap or do you have a contingency plan in case the F-35 slips to the right again?

Secretary GATES. First of all, the Air Force will begin to get F-35 aircraft in 2013. I think these things need to be put in perspective. In 2020, the United States will have—the U.S. will have 2,700 combat aircraft. That is about thousand more than any potential competitor. Forty-two percent of our force will be fifth generation fighters. That is 20 times more fifth generation aircraft than the Chinese and 15 times more than the Russians we think will have by 2020. That doesn't count the investment that we are putting into capabilities like the reapers, that just as an example, it would take 36 F-16s to provide the 24-hour persistent coverage that eight reapers provide with the same armament and the capabilities of the F-35 and the F-22 are significantly superior to the aircraft that they have replaced. So you don't have to replace them on a one-for-one basis.

So I am fairly comfortable with where we are with all these programs. If we carry out the buy of the F-35 which is 2,450 aircraft

roughly and we go forward with the programs that we have in place, I think that we will be in a significantly superior position to any potential competitor and the airmen that you referred to, Mr. Young, worried about whether that is going to be an American aircraft rather than somebody else's, that fellow on the ground is not going to have to worry.

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I think all of us certainly understand that you don't have to replace one for one because of the capability of these fifth generation aircraft. But what I hear you saying the bottom-line is that you do not consider that we are putting our Air Force at a moderate risk with these plans?

Secretary GATES. The risk is the one the chairman alluded to before. And that is the Air Force, in order to be able to afford the modernization, is going to have to retire some older aircraft, and so that is just a fact of life. And so there will be some modest reductions. But when you take into account the overall capabilities of the F-22, the F-35 and the UAVs, I think we will have actually a significantly more powerful Air Force in the future than we do today.

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. We have one last question from Mr. Moran. I promised him that we would give him a chance to finish his thought.

SECURITY CONTRACTORS

Mr. MORAN. You are going to like this, Mr. Chairman. I will dispense with the pleasantries this time around. What I was getting at in the last series of questions, deals with the Afghan national police force, because that is the most critical aspect of being able to transfer, it has got to be transferred to the police, not the Army or anything else. They are the most visible representative of the government. And yet that is a contract, we contract out that responsibility. Now, General Caldwell is wonderful. Currently it is being done by a group called DynCorp, with State Department. Mr. Secretary, you took it over into the Defense Department. But in the process, you effectively made only two contractors eligible for that contract, Northrop and Blackwater. You know that Blackwater is responsible for wantonly killing a lot of Iraqi innocent civilians. You know it, the Iraqis know it, the Taliban know it, and al Qaeda knows it because they plan to use it as part of their propaganda program.

What were you thinking in doing that, and can't we fix that so that there is no real possibility of Blackwater having that contract where it might very well erode public confidence in Afghanistan as to the Americans' mission?

Secretary GATES. First of all, before the contract was implemented, it was protested. The protest was upheld by GAO. The contract is not being pursued at this time. DynCorp's execution of that contract is continuing. We are making some changes in the contract. I would also point out there are an awful lot of U.S. and international police trainers as well. It is not all being done by contract by any means, and in fact, one of the things that we have been out there working hard on with our allies is to get more police trainers from places like the Carabinieri and the Guardia Seville and so on.

Mr. MORAN. That is all good. But that protest was held against your decision, and that it is what troubled me because it seemed inconsistent with otherwise very thoughtful decisions. We can talk about it later.

Mr. DICKS. All right. The committee is adjourned until 1:30 tomorrow, at which time we will hold a hearing on the Army and Marine Corps ground equipment in room H-140.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale, thank you very much.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Obey and the answers thereto follow:]

TRAINING AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Question. The Afghan National Army has grown well in both size and capabilities, but the Afghan National Police has failed to keep pace. They lack discipline, are often ineffective and have failed to shake off their reputation for corruption. In addition, both the ANA and ANP are said to lack effective indigenous leadership.

Please describe the program that the Department of Defense has in place to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Answer.

ANA: The Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) is the primary training institution for the ANA. ANATC contributes to force generation through multiple programs and institutions designed to contribute to the fielding and subsequent development of an army with the skills and competencies needed to conduct effective COIN operations. Within NATO Training Mission Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), the Combined Training and Advisory Group-Army (CTAG-A) has the mission of advising, mentoring, and monitoring the ANATC in order to establish a doctrine, education and training system capable of supporting the development of a professional ANA in a timeframe that supports growth targets. Major training initiatives include:

- *Basic Warrior Training:* This recruit training process begins at the Basic Warrior Training Course (BWT) at Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) or at one of six remote BWT (RBWT) courses in the corps' areas. To ensure the ANA continues to meet its quality goals, NTM-A worked with the ANATC to add a U.S. Army marksmanship unit to instruct at KMTC and the remote training sites. This has increased the quality of the BWT program and improved operational readiness of fielded forces. In addition to this training, the extensive partnering between Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units in the field is critical to improvements in the quality of the total force.

- *Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Training:* The ANA Bridmal Academy in Kabul conducts much of the training and development programs for the ANA NCO Corps. The academy teaches the Squad Leader Course, Platoon Sergeant Course, Senior Sergeant Course, First Sergeant Course, and Sergeant Major Course.

- *Officer Training:* The ANA conducts officer training and professional military training courses in partnership with coalition mentors. The current courses taught in the officer Professional Military Education (PME) program include: the Basic Officer Training Course, which provides basic branch specialty training for new lieutenants; the Company Commanders' Course, which prepares captains for company level command; the Staff Officers' Course, which provides captains and majors with basic staff officer skills; the Command & General Staff Course for majors and lieutenant colonels, which is the first officer PME course; the *Kandak* (Battalion) Commanders' Course, which prepares lieutenant colonels for *Kandak*-level command assignments; and the Strategic Command & Staff Course, which is the culminating PME course taught to senior colonels and general officers.

- *Literacy and Language Training:* NTM-A instituted a two-week pilot literacy training program during pre-basic training for ANA soldiers. In addition, literacy training is an integral part of instruction at the Bridmal NCO Academy and the BWT course.

Additionally, the ANA set up a Foreign Language Institute, which Luxembourg has expressed interest in funding via the ANA Trust Fund. This program emphasizes the instruction of non-English languages such as European and Asian languages and Dari/Pashto to strengthen international military education opportunities for the ANA.

ANP: One of the key challenges to building the capacity of the ANP to achieve their mission is training. In past years, due to the lack of program resourcing, 60-

70% of the force was hired and deployed with no formal training, the “recruit-assign” model. While working to increase the throughput of new recruits, NTM-A/CSTC-A has also had to implement plans, in coordination with the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), to provide training to those already on the *tashkiel* (manning document). For basic recruit training, one of the major initiatives implemented in March 2010 is the establishment of a new model of “recruit-train-assign” rather than the previous model. “Recruit-train-assign” will ensure all new police recruits receive necessary training before performing official duties. Other training initiatives are detailed below.

- *Afghan Police Training Teams (APTT)*: NTM-A is working with the IJC and the MOI to develop APTTs that can work alongside ISAF Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) and Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) to extend the reach of training and development capacity into districts that lack training support. This effort can accelerate the ANP reform program and raise the quality of deployed police units. APTTs, located mostly at the district level, will consist of one officer, two NCOs and a civilian literacy trainer. Teams will be responsible for police training, literacy training, mentoring, administration (drug testing and accountability for personnel, weapons and entitlements), and anti-corruption.

- *Basic Training*: Currently basic training of the ANP occurs at 18 training centers. Training of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) occurs at four training facilities. Several partner countries also conduct police training at or near their Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) sites, including the Czechs in Logar, the Turkish in Wardak, the Dutch in Tarin Kowt, the British in Helmand, and the Germans in several areas throughout the north. In order to meet growth goals and train the current force, the MOI extended the length of the duty day at basic training and decreased course length from eight to six weeks to improve student throughput. The six-week course contains the same program of instruction (POI) and actually increases the number of student/instructor contact hours compared to the eight week course with the addition of 64 hours of mandatory literacy training (actual POI hours thus increased from 265 to 329).

- *Leadership Training*: The lack of trained and competent leadership is one of the largest problems within the MOI. NTM-A is working with the MOI to institute a competitive selection and promotion process that is transparent and merit-based. To further professional development, we are working with the international community to train ANP in specialized police schools and host talented ANP students in their own professional law enforcement academies. NTM-A is exploring ways to enable non-governmental organizations to provide training to the ANP in the areas of human rights and community relations.

- *Literacy*: An important component of the revised POI is the inclusion of mandatory literacy training as it not only improves the quality of the force but has been shown as a recruiting tool. NTM-A/CSTC-A added 64 hours of mandatory literacy training to the basic training POI at all police regional training centers. In addition, the MOI expanded follow-on literacy training throughout the country by adding literacy trainers in 221 locations.

Question. Would you describe the training program as successful to this point? Why or why not?

Answer. The training of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) has been successful over the past several years and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have greatly improved their capabilities since the Department of Defense (DoD) began training in 2002 (ANA) and 2005 (ANP). Despite successes, considerable gaps remain. Until recently, the ANSF development has been largely under-resourced in both funding and manpower.

There have been a number of new initiatives that have reshaped the ANSF development program with the goal of being able to quickly grow the size of the ANSF while simultaneously improving the quality of the overall force. The two most significant changes to the ANSF program include improved unity of command through organizational changes to the NATO command structure—including the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A)—and the embedding of international forces to partner with the ANSF.

One of the most significant challenges to successful execution of the ISAF plan for the growth and development of the ANSF is the shortage of NTM-A institutional trainers. Without sufficient mentors and trainers, our ability to effectively grow and develop the ANSF is at risk.

The ANA continues to improve capacity and increase end-strength. The ANP currently is on track to meeting growth goals, but there is overall concern among the U.S. interagency and the international community regarding the ability of the ANP

not only to grow but also to improve the quality of both basic police training and the quality of the fielded force.

DoD will continue to work with the ANSF to grow and develop the force so they can eventually assume lead for security responsibility throughout Afghanistan. The Commander, ISAF will assess the new programs as they move forward, including a formal assessment this summer, to allow for course corrections and implementation of mitigation strategies.

Question. Does the low literacy rate among Afghans significantly affect the content of training?

Answer. The Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) training program of instruction takes into account the literacy rates in Afghanistan and uses appropriate training mechanisms (hands-on training and other mechanisms) to counter the low literacy rate of recruits. Additionally, to improve the overall quality of the ANSF, the current curriculum of both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) basic training courses includes 64 hours of mandatory literacy training. Once the ANA and ANP personnel graduate, they will also have the opportunity to receive additional literacy training in the field with the goal of all ANSF achieving a 3rd grade literacy level. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has contracted with more than 200 literacy trainers in districts throughout Afghanistan to provide ongoing training for the ANP.

Question. To what extent do Afghan security forces participate in military operations? To what extent do they lead these operations?

Answer. All Afghan National Army (ANA) battalions are partnered with coalition forces. About 30% of Afghan National Police (ANP) units are partnered with Coalition forces and that number is increasing, especially in critical districts, as the U.S. force increase continues through August 2010. Recently, Afghan Army units have played a key role in nearly every dimension of the Central Helmand Campaign and, in many cases, though not the majority, led clearing efforts at battalion and company level. The trend of the ANA forces leading clearing operations has also increased in Regional Command (RC) East and is expected to increase throughout the country with increased coalition forces and partnering efforts. ANA Commando Battalions, partnered with U.S. Special Operations Forces, frequently lead special operations throughout the country. Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are presently playing a mission essential role in Central Helmand as we transition to the hold and build phases, in which they have a leading role.

Question. A September 2009 report by the Department of Defense Inspector General found that the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by General Caldwell, only had about 51% of the field trainers needed to meet current requirements. Is this still the case?

Answer: Since the release of the September 2009 Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) report, the field training requirement for the Afghan National Army has increased to a total need of 180 mentor teams to meet the training needs of a 134,000-strong force by October 2010. There are currently 142 teams deployed against this requirement and an additional 24 offers that have not yet been deployed. The field training requirement for the Afghan National Police has increased to a total need of 475 mentor teams to meet the training needs of a 96,000-strong force by December 2010. There are currently 312 teams deployed against this requirement and an additional 20 offers that have not yet been deployed (only 14 more teams are needed within priority districts).

Since September 2009, SHAPE has made significant progress in filling the institutional and field training requirements for the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). Ensuring that NTM-A has sufficient institutional and operational trainers remains a top priority. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently working with NATO to provide sufficient resources for NTM-A. A series of SHAPE-led force generation efforts have resulted in a significant number of international commitments to help meet the institutional and operational trainer shortfall. The U.S. Government continues to be engaged in very active diplomatic efforts to urge our coalition partners to provide additional trainers and mentoring teams for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). DoD is also examining its own contributions to ensure it is doing everything it can to fill the requirement.

Question. Commanders in theater indicate that developing indigenous leadership is key to fostering unit cohesions, maintaining discipline, reducing corruption and promoting the operational success of Afghanistan's security forces. What leadership development training is available for ANA and ANP?

Answer. For the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Air Corps (ANAAC), the capacity to train leaders is expanding in the officer and enlisted career tracks. Both Afghan Army officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are working to professionalize their career fields based on institutionalized military training, civilian edu-

cation opportunities, and experience gained from assignments of gradually increasing responsibilities and complexity. Courses to develop non-commissioned officers include the Tactical Leaders Course, the Non-Commissioned Officer Basic Course, the First Sergeant Course, and the Sergeant Major Course. Commissioning sources for the Afghan Army include the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, a four-year program similar to West Point that recently graduated 212 cadets as Afghan Second Lieutenants, and an Officer Candidate School. There is also a course of instruction that provides leadership instruction and re-integration training for former mujahedeen fighters desiring to join the ANA. Afghan officers attend the Officer Basic Course and the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Course prior to deployment to the field units. Subsequent instruction includes the Junior Officer Command and Staff Course, the Operational Command and Staff Course, and the Strategic Command and Staff College. The Afghan Ministry of Defense is working to link the successful completion of leadership schools to promotion to key leadership positions. Another important component of the professional leadership development is the opportunity for literacy training and self-improvement throughout a soldier's career.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is making progress toward establishing a professional development model for patrolmen and officers. Patrolmen can attend the Police Non-Commission Officer Course and the Senior Sergeant Course. Career police non-commissioned officers (NCOs) can attend functional training, including advanced shooting and survival, basic criminal investigations, and crime scene investigations. The Afghan Police Training Team (APTT) is an Afghan initiative where a small team of trainers, accompanied by a literacy trainer, travels to districts identified for poor police performance and provides leadership training for police leaders as well as literacy training for the local police force. Police officers are commissioned from Officer Candidate Schools or the National Police Academy, a three-year commissioning program that recently produced 586 graduates. New police officers can expect to attend an Officer Basic Course in their career field, then attend specialty training like the APTT course or become an instructor after a field tour of duty. In order to reduce attrition, reduce casualties, attack corruption, and make commanders more capable as leaders in the field, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior initiated an Afghan Police Commanders' Course, a three-tier leadership training strategy to be instituted later this year. Police leaders at the district, provincial, and national levels will attend courses at their respective levels and will not be considered for promotion to the next higher assignment without completing the required level professional development course.

The apex of the ANP leadership training program is the Afghan National Police Academy in Kabul. Currently a new National Police Training Center (NPTC) campus is being constructed in Wardak province that will become the new home of senior police officers and non-commissioned officers. Courses are projected to start at this new facility in September 2010.

The Afghan Defense University (ADU) is also under construction in Kabul and will serve as the ANA strategic-level campus for both Army officers and senior non-commissioned officers (similar to the U.S. Army War College and the Sergeants Major Academy). The cornerstone for ADU was laid on April 6, 2010, and initial courses are projected to begin at this new facility in March 2012. Both ADU and NPTC plan to conduct an exchange program where both institutions can provide senior police and army leaders the ability to conduct joint and combined operations.

The way ahead for the professional leadership development of the ANSF includes building enduring institutions, including brick and mortar structures, a professional military education system, and a career management structure capable of managing the force. We must and will continue to provide appropriate partner elements with ANSF units for training and modeling what right looks like. We will continue to encourage the Afghan leadership to address quality of life issues that are affecting retention—housing, equipment, training, and survivability. Most important, as coalition partners we must create a culture of self-development within the ANSF. The emphasis is on education (literacy) and self-advancement opportunities throughout a soldier's or policeman's career.

Question. How long do you anticipate it will take to develop a self-sustaining leadership cadre for Afghanistan's security forces?

Answer. The current NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A) estimate is three to five years to develop a self-sustaining leadership cadre for Afghanistan's security forces.

Building a "self-sustaining cadre" takes years because of the time needed to develop a professional cadre that leads by example and has seasoned veterans in its ranks; to establish enduring institutions such as the Afghan Defense University and the Afghan National Police Academy, to serve as the strategic level training centers

for Afghan army and police senior leaders; and to build refined programs of instruction (curriculum) to support and facilitate learning.

NTM–A is assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) develop its institutional training base to include training courses from six weeks (basic training for Afghan policemen) to four years in length (National Military Academy of Afghanistan). There has been significant progress in the past few years, as highlighted by the recent National Military Academy of Afghanistan graduation of 212 second lieutenants in what was only its second graduating class. In March 2010, NMAA inducted more than 600 young Afghans into the freshman class.

Question. What level of capability will we need to see from ANA before we begin to transition responsibility for security in Afghanistan to their forces? How will we measure that capability?

Answer. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is currently working with the Afghan government and international community on the ground in Afghanistan to develop the appropriate concept for the transition to greater Afghan leadership, ownership, and responsibility. This concept must be approved by the Afghan government and the North Atlantic Council to ensure full agreement on the conditions, process, roles, and responsibilities of transition. The U.S. Government believes that for transition to be meaningful and sustainable, benchmarks for transition cannot be measured simply by the number of Afghan security forces, their operational capabilities, or even the threat level. Rather, governance and development criteria must also be established to ensure that the appropriate conditions exist to achieve and sustain security in Afghanistan. We will not transition to full Afghan responsibility until the Afghans have the capacity in a particular district or province to manage the security situation on their own, with U.S. forces and allied forces initially providing tactical and eventually strategic oversight. Although conditions and benchmarks will be set within a national framework, they will also be responsive to the particular circumstances of each district and province.

Question. What is the implication for our Counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy if the Afghan people continue to perceive the National Police as ineffective and corrupt?

Answer. It is essential to our COIN strategy to have the Afghan National Police (ANP) trusted by the people and perceived as effective and not corrupt. NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM–A) is working to increase accountability and transparency as well as institutionalize processes within the ANP to counter corruption.

A major concern of the international community is the lack of personnel accountability in the ANP. There have been varying accounts of “over-the-tashkil”¹ police in various districts performing police work while not being paid through the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA), as well as accounts of “ghost police” who are on the payroll but are not actually present for duty. In October 2009, NTM–A/Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) began conducting a Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) to establish a database of all ANP, in an attempt to enhance accountability and transparency. The PAI will provide a baseline for the police force and help eliminate corruption. The process includes registration, drug-testing, vetting, weapons verification, and obtaining biometric data on all ANP personnel. The goal is to complete the PAI by early May 2010.

Additionally, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (DoD), a Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF–A) has been set up in the MoI. The MCTF–A will investigate corruption cases within the MoI and also will work closely with prosecutors and the judicial system to ensure that corrupt officials are brought to justice.

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Obey. Questions submitted by Mr. Moran and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. Recent congressional hearings focusing on a Xe subsidiary, Paravant, demonstrated that the Department of Defense continues to struggle with contractor oversight and management in Afghanistan. In the wake of the shooting death of two Afghan civilians by Paravant independent contractors in May 2009 what has the Department done to tighten its authority over armed contractors in Afghanistan and other theatres of operations?

Answer. The individuals in question were hired by Paravant under a subcontract with Raytheon to train the Afghan National Army. They were not private security contractors (PSCs), nor were they authorized to be armed.

Significant improvements have been made in the policy and management framework governing armed contractors employed by the Department of Defense (DoD)

and their activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD Instructions, in particular, DoD Instruction 3020.50, "Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations," and associated theater directives has established core standards for vetting and training all U.S. Government PSC and other armed contractor personnel. The U.S. Government also has adopted common standards for Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) and escalation procedures, as well as a requirement that all U.S. Government PSCs use only authorized weapons and ammunition. Finally, all U.S. Government PSCs must be licensed to carry arms in accordance with host nation law and must receive U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)/Coalition Forces' approval to carry arms.

DoD contractors remain accountable under the law and are subject to a number of statutes governing their behavior, including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and relevant provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Question. In a written response to Senator Levin's 25 February 2010 letter, Secretary Gates pledged to investigate Blackwater subsidiary Paravant's activities in Afghanistan, including allegations of misappropriating government weapons, carrying weapons without approval and hiring staff with serious criminal records including larceny and substance abuse. Which office in DOD is leading this investigation? Will the contents of this investigation be publicly released? Will the results of this investigation be considered for future contracting decisions?

Answer. As I stated in my March 25 letter to Senator Levin, the Department of Defense (DoD) takes very seriously the allegations concerning Xe Services (the company formerly known as Blackwater) as set forth in recent press articles and congressional hearings. As information develops, we will continue to monitor the potential impact of that information, as well as any ongoing investigations on the execution of any future source selections to satisfy DoD program requirements.

Allegations of wrongdoing by Xe Services and its affiliated companies are currently being investigated by multiple Government agencies for their review and action. In order to protect the evidence, witnesses and agents, and to avoid serious compromise of the casework, DoD will not comment on or release any information about the probes at this time. Any evidence of wrongdoing will be forwarded to the appropriate agencies for their review and action as appropriate.

With respect to the shooting incident at the intersection of Jalalabad Road and Mosque Road in Kabul, Afghanistan on May 5, 2009, the DoD Office of General Counsel (OGC) received the case file from U.S. Central Command on May 28, 2009. On May 29, 2009, OGC transmitted the case file to the Department of Justice (DOJ) with DoD's formal request that DOJ make its Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) jurisdiction determination in the case. On June 1, 2009, DOJ advised DoD that it decided to take the case as a MEJA referral, and the case was assigned to the former DOJ Domestic Security Section (now DOJ Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section). The case was presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Two individuals employed by Paravant LLC alleged to be involved were indicted on January 6, 2010 on charges of second-degree murder, attempted murder, and firearm offenses, and they were subsequently arrested. The currently scheduled trial date is September 14, 2010. I refer you to the Department of Justice for additional information.

Question. Earlier this month the GAO sustained a protest by DynCorp International preventing the transfer of training for the Afghan National Police (ANP) from the Department of State to the Department of Defense. Prior to the GAO's sustainment, DOD was going to use an existing IDIQ contract with 5 companies to compete and award a new contract to train the ANP. One of the 5 companies was Xe Services, the successor company of Blackwater.

What is DOD doing to ensure that it can legally transfer the training of the ANP from the State Dept. to DOD?

Answer. In April 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) took over responsibility of the ANP program due to the need to train large numbers of ANP in a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment. At the time, the Department of State (DOS) had a contract in place with DynCorp International LLC to provide the basic police training skills to the ANP. DoD and DOS believed it would be most economical and most efficient for DoD to continue to fund this contract by providing Afghan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) to DOS and for DOS to continue to execute the contract.

As part of our effort to improve the police training process, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (Ambassador Karl Eikenberry) and the Commander, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (General Stanley McChrystal) recommended that management of the DoD-funded and DOS-managed police training contract used to hire civilian police trainers should be shifted from DOS to DoD to provide unity of control and command. DOS and DoD subsequently approved this recommendation. The rec-

ommended effective date for the transition was January 2010, the date the existing DOS contract with DynCorp was scheduled to end.

Due to the operational need to award a new contract quickly and the respective organizations' subject matter expertise and experience in support of Afghanistan operations, the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) selected the Counter-Narcoterrorism and Technology Program Office (CNTPO), through the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Forces Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT), to oversee the development of an appropriate acquisition strategy for the ANP program. The new strategy called for procuring the required services through the issuance of task orders under existing Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (MAIDIQ) contracts with CNTPO. The task orders for the training of the ANP and ANP program logistics requirements were to be competed among the five existing MAIDIQ contractors.

Before orders could be issued, on March 15, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sustained a protest by DynCorp International LLC. The GAO determined that the task orders for the ANP program were outside the scope of the MAIDIQ contracts. As a result, the ANP training effort will not be awarded under the MAIDIQ contracts. DynCorp will continue performance under the current DOS contract while DoD weighs options to ensure the ANP program requirements are met in an expeditious manner in consideration of this recent development.

DoD currently is planning to conduct a full and open competition over the coming months for the ANP training contract. In the interim, the ANP training program has not stopped. DOS extended the current DynCorp contract until July 31, 2010. DoD and the DOS are exploring options on a bridging solution for the period from July 31 until the competition is complete and a new contract is in place.

Question. If the DOD holds a competition for the ANP training contract, what steps is the department taking to ensure that the new contract recipient does not in any way harm the overall U.S. effort in Afghanistan?

Answer. Significant improvements have been made in the policy and management framework governing contractors employed by the Department of Defense (DoD) and their activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, the number of contracting officer representatives (CORs) in Afghanistan continues to grow. DoD is ensuring that CORs are appointed in critical areas and that they are performing worthwhile and timely audits of contractor performance.

Contractors overseas remain accountable under the law. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act applies to certain contractors, and Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to subject certain contractors to relevant provisions of military law.

Question. Mr. Secretary, during the hearing you mentioned that uniformed U.S. and international personnel are also involved in training the Afghan Army and Police. Can you please provide a breakout of the number of U.S. military, international military and private contractor personnel involved in training Afghan security forces?

Answer. As of April 11, 2010, there were 1,151 U.S. military personnel training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This number includes 607 who are providing an interim solution to a shortage of international instructors. There are 335 international military and police personnel training the ANSF. This number will increase as additional trainers arrive to fulfill pledges made by nations at various sourcing conferences held over the last five months. There are approximately 2,800 contractors training the ANSF in various capacities. These numbers apply only to the formal training and instructors in the ANSF institutional training base.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Moran.]

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT

WITNESSES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS, PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY), UNITED STATES ARMY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. DICKS. The Committee will come to order. This afternoon the Committee will hold a hearing on the status of ground equipment in the Army and Marine Corps. We are pleased to welcome Lieutenant General William N. Phillips, United States Army, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and Lieutenant General George J. Flynn, U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

General Flynn, you have testified previously before this committee. Welcome back.

General Phillips, this is your first time to appear before the Subcommittee on Defense. We are aware of your experience in acquisition and your recent tour of duty as Commanding General of Joint Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. You bring a wealth of knowledge to our discussions and we will benefit from your statement and your answers to the questions posed by the members of the committee.

Let me just say to each of you, thank you for being here and thank you for your many years of service in the defense of our country.

Today we will talk about fighting vehicles, support vehicles, communications gear, and other ground equipment. This is the equipment used by our soldiers and Marines in the ground fight, down in the dust and dirt of Afghanistan. It needs to be of first quality in terms of capability, maintainability, and reliability.

The units of the Army and the Marine Corps have great equipment, the results of past careful, but sometimes lengthy development and production efforts. We look forward to an update on ongoing acquisition programs and the associated budget requirements for systems such as Strykers, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, MRAPs, trucks and communications equipment.

In recent years, a number of programs have not achieved cost and schedule goals. And after extended periods of time and many billions of dollars spent, the programs have been canceled as non-productive and, in some cases, irrelevant to the current and pro-

jected fight. The Army's Crusader Self-Propelled Howitzer, the Comanche Helicopter, Future Combat Systems and the Presidential Helicopter programs are examples of failed efforts.

The Committee will be interested to hear about initiatives in the Army and Marine Corps acquisition offices to improve program management and thus deliver equipment that meets the needs of our Soldiers and Marines in a cost-effective manner.

The canceled programs mentioned previously have yielded certain advances in technology and useful items of equipment. The Army and Marine Corps are incorporating the new technology and equipment as modernization upgrades in existing organizations. For example, the Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Tactical and Urban Sensors, and Non-Line-of-Sight Launch system, all of which were developed in the FCS program, will soon be fielded to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

The Committee wants to hear about the progress of testing that will ensure that the equipment will work as advertised when placed in the hands of our Soldiers and Marines.

The Army and Marine Corps continue to procure medium and heavy trucks. The Army budget request includes no funding for procurement of HMMWVs, but does include nearly \$1 billion in recapitalization of older HMMWVs. Additionally, the Marine Corps budget provides for procurement of only 74 HMMWVs.

The Committee will also want to hear the logic of recapping older vehicles versus purchasing new ones. Furthermore, the Committee would like to discuss the mix of HMMWVs, MRAPS, MRAP ATVs and Joint Light Tactical Vehicles that, in the future, will compromise the set of Light Tactical Vehicles in Army and Marine Corps units.

We will proceed with your statements in just a minute, but before we do, I would like to ask the distinguished Ranking Member and former Chairman, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Young, for any comments that he might have.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And you have certainly adequately pointed out the interest that we have today.

But I think the story you just told and the history of the HMMWV and the vulnerability to the IEDs, that this Committee moved quickly to provide funding for the MRAPs. And once we fielded the MRAPs, the enemy found a way to, with using the EFPs, to attack the MRAPs.

We have to stay ahead of the enemy. We have to make sure our ground troops are able to be transferred, to be moved, to be in vehicles that will in fact give them protection. And that is a primary priority for this member and this Subcommittee.

So we look forward to your testimony and want to do whatever we can to guarantee that our soldiers on the ground are going to have a safe way to travel around Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Young.

We also want to welcome Major General Tom Spoehr, Army Assistant G-3, Force Development. Thank you, General, for being here to help us better understand these important issues.

General Phillips, you may proceed with—we will put both statements, and all your statements, in the record. And you may proceed as you wish.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL PHILLIPS

General PHILLIPS. Congressman Dicks and Congressman Young and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Defense, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Army ground equipment and other acquisition programs.

I am pleased to appear along with Lieutenant General George Flynn and also Major General Tom Spoehr. I am pleased to represent here today over 40,000 members of the Army acquisition workforce and the more than 1 million Soldiers who have deployed in combat over the last 8 years and who have trusted us to provide them with the best world-class equipment and weapons systems possible, so that that can ensure their success on the battlefield, so that one day they can return home safely to their families and friends.

Sir, I respectfully request that my written statement be made a part of the record for today's hearing.

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, so ordered.

General PHILLIPS. Mr. Chairman, the Army continues to meet the equipping demands of our soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the operations worldwide, as well as prepare for future challenges, because of the resources provided by this subcommittee and the Congress.

And, sir, having spent almost the last year in Iraq and Afghanistan, I thank this Subcommittee for the work they have done to allow us the opportunity to build the systems, field them in Iraq, so that our soldiers—and watching our Marines as well on the field of battle—can execute the mission and return home safely to their families and their friends.

We are grateful for what you do and we are grateful for the American taxpayer for what they have done to allow us the opportunity to build these systems.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your support as well as that for the acquisition and contracting workforce to handle the increased workload in managing our acquisition programs. We thank you for authorizing us five additional general officer billets for Afghanistan.

Most recently, I served as a commanding general in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today we have Brigadier General Camille Nichols from the Army serving as that commander in that capacity. Sir, as we grow the acquisition workforce, the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act that you referred to earlier, of 2009, is helping us to ensure that our programs are healthy and that any problems that are identified are identified early, and program adjustments are made to keep them healthy.

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Sir, with regards to meeting the needs of our current and future warfighters, the Army has a comprehensive modernization program that leverages lessons learned from the last 8 years of war. At the center of our efforts are the Brigade Combat Team Modernization plan, which includes incrementally modernizing our networks over time to take advantage of rapid advances in technology, incrementally fielding capability packages to put the best equipment into the hands of our Soldiers as rapidly as it is available, and incorporating mine-resistant and ambush-protected vehicles, or MRAPs, into our force, and rapidly developing and fielding a new Ground Combat Vehicle that meets the requirements of the 21st century.

Network modernization uses two primary transport programs to incrementally move the Army to a single and expanded Army battle command network: Warfighter Network Tactical, or WIN-T, and the Joint Tactical Radio System. Capability packages provide the Army a regular and timely process to enable our deployed units with the best available technologies based upon the threats they are likely to face.

Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team systems were approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive for low-rate initial production. Our warfighters have used these systems in combat, many of them, and we are working hard to get them combat-ready. The Army is incorporating MRAPs throughout our unit formations.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Mr. Chairman, the Ground Combat Vehicle is the Army's next generation infantry fighting vehicle, designed from the ground up to operate in an improvised explosive device environment. The Army released the Request For Proposal (RFP) for technology development on the 25th of February. We intend to produce the first competitive prototype by 2015 with the first production vehicles by 2017.

Our comprehensive modernization program includes our combat platforms and is focused on standardizing 31 heavy brigade combat teams with two variants of our dominant combat maneuver platforms, M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley. In addition, we have Stryker vehicles that we continue to produce and, at the same time, we are looking at upgrades to the Stryker program, to include the double V hull.

An important cornerstone of our modernization strategy is the Paladin Integrated Management program, better known as Paladin PIM. This is a key part of our Army modernization program and it will be the first upgrade to the Paladin Howitzer in many years.

Providing our soldiers with the best possible protection, payload, and performance includes continued modernization of our tactical wheel vehicle fleet. At the heart of our plans is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, with the Marine Corps as our partner, to replace the HMMWVs. That will start in about 2015.

Army unmanned aircraft systems are of vital capability to our deployed forces. They provide us tremendous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Such platforms as Raven, Shadow, Constant Hawk and Persistent Threat Detection Systems are really

combat multipliers for our warfighters on the field of battle, as well as the extended range multipurpose system.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Defense, on the field of battle today, we face a very adaptive, resourceful enemy. And I see it as my key role in the job that I now have to making sure that we develop programs, technology, drive those programs to a successful production, and field that capability to our soldiers in the quickest manner possible, so they once again—I will say it one more time—that they can perform on the field of battle efficiently, effectively, and then return home safely to their families and their friends.

Sir, once again, thanks to your Subcommittee and Congress for what they do to allow us to execute our mission. Sir, that concludes my remarks.

[The statement of General Phillips follows:]

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS
PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY AND
DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON ARMY GROUND EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

SECOND SESSION, 111TH CONGRESS

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Introduction

Chairman Dicks, Congressman Young, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Defense – thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss Army ground equipment and other acquisition programs. It is a privilege for me to represent Army leadership, members of the Army acquisition workforce, and the more than one million courageous men and women in uniform who have deployed to combat over the last eight years and who have relied on us to provide them with world-class weapon systems and equipment for mission success. Your steadfast support and shared commitment to this goal are appreciated throughout our ranks.

In providing our Soldiers with world-class capabilities, we remain ever mindful that our most important asset is our people – our acquisition and contracting workforce. We appreciate the support provided by Members of this Subcommittee and Members of Congress as we work to rebuild this important workforce to handle the increasing workload in managing our acquisition programs as well as the number of contracted actions and contracted dollars, which in the last 15 years has increased in excess of 500 percent. At present, we have roughly 41,000 civilian and 1,600 military workforce members who manage roughly 25 percent of the Army's budget and a diverse portfolio of more than 600 programs.

As background, Section 852 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law No. 110-181, directed the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund which enabled the Department of Defense to recruit and hire, develop and train, and recognize and retain its acquisition workforce. In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense directed Defense Acquisition Workforce Growth of 20,000 defense acquisition civilian personnel by Fiscal Year 2015. Our goal is to in-source current contractor positions performing inherently governmental (or closely associated with inherently governmental functions) and to hire new defense acquisition positions. The Army has a target to in-source roughly 4041 contractor positions, which includes roughly 151 in-sourced positions for Army contracting, and to hire about 1,885

new acquisition personnel, which includes approximately 1,650 new positions for Army contracting.

Along with the additional workforce personnel, we thank you for authorizing five additional General Officer billets for contracting. We have promoted three Colonels with a strong contracting background to General Officer in the past three years. I served most recently as the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan and today we have Brigadier General Camille Nichols, serving in that capacity. With your help and the help of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we are working aggressively to reverse the years of decline in authorized strength levels and restore the skill level of our acquisition and contracting workforce to deal with the growing complexities of our business environment.

The Army's acquisition and contracting workforce is a critical resource that requires unique education, training, and experience in order to perform vital acquisition functions. We are working to ensure the readiness and sustainment of our professional civilian and military workforce by promoting leadership and professional development opportunities and thereby ensure quality products and services for our Soldiers.

The Army Modernization Strategy

The Army Modernization Strategy is determined by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-8, and reflects an overarching vision to meet the equipping demands of the 21st Century by developing and fielding an affordable and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow Soldiers and units to succeed in both today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations. The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines of effort:

- 1) Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified capability "gaps" through traditional or rapid acquisition processes.

- 2) Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions.
- 3) Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in accordance with the Army Resource Priorities List and Army Force Generation model.

The Cornerstone of Army Modernization – The Brigade Combat Team Modernization Strategy

In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates provided guidance and directed the Army to “accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades” and noted the lack of a clear role for the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle in the current vehicle programs. The Army was further directed to “cancel the vehicle component of the current Future Combat System (FCS) program, reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle modernization program . . .”

Following the Secretary of Defense’s April 2009 decisions, the Army directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop recommendations to modernize our Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) incrementally and to determine the operational requirements for a new Ground Combat Vehicle. In response, TRADOC established Task Force 120 (TF 120) which evaluated the Army’s short- and long-term modernization requirements to ensure proposed solutions mitigated the Army’s highest risk capability gaps. TF 120 delivered its recommendations to senior Army leaders in early September 2009, which focused on capability packages, Ground Combat Vehicle operational requirements, and BCT network integrated architecture. These recommendations form the basis for the incremental modernization of all the Army’s BCTs.

Subsequently, in November 2009, the Secretary of Defense approved the Army’s BCT Modernization Plan which includes the following elements:

- Modernizing the network over time to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force;
- Incorporating MRAPs into our force;
- Rapidly developing and fielding a new Ground Combat Vehicle that meets the requirements of the 21st Century Army; and
- Incrementally fielding Capability Packages that best meet the needs of Soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.

Army Network

Central to the Army's modernization efforts is an enhanced and interoperable communication network that gives the Army a decisive advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The Army Battle Command Network will improve our situational awareness and collaborative planning capabilities by sharing essential information from an integrated platform or a disconnected Soldier to their Command Post. Network modernization uses two primary transport programs which will incrementally move the Army to a single and expanding Army Battle Command Network: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical and Joint Tactical Radio System.

Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) is the transformational command and control communications system that provides the backbone wide area tactical network at echelons from theater through company in support of full spectrum operations. Following the program's restructure in 2007, the Army will field the latest networking capability to our Soldiers in four increments, as advanced technologies for enhanced communications becomes available. At present, the Army has already fielded Increment 1 to more than 60 percent of the total force, giving our Soldiers a communications network that is largely satellite based, allowing for beyond line-of-sight communications and commercial Internet networking technology.

Increment 2 brings initial networking on-the-move capabilities embedded in various platforms to allow a fully operational and connected communications networking

capability for our Soldiers (from Division down to the company level). Increment 2 features include commercial routers, radios, and antennas that are technologically mature, with waveform technology optimized for high-capacity broadband networking and support that enables communications while the unit is on-the-move. Increment 2 was approved for a Milestone C Low Rate Initial Production decision in February 2010. Fielding to the Force is expected following its Initial Operational Test in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2012.

Increment 3 capabilities bring the full networking on-the-move capabilities that feature a single radio combining the line-of-sight and the satellite waveforms from Increment 2 in a military chassis which includes Global Broadcast Service receive capability. Air-tier development work introduced under this increment brings even more robust communications, providing three tiers of communications that result in less reliance on overburdened satellite communications. Network Operations will continue to develop in both Increments 2 and 3 to achieve a fully integrated capability for planning, initializing, operating, and managing the entire on-the-move network.

WIN-T Increment 4 represents the last of the developmental program elements and will provide technology insertions to enable anti-jam protected satellite communications on the move.

The **Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)** is a Department of Defense (DoD) initiative to develop a family of software-programmable tactical radios that provide mobile, interoperable, and networked voice, data, and video communications at the tactical edge of the battlefield. JTRS development is 85 percent complete. For the Army, JTRS will provide a tactical radio communications network for Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams by providing the tactical networking transport capability through scalable and modular networked communications. It will also provide the current force a mobile, ad hoc networking capability using new advanced waveforms – Soldier Radio Waveform and Wideband Networking Waveform.

Incorporating MRAPs into our Force

In response to deadly Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by providing significantly improved protection for our Soldiers. The Army is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP vehicles as the foundation for the **MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)**, modifying it for the mountainous terrain found in Afghanistan and other regions around the world. The MRAP Family of Vehicles provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the best protection we can provide.

Developing a New Manned Ground Combat Vehicle

The **Ground Combat Vehicle** is the Army's next-generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle, combining lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP vehicle, the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the operational mobility of the Stryker. The Army released a Request for Proposals (RFP) on February 25, 2010, for the Technology Development phase of the Ground Combat Vehicle effort. The first combat vehicle designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment, the Ground Combat Vehicle will have enhanced mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network. And, it will have the capacity available to accept future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats change. Because of the pace of change and the operational environment, the Army is pursuing a Ground Combat Vehicle program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in seven years.

Capability Packages

Capability Packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to enable our deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel solutions based on the

evolving challenges of the operating environment. The best available capabilities will go to the Soldiers who need them most, based on the threats they are likely to face. Our incremental packaging approach will help ensure that we provide the best available technologies to upgrade our units as they prepare to deploy.

The **Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)** completed the FY09 Limited User Test (LUT) in September 2009, and completed a successful Milestone C Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision at the December 2009 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting. The Defense Acquisition Executive approved the initial LRIP procurement of one BCT set of Increment 1 systems. Follow-on DAB In-Progress Reviews are planned for April and December 2010 to assess continued development progress, supporting the procurement of 2nd and 3rd BCT sets. Additional technical and operational testing is planned for 2010 to support the December 2010 DAB decision. Technical Testing begins in April 2010 and culminates in a September 2010 LUT. The Army awarded the LRIP contract for the initial Brigade on February 24, 2010. Increment 1 systems included in the LRIP contract are: The Network Integration Kit, Class I Unmanned Aircraft System, Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Urban-Unattended Ground Sensors, and Tactical-Unattended Ground Sensors. The NLOS-LS completed the flight LUT in February 2010. The results of this LUT are expected in April 2010. The NLOS-LS will request a Path Forward decision at the DAB In-Progress Review in April 2010.

Additional Acquisition Programs

The **Sniper Detection** or Counter-Sniper efforts are of significant importance to our deployed forces in harm's way, and we appreciate the support we have received from Congress. Of the \$50M, the Rapid Equipping Force will use \$15M to fill an Individual Gunshot Detection 10-Liner requirement for immediate Warfighter needs based on readily available commercial items to satisfy limited key capabilities. The Program Executive Office Soldier, Project Manager (PM) Soldier Sensors and Lasers (SSL), will use the remaining \$35M for evaluation, procurement, and sustainment of

more technically advanced product than the system earlier procured and fielded by the REF.

The Army's Science and Technology program plays a critical role in achieving our acquisition strategy by pursuing cutting edge, unprecedented technologies for both the current and future force. For example, the **Advanced Distributed Aperture System**, a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with the Army serving as the Technical Manager and using technologies developed by the Army S&T community, is demonstrating technologies that will provide helicopter pilots with capabilities for 360-degree situational awareness for low level and day/night mission flights. The JCTD concludes in the fourth quarter of FY10 with an operational utility assessment that will enable SOCOM to determine the best acquisition path forward.

With regard to existing vehicle upgrades, the Army's combat platform modernization program is focused on standardizing 31 Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) sets with two variants of the **Abrams** tank and **Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle**, two of the Army's highest priority combat vehicle recapitalization programs. This modernization will provide 26 operational HBCT equivalents and five strategic HBCT equivalents. At present, the Army has nearly completed fielding modularized HBCTs, which gives every brigade a common structure. The short-term modernization goal is to populate these brigades with only two variants of the Abrams and the Bradley – the Abrams M1A2SEP v2 is being paired with its partner the Bradley M2A3 and the Abrams M1A1AIM SA is being teamed with the Bradley M2A2ODS SA. The modular HBCT force structure will be equipped with the two variant Abrams and Bradley fleet by the end of 2013. This modernization plan aligns compatible combat platforms with common modular formations.

Stryker has planned procurement of 3,953 vehicles with 3,149 having been accepted as of January 31, 2010. These vehicles support eight Stryker Brigade

Combat Teams (SBCT), with the eighth SBCT being fielded in FY11 to Ft. Bliss, Texas; a Stryker Theater Provided Equipment set supporting the Afghanistan theater; a strategic pool of ready-to-fight systems; Institutional Training Base needs; Test Articles; a Depot Repair Cycle Float Pool managed by the U.S. Army Materiel Command; and other operational requirements. Stryker vehicles have operated more than 24 million miles in combat while maintaining well above required operational readiness rates. The Stryker program received a Full Rate Production decision on eight of 10 configuration variants, including the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, Reconnaissance Vehicle, Commander Vehicle, Mortar Carrier Vehicle, Fire Support Vehicle, Anti-tank Guided Missile Vehicle, Engineer Squad Vehicle, and Medical Evacuation Vehicle. The remaining variants – the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and the Mobile Gun System – are in Limited Rate Production. The Army is currently supporting an effort to improve Stryker survivability by requesting approval to build and test prototype Stryker vehicles incorporating a Double V hull design. Pending independent validation, the Army may incorporate this design onto Stryker vehicles supporting the Afghanistan operation.

The **Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)** program is the Army's fire support modernization effort for the M109A6 Howitzer (Paladin) and the Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle (FAASV) platforms that support our HBCTs. The Paladin PIM addresses obsolescence and sustainment through the integration of Bradley components and Non-Line of Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C) technologies resulting in an upgraded firing platform. Commonality of key components, including the engine, transmission, final drives, and suspension will reduce Operations and Support costs as well as the logistics footprint of the HBCT.

Modernization of the Army's **Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)**, continues to be a critical step in providing the Soldier with the best possible protection, payload, and performance in each vehicle of the fleet. The overarching goal of our TWV strategy is to balance (planning, analyzing, coordinating, and executing) the quantity, quality, and sustainment of Army equipment throughout its life cycle to meet combat, training,

generating force, and homeland defense requirements with the appropriate capabilities. Finding the right balance and mix of TWVs requires the Army to assess and adjust investments continually. We will continue to use a combination of new procurement, recapitalization, and reset to achieve our strategic objective by addressing the readiness issues associated with shortages, proper mix, and age/usage in a cost effective manner. The Army will continue to take maximum advantage of existing platforms, making necessary improvements in both capability and reliability. All new vehicles will have scalable armor in the form of A-B Kits executed in accordance with our Long Term Protection Strategy.

At the heart of our modernization plans is the **Joint Light Tactical Vehicle** (JLTV). A joint program with the Marine Corps, JLTV is a family of vehicles with companion trailers capable of performing multiple mission roles that will replace the **High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle** (HMMWV) starting in 2014. The Army has leveraged depot recapitalization for our HMMWV fleet to sustain readiness and meet near-term requirements. We will continue to procure and field the **Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles** (FMTV) to replace vehicles in the medium fleet that are over 30 years old. Our FMTV investment strategy will provide a more sustainable fleet, capable of meeting the Army's future mission requirements. Recapitalization of our **Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles** fleet will focus on variants of the aging Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, the Palletized Load System, as well as the incorporation of MRAPs vehicles into our future force, as they are released from theater. As part of this effort, this investment strategy will also recognize the fiscal and operational realities inherent to the current operational environment. To do this the Army will find ways to manage its TWV fleet readiness in ways that are both creative as well as efficient. Additionally, the Army will move away from the pure-fleet unit-set-fielding prerogatives of the 1990s and consider more appropriate and efficient ARFORGEN-based operational models.

The Army has fielded over 400,000 **M4 carbines**, replacing M16s in all the Combat Brigades and Division headquarters. The smaller, more maneuverable weapon has been the overwhelming individual weapon of choice for our Soldiers in combat. Regardless of the successes we have seen in our small arms, we continue to pursue improvements in our individual weapons' capability. We are currently taking a dual approach to improve the current weapon, the M4, as we move forward with a new carbine requirement. The Project Manager (PM) released a market survey in January 2010, seeking the best industry has to offer for improvements to the current M4. The PM expects to release an RFP soon to compete the upgrade program. Additionally, the Army will conduct a full and open competition to address a new requirement for an individual carbine. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approves the new requirement, the PM will initiate the competition with the release of a Request for Proposal for comments from industry. This is the first step in conducting the competition. The Army is working with the other Services in these programs to ensure their requirements are included in our process and they are always invited to participate in the programs' development and production.

The **Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)** are a rapidly growing capability within the Army. For example, when Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in March 2003, there were only 3 systems (13 aircraft) deployed in support of that operation. Today, we have 337 systems (1,013 aircraft) in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This capability continues its fast growth. For example, it took the Army 13 years to fly the first 100,000 hours of UAS. It took us less than a year to fly the next 100,000 hours, and now we fly more than 220,000 hours each year. By May 2010, Army UAS will have flown one million flight hours, almost 90 percent of which were flown in support of combat operations.

The **Extended Range/Multipurpose (ER/MP) UAS** will be deployed and integrated with the Combat Aviation Brigade, with immediate responsive **Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)** to the Division

Commander. The ER/MP can carry multiple simultaneous payloads to include: (1) Electro-optical/Infrared/Laser Designator; (2) Synthetic Aperture Radar; (3) Communications Relay; and (4) Weapons. The ER/MP UAS will use both Tactical Common Data Link and Satellite Communications data links. The program deployed a Quick Reaction Capability to OIF in July 2009 and will deploy another to OEF in summer 2010 in support of the surge. The Program of Record will field its First Unit Equipped in FY11.

