

**FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION:
STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

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HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
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FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

Opening statements:	Page
Senator Carper	1
Senator Akaka	14
Senator Levin	16
Senator Burris	19
Prepared statements:	
Senator Carper	47
Senator Burris	50

WITNESSES

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009

Hon. Mark Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado	4
Paul W. Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Deputy Assisant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Depart- ment of State	7
Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation	25
Nicholas Schmidle, Fellow, New America Foundation	27
Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council	29
Nathaniel Fick, Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New American Security	32
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and Inter- national Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer- sity	34

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Curtis, Lisa:	
Testimony	25
Prepared statement	56
Fick, Nathaniel:	
Testimony	32
Prepared statement	75
Jones, Paul W.:	
Testimony	7
Prepared statement	51
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf:	
Testimony	34
Prepared statement	78
Nawaz, Shuja:	
Testimony	29
Prepared statement	71
Schmidle, Nicholas:	
Testimony	27
Prepared statement	66
Udall, Hon. Mark:	
Testimony	4

APPENDIX

Questions and Answers for the Record from:	
Mr. Jones	81
Ms. Curtis	92
Mr. Schmidle	96

IV

	Page
Questions and Answers for the Record from—Continued	
Mr. Nawaz	98
Mr. Fick	102
Mr. Mowatt-Larsen	104

FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES,
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Burris.

Also Present: Senator Mark Udall.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want to welcome a very good friend—Senator Udall from Colorado. Thank you very much for joining us. He and I were part of a congressional delegation about a month and a half ago that went to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We learned a lot and came back with a special interest in the issues we will be discussing today. So I very much want to welcome you today.

I am going to start off with a statement, and we will be joined by some others of our colleagues. I would like for Senator Udall to stay for as long as his schedule permits, and we welcome him to participate with us as we go through statements.

Before I begin, I really want to give my thanks to the men and women serving in the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We certainly want to give our thanks to the men and women serving in uniform, particularly in Afghanistan today. We are grateful for the sacrifice both on the civilian side and on the military side in that country.

We were in both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, back in May. I can say with great confidence that our new Ambassador there, Karl Eikenberry, and his wife who has joined him there, and Ambassador Anne Patterson in Pakistan are very impressive people with a very highly effective staff. We commend them for their leadership, and all of our personnel that are serving there capably.

An Islamic insurgency rages, as we know, in western Pakistan, and senior U.S. officials are concerned about the declining security situation and new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal, although I must say I am pleased, I think we are encour-

aged, by the way the Pakistan military has turned on the Taliban with the strong support of all the political parties of any consequence and the strong support of the voters and the electorate and the population of Pakistan.

But the insurgency, particularly in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, the political instability in that region, the devastating humanitarian crisis as a couple million people in Pakistan have been dislocated from their homes, and an intensely anti-American population threaten an already fragile Pakistani Government. These factors present unique challenges to the United States and the strategy of our President laid out in late March.

In my view, the Administration has developed a strategy that addresses the region's concerns while understanding that the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan are indeed linked. This hearing will examine implementation of that new strategy.

When we were leaving, Senator Udall and I were doing a press conference with our colleagues, and I was asked by one of the reporters, "What is the exit strategy for the United States?" And I said that the exit strategy is our new strategy, the new strategy outlined by the President in March. It has military components, training components, and civilian components, and we need to do all three.

Our focus today will be on the hardest and most critical problem of the region, and that is Pakistan. Most national security experts agree that Pakistan is maybe the most dangerous country in the world today for one primary reason: Nowhere else in the world is there such a lethal combination of Islamic extremism, terrorist groups with global reach, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear weapons.

In late March, President Obama said that Pakistan's lawless border region has become the most dangerous place in the world for Americans. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan "the site of planning for the next attack" on the United States.

General David Petraeus, who oversees the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, said recently that Pakistan has become the "nerve center" of al Qaeda's global operations, allowing it to reestablish its organizational structure, build stronger ties with offshoots in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and in parts of Europe.

Pakistani officials acknowledge that their country is facing perhaps the greatest threat since its creation in 1947: A growing virulent threat from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Islamic groups.

In the months since our delegation was in Pakistan, the Pakistani military, as I mentioned earlier, has launched an offensive in the North-West Frontier Province, specifically in the Swat Valley, and in South Waziristan, an agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Many experts have been skeptical whether Pakistani officials understand the existential threat to their own country. But as I said earlier, an extraordinary thing has happened in the last month and a half. For the first time President Zardari, opposition leader Sharif, the Pakistani military, and more than 80 percent of Pakistanis view the Taliban and al Qaeda as a critical threat to Paki-

stan. Those numbers are almost double what they were about a year ago.

I agree with Secretary Napolitano's recent statement from Pakistan that the Pakistani Government's crackdown on the Taliban has improved U.S. security. The Obama Administration has promised Pakistan \$1.5 billion in aid for the next 5 years in humanitarian and economic assistance; and although the Senate unanimously passed the Kerry-Lugar bill that I cosponsored. The bill is now stuck in Congress with a list of conditions with which many Pakistanis are uncomfortable. This bill is both vital to the U.S. national security and to Pakistan's 175 million people, and I urge the conferees to send the President a bill to sign, and soon.

Finally, it goes without saying that the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance to all of us. As the insurgency spreads in Pakistan, senior American officials are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear weapons, including the potential for militants to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel production facilities or to seize a weapon in transport. Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the wrong hands should be, must be, the top priority for both of our countries.

These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. Let me mention a couple of them.

One, the Obama Administration has recognized that the United States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in Pakistan. How is the implementation of the President's strategy proceeding?

Two, there is a complex network of extremist groups operating in the lawless regions near the Afghanistan-Pakistan borders, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and other affiliated and sectarian groups. How should policymakers prioritize which of these groups to target? Who is reconcilable among them?

Three, since September 11, 2001, the United States has allocated billions of dollars to non-military assistance programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What should our goal be for distribution of the Kerry-Lugar assistance? And what should the delivery mechanisms be?

Four, what can our government do to address the problems caused by anti-American sentiment in Pakistan? Does the current humanitarian crisis present the United States with an opportunity in this regard? What additional actions might reverse widespread distrust of the United States among Pakistanis?

Five, in the past the Pakistani Government and army have undertaken only sporadic militarized efforts punctuated by lulls when truce deals allowed the militants to regroup and grow stronger. How should we assess what now appears to be a fairly robust Pakistani effort to combat extremism inside their country? Are current military operations a sign of meaningful change in this pattern? We sure hope so.

And, six, some analysts argue that the Pakistani military has been slow to reorient itself toward modern counterinsurgency planning. How does this affect U.S. regional interests? Has our military

assistance to Pakistan sufficiently bolstered that country's counter-terrorism capabilities?

And, finally, what is the probability of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive material to create a dirty bomb? What is the possibility of an insider threat at Pakistani nuclear facilities?

Today, with these questions in mind, I would like for us to try to do the following: Assess the status of the implementation of President Obama's new strategy toward Pakistan; examine the complex set of threats from western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan; discuss the most effective short-and long-term policy options regarding Pakistan; solicit ideas about how Congress can play a more robust role in the path forward, specifically in non-military assistance to Pakistan.

If our national security is linked to the success, the security, and the stability of a democratic Pakistan, we have no choice but to engage in a smart, sustained, and long-term partnership. The United States needs and is finally on the path to achieving, a Pakistan-based policy as opposed to a leader- or government-based policy.

Thanks again to our witnesses for taking this opportunity to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before us and how best to address them.

Before I introduce our first witness, I am going to call on my friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Mark Udall.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK UDALL, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO**

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Carper, and good afternoon to you, Mr. Jones, and to this very interested and interesting audience, Mr. Chairman. I note a lot of young people here interested in policymaking, and clearly they are going to shoulder some of the challenges in the near and the far term as we work in very difficult but important settings to overcome the threat of extremism and violence and chaos.

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member McCain for inviting me to address the Subcommittee briefly today. I was very honored to be a part of Chairman Carper's congressional delegation trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have memories and experiences that will stay with me forever.

I did want to share my impressions of the trip with you here today and with the broader Congress. As the Chairman mentioned, the purpose of our trip was to get an updated view of the U.S. military and civilian operations, particularly focusing on President Obama's new strategy, and we did get an updated view. I came away believing we have a window of opportunity to arrest deteriorating security conditions in both countries and to work with the civilian governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve stability and security in the region, which I really think is our goal.

Let me further add some specific ideas and impressions. I think I will probably, for the most part, echo the Chairman's comments, but perhaps I will also augment some of his insights.

In Pakistan, our strategic challenge is different than it is in Afghanistan. We cannot allow extremists to destabilize this nuclear armed state that has the world's second largest Muslim population.

By the estimation of many experts, the possibility that Islamic radicals could destabilize and undermine the Pakistani state has become, frankly, all too real. But we do not have troops on the ground in Pakistan, nor are Americans very popular. Mr. Chairman, a recent poll indicates that the new Administration is no more popular than the last, with 90 percent of the Pakistani population agreeing that the United States is trying to weaken the Muslim world.

One difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that our leverage is much less in Pakistan than it is in Afghanistan, and, thus, our options are fewer. Yet there are a number of steps we can and we should take to improve our relationship with Pakistan, and in so doing, enhance our reputation and our influence in this critical part of the world.

We can demonstrate an interest in a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan, a relationship that goes beyond fighting a common enemy but assisting as well with police reform and training and sustainable economic development. There is no better demonstration of this than the recently passed Kerry-Lugar bill, which will invest in non-military projects that will directly benefit the Pakistani people and help build—and rebuild, frankly—trust and cooperation. We heard quite a bit about some of these opportunities from the business community and other leaders in Pakistan.

We can also continue to provide accountable military assistance—underlining “accountable”—to ensure that Pakistan’s military and police have the training and the equipment that they need. And we should encourage India-Pakistan rapprochement both to demonstrate our commitment to the region as well as to help the Pakistan people and government focus on the real and imminent threats.

I was, in that regard, really encouraged to hear during our visit that the Pakistani people, the government, the business community, and the journalists we met with are very much concerned with the growing insurgency on their western border and less concerned than they have been about their eastern border with India. There is a much larger recognition that there is an existential threat posed by extremism to Pakistan itself, not just to these ungoverned areas on the western edges of Pakistan, and a sense that the civilian government really has to reassert itself in this perilous environment. Pakistan’s recent military actions are an indication of this new commitment.

Having said that, I still have concerns about the way forward. I am concerned that the Pakistani army lacks the will to sustain its fight against insurgents within its borders. The army has driven the enemy out of Swat, but unless it protects the area, the enemy could return for another day. It is not enough to clear; the Pakistani army also needs to hold and build. And I know Senator Carper and I are also very concerned about the 2.5 million Pakistanis who have been forced to flee their homes and the areas in which they live because of the fighting.

Islamist groups are infiltrating the refugee camps, but at this point, the authorities in Pakistan will not allow American officials or planes to deliver aid because of anti-American sentiment and security risks. Pakistani Lieutenant General Ahmad, who heads up

the Pakistani army's disaster management group, has said that the United States is seen as part of the problem. But if we cannot help deliver U.S. aid to the refugees, as we did in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, this is a tremendous lost opportunity for us. We are essentially competing with Islamist groups for the loyalty of these people, and we are losing, despite contributing more than any other country to the U.N. effort.

So let me close by saying I believe the President's combined civil-military strategies are our best hope to turn the tide in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should not overestimate our abilities to rebuild broken states and transform entire regions of the world. Ensuring our security here at home and serving our interests abroad means that we need to be both tough and smart as we engage with our allies and adversaries.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for letting me have a chance to share my impressions in this important hearing. I am scheduled to preside on the Senate floor in about 15 minutes, but I am going to stay and listen to Mr. Jones before I am required to leave.

One last comment. I see, again, so many young people here who obviously are very interested in foreign policy and how to build a tough and smart international security policy. I just had a chance to reread a book entitled "Three Cups of Tea," and I would recommend it to all of you here as one of the ways forward. The author Greg Mortensen would be the first to tell you that his programs and his successes in northern Pakistan are not the only strategy that we ought to fund and implement. But it is a fascinating account of how to build societies in ways that let those societies then fend for themselves. So I recommend "Three Cups of Tea" to everybody here and, of course, to my fellow Senators as one of the ways forward.

Thank you again.

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much. Thanks again for being here today and for your comments. I think we are going to have a partnership on these issues for a long time, and I look forward to that.

Our first witness, panel one in its entirety, Paul Jones. Mr. Jones serves as both Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia at the U.S. Department of State. That is quite a title. He is a career member of the State Department's Senior Foreign Service, formerly served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, Philippines; as a U.S. Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Vienna, Austria; and as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia. While working for the State Department, Mr. Jones was Director of the Office of Central Europe, responsible for the U.S. policy in the Balkans. There is a lot more I could add to that, but I am going to stop right there so we will have an opportunity to hear from you and our other witnesses today. We are honored and thankful for your service and very much pleased that you could be here today.

Thanks so much. Welcome. Please begin.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL W. JONES,¹ DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you so much, and, Senator Udall, a great honor to appear before both of you and your Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the opportunity.

I want to bring greetings from Ambassador Holbrooke who is currently winding his way back from consultations in Egypt to further our outreach to key countries for our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it is a great opportunity for us to explain a little bit of the strategy and get into a conversation, because we would really welcome your views. So I will be quite brief in my opening statement, and I look forward to your questions and your comments.

Secretary Clinton and Special Representative Holbrooke are very much committed to working closely with Congress as we implement the President's new strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We acknowledge and very much appreciate the deep interest and firsthand experience among Members of your Subcommittee.

Since January 20, Special Representative Holbrooke has assembled a very diverse interagency team to implement this new strategy, leveraging the expertise of representatives from nine U.S. Government agencies as well as leading academics. Our early efforts have supported Pakistani efforts to enhance political and economic stability as well as Pakistani efforts to roll back the Taliban threat and respond to the need of the growing numbers of displaced persons.

More specifically, the United States has, over the past couple of months, established regular cabinet- and summit-level trilateral consultations to build trust and cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani leaders. We have deepened relations with leading Pakistani politicians across the political spectrum. We have worked with Japan and Pakistan to organize a Pakistan Donors Conference in Tokyo in April of this year, resulting in \$5.8 billion in pledges to assist Pakistan as it addresses significant macroeconomic challenges.

We have helped rejuvenate Pakistan-Afghanistan transit trade negotiations, which have the potential to enhance economic opportunity in both countries. We have encouraged the first direct contacts in the context of these trilateral discussions between ministers of agriculture, interior, and finance of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And we have provided military assistance to support renewed Pakistani efforts to defeat insurgents, and we have led the international effort to mobilize relief for Pakistan's internally displaced persons.

At the same time, Pakistan itself has taken a number of very important steps. Pakistan has resolved a political crisis in mid-March, resulting in the reinstatement of the Pakistani supreme court justice. Pakistan political leaders held an All-Party Conference on

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the Appendix on page 51.

May 19, which resulted in a declaration supporting military action against insurgents and extremists. Pakistan has conducted a sustained counterinsurgency operation with wide public support, and it has assisted about 2 million displaced persons under the civilian-military leadership of the same Pakistani officer who directed Pakistan's effective earthquake relief effort in 2005.

In the coming months, we plan to enhance our support for Pakistani efforts to address significant economic and governance challenges. We deeply applaud the Senate's unanimous passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which authorizes \$1.5 billion per year in non-military assistance for 5 years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful demonstration of our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people and reinforce our desire for a long-term partnership based on common interests.

It is vital that we help address the economic and social conditions that extremists exploit in western Pakistan with more and more consistent economic aid. Our assistance will support Pakistani efforts to hold and build in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended. But more than helping rebuild homes and businesses, we must also enhance bilateral and regional trade potential by encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors such as energy and by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones to provide incentives for investment in critical regions by offering duty-free imports to certain products made in the border regions.

Legislation before the Senate today would establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in areas directly affected by the fighting and would boost confidence in economic opportunity, including for displaced persons who will be returning. The President called for passage of this ROZ legislation when he announced his new strategy on March 27, and again during the trilateral summit meetings with Presidents Zardari and Karzai on May 7. It is a critical aspect of our strategy to bring economic opportunity to what would otherwise be the heart of al Qaeda's safe haven, and it is vital for protecting our national interests.

The challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course, very complex, and we cannot expect results overnight. Signaling and demonstrating our long-term commitment to a true partnership is essential for our success. The Administration is committed to working closely with Members of this Subcommittee and Congress generally on every aspect of implementing the President's strategy.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity, and I welcome your questions and your comments.

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for that statement and for the responses that we are about to receive.

If you could just summarize for us briefly the Administration's changes in strategy for Pakistan. Just go back several months, rewind and pick it up right there.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are several aspects that I would highlight. One is the level of political engagement. We are presented with an opportunity of a new civilian democratically elected government in Pakistan, and as the Administration came

in, very quickly we moved to engage the entire spectrum of civilian political leadership in addition to our ongoing conversations with the security sector and other sectors of society at both the summit and the cabinet level, and we have had a tremendous response from the Cabinet of the U.S. Government who are directly engaged with their counterparts in Pakistan and Afghanistan to raise the level of our dialogue.

We have also put forward a plan and we are detailing it now in a series of assessments for how we would increase quite significantly our economic assistance to Pakistan, focusing more on people-to-people exchanges and efforts that have a real impact immediately for people on the ground.

In particular, some things have changed since the strategy. Obviously, the development of the insurgency and the quite dramatic change, as you have highlighted, Mr. Chairman, in public opinion led to other challenges and opportunities that we have responded very quickly to in terms of assisting with displaced persons. But I would generally say that we are looking at increasing our engagement both in terms of assistance and in political activities, and also, as I had mentioned when speaking about Ambassador Holbrooke's travel, we are engaging at very serious and high levels with all of the many countries who have relationships and interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to get us all sort of on the same page politically speaking; and complementing that, we are engaging in a new effort to try to raise the level of our donor coordination for these countries so that we can make better use of all international donor assistance.

Senator CARPER. When we were in Pakistan, I was struck—even now—at the enduring distrust and concern that the Pakistani political leaders and military leaders still view India with. They have had a change of leadership in India as you know, maybe the strongest central government they have had there in a long time, and it seems to me and to those of us who were on our delegation trip that this was maybe a unique opportunity—hopefully not the only opportunity—for some kind of rapprochement between Pakistan and India, a chance to begin to ratchet down levels of distrust, to be able to refocus Pakistani military preparedness not on their eastern borders, but where the real problems lie with respect to the insurgency groups that are in the western part of the country.

I was struck by the apparent reluctance of the Pakistani Government and military leaders to accept our help, direct or indirect, even with respect to helicopters and the need for mobility to go after the bad guys in the northwestern parts of the country. They have in Pakistan only a handful of helicopters that apparently are operable. I do not know if they are willing to accept more helicopters from us. I do not know if they are even willing to accept our support for parts and for training their maintainers to be able to extend more effectively their counterinsurgency operations.

But we have been presented—and I think the Pakistani people have been presented—with a great opportunity here given the fact that the Taliban overplayed their hand in Pakistan, there has been a sort of uprising, popular uprising that has led to the military taking a very strong role and I think a very successful role thus far.

But when you look at what we are trying to do to further bolster the Pakistani military hand in going after the bad guys, a real help here could be to go after once and for all this distrust—more than distrust between Pakistan and India, but this long-time focus almost to the exclusion of everything else on India. How do we move into this situation? If we cannot convince them to take our helicopters or our aid in making sure that the half-dozen or dozen helicopters they have will work, what can we do on the positive side with respect to ratcheting down the tension between Pakistan and India? Just lay that out for us if you would. Because to the extent that they spend less money and less time thinking about India and having to worry about that flank, that gives them more time and more resources to go after the people they really need to be going after.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I need to state clearly for the record that Ambassador Holbrooke's mandate is for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we treat India, which has been very interested in—obviously, as a major neighbor, has invited Ambassador Holbrooke to visit on each occasion that he has been in the region and continues to be very interested in the implementation of our strategy. But he does not have a specific mandate for the relationship between Pakistan and India. That is handled in other parts of our State Department.

I think, as you suggest, there clearly is some recognition in the governments that they would like to open up more dialogue. There was a meeting recently between President Zardari and Prime Minister Singh.

Senator CARPER. Where did that occur? And I think there may be another opportunity down the road.

Mr. JONES. Yes, that was in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on the margins of dual meetings. There was a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and what is called the BRIC—Brazil, Russia, India, China. There was a summit meeting there that presented an opportunity.

I would like to comment about the other elements of your question. Clearly, Pakistan has laid out some very clear red lines in terms of the assistance that it would like to accept, and I think this goes to the heart of what you were discussing in terms of the distrust that has a lot of historical baggage in our relationship. But Pakistan actually has been welcoming helicopters and other hardware to support the counterinsurgency operations—we have made a huge priority in this Administration to support that request. We have delivered four MI-17 helicopters to Pakistan just in the last few weeks. We have two more coming, I believe later this month, and a couple more behind that. It is not a helicopter that we use or stock, so it is not so easy to go around and try to identify and find the helicopters to assist Pakistan with. We have also gone out to countries around the world to see who else could help with helicopters that are in their inventory, and there are other ongoing efforts in that regard.

But I think what we will see is, as we are able to demonstrate both in terms of our response to the humanitarian crisis and the assistance that Pakistan is open to receiving our consistency and commitment to supporting their efforts, I think we will see gradu-

ally greater openness, and that is, I think, how we overcome the distrust. But that will not be a short-term process, but it is an important one that we are embarked on. And I think really a key to this is the legislation that we have discussed, the commitment of not just \$1.5 billion per year, but over a 5-year period of assistance, that I think will allay a lot of the concerns in the political class in Pakistan that we are there for short-term benefits rather than a long-term partnership.

Senator CARPER. Well, I do not mean to be critical of the priorities that the Pakistanis are setting for their own military. Just look at our own. We are going to be debating in the next week or two on the Senate floor the defense authorization bill, and we are going to be trying to determine whether or not if we are going to continue to buy weapons systems, build weapons systems, very expensive weapons systems, to fight last decade's wars instead of spending monies to fight this decade's and next decade's more likely counterinsurgencies.

The F-22 is a perfectly good aircraft. We have been building them for years, flying them for years. I do not believe we have ever used one in combat. Now we are faced with a question of continuing to build more of them. We will see where that ends. But I am encouraged to hear that there is willingness to accept some helicopters, and maybe the willingness of some other countries to provide that kind of mobility.

We are putting, as you know, 17,000 additional Marines and Army troops into Afghanistan. They will be aided by 150 helicopters to go after the bad guys, especially in the southern part of that country. I think there are four new helicopters. That is good. Two more after that. Well, that is good as well. A hundred and fifty in Afghanistan just to help the 17,000 men and women that we are putting into that country.

One last thing before I move off of this. We met at a wonderful lunch, and I think it was hosted by the governor of Lahore, and I recall sitting at a table with the former Foreign Minister from Pakistan, and he talked to us about back-channel negotiations with the Indians over a decade ago which he thought led very closely to some kind of rapprochement between Pakistan and India. We have learned of a similar kind of initiative maybe 2 or 3 years ago in that country—the same, again, trying to find some meeting of the minds between Pakistan and India. I would just urge us to use whatever influence that we have, direct or indirect, to move that along.

I think it was in April 2008, GAO reported that the United States lacked the comprehensive plan encompassing all elements of national power. What progress has been made in developing such a plan for addressing the situation in Pakistan? How well are the various agencies coordinating their efforts in developing a comprehensive plan? And what interagency agreements, if any, have been reached?

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I think to start with one element, Ambassador Holbrooke's team is, as I said, located in the State Department, but consists of representatives of nine U.S. Government agencies detailed out, selected by the member of Cabinet—the head of agency to represent in Ambassador Holbrooke's office. So we are

not conducting this operation by an interagency committee but actually have a whole-of-government approach nested under Ambassador Holbrooke to whom President Obama entrusted the implementation of the civilian aspect of the plan.

In addition to that quite remarkable—in my experience, the first in my 23 years with the government—experience of such an interagency operation, we have a tremendous level of interagency coordination and cooperation. We have instituted a weekly meeting that we just had last night—it goes on for about an hour and a half—where Ambassador Holbrooke and General Lute from the National Security Council (NSC) chair—and I co-chair in Ambassador Holbrooke's absence—of very senior members from a remarkable number of agencies, much more than the nine represented on our team, with a very open and quite remarkably free-flowing conversation.

We discuss, for example, as just referenced, the visit of Secretary Napolitano, and the points that she was planning to make, we were talking about them in terms of how do we add into her points, how do we reinforce the message there, how do we make it part of our broader context. So there is that going on, which I think is really quite a remarkable effort, in my experience.

Then, finally, I would note the civ-mil coordination. General Petraeus, entrusted with implementing the military aspects of the President's strategy, is in constant touch with our team, with Ambassador Holbrooke, and members of his team are in touch with ours. And our embassies, our missions in both countries are developing civ-mil implementation plans for the strategy that are quite detailed and expensive and bring in at the post level in our missions out there all the agencies required.

So I submit that it is quite a remarkably successful interagency effort going on now, and I think we are drawing on—to cite one example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is putting forth a remarkable increase in the number of people out in Afghanistan and looking at a strategy for Pakistan because these are two countries that depend hugely on agriculture. So we are bringing in agencies that were not so directly involved before and marrying them up with the agencies that we are—

Senator CARPER. Good. One last question, and then I am going to recognize Senator Akaka and then Senator Levin, and welcome to you both, gentlemen. Thank you both for joining us.

I think it was Einstein who said in adversity lies opportunity. We have got the Pakistani military going after Taliban and other extremist militant outfits in the western part of the country. That is the good news. The bad news is we have seen a couple million people displaced from their homes. I am impressed by how many of those displaced people are literally taken into people's homes, as opposed to shuttling them off into refugee camps.

