[Senate Hearing 111-]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2009
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
2009 ANNUAL REPORT
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ANNUAL REPORT
2009
=======================================================================
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
----------
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman
Chairman MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
MAX BAUCUS, Montana MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California DAVID WU, Oregon
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BOB CORKER, Tennessee DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director
Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Preface.......................................................... 1
General Overview................................................. 3
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations......................... 8
Findings and Recommendations................................. 8
Political Prisoner Database.................................. 40
II. Human Rights................................................. 44
Freedom of Expression........................................ 44
Worker Rights................................................ 68
Criminal Justice............................................. 88
Freedom of Religion.......................................... 110
Ethnic Minority Rights....................................... 144
Population Planning.......................................... 151
Freedom of Residence......................................... 161
Status of Women.............................................. 165
Human Trafficking............................................ 172
North Korean Refugees in China............................... 177
Public Health................................................ 181
Climate Change and Environment............................... 190
III. Development of the Rule of Law.............................. 203
Civil Society................................................ 203
Institutions of Democratic Governance........................ 208
Commercial Rule of Law....................................... 217
Access to Justice............................................ 232
IV. Xinjiang..................................................... 243
V. Tibet......................................................... 270
VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau.......................... 300
VII. Endnotes.................................................... 310
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
2009 ANNUAL REPORT
Preface
The Chinese Government has made economic development a
priority, and lifted millions of people out of poverty, but
Chinese Government policies and practices continue to violate
the rights of Chinese citizens, and fall far short of meeting
international standards. The Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, which formally was established in 2000 by the
legislation that granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) as China prepared to enter the World Trade Organization
(WTO), is mandated by law to monitor human rights, worker
rights, and the development of the rule of law in China, as
well as to maintain a database of information on Chinese
political prisoners--individuals who have been imprisoned for
exercising their civil and political rights protected under
China's Constitution and laws or under China's international
human rights obligations.
When China entered the WTO in 2001, the Chinese Government
made commitments that were important not only for China's
commercial development in the international marketplace, but
also for the development of the rule of law at home. These
commitments require that the Chinese Government ensure
nondiscrimination in the administration of measures that are
trade related, and publish promptly all laws, regulations,
judicial decisions, and administrative rulings relating to
trade. WTO accession and the Chinese Government's years of
preparation for accession provided the impetus for many changes
to China's legal system over the past two decades. Those
changes, some of which have been significant, still have not
produced a national legal system that is consistently and
reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. The
Communist Party rejects the notion that the imperative to
uphold the rule of law should preempt the Party's role in
guiding the functions of the state. As this report shows, the
Chinese Government's repressive tendencies at home undermine
the credibility of its stated international commitments to
create a more open society that provides greater respect for
human rights, worker rights, transparency, and the rule of law.
The development of a stable China firmly committed to the
rule of law and citizens' fundamental rights is in the national
interest of the United States. Those rights include the
freedoms of speech, assembly, association, religion, and other
rights protected under China's Constitution and laws or under
China's international human rights obligations. To ensure a
positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China
relationship, China's leaders must demonstrate genuine
commitment, not just in words but in deeds, to promoting the
development of the rule of law, human rights, and transparency
in no less measure than they have prioritized economic
development.
The imperative to uphold the rule of law, human rights, and
transparency could not be more relevant than it is with respect
to planned expansion of bilateral cooperation on climate change
recently announced by the United States and China. The United
States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on
July 28 that elevates cooperation on climate change in the
relationship between the two countries and expands bilateral
cooperation to accelerate the transition to a sustainable, low-
carbon global economy. In the pursuit of such a goal, the
integrity of scientific data and technical information must be
preserved, free from censorship or manipulation for political
or other purposes. Researchers, engineers, and scientists
engaged in international collaborative projects must be free
from concern about whether the information they share with a
research partner today will be declared a state secret
tomorrow, and whether they will face prosecution as criminals
as a result. To maximize the potential for progress on climate
change, Chinese officials must engage as allies, and not
repress, environmental whistleblowers, a vigilant press, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights lawyers.
Recently announced goals for U.S.-China cooperation and top-
level business collaboration on clean technology can only be
achieved if accompanied by reliable and consistent enforcement
of intellectual property rights in China.
This report documents, in each of its sections, the
challenges and opportunities that exist for China to create a
more open society with greater respect for human rights,
transparency, and the rule of law. The report also demonstrates
the importance of the Commission's Political Prisoner Database,
a unique, powerful, and publicly available resource on which
the Commission relies for advocacy and research work, including
the preparation of this Annual Report. The human rights issues
underlying political imprisonment and detention are numerous.
Instances of human rights violations and resulting imprisonment
form a pattern of systematic repression--the Chinese Government
should demonstrate its commitment to international standards by
reversing this pattern.
The Commission intends that the detailed contents of this
report may serve as a roadmap for progress. By documenting
human rights violations in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database, by advocating in meetings with
Chinese officials on behalf of political prisoners, by raising
public awareness of human rights and rule of law issues, and by
placing these issues on the agendas of bilateral and
multilateral meetings, the United States Government establishes
a baseline for measuring progress. Some of those who supported
establishing permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China
in 2000 believed that PNTR would improve the prospects that the
Chinese Government would fulfill its commitments to
international human rights standards--but the Chinese
Government has yet to live up to those commitments. Holding the
Chinese Government accountable to its international commitments
and to its own laws, when those laws meet international
standards, is an essential element of the roadmap for progress.
As the United States and China engage in bilateral and
multilateral dialogues, the Commission urges Members of the
U.S. Congress and Administration officials to monitor carefully
Chinese Government positions and actions on issues critical to
developing the rule of law, promoting transparency, and
protecting human rights. The Chinese Government, for example,
issued a National Human Rights Action Plan in 2009 that uses
the language of human rights to cast an ambitious program for
promoting the rights of its citizens. In meetings with Chinese
officials, Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration
officials should inquire about the Chinese Government's
progress in translating words into action and securing genuine
improvements for its citizens as set forth in the plan. To that
end, this Annual Report and the information available on the
Commission's Web site, www.cecc.gov, provide an abundance of
resources.
General Overview
The Commission observed continuing human rights abuses and
stalled development of the rule of law in China during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year (October 2008 to October
2009). The level of repression increased in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibetan areas of China, as did
the level of harassment of human rights lawyers and advocates,
and restrictions on Chinese reporters. Repression of religious
adherents continued. Across the areas the Commission monitors,
these general themes emerged:
(1) Chinese leaders' increasing preoccupation with
maintaining what they deem to be ``social stability'';
(2) more pronounced deficiencies in checks on state
power, and in some cases the government's undoing of
existing checks;
(3) the reversal of some trends toward greater
transparency of and predictability in the legal system;
and
(4) greater Chinese Government and Communist Party
sophistication in co-opting the language of human
rights and the rule of law to shape perceptions of
China's record on these issues.
Maintaining Stability
The frequency of mass protests in China during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year attracted attention throughout
China and worldwide. Party leaders considered 2009 to be a
sensitive year and set an even greater priority on maintaining
social stability. As a result, central and local governments
increased public security budgets and expanded mechanisms
charged with ``stability maintenance work.'' Offices charged
with ``stability maintenance'' focused on developing ``early
warning systems'' for social instability and expanding networks
of ``informants'' at local levels.
Many protests were triggered when workers, farmers and
other rural residents, or urban residents turned to laws and
regulations to defend their interests against those of
businesses, allegedly corrupt government officials, or both.
Many such disputes resulted, for example, from complaints
against industrial pollution, worker grievances, property
disputes, uneven development, and wealth inequality. Citizens'
appeals often included calls for fair and just government
mediation. In some instances, more powerful and well-funded
economic players took measures to cause the harassment and
intimidation of local protesters. Local government officials in
many cases justified taking police action against protesters by
asserting that doing so helped to promote ``economic
development'' and ``defend social order.'' Police action
against protesters in the name of maintaining order and
``stability above all else'' came to international attention in
the past year as authorities forcefully suppressed a
demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July
5, a day which also marked the start of violent clashes and
attacks in the city.
The lack of adequate rule of law at the local level
contributed to channeling social pressures toward
administrative and Party officials for management or
resolution, instead of through the judicial system. When
economic disputes became protests, protesters often called on
government officials to intervene on their behalf. The
performance evaluation of officials, however, in part is based
on the successful preemption or suppression of mass protests
and petitioning as well as on achieving economic development
targets. Such measures of government performance work against
addressing the root causes of citizens' protests and against
resolving disputes in a fair manner. Even though empowering the
courts to fulfill their constitutional and lawful purpose would
serve citizens' interests, officials fail to empower the
courts. Government and Party officials are reluctant to bend to
the rule of law, and the leadership fears that full
implementation of the rule of law could unleash social forces
that are beyond the capacity of the courts to control.
Checks on State Power
Deficiencies in institutional and legal restraints on state
power became more pronounced during the Commission's 2009
reporting year. Serious abuses of fundamental human rights
resulted in part from the weakness or absence of basic
protections available to citizens through legal process. Even
when procedural protections exist on paper, insufficient
safeguards are in place to guarantee their implementation. For
example, China's lower courts frequently seek instructions from
higher courts before issuing decisions. This system of
``instruction on request'' undermines the fundamental purpose
of the appellate process, and serves as an impediment to the
development of administrative and judicial decisions supported
by statements of legal reasoning. That, in turn, negatively
impacts the public's faith in the integrity of legal
institutions. During the 2009 annual session of the National
People's Congress, delegates introduced a bill aimed at
abolishing ``instruction on request.'' The shortcoming,
therefore, is not that officials have failed to identify the
problem, or that a viable solution is out of reach. Rather,
officials do not empower lower courts for the reasons noted
above: the Party's unwillingness to bend to the rule of law,
and the fear of unleashing social forces that are beyond the
capacity of courts to control.
Even when laws on the books are well crafted, abuses arise.
The presumption of guilt permitted under Chinese criminal law--
especially in ``politically sensitive'' cases--confounds
defense attorneys' attempts to present evidence of innocence,
to provide evidence that a defendant committed a lesser crime,
or otherwise to mount an effective defense. To uphold the
Chinese Government's domestic and international commitments to
adhere to legal procedure, China needs a community of legal
scholars and lawyers well trained in procedural law to
represent citizens--even in ``sensitive'' cases. This report
documents that China has such lawyers, but local judicial
bureaus and lawyers associations have denied a number of them
renewal of their professional licenses. Absent adequate legal
and institutional constraints on state power, government
authorities and unofficial personnel continued during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year to monitor unlawfully and
subject to periodic illegal home confinement social activists,
dissidents, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and
their family members. Such unlawful activity increased during
sensitive periods, such as during the 20th anniversary of the
Tiananmen protests.
Predictability of the Legal System
The impetus for much of China's legal reform in the past
two decades was its preparation for accession to the World
Trade Organization in December 2001. Those changes, while
significant, have not produced a national legal system that is
consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and
predictable. The Communist Party rejects the notion that
upholding the rule of law should preempt the Party's role in
guiding the functions of the state.
The ``crime'' of disclosing state secrets exemplifies the
limitations on the rule of law. Broad categories of information
may be classified as state secrets, including information
related to ``economic and social development.'' Officials use
this discretion to punish citizens for attempting to expose
official abuse of power. For example, in 2005 officials
sentenced Shi Tao, a journalist, to serve 10 years in prison
for exposing a directive from propaganda officials concerning
restrictions on media coverage of the 15th anniversary of the
June 1989 Tiananmen protests. Officials had designated the
directive ``top secret.'' Individuals charged with illegally
disclosing state secrets may mount a defense against the
charge, but they cannot legally challenge the decision that
classified the information as a state secret. A draft revision
of the Law on Guarding State Secrets that the National People's
Congress published for public comment earlier this year leaves
broad criteria for classifying information as a ``state
secret'' intact.
Even in the domain of commercial law, developments over the
past year have shown how business disputes and commercial
issues may have real consequences for human rights when the
Chinese Government or Party perceives its interests to be
threatened. The case of Rio Tinto, an Australian mining
corporation whose employees Chinese authorities reportedly
detained initially on allegations of possible violations of
state secrets laws, and later on accusations of violating laws
on commercial secrecy, is an example.
Extralegal detention remains a serious problem that
endangers the legitimacy and predictability of the legal
system, and violates a number of basic human rights. Chinese
citizens, including petitioners, peaceful protesters, and
individuals deemed ``undesirable'' by authorities, remain
subject to arbitrary detention in extralegal detention
facilities such as secret jails and ``law education classes.''
Some are held for nonmedical reasons in psychiatric hospitals.
Authorities' use of unlawful detention varies periodically--it
increases prior to significant events and anniversaries--and
from area to area.
Shaping Perceptions
Chinese Government and Party officials displayed during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year greater sophistication in co-
opting the language of human rights and the rule of law to
shape perceptions of China's record on these issues. The
soaring influence of China's Internet and a greater focus on
competing with international media in reporting on China have
shaped the Party's strategy of control. The Chinese Government
and Communist Party's official media expedite reporting on some
events in order to influence mass media coverage. At the same
time, the government increases censorship of unofficial
information channels, such as the Internet. International
journalists working in China face fewer restrictions than their
domestic Chinese counterparts, but they continue to meet with
harassment and their ability to function as an effective
alternative to official ``spin'' sometimes is limited.
The Chinese Government continued to soften some rhetoric
toward religion by articulating a ``positive role'' that
religious communities in China should fulfill, but the
government's language casts for religion the duty to build
support for state economic and social goals. Officials and
central government directives continued to warn against foreign
groups ``using religion'' to ``interfere'' in China's
``internal'' affairs and to ``sabotage'' the country. The
government continued to use legal measures to restrict rather
than protect the religious freedom of Chinese citizens. Parents
and guardians faced restrictions on their right to pass on
religious education to children, and children remain subject to
restrictions on their right to exercise the freedom of
religion. The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens
the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts. The
government permitted and, in some cases, sponsored the social
welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious communities,
but in the past year, authorities also took steps to block some
social welfare activities by unregistered religious groups.
The government has in the past year used institutional,
educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan
Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations.
Chinese officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing
determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure
Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved
by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to
discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into
a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy have
resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of
religion and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet.
In an apparent effort to shift attention from policy
shortcomings in China, and to appeal to international support,
authorities blamed a demonstration by Uyghurs in the XUAR
capital of Urumqi on July 5 and strife in the region starting
that day on the ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and
religious extremism. Authorities also accused U.S.-based Uyghur
rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer of orchestrating events on July
5--a charge she denied--and launched a media campaign to
portray family members denouncing her.
China's global reach and expanding economy provide the
government an array of international levers to penalize
governments and organizations that criticize the Chinese
Government's human rights record, as well as channels to reward
international entities that support the government's positions,
or who choose to remain silent. China's actions related to
Darfur and Sudan, and China's reported surveillance and
intimidation of non-governmental organizations, religious and
spiritual adherents, and international activists may be
understood, at least in part, in this context.
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations
Findings and Recommendations
A summary of findings follows below for each area that the
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's mandate, submits
a set of recommendations to the President and the Congress for
legislative or executive action.
freedom of expression
Findings
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year,
Chinese officials continued to target for punishment or
harassment citizens who peacefully expressed political
dissent or who advocated for human rights, including
those who voiced concern that the Chinese Government
had not adequately investigated the cause of school
collapses following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake,
those who sought to express support for Charter 08 (a
document calling for political reform and greater
protection of human rights), and those who spoke out
about alleged official misconduct. Officials treated
such activity as a threat to national security,
charging citizens with the crime of ``inciting
subversion,'' or treated such activities as
``defamation.'' Officials ordered other citizens to
serve time in reeducation through labor, a form of
administrative detention without trial. Local officials
also abused police power, subjecting citizens to
surveillance and interrogation, warning them not to
speak to news media, taking citizens into custody, and
restricting their freedom of movement.
The government and Communist Party continued
to apply a system of censorship and regulation of the
news media and publishing industry that violates
international human rights standards for free
expression. Top Chinese officials continued to
emphasize the media's subservient relationship to the
government and Party. Party and government officials
continued to punish journalists and news media (for
example, by suspending publication) and to rely on
prior restraints on publishing, including licensing and
other regulatory requirements, to restrict free
expression. Officials continued to view news media
commercialization as serving official over public
interests. They have expressed a desire to create a
more market-friendly media to facilitate the spread of
propaganda and China's ``soft power.''
The government continued to promote a limited
watchdog role for journalists and to support raising
professionalism among journalists, but emphasized
political loyalty as an important criterion.
The increasing influence of China's Internet
and a greater focus on competing with international
media for reporting on China have led the Party to
adapt its strategy of control by expediting the release
of official reporting of some events in order to shape
mass media coverage, while at the same time increasing
censorship of nonofficial channels of information.
Foreign journalists reporting in China face
fewer restrictions than domestic journalists but they
still face harassment.
While the Internet continued this past year to
serve as a limited, but important, outlet for
individual expression and criticism of government
policies, the Chinese Government's regulation of the
Internet and other electronic communications continued
to violate international standards for free expression.
Officials continued to shut down or block
access to domestic and foreign Web sites based on those
sites' political or religious content. Chinese
authorities and companies offering Internet content in
China continued to monitor, filter, and remove
political and religious content from the Internet.
Officials this past year also sought to
strengthen their ability to monitor Internet users'
online expression. They introduced and then backed away
from a requirement that all computers in China be sold
with pre-installed censorship software found to filter
political and religious content and monitor individual
computer behavior. Officials also began forcing news
Web sites to require new users to provide their real
name and identification number in order to post a
comment.
Officials continued this past year to describe
campaigns to remove content as aimed at ``vulgar'' or
pornographic content, but guidance issued by the
government included political content as well.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise concerns with Chinese officials about
their government punishing peaceful expression and
preventing citizens from accessing information the
government deems sensitive for political and religious
reasons, under the guise of protecting national
security or minors from pornography. Remind Chinese
officials they are within their rights under
international human rights standards to restrict
freedom of expression to protect minors and national
security, but that those standards also provide
important limitations on such power.
Support U.S. Government programs that
encourage Chinese journalists to visit the United
States for professional development and training on a
wide range of topics, from the practice of journalism
at U.S. news media and legal protections for
journalists in the United States, to the role of the
media in American society, history, and culture, and
how courts decide cases involving Internet restrictions
and freedom of expression. The Chinese Government has a
stated interest in increasing the professionalism of
Chinese journalists, and officials have both likened
their Internet restrictions to purported similar
policies in the United States, while also saying that
the news media in China should learn more from the
United States.
Take steps to increase awareness by the
American public and international community of the
Chinese Government and Communist Party's controls over
their own media and their subsidy of Chinese media
expansion overseas, and urge China to allow
international news media freer access in China. The
Chinese Government has committed 45 billion yuan
(US$6.6 billion) to subsidize the overseas development
of central government and Party-controlled media such
as People's Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV in order to expand
the nation's soft power.
Support U.S. Government programs that make
available Chinese-language how-to guides on, for
example, how to create a blog or how to access human
rights Web sites. Support programs for both
technologies and strategies that address problems
implicit with China's online censorship, as well as
effective means of making such technologies and
strategies widely accessible and known by Chinese
citizens.
Support funding for Radio Free Asia and Voice
of America news reporting and multi-dialect and multi-
language broadcasting to China so that Chinese citizens
have access to uncensored information about events in
China and worldwide.
Solicit input from U.S. Government agencies,
non-governmental organizations, and private companies
on best practices and possible legislation in order to
ensure American companies are promoting free expression
in China, and also consult similar initiatives being
undertaken by other countries, including the European
Union. The Chinese Government's recent effort to
require all computer makers, including those based in
the United States and other countries, to include
filtering software that blocks political and religious
content in all computers sold in China, is a reminder
that Chinese officials continue to seek ways of co-
opting technology companies in assisting in online
censorship.
In official correspondence with Chinese
counterparts, include statements calling for the
release of political prisoners named in this report who
have been punished for peaceful expression, including:
Tan Zuoren (earthquake activist facing charges of
inciting subversion), Huang Qi (earthquake activist
facing charges of possessing state secrets), Liu Xiaobo
(prominent intellectual and signer detained in
connection with Charter 08), and other prisoners
included in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
worker rights
Findings
Workers in China still are not guaranteed
either in law or in practice full worker rights in
accordance with international standards, including, but
not limited to, the right to organize into independent
unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the
Communist Party, is the only legal trade union
organization in China. All lower-level unions must be
affiliated with the ACFTU. While the ACFTU has become
more active, focusing on unionization of foreign-funded
firms and organization of migrant workers, and pushing
the expansion of collective contracts, the ACFTU
continues to be dominated by the Communist Party with
its overarching political concerns of social stability
and economic growth.
Labor strife increased during the Commission's
2009 reporting year. With the economic crisis, Chinese
workers have increased pressure on the Chinese
Government to force employers to pay wages in a timely
manner, improve working conditions, and comply with new
labor legislation. Labor conflict occurred on a larger
scale and was often more organized and more legalistic
than in the previous reporting year. Workers were also
increasingly strategic in their escalation of strike
activity, often moving quickly from shopfloor disputes
to public demonstrations to press for local government
intervention in a workplace dispute.
Despite legislative activity in recent years
that increased legal protections for workers, in the
wake of the global economic crisis, the government is
now focused on maintaining employment, often to the
detriment of implementation and enforcement of the new
labor codes. Local implementation measures for new
labor laws that took effect in 2008 (i.e., the PRC
Labor Contract Law, PRC Employment Promotion Law, and
PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) are
concentrated in the south and southeast. Many of these
local measures are emanating from the judicial system
rather than from local legislative or administrative
units. Many of these judicial guiding opinions and
measures are focused on addressing unemployment and
investment flows.
With the large increase in labor disputes
since 2008, the government has put increased emphasis
on extrajudicial dispute resolution and flexibility in
resolution procedures, especially encouragement of
mediation at lower levels and cooperation between
levels of government (e.g., cooperation between
province and city, city and county, etc.) to limit the
social and political impact of large-scale disputes.
Proactive local governments have passed
regulations that offer special incentives to firms that
mitigate layoffs. At the same time, they are also
compensating workers in the wake of enterprise
shutdowns and bankruptcies.
Informalization of the Chinese labor force
accelerated this year as firms adopted measures to
reduce the costs of formal employees. Widespread use of
subcontracted workers and temporary workers continues.
Informal workers often suffer substandard working
conditions, nonpayment of wages, and exclusion from
social insurance programs.
The central and local governments continued
work on social insurance reform, especially national
legislation to set broad goals and local legislation
and policy that expand social insurance to rural
migrants and increase the ``portability'' of social
insurance benefits for mobile workers.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support projects promoting legal reform
intended to ensure that labor laws and regulations
reflect international norms. Prioritize projects that
do not focus only on legislative drafting and
regulatory development, but that ensure that
implementation produces outcomes for workers that
reflect real improvements, and measure progress in
terms of compliance with international norms at the
grassroots.
Support projects that enhance the
professionalization of the dispute resolution process,
including training of ACFTU officials, lawyers, human
resource managers, arbitrators, and mediators.
Prioritize programs that target the enhancement of the
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the
dispute resolution process.
Continue to support multi-year pilot projects
that showcase the experience of collective bargaining
in action for both Chinese workers and ACFTU officials.
Where possible, prioritize programs that demonstrate
the ability to conduct collective bargaining pilot
projects even in factories that do not have an official
union presence.
Support the production and distribution in
various formats (print, online, video, etc.) of
Chinese-language how-to materials on conducting
elections of worker representatives and collective
bargaining.
Support projects that prioritize the large-
scale compilation and analysis of Chinese labor dispute
litigation and arbitration cases, leading ultimately to
the publication and dissemination of Chinese-language
casebooks that may be used as a common reference
resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers,
employers, unions, and law schools in China.
Support capacity-building programs to
strengthen Chinese labor and legal aid organizations
involved in defending the rights of workers.
Support projects that enhance the labor
inspection process in China. Prioritize projects that
involve multiple actors, including labor and legal aid
organizations and ACFTU officials, as well as
representatives of the media and government officials.
criminal justice
Findings
Extralegal detention remains a serious
problem. Chinese citizens, including petitioners,
peaceful protesters, and other individuals considered
to be ``undesirable'' by authorities, continue to be
arbitrarily detained in extralegal detention
facilities, such as ``black jails,'' ``law education
classes,'' and psychiatric hospitals for nonmedical
reasons.
Government authorities and unofficial
personnel persisted in unlawfully monitoring and
subjecting to periodic illegal home confinement certain
groups, including activists, dissidents, religious
adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family
members, particularly during sensitive periods, such as
the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen protests.
The rights of criminal suspects and defendants
continued to fall far short of the rights guaranteed in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
as well as rights provided for under China's Criminal
Procedure Law and Constitution.
While the revised Lawyers Law reportedly has
led to some improved access to detained clients in
certain jurisdictions, lawyers continued to confront
obstacles in meeting with their clients, particularly
in politically sensitive cases. Some suspects and
defendants in sensitive cases were not able to have
counsel of their own choosing; some were compelled to
accept government-appointed defense counsel.
The Chinese Government released its first-ever
human rights action plan in April, which contains
encouraging policy commitments with respect to, among
other things, fair trial rights and detainee rights.
There was a spate of unnatural deaths in
detention centers during the first few months of 2009,
which prompted the Supreme People's Procuratorate to
launch an investigation and review of management in
China's detention centers.
Although it is unlawful under Chinese law to
obtain confessions and other evidence through torture,
such evidence is nonetheless admissible in criminal
trials. The Supreme People's Procuratorate announced in
August that it was planning to issue a regulation
providing that confessions obtained through torture
would no longer be admissible in death penalty cases.
In June, Beijing municipality announced that
by the end of 2009 it would cease executing prisoners
by gunshot, but instead would use lethal injections.
The Supreme People's Court indicated that eventually
all executions nationwide will be carried out by lethal
injection.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Raise with Chinese officials the issue of
black jails and other secret detention facilities, and
press the Chinese Government to adopt the
recommendation of the UN Committee against Torture to
investigate and disclose the existence of such
facilities, as a first step toward abolishing such
forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese
Government to extend an invitation to the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit China.
Call on the Chinese Government to provide the
international community with a specific timetable for
its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which it signed in 1998.
Urge the Chinese Government to amend its
Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced
protections and rights for lawyers and detained
suspects contained in the revised Lawyers Law, and
ensure its effective implementation.
Ask the Chinese Government what measures it is
taking to ensure that the laudable policy commitments
with respect to fair trial rights and detainee rights
contained in its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action
Plan are translated into laws and regulations, and what
steps it will take to ensure their successful
implementation.
Urge Chinese officials to take all necessary
measures to guarantee that evidence obtained through
torture or other illegal means is inadmissible in all
criminal trials.
freedom of religion
Findings
The Chinese Government continued during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year to strictly control
religious practice and repress religious activity
outside of state-approved parameters. Local governments
implemented measures to prevent ``illegal'' religious
gatherings and to curb other ``illegal'' religious
activities, in some cases destroying sites of worship
and detaining or imprisoning religious believers.