The hand-launched and rucksack portable **Raven** Small Unmanned Aircraft System provides the small unit with enhanced situational awareness and increased force protection through expanded reconnaissance and surveillance coverage of marginal maneuver areas. Commanders at the company level have greater ability to shape over-the-hill operations with their own dedicated UAS. In addition to the Army, the Raven is fielded to the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and ARNG, providing support for Overseas Contingency Operations while also providing increased capabilities for domestic mission responsibilities as required. We have fielded 1,318 systems (3,954 aircraft), and there are 291 Raven Systems (873 aircraft) currently supporting Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, with over 201,900 flight hours in OIF and 39,800 flight hours in OEF. The program is meeting all cost, schedule, and performance targets.

The **Shadow** Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System provides DoD and coalition partners with a high quality, reliable, and interoperable UAS. Currently, units are flying at an OPTEMPO of up to eight times what was originally envisioned for the system. While the OPTEMPO remains high, the accident rate has been reduced each year. The Marine Corps is partnered with the Army for purchase of Shadow systems, support equipment, and performance based logistics services. Through this approach, economies of scale provide efficiencies for cost, commonality, and Joint operations. Currently, 75 systems (300 aircraft) have been delivered and fielded to the Army and nine systems (36 aircraft) to the Marine Corps. The readiness rate of the Shadow

system averages above 98 percent. As of February 2010, the total hours flown by Shadow in support of theater operations were 436,885 hours, out of a total program history of 479,806 hours flown. More than 91 percent of all Shadow hours flown since 2,000 have been in support of theater operations.

The **Class I UAS** will provide significantly enhanced networked capabilities to the force. Class I systems are ducted fan air vehicles with a single integrated gimbal consisting of an electro optical camera, infrared camera, laser range finder, and laser designator. The Class I mission is to provide Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition to the platoon and company. The system's hover and stare capability allows it to stay in one place for an extended period of time while its maneuverability allows it to operate in complex environments that would be impractical for current force fixed wing UAS.

The Class I UAS leverages technologies developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as part of the gas Micro Air Vehicle (gMAV) program. The gMAV has interchangeable electro optical and infrared camera. Currently, 15 systems (29 aircraft) are in use in OIF, with over 199 flight hours in 407 sorties. The Class I block 0 UAS, a gMAV variant, is in development and testing for the E-IBCT as part of our Capability Packages.

The **Persistent Threat Detection System** is a Quick Reaction Capability program with a tethered aerostat equipped with a high resolution electro-optic/infra-red camera system. It is integrated with existing radar, infra-red, and acoustic systems that cue the aerostat payload to provide near real-time eyes on target for continuous surveillance and detection in support of missions in theater. Currently, a total of five systems have been deployed in OEF and three in OIF.

Constant Hawk is another successful Quick Reaction Capability program supporting counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts in OIF. It provides

airborne persistent surveillance capability that allows analysts to backtrack a sequence of events, detect the event, and identify its origin. We currently have four systems deployed in OIF as part of Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize (ODIN). Due to its demonstrated capability and successes in Iraq, we have three Constant Hawk systems programmed for Task Force ODIN-Afghanistan.

The Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) evolved from the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) requirement set. The EMARSS is a manned multi-intelligence airborne ISR system that provides a persistent capability to detect, locate, classify/identify, and track surface targets in day/night, near-all-weather conditions with a high degree of timeliness and accuracy.

The EMARSS will consist of an Electro-optic/Infrared (EO/IR) Full Motion Video sensor, a Communications Intelligence collection system, an Aerial Precision Guidance system, line-of-sight tactical and beyond line-of-sight communications suites, and a self-protection suite. This combination of attributes provides the ground tactical commander an assured near-real-time operational view of the battlespace enabling tactical ground forces to operate at their highest potential.

Conclusion

Army acquisition is providing our Soldiers with leading-edge technologies and advanced capabilities to fight the wars we are engaged in today while simultaneously preparing them for future threats. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young, and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee – I look forward to working with you to ensure that our Soldiers are equipped for mission success – today and in the future.

Mr. DICKS. General Flynn.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL FLYNN

General FLYNN. Sir, Chairman Dicks, Congressman Young, and distinguished members of the Committee. First it is a little bit different being in this committee room without the presence of Chairman Murtha, but I suspect that he is in overwatch, and I also suspect that he has inspired at least one hard question. So I will be prepared for that.

Mr. DICKS. We will make sure of that.

General FLYNN. Second, I want to thank you for the support of our servicemen and -women, and in particular for your support of our Marines.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to discuss with you your Corps ground equipment requirements. In developing the requirements for these programs, we consider several factors to properly balance our adaptable and versatile force. We consider the threat, our naval character, our Corps' competencies, and the need to be agile in order to respond and guard against surprise. Our view of the world is that we will need to have credible capabilities that assure access in time of crisis, that allow for the reinforcement of our allies, and provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief wherever needed.

Compounding our response requirement is the reality that state and nonstate actors around the world will have increasingly sophisticated warfighting and anti-access capabilities.

As both an expeditionary and sea-based force that is specifically designed to be an integrated combined arms force, we require equipment that enables us to execute and integrate the six warfighting functions across multiple domains: air, sea, land, and now cyber. We must also be able to execute a range of missions and swiftly respond among the four military tests and the capstone contest for joint operations: security, combat, engagement and relief, and reconstruction.

In the development and validation of our equipment requirements, we are guided by our six corps competencies. These competencies are persistent naval engagement, integrated combined arms, service with the Navy, assured access from the sea, complex expeditionary operations, joint and multinational operations, and interagency activities.

As recent events in Haiti and Afghanistan have proven, your soldiers of the sea are equally comfortable and capable of operating from a sea base or an austere expeditionary forward operating base. In these operations, we once again prove that we are no better friend or no worse enemy to those who wish us harm.

The demonstrated agility of our general purpose amphibious force underscores the versatility of your Marines. Empowered by the education and training they receive, and enabled by the utility and flexibility of equipment sets that Congress has provided, your Marines continue to perform.

The Marine Air Ground Task Force construct serves to amplify and highlight the effectiveness of task-organized Marine Corps units operating in vastly different environments across the spectrum of conflict.

As we look to the future, we understand the increasingly complex, challenging, and dynamic security environment. We acknowledge the likelihood of increased fiscal constraint. The bottom line is that we explicitly understand the need for utility, flexibility, and versatility in equipment requirements development at affordable costs.

Some of the challenges we see include properly balancing payload, performance, and protection with transportability costs and energy efficiency. This challenge is causing us to look at how we develop the basic requirements for equipping our warfighting units. In the future, we may have units with a basic table of equipment augmented by mission or operating environment specific equipment sets.

In light of exponential cost increases for modernized equipment, we must also examine new ways of managing costs in order to provide the right capability with the right capacity to operate in every clime and place. In short, in an era of increasing access challenges, the ability to be flexible and adaptable across the full range of military operations, coupled with our unique ability to operate from the sea, will continue to make your Corps of Marines a valued tool in the joint warfighting tool kit.

I am confident that with your continued support, we will remain able to provide the Nation with what it expects from our Corps of Marines.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today, along with General Phillips and General Spoehr. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The statement of General Flynn follows:]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN
DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
CONCERNING
MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT
ON
MARCH 25th, 2010

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

“The pathway of man’s journey through the ages is littered with the wreckage of nations, which, in their hour of glory, forgot their dependence on the seas.”

- Brigadier General James D. Hittle, USMC (Retired), 1961
Military Historian and Theorist

Introduction

Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young, and distinguished members of this Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today. On behalf of all Marines, I want to thank you for your continued support to our Marines and their families. I also appreciate the opportunity to discuss Marine Corps ground equipment programs with you.

The Strategic Landscape

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* clearly state our need to prepare for an uncertain future and balance our capabilities to prevail in today’s wars while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Assessing the conflicts we are engaged in today and looking into the future, we see a strategic landscape defined by an intricate interplay of geopolitical power struggles, the expansion and adaptability of threats from non-state actors, and an increased need for facilitating joint interagency and multi-national operations. The strategic landscape will also contain greater access challenges both in the form of active enemy defenses and the hosting of U.S. forces on foreign shores - all compounded by existing physical geographies that also challenge access.

The Threat: Today, we face a diverse range of adversaries who possess capabilities that span the entirety of the technological spectrum. The future security environment will see the continued transformation of previously considered conventional forms of conflict into what can be described as hybrid challenges. Hybrid challenges represent combinations of conventional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats that the adversary believes will negate the

overwhelming conventional strength of our forces. We also predict that hybrid challenges will be the most likely form of threat facing the United States in the future. Furthermore, our adversaries, both state and non-state actors, will continue to develop anti-access capabilities to prevent us from employing our forces. Arms proliferation has put advanced mines, anti-ship, and anti-air technology in the hands of both state and non-state actors. Therefore, we believe that access can no longer be assumed.

Constants: History teaches us that while the tactics and methods of warfare constantly change, the character of war does not. Warfare has been and always will be a clash of human wills. As such, the most adaptable, most effective, and by far most valuable asset to the Marine Corps is the individual Marine. Our Marines operate in a multi-faceted environment that spans from one extreme of primitive austerity through the other extreme of technological saturation. The Marines have prevailed and will continue to prevail by holding fast to our core values, emphasizing professional military education, stressing the importance of leadership at all levels, and executing brilliance in the basics. Materiel, while important, is not the only solution. Our philosophy is not only to train the Marine to employ the weapon or vehicle system, it is also to develop systems that enable, enhance, protect, and maximize the capabilities inherent to our Marines.

Prevailing in the 21st Century

Our Naval Character: For 235 years, the Nation has relied on the Navy/Marine Corps team to project power abroad, protect national interests, and to provide assistance both where and when needed. This could not be truer today as our Navy/Marine Corps team is simultaneously engaged across the globe in major combat operations, providing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and conducting Security Cooperation operations. From Haiti to the Helmand

Province in Afghanistan, we have demonstrated our ability to respond across the full range of military operations and proven that we are truly no better friend and if the situation requires --- an adversary's worst enemy.

Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) tailored and equipped to the mission and deployed aboard amphibious ships provide the Nation the unique capability to quickly respond from the sea to crises, conflict, security cooperation, or requests for assistance anywhere across the globe. In recent times, the amphibious withdrawal from Somalia in 1995, the projection of power from the sea in Afghanistan in 2001, several responses to natural disasters, and the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Lebanon in 2006 have proven the value of our investment in these forces and their wide ranging utility. The linchpin of our ability to operate from the sea is our amphibious fleet. As soldiers of the sea, our unique capabilities are enabled by the Navy's provision of protected force projection through amphibious and prepositioned lift.

The Challenge

The Marine Corps is currently responding to three distinct areas of operational demand. One demand is the Nation's requirement for sufficient forces involved in major combat operations conducting counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The second area is the steadily growing demand from geographic Combatant Commanders and the U.S. Department of State for Theater Security Cooperation. The third area of increasing demand is from geographic Combatant Commanders for forward deployed expeditionary forces to respond to crises across the full range of military operations. The Marine Corps is balancing the competing needs of re-setting the force, providing the unique equipment needs to our forces in Afghanistan, and modernizing our force. As we modernize, we must remain focused on retaining and developing a general purpose force ready to prevail in the future operating environment.

Marine Corps Ground Equipment

Expeditionary Equipment Requirements: The term “expeditionary” implies the employment of Marine Corps forces that are characterized as being fast, austere, and lethal. In order to address hybrid threats, the focus of our modernization efforts must be making our equipment lighter, faster, more efficient, more survivable, and more lethal. In a word, all of our equipment must be expeditionary. As we modernize, we will be developing equipment that is optimized to fit into amphibious shipping, can be transported by aviation platforms organic to the MAGTF, provides operational flexibility to the commander to operate faster, further, and safer; and provides accurate firepower. Furthermore, our Marines need a family of vehicles that allows them to maneuver more rapidly than the enemy, includes an enhanced communications suite, and can operate for longer periods of time further from sources of support. Integrated fire support from organic indirect fire, Naval surface fires, and aviation will support this maneuver. Sustaining this maneuver requires new technologies such as the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (Cargo-UAS). In all cases, ground mobility is essential to the survivability and effectiveness of an expeditionary force.

The Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy: Within the parameters of protection, payload, performance, and cost, our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy defines how we are balancing the needs of today’s fight against preparing for future operating environments without focusing too heavily on one or the other. While fielding the platforms needed to succeed in our overseas contingency operations, we are simultaneously focused on designing, developing, and fielding platforms that will prevail in future challenges. This strategy for ground combat and tactical vehicles is synchronized to support the demands of the current fight with a balanced

set of vehicles that the MAGTF requires in order to conduct expeditionary operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Nine years of operating in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced volumes of lessons learned and improvements needed for our ground equipment. Thanks to the support of Congress, the American people, and industry, we have been able to upgrade some of our current assets and provide our Marines with the best equipment possible.

For example, the **Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP)** is designed as a multi-mission platform capable of mitigating the effect of IEDs, underbody mines, and small arms fire. The Fiscal Year 2010 budget plans include Independent Suspension System upgrades for 1,504 Marine Corps Category I (urban combat operations and ambulance) and Category II (Cougar – multi-mission convoy lead, troop transport, ambulance, and utility) vehicles operating in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the **MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)** is designed as a lighter, more agile MRAP variant for operations in the rural, rugged, and mountainous environment in Afghanistan. As of 11 March 2010, the Marine Corps has fielded 597 of the 1,420 Marine Corps M-ATVs required for operations in Afghanistan. The current number of M-ATVs fielded includes the completion of our 80 vehicle requirement for Home Station Training, which better enables us to deploy fully trained forces and expedite the fielding process in-theatre. The **M88A2 Hercules**, with its 25 ton lift and 70 ton towing capability, provides the robust and survivable repair and recovery capability necessary for MRAP support operations in Afghanistan.

Concurrently, other legacy systems are receiving upgrades in protection, mobility, reliability, and/or lethality. The **Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)** has received the A2 upgrade in order to improve its survivability. In addition to a new armor package, automatic fire-

extinguishing system, and stronger suspension components to handle the increased weight, the add-on mine blast and IED shields are proving to be life-savers in combat. The **M1A1 main battle tank**, which continues to provide unsurpassed survivability as a precision direct-fire platform, is receiving upgrades to its communications equipment to improve tank-infantry coordination in the urban areas, improved sighting and target acquisition, and the implementation of a bulldozer kit to assist in clearing obstacles.

The **Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTV-R)** has served as the “backbone” of the logistical support in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. This is mainly due to its robust design and the **MTVR Armor System (MAS)**. This permanent improvement provides complete 360 degree protection as well as overhead and underbody protection for the cab occupants.

The **Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVS)** is replacing the aging Marine Corps heavy-tactical wheeled vehicle, the LVS. The LVS is the Marine Corps’ heavy logistics vehicle, and performs logistics missions such as transport of break-bulk, bulk liquids, ammunition, and heavy engineer equipment. Three LVS variants (Cargo, Tractor, and Wrecker) replace five LVS variants. In addition to a base armor kit, the LVS has the capability to accept additional armor kits which meet or exceed all survivability requirements in extensive live fire testing. In its short time deployed to Afghanistan, it has displayed its toughness in dealing with the operating conditions and IED environment. Since its introduction as the host vehicle for the Mobile Trauma Bay (MTB), which I will discuss later, the LVS has also contributed significantly to enhancing the Marine Corps’ forward trauma care capability.

Future Ground Combat Acquisition Programs. While we must commit considerable capital to provide our Marines with the best equipment needed to prevail in the current operations in

Afghanistan, we must also prepare to face hybrid threats elsewhere within the future strategic landscape. I will now discuss a few key future ground vehicles.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): This Joint Marine Corps/Army program, with the Army as the lead Service for acquisition, is currently in the Technology Development phase. The JLTV family of vehicles is designed to replace a portion of the current family of M-ATVs and HMMWVs. All Marine Corps JLTVs will be required to be externally transportable by Marine Corps Heavy Lift CH-53 helicopters and be transportable aboard both Navy amphibious vessels and Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS); these expeditionary requirements will define maximum allowable weights and dimensions. The JLTV family of vehicles will have scalable levels of protection consisting of a base armor and safety capabilities with add-on armor kits available. The basic vehicle design will account for the heaviest anticipated payloads including armor kits to permit the vehicle to retain its all-terrain mobility capabilities when fully loaded.

Industry teams are currently on track to meet key program requirements. The JLTV program plans to maintain healthy competition now and through the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development phase. The Marine Corps' initial acquisition objective is for approximately 5,500 vehicles in 4 passenger configurations to support the infantry transport, heavy guns carrier and anti-armor missile employment missions; and 2 passenger configurations to support the cargo and ambulance missions.

Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): The MPC will be a multi-wheeled, armored personnel carrier designed to operate in constrained urban terrain. Required to carry 8-10 combat loaded Marines and a 2-man crew, the MPC will enable high-speed land maneuver as well as substantial ballistic protection to embarked Marines. MPC is a pre-milestone (MS A) program.

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): The EFV will provide the Marine Corps and the Nation with the *means to project surface forces directly from amphibious ships to the shore and onward to objectives in an uncertain environment*. In an era of increasing challenges to access, it is our number one ground acquisition priority. The vehicle's design will permit it to carry combat-ready Marines ashore using the sea as maneuver space. This will provide our seabased forces the ability to overcome anti-access weapons and strategies. As demonstrated by Hezbollah's use of anti-ship missiles in Lebanon, over-the-horizon capabilities may be critical even for operations like non-combatant evacuations. The EFV's ability to conduct high speed maneuver at sea as well as on land, combined with its weapon, communication, and protective systems make it a highly survivable and lethal capability.

The EFV will be built in two configurations. The command and control variant will provide a mobile command post for regimental and battalion commanders. The personnel variant will carry 17 embarked infantrymen and a 3-man crew. The program completed critical design review in December 2008 and is on schedule to begin Low Rate Initial Production in 2013. The acquisition objective is 573 vehicles. Initial Operational Capability is planned for 2016 and Full Operational Capability is planned for 2026. There are seven new prototypes currently being manufactured at the Joint Services Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio. These vehicles will begin Developmental and Operational Testing later this summer following contractor testing.

The Triad of Ground Fire Support. The Marine Corps has long operated under the maxim of combined arms - maneuver supported by fire. This is critical in conducting counterinsurgency or other operations needed to address hybrid threats. The high mobility and accuracy of these

platforms is necessary to deliver precision fires while reducing the instances of civilian casualties and collateral damage.

The Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer: The M777 weighs about half as much as the cannon it is replacing and fires projectiles to a range of 15-19 miles. Our Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Afghanistan has 15 of these howitzers at three different locations.

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS): The HIMARS provides both precision and volume rocket based fires to the MAGTF. There are two HIMARS battalions in the Marine Corps: one active duty battalion based in Camp Pendleton, California and one reserve battalion with a headquarters in Grand Prairie Texas and subordinate battalions in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, El Paso, Texas, and Huntsville, Alabama. Each HIMARS battalion has three batteries consisting of six mobile launchers. Currently, one HIMARS battery is deployed to Afghanistan. This support is expected to continue for the near future and will be sourced by both active and reserve forces. Full Operational Capability will be achieved this summer when training is complete.

The Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS): The EFSS is a rifled, towed 120mm mortar which is designed to be carried internally by the MV-22 Osprey, CH-53s, and CH-47s and will accompany and support vertical assault maneuver units. EFSS is currently being fielded to active duty artillery battalions. When complete, there will be ten EFSS batteries fielded. Each of these batteries will have six 120mm rifled mortars in addition to six LW155 howitzers. EFSS Initial Operational Capability was achieved in March 2009. The first EFSS deployed with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in January 2010 and is currently en route to the Central Command Area of Responsibility. A second EFSS battery will deploy with the 26th MEU in the fall of 2010.

Other Initiatives. The versatility, flexibility, and adaptability of our Marines continues to be enabled by a number of other initiatives as well.

The **MAGTF Combat Operations Center (COC)** has evolved from the original Unit Operations Center (UOC). It is a common, modular, scalable expeditionary capability enabling a MAGTF Commander to implement command and control (C2) in operational conditions spanning the full range of military operations (ROMO). COC is not a component of any other system, but rather acts as the key MAGTF enabling capability for the integration of MAGTF Tactical Data Systems (TDS) and tactical voice radios. The COC replaces the requirement for MAGTF Commanders to develop and field their own ad hoc COC systems.

Within the MAGTF, Command Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) enable aviation and logistics operations.

Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S): The Common Aviation Command and Control System is the cornerstone of Marine Corps aviation command and control modernization efforts. CAC2S emerged as a top-down, bottom up requirement to provide the aviation command and control portion of the MAGTF triad with a state of the art system of systems that will both meet war-fighter needs and incorporate Joint and Department of Defense directives for a modernized, mobile, interoperable, and common suite of capabilities. CAC2S fuses data from sensors, weapons systems, and C2 systems into an integrated display that increases situational awareness and facilitates decision making. CAC2S shares many common parts with the Marine Corps Combat Operations Center, thereby decreasing the logistics footprint and simplifying training requirements. It enhances a MAGTF commander's ability to integrate MAGTF aviation capabilities in the Joint framework, and control the timing of organic,

Joint, and Coalition fires, maneuver, and logistics while operating within the MAGTF battlespace.

Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) is a portfolio of approximately 40 legacy systems that provide the backbone for all logistics information required by the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), is the primary technology enabler for the Marine Corps Logistics Modernization strategy. The core is a modern, commercial-off-the-shelf enterprise resource planning software with a design focus on enabling the warfighter to operate while deployed with reach-back from the battlefield.

Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR): G/ATOR was designated as a "Special Interest Program" by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD, AT&L), in February 2009. The G/ATOR is a multi-role, ground-based, expeditionary radar that replaces five legacy radar systems for the MAGTF. It satisfies the Marine Air Command and Control System and the Ground Counter Fire and Counter Battery capabilities.

Mobile Trauma Bay (MTB): Developed in response to an Urgent Operational Needs Statement where battlefield commanders identified a requirement to provide on-the-spot medical care close to the point of contact, the MTB is an outstanding example of innovation that will cut casualty evacuation times from hours to minutes. The MTB was originally designed as a makeshift shelter with free-moving cots and loose medical equipment with Kevlar blankets lining the interior of an MTRV cargo bay. It has now gone through 914 concept drawings and upgrades. Currently, the MTB is a self-contained armored unit mounted on an LVSR that provides for the conduct of forward resuscitative care. The MTB enables the Shock Trauma Platoon to provide emergency/trauma care through task organized tactical trauma teams with a means of force protection and environmental control. The Marine Corps Logistics Command in

Albany, Georgia designed and developed the prototype and produced 9 systems: 6 deployed to Afghanistan, 2 to home stations, and 1 is retained for further refinement and technological upgrades. The MTB is not yet a program of record.

Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (Cargo-UAS): To date, the Marine Corps Unmanned Aircraft Systems have matured and continue to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition for the MAGTF. Responding to a 2009 Urgent Universal Need Statement and Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement for unmanned cargo delivery capability, the Marine Corps was designated as the lead service in developing this platform. The focus of this effort is to get “trucks off the road” using autonomous cargo UASs in order to mitigate the threat to re-supply convoys in the CENTCOM area of operations as soon as possible.

Energy Initiatives: The Marine Corps is aggressively pursuing greater warfighter effectiveness by investing and developing material and non-material solutions that make our Corps more self-sufficient, increase our agility, and “free us from tyranny of existing fuel solutions.” To achieve this vision, we have established an Experimental Forward Operating Base in Quantico, VA to test and develop alternative power, water, and shelter solutions. In addition we just deployed 8 solar-water purifiers that are now producing fresh water for local Afghans without the need of generators. The Corps is pursuing a comprehensive strategy in cooperation with other services and DoD to additionally “lighten the load” on individual Marines and help reduce the amount of traffic dedicated to hauling fuel and water.

Closing

We face an adaptive enemy and an uncertain future. We must also be adaptive and provide our Marines with the tools they need to maximize their operational flexibility and

continue to prevail. To do this, we must modernize our ground equipment to be lighter, faster, and more sustainable while maximizing the effectiveness and protection of our most important asset... our Marines. With the support of the Congress, the American people, and industry we can ensure our Marines are ready for the current fight as well as the uncertain future. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to report on their behalf.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Mr. DICKS. General Phillips, after termination of the manned ground vehicles in the FCS program, the Army initiated a new program called the Ground Combat Vehicle program. The first vehicle planned for production in the Ground Combat Vehicle program is a new infantry fighting vehicle which would replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. How will the new Ground Combat Vehicle improve on the Bradley?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, thank you for your question. The Ground Combat Vehicle was developed after 8 years of learning about the war, our Army at war and lessons learned from FCS, as you just defined, sir. It is much different than what the Bradley provides us on the battlefield today.

First and foremost and most obvious is the Bradley has a capacity for about nine soldiers today. The Ground Combat Vehicle will carry 12 soldiers. That is a requirement. And it would be a nine-person squad plus a three-person team that will operate inside that vehicle.

Also we want this vehicle to be scalable in that we want it to be able to operate in all environments from low-threat permissive kinds of environment where you might even operate an HMMWV in, all the way up to major or full spectrum operations. We wanted it to be scalable to the point where you can add underbelly armor, that you can armor the sides of the vehicle as the threat increases, where you might want to operate within, much different than what the Bradley provides today.

Mr. DICKS. Is the Bradley susceptible to IEDs? Does it have the same kind of defensive capabilities as the MRAP and the M-ATV?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it has less than the MRAP. Let me say this, any vehicle is susceptible to an IED or an EFP kind of event, to a certain extent, some better than others. The Ground Combat Vehicle is expected to be much better than the Bradley is today, sir, and have MRAP capability protection or better, as well as Abrams kind of mobility as well.

RAPID ACQUISITION

Mr. DICKS. The Committee understands that the new Infantry Fighting Vehicle is scheduled for first fielding in 2017. Given all the work done under the FCS program, the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, nobody knows that better than you, and the experience of rapidly fielding the MRAP vehicles, isn't 7 years a long time? I mean, why can't we use the model of the MRAP as a way to go forward on this manned ground vehicle?

General PHILLIPS. A couple of points. The MRAP was a rapid acquisition. It didn't go through all the testing that a normal acquisition program would, when you apply 5000.2, which is how we manage programs. It is a much different acquisition.

We did limited testing. We simply went out to try to buy the best armored vehicle we could with the requirements as we knew them then. We made some mistakes along the way and we have seen that in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. DICKS. But you fixed those mistakes, didn't you, as you went along? "Serial development," I remember that phrase.

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. We have done some of that with MRAP. That is a great response. Within the Army, this has been a great debate in my first 60 days on the job and we continue the debate. Some would want us to produce it quicker, some would think that is probably too quick.

Mr. DICKS. You have done better on the quicker one, the ones that have taken—the ones that we have seen, the Crusader, Comanche and the—the ones where you have taken a long time to do it, the results haven't been as good as when you expedited it and just said, here is what we need and go do it.

Do you think the industry—if you did that—this approach, do you think the industry could develop for you a capable Ground Combat Vehicle that meets your requirements without going through this long development and costly development phase? We will spend billions before we get a single vehicle.

General PHILLIPS. When you look at the requirements, we want this vehicle to have a network capability, mobility, efficiencies, force protection. It would be very difficult for industry to develop a vehicle that would meet all of those requirements. And the lessons learned from those 8 years of war and what we have learned through years of development from Future Combat Systems has led to us where we are today with this requirement.

We think by 2015, we can have the initial prototypes ready for test and evaluation to make sure that we did get it right. And then 2017, the first production.

PROCUREMENT STRATEGY

Mr. DICKS. Are you going to have a narrowing down of competitors or are you going to have two people develop these—how many—tell us what your procurement strategy is.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, our strategy intent is doing the analysis of alternatives at the same time we have the RFP on the street. We will take up to three competitors, three industry partners, that will develop the vehicle. It could be two, it could be three, but we want at least two, potentially three.

We will take them forward from September of this year for 27 months for the technology demonstration phase. At that point, we would down select to two vendors for the engineering and manufacturing development. That is following weapons system acquisition reform of 2009 to carry competitive prototyping all the way through essentially to production.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Mr. DICKS. And again, you are going to have nine plus three and the networking. This is an important part of what you learned in Future Combat Systems, is where you are and where the enemy is. Can you tell us a little bit about that?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, situational awareness for our Soldiers on the battlefield is key to the effectiveness they have. It is like the Abrams tank that we have today, the digital tank that gives the commander the situational awareness to be able to see what is happening around the battlefield. We would want this vehicle to have even greater capability than we have today, with their network and situational awareness that reaches down to the soldier

level as well as to the sensors that we put on the ground and the sensors we have in the sky, UAVs and other sensors. Sir, that is absolutely critical to our capability for the Ground Combat Vehicle.

Mr. DICKS. As I recall on the Bradley, we started with aluminum and we found that there was a real bad fire problem there and we changed the Bradley; is that correct?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I believe you are correct. I did not work that program, and I would have to do a little research. But I believe that is correct.

Mr. DICKS. I believe that was finally changed, and I assume that would be a lesson learned in this development as well.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, absolutely. The lessons of the past, you defined them very well in your opening comments. We have to learn from those and we have to move forward and execute and deliver for Congress and for the American people, and especially our soldiers, that capability.

Mr. DICKS. Because we can't afford to waste a lot of money. You add it all up, it is a lot of money we put into these other programs that didn't bear any fruit.

Mr. Young.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I completely agree.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I share your concern about the length of time it takes to develop something. However, remember when Secretary Gates invited Mr. Murtha and I to sit with him and talk about the need for an MRAP-type vehicle? It seemed like once we agreed to fund, it was like within 2 or 3 weeks we heard they were being deployed. It wasn't that quick, but it seemed like it. But if I understand correctly, General, the MRAP-type vehicle had already been developed by other countries actually. So we didn't have too much developmental problem to go to the MRAP. Was that accurate?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is an accurate statement. It was essentially a commercial off-the-shelf vehicle that we went to industry partners who could build a vehicle and then armor it up. Sir, part of the difference is the MRAP did not go through the normal acquisition process that we have and that we have to follow. Much of that was waived and it was essentially a commercial vehicle adding some capability to it and deployed into theater.

What we do today with the major acquisition program and the discipline and rigor that we put into that, it takes a length of time to make sure we have the testing right and we have the vehicle right to meet the standards.

Mr. YOUNG. Once the MRAP was very effective in being able to protect our soldiers in Iraq. Then when we began to use them in Afghanistan, we discovered that they were not the best vehicle for some of the areas in Afghanistan. So then comes the M-ATV, right?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, correct.

M-ATV INGRESS

Mr. YOUNG. Why can't the soldiers get back in the M-ATV once they get out?

General PHILLIPS. I was not aware there is an issue with soldiers getting out and getting back into it, unless I misunderstood your question.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, let me ask it further. We are told that there is an entry problem; that if the soldier leaves the M-ATV, often-times he cannot get the door open to reenter the vehicle.

General SPOEHR. Sir, you are correct. There is a problem with a sticking door that we have recently been made aware of. And we found 20 instances of sticking doors on the M-ATV. The program office has come up with a fix to that, and I can't tell you what that fix is. But it is in the process of being implemented in Afghanistan.

Mr. YOUNG. So it is not a generic problem that affects all the M-ATVs, about 20?

General SPOEHR. They have found 20 to this date that have a sticking-door problem. But there is already a solution that has been found.

Mr. DICKS. Can they fix—they fix it in country, right?

General SPOEHR. It is a door misalignment. If your car door was a little misaligned, it would jam once you closed it.

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Mr. YOUNG. It sort of reminds me of the problem we had with the HMMWVs, where the soldier was having a difficult time to get his seat belt undone so he could exit the vehicle. Incidentally, the fix for that was created by a constituent in my district. So we are pretty excited about that, that they solved that problem.

I want to ask you just about the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. When we talked about this last year and the year before, there were a lot of questions about whether or not this actually provided survivability because of the construction. We were getting really excited about the V hulls on the MRAPs and the heavy steel, and then I think this Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle has a flat bottom, an aluminum bottom. Is that correct?

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is not designed to be an MRAP-like transporting vehicle. It is designed to be a fighting vehicle that can surf, can swim, and also conduct mechanized maneuvers on shore. And it is vulnerable, under the hull right now with the straight hull, to underbelly IED devices.

We have just recently completed the testing for the EFV up at Aberdeen without the added applique armor, and it has tested vulnerable to the underbelly. In conjunction with the program, we are also developing applique armor to put underneath the vehicle. That, based on simulations, will probably give it at the bottom end of MRAP-like capabilities. But it is designed to be a maneuver vehicle. It is not designed to have the same use where we would use the MRAP in predictable transportation routes. And that is why we think, especially as we relook our ground tactical vehicle strategy, that we need different sets of vehicles to provide capabilities to allow us to do different things, to give us the flexibility to go where we need to go under a variety of conditions.

Mr. YOUNG. General Flynn, this vehicle is intended to bring Marines from the ship to the shore?

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. And to be fighting at the same time.

Mr. YOUNG. How far inland can that vehicle go?

General FLYNN. Sir, if it swims in from 25 miles out, has about a 200-mile range once it gets ashore.

Mr. YOUNG. What barricades would stop you from maneuvering or moving into an area? Can it go across a wall, for example, a stone wall?

General FLYNN. Not necessarily. It would depend on the height of the wall, sir. And I can get you the specifics of what heights it can climb. But that some obstacles could do it, sir. But one of the benefits of being able to come from the sea, sir, you are not necessarily locked into a certain location or a certain beach to be able to do it.

[The information follows:]

As a tracked combat vehicle, the EFV is required and capable of crossing a 3-foot-high wall, and an 8-foot-wide gap.

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE ARMOR

Mr. YOUNG. The Stryker will have a new hull that will be—so additional protection similar to MRAP. Would this expeditionary fighting vehicle be eligible for a new bottom, a new hull, other than the applique armor you were talking about?

General FLYNN. Sir, I don't think that would be possible because of the ground clearance underneath the vehicle. I think if we added a hull to it, we are not going to have the ground clearance that we would need without raising the height of the overall vehicle. So I think that would be an engineering challenge.

HMMWV

Mr. YOUNG. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. The HMMWV seems to not have a lot of use any longer; is that correct?

General FLYNN. Sir, from the Marine Corps side, right now if, for example, in Afghanistan, even if you are an up-armored HMMWV, it takes the battalion commander to authorize that to leave the operating base. What we are seeing, though, is—again, this goes to our overall tactical vehicle strategy—is we do need some light vehicles to go to places where you can't take heavier vehicles. We are experimenting right now with a way of possibly recapitalizing our HMMWV fleet. And we should have the results of that experimentation in May to see if we can—because we have 27,000 in the inventory right now. And if we could capitalize on that, give it some added protection, we may be able to save some money and provide that range and capabilities that we are looking for in an integrated ground tactical vehicle strategy.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, if I could answer also. You are referring to Afghanistan, and I would agree with your comments about the HMMWV. The Army has a requirement for about 152,000 HMMWVs. We essentially already met that objective, but for other permissive environments and anywhere within CONUS, we have a great demand for the HMMWV that will remain in our inventory for some time.

Mr. YOUNG. And if I understand correctly, there are overseas foreign sales of the HMMWV that—the manufacturer would come on line for?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. We will be buying HMMWVs over this year and through the next year, upwards to about 8,995, through Foreign Military Sales and supporting other services. You are exactly right.

MULE PROGRAM

Mr. YOUNG. General Flynn, how is the mule program going?

General FLYNN. Do you mean real mule program, sir?

Mr. YOUNG. Last year or the year before last, the Marine officer who testified was really excited about using the mules. And they thought it was really a modern way to go.

General FLYNN. Sir, out at Bridgeport, California, sir, using experience that we gained in the small wars in the 1920s, we actually do training with mules. And we use mules in areas of Afghanistan where it is hard to get to. We actually use pack trains. So we do teach a course in how to do a mule transportation and how to care for and feed a mule and how to load it. And in certain situations we actually do use mules, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Does the Army have a—the Army mule—

General PHILLIPS. Sir, not a formal program. We do use mules for—or employ our canon artillery at Fort Sill where they demonstrate the caissons from the early 1800s, sir, but that is our only use of mules today at least.

General FLYNN. Sir, we are a joint organization and we have trained soldiers—the Marines have trained soldiers in Bridgeport, California on the proper use of a mule.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Hinchey.

EXPERIMENTAL FORWARD OPERATING BASE

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Generals. Thank you very much for your service.

General Flynn, I want to ask you a question about something in your testimony that struck me as being very interesting. It is the creation of an experimental forward operating base in Quantico, Virginia. And the purpose of it is to test and develop alternative power, water, and shelter solutions.

Can you tell us a little bit more about that, what the obstacles are, what are the principal areas that are being developed?

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. This is one of the major initiatives of General Conway and also the Secretary of the Navy. What we did in the last month, we created a forward operating base and we asked industry partners to come in and demonstrate existing technology that we could use to immediately apply in the battlefield. The idea is, we transport a lot of water in one area of the technology. So if we could find a way of purifying water at the point of origin, that would take trucks off the road, it would take Marines and Soldiers off the road in having to secure that, and it would also make us more efficient.

On the energy side is, that we have so much power generating requirement; how could we generate power? We looked at everything from solar panels to modification of the truck transmissions to generate power to wind generation. We also looked at how we could better keep the environmental in our shelters so that we are

not using so much power to either keep them cool or keep them warm. And the other thing is how to design power grids.


So we had an independent evaluator there. We actually contracted with the Army for them to do that. And then we are going to take the most promising technology and we are going to deploy them. One of the outcomes of this, one of the companies that came and demonstrated, donated eight solar-powered water purification pieces of equipment. And we sent them to Afghanistan. And one of our Marine units gave a couple of them to the local villages. And what they did is they initially weren't using it because it looked pretty high-tech sitting out in the open, and they asked the Marines to move it behind the wall and they did. So that village is creating purified water and they are trading it with another village for bread.

Mr. HINCHEY. What village is that?

General FLYNN. I will get you the name, sir. But that is ongoing. So we are trying to save money. We are trying to save equipment, and we are trying to save lives by becoming more energy efficient. And we think there are going to be some of these technologies that are going to prove themselves.

[The information follows:]

Answer. The village who received the unit is Naw-Abad. Please see attachment for further details.



UNCLASSIFIED

Naw-Abad Solar Water Purification System



		<p>FIVE WS: AT 1500D* ON 16 FEB 2010, BHG, WITH STAFF FROM PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE COMPLETED INSTALLATION OF A SOLAR-POWERED WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEM IN THE VILLAGE OF NAW-ABAD.</p> <p>TASK ORGANIZATION: BHG (D CO, HQ CO), PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE, G-9 STAFF, G-10 STAFF.</p> <p>KEY POINTS & THEMES:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CLEAN WATER WILL HELP ENSURE THAT YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN STAFF HEALTHY. 2. GIROA AND COALITION FORCES OFFER A FUTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE ENEMY SEEK ONLY TO INTIMIDATE AND DESTROY. 3. GOOD HYGIENE AND HEALTH PRACTICES WILL HELP KEEP THE VILLAGES CLEAN OF DISEASE. <p>OVERALL SUMMARY: THE PRIMARY CONCERNS AMONG THE VILLAGERS OF NAW-ABAD IS ACCESS TO WATER AND THE COST OF DIESEL FUEL. THROUGH VILLAGE MEDICAL OUTREACH OPERATIONS, AND REGULAR ENGAGEMENT, THE LACK OF CLEAN DRINKING WATER WAS A MAJOR HEALTH CONCERN FOR LOCAL VILLAGES. TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS, BHG INSTALLED A SOLAR-POWERED WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEM WITHIN THE VILLAGE OF NAW-ABAD AT THE COMMUNITY WELL NEXT TO THE MOSQUE. THE SYSTEM WAS PROVIDED BY THE USMC EXPEDITIONARY ENERGY OFFICE AT HQMC.</p>

Mr. HINCHEY. Think that is a very effective thing to do. I think it is something that is very advanced and very necessary. We have a number of academic institutions, we have a number of colleges that have research in this. We have some companies that are engaged in this kind of activity. So I would like to know more about what you are doing and ways in which these operations might possibly be engaged with you, and maybe provide some things that could be useful.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. As part of this energy initiative, General Conway set up an Energy Office. So I can actually link you up with the lead for this, and we are looking for whatever we can get from university research organizations, or anybody who has the technology. We are all ears and all eyes and we are open to anything, sir.

Mr. HINCHEY. Good. I would like to do that. Can you tell us beyond that what kind of technologies appear to be the most promising? Do you have any sense about that?

General FLYNN. Sir, I think how to manage a power grid is one example of technology that I think is promising. How to use less energy and lighting, that is another one that looks pretty good. And water purification. There are a number of ones that seem promising right now that we could probably field.

And then the generation of electricity. Solar power could be used for small requirements, but you really need a lot of solar panels to create enough energy for some of the larger requirements. But this on-vehicle generation of power is probably one that I am kind of excited about, and I also think wind technology is another one that is a good one, sir.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks. Thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Hinchey. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

FCS ACQUISITION PROCESS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you all for your service.

In the interest of transparency, I would like to put a special pat on the back to General Phillips, who was base commander at Picatinny Arsenal in my congressional district, before he went over to Iraq and Afghanistan. And we are enormously proud of the work you did there. Thank you all for being here.

We had the Army Chief of Staff in the other day and we had our new Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, and I admitted in public I was a strong supporter of the Future Combat Systems. We spent about \$15 billion on the Future Combat Systems, and I understand that we have retained things that are critical masses within that system for the future.

The expression is if we are building the new—and following along with Chairman Dicks' questions—if we are building a new Ground Combat Vehicle—we built the Future Combat Systems from the ground up too.

I am sort of wondering here whether we—if it takes until 2017—and I assume this is a debate that goes on within the military, the Army, we could be building something that potentially could be obsolete. I am wondering what we are doing here. I am supportive of what we are doing. But I worry—and I would like to see a little

more reassurance when you talk about the Army acquisition process and how things work outside it to expedite things—that that is a comment on the Army acquisition process. I would like to know how we can expedite what we are going to do here.

General PHILLIPS. Up front, let me just say thanks for your years of service to our Armed Forces and to our families, and thanks to all of the Members of Congress and members here today for your service to our Armed Forces.

Sir, FCS initially was going to just provide a capability for about 15 brigades, not the entire Army. So from the very beginning it was sort of limited in nature.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It wasn't limited in nature, because it was to replace the Abrams and the Bradley which was that legacy for us. There certainly was a concentration by the Army in trying to, shall we say, excite Members of Congress in why it was an absolute necessity that we proceed with it. But that was my take on it. Excuse me for interrupting.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, you are correct. And through spinouts and other technologies that we would get through FCS, we would obviously spin that into the current force that we have today as we build toward the future force.

The termination or cancellation of the Future Combat Systems gave us a great opportunity to leverage what we knew at that time. What was terminated was the ground vehicle systems within the FCS construct. All of the other items that were there, the Tactical and Urban Unattended Ground Sensors, the Class I UAV, and many other systems provide us an opportunity to really fix what I see as a gap today, which is the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. Sometimes, in my view, we neglect them.

Now, with what has happened with the Future Combat Systems, how can we spin out those technologies quickly to upgrade those 40 or so IBCTs? Twenty-nine by the year 2015 or so, we want to upgrade with this technology and these capabilities, spin those systems out so we can leverage what FCS has provided us through today. Sir, that is part of our intent.

The hardest one that you mention is the Ground Combat Vehicle and it is not just the Army's acquisition process, sir. It is really the Department of Defense acquisition process as we manage this system all the way through. We think that we have a program that is medium- to low-risk.

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What will it look like? I saw a very good article in the Armed Forces Journal, entitled "Mother Ship or Battle Ship: Competing Visions of the Army Ground Combat Vehicle." What is it going to be like? Is it going to be, as you said earlier, a troop deliverer, or is it going to be a battleship or is it going to be a combination of all of the above?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, really all of above. It will be a combat vehicle that we can use to transport troops, to soldiers, or to execute combat operations today. Which is a little bit different than what we use the MRAP or the M-ATV, which is essentially to get around the battlefield. And if those soldiers that are riding in an MRAP or an M-ATV today run into an IED, that would protect

them; or if they are ambushed, that would protect them. It has limited capability to engage and defeat. This would be a Ground Combat Vehicle that will come into our inventory that will fight from day one.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And the scale of—the weight of these things—that is why we can't use the big MRAPs in Afghanistan, is because there is no road system to support them. Would we be able to support in the Afghan theater this new Ground Combat Vehicle?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, from what I have seen today and the analysis from the TRADOC Doctrine Command that we just went through this week, the answer in my opinion is “yes.” Not all areas, but certainly in many areas today.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And within that article by Daniel Goure, the new President of the Lexington Institute—there is a rather alarming quotation here. It refers to Major General Robert Scales. And I quote, The only requirement Scales doesn't include in the Ground Combat Vehicle that—Let me read this. “The only requirement Scales doesn't include is that the Ground Combat Vehicle be heavily armored. Survivability would be achieved not by being where the IEDs are, but would be where IEDs would be deployed, and using information, speed, and maneuver to outfox the enemy or the adversary,” within quotes. I mean, we would be having a vehicle on the battlefield which would have an issue relative to survivability?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we want this vehicle to give us scalable, armor, and survivability that you could, depending on the environment that you would operate this vehicle within, you could scale up to the threat that you would face.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you would take issue with what I—

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I am not sure what context General Scales had said that article in. But I just know that what we are asking for within the request for proposal that industry has today, that they will soon propose against, it has scalability of protection and survivability requirements within it.

Mr. DICKS. So it would survive an IED attack?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is our intent. And it would have scalability in terms of what you would put underneath the vehicle itself, depending on the threat that exists in that theater. You could put different armor solutions underneath. It could be a V hull. I don't know. That would be up to industry to propose their solutions for us as we look at what is in the art of doable.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We don't have much time, I think. That is sort of why 2017 is a long way away. So we are going to rely on other types of vehicles. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Phillips, what was it like being represented in Congress by Congressman Frelinghuysen?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it was absolutely incredible, and he gave us great support at Picatinny Arsenal, which is a great place to soldier, sir.

HMMWV REPROGRAMMING

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would have anticipated that answer.

General, I know that my good friend and colleague, Congressman Young, has asked a series of questions about the HMMWV. My only question would be to you as well as to General Flynn: Does the Army or Marine Corps have plans to reprogram 2010 dollars for HMMWV purchases?

I know the question has been addressed. It is only on the reprogramming. That is my question.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, there is a plan to reprogram dollars, still within the Army, I believe today, to reprogram to some extent for a recapitalization program for HMMWVs. And I will just restate this: The HMMWVs have a place in our Army and we have a requirement for 152,000, so many of those HMMWVs that we want to bring back into the inventory through recapitalization and utilize them.

A recapped HMMWV for us costs around \$90,000. If we were going to go and buy a new one, it would be somewhere between 180, probably, to 215 because of the differences in variance. So it is cost-effective for us to recap HMMWVs, sir.

More to come on the reprogramming. It hasn't left the Army yet, as far as I know, sir.

General FLYNN. Sir, I am not the Marine Corps programmer, but I do know—I have commented on some shift of money, and I would like to, for the record, get back to you whether we actually reprogrammed money in this case for 2010, sir.

[The information follows:]

Answer. Yes. An above threshold reprogramming request has been developed and is in the internal review and approval process. Based on recent decisions, the Marine Corps intends to cease procurement of new HMMWVs, so unexecuted funds are available to meet critical Urgent Universal Needs Statements (UUNS), emerging OCO requirements, and Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Equipment Density List (EDL) deficiencies based on what is determined to be a higher priority.

TOWED HOWITZER

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General Flynn, on the Towed Howitzer, moneys were appropriated in 2010. And it was, I believe, the committee's belief that there would be no further request for moneys for the Howitzer. But there is money in the Marine Corps 2011. Could you explain what that is for and how your needs have changed?

General FLYNN. Sir, some of that money is being requested to replace some of the Howitzers that have been damaged, and also through utilization, and also to allow us to buy to the complete authorized allowance levels, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Would you assume, barring changes, that that would be it for the purchases at this point?

General FLYNN. My understanding is that what money is in 2011 will buy out the whole authorized allowance of that, sir.

M4 CARBINE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General Phillips, on the M4 Carbine, my understanding is the Army is looking for a replacement weapon. What are the significant drawbacks of the M4? And what are you looking to do with the next generation, if you would?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I must state up front that the M4 is an extraordinary weapon system for our soldiers. It is performing extremely well. We have about 400,000 of them. We have another 38,000 with our special operators.

Soldiers give us great feedback on the M4, but it is still not without its shortcomings. We executed 62 enhancements to the M4 to date. If you look at the mean rounds between failure for an M4, the requirement is 600. We are five times that today on the field of battle.

But soldiers still complain somewhat. The last complaint I heard before I left theater was the magazine sometimes jams, and it jams because soldiers might leave the rounds in a magazine for 5 or 6 days, and after that period of time the spring—something happens inside and it may jam in the weapon itself. We are fixing that. That will be the next series.