But there is a great opportunity for us to help relocate from the Swat Valley and other places where people have been displaced, helping people get back to their homes, rebuild their homes, their communities, and get their lives back to something close to normal.

I understand that there is a reluctance for the Pakistani Government to even accept U.S. aid that is clearly identified as from the

United States; perhaps we need to work maybe through nongovernmental entities, NGOs, to provide that assistance.

But having said that, to the extent that the Pakistani military has driven out the bad guys and gotten them on the run—we have a lot of people displaced—to the extent that we can go in and be seen, directly or indirectly, as helping to improve that situation, it is a great plus for us and obviously a great plus for the Pakistani people.

Your thoughts, please? How is it going? What are we doing?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator CARPER. How successful are we being?

Mr. JONES. Normally, in such humanitarian situations, most of our aid does go through the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations, and in this case it is no different. So we have pledged a total of \$381 million, disbursed currently a little over \$160 million, to assist the displaced people, some 2 million people.

I think it is quite well known and recognized in Pakistan that we are the leader in that effort. You are quite right, some of these areas, in contrast to the earthquake situation, are still not secure. It is not a very safe situation for us to send out American personnel much beyond Peshawar. In fact, there are quite a number of threats right now. So we are somewhat limited by other factors as well.

The Pakistani Government has said that they want to pay for the side that is their responsibility and, in fact, have disbursed an equivalent of about \$380 per family to the displaced people so that they would have the opportunity on their own to live outside of their homes.

As you mentioned, some 80-, 90-plus percent are living in people's homes, so it is not always the easiest place to access people. It is much better in homes, but there are fewer central points to provide assistance. But we believe the U.N. and NGOs have really spread out their assistance in a way that is helpful.

I would say that, as you suggest, we do want the people of Pakistan to know that America is assisting. We also want the people of Pakistan to know that their own government is assisting. And I think that is coming across quite clearly and is a very important effort to counter the attempts by extremists to influence displaced persons. It is very important for the displaced persons to see that their own government is actually providing assistance. And I think that is in one respect why Pakistan is possessive about that effort, and they are doing, by all accounts, quite well at it.

I was just speaking to a member of our team who recently came back from Pakistan who said, in contrast—because this gentleman served in Pakistan a couple of years ago. He said you just flip through the channels on TV or you hear of what people are talking about on the radio and we see it in the print media, and you see both public service ads and editorials that very much praise the role of the Pakistani military and the Pakistani Government in responding to this situation, the military in terms of the offensive against the insurgents and the government in terms of the assistance to people. And that I would say is also very important because that is what is going to keep people from being influenced by ex-

tremists who are seeking to take advantage of vulnerable people who are displaced. So we are very pleased with that.

You are right. It is also important for people to see the American Government as playing its appropriate role in assisting, and I think that is coming along. But I think it is also important, as I say, that the Pakistani Government is rightly seen as being helpful to the citizens.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, welcome. If you would like to make an opening statement, feel free. Senator Akaka, thank you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing. The implementation of an effective policy toward Pakistan is a very significant and important national security priority.

I just want to mention that there are two issues in particular that I want to highlight.

First, if we pursue an engagement strategy with Pakistan to reduce the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, we must be prepared for a long-term commitment. I am pleased that President Obama supports efforts to strengthen Pakistan's civil institutions and security. These efforts will help address the short-term and the long-term challenges facing Pakistan.

Second, the United States should forge lasting, international partnerships to bring security and prosperity to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. We must listen to the needs of our partners as we define and refine the implementation of our strategies. History has shown us that nations working toward the same goals in a well-coordinated manner bring a greater likelihood of success.

I am keenly interested in Pakistan. For me, it goes back to the year 2000 when I visited Pakistan, and at that time President Musharraf was in charge there. It started for me a good relationship with Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, this is my opening statement.

Senator CARPER. Fair enough. Would you like to go ahead and ask some questions?

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Thank you very much.

Mr. Jones, Mr. Fick's written testimony—he is the CEO from the Center for a New American Security—states that the costs of the unmanned aerial vehicle air strikes inside Pakistan outweigh the benefits and these air strikes are, on balance, harmful to the U.S. and allied interests.

What is your view on this issue? And, what steps should the United States take to reduce the potential loss of good will in Pakistan and Afghanistan if these air strikes continue?

Mr. JONES. Senator, thank you so much. Thank you for the question. I would have to say on that particular subject I would need to defer speaking about that in any specific sense for a closed session, if you would understand that. I would say that a very important part of our strategy is to, with strategic communications, influence information as it is termed in various aspects.

I think that in that area overall we are making some progress. We have plans to increase quite significantly our assistance to Pakistan in terms of helping it get its own information and its own information out in the tribal areas and among displaced persons, and we are working closely with international organizations and with the Government of Pakistan to try to help do that through various means of assistance in procuring local radios and helping with Pakistan public service announcements, things that will help people understand what actually are the goals of the Pakistani Government and the international community and how they are helping the country of Pakistan.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he stated that the United States will set clear metrics to measure progress and be accountable. I agree that metrics are important and that we need to focus on measuring effectiveness and not just effort. How are these metrics being designed and implemented?

Mr. JONES. Yes, thank you for that. We have been working hard on metrics so I appreciate the question, Senator.

There are a couple of different levels of metrics, obviously. One, as I was mentioning just a little bit earlier, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan our embassy and our military counterparts are developing implementation plans at the field level, and embedded in those plans will be specific metrics that we will be able to assess how we are doing in implementing our plans.

Then at the higher level, at the strategic level here in Washington, the National Security Council is taking the lead in pulling together the higher-order metrics that we will measure against on a regular basis and report both to the Executive Branch and to Congress on how we are doing against those metrics. Our effort is to try to focus on metrics that there are metrics that measure inputs, metrics that measure outputs, and metrics that measure actual effects on the ground. We want to focus on the latter, recognizing that we need a certain mix of those three metrics because the effects on the ground are usually somewhat delayed from the inputs, and so you want to see that the activities that we have pledged to undertake are actually happening, that there is some output from it, and then there is effect on the ground.

So we are heavily engaged in that process, and I think pretty shortly we will be able to come to Congress and explain the metrics that we have devised. We welcome input, and I think there has been quite a number of consultations at the staff level on what sort of metrics would be most useful. And we have also received that feedback in terms of appropriations legislation.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he articulated his goal: To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. A primary focus on al Qaeda, of course, makes sense. Are there any other significant organizations that may negatively impact regional or international security that must also be considered?

Mr. JONES. Yes, Senator, there certainly are, and the organizations that have in the past and currently aid and abet al Qaeda, such as the Taliban, are of great concern to us, organizations such

as LeT and others that have been engaged in terrorist operations that are on sanctions lists. There is a variety of opinion about to what extent some of these organizations coordinate and cooperate, but I think it is safe to say that there is the—as long as you have organizations that are inclined toward extremism and terrorist acts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that increases the vulnerability to cooperation with al Qaeda and organizations that actually have the ability to and the intent to inflict harm on the United States, on our allies and our interests.

And that is clearly what we see currently as the threat in this region, and so we take a broader view than just al Qaeda, as you mentioned, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. The President's strategy states that the United States must pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan. This is an important issue considering the historic tensions between these two countries.

What is the strategy for pursuing constructive diplomacy between these two countries? What steps already have been made?

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Senator. We are very encouraged to see some of the steps that have been taking place on their own between India and Pakistan. There has been the recent meetings we were discussing just a short while ago between the leaders of those two countries in Russia on the margins of a summit, and the possibility of future such meetings appears, according to their statements and according to their stated interests, in improving their relationship.

Under Special Representative Holbrooke's office, our primary responsibility is implementing the President's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and working with all the countries and neighbors that have an impact on that. Obviously, India is a very important neighbor, and the Indians have specifically requested Ambassador Holbrooke to stay in very close contact and to visit New Delhi whenever he can on his trips out to the region. So we are in very close contact. The Indians are obviously also a significant donor in Afghanistan, major players in the region.

I think what is most encouraging is seeing the interest on both these countries, India and Pakistan, to improve their relationship.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, thank you very much again for joining us, for your statement, for your questions, and your interest in this issue.

I am delighted that the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee is here. Senator Levin, please proceed.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is a very important subject, and it needs a great deal of attention.

It has been my concern for a long time that unless Pakistan's leaders, both civilian and military, commit in deeds and words to eliminating the threat from militant extremists and make clear that they are doing so for the sake of their country's own security interests and not for the sake of the United States, then no amount of assistance will be effective. I raised this point directly with Paki-

stan President Zardari when he was in Washington in May. If Pakistan makes the fight against extremists their own fight, then we ought to be willing to help Pakistan achieve a more stable and secure future. But we cannot buy their support for our cause, or appear to do so, since that would only play into the hands of their and our enemy.

Now, in the last few weeks, Pakistan's military operations in the North-West Frontier Province and more recently in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), suggests that the Pakistan Government may now recognize that the terrorist threat posed by extremist groups in the western border region is an existential threat and must be confronted.

Yesterday, it was reported that President Zardari said he wants to create a "Pakistan where militancy is defeated," and Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Kayani was quoted as saying that "the immediate internal threat" of Taliban extremism was greater than any external threat, which was understood to be a reference to India.

Where do they make these statements? The interview yesterday, with the the President of Pakistan, was in the *London Daily Telegraph*. Is he making the same statements to the Pakistan public? Do you know, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Senator, thank you. I do not know specifically if he is saying those words. I would note that there has been, as I am sure you have noted, quite a change in the whole political dialogue in Pakistan among the leaders and among the media that have changed quite considerably to recognize the Taliban as an enormous threat.

Senator LEVIN. Is that well known to the Pakistani public that their government considers the Taliban the major threat to their existence?

Mr. JONES. According to the polling that I have seen—and I have not seen anything very authoritative—there has been a remarkable shift in public perception of the Taliban as being a threat to their government and society, to the order of 30 percent to 80 percent. I have had, as I am sure you have, the experience of meeting with quite a number of Pakistanis out in Islamabad who are really quite scared for the future of their country. And as I understand it, that certainly would not have been the case a year or more ago.

So I think there has been quite a dramatic turnaround. It is an iterative process. I do not think we can say that has turned the corner, but it is something that I think we have a great interest in encouraging what we would say is the correct analysis of their national security interests.

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree that unless they make it clear that is their view, not something that we are imposing or buying from them, that it is not going to be effective?

Mr. JONES. I completely agree, yes.

Senator LEVIN. Does the Government of Pakistan have any intention of confronting the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan to deny them safe haven and prevent cross-border attacks against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan?

Mr. JONES. Senator, the history and relationships along the border area are remarkably complex with a lot of historical baggage,

and I think what we have seen is the government and the army of Pakistan taking some significant steps against the Pakistani Taliban. I think it is in our interest to encourage those steps and look toward widening the aperture so that the activities go much broader to all the various extremist groups that threaten Pakistan in the region.

So I think we are headed in the right direction. It is going to take some time to overcome some of the history and relationships that have developed since the time of the Soviet invasion.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether the Government of Pakistan has sought to prevent the Afghan Taliban leadership or the Shura from meeting openly in Quetta, Pakistan?

Mr. JONES. I think in order to fully address your question, we would have to—I would want to go into a closed session to talk about what we know and on what basis. But as I say, I think the important statement to make in this setting is that we think that there are opportunities here that are being recognized in Pakistan. As you say, the most important part is what is being recognized there, but that we can encourage.

Senator LEVIN. Are you familiar with a group that is, I think, called the “Nazir Group in South Waziristan?”

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Is it true that the Pakistan military considers them as a good group of Taliban? And do we? They have a goal of attacking us in Afghanistan, us and NATO. I am just wondering whether or not—what our attitude is towards that group, and what is the Pakistan Government’s attitude towards the Nazir Group?

Mr. JONES. Yes. Obviously, Senator, we place an extremely high priority on working with Pakistan against groups that pose a direct threat to our troops, and there are quite a number of individual clans, groups, offshoots, in that region who do pose such a threat.

The complexity of the relationships and the historical approach that Pakistan has taken to this region lead to shifting alliances, shifting attitudes. So if the Pakistan Government is going after, for example, in one moment Baitullah Mehsud, one individual organization that is credited with the assassination of Prime Minister Bhutto, at that moment they may cooperate with other groups that would also be encouraged to go after that particular organization, while at other moments they may shift to another approach.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether or not—and I will conclude; my time is up. But just on the same subject, do you know whether the Pakistan military, both at this moment but also in the recent past, considers that group, the Nazir Group in South Waziristan, as a friendly, good group of Taliban?

Mr. JONES. I do not know that.

Senator LEVIN. OK. Fair enough. Thank you.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARPER. Senator Levin, thank you very much for being here and for all those questions.

Senator Burriss has joined us from the State of Illinois. It is great to see you, and thank you so much for being a part of this hearing. Senator Burriss, you are recognized. If you would like to make a

brief opening statement, feel free, and then you will have time for a number of questions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested in the situation and came more to listen to the testimony than to raise what I think would be some difficult questions. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much for being a part of this.

Let me come back to you with a couple more questions, Mr. Jones, and if any of my other colleagues have them, fine, and after that you are done. But thanks for your presence here.

I remember, I think it was December 2007, being in Iowa. I was there during the run-up to the Iowa caucuses. I was there with the senior Senator from Delaware, who was running for President at the time. And I was with him the morning when former Prime Minister Bhutto was assassinated. I remember being with him at a press conference, a hastily called press conference, I believe in Des Moines. And I remember the words that he said that day. Among other things he said that what we need in Pakistan is not a Musharraf policy, we need a Pakistan policy.

And what I think I heard you describing earlier today when you talked about the interagency cooperation on our side, I thought you mentioned that you co-chair this working group, and one of the other co-chairs you mentioned is a military leader, and certainly when Ambassador Holbrooke is not there, I think you fill in for him.

That sounds to me a lot more like a Pakistan policy than a Musharraf policy.

Mr. JONES. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more, and as mentioned earlier, I think Congress plays an incredibly important role in that in the legislation and the attention that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives have paid to broadening our engagement. And I think now when we visit Pakistan, we are engaging with the entire political spectrum, and also looking, as I referred to earlier, to deepen our engagement with the Pakistani people.

We had in a recent congressional delegation—the mayor of Karachi came up.

Senator CARPER. It was ours.

Mr. JONES. Yes, it was yours—came up from Karachi, the head of the MQM party. Another great opportunity to engage across the political spectrum with leaders of Pakistan, which makes a more firm basis of a policy. And I think when you look at the different levels of support within Pakistan for their different leaders, obviously, as in ours, it is dynamic, it shifts, and it is to our benefit to really make our engagement as broad as possible.

Senator CARPER. The last issue I want to discuss is, if you will, the safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is a matter on which they certainly have a lot of interest, a lot at stake, and as it turns out, so does the rest of the world. Where does the United States rank the issue of the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal given the numerous priorities that we have in Pakistan? And what

is the probability of militants inserting sympathizers into Pakistan's laboratories or fuel production facilities?

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say just in a very general sense that, obviously, that is among our very top priorities, and we have within the U.S. Government and within the State Department people dedicated who are following that problem and working on it, following that issue very closely. We obviously pay attention to that on Ambassador Holbrooke's team and work closely with other personnel in the State Department and other agencies following that.

I think overall I can say that we have confidence that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan are being safeguarded by the Pakistani authorities. To go into more detail, I think we would want to bring the people who are particular experts on that into a closed session, but I completely agree with the level of interest and appreciate the question.

Senator CARPER. What has been the level of cooperation between U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani Government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S. funds?

Mr. JONES. The relationship between the Pakistani Government?

Senator CARPER. Not with respect to nuclear weapons.

Mr. JONES. Right.

Senator CARPER. Just talk to us about the level of cooperation between our U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani Government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S. funds.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator CARPER. We want to know how our funds are being spent.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator CARPER. And I am not sure that other countries to whom we provide aid or assistance are all that interested in allowing us, through transparency, to actually know how the money is being spent.

Mr. JONES. Yes. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the historical inconsistency in our levels of assistance, we have also shifted back and forth with the way we have delivered assistance in Pakistan. We had previously offered quite a great deal of budget support. We went through a period not too long ago of actually breaking that down into projects, projectizing the budget support, which allowed us to have greater oversight and a greater window of visibility into exactly how funds are being spent.

What we are doing now is we are going to quite significantly increase the number of USAID direct hire personnel in Pakistan, consonant with the planned increases in economic assistance. But that, we believe, will give us a greater level of oversight into the assistance that we provide.

We have some issues that are—we feel we have good cooperation from the government, but in any situation where one is providing assistance, we have to have internal controls. And we have a great deal of interest from the Inspector General of USAID and the State Department and DOD in following exactly that question.

We also have some restrictions in terms of our ability to physically get out in some insecure areas where we particularly want to target our assistance. But we have tried to overcome that by sort of a tiered approach of having local nationals who work for us, having a number of different windows into how the money is being spent, and getting photographic and other evidence that the projects that we have supported are actually coming to fruition. So it is a complex environment, but it is one that we follow very closely.

I would simply add that another element of the Administration's strategy is to try to reduce the large contracts, break them down into smaller units that can be monitored more effectively on a short-term basis and have more direct effect, whether it is implemented through government agencies or civil society and NGOs.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. I know you have indicated that the question of drone attacks, UAV attacks—much of which can only be dealt with in a classified setting. But something which has been in a very unclassified setting has been the attacks on us for those attacks that the Pakistani leaders have engaged in. And I do not doubt for one minute that they are aware of the fact that we are going to be using these attacks against targets. And yet when they attack us publicly for doing what I believe is obvious, they are very well aware of and support, what it does is make our situation a lot worse in Pakistan in terms of the Pakistani public view of the United States. And we can have all the humanitarian assistance in the world, hope that the Pakistani people understand the source of it, and that is fine, providing we are effective in that effort. But it just wipes out a lot of the value of that if the Pakistani leaders are publicly attacking us.

I am just wondering whether or not we have raised this issue with the Pakistani leaders. They do not want us to use UAVs, tell us privately we are not going to be using UAVs in Pakistan if they oppose it. But for them to look the other way or to give us the green light privately and then to attack us publicly leaves us, it seems to me, at a very severe disadvantage and loss with the Pakistani people.

I am wondering what your thoughts are on that.

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I appreciate the comment, Senator. We have those discussions with the leadership in Pakistan because the Pakistani leadership raises those issues directly with us. And I think it strengthens our hand to be able to refer to the comments that you just made and have made on other occasions, Members of Congress have made on other occasions to have those conversations in ways that will benefit both our countries. So I will take that comment, if I could, sir, and relay it to Ambassador Holbrooke, and we will factor that—

Senator LEVIN. I have already relayed it to Ambassador Holbrooke. My question is whether he has relayed it to them.

Mr. JONES. Well, as I say, during the meetings that I have been in in Pakistan, the subject certainly comes up, and there is quite a wide-ranging discussion on it.

Senator LEVIN. Well, I have got to tell you, if they do not want us to do this, they should flat out tell us privately. Do not look the

other way and then attack us publicly. It is wrong. It is not just wrong morally. Put aside that. It is wrong in terms of American security for us to be attacked by Pakistani leaders for doing something which they quite obviously know we are going to do and support, either implicitly or privately, explicitly. That affects my view, I have got to tell you, on the kind of support that we ought to provide to Pakistan because one of the reasons for that support is that hopefully the view of the Pakistani people of our motive will be improved if they see we care about their economic situation. But that is just wiped out if their leaders are blaming us for the loss of civilian life inside Pakistan.

These are very difficult issues. I know they are. And they ought to be limited, if not eliminated, these UAV attacks. They surely should be limited and handled with incredible care, if they are going to be used at all. But it is unacceptable to me to be pilloried by the Pakistani leaders, criticized in their public for carrying out these attacks. And I just want to let you know, and you can let them know, if you want. That approach of theirs affects the view of this Senator in terms of the kind of support which I am willing to vote for.

Mr. JONES. We certainly will let them know that. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Thanks.

Senator CARPER. Just a quick comment. We had rather extensive discussions 4 or 5 or 6 weeks ago when we were there on this subject and highly classified briefings as well. One thing I think we can all agree on is that to the extent that there are drones or pilotless aircraft used in these attacks, it is imperative that we minimize as greatly as we can any civilian casualties.

A second thing, it appears to me that if we had better intelligence—and as you know, we try to use electronic intelligence, we try to use human intelligence to be able to verify where the most highly dangerous of insurgents are located, where they are operating, where they might be gathered. To the extent that we can be provided more accurate information and more timely information through the Pakistani intelligence services themselves, we can, I think, significantly reduce the potential that people, civilians, are going to be harmed in those attacks.

Senator LEVIN. I agree.

Senator CARPER. Senator Burris, any closing comments here before we excuse our witness?

Senator BURRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Just one thought.

Senator CARPER. Please.

Senator BURRIS. It is not a question. It is just a concern in terms of what the Taliban are doing: That is, surrounding themselves with civilians, and that makes our task even more difficult when the evidence shows, Mr. Jones, that this does take place, where Taliban forces will be in homes or villages and launch their activities from those sources where there are civilians. And it makes our job that much harder, and then we end up launching a drone or a missile, and 18 or 19 civilians are killed, and then we are the bad guys. So in some way, we have to try to solve that situation.

Senator CARPER. I could not agree more.

Mr. Jones, I was meeting with some folks in Delaware the other day, and as we were ending our meeting, this fellow said to me,

well, I would not be doing my job if I did not give you my final order—not a direct but an actual request for what we might do in the Congress to address the concerns that were raised at our visit.

I am going to give you an opportunity to close it out here from your panel. What do you need from us? Not just this Subcommittee or not just this Committee, but what do you need from the Congress particularly with respect to Pakistan? We will not get into Afghanistan. What do you need from us?

Mr. JONES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just say before commenting on that, I am really heartened and encouraged that I think we are in complete agreement between the Executive and Legislative Branches, as discussed in this hearing, with the goals of our policy, and we are really committed to working together with you to achieve them.

The support has been tremendous. I think enactment of what is known as the Kerry-Lugar legislation in the Senate and the Berman bill on the House side would be very important. I think that is critically important to conveying the kind of strategy that you enunciated.

Obviously, passing the President's request for the 2010 budget—it contains significant assistance that we need to incorporate into our strategy.

And then, finally, as I mentioned, the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation, which is attached to the House version, to the Berman legislation. Obviously, there are other vehicles, but we think that is something that really carries a lot of resonance in Pakistan, and it is particularly targeted at the border areas and would encourage confidence, would encourage some economic activity that we think would show people that it is not only about assistance but it is about opening up what for us is a very small opportunity of duty-free trade for the Pakistanis, a very big symbol, and we think it would help our mutual efforts.

So I really appreciate this opportunity and look forward to being in close contact with you, Mr. Chairman, and your Subcommittee.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you so much. Thank you for joining us and for your efforts. And you are excused.

We would like to invite the second panel to join us at this time, please. Thank you.

Mr. JONES. Thank you again.

Senator CARPER. As our second panel is joining us at the table, I am going to go ahead and begin some introductions of our panelists.

I will start off with Lisa Curtis. Lisa Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation where she focuses primarily on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It is a great portfolio for this panel. From 2001 to 2003, she served as a Senior Adviser in the State Department's South Asia Bureau, where she advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistan relations. In the late 1990s, Ms. Curtis served in the CIA as a political analyst on South Asia. She also served as a political officer to U.S. embassies in Islamabad and in New Delhi from 1994 to 1998, and during her tour in Islamabad, she earned a Meritorious Honor Award from the State Department for contributions to a year-long four-nation endeavor to free hostages held by militants in Kashmir.

Next, welcome to Nicholas Schmidle. Mr. Schmidle is a Fellow at the New America Foundation. He is the author of “To Live or To Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years Inside of Pakistan,” which just came out, I am told, in May, about 2 months ago. My staff has read it and highly recommends it to me. I understand that you regularly contribute to the *New York Times Magazine*, to *Slate*, to the *New Republic*, the *Washington Post*, the *Virginia Quarterly*, and many other publications. In 2008, I am told Mr. Schmidle received the Kurt Schork Award for freelance journalism based on his reporting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he lived throughout 2006 and 2007 as a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs.

Next is Shuja Nawaz. Mr. Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, was named the first Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington this past January. Mr. Nawaz has contributed his experience to RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and other leading think tanks. While attending Gordon College, he was named the Cabot Fellow and won the Henry Taylor International Correspondent Award. His latest two books are “Crossed Swords: Pakistan and Its Army, and the Wars Within” and “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place.”

Next, Nathaniel “Nate” Fick. Mr. Fick was named Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security about a week ago. Congratulations. Before joining the Center for a New American Security, Mr. Fick served as a Marine Corps infantry officer—Semper Paratus—leading a reconnaissance unit during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I understand you are the author of the 2005 *New York Times* best-seller entitled “One Bullet Away.” The Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command has made your book required reading for officers deploying to Afghanistan and to Iraq. Mr. Fick, previously an on-air national security consultant to CBS News, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. I understand you serve on the boards of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation, whose mission is to provide opportunities for children of marines killed in action. Good for you. Thanks for doing that.

And, finally, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen.

Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served over 3 years as Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy. You served, I am told, for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in various roles, including Chief of the European Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen’s overseas assignments include Stockholm, Moscow, Athens, Yerevan, Zurich, and Oslo. Before his career with the CIA, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the U.S. Army. He has been awarded the CIA Director’s Award, Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, among others.

That is quite a line-up, and we are honored to have each of you before us this afternoon to continue this conversation.

I am going to ask you to please stick to your 5 minutes, and if you go much beyond that, I will have to rein you in. But I will ask you to stick to that so we will be sure to be able to ask you some good questions later on.

Ms. Curtis, I understand you are just back from the region, having participated in a Transatlantic Opinion Leaders tour of Afghanistan, and we want to invite you to begin your testimony. Welcome and thank you.

**TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,¹ SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and Senator Burriss. It is an honor to be here today. My remarks will focus on developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan where, as you mentioned, I recently returned.