In the past year, government efforts to
discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan
Buddhism into a doctrine that promotes government
positions and policy escalated, resulting in continuing
Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai
Lama's return to Tibet. Buddhist communities outside
the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism also faced continued
government controls, and unregistered Buddhist temples
remained subject to closure and demolition by
government authorities. Catholic bishops in China's
unregistered church community remained in detention, in
home confinement, under surveillance, in hiding, or in
unknown whereabouts, while authorities strengthened
rhetoric on the state-controlled Catholic church's
independence from the Holy See. The government
maintained its longstanding ban against the Falun Gong
spiritual movement and other religious and spiritual
groups deemed to be cults, subjecting some members to
detention, imprisonment, and other abuses. Repression
of Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) worsened as authorities strengthened security
campaigns targeting ``religious extremism,'' and
outside the XUAR, the government also maintained broad
controls over the practice of Islam. The government
continued to subject registered Protestant
congregations to tight state control over their
internal affairs and officials continued to target some
unregistered Protestant churches for closure and to
harass, detain, or imprison some church leaders and
members. Authorities maintained restrictions over the
activities of registered Taoist priests, and
unregistered Taoist priests were subject to penalties
for failing to submit to state control. Other religious
and spiritual communities remained without legal
recognition to practice their faith.
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year,
the government also continued to use legal measures to
restrain, rather than protect, the religious freedom of
all Chinese citizens. Children faced continued
restrictions on their right to freedom of religion, and
parents and guardians faced restrictions on their right
to impart a religious education to their children. The
Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the
freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts. The
government permitted, and in some cases, sponsored, the
social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious
communities, but in the past year, authorities also
took steps to block some social welfare activities by
unregistered religious groups.
The Chinese Government and Communist Party in
the past year continued to affirm basic policies of
control over religious practice. Authorities continued
to soften some rhetoric toward religion by articulating
a ``positive role'' for religious communities in China,
but used this sentiment to bolster support for state
economic and social goals. At the same time, officials
and central government directives continued to warn
against foreign groups ``using religion'' to
``interfere'' in China's affairs and ``sabotage'' the
country.
The Chinese Government's legal and policy
framework for religion violates the protections for
freedom of religion set forth in Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and other international human rights
instruments. Although the PRC Constitution guarantees
that all citizens enjoy ``freedom of religious
belief,'' it limits citizens' ability to exercise their
beliefs by protecting only ``normal religious
activities,'' a vaguely defined term in both law and
practice that has been used as a means to suppress
forms of religious activity protected under
international human rights law. Although the national
Regulation on Religious Affairs and local government
regulations provide a measure of protection for some
religious activities, such protection is limited in
scope and applies only to state-sanctioned religious
communities.
Chinese officials harassed, detained, and in
some cases, physically abused attorneys who defended
practitioners of the banned spiritual movement called
Falun Gong and members of unregistered Protestant
churches. The Commission observed cases of procedural
irregularities and violations in criminal cases
involving religious practitioners.
The Communist Party's 6-10 Office, an
extralegal security force created to enforce the ban
against Falun Gong, also actively targeted other banned
groups deemed by the government to be ``cult
organizations,'' including groups of Protestant and
Buddhist origin. The Commission documented various
efforts by the 6-10 Office to suppress these groups,
including propaganda campaigns, surveillance and
intelligence operations, as well as detentions and
imprisonment.
Despite creating space for some citizens to
practice their religion within government-approved
parameters, where some, but not all, Chinese citizens
are allowed to do so, and where members of China's five
government-sanctioned religious communities remain
subject to tight controls over their affairs, the
Chinese Government has failed in its obligation to
protect Chinese citizens' right to freedom of religion.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese Government to remove its
policy framework of recognizing only select religious
communities for limited government protections and to
guarantee to all citizens freedom of religion in
accordance with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Call for the release of Chinese citizens
confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for
pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including
the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such
prisoners include Jia Zhiguo (unregistered Catholic
bishop whom authorities detained in March 2009 in
connection with his religious activities independent of
the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association),
Phurbu Tsering (Tibetan Buddhist teacher and head of a
Tibetan Buddhist nunnery whom authorities brought to
trial in April 2009 on a weapons charge his lawyers
said involves coerced confession and insufficient
evidence), Shi Weihan (bookstore owner and Protestant
house church leader sentenced in 2009 to three years in
prison for illegal operation of a business after
authorities accused him of illegally printing and
distributing Bibles), Xu Na (detained for possessing
documents and computer disks containing Falun Gong
materials and sentenced in 2008 to three years in
prison for ``using a cult organization to undermine the
implementation of the law''), Yusufjan and Memetjan
(university students who are members of a Muslim
religious group and were detained in May when members
of the group met on a university campus), as well as
other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the
Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
Support non-governmental organizations that
collect information on conditions for religious freedom
in China and that inform Chinese citizens of methods to
defend their right to freedom of religion against
Chinese Government abuses.
Support organizations that can provide
technical assistance to the Chinese Government in
drafting legal provisions that protect, rather than
restrain, freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens.
ethnic minority rights
Findings
The Chinese Government continued during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year to implement policies
that undermine ethnic minority citizens' rights. The
government repressed expressions of ethnic identity
perceived to challenge government authority, especially
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas, and the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. While the Chinese
Government maintained some protections in law and
practice for citizens it designates as ethnic
minorities, shortcomings in the substance and
implementation of Chinese policy continued to prevent
ethnic minorities from exercising their rights in line
with domestic law and international human rights
standards. Ethnic minorities did not enjoy ``the right
to administer their internal affairs,'' as provided for
under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. [See
Xinjiang--Findings, and Tibet--Findings in this section
for additional information.]
In the aftermath of demonstrations in 2008 and
2009 by Tibetans and Uyghurs that highlighted systemic
problems in state policies toward ethnic minorities and
ethnic issues, the central government continued to
attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while
asserting the effectiveness of government policies and
amplifying publicity in their support.
In the past year, the government continued to
implement development policies that prioritize state
economic goals over protecting ethnic minorities'
rights and guaranteeing ethnic minority participation
in decisionmaking processes. It also continued in the
past year to impose controls over how individuals and
communities define their ethnicity, interpret their
history, and preserve their culture and language.
Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region continued to implement measures that undermine
Mongol traditions and livelihoods and punish people who
defend Mongols' rights or who express dissent.
The Chinese Government pledged to increase
protection for the rights of ethnic minorities in its
2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP).
While the HRAP outlines measures to support
legislation, governance, education, personnel training
and employment, language use, and cultural and economic
development among ethnic minorities, domestic and
overseas observers have questioned the likely impact of
the HRAP amid the Chinese Government's poor human
rights record, including in the area of ethnic
minorities' rights.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Fund rule of law programs and exchanges that
raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different
models for governance that protect ethnic minorities'
rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy
over their affairs.
Support non-governmental organizations'
efforts to continue or develop programs that address
ethnic minority issues within China, including training
programs that build capacity for sustainable
development among ethnic minorities, programs to
protect ethnic minority languages and cultural
heritage, and programs that research rights abuses in
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Call on the Chinese Government to release
people confined, detained, or imprisoned for advocating
for the rights of ethnic minority citizens, including
Mongol rights advocate Hada (serving a 15-year sentence
after pursuing activities to promote Mongols' rights
and democracy) and other prisoners mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Support organizations that can monitor the
Chinese Government's compliance with stated commitments
to protect ethnic minorities' rights, including the
commitments articulated in the government's 2009-2010
National Human Rights Action Plan. Provide support for
organizations that can provide assistance in
implementing programs in a manner that draws on
participation from communities involved and ensures the
protection of their rights.
population planning
Findings
The Commission found increasing evidence,
including from official sources, that Chinese
authorities continue to employ compulsory abortion and
sterilization as an official policy instrument on a
large scale in over a third of China's provincial-level
jurisdictions. In some areas, authorities specifically
targeted migrant workers for forced abortions.
In some areas, government campaigns to force
women with ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies to undergo
abortion or sterilization procedures reportedly
included government payments to informants. Some local
governments also linked job promotion with an
officials' ability to meet or exceed population
planning targets. Officials received points on their
performance evaluations for overseeing abortions of
``out-of-plan'' pregnancies.
The demographic impact of China's population
planning policies continues to manifest, most notably
in the country's highly skewed sex ratio. A study
published in the British Medical Journal estimates that
in 2005, there was an excess of 32 million males under
the age of 20 in China. The study primarily attributes
this ``imminent generation of excess males'' to the
practice of sex-selective abortion.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge Chinese officials to cease coercive
measures, including forced abortion and sterilization,
to enforce birth control quotas. Urge the Chinese
Government to dismantle coercive population controls,
while supporting programs that inform Chinese officials
of the importance of respecting citizens' diverse
beliefs.
Urge Chinese officials to release Chen
Guangcheng, imprisoned in Linyi city, Shandong
province, after exposing forced sterilizations, forced
abortions, beating, and other abuses carried out by
Linyi population planning officials.
Call on Chinese officials to permit greater
public discussion and debate concerning population
planning policies and to demonstrate greater
responsiveness to public concerns. Impress upon China's
leaders the importance of promoting legal aid and
training programs that help citizens pursue
compensation and other remedies against the state for
injury suffered as a result of official abuse related
to China's population planning policies. Provisions in
the PRC Law on State Compensation provide for such
remedies for citizens subject to abuse and personal
injury by administrative officials, including
population planning officials. Support the development
of programs and international cooperation in this area.
freedom of residence
Findings
The Chinese Government continued to enforce
the household registration (hukou) system it first
established in the 1950s. This system limits the right
of Chinese citizens to choose their permanent place of
residence. Regulations and policies that condition
legal rights and access to social services on residency
status have resulted in discrimination against rural
hukou holders who migrate to urban areas for work.
Authorities continued to relax certain hukou
restrictions for Chinese citizens who met specific
requirements. National-, provincial-, and municipal-
level hukou measures enacted this past year aimed to
promote employment amid the current economic downturn,
but excluded most migrant workers who did not have a
college education or special skills.
The government continued to impose certain
restrictions on Chinese citizens' right to travel that
violated international human rights standards.
Authorities placed a number of Chinese activists under
home confinement and surveillance. Some Chinese
citizens were prevented from leaving mainland China,
while other Chinese individuals were prevented from
entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
In international discussions on internal
migration, highlight the role played by China's
household registration system.
Support programs and organizations that defend
migrant workers' rights and encourage policy debates on
household registration system reforms.
Call on the governments of the Hong Kong and
Macau Special Administrative Regions to cease the
practice of denying entry to Chinese democracy
activists or dissidents from overseas.
status of women
Findings
Chinese officials continued to pursue policies
that aim to protect women's rights. China's sexual
harassment and domestic violence-related legal
framework saw further improvements.
The Chinese Government's implementation of
some domestic laws and policies related to women's
rights continued to fall short of international
standards. Problems such as lack of transparency and
control over information flows have impeded some of the
government's efforts to fulfill these commitments.
Gender inequalities continue to be reflected
in women's low levels (relative to men) of political
participation, unequal access to education, limited
access to healthcare, and relatively weaker protection
of property and inheritance rights.
Gender-based discrimination in China in areas
such as wages, recruitment, retirement age, and sexual
harassment remains, but the government has made efforts
to eliminate gender-based discrimination and promote
women's employment.
The differences in mandatory retirement ages
for men and women in China continue to impede the
career advancement of some women, especially those in
senior positions and women with higher educational
levels. The lower compulsory retirement age for women
also contributes to hiring discrimination. Currently,
retirement ages for male and female government and
Party officials are 60 and 55, respectively, while
retirement ages for male and female workers in general
are 60 and 50, respectively.
Hainan province became the first province to
require that courts at all levels establish a collegial
panel of judges dedicated to the protection of women's
rights.
Recommendation
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs in China that remove barriers
to educational opportunities for girls, especially in
rural areas; that raise awareness among judicial and
law enforcement personnel regarding domestic violence,
sexual harassment, and sexual violence; and that expand
women's leadership training through U.S.-China
exchanges and international conferences.
human trafficking
Findings
The legal definition of trafficking under
Chinese law does not conform to international
standards. Under Article 240 of the PRC Criminal Law,
the trafficking of persons is defined as ``abducting,
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending,
or transferring a women or child, for the purpose of
selling the victim.'' This definition is narrower in
scope than the definition provided in Article 3 of the
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which China
has not yet signed. According to the U.S. Department of
State's 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP
Report), China's definition ``does not prohibit non-
physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage,
involuntary servitude, forced labor, or offenses
committed against male victims'' and ``does not
automatically regard minors over the age of 14 who are
subjected to the commercial sex trade as victims.''
China remains a country of origin, transit,
and destination for human trafficking and abductions.
The majority of trafficking cases are domestic and
involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced
labor, and forced marriage.
Although the majority of trafficking cases
take place within China's borders, human traffickers--
also called snakeheads--continue to traffic Chinese
women and children from China to locations overseas,
including to Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the
Middle East, and North America.
Women and girls from foreign countries,
including North Korea, Vietnam, and Burma, continue to
be trafficked into China, and forced into marriages,
employment, and sexual exploitation.
The Chinese Government made some efforts to
eliminate trafficking and comply with trafficking-
related international human rights standards.
Authorities during the past year continued to
investigate, prosecute, and prevent trafficking crimes,
especially domestic trafficking cases, and those
involving the abduction of women for forced marriage or
commercial sexual exploitation. Officials also
continued to take steps to increase international
cooperation and improve China's anti-trafficking legal
framework.
The State Council issued the National Plan of
Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children
(2008-2012) (NPA) in December 2007. In March 2009, 29
ministries, central government offices, and Party
organizations jointly issued implementation regulations
for the NPA. The NPA and several similar provincial-
level implementation plans and opinions issued in 2008
and 2009 focus mainly on women and children.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese Government to sign and ratify
the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
to revise the government's definition of trafficking,
to create a comprehensive anti-trafficking law to align
with international standards, and to abide by its
international obligations with regard to North Korean
refugees who become trafficking victims.
Support legal assistance programs that
advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chinese
trafficking victims.
Call on the Chinese Government to provide more
services for trafficking victims, particularly for
Chinese citizens trafficked for labor exploitation and
trafficked abroad.
Support international and cross-border
mechanisms that can help enhance the Chinese
Government's collaboration with other countries,
regions, and international organizations on victim
identification, repatriation, and criminal prosecution.
north korean refugees
Findings
Central and local authorities sustained
efforts to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean
refugees hiding in China. Trafficking of North Korean
women along the Chinese border into forced marriages
and the sex industry continued in the Commission's 2009
reporting year. The Chinese Government refuses to
provide North Korean trafficking victims with legal
alternatives to repatriation.
Chinese local authorities near the border with
North Korea continued to deny access to education and
other public goods for the children of North Korean
women married to Chinese citizens. Chinese Government
officials contravened guarantees under the PRC
Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC Compulsory
Education Law (Article 5) by refusing to register the
children of these couples to their father's hukou
(household registration) without proof of the mother's
status.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Establish a task force to examine and support
the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to
gain unfettered access to North Korean refugees in
China, and to recommend a strategy for creating
incentives for China to honor its obligations under the
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol by desisting from the forced
repatriation of North Korean refugees, and terminating
the policy of automatically classifying all
undocumented North Korean border crossers as ``illegal
economic migrants.''
Urge Chinese officials to ensure that
household registration, and the public goods such as
access to education that registration provides, are
promptly granted to children born to North Korean women
in cohabitation with Chinese citizens, in accordance
with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC
Compulsory Education Law (Article 5).
public health
Findings
The Chinese Government launched a 10-year
medical reform plan, which includes promises for reform
in the areas of medical insurance, pharmaceuticals,
public health services, and public hospitals.
Discrimination and social stigma against
people living with medical conditions such as
infectious disease, physical disability, and mental
illness remain commonplace.
Chinese non-governmental organizations and
individual advocates continue to play an important role
in raising awareness about medical conditions and the
rights of those living with them; however, Chinese
authorities continue to suppress health-related
activism.
Individuals with varying medical conditions
continued to bring employment discrimination lawsuits
under antidiscrimination provisions in the PRC
Employment Promotion Law that took effect in 2008.
Due to insufficient public health services in
rural areas and a lack of government transparency and
public awareness regarding disease outbreaks, China's
rural population has proved to be particularly
vulnerable to the spread of hand-foot-mouth disease,
tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other infectious diseases
this year.
The Chinese Government's efforts to prevent
and control the spread of influenza A(H1N1)--commonly
referred to as ``swine flu''--have prompted discussion
about changes in its handling of disease outbreaks.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the Chinese Government to ease
repression of health-related activism by individuals
and non-governmental organizations and provide more
support to U.S. organizations that address public
health issues in China.
Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on
effective implementation of the PRC Employment
Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit
discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS,
hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses in hiring and in
the workplace.
Urge the Chinese central government to work
with local governments to ensure effective
implementation of the healthcare reform plan. Local
government cooperation is critical in achieving the
projected goal of healthcare access for the entire
population by the year 2020.
climate change and environment
Findings
In 2007, China surpassed the United States to
become the world's top emitter of carbon dioxide. While
President Hu Jintao has stated that China will
``endeavor to cut carbon dioxide emissions per unit of
GDP by a notable margin by 2020 from the 2005 level,''
the Chinese Government has not agreed to carbon
emission caps. A top Chinese climate change policymaker
reportedly recently indicated that China's carbon
emissions may continue to rise until 2050. At the same
time, the Chinese Government has initiated a wide range
of measures, especially to improve energy efficiency
and lower energy intensity, the amount of energy
expended per unit of gross domestic product. In
addition, the Chinese Government actively has sought
investment from developed countries for projects
related to the Clean Development Mechanism that can
provide ``carbon credits'' to developed countries that
have agreed to emission reduction targets in
international agreements.
Weaknesses in China's environment-related
implementation and enforcement capacity will pose
significant challenges to efforts to improve energy
efficiency and transform its economy into a ``low-
carbon economy.'' In addition, China's capacity
reliably to measure, report, and verify its greenhouse
gas mitigation actions remains uncertain.
Limitations on citizen access to information,
including pollution and related data, hinder efforts to
raise environmental awareness, promote public
participation, and develop incentives for compliance.
Limits on access to remedies for environmental harms,
selective enforcement, limited public participation in
decisionmaking processes, and selective suppression of
citizen demands for a cleaner environment also weaken
compliance efforts and contribute to citizen
dissatisfaction. Party and government officials have
continued to implement policies restricting the
operations of many NGOs.
The priority attached to economic development
has led to compliance challenges that hinder the
realization of some of the government's environmental
protection goals. Lack of accountability, corruption,
local governmental protectionism, and malfeasance
impede implementation and enforcement.
Without adequate procedural protections,
implementation of environmental and climate change
mitigation policy may place the rights of vulnerable
groups, including the rural poor and ethnic minorities,
especially nomadic herders, at risk. Hydroelectric dam
construction, for example, has been accompanied by lack
of attention to environmental impact assessment
processes mandated by law, and by reports of the
infringement upon the fundamental rights of local
populations. Planned rapid acceleration of the pace of
development of nuclear and hydroelectric projects
heightens these concerns going forward. China's planned
efforts to increase carbon sequestration in grassland
areas shines an additional spotlight on the need to
guarantee the rights of nomadic herders who inhabit
those areas.
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year,
official sources reported environmental protection
successes, including the continued decline of sulfur
dioxide emissions and chemical oxygen demand.
Regulatory and institutional developments included
issue of the Planned Environmental Impact Assessment
Regulation, the introduction of environmental pollution
liability insurance on a trial basis, the establishment
of ``environmental courts'' in a few cities on a trial
basis, the establishment of environmental ``police''
(environmental protection sub-bureaus within the public
security bureaus) on a trial basis, and some limited
progress toward the development of a ``public interest
litigation'' system. The announcement of a draft PRC
Tort Liability Law may in the future improve China's
framework for environment-related compensation suits.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support U.S. Government cooperation with China
and other educational programs geared toward raising
awareness among Chinese officials of how to implement
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and
environmental protection policies effectively without
at the same time transgressing on fundamental rights.
Call upon the Chinese Government to cease
punishing citizens, such as Wu Lihong and Sun Xiaodi,
for their grassroots environmental activism, or for
their utilizing official and institutionalized channels
to voice their environmental grievances or to protect
their rights.
Support U.S. Government engagement with
relevant ministries in developing China's capacity to
reliably measure, report, publicize, and verify
emission reduction strategies and techniques. Encourage
Chinese officials to make government and expert
research reports regarding climate change and its
impacts in China public and easily available.
Invite domestic environmental civil society
organizations and urge the Chinese Government to invite
Chinese environmental civil society organizations as
participants or observers in bilateral and multilateral
climate change and environmental protection projects
and dialogues. Invite Chinese local-level leaders,
including those from counties, townships and villages,
to the United States to observe U.S. public policy
practices and approaches to problem solving. Engage
local Chinese officials in their efforts to reconcile
development and environmental protection goals. Call
upon U.S. cities with sister-city relationships in
China to incorporate environmental rights awareness,
environmental protection, and climate change components
into their programs. When making arrangements for
travel to China, request meetings with officials from
central and local levels of the Chinese Government to
discuss environmental governance and best practices.
Support multilateral exchanges regarding
environmental enforcement, environmental insurance,
criminal prosecution of serious environmental
infringements, and public interest litigation
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen
environmental impact assessment processes and citizen
participation in those processes.
Establish a Working Group on Climate Change
Policy Implementation, the Rule of Law, and Human
Rights in accordance with Section II(B) of the
Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on
Climate Change, Energy and Environment between the
Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China (the MOU)
signed during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue held in July 2009. (Section II(B) of the MOU
states that, ``[t]he Participants may establish working
groups or task forces involving relevant ministries as
necessary to support the objectives of the Climate
Change Policy Dialogue and Cooperation.'')
civil society
Findings
The Chinese Government continued to control
civil society in China in ways that contravene
international standards. Chinese citizens who sought to
establish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
organize around issues deemed by officials to be
sensitive faced obstacles, and officials in some cases
intimidated, harassed, and punished NGOs and citizen
activists.
NGOs continue to face challenges fulfilling
registration requirements. NGOs that do not fulfill
these requirements are left vulnerable to official
pressure and bereft of legal protection.
The number of NGOs participating in legal and
policymaking activities in areas that are not
politically sensitive continues to increase gradually.
At the same time, NGOs and individuals who work on
politically sensitive issues continue to face
challenges.
In 2009, at least one locality (Beijing)
reportedly passed measures stipulating that NGOs based
in the area will no longer need to obtain a sponsor
organization when applying for government registration.
In place of the sponsorship requirement, 10 city-level
government-organized NGOs will manage Beijing-based
NGOs legally registered with and approved by the
Beijing city government.
In July, Beijing officials fined and then shut
down Open Constitution Initiative (OCI)--a Beijing-
based academic research and legal assistance
organization, and detained two of its employees,
including the center's cofounder and legal
representative, Xu Zhiyong. OCI was well known for
taking on cutting-edge legal issues and cases, such as
its investigation into the cause of the Tibetan
protests and rioting in March 2008. Also in July,
officials reportedly targeted Beijing Yirenping Center,
an NGO that works to raise awareness about public
health risks and eliminate discrimination against those
who carry certain diseases.
Volunteer activities related to the May 2008
Sichuan earthquake reportedly have dissipated, and
government officials have accused some volunteers of
``stirring up protests'' by victims' families.
Several recent natural disasters, including
the snowstorm in southern China in early 2008 and the
May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, contributed to an
unprecedented spike in charitable giving. The
government's limited capacity to handle and manage
these donations, particularly during the months after
the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, exposed flaws in
China's charity system and resulted in public demands
for charity reform.
In December 2008 and February 2009, the
Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of
Taxation, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued
circulars detailing new qualifications for legally
registered NGOs to obtain tax-exempt status. Under the
new guidelines, provincial-level governments and the
central government will be in charge of verifying and
approving the tax-exempt status of government-
registered NGOs.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Strengthen U.S. Government support of public-
private partnerships involving governments, businesses,
media, and communities that will build social networks
for NGOs and individuals and cultivate social
entrepreneurship in China.
Develop a comprehensive strategy consistent
with U.S. foreign assistance policy to bolster the U.S.
Agency for International Development's activities in
China.
Take measures to facilitate the participation
of Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in
relevant international conferences and forums, and
support training opportunities in the United States to
build their leadership capacity in non-profit
management, public policy advocacy, strategic planning,
and media relations.
institutions of democratic governance
Findings
The Communist Party continues to exercise
control over political affairs, government, and society
through networks of Party committees, which exist at
all levels in government, legislative, judicial, and
security organs; major social groups (including
unions); enterprises; and the People's Liberation Army.
Chinese leaders made repeated public
statements emphasizing the leading role of the Party,
the need to adhere to China's unique style of
``socialist democracy,'' and the impossibility of
implementing ``Western-style'' democracy with a
separation of powers and competing political parties.
Isolated experiments with intra-party democracy are
taking place around the country with high-level
Communist Party support.
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year,
the Party created additional organizations to
``maintain social stability.'' The Party expanded in
2009 the number of ``stability maintenance offices''
and ``stability maintenance work leading groups''
across the country at the central, provincial,
municipal, county, township, and neighborhood levels,
and even in some enterprises.
Village elections measures continued to
expand, and Chinese legislators included revising the
PRC Organic Law on Villagers' Committees in the
National People's Congress Standing Committee's five-
year legislative agenda. Problems continue to plague
village elections, and corruption at the village level
remains a concern.
In 2009, some Chinese Government agencies and
other state institutions continued efforts to implement
the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI
Regulation). Open government information regulations
and high-level efforts to increase accountability and
transparency at the local level, in principle, have the
potential to improve government openness, but
implementation has been problematic.
Public hearings and other processes appear to
offer some opportunities for public engagement.
Questions remain regarding the depth and breadth of
participation, and the process of compiling, assessing,
and incorporating public input is still not
transparent.
Citizens and social groups were proactive in
expressing demands for democratic reforms and human
rights protections to be undertaken by the Party and
Chinese Government, but these requests were repeatedly
met with official reprisal, including harassment,
detention, and in some cases, prison sentences.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support programs that aim to reduce corruption
in people's congress and village committee elections,
including expansion of domestic election monitoring
systems.
Support projects that seek to work with local
governments in their efforts to improve efficiency,
transparency, and accountability, especially efforts to
expand and improve China's open government information
initiatives.
Support projects that assist local
governments, academics, and the non-profit sector in
expanding the use of public hearings and other channels
for citizens to incorporate their input in the
policymaking process.
Call on the Chinese Government to release
people detained or imprisoned for exercising their
right to call for political reform within China,
including Liu Xiaobo (signer of Charter 08 who was
formally arrested on June 23, 2009, on the charge of
``inciting subversion of state power'') and other
people mentioned in this report and in the Commission's
Political Prisoner Database.
commercial rule of law
Findings
The Chinese Government's uneven implementation
of the commitments it has made pursuant to its
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) continues to prompt serious concern. The WTO, in
a report dated August 12, 2009, found that certain
Chinese regulations that restrict foreign companies and
Chinese-foreign joint ventures from importing or
distributing products such as books, DVDs, and music,
as well as from importing films for theatrical release,
violate China's international trade obligations. In
another case, the WTO ruled in July 2008 that China's
tariffs on auto parts imports violated WTO rules. On
August 28, China announced that it will scrap the
higher tariffs starting September 1, 2009. Beyond the
context of China's WTO commitments, additional concerns
arose this year in areas such as food and product
safety, telecommunications regulation, intellectual
property, and economic crime. Developments in these
areas overshadowed limited improvements in areas such
as contract enforcement, insurance, and antimonopoly.