So we have a dual strategy. We are going to continue to upgrade the M4. We expect to have an RFP in about 60 days. Then we are going to go out and ask for the next generation of carbine that may not, in fact, be a replacement, but it may be an additive to the M4 today on the battlefield, sir.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is part of it keeping the weapon clean? Do I understand—

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I carried an M9 myself in Iraq, and I fired it often in training. And I cleaned my weapon very often to make sure that it was ready. Every soldier is taught to clean their weapon. And some of the things we find is when they don't clean their weapon, sand and grit get inside there. It is a very dusty environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have to do that, sir, you are exactly right.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston.

RIFLE AMMUNITION

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I wanted to ask a follow-up question to that. I understand there is a new green ammo. It is M855A1. When is that going to be available to test out in individual weapons?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is currently undergoing product qualification test. It is a very good round in terms of lethality. I have seen the performance results of it, and against the current M885 round, it is vastly superior to what that round will provide us. It is also lead free. It has no lead inside the bullet itself; a little bit inside the primer.

To answer your question, in June of this year we expect to have about a million rounds off the production line available to the Army, and they will tell us where they want to put it. My hopes will be that we can get this round into combat quickly, sir.

Mr. KINGSTON. Is that part of the improvement initiative?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Actually when we looked at this lead-free round green ammo, we looked at the complete weapons system. Soldiers have told us when we fired the M4, the flash, especially at night, could give them night blindness. We perfected the

powder along with the round itself, so when they fire at night they won't get that flash. Yes, sir.

FORKLIFT

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. I want to ask you a question about the K5 forklift programs, the light capacity, rough terrain forklift. And I understand that the Marines put out the operational requirements document—well, actually both of you all did. But the Marines have stuck with a shield, I guess a bullet-proof shield, but the Army has taken that out of their requirements. And there have been three of these ORDs that have kept that requirement in, but the Army has taken it out and the Marines have left it in. And I was wondering—maybe both of you could comment on that.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I believe—

Mr. KINGSTON. And the concern that I have, General, you know back in the first part of the war when we had to go back and up-armor all of the HMMWVs—it would appear to me that we have learned the value of the up-armor at the factory rather than going to a logistics center in Albany, Georgia or wherever and—

General FLYNN. Sir, our requirement is, we have the requirement for it to be shielded, sir. And it is just because of the expeditionary environment that we expect it to operate in. So that is why we are sticking with that requirement, sir.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I will take your question for the record, if I could, and review the program and make sure we get back with you on the exact status of where we are on that piece. I think part of it, though, as I recall, had to do with operations in a permissive environment and how we would utilize it. But, sir, I owe you a better answer than that.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—An answer was not provided by the Army.]

HIGH MOBILITY ENGINEER EXCAVATOR

Mr. KINGSTON. From a cost standpoint, or maybe you would want to split half of them or something like that.

Another question, General, that has to do with—I guess this is for General Flynn. But on the HMEE, the High Mobility Engineer Excavator system, on the Army's Web site, May 29, 2009, a soldier hit an anti-tank mine and exploded, but he walked away from it. Sergeant Adam Smith, Jr., the 9th Engineer Battalion, 172nd Infantry Brigade. He walked away and said, I am thankful it was a HMEE and not a SEE, a small excavator. And so my question is, the Marine Corps does not have the requirement for a HMEE, I don't believe, but the Army is utilizing them. And I have driven one, it is a high speed backhoe, basically. It can really move equipment, lots of equipment very quickly. I think the Army is very happy with it in Iraq. I don't know how many you have in Afghanistan, but the Marines I don't think have a requirement for one yet, and I was just wondering about it.

General FLYNN. Sir, if I could, I would like to get back to you on the record on that because I am not familiar with the vehicle, or I haven't seen a requirement for that, sir, but I will get back to you.

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, that is it for me right now. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Answer. No, the Marine Corps does not have a requirement for the HEMTT. The Marine Corps' medium lift capability is provided by the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), which has a 7-ton off-road/15-ton on-road payload; and the heavy lift capability is provided by the Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSr), which has a 16.5-ton off-road/22.5-ton on-road capability. These vehicles also meet unique Marine Corps capabilities such as shipboard compatibility and increased fording depth (60-inch).

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. Let me ask you, General Phillips, about the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program. You are asking for \$707 million for air vehicles, modifications and payloads. The UAV program has evolved rather rapidly, has it not? And now there is an eclectic variety of sizes and missions and the like. Could you give us a brief description of the UAV program that the Army has?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, absolutely. In May of this year, we think that we will surpass 1 million combat hours for UAVs. And the variants that we have, the Raven UAV, which is a very small, about three-foot wingspan, there are, I think, over 1,300 of those systems fielded. They are used by platoons and companies and sometimes battalions for FOB security and when they are actually conducting operations. That is inside a brigade. Also inside a brigade is the Shadow UAV system as well. There is about, I think, 75 of those systems fielded today, going up to about 102 systems. Each system has three air vehicles. It provides a brigade commander and battalion commander on the field of battle intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability through electro-optical and IR sensors and camera sensors onboard.

Above that, sir, we have the extended range multipurpose UAVs that fly normally at corps and division level, that is like the Predator, but it is used tactically rather than strategically and operationally, which is how the Air Force uses it. So it is used by the Combat Aviation Brigade, flown by enlisted UAV pilots actually in the Army, to give intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to our warfighters, brigade commanders and division commanders.

And, sir, there are some other systems I could talk about, like Hunter, which there are very few of those, but that is military intelligence. Constant Hawk is not a UAV system, but it flies in support of them to give counter-IED defeat capability.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the Air Force obviously has missiles as well as UAVs. How are you able to deconflict the operation that you have with Air Force UAVs?

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we actually have a very disciplined and rigorous aircraft control capability, aircraft traffic control capability that deconflicts UAVs, fixed wing, rotary wing aircraft, and they have certain corridors and altitudes that they fly within. The Air Force obviously is flying at very high altitudes with their Predator and other aircraft systems. They are almost constantly on watch in

Afghanistan to provide support for our Soldiers and our Marines. We have that ATC capability all the way down to the lowest level of UAVs.

In the time that I have watched aviation operate in theater, I am only aware of one incident that was actually a collision between a UAV and a manned aircraft, and it was a Raven aircraft that actually ran into the back of an OH58D Kiowa Warrior, and that was many years ago. I share that with you because our ATC capability today that exists in Iraq and Afghanistan is very good to deconflict air, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. So are you now using UAVs in Afghanistan?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, very much so.

Mr. ROGERS. Now, the Air Force operates their UAVs by reachback from overseas operating areas with pilots and intelligence specialists at crew stations in the U.S. The Air Force pilots are rated, they are officer aviators. You train enlisted personnel. What is your assessment of the performance of your UAVs compared with Air Force pilots?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I will speak from my perspective in the job I have, but also from 32 years of being an Army aviator. I have been out to where we train our UAV pilots at Fort Huachuca, I have watched them, I have watched the training. I have been to Creech Air Force Base and actually have sat with an Air Force pilot flying the Predator, and I have great respect for how they execute that capability, which is extraordinary.

Our UAV pilots, our enlisted pilots and aviators, are very well trained through 34 weeks of rigorous training where they learn ATC procedures. Their safety record is phenomenal. I spoke yesterday to our safety officer for aviation, Brigadier General Bill Wolf and I asked him how our UAV pilots were doing. He, as a safety officer, is very impressed with the record of our young enlisted UAV pilots. And I am very high on what they are doing for our Army and the capability they are providing, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. In Afghanistan, are you using the UAVs as a weapon as opposed to surveillance?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it is both, using them as a weapon and also in surveillance. I would say today in Afghanistan for the Army, a lot of what we do is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as opposed to actually using them to attack, even though they do have that capability. That ISR information gives our commanders on the ground great situational awareness so they can engage with various weapons and defeat the enemy.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

General PHILLIPS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran.

SNIPER DETECTION

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to ask about two topics, one, sniper detection; the other, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

First of all, with regard to sniper detection. This Committee put language in both the supplemental—I will continue on for a couple of minutes so you can check your notes there, I didn't give Gates enough time, though, apparently yesterday—the language in the

supplemental and in this past full appropriations bill regarding sniper detection. We wanted to know what your plan was, what is your procurement plan, and how you are planning to equip both Marines and Army.

So we are wondering whether counter sniper equipment should be standard issue for Army units in Afghanistan and Afghanistan, and likewise for Marine Corps units, because as we go into these Taliban strongholds, in addition to IEDs, of course, land mines, they really are subject to sniper fire, and it is an increasing threat. Do you think the soldiers ought to wear it as standard equipment or vehicle mounted? I should probably hear from both sources.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that really is a good question. In my view, I think we need that capability for our soldiers, but it depends on the threat that you might face. If there is a sniper threat in that theater where you go, we should field a capability to our soldiers, my view. But I am not sure every soldier needs one. What you really need is the capability to detect where that sniper is actually firing from. We have vehicle manned systems, and we have tested some individual gunner or sniper detection systems on the individual. I think we fielded about 2,100 of those.

The \$50 million that I believe you authorized for us to spend, we spent about \$15 million of that already. We fielded, I believe, up to about 2,100 systems. And we are going through a formal process to determine what is the exact requirement we would want for the next generation, and we expect to have that on contract sometime this year, sir, but I can't give you a specific date. I think that we need the capability for counter sniper.

Mr. MORAN. But it should be up to the individual unit, depending upon where they are being deployed and what their mission is.

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. And they would have the operation, through the Operational Needs Statement, to actually tell us I need this capability and I need it along these timelines, and then we could get them the best we could get at that time.

Mr. MORAN. Does that apply to both services?

General FLYNN. Sir, we are doing a number of different approaches, first of all, the technology. But one of the best counter-sniper pieces of equipment is a better sniper. So we are investing heavily in making sure that our snipers have the latest in optics equipment and also in sniper rifles to counter a sniper. Normally, the best weapon against an enemy sniper is our own sniper.

Mr. MORAN. I understand that. But we do have the technology that has been refined to identify where the sniper is located.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. And where that technology has proven itself, we are employing it, sir.

Mr. DICKS. All right. Good. So I guess that is a yes response in both, and you are going to use that money as fast as you can responsibly use it.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. We seem to have a different attitude, if you will, perspective on the part of the Marines and the Army. The commandant suggested that the Marines ought to go back to their expeditionary roots rather than replicate a ground Army. He felt that several years of fighting in Iraq encumbered the Marines with too many heavy and cumbersome vehicles that were designed of course to survive IEDs. But this past December, he in-

licated that he felt that a planned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that would weigh nearly 22,000 pounds is too heavy for strategically mobile troops and that the Corps is actively considering a lighter version. Well, that is the kind of thing we need to understand, particularly in this hearing that is focused specifically on combatant vehicles, ground combatant vehicles.

The JLTV is supposed to be a joint program. The Deputy Chief of Armor Capability says there is more work to be done in developing the concepts behind this vehicle. Is there a conflict between the commandant's assessment and what the Army sees as the appropriate vehicle?

General FLYNN. Sir, we see the requirement for a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle with the operative word being on "light" because we are finding in many cases that we do not have the transportability and mobility to go everywhere that we need to go. And we do understand the need to partner with the Army. The key elements of that, though, is it is part of us taking a comprehensive look at all our ground tactical vehicle requirements.

And one of the things that General Conway told me to do by next month is to have a new ground tactical vehicle strategy that is affordable, that actually goes to creating a family of capabilities that will allow us to do different things. Part of that family of vehicles will be a giant light tactical vehicle.

I work all the time with my Army counterparts at TRADOC, and they have a need for a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle in some of their airborne and air assault forces. So we are linked on the requirement. The key thing is, for lack of a better term, those capability sets that I think we need families of vehicles in the right numbers that would give us a range of capabilities to allow us to go everywhere. One of the challenges we are having now as a sea-base force is we could weigh down a ship before we cube out a ship, and we have never done that in the past.

Mr. MORAN. You could weigh down a ship before you—

General FLYNN. We could have so much weight on it that there is actually more room to load it, but because of the weight of the vehicles, we are not becoming the ability to go to all the areas around the world where we need to go. So we are looking for a mix of capabilities in our Ground Tactical Vehicle Strategy. And as I told the chairman earlier, we will be willing to brief you on that strategy as soon as we get it done in the next month or two.

Mr. MORAN. Well, this was an issue with the Stryker, but 22,000 pounds is too heavy you feel, but it will be a jointly developed program.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young.

CRUSADER AND PALADIN HOWITZERS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask, what is the difference, General Phillips, between Paladin and the system that we spent an awful lot of time before it was canceled, Crusader.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, great question. I would like to just go back to the previous question from Congressman Moran. We clearly are

in sync with our Marine Corps brothers on going forward with JLTV.

Sir, the Paladin is a howitzer that goes back to probably late 1960s, early 1970s. It has been improved for very many years. And with the termination of the Crusader and now the NLOS Cannon, it is important that we improve our self-propelled howitzer capability.

As a young artillery officer, I served on the M109, the first version of the howitzer—it was just called an M109 then, it evolved into the Paladin. It is very important that our Army move forward to be able to fund a strategy to upgrade the current Paladin utilizing some of what we learned from NLOS cannon, like the electric turret and other items, and put that into the Paladin PIM upgrade. And sir, that is exactly what we are pursuing.

Another piece that is very difficult with that is obsolescence inside that platform that does date back to the late 1960s, early 1970s, sir.

Mr. YOUNG. Isn't that what Crusader was supposed to do before we canceled it?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, Crusader, I am not sure if I have the data right, but was very heavy, many tons and very expensive as well, sir, and obviously canceled. NLOS cannon was canceled. We will simply take the Paladin howitzer as it is today, identify the upgrades that we want to incorporate into it, and it will be a new self-propelled howitzer that our heavy brigade combat teams need for the future fight.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PALADIN BRADLEY CHASSIS

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield on that just a second?

Mr. YOUNG. Sure.

Mr. DICKS. However, the Army is proceeding with the Paladin Integrated Management Program which mounts a howitzer on a chassis that is derived from the Bradley. Please explain this apparent contradiction. In other words, why are we saying that Bradley is no good, but here we are going to use the chassis for this particular purpose?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I will let Major General Spoehr weigh in here, but my quick response is, obsolescence of all the parts, to include the engine, the transmission, and some of the torque converters that go into driving the tracks and so forth, obsolescence has driven us to try to get commonality with something that we have inside the Army today.

Tom Spoehr.

General SPOEHR. Sir, I would just add that there is a slightly mission set difference there, and that, normally speaking, a track howitzer would not be at the front pushing out into areas where you would expect to find IEDs. So the threat from an IED is a little bit lower for a track howitzer.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Going back to the new ground vehicle, is this going to be a tracked vehicle or a wheeled vehicle?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we are not sure yet.

Mr. DICKS. That is going to be up to the alternative analysis and contractor development?

General PHILLIPS. Roger, sir, exactly. The analysis of alternatives, AOA, in July will inform us, as will the proposals that we get back from industry. And we will probably have a host of solutions that we will propose again, sir.

ABRAMS TANK

Mr. DICKS. Tell us what you are doing with the M1 tank.

General SPOEHR. Sir, we have been moving towards a two-fleet strategy, and so we are seeking a strategy that has the M1A2 SEP and the M1A1 AIM SA tank. It is a two-fleet balance mix. It is a wonderful tank.

We also have a program for some modest improvements over the course of the years to keep this platform relevant with digital upgrades and other things. As we have added more things, the platform has become burdened in terms of its ability to generate the necessary power and to communicate with the other vehicles in a heavy brigade combat team. So some of the modest improvements that we want to put on the M1 tank will keep it relevant for the foreseeable future because it will be part of our fleet at least until 2025, and probably further.

Mr. DICKS. What are the key advantages of each tank and what are the key differences?

General SPOEHR. Sir, we have two primary types of tank, the M1A2 SEP and the M1A1 AIM SA. They are very similar, they are both great tanks. The M1A2 SEP is a fully digital tank and so it is able to communicate through all the modern technology and has a digital backbone. So as you add new black boxes to that tank, it can fully accept them.

The M1A1 AIM SA tank is an analog tank. It is older technology, and so it doesn't accept as readily a digital-type system that you would find today.

The other major difference, sir, is that the newer tank, the SEP tank, has a commanders' independent thermal viewer, which gives the commander an ability to look separately from the gunner for other targets and other threats to his tank using a thermal site, which is a huge advantage.

Mr. DICKS. The Army budget justification material indicates that the M1A1 situational awareness tank are for the Army National Guard and the M1A2 system enhancement package tanks are for the active Army. What is the rationale in providing one type of M1 tank to the Guard and another to active units?

General SPOEHR. Sir, we are providing both. The newest tank is going to both of our components, the Army National Guard and the active components. So shortly, it is the Idaho National Guard, their brigade combat team will be getting the SEP tank, which is the newest tank in our inventory.

Mr. DICKS. So both the active force and the Guard and Reserve will get both tanks.

General SPOEHR. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Well, maybe we ought to check your budget justification material and we can get that straightened out.

General SPOEHR. It could be a matter, sir, that the new tanks are not going directly to them; it could be a cascade, so it may not be—

Mr. DICKS. I see. What variety of Abrams tanks is the most capable, and what would be the cost to upgrade all Abrams tanks to the most capable model?

General SPOEHR. Sir, the most capable tank is the M1A2 SEP tank. I do not have the cost, but I can get it to upgrade the entire fleet to that configuration.

Mr. DICKS. Give us an estimate for the record.

I voted, so I intend to keep going here.

[The information follows:]

The aggregate cost to convert all existing Abrams tanks for which we have requirements to M1A2 SEPs is ~\$5.9B. The current cost to produce an M1A2SEP v2 is \$8.4M. Currently 700 M1A2SEP v2 tanks are required to “pure fleet” the Army’s Active, National Guard Modular HBCTs, and prepositioned stocks.

The Abrams M1A2SEP v2 is designed to operate in close partnership with the Bradley M2A3. In order to optimize platform interoperability and communication, the Bradley fleet would need to be upgraded as well. The cost to modernize the Bradley fleet is ~\$7.3B. Based on source vehicle, the current cost to produce an M2A3 Bradley ranges from \$2.3M to \$4.2M. 1,966 M2A3 Bradleys are required to “pure fleet” the Army’s Active, National Guard Modular HBCTs, and prepositioned stocks.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I just want to get a little clarity. While the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon has been canceled, that program, we are using that technology, that is not escaping here.

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, we are using that technology. Some of it inside the Paladin PIM improvement, yes, sir.

PALADIN SCHEDULE DELAY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How about the schedule for the Paladin?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it is currently being reviewed. And we will brief our Chief of Staff on Tuesday on the strategy going forward for the Paladin PIM.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a delay?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And that is not a signal of anything?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, the funding is still necessary for the Paladin pin program. We originally had a Milestone C scheduled in May, and we know that that milestone will slip some, I just can’t tell you the date that it will slip. Once we brief our strategy and get it through the Army, sir, we can certainly come back to you and this Committee and inform you on our strategy.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just getting back to the ground combat vehicle, I know it is in the future, how would it be transported? Will it be transportable, in your mind, in a C-130?

General PHILLIPS. No, sir.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So it would be C-17, or—

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it would be C-17.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That tells us a little bit about the weight issue.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, to transport inside a C-130—I am going back to my Stryker days—about 40,000 pounds, depending on the variant of C-130 that you are flying in. That was about the tip of

a spear where you could get a vehicle inside the C-130. The Air Force can provide specifics, but that was our target originally for the Stryker program. With this vehicle, it will certainly fly onboard a C-17 or go on shipment via the U.S. Navy.

ELECTRICITY GENERATION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have a question for General Flynn. I deliberately didn't ask about the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, I left you alone, I am going to let others do that.

I understand you were using some low-cost generators on your logistics line for vehicles to sort of keep them running. Are you familiar with that, on your convoys?

General FLYNN. Do you mean power generators?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, power generators.

General FLYNN. Sir, that is one of the technologies we looked at at that energy FOB. We have a prototype that actually, when you drive the vehicle, it creates energy and we are able to store it and use it.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. In the interest of full disclosure, I have a company in my district that is very much involved in that. I am glad that the Marines are looking at it, which is a nice way of saying I think the Army might look at. I mean, we are huge consumers of fuel. And God only knows, it costs millions of dollars just to get a gallon of fuel over there. But you are actually proceeding to take a look at that and incorporate it into your supply lines.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. And exactly for the reason you say is one of the biggest things that we move in theater is fuel. And if we can reduce our fuel consumption, we can take vehicles off the road, convoys off the road, Marines off the road, soldiers off the road.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, in the absence of Ms. Kaptur, who would certainly drive that point home if she were here, I put in a plug for it, I think it is a pretty neat idea. They are small, but capable. So thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. We are going to continue.

Mr. Hinchey.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman.

It is very interesting to be here with you and listening to all the things that you are doing and saying. We know that historically a lot of technological innovation and creativity has come out of the military and then eventually made its way out to the general economy and the general public. So I am very interested in a number of things that you are doing, including this experimental forward-operating base that we talked about. I am wondering if there is anything in the context of that development that includes the development of a solar battery, a battery which would generate energy directly from the sun and hold on to it for a long period of time. Is there anything like that that is being done in the military anywhere?

General FLYNN. Sir, I did not see that technology demonstrated down at the FOB, but that doesn't mean that we are not looking at it, but I can get back to you on that.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I am not aware of any either. We can do some research on that and get back to you.

JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks. It just seemed interesting if something like that could be done, including for vehicles that would be conventional, but then run out of power and stuck someplace, if they could click that on, that would be something that would be very significant.

Also, the Joint Tactical Radio System, those radios, this is another fascinating operation. It says they are software defined, high capacity, multichannel tactical radios. The program was launched in '97 based on a Mission Needs Statement. The Department of Defense is developing multiple variants, including ground mobile, handheld, ManPAC, small, airborne maritime fixed stations—a number of things like that which seem very, very interesting. Do you want to tell us more about it? Thank you.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it is really a key component of our network strategy that we are implementing all across the Army, not just for certain brigades, but we want to take the network and expand it all across the Army. JTRS is part of the backbone of that system, along with the system WIN-T that I mentioned in my opening comments. It is a software programmable radio that provides really the network and Internet-like capability down to the soldier level. Some of those radios like the HNS that you just mentioned, connects us, the soldier, to sensors on the battlefield. So you can have a soldier that has a radio and also a sensor that has a small form-fit factor radio that would communicate back to the soldier, who could communicate back to his leadership platoons and provides incredible situational awareness on the battlefield. It is a centerpiece of our network strategy going forward for our brigade modernization, sir.

Mr. HINCHEY. That is very, very interesting. Can you tell us the timeline for fielding the JTRS, the ground mobile radio for the first three Army brigades combat teams?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we are doing some testing now with ground mobile radio. We have some of the early versions in production. We have the—we call them EMD versions—engineering, manufacturing and development versions—that were tested in the actual limited user test last September. We expect the GMR radio to go into production in fiscal year 2011 so we can begin to field it in Brigades 2 and 3 down the path. It remains critical to our IBCT modernization strategy.

If I could also add, we invested, all the services to date, about \$5.5 billion into JTRS, and we want to leverage that investment. We are about 85 percent complete on development, and now we are ready to go into production, sir.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much.

General PHILLIPS. Thank you, sir.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you this; on the acquisition workforce, General Phillips, one of the tasks is to revitalize the Army acquisition workforce. What actions will you take to do this?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is a great question. In my years that I have in this job, that is going to be one of my top priorities is to continue to build our acquisition workforce. With your help, the help of this Committee, and Congress, we have the authority, through OSD, to hire 1,885 new workers into our acquisition workforce. That is on top of the already about 42,000 today. We are going to in-source another 4,041 workers that used to be contractors that at some time we decided they weren't inherently government, and most of the work that we do in acquisition I believe is inherently government.

So we are going to bring into the workforce almost 6,000 new workers through in-sourcing and new capability.

Now, sir, of that 1,885 that I mentioned—contracting desperately needs new workforce inside our formation—about 1,650 of that are contracting officers that we will bring in. We have already promoted three generals, as I mentioned, sir, we will promote more. You gave us an allocation for a total of five, our work is not done in contracting. Sir, I hope that is helpful, but thanks to you and the Committee for what you have allowed us to do.

HIRING PERSONNEL

Mr. DICKS. So how do you get these people? Is this off of a Web site, or do you just hire the way we used to hire people, you bring them in for an interview? How do you do it?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it is a very disciplined process. We use Section 852 funding that goes along with this to recruit. And once we recruit them, we have to retain them. We have a lot of folks that go out and recruit among colleges and universities. When you talk about acquisitions, especially contracting, we have a requirement to have 24 business credits, we would like to for them to have a degree as well, that is helpful. If a degree in business, that is even more powerful.

So we seek that kind of talent, and we do much of our recruiting for contracting and for acquisition in our universities and colleges around the United States, sir. It is a very disciplined program that we are following to go out and recruit these young men and women to join our ranks.

Mr. DICKS. How many people have been brought on in the last year?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I believe we brought on a little over 600. I will get you the exact figure, but it is around 650 folks that have been brought on in the last several years.

[The information follows:]

The U.S. Army has hired 2087 civilian acquisition personnel during Fiscal Year 2010. Approximately 1800 of the personnel hired were as a result of growing the acquisition workforce. The rest were hired as part of the normal replenishment process.

Mr. DICKS. General Flynn, what about the Marine Corps, is this a problem for you or not?

General FLYNN. Sir, in recent times, General Rogen, at our systems command, we are in the process of a significant hiring effort to bring on new acquisition professionals. And also, based on the guidance we received last year from the Department, we are also

in the process of converting many of our contractor positions to government employees.

Mr. DICKS. What were these contractors doing? Were they managing the acquisitions?

General FLYNN. They weren't managing the acquisitions, sir. I think in many cases, what the contractors were hired for was to help in the requirements—or the documentation that went along with the requirements process is where, in my organization, that is where a lot of them work is in the actual writing of the requirements document, not necessarily defining the requirement, but doing all the supporting documentation that goes along with defining the requirement, sir.

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is true for the Army as well. They work some of the requirements generation pieces, and inside the Pentagon as well, they support some of our resourcing strategies as well. But some of that work, as I mentioned earlier, is inherently government; that is why we are going to in-source in the Army a little over 4,000 former contractor positions to be acquisition core.

Mr. DICKS. Will the plan for improvement of the Army acquisition workforce include funding programs to the cost analysis improvement estimate, the CAIG estimate?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. As we go forward with our programs, one of our strategies for ACAT1 and ACAT2 programs is to make sure that we fully fund to—depending on which level it is, to either the Army cost position or the OSD cost position. If it is an ACAT2 program, we will be using Army cost position. That is part of our strategy, sir, and part of acquisition reform.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston.

Mr. KINGSTON. I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT

Mr. DICKS. I have a few more.

Over the past year, the Corps has emphasized the need to recapitalize these products, we are here talking about material handling and construction equipment, but instead, the 2011 budget request for material handling and construction equipment, including overseas contingencies operation, is only \$83 million, \$15 million less than last year's fiscal year 2010 budget request, a 15 percent decrease for construction equipment, the request is a mere \$18 million compared to \$73 million last year.

At this rate, the material handling and equipment will deteriorate and the flow of goods and equipment to the war effort will be slow. The equipment can mean the difference between life and death to units in the field.

General Flynn, do you have a plan for recapitalizing these lines of equipment?

General FLYNN. Sir, we have a plan for recapitalizing the lines of equipment, but the challenge that we have, sir, is making it all fit within the prioritization of the fiscal allocation that we do, sir. It is not that we don't recognize the requirement, it is the prioritization that takes place among competing requirements and the cost that each of those requirements has.

Mr. DICKS. Is this a serious problem at this point?

General FLYNN. Sir, the serious problem right now is being able to afford everything that we need, sir, in light of the cost growth of individual pieces of equipment. And the best example I can give you, sir, is for the last 30 years, our average of funding that we have had for ground procurement equipment has always been between \$2.5 and \$3 billion, that is the 30-year average. But what we are seeing is an exponential increase in certain levels of equipment. For example, about 8 years ago, it cost us about \$1,000 to outfit a Marine; now it takes us about \$7,500. That is a growth of seven times.

So when we have to prioritize and we have to make choices, we are making choices, but we are making choices not to put the force that is at risk that is forward deployed. All our forces forward deployed have all the equipment that they need to do their job. And we have also expended our resources to recapitalize our maritime repositioning ship program because we see that as a key part of the Nation's strategic reserve. And what we have done is we have consciously taken risks in our home stations, and that is where you will see some of our supply readiness has suffered. So we have had to make choices, we have made choices, but those choices have not been at the expense of the Marines forward deployed.

Mr. DICKS. In looking at some of this equipment, it appears to me that in Karachi, or wherever you are on-loading it, do you have stevedores, are there people there that do this kind of work?

General FLYNN. Sir, we don't have stevedores in places like Karachi. Our location is more where it is offloaded when it gets to us, but most of that is done commercially and brought in the country that way. Or if it is done through APOEs, we offload and load either way, and we also do some of the loading in some of our ports, sir.

Mr. DICKS. How does the Army handle this, General Phillips?

General PHILLIPS. Sir, for the MHE that you mentioned, we reset some of that equipment when it comes out. I am not sure about recapitalization, Major General Spoehr may be able to add some more to that. But the reset dollars that you allocate to us allow us to reset much of the equipment that does return to CONUS when those units rotate out. So I know we do reset some of the material handling equipment that comes back.

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, did you discuss the radio issue?

Mr. DICKS. Yes, we did, we got into that somewhat. If you want to—

Mr. KINGSTON. No, if you asked it, I just was wondering.

ADVANCED DISTRIBUTED APERTURE SYSTEM

Mr. DICKS. General Phillips, what is the status of the research and development effort going on for—I think it is ADAS?

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That is a system that our Special Operations Command has been looking at, too. It is a Joint Capability Technology Development Program. It is still under review. We expect by the end of this fiscal year that SOCOM will have an analysis ready on how valuable that is to our pilots. Essentially, that is a capability that goes onboard the aircraft and allows our pilots to have 360 degree situational awareness in low light, nighttime situations.

Sir, the jury is still out on this in terms of what value it might add to our pilots and our air crews. We owe you that answer when SOCOM comes back with the final analysis by the end of this year, sir.

Mr. DICKS. All right. Well, I think we have had a good hearing. The committee stands adjourned until April 14 at 1:30 p.m. in H-140, when we will hold a hearing on the National Guard readiness.

Thank you, gentlemen, for a good job.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:]

TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES

Question. Army and Marine Corps units depend on fleets of trucks—light, medium, and heavy—to transport Soldiers, Marines, supplies, and equipment. Prior to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan trucks were rarely armored. As various insurgent forces in Iraq began using improvised explosive devices to attack unarmored trucks, the Army and Marine Corps began to add armor packages on light, medium and heavy trucks. The Committee is informed that the Army and Marine Corps may evolve to a mix of unarmored HMMWVs; armored HMMWVs; Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and various MRAP vehicles. General Phillips, please describe the Army's plan for a competitive, "Open Market" effort to Recap HMMWVs.

a. General Phillips, what is the estimated cost of a recapped HMMWV versus the cost of a new vehicle?

Answer. At this time, the Army has not made any decisions on a competitive Up-armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) recapitalization (RECAP) program. A Request for Proposal (RFP) and supporting Business and Technical case analysis are being developed based on responses to a Request for Information/Market Survey. The Army's goal is to use competition in order to provide the best value for the government. Competition also helps provide the Army access to a full range of industry (depot, private, or public private teaming) capabilities, processes and potential technical advances.

Since planning is still in-process for a competitive Recap, validated cost estimates are not available to compare the cost between Competitive Recap and that of a new HMMWV. However, the unarmored and estimated UAH recapitalization costs are expected to be approximately 31% and 66% of the cost of new production, respectively.

Question. General Phillips, what would be the logic of Recapping a 15 to 20 year old HMMWV if the cost is about 90% of the cost of a new HMMWV?

Answer. The Army would not recapitalize a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMWWV) at a cost of 90 percent of the replacement vehicle cost. The recapitalization cost for an unarmored HMWWV is \$55,000 and the estimated cost for an up armored HMMWV (UAH) is \$105,000 to \$130,000, which is variant dependent. The unarmored and UAH recapitalization costs are expected to be approximately 31 percent and 66 percent of the cost of new production, respectively.

Question. General Phillips, Congress provided a total of \$1.3 billion for Army procurement of HMMWVs in the fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations. What is the Army's obligation plan for those funds?

Answer. The Army has obligated \$431 million of the \$1.3 billion (FY) 2010 funding, by placing 2,122 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) on contract. Of the remaining funding, approximately \$913 million, the Army is planning to reprogram approximately \$560 million for the existing HMMWV Recap and use the remaining funds to support other Army priorities.

Question. General Phillips, does the Army intend to reprogram fiscal year 2010 funds that were appropriated for the purchase of HMMWVs?

Answer. Yes, though all actions associated with the (FY) 2010 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) reprogramming are pre-decisional at this time. The Army is in the process of requesting approval from Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to reprogram a portion of the FY 2010 procurement funding for the existing HMMWV recapitalization and other priority Army uses.

HMMWV PROCUREMENT STRATEGY

Question. General Flynn, this year the Marine Corps requested only \$17.8 million for HMMWVs (\$4.8 million in the base, and \$13 million in the OCO) for a total of

94 vehicles. Funding from last year's appropriation still remains open for obligation. What is the thinking behind the small number of HMMWVs to be purchased? Will funding from last year's appropriation be obligated soon?

Answer. The Marine Corps is not procuring additional HMMWVs in their current configuration. However, we do procure Marine Corps Transparent Armor Gun Shields (MCTAGS) for all Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV) using the HMMWV funding line. The Marine Corps requests that it receive the full \$17.8M to fund Afghanistan MCTAGS requirements for Light Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) and Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR).

Fiscal Year 2010 HMMWV funding will be fully obligated within the next two to three months in support of Urgent Universal Need Statements (UUNS), MCTAGS and survivability upgrades to existing HMMWV vehicles. Because the Frag-Kit was not viable, \$122M of FY09 OCO funding, originally intended for Frag-Kit 4, is in the process of being reprogrammed to meet other, high priority service needs.

JLTV DELAYS

Question. General Flynn, the Committee understands that further delays of the JLTV have changed the forecasted need for tactical wheeled vehicles, but could you explain the path forward to fill the JLTV void?

Answer. Review and update of the Marine Corps' ground vehicle strategy has underlined the critical need for about 5,500 light combat support vehicles that provide the payload and mobility of the original HMMWV, with all the protection we can get in an expeditionary, fully transportable and maneuverable, vehicle.

To mitigate the risk of a JLTV delay, we're evaluating a modified Expanded Capacity Vehicle (ECV) design. This modified ECV is a lightweight highly protected system currently under development as part of experimentation activities at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). This vehicle will replace existing 2 and 4 door vehicle cabins of the HMMWV ECV Fleet with a capsule cabin design, incorporating best practices survivability design concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms. If the experimentation activities continue to produce positive results, a modified capsule-like recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades, could be used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization "bridge" to JLTV-level capabilities. The Marine Corps will focus our JLTV development efforts on the lightest JLTVs, the four and two passenger prototype's built for the current Technology Development phase. We are very active in this phase, focusing on modular protection, with the empty weight close to an empty Up-Armored ECV, but capable of full payload.

WHEELED VEHICLE STRATEGY

The Marine Corps's mix of wheeled vehicles appears to be in a state of flux. With many light tactical vehicles currently in the mix, to include, HMWWVs, MRAPs, MRAP-ATVs, and the R&D program to develop the Marine Corps Personnel Carrier—the Corps needs to develop an updated and more complete wheeled vehicle strategy.

The Committee has asked for briefings on the current state of the wheeled vehicle strategy and is told that the documents will not be final until June 2010, possibly too late to affect the fiscal year 2011 markup.

Question. General Flynn, given the increased mix of wheeled vehicles available to the Corps, surely you understand the difficulty in determining which mix of vehicles the Committee should fund. Will you be able to provide a wheeled vehicle strategy to the Committee prior to our markup of the fiscal year 2011 bill?

Answer. The Marine Corps understands the time constraints for the FY11 markup, but also has an obligation to maximize the investments made in existing platforms and is looking at every available option that may meet the requirement. As we move forward in the formulation of this plan, it will be presented to Marine Corps and DoD leadership. When the plan is finalized, it will be provided to Congress.

Question. General Flynn could you describe your thoughts regarding a possible wheeled vehicle strategy?

Answer. Any strategy that addresses the mobility of our Marines will account for performance, payload, and protection, and focus on providing versatile equipment sets that allow for maximum operability without regard for geographic terrain and weather conditions. There are many potential courses of action at this point, and the Marine Corps is looking to capitalize on its previous investments.

MRAPs and M-ATVs were not originally part of our strategy, but these assets provide for significant capability within specific mission sets. With this in mind, one way we are looking at accounting for the significant investment is to equip our units

with standard training and garrison allowances, and depending on operational tasking, provide appropriate equipment sets to augment established equipment allowances.

Other significant pieces to this strategy are weight and sustainability. Any technology pursued has to contribute to the Marine Corps ability to project force via the sea. It must be interoperable with amphibious shipping, capable of operating within the littorals, and be sustainable—with respect to fuel consumption and energy generation.

As the Marine Corps develops our Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy, maximizing the utility of the equipment sets Congress has already provided remains in the forefront—as does remaining postured to be “most ready when the nation is least.”

MRAP/M-ATV BALANCE

With the shift of forces toward the conflict in Afghanistan, and because of the terrain—a lighter, smaller and more agile form of the MRAP was needed. This new MRAP is referred to as the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle, (M-ATV). The current requirement for M-ATVs is 8,104 vehicles.

To date, Congress has appropriated \$34.937 billion (plus an additional \$5 billion reprogrammed from the within Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO funding) for MRAP vehicle procurement funding (nearly \$40 billion in total). The FY 2010 Supplemental request includes another \$1.123 billion, plus \$3.415 billion in the FY 2011 OCO. This totals almost \$45 billion. The total MRAP requirement is approaching 27,000 vehicles.

Question. General Flynn, realizing the urgent need for a lighter, more agile form of mine resistant transportation required for the upcoming growth in our forces in Afghanistan, Congress acted and has steadily funded the M-ATV, as it did to fill the original MRAP requirement. However, recent reprogramming requests show that the Marine Corps Systems Command, on behalf of the services, including the Marine Corps, has contracted to purchase additional larger models, like those purchased for Iraq. Has the balance of MRAPs to M-ATVs been determined?

Answer. Yes, the balance between MRAP and MATV has been determined by the Marine Corps. The recent reprogramming requests made by Marine Corps Systems Command for additional larger models have been on behalf of other Services and do not include any additional requirements for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' original requirements determination for both MRAP and MATV have actually been adjusted downward based on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Lessons Learned (LL) post initial vehicle fielding. Since these initial adjustments the Marine Corps requirement numbers for the entire MRAP Family of Vehicles (FOV) (to include the MATV) have remained stable. The JROC has approved all changes to the Service vehicle requirements prior to MCSC action.

Question. General Flynn. The Department was given authority by Congress to use up to \$5 billion from the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund. This fund has been used solely to procure and fund additional MRAPs and M-ATVs—with little opportunity given to the Committee for oversight. Has the total revised quantity of MRAP and M-ATV vehicles been determined? Will the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) update the current requirement in the near future?

Answer. The Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) Memorandum (JROCM) 001-10 dated 29 January 2010 approves the current quantity of MRAP and M-ATV vehicles requested by the services and SOCOM. The MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO) is not aware of any additional pending requests to revise the quantity of vehicles. The Joint Allocation Decision Board (JADB) is a governance body formed by the Joint Staff when the initial MRAP production/fielding began and remains in place. The JDAB has successfully worked the re-allocation between services of vehicles on occasion and in doing so, met all requirements without the need to increase the overall requirement.

Question. General Flynn, these vehicles have been a life saver for our Service members in combat zones. Congress was, and is, willing to make this happen. But with nearly \$40 billion previously appropriated for the MRAP fund, and an additional \$5 billion requested, is there an end in sight?

Answer. We believe we are nearing the end of production. The vehicle quantities are identified by the Services and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and are approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The \$1.123 billion requested in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Supplemental request completes requirements for the procurement of the current JROC acquisition objective for vehicles. It also provides transportation, sustainment, maintenance, repair, and engineering

changes/safety enhancements for all previously procured vehicles. The \$3.415 billion in the FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) will provide transportation, sustainment, maintenance, repair, and engineering changes/safety enhancements for previously procured vehicles.

The uncertainty of the duration of OCO may force the Services to buy additional vehicles, to replace combat and service life losses. It is also possible that the fleet will need engineering changes, modifications and upgrades to continue meeting the needs of the warfighter.

MEDIUM AND HEAVY TACTICAL TRUCKS

Question. The Army budget request proposes approximately \$2.1 billion for medium and heavy tactical trucks. The total amount requested for fiscal year 2010, including the pending 2010 supplemental is \$2.9 billion. The Army contract for the production of the Family of Medium Tactical Trucks was re-competed and the award went to Oshkosh in Wisconsin in August 2009, with protests resolved in February 2010. The FMTVs had been assembled in Sealy, Texas since 1991. What is the acquisition objective for FMTVs?

Answer. The Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) is 83,185.

Question. General Phillips, what is the on hand inventory of FMTVs?

Answer. As of March 22, 2010, the on hand inventory of the most modern vehicles of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles fleet is 42,525.

Question. General Phillips, describe how the Army allocates the shortage of FMTVs?

Answer. The Army allocates Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) shortages based on operational priorities. For example, units entering the Available Pool of the ARFORGEN model receive a higher level of fill of their authorized quantity of FMTVs.

Question. General Phillips, what is the shortage of trucks in the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve?

Answer. Currently, the Army National Guard is short 13,017 Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs) counting both M939s and Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs) on hand. That is 38 percent of the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) authorization on hand. The Army Reserve is short 2,658 MTVs (22 percent of the MTOE authorization).

The Army National Guard is short 1,344 Heavy Tactical Vehicles (HTVs) counting Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, Palletized Load System, Heavy Equipment Transporter and Line Hauls on hand (10 percent of MTOE authorization). The Army Reserve is short 1,086 HTVs (17 percent of MTOE authorization).

The shortages in each of the components are being addressed through the distribution of new production and programming in the future program.

Question. General Phillips, what percentage of the medium and heavy truck fleets is armored?

a. Are armored trucks assigned to units other than in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Currently, 10 percent of the medium truck fleet is armored and 22 percent of the heavy truck fleet is armored. In the Army's Tactical Wheel Vehicle Investment Strategy, the modernization path forward is to acquire all armor-capable (or armor installed) vehicles, such as the new Long-Term Armoring Strategy vehicles currently being procured for the medium and heavy fleets and the Low Signature Armored Cab for the medium fleet.

a. Yes. The Army also has Armored Medium Trucks in Kuwait, Army Prepositioned Stocks, and at various locations in the United States for training purposes.

Question. General Phillips, should units in high threat areas, other than Iraq and Afghanistan have armored trucks?

Answer. Yes. We intend to put armored and armor-capable vehicles in other theaters through the investment and modernization process. In the Army's Tactical Wheel Vehicle Investment Strategy, the modernization path forward is to acquire all armor-capable (or armor installed) vehicles. As the fleet is modernized with those vehicles, all theaters will become armor-capable.

Question. General Phillips, very briefly, describe the Reset and Recap programs for tactical trucks?

a. Is there a backlog?

Answer. A Reset program restores vehicles that were deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan to their pre-deployment condition. No upgrades or product improvements are made. A recapitalization program upgrades an older model vehicle to a more modern

configuration and capability. Currently both Medium and Heavy Tactical Vehicles go through a Recap or Reset program depending on the model and type of vehicle.

a. No. There is no backlog in terms of being behind schedule for either the medium or heavy fleet.

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV) WEIGHT

In response to an operational need and an aging fleet of light tactical wheeled vehicles, the Defense Department developed a requirement for a new tactical wheeled vehicle platform that would provide increased force protection, survivability, and improved capacity over the existing up-armored HMMWV (UAI-I) while balancing mobility and transportability requirements with costs. Since the initiation of the JLTV program the military departments have procured nearly 27,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) for duty in Afghanistan.

Question. General Flynn, in recent press statements, the Commandant expressed his determination to return the Marines to their expeditionary roots, rather than replicate a ground Army. He commented that seven years of fighting in Iraq encumbered the Marines with too many heavy and cumbersome vehicles designed to survive IED blasts. In December, it was reported that he felt the planned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), projected to weigh nearly 22,000 pounds, is too heavy for strategically mobile troops, and that the Corps is actively considering a lighter version. Is this true?

Answer. Yes. A 22,000 pound vehicle is not light. Yet, the JLTV is needed to preserve the Marine-Air Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) expeditionary capabilities while remaining responsive to missions across the spectrum of expeditionary operations. The JLTV must be expeditionary; light enough to be employed as part of an assault echelon, tough enough to fight when it gets there and mobile enough for austere environments. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command is working closely with the Army Joint Program Office (JPO) to continue to work JLTV weight down by identifying non-essential requirements, thereby reducing the vehicle weight without creating risk in the program. We are confident our efforts will provide the best balanced capability set for the MAGTF, providing a Light Vehicle liftable by both services Rotary Wing aircraft.

Question. General Flynn, given that the JLTV is a "joint" program, the deputy chief of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, says "there is more work to be done in developing the concepts behind the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle." Given his comments, and the Commandant's assessment, do you think the JLTV program should be continued on behalf of the Marine Corps?

Answer. Yes. We understand the missions required by the vehicle and where it fits into our formations. We also appreciate the challenge of providing adequate protection and transportability in a light combat support vehicle, but it is necessary for our future Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). At this point, we have the concepts and requirements correct and are confident that this will be accomplished, but we need the weight and cost of the vehicle to meet our requirements. We are pursuing a realistic Acquisition Program Baseline at Milestone (MS) B next fall that will obtain the right solution at an affordable cost.

MARINE PERSONNEL CARRIER (MPC) SCHEDULE SHIFT STRATEGY

The Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) is envisioned as a new wheeled armored vehicle, medium weight personnel carrier. It will comprise a part of the Marine Corps' ground mobility portfolio and will have ballistic, mine, and IED protection. The vehicle will have the capacity for ten Marines and two crew members and be transportable by C-17 aircraft. Additionally, it will have a fording capability. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for research and development for the MPC is \$26.8 million. However, in April last year, the Marine Corps chose to delay the initial operating capability (IOC) by two years because the program was characterized as "out-prioritized in the near years in terms of budget." The new IOC would move to beyond fiscal year 2017 and with no forecast as to when the vehicle would reach full operational capability.

Question. General Flynn, other than financial constraints, the Committee understands that the Marine Corps believes that a shift to the right for the Marine Personnel Carrier program could better synchronize it with the fielding of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Is this the real reason, and if so, how many years would you slide it to the right?

Answer. As the Marine Corps modernizes its vehicle fleet, we are mindful of resources, the timeline involved to production and the impact of new equipment on operating units. The MPC will complement the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

(EFV) in the future Assault Amphibian Battalions to accomplish their mission to provide maneuver support to combat units across the spectrum of operations in expeditionary environments. These vehicles will replace the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). The 2017 IOC timeline stressed both our budget and the operating forces who will be faced with concurrent fielding of the two systems. Given the alternatives to phasing EFV and MPC, we concluded that the better approach is to equip an Assault Amphibian Battalion with EFVs first, and once EFV New Equipment Training is accomplished, begin introduction of the MPC into that Battalion. This method provides a resource informed approach to phasing new equipment within an affordable procurement profile for combat vehicles. It will result in the MPC IOC slipping three years to 2022.

Question. General Flynn, General Brogan stated that “The Marine Corps wants that vehicle, (referring to the MPC) the requirement is definitely there.” What amount of time is reasonable for Congress to extend such programs?

Answer. General Brogan was right, we understand the requirement, the concept of employment for the vehicle, and where it will fit in our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The 85–90% solution for a swimming, well protected, mobile APC is available today, and we believe it is appropriate to maintain a low level of funding to ensure we can procure the best solution for the MAGTF when conditions permit investment in that capability.

Question. General Flynn, the Committee understands that in the interim, the Marines will continue to use MRAP vehicles and older assault amphibious vehicles. Realizing that the Marine Corps did an analysis of alternatives over a year ago, and considering the research and development costs, and by your admission, the MPC was “out-prioritized in . . . terms of budget,” did the Marine Corps consider the Army’s Interim Armored Vehicle, the Stryker, a vehicle with very similar requirements?

Answer. Yes, the Stryker was evaluated in the MPC Analysis of Alternatives and we found it did not meet the protection or the mobility requirements of the MPC. We continue to monitor Army plans for Stryker upgrades and remain open to joint solutions that meet the required MPC capability.

Question. This year’s request for R&D for the Marine Corps Personnel Carrier is \$26.8 million. Now that the program will move to the right, how much will be required in this account?

Answer. The Marine Corps budget request of \$26.8M for MPC R&D is consistent with the low level of funding required to ensure we can procure the best solution when conditions permit investment in that capability. Our relatively small R&D request is structured to ensure we continue system design and integration work to procure the most effective mobility, protection and payload combination available in a wheeled armored personnel carrier while mitigating cost and schedule risk.

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE (EFV) SCHEDULE

The Marine Corps has been developing the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) since the mid-1990s. According to the Government Accountability Office, total estimated research and development costs jumped from \$1.5 billion in 2000 to \$3.6 billion last year, and the vehicle unit cost has risen from \$8 million to \$23 million (given lower levels of production and including research costs).

In an April 6, 2009 news briefing, Secretary Gates stated: “In today’s environment—for acquisition and contracting reform, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps. First, this Department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries—not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources.” Since that time, the Department has cancelled many programs that meet these criteria, however, the EFV which appears to meet all of Secretary Gates’ cancellation criteria, continues to be funded.