Containing the global terrorist threat in South Asia requires the United States to forge a trusting and cooperative partnership with Pakistan. The future direction of the region, including the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, pivots on Pakistan's ability to overcome multiple socioeconomic challenges as well as its willingness to fight terrorism in all its forms within its own borders.

There has been a welcome change in the Pakistan military's attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest part of the country in just the last 10 weeks. In late April, under both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, and following Taliban advances into new districts close to Islamabad, the Pakistan army began an offensive that has since ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. A combination of events, including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan as "infidel," has begun to change the Pakistani public's attitude toward the Taliban, thus prompting the army to take them on militarily.

The fighting, however, has led to a severe humanitarian crisis with nearly 3 million people fleeing their homes. The United States has provided substantial aid to help relieve the crisis, \$380 million, as we heard previously, but the United Nations is still far short of the funds it needs to address the crisis. There are reports that banned extremist organizations have access to refugee camps and will use the plight of the displaced people as a recruiting tool. The United States must insist Pakistan restrict extremist groups' access to these camps.

The Pakistan army also is preparing for an additional offensive in the tribal areas in South Waziristan. This is where insurgent forces of Pakistani leader Baituallah Mehsud reside. Baituallah Mehsud is an ally of both al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, but has focused his attention more recently on targeting the Pakistani state through a spate of suicide bombings. The United States must encourage Pakistan to implement hold and build strategies in the tribal areas following any military operations. The United States also should discourage the Pakistan military from striking additional peace deals, pointing out that past deals have only undermined Pakistan's position strategically.

¹The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on page 56.

During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several NATO commanders expressed the view that Pakistan military operations in the tribal areas are helping reduce the flow of militants and insurgents into eastern Afghanistan. Still, NATO commanders acknowledge that the command and control of the Afghan Taliban resides in and around Quetta, Baluchistan, and provides leadership and critical access to money flows for insurgent operations in Afghanistan. They said that if the Taliban leadership in Quetta was neutralized, it would deal a significant blow to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, depriving it of guidance, focus, and legitimacy.

Therefore, the United States must convince Pakistan to crack down on Afghan Taliban leadership and should determine the level and type of further U.S. military aid to Pakistan based on Islamabad's efforts in this regard.

One of the major problems in garnering full Pakistani cooperation against the Afghan Taliban is continued paranoia among security officials about India's role in Afghanistan. The United States views Indian development activities, like road and dam construction, and humanitarian assistance as helpful while Pakistan security officials view it as an attempt to encircle Pakistan.

Let me just say a few words on Afghanistan, if I may, based on my observations from my trip.

I think there has been improvement in the coordination of the international effort that I could perceive, and I think there is support among the NATO partners for the evolving U.S. strategy, namely, the focus on a population-centric approach. Allies such as the U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Poland are providing invaluable contributions to the fighting.

The new push by U.S. forces into Helmand Province is part of a broader effort to regain the initiative from the Taliban in the south. The NATO commanders I met with in Regional Command South were enthusiastic about the arrival of the additional U.S. troops to southern Afghanistan. They noted that up until now they had lacked sufficient resources to implement an effective counter-insurgency strategy. The commanders we met with believe the U.S. troop influx will help shift the momentum against the Taliban, perhaps as early as late summer or early fall.

It is important that the August 20 elections in Afghanistan are carried out in a credible manner and that the Afghan people believe the democratic process can bring change to their everyday lives. It would be devastating if, just as the international community is getting its act together and implementing a winning strategy, the Afghan people lose faith in the democratic process because of a flawed election.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, containing the global terrorist threat requires us to partner closely with Pakistan. In this regard, Congress should move quickly to reconcile the two separate pieces of Pakistan legislation that have recently passed the House and the Senate to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to a long-term partnership. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act that would provide U.S. duty-free access to items produced in zones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan also is an integral part of changing security perceptions in the region and should be a priority for this Congress.

Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis, thank you. Mr. Schmidle, welcome.

**TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE,¹ FELLOW, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION**

Mr. SCHMIDLE. First, I would like to thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and Senator Burris. I am honored for the opportunity to share some thoughts on the subject of strengthening U.S.-Pakistan relations today with a specific focus on explaining the character and dynamics of jihadist militancy in Pakistan.

The United States is dependent on Pakistan for accomplishing its objectives in Afghanistan. Many of the insurgents fighting against American soldiers in Afghanistan are either based in Pakistan or being commanded from Pakistan. Top Afghan Taliban leaders use Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, as their headquarters from where they direct operations in southern Afghanistan. And insurgents in eastern Afghanistan are being supported and led by networks in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and, to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province.

I am going to focus my testimony today on those insurgent and jihadists fighting against the Pakistani Government, however. I often hear U.S. military officials describe their adversaries along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in general terms such as "the enemy," while in the same sentence proposing to isolate specific "irreconcilable" militants from specific "reconcilable" ones. But what is the character of the jihadist threat in Pakistan? I want to take a few minutes to answer this question in two parts. The first part is who constitutes the enemy in Pakistan, and the second part is how does the Pakistani military conceptualize the enemy.

So who are the jihadists and insurgents fighting against the Pakistani Government? The Pakistani militants are not a monolithic, disciplined entity. They are probably best understood as belonging to one of three categories, each with different safe havens, objectives, and vulnerabilities. Those three groups are: First, foreign al Qaeda elements; second, Kashmiri and sectarian militants; and, third, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban Movement.

The foreign militants—which are predominantly Arabs and Uzbeks, with a smaller number of Turks, Chechens, Africans, and some Europeans—can be classified as al Qaeda and are estimated to account for several hundred fighters. They are suspected of being based in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand Agency, Bajour, and in Swat. Owing to their internationalist backgrounds, most of them have international aims, whether it is committing terrorism abroad; committing terrorism against international targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan; or in order to consolidate their own control over these areas, committing violence against the traditional tribal authorities. Of the three categories of militants in Pakistan, these are by far the least interested in reconciliation.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Schmidle appears in the Appendix on page 66.

The Kashmir and sectarian groups have long enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani State. In the mid-1980s, the main anti-Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba, was formed with military support with the goal of transforming Pakistan from being a Muslim state into being an explicitly Sunni Muslim State. However, Sipah-e-Sahaba members spent a considerable amount of time in Afghanistan during the Taliban era, participating in pogroms against Afghanistan's Shia Hazara minorities. In the early 1990s, a Sipah-e-Sahaba splinter group, known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, was created with an even more ambitious and murderous agenda and has been accused in the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl and the bombing of a church in Islamabad in 2002 and, to some extent, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are the homegrown Pakistani equivalent of the sectarian death squads that have terrorized Iraq for years.

Within the second category are also the Kashmiri militant groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Most of these groups, Kashmiri and sectarian ones alike, are based in southern Punjab, in and around Multan, Bahawalpur, and Jhang. The Kashmiri groups receive substantial support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies to carry out attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir, and this support and training makes them now particularly dangerous. So unlike many of the Pashtuns who call themselves Taliban and are fighting against the State, these fighters are simply more than just disgruntled men with guns.

The uprising at the Red Mosque in July 2007 was critical for this reason, for not only did it bring together sectarian and Kashmiri militants from southern Punjab, but it also brought together Pashtuns from the border and Arab jihadist ideologues. But, second, and most importantly, it exposed the limitations of the Pakistani intelligence agencies, for while senior leaders of the state-supported jihadist groups went to the mosque to plead with the brothers who were in charge to halt their activities, the foot soldiers from these state-supported jihadist groups had already switched sides. In other words, the state may have succeeded in its bid to reconcile the leaders of some groups, but what good is a leader with no one to lead? Those who survived the final raid on the mosque ultimately fled to the tribal areas, where they have taken up refuge with the Taliban.

This brings us now to the Pakistani Taliban, which have evolved into the lethal force they have become primarily because they represent a fusion of al Qaeda, Kashmiri and sectarian jihadist groups, and Pashtun discontent. Consider the case of Baitullah Mehsud and his organization based in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. Mehsud's deputy, Qari Hussein, belongs to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the anti-Shia sectarian group. When his men kidnapped almost 200 Pakistani soldiers in August 2007, they looked through the soldiers' gear, found at least one of them who was carrying Shia literature, and proceeded to have his head cut off—by a teenage boy with a knife. This sectarian facet is critical to understand because now we see most of the fighting in the Kurram Agency of the tribal areas occurring between Sunni Talibs and local Shia fighters.

So who is reconcilable? There are two groups of combatants who fall into this category: Those Pashtuns currently fighting alongside the Taliban who joined the Taliban out of a sense of ethnic identity and Pashtun nationalism, and those bandits and criminals who realized that donning a turban and beard provided some legitimacy to actions otherwise considered “banditry.” But the most important group that the Pakistani Government should be targeting with aid and security are those Pashtun-populated areas in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan where the Taliban are not a significant presence yet. The more that Islamabad can portray the insurgency as being led by foreign religious extremists and not by local Pashtuns, the better chance it has of success.

Could I have two paragraphs to talk about the Nazir Group here in the end?

Senator CARPER. If they are short.

Mr. SCHMIDLE. OK. Publicly, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has maintained a certain amount of confidence that it can pit various groups against one another. But as we were mentioning, as Senator Levin was mentioning earlier, in the Pakistani threat perception there are “good” and “bad” Taliban, and this case certainly applies in South Waziristan, where right now the military is talking about an offensive there, and we see Baituallah Mehsud and his fighters coming under attack, and yet Maulvi Nazir being seemingly unfazed.

Now, this relationship between Maulvi Nazir and the Pakistani military really dates back to the spring, April 2007, when Maulvi Nazir drove the Uzbek foreign al Qaeda elements out of his territory with support from the Pakistani army. The general who was in charge of this territory later confided to me that he had commanded his soldiers to take off their uniforms, to take AK-47s, to look like locals, and to fight “as Taliban” with the Taliban against these foreign fighters. So this story should show that the newfound vigor on display by the Pakistani army only pertains to some militant factions.

I will end on that.

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Mr. Nawaz.

**TESTIMONY OF SHUJA NAWAZ,¹ DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA
CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL**

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Levin and Burris. I am honored to appear before you today to share my thoughts with you on what works and what could work in Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better partner in building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a Pakistani but also as someone who has lived and worked in the United States since 1972.

While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, I do not think it is hopeless. Pakistan is a complex country, struggling nearly 62 years since independence to define its nationhood. Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military, has left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its military rulers have been matched by the short-sightedness of its civil leadership. Most polit-

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz appears in the Appendix on page 71.

ical parties are run as personal fiefdoms and family businesses or on feudal patterns. Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerge. Ironically, only the major religious party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and routinely elects new leaders from the rank-and-file.

I welcome President Obama's and the U.S. Congress' moves to change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term commitment to the people of Pakistan and not on an alliance with any single person, party, or institution. In this season of bipartisan support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape U.S. policy, I offer some information and suggestions.

First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of Pakistan: Over 60 percent of its population is below 30 years. Most of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the economy and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and vulnerable to the blandishments of their radical co-religionists, who have used a convoluted interpretation of Islam to attract Pakistani youth to their side.

Yet Pakistani society has strong sinews. When given the chance, its people work hard and do well. They helped build Britain's textile factories and help run the economies of the Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula. They remit about \$6 billion a year to their homeland. A recent World Bank study showed that from 1980 to 2007, Pakistan ranked second only to China's 9.9 percent average GDP growth rate with a growth rate of 5.8 percent. All this in spite of government. Today Pakistan has a middle class of some 30 million with an average per capita income of \$410,000 a year on a purchasing power parity basis.

So how do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can leverage its strengths and build a long-lasting relationship? Certainly not by threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a proud people and do not respond well to the carrots-and-sticks approach. In any case, such an approach is not employed by most of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with another country? Rather, we need to build trust on the basis of understanding.

Pakistan's military now appears to have recognized that the internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence of a powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full training nor the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the United States talks of counterinsurgency training, it sounds to the Pakistanis that they must abandon conventional defense. We must clarify that this is not the case.

Until Pakistan's threat perceptions change, we must be prepared to support its military in creating a hybrid force, ranging across the spectrum of capabilities. This will allow them to shift from the Committee on Information Needs (COIN) to conventional, as needed.

Now, how can the United States become more effective? USAID is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt, empowered, and given the staff to strategize and manage its projects, develop relationships inside Pakistan, and effectively deliver aid where it is needed. USAID is aptly named in my view. Most of its aid money stays in the United States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop

being a contract management agency and become again a powerful partner of U.S. diplomacy, working with local counterparts.

We must also better coordinate assistance, so DOD, State, Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE, and other agencies work together rather than autonomously or at cross purposes. So Congress needs to support the Special Representative's work in this regard.

Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically difficult moves such as the Free Trade Agreement and removal of quotas on textile imports would allow Pakistan to help itself. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics supports this idea. But we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added chain towards manufacturers if it is to stay ahead of the population growth curve.

The ROZs fall in the same category. It is a very expensive solution, but it is not a permanent solution to the problem. So we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder towards manufacturers, as I said, and to have these ROZs located near population hubs and communications.

There is a better way of creating jobs in FATA, and we have a calculation that if you create 300,000 jobs in FATA, you have basically eliminated the entire pool of unemployed youth in the area which are being recruited by the Taliban.

On retraining the military, we must recognize that the Pakistan army also needs help in keeping up its conventional force even while we build up its mobility and ability to fight militants. Mr. Chairman, four helicopters will not do the trick. The United States can and should divert larger numbers of helicopters and COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan as it replaces the fleets of European Allies, for example.

We must also replace the coalition support funds with regular foreign military funding with milestones and benchmarks proposed by Pakistan's military and agreed to by the United States. This will help transform the current patronage relationship from an army for hire to an army that is fighting Pakistan's own war.

How do we attract the aid monies and make their use transparent? I believe in accountability, Mr. Chairman, and responsible use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does not have the ability to track its civil or military expenditures effectively; we must help Pakistan to create these systems. A comprehensive financial tracking system in the Ministry of Finance and in the Ministry of Defense will help strengthen civilian control and supremacy inside Pakistan.

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Nawaz, I am going to ask you to wrap up your testimony please.

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir.

The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such efforts. On its part, the U.S. Government needs to make its aid transparent. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity of Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic challenges. The United States must work behind the scenes to understand Pakistan's security concerns and to alleviate them, and India is a key player in this region. The United States must use its influence with India so that it shows, in the words of my friend Peter Jones at the University of Ottawa, "strategic altruism." Both India

and Pakistan must leapfrog the hurdles of historical distrust and conflicts to fight the common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism. There is no alternative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. Mr. Fick, welcome.

TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL FICK,¹ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

Mr. FICK. Thank you, Chairman Carper, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today.

My comments this afternoon are based largely on a research project I have just completed with my colleagues David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum. I know you are familiar with Dr. Kilcullen's work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mr. Exum is currently serving on General McChrystal's assessment team in Kabul. I have submitted our entire formal report as written testimony.

Avoiding the worst outcomes in Pakistan over the coming year demands that we focus on securing areas that are still under government control, build up the police and civil authority, and measure progress against realistic benchmarks so that we know what is working and what must be changed.

The near-term challenge for the United States and its allies is to stop the extremist advance, both geographically and psychologically. If the militant advance is not at least halted in the coming year in the Pakistani State, including the supply routes supporting the coalition in Afghanistan and Islamabad's nuclear arsenal could face an existential threat.

The first priority is to change two policies that have proven especially destabilizing: Drone strikes against targets beyond al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier, and unconditionally aiding the Pakistani military at the expense of other security forces.

Remote attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles are currently the U.S.'s primary method of combating violent extremism in north-west Pakistan. The appeal of drone attacks for policymakers is clear, their positive effects are measurable, and they avoid coalition casualties. They create a sense of insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions with each other.

Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks as they are currently being conducted inside Pakistan outweigh the benefits, and they are in the current context harmful to U.S. and allied interests. U.S. officials vehemently dispute, rightly, the civilian casualty figures used by the Pakistani press, and it seems certain that far more militants and far fewer civilians have been killed than is reported there.

What matters as much as the real numbers, however, is the perception of these operations among the people in the FATA and the northwest frontier, as well as among the people of Pakistan's other provinces. Even beyond the Pashtun belt, drone strikes against Taliban targets as opposed to al Qaeda excite visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani opinion. The U.S. reliance on

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Fick appears in the Appendix on page 75.

drones also displays every characteristic of a tactic or, more accurately, a piece of technology substituting for a strategy.

Currently strikes from unmanned aircraft are being carried out in a virtual vacuum without a concerted information operations campaign or an equally robust strategy to engage the Pakistani people more holistically. Killing terrorists is necessary. Expanding the target list beyond al Qaeda, as happened in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination, empowers the very people the coalition seeks to undermine.

With militant attacks spreading east of the Indus River and threatening the urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, where much of the Pakistani middle class lives, the United States and its Pakistani allies should build on their strengths by drawing a notional line at the Indus River to defend those people already under the control of the central government. One element in this strategy should be the reallocation of funds from the Pakistani military and intelligence services—which continue to view India as Pakistan's most pressing threat—and toward the police.

The Kerry-Lugar Act is a welcome step in the right direction. It decouples military from non-military aid, triples that non-military aid to \$1.5 billion a year, and includes increased allocations for the police, independent judiciary, and anticorruption efforts. It also—and I will cover this in more detail shortly—requires benchmarks and criteria for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.

To be sure, short-term aid to the police forces is not a long-term fix for Pakistan. In the coming year, however, the neglected Pakistani police forces must be bolstered so that they can credibly secure the populations of Punjab and Sindh from militant attacks.

All strategies require constant assessment, and President Obama's plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is no exception. In the speech unveiling his new approach, the President promised to set clear metrics and consistently assess the impact of U.S. policies.

Effective benchmarks, as Mr. Jones correctly stated earlier, should measure outcomes for the population rather than inputs by governments. Too often, the international community has measured progress by tracking money raised, money spent, or troops deployed. These are inputs, not outcomes, and they measure effort not effectiveness.

Better benchmarks track trends in the proportion to the population that feels safe, can access essential services, enjoys social justice and the rule of law, engages in political activity, and earns a living without fear of insurgents, drug traffickers, or corrupt officials.

Because perception matters in politics and the coalition's goals are political—to marginalize the extremists, bolster the government, and wean the population away from armed struggle—perceived outcomes matter the most. It is not enough to make people objectively safer and better off. Before they are willing to put down their weapons and support the government, the population must feel safer and must perceive the government as the winning side.

Key metrics to watch in Pakistan include the rate at which Taliban chapters continue to open in the Punjab and whether the balance of 2009 sees more attacks in the urban centers of Karachi and Lahore. These developments would indicate that instability is

increasing in the Punjab and Sindh heartlands and would suggest that the situation on the ground is worsening.

The assassination rate of maliks is another indicator. The Taliban have killed hundreds of maliks since 2004, a sign of intimidation and illustrating the erosion of civil society and the collapse of law and order. A drop in killings might simply indicate that most maliks have been killed or driven away from their districts, but continued high assassination rates would indicate ongoing insecurity.

In closing, I would like to make an overarching suggestion. During the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan, one slogan unified all efforts of the U.S. Government: "Get the Russians out." For this campaign we should consider using "Build local capacity," which, while maybe not as catchy, has the virtue of being clear and one word shorter.

Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today.
 Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.

**TESTIMONY OF ROLF MOWATT-LARSEN,¹ SENIOR FELLOW,
 BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
 AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY**

Mr. MOWATT-LARSEN. Thank you. Good afternoon, gentlemen. The Subcommittee asked me to address three issues: First, to assess the security challenge to Pakistani nuclear weapons; second, address the nuclear terrorism threat, in other words, the terrorist nuclear intent and capability; and, third, to make some recommendations on what might guide stronger cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.

To that end, I wrote a paper with my Harvard colleague and nuclear security expert, Matthew Bunn. I provided that paper as a restricted document to the Subcommittee so we could go in full into this topic, particularly the cooperation, without hyping or otherwise exacerbating any sensitivities, particularly when cooperation entails issues that affect national sovereignty as well as specific nuclear sensitivities that obviously, whether we are talking about Pakistan, the United States, or any other country, are very relevant.

It is also, I think, for context, important to bear in mind that it is very dangerous to hype the issue of losing control of Pakistani nuclear weapons. I think any statement I have made certainly has stressed that the Pakistan military that protects the nuclear arsenal is a very professional organization. It takes its duties extremely serious, and I do not think anything I would say would question the degree of effort that they have put into this or their intent.

I think the bigger question here is the problem we face itself has a zero tolerance standard, which applies particularly when we are looking at Pakistan but also globally. It is a standard that President Obama laid out very clearly in Prague, and I think changed the entire nuclear landscape. He described it as "a single bomb threshold," where a bomb going off, a terrorist bomb, in any city of the world changes life for everybody. That is the standard that

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen appears in the Appendix on page 78.

we are worried about when we think about upgrading security in any country in the world and the nature of the cooperation. I think that demands to cooperate are enhanced.

The essential challenge we face is that terrorists only have to be successful one time, we have to be successful every time. And there is no such thing as perfect security or perfect anything if my 36 years in the government are of any relevance.

I would like to summarize just a few of the highlights of things I think would be germane to say publicly. First, there are three trends that Pakistanis face that in particular affect them. They are not unique to Pakistan, but they are trends that are particularly worrisome. First is the increasing levels of extremism in the country that exacerbate the threats for insiders working with outsiders, the insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders to either take out material or facilitate people's access inside.

Second, their program, unlike many programs in the world, is an expanding program, a rapidly expanding program. More weapons in more places means more potential for things to go wrong.

And third is the potential threat to a change in government and the challenges that might pose that have not been fully considered. The challenge to the national command authorities who control the nuclear command and control is not trivial at all. Now again, I am sure that the Pakistani establishment is taking it extremely serious and working through all the scenarios they think could occur.

Second area of broad interest, what can terrorists do? Can terrorists, in fact, detonate a nuclear weapon? It is very hard for a terrorist group to do this. No one is saying it is easy. Is it more than 1 percent? If it is, it is an existential problem, and that is what we face.

Terrorists have three pathways to do this. They can steal a bomb, they can attack a facility, or they can steal enough material to construct a bomb. We know since Aum Shinrikyo in the early 1990s and al Qaeda as early as 1993 that the intent is clear, terrorist groups want to do this. The only thing we think that they have not been able to do, which is significant, is overcome the barriers in terms of having the capability. And that is what we are trying to stop by ensuring security of all nuclear facilities globally, but particularly in unstable areas.

Finally, in looking at cooperation, just to discuss in a more general sense, I think one thing in particular I would stress is the insider threat. We have seen in the United States, itself, that we have had arrests in my time in the Department of Energy, for example, of employees that had issues. So, therefore, again, we think we have something to share. We think all countries should share more about nuclear security-related upgrading. The Pakistan-U.S. effort in this regard, from my standpoint, is a model for how countries need to think. And I think the International Atomic Energy Agency should play a bigger role.

Second, how do they strengthen protection against outsiders, particularly outsiders who will attack a facility?

Third, talking about winning the battle of hearts and minds—and I have heard some of that here today. And most notably with hearts and minds is making the point that Islam as a great religion in no way would condone the slaughtering of innocents that is part

and parcel of a nuclear terrorist attack. Groups like al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or others cannot get a free ride expressing the intent as a legitimate expression under Islam, and it is important that clerics and groups worldwide, particularly nongovernmental groups, work against that trend.

Fourth, increasing threat awareness, the fact that nuclear terrorism is not still regarded as a real threat in many parts of the world, as I alluded to earlier.

And, finally, the improvement of joint communications and reducing misunderstandings. If the United States and Pakistan do nothing else than have a robust trust and communication that is created through these exchanges, by my standard, again, of the most important things we need to do, that would be at the top of the list. We can resort to those mechanisms, particularly in a crisis where there is a suggestion—whether it has happened or not—that there may be a lost nuke or an attack on a facility, and we are dealing with reports that have to be confirmed and the only way we are going to really be able to do that is through trusted channels between Pakistan and the United States.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARPER. Yes, thank you for excellent testimony from all of you. And Senator Levin, who has been here in the U.S. Senate for a long time, heard a lot of witnesses, a lot of panels of witnesses, said to me just before he slipped out during Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's testimony, he said, "These are damn good witnesses."

And I have sat next to him in a bunch of hearings over time, and I do not think I have heard him ever say that. I am sure he has thought it. But this is really exceptionally a good panel, and thank you all for sharing your thoughts with us.

I am going to yield to Senator Burris if he has any final questions or comments. I have a number of questions I want to ask before we conclude. I think we are going to vote at 4:45, about 20 minutes from now. But I would like for us to get in more questions. Senator Burris, any comments or questions you would like to ask, feel free.

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am listening to this excellent testimony and thought I knew a lot until now. Mr. Schmidle, maybe you can help me out here. I am trying now to distinguish between whether or not the Pakistanis or al Qaeda or the Afghans or the Taliban or each of these groups, are these Pakistanis that are what we would call militants and they are joining the anti-force within their own government that are now fighting for or against our troops that would cross over the border and go back into Afghanistan? Could you clear this up for me since now I have listened to such excellent testimony and am trying to sort it out?

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Senator Burris, thank you. I am not sure that I can totally clarify it. I think that it is incredibly murky, as you suggested.

Those who are fighting in Pakistan, there are very few Afghans who are crossing the border to fight with the Taliban against the Pakistani Government. There are, however, many Pakistanis who up until the time—really we have to look at this July 2007 government raid of the mosque in Islamabad as a turning point when the

insurgency against the government became popular for a while amongst the various militant groups, who up until that point, even though they thought that President Musharraf was doing the work of the Americans and there was still some opposition to him, still primarily focused their attention on fighting American and NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan.

So since that event, though, it did attract a great amount of attention from the various militant groups. Those Pashtuns, however, who are fighting in the North West Frontier Province are not necessarily militants. I mean, some of them are simply tribesmen who, over the course of the past several years, have in an accidental bombing raid by the Pakistanis had their house destroyed and have then said, OK, well, I have now sworn the rest of my life to avenging my wife's death, or whatever.