Numerous cases of Americans suffering broken
commercial contracts in China, incurring significant
financial losses, have been brought to the Commission's
attention. At the same time, however, the Commission
also noted indications of some limited improvement in
the environment for judicial enforcement of commercial
contracts, at least in large urban areas of China. In
addition, during the Commission's 2009 reporting
period, contract enforcement received attention from
central judicial authorities in the form of a new
Interpretation Related to Questions Arising in
Connection With Implementation of the PRC Contract Law
(Interpretation), issued by the Supreme People's Court.
The Interpretation pushes lower courts to enforce oral
contracts, and also is aimed at preventing local courts
from dismissing form contracts out of hand. In a
further development related to contract enforcement, on
March 30, 2009, the Supreme People's Court also made
available to the public a nationwide database of
judgment debtors. The online, searchable database lists
all defendants against whom people's courts have issued
orders to pay outstanding money damages or other
compensation for nonperformance of specific acts. The
database creates incentives for debtors to comply with
executable judgments issued by Chinese courts and also
may reduce the costs that companies incur when
assessing potential business partners and acquisition
targets. The information available in the database also
may be used by companies doing due diligence
evaluations.
Recent detentions of business executives of an
Australian mining company have drawn an international
spotlight on economic crimes and the criminalization of
commercial disputes in China. The range of economic
crime in China is broad, and business disputes in China
frequently become subject to criminal law enforcement.
Product quality and food safety emergencies
continued to prompt changes in Chinese law. The new PRC
Food Safety Law, enacted by the National People's
Congress on February 28, 2009, and effective as of June
1, 2009, aims to consolidate the regulatory and
legislative landscape governing food safety and product
quality. The impact of the law as yet is unclear as it
will depend not only on the effectiveness of
implementation and enforcement, but also on the
thoroughness with which regulatory authorities specify
standards, timeline, budgets, and dispute resolution
procedures, and on China's ability--as yet unproven--to
develop local revenue sources and local expertise to
hire and train qualified inspectors and regulators in
sufficient numbers with requisite credentials.
Notwithstanding international criticism of
China's control of the Internet (including the
controversy surrounding the Chinese Government's
proposed mandatory preinstallation of Green Dam
Internet filtering software on personal computers sold
in China [See Section II--Freedom of Expression]), the
Chinese Government also used regulation of the
telecommunications industry to control the transmission
and dissemination of online content that the government
and Party deem to be potentially detrimental to
themselves, or to national unity, territorial
integrity, social order, or stability. This was
illustrated in the past year via the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology's issue of Measures
for the Administration of Permission To Provide
Telecommunications Services, which took effect on April
10, 2009.
In December 2008, the National People's
Congress passed amendments to the PRC Patent Law
(Amendments) that took effect on October 1, 2009, and
are intended to encourage domestic innovation. The
Amendments contain provisions for compulsory licensing
(i.e., requiring patent holders to license patents to
others) that foreign patent experts have found
troubling. Under the Amendments, compulsory licensing
decisions turn on vague standards such as
``sufficient'' use of patents and ``proper
justification'' for patent holders' decisions, and the
amendments expand the potential for broad official
discretion that could undermine intellectual property
protections.
The PRC Insurance Law was revised in February
2009 and took effect October 1, 2009. If it is
effectively enforced, the revised law would provide for
stricter oversight of insurers by the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission, and for a number of protections
for policyholders. The revised law also includes
provisions intended to contribute to the stability of
the macroeconomy. The revisions require strict
separation between the insurance sector and other
finance-related sectors, namely banking, securities,
and trusts. In addition, insurers may not concurrently
engage in the personal insurance business and the
property insurance business. The law also introduces
qualification requirements for directors, supervisors,
senior management, and actuarial personnel of insurance
companies. The revised law also requires insurance
companies to establish internal compliance and
reporting systems.
Enforcement of the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML)
has lagged as the three enforcement authorities, the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce, National
Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), have devoted efforts to developing
AML implementing regulations. This delay has led some
parties alleging anticompetitive behavior to bring
private cases directly to courts rather than to the
administrative enforcement authorities. As enforcement
authorities issue implementing guidelines, however, the
number of complaints filed with administrative
enforcement authorities is expected to rise. Even
though courts offer a forum for grievances at the
present time, they do not necessarily possess the
requisite investigatory and regulatory capacity to
dispose of the cases that already have been brought.
For this reason, while private actions offer a channel
for grievances now, experts on Chinese antimonopoly law
do not expect the cases that already have been accepted
by the courts to move quickly or to produce landmark
judicial decisions.
MOFCOM is the enforcement authority
responsible for the premerger review process under the
AML. MOFCOM's solicitation of third party views from
government entities, customers, trade groups, and
competitors appears to have become an integral part of
MOFCOM's premerger review process, a move ostensibly
intended, at least in part, to address concern about
the possibility of decisions made based on non-
objective factors. MOFCOM's review and much publicized
denial of the proposed Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger in the
past year provides one illustration of MOFCOM premerger
review processes.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support joint U.S.-China training programs and
legal exchanges aimed at addressing problems
anticipated in China's implementation of compulsory
licensing provisions in its newly amended Patent Law.
Encourage bilateral discussions between U.S. and
Chinese officials to address and resolve market access,
legal, and other policy concerns arising from the
amended Patent Law. Involve experts in fields where the
threat to intellectual property rights posed by the new
amendments is particularly acute (e.g., biotechnology).
Develop and support U.S.-China legal
cooperation programs aimed at increasing incentives for
Chinese farmers and food production companies to
control quality at the grassroots. That is, support and
develop U.S.-China legal cooperation programs aimed at
improving individuals' access to China's existing
system of private civil litigation providing improved
access to counsel, legal aid, and access to channels
for injured parties to take legal action against
offending parties.
Call upon the Chinese Government to improve
China's systems for obtaining damages so that food
product companies found to be in violation of food
safety laws face a real threat of bankruptcy.
Encourage the Chinese Government to establish
programs that help build the institutional foundations
for producers in China to acquire reputations for
safety and quality, which in turn would reinforce
market-driven incentives to maintain higher quality in
production and improved supply-chain management over
the longrun.
access to justice
Findings
Conditions for China's human rights lawyers
worsened this year. Public security officials and those
working under their direction increasingly used
abductions, physical violence, or threats of physical
violence to harass and intimidate human rights lawyers.
Authorities revoked the licenses of at least 21 human
rights lawyers. The academic research and legal
assistance organization Open Constitution Initiative
(OCI), or Gongmeng, was shut down for alleged tax
problems. Authorities detained law professor and
cofounder of OCI, Xu Zhiyong, for several weeks for
alleged tax evasion, before releasing him on bail.
Social stability was a major concern during
this reporting year, and ``mass incidents'' were
reportedly on the rise. Chinese authorities sought to
strengthen institutions and measures to handle mass
incidents.
In explaining the decline in Administrative
Litigation Law cases during the first half of 2009
compared with the same time period in 2008, the Supreme
People's Court acknowledged that citizens lack
confidence in the courts to fairly resolve disputes
involving government officials.
The xinfang (``letters and visits'') system is
an alternative to courts by which citizens can seek
redress for grievances by submitting petitions to
relevant authorities. However, the system's lack of
accountability at the local level caused many
petitioners not to obtain relief for their grievances,
and large numbers have been harassed, abused, put in
illegal black jails, locked up in psychiatric
hospitals, or sent to reeducation through labor. The
central government adopted measures that sought to
improve the handling of ``letters and visits,'' and to
discourage citizens with grievances from traveling to
Beijing to obtain redress through central-level
institutions.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
In meetings and official correspondence with
Chinese officials, express concern about the revocation
of at least 21 human rights attorneys' licenses this
year, and the closure of the academic research and
legal assistance organization Open Constitution
Initiative (OCI). Request that the lawyers' licenses be
reinstated and that OCI be permitted to continue its
work.
Support non-governmental organizations and
other entities that partner with China's human rights
lawyers and non-profit legal organizations. Provide
additional support to bring more Chinese human rights
lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States
on the International Visitors Leadership Program and
other similar programs.
Support non-governmental organizations that
address human rights issues confronting petitioners in
China, and which also aim to build capacity among
petitioners to protect their lawful rights. Urge the
Chinese Government to protect the rights of petitioners
to lawfully air their grievances.
Express concern to Chinese authorities over
treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders
to reexamine the incentive structures at the local
level that lead to the forced return of petitioners
from higher administrative levels and the stifling of
citizen expressions of legitimate grievances.
Communicate concerns about possible official
political abuse of psychiatry and politically motivated
commitment of petitioners to psychiatric facilities in
China to the American Psychiatric Association, the
Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry, the World Medical
Association, and the World Psychiatric Association
(WPA). Concerns should be raised at the regional WPA
meeting in Beijing in September 2010.
Call for the release of lawyers, activists,
and others who are incarcerated, subject to unlawful
home confinement, or who have disappeared for their
activities to defend and promote the rights of Chinese
citizens, including Hu Jia, Gao Zhisheng, and Zheng
Enchong, as well as other prisoners mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
xinjiang
Findings
Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year. A demonstration held
by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on July 5,
2009, was forcefully suppressed by police, and
outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day,
drew an international spotlight to longstanding
tensions in the XUAR and Uyghurs' grievances toward
government policies that have undermined the protection
of their rights. The ensuing harsh security crackdown
in the XUAR--including reports of arbitrary detention
targeting Uyghurs and steps to punish acts of peaceful
protest--further underscored longstanding government
repression in the region and the use of anti-crime and
anti-terrorism campaigns to quell dissent. Prior to the
July 5 demonstration, however, human rights conditions
in the region had already declined throughout the year,
maintaining a trend in worsening conditions documented
by the Commission in its 2008 Annual Report.
Authorities continued in late 2008 and in 2009
to tighten repressive security controls and use them to
stifle dissent and independent expressions of ethnic
and religious identity, especially among Uyghurs. The
Chinese Government also maintained, and in some cases
bolstered, policies in areas such as language use,
labor, and migration that continued to disadvantage
Uyghurs and other non-Han populations in the XUAR and
engineer broad cultural, economic, and demographic
shifts in the region.
Acts of deadly violence took place during the
week of July 5, a time during which both Uyghurs and
Han Chinese were reported to commit violent assaults on
each other. However efforts to prosecute people appear
to have extended beyond acts of violence and include
political motivations in some cases, targeting dissent
by Uyghurs. In the aftermath of the July 5
demonstration and strife in the region, the Chinese
Government reiterated pledges to place ``stability
above all else'' and called for ``striking hard''
against people involved in ``instigating'' and
``organizing'' events on July 5. Against the backdrop
of a criminal law system in which authorities have used
criminal charges to cast free expression as a crime, it
appears that some acts of peaceful protest or
expression may be subject to formal criminal
prosecution. While security measures are reported to
remain tight in the region, a number of details and the
full implications of the government response to events
on July 5 remain unknown, especially in light of
government controls over the free flow of information
on the events.
The Commission also observed problems in the
past year including state-sanctioned discriminatory job
recruitment practices, abusive practices in state-led
labor transfer and work-study programs, procedural
violations in the criminal justice system and unique
barriers to access to justice for non-Han ethnic
groups, the intensification of educational policies
that marginalize the use of Uyghur and other languages
besides Mandarin Chinese, and the maintenance of harsh
policies toward Uyghur refugees and other individuals
returned to China under the sway of China's influence
in other countries. In addition, in the past year, the
government began to destroy a cornerstone of the
Uyghurs' cultural heritage and undermined their
property rights through a project implemented in the
city of Kashgar to demolish most buildings in a
historic area and resettle residents.
The government sharpened rhetoric throughout
the year against U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate
Rebiya Kadeer and ``Western hostile forces'' using the
``cover'' of human rights to ``sabotage'' the XUAR's
stability, calling into question the government's
willingness to engage with the international community
in upholding its obligations to protect the rights of
XUAR residents. Government rhetoric against Rebiya
Kadeer heightened in July as authorities claimed that
Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress, which she
leads, instigated strife on July 5. Authorities did not
produce evidence that proved their accusations, and
Rebiya Kadeer has rejected the charges against her.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Support legislation that expands U.S.
Government resources for raising awareness of human
rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for
increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human
rights.
Raise concern about human rights conditions in
the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of
antiterrorism and security campaigns to suppress human
rights. Stress that protecting the rights of XUAR
residents is a crucial step for securing true stability
in the region. Call on the Chinese Government to
demonstrate a commitment toward dialogue on human
rights issues by ending rhetoric against ``Western
infiltration'' and slander against peaceful Uyghur
rights advocates.
Call for the release of Uyghurs imprisoned for
advocating for their rights or for their personal
connection to rights advocates, including: Nurmemet
Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in prison after
writing a short story); Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and
Mutellip Teyip (two young men detained in December 2008
after distributing leaflets on the Xinjiang University
campus calling on students to organize a public
demonstration); Ekberjan Jamal (sentenced in 2008 to 10
years in prison for ``splittism'' and revealing state
secrets, after he used his cell phone to make audio
recordings of public demonstrations and sent the
recordings to friends overseas); and Alim and Ablikim
Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer,
sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison,
respectively, for alleged economic and ``secessionist''
crimes), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this
report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner
Database.
Especially in light of events of July 5,
stress to Chinese officials the importance of: abiding
by the guarantees for freedoms of speech, assembly, and
association contained in the PRC Constitution,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
distinguishing between acts of peaceful protest and
acts of violence, and not treating peaceful protest as
a crime; providing details about each person detained
or charged with a crime, including each person's name,
the charges (if any) against each person, the name and
location of the prosecuting office (i.e.,
procuratorate) and court handling each case, and the
name of each facility where a person is detained or
imprisoned; ensuring that security officials fulfill
their obligations under Articles 64(2) and 71(2) of the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law to inform relatives or
workplaces where detainees are being held; ensuring
criminal suspects are able to hire a lawyer and
exercise their right to employ legal defense in
accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law and are able to employ legal defense of
their own choosing; allowing access by diplomats and
other international observers to the trials of people
charged with crimes connected to events on July 5; and
allowing international observers and journalists full
and unfettered access to all areas of the XUAR.
Support non-governmental organizations that
address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them
to continue to gather information on conditions in the
region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase
their capacity to preserve their rights and protect
their culture, language, and heritage. Support the
efforts of media outlets that broadcast news to the
XUAR and gather news from the region, such as Radio
Free Asia (RFA) and the Voice of America (VOA), to
expand their capacity to report on the region and to
provide uncensored information to XUAR residents.
Support legal programs in the XUAR to promote
rule of law and train legal personnel, including those
able to meet the legal needs of XUAR residents who
speak languages other than Mandarin Chinese. Urge
scholarship programs that operate in China, including
those in law-related subjects, to increase outreach to
students from the XUAR.
Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees with
Chinese officials and with officials from international
refugee agencies and from transit or destination
countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on Chinese
officials and officials from transit or destination
countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee
designations of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
and the refugee and citizenship designations of other
countries. Call on transit and destination countries to
abide by requirements in the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees and Convention against Torture on
refoulement.
Call on Chinese Government officials to abide
by the government's domestic and international
commitments to protect cultural heritage within its
borders, including by protecting the right of Uyghurs
to preserve their cultural heritage and property.
Provide support for organizations that can directly
assist Uyghurs in the documentation and preservation of
their cultural heritage.
tibet
Findings
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year,
the Chinese Government and Communist Party strengthened
the policies and measures that frustrated Tibetans
prior to the wave of Tibetan protests that started in
March 2008. Tibetans continued to express their
rejection of Chinese policies by means that included
staging political protests. As a result of Chinese
Government and Party policy and implementation, and
official campaigns to ``educate'' Tibetans about their
obligations to conform to policy and law that many
Tibetans believe harm their cultural identity and
heritage, the level of repression of Tibetans' freedoms
of speech, religion, assembly, and association
increased further.
The environment for the dialogue between the
Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Government and
Party officials continued to deteriorate: both sides
have referred to the dialogue as having stalled. The
principal results of the eighth round of formal
dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and
Party officials were the Dalai Lama's envoys' handover
of a detailed memorandum explaining Tibetan proposals
for ``genuine autonomy,'' the Party's rejection of the
memorandum, and the Party's continued insistence that
the Dalai Lama fulfill additional preconditions on
dialogue.
The government has in the past year used
institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda
channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their
religious views and aspirations. Chinese officials
adopted a more assertive tone in expressing
determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to
pressure Tibetans living in China to accept only a
Dalai Lama approved by the Chinese Government.
Escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai
Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine
that promotes government positions and policy has
resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for
freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama's return to
Tibet.
The government pressed forward with a Party-
led development policy that prioritizes infrastructure
construction and casts Tibetan support for the Dalai
Lama as the chief obstacle to Tibetan development. The
government announced a major new infrastructure
program--the ``redesign'' of Lhasa--that is scheduled
for completion in 2020, the same year that the
government plans to have ready for operation several
new railways traversing sections of the Tibetan
plateau. The Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist
Party and the Minister of Railways discussed in May
2009 accelerating the construction of railways that
will access the TAR. Confrontations between Tibetans
and Chinese Government and security officials resulted
in 2009 when Tibetans protested against natural
resource development projects.
The government and Party crackdown on Tibetan
communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and
workplaces following the wave of Tibetan protests that
began on March 10, 2008, continued during 2009.
Security measures intensified in some Tibetan areas
during a months-long period that bracketed a series of
three sensitive anniversaries and observances in
February and March 2009. As a result of increased
government security measures and harsh action against
protesters, Tibetan political protests in 2009 were
smaller and of briefer duration than the protests of
March and April 2008. The Commission's Political
Prisoner Database contained as of September 2009 a
total of 670 records of Tibetans detained on or after
March 10, 2008--a figure certain to be incomplete--for
exercising rights such as the freedoms of speech,
religion, assembly, and association.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Urge the Chinese Government to move beyond the
current stalled condition of the dialogue with the
Dalai Lama or his representatives. A Chinese Government
decision to engage the Dalai Lama in substantive
dialogue can result in a durable and mutually
beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and
improve the outlook for local and regional security in
the coming decades.
Convey to the Chinese Government the urgent
importance of respecting Tibetan Buddhists' right to
the freedom of religion through measures that include:
ceasing aggressive campaigns of ``patriotic education''
that compel Tibetans to endorse state antagonism toward
the Dalai Lama and increase stress to local stability;
allowing Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate
religious teachers in a manner consistent with their
preferences and traditions; and using state powers such
as passing laws and issuing regulations to protect
Tibetans' religious freedom instead of remolding
Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
Continue to urge the Chinese Government to
allow international observers to visit Gedun Choekyi
Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai Lama recognized,
and his parents.
In light of the heightened pressure on
Tibetans and their communities in the period following
March 2008, increase support for U.S. non-governmental
organizations to develop programs that can assist
Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully
protect and develop their culture, language, and
heritage; that can help to improve education, economic,
health, and environmental conservation conditions of
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and
that create sustainable benefits without encouraging an
influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. Support
funding for Radio Free Asia and Voice of America news
reporting and multi-dialect broadcasting to the Tibetan
areas of China so that Tibetans have access to
uncensored information about events in China and
worldwide.
Encourage the Chinese Government to take fully
into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when
the government plans infrastructure and natural
resource development projects in the Tibetan areas of
China. Encourage the Chinese Government to engage
appropriate experts in assessing the impact of such
infrastructure and natural resource development
projects, and in advising the government on the
implementation and progress of such projects.
Continue to convey to the Chinese Government
the importance of distinguishing between peaceful
Tibetan protesters and rioters, honoring the PRC
Constitution's reference to the freedoms of speech and
association, and not treating peaceful protest as a
crime. Request that the Chinese Government provide
complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or
sentenced with protest-related crimes.
Continue to raise in meetings and
correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of
Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the
peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative
examples include: former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now
serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing
leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-
Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub
(sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets);
reincarnated lama Bangri Chogtrul (serving a sentence
of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for
``inciting splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag
(sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting
political slogans at a public festival).
hong kong and macau
Findings
In January 2009, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Chief Executive Donald Tsang
announced his decision to defer the public consultation
on electoral methods in 2012 until the fourth quarter
of 2009, citing the preeminence of ``tackling economic
and livelihood concerns.'' Tsang's decision appears to
echo the Chinese central government's focus on economic
matters over political reform this year as well.
Several pro-democracy legislators protested against
Tsang's decision, accusing him of using the economic
downturn as an excuse to delay universal suffrage.
The Macau Special Administrative Region passed
a National Security Law in February 2009 which
criminalizes, as well as stipulates prison terms for,
treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft of
state secrets, and association with foreign political
organizations that harm state security. Citizens have
reported concern that vague language in the law leaves
it open for abuse by officials, and point to the March
2009 barring of Hong Kong pro-democracy lawmakers,
academics, and activists from entering Macau as an
example of such abuse.
Recommendations
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials
are encouraged to:
Call on the government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to advance the progress
of electoral reform and avoid further delaying the goal
of election by universal suffrage in Hong Kong.
Call on the government of the Macau Special
Administrative Region to review its policy of
restricting the entry of lawmakers, scholars,
journalists, and activists into Macau.
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 16 to
1.
Political Prisoner Database
Recommendations
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration
officials are encouraged to:
Check the Political Prisoner Database (http://
ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on
one prisoner, or on groups of prisoners. Consult a
prisoner's database record for more detailed
information about the prisoner's case, including his or
her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials
have violated, stage in the legal process, and location
of detention or imprisonment, if known.
Advise official and private delegations
traveling to China to present Chinese officials with
lists of political and religious prisoners compiled
from database records.
Urge U.S. state and local officials and
private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-
city relationships with China to explore the database,
and to advocate for the release of political and
religious prisoners in China.
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY
The Commission's Annual Report provides information about
Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the context of
specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the
abuses result from the Communist Party and government's
application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the
Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly available online
database maintained by the Commission, for its own advocacy and
research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report,
and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of
information about political and religious prisoners for Members
of Congress and Administration officials.
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-
specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this
Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at http://
ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available
at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)
The PPD has served, since its launch in November 2004, as a
unique and powerful resource for governments, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and individuals
who research political and religious imprisonment in China, or
advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The most important
feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine
database and uses a powerful query engine. Though completely
Web based, it is not an archive that uses a simple or advanced
search tool, nor is it a library of Web pages and files.
The PPD received approximately 30,700 online requests for
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending July 31,
2009. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning in
late 2004, approximately 30 percent of the requests for
information have originated from U.S. Government (.gov)
Internet domains, 16 percent from commercial (.com) domains, 15
percent from network (.net) domains, 12 percent from
international (e.g., .fr, .ca) domains, 2 percent from
education (.edu) domains, 2 percent from non-profit
organization (.org) domains, 2 percent from Arpanet (.arpa)
domains, and 1 percent from international treaty organization
(.int) domains. Approximately 20 percent of the requests have
been from numerical Internet addresses that do not provide
information about the name of an organization or the type of
domain.
POLITICAL PRISONERS
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on
their areas of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective
analysis of information about individual prisoners, and about
events and trends that drive political and religious
imprisonment in China.
As of September 7, 2009, the PPD contained information on
5,176 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of
those, 1,266 are cases of political and religious prisoners
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and
3,910 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have
been released, executed, or to have escaped. The Commission
notes that there are considerably more than 1,266 cases of
current political and religious imprisonment in China. The
Commission staff works on an ongoing basis to add cases of
political and religious imprisonment to the PPD.
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their
extensive experience and data on political and religious
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner
information, as well as on
information provided by NGOs, other groups that specialize in
promoting human rights and opposing political and religious
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.
POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment
in China. The upgrade to the database that the Commission hoped
to have available by the end of 2008 is nearing completion. The
upgrade will leverage the capacity of the Commission's
information and technology resources to support research,
reporting, and advocacy by the U.S. Congress and
Administration, and by the public, on behalf of political and
religious prisoners in China.
Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights
violations by Chinese authorities that led to his or her
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free
expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social
or political change and to criticize government policy or
government officials. Users may search for prisoners by name,
using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. The PPD
allows users to construct queries that include one or more
types of data, including personal information or information
about imprisonment.
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data
without providing personal information to the Commission, and
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries,
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be
a nickname) and password are the only information required to
set up a user account.
Many records contain a short summary of the case that
includes basic details about the political or religious
imprisonment and the legal process leading to imprisonment. The
upgrade will increase the length of the short summary about a
prisoner and enable the PPD to provide Web links in a short
summary that can open
reports, articles, and texts of laws that are available on the
Commission's Web site or on other Web sites. Web links in
Commission reports and articles will be able to open a
prisoner's PPD record.
When the PPD upgrade is available for public use, it will
increase the number of types of information available from 19
to 40. [See box titled Congressional-Executive Commission on
China Political Prisoner Database: Current and Additional Data
Fields below.] The upgrade will allow users to query for and
retrieve information such as the names and locations of the
courts that convicted political and religious prisoners, as
well as the dates of key events in the legal process such as
sentencing and decision upon appeal. The users will be able to
download PPD information as Microsoft Excel or Adobe PDF files
more easily--whether for a single prisoner record, a group of
records that satisfies a user's query, or all of the records
available in the database.
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database:
Current and Additional Data Fields
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PPD Fields Added in
Current PPD Fields (19) Upgrade (21)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CECC record number Affiliation
Detention status Residence (province)
Issue category Residence (prefecture)
Main name Residence (county)
Chinese characters (main name) Formal arrest date
Other (or lay) name Trial date
Alternate name(s) Trial court
Pinyin name (for non-Han) Sentence date
Ethnic group Sentence court
Sex Appeal date
Age at detention Appeal court
Religion Appeal ruling date
Occupation Appeal ruling court
Date of detention Sentence ends per PRC
Province where imprisoned Actual date released
Current prison Charge (statute)
Sentence length (years) Sentence length (months)
Legal process Sentence length (weeks)
Short summary Sentence length (days)
Prefecture where
imprisoned
County where imprisoned
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section II. Human Rights
Freedom of Expression
Introduction
During its 2009 reporting year, the Commission observed the
continued failure of Chinese officials to protect the right of
citizens to engage in free expression, as guaranteed under the
PRC Constitution and international law. Chinese officials
continued to target for punishment citizens who peacefully
expressed political dissent or advocated for human rights,
including those who voiced concern that the Chinese Government
had not adequately investigated the cause of school collapses
following the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, sought to express
support for Charter 08 (a document calling for political reform
and greater protection of human rights), and spoke out about
alleged official misconduct. Citizens faced prison sentences or
reeducation through labor or other abuses of police power,
including surveillance, interrogation, and restrictions on
movement. Officials also continued to restrict peaceful
religious expression, confiscating or punishing the
distribution of unapproved bibles, Muslim books, Falun Gong
documents, and other ``illegal'' religious materials, and
restricting religious sermons, interpretations of religious
texts, and the ability of citizens to proselytize or teach
religion to their children. [For more information, see Section
II--Freedom of Religion, including subsections titled Controls
Over Religious Publications, Controls Over Religious
Publications in the XUAR, and Restrictions on Proselytizing,
Contact With Foreign Christians, as well as the box titled
Religious Prisoners.]