Question. General Flynn, the budget submission shows that the Marine Corps made a decision, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and the Department of Defense, to slide procurement of the EFV one year. Since its inception, a major program review cut the number of EFVs to be purchased from 1,013 to 573—and there is a suggestion that a new reduction would take the numbers down to 480.

The original cost estimate for program completion was \$7.1 billion, and has now increased to a projected \$16 billion. To date, the program has spent \$3 billion, not including the FY 2011 request at an additional \$243 million.

The program was conceived in 1987 and the initial contract was awarded in 1996. The program incurred a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2007, has been re-baselined numerous times, is at least eleven years behind schedule, and is not planned to fully field until 2026 (at the reduced quantity).

Question. General, do you dispute any of these facts? Surely this isn't a typical development program?

Answer. The reduction from 1013 EFV to 573 was implemented in response to 2008 Strategic Planning Guidance to maintain a 2 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) forcible entry capability and propose a set of vehicles better balanced to meet the Irregular Warfare (IW) environment demands. Likewise, suggestions to reduce the quantities below 573 are centered around changes to the Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)) program, not internally generated USMC modifications to needed capabilities.

The technical challenges to assured access from 25 nm off a foreign coastline are significant, and the program has worked tirelessly to bring the capability for high water speed, lethality and protection to the MAGTF in a timeline commensurate with the MV-22.

This is not a typical development program, as it must integrate aspects of marine architecture, combat vehicle design, lethality, survivability and long range C2 into a single platform, a platform that must be suitable to the maritime environment, but retain high reliability due to the distance it must travel from ship to shore. From our perspective, numerous analyses of alternatives, conducted through the history you've cited conclude the EFV concept is the most cost effective way to conduct the missions in the environments for which it is designed. We appreciate the support provided to our Marine Corps on the program to this point, and look forward to its completion and fielding. We remain confident the program will deliver the capability on cost and schedule as stated in the Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement (APBA) today.

Question. General Flynn, the Commandant has been a consistent advocate of the EFV, even through some of its most difficult developmental challenges. Secretary Gates was extremely critical of the Department's acquisition process in general, in the budget statement he gave on April 6th last year. In the question and answer session that followed he stated that several programs had significantly exceeded their budgets and that program goals should be tied to actual and prospective capabilities of future adversaries. On May 1st, Secretary Gates was quoted as saying that the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in particular had not embraced combat lessons learned such as V shaped bottoms. After so much criticism, cut backs, and re-starts, why does your budget still contain funding for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle? Should this program be continued at all costs?

Answer. The Marine Corps has a commitment to our Nation and a Title X responsibility to execute amphibious operations. We live in a maritime world and amphibious capability will be more relevant tomorrow than it is today. Our Marine Corps has executed more than 100 such operations in the last 25 years alone and the recent Haiti earthquake reaffirmed our need to be most ready when others are least. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviewed and affirmed the need for a high-speed amphibious assault capability that provides the Joint Commander with an effective amphibious assault capacity. The ability to rapidly employ combat-loaded Marines ashore from ships positioned 25 or more nautical miles off-shore provides increased force protection. The ability to conduct operations in the littoral using the sea area as a secure maneuver space will allow the optimized use of force against irregular/terrorist targets and maintain a strong presence in an area with minimal impact upon the local populace. The EFV's lethality, mobility, survivability, and robust command and control capabilities will make it an effective platform in any environment. We stand behind the success criteria for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle stated in previous testimony, the Program must pass the planned SDD-2 Operational Assessments, demonstrate the ability to meet Key Performance Parameters and stay on cost and schedule within regulatory guidelines.

Question. General Flynn, do you believe this program will ever complete development and become operational?

Answer. EFV is on track to demonstrate system reliability and growth potential for production decision in January 2011 which is Knowledge Point-2. Demonstration of all Milestone C (MS C) exit criteria will be met as projected in the program baseline. We remain committed to ensuring the EFV meet our requirements, as it provides the ground maneuver centerpiece of our future Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

EFV DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is a keystone for both the Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver watfighting concepts. The EFV represents the Marine Corps' primary means of tactical mobility for the Marine Rifle Squad during the conduct of amphibious operations and subsequent ground combat operations ashore, but is the program really justified?

During the recent Navy rollout briefing, an inquiry was made regarding the slip in the EFV schedule. The response was, "The Marine Corps made a decision, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and OSD, to slide procurement of the EFV one year so that we (the Marine Corps) can: (1) Receive delivery of the seven System Design and Development (SDD) test vehicles, which will be used to validate the reliability and mean times between failure of the vehicle, and (2) Conduct a series of QDR directed war games to look at trade-offs in alternative concept of operations for employment."

Further, the written response said, "The EFV program is executing on time and on schedule but the Marine Corps wants to thoroughly assess the results of the R&D efforts before moving forward with full rate production. We believe the nation still requires a range of capabilities to gain access to contested areas, thereby ensuring theater access for the larger joint force. We feel the EFV is critical to this requirement—but we are committed to getting it right."

Question. General Flynn, if the EFV is on time and on schedule, how then is this possibly the longest systems development program in the history of the Department of Defense?

Answer. There is no question; the EFV has taken far longer time to develop than was expected. However, the restructured EFV program continues to perform well technically as seven new prototypes prepare for operational testing at Camp Pendleton this summer. The design efforts and reliability growth planning efforts that have been put in place are for other programs. The contractor has continued to perform within the cost and schedule parameters. The performance of the program since 2007 has been very positive by any objective measure. We are asking a lot of the EFV. Over the last few years the Marine Corps has demonstrated our commitment and remain committed to getting it right.

Question. General Flynn, given the many years and billions of dollars invested in the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Committee has serious reservations whether the program will ever meet a standard for completion. With initial operational capability now projected at 2015, and full operational capability now projected at 2025—isn't this an excessive development cycle for a program of this magnitude?

Answer. Although EFV reliability performance fell short resulting in an extended development period, many other vehicle performance capabilities have been demonstrated at their required values due to the significant amount of effort performed during the development phase. These capabilities include firepower, water speed, land speed, carrying capacity, and interoperability performance.

Efforts during the development period include the complex engineering and design efforts associated with developing a combat vehicle that can not only match the M1 AI tank's land speed but can also launch from naval ships 25 nautical miles (nm) offshore and transition to the shore within one hour (at approximately 20 knots). In comparison, the currently-fielded vehicle, the Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAV) launches from ships approximately 2 nm offshore and has a peak water speed of approximately 5 knots. The EFV program is required to meet a challenging requirement and demonstrate its suitability to the expeditionary environment. We are asking a lot of the EFV. Over the last few years the Marine Corps has demonstrated our commitment to this program and remains committed to getting it right.

Question. General Flynn, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore, far beyond the EFV's range. What is the possibility of this occurrence?

Answer. Marines and embarked Sailors in the amphibious force operate as part of a Naval and Joint force. Although the proliferation of longer range weapons is a growing concern to the fleet, we are confident that the 25 nm range provides our amphibious fleet the needed response time to counter such weapons. The reach and accuracy of rogue missiles will continue to improve and so must our counter measures to these threats. With the capabilities inherent in the rest of the force, we are reasonably assured that threats to the amphibious force will be manageable despite increased adversary capabilities.

Question. General Flynn, granted there are scenarios that would justify any program, but given that the United States has not conducted a beach assault landing in the past 59 years, is it possible that the EFV is no longer necessary?

Answer. Since 1991 the Navy and Marine Corps have conducted amphibious operations twice as frequently as during the cold war. Amphibious forces are not required to only assault a defended beach. The withdrawal from Somalia and evacuation of non-combatants from Lebanon in 2006 are prime examples of the use of amphibious forces in an uncertain environment. Had the Hezbollah elected to threaten U.S. forces with cruise missiles—the evacuation of over 10,000 Americans from Lebanon would have been conducted very differently. When EFV becomes available we will regain the capability to conduct amphibious operations without placing ships at risk of loss by cruise missiles.

EFV FLAT BOTTOM DESIGN

The Research and Development for this amphibious vehicle has advanced slowly and does not appear to address land mine and IED hazards. Its ability is far greater than the current Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) introduced in 1972, but even with years of extensive research, the new vehicle has its liabilities. The program development has not incorporated changes to account for its inadequacy to address land mines and IEDs (the vehicle has a flat aluminum bottom) and some in Congress are concerned that the flat-bottomed EFV, with an 18-inch ground clearance, would be highly vulnerable to IEDs that detonate under vehicles. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has stated that they are “concerned that the current EFV design does not provide adequate personnel protection against IED and mine threats.”

Question. General Flynn, according to the EFV website: The EFV design mitigates the damage caused by IED and RPG threats similar to those encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq. The Commandant recently testified that the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in some ways outperformed Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles in blast tests at Aberdeen Proving Ground. This is still a flat bottom tracked vehicle with an 18” clearance. Please elaborate on the Commandant’s testimony. How is this possible given the flat bottom design?

Answer. The EFV outperformed the MRAP in a number of areas, including direct fire, and indirect fire. It met the side IED protection of the MRAP. The EFV Program Manager is pursuing the development of an appliqué armor kit that will be available when the EFV reaches IOC in 2015. While the appliqué armor panels have not yet been developed or tested, engineering analysis and design modeling predict the structure of the vehicle will accept the impulse of the underbelly IED shot and the appliqué panels will preclude penetration. So we are optimistic that the vehicle will have the structural strength to accept the underbelly appliqué and survive, even at the lower clearance, much as the M1A2 underbelly appliqué. We do not yet know the impact of the appliqué on other performance attributes of the EFV. This will be the subject of future testing.

Question. General Flynn, your plan proposes that once ashore, armor could be applied to the underside of the EFV. How will the armor get to a beach during landing? Who is going to stop, crawl under that narrow clearance and bolt on armor while under fire? Is this a realistic scenario?

Answer. Each of the Services is organized differently to achieve different missions. The Navy, Army and Air Force are organized to dominate their respective domains (Sea, Land and Air) while the Marine Corps is optimized to respond quickly to the unknown across these domains. To achieve this capability the Marine Corps accepts risk in the capabilities needed for long duration operations.

This trade-off is evident when comparing capabilities. Marines operating with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV) and the MV-22 Osprey from amphibious ships allow the nation to rapidly respond to the unknown. Marines arrive quickly on the scene and will require reinforcement if the operation requires forces for a long duration.

The concept underpinning the EFV is to prioritize speed in moving the Marines ashore to increase the survivability of our ships and this comes at the risk of sustained operations ashore. To ameliorate this risk, we complement the capabilities of the EFV with a mix of air and ground vehicles. If the EFV borne force becomes vulnerable to road side mines the commander has a number of options. Initially the force will move off the roads—using the increased off-road capability a tracked vehicle brings to mobility—and vary their routes to reduce the enemy’s effectiveness in targeting the force with anti-vehicle mines (or IEDs). At the earliest opportunity and when operationally appropriate, the commander can call forward and install the additional armor for the EFVs—similar to successful armoring efforts conducted on numerous combat vehicles during the past years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Concurrently, the commander would also hold additional options to transfer the Marines to more mine/IED protected vehicles arriving from Maritime Prepositioned Forces

(MPF), or choose to operate the EFV in waterways to counter mine threats. Most commanders will use a combination of these means to react to the new situation, but great commanders will use this mix of capabilities to place the enemy in a dilemma caused by our flexibility.

Your Marine Corps manages tradeoffs to ensure we can challenge adversaries as part of the integrated joint force.

MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT RECAPITALIZATION

Material Handling Equipment is used for lifting and moving supplies with greater ease and economy. These items of equipment generally refer to but are not limited to forklifts, motorized pallet jacks (hand trucks), tractors, and other specialized industrial trucks. The Marine Corps is failing to invest appropriately in these types of Material Handling and Construction Equipment, thus putting the mobility of the force, at large, at risk.

Question. Over the past year, the Corps has emphasized the need to recapitalize these products, but instead, the FY 2011 budget request for Material Handling Equipment, including Overseas Contingency Operations, is only \$83 million, \$15 million less than last year's FY 2010 budget request—a 15 percent decrease. For Construction Equipment, the request is a mere \$18 million, compared to \$73 million last year. At this rate, the material handling equipment will deteriorate and the flow of goods and equipment to the war effort will be slowed. This equipment can mean the difference between life and death to units in the field. General Flynn, do you have a plan for recapitalizing these lines of equipment?

Answer. The Marine Corps understands the importance of Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and Construction Equipment (CE) to successful operations. Unfortunately, we have had to make some difficult prioritization decisions within our budget requests. However, additional Light Rough Terrain Forklift and Extended Boom Forklifts will be procured to support readiness until new replacement programs are initiated beginning in FY 2012 and FY 2013.

Question. The Marine Corps's fleet of Material Handling and Construction Equipment is not glamorous. When Material Handling Equipment is not available to unload, stack, load and distribute goods—repair parts, food, and services do not make it to Marines in the fight. For example, in Desert Storm the cranes, forklifts, and container handlers unloaded and distributed over 37,000 ISO (Independent System Operator) containers and 500 thousand tons of ammunition. General Flynn, where does the fleet of Material Handling and Construction Equipment fit in the Corps list of priorities?

Answer. The criticality of Construction Equipment (CE) and Material Handling Equipment (MHE) is fully appreciated. The Marine Corps recognizes both of these investment components as a key element of our overall maneuver and sustainment capabilities, especially within the Ground Combat Element and Logistics Combat Element of our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

The adequacy of the CE and MHE requirement has been adjusted upward based on lessons learned and modified tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Marine Corps is confident that we have accurately identified the total requirement and is taking appropriate action. The demands placed on these equipment items in theater are unprecedented, and have required a significant examination and planning effort to ensure an appropriate balance between the rehabilitation/recapitalization of currently held assets and the procurement of new items. By carefully affecting this balance we are able to capitalize with the greatest result on current physical asset, as well as available fiscal resources.

RAPID EQUIPPING FORCE (REF)

Question. The Rapid Equipping Force process is designed to meet the warfighter's immediate needs. Key elements of the process are speed and flexibility. Funds are made available to the Army to provide for a rapid response to an adaptive enemy. The fiscal year 2009 funding for the Rapid Equipping Force was \$212 million. As of the January report to congress, \$38 million of the fiscal year 2009 funding remained to be obligated. What is the current status of fiscal year 2009 funding for the Rapid Equipping Force?

a. Has there been a decline in requirements or requests for Rapid Equipping initiatives?

Answer. The REF had FY09 Other Procurement Army (OPA) funding carryover of \$36M and received \$17M additional OPA funding for a total of \$53M. Currently, the REF has committed \$37M with \$25M obligated. The remaining \$27M unobligated OPA is projected to be committed by 3rd Quarter FY10 and obligated shortly thereafter. The REF had a FY09 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation carry-

over of \$1.2M. \$1.1M has been committed and is projected to be obligated in 3rd Quarter FY10. The balance will be committed in 3rd Quarter for a projected 4th Quarter obligation.

a. There has not been a decline; to the contrary, there has been a continuous increase in REF requirements from 2008 through the present. In 2008 REF received 115 requirements. In 2009 the number of requirements received by REF increased to 440. Year-to-date in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 (reporting the first two quarters October 1, 2009–March 31, 2010) REF has received 326 requirements; at this pace the REF will have over 650 requirements for this FY.

Question. The fiscal year 2010 appropriation for the Rapid Equipping Force is \$6 million in the base and \$7 million for Overseas Contingency Operations, a total of \$13 million. The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request submitted to Congress with the fiscal year 2011 budget request is \$125 million. The fiscal year 2011 request is \$42 million in the base and \$59 million for Overseas Contingency Operations. Key projected uses of funds include force protection, medical, intelligence, and logistics. General Phillips, what additional details can you provide to the Committee on the requirements for funding of the Rapid Equipping Force for the remainder of 2010 and for 2011?

Answer. FY10 Funding: As of April 7, 2010 the REF has \$25M in (REF Director) validated requirements for projects that require Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) funding; this figure will increase as the year continues. The REF submitted a \$27.8M OMA Unfunded Requirements to the Army Staff for projected OMA shortfalls. The REF has \$11M in validated requirements for projects that require Other Procurement Army (OPA) funding with a balance of \$15M OPA remaining. The REF has \$21M in validated requirements for projects that require Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funding with only \$5.3M RDTE remaining. We expect requirements to increase between now and fiscal year end as we continue to support the Warfighter.

FY11 Funding: Historically, REF funding has remained relatively constant at current level, between \$185M and \$200M during the past 5 years and REF does not foresee any significant changes from FY10 to FY11. In an era of persistent conflict we will find ourselves employed globally against asymmetric threats (un-programmable in nature). The Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) drawdown will allow the REF to better meet urgent and evolving needs of commanders in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). A year ago the requirements received from OEF to OIF was a 2:1 ratio. Today the ratio is 5:1, OEF to OIF requirements. As the requirements and footprint in OIF have decreased, conversely there has been an increase in enemy attacks and the effectiveness of those attacks in OEF. This can be measured by increased casualties and a corresponding increase in REF 10 liners from OEF. Attacks in OEF have increased roughly 90% from this time last year. Comparing January–March 2010 to the same time period in 2009, there has been a 105% increase in the number of US Killed In Action, and an increase of 315% for Wounded In Action. The REF has received 147 OEF requirements during the period from January through March 2010, as compared to only 31 OIF requirements during the same period. In the same three month period a year earlier, the REF received 56 OEF requirements to 25 OIF requirements. This represents a 260% increase in OEF requirements for the same three month period a year ago. OEF is a less mature theater than OIF and now the REF has a greater opportunity to focus efforts on OEF. Afghanistan has unique geographical and counterinsurgency challenges that present us with many new requirements.

Question. Does the Army have a process to review the performance of equipment purchased under the Rapid Equipping Force program to determine if some items should be fielded Army wide?

Answer. The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) is a quarterly Army process that identifies the very best Non-Standard Equipment for consideration as Programs of Record and enduring throughout the force. The CDRT process is managed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), in partnership with Headquarters, Department of the Army's (HQDA) G-3/5/7 Capabilities Integration Division (DAMO-CI). Equipment identified as enduring is accelerated in transitioning to a new or existing acquisition program within the Army Material Command.

Question. Are unit commanders and supply personnel trained on the Operational Needs Statement process, and the Rapid Equipping Force?

Answer. The Operational Needs Statement and Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) application training is not formally conducted by, or directed to be conducted by subordinate commands down to the lower level unit commanders and supply personnel. Training is provided via online User's Guides, Training Slides and

Computer Based Training materials. Furthermore, the ECOP Help Desk personnel are available to conduct Video Telephone Conference training sessions as requested.

REF makes every effort to train units on the REF process. REF identifies units projected to deploy into Theater (currently Iraq and Afghanistan) six months out to arrange a pre-deployment visit with the Brigade Commander and Staff. The REF Director and Sergeant Major travel to the unit's location to give a REF overview briefing. This briefing covers all pertinent information including what the REF is, its mission and role, how to submit a requirement, the REF process, and contact information. Many of the Brigades appoint a Commissioned Officer or a senior Non Commissioned Officer to be the single point of contact with the REF. This individual travels to Fort Belvoir (REF location) where he/she receives training from the REF on its process and capabilities and meets key REF personnel. Units also receive a list of REF equipment that they will receive from the unit they are replacing. REF maintains forward deployed Operational Support Teams (OST) that interact with deployed units on a regular basis. OSTs assist deployed units as much as possible, assessing capability gaps, training on REF equipment and guiding them in the REF process. REF also maintains a website which Soldiers have access to. Soldiers have the opportunity on the website to offer "good ideas" as possible solutions for perceived capability gaps.

STRYKER VEHICLES

Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review notes that the Army will convert one Heavy Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team by 2013. Several more may be converted as resources are available. The Army has deployed one Stryker Brigade Combat Team to Afghanistan. Funding for Stryker vehicles in fiscal year 2010 is \$513 million, including a congressional increase of \$150 million, to procure 93 vehicles plus survivability enhancements. The fiscal year 2011 request proposes \$300 million to procure 83 vehicles. The budget request adds a new line for Stryker modification with proposed funding of \$146 million for survivability enhancements. The Overseas Contingency Operations request includes \$445 million for Stryker survivability kits referred to as "Operation Enduring Freedom" kits. General Phillips, please discuss in more detail the numbers of Stryker variants that will be purchased with the fiscal year 2010 and 2011 procurement funding, and the key points of the survivability enhancements.

Answer. The current Army plan is to procure 17 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicles (RV) and 76 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICV) in fiscal year 2010 (FY10). The Army plans to purchase 29 RVs and 54 ICVs in FY11. Additionally, pending a successful test of the Double-V Hull design, the Army may choose to reprioritize FY10 and FY11 funding to procure Double-V Hulled Strykers for use in Afghanistan.

Question. What is Army's concept of the proper number of Brigade Combat Teams, and what is the proper mix of Infantry; medium weight or Stryker; and Heavy Brigade combat teams?

Answer. Our goal is to build a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies at a sustainable tempo for our all-volunteer force. Army analysis balances the array of ongoing force requirements in support of OEF and OIF, extant war plans, contingency plans and future contingency requirements as reflected in Office of the Secretary of Defense's planning scenarios. The 45 Active Component (AC) and 28 Reserve Component (RC) Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) meet the needs for sustained operations and potential surges. The 7 STRYKER BCTs (6 AC/1 RC), 26 Heavy BCTs (19 AC/7 RC) and 40 Infantry BCTs (20 AC/20 RC) all possess great versatility which enables full spectrum operations. The ongoing force mix analysis has indicated the need to increase the number of STRYKER BCTs available to Combatant Commanders; the Army is converting one AC Heavy BCT to an AC STRYKER BCT beginning in FY11.

Question. Have units in the field gradually changed the role of the Stryker from a troop carrier vehicle to a fighting vehicle?

Answer. No, by design, variants within the Stryker Family of Vehicles are considered carriers (except MGS and ATGM) which enable rapid transport of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) formation on the battlefield. Several of the variants do have direct fire weapons; their primary purpose remains to provide direct support to the 108 infantry squads and the twelve reconnaissance platoons in the execution of combat tasks. While the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS) have long-range, direct fire weapons capable of destroying enemy armored vehicles, both variants are designed to support infantry combat operations and are not used as fighting vehicles for stand-alone long-range engage-

ments. In fact, the Soldiers and leaders within the SBCT refer to the Stryker as trucks, acknowledging they do not consider them fighting vehicles like the Bradley or Abrams. The intent of providing more accurate and capable weapon systems on the various Strykers is to increase the overall force protection level of the formation by enabling SBCT Soldiers to be more lethal, capable and effective on the battlefield through more rapid identification and reduction of threats. The use of the Strykers in an SBCT in combat reflects Tactics, Techniques and Procedures developed during home station training and live fire qualification exercises. The capstone qualification event in an SBCT is a combined exercise that incorporates vehicles, weapons systems and dismounted squads, as opposed to vehicle-focused gunnery in the heavy formations.

Question. Compare agility, mobility, and IED protection of the Strykers and MRAP-ATVs in use in Iraq. Please discuss the battle losses experienced by the 5th Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division shortly after the Brigade arrived in Afghanistan in July 2009.

Answer. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and Stryker were acquired to provide unique capabilities. The M-ATV is designed to meet theater needs for a smaller, lighter MRAP and will be used in roles similar to the Up Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in Afghanistan. The M-ATV is only designed to carry four passengers and one gunner. The Stryker is primarily an Infantry Combat Vehicle, designed to transport nine infantry Soldiers and their equipment quickly across the battlefield in relative security. In addition there are eight other Stryker variants that provide a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) with an organic combined arms lethality and enhanced operational flexibility. Stryker variants include Medical, Engineer, Command and Control Vehicles, NBC Reconnaissance, Mobile Gun System, Mortar Carrier, Fire Support and TOW Anti-Tank variants. The services have only been fielding M-ATVs for a few months; therefore not enough data has been collected on the M-ATV to make a comparison between that vehicle and the Stryker Family of Vehicles. However, initial feedback indicates both vehicles are performing very well in their assigned roles.

Stryker vehicles have continually improved survivability as the enemy threat has evolved. Examples include Hull Protection Kit, Mine Roller Adapter Kit and Blast Mitigation Kit. The Army is currently focusing this effort by enhancing fire suppression and mitigating IED blasts while strengthening suspension and drive line components and designing and testing an improved driver's seat allowing easier egress of the occupant.

During the period 10 August to 27 November 2009, 5/2 SBCT reported 61 engagements against Stryker vehicles during its deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. A review of reports from the theater revealed approximately 85% of the engagements involved improvised explosive devices and approximately 15% of the engagements involved complex attacks. Reporting on the 61 engagements revealed approximately 84% of the Strykers received some form of damage ranging from minor damage to catastrophic loss. A total of 9 Strykers were lost by 5/2 during this period.

Question. The Committee is aware that a "Double-V" hull has been developed for the Stryker vehicles, which may offer blast protection against IEDs that is similar to that of an MRAP-ATV while maintaining speed and agility off-road. Please explain the advantages of the Stryker with the double-V hull.

a. What are the plans for testing and potentially fielding Strykers with double-V hulls?

b. What are the production plans; time lines and funding requirements for fiscal years 2010 and 2011?

Answer. The Army has requested and received approval from OSD to build and test a limited number of prototype Stryker vehicles with an integrated Double-V Hull design. As these test vehicles become available, which is expected to begin in early 1st Quarter Fiscal Year 2011, robust independent testing concentrating on Soldier survivability will occur, overseen by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. At the conclusion of this testing which is expected to take approximately 60 to 90 days, the Army Acquisition Executive will chair a Configuration Steering Board with appropriate Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint staff participation to review test data and determine whether or not to recommend additional Stryker vehicle procurement with Double V hull. The Defense Acquisition Executive has informed the Army that if further procurement is requested, he would consider authorizing, with Congressional approval, production and limited fielding of up to 450 modified Stryker vehicles to support urgent operational needs in Afghanistan.

a. The projected increase in protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is expected to double the current protection level available on Stryker vehicles cur-

rently operating in Afghanistan. This increased protection is expected to greatly increase survivability.

b. Although initial testing of the Double-V Hull design has been promising, only independent testing of the design integrated onto the Stryker vehicle hull will determine how good it actually is compared to MRAP.

LW155 REMAINING REQUIREMENT

Congress has strongly supported the purchase of 155mm lightweight towed howitzers (155LW) to help transform the Marine Corps artillery into lighter, more mobile elements.

For fiscal year 2010 Congress supported the President's Budget request of \$7.4 million in the base bill for the lightweight 155 mm howitzer, and added an additional \$54 million for lightweight howitzers in the fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriation for 155LW that were not formally requested by the Marine Corps.

The Committee understood that the fiscal year 2010 Congressional plus up would have purchased the remaining requirement and end the line. However, the fiscal year 2011 base request calls for \$10.3 million for 155LWs, and an additional \$103.6 million in the request for Overseas Contingency Operations, for an additional 22 howitzers.

Question. General Flynn, what is the remaining requirement for 155mm lightweight towed howitzers?

Answer. The FY10 Congressional plus up has helped us close the gap in funding needed to attain our Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO). The funding requested in the FY11 OCO will procure 22 additional, guns, aiding the Marine Corps in achieving its AAO of 511 howitzers. The funding requested in our FY11 Baseline (\$10.3M) will provide Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) Refresh & Upgrades.

As for why OCO funding is appropriate, there are two reasons:

(1) We have already seen some transportation accidents that have damaged guns in theater, and expect we may have to replace some for that reason.

(2) More importantly, the LW-155 was projected to have a useful life of 20 years, firing a total of 15,000 rounds over that time. We currently have 20 howitzers in Afghanistan firing an average of 5,000 rounds per year. At that rate, we can expect that these guns will be washouts by 2011. The FY11 OCO request provides for combat replacements and sustains the AAO.

Question. Has the Marine Corps artillery requirements increased as a result of the mission in Afghanistan? The surge?

Answer. No. The current Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO) is 511. The FY10 funding will get the Marine Corps to 489 of the 511 howitzers. The funding requested in the FY11 OCO will procure 22 additional guns, aiding the Marine Corps in achieving its AAO. The funding requested in our FY11 Baseline (\$10.3M) will provide Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) Refresh & Upgrades.

2ND INFANTRY DIVISION EQUIPMENT IN KOREA

Question. The 2nd Infantry Division is forward-based in South Korea. It has one heavy brigade combat team in Korea, plus communications, logistical, intelligence, and other assets. That brigade has M1A1 Tanks, and M2A2 Operation Desert Storm series Bradley Fighting Vehicles. However, the Army has newer and more capable versions of the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting vehicle. Why not provide the most capable variants of the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and other items to the U.S. Army forces in Korea?

Answer. Currently, the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) on the Korean peninsula is scheduled to receive the M1 Abrams AIM SA (Abrams Integrated Management—Situational Awareness) variant and M2 Bradley ODS (Operation Desert Storm) variant in the second quarter of fiscal year 2001.

Based on potential force mix changes pursuant to the Quadrennial Defense Review and equipment available as other HBCTs undertake directed missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is assessing the feasibility of providing the newest M1 Abrams SEP (System Enhancement Program) and M2A3 Bradley to the HBCT forward-stationed in Korea.

Question. Tactical wheeled vehicles operating in Iraq and Afghanistan were initially unarmored, but force protection efforts in response to enemy tactics have resulted in wheeled vehicle fleets that have fully armored passenger cabs. Many of them have remotely operated weapons stations. Should U.S. Army units in Korea be equipped in a similar fashion?

Answer. Yes. We intend to put armor-capable vehicles in Korea and have already placed some armored vehicles in Army Prepositioned Stock 4 (in Korea) through the

investment and modernization process. In the Army's approved Tactical Wheel Vehicle Investment Strategy, the modernization path forward is to acquire all armor-capable (or armor installed) vehicles. As the fleet is modernized with those vehicles, Korea will be equipped with armor-capable vehicles.

Question. Are you aware of other equipping upgrades that, based on lessons learned in Iraq or Afghanistan, should be applied in Korea or elsewhere?

Answer. Yes. The Army has identified equipment upgrades and new capabilities battle tested in Iraq and/or Afghanistan that warrant inclusion in Army units deployed in other theaters and CONUS. Many have already been fielded to Korea and elsewhere such as improved helmets, body armor and individual weapons (M4 Carbine) for soldiers, enhanced command and control systems such as Command Post on the Move (CPOF) and Warfighter Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T) Inc 1, Raven Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Aircraft Survivability Equipment upgrades.

Question. When will the brigade combat team in Korea receive Brigade Modernization spin outs from the FCS program?

Answer. The Army has not yet determined when the brigade combat team (BCT) in Korea will receive Brigade Modernization spin outs from the Future Combat Systems program. While the Army will field these technologies in Capability Packages to all BCTs by fiscal year 2025, the unit fielding schedule for Capability Packages will be determined by multiple factors including deployment and procurement schedules.

MAGNETO-INDUCTIVE REMOTE ACTIVATED MUNITIONS SYSTEM

Question. The Magneto-Inductive Remote Activation Munition System (MI-RAMS) provides command and control of land based ordinance, including tactical demolition, for U.S. Army Combat Engineer Forces. It provides the ability to remotely initiate and/or control target neutralization through buildings, concrete, metal, subterranean structures, tunnels, caves, and under water which current radio frequency devices cannot accomplish. It provides Explosive Ordnance Device forces an unjammable remote firing device capability for clearance and IED neutralization operations. The system reduces the amount of time a Soldier is exposed while employing demolitions, and significantly lightens the load the Soldier has to carry. What is the status of the Army's MI-RAMs program?

Answer. The MI-RAMS program (M156, XM40 and XM331) is currently unfunded after Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10). The M156 kit is in low rate initial production. A Type Classification Standard/Full Rate Production (TC/FRP) decision is planned for June 2010 and would be subsequently followed by a Full Materiel Release (FMR) in September 2010. The XM40 and XM331 have successfully completed all developmental testing and are completing all necessary documentation required for a Milestone C production decision.

Question. No funds are requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget for production of MI-RAMS system. What happens to the production line once IOC is achieved, if no production orders are placed by the Army?

Answer. If no additional orders are placed, the Army anticipates that the vendor will evaluate its commercial opportunities, workload and strategic plans for this product and make a decision concerning the disposition of its production line.

Question. What percent of Army Combat Engineer Force inventory objectives for MI-RAMS systems will be met by the end of fiscal year 2010?

Answer. By the end of fiscal year 2010, the Army inventory for the Magneto-Inductive Remote Activated Munitions System M156 kit will be 310 systems, which is approximately 6 percent of the objective requirement.

Question. What is the Army doing to ensure that now that all the R&D has been done the MI-RAMS system is fielded to combat forces to meet their need for a safer, lighter, and more capable detonation device which can contribute to our frontline forces in the fight against IED's?

Answer. The existing systems will be fielded primarily to deploying Explosive Ordnance Disposal units. Any additional systems will be fielded in accordance with Army Force Generation Model and the Dynamic Army Resource Priority List.

Question. Given the high priority of MI-RAMS on the Army Engineer Schools' priority list and the importance of providing the most capable equipment to out front-line Army EOD and special forces, does the Army intend to budget for MI-RAMS in its upcoming fiscal year 2012 internal (POM) budget as a common service item for the Army Combat Engineers, EOD, and Special Forces?

Answer. This requirement will compete for funding along with other priority programs as the Army develops its Future Years Defense Program.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010.

NATIONAL GUARD AND U.S. ARMY RESERVE READINESS

WITNESSES

GENERAL CRAIG R. MCKINLEY, CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT, III, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK C. STULTZ, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY RESERVE

OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will be in order. This afternoon the committee will hold a hearing on the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve readiness. We will focus primarily on near-term readiness issues related to personnel, training and equipment repair, reset and battle loss replacement.

Because the senior services have consistently underfunded the Reserve components, Congress has provided funding for the National Guard and Reserve equipment account for over 30 years. And at times, this funding has made all of the difference in the ability of units to perform critical missions.

We are pleased to welcome several distinguished general officers as witnesses.

From the National Guard, General Craig R. McKinley, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the first four-star Chief of the National Guard. And he is accompanied by Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, Director of the Air National Guard; and Major Raymond W. Carpenter, the Acting Director of the Army National Guard.

Additionally, we are pleased to welcome the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz.

General Stultz, we will discuss Army Reserve requirements and help the committee to better determine their needs.

Gentlemen, welcome. We are eager to hear your testimony on better determining the needs of guardsmen and reservists deployed around the world. These officers are very well qualified to answer the questions of the committee. Thank you all for testifying before this subcommittee.

Gentlemen, the committee is concerned about the readiness of the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. Your soldiers and airmen are performing magnificently in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hot spots around the globe. The committee would like to commend the soldiers and airmen of the Guard and Reserve for their dedication throughout these years in Iraq and Afghanistan. We look forward to your testimony.

Now before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on the Ranking Member, my friend Bill Young and former Chairman of this subcommittee, for his comments.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to add my welcome to yours to our very distinguished guests. I think no other committee in Congress understands the strain that is placed on our military, including our Guard and Reserve forces. It is good to have the leaders of those who manage and direct and control these very, very important segments of our overall national defense.

In fact, the old "weekend warrior" saying I think has sort of faded from everybody's vocabulary when we see the amount of time that our Guard and Reserve forces are deployed to the region.

So we appreciate what you do and understand the importance of your manpower and woman power, but we also understand that the best forces in the world really have a hard time doing their job if they don't have the proper equipment.

Today we need to hear some of the heartburn issues that you might have on equipment that is absolutely necessary, number one, for you to train your troops; number two, for them to have the tools to perform their mission; and number three, to be able to protect themselves while they are doing that.

So, small order, but we are looking forward to hearing from you just what it is you need to make sure that these three components are very well covered. You will have some interesting questions from the committee. This committee has always been a very strong supporter of our Guard and Reserve forces. Thank you for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. General McKinley.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL MCKINLEY

General MCKINLEY. Chairman Dicks, Mr. Young from my home State of Florida, it is great to see you all, Mr. Lewis, Ms. Kilpatrick. Thank you very much for allowing us the opportunity to be here today.

This is my second year as Chief testifying, and I would just like to say how proud we are to be here collectively as a group. I know, as you all do, we miss Chairman Jack Murtha. He was a staunch advocate for all of the National Guard and Reserves. We miss him.

Today we have about 460,000 members of the Army and the Air National Guard. Our strength is good, and our retention is even better. We have introduced Bud Wyatt and Ray Carpenter. They are my staunch advocates on the Army and Air Force side, and they work with the services. And as you know, the National Guard is comprised of members from the Army and from the Air Force. Without General Casey and General Schwartz supporting us, we would not be in the state we are in today. So I commend both services.

I am also accompanied today by General Tim Lowenberg, who is the Adjutant General of Washington State.

And Jack, it is a pleasure to sit with you on the same panel. We are very close friends. All of the Reserve Component Chiefs are, so it is great to be here with General Stultz.

Sir, we have submitted our statement for the record. We want to get right to your questions. If I can take less than a minute to just say one thing.

Mr. DICKS. We really want to hear from you, so take as much time as you want.

General MCKINLEY. Thank you.

As the United States Armed Forces continue to conduct operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as you all well know from your visits over there, and elsewhere around the world to include here at home, units of the Army and the Air National Guard are participating as total force partners in the effort.

The National Guard has repeatedly proven itself to be ready and a very accessible force. And we validated the total force concept by showing that the men and women in our formations are ready to answer the call to be mobilized, to deploy overseas, to return home, and then become prepared to do it all over again.

The citizen soldiers and airmen of your Air National Guard are adding value to America every day. The capabilities they bring to bear would not have been possible without the strong support of this committee, and we thank each and every one of you for that support.

The most critical part of that proven capability, however, is our National Guard men and women. Today's men and women volunteer to join and stay in the National Guard, fully expecting to be deployed. This shift in expectation is a central aspect of the National Guard shift to being a fully operational force and no longer merely a strategic reserve, as the Chairman mentioned. Indeed, the soldiers and airmen of your National Guard now serve with that expectation and are proud of it. They want to remain central players in the Nation's defense and would indeed be resistant to any move to return to a role limited to being strictly a strategic reserve.

Overall, we can say that the budget request for fiscal year 2011 meets the critical needs of the Army and Air National Guard in this era of persistent conflict overseas and ongoing threats to American lives and property here in the homeland. Of particular importance to us is the request for operations and maintenance funds. This money is critical. We use it to buy the fuel, the spare parts, building maintenance and other things essential to being effective Reserve components of the Army and the Air Force. We ask the committee to fully fund that request, and thank you in advance for that.

All of us in the National Guard are highly mindful and deeply grateful for the strong support of the National Guard which this committee has shown to us in the past. And in return, we try to be good stewards of the funds you appropriate for us and use that money to make your National Guard as strong as it can be. We are particularly grateful for the additional funds which this committee has provided to the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. We have used these funds to fill critical shortages in the Army National Guard and to provide technological modernization in our Air National Guard capabilities. We are especially grateful

for the flexibility in which those funds are provided to us, allowing us to apply that money to our most critical equipment needs.

Funding for our Counterdrug Program is included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, and we ask for your full support of that request. As we have seen with recent incidents along the Southwest border, the scourge of drugs migrating across our borders constitutes a real threat. Consequently, our National Guard Counterdrug Program fills a very vital need. We are well aware that last year, as it has done in previous years, this committee supported significant additional funds for that Counterdrug Program to fund capability enhancements. Nearly a quarter of the capability of the National Guard Counterdrug Program exists today because of additional funding provided in the past by Congress.

In order to move quickly to your questions, I would now like to ask General Wyatt and General Carpenter to make a couple of brief remarks.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL WYATT

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, first of all, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the extraordinary men and women of the Air National Guard, some 106,700 strong. Many of our folks have been deployed multiple times in recent years, yet they continue to volunteer at unprecedented rates, not only for worldwide contingencies, because they strongly believe in what they do in defense of our country, but also in their local communities on behalf of our Governors and our Adjutants General.

They leave home, they leave their families, and in most cases, they leave civilian employment for months on end, so we greatly appreciate the continued support that this committee has provided to them over the years.

During this past year, the Air National Guard has deployed over 18,000 service members to 62 countries and every continent, including Antarctica.

Additionally, America's Air National Guard continues to protect our domestic skies, with more than 16,000 members supporting missions at 16 of the 18 Air Siren Alert sites across the country.

Our men and women are also ready and capable of responding to all manner of natural and man-made disasters. And the backbone of our force, our traditional Guard members, continue to provide critical surge capability for the United States Air Force.

Needless to say, this past year has been another busy one for us, so the Air National Guard remains very visible at home and abroad. We continue to be full partners in the Aerospace Expeditionary Force, and a vital part of our total Air Force.

We have three basic priorities, and I will just outline those broadly: The most important one is to develop our adaptable airmen; secondly, modernize our warfighting capabilities; and lastly, secure the homefront and defend this nation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward to your questions.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARPENTER

General CARPENTER. Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to represent the more than 361,000 citizen soldiers in the Air National Guard.

As I speak, over 52,000 of our soldiers are mobilized, deployed, and on point for the Nation. These soldiers joined our force knowing they would deploy. They are willing to make a difference in the world and defend our country.

Army National Guard soldiers are part of an operational reserve. Your Army National Guard is accessible, and it is important that we fully resource those formations and ensure that they maintain the highest levels of readiness. The sacrifices of those soldiers and families and employers is something we must not only acknowledge but certainly appreciate.

The National Guard of today is dramatically different than the one I joined nearly four decades ago. The last eight years have seen the Guard transform from a strategic reserve to an operational force. The enablers for the Army National Guard, especially the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account, have been provided and sustained by congressional initiatives. We thank you for your continued support.

Today we would like to emphasize the key initiatives presented in our 2011 Posture Statement. In accordance with the theme of adding value to America, we highlighted several overseas and domestic operations as well as several innovative training and family programs. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA), as General McKinley mentioned, has been especially supportive in our pursuit of equipping the force.

Last year you appropriated almost \$800 million for the Army National Guard in that account. And over the last 6 years, you have appropriated almost \$5 billion. We now have equipment in our units at the rate of 83 percent of the critical dual-use equipment, wartime equipment that is also vital for use by our Governors to respond to domestic emergencies; 66 percent of that equipment inventory is now on hand and in the States and available for the Governors, should they have to use it even tonight.

An important benefit of NGREA funding is transparency in accounting. In fact, every dollar can be tracked and accounted for in that process. With NGREA, we are able to show Congress exactly what equipment the Guard received for the money spent and where the equipment is located. Thanks to NGREA, we will retire the M-35 (many of you may know that as the venerable deuce and a half) this coming year. That truck has been in our inventory for over 40 years, and we will replace that vehicle with a new family of modern tactical vehicles.

I also request your support in the budget for the growth of the non-dual-status technician program. As you may know, those technicians are the ones who do not deploy because they are not soldiers. They are part of the civilian workforce. They provide the critical support back home while soldiers are deployed. They maintain the pay accounts, the equipment accounts, and perform administrative duties in the absence of the dual-status technicians, the

deployable soldiers. The budget request increases the number of those non-dual-status technicians to 2,520.

As General McKinley emphasized, we ask that the operations and maintenance accounts presented in the President's budget be approved intact. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward to your questions.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The National Guard Posture Statement is printed at the end of this hearing.]

Mr. DICKS. Thank you.

General Stultz.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL STULTZ

General STULTZ. Chairman Dicks, Chairman young and other distinguished Members, it is an honor to be here today.

As Ray just alluded to, when I entered the Army Reserve back in 1979, having left active duty, it was a one-weekend-a-month, 2-weeks-in-the-summertime—and that is all we asked—force. It was under-resourced, under-trained, under-equipped and not really ever expected to be ready when they respond.

Mr. DICKS. What year was that again?

General STULTZ. 1979, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Where did you enter?

General STULTZ. I entered the 108 Division in Charlotte, North Carolina, as an infantry officer, sir.

But today, I am happy to report that your Army Reserve is a national treasure. It is a tremendous return on investment for this Nation. Today, I am authorized 205,000 soldiers. I have almost 208,000 on duty; 3,000 in excess of what we are authorized. Each one of those soldiers has either enlisted or reenlisted since 9/11. They know what they got into. They know what they stayed in for.

Today, we have 30,000 soldiers on active duty in the Army Reserve, in addition to our 16,000 full time AGRs, so we are giving this Nation 45,000 full-time service strength on an ongoing basis.

Since January of this year, I have visited ten different countries around the world, visiting Army Reserve soldiers who are on duty in those countries providing security cooperation as well as fighting combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is an operational force, not the old strategic force that I entered in 1979.

Our focus in the Army Reserve is, just like the focus that the National Guard has already said, it is taking care of our soldiers to make sure that they are properly trained, to make sure that they are properly equipped, to make sure that they have everything they need before we ask them to go in harm's way, and to focus on taking care of their families back home and, to a great extent also, to make sure that we have the support of their employers for this Nation.

We are still short equipment. We have come a long way, thanks to your support, thanks to the appropriations you have given us, and thanks to the National Guard and Reserve equipment account, as was mentioned earlier. Today we are about 80 percent equipped, but we are only about 65 percent modernized. So we still have a lot of old equipment in our ranks that we are using.

The other challenge we have is, as we move forward toward fiscal year 2016, within the Army Reserve we are reorganizing to create

capabilities that we have realized in this war that the Nation needs, more military police, more civil affairs, more engineer capability. And we are taking down a lot of legacy structure to the tune of about 16,000 additional operational capability. That comes with a bill also for equipment because, as we stand up more military police or more engineers, I have to equip them. So we still have about \$6 billion in unfunded requirements, and if you couple that with the modernization, about \$11 billion in total requirements to be fully modernized for our fiscal year 2016 structure. We ask for your continued support for those equipment needs and continued support for the NGREA funds, which give us the flexibility to prioritize where we spend the equipment versus the Army prioritizing it as one lump group.

Sir, I look forward to your questions today. But without a doubt, I can say your Army Reserve is in great shape, great morale, and thank you for your support.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—The United States Army Reserve Posture statement is printed at the end of this hearing.]

WORKING WITH EMPLOYERS

Mr. DICKS. General Stultz, tell members about this program you worked out with employers. I think that is something I want everyone to hear about.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. As some of you may know, my background is a traditional Reserve soldier. I worked for 28 years for Proctor & Gamble while I was in the Army Reserve, being called up on a repetitive basis for Desert Storm in 1990–1991, for Joint Endeavor in Bosnia in 1997, and this most recent Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) back in 2002.

And so when I got into the position as chief of the Reserves, one of the things I said is, we have to have our soldiers, we have got to have our families, and we have to have our employers. If we don't have the employers, we can't sustain the operational reserve.

I set up a series of meetings through Chambers of Commerce and business executives through national security and other groups to sit down with employers and talk about how we are going to do this together. How are we going to maintain this operational tempo and keep their support?

What I found, however, is they wanted to talk about talent. They wanted to talk about meeting their needs, and it really kind of caught me by surprise because I had come to them to talk about taking employees away to be soldiers, and they wanted to talk about bringing soldiers to be employees because the employers of America recognize the challenge they have is to find someone, and I met with the American Truckers Association, they said, here is our challenge: We have to find somebody that is drug-free, physically capable, has the aptitude, that is morally fit; they don't have anything in their background that is going to get us in trouble; all of those kinds of criteria to drive our trucks through this Nation.

I said, we are already doing that, because between the Army Reserve and the Army Guard and some of the other reserve components, we recruit, train experienced truck drivers and test them under fire. We put them in Iraq; we put them in Afghanistan driving trucks for us. What we need to do is come together and say,

how do we do this? So it really turned into more of a human capital strategy for the Nation versus for the reserve components. And that is, how do we produce the workforce we need for tomorrow, the workforce we need in the Reserve, in uniform, and the workforce America needs in her communities?

So we started partnering with the medical communities, where they are short technologists, such as x-ray, respiratory, ER, and surgical techs. We are recruiting them for our hospital units and reserve.

We started partnering with law enforcement agencies that are trying to fill their needs, Customs and Border Protection, sheriffs' departments. We are fulfilling our MP ranks.

Right here in D.C., Kathy Lanier, the Chief of Police, came to us and said, I will give them credit for the training they have had in the military, and I will give them credit for their supervisory experience as a noncommissioned officer if you will bring them to me to be law enforcement officers for the District of Columbia.

Today we have over 1,000 employers across America that have partnered with us, everything from Al's Body Shop in Slidell, Louisiana, who probably has five or six workers but says, I like to hire soldiers; to companies like General Electric, Wal-Mart, Conway Trucking, JB Hunt, Cleveland Clinic, Pittsburgh Medical, and a variety of others, where we are now filling the ranks.

Our latest foray is with the Federal Government.

Mr. DICKS. That will be your toughest challenge.

General STULTZ. Ray Jefferson is the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Veterans Affairs, and he is now bringing his people in to partner with us to say, how do we tap into that resource we call our Guard and Reserve to fill the ranks of our Federal workforce that we need, everything from the FAA to TSA to you name all of the different entities that are out there. So it is a great program.

We are taking soldiers coming back from war in the Guard and Reserve who are saying, I left, I was flipping burgers, but I have been given responsibility. I have a different level of confidence. I want something better, and we are opening the doors for them and putting a better person back into the communities of America. It is working. We have brought the National Guard and the other reserve components in with us.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

Mr. DICKS. I think it is a great initiative. You told us about it on our recent trip.

General McKinley, you said something about an operational reserve or a strategic reserve. Does the country still need a strategic reserve?