It is multi-layered as to who the actual belligerents are in this struggle. I do not know if that clarifies things at all.

Senator BURRIS. It does not. Can anyone help me out here?

Ms. CURTIS. If I might?

Senator BURRIS. Sure, please, Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. I think you have hit on a major crux of the problem, sir, and this has been that we have seen from the Pakistan Government, the military in particular, a dual policy of fighting some terrorists and supporting others. And it has not worked, sir. It is threatening to our interests in the region, threatening to their own interests in the region. And I think that is why we see such a confused situation—

Senator BURRIS. Is the Taliban—they are al Qaeda?

Ms. CURTIS. What I am saying, sir, is that Pakistan has supported and elements of the security services probably are supporting parts of the Afghani Taliban to protect their own interests vis-a-vis India. They do not want India to have a foothold in Afghanistan, so this is part of the problem that we do have different objectives, and I think what we need to see from Pakistan is a more holistic approach to militancy and a willingness to confront the militancy and confront all militant groups on the same level rather than, as we heard from one of the other witnesses, shifting alliances, supporting some groups on one day, other groups on another day.

It seems this policy has failed. It has failed to provide security in this region, and it is threatening to global national security interests.

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Nawaz, can you help me out a little bit?

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, Senator, if I can just simplify it, the Afghan Taliban comprised the so-called Quetta Shura and then the Haqqani group, which is in North Waziristan and the group belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that operates in the northern regions of FATA from Nuristan and Kunar Valley.

The Afghan Taliban have not gotten into any battles with the Pakistan army. They have avoided it, and the Pakistan army has returned the favor. They have not made it difficult for them to seek sanctuary in Pakistan. The local Taliban, the ones that Mr. Schmidle was referring to—

Senator BURRIS. When you say "local," you mean the Afghan Taliban?

Mr. NAWAZ. The Pakistani Taliban.

Senator BURRIS. Oh, the Pakistan Taliban.

Mr. NAWAZ. They are known, in fact, as the Tehreek-e Taliban of Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. They emerged only in the last couple of years. They have aligned themselves as franchisees of al Qaeda at times as well as aligned themselves with the Punjabi militant groups, the Sunni groups that were previously supported by the Pakistan intelligence services in Kashmir against India. So new alliances have been formed that are now operating inside Pakistan against the Pakistani State.

But just to be clear, the Afghan Taliban have not taken up arms generally against the Pakistan army, and the army has not, therefore, chosen to attack them. This is a sort of oversimplified view. There are areas where there are some crossovers, but this is probably the best that one can do in—

Senator BURRIS. So this is what our combatants over there are trying to deal with it?

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. FICK. Senator Burriss, could I add one comment—

Senator BURRIS. Please, Mr. Fick.

Mr. FICK [continuing]. From the perspective of a former combatant. I would suggest that one easy way to think about it is almost like the concentric rings of a target. And if at the center of the target you have the groups with ambitions beyond the theater, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically al Qaeda, an organization with global ambition, the next concentric ring going out would be organizations with ambitions perhaps throughout Pakistan, and then wider still are groups with more local and limited ambitions.

And as you get closer to the heart of that bull's eye, the heart of that target, the greater is the threat to the United States and the more latitude we should have to deal with it militarily. As you get closer out to the edges there, to the groups that have more local and limited ambition, we have to be much more careful militarily for risk of turning the people against us.

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CARPER. You bet. Thank you. Thank you so much for joining us today, Senator Burriss.

I was just saying to Wendy Anderson, our senior staff person on these issues, it seems to me—and I have sort of moved toward this thought as I listened to the first panel and now our second panel—the importance of reducing tensions between Pakistan and India and sometimes I think in terms of a two-fer, or I think we may have a three-fer here in this case: One, to the extent that those tensions are significantly reduced; first, reduce the likelihood of a war between those two countries and potential for nuclear exchange.

Second, it allows the Pakistan military to focus on counterinsurgency rather than fighting a war with the country of India. One of you talked about helicopters and we need more than just four helicopters. The Pakistanis need more than four or six, for that matter. But then it would be, folks, the kind of military equipment and capabilities that frankly have not much at all to do with India.

The third is that one of you spoke about how the Pakistanis provide almost a safe harbor for—I think it was through the Afghan

Taliban so that the Afghan Taliban can go back and forth and really destabilize the Government of Afghanistan, keep them occupied in an effort to reduce the presence or the successful involvement of India in Afghanistan. If I were the Pakistanis, I would not want to be surrounded on one side by a hostile India and on the other side, on my other flank, by an Afghanistan that is allied with India.

I think that those are potentially at least three good things that flow from reducing tensions. My hope going forward is that the efforts that have been started before in the 1990s and even in this decade that they will not just begin anew, but will begin with our strongest support and encouragement.

Anybody have a thought on what I just said? You do not have to, but if you do I welcome it. Yes, Ms. Curtis?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I think the India-Pakistan rivalry, deep-seated, historical, three wars, military crisis, so I think to try to say that, "Well, if we could just get Pakistan to not have to worry about its border with India, then it could focus on militants," is just too simplistic. We have to look at what led to the derailing of the dialogue. We had a very productive Indo-Pakistani dialogue from 2004 to 2007. The Mumbai attacks, a Pakistan-based group conducting a rampage, killing 160 people in India in November 2008.

Senator CARPER. Excuse me for interrupting, but do you think that attack had anything to do with trying to undermine the discussions that were going on?

Ms. CURTIS. I think it probably did. I think it probably was aimed at causing conflict between the two countries and probably was aimed at taking Pakistani forces away from fighting the militants in the tribal areas to having to focus on the India border. But India also has to think about its security, and if it is being attacked and the elements are coming from Pakistan, then it has to prepare itself as well. So we have to keep this in mind.

I think the role that the United States can play is to quietly encourage them to get back to talks, but talks that will really allow them to view the region differently, focus on non-state actors that destabilize both countries. Rather than trying for the United States to insert itself into the very sensitive Kashmir issue.

Senator CARPER. Notice I have not mentioned Kashmir at all.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think this issue has been dealt with in the past through the back-channel negotiations that were mentioned before; there has been movement. So encouraging the two sides to get back to those talks bilaterally I think should be the focus of the United States.

Senator CARPER. Another comment? Mr. Nawaz.

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes, Senator. I am often referred to as an optimist. But then a friend—

Senator CARPER. So am I.

Mr. NAWAZ. A friend reminds me that a pessimist is an optimist with experience.

Senator CARPER. Yes, I think you noted that in your comments. I wrote that down. I hope you do not mind if I use it.

Mr. NAWAZ. Not at all. Senator, I think the key is not simply in making this a linear equation between opening up the dialogue be-

tween India and Pakistan and getting Pakistan to focus on militancy.

The longer-term goal really must be to strengthen both Pakistan and India so that they can achieve their economic potential. India has 300 million people living at absolute poverty; Pakistan has also huge gaps between the rich and the poor, and the opportunity cost of their defense expenditures is extremely high. So whatever can be done by the United States and other friends of both countries in opening up a dialogue between the two countries, opening up trade, for instance, which would create vested interest groups on both sides, which would make war impossible, should be encouraged.

Economics 101 dictates that neighbors should be major trading partners. Neither India nor Pakistan is each other's major trading partners. India's major trading partner is the United States or China, depending on how one counts the figures. Pakistan's major trading partner is the United States. And neither are neighbors of the United States.

So it is very critical to try and reopen the dialogue that had begun, that was near fruition, at least on three of the four key areas where there was conflict, with Kashmir having been decided as an issue that was best left to settle by itself and to grow organically so that the line of control would become irrelevant. I think that is the approach that needs to be encouraged. And that will allow Pakistan to become economically and politically stronger and, therefore, be able to deal with the militancy at home.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Let me return to the issue of security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and particularly with the points I think raised by Mr. Mowatt-Larssen with respect to insider threats at nuclear facilities.

I am going to ask you to try and be brief; we are going to start voting in about 5 minutes. So please be brief in responding. But as I think, as you rightly point out in your testimony, the Pakistani military intelligence and nuclear establishment are not immune to rising levels of extremism in Pakistan.

Do you believe that increasing levels of extremism create or exacerbate the insider threat at nuclear facilities? We will just start with you, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.

Mr. MOWATT-LARSEN. Yes, I would Mr. Chairman. In fact, I would describe the insider threat from the standpoint of my background in intelligence and security and counterintelligence as their No. 1 threat. It is a far more likely possibility than, say, the more hyped problems of losing control of a nuke or a convoy being ambushed. Those things are things that have to, of course, be eliminated from possibility, but the possibility of the insider who is able to gain access to a facility and, say, over time bring out material or technology, we have already seen in Pakistan. And I know it does not help to raise this all the time, but the A.Q. Khan network where, of course, the father of the Pakistan program was working outside the control of the Pakistan establishment, that is, of course, something that is always going to be there, as well as the group that worked with al Qaeda and bin Laden specifically after September 11, 2001, that was trying to do the same thing. So we have already seen very scary examples of the insider threat.

What exacerbates it even more—and I will close with this thought—is the fact that we know that nuclear materials have been out there, accessible for terrorists to buy on the black market. There have been 19 incidents of weapons-usable material that have been seized on the black markets in the last 15 years. So we know that there is a problem, and in all 19 of those cases, to the best of my knowledge, they were not reported as missing from the facilities that they started at. So we do have a problem, and it is very important for the Pakistanis to simply exclude the possibility that insiders could take material out so terrorists can construct a nuclear bomb.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Mr. Schmidle, and then Ms. Curtis.

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I just want to comment on whether the scientists, the army, the intelligence agencies are more or less prone to extremism than anyone else in society. I do not think that is the case. I think when you look at who is composed of the scientists, who is composed of the army, and even in the case of the ISI—which is often labeled as being excessively Islamist. The ISI is picked from the army; the army is picked from the population. The population, up until very recently, was sympathetic to the idea of the Taliban, was sympathetic to the idea of them as righteous Muslims, slightly misguided, but at least doing what they thought was in the right way.

I think that the game has changed in the past couple of months with the idea of the Taliban and the reality of the Taliban have collapsed. I also do not know to what extent there was ever really sympathy. I never heard common sympathy from common people for al Qaeda. Maybe for al Qaeda leaders as symbols, but not for al Qaeda tactics.

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I agree with Mr. Mowatt-Larssen that the biggest threat is the insider threat rather than the idea that somehow the government or the military is overthrown by extremists.

But that said, I think it is important for the military leadership to be clear on how much of a danger extremists are posing to the country. And this gets back to the point—Senator Burris is not here—but the fact is in the past the Taliban has been seen as a strategic asset for Pakistan, and so it is incumbent on the military leadership to explain to the public that “no, these are threats to the country.”

And we are beginning to see that General Kayani did state last Friday, in his speech to Staff College, to upcoming military officers, that while there still were external threats, the most immediate threat to Pakistan right now was internal.

So I think these kinds of statements are extremely important because they do in a sense form the thinking within the military, which is very important.

Senator CARPER. Thank you.

A question for Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Maybe two questions. First of all, how resilient or dedicated are the people of Pakistan to continue supporting the nation's campaign in South Waziristan?

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I think that the test case is ultimately the plight of the refugees. I think that the plight of the refugees is more im-

portant right now than any military operation and the government can do because the Pashtuns on either side of the border right now in Afghanistan and Pakistan are watching to see whether the Pakistani army is, (A) serious about actually catching the heads of the Swat-based Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah and his associates, and, (B) serious about bringing the people back to their homes, convincing them the Pakistani army may have messed up once, but it will not mess up again, that it is now there for their security.

I think this is the most critical thing. I think that if the army takes its eye off the ball and now goes into South Waziristan, leaves these 2.5 million refugees in Swat, creates another couple of hundred thousand refugees in South Waziristan, I think the public support will begin dissipating very quickly.

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fick, any thoughts on that?

Mr. FICK. I agree.

Senator CARPER. Short answer, isn't it? Right to the point. That is good. No, you can stop right there. I have more questions, so thank you.

Again back to Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Could you just elaborate for us, if you will, on your recommendation that Pakistan refrain from launching a campaign in South Waziristan? You talked about this in what you just said, but help me again. You may have said this, but again, what alternatives would you offer to that?

Mr. SCHMIDLE. The alternatives I think are—I feel like the problem is overextension more than anything else. I feel like you fail to consolidate what has been a military success, to a certain degree, in Swat.

Senator CARPER. It reminds me just a little bit of our involvement in Afghanistan—

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I would agree wholeheartedly, that taking the eye off the ball into Iraq—

Senator CARPER [continuing]. In 2001.

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Definitely. But I think that it then complicates—I think that it also exposes the inherent incompatibilities of U.S. and Pakistan priorities and perhaps creates more short-term problems for collaboration, and right now there is some level of momentum, there is some level of support. I think that when the United States sees that the Pakistani army is only going after some of these Taliban leaders and leaving others to cross the border at ease, it then resuscitates some of these bilateral problems between the two countries.

Senator CARPER. Please, Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. I would disagree somewhat, sir. I think that what you risk is if you are squeezing the Swat Valley, taking operations there, a lot of these people are going to be able to still find safe haven in South Waziristan—or North Waziristan for that matter.

So I think it is important while the Pakistani public is supporting the military in these operations that they do carry the fight to South Waziristan as well. I understand the plight of the refugees. That has to be dealt with, but that is mainly an issue for the civilian government to be dealing with.

So I have to say I see it a bit differently, and I do not compare it to the situation with the United States and Iraq and Afghanistan because I think that you would have synergy in terms of if the

Pakistanis are squeezing the militants in South Waziristan, you have the coalition forces on the other side in Afghanistan, and then we can finally have this hammer and anvil strategy that we have been working toward for so long. And you do have the Pakistani public behind these operations in Swat Valley, so I would just have to disagree, and I think we should be encouraging them to also start squeezing the militant safe haven in the tribal areas as well.

Senator CARPER. Just very briefly, go ahead.

Mr. SCHMIDLE. I think we should not mistake what is a change in will on the part of the Pakistani army with what is not a change in capacity. The Pakistani army does not have the ability to take on the entire tribal belt if it is inflamed with Taliban insurgency, which it would be if they went into South Waziristan.

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. Let me just follow up on that with a question of Mr. Nawaz and probably Ms. Curtis, and that is, your assessment, please, of the ability of Pakistan to adopt and integrate counterinsurgency doctrine.

Mr. NAWAZ. Senator, I think there has been some attempt, but it is going to take a long time. The army is still very much conventional and its stance is conventional, and it is still looking at most of these actions as low-intensity conflict and not as counterinsurgency. They do not have the equipment nor the training. And, therefore, I do not think that they are quite ready.

If you look at Swat, it was really conventional use of the military and it is not counterinsurgency. In my own conversation with senior military leaders, they tell me that they do not have the capacity to hold Swat or Bajour or other parts of FATA, that they need to have civilian counterparts and the police force that will be there—which is why the new move to induct ex-servicemen into the police force is probably a good idea.

Senator CARPER. Good. Ms. Curtis and then maybe a former marine would share a thought on this. Ms. Curtis, please.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, obviously—

Senator CARPER. I do not know if you are ever a former marine. At least I do not think so.

Mr. FICK. Just never an ex-Marine.

Senator CARPER. There you go.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, obviously the capability issue is an enormous one, and I think the United States is going to have to play a very large role in assisting the Pakistanis with counterinsurgency training, with equipment, more helicopters, as you specified, and then also encouraging the military to work with the civilian leadership to develop a comprehensive approach to be able to hold and build areas. And this is definitely going to be an uphill battle, but I think it is something that has to be done. We cannot really hesitate in following through on this.

But it is my understanding that there has been some measure of resistance within the Pakistan military to receive this kind of training. This may be starting to change, but I think it is something we need to keep working toward because it will be absolutely critical because now that they have gone in, militarily, particularly the Swat Valley, they will have to work on a hold and build strategy. They cannot allow the Taliban to come back in. This would be,

I think, sort of devastating for security in the country and the future stability of the rest of the country.

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fick, please.

Mr. FICK. I would suggest that the use of heavy artillery is inversely correlated with effective counterinsurgency, and the Pakistani army right now is using a lot of heavy artillery in the west, which is why I am suggesting that we look at the police. And we should not get too wrapped up over the question of whether the Pakistani army can effectively conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. We should look at whether the Pakistani Government can do it. And that requires using different tools.

For most people, especially in rural areas, contact with the police is the only contact or the most frequent contact they have with their government, and this is the first line of contact and defense for the Pakistani Government. In terms of training the police, we should not look to our military. Posse Comitatus works. Our military is not good at training police, so we need to find other ways to do it.

Senator CARPER. Well, we have some experience in training police in Iraq.

Mr. FICK. And Afghanistan.

Senator CARPER. And now in Afghanistan.

Mr. FICK. And we are much better at training militaries than we are at training police.

If I could get back to your earlier question with regard to South Waziristan and suggest that you look at the work that then-Colonel Mick Nicholson, now Brigadier General in RC South—

Senator CARPER. We know him.

Mr. FICK. The work he did in RC East when he was a brigade commander, effectively influencing tribes across the border in Waziristan, is another model. He had great success.

Senator CARPER. That is a good point. Thank you. As we come to the end here, we have a vote underway, and so we are going to excuse you very shortly.

One of the things I like to do when we have a panel this diverse, and frankly this well regarded and thoughtful, one of the things I like to do is to ask you to say—just run down the list really quick, Ms. Curtis, as you listened to your other four colleagues here on the panel, I am sure they said some things you agree with, some things that you do not agree with. Just think back to maybe one of the points or two that you most agree with, that the other panelists, your colleagues, have suggested. Anything come to mind? There has to be one or two.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think that Mr. Schmidle did an excellent job of explaining the different Pakistani militant groups and clarifying a lot of those issues. So I think I agree with everything he said in his oral remarks. And I think he spelled out clearly how complex this situation is and demonstrated from the Pakistani viewpoint what exactly they are dealing with.

And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, I think I agree with how he characterized the threat of the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the dangers of hyping that threat. I think too often we focus on that. What I say is it is a low-probability but high-risk scenario. I think the Pakistan military takes the safety and security

of its nuclear weapons very seriously, and there is no reason to panic, but at the same time, obviously, it is an issue that we have to stay attuned to.

Senator CARPER. Great, thanks. Mr. Schmidle, among the comments of your colleagues, what really stands out in your mind that you want to reinforce with us?

Mr. SCHMIDLE. Mr. Fick's point about the police and about thinking of the Indus River as a conceptual line. I think it is a lot less threatening for the Pakistani Government and for the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment to accept American police trainers in the Punjab, which is a much less politically sensitive area to be working with police there, training, building up capacity in areas that have not been hit by the Taliban yet, but could be the next line. And I think that is a very good point and something that should be taken into consideration.

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. Mr. Nawaz, same question, please.

Mr. NAWAZ. I agree with Mr. Fick's point that counter-insurgencies are won by police and not by the military, and also that the nuclear threat will always be there because there is no perfect security. But there are enough very serious minded people in the military and in the Government of Pakistan that are devoted to ensuring that the Nuclear Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division remains active and totally involved.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Fick.

Mr. FICK. I like to look at things in terms of the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action. And Mr. Schmidle addresses the most likely course of action, one of the Pakistani army and government supporting some groups while fighting others; that is something I am going to take away.

The most dangerous course of action here, the existential threat, if there is one, is nuclear. And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's point about the insider threat is something that I am going to look more into.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.

Mr. MOWATT-LARSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it has been fascinating for me just what my colleagues have discussed that directly pertains to the ultimate effectiveness of nuclear security, and that is my biggest takeaway. As that battle goes, particularly the battle for the control of the country and the hearts and minds and the antipathies towards the United States, lowering those reduces that insider threat.

I also agree, actually, with the comment by Mr. Schmidle that there is no greater propensity for the use of nuclear weapons to be extremist than any other segment of society. I do not even know what the statistics are, but it is that the consequences are that much higher in that actuarial calculation if one or two are.

Finally, I would have to pile on to the police equation from the stand point of something we have talked about as well on the nuclear security side? It is good to get out of sometimes the mentality of nuclear security as the nuclear security people look at that, whether that is in the intelligence services or in the military, and the police do have a role and can play a bigger role in nuclear security as well in Pakistan.

Thank you.

Senator CARPER. All right. In closing, we have about 5 minutes left to vote. I just want to say to each of you, thank you for the work you have done with your lives to date. Thank you for sharing some of what you have learned with us here this afternoon. I appreciate very much where you have agreed because it is helpful to us to reinforce the messages that you all reinforced here, especially in the last several minutes. My colleagues and I are grateful for your work, and I want to say to our first witness from the Administration, we very much appreciate that input.

In the next couple of weeks, we are going to have the hearing record open for 2 weeks—for the submission of additional statements and questions from my colleagues. If you get any of those questions, I would just ask for your cooperation in providing prompt responses to those questions that might be submitted for the record.

Again, our thanks to each of you. This has just been illuminating, certainly interesting, and I think very important. Thanks so much.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE



TOM CARPER
UNITED STATES SENATOR · DELAWARE



FOR RELEASE: July 7, 2009
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**SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

**HEARING: "From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan
Relations"**

Opening Statement of Senator Thomas R. Carper, Chairman

I would like to thank my colleagues, our distinguished witnesses and guests for joining Senator McCain and me today.

Before I begin, I want to give a special thanks to the men and women serving in the U.S. Embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I was in both countries in late May, and I can say with great confidence that Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and Ambassador Anne Patterson and their staffs are highly effective. I commend their leadership and all our personnel serving there for their capable service.

An Islamist insurgency rages in western Pakistan and senior U.S. officials are concerned about the declining security situation and new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal. This intensifying insurgency, political instability, a devastating humanitarian crisis, and an intensely anti-American population threaten an already fragile Pakistani government.

These factors present unique challenges to the United States and the strategy President Obama laid out in late March. In my view, the administration developed a strategy that addresses the region's concerns, while understanding that the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. This hearing will examine implementation of the new strategy. Our focus will be on the hardest and most critical problem of the region: Pakistan.

Most national security experts agree that Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today, for one primary reason: Nowhere else in the world is there such a lethal combination of Islamic extremism, terrorist groups with global reach, nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons.

In late March, President Obama said that Pakistan's lawless border region had "become the most dangerous place in the world" for Americans. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has called the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan “the site of planning for the next attack” on the United States.

Moreover, the region is still widely thought to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden. General David Petraeus, who oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, said recently that Pakistan has become the “nerve center” of al Qaeda’s global operations, allowing it to re-establish its organizational structure and build stronger ties with offshoots in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa and parts of Europe.

Pakistani officials acknowledge that their country is facing perhaps the greatest threat since its creation – a growing, virulent threat from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Islamist groups. In the month since our delegation was in Pakistan, the Pakistani military has launched offensives in the Northwest Frontier Province (Swat Valley) and in South Waziristan, an agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Many experts have been skeptical of whether Pakistani officials understand the existential threat to their own country. But an extraordinary thing has happened in the last month-and-a-half: for the first time ever, President Zardari, opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani military and more than 80 percent of Pakistanis view the Taliban and al Qaeda as a critical threat to Pakistan. I agree with Secretary Napolitano’s statement that the Pakistani government’s crackdown on the Taliban has improved U.S. security.

The Obama administration has promised Pakistan \$1.5 billion a year in aid for the next five years in humanitarian and economic assistance. And although the Senate unanimously passed the Kerry-Lugar bill I cosponsored just two weeks ago, the bill is now stuck in Congress with a list of conditions with which many Pakistanis are uncomfortable. This bill is vital both to U.S. national security and Pakistan’s 175 million people, and I urge the conferees to send the president a bill to sign.

Finally, it goes without saying that the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of the utmost importance. As the insurgency spreads in Pakistan, senior American officials are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, including the potential for militants to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities or to seize a weapon in transport. Preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the wrong hands should be a top priority for both our countries.

These facts lead to a series of urgent questions:

One, the Obama administration has recognized that the United States needs a long-term, comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in Pakistan. How is implementation of the President’s strategy going?

Two, there is a complex network of extremist groups operating in the lawless region near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and other affiliated and other sectarian groups. How should policymakers prioritize which of these groups to target? Who is reconcilable among them?

Three, since 9/11, the United States has allocated billions of dollars to non-military assistance programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What should our goals be for distribution of the Kerry-Lugar assistance? What should the delivery mechanisms be?

Four, what can our government do to address the problems caused by anti-American sentiments in Pakistan? Does the current humanitarian crisis present the United States with an opportunity in this regard? What additional actions might reverse widespread distrust of the United States among Pakistanis?

Five, in the past, the Pakistani government and army have undertaken only sporadic militarized efforts, punctuated by lulls when truce deals allowed the militants to regroup and grow stronger. How should we assess what now appears to be a fairly robust Pakistani effort to combat extremism inside their country? Are current military operations a sign of meaningful change in this pattern?

Six, some analysts argue that the Pakistani military has been slow to reorient itself toward modern counter-insurgency planning. How does this affect U.S. regional interests? Has our military assistance to Pakistan sufficiently bolstered that country's counterterrorism capabilities? Should the United States reassess how foreign military financing and coalition support funds are used by the Islamabad government?

Finally, what is the probability of al Qaeda or another terrorist group acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive material to create a dirty bomb? What is the possibility of an insider threat at Pakistani nuclear facilities?

Today, with these questions in mind, I would like us to try to do the following:

- Assess the status of the implementation of President Obama's new strategy towards Pakistan;
- Examine the complex set of threats from western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan;
- Discuss the most effective strategic, short- and long-term policy options regarding Pakistan, particularly related to Islamic extremism and to security Pakistan's nuclear arsenal; and
- Solicit ideas about how Congress can play a more robust role in the path forward, specifically in non-military assistance to Pakistan.

If our national security is linked to the success, security and stability of a democratic Pakistan, we have no choice but to engage in a smart, sustained, long-term partnership. The U.S. needs, and is finally on the path to achieving, a Pakistan-based policy as opposed to a leader- or government-based policy.