Chinese officials continued to deny citizens the right to
freedom of the press by censoring domestic news coverage and
maintaining ``prior restraints.'' Officials censored media
coverage of stories relating to the economy, the environment,
and protests in Iran following the contested June 2009
presidential election, and punished news media for covering
``politically sensitive'' issues. Officials strengthened
``prior restraints'' on the media, a system under which
journalists, editors, publications, and Web sites must obtain
licenses from the government in order to obtain legal status.
Officials targeted for closure publications containing
political or religious content dealing with Falun Gong, Tibetan
areas of China, or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
or publications by organizations that did not have a license to
publish. The government continued to allow the media limited
space to question government officials and policies.
The Chinese Government's regulation of the Internet
continued to violate international standards for free
expression. Authorities and Internet companies continued to
remove political and religious content from the Internet,
including references to Charter 08, and Web sites relating to
human rights, Tibetan areas of China, and the XUAR. Officials
also sought to strengthen their capacity to monitor Internet
users' online expression. They introduced and then backed away
from a requirement that all computers in China be sold with
pre-installed censorship software found to filter political and
religious content and monitor individual computer behavior.
Officials also began forcing news Web sites to require new
users to provide their real name and identification number in
order to post a comment. The Internet continued to serve as an
important outlet for public criticism, including the Deng
Yujiao case in which a young woman allegedly stabbed an
official to death in self-defense, and public opposition to the
government's attempt to require computers in China to come with
pre-installed censorship software.
This past year, the Chinese Government continued to express
an intent to ``guarantee citizens' right of information.''
Implementation of the Regulations on Open Government
Information, which took effect in May 2008, has been hampered
by agency refusals to disclose information and the reluctance
of courts to enforce compliance. Proposed revisions to the 20-
year-old PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets do not
address the vagueness and overbreadth of China's laws and
regulations related to state secrets that make them susceptible
to abuse. Local officials continued to fail to disclose the
extent of mining disasters, disease outbreaks, and information
about polluters.
Abuse of Criminal Law and Police Power To Punish Peaceful Expression of
Political Opposition and Human Rights Advocacy
Chinese officials continued to target citizens who
peacefully expressed political opposition or advocacy of human
rights. These efforts to stifle free expression contravene
China's constitutional protections for freedom of speech and
freedom to criticize government officials,\1\ as well as
international standards. Chinese officials, however, insist
that Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of expression. During the
February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government's human
rights record, the Chinese delegation claimed that ``[n]o
individual or press has been penalized for voicing their
opinions or views'' and that China's laws provide ``complete
guarantees'' on freedom of expression.\2\ [For more information
on cases of officials in China abusing the criminal law (e.g.,
charging citizens with ``splittism'') or police power to punish
religious expression, including possession of Falun Gong
materials or teaching religion to their children, see box
titled Religious Prisoners in Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion and Inciting Subversion
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This past year officials continued to label peacefully expressed
opposition to the Communist Party as a threat to national security and
to rely on Article 105 in the PRC Criminal Law as the basis for this
charge. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment
for attempts to subvert state power or 15 years for inciting such
subversion.\3\ While international law permits a government to restrict
expression to protect national security,\4\ China's application of
Article 105 violates international law. Specifically, both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19) and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 29) require that a
restriction on free expression be limited to that which is
``necessary'' to protect national security, or ``solely for the purpose
of'' protecting national security.\5\ Chinese courts make no attempt to
assess whether the speech in question posed an actual threat to
national security.\6\ The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has said
that the vague wording of China's national security crimes leave their
application open to abuse of freedom of speech.\7\ A recent study of
``inciting subversion'' cases by a human rights non-governmental
organization found that ``speech in and of itself is interpreted as
constituting incitement of subversion,'' \8\ and Chinese defense
lawyers have noted that courts have wide latitude because there exists
no legislative or judicial interpretation limiting the application of
the subversion crime.\9\
The recent case of Zhang Qi typifies courts' handling of subversion
cases. The Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Zhang
on July 7, 2009, to four years in prison for ``inciting subversion.''
\10\ Zhang is a member of the Union of Chinese Nationalists (zhongguo
fanlan lianmeng), an ``illegal'' organization which opposes the
Communist system.\11\ The court opinion cited the following evidence:
four essays Zhang posted online that ``contained harmful information
attacking the people's democratic dictatorship and socialist system''
(citing only the titles of the essays and no specific passages); online
discussions in which Zhang expressed opposition to the Communist Party
and a desire to change the socialist system; and Zhang's involvement
with the organization's Web site and recruiting supporters.\12\ The
opinion provided no evidence that Zhang advocated violence, did not
assess the threat Zhang's activities posed to national security, and
made no attempt to balance the state's interest with Zhang's right to
free speech or association. Other cases this past year include: In November 2008, the Chengdu Intermediate People's Court in
Sichuan province sentenced freelance writer and journalist Chen
Daojun to three years in prison for inciting subversion.\13\
Prosecutors cited essays Chen wrote criticizing the government's
policies toward China's ethnic Tibetan minority.\14\
In January 2009, the Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court in
Zhejiang province sentenced China Democracy Party (CDP) member Wang
Rongqing to six years' imprisonment for subversion, citing his
publication of ``The Opposition Party'' and other articles critical
of China's political system, as well as his organization of
activities for the CDP, an ``illegal'' opposition party.\15\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subversion and Inciting Subversion--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2009, the Jixi Intermediate People's Court in
Heilongjiang province sentenced rights activist Yuan Xianchen to four
years' imprisonment for inciting subversion.\16\ The court cited
Yuan's distribution of anti-Party writings to petitioners in Beijing,
interviews with the overseas news Web site Epoch Times in which he
criticized the Party and called for democracy, Internet essays
``attacking'' socialism, and funds he received from domestic and
overseas organizations.\17\
In August 2009, the Suqian Municipal People's Court in
Jiangsu province held the trial of democracy advocate Guo Quan on
charges of subversion of state power.\18\ Guo earlier told his lawyer
that while detained, authorities questioned him about his online
organizing of a democratic party, support for a multi-party system,
and essays alleged to have slandered socialism and subverted state
power.\19\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PUBLIC CRITICISM OF COLLAPSE OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN DEATHS
FOLLOWING THE MAY 2008 SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE
Officials sought to silence parents and other citizens
seeking to investigate the role shoddy construction played in
the collapse of large numbers of schools in the May 2008
Sichuan earthquake, and legal remedies and names and figures
for the schoolchildren who perished.\20\ Parents of deceased
children reported that local officials offered them money in
exchange for silence, ordered some to serve reeducation through
labor, kept some under surveillance, stopped them from holding
memorials, warned them not to speak to media, and prevented
them from traveling to Beijing to petition the central
government.\21\ As the one-year anniversary of the earthquake
approached in May 2009, Ai Weiwei, a blogger and artist
organizing a campaign to tally the student death toll, said
that officials had attacked or detained 20 of his volunteers
and that his blog postings were frequently removed from the
Internet.\22\ Sang Jun, who lost his 11-year-old son in the
earthquake, said that hundreds of officials were watching
dozens of parents in Mianzhu county, Sichuan province.\23\ One
Mianzhu official reportedly told Sang that contact with foreign
press would be considered ``unfavorable to China.'' \24\ A
Mianzhu official denied the reports of harassment.\25\
Officials charged other citizen activists with national
security crimes. In August 2009, the Chengdu Intermediate
People's Court in Sichuan held the trial of writer and
environmental activist Tan Zuoren on the charge of inciting
subversion.\26\ Tan had begun an independent investigation into
the school collapses and was detained shortly after he issued
preliminary findings. Prosecutors reportedly cited Tan's
previous criticism of the government's handling of the 1989
Tiananmen protests as well as his interviews with international
media after the earthquake.\27\ Also in August, the Chengdu
Wuhou District People's Court held a closed trial for rights
activist Huang Qi on suspicion of ``illegal possession of state
secrets.'' \28\ The underlying activity leading to the charge
is unclear, but Chengdu officials detained Huang shortly after
he visited earthquake areas and issued a report on his human
rights advocacy Web site about parents' demands for
compensation and an investigation.\29\ The trials of Tan and
Huang were marred by procedural irregularities and official
abuse, including barring witnesses from testifying.\30\
Officials also released from custody Liu Shaokun and Zeng
Hongling, both of whom were detained in connection with their
articles, photos, and public comments about the earthquake.\31\
CONTROLS OVER FREE EXPRESSION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
continued to block free speech and harass, detain, and imprison
people for peaceful forms of expression. In December 2008, XUAR
media reported that Urumqi authorities took into detention
Miradil (Mir'adil) Yasin and Mutellip Teyip after the two young
men distributed leaflets on the Xinjiang University campus
calling on students to organize a public demonstration.\32\
University officials said the leaflets had ``reactionary''
content aimed at ``inciting students to demonstrate in the
streets and create chaos.'' \33\ Available information suggests
the leaflets may have called on students to peacefully protest
tobacco and alcohol sales.\34\ [For more information see
Section IV--Xinjiang--Controls Over Free Expression and
Assembly.]
SUPPRESSION OF CHARTER 08
Officials harassed a number of citizens beginning in
December 2008 in connection with Charter 08, a document calling
for political reform and greater protection of human rights in
China. More than 300 Chinese citizens released Charter 08
online on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.\35\ By October 2009, 9,700 people
reportedly had signed the Charter.\36\ Liu Xiaobo, a prominent
intellectual and signer, was detained on December 8, 2008, a
day before the Charter was released.\37\ Authorities violated
Chinese law by placing Liu under residential surveillance at an
unknown location, instead of his Beijing home, by denying him
access to his lawyer and family, and by holding him without
formal charge beyond the six-month limit for residential
surveillance.\38\ On June 23, 2009, Beijing public security
officials arrested Liu on the charge of inciting subversion for
``spreading rumors and defaming of the government,'' and
refused to allow defense lawyer Mo Shaoping to represent him
because Mo had also signed the Charter.\39\ In early January
2009, overseas non-governmental organizations and media
reported that Chinese authorities sought to question, formally
summoned, threatened, or otherwise harassed more than 100
signers of Charter 08.\40\ Those harassed reported that
officials warned them not to give media interviews to promote
Charter 08, sought to determine the main authors of the
document and how it was disseminated, and demanded public
retractions of signatures.\41\ Signers continued to report
police questioning and surveillance during the first half of
2009, including one signer who was placed under residential
surveillance after she distributed copies of the Charter on the
street.\42\
HARASSMENT ON EVE OF 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF TIANANMEN PROTESTS
Officials sought to suppress the free expression of
citizens in the lead-up to June 4, 2009, the 20th anniversary
of the government's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.
In March 2009, officials briefly held Zhang
Shijun, a former soldier who served during the
protests, after he published an open letter to
President Hu Jintao calling for a reassessment of the
Tiananmen protests and gave interviews to foreign
media.\43\
In April, police in Beijing detained Qi
Zhiyong for one day and stationed officers outside his
apartment. Qi, who lost a leg after being shot during
the 1989 protests, had spoken out about the incident
and given interviews to foreign news media.\44\
In March and May 2009, Beijing public security
officials summoned Dr. Jiang Qisheng, a writer and vice
chairman of Independent Chinese PEN Center, which is
affiliated with an international writers association,
and confiscated his computer, books, and manuscripts
from his home.\45\ Jiang was reportedly preparing to
publish an account of the Tiananmen protests and their
aftermath.
In June, officials ordered Zhang Huaiyang to
serve one and one-half years of reeducation through
labor.\46\ Officials had detained Zhang on the charge
of inciting subversion. Zhang had signed Charter 08 and
posted an essay online titled ``Is There Really No One
Who Dares To Take to the Street To Commemorate 6-4? ''
\47\
In June, officials in Chongqing municipality
ordered Chen Yang, a Charter 08 signatory, to serve one
year of reeducation through labor after he took part in
an online discussion with friends about wearing white
and lighting candles to commemorate the Tiananmen
protests.\48\
Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported on
June 4, 2009, that officials had harassed 65 activists
to prevent them from commemorating the Tiananmen
protests, including the detention of Wu Gaoxing for
wearing a commemorative shirt while riding a bicycle.
The report said police were stationed outside the homes
of individuals such as human rights lawyers Pu Zhiqiang
and Teng Biao and that other individuals were forced to
leave Beijing or were visited at their home by police
and warned against giving media interviews or meeting
with friends to commemorate the event.\49\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defamation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local officials continued to abuse the crime of defamation to punish
critics and whistleblowers. At a conference held in May 2009, the
official Legal Daily reported that a number of Chinese legal scholars
expressed concern at what the article described as ``many'' recent
cases of local governments using the ``crime of defamation'' to
retaliate against whistleblowers and ``abuse government authority to
smother citizens' freedom of speech and right to supervise.'' \50\ The
article noted that in 2008, journalists were the targets of such cases,
while in 2009, the targets were citizens who used the Internet to
expose problems. Scholars interviewed for the article blamed the
``arbitrary'' and ``subjective'' nature of official power in China and
criticized Article 246 of the PRC Criminal Law, which provides
officials with a loophole to pursue a defamation case in the absence of
a complaint if ``serious harm is done . . . to the interests of the
State.'' \51\ China's lack of an independent judiciary also contributes
to the problem.\52\ Cases this past year included: In March 2009, police from Lingbao city, Henan province,
traveled 1,200 kilometers to Shanghai to apprehend Wang Shuai after
he suggested in an online post that Lingbao officials had
misappropriated funds intended for drought prevention. They brought
him back to Lingbao and kept him in custody for five days. Following
public outcry, provincial officials disciplined Lingbao police and
paid Wang 784 yuan (US$115).\53\
In April 2009, China Daily reported that police detained
blogger Shi Zhixian for three days in March for alleging that
officials rigged a local election in which he ran as a candidate.
Police reportedly issued an apology, offered him compensation, and
disciplined five officers.\54\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation and Censorship of the News Media and Publishing
The Chinese Government and Communist Party continued to
censor and regulate the news media and publishing industry in
violation of the PRC Constitution and international standards
for free expression. Article 35 of the PRC Constitution
provides for freedom of the press.\55\ The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Universal
Declaration of Human Rights prohibit restrictions on the press
except those ``necessary'' for, or ``solely for the purpose
of,'' respecting the rights or reputations of others or
protecting national security, public order, public health or
morals, or the general welfare.\56\ The government and Party
exceed these limits by restricting political and religious
content and controlling the media for political purposes.
Officials continued to deny the existence of press
censorship.\57\
OFFICIALS TREAT NEWS MEDIA AS A TOOL OF THE PARTY
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year, top Chinese
officials continued to emphasize the media's subservient
relationship to the government and Party. In the Commission's
previous reporting year President and Party General Secretary
Hu Jintao gave a major speech on the role of the news media in
June 2008, during which he said journalists should ``promote
the development and causes of the Party and the state'' and
that their ``first priority'' is to ``correctly guide public
opinion.'' \58\ In November 2008, Liu Yunshan, director of the
Party's Central Propaganda Department, told local propaganda
bureaus and ``persons responsible for news media'' to emphasize
``positive propaganda'' to deal with the economic downturn.\59\
In July 2009, Director Liu Binjie of the General Administration
of Press and Publication, which regulates the news media,
outlined the main tasks for news regulators during the second
half of 2009, including ``painstakingly organizing and leading
news units to carry out news propaganda work welcoming the 60th
anniversary of the nation's founding.'' \60\ Liu also called
for propaganda on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region's
economic and social development and ethnic solidarity and to
provide ``ideological guarantees'' and ``public opinion
support'' for the work of the Party and nation. In a speech in
June 2009 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Jiangxi
Daily, Jiangxi provincial Party Secretary Su Rong said
journalists must uphold the ``Marxist view of journalism'' and
quoted former Party chairman Mao Zedong as saying ``to do news
work, the politicians must run the newspapers.'' \61\
COMMUNIST PARTY DIRECTS MEDIA COVERAGE
This past year, the Party's view of the news media as a
mouthpiece continued to be reflected in Party directives
restricting news reporting of certain topics deemed politically
sensitive. The primary source of such directives, the Party's
Central Propaganda Department (CPD), informs publishers and
editors what stories can and cannot be covered and how to cover
certain topics, and in some cases instructs news media to run
only stories from Xinhua, the official news agency of the
central government.\62\ The following table indicates some of
the publicly known directives over the past year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restricted Topic Restriction
------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 2008--Arrest of a reporter Ban on all media coverage.
at China's only national
television station, CCTV.\63\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2009--Charter 08.\64\ Media may not interview or write
about Charter 08 signers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 2009--Massive fire near Media not to publish photos,
CCTV's headquarters.\65\ videos, or indepth reports. Only
run Xinhua reports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2009--Shoe-throwing incident Followup reporting and news
during Premier Wen Jiabao's visit commentary prohibited.
to Cambridge University.\66\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2009--China's 4 trillion yuan Media ordered to provide ``positive
(US$586 billion) stimulus package propaganda'' and avoid ``negative
to revive the economy.\67\ guidance'' and ``commentary.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restricted Topic--Continued Restriction--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2009--Shanghai news media Media should remove the report or not
report on China's increased carry it.
holdings of U.S. stock.\68\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 2009--Public criticism of a Media not to ``publish discussion
government plan to require questioning or criticizing'' the
``Green Dam'' filtering government's plan, but instead to
software in all computers sold ``expand positive guidance.''
in China.\69\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 2009--Protests following Ban on criticism and comments on
contested presidential election Iranian government's measures to
in Iran.\70\ control protests. Only reports from
Xinhua and People's Daily allowed to
be published.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
August 2009--Chinese Media ordered not to report on or
activists.\71\ publish essays by 247 persons,
including Liu Xiaobo.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The directives are not transparent, and officials
interviewed by the Commission denied their existence.\72\ In a
prominent case from 2005, one court found that such directives
are state secrets and sentenced the journalist Shi Tao to 10
years in prison for leaking a directive to an overseas Web
site.\73\ In February 2009, the Deputy Director of the Yunnan
Provincial Party Propaganda Department publicly acknowledged
the ability of propaganda officials to dictate news
coverage.\74\ During a domestic media interview, Deputy
Director Wu Hao said ``the propaganda department still has the
power to direct the media. We can order the media to not report
or comment . . .'' \75\ In April, officials at one television
station acknowledged that they received broad guidance on major
topics such as coverage of large-scale disasters, the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and the 60th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic of China, but enjoy greater
independence in the areas of science and technology,
entertainment, and current affairs.\76\
OFFICIALS PUNISH JOURNALISTS AND NEWS MEDIA FOR REPORTING
This past year, Party and government officials continued to
punish journalists and news media for attempting to cover
``politically sensitive'' stories or because they published
such stories. In September 2008, the Inner Mongolia Press and
Publication Bureau ordered suspension of publication of the
China Business Post for three months after the paper published
a report critical of the state-run Agricultural Bank of China,
which at the time was preparing for a stock offering.\77\ The
paper said unspecified ``higher-level officials'' had punished
it for failing to follow the requirement that ``significant and
sensitive news stories must be verified with the party being
reported on before publication'' and for disregarding a ban on
``cross-regional reporting,'' in which newspapers reporting
about events in other localities had once enjoyed some
leeway.\78\ In November 2008, Li Changchun, a member of the
Party's Politburo Standing Committee, reportedly ordered the
removal of a publisher at Yanhuang Chunqiu after the magazine
published an article in memory of former Party General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who died in 2005 after spending 16 years
under home confinement following the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.\79\ In January 2009, authorities in Shanxi province
reportedly suspended two journalists and two editors for
producing a television episode on the potential bankruptcy of a
Linfen city textile mill and the uncertain future of the mill's
6,300 workers.\80\
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE NEWS MEDIA AND PUBLISHING
The government continues to rely on prior restraints on
publishing, including licensing and other regulatory
requirements, to restrict free expression.\81\ No one may
legally publish a book, newspaper, or magazine, or work as a
journalist in China, unless they have a license from the
General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the
government agency in charge of regulating the news media and
publishing industry.\82\ Chinese law requires that every book,
newspaper, and magazine have a unique serial number, and the
GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these
numbers.\83\ To obtain a license to publish news, applicants
must meet financial requirements and must have a government
sponsor, although sponsors vary in degree of oversight.\84\ The
Central Propaganda Department (CPD) closely collaborates with
government agencies to control the press.\85\
The government continued to use its licensing authority to
violate freedom of the press. In July 2009, Beijing public
security officers and officials from the Beijing City Cultural
Law Enforcement Agency raided the offices of Beijing Yirenping
Center, a public health non-governmental organization, and
confiscated more than 90 copies of the center's ``China's Anti-
Discrimination Legal Action Newsletter.'' The officers claimed
Yirenping failed to possess the necessary permits to publish
the newsletter.\86\ From January to July 2009, officials
reportedly seized 1.35 million ``illegal'' newspapers and
periodicals.\87\ Authorities continued to use Article 225 of
the PRC Criminal Law, which defines operating a publishing
business without government permission as an illegal business
activity,\88\ to fine and imprison publishers. In June 2009, a
Beijing court sentenced bookstore owner Shi Weihan to three
years' imprisonment under Article 225 because Shi had printed
and given away Bibles.\89\
The government continued its campaign to target
publications for their political and religious content. Chinese
regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the
publication of material that ``undermine the solidarity of the
nations, or infringe upon national customs and habits,''
``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harms the honor
or interests of the nation.'' \90\
In December 2008, GAPP issued a notice calling
on customs officials to focus on ``illegal
publications'' and `` `Falun Gong' and other `cults'
propaganda materials.'' \91\
The State Administration of Industry and
Commerce reported in January 2009 that it targeted
``illegal political publications'' in the runup to the
2008 Olympic Games and that rooting out such
publications would remain a priority in 2009.\92\
In April and May 2009, local and provincial
governments across China issued notices launching a
special campaign targeting ``illegal political
publications.'' \93\ The Fujian Provincial Transport
Administration Department, for example, issued a notice
that placed the focus on publications that ``slandered
the country's political system, distorted the history
of the Party, the country's history, the military's
history, slandered the Party and the country's leaders,
publicized `Falun Gong' and other evil cults, and
incited ethnic splittism.'' \94\
In March 2009, Harbin city police in
Heilongjiang province reportedly seized more than 2,000
copies of ``illegal political publications'' including
some relating to the Gang of Four and another 30,000
``illegal political publications'' relating to famous
Party leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and
other books on Chinese politics and history.\95\
In April 2009, officials in Lhasa, the capital
of the Tibet Autonomous Region, reportedly burned more
than 1,000 copies of ``illegal political'' publications
and ``Dalai clique splittist'' publications.\96\
In 2009, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
authorities established a fund to reward efforts to
``purify'' the cultural market, with a focus on
``illegal'' religious and political publications.\97\
[See Section IV--Xinjiang--Controls Over Free
Expression and Assembly for more information.]
Authorities have confiscated Bibles imported
to the country,\98\ and in the past year, officials
confiscated Bibles in raids on house churches.\99\ [See
Section II--Freedom of Religion--Controls Over
Religious Publications for more information.]
This past year, officials strengthened oversight over
journalists.\100\ A January 2009 GAPP circular announced that
journalists and editors working for Chinese news organizations
must exchange their current press cards, which they are
required to have to legally practice their profession, for new
ones, affecting approximately 260,000 news personnel.\101\ The
Chinese Government claims that government licensing and
supervision of journalists and editors is needed to prevent
corruption and protect journalists.\102\ International experts
on freedom of expression, however, have declared such licensing
schemes for print media unnecessary and subject to abuse and
have found press accreditation appropriate only where necessary
to provide access to certain places and events.\103\ GAPP also
announced creation of a black list of journalists who ``violate
laws and regulations or professional ethics'' and have had
their press cards revoked.\104\ The current code of
professional ethics, which was last revised in 1997 and
reportedly will be further amended by November 2009,\105\
requires news workers to ``make great efforts to learn and
propagate Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng
Xiaoping's theory of constructing socialism with Chinese
characteristics'' and ``firmly implement the Party's basic
orientation and principles.'' \106\
This past year, the government continued to link the
professional training and selection of journalists with
requirements for political loyalty. In April 2009, the CPD, the
Central Office for Overseas Publicity, the State Administration
of Radio, Film, and Television, GAPP, and the All-China
Journalists Association issued a circular launching a campaign
called the ``Three Items To Study and Learn'' (sanxiang xuexi
jiaoyu).\107\ The circular calls for ``further strengthening
the political quality of editors and journalists,'' and
``guaranteeing the correct orientation of news propaganda
work.'' \108\ It notes that in recent years a large number of
young journalists have risen in the ranks, ``making it even
more necessary to help them practically grasp the Marxist
view.'' \109\ An important goal of the campaign is to help news
workers develop the capacity to avoid ``ideological errors''
and to ``persist in using the Marxist view to correctly analyze
and guide news practice.'' \110\
FACTORS PROVIDING MEDIA SOME SPACE, WHILE THE PARTY SEEKS TO MAINTAIN
CONTROL
Commercialization of news media
Over the last three decades, authorities have encouraged
the proliferation of news media that depend less on financial
subsidies from the government but have not sought to relinquish
Party control over content.\111\ Commercialization has resulted
in less severe state control, but all legal media in China
remain ``state-controlled'' in the sense that they are still
subject to propaganda directives and prior restraints such as
being required to have a government sponsor. Some major media,
such as Xinhua, People's Daily, and CCTV, remain directly under
the control of the government or Party and have as their main
purpose the communication of the official line.\112\ A few more
market-oriented media, including Caijing\113\ and Southern
Metropolitan Daily, have developed a reputation for greater
independence.\114\ Editors at these organizations, however,
proceed cautiously and have been punished by officials in the
past.\115\
Officials continue to use commercialization to serve their
own interests. They cite the numerical growth in newspapers,
magazines, and journalists as evidence itself of press
freedom.\116\ They also express a desire to create market-
friendly media to facilitate the spread of propaganda and
China's ``soft power.'' President and Party General Secretary
Hu Jintao said in his June 2008 speech that commercial media
need to be co-opted into a ``new setup for public opinion
guidance.'' \117\ In March 2009, the deputy secretary of the
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Liu Yupu, spoke to
journalists in Shenzhen about the effects of the global
economic downturn, telling them they were ``the most critical
mouthpieces'' of the Party and government and must ``strengthen
their own sense of political responsibility,'' while at the
same time making their news ``more readable and watchable . .