General MCKINLEY. I think the debate, Mr. Chairman, will take place in the post-QDR world we live in. In the Pentagon, there are different opinions, obviously, on this subject. I am a believer, personally that we need a strategic reserve and we need an operational reserve. We don't need one of any one kind, but we need to have members who can float in and out of all of those statuses because when a member comes back from a deployment, everyone needs a decompression time. That is where strategic reserve comes in handy. But this operational reserve is a world treasure that this

Congress has funded and the National Guard and Reserve have exercised.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. DICKS. I can remember, a few years ago, General Powell saying that he wasn't sure the National Guard could deploy. He had questions in his own mind. That certainly has been answered, and I think very decisively that they can and are doing it as we speak.

So this question of how many forces do we have, and I understand everybody likes the idea of being operational and deploying and having real responsibility, et cetera, but I do think there still needs to be a debate about, should there be additional reserve people to create a strategic reserve?

Let me ask you a question I have been troubled by, I was on Homeland Security and I mentioned this previously to you, under this relationship of Northern Command with the National Guard Bureau and with the Department of Homeland Security and whether there needs to be an additional effort to do planning and between these three entities to take care of homeland security issues, and we know that the Guard and the Reserve, to some extent, are handling these crises that come up in the country, the Hurricane Katrinas and the other events that we have had. But the role of how you work this and coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command still doesn't look as clear to me as it should be. And this idea of a planning effort between the three entities to deal with various contingencies, what do you think of that?

General MCKINLEY. Mr. Chairman, we have come a long way since the tragic events of 9/11. Is there room for improvement? Absolutely.

I think Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano have met, and I have not been privy to their discussions, but I know that they want to create this atmosphere which lets us tear down these stovepiped bureaucracies, that lets us organize better, plan better, and exercise our options better. I know the National Guard, through the Adjutants General, through their Governors, have a very sound program which we in the National Guard fully subscribe to and fully support. But I commend your question in that, is there room for improvement and more synchronization required? I would totally agree with your premise.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Mr. DICKS. Also, explain the Civil Support Teams. They are supposed to come in, as I understand it, if there is a chemical, biological or nuclear event to be, I guess, with FEMA or whoever the lead Federal agency is. Explain how this is going to work in those kinds of contingencies? Would NORTHCOM come in to back up the Guard at some point if necessary?

General MCKINLEY. There is not a day that goes by in your States, the territories or the District, where we don't call out our small, 57-person Civil Support Teams. Every State, territory and the District has one. Florida and New York have a second, based on their size and population base.

These small teams are your first responders to go in as a military unit to identify any kind of chemical, biological, or radiological incident that may need to be up-channeled to a higher state of response. Those were done by the National Guard. My predecessor, Steve Blum did that, and we took it basically out of hide, and with the support of committees, we have been able to have these small person units that are really the scalable first military response in a State or a territory.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
ENHANCED RESPONSE FORCE PACKAGE

That then led to our (CERFPs). These are response elements that would then build on top of the Civil Support Team to provide local, scalable support to the Governor and to the first responders in the cities, to build on top of that. And the new proposal will be through planning that has been done by the Department of Defense to create the Homeland Response Force, HRF. That will allow the Army National Guard along with the Air National Guard to work a package up to a larger response force, and then the seam line is created by which if the President needs to call up more forces, he can turn to the United States Northern Command and bring those additional forces on.

So these are all new features since September 11, 2001, that are part of our Department of Defense response. Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Gates have worked this, and I am very comfortable with those response plans.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, another former chairman of this subcommittee has an appointment with the King of Jordan, and I would like to yield my time to him.

Mr. DICKS. That is perfectly understandable.

Mr. Lewis, former Chairman and Chairman of the full committee and ranking member.

ROLE OF GUARD AND RESERVE IN DISASTERS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to say that, as leaders of the Guard and Reserve we are more than thrilled with the cooperation and the work you provided for us, the security you provided over the years, our recent experience as observers with earthquakes in Haiti, the problems in Latin America that relate to control of our border, et cetera, suggest there is many a challenge that you face. I would be very interested to know what role the Guard and Reserve may have played in a place like Haiti and what that portends to potential challenges like earthquakes and otherwise, fires and so on, in southern California. So that general area is of interest to me.

And there is one other subject. As you patrol the border, it takes us directly to an Air Force role. Reporting indicates that a very high percentage of our Air Force, formal force, recruits our people who are interested in UAV training and work, and I presume that the Guard and Reserve is interplaying there as well. So both of those areas, comment if you would.

General MCKINLEY. That is a great question, and I know General Stultz has some comments on Haiti because Army Reserve was in-

volved there, and I will let my colleagues talk about the Army and the Air Force on the other parts of your question.

The tragedy in Haiti points out to us that at any time, any place, we could have a major natural disaster that we all need to be very prepared to respond to. In California, as you know, sir, we are very concerned with the fault line that runs through the State, and I have worked with your former Adjutant General, Bill Wade, and now with Mary Kight to make sure that the National Guard forces in California are ready to respond, and I am very confident that they are. But sometimes the scale of the incident is so large, we need to have a whole of government approach.

In the case of Haiti, quite frankly, the President reacted very quickly. Our Southern Command out of Miami, Florida, with General Doug Fraser as the commander, took full responsibility of that, to provide support to USAID as the lead Federal agency. And military response force fell in, as you all saw and observed.

We were prepared as a National Guard to support the request for forces from General Fraser. We were not asked to provide a large-scale effort because of the international nature of the disaster. That certainly would be different if it was one of our States, our territories, or the District of Columbia.

So I will let General Stultz talk about his Army Reserve contributions because they are many, and I think they are ongoing.

General STULTZ. I was just in Haiti a week ago visiting the soldiers I have there. I have the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, which is out of New Orleans, Louisiana. That headquarters actually was deployed to Kuwait in 2002 and was there for six years on a rotational basis, came home, is now remissioned against Southern Command to support them. And so when the situation in Haiti occurred, they were one of the first units that we called and said, get ready to go, since that is your area of operation now.

What we have learned, though, is we do need some flexibility. As General McKinley indicated, it took a Presidential call-up for us to get access to that unit to use them in Haiti when in fact they were ready to go right away. That unit is comprised of 55 active component soldiers and 64 full-time AGRs, in addition to the troop unit, the soliders there, the traditional Reserve soldiers. Yet we weren't able to get access to them until the President signed the Presidential call-up.

Even after that occurred, it took some time through our bureaucracy to get the orders cut and get them in place and get them ready to go. It illustrated to us that we have to streamline this capability, and we need some new, I think, authority for short time call-ups without having to go to the President for these types of crisis situations.

I think they are putting together a legislative proposal now for giving the Secretary of Defense maybe a certain level of authority to call up for short durations for crisis.

That being said, I can tell you, on the ground, they are doing a great job. While I was there last Monday, I spent time on two of our Army watercraft. We have four in the theater operating, bringing ship-to-shore relief supplies. While I was there, they were moving rice around the island from one port to another to feed the locals. So the Reserve soldiers that are there feel good about what

they are doing, and they are confident about what they are doing, but it illustrates the fact that we don't have the proper authorities.

That is magnified, I think, when we talk about the homeland situation where in certain States, just like the State of Florida, for instance, I have engineers, and I have medical capability. I have logistics capabilities with truck units. I have aviation capability with medivac helicopters, yet if something happens in the State of Florida, without a Presidential call-up, those forces really are not available. We have to break those barriers down to serve this Nation better.

General CARPENTER. Sir, to reference a couple of your comments and questions, the Puerto Rico Army National Guard deployed three UH-60s into Haiti within two days after the earthquake. They spent 17 days there with those three helicopters, logged in almost 300 hours and are credited with saving 12 lives. So, inside of the Caribbean environment, Puerto Rico looks at Haiti kind of like my home State of South Dakota looks at Minnesota. And It was an emergency. They responded and did a great job.

We also had about 2,500 soldiers, a task force, organized to deploy down into Haiti, and because of the situation that General Stultz just identified in terms of the authorities, we were unable to deploy those, but we were ready to do that.

Beyond that, your comments on the California fires, every time we have a fire event in California, we in the Army National Guard organize, at least from the aviation perspective, a Rotary Wing Task Force that is set to respond if they are called. And luckily, to this point, most of the fires have been supported through California assets and Nevada assets.

C-130J

Mr. DICKS. Some people talked about using C-130Js for firefighting. What do you think of that?

General WYATT. We are currently exploring that possibility with the Department of the Interior and working with the Department of Defense and the United States Air Force.

Mr. DICKS. Don't forget agriculture. That is where the Forest Service is.

General WYATT. Yes. We currently have some C-130Js in California that do have the mobile firefighting system available to those jets. And we also have some H model units across the country that have the mobile system.

But there is a need in the country, as I understand it, from the firefighting business that the civilian fleet that supports the mobile firefighting system is in decline, and something needs to be done to recapitalize that fleet. We think there are some possibilities there. We continue to work with the Air Force.

RPA

Mr. LEWIS. You need about 12; is that right?

General WYATT. There would be a significant need for additional airplanes.

A couple of responses to your earlier questions, Mr. Lewis, briefly on Haiti, the Kentucky Air National Guard Contingency Response Group, this is a group that goes in and assesses damages to air-

fields and then opens the airfield; they were on the ground right after Special Operations Forces had done an initial assessment. They did such a good job that General Johns, Air Mobility Command, who is the command of that formation, has directed additional resources to help fully equip that unit. That is good news there.

Also the Puerto Rico Air National Guard supporting the Coronet South Mission in Southern Command out of Puerto Rico, C-130s were available immediately to help with some of the airlift.

Regarding your RPA question, the Air National Guard is heavily involved in UAS, Unmanned Aerial Systems. Now we have transitioned to remotely-piloted aircraft, is the term we are using in the Air Force. We have five units in the Air National Guard: Fargo, North Dakota; Syracuse, New York; a unit in California; a unit in Nevada; and a unit in Texas. Four of those units fly MQ-1s. The Syracuse unit flies MQ-9s. We fly nine of the 40 Combat Air Patrols for the United States Air Force worldwide. We see opportunity to increasing the number of RPA units in the Air National Guard as we climb to meet that 65 cap build that Secretary Gates has set.

Mr. LEWIS. It sure seems to me that UAVs and their radar capability could be major assets in our war against not just terror but drugs across the border. I would look to a time when we have major coordination between Guard and Reserve personnel who are involved in these activities and local law enforcement as well as our homeland security people.

General MCKINLEY. As you know, our C-26s, which the State of California had and the State of Florida had equipped for local law enforcement to interact through our counter drug and counter narcotics programs, were very effective, and we are also now partnering with Administrator Kostelnik, who is the air wing director of Customs and Border Protection, to put our sites similarly located together so we can use the synergy of a guardsman working during the day possibly for Customs and Border Protection along the border and maybe being a member of the National Guard. Those are the kind of synergies we were talking about earlier today, and we just need to keep getting better every day at it.

General WYATT. I might add, Mr. Lewis, there was for the first time in the Haiti situation an RPA that was assigned to go down and assess and actually launched out of Port-au-Prince airport, a great news story there. And to kind of highlight your recognition of the importance of RPAs, this year, for the first time, the Air Force will train more pilots for RPAs than it will for manned aircraft.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky.

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALL

Mr. VISCLOSKY. That is a fascinating statistic.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service. I appreciate both the Reserve and Guard. We have an incredible Guard unit in the State of Indiana, and General Umbarger has just done a terrific job, and we appreciate it very much. They have been great to work with.

The question I have on the Guard is if they received the full amount of the President's budget request as well as the full amount currently planned for future year defense programs, how much additional funding will still be needed in order to bring the Guard here and the Army up to 100 percent of the equipment requirements for domestic and operational purposes?

General MCKINLEY. Sir, thank you for your comment. I would agree that the State of Indiana has some magnificent facilities, and General Umbarger is doing a great job.

I would turn to my colleagues, both Air and Army, to kind of give you a wrap-up summary of what their additional requirements would be to get to 100 percent.

General CARPENTER. Sir, I would tell you first of all that the success we have had in filling the accounts and the equipment we have on hand right now is terrific.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, 83 percent of the critical dual-use equipment is now in place. We think that we have a shortfall right now of around \$19 billion or \$20 billion. But that really is just to complete the task here in terms of what has been accomplished to this point.

General MCKINLEY. I think General Stultz brought up a great point earlier, that not only do we need equipment, we need the modernization money to make the current equipment we have reliable and fully functional in the capacities we need it in.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, would that be included in the \$19 billion to \$20 billion estimate you gave us?

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. This is a combination of the modernization piece as well as filling the shortfalls and filling the gaps we have inside of our formations.

General WYATT. We do have an air piece. This is the importance that NGREA plays in the Air National Guard. Our problem is not so much shortages of equipment, with the exception of ground support equipment. Our trucks are getting extremely old. We are looking at about \$200 million for primarily ground support equipment. But our problem is not necessarily the aircraft fill rate. The problem is the status of those airplanes and the age of the airplane and the modernization that we need to do.

The importance of the NGREA account cannot be overemphasized when we talk about the modernization of our equipment. We take a look at identifying those pieces of equipment that support not only the Federal war fight but the State mission, and we concentrate the bulk of our NGREA expenditures on that dual-use equipment. The particular items that I am talking about are brought to the attention of the Air National Guard through a process called we call weapons and tactics analysis center, where the ground level, the war fighters, bring their need that they have identified from their experiences in combat and in supporting the Governors and the State mission to identify those pieces of equipment and resources that they need to do both missions. And we concentrate the use of our NGREA accounts in those regard.

HUMVEES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, if you have a list of your unfunded requirements, we would appreciate that very much.

One last question I would have is the Department in their submission for 2011 has not requested any additional funding for the purchase of Hummers. My understanding is that, for 2010, the Army is going to, if it has not already, is going to submit a reprogramming request in excess of half a billion dollars. In the Army National Guard, is the readiness rate of the equipment on hand such that additional new Humvees are not needed?

General CARPENTER. Sir, I would tell you two things about the decisions that the Army made about Humvees. First of all, if you look at the equipment that is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan right now, up-armored Humvees are no longer the vehicle of choice. Most of the units that are deployed and operating in that environment use the new MRAPs because it provides greater protection to the soldiers who are out there conducting operations.

So when you look at that, plus you look at the fill rate that we have got inside the Army National Guard, we have a requirement for 48,000 Humvees. By the time we get what has been purchased delivered to our formations, we will have the 48,000 Humvees that were required.

Now the question is the modernization piece that has been talked about here earlier; 30 percent of those vehicles will be modernized at that point. The effort for us inside the Army National Guard is to recap these vehicles, nearly half a billion dollars you just mentioned, with the idea that we are going to extend the life of those older model Humvees and basically take them back to zero miles, zero hours.

The great story about those Humvees is they are probably one of the most compatible vehicles we have got out there for the homeland defense, homeland security mission that we use in terms of emergency response.

So the decision that was made by the Army is probably the right decision as far as we are concerned from the Army National Guard in terms of the modernization.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. If you on a numerical basis are going to be at your 48,000, if I remember your statistic, why did the Army ask for the 560 that now they feel they don't need? If you were at that, why did they ask for that money in the first place?

General CARPENTER. I would guess, you would have to direct that at the Army, but I think what happened is it changed in the way operations are being conducted overseas in terms of looking at MATVs, MRAP vehicles for those kinds of operations versus the up-armored Humvees.

Mr. VISCLOSKEY. If they said they needed whatever the number is and they were added, why did they ask for the 560 in the first place? If you could answer for the record.

It is my understanding that HQDA submitted a request to reprogram \$560M of FY10 overseas contingency operations funds to Recapitalize Un-armored Legacy HMMWVs, of which approximately 3,000 vehicles will be ARNG vehicles.

Although we will achieve 100% of HMMWVs equipment on hand, by FY11, only 32% of our authorized fleet is currently deployable to Operation New Dawn or Operation Enduring Freedom. Over 20,000 of our HMMWVs have already passed their Useful Economical Life. The original plan was that these vehicles were going to be replaced through HMMWV procurement. However, the HMMWV Contract was terminated and we expect to receive our last lot of new HMMWV this Fall. Recapitalizing ARNG legacy fleet is the solution to overcoming the decision to terminate the HMMWV Contract.

There is also a request to reprogram FY11 overseas contingency operations funds that would Recapitalize an additional 3,000 ARNG HMMWVs. The remaining 6,000 HMMWV Recap requirement is currently (unfunded) in the FY 12–16 Program Objective Memorandum.

With the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) not likely to begin fielding to the ARNG units in significant quantities until at least FY2020, it is critical that the ARNG legacy HMMWVs be modernized beginning with the FYs10 & 11 overseas contingency operations reprogramming request.

General STULTZ. I will say, kind of along the same line as Ray, currently in the Army Reserve, we are short Humvees, but across the Army, we are in excess. So a lot of what the Army is trying to do is redistribute what is existing in the Army to get it into the right places.

The concern I have is I have about 85 percent of the Humvees that I am authorized right now, but only 13 percent are armor capable. So they haven't been modernized. They do need to be re-capped or reset in order to be able to accept the armor should we need to take them into Iraq, Afghanistan or some other theater where we need that armor capability.

The Humvees that I have in my organizations are what we call thin-skinned. They have never had the upgrades for the armor.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. On that question, if you would yield, would they deploy those, or would you have Humvees in country that would be there that you would utilize?

General STULTZ. That is part of the challenge right now, sir. As we have gone through or still are in the process of drawing down or potentially drawing down in Iraq but surging in Afghanistan, we are remissioning units that we had lined up to go to Iraq, but now we are changing direction and saying, let's send them to Afghanistan. Part of the challenge is the equipment that those units were going to use was positioned in Iraq. They were the up-armored Humvees and the RG-31s for the engineer route clearance units, the Buffaloes and the Huskies. When we defer them and say, now we are going to send them to Afghanistan, they will tell us, well, they need to bring their equipment. Well, their equipment is not armor capable.

Mr. DICKS. But we are moving a lot of equipment from Kuwait to Afghanistan.

General STULTZ. And that is what caused that to have to happen. When they started remissioning our units, we said, unless you bring that equipment that is positioned in Iraq and Kuwait, we don't have the equipment at home. We have never been modernized to that point.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young.

EMPLOYMENT

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The comments one of you made, I am not sure which one, about the employers working with the Guard and Reserve, I had the privilege of attending quite a few deployment ceremonies for Guard and Reserve units in Florida and also welcome home ceremonies, and I am really impressed by the number of employers who actually attend those same functions to indicate their support for the troops who are being deployed. Of course, their real pleasure is the

fact that they have come back home, at least for awhile. So that was a good comment, and I appreciate that, and I think working with the employers is really crucial to making our Guard and Reserve work so that the troops can actually do their job in the military without having to worry about where they might be when they come back home. So I really appreciate that effort.

Probably no military unit ever reaches 100 percent of everything that it needs. We in the committee would love to make sure that happens, and I know Chairman Dicks would probably like to be 110 percent of whatever you need, and I would share that as well.

Mr. DICKS. And all modernized.

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALL

Mr. YOUNG. Right. But since you do have a shortfall, and all of your statements indicate shortfall and not necessarily so much for the aircraft but for ground vehicles and ground equipment, what is critical? If we can only help you bring your numbers up, what would be the most important thing for us to do to bring that force to where you needed to be?

General MCKINLEY. I will let the Army and the Air talk for their respective enterprise, but I would think Congressman Young, as you know, in Florida, we almost have to tailor it to the State requirements that are needed. In your home State, with the number of storms you have and are projected to have this year, we need to have certain equipment for General Burnett and the Governor that will help them in case of a hurricane relief operation.

I am sure General Lowenberg has similar requirements in Washington State for different reasons.

Mr. DICKS. We have the potential for a huge earthquake up there. We could have a nine at any point.

General MCKINLEY. Absolutely. So each part of our country has certain requirements. That is why these emergency assistance components between our States are so important, so we can share equipment that may be deployed overseas or may be short of supply.

Ray, would you prioritize some of the things and Bud and Jack for yours, too.

General CARPENTER. Sir, I think our most critical shortfall yet out there is modernized trucks. We saw the problem first in Hurricane Katrina when we had vehicles that were not high-water vehicles that we tried to transit into the areas where they needed to be to provide the support to the populations, and they could not do that because they were not high-water vehicles.

We continue to champion the cause for modernized truck fleets. The industrial base, however, has not been able to produce them in adequate quantities for us to be able to assess them into our organization.

FAMILY MODERN TACTICAL VEHICLES

Mr. YOUNG. Are these different sized trucks? Are they one specific type of truck? Be a little more specific, if you could.

General CARPENTER. They are what we call FMTVs, Family Modern Tactical Vehicles. They replace the M-900 series trucks and the M-800 series trucks that we have in our inventory right now.

The Army is in the business of buying and modernizing the fleets across the Army, but the industrial base has not been able to support the requirements that are out there at this point.

Mr. YOUNG. I remember visiting with General Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm, and we basically asked him that same question: What do you really need? And the answer was trucks, trucks and more trucks. The answer was trucks. How much of a shortfall do we have in trucks in the Army Guard?

General CARPENTER. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, we are going to retire the "deuce and a half" out of our fleet this year. The M-800 series trucks, which is the next oldest version trucks, we are going to retire out of our fleet probably by 2013 or 2014. But the 900 series trucks, which is the newest one separate from the modern FMTVs that I just described, we are not going to retire those out of our fleet for an extended period of time, and we are busy recapping those trucks because we know we will have them for a while.

I would like to take your question for the record in terms of the actual number of FMTV shortfalls. I don't have that right at my fingertips.

[The information follows:]

The current status of the wheeled vehicle fleet in the Army National Guard is 94% on-hand. All the trucks authorized and on-hand are important to potential domestic response emergencies as they provide capabilities for an array of missions. These trucks serve to transport people, equipment, or supplies. Earlier model vehicles are capable of serving in most roles required by domestic response; however, these same vehicles are generally not deployable due to a lack of armor protection.

High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) make up a portion of less than 1% of these shortages, but are projected to be 100% on-hand by the end of 2010. Only 21% of our HMMWV fleet is currently armor capable and deployable to theater. Based on Army distribution projections, this number will grow to 32% by the end of FY 11. Termination of HMMWV production stops further improvements to deployability.

The Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles contains the largest share of the shortages, 5,900 vehicles. We are just starting to receive the newest medium tactical truck, the Long Term Armor Strategy vehicle. The Long Term Armor Strategy is the first production of medium vehicle designed to accept armor. Current projections show Long Term Armor Strategy vehicles increasing to 15% of the ARNG medium fleet by the end of FY 11. We continue to divest older medium trucks as soon as practical, with an objective of divesting the M35 by the end of FY 11 and the M809 series by the end of FY 12.

Mr. YOUNG. Would you also include in your response for the record a breakdown on which of the trucks are important to potential at-home emergencies versus deployed to a military war zone?

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir, I will do that.

Mr. YOUNG. General Stultz.

General STULTZ. Trucks, trucks, trucks. I will do the same as with the National Guard. I will submit for the record a list, and we do have it broken down.

[The information follows:]

As we transition into a fully modernized operational force we continue to encounter and successfully tackle many challenges, among them equipping a fully modernized Army Reserve. As a predominantly Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) force, we must equip out formations with the required quantities of equipment and strive to equip them with the most modern and capable version available to effectively accomplish our mission. Among the key pieces of modern equipment we require to complete our transition and meet operational challenges are the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) at approximately \$1.3B unresourced and Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) at approximately \$1.0B unresourced. With respect to which of our trucks are critical for poten-

tial Homeland Defense (HLD) and natural disaster related emergencies, both the FMTVs and HEMTTs provide that capability and are part of the Army's critical dual use (CDU) inventory. Additionally, our HMMWV fleet represent another key enabler of HLD/HLS and disaster relief missions. Among them our HMMWV ambulances, currently at 80% equipment on hand (EOH), are an example of essential vehicles during an at-home emergency situations.

But just to give you kind of a snapshot, the family medium of tactical vehicles that General Carpenter mentioned, those are the replacement for the deuce and a half's five ton cargos that you can use for troop transport. You can use them for carrying just about anything. You have various types of shelters that you can put on the back of them. I am authorized 7,000 of those trucks in the Army Reserve. I currently have 2,000 on hand. I am short 5,000. Now, I do have some old in-lieu-ofs, but I actually have a requirement for about 5,000 FMTVs in the Army Reserve.

The HEMTT that you are familiar with, the HEMTT truck that has everything from fuel capability to wrecker capability, I am authorized about 3,500 of those in the Army Reserve. Today I have 1,500, so I am short about 2,000 of those vehicles. So that kind of gives you a magnitude of somewhere around 7,000 trucks right on hand right now I can say I am short. That will grow, as I mentioned earlier, as we regenerate new structure in the Army Reserve with new capability, a lot of which will be ground-based and truck-based.

Additionally, we have some significant needs in our capabilities with communication systems because just as you have to shoot, you have to move and communicate. We are short radios, and we are short communication systems, command-and-control systems that are critical to our needs also.

Mr. YOUNG. You and General Carpenter both mentioned recapping a lot of vehicles. What is the most protective—well, let me rephrase that. What is the most efficient vehicle for a soldier on the battlefield to use, a recapped, a rebuilt vehicle, or a new vehicle with modern whatever technologies are added to the new vehicle?

General CARPENTER. Sir, the recap program, no matter what kind of a vehicle it is, takes it back to zero miles and zero hours. And it is, for the most part, a great use of taxpayer dollars, and it is being a good steward of the taxpayer dollars and so those are important.

But it really doesn't make sense, for instance, to recap an older vehicle unless you can provide the same capability, read that, the same technology, the same, whether it is a weapons system or a logistical system, whatever. At some point, it doesn't do you any good to recap the old model because you don't get the capability that you need on the battlefield.

So to the extent that it makes sense, we are recapping and modernizing the equipment that we have got. To the extent that it means a newer vehicle, like the comparison between a Humvee and an MRAP, you really are stuck with the modernization piece of it.

HUMVEES

Mr. YOUNG. I recognize that some of the Humvees, for example, are not necessarily used in a combat situation. Maybe those are the ones that General Stultz talked about that are the thin-skins. But

can you recap a thin-skin Humvee to make it as capable and as secure as you would if you built a new Humvee?

General STULTZ. Not being a total expert in this, but in some of the programs they do, they can take it all the way down to the bare metal and start over again. And I think the question that you have to ask is, what does it cost to totally reset a Humvee, build it all the way back from scratch, to the capability that it has the structural capability to handle the armor, it has the electrical capability, it has the power generation, the motor, to handle all that? And then, once you do all that with the cost, what would it have cost to just build a new one and go from there?

And I think that is part of the dilemma we face sometimes, is, what is the most effective? Because to get to the standard you are saying with some of the models we have, not with all of them but some of them, you literally have to tear it all the way down and start over.

I was just in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, about two weeks ago, visiting two of the plants that are building the M-ATVs and building the HEMTTs. And they are resetting the HEMTTs there. And they showed me the line where they take the vehicle and, by the time they get through taking it down, all that is left are two metal rails. And then they bring in a new engine, they bring in a new transmission, they bring in new differentials, they bring in new whatever to reset that vehicle to the new standards of a HEMTT A4, is what they call it.

And they tell me—now, I am not that expert—that they can do that much cheaper than manufacturing a new one. But I think that is the dilemma.

The other dilemma we face is, how much are we going to invest, because we do have to be good stewards of our taxpayers' money, in refurbishing the old equipment with a new generation of equipment? It is kind of the same challenge we face in technology.

While I was there at Oshkosh, I drove that M-ATV around their course, a wonderful piece of equipment that they are using in Afghanistan now. And you say, you know, wow, it would be great to put these in the hands of all of our soldiers instead of that re-capped Humvee. But the cost of that vehicle compared to a newly manufactured Humvee is tremendous. And that is where, can you afford that?

Mr. YOUNG. Let me ask just one more question here. And this just shows that I don't know that much about it, and that is why I am asking the question.

If you are going to build something new, whether it is an airplane or a truck or an automobile, you start down the line, you put new pieces in place, you add on to the new thing; at the end of the line, the vehicle comes out.

In the place of recap, you don't do it that way. The first thing you have to do is start and tear it down before you can start to rebuild the process. And doesn't that take additional time? Doesn't that take additional workforce? Doesn't that add to the cost of it?

I am like you; I am just trying to figure out what is the most cost-effective way to give our troops the best vehicles possible. So you can respond to that for the record, if you like.

[The information follows:]

Although the Army Reserve relies on and benefit from the various Army's Recap programs as a means to extend the Economic Useful Life (EUL) of older systems and long with procurement of new equipment fill equipment shortfalls, we need to defer answering the Recap cost benefit analysis question to HQDA who funds and manages these programs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. All right.

Mr. Rothman.

STOP-LOSS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, thank you for being here. Thank you for your distinguished careers and your service today.

A question about stop-loss for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. I am told that, as of January of this year, there are still approximately 3,400 soldiers in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve who remain on active duty beyond their scheduled separation dates as a result of stop-loss. And, in the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriation budget, we provided a special \$500-per-month pay for those individuals during fiscal year 2010.

But I am told, General McKinley, that the Army Guard had previously stated that it would end the use of stop-loss in September of 2009. What policies have been taken to end stop-loss? And when will you expect there to be no longer any stop-loss for the Guard or Reserve?

General MCKINLEY. Sir, if you don't mind me passing that to my colleague who can give you the specific Army answer, I will pass to both Jack and to Ray.

General CARPENTER. Sir, as you have pointed out, as of last September we were no longer mobilizing and stop-losing soldiers that were deploying into theater. However, prior to that point, prior to the first of September, units that were mobilized for the 12-month mobilization period, stop-loss was in effect. So for the soldiers that were mobilized and deployed in August, for instance, of 2009, those soldiers are in theater and they are in a stop-loss status.

Now, the 12-month mobilization, for instance, for the August soldiers that were mobilized is going to end in August, if not July, of fiscal year 2010. At that point, all the soldiers who were stop-logged will be out of our ranks and out of the formations.

So the process was not on the first of September to curtail stop-loss for everybody, because what that would have done is soldiers would have been in mid-tour and it would have been disruptive to the units.

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, is it fair, then, to characterize your answer as, by the end of August 2010, there will no longer be stop-loss in the Army Guard or Reserve?

General CARPENTER. Yes, exactly. Exactly.

Mr. ROTHMAN. That is great news.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, one thing I would add to what Ray said, because you are exactly right, the other thing we did find in the Reserve, and I think the same thing in the Guard, is, of the soldiers that we had stop-logged, traditionally around 75 or 80 percent of them ended up staying. They went into theater in a stop-

loss situation in a lot of cases so they could reenlist and get the tax benefits that were associated with being deployed. And so—

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. That is good information. But for the other 25 percent, they were indentured servants.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROTHMAN. And that is a charitable name for it.

Just two other fast questions—

Mr. DICKS. Indentured volunteers, how about that?

STATE OF ECONOMY

Mr. ROTHMAN. Indentured volunteers. Okay, yeah, that is probably more accurate.

Two other fast questions, if I may.

Given the present state of the national economy, and perhaps international economy, but certainly here in America, a number of our Guard and Reserve are having trouble when they get back, no longer on active duty, finding jobs. Their jobs disappeared. Their businesses that they worked for have disappeared, not just their position within that organization.

Is there some kind of job counseling? Is that appropriate? Do we have that in our Reserve and Guard situation? And if we don't have it, why not? And if we do have it, can we make it better?

General MCKINLEY. The unemployment statistics, sir, really concern me. I think our Guard is experiencing about twice the unemployment rate when they return from overseas as the statistic nationally.

And each State, to their credit, through their Adjutant General and their Governor and the offices in their States, have worked very hard to come up with reemployment programs. I think that is why General Stultz's opening comments that he made today about some of the initiatives the Army Reserve has used have been very helpful for us, too. So I echo your concern.

So, Jack, you may want to just summarize that real quick.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. What we said in the early opening is, we recognize the problem with the employers, and we have to have employed soldiers if we are going to sustain the Reserve and Guard. And so we have initiated a lot of programs partnering with employers.

The challenge you are going to have or we are having is, those soldiers who return to find that the job that they had, the industry has gone out of business or has laid off or whatever, we can find a new job for them, but it may not be where they live. And so now they are confronted with this thing of, I want to live in my hometown where I left; you are offering me a new job, but it may be two States over, in some cases.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

Mr. ROTHMAN. But, General, is it the policy of our military, and certainly our Guard and Reserve, to find each and every Guard and Reserve member no longer on active duty, looking for a job, who has been on active duty, is it our policy to find each and every one of them a job? Or is that just anecdotal or hit-or-miss?

General STULTZ. It is not a policy, not within the Army Reserve, that we find soldiers jobs. It is a practice that we say we think we

owe it to them. And if we are going to sustain that operational force, we are going to have to be looked upon as, "I can be a member of the Reserve and I can get a good job."

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. But if I may, if it is not a policy, then it would seem to be at the discretion of the present leadership of the Guard and Reserve. And I am—

Mr. DICKS. Should it be a policy, if the gentleman will yield?

Mr. ROTHMAN [continuing]. Wondering why it shouldn't be a policy, or why it should not be a policy.

But I think, you know, if it is important enough to do, we ought to make it a policy. If it is not that important, then it shouldn't be. But to rely on local decision-makers, when perhaps this should be a national policy, is something that perhaps the committee can discuss.

Or do you have an opinion on that, any of you gentlemen?

General CARPENTER. Sir, there is a program called Employer Support to the Guard and Reserve. And it is hugely active across the National Guard and across the Reserve components.

The fact of the matter is, in the Army Guard, 70 percent of our soldiers are nontraditional; read that: They are not full-time in the National Guard, and they are not students. And if we don't have 70 percent of those soldiers who are supported by employers out there, frankly, we don't have a National Guard. And so—

Mr. ROTHMAN. So we do have a policy, General? Is that what you are saying?

General CARPENTER. We have a program. I am not sure "policy" is the right terminology to put on it.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. The objective is to be as helpful as possible. The policy is not to assure that each one gets a job, but the policy is to be as proactive and helpful as possible. Is that a fair restatement?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

MORALE

Mr. ROTHMAN. And, finally, if I may: Morale. There is a lot of anger in our country these days, for lots of reasons. And some say that it is—and I am wondering, do you see any morale issues, political, one side or the other, infiltrating itself into any aspect of the Guard and Reserve that you are aware of?

General MCKINLEY. Congressman, you know, it has been 35 years since folks our age at this end of the table were subjected to conscription and the draft, and it is an all-volunteer force. And I won't speak for Jack; he can speak for the Army Reserve. But from the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, we are seeing nothing but strong, patriotic desire to serve.

The propensity to serve is great. Young people in numbers are coming to our recruiters, wanting to be part of these organizations, for a variety of reasons. But I have not seen any indicators, to my knowledge—and I will let Army and Air speak—that talk about any kinds of morale problems.

In my opening comments, what I sense on the horizon, though, is if you don't let these young people serve in a capacity that lets them be prepared to be part of that first team effort, wherever it is, if it is overseas or if it is at home, but if you relegate the Guard

to a second-class citizen or put it on the shelf and don't use it and don't make it part of the Army and the Air Force, that is when I suspect we will have people say, "We didn't sign up for this."

So I am actually leaning towards maintaining our Guard in an operational capacity enough so that young men and women feel that they have contributed to the overall effort of our Nation. And I am watching out very carefully with the Adjutants General, who are my board of directors, to make sure we don't go back to a point where we are under-used, under-utilized, under-equipped, not well-led. Those are my biggest concerns.

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston.

C-130S

Mr. KINGSTON. General McKinley, I want to ask—because I have the 165th Guard unit down in Savannah, Georgia, that has a very aging C-130 fleet, and I am worried as I see what is happening with the redistribution of some of these planes. If they have aging fleets and there is no plan to get them C-130Js, are they on some kind of—should we put them on a watchlist?

General MCKINLEY. Congressman, I live down the road in Jacksonville. I flew the 130s in Savannah. It is a great organization and a great unit. When I flew them, they were new airplanes. We have aged our C-130 fleet dramatically over the last 20 years, and now Savannah has some of the oldest model C-130s.

I have charged our Air Director, General Wyatt, to work with the United States Air Force to come up with some strategies. And if you would allow me to let him talk to you about the C-130 fleet, I think it is important to hear where it stands. There has been some speculation that the Air Force wants to draw down older airplanes, and I think General Wyatt can give you some confidence that he is working very closely with United States Air Force on a modernization strategy.

General WYATT. You know, Congressman, if you will, an earlier question dealt with airplanes in the Air National Guard, and the question had to do with the fill rate of the authorized airplanes.

The days since BRAC 2005 have changed significantly. There was a significant amount of organic airlift in the Air National Guard that was removed out of the Air National Guard as a result of BRAC. Since then, we have had some data points, the most recent one being the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS) that was filed February 1, addressing the tactical airlift, where the C-130 fits. And the conclusions of that study, which was commissioned by TRANSCOM, indicated that, while there are about 401 C-130s in the total force, the need foreseeable in the future would be only 335.

But I would point out that that study was commissioned before any consideration was given to what we call the direct support mission. The direct support mission is a newly emerging mission that is in support of the Army. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council identified a need of 78 airplanes to handle the direct support mission on behalf of the United States Army. We have in the program 38. It used to be a 78 requirement, but the program has been reduced to 38 C-27s, which addresses some of the tactical airlift.

But I would suggest to you that the study, because it does not consider the direct support mission, needs to be revised to consider that.

We have seen in PB-'11 the difficult choices that the Air Force has to make with this aging C-130 fleet that you have mentioned. When taken in conjunction with the MCRS, the Air Force has determined a need to retire some of the older airplanes. And, in fact, they have done that with E's in PB-'11 and some of the older H models.

So we are in that period of time where we think there is probably a greater need for tactical airlift than the MCRS has identified, and we are working our way through that situation.

The concern is that the direct support mission, if you take a look at what that really is, the Air National Guard has been doing the direct support mission on behalf of Governors since we have had airplanes, because that is how we respond to natural disasters. If you look at Katrina and you saw the numbers of airlift, organic airlift in the Air National Guard that responded on a moment's notice, you can see the importance of organic airlift.

So my concern is, while the Army says, "We need trucks, trucks, trucks," I am saying we need to take a look at lift, lift, lift. So I see an opportunity or a need here to reexamine the MCRS in the light of the additional needs created by the direct support mission and the organic homeland support/homeland defense mission to determine whether the C-130 number is correct.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would just yield briefly, didn't Secretary Gates say that we could do this with—make up the difference with C-130s?

General WYATT. The mission can be flown with C-130s, yes, sir, it can.

Mr. DICKS. Are we talking about the J model?

General WYATT. It can be flown with any C-130. The question is, if you are going to do a significant portion of the direct support mission with C-130s, a lot of our C-130 fleet, the E models are now retired out of the fleet as a result of PB-'11, and we have a significant number of H models, H-1s, that need to be retired also, just because of the MCRS lowering the numbers but also because of age and the expense.

Now, we do have the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) that is funded for a little over 200 of the H-2, H-2.5, and H-3 C-130s. That will help modernize some of H model fleet. But we are still talking about a possible need to address, whether it is C-130 or C-27, that direct support mission, which also flows very well into the Governors' and the Adjutant's Generals responsibility for organic airlift for the homeland security/homeland defense mission.

FORESTRY IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. KINGSTON. General, it might be helpful to committee members, I know it would be very helpful to me, if maybe you could elaborate on this in writing. Because I think a lot of us are going to start hearing from our Guard units around the country, and we want to know—because, you know, Guard units have been doing a lot of good things over the years, and their aircraft are deteriorating in age.

General, I had a question for you. In Afghanistan, when we were over there, one of the things that came up is that the poppy industry is \$200 million to \$300 million, and a big issue in terms of trying to get the USDA over there, training them to look at alternative crops, wheat and so forth.

There is this issue on forestry. And, as I understand it, Afghanistan has had a 50 percent deforestation since 1978. Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you have heard that statistic, but, as a former Interior chair, I know you would be alarmed by that. But 50 percent of their forestry gone in a 25-, 30-year period of time. I think that is what I read. But that the Taliban is letting these guys cut down the trees short-term because they get in with the local population, who are historically in the logging area in the north, and we don't seem to be able to do anything about it.

As I heard you talk about citizen soldiers driving trucks over there, I am thinking about loggers, foresters, farmers who are in the Guard units being invaluable in terms of fighting the deforestation, because of the lumber industry and poppy. And I was wondering if you could tell me if you guys are playing a role in that.

Mr. DICKS. If you would yield, also, we understand there are seven Guard units deployed to Afghanistan providing skill-based training and advice to Afghan universities, provincial ministries, and local farmers. And does USDA partner with the Guard to develop better agribusiness alternatives for Afghanistan?

I mean, this poppy thing, I think we are in an absolute no-win position. I mean, we are kind of looking the other way. And I think we have to commit ourselves to an alternative crop strategy. Maybe eradication isn't the answer this year, but I don't see how we can let this continue to go the way it is going.

And I would like to know about what these seven Guard units are doing.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT TEAMS

Mr. KINGSTON. And I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to say this, General. When I was over there with the chairman about a month ago, I was briefed by our USDA folks. And there was no discussion of coordination with the Army Guard or anyone else on it. That might be taking place, but I am just saying it was not brought up at all.

General CARPENTER. Sir, to follow up on the chairman's comment, we have nine what we call Agricultural Development Teams in theater in Afghanistan right now as we speak. And they are working in 14 provinces in Afghanistan.

An ADT is about a 60-person unit, combined between the Army and the Air National Guard. And inside that 60-person unit is a team of about 12 subject-matter experts that have an agricultural background. They may be engineers, they may be hydrologists, they may be crop specialists, they may be animal husbandry specialists. And those 12 people form the center of that team, and their whole mission is to reestablish agriculture inside of these provinces.

The effort here is to get this organization, get the provinces and the farmers past what we call subsistence farming and get them into a commercial farming environment where they can actually

produce the commodities so that they can sell them and make that a more viable industry, a more viable effort than what we see in the poppy trade right now.

For the most part, what you see for the farmers out there that are raising poppies is that they are raising a crop and they are not getting a huge amount of money for raising that crop. The drug lords are the ones that are actually making the money. So if that farmer produces grapes or produces some sort of a grain commodity, it is going to be the same for him, in terms of the take-home or what they end up with.

The ADT is organized to establish a long-term relationship between the province in Afghanistan and the land-grant college in Missouri, for instance, because Missouri got into this first, and that was the whole effort. We have worked with the USDA. As a matter of fact, we have gone over and briefed them. We have solicited their support. And they are absolutely interested in partnering with us in these Agricultural Development Teams.

The effort for the ADT, Agricultural Development Team, was, when we get to what we call a permissive environment, in other words, when the fighting is lowered to some sort of an environment where we can put USDA officials, support from the universities into that kind of environment to support the growth of agriculture, then that is going to be the next step in terms of where we go with the development teams.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. A great question.

Mr. Bishop.

STATISTICS GUARD/RESERVE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much.

Welcome to all four of you gentlemen.

I am going to look at a different tack. As you know, General Stultz, the Army Reserve is an organization of people who work hard to serve the Army and the Nation, and the officers and soldiers make up one of the most diverse groups. They come from a wide variety of communities and backgrounds. But the minority general officers rank seems to be not very diverse. Looking at the statistics, it appears as if there is in the Reserve, for example, 17.1 percent black officers, of which there is only one black female general officer; zero Hispanic, Asian Pacific Islander, or Native American female general officers.

I don't know what the stats are in the Guard, but we have the same concerns about that.

The Congressional Black Caucus has been working with the Joint Chiefs over the last several years to try to have general officer ranks at least reflect the population within the respective services. And we have been working continuously trying to make that happen, with a number of efforts, including mentoring, including the makeup of the promotion panels, and the reports of performance standards being equal-opportunity-inclusive.

Can you tell me what the Reserve and the Guard are doing to try to maintain or to establish an adequate level of diversity, a reflective level of diversity?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. And it is a great point, because we are not satisfied with where we are, obviously, by what you just said.

We do have within the Army Reserve 15 female general officers right now in our ranks. But only one, Marcia Anderson, is African American, and so we are not balanced in that respect. We have approximately 12 percent minority general officers in our ranks, but, again, that does not reflect the rest of the troop population. So we have a ways to go there.

We are actively, one, trying to mentor those in the ranks of O-5, O-6. And off of our most recent general officer board, which has yet to be published, we will increase our diversity somewhat. But, again, we are not getting there fast enough to satisfy us. Because what I need is I need for that young female soldier or that young minority soldier to be able to look to the top and say, "I have an opportunity, and I have representation."

Mr. BISHOP. And a mentor.

General STULTZ. And a mentor, sir, yes, sir.

And we have some wonderful, wonderful minority and female general officers that are not just wonderful military leaders, they are wonderful leaders in their civilian communities, in their hospitals or in their governments or in their businesses.

But, you are right, we aren't there yet. We are working to get there, but we are not there yet.

General MCKINLEY. I would echo General Stultz's comments that the National Guard is not there yet either. It is a journey, not a destination, in terms of managing our diversity programs.

What I believe is important for us is to continue to mentor and nourish the young people in the States and the territories that make up our National Guard. And I work very closely with the Adjutants General in the States. We are a community-based organization, and if our units don't look like the community that they work in and live in, then we have a serious problem.

You know, "years of" have created some emphasis programs, so we are in a "year of diversity." I was told by my staff recently that a year just doesn't cut it. It should be a "decade of diversity," with metrics built in every year to see how you do. And I have asked these gentlemen who work with me in the Army-Air Force to do that.

And then, finally, President Obama has commissioned a commission on military diversity programs. General Les Lyles chairs it. I have had the opportunity to speak to General Lyles. He is looking across our components, active Guard and Reserve, to see how we are doing. And I think that will bring a real sense of emphasis once that report is submitted to the President, so that we all know that we have work to do, we need to continue nurturing the younger people so that they can feel empowered to be part of this organization.

And I thank you for that question, because it keeps us focused on some very important reasons for why we are in these chairs.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Carpenter, I heard your comment that you are going to retire the Deuce and a Half. Boy, I will tell you, I spent 6 1/2 years riding in the back of one of those things.

General STULTZ. He still has the truck.

Mr. ROGERS. And if I had known then that you were going to retire the Deuce and a Half, I would have worked to make you General of the Army. And so, it is sort of a sad time that you are going to retire the old "Deuce and a Half."

General CARPENTER. Sir, actually, you were instrumental in doing that. So, from riding in the back of that, you have made the possibility by way of funding through NGREA and all the rest of the support to retire that Deuce and a Half. So you have been more valuable in this process than riding in the back, sir.

AGRICULTURAL EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah, any kind of lift, except the Deuce and a Half.

You know, on the agricultural effort in Afghanistan, I remember going to Pakistan and Thailand about 20 years ago, where we were trying to pay farmers to grow something other than poppy—wheat, tobacco, and the like. And they would take our money and then go till another crop of poppy. And I suspect that is exactly what is happening in Afghanistan now.

Have we ever thought about compensating the poppy growers for destroying their crop and combining that with teaching the growing of another crop?

General CARPENTER. Sir, I am really not in a position to answer that question. That is probably a question that needs to be directed to the powers-to-be in theater and their strategy for how they are dealing with the war on terror in Afghanistan.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it seems to me that might be something we could think about.

The Counterdrug Program—Kentucky National Guard has had a great history with eradicating marijuana growing in the Daniel Boone National Forest, which is, I think, the second-largest marijuana growing patch in the U.S. In fact, I have ridden on the helicopters as we traversed the mountains and been unable to land in the helicopter in that rough terrain, soldiers rappelling down the rope with a large net, cutting the marijuana and putting it in the net, and then being picked up by the chopper and transported, hanging, dangling 100 feet under the chopper with a big bag of marijuana maybe 50 miles to the landing spot—a dangerous operation, all the while trying to dodge bullets fired at them from the marijuana growers. I mean, it is not an easy chore. And yet the Kentucky Guard has just been heroic almost in that effort over the years.

What can you tell me about your budget request for the continuation of that program in the Guard? And what do you think about the program?

General MCKINLEY. Congressman, thanks for the question.

You know, I go back a ways, and in 1989 I remember our Adjutant General, Ron Harrison, in Florida kicking off a program called Drug Demand Reduction in our high schools. And that was the initial stages of trying to reduce demand here at home. Because we know across the spectrum you can have interdiction, you can have eradication, but if you don't reduce the basic demand, you are still going to have a flow of drugs across the border.

Congress authorized the Counterdrug Program for the National Guard. We feel it is very effective. Over time, our costs for sustainment of the program, quite frankly, have not kept up with the demands on the program. But if it wasn't for this committee and what you provide for the Counterdrug Program, we would not be able to do the eradication efforts, we would not be able to have the relationships we have with the local law enforcement agencies and really, actually, have what I consider one of the crown-jewel programs in the National Guard.

So the moneys we have in the budget will provide for an adequate Counterdrug Program. Any additional moneys that Congress would provide would enhance it. And I am most concerned with the efforts along the southwest border, what I am seeing in the nexus of drug lords, terrorism, instability across the border. I am very concerned that we have now reached a point in this Nation where this program is a vital program now to the States and territories and the District, and without the support of this committee, we will be far less effective at a time when we need it the most.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it has been a very effective way in Kentucky to get at that huge marijuana crop in the Boone National Forest, and I would hope that we could continue that. It has been very effective, but it needs help.