Thanks again to our witnesses for taking this opportunity to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before us and how best to address them.

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**Statement for the Record
From Senator Roland W. Burris**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

I would like to start today by thanking Chairman Carper and Ranking Member McCain for holding this important hearing.

A stable and secure Pakistan plays a crucial role in the success of our mission in combating religious and cultural militancy in this region of the world.

President Obama’s recently unveiled strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan ties the futures of the two countries together and lays out a comprehensive approach to conquering militant extremism in the region.

What I hope to determine today is whether this strategy will enable the United States to work with Pakistan and Afghanistan to champion the complex challenges emerging from the dangerous Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

One of the most significant U.S. concerns is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Providing resources to develop effective counterinsurgency practices could go a long way to protecting Pakistan’s nuclear materials and enhancing not only the security of the region but also the safety of the United States.

To ensure the stability of the region, we need to take a serious look at how our recent strategic policies are impacting the people of Pakistan. One of the biggest challenges we face in working with the Pakistani government is assuring them that we are truly invested in their long term security and economic well-being.

We have reason to believe that stronger economic and humanitarian aid can have a critical impact on the stability of Pakistan. Many of the interests of the United States and Pakistan are inextricably linked—therefore we must work together in the short- and long-term to ensure that our mutual goals are met. Furthermore, we must be willing to modify our approaches as necessary to ensure that they meet the objectives of achieving security and stability that will last.

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses and hope that together we can implement a strategy that will give this troubled region the resources it needs to enhance and protect its security.

Updated: July 6, 2009 1430 EDT

STATEMENT BY:
PAUL W. JONES
DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE THE:
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
UNITED STATES SENATE

JULY 7, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee:

It is a great honor to appear before your committee, and my privilege to update you on the Administration's robust efforts to meet our challenges in Pakistan.

Secretary Clinton and Special Representative Holbrooke are committed to working closely with Congress as we implement the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. We acknowledge and very much appreciate the deep interest and first-hand experience among the members of this subcommittee.

Congressional support for these efforts – for both the President's strategy and the resources needed to implement it – has been and will be critical to our success, and we look forward to engaging in further dialogue with you, as well as to your continued personal engagement in the region.

As the President has said, a stable, secure, democratic Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We are taking concrete steps to support and strengthen the democratically elected, civilian government of Pakistan as the Pakistanis increase their efforts to confront the extremist threat from al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan is a proud and important country of some 175 million people, with whom America has close people-to-people ties.

We are rebuilding a relationship with Pakistan that has been marked over the years by inconsistencies. In Pakistan, many believe that we are not a reliable long-term partner and that we will abandon them after achieving our counterterrorism objectives. Similarly, many in the United States question the dedication of some elements of the Pakistani Government to confront al Qaeda and its affiliates.

Rather than seeking a tactical, short-term partnership, our engagement is aimed at putting our bilateral and regional relationship on a sustained, long term, strategic course.

To help Pakistan meet its challenges – in governance, economic policy, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism – our implementation of this strategy must be constant, comprehensive, and consistent. We are working to bolster civilian democratic rule while also strengthening the role of the Pakistani people in pursuing a vibrant civil society and a prosperous democracy.

Since January 20, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke has assembled a diverse, interagency team to implement the President's new strategy, leveraging the expertise of representatives from nine agencies as well as leading academics. Our early efforts have supported Pakistani efforts to enhance political and economic stability, as well as Pakistani efforts to rollback the Taliban threat and respond to the need of a growing population of internally displaced persons.

Specifically, the United States has:

- Established regular, summit and cabinet-level trilateral consultations to build trust and cooperation with Afghan and Pakistani leaders;
- Deepened relations with leading Pakistani politicians across the political spectrum;
- Worked with Japan and Pakistan to organize a Pakistan Donors Conference in Tokyo in April 2009, resulting in \$5.8 billion in pledges to assist Pakistan as it addresses significant macroeconomic challenges;
- Helped rejuvenate Afghanistan-Pakistan transit trade negotiations which will enhance economic opportunity;
- Encouraged the first direct contacts between Pakistani and Afghan Ministers of Agriculture, Interior, and Finance;
- Provided military assistance to support renewed Pakistani efforts to defeat insurgents; and
- Led the effort to mobilize international relief for the internally displaced.

At the same time, Pakistan has:

- Resolved a political crisis in mid-March which led to the re-instatement of Pakistani Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry;
- Hosted a May 19 All-Parties Conference which resulted in a declaration supporting military action against insurgents and extremists;
- Conducted sustained counterinsurgency operations with wide public support; and

- Assisted two million displaced persons under civilian-military leadership of the same Pakistani officer who directed Pakistan's effective earthquake relief in 2005.

Through these steps, we move farther down the road to a stable, more democratic Pakistan that is no longer threatened by our common enemy: al-Qaeda.

Pakistan is now directly confronting the existential threat posed by the extremists based on Pakistan's western border. We are supporting Pakistan with economic development assistance, as well as significant counterinsurgency and counter terrorism training and equipment, including Mi-17 helicopters which Pakistan is using to deploy its Special Forces. Recent Congressional approval of the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) will allow us to better address Pakistan's immediate needs and assist with the counterinsurgency capabilities of both Pakistan's military and the Frontier Corps. The State Department and Defense Department will work closely with U.S. Central Command and Embassy Islamabad to ensure that this new assistance program produces results.

Pakistan's recent counterinsurgency operations in the North West Frontier Province have successfully rolled-back Taliban gains, but they underscored that there are no quick fixes when combating a ruthless insurgency. The Swat Valley may be increasingly "clear," but Pakistani officials recognize that there is an immediate need for sustained engagement to "hold" and especially re-"build" areas damaged by the fighting. The United States and the international community have an important role to play in supporting the Pakistani's government's reconstruction efforts and in helping build the civilian government capacity that is necessary to ensure that hard-fought military gains are not lost.

We are leading the effort to assist Pakistan's more than 2.3 million internally displaced persons. To date, the United States has provided over \$164 million in assistance for these displaced populations, and we have coordinated with partners around the globe to raise more than \$300 million. We are pleased to be leading the international community in responding to this situation, but we believe the international community must do more. To that end, Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Holbrooke are actively pressing key partners to make further commitments to assist the Pakistani people in their time of need.

In addition to providing financial and material support to the UN agencies and NGOs helping the displaced, we are also thinking creatively about how we can make a difference person to person. One example of an initiative which required little financial support but has a big impact: we are working with the Pakistani American community to identify and deploy American doctors of Pakistani

descent – including five women – who can address the vital health needs of the displaced in a culturally sensitive manner. One of these doctors has already completed two weeks of volunteer service, another is currently in Pakistan, and four more are being processed for deployment this month. While in the camps, they are providing services to hundreds of patients a day. These are brave Americans who are dedicating their own time and energy to travel to Pakistan to provide much needed care, and we salute their dedication. Outside of the government, we have been similarly pleased to see Pakistani Americans coming together to form a non-profit foundation seeking to improve the lives of the Pakistani people.

Only by working closely with key allies – including the EU members, Turkey, and the Gulf States – will we be able to support Pakistani efforts to address the immediate humanitarian and long-term reconstruction challenges, while also improving its long-term economic health. We have underlined this international engagement at the April 3-4 NATO Summit, where Allies agreed to build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan, as well as at the April 17 Pakistan Donors' Conference in Tokyo, where the international community pledged more than \$5 billion in new support, well above the \$4 billion requirement identified by the International Monetary Fund. NATO has already taken steps to fulfill this commitment, designating Turkey as the lead nation for engaging Pakistan. And several partners are taking steps to deliver their Tokyo pledges.

We are also urging partners to work closely with us both bilaterally and through the Friends of Democratic Pakistan to coordinate development assistance. The Friends held a successful ministerial meeting in parallel with the Tokyo Donors Conference, at which Pakistan's international partners affirmed their political support for the democratically elected government. Additionally, Ambassador Holbrooke coordinates regularly with Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan from more than 20 countries. These Special Representatives met most recently at the G-8 Ministerial in Trieste in late June, where they focused on the border issues shared between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the coming months we plan to enhance our support for Pakistani efforts to address significant economic and governance challenges. By increasing economic and educational opportunities, expanding the reach of quality healthcare, reinforcing human rights – particularly women's rights – and empowering civil society, the lives of millions of average Pakistanis will improve. We applaud the Senate's passage by unanimous consent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (S962), which authorizes \$1.5 billion per year in non-military assistance for five years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful demonstration of

our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani people and reinforce our desire for a long-term partnership based on common interests.

It is vital that we help address the economic and social conditions that extremists exploit in western Pakistan with more economic aid. Our assistance will support Pakistani efforts to “hold and build” in western Pakistan as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended. But more than rebuilding homes and businesses, we must also do our part to enhance bilateral and regional trade by encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors, such as energy, as well as by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) which will provide incentives for investment in critical regions by offering duty-free import of certain products made there.

Legislation before the Senate would establish ROZs in areas directly affected by the fighting and would substantially improve the economic opportunity for returning displaced persons. I reiterate the President’s call on the Senate to pass ROZ legislation to boost private investment and sustainable economic development in targeted areas of Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan. This is a critical aspect of our strategy to bring economic opportunity to what would otherwise be the heart of al-Qaeda’s safe haven and is vital to protecting our national interests. ROZ legislation will send a powerful signal about our commitment to the Pakistani people and, combined with progress on Afghanistan-Pakistan transit trade, will help transform the economy of the border region.

Beyond challenging extremist gains on the ground, we must also help Pakistan overcome Taliban domination of the radio waves by supporting Pakistani efforts to present an alternative narrative. Strategic communications is an area that has been woefully under-resourced until now and our new plan will help Pakistan more effectively challenge the extremist propaganda underlying the insurgency’s terror campaign.

We appreciate strong Congressional support of our efforts to date, and we agree with the basic premise that security assistance for Pakistan has to show results. In the President’s words, “We must focus our military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists” but “we will not and cannot provide a blank check.” We will set metrics, and closely monitor our economic, social, and military assistance to Pakistan in order to ensure the objectives outlined in the President’s comprehensive national strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan are progressing accordingly. Additionally, adjustments to our programs will be made if they are not delivering the intended results.

The challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course, complex and we cannot expect results overnight; signaling and demonstrating our long-term commitment to a true partnership will be essential to winning the trust of our civilian and military partners in Pakistan. The Administration is committed to working closely with the members of this committee, and Congress, to ensure that we have the resources which are necessary to protect vital U.S. national interests.

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss our policy before this committee. I welcome your questions.

“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”

**Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, Federal Services, and International Security**

July 7, 2009

**Lisa Curtis
Senior Research Fellow
The Heritage Foundation¹**

My name is Lisa Curtis. I am a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.

Containing the global terrorist threat in South Asia will depend largely on the ability of the United States to forge a trusting and cooperative partnership with Pakistan over the next several years. The future direction of the region, including the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, pivots on Pakistan’s ability to overcome multiple socio-economic challenges as well as its willingness to fight terrorism in all its forms within its own borders. My testimony will address recent developments in the region and make recommendations for U.S. policy over the next eighteen months. My remarks will focus on developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, where I traveled from June 21 – 28 as part of a NATO-sponsored Transatlantic Opinion Leaders delegation.

¹The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization operating under Section 501(c)(3). It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. In 2008, it had nearly 400,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2008 income came from the following sources:

Individuals	67 %
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The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.8% of its 2008 income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national accounting firm of McGladrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

Pakistani Offensives in Swat and Waziristan

There has been a significant change in the Pakistan military's attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest part of the country in the last ten weeks. Just one week after Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so, the Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in mid-April. On April 24th under both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, the Pakistan Army deployed paramilitary troops to the region and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani sent a warning to the militants that the Army would not allow them to "impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan." The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani policy toward the militants and was followed by aggressive military operations that have ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. The Pakistan government says its military has killed more than 1,600 militants in the past eight weeks in the Swat operation.

The fighting also has led to a severe humanitarian crisis with nearly three million people fleeing their homes, the largest such human exodus since the country's founding in 1947. The U.S. has provided substantially more aid than other nations to help relieve the refugee crisis (about \$300 million so far), but the United Nations (UN) has declared it is still far short of the funds it needs to address the crisis. The internally displaced are facing health threats as there is a severe strain on medical facilities and health services, according to the World Health Organization.

The Pakistan Army also appears set to begin an offensive in the tribal areas in South Waziristan, where insurgent forces of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud reside and possibly even North Waziristan, where the forces of Afghan terrorist leader Jalaluddin Haqqani have found safe haven. Baitullah Mehsud is an ally of both al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban but has focused his attention more recently on targeting the Pakistani state through a spate of suicide bombings. Mehsud has also been linked to the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Jalaluddin Haqqani is a powerful independent militant leader who operates in the border areas between Khost province in Afghanistan and North Waziristan. He has been allied with the Afghan Taliban for nearly 15 years, having served as tribal affairs minister in the Taliban regime in the late 1990s. The Haqqani network has reportedly been behind several high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, including a truck bombing that killed two U.S. soldiers in Khost province in March 2008 and the storming of the Serena Hotel in Kabul during a high-level visit by Norwegian officials in January 2008. Credible media reports, quoting U.S. officials, further reveal a Pakistani intelligence link to the Haqqani network's planning and execution of a suicide bomb attack against India's embassy in Kabul last July that left over 50 Afghan civilians and two senior Indian officials dead.

The fact that both anti-Pakistan and pro-Pakistan militants reside in the tribal areas highlights the complexities of partnering effectively with Pakistan to defeat the terrorists as well as the fluidity of the situation as Pakistani leaders increasingly recognize the gravity of the threat posed by the various terrorist groups to the stability of the Pakistani state. The U.S. also has stepped up its drone missile strikes in the region in the last two weeks, apparently with the support of Pakistani

intelligence. More than 60 were killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan two weeks ago that apparently missed Baitullah Mehsud by a matter of hours. Pakistani jets last week bombed suspected militant hide-outs in North Waziristan, where militants had killed at least 30 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush on an army convoy the week before.

During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders expressed the view that Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas are beginning to pay dividends in terms of reducing the flow of militants and weapons into Afghanistan. This demonstrates that a strategy of coaxing the Pakistanis to do more against the terrorist threat in the tribal areas, while continuing to support the country through economic and military assistance may be working.

Despite its frustration with the continued existence of the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas, the Obama administration has operated on the assumption that the Pakistani military would awaken to the dangers the terrorists pose to Pakistani society. Unfortunately, past links between extremists and elements of the Pakistani security establishment have led to confusion about the genuine threat to the nation. In turn, this ambivalence towards extremist groups has fueled conspiracy theories against outsiders (mainly India or the U.S.) that have been aired in the Pakistani media and led to a public discourse that diminished the threat from terrorism.

A recent combination of events, including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan as "infidel," has begun to change the Pakistani public's attitude toward the Taliban and given the Army the public support it requires to fight them militarily.² COAS General Kayani said last Friday that, "While external threats continue to exist, it is the internal threat to Pakistan that needs immediate attention." The U.S. must focus on helping sustain the Pakistani momentum against the Taliban by supporting them through military assistance as well as generous economic and humanitarian aid that helps resettle and rebuild the lives of those civilians displaced by the fighting.

Afghanistan

I would like to address the situation in Afghanistan and share some observations from my June 21 – 28 trip there as part of a NATO-sponsored experts' delegation. During the trip, we met with senior NATO, UN, and Afghan officials and visited the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTTC), the Counterinsurgency School outside Kabul, as well as Regional Command-South in Kandahar and Regional Command-West in Herat.

International Coordination: There are signs of improvement in the coordination of the multinational effort in Afghanistan. The NATO partners welcome the U.S. "comprehensive and integrated" approach introduced by U.S. President Barack Obama on March 27th. New Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal recently elaborated on this approach by describing the major goal of the Afghanistan mission as "protection of the people, rather than defeat of the insurgents." According to NATO commanders on the ground, there is greater focus on local patrolling, engaging with the

² Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan on the Brink," *The New York Review of Books*, Volume 56, Number 10, June 11, 2009.

population, and conducting humanitarian operations. The new formulation of the strategy has struck the right chord with the other NATO and troop-contributing nations.

It is important to remember that the mission in Afghanistan is truly an international endeavor. The U.S. is providing the bulk of the fighting forces, but several other countries, especially the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands, also are making invaluable contributions to the military operations while others support aspects of the campaign like police training, election monitoring, and institution building. The NATO partners recognize the stakes for the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan and we should not allow differences over tactics in achieving this mission to divide us politically. In other words, our common strategic goals for the region far outstrip any differences we may share over short-term tactics.

The leading international players in Afghanistan (U.S., NATO ISAF, UN, and EU) are focusing on harmonizing their efforts and getting down to the brass tacks of improving governance, building state institutions, and developing the economy. NATO priorities include support for free and transparent elections, training and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), and regional engagement. NATO commanders on the ground highlighted the fact that the ANA is now in many cases leading military operations—something it could not do just three years ago. NATO leaders also expressed their commitment to a policy of working closely with the Afghan government and UN to ensure that areas cleared of militants will immediately receive development and reconstruction assistance and the institution of Afghan government authority.

The functioning of the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB), chaired by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Afghan government, has helped improve the international coordination process. In the past, several different countries and organizations spoke separately with the Afghan government, leading to significant confusion about development priorities and progress and hindering the achievement of our overall objectives in the country. The JCMB has begun to rectify this problem. For example, the JCMB is currently involved in helping organize the planned civilian surge aimed at bolstering the Afghan government ministries. One UN official explained how Afghan ministers came up with a solid, comprehensive plan for the civilian surge on their own, which was conveyed to NATO ISAF through the UN. This kind of close and centralized interaction between the international community and the Afghan government is essential to enabling and empowering Afghan leaders to take the lead in stabilizing and securing their country.

Elections: It is imperative that the August 20th elections are carried out in a credible manner and that the Afghan people believe the democratic process can bring change to their everyday lives. It would be devastating if just as the international community is getting its act together and implementing a winning strategy, the Afghan people lose faith in the democratic process because of a flawed election. There is more apathy toward this election than the 2004 elections because many Afghans believe the Karzai administration will use government machinery to rig the election, thus rendering their vote useless. If people believe the elections were manipulated and unreflective of voters' wishes, this could serve a major blow to our overall goals in Afghanistan.

At the same time, since this is the first Afghan-led election, the Afghans are taking ownership of the process and do not view it as something imposed on them by the West. Voter registration went better than expected, with new voters registering in all but about ten districts (the so-called “black districts” that are under Taliban control). UN officials acknowledge the elections will not be perfect, however, and they are worried about issues such as underage and multiple voting. There are critical checks on the process like the use of indelible ink on voters’ fingers and counting ballots at the polling stations with results posted immediately afterwards. To deal with the security concerns, an additional 10,000 police will be deployed throughout the country in the coming weeks.

Security Situation in Southern Afghanistan: There has been about a sixty percent increase in attacks this year in Afghanistan with approximately eighty percent of those attacks occurring in a handful of districts in the southern part of the country. The new push by U.S. forces into Helmand Province is part of a broader effort to regain the initiative from the Taliban in the south. The idea is to clear insurgents from so-called “black districts” that are now under Taliban sway and bring in development and reconstruction aid and re-establish government authority. The timing of the operation is critical as it comes six weeks before the national elections. It is necessary for the coalition forces to access these insurgent-infested areas and disrupt the insurgents’ ability to entrench themselves deeper into these spaces.

The NATO commanders I met with two weeks ago in Regional Command-South in Kandahar were enthusiastic about the arrival of the additional 17,000 U.S. troops to southern Afghanistan. These commanders noted they had a sound strategy to counter the insurgency but up until now had lacked sufficient resources to implement their strategy. “For the first time RC-South will be given the resources it needs to move forward,” commented one senior commander. The new forces will allow them to gain greater situational awareness and hold more territory, which will inspire more confidence among the population that the coalition forces can protect them. They believe the U.S. troop influx will help shift the momentum against the Taliban, perhaps as early as late summer or early fall.

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

The challenges in Afghanistan are linked to Pakistan but the complexity of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, the constantly evolving tactics of the insurgency, and the insurgents’ ability to slip with ease between borders make policy solutions difficult. Most interlocutors conveyed that relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were growing stronger and had improved from a year ago, although some high-level Afghan officials said the cooperation was occurring only at a surface level and that Pakistan still supported the Afghan Taliban. Some interlocutors claimed that Pakistan’s intelligence service provides the strategic organization and operational support for the Afghan Taliban, while Middle Eastern financiers provide the bulk of financial resources.

NATO leaders reported that coordination with Pakistan along the eastern border had improved over the last year, which was beginning to impact positively on the eastern sector of Afghanistan. Tripartite intelligence sharing among Pakistani, Afghan, and NATO ISAF officials has been improving. A Border Coordination Center (BCC) staffed by Afghan, Pakistani, and NATO

ISAF personnel has been established at Torkham Gate in the Khyber Pass and a second BCC is currently under construction at Spin Boldak.

Still, NATO commanders said Pakistan was a “significant enabler” for the insurgency in Afghanistan. The command and control of the Afghan Taliban resides in and around Quetta, Baluchistan and provides leadership and access to money flows for the insurgent operations in Afghanistan. Interlocutors staffing Regional Command-South told our delegation that if the Taliban leadership in Quetta was neutralized, this would constitute a significant blow to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, depriving it of guidance, focus, and legitimacy.

One of the major problems in garnering full Pakistani cooperation against the Afghan Taliban is the continued paranoia about India’s role in Afghanistan that pervades the Pakistani security establishment. *New York Times*’ correspondent David Sanger’s recently-released book, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*, provides insight into the depth of suspicion in Pakistani military circles about Indian activities in Afghanistan. Sanger says that Indian development activities the U.S. views as helpful such as road and dam construction and provision of humanitarian aid, the Pakistanis view as Indian attempts to encircle Pakistan with the ultimate goal of invading and dominating Pakistan.³ In Sanger’s account, a Pakistani General describes to a U.S. official why Pakistan must maintain relations with the Afghan Taliban. He explains that eventually the coalition forces will pull out of Afghanistan and thus it will be necessary for Pakistan to have good relations with the opposition in Afghanistan (i.e. the Afghan Taliban). Sanger asserts that the Pakistan Army regularly gave the Taliban and other militants groups “weapons and support to go into Afghanistan to attack Afghan and coalition forces.”

We must convince Pakistan to crack down on the Afghan Taliban leadership within its own borders in order to achieve our goals vis a vis Afghanistan. The U.S. must measure Pakistan’s efforts against the Afghan Taliban leadership as a metric for determining how much and what kind of U.S. military assistance Pakistan should receive. When the U.S. government possesses information that indicates Pakistan is supporting terrorist elements, the U.S. must ensure Pakistan experiences negative consequences for such support.

Pakistan-India Relations

While Washington policymakers must seek to address Pakistani concerns vis a vis India, they also must recognize that this is an uphill task, given the historical animosity between the South Asian rivals that has existed since their independence from the British over 60 years ago and which has resulted in three all-out wars; the nuclearization of the Subcontinent; a brief border war in 1999; and a major military build-up in 2001-2002.

The recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on June 16 on the fringes of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathering provided an opportunity for India to set parameters for any future dialogue. Prime Minister Singh demonstrated his interest in moving talks forward by agreeing to meet with the Pakistani

³ David E. Sanger, *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power* (New York: Harmony Books, 2009), pages 244-245.

leader just one month after his party's re-election to another five-year term of office. But his statement to Zardari in the media glare that "My mandate is to tell you that Pakistani territory should not be used for terrorism against India," sent a strong message that the November 2008 Mumbai attacks will continue to color the tone of talks until Islamabad demonstrates firmer action against the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), the Pakistan-based terrorist group behind the Mumbai rampage.

Singh's statement came two weeks after a Pakistani court freed LeT leader Hafiz Muhammed Sayeed from prison on June 2nd under the contention that it did not have enough evidence to continue his detainment. This past weekend the Pakistani government filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan to challenge the release of Sayeed. In a related development, an anti-terror court in Pakistan last week apparently adjourned hearings until July 18 in the case against five LeT members (Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Zarar Shah, Abu al-Qama, Shahid Jamil Riaz, and Hamad Amin Sadiq) who were arrested by the Pakistani authorities in connection with the Mumbai terror strikes. New Delhi will watch carefully how the Pakistan government handles the cases against the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks as it decides how to move forward with talks with Islamabad. The Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries have tentatively agreed to meet in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt on the fringes of a Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit on July 14th.

An incident over the weekend along the Indo-Pakistani border highlights the need for regular and consistent communication between the two countries. Pakistan-based militants fired rockets into an Indian village in the state of Punjab close to the international border. This is the first such incident of a rocket firing across the border and raises fresh worries that militants based in Pakistan can provoke broader Indo-Pakistani conflict.

Congressional Action

Support Afghanistan Civilian Surge. The idea of increasing the number of civilian specialists within Afghan ministries to build government capacity and speed up development and reconstruction is widely favored by the Afghan people. The U.S. Congress should work closely with the administration to provide the appropriate authorities for deploying civilian specialists as soon as possible.

Focus on Building up Afghan Security Forces. President Obama's commitment to build up the ANA to a strength of 134,000 is not enough. Investing more resources into expanding the ANA now will speed the process of Afghanistan assuming responsibility for its own security and save future investment of U.S. blood and treasure into the country.

Support a greater role for Pakistan in the reconstruction of Afghanistan in exchange for Islamabad cracking down on the Afghan Taliban leadership on its territory. Leaders in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have demonstrated they are capable of developing a new vision of Afghan-Pakistani relations based on increased trade and economic interaction. For instance, one Afghan interlocutor called for construction of a road between Gwadar Port in Baluchistan, Pakistan and Kandahar City in Afghanistan as a way to spur trade activity in the region. The U.S. should make clear to Pakistani leaders, however, that stronger efforts to crack down on the

Afghan Taliban leadership on Pakistani territory will be a prerequisite for Pakistan receiving a larger hand in reconstruction projects inside Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers should make clear to Pakistan that a dual policy of supporting some terrorists while fighting others is no longer sustainable if Pakistan wants to survive as a stable nation-state engaged with the rest of the world community.