.'' \118\ In April 2009, the government announced a plan to de-
link most news publishers from the government and create five
or six commercially viable media conglomerates whose aim would
be to ``raise the nation's combined national power and cultural
soft power.'' \119\ The plan reflects official concern over the
perceived dominance of foreign ``Western'' media in shaping
China's image\120\ and coincided with other recent policies to
greatly expand China's media presence abroad. In January 2009,
for example, the central government announced plans to spend 45
billion yuan (US$6.6 billion) to improve the nation's image
through the overseas expansion of three major state news media:
CCTV, Xinhua, and People's Daily.\121\ While one Chinese
academic said the de-linking policy could lead to less
censorship,\122\ the guiding opinion announcing the policy
noted the need to maintain the ``Party's leadership of news
publishing work.'' \123\
Government continues to promote limited watchdog role for journalists
Some aspects of the Party's policy toward the media serve
the Party's interests but also give the news media some space
to report. Under a policy called ``public opinion
supervision,'' journalists are encouraged to cover abuses and
corruption at the local level, so long as it does not threaten
the center, as a way of keeping central officials informed of
local problems.\124\ Governments at all levels are urging
officials to cooperate with journalists. For example, a
November 2008 GAPP circular stated that ``[n]o organization or
individual should interfere with or obstruct'' the ``legal
reporting activities'' of news personnel.\125\ In July 2009,
authorities in Kunming city, Yunnan province, reportedly
proposed a regulation that imposes punishments on officials who
interfere with ``news media carrying out public opinion
supervision in accordance with the law.'' \126\
This past year, the Commission observed some media issuing
reports questioning government policies. Chinese media
published stories critical of the confinement of petitioners in
psychiatric hospitals,\127\ black jails [see Section II--
Criminal Justice, for more information],\128\ the behavior of
delegates to the National People's Congress session in March
2009,\129\ abuses at detention centers,\130\ a government
policy to require all computers sold in China to come with pre-
installed filtering software,\131\ and the August 2009 trial of
a prominent activist.\132\ The extent to which media can report
on such issues and the boundaries for reporting are unclear,
although coverage of such topics as the ``military, religion,
ethnic disputes, the inner workings of government'' is
reportedly off-limits.\133\ Some media may have greater leeway
because, as in the case of Xinhua, People's Daily, and CCTV,
they are backed by top central leadership.\134\ Chinese
officials also may allow certain stories to be published in
English-language domestic media but not in the Chinese-language
media.\135\
Controlling the news agenda to counter Internet and international media
The increasing influence of China's Internet and a greater
focus on competing with international media for reporting on
China have led the Party to adapt its strategy of maintaining
control through faster official reporting of some events while
at the same time increasing censorship of nonofficial channels
of information. In June 2008, President Hu said the Internet
had become a significant source of information that needed to
be managed better.\136\ He called on news reports on ``sudden-
breaking public events'' (tufa shijian) to be released
immediately so that the government could take the initiative in
``news propaganda work.'' \137\ Hu also called on journalists
to help change international opinion that still reflects a
``West is strong, we are weak'' pattern. In an October 2008
article in the Party journal Seeking Truth (Qiushi), Central
Propaganda Department Director Liu Yunshan praised the Party's
propaganda response to Tibetan protests (and rioting) in
Tibetan areas that began in March 2008 as having effectively
``influenced international opinions.'' \138\ The Commission
noted in its 2008 Annual Report the development that the Party
had begun to allow journalists to report certain major breaking
news more quickly and without official approval, so long as
they toed the Party line.\139\
The trend of quicker reporting, accompanied by increased
censorship of unofficial channels, continued this past year.
Following a demonstration by Uyghurs and violence in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in July 2009, Xinhua
issued reports early on and provided regular updates, mostly in
English, that overseas media relied upon.\140\ At the same
time, authorities shut down numerous Web sites and deleted
posts on Internet forums that contained descriptions or
pictures of the protests.\141\ The government has sought to
capitalize on this trend of quicker reporting.\142\ During the
February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government's human
rights record, the Chinese delegation cited media coverage of
the contaminated milk scandal in the fall of 2008 as evidence
of press freedom.\143\ As noted in the Commission's 2008 Annual
Report, however, one newspaper that had discovered cases of
sick children was unable to publish the story because of
censorship before the 2008 Olympic Games, and officials banned
commentaries and news features about the tainted milk
products.\144\
FOREIGN AND NON-MAINLAND JOURNALISTS WORKING IN CHINA
Foreign journalists reporting in China face fewer
restrictions than domestic journalists but continued to face
harassment. As a result of China hosting the Olympics in 2008,
since January 2007 foreign journalists allowed into China may
report without additional government permission, with the
notable exception of closed-off areas such as the Tibet
Autonomous Region.\145\ In October 2008, officials issued
permanent measures enshrining this policy.\146\ For Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwanese journalists, however, new rules issued in
February 2009 reinstated an official approval requirement for
reporting.\147\ Despite the positive legal change for foreign
journalists, they continued to report instances of official
harassment. In March 2009, the Foreign Correspondents' Club of
China (FCCC) criticized detentions and closed access as
reporters tried to visit Tibetan areas one year after protests
that began in March 2008.\148\ In July 2009, FCCC welcomed the
``relatively open access'' for foreign journalists traveling to
the XUAR to cover the aftermath of the July 5 demonstration in
the capital of Urumqi.\149\ Chinese officials reportedly
allowed about 60 foreign journalists to travel to Urumqi on a
government-arranged reporting trip and set up an on-site media
center for them.\150\ The FCCC, however, cited ``serious
concerns,'' including officials ordering journalists to stop
reporting and ordering them to leave certain areas, including
the city of Kashgar.\151\
While conditions for foreign reporters may be improving,
officials appear to be increasing pressure on Chinese sources
and colleagues. At a Commission roundtable in July 2009, one
foreign correspondent reported that ``as the rules have more
aligned with international reporting standards, harassment and
intimidation may be `going underground.' The pressure seems
more often directed at vulnerable Chinese sources and staff.''
She noted a new code of conduct for Chinese news assistants
that reminded them that it was illegal to conduct independent
reporting and urged them to ``promote positive stories about
China.'' \152\ As noted elsewhere in this section, this past
year officials warned Chinese citizens not to speak to foreign
journalists and punished them for doing so.\153\
Access to Information
CENSORSHIP OF THE INTERNET AND CELL PHONES
Internet censorship violates international human rights standards
The Chinese Government's regulation of the Internet and
other electronic communications continued to violate
international standards for free expression. Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees
the right to ``seek, receive and impart'' information ``of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers,'' through any media of one's
choice.\154\ Article 19 permits restrictions on this freedom,
provided they are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect the rights or reputations of others, national security,
public order, or public health or morals. Chinese officials
exceed these allowances, however, because their extensive
censorship of the Internet and cell phones is not limited to
the removal of content such as pornography, spam, or content
deemed to violate intellectual property rights, but also
political and religious content the government and Communist
Party deem to be politically sensitive. Chinese officials
continued to defend restrictions on the Internet as necessary
and based in law,\155\ and in line with international human
rights standards\156\ and the practice of other countries.\157\
They have also characterized their investment in information
technology as done to ``strengthen the infrastructure that
allows citizens to fully enjoy freedom of speech.'' \158\ At
the same time, the Party has sought to reap the benefits from
the Internet's expansion, to aid in dissemination of Party
propaganda and to support China's economic development.\159\
The Internet continued this past year to serve as an
important outlet for individual expression and criticism of
government policies. According to statistics from China
Internet Network Information Center, the state network
information center, China has more Internet users than any
country in the world, and the figured reached 338 million in
June 2009.\160\ As of March 2009, there were 670 million cell
phone users in China, and as of June 2009, 155 million cell
phone users accessed the Internet through their phone.\161\
According to Freedom House, the Internet is freer than
traditional media because of its ``egalitarian nature and
technical flexibility.'' \162\ As in recent years, citizens
this past year used the Internet to organize protests, expose
corruption among local officials, and oppose government
policies. Internet users reportedly played a significant role
in raising awareness about the Deng Yujiao case involving a
young woman who stabbed a local official to death to thwart an
attempted rape.\163\ In March 2009, a local official in Hunan
province lost his job after Internet users posted receipts
showing lavish spending at a karaoke club.\164\ After Internet
users, citizens in China, and domestic media, as well as
foreign governments and companies, criticized a government
requirement that all computers sold in China include censorship
software, officials backed away from the plan.\165\ The
presence of online criticism, however, does not signal the
government's intent to allow greater freedom of expression on
the Internet in line with international standards. As noted
here and elsewhere in the section, the government continues to
control media reporting that appears on the Internet, to block,
filter, and remove political and religious content, and
imprison citizens such as Tan Zuoren, for using the Internet to
disseminate criticism of the government.
Blocking social networking, human rights, and other politically
sensitive Web sites
Officials continued to shut down or block access to
domestic and foreign Web sites because of those sites'
political or religious content. Authorities reportedly ordered
the closure of the domestic ``Rights Defense China'' Web site
in October 2008 for posting ``sensitive information.'' \166\ In
January 2009, the Beijing Municipal Government's Information
Office reportedly ordered the closure of the blog hosting Web
site Bullog (www.bullog.cn) after the site failed to remove
large amounts of ``harmful information'' relating to current
events and politics.\167\ In March 2009, authorities repeatedly
shut down the multi-language Web site Uyghur Biz (also known as
Uyghur Online) and interrogated Beijing-based Uyghur scholar
Ilham Toxti (Tohti), who runs the site.\168\ In July, the
technology pages of Sina.com and Netease.com, two popular
domestic news portals, were shut down for several hours after
posting articles about a corruption investigation in Namibia
involving a company that had been overseen by President Hu
Jintao's son.\169\
Authorities continued to block domestic access to foreign
news and human rights Web sites, including the Commission's Web
site,\170\ and blocked search engines and social networking
sites during politically sensitive periods throughout the past
year. In August 2009, the Chinese military newspaper PLA Daily
warned that Twitter and YouTube were being used by Western
forces as subversive tools, citing their use by those opposed
to election results in Moldova and Iran.\171\
In December 2008 and January 2009, officials
reportedly blocked the Chinese-language sites for the
BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, YouTube's
Hong Kong and Taiwan sites, and the Web sites for the
New York Times, Amnesty International, and the Hong
Kong-based news organizations Ming Pao, Asiaweek, and
Apple Daily, after some of the sites were unblocked for
the 2008 Olympic Games.\172\
In March 2009, Google reported that its
YouTube site was being blocked in China. Prior to the
block, a video was posted on the Web site purportedly
showing Chinese police beating Tibetans during protests
in March 2008.\173\
In June 2009, days before the 20th anniversary
of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, authorities reportedly
blocked access to the social networking site Twitter,
the blogging portal MSNSpaces, the photo-sharing site
Flickr.com, and the Microsoft search engine
Bing.com.\174\
In July 2009, authorities reportedly blocked
access to Twitter, YouTube, and Fanfou.com, a domestic
micro-blogging site similar to Twitter, following the
July 5 demonstration in Urumqi and outbreaks of
violence starting that day.\175\ Two other domestic
micro-blogging Web sites, Digu and Zuosa, also went out
of service during this time, with a spokeswoman from
one of the companies saying ``it's a sensitive period,
so we are not in a rush to re-open it.'' \176\
Active filtering and removing of political and religious content
Chinese authorities and companies offering Internet content
in China continued to filter and remove political and religious
content from the Internet. Internet regulations, which apply to
cell phone service as well,\177\ prohibit not only
dissemination of pornographic and defamatory content, but
political and religious content under broad and vague
prohibitions on information ``harming the honor or interests of
the nation,'' ``disrupting the solidarity of peoples,''
``disrupting national policies on religion,'' and ``spreading
rumors,'' the meanings of which are nowhere defined in Chinese
law.\178\ The Chinese Government monitors the Internet through
a large number of public security officials and agencies
overseeing the Internet and places a legal burden on companies
providing Internet and cell phone services to filter and remove
content. Companies providing Internet or cell phone services in
China, including those based in other countries, are required
to monitor and record the activities of its customers or users,
to filter and delete information the government considers
politically sensitive, and to report suspicious activity to
authorities.\179\ The law's vagueness and the consequences for
companies who allow too much information lead many companies to
err on the side of censoring more information.\180\ In
addition, the lack of clarity leads to wide variation in the
level of censorship companies practice.\181\ In July 2009, the
government reportedly issued a secret directive that
strengthens monitoring of comments posted by Internet users on
Chinese news Web sites. The directive forces such Web sites to
require new users to provide their real name and identification
number in order to post a comment, a move that could have a
chilling effect on free expression.\182\
This past year, officials and companies continued to filter
political and religious content critical of China's top
leaders, human rights record, policies toward Tibetan areas of
China and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and
information relating to Falun Gong and the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.\183\ In April 2009, China Digital Times reported that
Chinese Internet users were circulating leaked documents from
Baidu, which runs China's top search engine.\184\ The documents
provide lists of topics and words to be censored, including
references to petitioners, the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Falun
Gong, and China's leaders.\185\ The China-based search engines
of Yahoo!, MSN, and Google also filter politically sensitive
information.\186\ In October 2008, these companies and other
participants announced the formation of the Global Network
Initiative, a coalition of companies, human rights groups, and
Internet experts, whose purpose is to encourage companies to
comply with principles of freedom of expression and to submit
to monitoring by independent experts.\187\
Examples of filtering politically sensitive content this
past year include:
After Chinese citizens posted online Charter
08, a document calling for political reform and greater
protection of human rights, in December 2008,
references to the Charter appeared to have been removed
from the Internet, according to searches carried out
using the Baidu, Sina, and Google.cn search
engines.\188\
In March 2009, Internet and cell phone text
messaging services were reportedly disrupted in Tibetan
areas of western China ahead of a series of dates that
many Tibetans consider to have a high level of cultural
and political sensitivity.\189\
In March 2009, authorities began to censor
references to the ``grass-mud horse,'' a Chinese word
that sounds like an obscenity, after Internet users
began using the term to protest a government crackdown
on ``vulgar'' content on the Internet.\190\
Reporters Without Borders issued a report in
June confirming the continued censorship of Internet
searches in China for references to the 1989 Tiananmen
protests.\191\
In August 2009, China Daily reported that
Google.cn and Baidu had blocked searches for Xu
Zhiyong, the law professor and rights defender who had
been detained on charges of tax evasion.\192\
Chinese officials also continued to enlist citizens to help
monitor the Internet and influence public opinion. In recent
years, authorities have paid commentators known as the ``50-
Cent Party'' to promote the Party's views in online forums and
to report ``dangerous'' content to authorities.\193\ In June
2009, Xinhua reported that Beijing officials were recruiting
tens of thousands of volunteers by year's end to monitor the
Internet and report ``lewd'' content or Internet users showing
``uncivilized behavior'' while surfing the Internet.\194\
Officials continued this past year to label campaigns to
remove content as aimed at ``vulgar'' or pornographic content,
but guidance issued by the government included political
content as well.\195\ For example, this year officials launched
a campaign against ``vulgar'' content on the Internet and
targeted audio- and video-hosting Web sites. The State
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television issued a circular
in March 2009 requiring Internet audio-visual program service
providers to edit or delete programs containing, among other
things, ``distortions of Chinese culture,'' ``disparaging or
mocking depictions of revolutionary leaders, heroes, and
important historical figures,'' or ``disparaging depictions of
the PLA, people's armed police, the public security bureau, or
the judiciary.'' \196\
Officials continued to acknowledge their ability to monitor
and delete information on the Internet and expand their
capabilities. In February 2009, Liu Zhengrong, a top official
at China's Internet Affairs Bureau, urged heightened vigilance
this year, telling colleagues to ``check the channels one by
one, the programs one by one, the pages one by one. You must
not miss any step.'' \197\ The Deputy Director of the Yunnan
Party Propaganda Department said in a February 2009 media
interview that ``we can delete all inconvenient, or negative,
online posts one by one.'' \198\ According to one Party
scholar, local officials delete unfavorable commentary about
them on the Internet and render the IP address of those
computers inactive; on occasion they trace the comment and
retaliate.\199\ [See box titled Defamation above.] In March
2009, the deputy director of the General Administration on
Press and Publication, which also regulates online publishing,
said that the agency would soon have the capability to monitor
content on hundreds of thousands of publishing Web sites.\200\
Chinese scientists are reportedly developing better software to
detect ``undesirable content.'' \201\ Officials this past year
also sought to extend their ability to censor beyond the
network level to the level of an individual computer. [See box
titled Green Dam below.] While the government ultimately backed
away from its Green Dam initiative, officials reportedly
required all Internet service providers to install the Landun
(Blue Shield) software on their servers by September 13, 2009,
or face penalties.\202\ Blue Shield (also known as Bluedon or
Blue Dam) blocks Web sites and records users' online
activities, and is reportedly much more effective than Green
Dam.\203\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Green Dam
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT) issued a circular requiring that computers sold within mainland
China after July 1, 2009, must come ``pre-installed'' (yu zhuang) with
the government-approved ``Green Dam-Youth Escort'' Internet browsing
filtering software.\204\ The order did not become public until June 9
and prompted domestic and international concerns over freedom of
expression, the software's security, lack of notice and transparency,
and the legality of the move under China's competition, monopoly, and
procurement laws.\205\ Officials claimed the move was intended to
protect young people from ``harmful information,'' but editorials in
the official China Daily and Caijing questioned why the requirement
applied to all computers sold and raised concerns about who would
determine what content to block.\206\ Tests conducted by several
outside sources found that, in addition to pornographic content, the
software also filtered political and religious information, including
references to Falun Gong. OpenNet Initiative (ONI), one of the groups
that tested the software, also found that the software ``actively
monitors individual computer behavior.'' \207\ ONI warned that the
policy of filtering at the level of personal computers would ``increase
the reach of Internet censorship to the edges of the network, adding a
new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system.''
\208\ The requirement also applied to foreign manufacturers, who
criticized the lack of transparency and short notice and called for
reconsideration of the requirement.\209\ U.S. Secretary of Commerce
Gary Locke and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk issued a joint letter
to the MIIT and Ministry of Commerce protesting the policy. ``China is
putting companies in an untenable position by requiring them, with
virtually no public notice, to pre-install software that appears to
have broad-based censorship implications and network security issues,''
Locke said.\210\ On June 30, 2009, the MIIT announced that it would
delay the requirement,\211\ although some companies continued with
efforts to comply.\212\ In August, the MIIT's minister announced that
it would not force all computers to come with the Green Dam
software.\213\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior restraints: government licensing of Web sites
The government requires all Web sites in China to be either
licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII),\214\ with additional licenses required for
sites providing news content\215\ or audio or video
services.\216\ Web sites that fail to register or obtain a
license may be shut down and their operators fined. An October
2008 People's Daily article said that the State Administration
of Radio, Film, and Television was planning to target Web sites
operating without a license for audio and video programs.\217\
Technical and legal challenges to censorship
Chinese citizens continue to take advantage of proxy
servers and to employ other techniques to access and share
information that the government has attempted to block or
filter. After a demonstration and outbreaks of violence took
place in Urumqi, XUAR, in early July 2009, authorities cut
Internet access in the area,\218\ and appeared to block
nationwide access to Twitter and YouTube, remove comments about
the demonstrations from Web sites, and filter Internet
searches.\219\ Despite these measures, citizens were reportedly
able to send pictures, videos, and updates from Urumqi; in some
cases, content was posted on sites outside China in order to
save the content.\220\
Over the past year, citizens have filed lawsuits against
Internet companies for censoring their online material. In
January, a Beijing company executive and former standing
committee member of the Anhui Province People's Political and
Consultative Conference, filed a lawsuit with the Haidian
District People's Court in Beijing against Sina.com after his
blog was blocked the same day he posted an essay calling for
political reform.\221\ In a potentially significant ruling, one
court in Beijing ruled in May 2009 that there are limits to
Internet companies' censorship of user content, the first time
an Internet user has won such a case.\222\ In that case, an
economics professor challenged the decision by Beijing Xin Net
to shut down the professor's Web site after he posted articles
calling for the abolition of China's reeducation through labor
system. The court, although not addressing free speech issues,
ruled that the company violated the user contract by not
providing proof of its claim that the site contained
objectionable content and failing to show that it had requested
the content be changed. In June 2009, Huang Zhijia, a judge in
Hubei province, filed a lawsuit in Beijing's Haidian District
Court against Sina.com after it took down one of his blogs in
which he accused the Party School of granting him an
unrecognized diploma.\223\ In explaining how Sina.com applies
government regulations, a customer service representative said
the company works with public security officials to filter
violent and pornographic content as well as ``radical political
comments.'' \224\
Blocking of foreign tv, radio
The government continued to impose restrictions on Chinese
citizens' access to overseas TV, radio, and news. Access to
foreign TV stations is generally restricted to hotels and
foreign residences, and transmissions have been interrupted
when politically sensitive stories about China appear.\225\
China's sole national television station, CCTV, began a live
broadcast of U.S. President Barack Obama's inaugural address in
January 2009, but cut away after a politically sensitive
portion of the speech, which was later deleted from official
``full'' translations appearing in Chinese media.\226\ Chinese
officials repeatedly pit the ``Western'' media in a battle
against China, this year urging China to step up jamming of
``hostile'' foreign broadcasters such as the Voice of America
and Radio Free Asia and ``foreign enemy'' broadcasting
stations.\227\ In April 2009, China announced that Xinhua would
not be regulating foreign financial information providers as
part of an agreement in connection with a World Trade
Organization complaint.\228\ Such financial providers are,
however, still subject to China's censorship standards.\229\
Open Government Information
This past year, the Chinese Government continued to express
an intent to ``guarantee citizens' right of information.''
\230\ In March 2009, Xinhua reported that the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) had begun posting the central government's budget
on its Web site, whereas previous data had been available in a
finance year book.\231\ In June, the MOF and the National
Development and Reform Commission announced that by 2010 all
government agencies would have Web sites.\232\ As the
Commission has noted in previous reports, in recent years the
Chinese Government has passed regulations to encourage the
government's disclosure of information to citizens and improve
public access to government information.\233\ The Regulations
on Open Government Information (OGI regulation) went into
effect in May 2008,\234\ and this past year citizens tested
provisions in the regulations giving them a right to request
information\235\ and challenge agency refusals to disclose
information.\236\ Agencies have used a variety of reasons to
refuse to disclose information. Agencies have, for example,
asked for specific identification numbers of the documents
requested, which is impossible because such documents are
secret.\237\ They have also responded with vague or irrelevant
answers, or claimed that the information does not exist or does
not fall under the scope of information disclosure
regulations.\238\ According to the vice president of Peking
University Law School, government agencies frequently cite
exceptions in the regulations that exempt disclosure of
information relating to state and commercial secrets or that
threaten national security or public order.\239\ The Ministry
of Justice, for example, denied Beijing lawyer Xie Yanyi's
request for information on reeducation through labor policies
saying it related to state secrets.\240\
A main problem, observers say, is the lack of an
independent judiciary to enforce implementation.\241\ Almost a
year after the OGI regulation took effect, a March 2009 Caijing
report indicated that courts in every locality had received
cases challenging agencies' refusal to release
information.\242\ Chinese observers of courts' handling of OGI
cases, however, have noted a number of problems that have
contributed to a low success rate for plaintiffs. Courts
reportedly have been reluctant to challenge an agency's
determination of a state secret.\243\ The OGI regulation
contains no provisions to provide courts with guidance on the
boundaries of what should not be disclosed because it is a
secret.\244\ The Supreme People's Court will reportedly issue a
judicial interpretation by the end of 2009 that would provide
courts with clearer guidance on handling OGI cases.\245\ The
more fundamental issue is that China's laws loosely define
state secrets to cover essentially all matters of public
concern. Following passage of the OGI regulation, some scholars
had hoped that officials would amend the PRC Law on the
Protection of State Secrets to clarify the scope of state
secrets to aid in implementation of the OGI regulation.\246\
The government is currently reviewing a draft amendment to the
law.\247\ [See box titled Proposed Revision to State Secrets
Law below.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Revision to State Secrets Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2009, the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee
reviewed a draft revision of the PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets
(State Secrets Law) and the NPC released the draft for public
comment,\248\ but the proposed changes do not address abuses that occur
under the current state secrets legal framework. Currently, the broad
and vague definition of ``state secrets'' in Chinese law and
regulations give officials wide latitude to declare almost any
information a state secret.\249\ Officials use this discretion to deny
citizen requests for government information\250\ or claim that a
citizen possessed or leaked a state secret in order to punish political
activity.\251\ Furthermore, police can declare that a case involves
state secrets to deny criminal defendants basic procedural rights,
including access to counsel and an open trial.\252\ Citizens cannot
challenge such a determination\253\ and officials may declare
information a state secret retroactively.\254\ Chinese academics and
media have raised these concerns.\255\ In June 2009, the official China
Daily issued an editorial that said: Government institutions should no longer be allowed unlimited freedom
in defining State secrets. The unnecessarily wide scope of State
secrets must be streamlined. . . . If citizens continue to shoulder
unlimited, and undefined obligations, they should not be left
defenseless when accused. There should be legal relief for citizens
victimized by abuse of the definition ``State secrets.'' \256\ The proposed draft lacks any substantial provisions to deal with these
concerns. The draft law leaves unchanged the broad and vague provisions
defining state secrets in the current law (Articles 2 and 8).\257\
While at least one academic recommended that drafters consider granting
people's congresses or judicial institutions the power to review an
agency's state secret determination,\258\ the draft law failed to
incorporate any independent review mechanism.\259\ The draft imposes an
affirmative obligation on Internet and telecommunications companies to
report the discovery of a disclosure of state secrets and to remove
such information upon official request.\260\ The draft law also adds
administrative fines ranging from 1,000 yuan (US$146) to 50,000 yuan
(US$7,321), which may make officials more willing to classify
information as a state secret.\261\ The draft includes a few modest
provisions that may curb some abuses. The draft law, for example, adds
a requirement that agencies conduct periodic audits of information
classified as a state secret to determine if any should be
declassified.\262\ Such periodic audits are not provided under the
current law.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the OGI regulation, officials continued to hide
vital information from the public. It took nearly three months
for word to leak out about a July 2008 explosion at an illegal
mine in Zhonglou, Hebei province that killed 35 men. The mine
owner paid off the families, and local officials issued a false
report, while journalists received bribes to remain silent. Two
weeks after the accident, officials in Shanxi province
announced the deaths of 11 persons in a natural landslide.
Investigators, following a tip from the Internet, later
discovered that 41 had died.\263\ A Shanghai-based Xinhua
journalist who exposed a mine disaster coverup in Shanxi
province was later summoned to Beijing and told by Xinhua
officials to lay off the story in October 2008.\264\ In
October, it was discovered that local officials in Liaoning
province kept the discovery of melamine-tainted eggs quiet for
weeks and ordered a ban on discussing the issue with
media.\265\ The Beijing News, which had reported the egg
coverup, also reported that authorities in Sichuan province
failed to publicly announce an epidemic of maggots in mandarin
oranges for a month.\266\ These incidents followed an alleged
coverup of the melamine milk scandal in the runup to the 2008
Olympic Games. In March 2009, China National Radio reported
that Henan officials underreported incidences of hand-foot-
mouth disease.\267\ The Chinese public has also expressed
frustration at the government's delay in disclosing the number
of children killed in school collapses following the May 2008
Sichuan earthquake.\268\ An environmental non-governmental
organization announced in June 2009 that it had requested
disclosure of information about businesses that had violated
environmental regulations from 113 cities, and 86 cities had
refused to provide any information.\269\
Worker Rights
Introduction
Workers in China still are not guaranteed either in law or
in practice full worker rights in accordance with international
standards, including, but not limited to, the right to organize
into independent unions. Despite new laws that took effect in
2008 and
codified new protections for workers, Chinese workers in 2009,
particularly migrant workers, bore the brunt of the global
financial
crisis. During economic retrenchment and rising unemployment
pressure, the Chinese Government focused less on writing labor
protections into formal law and less on industrial upgrading
involving lower reliance on labor-intensive manufacturing, and
more on maintaining employment and economic growth.