You know, I think on the southwest border your services are probably going to be needed sooner than later, because it is growing out of hand. The drug cartels on that border now are spilling across into this country with violence. Every community represented here has an arm of the Mexican drug cartel there distributing drugs in huge numbers. And we have been unable to seal that border yet. But the most effective time that we were able to tackle the problem was when the Guard was there. And you did a great job. And I suspect that we will be calling on you again in that respect.

Well, thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. Hinchey.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for everything that you do and for all of this issue, which has been absolutely deeply interesting.

I know that the National Guard and the Army Reserve has been under a lot of pressure over the course of the last several years. And I know that that is something that is unusual, and it hasn't happened in this way in, you know, quite some time.

Maybe you wouldn't be, you know, prepared to give us the exact specific information on this, but if that is the case, maybe you would be kind enough to just put it in the record for us so that we can take a look at it and see what the kind of pressure has been, how the numbers have gone up and how dramatically your military personnel were put into Iraq, say, for example, primarily, in such large numbers.

General MCKINLEY. Sir, we would be glad to provide that from the National Guard perspective.

[The information follows:]

WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE EXISTS ON NATIONAL GUARDSMEN IN IRAQ?

Army National Guardsmen and their families encounter many of the same pressures as their Active Duty counterparts, such as suicide, divorce, post trauma stress disorders among others. However, the pressure that is unique in the Reserve Component is employment related issues. As a result of mobilizations, National Guardsmen in Iraq have experienced a tremendous amount of pressure and, in many cases, worrying when it comes to the high percentage of unemployment when they arrive back home. For example, the 41st BCT out of Oregon Army National Guard returned from deployment in April 2010, and reported 969 Soldiers needing help finding jobs.

According to a U.S. Department of Labor April 2010 report, young, unemployed veterans who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan face even lower odds of finding jobs in this economy than their civilian counterparts. The jobless rate hit 21 percent last year for the youngest veterans, who are 18 to 24 years old. That is compared to 16.6 percent of non-veterans in the same age range. The annual unemployment rate for the youngest group of veterans from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has been increasing during the past three years, from 12 percent in 2007, to 14 percent in 2008, to 21 percent in 2009. That is compared to an overall unemployment rate of 9.7 percent nationally.

Also, with the increase in overseas deployments, many self-employed Army National Guard Soldiers, Reservists and Small Business Owners are losing their businesses or experiencing financial losses. Many self-employed Soldiers have filed bankruptcy because they are not protected under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) which provides the legal basis for the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve. Self-employed business owners do not have the same job protection that businesses are required by federal law to extend to their workers.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT

The ARNG has deployed over 240,000 Soldiers during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In FY05, a total 60,356 Guardsmen were deployed in support of combat operations in Iraq and Kuwait, reaching the highest point since OIF started. During FY08 the Guard deployed 36,942 Soldiers and in FY09 a total of 33,937 troops. The National Guard has maintained a high operational tempo for more than eight years in support of OIF. See the attached chart depicting the level of activity of the ARNG operational force in Iraq and Kuwait.

HOW DRAMATICALLY HAVE YOUR MILITARY PERSONNEL BEEN AFFECTED BY BEING PUT INTO IRAQ IN SUCH LARGE NUMBERS?

The Army National Guard and Active Duty Soldiers are exposed to the same stressful environment and suffer the same types of issues of post traumatic stress disorder, marital problems, drug and alcohol abuse, suicide, among others.

A study conducted by Anderson and Lie in 2007, more Soldiers returning from the war in Iraq show signs of mental health problems such as depression and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) six months after their tour of duty versus immediately coming home. The study revealed that although Reserve and Active component experienced many of the same traumatic combat experiences and was at similar risk for behavioral health concerns at Post Deployment Health Assessment, by the Post Deployment Health Risk Assessment this gap had significantly widened. For example, at Post Deployment Health Assessment, the incidence of PTSD in the Active component was 11.8% and 12.7% in the Reserve Component. At the time of Post Deployment Health Risk Assessment, the PTSD rate for Active component was 16.7% compared with 24.5% in the Reserve Component. Similar trends have occurred with depression and overall mental health risk.

The substance abuse is highly correlated with PTSD and other psychological disorders that may occur after stressful and traumatic events, such as those associated with the war. Alcohol use and alcohol-related problems before and after military combat deployment are other areas in where Soldiers showed increased risk. Reserve or National Guard personnel were significantly more likely to experience new-onset heavy weekly drinking, binge drinking and alcohol-related problems compared to the Active Component, as well with respect to non-deployed personnel. (Source: JAMA.2008; 300 (6):663-675 or www.jama.com)

With the onset of many behavioral and substance abuse related issues occurring six months after a tour of duty, a key lesson has been the need to ensure resources

are available to care for the needs of these Soldiers. Furthermore, for those Soldiers who have been identified through Post Deployment Health Reassessments and care established, then continuity of care is crucial to ensure the Service members' treatment does not lag and all services are completed. Analysis of suicide cases in the Army National Guard is helping to draft further tools for ARNG leaders and family members to use in support of Soldiers returning from war.

Another enduring lesson learned from the overseas contingency operations is that we need to stabilize and sustain our forces mentally, physically, and spiritually. To provide the best support and transition assistance for wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers, the Army National Guard continues to support the Army's warrior transition units and community-based warrior transition units. The transition units provide non-clinical support, complex case management, and transition assistance for Soldiers of all components at medical treatment facilities on Active Army installations. The community-based warrior transition units provide high-quality health care, administrative processing, and transition assistance for recuperating Reserve Component Soldiers while allowing them to live at home and perform duties close to their homes and families.

The Army National Guard remains committed to supporting the families of deployed Soldiers throughout the deployment cycle. Army National Guard families were supported in numerous ways in FY09. The National Guard Bureau's Family Program Office provided families with training via computer-based modules, centralized classes, and locally provided lectures to help make families self-reliant throughout the deployment cycle process. The Army Well-Being Program established the Army Families Online website, an information portal for families of National Guard Soldiers. The Department of Defense Military OneSource Program provided benefits which include counseling services, resources for parents, assistance with consumer credit, and online tax return preparation for military families.

Another service available is the Resiliency Training Center, which focuses on prevention through proactive marriage workshops and stress-relief training before, during, and after deployments. The main goal of the resiliency program is to create "resilient" service members and families.

Some of our Family readiness efforts include Family Assistance Centers, the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, the Strong Bonds Program, and Suicide Prevention training. The Army National Guard operates 369 Family Assistance Centers across all 54 States and Territories.

The National Guard Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program provides information services, referral, and proactive outreach opportunities for Soldiers, Families, employers, and youth throughout the entire deployment and life cycle: pre-deployment, deployment, post-deployment, and return to civilian life.

The Strong Bonds Program is a Commander's program that is unit-based and chaplain-led to help Soldiers and their Families build and rebuild strong relationships, especially when getting ready for or recovering from a deployment.

The Army National Guard recently initiated the Job Connection Education Program (or JCEP). This program improves National Guard force stability by advancing member skills at seeking, obtaining, and retaining civilian employment, much like the Army Career and Alumni Program, but at the local level. Job Connection Education Program team members work closely with local employers to ensure they are aware of all the resources available to them in their effort to hire local Guard Soldiers. The Army National Guard is also partnering with the Army Reserve in the Employer Partnership Office.

To help Soldiers to improve their job skills, the Army National Guard has started an initiative called Guard Apprenticeship Program Initiative (GAPI). This initiative involves partnering with the Department of Labor and coordinating with the Department of Veterans Affairs while National Guard Soldiers work in their civilian jobs and participate in the program. Apprenticeship is a training opportunity for ARNG Soldiers to earn national certification and skills in a specific field while earning wages.

As you know, the Air National Guard does its deployments a little differently than the Army National Guard does. They volunteer their members, and they have a shorter rotation, but they have a higher frequency rate.

So, whether it be United States Air Force through its Air National Guard or Ray Carpenter's Army National Guard, the services have used the National Guard very effectively. Most of our members have deployed once, twice, maybe three times. I was out

in the field the other day; a soldier had deployed three times, getting ready to go on his fourth deployment. I am sure Jack is the same way.

So we will provide you our exact numbers for the record.

Jack.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, same, we can provide those numbers for the record.

[The information follows:]

The numbers of USAR mobilizations since 9/11 for contingency operations follows:

FY	Total	Enduring Freedom	Iraqi Freedom	Joint Endeavor	Joint Guardian-Kosovo	Noble Eagle	Southern Watch-Kuwait	TTAD	Air Force Security	Border Security
FY01	860			57	25	778				
FY02	14,390	2,209		348	307	11,319	174			33
FY03	65,639	58,090	106	341	229	6,844	28		1	
FY04	35,443	9,677	22,869	45	89	2,750		10	3	
FY05	33,347	9,675	20,196	18	71	3,358		27	2	
FY06	24,917	7,338	14,341	13	55	3,165		5		
FY07	24,220	10,509	10,979	14	19	2,689		10		
FY08	27,436	14,406	12,824	1	9	189		7		
FY09	17,397	9,878	7,445		20	36		18		
FY010	2,675	1,884	788			1		2		
Totals	246,324	123,666	89,548	837	824	31,129	202	79	6	33

Just for perspective, though, I mentioned earlier, I am authorized currently 205,000. I have mobilized over 190,000 since 9/11. Now, that is not 190 of that 205, because they have obviously—some retired, some got out, and we have new recruits. But we keep about 30,000 soldiers mobilized ongoing within the Army Reserve, in addition to our full-time force that is there all the time.

General CARPENTER. Sir, what you refer to is what we call optempo and the frequency with which we are mobilizing and deploying soldiers.

Because of what we do in terms of cross-leveling soldiers to units, right now for the soldiers that are deploying, their normal dwell is somewhere around 2.2 years. The units' dwell is somewhere around 3.3 years. And so this is probably at the top end of where we want to be.

Ideally, in the Army Force Generation Model for the Reserve component, we would like to see 1 year deployed and 4 years at home.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks very much.

General WYATT. From the Air National Guard side, we do our deployments considerably different. We participate in Air Expeditionary Force rotations that are 120 days long. And we do have some stress career fields that, when they are mobilized, may go into theater a little bit longer. But we do enjoy the shorter mobilization periods.

But we have been doing this since the early 1990s. I remember as a wing commander at Tulsa our first deployment in 1996. And, since 1996, that particular unit has I think been in theater around 13 times. But they are for shorter periods of time.

I measure the stress on the force a couple of ways, sir. One is to get out in the field, CONUS and OCONUS when I am allowed in theater, to see firsthand what the morale is and what the spirit of our airmen is. The second method is taking a look at our retention rates. And our retention rates are exceeding all of our goals and have been for a significant period of time. Our retention rate is over 90 percent.

What I am seeing is a resilient force, a force that relishes its opportunity to be an operational force. We enjoy working with the United States Air Force to allow us to do shorter mobilizations, which addresses the needs of, not only predictability, but a shorter time away from those jobs and those families. And I think that is one of the reasons why we have been able to do that since the early 1990s, and I don't see any reason why we can't continue doing so.

I think the key is the predictability, trying to keep the rotations as short as possible, at least from the Air National Guard side; and, secondly, making sure that the missions that we do are the same frontline missions that the United States Air Force does. We fly about 33 percent of all the United States Air Force missions worldwide on about 7 percent of the Air Force budget.

So we think we are ready, reliable, accessible, available, and we can keep doing it this for an indefinite period of time.

C-5A

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, thank you very much.

And, if I may, General Wyatt, I would like to ask you another Air Force question, if I may, about the C-5As and the C-17s and how that situation is changing. Apparently, under the proposed fiscal year budget, it includes the retirement of 12 of these C-5As and then the replacement of eight C-17 aircraft.

So that situation seems to be something that may be concerning. How is the adjustment going to be with the reduction of 12 and the replacement of eight of these two different aircraft? How is that adjustment going to be? Is it going to be difficult to deal with this situation?

General WYATT. I think the answer to that question would be—I previously referenced the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study that basically establishes the number of strat lift, as opposed to tactical airlift that I talked about earlier. The C-5s and C-17s fall into that strat lift category. And I think the issue becomes a total force issue when you consider that the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the active-duty Air Force all fly C-5s and C-17s.

The C-5s that are in the Air National Guard, one of them in your State, sir, at Stewart—we also have one in West Virginia and a C-5 unit in Tennessee. We have an Air National Guard C-17 unit in Jackson, Mississippi. And then we have a couple of units in Alaska and Hawaii, where the Air National Guard associates with the active duty to fly those airplanes, the C-17s.

The challenge is, there are certain numbers of the larger C-5A that our Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study says that the Air Force needs to keep, and that will probably be a mixture of the newer B's and probably some of the A models.

To answer your question, what the Air Force is doing right now, in conjunction with the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, is taking a look at the best way to maintain the required force structure with the larger-body C-5 fleet and also try to modernize the C-5 fleet in the numbers needed, with the re-engining program, to convert the B's and some A's into what we call C-5M models.

So I think the Air National Guard will be participating, I am sure we will with the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve, to determine the right number of those. And then I see a need to convert some of our existing C-5A units to C-17s. The C-17 is a newer airplane, more reliable, higher MC rates, less to maintain. So it fits well with where we need to go in the Air National Guard.

I think that what you will see is probably some of our units—and I don't know which ones because we are still working with the Air Force—but some of our units convert from C-5As to C-17s. I think some of our units may stay in the C-5 and convert to C-5Ms. We don't know for sure. But we are working those issues.

But it will be a total force look. And I am sure the Air National Guard will be involved, to some degree, continuing in the future in strat lift, because it is a way that the Air National Guard can continue to be a relevant partner in all of the missions and provide the relief that the active-duty Air Force needs in the high operations tempo.

Your unit right now is one of the four units in the Air National Guard that is assisting with the surge into Afghanistan, a huge load on the strat lift. And your folks are doing a fine job.

C-17S

Mr. HINCHEY. Do you know where those C-17s are going to be located?

General WYATT. I don't. The process that the Air Force uses is called the Strategic Basing Executive Steering Group, and they are taking that decision under advisement right now. I am advised that they hope to have a decision on the bed-down of the C-17s in June of 2011, I think is when they predict that they will have the final basing decisions. But the criteria for the next bed-down should be coming soon.

General MCKINLEY. And if I could add, sir, that it is really important for us to have dialogue with the States through the Adjutant General to the Governor. So our pledge to this committee is to work with the Air Force to make sure we release as much information as soon as we know it so that there is an active dialogue so there are no surprises. I can't guarantee that, but that is our goal, and that is what we owe you.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kilpatrick, please.

STRYKER BRIGADES

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, good afternoon. Thank you for your service, your testimony and commitment.

After we ratchet out of Iraq and step in Afghanistan, the Stryker has been used quite effectively. The Stryker is now in a modernization program to increase survivability and that kind of thing. And the Stryker brigades that we had there are now moving to Afghanistan.

Is there a need, General Carpenter, for the Stryker up-modernization vehicle? You talked about the MRAPs. I know the Humvees are gone. Is there a use for the Stryker and where in Afghanistan?

General CARPENTER. The active Army has Stryker brigades deployed into Afghanistan as we speak. We have one Stryker brigade in the Army National Guard. That is the 56th Stryker Brigade, out of Pennsylvania. They deployed into Iraq, and they have been home now since last fall. They came home in September. They did a tremendous job over there. And that vehicle is a pretty impressive vehicle. And that unit got kudos across the board for their accomplishments in Iraq.

Ms. KILPATRICK. Fine.

SUICIDES

And let me mention, if I might, Mr. Chairman—I know we are short on time—suicides. Everything I have read, suicides are up, unlike the other Army, active Army, and you all too.

The young men and women or the men and women have support services that they can go to when they come out. I don't think that

is available to them in the National Guard. Is that a reason why suicides are up? And why are they up.

General MCKINLEY. Ma'am, the outcry from our Adjutants General in the States have brought us to the conclusion that we need to resource psychological counselors in each State. And I will let Ray cover it.

I know, Jack, you have it, and Bud.

But we have seen statistics that concern us greatly. And we had not put enough money into those programs prior to this spike in suicide rates and statistics. So I think all of us can assure you that we take this very seriously and we are throwing resources at it, which we think will help.

Jack, do you want to start, and we will just go down the row?

General STULTZ. Yes.

It is an area of focus. Any soldier we lose is a tragedy, whether it is one or whether it is 20.

The challenge we have right now in the Army Reserve is—I look at it from two different perspectives. One is, I have a challenge, unlike the active Army where we teach a battle buddy system and look out for your buddy and if your buddy is having problems you should take care of him; my problem is that battle buddy only sees his battle buddy 2 days out of month. See, the other 28 days he is back home with his family, with his civilian job. He comes to drill for that one weekend.

And so we are trying to develop a program and an approach—just like General McKinley said, we have to put the resources out there, but we have to put them at the right location. We not only have to focus on the soldier, we have to focus on the family, because that family is going to see that soldier the other 28 days of the month when he is exhibiting the concern that they have. And then we have to break down that stigma of “I can't ask for help, I am a soldier” or “I can't ask for help for my husband because I don't want to hurt his career.”

The other thing that we are confronted with is, most of the suicides that I am experiencing in the Army Reserve are not related to deployments. Most of the suicides that I am experiencing in the Army Reserve are soldiers who haven't deployed.

We are looking at the situation of, are we getting soldiers who are coming to us because they are looking for help and they are looking to us because they understand the camaraderie, the concern, the care of the military.

And so we are trying to put a major focus on what we call our Sponsorship Program. When a new soldier comes to the Army Reserve, let's grab that soldier right away, let's find out what is going on in his life, let's find out what made you join the Army Reserve. Because he may be dealing with something right now that brought him to us that we can interdict and we can keep a good soldier, because he wants to be a soldier, and not just focus on the stress and strain of deployments but what else is going on in their lives.

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you.

General CARPENTER. Ma'am, I would tell you that our experience is exactly the same as what Lieutenant General Stultz has described.

What we have found—and we do a detailed analysis on each one of these suicides, because we want to know what happened in that individual's life that caused them to think that suicide was the best option in terms of their future. And so, in the analysis, what we find is that they have had some sort of a significant event inside of their life, either they have lost their girlfriend, they have lost their job, you name it. And the coping skills that these mostly young people have are something we need to reinforce.

And we have inside the National Guard a resiliency program that is being sponsored primarily out of the State of Kansas with the Adjutant General there, and we are working it across the Army National Guard, that will build up the resiliency for those people who are considering that as an option and resist the temptation for suicide.

And inside the Army, they are also developing a resiliency program with the same objective. We have State best practices programs across the 54 States and territories, and the Adjutant General on that level are dealing with the units and dealing with the particular issue of suicide. It is a very troubling statistic and something we are trying desperately to reverse.

PILOT PROJECT

Mr. DICKS. You know, on that point, I would like to just mention something. I am aware of a group called Psychiatry Networks, who have been trying to work out a pilot project or something. These are a group of people, many of which have had Guard and Reserve experience, who are psychiatrists.

You know, you think about this generation; the technology is something that they are involved in. And, you know, it just seems to me, especially for the Guard and Reserve, when these people come home and they are not at a base, having some way of going online—I know the Army is experimenting with one operation in Hawaii at this point. But I think this is another concept that should be considered, and especially by the Guard and Reserve.

Ms. Kaptur.

READJUSTMENT FOR RETURNING TROOPS

Ms. KAPTUR. I want to support the chairman in his suggestions there. And, actually, there is a program that is being used by—invented by an Ohio psychiatrist and psychologist that is a little handheld device where they listen. I would like to get one of those into each of your hands, if that would help. You can listen to it; you can give it to your staff. It is being used in the VA; it is being used in different ways.

And I found that in our region—I represent northern Ohio. I don't have a big base, but I have the best 180th Tactical Fighter Wing of F-16s in the country. And we thank you, General, for your leadership there. And I represent a Red Horse unit, a combat engineering, and also, on the Reserve side, 983rd Combat Engineering. They are phenomenal.

But when they come home, what we find, because the commanding officers with the Reserve are over in Chicago but we are over in Ohio, two States away, that we lose these men and women. In fact, the one casualty we had out of the 983rd actually was sepa-

rated from his unit in Iraq and he wasn't with a buddy, and it creates a more vulnerable situation.

When they come home, they don't want to go to the VA clinic; they just want to go back to whatever county they are from. And it doesn't work that well at the local level. So we are glad you are focused on that. And I would just implore you to—we will send you this information, and maybe you can use it in some way. But we are looking for better ways to readjust those who are coming home.

ENERGY

My major question really revolves around energy. I am dedicating a major portion of my career to make this country energy-independent. I don't know that I am succeeding very much, but I am sure trying.

And I know the Marine Corps is listening. They have a great segment on their Web site. Army is a little—I don't know; they are out there somewhere. Navy is doing a lot.

And my question to you is, to what extent has our commitment to energy independence as a country actually been operationalized inside of your commands? And both on, for instance, trucks. I represent all these big trucks. And are we working on research platforms with our local universities, with the Reserve, with the Guard, to use all kinds of ingenuity to bring up gas mileage and to get new energy systems in there, as well as on the bases that you command? What about getting energy use down there, using new technologies?

How embedded is this in your operations, or are we still just at the cutting edge of all of this?

General MCKINLEY. Ma'am, I am in my fifth year here on this assignment. I was the director of the Air Guard before this. Both services, Air Force and Army, have put an awful lot of emphasis in these programs, which then translates down to the Army Guard and the Air Guard.

Each director had some statistical data that I pulled up today, because I knew you might be interested in this issue because you were last year. So they will give you—

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you for remembering.

General MCKINLEY. No, ma'am, I know that. And we thank you for that interest, because we think we have to put more emphasis in conserving our resources. DoD is the largest consumer of energy of anybody in the government.

My charge to both the directors of the Army and the Air Guard is to do continuous process improvement and wring out every efficiency we can. Because I know that it is not going to be long before the budgets in the Department of Defense are going to start getting more constrained, and we are going to have to wring out every dollar that we can within the National Guard to sustain the programs that are most meaningful to us.

So, that is my commitment to the Committee and to you, ma'am, is that we will continue to do that. But I would like, if you have a second—

PETROLEUM PRODUCT FUELS

Ms. KAPTUR. Just on the record, General, for Ohio, our General Yatt, our Adjutant, told us that one-third of his State share is spent on utilities, on facilities maintenance. And I said, what if we could relieve you of that burden and you could put it into readiness? Boy, his eyes got real big.

General MCKINLEY. Greg knows how this works, and he is a very strong advocate for this.

But, Bud, Air; and then Army; and then, Jack, I am sure you have a comment.

General WYATT. First of all, Congresswoman Kaptur, a comment. Air Force-wide, you probably have been following the conversion from use of petroleum product fuels. We are the largest user of petroleum products of any—

Ms. KAPTUR. I have noticed.

General WYATT. And what we are doing, we have an Air Force-wide program to take a look at biofuels conversion and testing biofuels in place of petroleum products. And we are making great progress.

Ms. KAPTUR. I would love to have someone, General, come and see me on that, so I can see where you are headed.

General WYATT. I will accommodate that, yes, ma'am.

And, also, I think the State of the Ohio is listening to you. I remember early in my tenure as a director visiting the 180th Fighter Wing, Block 42 F-16s, in Toledo—

Ms. KAPTUR. Best in the country.

General WYATT [continuing]. And a great, innovative solar energy farm that they have in place up there.

We have in the Air National Guard several initiatives across the country. I took a brief this morning from the Virgin Island Air National Guard exploring wind tunnel and wave action energy to help offset some of the costs of energy consumption in the Virgin Islands.

But we have done audits across all of the Air National Guard bases. We know where our problems are. We are now focusing about \$25 million a year out of our particular budget toward now putting our money where our knowledge is, into solving some of our energy efficiency problems.

Ms. KAPTUR. I am going to get a little parochial here, General, but I would love for you to work with the Reserve and figure out how to run a conduit from our F-16 unit up to the 983rd Combat Engineering Unit, and, all of a sudden, we help both bases.

General WYATT. You know, when I visited the folks at Toledo, there are periods of the day when they generate more energy than they use. So that is an option.

Ms. KAPTUR. And we would sure love that combat engineering unit to figure out how to store it. If we could do a fuel cell, whatever we need to do, to break through to new technologies, we are very interested in that. These are really intelligent people that are based out of those units, and they want to help.

General CARPENTER. Ma'am, a quick comment. The Army established a goal in 2003 to reduce the energy consumption by 3 percent. And the Army National Guard, over that period of time, has

reduced our consumption by 12 percent. And we are the only component that has met that requirement. So we are well aware of that particular initiative.

But we use the vehicles that the Army produces, for the most part, and so we are kind of stuck with how that fuel consumption works. Where we can really be innovative is in the facility business, as you pointed out.

And we have 15 States that are involved in different kinds of projects to conserve utilities. In North Carolina, we have a geothermal well that supports an installation there and reduces the utility costs. In other places we have wind farms and we have solar panels.

So that is really, as you pointed out, that is really where the savings can be harvested inside the Army National Guard.

Ms. KAPTUR. I know we have to vote, and the chairman has been very generous, but just let me say that, at our Air Guard base, they are looking at how to convert their fleets inside the base to plug-in hybrids in the solar system that is up there.

At the 983rd, we have the possibility to use local engineering talent at our university to help infuse the fuel systems with hydrogen in order to save on fuel and develop some new platforms. But we need the leadership at the national level to let these officers down at that level know it is okay. You know, we need these platforms out there at these Guard and Reserve bases, so anything you can do to help us on that would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STRYKER BRIGADE

Mr. DICKS. All right.

Let's go back to the Stryker Brigade. What do you think of the double-V hull on this Stryker, the one that is being developed?

General MCKINLEY. I will let the Army comment.

General CARPENTER. Sir, it is being developed inside the Army Evaluation Command. They are, as I understand it, working to field that particular product out to the Stryker Brigades.

I am not totally familiar with exactly what the status of that is, at this point. But suffice it to say, anything that protects soldiers is something that we absolutely are in support of.

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Well, General Dynamics I think is working on this, and they are trying to develop it as quickly as possible.

If a Stryker Brigade were added to the Army National Guard, where do you recommend it be located? And any answer that doesn't have the West Coast involved—well, I make no secret that I have recommended that we do it.

And Washington, Oregon, and California, I think all the Governors have written a letter suggesting that it be done with, I think, a battalion in each State. What do you think of that idea?

General MCKINLEY. Well, General Casey is obviously aware of the interest of the three States on the West Coast. General Casey has expressed an interest to me to dialogue. Obviously, the Army will provide those resources to the component that they choose.

I certainly think, from a strategic perspective, that the Stryker wheeled vehicle has applications to defense of the homeland. So I am interested in looking at ways to make sure that our single

Pennsylvania Stryker Brigade has an ability to round out itself. We have a saying in the National Guard—Jack, I don't know if it is in the Army Reserve—but if you have one of anything, it is not a good situation. So here we are in the National Guard with one Stryker brigade. We cannot cross-level. We can't bring in people from other parts of the country to help.

So, if the United States Army and if we were able to work an arrangement with the General Casey—the West Coast obviously is uncovered at this point. The southwest border, as we have talked about, is another area that is of concern to us. So those are my initial thoughts, sir.

Mr. DICKS. So you would be interested, possibly, in more than just one additional unit, but possibly a third?

General MCKINLEY. Sir, I can't get into General Casey's force modernization strategy, but I will tell you that both Jack and Ray have expressed an interest to me that this is a vehicle that is being used today; it is the future. It has much more relevance than a tracked vehicle for a variety of reasons. And so, as General Casey looks at his force lay-down, I certainly want to be at the table, and I know Jack and Ray do, too, when that discussion is made.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. The Army is talking about a new Bradley, right, or a follow-on to Bradley? Yeah. Has the Guard been involved in any of that discussion or not?

General CARPENTER. Well, sir, the only thing I am aware of is the new ground combat vehicle that is a replacement for the FCS program at this point. And it is in its initial stages inside the Army, at this point, sir.

M1 ABRAMS TANK

Mr. DICKS. Okay. What about the M1 Abrams tank? The Army budget request includes procuring two variants of the M1 Abrams tank. One version is the M1A1 situational awareness tank, and the other is the M1A2 system enhancement package. What are the advantages of each tank, and what are the key differences?

General CARPENTER. Sir, I would have to take that question for the record, if I could, please.

[The information follows:]

The M1A2 SEP comes with the following upgrades:

- Stabilized Commanders Weapon Station (CWS)
- Armored Gun Shields
- Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) II A kits
- Drivers rear Security System
- Improved Line Replaceable Units (LRU)
- Tank infantry phone
- Improved voltage regulator
- Blue Force Tracker and Force XXI Battle Command for Brigades & Below (FBCB2)

The M1A2 SEP doubles the all weather sensor capabilities to produce a true "hunter-killer" platform, while the updated computers provides split-second Command and Operations over the entire spectrum of conflict. The open architecture of the SEP is ready to accept the insertion of capability sets and other technology, while the built in testing and prognostics saves diagnosis and repair time and money. The upgrades to the SEP create an extraordinarily survivable and lethal fighting platform that provides the Soldier with an even greater advantage.

Mr. DICKS. The Army justification material indicates that the M1A1 situational awareness tanks are for the Army National

Guard and the M1A2 system enhancement package tanks are for the active Army.

What is the rationale in providing one type of M1 tank to the Army National Guard and another to active units?

General CARPENTER. Sir, currently we have two variants of tanks inside the Army National Guard, so this is not an unusual situation. As we deploy these units into theater, normally they get the most modern equipment and the most capable equipment. And so we have seen, inside of the deployments we have made, especially in 2005 when we were deploying heavy forces, that the best, the most modern piece of equipment was the tank that we used.

Now, as we see additional Stryker brigades fielded inside the Army, for instance, those newer, modern tanks will cascade to us inside the Army National Guard.

Mr. DICKS. Okay.

What about sniper detection? Are you involved in that at all? I assume you are.

General STULTZ. From the Army Reserve's perspective, no, sir.

MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST (MEEL)

Mr. DICKS. Just for the record, the Army has provided counter-sniper equipment to units in response to operational need statements from units which requested devices that are deployed or preparing to deploy.

Should counter-sniper equipment be standard issue for Army units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. Does the Army have a plan to make a soldier-worn and vehicle-mounted counter-sniper devices standard issue? What has been the feedback from soldiers who have used counter-sniper devices in combat?

Anybody have anything on that?

General CARPENTER. Sir, the deployment process for units that go to Iraq and Afghanistan is they get a MEEL, a mission-essential equipment list. And inside that MEEL, that is where you would find the counter-sniper capability as well as some of the other capabilities that you described.

As it is recognized by the theater commander or the units in theater as a requirement for that mission, it becomes part of the MEEL. And so, that is over and above what the normal equipment is that goes with that unit.

Mr. DICKS. So how do people train in that situation?

General CARPENTER. Sir, they either train—

Mr. DICKS. In Kuwait or in country or—

General CARPENTER. That is what I was going to say. They either train at the mobilization station before they depart CONUS, or they train in Kuwait, for instance, at Camp Buehring before they go up into Iraq.

Mr. DICKS. But they do have some opportunity to train on the equipment they are going to be using, right?

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir.

UH-60 SHORTFALLS

Mr. DICKS. What are the current UH-60 shortfalls in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard?

General CARPENTER. Sir, with regard to the Army National Guard, our biggest problem isn't the shortfall of the UH-60s. We actually, by the time we get the new piece of the modernization program here inside of fiscal year 2011, we will have the requisite number of UH-60s.

Our problem is modernization. When we get completed with the modernization program for the UH-60—that is the A to D model program that we are involved in right now, and the A to A model—we will still have over 200 aircraft at the end of that, which is in 2021–2022, I believe. We will still have aircraft that are not modernized. So, past the POM that we are dealing with right now, I think the number is around 220 aircraft.

Mr. DICKS. Right. So, in the NGREA account, there is not enough money there to be able to take care of these kinds of requirements, right?

General CARPENTER. Sir, we have not purchased any UH-60 helicopters with the NGREA account at this point. We are looking at that as an option, and we are working with the Secretary of Defense and also with, I believe, some of the members of your staff on that particular issue.

NGREA ACCOUNT

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you—you just raised a very interesting point. Do you get advice from the Secretary of Defense on how to spend the NGREA money? I thought we gave it to the Guard and you were supposed to figure it out. But I can understand that the Secretary could have a role in that, but how does that work?

General MCKINLEY. Sir, we do that within the National Guard. The Secretary allows us to do that. We brief it up through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Reserve Affairs so that they have full visibility. But what you send the money to us to do is what we do.

Mr. DICKS. And we give you flexibility to pick out your highest priority items, right?

General MCKINLEY. Absolutely.

Mr. DICKS. Okay.

General Carpenter, do you have any comment on that?

General CARPENTER. Sir, we have almost solely purchased what we call critical dual-use equipment inside the Army National Guard with the NGREA account, and we will continue to do that. We have never, however, purchased a UH-60 aircraft, to this point. And we haven't been told no. And, frankly, we are interested.

Mr. DICKS. General Wyatt, what are the current HH-60 shortfalls in the Air National Guard?

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman, we have three HH-60 combat search and rescue (CSAR) units in the Air National Guard: New York, Alaska, and California—five aircraft at each of those locations. I believe there is a program of acquisition in the Air Force now for six HH-60s to replace aircraft lost in theater. I think those aircraft are scheduled to go to the active component.

When the CSAR-X program was cancelled, our concern became replacement and/or recapitalization of our aging HH-60 fleet. So while we don't currently have any shortfalls in the number of airframes, we are looking at ways to improve the capabilities and

make sure that those aircraft that we have are recapitalized and/or modernized until the next platform of choice comes on line with the United States Air Force.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. I have a couple more questions, but why don't we go vote?

[Recess.]

SPIN-OUTS FOR THE BRIGADE MODERNIZATION EQUIPMENT

Mr. DICKS. We have General Carpenter here.

When will the Army National Guard units begin to receive items of equipment that are spinouts from the cancelled Future Combat System program? Or will you?

General CARPENTER. Sir, originally there was no plan for us to receive the spinouts. And subsequently there has been a plan now put in place for, I believe it is two brigades inside the Army National Guard that are going to receive those spinouts, probably somewhere post-2015.

Mr. DICKS. 2015. What is your assessment of the potential contribution of the spinout equipment to the Army National Guard units?

General CARPENTER. Sir, most of those spinouts are technology-oriented and will improve the capability of the unit as they assume their mission.

Mr. DICKS. Will they have any relevance to the State mission?

General CARPENTER. The spinouts that I have seen, sir, may have. I would like to take that one for the record.

[The information follows:]

The Spin-outs for the Brigade Modernization Equipment are tentatively scheduled to reach the Army National Guard (ARNG) late in FY13. The ARNG will either receive the XM 156 Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or the XM1216 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle from the Future Combat Systems spin out program. Both vehicles have the potential to be used in support of domestic operations as well as for the tactical mission.

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. And you might as well do this: What do you expect this equipment will contribute to the tactical mission and for the disaster relief? So we will do that one for the record.

[The information follows;]

The ARNG will either receive the XM 156 Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or the XM1216 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle from the Future Combat Systems spin out program. Both vehicles have the potential to be used in support of domestic operations, as well as for the tactical mission.

The committee understands that A-model Apaches found only in the Army National Guard units are not considered deployable for the current fights. The Army has been in the process of converting early-model AH-64A aircraft to the AH-64D configuration. What is the status of getting all of the older A-model Apaches converted to D-models?

General CARPENTER. Sir, we have four units, four battalions that have not been modernized; read that: Go from the AH-64D model to the Longbow model. And we are scheduled to complete the transformation of all those battalions by 2014.

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Is the A to D conversion fully funded?

General CARPENTER. Sir, it is in the POM.

Mr. DICKS. It is in the POM, okay.

What training aids or simulators are available to train air crews to avoid both hostile and non-hostile losses?

General WYATT. Can I take that for the Air National Guard, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. Yeah.

General WYATT. We do have some simulation at some of our units, primarily fighter units, to avoid the hostile fire.

Mr. DICKS. But what about the Apaches? Do the Apaches have simulators?

General CARPENTER. Yes, sir. There is a simulation program at the Army Aviation Center in Rucker. And there are also some regional aviation training sites where there are simulators for that purpose.

Mr. DICKS. All right. I think we have covered it. Thank you very much. We appreciate your good work.

And the committee stands adjourned until April the 21st at 10:00 a.m., when we will hold a hearing on the national capital register master plan for medical.

Thank you, gentlemen.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the answers thereto follow:]

AT-6B NATIONAL GUARD DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

Question. Last week, the RAND Corporation released a study recommending investing in Irregular Warfare capability, including purchasing 100 AT-6B-like aircraft (along with 30 additional MC-12s-ISR aircraft).

Can you please explain what the current timeline is for the AT-6B Air National Guard Demonstration Program?

Answer. The ANG AT-6B demo is scheduled for August/September 2010.

Question. What do you see the future of Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance aircraft in the Guard and active force?

Answer. While the Air National Guard (ANG) cannot address how the active force will ultimately organize, train, and equip the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) force; the ANG is full partners with the active force in developing this much needed capability. The ANG has addressed the possible future of the LAAR aircraft within the ANG force structure as part of the ANG Flight Plan, excerpted below:

"The ANG has a pool of highly qualified specialists that would bring immediate experience and expertise to Irregular Warfare (IW) missions in both material and non-material solutions. The work force maturity and experience of ANG pilots and maintainers will benefit the Building Partnership Capacity aspect of the LAAR mission. The ANG's dual federal/state missions and cross-domain expertise makes the ANG well-suited to perform IW-focused missions.

In the test and training areas, the ANG has a proven record of achievement in fighter/attack test and training through the ANG Air Force Reserve Test Center (AATC) and Formal Training Units. Additionally, the ANG is already involved with LAAR technology development through the AATC/AT-6 demonstration and a formal cross-flow of information with the Imminent Fury Operation Test and Evaluation.

The United States Air Force post-Base Realignment and Closure fighter draw down will leave many ANG fighter units without a mission, risking the loss of valuable fighter/attack experience and absorbable cockpits. These units have basing facilities and access to airspace and ranges that would facilitate bed-down of a LAAR force.

As evidenced by the ANG's mature partnership efforts through the State Partnership Program, heavy participation in Remotely Piloted Aircraft operations and processing, exploitation, and dissemination the ANG is already involved in IW efforts. As IW-related mission areas mature—specifically with regards to procurement levels, organization constructs, and training requirements—the ANG will likely be well-suited for proportional representation. In addition to presenting highly experienced personnel to the Combatant Commands, Guardsmen can provide the capabili-

ties of IW platforms to the states to meet emerging Incident Awareness and Assessment and Defense Support of Civilian Authorities needs.’

AFRICOM

Question. In addition, Thomas Lamont, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve affairs, said “Our Reserve force can play a great role in U.S. Army Africa’s missions, bringing with them military skills and also skills from their civilian lives that apply to emerging nations on the African continent.”

What are your thoughts on growing the role and responsibility of the Army Reserve in AFRICOM? Would it make sense to have an AFRICOM dedicated Army Reserve Theater Support Command base in the United States?

Answer. The Army Reserve has built Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) Combat Support (CS)/Combat Service Support (CSS) as one of its core competencies. Our Civil Affairs, Engineer, Medical, Logistic and Training capabilities fit well with AFRICOM’s potential needs. To your specific question, today we provide 38% of the Army’s EAB CSS capability and are well positioned to assume an additional Theater Support Command (TSC) if the Army’s requirement system determines there is a need for it. Currently the Army has not made the determination if AFRICOM and United States Army Africa (USARAF) require a TSC. The Total Army Analysis 14–18 (TAA 14–18) is in progress and will validate all force structure requirements; this will provide the analysis to support the Army leadership in making resourcing decisions.

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahart. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answer thereto follow.]

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Question. As you are aware, since calendar year 2000, Congress has appropriated over half a billion dollars to establish, certify and equip the 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (CST) Teams. Recognizing the extremely perishable skills of the Teams and the need for a coordinated and standardized training program, in Fiscal Year 2007 Congress authorized and appropriated the CST Sustainment Training and Evaluation Program. This program directly addresses the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve stated concern that the nation “does not have sufficient trained, ready forces available” to respond to a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons incident, creating “an appalling gap that places the nation and its citizens at greater risk.”

Since the initiation of CST STEP, over forty (40) teams have received collective sustainment training at the HAMMER Training and Education Center ensuring that a critical national asset is ready to respond at any time, in a coordinated fashion, to CBRNE incidents. Throughout the past several years Congress has worked closely with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to support long-term programmatic funding for the CST STEP. NGB staff continue to be supportive of the CST STEP and the HAMMER facility, however, I am concerned with your commitment to make CST STEP a program of record. What are your plans for funding the CST STEP in the current fiscal year? What are your plans for funding the CST STEP in Fiscal Year 2012?

Answer. CST STEP remains an important program to ensure readiness of critical CBRNE and disaster response capability within the United States. Although we do not have current year funds, we are working closely with the Services to seek FY12–17 POM funding for live agent training in support of our CST capability. Recently, Congress has not fully appropriated requested funding for the CSTs and other NG CBRNE capabilities. However, the NG remains committed to seeking out all training venues that effectively meets documented training requirements and are supportable within the budget appropriated by Congress.

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010.

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

WITNESSES

CHARLES L. RICE, M.D., PRESIDENT, UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH SCIENCES, PERFORMING THE DUTIES FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS

DOROTHY ROBYN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

VADM JOHN MATECZUN, MC, USN, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION MEDICAL

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order.

Today, the Committee will receive testimony regarding the National Capital Region integration as a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure, known as BRAC. This hearing will cover the comprehensive master plan and various medical treatment issues pertaining to soldiers and their family members.

The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, with full support from this Committee, required the Department of Defense to develop and implement a comprehensive master plan to provide world-class military medical facilities and an integrated system of health care delivery for the NCR. Military medicine in the National Capital Region already incorporates many of the world-class attributes and capabilities. However, the Committee is concerned about the timeline for integration and ensuring that access to treatment is not disrupted.

The 2005 BRAC recommendation that will realign operations from Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital is the Department's first step in the larger effort to transform the way it delivers health care in the NCR. This transition represents the most significant realignment of medical care, including the movement of patients, physicians, and facilities, in the history of the Department of Defense. DOD has estimated the total cost of the newly identified requirements associated with achieving the new standard will be \$781 million.

The projects, including conversion to single-patient rooms and replacement and renovation of older infrastructure on the campus, requires a mix of military construction and operation and maintenance funding. The plan intends to provide wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers with access to warrior transition services that will surpass the quality of current services. The plan will also provide a road map to continue improving healthcare facilities for our military families.

The Committee understands that resolving budgetary and governance issues is critical to the success of this integration. The Committee stands ready to assist, but it is ultimately the responsibility of the Department to develop a plan to guide the way ahead. The committee would hope that the Department would take seriously the need to fully fund in future budget submissions the upgrade and/or replacement of military medical facilities throughout the enterprise.

Now I will turn to Mr. Young for any comments that he would like to make.

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I wanted to join with you in welcoming our distinguished panel this morning.

The condition of our medical facilities in the National Capital Region and throughout the country is an issue that is very important to me and to this subcommittee.

Since the beginning of the war on terror, my wife and I have spent hundreds of days at both Bethesda and Walter Reed and know firsthand the challenges facing our wounded soldiers who receive their treatment there and their families who—at some point, the government leaves off, but the families still need a lot of help and especially the medical professionals who take such good care of them.

The BRAC decision to consolidate these facilities has been made; and so we focus our attention to making sure that our men and women, our heroes, our warriors serving our country and their families, are provided with the world-class health care facilities they deserve. It is both of our jobs to make sure that happens, and it is a job that we on this subcommittee take very seriously, and I am sure that our panel does as well.

So I look forward to our discussion this morning, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for the tremendous interest that you have always shown in our wounded heroes and our medical facilities. I look forward to this hearing this morning.

Thank you.

Mr. DICKS. Dr. Rice, you may proceed with your statement. Your entire statement will be placed in the record.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. RICE

Dr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our plans for fully implementing the BRAC decisions as they relate to military medical transformation in the National Capital Region. I want to offer a few brief statements today about where we are headed in the next 17 months, as well as over the longer term.

The decision to consolidate medical functions in the National Capital Region is one of the single most transformative initiatives in the military health system, as you have already observed. It will change how we deliver and integrate health care delivery in a joint environment.

We have 440,000 beneficiaries in this region, 80,000 of whom are enrolled in our military hospitals and clinics. The NCR also serves

as the principal referral center for casualties aeromedically evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan combat theaters, a population to whom we have profound obligations.

The major transition activities planned for completion in the next 17 months include the closure of Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the relocation of many of the clinical activities to the Bethesda Naval Hospital campus to become the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center; relocation of other Walter Reed activities to a newly built community hospital at Fort Belvoir; the closure of inpatient services at the medical center at Andrews Air Force base, with a comprehensive ambulatory care clinic and aeromedical staging facility remaining in place.

Construction at both the Bethesda and Fort Belvoir sites is well under way. Our approach to medical facility design is new. Investments in evidence-based design concepts for our new facilities offer a better healing environment for patients and their families and other important benefits to include lower infection rates and shorter lengths of stay.

The hospital at Fort Belvoir will be a showcase for this new approach. Admiral Mateczun, Dr. Robyn, and I recently visited the Fort Belvoir hospital last month, and we were all impressed by the design concepts being incorporated that will create an unmatched healing environment.

I thank you again for this opportunity. The new approach to health care in the National Capital Region will set new standards for design, service, and quality. We believe it will be a model not just for military medicine, but for United States medicine. I appreciate the ongoing support of this committee and your continuing interest as we complete our master transition plan and finalize our governance model.

I am pleased to respond to any questions that you may have, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Dr. Rice follows:]

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BY THE COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY

CHARLES L. RICE, M.D.

PRESIDENT, UNIFORMED SERVICES UNIVERSITY OF THE HEALTH
SCIENCES, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS REGARDING

THE JOINT TASK FORCE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION MEDICAL: MASTER PLAN

BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

April 21, 2010

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our plans for fully implementing the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions as they relate to military medical transformation in the National Capital Region (NCR). I also thank you for your support of our military beneficiaries in the NCR, and around the world.

The decision to consolidate medical functions in the NCR is one of the single most transformative initiatives in the Military Health System (MHS), and will change how we deliver and integrate health care delivery in a joint environment. I am pleased to share my perspectives along with the other leaders who are instrumental in seeing this transformation through to completion – Vice Admiral John Mateczun, Commander of the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical, Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Mr. Michael McCord, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Comptroller, and Vice Admiral Michael Vitale, Commander, Naval Installations Command.

I want to provide the Committee an overview of the current state of the MHS, particularly as it relates to the many activities driven by BRAC underway in the NCR, and our near term plans to ensure the needs of our beneficiaries and expectations of our stakeholders are met and exceeded.

The MHS serves over 9.5 million beneficiaries – Active Duty personnel, retired personnel and their families, plus many men and women in our Reserve and Guard and their families. Within the NCR, the Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for approximately 440,000 beneficiaries; 80,000 of whom are enrolled to our military medical treatment facilities (MTFs).

In addition to the enrolled population, the NCR serves as the principal referral center for casualties aeromedically evacuated from the Iraq and Afghanistan combat theaters. We have profound obligations to these wounded Service members and their families. It is when we make reference to creating “world-class” facilities and services, the needs and requirements of these heroes are foremost in our minds.

Implementation of the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendations has required a careful choreography of four interrelated planning factors – people, physical infrastructure, processes, and technology. Each factor has required substantial cross-Service coordination, particularly as it relates to assignment and oversight of personnel, and command authorities. Additionally, we have responded to the Defense Health Board recommendations regarding important facility upgrades to adhere to our commitment to build a facility that honors the sacrifice of those we will serve. The Department remains committed to completing this transition within the statutory deadline of September 15, 2011.

The major transition activities planned for completion in the next 17 months include:

- Closure of Walter Reed and relocation of many clinical activities to the Bethesda Naval hospital campus, creating the consolidated Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC).
- Relocation of other Walter Reed activities to a newly built community hospital at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
- Closure of inpatient services at the medical center at Andrews Air Force Base, with a comprehensive ambulatory care clinic remaining in place.

This relocation of facilities and expansion of outpatient services will give eligible beneficiaries more proximate and convenient healthcare. The reduction of excess capacity and related overhead will release scarce personnel and resources to meet the changing needs of wounded warriors, active duty families, and retirees.

Both the Bethesda and Fort Belvoir sites are replete with construction equipment and crews. Our approach to medical facility design is new. Investments in evidence based design (EBD) concepts for our new facilities are critically important as they offer a better healing environment for patients and their families. The hospital at Fort Belvoir will be a showcase for this new approach. I visited Fort Belvoir last month and was impressed by the design concepts that incorporated to create an unmatched healing environment.

Evidence based design has been shown to have important benefits, medical facilities that have utilized this approach show fewer infection rates and shorter lengths of stay. In the end, I am confident that medical facilities will result in better services, quality, and access for our patients.

On the Bethesda campus, there are a number of other facilities being constructed or upgraded to reflect the very special role of this medical center to serve our wounded Service members. This includes the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, a Vision Center of Excellence, Wounded Warrior Transition Units, and other administrative offices.

Finally, one of the more challenging elements of this transition has been to develop a command and governance plan which ensures the vision of the BRAC Commission and of the Department is fulfilled. Specifically, we are creating a truly joint medical organization, comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force medical personnel, united to serve our joint population. With the WRNMMC serving as the flagship medical facility, we are also working with our colleagues in the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Institutes of Health to craft a highly collaborative relationship across clinical services delivery and medical research. Consequently, the joint leader for this service area must be empowered to make decisions and move resources on behalf of the patient served.