Provide Aid and Monitor IDP Situation. The U.S. has already provided significant humanitarian aid for the Pakistanis that have been displaced by the fighting in Swat Valley but policymakers must continue to monitor the situation and ensure the Taliban does not use the plight of the IDP's as a recruiting tool. There have been reports that the LeT has been assisting IDP's through a front organization, the Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, and reportedly has sent 2,000 workers to provide aid and transport to IDPs in three different camps.⁴ The U.S. should insist on Pakistani restrictions on extremist groups aiding the IDP's.

Support Pakistan in Developing Hold and Build Strategy for the Tribal Areas. In the past, Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas have failed to stabilize the region or bring in greater government control. The U.S. must encourage Pakistan to implement hold and build strategies following military operations that establish government writ in the region and eventually bring reform that incorporates the areas into the larger Pakistani political framework. The U.S. should quietly encourage Pakistani leaders to develop a comprehensive plan of action to counter extremist trends in the country. Such a plan would require Pakistan's federal and provincial civilian leaders and the army to work in tandem, reinforcing the tactics and strategies of one another. Pakistani government resources will be stretched in the coming months as the military seeks to stabilize the Swat Valley and squeeze militants in the tribal areas. The U.S. will need to exercise patience with Pakistani efforts and not expect the situation in the tribal areas to be under full control for several years.

Dissuade Pakistan from Striking New Peace Deals with Militants. The Pakistan military will likely feel compelled to strike peace deals with militants, especially if fighting in the tribal areas drags on or if the tempo of revenge suicide attacks increases. Washington should seek to convince Pakistani leaders that past peace deals have only undermined their position strategically and must be avoided at all costs.

Prioritize Pakistan Aid and ROZ Legislation. The two separate pieces of Pakistan legislation that have passed the House and Senate (the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act and the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, respectively) should be reconciled in an expeditious manner so that the U.S. can demonstrate its commitment to a long-term partnership with the country at a time when it is battling Taliban advances. Initiatives like the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act (ROZ) that would provide U.S. duty-free access to items produced in industrial zones in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan would also help the South Asia nations experience the benefits of regional cooperation. The ROZ legislation will contribute to changing security perceptions in the region, turning Afghanistan and Pakistan away from zero-sum geopolitical calculations that fuel

⁴ "Pakistan's IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities," International Crisis Group, *Asia Briefing No. 93*, June 3, 2009.

religious extremism and terrorism and toward a focus on enhancing cooperation and regional integration.

Dedicate More Resources to Strategic Communications. The U.S. Congress should support efforts to improve both U.S. and NATO strategic messaging campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. and NATO need to be more pro-active and strategic in how they message the Afghan public, instead of merely reacting to events. Although it is critical to react with the truth, and it can take time to discern the facts of an incident (as in the recent air strikes in Farah Province that resulted in several Afghan civilian casualties), the coalition forces need to be ready with interim responses to address rapidly developing events. The U.S. also needs to increase its awareness of the impact of its public messages on both the insurgents as well as the Afghan population. U.S. public statements that there is a limited time period (one – two years) to turn the situation in Afghanistan around have been counterproductive and provide encouragement for the enemy. The enemy’s goal is to weaken the will of the international community and statements like the above allow insurgent leaders to convince their cadre that they are succeeding.

Encourage Indo-Pakistani Rapprochement but Tread Carefully on Kashmir. The U.S. must be sensitive to the depth of India-Pakistan rivalry and tread carefully when it comes to intractable Kashmir dispute. The U.S. must not fall into the trap of pushing for a resumption of official Indo-Pakistani talks as an end in itself but instead encourage changes in the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani relationship that will reduce tensions and uproot terrorism from the region. Indian insistence that Pakistan shut down the LeT was a reasonable demand even before the Mumbai attacks and has now become essential to reducing the chances of additional acts of terrorism that could lead to conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations. Pushing for a resumption of Indo-Pakistani peace talks without concerted action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks could well embolden groups like LeT to up the ante.

Rather than repeating vague U.S. policy formations like “any solution must take into account the will of the Kashmiri people,” that do little to build peace in the region and risk raising false expectations about the potential for U.S. mediation, the U.S. should quietly encourage Indian and Pakistani officials to develop a different security paradigm for the region. This new paradigm would allow them to focus on containing dangerous non-state actors that threaten stability in both countries. The first step of realizing this new security paradigm is for Pakistan to demonstrate that it will no longer tolerate the export of terrorism from its territory.

If Pakistan takes decisive action to close down the LeT, India and Pakistan could pick up the threads of the dialogue they conducted from 2004 to 2007. Through this dialogue, the two sides strengthened mutual confidence by increasing people-to-people exchanges, augmenting annual bilateral trade to over \$1 billion, launching several cross-border bus and train services, and liberalizing visa regimes to encourage travel between the two countries. There was even progress on the vexed Kashmir issue with the two governments narrowing the gap in their rhetoric about an ultimate solution to Kashmir. Both sides referenced the idea of keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant and instituting some type of joint mechanism to facilitate cooperation between the Pakistani and Indian parts of Kashmir.

Conclusion

Pakistan is at a critical juncture. The Obama administration is demonstrating a willingness to invest significant resources (even amid a serious global economic downturn) into helping the country develop into a prosperous, peaceful and thriving state. But achieving this goal requires Pakistani leaders to adjust their own regional security perceptions and to view the internal terrorist threat as urgently as their counterparts in Washington do. Only through a strong and trusting U.S.-Pakistan partnership can Pakistan stabilize its economy and face down extremists who wish to destroy its tolerant traditions, retard its growth and development, and isolate the country from the global community.

**Nicholas Schmidle
New America Foundation**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Understanding the Character of Jihadist Militancy in Pakistan**

**Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security
United States Senate**

July 7, 2009

First, I would like to thank Chairman Carper, Ranking Member McCain, and other members of the subcommittee who have gathered today. I am honored by this incredible opportunity to share some thoughts on the subject of strengthening U.S.-Pakistan relations, with a specific focus on explaining the character and dynamics of jihadist militancy in Pakistan.

The United States is dependent on Pakistan for accomplishing its objectives in Afghanistan. Policy makers, diplomats and senior military officials seem increasingly aware of this fact; the wholesale adoption of the phrase “AfPak” offers one piece of evidence. But we now run the risk of conflating the prevailing issues, problems, and opportunities in both countries.

A colleague at the New America Foundation recently shared an analysis that embodies the dilemma of conceptualizing these two countries too closely together. While 100 percent of American casualties will be taken in Afghanistan, he said, the overwhelming majority of American interests – including the leadership of al-Qaeda and concerns over nuclear proliferation – reside in Pakistan, where we have, unfortunately, very little influence.

Many of the insurgents fighting against American soldiers in Afghanistan are either based in Pakistan or being commanded from Pakistan. Top Afghan Taliban leaders use Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, as their headquarters, from where they direct operations in southern Afghanistan. And insurgents in eastern Afghanistan are being supported and led by networks based in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province.

But I am going to focus my testimony today on those insurgents and jihadists fighting against the Pakistani government; recent al-Qaeda communiqués have outlined the group’s goals of overthrowing the Pakistani government and seizing its nuclear weapons. I often hear U.S. military officials describe their adversaries along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in general terms as “the enemy,” while, in the same sentence, proposing to isolate specific “irreconcilable” militants from specific “reconcilable” ones. But what is the character of the jihadist threat in Pakistan? I will use the next few minutes to answer this question in three parts:

1. Who constitutes “the enemy” in Pakistan?
2. How do the cultural, tribal and religious dynamics along the border play in to the militants’ strengths and weaknesses?
3. How does the Pakistani military conceptualize “the enemy?”

1. Who are the jihadists and insurgents fighting against the Pakistani government?

The Pakistani militants are not a monolithic, disciplined entity. In fact, they are probably best understood as belonging to one of three categories, each with different safe havens, objectives and vulnerabilities. Those three groups are:

1. Foreign al-Qaeda militants
2. Kashmiri and sectarian militants
3. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or “the Pakistani Taliban Movement”

The foreign militants – which are predominantly Arabs and Uzbeks, with smaller numbers of Turks, Chechens, Africans and some Europeans – can be classified as al-Qaeda and are estimated to account for several hundred fighters. They are suspected of being based in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Swat. Owing to their international backgrounds, most of them have international aims, whether it’s committing terrorism abroad, committing terrorism against international targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan, or, in order to consolidate their own control over these areas, committing violence against the traditional tribal authorities. In that respect, there are even some distinguishing characteristics of these foreign militants, with the Chechens and Uzbeks reportedly being more involved in the drug trade, the Uzbeks being constantly involved in skirmishes and tribal disputes, and the Arabs, who founded and continue to dominate the leadership of al-Qaeda, being more observant of tribal norms and yet seemingly more intent using the FATA as a base for global, catastrophic acts of terrorism. Of the three categories of militants in Pakistan, these are, by far, the least interested in reconciliation.

The Kashmiri and sectarian groups have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani state. In the mid-1980s, the main anti-Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba, was formed under the supervision of General Zia ul Haq’s military regime. Haq, a Sunni Muslim with close ties to the leading Islamist parties, sought to transform Pakistan from being a Muslim state to a Sunni Muslim state. While their goals were – and are – more focused on removing Shia influences from Pakistan, members of the group spent considerable time in Afghanistan during the Taliban era, participating in pogroms against Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara minority. A Sipah-e-Sahaba splinter group, known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, was created in the early 1990s with an even more ambitious and murderous agenda. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants have been implicated in the abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl, in the bombing of a church in Islamabad in 2002, and in

the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. While their goals are more social and religious than, say, the political goals of al-Qaeda, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are the homegrown, Pakistani equivalent of the sectarian death squads that have terrorized Iraq for years.

Within this second category are also the Kashmiri militant groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. Most of these groups - Kashmiri and sectarian ones alike - are based in southern Punjab, in and around Multan, Bahawalpur, and Jhang. Like the sectarian groups, each of the Kashmiri groups received substantial support from Pakistani intelligence agencies to carry out attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir. This support and training has made them particularly dangerous. So unlike many of the Pashtuns who now call themselves Taliban, these fighters are more than simply disgruntled men with guns. They have long-standing contacts in the intelligence agencies, some of who sympathize more with the jihadists than with the government. These contacts enabled Jaish-e-Mohammad, for instance, to carry out two destructive assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf in late 2003.

You may be wondering why, with all this support and training from the state, they've now turned against it? To understand this, it's best to look back to Lal Masjid, or the Red Mosque. In July 2007, Pakistani commandos besieged the mosque, where hundreds of jihadists remained inside. This incident was critical for many reasons. First, it brought together sectarian and Kashmiri militants from southern Punjab, Pashtuns from the border, and Arab jihadist ideologues. But second, and perhaps most importantly, it exposed that the limitations of the intelligence agencies. While senior leaders of the state-supported jihadist groups went to the mosque to plea with the brothers in charge to halt their activities, the foot soldiers from these state-supported jihadist groups had already switched sides. In other words, the state may have succeeded in its bid to reconcile the leaders of some groups, but what good is a leader with no one to lead? Those who survived the final raid on the mosque ultimately fled to the tribal areas, where they joined Pakistani Taliban groups in their campaign against the government.

This brings us to the Pakistani Taliban, which have evolved into the lethal force they've become primarily because they represent a fusion of al-Qaeda, Kashmiri and sectarian jihadist groups, and Pashtun discontent. Consider the case of Baitullah Mehsud and his organization, based in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. Some news reports to the contrary, Mehsud is *not* a "tribal chieftain." He is a young fighter in his 30s who, through coercion and assassinations of legitimate tribal chiefs (many of which were believed to be carried out by Mehsud's Uzbek allies) and budding rivals, emerged as the most powerful man in the Mehsud tribe. The other weapon Mehsud possesses is a platoon of suicide bombers, many of whom are kids. Mehsud's deputy, Qari Hussein, is regarded as "Ostad-e-fedayeen," or the Teacher of Martyrs. Hussein also belongs to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the anti-Shia sectarian group. When his men kidnapped almost 200 Pakistani soldiers in August 2007, they looked through the soldiers' gear, found at least one of them who was carrying Shia literature, and proceeded to have his head cut off - by a teenage boy with a knife. This sectarian facet is critical to understand. Most of the fighting in Kurram Agency in the FATA has been between Sunni Talibs, under the command of another Mehsud lieutenant, and the large Shia population in the agency.

So who is reconcilable? There are two groups of combatants who fall into this category: those Pashtuns currently fighting alongside the Taliban who joined the Taliban out of a sense of

ethnic identity and Pashtun nationalism; and those bandits and criminals who realized that donning a turban and a beard provided some legitimacy to actions otherwise considered “banditry.” But the most important group that the Pakistani government should be targeting with aid and security are those Pashtun-populated areas in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan where the Taliban are *not* a significant presence yet. The more that Islamabad can portray the insurgency as being led by foreign, religious extremists, and not by local Pashtuns, the better chance it has of success.

2. How do the cultural, tribal and religious dynamics along the border play in to the militants’ strengths and weaknesses?

While South Waziristan is self-evidently *not* Swat, the importance of understanding the distinction between the two areas cannot be overemphasized. I’ve detected a great amount of satisfaction and appreciation from U.S. military officials for the Pakistani army’s recent offensive in Swat, coupled with an expectation and desire that they go charging into South Waziristan next. In Swat, Dir, and Buner, the “northern districts” of the North West Frontier Province, and to some extent in Bajaur, the northern agency in the FATA, we’ve seen a certain amount of tribal- and community-based resistance to the Taliban. It is unquestionably a positive development, and it goes to show that the Taliban are a PR nightmare and their own worst enemy. But I fear that there is an expectation in South Waziristan that tribes and rivals of Mehsud will emerge to help lead the Pakistani army to victory there. About three weeks ago, a Talib stepped up and gave a series of interviews in which he proclaimed his intention (backed by thousands of fighters) to side with the army against Mehsud. Ten days later, he was shot and killed.

Waziristan has long been a source of trouble. At the turn of the 20th century, the British Viceroy of India declared, “No patchwork scheme will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steamroller has passed over the country from end to end, will there be peace. But I do not want to be there person to start that machine.” Unlike Swat, where the Taliban only recently seized power, South Waziristan has been under Taliban rule for the most of the past decade. Resistance is more tribal-based than religious-based. The culture is, simply put, a martial one. Whereas, in the northern districts of NWFP, the people are less eager to fight, even while the appeal of pan-Islamic ideologies is greater. In Swat, Dir, Bajaur and Malakand, a group called the Tehrik-e-Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi, or the Movement for the Implementation of Sharia, preceded the Taliban. TNSM, as the group is best known, was itself preceded by Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistani variant of the Muslim Brotherhood. Violence is less entrenched in local culture in the northern districts than compared to Waziristan, a distinction that should be recognized before urging the Pakistani army, which is still trying to subdue the Taliban in Swat, to invade South Waziristan.

3. How does the Pakistani military conceptualize “the enemy?”

Publicly, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has maintained a certain amount of confidence that it can pit various jihadist groups, tribes or rival factions against one another, while remaining firmly in control. And yet in private conversations I had with intelligence officials during repeated trips to NWPF in late 2007, I was told, in no uncertain

terms, that they had lost control over their sources, contacts and assets. That said, the Pakistani government continues to foster a dual set of priorities in dealing with the Pakistani Taliban.

Not all Talibs based in Pakistan are openly against the government. Therefore, in the Pakistani threat perception, there are “good” and “bad” Taliban. For instance, the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan and Khost, Afghanistan, is entirely oriented towards attacking NATO forces and government targets in Afghanistan. The same goes for Maulvi Nazir, a top Taliban commander in South Waziristan. Both are considered “good” Talibs. Nazir’s case is particularly instructive since the Pakistani army has announced that it is planning to pursue Taliban camps in South Waziristan. This operation is bound to lay bare how the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment distinguishes between “good” and “bad” Taliban, like Mehsud.

South Waziristan is divided into two tribes: Wazirs and Mehsuds. Maulvi Nazir endeared himself to the officer corps when he expelled hundreds of Uzbek militants from the Waziri areas in March 2007 (they landed in the Mehsud areas). I was traveling just outside of South Waziristan in those days, and rumors were rife that the army was aiding Nazir. Then, a year later, I met the general who had been in charge of the area during the fighting and I asked him about the reports that his men had been arming and supporting Nazir’s Taliban. Without pause, he confirmed the rumors. From his vantage point, Nazir was a Pakistani who needed aid in driving foreigners out of his area. Consequently, the general commanded his men to remove their uniforms, wear local clothes, and fight alongside the Taliban, backed by air and artillery support from the army.

This story should show that the newfound vigor on display by the Pakistani army only pertains to some militant factions. Though Nazir might have driven the Uzbeks out, he has continued hosting senior Arab al-Qaeda leaders. Numerous drone strikes have landed in his safe-havens over recent months, which is just further evidence that while the U.S.-Pakistani partnership has improved in some areas, incompatible objectives remain in others.

Testimony, for the record by

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before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Federal
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security

On

"From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening US-Pakistan Relations"

7 July 2009

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator McCain, members of the subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today to share my thoughts with you on what works and what could work in Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better partner in building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a Pakistani but also as someone who has lived and worked in the United States since 1972.

While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, it is not hopeless. I remain optimistic. Yet there is cause for concern. As a friend of mine reminds me often: a pessimist is simply an optimist with experience.

Pakistan is a complex country, struggling nearly 62 years since independence to define its nationhood. Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military, have left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its military rulers have been matched by the incompetence and short-sightedness of its civil leadership. Most political parties are run as personal fiefdoms and family businesses, or on feudal patterns. Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerge. Ironically, only the major religious party, the Jamaat i Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and routinely elects new leaders from the rank and file.

I welcome President Obama's and the US Congress' moves to change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term commitment to the people of Pakistan, not an alliance with any single person, party, or institution. In this season of bipartisan support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape US policy, I offer below some information and suggestions.

- First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of Pakistan: over 60 per cent of its population is below 30 years. Most of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the economy and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and vulnerable to the blandishments of their radical co-religionists, who have used a convoluted interpretation of Islam to attract Pakistani youth to their side.

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- Yet, Pakistani society has strong sinews: when given the chance, its people work hard and do well. They have helped build Britain's textile factories and help run the economies of the Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula. They remit about \$6 billion a year to their homeland. A recent World Bank study showed that over 1980-2007, Pakistan ranked second only to China's 9.9 per cent average GDP growth rate with its 5.8 per cent. All this, I maintain, in spite of government. Today Pakistan has a Middle Class of some 30 million with an average per capita income of \$10,000 per year on a purchasing power parity basis.
- How do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can leverage its strengths and build a long lasting relationship with the United States? Not by threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a proud people and do not respond well to the carrots and sticks approach. In any case, such an approach is not employed by most of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with another country? Rather, we need to build trust on the basis of understanding. A glance at the roller coaster history of US-Pakistan relations will prove this point. Whenever the US has pushed Pakistan to change without creating the environment inside Pakistan to favor change, the reaction has been negative and detrimental to friendship. Sanctions have not worked to deter Pakistan away from working on its nuclear capability, for example.
- Pakistan's military now appears to have recognized that the internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence of a powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full training or the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the US talks of Counterinsurgency training it sounds to the Pakistanis that they must abandon conventional defense. We must clarify that this is not the case. Till Pakistan's threat perceptions change, we must be prepared to support its military in creating a hybrid force ranging across a spectrum of capabilities. This will allow them to shift from COIN to conventional, as needed. Pakistan badly needs support that will allow it to move troops rapidly on either of its eastern or western borders and between them. It operates on the basis of the capability of India to the east to inflict damage, if it chooses. Yet, it cannot match India's military might in numbers. Pakistan's security demands the maintenance of a conventional force with a concurrent capability to fight an internal insurgency. But the latter needs to be accelerated to help it regain territory in the North Western part of the country.
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How can the US become more effective?

1. USAID is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt, empowered; given the staff to strategize and manage its projects, develop relationships inside Pakistan, and effectively deliver aid where it is needed. USAID is aptly named: most of its aid money stays in the United States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop being a contract management agency and become again a powerful partner of US diplomacy, working directly with local counterparts to solve local problems. The model of the Office of Transition Initiatives, involving working with recipients of aid on the ground and crafting projects that meet urgent needs in a manner that empowers the locals seems to be working. USAID as a whole might want to move faster toward that model. In

Pakistan OTI has had successful pilot projects as has the Narcotics Assistance Section of the US Embassy there. It is not a question of absence of information or experience. Congress should try to move USAID away from wholesale outsourcing of its work to a select few Washington-based organizations with political clout to aid recipients and local NGOs.

2. We must also find better ways to coordinate assistance, so DOD, State, Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE and other agencies work together rather than autonomously or at cross purposes. Congress needs to support the Special Envoy's work in this regard.
3. Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically difficult moves such as a Free Trade Agreement and removal of quotas on textiles imports would allow Pakistan to help itself. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics of Pakistan's textile trade with the United States supports this idea. But, we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder toward manufactures, if it is to stay ahead of the population growth curve.
4. A related issue is the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. These can be useful as a temporary though subsidized salve, not a permanent solution. China's experience indicates that ROZs need to be near major population centers and communications hubs. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA are too remote a location to give the ROZs long-term viability. There is also the danger of carpetbaggers from other provinces coming in to take advantage of tax holidays and leaving when those facilities disappear.
5. There is a better and faster way to create jobs immediately in FATA. A calculation by ex-World Bank economist Khalid Ikram, melds with my own thinking on this topic. We can employ the young males in the 17 per cent youth bulge in FATA's 3.5 million population by launching major infrastructure projects: major roads linking FATA to Pakistan, small dams and tube-wells to help irrigate cash crops, would help mop up the roughly 300,000 Pakhtun youth who are now the target of Taliban recruitment efforts. Detailed recommendations along these lines were recently made by us in the Atlantic Council's Task Force Report on Pakistan and in my paper for the CSIS on FATA. In my own meeting with 23 Maliks in North Waziristan last year, they were looking for help in building the irrigation infrastructure so they could produce cash crops and process them for export to the Gulf. Locals also appreciated greatly a boat bridge over the Tochi River that reduced travel times by hours. Such civil works would create immediate employment for youth in FATA. And roads linked to Pakistan proper would produce their own spin-off benefits, as tea houses, hotels, repair shops etc. would create an informal sector for more employment of locals.
6. On retraining the military, we must recognize that the Pakistan army also needs help in keeping up its conventional force, even while we build up its mobility and ability to fight militants in rough terrain on its western borders. Mr. Chairman, four helicopters will not do the trick. The US can and should divert larger numbers of helicopters and other COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan, as it replaces the fleets of European allies, for example. Pakistan badly needs heli-lift capability to fight a mobile militant force in its mountainous north. For its eastern border as well, it needs to be able to move troops rapidly to meet any Indian threat. Mobility would also help reduce a large standing and immobile army and over time reduce the strain on the budget.
7. We must also replace the Coalition Support Funds with regular foreign military funding, with milestones and benchmarks proposed by Pakistan's military and agreed to by the United States.

This will help transform the current patronage relationship from an army for hire to an army fighting Pakistan's own war. In my conversations with army officers in FATA I found great resentment up and down the ranks for the payment of monies by the US to compensate Pakistan for sending troops into FATA. Even more galling were the requests for detailed accounting of all expenses, especially when over time a larger proportion of those expenses were challenged or denied in succeeding years. This has not won any friends inside the Pakistan army. Direct military aid with agreed benchmarks would be a better way to handle this situation. And coupled with enhancing Pakistan's capacity to track expenditures, would allow Pakistan to make better use of these monies while meeting Congress' desire for accountability.

How do we track aid monies and make their use transparent?

I believe in accountability and responsible use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does not have the ability to track its civil or military expenditures effectively. We must help Pakistan create these systems so it can better manage its resources. A comprehensive financial tracking system in the Ministries of Finance and Defence should help not only management but also improve civilian control of military spending, while increasing transparency. It is in Pakistan's interest to set up strong management of aid programs and independent monitoring entities to prevent misuse of aid by bloated bureaucracies. The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such efforts. On its part the US government must make transparent all its aid and defense contract awards so both the US and Pakistani populace can track the use of aid monies.

Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity of Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic challenges. Understanding its regional insecurities, the US must work behind the scenes to understand Pakistan's security concerns and to alleviate them. India is a key player in the region. For the first time in years, a strong central government has been elected in India. The US must use its new influence with India to show, in the words of my friend Peter Jones, "Strategic altruism". Confidence building measures need to be picked up and the Track II channels that brought the two countries close to solutions of at least three of their major four issues of contention two years ago need to be revived. Both India and Pakistan must leap frog the hurdles of historical distrust and conflicts to fight the common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism. There is no acceptable alternative to this direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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**From Strategy to Implementation:
Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations**
Prepared Statement of Nathaniel C. Fick
Chief Executive Officer



July 7, 2009

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the Committee; it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the challenges confronting the United States in Pakistan.

My comments this afternoon are based largely on a research project I've just completed with my colleagues David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum. I know you're familiar with Dr. Kilcullen's work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mr. Exum is currently serving on General McChrystal's assessment team in Kabul. I've submitted the entire report as formal, written testimony.

The situation confronting the United States in Pakistan is extraordinarily difficult, and permanently altering the political dynamic there will require a sustained effort on many fronts.

Avoiding the worst outcomes in Pakistan over the coming year demands that we focus on securing areas that are still under government control, build up the police and civil authority, and measure progress against realistic benchmarks so that we know what's working and what must be changed.

The near-term challenge for the United States and its allies is to *stop the extremist advance*, both geographically and psychologically. If the militants' advance is not at least halted in the coming year, then the Pakistani state – including the supply routes supporting the coalition in Afghanistan and Islamabad's nuclear arsenal – could face an existential threat. The first priority is to change two policies that have proven especially destabilizing: drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and unconditionally aiding the Pakistani military at the expense of other security forces.