Labor strife increased during the Commission's 2009
reporting period. In May 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security announced that labor disputes in 2008 had
nearly doubled from a year earlier to reach 693,000 disputes,
involving over 1.2 million workers. One official from the
Supreme People's Court noted that labor strife has changed in
several important ways, including more large-scale, coordinated
labor actions.\1\ During 2009, local governments reported that
this trend is continuing as companies look for ways to reduce
employment and maintain flexibility in an uncertain economic
climate. These reports also point to the increasing legal and
rights consciousness of Chinese workers. Chinese workers also
have become more strategic in their use of largescale,
coordinated action outside the workplace, including street
demonstrations, traffic blockades, or sit-ins at local
government offices. Local officials often respond quickly to
worker actions that they perceive to threaten what they call
``social stability'' and that draw the attention of higher
level officials.\2\ In some regions with concentrated labor-
intensive manufacturing, large-scale actions have been taken
after an employer has absconded with unpaid wages or severance
compensation, putting further pressure on local governments to
respond.\3\
In response to collective action that is organized and
large scale, the government has attempted to redirect labor
disputes away from the formal channels of arbitration and
litigation toward more ``flexible'' and ``grassroots-level''
negotiation and mediation. These forms of dispute resolution
often rely on coordination among levels of local government
(e.g., provincial, city, town, etc.), involving local
government and Communist Party units, the official trade union,
and the police and security apparatus.
Given the growing concern of local governments to maintain
economic growth and employment, many localities have responded
to new laws that took effect in 2008 (the PRC Labor Contract
Law, PRC Employment Promotion Law, and PRC Labor Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Law) with local opinions and
regulations of their own that have the effect of weakening the
employee-friendly aspects of the national laws. Provincial-
level courts were the main conduit of these local regulations,
issuing measures and ``guiding opinions'' of national laws.
Some analysts have argued that this trend is likely to lead to
the ``regionalization'' and ``loopholization'' of national
law.\4\ Localities with large concentrations of foreign direct
investment and labor-intensive manufacturing have been the most
proactive in this regard, with high court explanations of the
laws from Shanghai municipality and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and
Guangdong provinces.\5\ The Supreme People's Court also issued
a guiding opinion in July 2009 on courts' handling of labor
disputes during the economic crisis.\6\
Chinese workers continue to be denied the right to freedom
of association. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the
Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in
China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the
ACFTU. While the ACFTU has become more active, focusing on
unionization of foreign-funded firms and organization of
migrant workers, and pushing the expansion of collective
contracts, the ACFTU continues to be dominated by the local
Communist Party with its overarching political concerns of
social stability and economic growth. In 2009, the ACFTU
continued its drive to unionize foreign-funded enterprises and
to press for collective negotiations with management in some
companies. In general, however, the union does not act as an
autonomous body with workers' rights and interests as its main
responsibility. Rather, it facilitates relations between the
Chinese Government and Party and employers. With the change in
the economy, ACFTU activities in 2009 have not been as vocal or
as aggressive as those seen in 2007 and 2008, when, for
example, the ACFTU was involved in high-profile organizing of
Wal-Mart stores in China. In general, the ACFTU unions are
focused on proactive and mediation-based labor dispute
resolution and government-led attempts to persuade enterprises
to minimize layoffs in exchange for wage reductions, reduced
working hours and leave rotations.
National and local governments continue to proceed with
social insurance reform, focusing on the expansion of social
insurance both in terms of the types offered and the citizens
covered. Rural citizens' and migrant workers' social insurance
is also being expanded. Some localities are experimenting with
programs that allow for more portable social insurance so that
migrant workers can take their social insurance benefits with
them when they switch jobs and relocate to other cities. The
draft PRC Social Insurance Law was released for public comment
in late 2008 and is expected to be passed by the end of
2009.\7\
National-Level Legislative Developments
In 2007-08, the Chinese government passed three major laws
on labor and employment: the PRC Employment Promotion Law, the
PRC Labor Contract Law, and the PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law. The year 2009 was a year for local
implementation and experimentation as the new laws took effect
shortly before the global economic downturn. The National
People's Congress undertook several study trips to investigate
local implementation and enforcement of the Chinese
Government's labor codes, and the central government continued
to promote the laws despite complaints from some local
governments and employers that the new laws were too harsh for
China's current economic climate. As there was with the initial
debate during the legislative process leading to issue of the
Labor Contract Law, there remain signs of a lack of consensus
about the effects of the new labor legislation on different
regions and types of workers.\8\
THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT GUIDING OPINION
In July 2009, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued a
guiding opinion urging courts, when handling labor disputes
during the economic crisis, to consider the interests of both
labor and enterprise management, and to do so in a manner that
both preserves ``social stability'' and is consistent with
national economic policy.\9\ According to SPC officials, this
opinion was a reaction to the unprecedented pressure on courts
to resolve a very large number of disputes even as disputes
have grown more complicated and contentious.\10\ The guiding
opinion attempts to balance continued emphasis on protection of
workers' rights (that was reflected and promoted in the 2008
legislation) and the realization that employers might simply
close down if not given assistance during the economic crisis.
The opinion emphasizes the need to protect workers' ``right to
existence'' while recognizing the difficult economic position
of many enterprises.\11\ The guiding opinion follows a long
list of national and local administration instructions to
employers to minimize layoffs\12\ and to seek consultation with
employees, the trade union, and the local labor bureau when
handling disputes, especially disputes related to layoffs.\13\
OTHER MEASURES RELATED TO LABOR RELATIONS DURING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
CRISIS
In addition to the local regulations detailed below, the
central government, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), and other units issued several circulars and
instructions related to labor relations during the global
economic crisis. On December 20, 2008, the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) and the Ministry of
Finance and State Administration of Taxation issued the
Circular on Easing the Burdens on Enterprises and Stabilizing
Labor Relations.\14\ This circular permits enterprises to
temporarily suspend payment of social insurance contributions
for six months.\15\ On January 23, 2009, the MOHRSS, the ACFTU,
and the Chinese Enterprise Directors Association (CEDA) jointly
issued the Guiding Opinion on Tackling the Current Economic
Situation and Stabilizing Labor Relations.\16\ This opinion
reiterated the government's preference for companies to use
alternative strategies to avoid layoffs, including wage
reductions, vacation time, and flexible working hours.\17\
Grassroots trade unions were also instructed to educate their
workers to support employers' strategies.\18\ This opinion was
particularly concerned with wage arrears and advised methods to
reduce the impact of sudden non-payment of wages.\19\ The
opinion also called for local governments, trade unions, and
employers to work together to resolve any collective disputes
that might emerge from factory closures and large-scale
layoffs.\20\
On January 5, 2009, Legal Daily reported the ACFTU, the
MOHRSS, and the CEDA convened a meeting in Beijing to discuss
tripartite bargaining and announced their intention to
implement a ``Rainbow Plan'' across China to initiate
collective wage negotiations. Speakers at the conference,
however, emphasized neither conflict between employers and
employees nor the need to protect workers' rights. Rather,
officials spoke of the need to find common ground during the
crisis and to emphasize ``stable employment'' and ``harmonious
labor relations.'' \21\
DRAFT SOCIAL INSURANCE LAW
The National People's Congress (NPC) addressed a key issue
related to workers' rights and livelihood--social insurance.
The draft Social Insurance Law was released for public comment
in December 2008. The draft law received more than 70,000
comments as the central government made an ambitious attempt to
standardize social insurance for workers and to provide more
comprehensive and portable insurance for employees generally,
but especially for highly mobile migrant workers. The first
step for this new welfare system is the creation of a social
security system nationwide based on citizens' identification
card numbers.\22\ According to an interview with Hu Xiaoyi, the
Vice Minister of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, the distribution of about 80 million social security
cards was approved.\23\
The draft law gives citizens, urban and rural, the
possibility to receive retirement pensions and insurance for
medical care, work-related injuries, unemployment, and
maternity.\24\ Both employers and workers are responsible for
paying the respective insurance premiums and fees (except that,
for work-related injuries and maternity, only the employer has
the responsibility to pay the insurance premiums).\25\
Employers are also subject to heavy legal liabilities if they
do not pay the corresponding insurance premiums and/or partake
in fraudulent actions.\26\
One of the most important issues for citizens is the
portability of insurance, especially for those citizens who
migrate to different cities. In the draft law, citizens can pay
retirement premiums in one location and receive payments in
another.\27\ Medical insurance and unemployment insurance can
also be transferred accordingly.\28\ At the same time, the
draft law describes, as well, the establishment of a new
cooperative healthcare system in rural areas in the medical
insurance plan, funded by both farmers and local
governments.\29\ Further, according to this draft law, the
government will cover the medical insurance fees for
individuals who live on minimum income subsidies, are disabled,
or are more than 60 years old.\30\ Unemployed workers, may
receive unemployment payments for a maximum of 24 months,
depending on the accumulated amount of time these workers and
their employers have been paying unemployment insurance.\31\
Overall, the draft insurance law seems to offer positive
alternatives for mobile workers who are seeking better
retirement plans and medical insurance. Implementation of the
final law, however, will be the responsibility of local
governments. The China-European Union Intergovernmental Social
Security Reform Cooperation Project, launched in April 2006, is
a five-year program providing technical assistance and
expertise in building social insurance programs. There
currently are about 20 pilot projects nationwide.\32\
Local-Level Legislative and Regulatory Developments
In 2009, several localities released high court opinions of
the 2008 legislation (i.e., the PRC Labor Contract Law, PRC
Employment Promotion Law, and PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law). This judicial activity was focused in the
south and the southeast with judicial opinions issued in
Shanghai municipality and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong
provinces. These opinions included some important clauses that
benefited employers, and in so doing may weaken the impact of
protections for workers contained in the national laws.\33\
There is growing concern that given the economic crisis, local
governments are increasingly opposed to implementation of the
2008 labor laws and are using local measures to pass locally
specific rules that will protect employers against some
provisions of the new laws that employers regard as more
onerous.\34\ In 2009, local regulatory activity was
concentrated in the courts. Judicial opinions and explanations
are not subject to the same degree of transparency or
participation required in local legislative institutions, so
these rules are not publicly debated, nor are they produced
jointly by ``competing'' interests such as the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions and the Employers' Association.
MEASURES TO PROTECT WORKERS IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN ENTERPRISE CLOSURE
Following the language of the national regulations, which
emphasized the protection of workers' interests and rights as
the primary goals of the 2008 new labor legislation, local
guiding opinions and regulations have maintained similar
vocabulary in their measures with respect to issues that
directly affect workers' interests, namely, the establishment
or termination of labor contracts, implementation or
cancellation of arbitral awards, payment of compensation or
other lawful expenses, and social insurance. However, many
regulations recognize the fact that layoffs and terminations
continue to increase as recessions in export destinations
persist. As a result, if an enterprise closes due to bankruptcy
or other reasons that are in accordance with the law, employers
can cancel any labor contracts and labor relations with workers
by sending an advanced notification to workers or paying the
corresponding ``substitute'' fees, as suggested in the local
regulations by Fujian province and Shanghai municipality.\35\
The Fujian measures state that employees of state-owned
companies should seek assistance through the workers'
representative committee.\36\ The Guangdong province guiding
opinion jointly issued by the Guangdong High People's Court and
the Guangdong Provincial Labor Arbitration Committee also
encourages more communication and cooperation among arbitration
committees and judges, especially in cases that involve the
termination or cancellation of arbitrated judgments.\37\
Many local interpretations also address circumstances for
workers whose employers have gone into hiding or disappeared,
especially during labor dispute arbitration proceedings. In
Jiangsu's most recent guiding opinion on how to handle labor
disputes during the global economic crisis, announced in early
2009, for example, it is stipulated that enterprise properties
and assets should be quickly frozen or sealed up in order to
maintain control over the properties of the hiding employers
and to safeguard the workers' rights and interests.\38\
However, the national-level Supreme People's Court Guiding
Opinion released several months later expressed sympathy for
``responsible'' companies and advised that local governments
should be cautious in quickly freezing or seizing the assets of
delinquent companies.\39\
As the global economic crisis deepened and the number of
labor disputes has continued to increase at an alarming rate,
there has been greater emphasis on encouraging mutual
cooperation and agreement between employers and workers. A key
notion in 2009 regulatory development is that protection of
both workers' rights and employers' lawful rights and interests
is essential to maintain stable labor relations and to continue
with industrial and economic development.\40\ This language is
a marked change from a year or two earlier when the central
government spoke of industrial upgrading and leaving poor-
quality jobs behind.\41\ Currently, the emphasis is on the
maintenance of employment levels.\42\
MEASURES TO DEVELOP EXTRAJUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
The 2008 PRC Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor
Disputes underlined the need to first exhaust all consultation,
negotiation, and mediation avenues to resolve labor disputes.
The legislation suggested that arbitration and litigation
should be used only when the other alternatives failed.\43\ It
also indicated the importance of the tripartite system of
coordination between labor bureaus, trade unions, and
enterprise representatives to solve labor dispute cases
together.\44\ Earlier local interpretations echoed and
encouraged the use of this structure,\45\ and in some
instances, they also suggested major collaboration and
involvement from local governments and other relevant
departments and organizations.\46\
However, with the explosion of labor conflict cases in
arbitration committees and courts, which suggests a growing
preference on the part of workers to use formal legal channels
over more informal negotiations with employers,\47\ the central
government has been trying to redirect these labor conflicts to
other channels at lower local levels, and to encourage more
mediation in general and negotiation within the
enterprises.\48\ Local governments are encouraged to strengthen
and provide better guidance to improve the competence of labor
dispute mediation organizations,\49\ and there is emphasis on
the communication and exchange of information between the
relevant bodies.\50\ Thus, the government is seeking
interorganizational collaboration, where arbitration
committees, courts, mediation committees, trade unions, and
enterprises research and work together to resolve labor
disputes.\51\
LOCAL MEASURES TO REGULATE LAYOFFS
In response to the current global financial crisis, on
January 23, 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security (MOHRSS), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), and the China Enterprise Directors Association (CEDA)
issued a joint guiding opinion on how to maintain stable labor
relations and reduce the possibilities for potential labor
conflicts and legal disputes. In this guiding opinion,
employers are encouraged to avoid or reduce mass layoffs and to
adopt flexible alternatives, vocational training programs,
especially for rural migrant workers, in order to improve
workers' skills, flexible working hours, leave rotations, wage
adjustments, and other cost-reducing measures.\52\ Local
governments such as Jiangsu province have issued their own
measures reinforcing and complementing the actions suggested in
the guiding opinion, including the reduction of social
insurance premiums to save jobs.\53\
Under the guiding opinion, employers should lay off workers
only when necessary due to ``operational difficulties.'' They
are advised to formulate a layoff plan in accordance with the
law and regulations and to report in a timely manner to the
local human resources and social security bureau.\54\ This is
intended to reinforce the requirements in the PRC Labor
Contract Law to provide early notices to both the workers and
the local labor departments,\55\ and it also suggests more
government involvement. The guiding opinion emphasizes the need
to strengthen the government's guidance and supervision and the
provision of guidance to the struggling enterprises.\56\
However, there is increasing evidence that enterprises are
avoiding these formal layoff procedures and using alternative
measures to reduce employees, which do not require extensive
consultation with the trade union or the workforce and also
that do not require government notification.\57\
While employers are told to pay severance compensation and
clear all wage arrears to avoid potential disputes,\58\ both
the MOHRSS Guiding Opinion and some local measures give
enterprises the option to pay workers in stages rather than all
at once after consulting and negotiating with the trade unions
or workers directly.\59\ Further, in the case of a delay in
payments, employers are required to report the delay to the
local human resources and social security bureau in advance and
seek the consent of the trade union or the workers.\60\ As a
result, these measures, while strongly highlighting the
tripartite system of coordination and cooperation among the
government, the enterprise, and the trade union, also allow for
direct negotiation between employers and workers in the event
of layoffs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor Disputes Trends
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced that
labor disputes in 2008 had risen to 693,000, a near doubling of cases
from a year earlier.\61\ Reports on disputes in 2009 show that this
rapid rate of increase is continuing and that the explosion of disputes
is particularly apparent in coastal cities and provinces, including
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong.\62\ The number of
cases arbitrated in Shanghai increased 119 percent from 2007 to 2008,
with some districts reporting increases of over 300 percent. Shanghai
labor arbitrators' average annual caseload now exceeds 400 cases.\63\
Taizhou city in Jiangsu province found that in the first quarter of
2009, nearly one-third of labor dispute cases involved layoffs or
terminations of contracts, approximately a fourfold increase from the
same period last year. A government report stated that these statistics
indicate ``a wave of dismissals'' as companies search for ways to trim
their workforces.\64\
There are several new trends in this large increase in disputes,
including an increase in cases involving layoffs and severance
compensation, social insurance, and wages; an increase in the
complexity of the cases, making them more difficult to resolve; and
finally, an increase in collective use of the courts by groups of
workers. These issues, coupled with the large increase in the workload
of arbitrators and judges, have lengthened the time it takes to resolve
disputes.\65\ In some cases, workers are waiting six months to a year
to have their cases opened by the arbitration tribunal. A labor
arbitrator in Guangzhou municipality stated that workers filing labor
disputes in April 2009 would have their cases heard in March 2010.\66\
In other cities, arbitrators are sending cases directly to the courts
without hearing cases, due to their unmanageable workload.\67\
Local governments are also changing their procedural guidelines to
adjust to the pressure of a rapidly rising caseload and dissatisfaction
with long delays between case filings and hearings. In particular,
local governments are pushing disputes down to lower levels for
resolution, and encouraging, even coercing, the disputants to resolve
disputes through negotiation or grassroots mediation, often led by low-
level officials.\68\ This emphasis on mediation and extrajudicial
resolution is not limited to local governments, but is also reflected
in national- and provincial-level regulations and circulars.\69\ These
procedural changes may make it more difficult to assess accurately the
true number of disputes, as many disputes will not reach arbitration
and litigation, which are the sources for the most commonly used
statistics for labor conflict in China. There were also new reports
that the rate at which workers win labor disputes is decreasing. A
district in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, reported a 210-percent
increase in the loss rate for employees.\70\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor Disputes Trends--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the large increases in arbitrated cases, Chinese courts
continued to be deluged with labor disputes. In some cases, these
disputes were the result of strong dissatisfaction with the arbitration
proceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in the courts if
either side is dissatisfied.\71\ In other cases, the increase reflected
the strong and growing rights consciousness of Chinese workers as they
claimed new protections offered in the legislation passed in 2008
during a time of increased layoffs and economic crisis. The Supreme
People's Court reported a 93.9-percent increase in labor cases over the
course of 2008. In 2009, this trend continued with nearly 170,000 cases
in the first half of the year, an increase of 30 percent from the 2008
high.\72\ The President of the Guangdong High People's Court reported
that Guangdong courts received over 76,000 new labor cases in 2008, up
157 percent from the same period last year.\73\ The people's court with
jurisdiction over the Tangxia industrial zone in Dongguan city reported
that by November 2008, each judge had received over 1,000 cases. More
than half of the annual caseload is made up of labor disputes, most
often migrant workers asking for workers' compensation, overtime pay,
or severance compensation.\74\ Courts in Jiangsu province reported
similarly high increases. In Jiangyin city, labor cases at the court
increased threefold. Court officials called for new measures to handle
disputes earlier and to manage large, spontaneous protests that occur
when factories suddenly close or initiate mass layoffs.\75\
Xinhua, the Chinese Government's state-run news agency, reported that,
due to economic pressure on companies and local governments, 2009 would
be a year with many mass protests and some local governments at risk of
losing control over labor protests.\76\ While strike and mass
demonstration data are not released publicly, anecdotal evidence
suggests that many localities in southeastern China experience large
strikes on a daily basis. Jiangsu province reported that, in 2008,
arbitrated labor disputes increased to 139,100, an increase of 79
percent over the year before. Collective disputes increased to 773,
with over 30,900 people involved, increases of 49 percent and 104
percent, respectively. Jiangsu labor officials also intervened in 720
mass incidents, involving over 72,900 workers.\77\ An official
publication announced that labor protests jumped 94 percent in the
first 10 months of 2008.\78\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significant Labor Actions 2008-2009
Following the economic downturn that began in 2008, there
continue to be widespread reports of strikes and demonstrations
in China's manufacturing centers in southern China. These
strikes are often motivated by factory slowdowns, closures, and
non-payment of wages or overtime.\79\ There is no evidence of
encouragement or involvement by official trade unions. Instead,
the trade union often appears during the period of negotiation
and settlement of the strike as subordinate to the
government.\80\ An exception is the Wal-Mart strike discussed
below.
Strikes occurred at Jetpower, a subsidiary of
Gold Peak Batteries, as workers in Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone complained of toxic poisoning from
cadmium during battery production. Workers seeking
compensation for occupational disease went on strike in
April; earlier, workers had gone on strike in February
over suspicions that the plant was relocating to
another city. During negotiations between the company,
workers, and government officials, the general manager
of the plant was also the plant's union chairman.\81\
In April 2009, 1,000 workers from a state-
owned textile factory in Baoding city, Hebei province,
organized a protest walk from Baoding to Beijing in
order to draw attention to their dissatisfaction with
plans for privatization. They eventually were stopped
by officials, and brought back to Hebei by bus.\82\
In April, a nationwide plan to scrap assistant
manager positions at Wal-Mart stores in China was
cancelled after managers protested the plan, including
a public protest at Wal-Mart China headquarters in
Shenzhen. Wal-Mart employees asked the Shenzhen branch
of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions to
intervene. Under the direction of the Shenzhen union,
collective negotiations ensued, leading to the
cancellation of the plan. Later in the year, however,
Wal-Mart announced plans to lay off a large number of
employees, including many of those affected by the
earlier plan, by allowing short-term labor contracts to
expire.\83\
In July, steelworkers in northern China's
Jilin province violently protested the planned merger
of their state-owned company with a private company
from Hebei province. The number of protesters remains
unclear. The general manager of the Hebei company was
beaten to death during the protests, which took place
as company executives met to discuss the merger.\84\
Smaller strikes, demonstrations, and individual
disputes also have involved violence, against both
workers and employers.\85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant workers in China are estimated to number over 140 million.\86\
They are defined as rural residents who have left their place of
residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in Chinese cities, sometimes in
the same province and sometimes far from home. The Chinese household
registration system (hukou) restricts easy migration between rural and
urban areas in China. Therefore, migrant workers may work in a city for
many years but are unable to qualify for city residency. Without city
residency, they are denied many basic public benefits, such as
inclusion into social insurance programs, education for their children,
and healthcare. As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are
often abused or exploited by their employers who take advantage of
their insecure social position and lower levels of education. While the
central government has allowed the hukou system to relax over time,
this system of institutionalized discrimination continues to affect
adversely the social, civil, and political rights of migrants.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant Workers--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the workplace, migrants have borne the brunt of the global economic
crisis as they are concentrated heavily in sectors adversely affected
by recessions abroad, especially in labor-intensive manufacturing and
construction. In February, the central government reported that 20
million migrant workers were now out of work.\88\ While the National
Statistical Bureau (NSB) reported that 70 million migrants returned to
rural areas during the Chinese New Year holiday because of the lack of
job opportunities (half the total number of migrants), post-Chinese New
Year surveys indicate that 80 percent of those migrant workers returned
to the coastal cities to find new employment during 2009.\89\ In July,
the mayor of the southern city of Dongguan stated that at least 10
percent of all migrant workers in the city had lost their jobs in the
second half of 2008 and first half of 2009.\90\
Wage arrears and non-payment of wages are some of the most serious
workplace problems that migrant workers face. Other serious problems
include workplace injuries and the lack of reliable social insurance,
especially for occupational injury and disease. During the global
economic crisis, wage arrears problems increased dramatically as
factories shut their doors.\91\ The NSB reported that 5.8 percent of
all migrant workers returning home for the holidays were owed back
wages, but the percentage jumped to over 13 percent for migrants whose
factories had shut down.\92\ Local governments and trade unions often
intervened in these cases, paying the workers subsidies if they agreed
to end their protests.\93\ Human Rights Watch issued a report drawing
attention to how discriminatory aspects of the hukou system combined
with a more restrictive labor market threatened already tenuous
protections for migrant workers.\94\
The lack of social security for migrants and the long and arduous road
through the legal system's labor dispute resolution proceedings are two
severe problems. In 2009, there were several high-profile cases of
migrant workers' injury and disease. In June, Liu Hanhuang, a migrant
worker whose hand was amputated after a work injury, was pursuing a
case through the appeals court when he reportedly murdered two
Taiwanese managers at his former place of work.\95\ Much of the media
coverage and Internet discussion of the Liu Hanhuang case was
sympathetic. One commentator argued that his crimes were the result of
his frustration and anger about his case, which had dragged on for more
than one year.\96\
Another migrant worker in Hebei province suffering from an
occupational lung disease drew national attention for his pursuit of
his legal rights for compensation.\97\ The 28-year-old worker suffering
from pneumoconiosis demanded that he be given an invasive surgical
examination in order to prove his illness after the local unit
authorized to certify occupational diseases issued a different
diagnosis. When the exam verified that Zhang suffered from the fatal
lung disease, the government criticized the hospital for doing an
illegal examination. Like the Sun Zhigang case in 2003, when a migrant
worker's death in police custody was followed by changes in the laws
governing repatriation of migrant workers to their home areas, this
case was followed by new calls for changes to China's system of worker
protection and labor inspection.\98\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migrant Workers--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the draft Social Insurance Law is debated and revised, many
localities have expanded efforts to include migrants in social
insurance coverage. However, there are still significant problems in
terms of participation (for both employers and employees), coverage,
and portability between rural and urban areas and even within urban
areas. As many migrant workers returned to their hometowns during the
Chinese New Year, there was an increase in the number of workers
withdrawing their social insurance accounts from coastal cities.
Migrant workers generally are able to withdraw monies only from their
individual accounts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions
that is paid by their employers. With migrant workers facing
uncertainty about whether they would return to the same place to look
for new work, and with the portability of pension accounts highly
restricted, they chose to withdraw their pensions. A single district in
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone reported that on a single day in March
2009 3,000 workers applied to withdraw pensions. In addition to
complaints regarding long lines and bureaucratic delays in withdrawing
pensions, some migrant workers complained of the basic unfairness of
the system. Urban workers are able to draw on both individual and
company accounts when they retire, while migrants are able to draw out
only their individual accounts as they move from job to job.\99\
Official reports estimate that only about 17 percent of all migrant
workers even participate in retirement insurance programs.\100\
Increasing informalization of the workforce (see below) has led to
declining social insurance protection for many migrant workers and low-
level urban workers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom of Association
Workers in China do not enjoy the right to freedom of
association. Trade union activity in China is organized under
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a quasi-
governmental organ that is under the direction of the Communist
Party.\101\ Leading trade union officials concurrently hold
high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU Constitution and
the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the dual nature of
the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and interests of workers
while supporting the leadership of the Party and the broader
goals and interests of the Chinese Government.\102\ The ACFTU
monopolizes many worker rights issues in China, such as
shopfloor organizing and ``formalistic'' collective contract
negotiations, but it does not consistently or uniformly advance
the rights of workers.\103\
In recent years, the central government has shown support
for an enlarged trade union role in collective contracting, and
in union organizing in private firms in China, including
multinational companies.\104\ These changes are less a sign of
opening up and liberalization than they are a collection of
strategies to improve the standing and legitimacy of the ACFTU
in workers' eyes. The government's strategy appears to be based
on its expectation that a more vibrant and engaged ACFTU may
limit demands for independent union organization and
spontaneous collective action by aggrieved workers.