While the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) is not a new construct, the application of this model for a United States-based geographic medical area of operation is new. Chairman Mullen and the Service Chiefs have worked tirelessly to establish a long-term leadership plan that provides the maximum authority to the JTF Commander, establishes clear accountability for performance, and ensures transparency in how we will oversee this organization going forward. I am confident the organizational model approved by Chairman Mullen and Deputy Secretary Lynn will work to provide our patients and our medical staffs with authority moved closest to the point of care.

Conclusion

I want to thank you again for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to offer the people we serve a set of medical facilities that will set new standards for design, service, and quality is a model for not just military medicine, but United States medicine, and which will improve our medical facilities in the NCR. I appreciate the ongoing support of this Committee, and your interest as we complete our master transition plan and finalize our governance model. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Mr. DICKS. We will finish the witnesses and then go to questions.
Dr. Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. ROBYN

Dr. ROBYN. Thank you, Chairman Dicks, Congressman Young, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you this morning.

My office is the advocate for maintaining the investment necessary for our facilities to support our missions and personnel effectively. My office also oversees the BRAC process which, among other things, has been a significant engine for the recapitalization of our enduring facilities. The 2005 BRAC process is channeling a significant amount of money into our enduring facilities, with hospitals and medical facilities among the largest beneficiaries.

The 2005 BRAC commission endorsed the Department of Defense's proposal to consolidate and realign medical care delivery in the National Capital Region. The BRAC decision recognized that the renovation of the aged and deteriorating Walter Reed facility was not the best use of our resources. By allowing us to channel these resources to the new configuration, BRAC addressed long-standing health care facility needs in the National Capital Region. In the Department's view, this restructuring will transform medical care delivery in the NCR.

Now, with less than 17 months to go before the BRAC deadline, September 2011, we are on schedule and on track to provide state-of-the-art facilities under the BRAC program for our wounded warriors and other beneficiaries in the National Capital Region.

As Dr. Rice said, we just toured the construction at Bethesda. It is quite remarkable, 10 years of construction activity going on in 2-and-a-half years' space of time on a very small footprint with a number of challenges.

In the course of transforming medical care in the NCR, we have made positive course corrections at several points in response to outside independent reviews. I won't go into detail on those, but I will say that the enhancements that resulted from responding to those outside recommendations account for most of the increase in the cost of this BRAC process. It was originally estimated to cost \$1 billion in the NCR and has ended up costing \$2.6 billion. A little bit of that was inflation given the very high inflation we saw in the construction industry, but most was actual expansion of scope and improvements that were not initially anticipated.

In addition, because of these course corrections, by the time we complete the medical BRAC construction at Bethesda and Belvoir, those facilities will have many of the attributes of the world-class standard as defined by the Defense Health Board.

In addition to the improvements we have already made, we will be making longer-term efforts to achieve all of the world-class attributes at Bethesda. However, those improvements should occur separate from BRAC and after we have completed the BRAC construction process. The reason is simple. We have an enormous amount of construction under way now at Bethesda linked to BRAC. As we said, the installation has a small footprint and the terrain and the on-base roads impose additional constraints. We

simply cannot undertake any additional construction without jeopardizing the safety of ongoing medical operations.

I appreciate this opportunity to highlight what we are doing. My colleagues and I look forward to working with the Congress to help make these goals a reality. Thank you.

[The statement of Dr. Robyn follows:]

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BY THE COMMITTEE

Statement of

Dr. Dorothy Robyn
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)

Before the
Subcommittee on Defense
of the
House Appropriations Committee

Transformation of Medical Care in the National Capitol Region
Through BRAC and Beyond

April 21, 2010

Chairman Dicks, Congressman Young and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you to discuss the transformation of medical care in the National Capital Region (NCR) through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) and the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH). I will also highlight the Department's effort beyond BRAC.

Introduction

I am responsible for overseeing the Department's building and installation portfolio, which is valued at some \$700 billion. My office is the advocate for maintaining the investment necessary for our facilities to effectively support our missions and personnel. I also oversee the BRAC process which, among other things, has been a significant engine for the recapitalization of our enduring facilities. The 2005 BRAC process is channeling a significant amount of money into our facilities, with hospitals and other medical facilities among the largest beneficiaries. My office has also become a champion for the establishment of multi-service, or "joint" installations, as a result of the BRAC 2005 decision to "merge" a number of bases that are located in close proximity. The goal is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these bases by broadening their utilization in support of the overall military mission.

The initiative to consolidate and realign medical care delivery in the NCR is of particular importance to my office, because of its basis in BRAC and its focus on

transforming medical care through a joint delivery system. My staff and I work closely with the people who have direct responsibility for planning and executing the construction necessary to implement BRAC for healthcare facilities in the NCR: VADM John Mateczun, the Commander of the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical; and Dr. Charles Rice, the senior official performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

In my testimony today, I will provide an overview of the original BRAC goals for restructuring our healthcare facilities in the NCR and subsequent enhancements the Department has pursued. I will also summarize our near-term plans to improve the Bethesda campus outside of the BRAC program and the status of the NCR Medical Master Plan.

Basis for and Execution of the BRAC 2005 Action

The BRAC 2005 decision reflected four major concerns about medical care in the NCR. First, there was a growing mismatch between the location of eligible beneficiaries and that of major medical facilities. Although the patient population was becoming increasingly concentrated in the southern part of the region, the two largest facilities (Bethesda and Walter Reed) were located just 6.4 miles from one another in the north. Second, due to a growing demand for outpatient services, Bethesda and Walter Reed had significant excess inpatient capacity. For example, Walter Reed was only using about 200 beds - less than one-sixth of its design capacity (1230 beds). Third, Walter Reed's

infrastructure was deteriorating due to a combination of heavy use and chronic under-investment in maintenance and repair. Estimates at the time indicated it would cost \$600-700 million to replace or renovate Walter Reed and under existing budget assumptions, that work would take many years to complete (6-8 years for replacement, 10-15 years for renovation). Finally, while medical care in the NCR was of superb quality, the attributes of a more modern, integrated system would improve the previous Service-centric, facility-based approach.

In response to these concerns, the 2005 BRAC Commission endorsed the Department's proposal to consolidate and realign medical care delivery in the NCR. Consistent with the BRAC directive, and in compliance with the BRAC deadline of September 15, 2011, the Department will:

- Close Walter Reed and move some of its activities to the Bethesda Naval hospital, creating the consolidated Walter Reed National Military Medical Center.
- Move other Walter Reed activities to a new community hospital at Ft. Belvoir.
- Close inpatient services at the medical center at Andrews Air Force Base, leaving an ambulatory clinic, the Malcolm Grow Surgical Center, in place.

The BRAC decision recognized that renovation of the aged and deteriorating Walter Reed facility was not the best use of our resources. By allowing us to channel these resources to the new configuration, BRAC addressed long-standing healthcare facility needs in this area.

In the Department's view, this restructuring will transform medical care delivery in the NCR. The strategic relocation of facilities and the related expansion of outpatient services will give eligible beneficiaries more proximate and convenient access to healthcare. The reduction of excess capacity and related overhead will free up scarce personnel and resources to meet the changing needs of wounded warriors, active duty families, and retirees. Furthermore, the shift from a legacy medical platform to a modernized, joint operational system will provide a host of benefits, ranging from enhanced recruiting and personnel retention to an improved ability to incorporate and capitalize on evolving methods and trends in healthcare delivery.

Now, with less than 17 months to go before the BRAC deadline, we are on schedule and on track to provide state-of-the-art facilities under the BRAC program for our wounded warriors and other beneficiaries in the NCR. VADM Mateczun and Dr. Rice deserve praise for their leadership and the efforts of their staffs. I just toured the Bethesda campus and was impressed with the amount of construction being accomplished within the limited footprint of that facility. The Navy is doing a great job in carefully managing construction while continuing to operate the medical center.

By the BRAC deadline, we will have constructed and renovated the Bethesda and Ft. Belvoir facilities to accommodate a staff of over 9,000 with approximately 3 million square feet of clinical and administrative space, supporting 465 inpatient beds (345 at

Bethesda and 120 at Ft. Belvoir). These statistics underscore the enormity and complexity of this undertaking:

1. More than 682,000 square feet of world-class inpatient and ambulatory clinical space will be added to Bethesda's final footprint;
2. Over 300,000 square feet of alterations to the existing medical center at Bethesda will be completed;
3. 700,000 square feet of administrative space, enlisted quarters, and facilities will be provided at Bethesda in support of the Warrior Transition Services; and
4. A 1.2 million square foot, innovative, state-of-the-art hospital will be constructed at Ft. Belvoir, fully incorporating Evidence-Based Design.

Enhancements to the Process

Our effort to transform medical care in the NCR has undergone positive course corrections at several points in the last several years. Let me mention two. The first one came in response to the *Independent Review Group (IRG) on Rehabilitative Care and Administrative Processes at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and National Naval Medical Center*, which was co-chaired by former Secretary of the Army Togo West and former Secretary of the Army and Congressman Jack Marsh. Drawing on the IRG recommendations as well as on lessons learned directly from combat, the Department committed to creating "Warrior Transition Unit" facilities at Bethesda to enhance wounded warrior care, especially for the outpatient convalescent phase. The Department also committed to enhancing inpatient facilities at both Belvoir and Bethesda by

incorporating “Evidence-Based Design” in the construction of these facilities through the translation of principles for improving the healing environment into the built environment. These enhancements account for most of the increase in the cost of medical transformation in the NCR that we have seen—from the initial BRAC estimate of \$1 billion to the current estimate of \$2.6 billion.

Second, the Department has responded to the recommendations of the July 2009 Defense Health Board (DHB) Subcommittee report, *Achieving World Class: An Independent Review of the Design Plans for the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital*. As a result, by the time we complete the medical BRAC construction in the NCR, WRNMMC and Belvoir will have many of the attributes of the DHB’s newly defined world-class standard. Specifically, we are using \$65 million in FY2010 to expand the existing operating rooms at Bethesda to meet this standard. We have also realigned \$125 million of BRAC FY 2010 funding for WRNMMC to address other DHB recommendations, including the incorporation of input from clinicians and end users. We have also requested \$80 million in military construction projects in our FY 2011 budget for warrior lodging and parking at WRNMMC, Bethesda. Once we finish the BRAC renovations, conversion to single-patient hospital rooms (one of the newly established world-class standards) will be more than 50 percent complete at Bethesda.

In addition to the improvements described above, we will be making longer-term efforts to achieve all the world-class attributes at WRNMMC. However, those improvements should occur separate from BRAC and after we have completed the BRAC construction process. The reason is simple: we have an enormous amount of construction underway now at Bethesda because of BRAC. Moreover, the installation has a small footprint, and the terrain and the system of on-base roads impose additional constraints. We simply cannot undertake any additional construction without jeopardizing the safety of the ongoing medical operations.

The NCR Medical Master Plan, required by section 2714 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2010, will provide detail on the framework and future actions necessary to further achieve the DHB-defined attributes of a world class medical facility and an integrated healthcare delivery system. The Department will provide this plan to the Congress in the very near future.

Conclusion

Thank you for this opportunity to highlight the Department's efforts to improve the delivery of healthcare in the NCR. This is an extraordinarily complex undertaking but one that will deliver major benefits. BRAC provides the NCR with a medical platform superior to what we have now, and the NCR Medical Master Plan will map the actions necessary to achieve "world class" for the rest of WRNMMC. My colleagues and I look forward to working with the Congress to help make these goals a reality.

Mr. DICKS. All right. Admiral Maticzun.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MATECZUN

Admiral MATECZUN. Thank you, Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young and other distinguished members of the subcommittee for inviting us here to discuss the Department's progress in transforming military medicine in the National Capital Region to improve care for our Nation's servicemembers, particularly those most in need of our help, the wounded warriors who are returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, retirees, and their families.

This committee has gone to extraordinary measures to support these efforts in the National Capital Region. Not only will these efforts allow for enhanced cancer care in the region, the committee's support has and will continue to be invaluable to the Department's efforts to achieve the new statutory world-class medical facility standards at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital.

The comprehensive master plan required in the fiscal year 2010 NDAA is in the final stages of approval within the Department and is a top priority for DOD top leaders. I have had the opportunity to meet with Admiral Mullen, as the chairman; the vice chairman, General Cartwright; and the services chiefs in the tank on many occasions to discuss military medicine in the National Capital Region. Dr. Rice and Dr. Robyn, who are here today, Dr. Stanley and Mr. Hale and Secretary Lynn have been intimately involved throughout the development of this plan. This type of involvement from the Department's top leaders is an indication of our commitment to the issue and its inherent complexity.

Military medicine and the National Capital Region has made great progress in incorporating additional attributes of world class as defined by the Defense Health Board and codified in the fiscal year 2010 NDAA. DOD has provided \$65 million of funding in fiscal year 2010 to expand the existing operating rooms at Bethesda to achieve that new world-class standard. It has also realigned \$125 million in additional fiscal year 2010 BRAC funding for Bethesda to address many other recommendations of the Defense Health Board's panel, including the incorporation of input from clinicians and end users.

Moreover, the Department has requested \$80 million in fiscal year 2011 of the President's budget to expand ADA-compliant lodging and parking on the Bethesda installation. The lodging design that we are now using will support warriors and nonmedical attendants in a two-bedroom suite concept that will improve on the Malone House model at use at Walter Reed today.

We have moved into this era where we are providing rehabilitation to the wounded warriors who are coming back, particularly those with wound injuries and amputation and traumatic brain injury, and this rehabilitation requires a new model for the lodging that we use for them. It requires that we transition them from an inpatient status to activities of daily living with a nonmedical attendant, if necessary, and then move them on to becoming increasingly independent in those activities of daily living and then even off campus to make sure that they have achieved the independence

necessary to move on, either back into the Department or into retirement.

Once the BRAC renovations are finished, conversion to single-patient rooms, which is one of the newly established world-class standards, will be more than 50 percent complete on the Bethesda campus. When approved, the master plan will show how the Department will address those additional world-class attributes that are required, and the plan will address concerns expressed in letters this committee and the House Armed Services Committee sent to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary.

Thank you again for inviting us to discuss the progress of military medicine and for the critical support that this committee has provided. I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of admiral Mateczun follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN MATECZUN, MC, USN
COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION MEDICAL

BEFORE THE

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

APRIL 21, 2010

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young, and committee members, thank you for the opportunity to share with you the Department of Defense's (DoD) progress on realigning and transforming Military Medicine in the National Capital Region (NCR) to enhance the world-class healthcare capabilities already existing in our nation's primary military casualty reception site and then to achieve the newly defined world-class standard. The Department anticipates that new construction conducted during BRAC will provide state-of-the art facilities at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), Bethesda and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH) by 15 September 2011. The new facilities will incorporate numerous world-class improvements and allow for better delivery of healthcare and recovery services to service members, retirees, and eligible families in the NCR.

The Department's has nearly completed a comprehensive master plan for the NCR Medical that will address the requirements under Section 2714 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to develop and implement a comprehensive master plan to provide sufficient world-class military medical facilities and an integrated system of healthcare delivery for the NCR. In addition to finalizing the plan, the Department has made substantial progress in implementing the findings and recommendations identified by the NCR BRAC Health Systems Advisory Subcommittee of the Defense Health Board's (DHB) independent review of plans for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH, provided in July 2009.

The Department is grateful for the efforts by the DHB to define the attributes of a world-class medical facility and the Department, in its 15 October 2009 submission to Congress, endorsed the specific recommendations the panel made for WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH to achieve this newly defined standard. With few exceptions, in the DHB panel's review found the

plans for FBCH to meet the new world-class medical facility standard. In addition, the Department believes it has made substantial progress in addressing the panel's recommendations for WRNMMC, Bethesda, since the DHB panel's review was provided in July 2009. The remaining recommendations related to the current BRAC construction will be completed by 15 September 2011.

In the comprehensive master plan, the Department will outline these additional world-class enhancements, as recommended by the DHB, for the NCR that include recapitalizing the aging part of the infrastructure at Bethesda and providing additional Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant warrior lodging, which improves upon the Mologne House model in use at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) today. The plan will also realign organizational and budgetary authorities to more effectively manage the WRAMC BRAC transition and the implementation of an integrated system of healthcare delivery.

World-Class Healthcare Capabilities Currently in the NCR

Today, WRAMC, National Naval Medical Center (NMMC) and Malcolm Grow Medical Center (MGMC) provide among the best healthcare and recovery services available in the world. The hospitals already achieve many attributes of the DHB panel's newly defined world-class standard and provide exceptional care of patients.

The capabilities at WRAMC for amputee care are already world-class and in fact lead the world in transformations in prosthetics care and rehabilitation; the NMMC's expertise in open Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) is renowned worldwide; and the state-of-the-art aeromedical staging facility at Joint Base Andrews provides a medically capable and caring atmosphere for our returning wounded warriors, the vast majority of whom transit through the NCR, even if they do not receive continued care in the region. The quality of care at the new WRNMMC, Bethesda

and the FBCH will retain this degree of excellence and those attributes of world-class care provided today in the region, and will further enhance areas of care to achieve additional world-class attributes.

The 2005 BRAC recommendation that realigned operations from WRAMC to WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH was the Department's first step in a larger effort to transform, realign, and significantly enhance the way it delivers healthcare in the NCR today and in the future. Taking into account the recommendations of the DoD's 2007 Independent Review Group and the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors (Dole-Shalala), the DoD Senior Oversight Council recommended and the Department established the Joint Task Force, National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as a Standing JTF to oversee these efforts, as well as the NCR Medical BRAC recommendations. Reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JTF CAPMED is an integral part of the DoD's commitment to provide the best healthcare available.

By the completion of Medical BRAC construction in the NCR, WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH will be fully operational hospitals with many of the attributes necessary to meet the newly defined world-class standard. Regarding current facility construction at WRNMMC, Bethesda, DoD has provided \$65M of funding in FY 2010 to expand the existing operating rooms (ORs) at NNMC to achieve the new world-class standard and has also realigned \$125M in additional FY 2010 BRAC funding for WRNMMC, Bethesda to address many other recommendations of the DHB panel, including the incorporation of input from clinicians and end users. Moreover, DoD has requested \$80M in the FY 2011 President's Budget to expand ADA compliant Warrior lodging and parking on the Bethesda installation. Once the BRAC renovations are finished, conversion to single-patient hospital rooms (one of the newly

established world-class standards) will be more than 50 percent complete at WRNMMC, Bethesda.

Comprehensive Master Plan for the National Capital Region Medical

The Department's comprehensive master plan will be a road map to achieve the additional world-class attributes, which were not part of the BRAC and the DHB panel identified for the NCR hospitals and were incorporated in the NDAA for FY 2010 and the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2010 Committee Print. The plan will provide the framework and specific action plans for world-class military medical hospitals and an integrated system of healthcare delivery for the NCR. Details related to the plan, particularly specific facility projects, will continue to be refined and integrated into the current NNMC Master Facility Plan.

The plan will provide an estimate of the total cost of requirements associated with achieving the newly defined world-class standard at WRNMMC, Bethesda and realigns budgetary and organizational authorities in the NCR to allow JTF CAPMED to more effectively oversee the WRAMC BRAC transition and operate an integrated regional healthcare delivery system. Most importantly, the Department is ensuring that wounded warriors returning from war will continue to receive the best healthcare and recovery services available.

World-Class Facilities in the National Capital Region

Since its 15 October 2009 submission to Congress in response to the DHB panel's review of WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH, DoD has initiated a master facilities planning process to define and execute the requirements to achieve the newly defined world-class standards at WRNMMC, Bethesda as part of its comprehensive master plan.

The projects will include completing the conversion to single-patient rooms and replacing and renovating older infrastructure on the campus, and will require a mix of Military Construction (MILCON) and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding. These projects will

achieve the additional attributes of world-class, as identified by the DHB panel, while enhancing existing capabilities, such as expanding and coordinating women's health services.

These requirements are not expected to bring additional personnel or new capabilities onto the installation, but they will replace and renovate existing aging infrastructure and organize medical functions for the benefit of patients. The phasing and timelines for execution of these requirements will be predicated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, community concerns, and other factors. The Department's medical Master Facility Plan (MFP) for WRNMMC is part of its CMP-NCRM and is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2010.

Wounded Warrior Care in the NCR

Next to the war itself, casualty care remains the Department's top priority. The Military Health System, as well as the DoD's Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) in the NCR, will continue to provide the best healthcare and recovery services for warfighters and their families. The new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH will anchor this effort in the NCR.

Creating optimal healing environments for inpatients and outpatients is integral to the renewal of spiritual, physical, and psychological wellness. To provide a full range of wellness and healing services, the Services have identified the levels of support required for their respective Wounded Warrior Programs at the new WRNMMC, Bethesda, and the Department has been actively engaged in coordinating and planning for all necessary support including medical services, WII programs, and installation requirements. Warriors will not be moved from WRAMC until appropriate recovery, support, and management services at WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH are in place. Any degradation in services and support would be unacceptable.

In addition to the provision of world-class medical care, an assessment has been made with all Military Services of their non-medical requirements for WII programs. From that, a footprint has been established in a Warrior complex to accommodate their needs. For the benefit of all Warriors, the center will operate similarly to the way a Soldier and Family Assistance Center operates today. JTF CAPMED is working with the Bethesda and Fort Belvoir installations to detail hours of operation, management of personnel, etc. from which the tactical aspects of operations will then be refined. Meanwhile, each node of the continuum of care is being revised including reception, inpatient, and transition to outpatient care stages to identify any secondary gaps. A Warrior and Family Coordination Center Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which provides for the common operating platform to ensure functions and responsibilities of the Services, Installation, and MTF support to Warriors and Families, is near completion.

Bethesda will support 350 of the most severely injured casualties including all amputees, open traumatic brain injury, and complex trauma cases accompanied by NMAs and their families. Furthermore, the design of new warrior lodging at Bethesda supports warriors and NMAs in a two-bedroom suite concept that will fully comply with the ADA and improve upon the Mologne House model in use at WRAMC today.

Organizational and Budgetary Authorities in the NCR

The Department directed in January 2009 that the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH be established as Joint commands subordinate to JTF CAPMED. To achieve further unity of command and unity of effort among the current medical components in the region, the plan will reorganize the current distribution of Operational Control (OPCON) of MHS assets in the NCR to allow the Commander, JTF CAPMED (CJTF) to most effectively oversee the transformation

and realignment in the region. It will also establish appropriate supporting relationships between the hospital and the Bethesda installation.

Manpower in the NCR

An Intermediate Manpower Document (IMD) has been developed and will be used to facilitate the development of the eventual Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). It will allow the compilation of all personnel requirements for the JTD, while maintaining more flexibility for changes during the transition and, as experience is gained, operating the new hospitals. JTF CAPMED and the Services are developing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to commit resources in support of the IMD. Until the Department makes its final determination on the ultimate governance alignment of JTF CAPMED, the IMD can remain a local database, with necessary MOAs, allowing flexibility for position changes and realignments.

Retaining the skilled civilian workforce in the NCR is imperative to operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. While attrition levels of government civilians at WRAMC remain normal, individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned about their jobs and location in the end state. The Department is engaged in comprehensive communication efforts with the current workforce to ensure transparency and maintain trust. Notifications will be made to permanent government civilians of their future work locations at WRNMMC, Bethesda, FBCH, or other reassignment opportunities by 1 July 2010. Permanent government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result of the transition

Conclusion

Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young, and committee members, thank you all for your interest and support in NCR Medical transformation and the efforts the Department is taking to constantly improve its healthcare and healthcare support. The Department is

committed to providing wounded service members, their families, and all MHS beneficiaries with world-class medical care and support.

Your support and oversight have made immeasurable contributions to this process. JTF CAPMED will continue to work with the Services and DoD to capitalize on strengths which together will deliver the finest, most robust, integrated regional health care system in the country. I look forward to the continued work ahead with you and thank you for this opportunity to be with you today.

MASTER PLAN SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS

Mr. DICKS. All right. With the submission of the DOD's comprehensive master plan delayed, can Congress expect a timely submission regarding a construction schedule and an update on other portions of the comprehensive master plan by June 30, 2010, as required by the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill?

Admiral MATECZUN. Chairman Dicks, the Department will have those plans that are required by the NDAA by the end of June. Those plans will provide significant granularity about the detail necessary to meet those requirements. You have mentioned an amount here that those reports will address very specifically; and, in addition, any of the questions that remain about authorities will also be addressed in that report.

Mr. DICKS. Does the Department believe there will be enough lodging at the new Walter Reed to support wounded warriors, non-medical attendants, and families?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. The number of rooms that will be available on the Bethesda campus, there will be room for all of the wounded warriors who need nonmedical attendants. They will be completely ADA compliant. In addition, there will be rooms for the nonmedical attendants that are necessary for those wounded warriors and for family members.

Mr. DICKS. What is the Department's position on Representative Davis' legislation that establishes JTF CAPMED and places Secretary Lynn in charge of running hospitals in the National Capital Region?

Dr. RICE. Mr. Chairman, the Department is currently reviewing that legislation and has not yet come to a conclusion.

Mr. DICKS. What capabilities at Walter Reed will be lost during the transition and after the transition is complete?

Admiral MATECZUN. Mr. Chairman, all of the capabilities that exist separately at Walter Reed today and at Bethesda are incorporated into the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, so no capabilities will be lost in the end state. There are singular capabilities at each, singular capability for amputee care, for instance, at Walter Reed that will transfer in toto to the Bethesda campus and is included in the new construction and will actually be enhanced from a facility's perspective.

The open traumatic brain injury capability that exists at Bethesda today will still exist at Bethesda in the future, and we will have increased inpatient capability. So that in the end state all of those world-class capabilities or best-in-the-world capabilities will be included in the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center.

Mr. DICKS. Does the Department still believe it can complete the transition of Walter Reed by the BRAC deadline, September 15, I think, 2011?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Does the Department plan to apply the new world-class definition to other hospitals in the military health system?

Dr. RICE. Mr. Chairman, the Department is planning to incorporate those elements of world-class design into future facilities.

Mr. DICKS. How will the Department ensure that project requirements identified for world class at the new Walter Reed Bethesda will be funded?

Dr. RICE. Mr. Chairman, the Department supports the President's budget and believes those requirements in the current fiscal year and in fiscal year 2011 are fully funded.

Mr. DICKS. So the \$80 million in the 2011 appropriation bill request for ADA requirements, is that all at Walter Reed?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. That is on the Bethesda campus.

Mr. DICKS. At the new campus.

Will the world-class requirements at the new Walter Reed Bethesda be identified in time to inform the POM 2012 process?

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. The POM process is under way, and the attributes of world class are being incorporated into the planning as we consider future projects.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young.

MORALE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The last time we met, Admiral, in a hearing about a year ago, I guess, I asked a question about morale on the part of the medical personnel, because there was some confusion about who was in charge. If you remember, I asked that specific question, who was in charge, and you answered you were, which helped identify where we direct those questions. The morale problem was because doctors weren't sure where they were going to be and what they were going to be doing. Has that situation improved?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir, I believe that situation has improved.

To give you an example, we just had three town hall meetings with the civilian workforce at Walter Reed. There are 2,200 skilled medical civilian personnel that are there, and they have been wanting to know where it is that they are going to go, are they going to have a job, and which hospital would it be at.

What we were able to tell them is that we were finishing the process now. We had promised them last year we would come back and let them know by spring of this year where it was they would be going. They have kept faith with us and stayed on the job at Walter Reed, and we will be notifying them no later than the first of July about where the job opportunities were going to be.

There were not many questions about the morale. They were concerned primarily about whether they would be able to get into the Fort Belvoir and Bethesda hospitals, whether the traffic was going to be really bad, and whether there was going to be parking on the complex. So I think the morale has significantly improved.

AMPUTEE CARE AND TREATMENT

Mr. YOUNG. I agree with that, by the way. In visiting at Walter Reed, I see quite a lot of Navy medical personnel, and at Bethesda I see a lot of Army medical personnel, and everybody seems to be working together really well, and that certainly bodes well for the patient, the wounded warrior.

The committee has invested a lot of resources building up Walter Reed to become a world-class center for amputee treatment. How

is this consolidation affecting those capabilities and will they be adequately replicated?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. They will be replicated and improved upon.

Two particular ways they will be improved, within the MATC right now, that is over on the Walter Reed campus, is in temporary buildings. It will be incorporated into the new outpatient building on the Bethesda campus. It will have additional capabilities such as a rock climbing wall, which many of them use in their rehabilitation. Physical therapy and occupational therapy and the orthopedics capabilities are all going to be co-located.

So, from a physical perspective, the care that they get as inpatients and during their rehabilitation will be extraordinary.

The lodging is going to be I think one of the most significant improvements that we have. Today, at the Malone House, when there is maybe a person there that is undergoing limb salvage and they are in a wheelchair and they have a lot of appliances attached to them, it is not easy to get around in the rooms. In the new suites that are being built and in the administrative building that goes along with them and in the dining hall, we have designed very good spaces for them to be able to move around in. So I think they will actually be in a better environment than they are today.

CENTER FOR DEPLOYMENT PSYCHOLOGY

Mr. YOUNG. That is good news. Because we do have a lot of amputee cases at both hospitals. This war has been vicious as it relates to our troops losing limbs. In fact, in your hospital at Bethesda today, there is a young man who lost most of both arms and most of both legs. It is a really sad situation, but I tell you his morale and his attitude is really super. These people, these heroes are really special, their attitude toward their country and mission and toward the military, and it makes you really proud.

Dr. Rice and I had a brief conversation as we were entering the room before the hearing started, and he had some comments that I would like to get on the record. So I want to ask Dr. Rice about the Center for Deployment Psychology that is headquartered at Bethesda and now an integral part of the Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. Doctor, I was interested to hear what you told me as we were entering the room, and I would like to get those comments on the record, if you are willing.

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir, Mr. Young.

Under your leadership—

Mr. YOUNG. That was the part I wanted to hear.

Dr. RICE [continuing]. You recognized that particularly returning guardsmen and reservists who often go back to areas of the country that are remote from military treatment facilities were seeking treatment for their psychological challenges from civilian psychologists who had no experience in the military. Thanks to your vision, we established the Center for Deployment Psychology at the Uniformed Services University expressly to provide educational opportunities for civilian psychologists in both one- and two-week courses to acquaint those psychologists with the challenges in the

combat environment so they can provide better care for the patients who sought their assistance.

I am pleased to say that program has been very successful. It is now incorporated into the Department's budget and is, as you pointed out, part of the Defense Centers of Excellence for Traumatic Brain Injury and Psychological Health. We are very proud of its accomplishments.

Mr. YOUNG. Dr. Rice, thank you very much. I want to thank all of you. Caring for our wounded warriors has a high priority, and this committee views it as one of the highest priorities. If there is something that is needed in our medical military system that you don't have, we would really appreciate you letting us know, because we want to make sure that nothing is left undone to care for our wounded warriors.

I thank you all for your testimony this morning and look forward to the rest of the hearing.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky.

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No questions at this time.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran.

INDEPENDENT DESIGN REVIEW

Mr. MORAN. I agree with the remarks by the chairman and the ranking member. This is hardly a confrontational hearing. We admire, respect, and appreciate all that you have been doing for the military needs of our service people.

It was troubling, though, that the Independent Design Review that was required by the fiscal year 2009 defense authorization bill which was completed just last summer found that the Department's plan would not result in a world-class facility at Walter Reed, that it would not meet joint commission accreditation standards, and that it was ambiguous about its vision, goals and expectations of the new hospital. It did find that the Fort Belvoir hospital would be a world-class facility. And some of the skeptics, it confirmed some of their worst fears. I thank you for turning it around.

In that independent review, there was a comment that was particularly striking. It said, "Service-specific and facility-centric military health care cultures and a confusing and redundant chain of command was a particular concern of the independent review." What do they mean by that? Obviously, they were deliberately obtuse there, but are you addressing that? Is it something we should be concerned about?

Admiral MATECZUN. Mr. Moran, there is a tremendous question, and it is not just a military question. As I have gone out and talked to people that really want to help us out at the Mayo Clinic, the Cleveland Clinic, Geisinger, and Kaiser, we grew up in a system that is built around facility hospitals or clinics, and it is very difficult to change that mind-set to integrate care for the patients all of the way through primary care, specialty care, including prevention and the other activities that we need to do. I believe that is what they were talking about on the facility-centric piece of it.

I myself have commanded a medical center, hospital clinics, and when you are in that position you tend to focus on optimizing that

facility, rather than optimizing the patient experience. It is part of the structural difficulty that we have to deal with. We find ourselves every day still trying to break out of that as we form this new region here in the capital region with a north hub in Bethesda and a south hub down in Fort Belvoir.

The service centricity seems to be focused on the fact that we have three different service systems. When you have three different service systems, that means that all policies diverge in execution. Everybody executes a little bit differently. Here in the National Capital Region, what that means is we have to go back to define standard operating procedures and align those divisions, particularly as they relate to patient safety and patient centric care. These are significant challenges.

I think we are finding a way ahead to be able to do those things, but I don't want to underrepresent the challenges that are presented in doing that.

CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

Mr. MORAN. I can understand there are different approaches to mental health issues, but generally the practice of medicine is pretty consistent, at least in terms of its objective.

Dr. Rice seems to be pregnant with a comment that you want to make, but let me raise something else, and then you can address this, too, if you would like.

Chairman Murtha and I think Mr. Young and Mr. Dicks and probably all of the committee, we commended the Department of Defense particularly for including the Centers of Excellence in the construction plans for the new Walter Reed medical center and providing the funding that was needed to operate the centers. They nationally recognized naval military medicine to be in the forefront in the advancement of modern medical care, breast care, gynecologic care, prostate pain, neuroscience, integrated cardiac. They are really impressing the whole—you talked about Mayo and Cleveland clinics. They are impressing the entire country's medical establishments with what has been achieved.

But the reason I raise it is the amount of space that you have planned is less than is currently available at Walter Reed. I question even whether the amount of money being provided is consistent with what we thought was going to be an expansion of these Centers of Excellence. Can you address that as well?

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. Mr. Moran, on the subject of the Centers of Excellence, I think one of the challenges that any Center of Excellence in an academic environment faces is it is a new model and it takes awhile for the appropriate organizational effort to be brought together. We anticipate that there will be efficiencies of both space and of funding as a result of the way these are being designed.

I would point to the cancer center that Admiral Mateczun spoke about earlier. What we have learned from the civilian academic world is that, rather than have the hematology oncology clinic located in one area and the surgical oncologist in another and the radiation oncologist in yet another, and the diagnostic radiologist, bringing them all together to better focus on the cancer patient's needs does result in efficiencies of operation and, therefore, by im-

plication, by a lower funding requirement. And the space can be better utilized because for a substantial part of the day the surgeons, for example, are in the operating room and therefore the clinic facilities that they would be using are available to the radiation oncologist or to the hematologist oncologist.

Mr. MORAN. So there is no reduction in prioritization or focus on the diagnosis?

Admiral MATECZUN. No, sir. Actually, we have an implementation team led by Dr. Craig Shriver, who is the head of one of those centers, and they will identify to us what they believe are the requirements, and then we will bring back those and incorporate them.

Since we have never done it within the DOD before, this is the first time, and we need to understand it. There is no need to reduce the space that they need.

FT. BELVOIR BARRACKS AND SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. MORAN. One last question. There are some things that have seemed to have slipped through the cracks in this planning, and we hate for them to be identified when it is too late. For example, I had to ask for an additional \$34 million for barracks to house the new facilities staff at Fort Belvoir. That hadn't been handled. As you know about the infrastructure, and I won't get into that because that is just too sticky a wicket to deal with right now in this context, but both at Fort Belvoir and Bethesda there are real questions about being able to handle the staff, patients, families, even the population around the facilities.

But it just came to my attention that there is only one dining facility that is open after 6 p.m. At Bethesda, and it is a Subway. Think about that. Only Subway is open after 6 when you have thousands of people there? We have an NGO that has to provide once-a-month weekend meals at that facility to the families of wounded warriors because of the current lack of dining facilities.

It seems like a mundane issue, but it is not mundane if you haven't eaten all day, and it is 6, and there is nothing open on the entire campus. Have you thought about that?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. The lodging complex that is going up now, Building 62, includes a dining facility incorporated in it, particularly for the wounded warriors themselves. That dining hall will operate independently for them.

We are looking at how to bring in the food courts or other things that we need to into current operations, but we will specifically address it in achieving the rest of those world-class standards. As we have gone out to the other places, what they tell us is the experience for patients is significantly enhanced with opportunities to eat other than dining facility types of food. We will make sure that those are incorporated.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Chairman Dicks.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

INTEGRATION OF MEDICAL FACILITIES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you all for the remarkable job you do on behalf of some remarkable people who serve our country so well, those who have been injured both physically and mentally.

Committee members here have been witness to a lot of transformations. We saw some I think major progress with our VA system, which I think is still the world's largest medical care system, and we obviously take a look at the transformation of our nuclear facilities and modernization.

I just want to focus where Congressman Moran initially focused his remarks, on the command and governance plan. And I refer perhaps, Dr. Rice, to your remarks where you say "implementing the 2005 BRAC commission recommendation has required a careful choreography." That is not exactly a military term, but I am interested in what in fact you are doing in terms of literally a command and governance plan? Can you put some meat on the bones here?

Mr. Moran put his finger on it. You have each of the services which is proud of their history. I made the mistake a few years ago of complimenting the Marines for what they do to wrap their arms around their fellow Marines. When they are down from my state, New Jersey, they go in to look at all facilities, but they give special attention. I am just wondering, how you are putting this all together? Is there actually a plan here? And I ask the question because, when something goes south, people start pointing their fingers at others around them.

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. Congressman Frelinghuysen, I think President Kennedy summed it up well when he said, victory has many fathers; defeat is an orphan.

The integration of medical facilities is a very complex undertaking. In the civilian world, which is where I spent much of my career, in the civilian academic world, there are a number of examples of mergers or attempted mergers between large facilities: Penn State Geisinger comes to mind, the University of California at San Francisco and Stanford, Beth Israel and Deaconess in Boston are just a couple that come to mind. They are very complex undertakings and frequently end up becoming unstuck, as Stanford and the University of California San Francisco and Penn State Geisinger did.

Layered on top of that are the three military services, because we do deliver care through the services. So this integration has required significant strategic and operational decision making in coordination at the senior leadership levels to reach consensus on key issues.

Admiral Mateczun has met a number of times with the Joint Chiefs to discuss both the facility design as well as the operational characteristics. I think it is important to underscore that, throughout those discussions on what the ultimate governance and leadership will look like, we have not lost focus on our primary responsibility, which is the care of our beneficiaries.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how would you gauge your success so far working with the different services, being mindful and respectful and, obviously, being aware of what has happened in the private sector when these sort of combinations and mergers occur? We are interested, obviously, in the end product here.

Dr. RICE. As are we.

Admiral Mateczun has done an astonishingly good job. I point out regularly that he was an explosive ordnance disposal man early in his career, so it is pretty hard to startle him. And he has a back-

ground as a psychiatrist, which seems to be entirely appropriate for this undertaking. He has done a terrific job I think of bringing together the various elements that have to be considered, from patient care delivery to logistics to finance to construction. It is a very complex undertaking. To sum up, it is a work in progress, but I think we ultimately see where it is headed.

Admiral MATECZUN. The comprehensive master plan will address those operational control issues.

Mr. DICKS. May I just add on here, this is the first joint operation, right, of a joint hospital? We are going to have the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force there all at the same time?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. And "joint" is a term that gets used in many different ways, but this is the first joint hospital. Joint means under a joint command. We have hospitals where we have people from three services working or tri-service staffing, but this is the first joint hospital.

Mr. DICKS. Who is sorting this out? You are the one that is in charge. Do you meet with the Surgeon General of the Air Force, the Surgeon General of the Army and you all work out a plan for how we are going to do this?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. I get to meet with the Surgeon Generals of all of the services, and we come to agreement on many issues. On those that we were not able to come to agreement on, we go to the tank with the service chiefs. When we are not able to go to agreement there, we start working our way through the OSD side of the Department up to the Deputy Secretary, who tells us which way it is going to be.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman. This is a nut that needs to be cracked here, and we need to be successful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop.

RELOCATION NOTIFICATIONS TO NCR MEDICAL COMMUNITY

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much.

Approximately 1,900 of the personnel at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center are supposed to go to the new Walter Reed, and 2,000 are supposed to go to Fort Belvoir. Have those individuals been notified of where they are going? If not, when will the medical staff at Walter Reed be notified of their future employment? And equipment, how much of the equipment at the old Walter Reed will be utilized at the new facility and/or Fort Belvoir? And for the committee, if you could, if you need to provide that information for the record, as well as give us some indication to this subcommittee what additional equipment will be required for the move.

And the other thing is, what are the plans for the disposition of the old Walter Reed facility and how much funding is expected for the cleanup after that disposition?

Admiral MATECZUN. Congressman Bishop, thank you for that question.

The people at Walter Reed, I talked briefly about the civilian personnel, 2,200 of them that we will notify. Actually, we have 4,000 civilians working within the National Capital Region, and we will tell all of them where it is that they are going to be. Those that

are the most impacted are the 2,200 that are at Walter Reed. We will let them know by the first of July.

On the active duty personnel, we have talked to the service chiefs and, because of the detailing cycles, we are going to probably be notifying all of those folks in the summer.

We have already selected integrated department chairs, so we have leadership that is working across both of those hospitals. They know the people that they are working with, and they have to make sure that we are able to staff both of them adequately and well and able to keep the training programs going.

Today, we have training programs at both Walter Reed, or they train at both Walter Reed and Bethesda. In the future, they will be training on both the Bethesda campus and on the Fort Belvoir campus, because there is going to be 120 beds there and a lot of patients to work with. After that, we will work through the contractors, who are also an integral part of the workforce.

We expect by the end of summer we will have at least notified the services. It is up to the services to notify the active duty folks where they are going to be going. Some will be detailed in as they come into the area. Some will have to be detailed into those billets out of Walter Reed.

In terms of the reuse equipment, we have identified \$50 million in reuse equipment that we will move from Walter Reed into either Bethesda or the Fort Belvoir campus. That is the major equipment. We are now going back and taking a look at the other equipment to see if we can find additional amounts of equipment that we can reuse as well.

We are trying to standardize equipment as we go, and so we want to make sure in terms of those patient safety items that we standardize them across the two hospitals. Right now, in our outfitting and transition budget, we have enough money to do the procurements that we need and to incorporate this reuse equipment.

Dr. ROBYN. In terms of the disposition, that will go to GSA.

Mr. BISHOP. What about the cleanup?

Dr. ROBYN. Can I take that for the record? I am not sure if we have estimated what the cleanup cost will be yet. I will get back to you.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

The costs to clean up Walter Reed and Forest Glen are primarily related to radiological decommissioning. The total cost is approximately \$15.14M. The Army has spent \$1.6M in FY06–FY09, has \$3.7M programmed in FY10, and has requested \$9.0M in the FY 11 budget. The Army will fund the remaining cost of \$841K in FY 12. The Walter Reed garrison expects cleanup to be completed by March 2013. Based on its environmental surveys, the Army also expects that the boiler plant (bldg 15) to require environmental restoration. The garrison does not expect this to be a major undertaking. The Army will not know the cost of this restoration effort until it completes a Corrective Action Plan and the District of Columbia's Department of Environment approves the plan.

MEETING BRAC DEADLINES

Mr. BISHOP. Dr. Robyn, you testified at the MILCON hearing that the September 15, 2011, BRAC deadline was not going to be met.

Dr. ROBYN. No, sir, I did not testify to that.

Mr. BISHOP. What did you say?

Dr. ROBYN. No. I testified that we believe we will meet the deadline of September 15 for all of our BRAC actions. We have six actions that we are watching very closely, and some of them are part of the National Capital Region BRAC process. But we believe we can make the BRAC deadline for all of our BRAC actions.

Mr. BISHOP. Is there going to be any resulting additional costs? For some reason, I thought you said there was going to be \$169 million additional costs because of the weather delays?

Dr. ROBYN. I did not testify to that. I think we met privately with appropriations staff to brief them on the six ones that we are watching closely. We indicated that in order to meet the BRAC deadline, which we view as important for a lot of reasons, and I can go into that, that we are planning to spend some additional money at these facilities. House appropriations staff came up with the \$169 million calculation.

Mr. BISHOP. Is that a reasonable figure?

Dr. ROBYN. That is a reasonable figure, yes.

Mr. DICKS. When will medical services be rendered at Fort Belvoir Community Hospital?

Admiral MATECZUN. Sir, there is an existing community hospital that will actually move into those facilities and be able to start providing care early in 2011 or late in 2010, depending on the support that is in that central tower that we have got. Those buildings will actually be ready early, and the existing hospital staff out there will move into that facility as soon as they can to start delivering services. They will probably deliver outpatient services first, and then we will finish the inpatient tower and be able to deliver inpatient services there in the summer of 2011.

Mr. DICKS. When will services end at Walter Reed?

Admiral MATECZUN. The industry standard across the country is to move over a very short period of time. We have a war game exercise that we are doing to see exactly how short that period is. But probably sometime around August of 2011 we will move all of the patients and then the staff.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston.

INCREASING BRAC COST ESTIMATES

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Robyn, I want to find out a little bit of background. As I understand it from BRAC, this was supposed to save \$724 million, and the cost was \$988 million to integrate Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital with a savings of \$124 million; is that correct? With annual recurrent savings of \$99 million?

Dr. ROBYN. Yes.

Mr. KINGSTON. That was the BRAC numbers from 2005; correct?

Dr. ROBYN. Yes.

Mr. KINGSTON. Where are those numbers now?

Dr. ROBYN. I believe before you got here I testified that the BRAC estimate for the realignment in the National Capital Region would cost about a billion dollars. The actual number is closer to \$2.6 billion. The reason for that has a little bit to do with inflation in the construction industry. It has mostly to do with expansion in

scope, and enhancements that we made to the original plan, largely in response to an outside independent review chaired by Togo West and Jack Marsh. So we added a number of facilities and other improvements to the original plan.

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay, so the cost went from \$988 million to \$2.6 billion?

Dr. ROBYN. Right.

Mr. KINGSTON. Did the savings also change? What does that do on—

Dr. ROBYN. Those are roughly the same.

Mr. KINGSTON. So we are still talking about a reduction, but the \$724 million comes off \$2.6 billion, rather than off \$988 million?

Dr. ROBYN. The cost of BRAC overall is significantly more than the original estimate. The original estimate is based on a model, COBRA, which is not really designed to tell you—it is designed to compare alternatives in the context of the decisions that a BRAC commission makes. It is not really designed to tell you the full cost of BRAC actions. So it is a little bit misleading.

But with BRAC overall, as with BRAC in the National Capital Region, the increase in cost is largely due to expansions in scope. We have used BRAC as an opportunity to build new where we had planned to renovate, to do substantial renovation and improvement. It has been a driver.

Mr. KINGSTON. Let me ask you this. If that is the case, why didn't BRAC anticipate that expansion? And when you talk about inflation, you know, that would be something that BRAC should take in mind; and I would find it hard to believe during this period of time you would have that much inflation when people are desperate for work. If there is inflation, that is BRAC's idea to anticipate it, and I don't think the case is there to say there was inflation.

Dr. ROBYN. I was not involved in this at the time, but my understanding is there was extraordinary inflation in the construction industry in parts of 2007, 2008, when most of the major construction activity on BRAC occurred. So that is not the major factor, but it is a factor. I suppose if we could have anticipated it, we would have, but we didn't.

Mr. KINGSTON. All right. In terms of the expansion, how is it that that wasn't foreseen by BRAC? Okay, hey, listen, if we start moving these pieces of the puzzle around, there are some opportunities that we should look at and there should have been a footnote to Congress on this proposal, and maybe there was.

Dr. ROBYN. There are some of you who know this history far better than I do. My understanding is, in the context of the National Capital Region, that the story about conditions in lodging at Walter Reed prompted these outside independent reviews. It was in response to those reviews and the desire to apply to new facilities, the recommendations that these facilities be made world class overall that these enhancements were included in the plan. So it was a bit of a moving target, and it was a response to new information and outside independent reviews as we went through this process.

Mr. KINGSTON. It would appear to me some of that should have facilitated additional savings, but it did not? It was just all on the high end?

Dr. ROBYN. Apparently so, yes.

Mr. KINGSTON. So a little Capitol Hill hysteria, is that what caused this?

Dr. ROBYN. I wouldn't put it that way, no. I think there were genuine issues that were raised.

Mr. KINGSTON. On BRAC, how much of this happens when BRAC comes out with, okay, here is the savings, and how often do those savings get implemented as proposed by BRAC? Because what Congress tends to do I think is vote on BRAC, have the victory, have the agony, and move on and assume that BRAC is consistent.

Dr. ROBYN. Right.

BRAC SAVINGS

Mr. KINGSTON. But how much of it really does come out to be like this where there is really no savings at all?

Dr. ROBYN. I think we do anticipate savings from BRAC overall, and we have had savings historically. It is why the Department is so concerned with meeting the BRAC deadline.

BRAC is kind of sacred to us. It has achieved enormous savings. It is very politically difficult for the Congress and others, but it has been absolutely essential to our ability to save money.

And I should point out probably that, in the case of prior BRACs, the focus was largely on getting rid of excess capacity. This BRAC had a different focus, and the focus was on enhancing our warfighting capabilities. So it was a different focus, less on reducing excess capacity and more on improving our ability to carry out our mission.