The Case against Drones

Remote attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles are currently the United States' primary method of combating violent extremism in northwestern Pakistan. The appeal of drone attacks for policy makers is clear: their positive effects are measurable and they avoid coalition casualties. They create a sense of insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions with each other.

Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks inside Pakistan outweigh the benefits and they are, on balance, harmful to U.S. and allied interests. Open source reports from Pakistan suggest that remote attacks there since early 2006 have killed around 14 militant leaders and more than 700 Pakistani civilians, or just over 50 civilians for every militant killed. U.S. officials vehemently dispute these figures, and it seems certain that more militants, and fewer civilians, have been killed than is reported by

CONGRESSIONAL
TESTIMONY

**From Strategy to Implementation:
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the press in Pakistan. What matters as much as the real numbers, however, is the perception of these operations among the people of the FATA and NWFP, as well as among the people of Pakistan's other provinces.

Even beyond the Pashtun belt, drone strikes excite visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani opinion. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory offends people's deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan's instability. The U.S. reliance on drones also displays every characteristic of a tactic – or, more accurately, a piece of technology – substituting for a strategy. Currently, strikes from unmanned aircraft are being carried out in a virtual vacuum, without a concerted information operations campaign or an equally robust strategy to engage the Pakistani people more holistically.

Killing terrorists is necessary. Overemphasizing it, however, wastes resources while empowering the very people the coalition seeks to undermine. It would be prudent, until a more holistic strategy for Pakistan can be designed and implemented, to scale back the drone attacks, focusing solely on al Qaeda and not on the various other extremist elements whose aims do not extend beyond Pakistan's borders.

Strengthening the Police

With militant attacks spreading east of the Indus River and threatening the urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, where much of the Pakistani middle class lives, the United States and its Pakistani allies should build on their strengths by drawing a notional line at the Indus to defend those people already under the control of the central government. One element in this strategy should be the reallocation of funds from the Pakistani military and intelligence services – which continue to view India as Pakistan's most pressing threat – and toward the police.

The recently passed Kerry-Lugar Act is a welcome step in the right direction. It de-couples military from non-military aid, triples that non-military aid to \$1.5B per year, and includes increased allocations for the police, independent judiciary, and anticorruption efforts. It also—and I'll cover this in more detail shortly—requires benchmarks and criteria for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.

To be sure, short-term aid to the police forces is not a long-term fix for Pakistan. In the coming year, however, the neglected Pakistani police forces must be bolstered so that they can credibly secure the populations of Punjab and Sindh from militant attacks. This measure, in conjunction with the curtailment of the drone attacks, aims to halt the extremist advance at the Indus, while shoring up and building upon the historical stability of the Pakistani heartland.

Measuring Progress

All strategies require constant assessment, and President Obama's plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is no exception. In the speech unveiling his new approach, the president promised to set clear metrics and consistently assess the impact of U.S. policies.

Effective benchmarks should measure *outcomes for the population* rather than *inputs by governments*. Too often, the international community has measured progress by tracking money raised, money spent, or

CONGRESSIONAL
TESTIMONY

From Strategy to Implementation:
Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations
Prepared Statement of Nathaniel C. Fick
Chief Executive Officer



troops deployed. These are inputs, not outcomes, and they measure effort, not effectiveness. Better benchmarks track trends in the proportion of the population that feels safe, can access essential services, enjoys social justice and the rule of law, engages in political activity, and earns a living without fear of insurgents, drug traffickers, or corrupt officials.

Because politics is about perception, and the coalition's goals are political – to marginalize the extremists, bolster the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and wean the population away from armed struggle toward peaceful politics – perceived outcomes matter the most. It is not enough to make people objectively safer and better off: before they are willing to put down their weapons and support the government, the population must *feel* safer, and must *perceive* the government as the winning side. What matters is that people have a well-founded feeling of security and progress, a belief – based in reality, not spin – that things are getting better. These trends are harder to gauge than inputs but they give a much more accurate picture than inputs alone. And although none of these metrics directly address al Qaeda, they do concentrate on the conditions under which people can be more susceptible to the influence of extremists and their enablers.

Key metrics to watch in Pakistan include the rate at which Taliban “chapters” continue to open in the Punjab and whether the balance of 2009 sees more attacks in the urban centers of Karachi and Lahore. These developments would indicate that instability is increasing in the Punjab and Sindh heartlands, and would suggest that the situation on the ground is worsening.

The assassination rate of *maliks* (government-appointed tribal representatives) in the FATA and Baluchistan is another indicator. The Taliban have killed hundreds of *maliks* since 2004, a sign of intimidation and illustrating the erosion of civil society and the collapse of law and order. A drop in killings might simply indicate that most *maliks* have been killed or driven away from their districts, but continued high assassination rates would indicate ongoing insecurity.

The Taliban infiltration rate from Pakistan into Afghanistan is another metric worth tracking. This rate has historically spiked following “peace agreements” in the tribal areas, which have usually resulted from defeats of the Pakistani Army at the hands of militants. A reduction in infiltration might indicate better security in Pakistan, and better border security; an increase would indicate Pakistan's continued failure to police its border or secure its territory.

Another indicator is the degree to which the Pakistani military is under civilian control and cooperating with the coalition. One measure of this is the proportion of Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps posts that allow the Taliban to infiltrate into Afghanistan under their noses, allow the Taliban to set up mortar and rocket firing positions nearby, or provide covering fire to protect the Taliban against the coalition. In the past, along some parts of the frontier, these actions have been extremely common, indicating either that the Taliban have intimidated Pakistani forces, struck a local deal, or that the security forces actively support the Taliban. A drop in rates of such behavior would indicate improvement.

The United States, in the years ahead, must have the wit and wisdom not only to develop a sophisticated strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to implement it well – tracking effectiveness and adapting to changing circumstances on the ground.

In closing, I'd like to make an over-arching suggestion. During the campaign against the Russians in Afghanistan, one slogan unified all efforts of the U.S. government: “Get the Russians out.” For this campaign, we should consider using, “Build local capacity,” which, while maybe not as catchy, has the virtue of being clear—and one word shorter.

Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today.

Prepared Statement of KOLI MOWATT-LARSEN,
Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

The Committee requested that I address three issues:

- 1) Assess security challenges to Pakistani nuclear weapons
- 2) Outline the threat posed by nuclear terrorism
- 3) Make recommendations to help guide U.S.-Pakistani nuclear cooperation

To that end, I co-authored testimony with my Harvard colleague and nuclear security expert Matthew Bunn. We provided this testimony in the form of a comprehensive paper that was restricted to committee members. We requested that the paper be handled in this unusual manner due to the sensitivities of the subject matter, and in deference to ongoing cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan on nuclear-weapons security.

I am personally convinced that efforts to work more closely in nuclear security are in the national interests of both the United States and Pakistan - and that such cooperation helps enhance global security. I appreciate the committee's willingness to handle our testimony discreetly, recognizing that national sovereignty issues and special sensitivities apply to ongoing nuclear security-related cooperation.

Contextually, it is also important to bear in mind that the Pakistan military that controls the nuclear arsenal is highly professional and committed to upgrading nuclear security. The authorities have taken notable measures in a comprehensive effort to strengthen their defenses. They appear to be continuously assessing their overall security and making adjustments to help guard against any security lapse or compromise that might lead to a "loose nuke" or theft of nuclear materials. I believe the responsible approach is to soberly present the challenges Pakistani authorities confront in assuring control over their nuclear assets, without hyping the problem or implying that they don't have the situation in hand.

The problem is not the quality of Pakistan's nuclear security efforts. The problem is that the standard for success is so unforgiving. In a world in which terrorists are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, there can be no breakdown in security that enables terrorists to obtain a nuclear bomb. The challenge is daunting: states must be successful every time in denying terrorists a nuclear capability; terrorists only have to succeed once. And as an added incentive to be on our toes, we must always bear in mind that there is no such thing as perfect security.

As President Obama stated in his speech in Prague, a terrorist nuclear bomb must never be allowed to devastate any city in the world. This "single bomb" threshold for nuclear threats places enormous strains on nuclear security that did not exist before terrorists arrived on the scene. The implication is that eliminating nuclear terrorism threats will require states to collaborate in ways that may still seem unimaginable, given the unique sensitivities that surround nuclear weapons. States that possess nuclear weapons - the US, Russia, Pakistan, India, and others - bear a special responsibility to work

collaboratively to ensure the world never faces the prospect of a nuclear catastrophe.

There are three broad trends that pose particular challenges to securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons. First, increasing levels of extremism in the country exacerbate the threat posed by malicious insiders in the nuclear establishment - people who may be willing to work with outsiders to provide access to nuclear-weapons related facilities, technologies, and materials. Second, Pakistan's aggressive expansion of their nuclear weapons program means more materials will become available in more places - in short, there will be more places for something to go wrong, greater numbers of possible pathways to a bomb. Moreover, Pakistan's interest in developing smaller, more sophisticated weapons with higher yields will place additional strains on maintaining absolute control over these assets. Third, the overall instability in the country and potential Taliban challenge to the government increases the possibility that at some point in the future, the system for managing nuclear command and control will be tested in unprecedented ways. In this context, while the Pakistan military is reportedly firmly in charge of the National Command Authority (NCA) that controls the use and deployment of nuclear weapons, it is not easy for senior military officers to anticipate and plan for all conceivable challenges to their authority, especially in the event of an extremist ascension to power, or takeover of significant portions of the country.

Denying terrorists a nuclear capability is particularly important in Pakistan's rough neighborhood. Fundamentally, terrorists have three pathways to a nuclear bomb: they can steal a bomb; attack a facility; or steal enough material to build a bomb. The first groups known to possess nuclear intent were the Japanese doomsday cult group Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda. Both groups began actively seeking the capability to produce a mushroom cloud in the early 1990's - before the world was watching. Al Qaeda's intent remains firm to this day. Fortunately, terrorists appear thus far to have failed in their efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb. Indeed, it is very difficult for any group to achieve a nuclear capability - but it is not impossible. Our biggest adversary is complacency. Time favors terrorist intent - if the world does not maintain constant vigilance and take the threat seriously, we will fail. Terrorists can wait patiently for opportunity to knock - in the form of a fatal breakdown in nuclear security somewhere in the world that enables them to acquire a bomb, or sufficient materials to build a bomb.

The nuclear terrorism threat is not theoretical - it is real. Over the past fifteen years, there have been nineteen publicized seizures of weapons usable nuclear materials globally. These seizures were serendipitous. The materials were not reported missing from their facility of origin. Historically, there has been a notable lack of resolve - in Pakistan and elsewhere - in dealing firmly with insiders and smugglers in nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The widespread lack of stiff penalties emboldens terrorists and fails to deter those who are willing to aid and abet a nuclear terrorism plot.

Finally, security cooperation between Pakistan and the United States

should focus on the following five generic areas, depending on what is deemed appropriate and consistent with national sovereignty and international obligations under the non-proliferation treaty.

- 1) Counter the insider threat
- 2) Strengthen protection against outsider threats
- 3) Reduce sources of support for terrorism, extremism, and the use of weapons of mass destruction
- 4) Increase awareness that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real
- 5) Improve joint communication mechanisms and reduce sources of misunderstanding. The greatest benefit of a US-Pakistani channel to cooperate on nuclear security is increasing the level of trust and confidence that will become a crucial asset to both sides in the event of a crisis.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Tom Carper (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

What has been the level of cooperation between U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S. funds?

Answer:

In keeping with the ‘whole of government’ approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan ordered by the President, we have improved coordination at all levels of the Federal government, beginning with the establishment of an interagency civilian implementation team under Ambassador Holbrooke. The National Security Council is leading the interagency effort to create metrics for performance evaluation.

To improve monitoring and evaluation, USAID and other agencies have installed a multi-tiered system of checks and balances that reinforces the Government of Pakistan’s own efforts. The system utilizes local program staff, Pakistani interlocutors, and independent monitors to follow assistance from project development through implementation.

For military assistance, representatives from the Office of the Defense Representative for Pakistan (ODRP) regularly meet with their peers in the Pakistani Joint Staff to discuss the processing of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) claims. Since August 2008, Department of Defense delegations have regularly visited Pakistan to evaluate and refine CSF claim processing and validation procedures in order to help the Pakistanis better understand the program’s requirements, and to help make the claim process more transparent.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Tom Carper (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

What plans have been made for a public information campaign to improve the perception of the United States and its partnership with Pakistan? Who is in charge of seeing that plan is implemented? Is the plan coordinated with strategic communication operations in Afghanistan?

Answer:

Our public information plan focuses on winning the information war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and improving the perception of the United States in Pakistan.

The first part of our strategy involves greater engagement with the Pakistani people. U.S. officials are increasingly talking directly to local-language Pakistani media outlets in addition to the major English-language press. For example, Special Representative Holbrooke gave an exclusive interview to Radio Buraq, a community radio station based in one of the cities taking in the most people displaced by the conflict in Swat. The English language newspaper Dawn later reported that Ambassador Holbrooke's granting an interview to Buraq rather than the BBC or a major Pakistani media organization showed that he's serious about winning the 'information war' against the Taliban.

Other critical elements of our plan are to better connect to the people on the ground in conflict areas through radio, cell phone and other means and to support key local communicators, who have the greatest ability to credibly counter militant propaganda and present a positive alternative. Despite Pakistan's vibrant media sector and widespread cell phone use, many Pakistanis, particularly in the heart of the Taliban controlled areas, are beyond the range of most communications. Here, local pirate radio run by militants dominate the airwaves. This will be countered when Pakistan, with our support, is able to expand the local populations' access to information by expanding broadcast media capabilities, including terrestrial, satellite and cable television transmissions; build and secure communications infrastructure like radio and cell phone towers; and broaden informal or person-to-person communication networks.

The Departments of State and Defense and USAID implement different aspects of the strategy, making interagency coordination essential. In the State

Department, the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy provide policy guidance and support for this integrated approach. We also consult with experts and have engaged with the private sector.

Some aspects of the implementation of our strategic communications in Pakistan are coordinated with our plan in Afghanistan. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal have spent time in Islamabad and their teams work together on areas such as cross border radio programs and broadcasting, and extending mobile phone service. There are also regular coordination meetings—via conference calls and video conferences—that link our strategic communication teams in Islamabad and Kabul with Washington officials, and the U.S. Mission to NATO, among others. However, the situation in Pakistan is distinct from that in Afghanistan and the same goals and strategies cannot apply to both nations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Tom Carper (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

How has USAID coordinated its plans to carry out development projects in Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier with the Pakistani government and what efforts are made to ensure the regions are secured before development projects are undertaken?

Answer:

USAID works closely with the FATA Secretariat and the government of the North West Frontier province to implement its programs throughout the FATA. Each program is carefully coordinated with the political agent and the FATA secretariat- including site visits by Government of Pakistan (GOP) representatives as appropriate. USAID programs also depend on guidance from GOP for security. Thus, USAID does not start implementing until the GOP declares a region secured and ready for development.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Tom Carper (#4)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

Can you provide us with an update on the progress of the Trilateral consultations between the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan?

Answer:

We are making progress on several fronts. Most significantly, transit trade talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan were held in Kabul on June 23-24. The talks produced significant progress, including: a) Pakistan orally agreeing to help expedite a bumper Afghan crop of fruit and vegetables across the border while talks continue; b) resolution of most technical trucking issues; and c) agreement to conduct a joint study to address smuggling concerns. The next round of talks will focus on the more difficult items to be resolved.

In the agricultural sector, chairs were selected for three trilateral working groups on food security, trade corridors, and watershed management. The "Strengthening Food Security through Research and Action Working Group" is addressing the UG99 wheat fungus (a virulent race of wheat stem rust identified in Uganda in 1999) that both Afghanistan and Pakistan consider a very serious threat to food security. In order to develop action plans for addressing the UG99 threat, USDA is funding, through the International Center for Wheat and Maize Research (CIMMYT), an upcoming symposium in Afghanistan, and helping coordinate a similar symposium in Pakistan on August 11-13.

Finally, we continue to discuss with the Government of Pakistan the opening of a Border Coordination Center in Pakistan.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Tom Carper (#5)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

Given the new focus on Pakistan, what has the U.S. done and what is it planning to do to provide more personnel and resources to the U.S. Mission in Islamabad?

Answer:

A new service recognition package was recently approved to increase the incentives for Americans serving in Pakistan, making it comparable to the current service recognition package for Iraq and Afghanistan. We have already seen a positive response to this new package, and two-thirds of our bureau-controlled positions are filled for Summer 2010. Additionally, we are encouraged by the number of employees (13) who have accepted to serve for two years, as the positions are normally one year assignments. Several key personnel have also agreed to extend their current assignments by another year. As we staff our upcoming vacancies we are encouraged by the number of bids we have received.

We will continue to evaluate Embassy needs for additional personnel and resources to ensure we are able to meet effectively our mission goals in Pakistan.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Roland W. Burris (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

A recent book by New York Times correspondent David Sanger indicated that Indian development activities in Afghanistan, which are viewed by the U.S. as helpful—such as road and dam construction and humanitarian aid—are viewed by the Pakistanis as attempts by India to surround Pakistan and eventually invade. How can we further engage the Pakistanis, as well as the Indian government, to move past ongoing suspicion about the role of India within Afghanistan?

Answer:

In conversations with Indian officials we have encouraged continued commitment to transparency in their programs and assistance to Afghanistan. Likewise, in our conversations with Afghan and Pakistani officials as part of the Trilateral dialogue, we have also emphasized that all of Afghanistan's neighbors need to work to support Afghan stability.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Roland W. Burris (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

Mr. Nicholas Schmidle, a Fellow at the New America Foundation and one of this hearing's witnesses, talked about the Kashmiri and sectarian militant groups that receive support from Pakistani intelligence groups to carry out attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir. He stated that one of the biggest problems is that they have long-standing relationships with the intelligence agencies, resulting in sympathies for the jihadists within the intelligence agencies. How do we move away from this? What, if anything, is the Pakistani government doing to locate sympathizers within its intelligence agencies?

Answer:

The Pakistani government, including its top military officials, such as General Kayani, recognizes and has publicly stated that it is in its interest to confront the threat of violent extremism in Pakistan. Our diplomats are engaged with officials at all levels of the Pakistani government as well as with important non-government actors to express our concern regarding the threat posed by militants and to offer our assistance.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Roland W. Burris (#3)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

Ms. Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow for the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, recommends measuring Pakistan's efforts against the Afghan Taliban as a metric for determining how much U.S. military assistance Pakistan should receive. Do the rest of the witnesses agree with this approach? What are some other means for measuring, rewarding, and punishing Pakistani involvement, or lack thereof, with Afghan Taliban forces?

Answer:

In order to achieve our foreign policy interests in Pakistan, the Department of State is working to re-establish the trust and the personal relationships between American's and Pakistani's that existed prior to the implementation of Pressler sanctions, which were put in place in 1990. Rather than threatening to punish Pakistan, we are seeking to provide security and economic assistance packages that demonstrate the United States sees Pakistan as a long-term partner. We believe this is the most effective way of influencing Pakistan. Pakistan has a complicated relationship with the Afghan Taliban dating back to its sponsorship of the organization in the 1990s.

Diplomatically, we remain engaged with officials at all levels of the Pakistani government to express our conviction that support for people affiliated with the Afghan Taliban does not serve Pakistan's national interests.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#1)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

In your testimony, you said that the Administration's new plan in Pakistan will help support the Pakistan government's ability to engage in strategic communications and present an alternative narrative to the Taliban vision.

- a. How will the Administration and the Pakistan government know that their strategic communications efforts are making a difference?
- b. Please describe any performance measures that will be used in support of these efforts.

Answer:

We are working to bolster confidence in the government, reduce support for the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremist groups, and improve the public's perception of the United States. Despite the vibrant media environment in much of Pakistan, the population in some areas dominated by extremists has almost no access to radio, television, or other modes of communications. We are helping Pakistan improve access by expanding broadcast media capabilities, including terrestrial, satellite and cable television transmissions; building and securing communications infrastructure like radio and cell phone towers; and broadening local means of communication.

We will know our efforts are beginning having an impact when local populations' access to information expands. We will know our strategic communications efforts are making a long-term difference when we witness – in the media and public opinion – a sustained shift in the narrative about extremism, militant groups, the Pakistani Government, and the United States.

The National Security Council is leading the effort to create metrics for performance that will help ensure oversight and accountability for U.S. funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Jones by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka (#2)
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 7, 2009**

Question:

In his testimony, Mr. Nawaz from the Atlantic Council stated that Congress needs to support the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in coordinating assistance so that agencies involved can avoid working at cross-purposes.

- a. Do you agree that this is a significant challenge?
- b. If so, what more should Congress do?

Answer:

In keeping with the 'whole of government' approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan ordered by the President, we are working to improve coordination at all levels of the federal government. The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan was created to bring to bear the full range of resources available to address the security and development challenges faced by our Pakistani and Afghan allies. Our team includes experts from nine federal agencies who are working to improve coordination and ensure our taxpayers' resources are effectively deployed. In Afghanistan, Ambassador Tony Wayne is coordinating all civilian assistance and economic policy across the U.S. Government. We are establishing an interagency coordinating role for assistance in Pakistan as well.

We are working with Congress to create metrics for grading the effectiveness of our assistance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We continually examine ways to improve current operating procedures and implementation mechanisms to ensure the maximum amount of U.S. foreign assistance reaches those who need it the most.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Lisa Curtis
From Senator Tom Carper**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

1. Question: A suicide attack recently on a bus in Rawalpindi was the first that singled out workers of Pakistan’s nuclear labs, raising new questions about the government’s ability to withstand increasingly bold assaults by the Taliban. You have previously mentioned the need for U.S. containment strategies to guard against the possibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Under what scenarios do you see these strategies being necessary, and how likely do you believe they may come to pass?

Response: While the attack on the bus carrying workers from one of Pakistan’s nuclear labs demonstrates al-Qaeda probably has some information about the location and activities of Pakistan’s nuclear programs, the likelihood of terrorists gaining direct access to a nuclear weapon in Pakistan is still very low. The Pakistan military is a professional and unified institution that takes the safety and security of its nuclear weapons seriously. Moreover, the U.S. government has provided assistance to Pakistan to enhance the security of its nuclear weapons programs through measures, such as the establishment of personnel reliability programs and permissive actions links, over the last seven years. Third, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are dispersed throughout the country, making it impossible for terrorists to gain access to an assembled nuclear weapon, especially through a single violent attack.

A more plausible scenario is one in which extremists infiltrate the Pakistani nuclear establishment slowly over time and gain access to nuclear materials or technology that could help them eventually build a nuclear device or possibly a dirty bomb. Past and potential present links among Pakistan’s army and intelligence services to extremists who are viewed as assets in pursuing geo-strategic goals vis a vis Afghanistan and India open the door for the possibility of Pakistani officials with access to nuclear information developing sympathy for al-Qaeda goals. Earlier revelations about a group of former Pakistani military officials and nuclear scientists who met with Usama bin Laden in August 2001 remind us of the dangers of al-Qaeda gaining nuclear know-how from either former or serving Pakistani officials with access to such information. The best way to prevent this from happening is for the U.S. to continue to cooperate closely with Pakistan in improving security at its nuclear sites, enhancing personnel reliability programs, and sharing intelligence related to al-Qaeda efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.

A scenario in which the U.S. would have to consider implementing contingency containment strategies to guard against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands would be if the Pakistan military began to lose its resolve in fighting the Taliban in the settled areas of the northwest part of the country. This seems highly unlikely at the moment. The Pakistan military has demonstrated its ability to oust the Taliban from the Swat Valley, thereby significantly diminishing the possibility of the Taliban gaining increased legitimacy and influence within the

country. To ensure the Taliban remain at bay, Pakistan will have to improve governance, institutional capacity, and delivery of basic services in underdeveloped areas of the northwest, as well as in southern Punjab, where militant groups with links to the Taliban have also thrived. So long as the Pakistan military leadership remains motivated to keep the militants in check, there will be little need to focus on contingency containment strategies for dealing with Pakistan's nuclear assets.

2. Question: What is your perception of the civilian government of Pakistan's ability to exercise control over the military? What, if anything, can the U.S. do to bolster the civilian government's control over the military?

Response: The civilian government has little ability to exercise control over the military. The military has been the strongest institution in Pakistan since shortly after independence in 1947. Even during periods of democratic rule, the Pakistan military has wielded significant political power and played the role of king maker behind the scenes. The civilian leadership is especially powerless to influence Pakistani policies toward neighboring Afghanistan and India. President Zardari and other civilian leaders appear interested in developing a new vision for relations with Afghanistan and India based on economic cooperation and integration. Civilian leaders are acutely aware of the dangers to Pakistan of allowing extremist groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (responsible for the Mumbai attacks in November 2008) and the Afghan Taliban to thrive in the country. The Pakistani military leadership, on the other hand, is reluctant to give up its policy of supporting militants to pressure India on Kashmir and to wield influence in Afghanistan.

The U.S. can and should focus parts of its economic aid programs toward building up civilian capacity and institutions. Most importantly, U.S. diplomacy and messaging to the Pakistani people should demonstrate American strong support for the principles of democratic rule. There is little the U.S. can do to directly impact the power balance between the military and civilian leadership in Pakistan, however. Any perceived attempt to do so would likely backfire on Washington.

3. Question: What is your opinion of the conditionality built into the House (Berman bill) and Senate (Kerry-Lugar) bills authorizing increased U.S. assistance to Pakistan? Would they hinder our relationship with Pakistan (both the government and population)?

Response: The U.S. Congress should condition future military assistance to Pakistan on Islamabad's efforts to fight terrorism and permanently break the links between its security services and elements of the Taliban and other extremist groups. Conditioning military assistance to Pakistan is necessary to demonstrate that the U.S. will not tolerate dual policies toward terrorists--and that there will be consequences for Pakistani leaders if elements of the security services provide support to terrorists. Such consequences are necessary to stem regional and global terrorism.