At the shopfloor level, the ACFTU's unions remain weak and
marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at
lower administrative levels play important roles in legislation
and regulation of workers' rights and employment laws, this
bureaucratic role is not matched with power at the enterprise
level. Generally speaking, firm level union branches are weak,
non-democratic, and subordinate to management.\105\ Despite an
increase in legislation and administrative regulations that
gives the ACFTU more power at the firm-level to resolve
disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union branches
make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker advocacy
difficult and slow.\106\
In recent years preceding the economic crisis, the ACFTU
initiated a number of programs and goals that enhanced its
standing internationally and increased its visibility to
marginalized workers, such as migrant workers and workers in
small, private firms. The November 2008 Regulations on the
Establishment and Development of Harmonious Labor Relations in
the Shenzhen Special Economic Region more clearly defined the
role of the ACFTU in Shenzhen to protect workers and to
represent workers during stoppages or strikes. This is in
contrast to national legislation, which instructs the union to
represent workers and restart production as soon as possible.
The 2008 PRC Labor Contract Law, the Shenzhen Regulations, and
other local-level regulations also gave unions a larger role in
enterprise decisionmaking, including the decision to initiate
layoffs.\107\ The trade union also vowed to continue high-
profile union organizing in multinational firms.\108\ At the
local and regional levels, unions have become more proactive in
organizing workers across different firms and negotiating
minimum wage standards and labor contracts.\109\ In early 2008,
the Shenzhen Municipal Trade Union announced an ambitious plan
to hire over 300 private lawyers to provide free legal aid to
aggrieved workers. This plan was seen as a model for other
unions across the country.\110\
The ACFTU has continued its campaign to set up unions in
large multinational firms. With the impact of the global
economic crisis and the increased fear of social instability
related to rising unemployment, the trade union's role has been
focused on assisting the government in resolving disputes and
conflict. This is reflected in the renewed emphasis on
mediation and lower level resolution of labor disputes in local
regulations and measures. Reports on strikes and violent
conflict between workers and the police do not mention the
ACFTU as representing workers effectively, but depict it as
either absent or on the side of the employer.\111\ The
Guangdong Provincial Trade Union announced in November 2008
that collective wage negotiations would cease temporarily in
enterprises suffering economic difficulty.\112\
Collective Contracting
Collective contracts and some process of collective
consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor
relations since the 1990s when state enterprise reform deepened
and labor conflict began to increase rapidly, especially in the
foreign and private sectors. The ACFTU has championed
collective contracts and collective negotiations as important
foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In
recent years, the collective contract system has received more
Chinese Government and Communist Party support as part of an
attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor
relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU,
and the employer associations.\113\ Nonetheless, the collective
contract and consultation system remains weak and formalistic
because enterprise-level trade union leaders are not positioned
to serve the interests of their workers. Many collective
contracts merely reflect the basic legal standards in the
locality and often are the result of concerted government or
Party work to encourage the enterprise to enter into
formalistic contracts rather than the result of true bargaining
between management and the enterprise trade union.\114\
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has pushed
the establishment of collective contract regimes in foreign-
funded enterprises in particular. Wal-Mart stores in China
began to draft collective contract provisions in 2008. Experts
have criticized these agreements for being reached between
ACFTU officials and Wal-Mart managers with little consultation
with Wal-Mart employees.\115\ However, as mentioned above,
there have been instances in which Wal-Mart unions have
attempted to protect workers against unilateral moves by
management to trim the workforce. The trade unions in Shanghai
municipality Wal-Mart stores completed a
collective contract agreement in 2008 that went beyond basic
legal protections and rights. This agreement set an 8-percent
increase in workers' wages for the next two years and
stipulated that workers with three years' tenure were entitled
to non-fixed-term contracts.\116\
The 2008 Regulations on Harmonious Labor Relations in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone are the most extensive local
regulations regarding collective contracts and collective
consultation. Chapter 3 of these regulations emphasizes the
role local governments and trade unions play in collective
consultation. The regulations encourage both employers and
workers to use collective consultation in accordance with the
law for the establishment and modification of labor contracts,
adjustments in labor remunerations, improvement in labor
conditions, and resolution of labor disputes.\117\ The
employing unit and the labor union or the workers'
representatives (laodongzhe daibiao) should consult
collectively on issues that include payments, health and
safety, insurance benefits, and salary adjustments in
collective contracts, on any changes in regulations that may
affect workers' interests, on the prevention and resolution of
labor disputes, and other issues that require consultation
between the involved parties.\118\ The city and regional
government labor departments, as well as trade unions at every
level, should provide guidance and help in coordinating
collective consultation.\119\
The regulations also provide for representation by external
professionals.\120\ The number of these representatives should
not exceed one-third of the number of the original
representatives.\121\ Regional (qucheng) or enterprise trade
unions can also represent workers in collective consultation
and/or the establishment of collective contracts.\122\ These
measures may allow for collective negotiations to become more
professionalized and legalistic. They may also make it more
possible for collective negotiations to occur in factories
without an ACFTU presence.
For salary adjustments, the Shenzhen Regulations instruct
that the employing units and the trade union or the workers'
representatives should organize collective consultation--a
process that should occur at least once a year.\123\ In
addition, the regulations highlight the necessity to establish
city and regional coordination committees for labor relations
(shi qu laodong guanxi xietiao weiyuanhui).\124\ They should be
composed of representatives of various local governments'
departments as well as organizations that include the
participation of enterprise representatives and trade
unions,\125\ and conferences should be organized to discuss
questions related to labor relations and labor disputes, to
provide opinions and suggestions on changes in laws and
regulations that affect workers' interests, as well as on how
to handle labor disputes, and to provide research on how to
conduct collective consultation and establish collective
contracts, or any other related issues in accordance with the
law and regulations.\126\
The ACFTU has also pushed for the extension of collective
consultation to include regular negotiation between industrial
trade unions and small and medium employers. In July, the ACFTU
released a Guiding Opinion on Actively Launching Work on
Industry-Level Collective Wage Consultation.\127\ According to
the deputy chair of the ACFTU, this work by the trade union is
to increase workers' bargaining power in industries where large
numbers of workers are employed by small and medium enterprises
producing similar products in one locale.\128\ This is a
strategy to enhance and promote the ACFTU among workers who
often are not unionized and in the past have been neglected by
ACFTU campaigns.
None of the ACFTU activity has changed the basic fact that
freedom of association does not exist in China. Rather, the
ACFTU activity and continued higher profile in recent years is
a proactive attempt by the government to stave off the
formation of independent unions. However, with the onset of the
global economic crisis and increased concern for social
instability, the ACFTU appears to have taken a more passive and
subordinate role with respect to the Communist Party and
government.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOS)
The 2009 crackdown on legal activists and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) representing disadvantaged groups in
public interest lawsuits is also adversely affecting the
advancement of workers rights in China. The July detention of
Xu Zhiyong, the closure of the Gongmeng Law Research
Center,\129\ and the harassment of other NGOs that strive to
protect civil rights in China impede recent advancements
regarding migrant workers' rights and employment
discrimination. [See Section III--Civil Society.]
Working Conditions
There is increasing evidence of deteriorating working
conditions for many Chinese workers and increasing bifurcation
of the workforce as highly skilled workers still are in high
demand while lower level workers bear the brunt of the global
economic downturn. The trend of informalization also hurts the
lower rungs of the labor market more severely as employers seek
to retain highly sought technical workers and managers while
reducing the size of the less-skilled labor force.\130\
Generally speaking, recent wage and benefits increases are
slowing down or disappearing altogether. The government's
emphasis on reducing layoffs and encouraging wage reductions,
holidays, and other stopgap measures may also be leading to
worsening compensation, though it may reduce overall
unemployment.
WAGES
The 1994 PRC Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers
and assigns local governments to set wage standards for each
region.\131\ The new PRC Labor Contract Law improves formal
monitoring requirements to verify that workers receive minimum
wages. Article 74 requires local labor bureaus to monitor labor
practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.
Article 85 imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates
below minimum wage. In addition, Article 72 guarantees minimum
hourly wages for part-time workers.\132\
Illegal labor practices have undermined minimum wage
guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, especially
for migrant workers. Subcontracting practices within industry
exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When investors and
developers default on their payments to construction companies,
workers at the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack
the means to recover wages from the original defaulters.
Subcontractors, including companies that operate illegally,
neglect their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers
without any direct avenue to demand their salaries. In 2007,
the Commission reported a steady increase in the number of
workers who turned to labor arbitration to settle their
disputes with employers.\133\ As detailed below, this trend
appears to have continued.\134\
WORKING HOURS
The PRC Labor Law mandates a maximum 8-hour workday and 44-
hour average workweek.\135\ As mentioned in the Commission's
2008 Annual Report, forced overtime and workdays much longer
than the legally mandated maximum are not uncommon, especially
in export sectors, where some employers avoid paying overtime
rates by compensating workers on a piece-rate basis with quotas
high enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime wages.\136\
It has been reported that suppliers in China avoid exposing
themselves to claims of requiring illegal, long hours by hiring
firms that help them set up double booking systems for foreign
importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations.
Such firms not only help suppliers prepare books to pass
audits, but also coach managers and employees on how to respond
to auditors' questions.\137\
In 2009, disputes over working hours abuses continued to be
a major reason for labor disputes, especially disputes
involving overtime or wage arrears related to past abuses and
to struggling enterprises avoiding legal responsibilities to
cut costs.\138\ The PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration
Law lengthened the time allowed to file a dispute and also put
more evidentiary responsibility on the employer to demonstrate
that overtime abuses had not occurred, which also resulted in
an increase in the number of workers seeking compensation.\139\
Many workplaces reduced hours and salaries in the wake of the
global economic crisis, which led to workers' complaints of
violations of the minimum wage.\140\
The economic crisis and increasing informalization of the
less-skilled workforce also led to greater bifurcation between
highly skilled workers and managers and low-level or
production-level workers. In order to retain scarce skilled
workers, companies continued to raise wages and benefits for
such staff, while cutting those of lower-level workers who can
be more easily replaced when the economy recovers.\141\
INFORMALIZATION
Since the mid-1990s, when China's economic reforms
quickened, there has been a ``rapid and unprecedented rise'' in
informal employment.\142\ Informal employment is defined as
employment that is not stable or secure, that lacks a written
agreement or contract, and that does not provide social
insurance or benefits.\143\ Economists estimate that 45 percent
of urban employment in China is now informal. Of workers in the
state or collective sectors, 22 percent are employed
informally, while the percentage rises to 84 percent for
workers in the private sector. ``Informal employment is the
rule rather than the exception,'' according to experts
reporting on findings from the field.\144\ Informal employment
is also more likely for women, the very young and the very old,
and among less educated workers.\145\
The 2008 Labor Contract Law included provisions to reduce
informal employment and to encourage the signing of labor
contracts, particularly longer term or open-term contracts. A
National People's Congress (NPC) implementation report states
that there has been considerable success in the expansion of
the labor contract system. The NPC also reported that contract
length had become longer. In Jiangsu province, 49.09 percent of
all contracts were between one and three years, while contracts
less than one year were only 14.42 percent. Open-term contracts
had increased by 1.19 percent.\146\ However, it is likely that
these figures overstate the number of Chinese workers with more
security and stable employment since the passing of the PRC
Labor Contract Law. There is evidence that the high rates of
``labor contract signing'' are leaving out a large number of
workers who now are employed in an informal and unstable
manner, receiving pay by the day, hour, or piece rate with no
formal agreement or relationship.\147\
There are also reports of increased use of temporary
workers to avoid the burdens of formal employment, replacement
of older workers with younger workers to avoid longer term
contracts, and the use of contract expiration as a principal
method of laying off formal employees during the economic
slowdown.\148\ Formal employment in China continues to erode,
especially for unskilled urban workers and rural migrants.
Child Labor
In spite of legal measures to prohibit the practice of
child labor in China, child labor remains a persistent
problem.\149\ As a member of the International Labour
Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions
on the elimination of child labor.\150\ The PRC Labor Law and
related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under
16,\151\ and both national and local legal provisions
prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines for
employing children.\152\ Under the PRC Criminal Law, employers
and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme
danger.\153\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have
dulled the effects of these legal measures. The overall extent
of child labor in China is unclear in part because the
government classifies data on the matter as ``highly secret.''
\154\
As reported by the Commission in 2008, child laborers
reportedly work in low-skill service sectors as well as in
small workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and
shoe manufacturing enterprises.\155\ Many underage laborers
reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15
years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the
education system and shortages of adult workers.\156\ Children
in detention facilities also have been subjected to forced
labor.\157\ Reports of child labor continued in 2009 with a
high-profile case surfacing at a factory in Guangdong province
that implicated foreign buyers. A migrant worker, Liu Pan, was
crushed to death in a factory producing paper goods for the
Walt Disney Company. It was discovered after his death that Liu
was only 15 when he was hired at the factory.\158\ China Labor
Watch also reported that the factory's use of child laborers
was widespread.\159\ Media also reported on the presence of
underage workers in government-sponsored labor transfer
programs that transferred workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region to jobs in the interior of China [see Section
IV--Xinjiang].
As reported in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report, the
Chinese Government, which has condemned the use of child labor
and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,\160\
permits ``work-study'' programs and activities that in
practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor, and are
tantamount to official endorsement of it.\161\ Under work-study
programs implemented in various parts of China, children who
are elementary school students pick crops and engage in other
physical labor.\162\ [See Section IV--Xinjiang for more
information on work-study programs in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.]
Central government legislation allows this form of child
labor. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that
``education practice labor'' and vocational skills training
labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational
institutes do not constitute the use of child labor when such
activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the
students.\163\ The PRC Education Law supports schools that
establish work-study and other programs, provided that the
programs do not negatively affect normal studies.\164\ A
nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and
secondary school students outlines the general terms of such
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals,
contribute to production outputs, and generate resources for
improving schools.\165\ These provisions contravene China's
obligations as a member state to ILO conventions prohibiting
child labor.\166\ In 2006, the ILO's Committee of Experts on
the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations
``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under
18 years performing forced labor not only in the framework of
re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular
work programs at school.'' \167\
Forced Labor
In May 2009, another forced labor case was exposed at brick
kilns in Anhui province. This case follows several high-profile
scandals at brick kilns in 2007 and 2008, involving forced
labor and child labor. In this case, brick kilns had employed
mentally handicapped workers and employed them in ``slave-
like'' conditions. The official media reported that
investigations were continuing in possible trafficking of
mentally impaired people in China as these workers came from a
number of different provinces and the brick kiln owner reported
that he ``bought'' the workers from a taxi driver in a nearby
province.\168\
As reported in the Commission's 2008 Annual Report, Article
244 of the PRC Criminal Law makes forced labor a crime. Events
during this reporting year showed the deterrent value of this
provision to be inadequate at best under current
conditions.\169\ Current law applies only to legally recognized
employers and does not apply to individuals or illegal
workplaces. As the Commission noted in its last Annual Report,
the All China Lawyers Association in June 2007 asked the
National People's Congress Standing Committee to introduce new
legislation making slavery a criminal charge.\170\ It is
unclear at the time of this writing whether such legislation is
in process. However, in March 2008, members of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) recommended
to the CPPCC (which is not a lawmaking body) that the Criminal
Law be amended to criminalize ``violently forcing labor.''
\171\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's International Commitments to Worker Rights
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China is
obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor
rights for workers, including freedom of association and the
``effective recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.\172\
China is also a permanent member of the ILO's governing body.\173\ The
ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
(1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to respect, to promote and to
realize'' these fundamental rights based on ``the very fact of [ILO]
membership.'' \174\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's International Commitments to Worker Rights--Cont.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ILO's eight core conventions articulate the scope of worker rights
and principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is
committed to respect the fundamental right or principle addressed in
each core convention, even if that member state has not ratified the
convention. China has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions,
including two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138
and No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and occupation
(No. 100 and No. 111).\175\ The ILO has reported that the Chinese
Government is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced
labor (No. 29 and No. 105).\176\ On its face, Chinese labor law appears
to incorporate some of the basic obligations of the ILO's eight core
conventions, but in practice many of these obligations remain
unfulfilled.\177\ Importantly, Chinese labor law does not incorporate
basic obligations of the ILO's provisions relating to the freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining.
The Chinese Government is a state party to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guarantees the
right of workers to strike, the right of workers to organize
independent unions, the right of trade unions to function freely, the
right of trade unions to establish national federations or
confederations, and the right of the latter to form or join
international trade union organizations.\178\ In ratifying the ICESCR,
the Chinese Government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which
guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The government
asserts that application of the article should be consistent with
Chinese law, which does not allow for the creation of independent trade
unions.\179\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-China Bilateral Cooperation
The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) participated in the
economic track of the first meeting of the United States-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009. Discussions at
the economic track focused on ways to promote a sustainable
global recovery and to ensure that future growth results in a
more balanced global economy and stronger financial systems.
USDOL and China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security agreed to further bilateral cooperation on labor
issues, including undertaking a dialogue between the two
agencies.
Criminal Justice
Introduction
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year, as in 2008,
the dual priorities of maintaining ``social stability'' and
preserving the Communist Party's hold on power have played a
significant role in the operation of the criminal justice
system and the use of police power.\1\ Even before the global
financial crisis, the Chinese leadership was concerned about
challenges to ``social stability'' during 2009 because of
several significant anniversaries, such as the 20th anniversary
of the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the 60th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic of China, that would fall
during the year.\2\ Anniversaries in China are potentially
destabilizing events because they can act as a trigger for
citizens' protests against current policies and conditions.\3\
The attention Chinese leaders are placing on ``social
stability'' is not surprising; the number of group protests,
petitions, and riots reportedly is on the rise, and clashes
between citizens and police appeared to intensify during this
reporting year.\4\
The problem of unchecked police power and arbitrary
detention of Chinese citizens showed no sign of abating during
2009. For example, the Commission noted numerous reports of
petitioners being held in extralegal secret ``black jails''
(hei jianyu) (both in Beijing and elsewhere) during the annual
March meeting of the National People's Congress and the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference.\5\ Extralegal
detention and harassment of activists continued during this
reporting year and intensified during the run-up to the 20th
anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen
protests on June 3 and 4.\6\
Fair trial rights received significant attention among
China's online community and the media during the past year in
the context of two criminal cases that were plagued by
irregularities and suspicious official conduct.\7\ Yang Jia was
executed in November 2008 after being convicted of killing six
public security officers in Shanghai, apparently in retaliation
for earlier police mistreatment, and Deng Yujiao, a young
female worker in Badong county, Hubei province was exempted
from punishment after she killed a local official and injured
another in self-defense to stave off an alleged attempted
rape.\8\ That members of China's online community and activists
sympathized with Yang Jia highlights the fraught nature of
relations between the Chinese public security apparatus and the
citizenry, and perhaps an increasing focus among citizens on
the importance of procedural fairness and justice.\9\ The
support among Chinese citizens for Deng Yujiao stemmed in part
from the anger and resentment many citizens apparently feel
toward corrupt local officials and the police.\10\
There were several potentially positive developments during
this reporting year with respect to criminal justice. The
first-ever National Human Rights Action Plan, which the
government released in April, contains policy commitments,
which, if implemented effectively, could lead to improvements
in fair trial rights and detainee rights. Also in April, the
Supreme People's Procuratorate launched a five-month campaign
to ensure ``proper management'' of detention centers in the
aftermath of a spate of unnatural deaths of detainees at
Ministry of Public Security-run detention centers during the
first few months of 2009.\11\ In August, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate announced that confessions obtained through
torture would no longer be admissible as evidence in death
penalty cases.\12\ The revised PRC Lawyers Law, which has been
in effect for over a year, reportedly has led to some improved
access by lawyers to their detained clients in certain
jurisdictions; however, serious implementation challenges
remain.\13\ In June, the municipality of Beijing announced that
by the end of 2009 it would cease executing prisoners by
gunshot, but instead would use lethal injections.\14\ The
Supreme People's Court indicated that eventually all executions
nationwide will be carried out by lethal injection.\15\
Abuse of Police Power
SUPPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS AND CITIZENS WHO SEEK JUSTICE RELATED TO
``SENSITIVE ISSUES''
Public security (gongan) officers and officers in the
domestic security protection (guobao) unit of public security
bureaus continued to engage in extralegal tactics such as
harassment, assault, kidnappings, and illegal detention in
order to punish Chinese citizens who expressed dissent or
sought to defend their rights and the rights of others.\16\
Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of
expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association
contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
as well as China's own laws.\17\
Parents seeking justice for their children who died in the
May 2008 Sichuan earthquake and those who were injured or
killed from drinking melamine-tainted milk were subjected to
illegal treatment at the hands of the police or their
agents.\18\ Authorities warned parent protesters in Sichuan
province ``of dire consequences if they continued to `make a
fuss.' '' \19\ Several parents who eluded the police and made
it to Beijing to petition reported that after they returned to
Sichuan, ``the threats from local officials increased and the
parents were told it was illegal for them to meet or talk to
foreign journalists.'' \20\ Beijing-based Zhao Lianhai, an
organizer of parents whose children were injured or killed by
melamine-tainted milk, had been questioned by public security
officers more than 20 times between September 2008 and March
2009.\21\
Several lawyers who took on ``sensitive'' cases or got
involved in ``sensitive'' issues during the past year were
abducted or beaten by public security officers and/or
individuals working under the direction or with the knowledge
of the public security bureau.\22\ [See Section III--Access to
Justice--Harassment and Abuse of Human Rights Lawyers.]
Shanghai-based rights defense lawyer Zheng Enchong has been
subjected to constant surveillance and harassment since his
release from prison in June 2006.\23\ Zheng was summoned by
police for questioning 10 times during April 2009 alone.\24\
Human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng was last seen being taken away
by police and hired ``thugs'' in February of this year. As of
mid-September, his whereabouts remain unknown.\25\
Within one month of the issuance in December 2008 of
Charter 08, a document calling for political reform and greater
protection of human rights in China, the non-governmental
organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that more
than 100 signatories throughout China had been summoned for
questioning by the police.\26\ At the same time as signers of
the Charter were being pressured by public security officers to
renounce their support for the Charter, other officers were
searching the individuals' homes, often confiscating computers,
manuscripts, and even bank account books.\27\ After prominent
intellectual and rights defender Zhang Zuhua--one of the main
drafters of the Charter--was taken into police custody on
December 8, his home was searched and many items were
confiscated, including computers, cash, credit cards, and bank
deposit books.\28\ Zhang's bank accounts were promptly
emptied.\29\ In late March 2009, domestic security protection
(guobao) officers warned Jiang Qisheng, a Beijing-based writer,
activist, and signatory of Charter 08, not to engage in any
activities commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen protests. Officers searched his home and took three
computers, several bank deposit books, and many manuscripts and
books.\30\ [See Section II--Freedom of Expression, for a
discussion of Charter signatory Liu Xiaobo's detention and
arrest.]
The abuse of police power to summon citizens for
questioning, search their homes, and arbitrarily confiscate
their personal property sparked an unprecedented open joint
statement from eight human rights groups in mainland China and
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in April 2009.\31\ The
declaration criticizes the Chinese Government's frequent use of
``police force to summon Chinese citizens, search their
residences, seize their computers, bank deposit books, paper
notebooks, drafts of their writings, etc.'' \32\ The groups
condemned such ``illegal exercise of police power'' and
violations of Chinese citizens' right to personal liberty and
property, and other fundamental human rights.\33\
Authorities also unlawfully subjected family members of
dissidents, rights defenders, and activists to strict
surveillance and control during the Commission's 2009 reporting
year. Officials use harassment (or the threat of harassment) of
family members of activists for at least three purposes: (1) to
punish and instill fear in activists by causing their families
to suffer, (2) to create leverage for the government in its
efforts to pressure activists to stop whatever conduct they are
engaged in that the government does not like (i.e., ``stop
doing X, and we'll stop harassing your family''), and (3) in
the case of detained activists, to obstruct attempts by family
members to bring public attention to the activist's plight.\34\
For example, on December 26, 2008, police summoned Charter 08
drafter Zhang Zuhua for a second time regarding the Charter and
threatened him that ``severe consequences'' to his family would
follow if he continued promoting Charter 08 and giving
interviews to the media.\35\ Liu Xiaobo's wife, Liu Xia, has
been followed constantly and monitored by public security
officers since Liu Xiaobo was taken away on December 8,
2008.\36\
Yuan Weijing, wife of imprisoned legal advocate and rights
defender Chen Guangcheng, continues to be placed under ``soft
detention'' (ruanjin).\37\ As many as 26 guards, who reportedly
work in two shifts, keep her confined to her home and prevent
visitors from entering.\38\ Zeng Jinyan, a blogger, rights
activist, and the wife of imprisoned human rights activist Hu
Jia, is under strict surveillance by domestic security
protection (guobao) officers. In February, when U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing, at least six
guobao officers prevented Zeng from leaving her apartment,
citing ``an order from the top.'' \39\ After fleeing China to
the United States, Geng He, wife of disappeared attorney Gao
Zhisheng, cited the Chinese authorities' harassment and abuse
of her children as the primary reason for their defection.\40\
Local law enforcement officials outside of Beijing often
abuse their power in order to silence aggrieved citizens who
may seek to go to the provincial capital and/or Beijing to
petition.\41\ For example, in Sichuan province, public security
officers illegally detained some of the parents who sought
justice for their children killed during the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake in order to prevent them from petitioning or
advocating for an investigation.\42\ And a 58-year-old
petitioner from Jilin province, Du Mingrong, told the Guardian,
a British daily newspaper, in May that he was locked up by
local officials for two years and was never told why. ``I was
just petitioning to get back some money that the police had
stolen from me. . . . I was beaten and tortured by officials in
Baishan in Jilin. I came to Beijing to protest.'' \43\
GOVERNMENT'S USE OF HIRED ``THUGS'' FOR INTIMIDATION AND ABUSE
A ``disguised'' form of police abuse continued during 2009:
the use of hired, unofficial personnel (often referred to as
``thugs'' in media and human rights reports) to beat, abduct,
and torture dissidents, activists, petitioners, and other
``troublemakers,'' with the knowledge of the police or
government officials.\44\ In December 2008, the UN Committee
against Torture (UNCAT) concluded that the Chinese Government's
use of ``unaccountable `thugs' who use physical violence
against specific [human rights] defenders but enjoy de facto
immunity'' was one of three ``over-arching problems'' that
undermine effective implementation of the Convention against
Torture.\45\ The UNCAT specifically noted reports that Gao
Zhisheng and other human rights lawyers were harassed by
``unaccountable personnel alleged to be hired by State
authorities.'' \46\ Gao was last seen on February 4, 2009,
being dragged out of bed from his relatives' home in Shaanxi by
more than 10 police and ``hired thugs.'' \47\ In the fall of
2008, Xu Zhiyong, a law professor and co-founder of the Open
Constitution Initiative (OCI) began to organize citizen rescue
teams to free petitioners from black jails in Beijing.
Government-hired ``thugs'' at Beijing's Youth Hotel (which
operates as a black jail) beat up Xu early on in his rescue
efforts.\48\ Xu Zhiyong was told by a petitioner inside the
black jail that the local government of Kaifeng municipality
(in Henan province) had hired gangsters as ``guards.'' The
hired ``guards'' reportedly received 1,000 yuan (US$146) for a
light beating and 3,000 yuan (US$439) for a heavy beating.\49\
[See Section III--Civil Society, for a discussion of the
government's shutdown of OCI and the detention and subsequent
release of Xu Zhiyong.]