Mr. KINGSTON. Do you come back to Congress with a report on BRAC periodically that says we are on track and here is what the savings are? Are there some good news stories out there?

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. I am sorry that I don't have them at the tip of my tongue. I testified last month before the HAC-MILCON subcommittee and had those numbers at hand. But we have historically achieved significant savings, in the billions of dollars a year.

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay.

Mr. YOUNG. If the gentleman will yield, can you provide those numbers for us for our record?

Dr. ROBYN. Yes. Absolutely.

Mr. YOUNG. There might be some debate about that.

[The information follows:]

Overall, DoD is projecting that BRAC 2005 will save approximately \$4B annually beginning in FY 2012. The annual savings for the Walter Reed closure is approximately \$172M.

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey.

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for all of you do in this particularly challenging time.

I wanted to ask you a question about the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, which is something that was historically significant in this country and which had served the military and veterans'

communities since the Civil War. It was abolished in 2005. I think, frankly, it would be interesting to look into this. I don't know if anyone has, but the rise in the inadequate attention to the growing number of people who are seriously wounded had something to do with the elimination of that Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. But 3 years later, the National Defense Authorization Act created the Joint Pathology Center and that was designed to ensure the key functions of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, that they wouldn't disappear and they would come back into play, and those functions included education, consultation, research, as well maintenance and modernization of the tissue repository to try to make sure that all of those were preserved.

Since that Armed Forces Institute of Pathology is currently operating under a fiscal year 2010 budget of \$76 million and a proposed fiscal year 2011 budget of \$67 million, \$9 million less, how does the Department of Defense anticipate that the Joint Pathology Center will be retaining its mission of serving as a world-class pathology entity? Can you tell us in detail the Department of Defense's funding expectations and the plans to ensure a smooth transition to this JPC?

Dr. RICE. Thank you for that question, Mr. Hinchey.

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, as you correctly identify, was a world renowned center and consisted of a number of elements, including the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's Office, a Legal Review Office, the tissue repository, which had been, has been in existence for almost 100 years in the consultation and education portion of AFIP's mission.

What has happened over the last 20 years or so in the world of pathology, and my comments here are particularly focused on the area of consultation and evaluation of tissue, that world has changed a good deal and has moved into a much more molecular focus as opposed to the traditional looking through a microscope at tissue and recognize the morphology. The result of that molecular focus is that pathologists around the country now have expertise in technologies available that allow rapid diagnosis without so much of an investment in morphologic recognition.

What the BRAC did was to dis-establish the AFIP, as it then existed, to move the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner up to Dover Air Force Base, where, as you know, the casualties return. And subsequently, the Joint Pathology Center was established as an element reporting to Admiral Mateczun at the Joint Task Force.

As I understand it, Admiral Mateczun, correct me if I am wrong, the initial operating capability for the Joint Pathology Center is anticipated for this summer, and it will be a full spectrum pathology consultation service for the Federal Government in support of clinical care. The pathology education will take place in partnership with the Department of Pathology at the Uniformed Services University, and it will be an integrated component of the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and the Department's Pathology Residency Fellowship Programs.

We undertook an evaluation of the tissue repository to determine whether or not the samples there were still in good condition and usable for research and have discovered that approximately 90 percent of the samples are in fact usable for that purpose. How we

proceed, subsequently, is still open to question because there are both legal and ethical considerations that have to be factored in. These were not samples that were collected originally for research or education purposes; therefore, to use them for that has some ethical and legal dimensions to it. And we expect to undertake an outside study probably in collaboration with the Institute of Medicine to pursue them.

Admiral MATECZUN. In terms of the budget, sir, we are standing up the initial operating capability. We know that there is going to be approximately 118 staff that move over with those functions. We are hiring right now against that. Of course, most of the—and we are working through the transfer-of-function, transfer-of-work questions associated with the BRAC. Most of the pathologists that are there today will be coming over, but we have to matrix at the start. And we are finalizing the budget now.

JOINT PATHOLOGY CENTER

Mr. HINCHEY. I thank you very much for that.

Do you think that you could provide us with a detailed summary basically of the facility and the staffing needs of the Joint Pathology Center and all of that which takes into account the vision of the JPC as a world class facility, something that is really going to be exemplary and do all the things that really need to be done for these people who need it so much? And if you can also, recent Defense Health Board Recommendations, if that is possible?

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir, we would be glad to provide those for you.

[The information follows:]

The Joint Pathology Center (JPC) will provide world-class diagnostic subspecialty consultation, education, training, research and maintenance/modernization of the tissue repository in support of the mission of the DoD and other federal agencies. A Concept of Operations has been developed and was approved by the Commander, Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical on 31 March 2010.

Capabilities: The core group of functions of the Joint Pathology Center includes a robust pathology Consultative Service with associated state-of-the-art technologic support, the Tissue Repository, Education and Research, and the Veterinary Pathology Service. Each function has defined missions that collectively will meet the requirements of the law and will meet the defined mission of the Joint Pathology Center. Leveraging of existing capabilities and expertise within the Joint Area of Operations and the development of strategic partnerships with other military and federal agencies and organizations will enhance and augment the core functions of the Joint Pathology Center.

Governance: The JPC will be a subordinate organization within the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED).

Facilities: The tissue repository buildings on Forest Glen (buildings 510 and 606) will house the Tissue Repository, Consultative Service, Office of the Director, and Telepathology. Histology, immunohistochemistry, special stains, specimen accessioning, and transcription will be performed at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Bethesda in the Department of Pathology. Adequate room for these services was planned into the space and processes of the histology laboratory and administrative areas.

Staff: The JPC will require 135 Active Duty and civilian staff.

Defense Health Board Recommendations: The Defense Health Board (DHB), in its advisory role to the DoD, reviewed the initial Joint Pathology Center (JPC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was not a detailed implementation plan. Among its comments were recommendations on workflow considerations, physical location of capabilities for consultative services, ratio of professional staff to administrative staff, civilian collaboration and alignment of the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) under the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED). The implementation plan and detailed and revised CONOPS that was approved on 31 March 2010 addresses the concerns of the DHB and will meet the recommendations of the

DHB review with the exception of JPC oversight being provided by a Board of Governors. Based on the JPC's mission set, DoD recommends a Federal Board of Advisors comprised of primary stakeholders. The JPC continues to work very closely with the DHB as details are finalized.

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ENDURING MISSIONS BEYOND BRAC

Mr. DICKS. Does the JTF CAPMED have missions that go beyond the NCR Base Realignment and Closure Coordination, Admiral?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. In our charter, we have a BRAC mission. I have responsibility for BRAC oversight of the medical BRAC projects. In addition, I am responsible for the health care that is delivered within the National Capital Region. So that goes beyond the BRAC project significantly, particularly when it comes to contingency operations. So we are able to plan now with JTF NCR, which stands up in case of an emergency here within the Capital Region. They coordinate the military districts, and I become a medical functional component of the commander of that Joint Task Force. So I am responsible for coordinating all of the emergency response that goes on.

Just as an example, we just finished up the Nuclear Security Summit and the medical support from the Department that went into that. So there are significant other missions. The Joint Pathology Center is another mission not related to the BRAC and certainly an enduring mission. So, yes, we do have other missions besides BRAC.

Mr. DICKS. Will medical personnel in the new hospitals still deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir, absolutely. And on the Comfort and all the other places that they need to deploy. In fact, what we will be able to do is to protect these assets in case of deployments.

Today, if a large-scale mobilization occurs, it leaves an individual hospital potentially vulnerable. If the Comfort goes out, then a lot of the Bethesda staff goes with it. As we distribute the active duty force across both of those hospitals, we mitigate the risk to any one deployment that goes on.

My job as the JTF commander is to make sure that we maintain the ability to receive casualties here in the National Capital Region as our country's primary casualty reception site. And so, as people mobilize and go off to their missions, we have to make sure that when they send the patients back, that they have somewhere to go.

The change that has really occurred over the last 5 years is with the Critical Care Transport Teams. I was a Joint Staff Surgeon when we sent all of the capabilities into Operation Iraqi Freedom. We sent a huge medical footprint, including some 64 hospitals and 41,000 medical personnel there to be ready to take care of casualties. At that time, we weren't able to move them back in critical care status. Now that we are, we don't have to have that footprint in theater, but we do have to maintain that footprint back here. And so we haven't relieved the need for beds; we have just moved it out of theater back here. So part of the mission that we have is making sure that we have those beds and the capability to receive casualties here.

Mr. DICKS. Why does it make sense to regionalize health care delivery in the National Capital Area?

Admiral MATECZUN. The National Capital Region is the largest collection of both the military beneficiaries and military forces to provide care. And so putting together an Integrated Regional System allows us to address, for instance, things like primary care; where are we putting our clinics?

Without coordination today, we are reliant upon each of the services to decide where it is that they want to invest in primary care, rather than examining the total needs of the population and rationally putting primary care there, just as an example.

Dr. RICE. May I add to that?

Mr. DICKS. Sure.

Dr. RICE. I think another very important reason to regionalize care in the National Capital Area is to take advantage of the education and research capabilities that are unique to this region. The new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center sits right across Wisconsin Avenue from the world's largest biomedical research complex, the National Institutes of Health. And on the campus at Bethesda is the Uniformed Services University. So we simultaneously have the ability to answer the unsolved questions in both military medicine and in health care generally, as well as to educate the next generation of military medical leadership.

MAINTAINING CAPABILITIES UNDER BRAC

Mr. DICKS. Are all capabilities being planned for the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center inclusive of all care that is currently being provided to service members and their family members?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. The BRAC requires that the capabilities that existed at the time of the BRAC are maintained, and that is the basic rationale for the distribution of the resources that are there, so nothing goes away. In fact, there has been a new mission that has been added particularly for casualty care over the last couple of years, and so that enhancement will also be maintained, but there will be no diminishment in the capability for medical care here in the National Capital Region.

Mr. DICKS. With each service medical component employing different concepts of care, delivery and processes, how will you develop common practices? Well, I think you have answered that. Anything else you would like to add on that?

Admiral MATECZUN. No, sir. Common processes are important. And this is something that really relates directly and specifically to patient safety. And we are working on that. In something just as simple as conscious sedation, where somebody comes in for a minor procedure, we have to be able to have a standard procedure that all of our nurses and technicians know and support, no matter where it is that they happen to be working in the Capital Region. And so we view that standardization as a patient safety imperative.

Mr. DICKS. Do we have a list on the \$781 million of what we are talking about, what kind of projects are we talking about?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. At the broad sort of upper level, but not at a level of specificity yet. We don't have a level yet that has been approved by the Department.

Mr. DICKS. That is a better answer. Well, whatever you got, send it up here, will you, so at least we will be able to take a look at it?

[The information follows:]

Below is a list of projects that comprise the \$781M. Additional detail has been provided in the Department's Comprehensive Master Plan for the National Capital Region Medial, which was provided to Congress in response to section 2714(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

Project	Description	Funding Type	Estimated Cost (\$M)
Comprehensive Clinical Expansion.	New Construction, Renovation, Demolition, Parking Garage, Temporary Facilities, Outfitting and Transition, Commissioning, AT/FP, Enhanced Building Information Systems.	MILCON/O&M	\$651M (\$567 MILCON \$84 O&M)
Installation Upgrades	Pedestrian Ways, Vehicular Access, Plazas, Childcare, Utility Infrastructure, Etc.	MILCON	\$85
Medical Center Technology	Smart Technology, RTLS, External SONET	O&M	\$30
Installation and Medical Center Environment.	Campus Way finding and Master Planning	O&M	\$15
Total	\$781

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young.

TEMPORARY BYPASS OF LANDSTUHL

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The policy and the practice has been, a soldier is wounded on the battlefield and treated immediately with the closest medical facility and then transported to Landstuhl in Germany. And then, from there, back here to either Walter Reed or Bethesda. I understand now the decision has been made to bypass Landstuhl and come directly from the area directly to Washington to the National Capital Area. What is the reason for that?

Dr. RICE. Sir, I think it primarily has to do with the concern about flying through the ash of the volcano whose name I cannot pronounce. But as I understand it, the air space is now beginning to open up over Europe, so my expectation is that we would resume the use of Landstuhl. I might point out that, in the past, it has been the practice when the patient's circumstances warrant it to bypass Landstuhl and fly directly back to the United States. In the case of—in a few instances of severe neurologic injury and certainly in the case of a severe burn, where the unique capability exists at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, patients have been flown directly back from the theater to San Antonio.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you for that answer. I wasn't sure when I read that decision whether it was a permanent decision or whether it was temporary because of the volcanic ash, which I can't pronounce either.

Dr. RICE. No, sir. It had purely to do with concern for the aircraft and the safety of the crews.

BUILDING 18 AT WALTER REED

Mr. YOUNG. On another subject, just one more question, Mr. Chairman. A couple of years ago, the Washington Post did a number of articles really blasting the Army at Walter Reed for conditions at Building 18. What is the status of Building 18 today?

Admiral MATECZUN. Sir, it is not being used for any patient care activities.

Mr. YOUNG. Well, actually, at the time that the stories were written, it was used for med-hold patients rather than patients that were being treated.

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. There are no medical-hold patients in Building 18 today.

Mr. YOUNG. Is Building 18 empty then?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. It is being refurbished, as I understand it, but I am not sure what the ultimate plan for it is. But there are no patients in that building.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As part of this undertaking, I understand there are efforts underway to develop world class simulation labs, the latest and state-of-the-art information technology, smart beds, smart rooms, things of that nature; been a lot of focus in the public domain on electronic medical records. Sometimes we give the VA more credit for, shall we say, a seamless system in the military. God only knows what you have. The issue of medical equipment, we talked earlier about, you know, the private sector, the race to get the best equipment. And obviously, this committee is prepared to give you whatever you need and I think historically has been very supportive of that. Of all the stuff we are setting up here, the technology, can you assure us you will be using—you will get the best of what there is? And most important, this is still a military installation. Will you assure us that whatever you set up is hardened in a way that somebody could not attack it and bring the whole damn thing down? I wonder if that is in your overall review. This is what plans and governance are all about. Before we fill the new building and provide the infrastructure, what are we doing in some of these areas?

Admiral MATECZUN. Yes, sir. In the realm of technology, in particular maybe kind of taking a look at the plan that the Department is using for the data storage that we have. And it is really key. The data storage is key because what we are doing in the National Capital Region is making sure that all of the medical data that is available, including images, can be available to anybody at any one of our—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Instantaneously?

Admiral MATECZUN. Instantaneously, yes, sir, which is not happening today. It is hard to move images between Walter Reed and Fort Belvoir today, for instance, in some instances. So we are putting together that technology.

What we will have are data centers that will be mirrored in the future. And so the Health Affairs is working on a plan that will actually have regional data repositories that will be mirrored, so that if something happens, and those are actually not inside the Capital Region, they are placed outside of the Capital Region, so that if something happens, that data would still be available for patient care. It is mirrored so that it is always available. If it goes down, it is still available on the mirror site, the mirror servers. And so we are thinking about I think each of those areas as we try to move forward.

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield? Have you built any of those data centers yet?

Dr. RICE. No, sir. That is all in design. We are pretty far along in understanding how that will all come together, but they are not actually built as yet.

Mr. DICKS. But have you decided on locations?

Dr. RICE. No sir.

Mr. DICKS. Who is in charge of this, who is in charge of the data centers?

Dr. RICE. Well, the——

Mr. DICKS. Mateczun just pointed the finger at you. Are you the guy?

Dr. RICE. There is a process under way in the Department right now for the way ahead on the electronic health record. And it involves network integration in the Department, as well as other components of the Department that are responsible for information technology. This is a very hot area of discussion, and we realize that it is a critical element for us to be able to accomplish our mission.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I won't reclaim my time from the chairman because it is his time.

Mr. DICKS. Go ahead.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Who is in charge? You are in charge of this?

Dr. RICE. Well, I wouldn't go that far, no, sir.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No, I say I think we are interested in making sure we get this right.

Mr. DICKS. We are interested in data centers, and we are working with the intelligence community. I mean, this is happening with Google, with all the major companies are having to come up with these data. Sometimes they are leased; sometimes they are bought. We are just interested in this. I mean, we would like to know, who is going to make the decisions about location?

Dr. RICE. That will be a Department level decision because it involves not just the health record, but involves a number of business processes in the Department as well as the secure transmittal of sensitive information.

Admiral MATECZUN. Sir, the device chairman, General Cartwright, heads up technology panels, and he is working very closely with all of the information systems people within the Department and all of the wickets that you have to go through with not only the intelligence community but with the health community as well. And so——

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just so I understand, the panels that you put together, you know, for these purposes, they are going to trump the services in terms of what they historically have done collecting data and information on their own?

Dr. RICE. Well, I think the—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know, once people enter the system, you sort of own them. But I am just wondering here.

Dr. RICE. Well, there are certainly requirements that each of the services has to manage its particular operational requirements. Then there is a collective set of information that has to be used across the entire Department. The electronic health record would be one example of that. The system that defines eligibility for commissary or health care privileges would be another such system.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have got a lot of systems now. It is apparent you are going to have a lot of systems in the future. And you are obviously going to be able to marry them because we are in a world of technology where these things are possible. Sometimes maybe you don't want to have them too married, because then you endanger probably somebody bringing perhaps the whole damn system down.

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. To go back to your earlier question, how the network architecture is laid out is under, that is General Cartwright's area of responsibility. Defining what the applications look like in the health care environment, that is, how does a nurse collect vital sign information, how does a physician write electronic orders, that comes under Health Affairs.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are giving us a high level of assurance we are going to get this right?

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. We have to get it right.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston.

LATEST MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rice, I am interested in this situation that Mr. Frelinghuysen mentioned about medical equipment. Whenever I go to the hospital, and I have been on the operating table and visited lots of friends and have doctor friends, I am just amazed at the advancement and development of medical technology. And you know, I think doctors are really smart people, but the people who design this equipment must be geniuses. It is incredible the evolution of these things. And you think back to your own BlackBerry, you would never use a BlackBerry that is 3 years old. And can you imagine what we will be using 3 years from now. Yet, at the same time, the military, you know, is known for its red tape. And getting that equipment in and deciding which ones are good and which ones are bad, I have seen, for example, in education, they finally get smart boards, and we haven't seen any real results on it. It is a fun play toy, and it gives teachers a novelty factor, and they get enthusiastic about it, but 2 years later, they realize they haven't really done much. And that happens with—I think it is right and proper to do things, but some of these are just gee-whiz gadgets, and they are only gee-whiz. Some of them really do work, and some of them don't. And I know, for example, MRIs really haven't wiped out the use of a CAT scan,

that you can still go back, and you need the balance. But how do you manage that picking and choosing the equipment, getting it in there, getting rid of the bad stuff, embracing the good and moving on quickly?

Dr. RICE. You have put your finger on a very complex problem that confronts all of health care; certainly, I can only speak with any knowledge about that. Having been responsible for a large university health care system before I came to the Department of Defense, I regularly had a parade of various physician advocates who would come into my office assuring me that this latest gadget was exactly what we needed to take better care of patients with not much evidence frequently. We have to establish a better evaluation process for comparing new technologies against existing technologies. And where existing technologies really have been supplanted, then get rid of them, because the newer one is better. Or alternatively, the newer one may look fancier, may have more dials and lights and whistles on it, but in fact does not do a better job than what we have now. It is an enormously complex problem. The Department exists only as a microcosm of that within the larger picture of American health care.

Mr. KINGSTON. You know, getting back to Mr. Frelinghuysen's statement, I think this committee wants to be supportive of you getting the good equipment but I think would also be very supportive of whatever red tape reforms you need in order to flow. And it is not just money. And I think often at the VA system, you know, no one—it is unpatriotic to suggest the VA system isn't efficient, but let's all be honest with ourselves, the emperor is naked in many cases, and we don't want to admit it. But the VA system is very bureaucratic. I know, in my own district, we have been trying to get a VA clinic open now for 3 years that was supposed to be operating in July of 2008, and we still don't even have a location. It is just absurd how inefficient it is.

So I think what we would like to see from testimonies like yours is not always, you know, and you are not asking for money, but you know, what are some of the reforms that we can give you to allow you to get the stuff in and out?

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir. I don't think this is primarily a red tape problem. I think it is more of a conceptual problem of how we undertake an honest evaluation of new technologies against existing technologies. And as I said, this is something that the entire country, in fact the entire world, grapples with.

REMARKS OF MR. KINGSTON

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I need to take one other second. I know Dr. Rice had a proper education at America's finest University of Georgia. Are you an Athenian or are you from Atlanta?

Dr. RICE. No, sir, I am an Athenian. In fact, your father and my father were on the faculty together.

Mr. KINGSTON. That is what I thought. I used to read to your little brother Will when my parents would go over to your house, and you were already in the Navy at the time. And your sister Ida and I were the same age, but my job was to read to Will so that the parents could carry on in the next room and I think sip their Brandy uninterrupted by your little brother.

Mr. DICKS. Sounds good.

Mr. KINGSTON. Yeah. It should stay on the record. But we have known the Rice family for many, many years.

Dr. RICE. Yes, sir.

FINAL PERSONNEL PLAN

Mr. DICKS. All right. Going back to the employment issue, is it true that there is no final personnel plan yet? Is that true, or are you close to one?

Admiral MATECZUN. Sir, what I have learned is that there is a vast difference between the manpower and the personnel communities. And one is about spaces, and the other one is about faces. And you know, the spaces have to have resources attached to them. And we are working out the final MOU with the services for those manning documents that have—the spaces are there. We are figuring out how many of them have money attached to them, and then we match the spaces to the faces after that. So I believe that the answer would be, it is not final and it may never, never completely be. We do have an internal, an intermediate manning document that we are constructing. We will get to memoranda of agreement with the services on what they resource those memoranda to.

Mr. DICKS. All right.

Any other questions? The committee will stand adjourned until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow in H-140, when we will hold a hearing on the Defense Health Program and Wounded Warrior Programs. Thank you very much.

[CLERKS NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. Dr. Rice, I understand that JTF CAPMED has been given command responsibility for the new Joint Pathology Center in Bethesda, and the National Tissue Repository developed and currently maintained by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Can you provide us with a summary of your plans for the center, its leadership, and how you will assure that it develops its operations at “world class” standards?

Answer. The plan for the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) is to allow for the provision of diagnostic subspecialty consultation, education, training, research and maintenance, and modernization of the tissue repository in support of the Department and other federal agencies. To lead this effort, an interim director of the JPC was appointed in December 2009. We will assure that it develops according to “world-class” standards by applying the best technology and expertise to the Center.

Question. Dr. Rice, the Secretary’s Defense Health Board (DHB) has provided a series of recommendations that it believes are necessary for optimal development of the Joint Pathology Center. Have those recommendations been fully incorporated in your planning? Please provide for the record, each recommendation and its disposition in your planning.

Answer. Yes. The Joint Task Force is very appreciative of the input provided by the Defense Health Board and has utilized it extensively in refining the plan for the Joint Pathology Center (JPC). We fully assessed the DHB recommendations and vast majority were incorporated into the plan. The recommendations and their responses are as follows:

CLINICAL SCOPE OF SERVICE

1. Define the scope of subspecialty services provided by the JPC.

Subspecialty services provided to the federal agencies will include: dermatopathology, neuropathology and ophthalmic pathology, urologic pathology, nephropathology, cardiovascular pathology, gastroenterologic and hepatic pathology, gynecologic and breast pathology, infectious disease pathology, pulmonary pathology, environmental pathology, full-service state-of-the-art molecular pathology laboratory, oral and neuroendocrine pathology, hematopathology, and soft tissue and bone pathology. Additionally, the JPC will provide muscle biopsy interpretation and

Environmental and Biophysical Toxicology laboratory services. Radiology-Pathology consultation and correlation will be provided by the Department of Radiology at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC).

2. Define In-theater support provided by the JPC.

There are four tiers of support in the continuum of care when considering in-theater support and support of the combat mission. Additionally, there is support of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner mission.

a. Provided support to the deployed pathologist through telepathology and surgical pathology consultation and the rapid diagnosis of such infectious agents such as Leishmaniasis. Recognizing that the deployed pathologist has limited access to continuing medical education opportunities, one focus of the JPC mission will be to provide robust on-line education in order to help meet those needs. Additionally, the Veterinary Pathology Service will provide pathology consultative support for working animals in-theater.

b. Provision of services to Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) providing direct support to in-theater operations. The JPC will provide consultation, and telepathology support to those MTFs with an emphasis on quality and turn-around-time. Additionally, imbedded fragment and Environmental/Biophysical Toxicology analysis and muscle biopsy interpretation are available to support those services.

c. Provision of services to stateside MTFs providing care to the wounded warrior. In addition to the services described in item 2b, the JPC will provide support to clinical and research initiatives centered on warrior care such as the Combat Wound Initiative and the Traumatic Brain Injury program.

d. Provision of services to the Veterans Administration in support of long term care of wounded warriors. In addition to provided the full spectrum of consultative services and support as described above, the JPC will support VA clinical and research initiatives such as the VA Depleted Uranium Follow-up Program.

3. Define the scope of service for telepathology provided by the JPC.

The mission of telepathology is to provide surgical pathology consultation to distant military medical treatment facilities with an emphasis on provision of support for pathology in-theater and remote locations throughout the contiguous United States and outside continental United States. At full operating capability (FOC), the JPC will continue the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) mission of providing consultation by telepathology to the DoD and VA. In consultation with its' federal government stakeholders, the JPC will develop a detailed "enterprise-wide" solution to providing appropriate telepathology services including formal consultation, quality assurance, and primary consultation for smaller facilities. Telepathology will also be utilized for video teleconferences in support of the education mission.

4. Define level of support provided to the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System.

The JPC will provide full-service support to the critical Office of Armed Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) mission. This includes full-spectrum pathology subspecialty consultation, including gross brain and heart dissection and neuropathology and cardiovascular consultation, support of the OAFME Forensic Toxicology mission by the Environmental/Biophysical Toxicology Laboratory, and immunohistochemical/ special stain support. The JPC will support the OAFME live courses and collaborate and support ongoing research initiatives. The level of support for the OAFME mission has been discussed and carefully coordinated with the Armed Forces Medical Examiner.

5. Identify the process of handling individual cases, including accession, triage, disposition, flow, reporting, and quality assurance.

This process is evolving as we review and evaluate options for laboratory information systems and appropriate tracking mechanisms as well as work on developing a comprehensive Quality Management System for the JPC. The JPC will accession specimens at WRNMMC (utilizing a dedicated area and staffing) that will ensure the integrity of the specimen/case submitted and identify and provide all reports for previous specimens accessioned to the specific patient. The JPC will have a robust courier system from WRNMMC to the JPC that will transport cases to the JPC. Dedicated administrative personnel at the JPC will distribute the cases to the appropriate subspecialty for assignment to a specific pathologist.

6. Recommend that the Department pursue funding sources with other federal agency stakeholders.

Upon delegation of the JPC mission to the JTF, the JTF began work on refining the funding requirements for the JPC and is working with Health Affairs to secure funding for FY2011. The funding of the JPC will be programmed funding handled in a manner similar to other organizations within the JTF. As the major federal stakeholder in the JPC, the VA has expressed support for funding of the JPC as

the level currently provided to the AFIP. We are working closely with the VA to refine the funding requirements necessary to support the services provided to the VA. As we bring other federal stakeholders on board, the JPC will seek similar agreements for funding.

7. Recommend positioning of JPC directly under JTF CapMed leadership rather than as a component of hospital-based pathology department.

As delineated in the final Concept of Operations, the Joint Pathology Center is situated within the headquarters of the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as an organization distinct for the Medical Treatment Facilities and the Centers of Excellence.

8. Recommend establishment of a governance board of federal agency stakeholders.

9. Recommend that the governance structure ensures that stakeholder interests receiving significant support.

(Answer to 8 and 9): The Joint Task Force established a Board of Advisors, consistent with other similar organizations. The Board of Advisors will be comprised of key stakeholders in the JPC will advise the Director of the Joint Pathology Center on matters such as services provided, organizational structure, function, and responsibilities. The Board of Advisors will be comprised of a senior pathologist nominated by each of the military services and other nonmilitary governmental key stakeholder organizations. Representation from key stakeholders will ensure that stakeholder interests and needs will be appropriately addressed by the JPC.

10. Ensure periodic assessment of resources in order to meet mission.

The JPC will utilize input from stakeholders, the Board of Advisors, and from the JPC pathology staff in determining additional services provided by the JPC. The placement of the JPC within the headquarters of the JTF will allow for a streamlined and expeditious review and resourcing for such new requirements.

11. Apply business principles such as LEAN design to make JPC as cost efficient as possible.

The JTF and JPC has applied appropriate business principles in the development of the plan for the JPC including utilizing nationally recognized Task Force recommendations for histology and immunohistochemistry laboratory testing.

12. Performance metrics should be developed in order to ensure success.

The Quality Management Plan will define the specific requirements for turn-around-time and other quality indicators (performance metrics) and will include a process for monitoring critical indicators and appropriately addressing issues. Expectations of the JPC include a 'case-received-by-WRNMMC to assignment-to-responsible-pathologist' of only a few hours, next shift turn-around of all special stains and recuts (i.e special stains are with the responsible pathologist by next shift), appropriate timeliness of consultation, communication of unexpected results with submitting pathologist, and timely faxing of reports. Additionally, quality indicators and metrics will be established for other ancillary studies such as molecular studies, biophysical toxicology studies, and electron microscopy.

13. Organizational structure sufficiently flexible for collaborative relationships with non-Federal entities to provide education component.

The JPC envisions opportunity for collaborative relationships with non-Federal entities to provide continuing medical education.

14. Recommend appropriate technical staffing be included to provide the necessary support of the specialty pathology personnel.

15. Staffing needs to address levels of experience among pathologists (i.e. staffing with relatively junior pathologists vs. senior more experience pathologists).

(Answers to Recommendations 14 and 15) Additional pathology and support and administrative staff in histology, molecular services, education and research, tissue repository, Automated Central Tumor Registry (ACTUR), and logistical support. The addition of more pathologists will allow for senior and experienced pathology oversight of consultation and other services and will allow for mentoring and development of more junior staff while ensuring quality of consultative services provided by the JPC. The addition of additional support and administrative staff will allow for better and timely workflow, enhanced services, and better support the pathologists in consultation, education, and research.

16. Recommend that JTF CapMed conduct a full man-power allocation review.

The Commander, Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical appointed an Implementation Team and, later, a Transition Team consisting of pathologists from all three services, the VA, Uniformed Services University of the Health Services (USUHS), AFIP, as well as technical personnel from the JTF, Health Affairs, and Army Executive Agent. The teams reviewed the Concept of Operations in detail, identify any gaps in services, personnel, and resources and made recommendations that were ultimately included in the final Concept of Operations. Additionally, re-

views of technical and administrative support (personnel, space, and resourcing) of the JPC were provided by the administrative shops of the JTF and were incorporated into the staffing plan and the final Concept of Operations.

17. The JPC should conduct a survey of other federal agencies to determine their current and future pathology needs.

18. Federal agencies should identify areas of subspecialty support needed.

19. Plan should ensure that the equity of all Federal agencies is considered in the services provided by JPC.

(Answer to 17–19): The Joint Pathology Center utilized the workload data from the AFIP in helping to construct the Concept of Operations. Additionally, we have engaged our major federal government stakeholders (VA and NIH) in this process. The VA has expressed the need for extensive pathology consultative support, an established quality assurance review mechanism for their pathology cases, support of the Depleted Uranium Follow-up Program, and continuing medical education support for their pathologists. The NIH has expressed an interest in limited use of the consultative services as well as opportunity to partner or utilize the Tissue Repository in support of clinical research initiatives. These were all considered and incorporated into our Concept of Operations.

20. Consider legal issues when non-DoD entities have access to tissue.

21. Delineate access and usage limits of resources.

22. Define route of access to specimens for civilian sector.

23. Consider funding streams from collaborative agencies with industry.

(Answer to 20–23): The JTF is fully and carefully utilized the repository in such a manner that ensures sustainability and allows for support of critical clinical research within the federal government and with civilian academic institutions. Given the limited utilization of the Tissue Repository specimens in the past, the JTF also strongly believes that a careful and considered approach that engages our stakeholders and encourages strategic partnerships is necessary to fully develop a plan for utilization of the Tissue Repository for research. The findings and recommendations of the Tissue Repository Consensus Conference (2005) and the Asterand Corporation will be utilized. Additionally, the JPC will include a way to more fully utilize the assets of the Tissue Repository for clinical care and education. The JTF is currently working with Health Affairs to contract for the required expertise necessary to help develop a strategic vision and plan for the modernization and utilization of the Tissue Repository.

24. Research agenda should not be developed autonomously but rather through DoD health research management process.

25. Process for criteria, inclusion, and prioritization for protocol approval must be clearly defined in strategic plan.

(Answer for recommendations 24 and 25): The JPC will provide opportunity for pathology research through established IRB approval processes and funding mechanisms with the JTF. The JPC will provide opportunity for collaborative research with Uniformed Services University of the Health Services (USUHS), military and VA Medical Treatment Facilities, and civilian organizations through established processes within the JTF. The JPC will support clinical research initiatives such as the Traumatic Brain Injury and will utilize the Environmental/ Biophysical Toxicology laboratory to support current and future research initiatives. The JPC will expand the opportunity for utilization of ACTUR and Cohort Registry Data to be used for collaborative research efforts. A careful plan will be developed to allow for appropriate utilization of the Tissue Repository in research efforts throughout the federal government and civilian organizations.

26. Define contributions provided by USUHS.

The JPC is working with USUHS to provide continuing medical education credit for its online courses. Initially, we envisioned that USUHS would provide the administrative support for the online course material but have since incorporated that into the JPC as an intrinsic function. The JPC will also actively engage USUHS staff in helping to identify and develop course content for its online education and will support USUHS live courses.

27. Define the level of Graduate Medical Education support that will be provided by JPC.

The final Concept of Operations better delineates the scope of graduate educational opportunities to be provided by the JPC including support of graduate medical education within the federal government through onsite rotations with subspecialists, extensive support of the National Capital Consortium Dermatopathology Fellowship and the Navy Oral Pathology Residency Program, and provision within the JPC of the Veterinary Pathology Residency Training Program.

28. Recommend opportunities for collaboration and development with other professional organizations.

Through strategic partnerships, the JPC envisions ample opportunity to collaborate with other professional organizations in the development and offering of educational activities.

29. Incorporate a method for adopting educational programs.

30. Consideration of broad spectrum of interest areas when determining the continuing education provided by the JPC:

(Answer to Recommendations 29 and 30): As delineated in the final Concept of Operations, refinement of the continuing medical education resources to be provided by the JPC including teleconferences, webinars, on-line courses, and a digital slide repository to support Maintenance of Certification requirements and those of low volume and deployed providers. The JPC will also expand the scope of educational resources to actively involve stakeholders in its educational offerings such as cytology and clinical pathology. The JPC will develop and update its' educational curriculum based on input from stakeholders and end-users as well as based on the needs identified through the Specialty consultants.

31. Strategic plan should include measures to procure equipment.

The Joint Pathology Center is utilizing established procurement processes with the Joint Task Force to procure equipment.

32. Advises workflow considerations and physical location that would allow consolidation of all consultative services.

Consultative Services are largely consolidated in one location with collocation with critical functions such as Electron Microscopy, Telemedicine, as well as administrative support and access to the vast Tissue Repository.

33. Advises satisfactory assurance of adequate resourcing.

The placement of the JPC within the headquarters of the JTF will allow for a streamlined and expeditious review and resourcing for such new requirements. The JPC recognizes that consultative services need to be flexible in terms of support provided to our stakeholders and that new missions, additional missions, and emerging technologies will arise.

34. DHB welcomes opportunity to participate in design/review of the strategic plan.

The Joint Pathology Center has engaged the Defense Health Board and looks forward to their help in establishing the organization.

Question. Dr. Rice, what provisions are you making for managing and modernizing the National Tissue Repository, and for ensuring continued tissue accessions for this valuable resource? How will this resource be made available for study to military and civilian medical researchers in the future?

Answer. By policy, the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) is required to maintain and modernize the National Tissue Repository and utilize the repository, as necessary, in the support of consultation, education, and research. The goal of the JPC is to establish itself as the tissue repository for the Federal Government. The tissue repository will also be used in support of research and education for governmental and civilian collaborative efforts. In order to make the repository available for medical researchers, JTF CAPMED is working closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to find an appropriate reviewer, such as the Institute of Medicine or similar organization, to help develop a strategic vision for the JPC and a detailed plan.

Question. Dr. Rice, adequate and appropriate facilities are certainly a necessity for this important new medical research entity. Since the current labs at AFIP have recently undergone a \$60 million renovation, have you considered leasing these labs back from GSA to allow the two renovated lab floors on the WRAMC campus to be used as Joint Pathology Center space until an adequate permanent facility can be provided?

Answer. Yes, the Department considered a leaseback of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) building, but this raised significant issues concerning adequacy of force protection requirements and base support of post-BRAC use of buildings on the WRAMC campus. The Joint Pathology Center will have adequate and appropriate permanent space on the Forest Glen and Bethesda Campuses without the AFIP building.

Question. Dr. Rice, I understand that your recent planning assumes an FY 2011 budget request of around \$22 million for the JPC. This is considerably less than the current budget \$76 million budget for AFIP. Can you explain how you could attempt to cover the assigned mission responsibilities at that level while providing a world class center?

Answer. The Joint Pathology Center (JPC) is not intended to replicate all capabilities of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) since many of the functions of the AFIP will be realigned elsewhere. The JPC budget was determined largely utilizing AFIP workload, identifying efficiencies gained through a new organiza-

tional structure and function as well as the current budget requirements for the specific functions of the AFIP that will be assumed by the JPC. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and other functions (e.g. Legal Medicine) that will be realigned elsewhere account for approximately two thirds of the AFIP budget.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young. Questions submitted by Mr. Rothman and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. Dr. Rice, what actions have been taken by the Department to preserve the AFIP capabilities until the new Joint Pathology Center is fully operational?

Answer. The Department has approved a detailed concept of operations for the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) on March 31, 2010. With the help of AFIP, the JPC will establish its Office of the Director by October 1, 2010, and officially assume its mission from AFIP on April 1, 2011, with the goal of ensuring continuity of clinical care and support during the transition. The JPC will achieve full operating capabilities by September 2011.

Question. Dr. Rice, what actions have been taken by the Department to establish a Joint Pathology Center? Where will the Center be located and when will it be fully operational?

Answer. The Department approved a detailed concept of operations and implementation plan for the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) on March 31, 2010. The Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical has been working with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to develop personnel, budget, logistics, and information technology plans in order to establish the JPC, which will be located on Forest Glen and the Bethesda Campus. The JPC is expected to achieve full operating capabilities by September 2011.

Question. Dr. Rice, in order for the Defense Subcommittee to ensure it provides adequate funding, please provide a summary of the facility and staffing needs of the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) that takes into account the vision of the JPC as a world-class facility and recent Defense Health Board recommendations.

Answer. The Joint Pathology Center will require 135 Active Duty and civilian staff, approximately \$2 million in initial start up costs, and approximately \$22.5 million in annual operating costs.

Question. Dr. Rice, please provide an update on the status of the creation of the JPC and its accompanying duties as outlined in Public Law No: 110–181 (H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act) and Public Law 111–32 (Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009).

Answer. A detailed concept of operations for the Joint Pathology Center (JPC) was approved on 31 March 2010 that incorporates these statutory requirements as part of the JPC's establishment. JPC will establish its Office of the Director by October 1, 2010 and officially assume its mission from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) on April 1, 2011, with the goal of ensuring continuity of clinical care and support during the transition. The JPC will achieve full operating capabilities no later than September 2011.

As section 722 of the National Defense Authorization Act 2008 required, the JPC shall function as the reference center in pathology for the Federal Government. The law requires the JPC to provide, at a minimum, the following services:

1. Diagnostic pathology consultation services in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary sciences.
2. Pathology education, to include graduate medical education (residency and fellowship programs), and continuing medical education.
3. Diagnostic pathology research.
4. Maintenance and continued modernization of the Tissue Repository and, as appropriate, utilization of the Repository in conducting the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (3).

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Rothman. Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. Dr. Rice, an integrated delivery system must be operated and managed as a single entity with a regional, unified view of acquiring materials, procuring training personnel and coordinating administrative tasks. To accomplish this unified medical mission, the medical services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the National Capital Region (NCR) will integrate to ensure the best utilization of resources available which will eliminate redundancies, enhance clinical care, promote health professions education and joint training, and enhance military medical research op-

portunities. This integration will also further the growth of transformative efforts with government, community and private sector partners.

Please describe for the Committee the importance of realizing an integrated health care delivery system as the Department implements the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of 2005 in the NCR and moves toward achieving world-class medical care.

Answer. The Department recognizes the importance of realizing an integrated delivery system (IDS) as this will achieve a synergy among military health care delivery systems. As the IDS is refined, it will continue to promote efficiency through regional consolidation and collaboration and enhance the quality of health care by reducing variance. The new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital will be established as joint hospitals that will operate from an integrated regional perspective. This will enhance patient care in many ways to include common models for primary care, specialty care and referrals.

Question. Dr. Rice, has the Department taken the steps to ensure this is going to occur?

Answer. Yes. The Department is tracking the development of the integrated health care delivery system in the National Capital Region closely.

Question. Dr. Rice, has a joint business development plan been developed?

Answer. Yes. The Commander, Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical issued Fiscal Year (FY) 2011–2013 Business Planning Guidance to ensure medical readiness, provide quality health care, and execute Base Realignment and Closure requirements across the Joint Operations Area in the National Capital Region.

Question. Dr. Rice, please describe current funding responsibilities for National Capital Region Medical and how these responsibilities will change during the transition?

Answer. Currently, funding responsibilities for the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as well as the Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) within the National Capital Region (NCR) are managed through the Service Medical Departments with either BRAC funds or Defense Health Program funds for on-going operating expenses.

JTF CAPMED has visibility of both the Army and Navy financial systems to ensure funds are appropriately received, obligated and executed. TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) and JTF CAPMED reconcile the obligations and execution data regularly and conduct semi-annual reviews to ensure the program remains as planned.

The Department is currently reviewing the most effective authority for JTF CAPMED to manage resources for its assigned forces during the transition and post-BRAC. It will provide details on this in its submission required under section 2714(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 that is due to Congress by 30 June 2010.

Question. Dr. Rice, has the hospital and/or JTF CAPMED formed a relationship with the installation, i.e. Navy Installations Command?

Answer. Yes. The relationship has been formed and the issue of authority has been refined. Those services and buildings that are not directly a part of the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center will be operated in direct support of the Medical Center's missions.

Question. Dr. Rice, the current NCR medical BRAC projects are scheduled to be completed by September 15, 2011. The Department recognizes that the NCR medical BRAC construction, initial outfitting and transition and relocation timeline for the transition from Walter Reed to Walter Reed National Military Medical and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital must be accomplished in the next 18 months. The integration of the Army and the Navy's two biggest and most prominent hospitals: Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and the National Naval Medical Center (NNMC) makes it evident that military medicine in the National Capital Region (NCR) would never be quite the same, and the integration of these two military medical giants would be the model for the future of military medicine.

How will the Department mitigate the risk of possibly serious disruptions of medical care during the transition?

Answer. To mitigate any risk to patient care and safety, the Department has hired leading industry experts in hospital transitions through a contract with General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT). GDIT has developed plans for key activities, to include the development a patient move plan, publication of a move manual, staff training on patient movement, and day in the life exercises for operating the new facilities and scheduling mock patient move exercises prior to each of the internal moves. Additionally, the patient census will be adjusted at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) through controlled medical regulation of warriors, temporary limitation of elective surgeries and procedures at WRAMC, and

temporary transferring of services to other military treatment facilities in the Joint Operations Area. Inpatient and intensive care capability will be maintained at Malcolm Grow Medical Center until the end of Base Realignment and Closure.

Question. How is the Department refining the current risk and issue management process to ensure confidence and uniformity in risk and issue management at all levels?

Answer. The Department has refined its approach in the NCR Medical to effectively deal with risk and issues collectively. The program's risk/issue management objectives are to:

- Effectively manage risks through risk identification, assessment, planning, monitoring, and control
- Reduce the likelihood that a risk event will occur
- Minimize the impact of an issue or risk event
- Develop awareness, understanding, and adoption of a structured and standardized JTF-wide risk management process
- Refine the risk and issue management process (toward a planned, systematic, complete, objective, repeatable, defined, managed, preventative, qualitative, and quantitative process) to achieve confidence and uniformity in risk and issue management at all levels.

The Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical reviews risks and issues at every level of command and participates with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and other DoD staff in regular reviews of the program.

Question. Dr. Rice, what types of risks or delays has the Department been anticipating if any at all?

Answer. The Department has identified four possible risks or delay areas: Facility Construction Timeline and Funding, Accreditation, Patient Safety and Human Capital Risk. A further explanation and planned response is listed below.

Facility Construction Timeline and Funding Risk: Intense management of construction agencies and the scheduling process of space availability to Initial Outfitting & Transition have and will continue to mitigate this risk and identify potential shortfalls in time for adjustment decisions and/or allocation of resources.

Accreditation Risk: Maintaining accreditation, patient safety and quality of care is also vital to success during transition. A combination of JTF CAPMED proactively coordinating with the Joint Commission headquarters prior to Initial Operation Capability (IOC) to obtain advice, guidance and recommendations, along with a unity of effort for joint governance of Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH) during the BRAC transition, will significantly mitigate the risks to patient safety and accreditation lapse.

Patient Safety Risk: Patient safety is the Department's number one priority during the transition. There are inherent risks associated with conducting extensive renovations and construction within and around an operating medical center. The Department also will mitigate risk through deferral of elective care and referral to private sector care. During the actual movement of patients from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to the new WRNMMC and FBCH a small percentage of routine direct care system patients may temporarily be referred to private sector facilities or other military hospitals. Inpatient and intensive care capability will be maintained at Malcolm Grow Medical Center (MGMC) until the end of BRAC to provide NCR capacity for wounded warrior or other critical care during the transition period.

Human Capital Risk: The loss of skilled and experienced human capital affects the ability to sustain world-class care and is therefore a significant risk. Utilizing a workforce mapping model to execute the Guaranteed Placement Program (GPP), the Department will be able to place the vast majority of WRAMC permanent government civilians at their desired work locations performing the work they want to do and will provide reassignment opportunities and career progression opportunities that do not exist today.

Question. Dr. Rice, please describe the scope of the transition in terms of beneficiaries and physicians and other personnel.

Answer. The transition will entail the movement or realignment of approximately 19,000 direct care enrollees, 4,300 Active Duty Service members, and 2,100 government civilian employees currently at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), National Naval Medical Center, and DeWitt Army Community Hospital.

Question. Dr. Rice, the Department estimates the total cost of newly identified requirements associated with achieving a world-class standard of care at Bethesda is \$781 million. The projects, to include converting to single-patient rooms and replacing and renovation of older infrastructure on the campus, require a mix of Military

Construction and Operation and Maintenance funding. The fiscal year 2011 budget request does not include funding to support the additional requirements that have been identified by the Master Plan.

Can you provide for the Committee a listing of the types of projects that the \$781 million the funds would accomplish?

Answer. The table below depicts the projects that comprise the \$781 million:

Project	Description	Funding Type	Estimated Cost (\$M)
Comprehensive Clinical Expansion.	New Construction, Renovation, Demolition, Parking Garage, Temporary Facilities, Outfitting and Transition, Commissioning, AT/FP, Enhanced Building Information Systems..	MILCON/O&M	\$651M (\$567 MILCON \$84 O&M)
Installation Upgrades	Pedestrian Ways, Vehicular Access, Plazas, Childcare, Utility Infrastructure, Etc.	MILCON	\$85
Medical Center Technology Installation and Medical Center Environment.	Smart Technology, RTLS, External SONET	O&M	\$30
	Campus Way finding and Master Planning	O&M	\$15
Total	\$781

Question. Dr. Rice, how will the already world-class amputee care, prosthetics care, and rehabilitation centers be established in the new facility?

Answer. The world-class centers will be established by the following: most of one whole floor in the new WRNMMC outpatient clinic addition (Building A) will be dedicated to physical medicine modalities with additional services and diagnostic support provided on two other floors. Over 115,000 sq. ft. is dedicated to Physical Therapy, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Occupational Therapy, Amputee Center, Orthotics, Prosthetics, Chiropractic Services, Orthopedics, Podiatry, and a satellite Laboratory, Radiology, and Pharmacy on the first three floors of the new outpatient clinic. This represents the largest physical medicine footprint in all of the Department of Defense and will continue to provide WRAMC's current capabilities in the care of amputees and the manufacture and adjustment of state-of-the-art upper and lower extremity prosthetics.

Physical therapy plays a major role in the rehabilitation of amputees, traumatic brain injured and psychologically injured patients. Clinical space in the new clinical building outlined above and in the inpatient areas have been designed to offer the best medical care to these injured patients. Appropriate personnel have been designated on the current manpower document to complete the mission in these areas.

Question. Will this require additional funding as well?

Answer. No, we do not require any additional funding at this time.

Question. Dr. Rice, what other projects beyond the ones outlined in the Master Plan may be needed in the Nation Capital Region to provide world-class care?

Answer. At this time, no other projects beyond the Master Plan are needed. The current Military Construction (MILCON) funding projections complete the known requirements to achieve those attributes of the new, statutory world-class medical facility standard at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. These are based upon the best available planning information, and, specifically, the Medical MILCON components are based upon the latest Department of Defense cost guidance.

[CLERK'S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.]

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