Conditioning military aid is not an ideal solution since it could create a backlash against the U.S. among senior Pakistani military officials who have lost nearly 2,000 troops fighting extremists along the border and hundreds of security personnel from terrorist attacks across the country over the last two years. But from Washington's perspective, we must begin to develop leverage with

our large-scale aid programs and ensure that U.S. taxpayer money does not indirectly end up assisting enemies that are fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan.

CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has acknowledged that U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has improved along the Afghan-Pakistani border over the last ten months. At the same time, he has acknowledged that elements of the Pakistani security establishment retain unhelpful links to the Taliban. U.S. officials have long been aware that Pakistani security officials maintain contacts with the Afghan Taliban and related militant networks. Pakistani officials argue that such ties are necessary to keep tabs on the groups. But there is growing recognition that Pakistan's contacts with these groups go beyond "keeping tabs" on them and may involve Pakistani security officials supporting, and even guiding, the terrorists in planning their attacks and evading coalition forces.

A particularly troubling relationship is that between Pakistani intelligence and militant leader Jalaluddin Haqqani who operates in the border areas between the Khost province in Afghanistan and the North Waziristan agency of Pakistan's tribal border areas. The Haqqani network has reportedly been behind several high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, including a truck bombing that killed two U.S. soldiers in Khost in March 2008, the storming of the Serena Hotel in Kabul during a high-level visit by Norwegian officials in January 2008, and a suicide bomb attack against India's embassy in Kabul in July 2008.

While language conditioning aid should avoid sending a message that the U.S. disregards Pakistani security concerns, it also needs to convey that the U.S. will no longer turn a blind eye to information that indicates Pakistani security services are working at cross-purposes in the fight against terrorism. Washington should acknowledge that it understands the deep-seated rivalry between India and Pakistan and will seek to play a low-key role in defusing their tensions but stop short of offering to mediate the vexed Kashmir dispute.

Both the Kerry-Lugar and the Berman bills include provisions to condition U.S. military aid to Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar bill limits certain military assistance beginning in FY 2010 and arms transfers beginning in FY 2012 to Pakistan until the Secretary certifies to the Congressional Committees that Pakistan's security forces are making concerted efforts to prevent al-Qaeda and the Taliban from operating in Pakistan are not materially interfering in Pakistan's political or judicial processes. The Berman bill prohibits military assistance from being provided to Pakistan beginning in FY2011 if the President fails to determine at the beginning of each fiscal year that Pakistan is taking actions to combat terrorist groups and to prevent cross-border attacks and is dismantling nuclear weapons-material supply networks in cooperation with the United States. Both bills contain national security waivers for these conditions.

To tame concerns in Pakistan that the U.S. is "over-conditioning" its aid, Congress may wish to consider focusing military aid conditions solely on the issue of Pakistan breaking links to terrorists. Convincing Pakistan to completely sever links with terrorist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, would go a long in achieving stability in Afghanistan and the region more generally.

The Kerry-Lugar bill also conditions economic aid to Pakistan by limiting funds to Pakistan after FY2009 unless the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan certifies to the Committees that assistance to Pakistan has made or is making substantial progress toward achieving U.S. assistance objectives. The PEACE Act also addresses the need for strong oversight and accountability in the provision and distribution of economic aid. Section 302 of the Title III provision that focuses on researching and evaluating the impact of U.S. aid will help ensure U.S. assistance is not wasted or abused. In reconciling these two pieces of legislation, the U.S. Congress should balance its need to monitor the aid closely with its goal of building trust and partnership with the Pakistani people.

4. **Question:** What metrics should be used to gauge the situation in Pakistan?

Response: The U.S. must measure Pakistan's efforts against the Afghan Taliban leadership on its territory as a metric for determining how much and what kind of U.S. military assistance Pakistan should receive. The U.S. should also gauge Pakistani actions to deter terrorists, including severing official ties with militant organizations and closing down militant training camps, as another metric in determining aid levels.

5. **Question:** What is a realistic timeframe for progress in Pakistan?

Response: We have already begun seeing some progress in Pakistan. There is more clarity among the military leadership and Pakistan public about the threat to the country posed by the Pakistani Taliban than there was six months ago. The military has proved it is capable of pushing back the Taliban forces from the settled areas of the country if it is determined to do so. Pakistani security forces have been able to oust the pro-Taliban forces from the Swat Valley and many of the internally displaced persons are returning to the area. The military, however, will have to remain in Swat for some time to keep the Taliban at bay.

The elimination of Baitullah Mehsud has also given a fillip to the Pakistanis in their fight against terrorism and demonstrates that U.S.-Pakistani cooperation can directly benefit the Pakistani people, given that Mehsud was responsible for dozens of suicide bombings that killed hundreds of Pakistanis over the last eighteen months.

Eliminating the terrorist safe-haven in Pakistan's tribal border areas will be a long-term endeavor. The U.S. and Pakistan must continue to work together to implement economic development programs and political reforms that are critical to long-term success in the struggle against terrorism. Achieving long-term gains against the terrorist threat in Pakistan will require comprehensive military action by Pakistani security forces to establish government authority in the region, joint U.S.-Pakistan efforts to provide economic development and job opportunities, and the institution of Pakistani political reforms that seek to incorporate the semi-autonomous border regions into the Pakistani nation-state. These efforts will likely need to be pursued over a five – ten year period before the terrorist threat is fully diminished.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Nicholas Schmidle
From Senator Tom Carper**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

1. During your time in Pakistan, you met with the imam of the Red Mosque and other leaders of extremist elements—some with ties to al Qaeda. What do you think their end-goals are? Is there any way to incorporate these elements into mainstream Pakistan and keep them from supporting al Qaeda?

Depending on the group and their base of operations, I think their goals differ. Their objectives also evolve with time. For instance, in the case of the Red Mosque, the leadership saw itself initially as a pressure group, meant to exert power on the government to implement sharia throughout the country, but later as the vanguard of an Islamic revolution. The first agenda, implementing Islamic law, is popular throughout the country; pious Muslims want to live according to Islamic law, which is understandable.

The problem with incorporating these elements into mainstream Pakistan is that, for the Taliban and their allies, sharia will never be enough. As witnessed in the case of Swat this past spring, even after the government ceded an entire district to the Taliban and allowed them to implement sharia, the Taliban wanted more. What are their ultimate aspirations? Hard to say, because while they clearly wish to expand their area of influence, I don't think that the Taliban have any desire to be saddled with the difficulties of governing Pakistan. They seem happier carving out enclaves for themselves. All this being said, I'd be surprised if the Taliban had some kind of “blueprint” for what they really want.

2. How resilient or dedicated are the people of Pakistan to continue supporting the military's campaign in South Waziristan?

Fortunately, Baitullah Mehsud's popularity is falling by the day, as is that of Maulana Fazlullah in Swat. I think Pakistanis' resilience and dedication to a counterinsurgency is tied to their perception of the Pakistani Army's resilience and dedication in executing it. The most important factor is the military's ability to capture or kill top Taliban commanders. People will be cynical about body counts and military claims of killing one or two dozen fighters when they know the commanders remain at large.

I wrote that top paragraph before Baitullah was announced dead. This is a major victory, if only a symbolic one, for both the US and Pakistan. I think this will strengthen the public commitment to eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. What they want the army to do, and what the army is capable of doing, of course, might be two different things.

3. Can you elaborate on your recommendation that Pakistan refrain from launching a campaign in South Waziristan? What alternatives would you suggest?

My point about discouraging the Pakistani army from rushing into South Waziristan is primarily based on timing. I thought then, as now, that it was more important for Pakistan's long-term fight against the Taliban that they rehabilitate the refugees from Swat and are able to eliminate the top leadership from Swat before they march into South Waziristan.

4. You have mentioned that—even if they are willing—the Pakistani Army may not have the capacity to defeat the extremists in South Waziristan. What could the U.S. do to build that capacity?

Honestly, I don't know because I haven't been inside of South Waziristan to know first-hand what the conditions are there. I don't know, for instance, whether it presents a similar counter-insurgency environment that, say Khost or Paktika present across the border in Afghanistan. My sense, however, is that it's not like these Afghan provinces, in so far as anyone from South Waziristan who can leave has tried to do so. That doesn't mean that all those remaining are allied with Baitullah Mehsud, or Maulvi Nazir in the Waziri areas, but it might be more of a counter-terrorism operation than a counter-insurgency one. If it's a counter-terrorism operation, then continuing to work with Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) is probably the best answer, along with drone strikes. If it's a counter-insurgency, then the effort should be more inclusive of civilian agencies, police, etc. If there's one section of Pakistan's security apparatus that could benefit most, I would agree with Nate Fick that it's the police.

5. As a journalist, how would you rate the Pakistani media coverage of events related to the U.S., Afghanistan, and the Pakistani campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan?

The Pakistani media coverage has been good, considering the difficult security climate. Unfortunately, the best reporters from either the Tribal Areas or Swat have been forced to relocate, leaving few, if any, independent reporters on the ground in, say, South Waziristan. And there's been little enterprising journalism featuring Pakistani reporters venturing into hostile areas.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Shuja Nawaz
From Senator Tom Carper**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

1. What is your assessment of the ability of Pakistan to adopt and integrate counterinsurgency doctrine?

Administratively and logistically the Pakistan army is well equipped to undertake COIN training. However, the doctrinal shift is only slowly taking root and it will need a lot of guidance and help from its leadership (it is after all a top-down army) and from Pakistan’s friends. When Pakistan’s military brass hear us talk about COIN, they understand that to mean COIN instead of conventional rather than in addition to conventional capability. Clarifying this will help them understand how a hybrid force structure will give them greater flexibility and effectiveness. General Casey may be able to give them a good briefing on this topic. Once they get that message, I do not doubt their ability to assimilate and integrate COIN. They have been learning-by-doing, in my view. Some of these lessons have been reflected in changes in their viewpoint. We must help them collate these experiences and put them into institutional memory. The South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council has put forward a project for this purpose for funding so we can assist in that regard. They have opened up to training in COIN from Australia, for example. The US can and should support those activities directly or indirectly. Politically, it is still hard for Pakistan to accept US boots on the ground for training or other major tasks.

Pakistan will need to introduce COIN into the Pakistan Military Academy (their West Point), the Staff College at Quetta, the Infantry Training School at Quetta, and at the War College in the National Defense University. They are fully capable of doing it. They also may want to revive and upgrade the British-era Frontier Warfare Course (I have some of those old booklets).

2. Pakistani officials have at times complained that the U.S. government is too slow in providing to Pakistan the kinds of defense supplies it needs to bolster its military’s own counterinsurgency capabilities. To what extent are such alleged delays a problem? In your understanding, is the delivery of such equipment proceeding smoothly or are there obstacles? Is Pakistan not getting any equipment and/or training you believe to be important?

The equipment is now flowing, especially night vision goggles. But helicopters are still in very short supply. Four or even five helicopters are not enough. The US needs to beat the bushes to get more helicopters freed up and into the pipeline. European allies (Belgium for instance) returning older Blackhawks or Eastern European allies who have Soviet-era weapons systems could supply helicopters similar to the Chinese helicopters that Pakistan uses. The US needs to think

carefully about supplying more gunships too. Currently only one helicopter squadron at Tarbela is available for the entire western theater in Pakistan.

To guard against these machines being put into the inventory against India, a leasing arrangement might be suggested. But this may not help close the trust gap.

The US military aid procedures are very cumbersome and slow and so arcane that it difficult for allies to understand the long lead times needed to get their requests into the system. The US needs to short-circuit these procedures to put them on a war footing.

3. To what extent are the Pakistan civilian government and military working together to address the militancy problem?

They appear to be consulting but the decision making on the fight against the militants is mainly in military hands. The civilian government is a weak coalition without institutions to help it assess situation rapidly and formulate good decisions. It cedes the lead to the army chief on fighting militancy. There is no clearly defined Pakistani strategy against militancy. Some rhetoric about the three Ds: Dialogue, Development, and Deterrence is repeated but few concrete measures have been taken. The intention to address the underlying causes of unrest in the North West exists, but major issues still need to be solved: mainly related to center-province relations. The civilian – military relations are also plagued by a trust deficit. We need to encourage greater confidence in the civilian leadership to make decisions and guide the military rather than have it continue following the military's lead.

The announcement of political reforms in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) by President Zardari on August 14, 2009, is a good development. He also promised speedier justice in FATA. But the provincial government of the North West Frontier Province represented by the Awami National Party distanced itself from these actions because it was not consulted. FATA needs to be better integrated into Pakistan proper.

4. What are the underlying causes of the militancy in the Frontier areas and are Pakistan and the U.S. sufficiently addressing those causes?

In brief, lack of economic and political integration and therefore voice in the affairs of Pakistan have led to a vicious cycle of failures in the system. The center needs to cede control to the provinces and to FATA. Local control over their resources is critical. Not much has been done to address these issues. Heavy infrastructural investment is needed and at much higher levels than even the \$1.5 billion the Kerry-Lugar bill promises. FATA and Balochistan need special attention. But to gain popular Pakistani public support, aid needs to be visible also in other parts of Pakistan, so it is not seen only as an adjunct to US interests in Afghanistan.

US help with the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) in Swat and Malakand was very important. But the US needs to be less demure about providing such aid and show that is the source of aid to the ordinary people of Pakistan. Ambassador Holbrooke's trips to the camps were important signals. The US can do more by persuading the Saudi government and other donors to step up too, despite their concerns about the current government.

5. What is your perception of the civilian government of Pakistan ability to exercise control over the military? What, if anything, can the U.S. do to bolster the civilian government's control over the military?

The civilian establishment is still very weak and lacks institutional capacity to formulate policy. It is at a disadvantage when dealing with an organized and unified military command and control system. The United States can help build that institutional capacity in key ministries: Finance, Defense, Interior, for example.

Also, the United States can overtly recognize the autonomy of the Supreme Court and strengthen the judiciary to serve as a counter weight to any extra constitutional tendencies. The absence of a US stance in favor of a free judiciary during the waning days of the Musharraf regime has hurt its credibility in Pakistan badly.

6. What is your opinion of the conditionality built into the House (Berman bill) and Senate (Kerry-Lugar) bills authorizing increased U.S. assistance to Pakistan? Would they hinder our relationship with Pakistan (both the government and population)?

I favor conditions and tough love; that's what friends are for. But I favor agreement on benchmarks after discussions with the recipients of aid, so they help set the conditions and reporting requirements and thus take ownership of them. An open statement of these intentions would help remove any doubts about the nature or intent of the conditions. The aim should be to ensure that aid is used effectively and efficiently, so Congress can report back to the US people on its efficacy. The Pakistani people are fed up with corrupt governments. The US must not be seen as feeding or condoning that corruption.

7. What metrics should be used to gauge the situation in Pakistan?
The economy is key. If the government can increase tax revenue by improving tax administration and tax policies, this will provide a solid basis for reforms in other sectors. Political dialogue with the opposition and attempts to integrate FATA into Pakistan will be good milestones.

A re-ordering and reduction of the Concurrent List of items that the Federal government controls in tandem with the provinces, and thus ceding full responsibilities to the provinces in areas that belong to them, will be a good signal of stability. Otherwise, centrifugal forces will push Pakistan into chaos.

The speed of aid absorption and review of project effects, verified by multilateral or national organizations (World Bank, Asian Development Bank or UK DFID and

Canadian CIDA), may be another good way to monitor aid effectiveness.

Finally, a smooth transition in the leadership of the army when General Kayani's term ends in November 2010 will be a good indicator of civilian supremacy. Kayani has promised to keep the army out of politics. He should be encouraged to stay on that path.

8. What actions could the Administration take to lessen tensions between Pakistan and India?

Encouraging Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to stand firm in his resolve to open up talks with Pakistan and to leap frog history by opening up the border for people and trade would produce a South Asian Miracle. It is also necessary to include the Pakistan army in the dialogue, so it does not see the civilians taking decisions in secret and pushes back on them. This will ensure a stable path toward Indo-Pak entente.

Helping India see the importance of lowering its profile in Afghanistan to quell Pakistani fears may also be useful. In return Pakistan needs to open up transit trade between India and Central Asia via Pakistan.

Offering Pakistan a civilian nuclear deal similar to India and bringing it into the nuclear safeguards system would be a major step forward. This will open Pakistan's nuclear facilities to international inspection.

Helping equip and restructure Pakistan's military to become more mobile and better prepared to defend the country against neighbors might increase the military's confidence in US intentions and lower animosity toward India in particular.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Nathaniel Fick
From Senator Tom Carper**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

- 1. You have suggested that Pakistan focus on consolidating control in the Sindh and Punjab provinces, yet al Qaeda and the Taliban are in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Can you explain this position?**

U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan are two-fold: to deny ungoverned space to non-state actors (primarily in Afghanistan and western Pakistan), and to avert a broader regional meltdown (primarily in the heartland of Pakistan, where the Pakistani middle class lives, and where the bulk of the country’s nuclear facilities are located). As a Marine officer in combat, I learned always to plan for two different scenarios: the most likely course of action (MLCOA), and the most dangerous course of action (MDCOA). In Pakistan, the MLCOA is that Al Qaeda and the Taliban will continue to destabilize Afghanistan from safe havens in the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan, and that Al Qaeda will attempt to use the same areas to plan operations and influence world opinion. The United States rightly acknowledges these threats, and is working to neutralize them. The MDCOA, however, is that this menace in western Pakistan will spread east of the Indus river, into the Sindh and Punjab provinces, threatening the stability of the Pakistani state and its nuclear arsenal, and potentially provoking Indian action. For this reason, an oil-spot approach is prudent: building on the historical stability of the Pakistani heartland while attempting to contain widespread extremism west of the Indus. A sound course of action for implementing such a plan would include the main components of the Kerry-Lugar bill – recasting the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in more holistic terms (as opposed to focusing on the security relationship to the near-exclusion of all else), emphasizing the importance of police forces (as opposed to the Pakistan Army and ISI), and building conditionality into the relationship so as to preserve American leverage.

- 2. Given your experience as a Marine officer, what Pakistani security forces (e.g. the Army, Frontier Corps, and Provincial Police) are most critical to U.S. objectives in Pakistan? What is the capacity of these entities and how can the U.S. bolster these entities?**

The primary U.S. objectives in Pakistan are to deny ungoverned space to non-state actors and to avert broader regional instability. Nearly a decade of experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has shown us that the denial of ungoverned space typically requires some combination of clearing, holding, and building. In the parts of Pakistan under extremist control, the Pakistan Army may indeed be required, by virtue of its firepower and broad authorities, to take the lead in at least the first of those steps. In other parts of the country, however, where extremists currently lack the ability to mass and wield such conventional strength, local forces are better, and police forces are best. For most people in many countries—and Pakistan is no exception—contact with the police is their most frequent and most substantive interaction with their government. When

the police are incompetent or corrupt, then the very legitimacy of the government is undermined. In Pakistan, the Army has survived in its current form because of support, at different times and to differing degrees, from the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia. The Army enjoys a prestigious place in society, and its importance is enhanced by the presence of external threats. The interests of the Pakistan Army and the interests of the United States thus align in relatively few places, whereas Pakistani police forces have no vested interest in domestic turmoil. Pakistani police build on a long history of civil service, and can be bolstered through both training and equipping, but primarily the former. Again, the contrast with the Army is stark: whereas the Army seeks prestige weapons which are of little use in a counterinsurgency campaign, the police are relatively easy to equip, but their power is greatly enhanced when they are seen as an effective component of a system which values good governance and the rule of law.

3. You have criticized ISI's cooperation with the U.S. and other allies in the past. Can we expect any changes in their cooperation now that the Pakistan Army is waging a campaign in Swat and South Waziristan and public opinion is in support of attacking the Taliban and Al Qaeda?

The Pakistan Army's campaign in Swat and South Waziristan is a positive development, but U.S. policymakers should remember two factors when evaluating the campaign: near-term progress against the militants may be attributed as much to the militants' mistakes as it is to the Army's successes; and long-term progress by the government of Pakistan will be in the form of holding and building in these areas, rather than simply conducting clearing operations in them. Al Qaeda in particular has seen local populations turn against it when it is perceived as sowing indiscriminate violence, as was the case in Iraq and Jordan in 2005 and 2006. If local populations in western Pakistan become less supportive of Al Qaeda, then that would present greater opportunities for cooperation between the United States and the government of Pakistan. Even if there is greater cooperation in targeting foreign-based groups, however, the real test will be whether Pakistani forces are as aggressive in going after the Taliban's Quetta shura or the Haqqani network – groups viewed by portions of the Pakistani security forces as assets, rather than as threats.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
From Senator Tom Carper**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

1. Some of the recent concerns raised about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are closely linked to concerns about the stability (strength) of the state. Is the cohesion of the Pakistani state in danger, or has this threat been exaggerated?

It is not helpful to hype the threat by suggesting that the Pakistani military does not have control over the nuclear arsenal or is unprepared to deal with the threats they face. However, they are not immune to the increasing pressures on nuclear security caused by rising levels of extremism in the country. For Pakistani authorities, their most daunting challenge lies in the potential for the loss of command and control over nuclear weapons and/or facilities as a result of instability and/or coup attempt. While there are no concrete grounds for alarm at the present time, the situation in Pakistan is volatile in comparison with any other nuclear state, in particular the long term prospects for violent extremists to challenge the state. In a worst-case scenario in which extremists assumed power, the Pakistan military would doubtless undertake necessary actions in an effort to secure the country’s nuclear assets. However, it is difficult for military planners to anticipate the myriad contingencies they might encounter in a crisis. Consequently, there is a possibility events will unfold faster and more unpredictably than the military is able to counter, increasing the risks of losing control (even temporarily) over a single nuclear weapon, facility, or materials to extremists or terrorists such as al Qaeda.

2. Will the success of the current military operations against the violent extremists have any immediate effect on the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Why or why not?

As retired CIA analyst Bruce Riedel suggested, there are more extremists/terrorists per square foot in Pakistan than any country on earth –mix in nuclear weapons, and it is a potentially lethal combination. Therefore, the overall success of military operations to combat violent extremism is crucial to maintaining a high degree of nuclear security. Strategically, it is vital to eliminate the root causes of violent extremism that increase the motivation for insiders in the nuclear establishment to work with outsiders (extremists and terrorists) in order to facilitate access to nuclear facilities, weapons and materials. Tactically, there must be a two-pronged effort: a) neutralize the outsider threat by strengthening the outer perimeter surrounding nuclear-related facilities from attack and penetration; and b) mitigate the insider threat by adopting a robust human reliability program to identify individuals in the nuclear establishment who may harbor extremist sympathies.

3. What is the single most important step the U.S. can take to help minimize the risk of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

Increasing apprehension inside Pakistan concerning alleged U.S. intentions to seize Pakistan's nuclear weapons is complicating nuclear security cooperation between the two countries. In my view, therefore, building trust and communication at senior levels of the US and Pakistani governments is the most important benefit to both sides. Arguably, the highest odds of a nuclear catastrophe in the region will arise from a fatal miscalculation by senior decision makers in Pakistan, India and/or the US in the heat of the moment. It is thus essential that all parties have robust, well-established lines of communication and consultation that will not fail during a crisis, when they are most needed. Moreover, candid, direct talks should help clarify respective plans and intentions, especially in situations involving the possible compromise or loss of nuclear assets. To the extent sovereignty sensitivities allow, such ongoing consultations should include high level brainstorming – “what if” discussions – and contingency planning to help eliminate potential miscalculations that will exacerbate the situation. It may be unreasonable to expect greater transparency to ameliorate all concerns, but whatever degree of trust and predictability that can be established may prove to be the difference maker in defusing an escalating nuclear crisis.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
From Senator Roland W Burris**

**“From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations”
Tuesday, July 7, 2009**

1. In your written testimony, you stated that the Pakistani government finds itself in a paradoxical situation on whether to implement a level of secrecy or physical security when it comes to their weapons storage sites. What recommendations have we given to the Pakistani military regarding the security of their nuclear arsenal and how can we assess the threat of insiders gaining access to sensitive information?

I am not in position to comment on the substance of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on nuclear security. But, generally speaking, the Pakistani authorities have consciously opted for fewer and less visible signs of physical security in order to enhance the secrecy of locations where they are storing nuclear weapons. Pakistani authorities have apparently calculated that this trade off will enhance the overall security of its arsenal by reducing the possibility that outsiders will be able to identify and attack nuclear storage sites. In the event such locations are compromised by an insider working with extremists, however, a reduced reliance of physical barriers – guns, gates and guards- could make it easier to facilitate access to a weapon by extremists. Consequently, Pakistan must restrict access to its most reliable cadre concerning the most sensitive information on nuclear weapons, such as where they are stored, when and where they are moved, and how they are deployed. In order to be effective, compartmentalization of information must be rigorous and access must be limited to as few personnel as possible; the authorities must

also continuously monitor those with special access to ensure they are loyal and harbor no sympathies with extremists.

2. Your written testimony stated that there has been a dramatic expansion of insurgent activity in Pakistan over the last two years that has increased the chance of extremists' ability to both recruit and place insiders within the Pakistani nuclear and/or security establishments. What steps are being taken by U.S. and Pakistani officials to make sure this doesn't happen?

Again, I cannot comment on U.S.-Pakistani nuclear security cooperation. The most likely source of a security breach in any nuclear state would result from outsiders working with insiders in nuclear facilities to access nuclear weapons and/or materials. Thus, human reliability programs that help ensure the integrity and loyalty of the work force are paramount in ensuring there is no breach of security. A successful program to mitigate the insider threat entails the implementation of measures such as special security training, an investment in investigative capabilities, development of tailored personnel assessment tools, threat awareness training for the nuclear work force, and an effective counterintelligence effort. It is also important to eliminate motivations for insiders to collaborate with violent extremists, e.g., antipathy towards the US.