CLASHES BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND CHINESE CITIZENS
Relations between China's law enforcement agencies and
Chinese citizens appear to be on a steady decline. In April,
Hong Kong-based analyst Willy Lam observed that police
incompetence and corruption were responsible for ``quite a
number of relatively minor incidents . . . develop[ing] into
law-and-order disasters.'' \50\ According to the Open
Constitution Initiative, which ranked the Yang Jia police-
murder case as the most important law-related event of 2008,
the fact that Yang Jia, ``was regarded as a hero by ordinary
citizens . . . indicated the unusual tension between the police
force and the general public. The public has lost faith in
police.'' \51\ In March, a land dispute in Yingde county,
Guangdong province resulted in violent clashes between police
and farmers, resulting in many injuries.\52\ One injured
villager told the Washington Post that he was now ``terrified''
of the police: ``I feel that Chinese cops can kill people like
ants with impunity.'' \53\ In mid-August, human rights
defenders in Beijing and Shanghai launched an online petition
protesting police violence.\54\
The number of ``mass incidents'' (quntixing shijian), an
imprecise term that includes mass petitions, violent riots, and
unauthorized peaceful demonstrations and assemblies, appears to
be on the rise.\55\ Chinese authorities reported 74,000 ``mass
incidents'' in 2004,\56\ and in February 2009, the Hong Kong
magazine Cheng Ming reported that an internal report circulated
by the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public
Security stated that during 2008 there were more than 127,000
``mass protests'' (qunti kangzheng shijian) throughout China in
which more than 12.1 million people participated.\57\ The
growing number of such incidents and protests and the apparent
inability of the Party, government, and security forces to
prevent them in the first instance, and appropriately handle
them once they occur, is one of the most serious problems
facing China's leadership.\58\ The number of attacks on police
stations and police vehicles, and even on police officers
themselves, reportedly has increased as well.\59\
Evidence of the fraught state of police-citizen relations
was apparent in several high-profile incidents that occurred
during the past year. On June 17, a mass incident erupted in
Shishou city, Hubei province, following the suspicious death of
a 24-year-old cook, Tu Yuangao, who was employed at a hotel
that reportedly had close ties to the local government.\60\
Rumors circulated that Tu was killed because he had threatened
to expose the hotel's involvement in the local drug trade.\61\
The police, however, promptly declared Tu's fall from the third
floor to be a suicide.\62\ Protesters burned the hotel and
overturned police cars in what became a full-blown riot that
pitted tens of thousands of citizens against riot police for
several days.\63\ In an unusual move, a local Shishou official
named Li Guolin, blogged about the events and criticized the
government's characterization of the riot as an isolated
incident.\64\ Li wrote, ``[T]he unrest was precipitated by long
established tensions in Shishou society. . . . Such tensions
are what the media calls `hatred toward the rich, the officials
and the police' that spread widely among the society.'' \65\
Another clash that revealed tensions between citizens and
police occurred in late May in Huining county, Gansu province.
Nearly 1,000 citizens protested the alleged beating of a
student by traffic police personnel after the student failed to
stop at a red light while riding his bicycle.\66\ A police car
was overturned before 100 additional police showed up on the
scene. Local citizens were reported as saying that the clash
reflected long-simmering resentment of the rough tactics used
by local police.\67\
The tense relationship between China's public security
apparatus and the citizenry was highlighted in the case of Yang
Jia, a 28-year-old man who was convicted of killing six police
officers in Shanghai in July 2008 and then executed for the
crime in late November.\68\ The police killings were apparently
in retaliation for an earlier incident of police abuse.\69\
Artist and blogger Ai Weiwei, who followed Yang Jia's case
closely, believed that Yang Jia killed the police officers as a
``protest against the system.'' \70\ Ai Weiwei noted that
sympathy for Yang Jia grew as procedural irregularities in the
Shanghai authorities' handling of the case spread across the
Internet.\71\ In an online poll conducted by Southern Weekend,
Internet users ranked Yang Jia's case as the most important
event of 2008.\72\
Another form of state brutality that received substantial
attention during this reporting year was the violence
perpetrated by urban management (or administration) officers,
or chengguan.\73\ The responsibilities of urban management
officers include checking permits, shutting down unlicensed
street vendor stalls, and generally assisting in maintaining
``stability'' in the cities, but in order to maintain
``stability,'' chengguan often resort to violence.\74\ The
reputation of urban management officers for brutality among
Chinese citizens is so widespread that the word ``chengguan''
is used as a synonym in colloquial speech for ``violence.''
\75\ In April, excerpts from an official training handbook for
Beijing's urban management officers that included instructions
on how to beat targets without drawing blood on the face or
leaving marks on the body was posted online, sparking outrage
in the media and blogosphere.\76\ In May, thousands of
university students from the Nanjing University of Aeronautics
and Astronautics in Nanjing city, Jiangsu province, reportedly
took to the streets after five students were beaten by
chengguan officers as they were trying to set up vendor stands
on the sidewalk.\77\ The unrest reportedly reflected simmering
anger among students regarding the harsh tactics used by the
chengguan.\78\ Over the past several years, academics and
others have called for the abolition of the urban management
system and have raised questions about the legal basis of the
system.\79\ In July, the State Council's Legislative Affairs
Office issued for public comment draft measures that would
legalize the business activities of street vendors and
peddlers.\80\ A Caijing report on the draft measures noted that
conflicts between chengguan and peddlers had increased and were
becoming more violent.\81\
Arbitrary Detention
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD)
defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary''
if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) there is clearly
no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an
individual is deprived of his liberty for having exercised
rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave non-compliance with fair
trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international
human rights instruments.\82\ Many forms of arbitrary detention
also violate China's own laws.\83\ Arbitrary detention in China
includes various forms of extralegal detention, such as
detention in secret black jails (hei jianyu), ``soft
detention'' (ruanjin)--a form of unlawful home confinement--and
the arbitrary confinement of individuals in psychiatric
hospitals for non-medical reasons. Another form of extralegal
detention--shuanggui (``double regulation'' or ``double
designation'')--is used by the Party for investigation of Party
members, most often officials in cases of suspected corruption.
Arbitrary detention also includes various kinds of
extrajudicial administrative detention, such as reeducation
through labor. Finally, the detention of those who have been
deprived of their liberty for exercising rights guaranteed
under the UDHR and ICCPR is arbitrary.\84\ [See Section II--
Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion, and other sections
for information on specific cases.]
EXTRALEGAL DETENTION AND DISAPPEARANCES
The use of extralegal detention, discussed in previous
Commission reports, continued unabated during this reporting
year. As in 2008, Chinese authorities subjected citizens to at
least three forms of extralegal detention: (1) arbitrary home
confinement or ``soft detention'' (ruanjin) and control,\85\
(2) detention in black jails and other secret detention sites,
which the UN Committee against Torture has deemed ``per se
disappearance,'' \86\ and (3) shuanggui.\87\
Arbitrary ``soft detention'' and control
As discussed in last year's Annual Report, and earlier in
this section, the unlawful ``soft detention'' (ruanjin) or
``home confinement'' that numerous dissidents, activists, and
their family members are subjected to has no basis in Chinese
law and constitutes arbitrary detention under international
human rights standards.\88\ Perhaps the most famous case of
unlawful home confinement was former Premier Zhao Ziyang's 16-
year-long period of ``soft detention,'' which ended with his
death in 2005. Zhao's thoughts on his confinement have come to
light this year with the release of his memoir, ``Prisoner of
the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang.'' Based on tapes
he secretly recorded around 2000, the memoir contains a letter
Zhao wrote to President Jiang Zemin in 1997 regarding his
illegal home confinement. Zhao states:
Since June 1989, I have been illegally subjected to
either house arrest or semi-house arrest. This has gone
on for eight and a half years already. . . . I do not
even know what specific laws I have violated, nor do I
know which state law enforcement agency and what
procedure of law have been used to authorize my house
arrest. How can subjecting a person to this kind of
undeclared house arrest and depriving his rights as a
citizen not constitute a crude trampling of the
socialist legal system? \89\
The abuse of police power to unlawfully restrict the
personal liberty of dissidents, activists, writers, and others
during the period surrounding the 20th anniversary of the
violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests was so
severe that 81 individuals who signed Charter 08 launched the
Anti-Soft Detention Anti-Surveillance United Movement.\90\
Their statement, issued on June 10, observes that every year,
in the lead-up to June 4 and other politically sensitive dates,
public security bureaus across China mobilize a massive amount
of police power for the purpose of subjecting dissidents and
rights defense activists to ruanjin and surveillance.\91\ The
group accuses the Communist Party of wide-scale violations of
human rights, particularly citizens' right to personal
liberty.\92\
Secret detention facilities and disappearances
According to the UN Committee against Torture, detention of
individuals in secret detention facilities ``constitutes per se
disappearance.'' \93\ Secret detention sites in China include
black jails (often housed in privately-run small hotels,
guesthouses, and government buildings), government facilities
used for forced detention for ``legal education'' and ``study
classes,'' and psychiatric hospitals used to hold petitioners
and others for non-medical reasons.
Black jails have no legal basis.\94\ Although the Chinese
Government has denied the existence of black jails on several
occasions, including during the February 2009 session of the UN
Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review of its human
rights record,\95\ the existence of black jails of various
forms throughout China is well-documented.\96\ Black jails
arose as a substitute for the dismantled ``custody and
repatriation'' (shourong qiansong) centers that had been used
to detain petitioners and undocumented migrants, up until they
were abolished in 2003.\97\ Law professor and human rights
defender Xu Zhiyong defines ``black jails'' as:
places used by provincial governments to illegally
imprison petitioners; we call them black jails because,
first, they are just like prisons--established by the
government to restrict people's freedom--and, second,
they are ``black'' because they have no basis in any
laws or regulations and are totally illegal.\98\
Xu believes that the government's use of black jails is
``in a sense . . . the biggest human rights issue because it
involves so many people, it's so widespread, and it's so
lacking in legal justification.'' \99\ Chinese Human Rights
Defenders and others have documented that the extralegal
detention and repatriation of petitioners is good business for
the public security apparatus in Beijing, small hotels that
double as black jails, and interceptors (i.e., individuals who
``catch'' petitioners). One county in Hunan province reportedly
pays nearly US$300 for each petitioner from the county who is
caught in Beijing.\100\ Owners of small hotels in Beijing may
be compensated up to US$35 per prisoner per day.\101\
There is compelling evidence that black jails in Beijing
exist with the knowledge and even cooperation of the Beijing
public security bureau.\102\ During one of Xu's citizen rescue
attempts, Xu was beaten by the guards, who warned him: ``We are
the government, what can we be afraid of? Do you want to call
110 [police hotline for emergency]? You can call now!'' \103\
Beijing public security officers reportedly were also involved
in the detention of Wang Shixiang, a petitioner from Anhui
province, who was detained in a black jail in Beijing during
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's visit to China in
February 2009.\104\ After Wang was beaten by guards at the
black jail, he managed to contact the Beijing Public Security
Bureau, but once the officers who arrived at the scene learned
that Wang was a petitioner, they did nothing to help him.\105\
``Legal education classes'' (fajiaoban or xuefaban) or
``study classes'' (xuexiban), are another form of secret
detention used by the Chinese Government.\106\ Officials
forcibly detain petitioners, Falun Gong practitioners, and
other ``undesirables'' in illegal detention sites where they
are, on occasion, forced to study the ``error'' of their ways
with the goal that they achieve a new understanding and cease
their conduct.\107\ At other times, they are simply held in
detention without any pretext of ``education.'' \108\ For
example, petitioner Zheng Dajing, who went to Beijing to
petition and was subsequently abducted and taken back to his
hometown of Yunxi county in Hubei province, spent over a year
in a detention center that was called a ``law education
class.'' \109\ Another petitioner from Hubei province, Wang
Zan, ended up in a black jail in Wuhan city in early March 2009
after traveling to Beijing to seek justice for having been
detained in a ``law education class'' for 113 days before and
during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.\110\
In October 2008, the Beijing News broke the story of Sun
Fawu, a farmer in Xintai city, Shandong province, who was
locked up in a psychiatric hospital by local authorities for
approximately 20 days to prevent him from going to Beijing to
petition.\111\ Sun was tied to a bed and forcibly
medicated.\112\ Sun was only released after he signed an
agreement that he would not attempt to go to Beijing to
petition again. Following the Sun Fawu story, more journalists
uncovered stories of petitioners like Sun who had no history of
mental illness, being forcibly detained in psychiatric
hospitals, and in some cases also forced to take
medication.\113\
Once an individual ``disappears'' into a Chinese
psychiatric hospital for non-medical reasons, he or she exists
completely outside the legal system.\114\ For this reason, one
Chinese commentator has called psychiatric hospitals in China a
``gulag archipelago'' with Chinese characteristics.\115\
Authorities have also used psychiatric detention as a
convenient way to have people simply ``disappear'' who might
present difficulties for the government, for example, in high-
profile criminal cases. In the Yang Jia case, for example,
Yang's mother, Wang Jingmei, was taken by Beijing public
security officers from her home on July 1, the same day that
Yang Jia killed six public security officers in Shanghai's
Zhabei district's police station.\116\ A few days later, Wang,
who does not suffer from mental illness, was locked up
incommunicado for over four months in a psychiatric hospital
(ankang) run by the Beijing Public Security Bureau while Yang's
case made its way through the courts.\117\ Yang's mother
apparently knew important information related to the case, and
her forced disappearance also may have played some role in her
reportedly approving a defense attorney hand-picked by local
Shanghai authorities.\118\ The attorney selected for Yang Jia,
Xie Youming, had ties to the Zhabei district government, which
presented a clear conflict of interest.\119\ After Wang was
finally released and taken to Shanghai for a final meeting with
her son before his execution, Wang insisted on speaking with a
judge in Yang's case. When she told the judge her story and
asked him why they had prohibited her from testifying at her
son's trial and appeal, the judge told Wang that they had been
unable to locate her.\120\
In another high profile case during this reporting year--
the case of Deng Yujiao--after Deng killed a local official and
injured another in self-defense to thwart an attempted rape,
authorities in Hubei province detained Deng in a psychiatric
hospital.\121\ Like Yang Jia, Deng Yujiao garnered much
sympathy and support among Chinese Internet users and the
media.\122\ Shortly after Deng was detained in the hospital,
one of Deng's friends managed to get into her room and found
her tightly strapped to the bed. Deng's friend reported that
Deng had told him that she had been beaten and that officers
had threatened her that if she did not admit she suffered from
depression, they would give her the death penalty.\123\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The prominent human rights attorney Gao Zhisheng was last seen being
forcibly taken away from his hometown in Shaanxi province by more than
10 public security officers and ``thugs'' on February 4, 2009.\124\
More than eight months later, Gao still has not been seen and his
whereabouts are unknown.\125\ Gao angered Chinese authorities by taking
on sensitive cases (such as those involving house church activists,
Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of illegal property seizures) and
exposing human rights abuses in China.\126\ In October 2005, Gao wrote
an open letter to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao detailing
torture of Falun Gong practitioners. A month later, authorities shut
down Gao's law firm and revoked his lawyers' license. In December 2006,
Gao was convicted of ``inciting subversion of state power'' and was
given a three-year sentence, suspended for five years.\127\
In September 2007, public security officers abducted Gao, apparently
prompted by the publication of an open letter Gao had written to the
U.S. Congress in which he alleged widespread human rights abuses in
China and described the Chinese Government's harsh treatment of him and
his family.\128\ During his abduction, which lasted more than 50 days,
Gao was tortured in an unknown location outside Beijing.\129\ Gao's
account of his torture, titled ``Dark Night, Dark Hood, and Kidnapping
by Dark Mafia,'' was released in February 2009.\130\ Gao describes how
he was struck repeatedly with electric batons all over his body,
including his genitals, and subjected to other forms of torture. He was
told that his tormentors--apparently hired ``thugs''--were chosen
specifically by higher level officials to torture Gao. They called him
a ``traitor'' for writing to the U.S. Congress, and admitted that Falun
Gong practitioners were indeed tortured as Gao had alleged, and that
Gao would experience the same kind of torture. Gao was also warned that
he would be killed if he told anyone about being abducted and
tortured.\131\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Disappearance of Gao Zhisheng--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2009, Gao's wife, Geng He, along with their two children,
escaped from China and arrived in the United States on March 11,
2009.\132\ Geng He explained that the main reason she defected with her
children was that Chinese authorities had prohibited her 15-year-old
daughter, Geng Ge, from attending school, which led her daughter to
attempt to commit suicide several times.\133\ On March 17, 2009,
foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang denied that the family had been
mistreated. The spokesperson stated: ``There's no political persecution
or limits on the freedom of the family.'' \134\
Geng He issued an open letter to the U.S. Congress on April 23, 2009,
asking that the U.S. Government pressure the Chinese Government to
reveal the whereabouts of her husband.\135\ In official correspondence
with Members of the U.S. Congress in early May regarding Gao's
whereabouts, the PRC Ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong,
indicated that Gao is ``currently serving the probation'' that he was
sentenced to on December 22, 2006, and that ``the public security
authority has not taken any mandatory measure against him.'' \136\
In June, Gao's older brother, Gao Zhiyi, unsuccessfully attempted to
locate his brother in Beijing.\137\ Gao Zhiyi first went to the Beijing
Public Security Bureau, but was denied entry into the building. He then
went to the police station near Gao Zhisheng's home and requested to
see his brother.\138\ Officers at the police station told Gao that they
needed to get instructions from above, and they did not know how long
that would take. The officers asked where Gao Zhiyi would be staying in
Beijing, and he responded ``at my brother's home.'' \139\ The public
security officers said that was not permissible, even though Gao Zhiyi
had a key to his brother's apartment.\140\ Gao Zhiyi reportedly left
Beijing without any news of his brother.
On July 10, Bob Fu, president of the U.S.-based non-governmental
organization ChinaAid, delivered to the Commission and the U.S.
Department of State a petition of more than 100,000 signatures calling
for the Chinese Government to release Gao Zhisheng.\141\ The petition
was also delivered to the PRC Embassy in Washington, DC. In early
September, Teng Biao reported on Twitter that Gao had apparently called
his family in Shaanxi province in July, but Gao still has not been seen
since February and his whereabouts remain unknown.\142\ As of the
release of this report, there still has been no response from the
Chinese Government regarding Gao's whereabouts and condition.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shuanggui: Extralegal investigatory detention of party members
Shuanggui, (often translated as ``double regulation'' or
``double designation''), refers to the process of summoning a
target of investigation (usually a Party official) to appear at
a designated place at a designated time.\143\ As discussed in
the Commission's 2008 Annual Report, shuanggui not only
contravenes the right to be free from arbitrary detention
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it
also violates Chinese law.\144\ Shuanggui detainees generally
are held in undisclosed locations and do not have the benefit
of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law's protections for criminal
suspects and defendants.\145\ In December 2008, the UN
Committee against Torture expressed concern about
``unacknowledged detention facilities'' and recommended that
the Chinese Government ``ensure that no one is detained in any
secret facility,'' noting that such detention violates the
Convention against Torture.\146\
Shuanggui continued to be used by Party discipline
inspection commissions during the past year to detain high-
ranking officials in the Party's ongoing battle against
corruption. One senior official after another from Guangdong
province's political-legal apparatus has been put under
shuanggui since last October, when Yang Xiancai, a former head
of Guangdong's High People's Court was placed under shuanggui
for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal. Huang
Songyou, former Vice President of the Supreme People's Court
who had spent years working at the Guangdong High People's
Court, was also put under shuanggui in connection with Yang's
case.\147\ According to Caijing, a Beijing-based magazine, the
Central Discipline Inspection Commission placed Shenzhen
municipality's mayor, Xu Zongheng, under investigatory
detention in an undisclosed location in early June for what the
Xinhua news agency called ``serious violations.'' \148\ The
allegations involve bribery in connection with large-scale
construction and development projects for the 2011 Universiade
Games, which will be held in Shenzhen.\149\ Xu was promptly
stripped of his position as the city's deputy Party secretary,
and he later resigned as mayor.\150\ In August, the former head
of Chongqing municipality's justice bureau was placed under
shuanggui for alleged connections with triads and organized
crime.\151\
REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR
The reeducation through labor (RTL) system operates outside
of the judicial system and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL); it is an administrative punishment that enables law
enforcement officials to incarcerate Chinese citizens at RTL
centers for a maximum initial period of three years, with the
possibility of an extension of up to one year.\152\ According
to the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, public security departments ``control the entire
process of sending an individual'' to an RTL center, and RTL is
frequently used to punish, among others, dissidents,
petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, and religious practitioners
who belong to religious groups not approved by the
government.\153\ Earlier this year, Professor Fu Hualing, head
of the Department of Law at the University of Hong Kong, wrote
that RTL ``continues to be used, extensively, for political
control and persecution.'' \154\
During the February 2009 session of the UN Human Rights
Council's Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government's
human rights record, the Chinese Government stated that there
were currently 320 RTL centers in China with approximately
190,000 inmates.\155\ In 2005, Chinese official statistics put
the number of RTL inmates at 500,000 (in 310 RTL centers).\156\
The Dui Hua Foundation reports that the decline in the RTL
population may reflect the movement of drug-related offenders
from RTL centers to drug rehabilitation facilities, but that it
also perhaps may reflect an effort by the government to reduce
the number of RTL inmates with the goal of modifying or
possibly eventually abolishing the system.\157\
In February, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) issued a
report on RTL which was based on a survey of over 1,000
petitioners in Beijing (many of whom were previously detained
in RTL centers) and interviews with 13 former RTL inmates.
According to CHRD's report, frequent beatings and torture,
forced heavy manual labor with little or no compensation,
little medical care, deprivation of access to family and
counsel, little or no exercise, and poor diet appear to be
standard practices in RTL centers.\158\ CHRD also reported that
``fellow detainees, usually camp bullies, are appointed
`supervisors.' They are instructed by camp officials to carry
out torture and mistreatment and given free rein to tyrannize
others.'' \159\
While there are several avenues for challenging RTL
decisions, such as administrative reconsideration or a lawsuit
under the PRC Administration Litigation Law (ALL), such efforts
rarely are successful.\160\ CHRD reports that courts often
refuse to accept ALL cases relating to reeducation through
labor, and that external interference (from, for example, local
government and Party officials) when a court does accept an ALL
lawsuit means little chance of success for RTL inmates.\161\ Of
more than 1,000 petitioners surveyed by CHRD, only 5 percent
had applied for administrative review or filed an ALL
action.\162\ Not one RTL decision was overturned. One
petitioner interviewed by CHRD stated: ``We simply don't know
how to seek legal remedies. No one will help us or tell us
where to look. When I was released I actually sought legal
remedies, but without any results whatsoever.'' \163\
Reformists and legal experts within China have been calling
for an end to reeducation through labor for decades.\164\
Perhaps the most recent public call to end reeducation through
labor came in the document Charter 08, which was issued by 303
Chinese intellectuals, activists, and others in December
2008.\165\ The Charter states: ``A democratic and
constitutional China especially must guarantee the personal
freedom of citizens. No one should suffer illegal arrest,
detention, arraignment, interrogation, or punishment. The
system of `Reeducation Through Labor' must be abolished.''
\166\
Torture, Abuse, and Deaths in Custody
UN PROCEEDINGS
In its final report on its review of China, the UN
Committee against Torture (UNCAT) noted that it ``remains
deeply concerned about the continued allegations . . . of
routine and widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of
suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions
or information to be used in criminal proceedings,'' while at
the same time it welcomed China's ``efforts to address the
practice of torture and related problems in the criminal
justice system.'' \167\ UNCAT repeated its call for China to
adopt the exclusionary rule so that evidence obtained through
torture would be inadmissible and that it amend its law to
reflect the definition of torture contained in the Convention
against Torture.\168\ Moreover, the UNCAT noted that the
provisions in China's laws that prohibit the use of torture are
limited to the use of torture to extract confessions, but
should prohibit torture for all purposes.\169\ A spokesman for
the Chinese Foreign Ministry called UNCAT's report ``untrue and
slanderous.'' \170\
UNNATURAL DEATHS IN DETENTION CENTERS
In its December 2008 report, UNCAT expressed concern about
``reports of abuses in custody, including high numbers of
deaths, possibly related to torture or ill-treatment, and about
lack of investigation into these abuses and deaths in
custody.'' \171\ Just a few months after UNCAT's report was
issued, reports of a 24-year-old inmate's unnatural death in a
detention center (kanshousuo) in Yunnan province sparked online
protests, and more reports of other unnatural deaths in
detention centers soon followed.\172\ The spate of deaths in
detention centers early this year prompted calls for reform
from academics, Internet users, and some government
officials.\173\ Detention centers are run by the Ministry of
Public Security and are where suspects and defendants are held
during investigation and trial.\174\ Duan Zhengkun, a former
vice minister of justice, stated that ``[d]etention houses
should not be managed by public security departments, because
they make arrests, and sometimes torture the accused to force
them to confess.'' \175\
The debate over detention center deaths has focused on two
principal issues: (1) confessions extracted through torture and
mistreatment of detainees, and (2) the use of inmates by
detention center guards to serve as ``jail bullies'' (laotou
yuba) to control and abuse other inmates.\176\ In late April,
the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) disclosed that there
had been 15 unnatural deaths in detention centers to date in
2009,\177\ and initiated a five-month review of the nearly
3,000 detention centers across the country, with the goal of
cracking down on ``jail bullies'' and ensuring ``proper
management'' of detention centers.\178\ In mid-July, Xinhua
reported that the SPP had completed its investigation of 12 of
the 15 unnatural deaths in custody and concluded that 7 had
been beaten to death, 3 had committed suicide, and 2 had died
in accidents.\179\
The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP)
released in mid-April restated the legal prohibition against
confessions coerced by torture.\180\ The HRAP further declared
that ``the state will improve legislation concerning prison
management and take effective measures to ensure detainees'
rights and humanitarian treatment.'' \181\ In order to prevent
detainee abuse during interrogations, the HRAP mandates a
physical barrier in all interrogation rooms to separate
detainees and interrogators, and that the detainees shall be
physically examined before and after interrogations.\182\ If
the policies pronounced in the HRAP are implemented fully in
law, regulations, and practice, they would mark an important
step toward the prevention of detainee abuse during
interrogations.
TORTURE AND ABUSE
In addition to the reports of abnormal deaths in detention
centers during 2009, reports of nonfatal torture and abuse in
detention centers, prisons, and reeducation through labor (RTL)
centers continued during the past year. As noted above, Chinese
Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) has documented that torture and
abuse in RTL centers is a common occurrence.\183\ Torture and
abuse in detention centers and prisons remains widespread,
despite the central government's repeated efforts to address
this longstanding problem.\184\ Guards use torture to coerce
confessions and enlist ``jail bullies'' to abuse inmates either
under the direction of prison guards or with their
knowledge.\185\
Chinese authorities continue to subject political prisoners
to long periods of solitary confinement, in contravention of
the PRC Prison Law and international human rights
standards.\186\ U.S. permanent resident and democracy activist
Wang Bingzhang, who is serving a life sentence in Beijiang
Prison, in Guangdong province, has been held in solitary
confinement for years.\187\ When a family member asked the
prison warden why Wang was being held in solitary confinement,
the warden reportedly said that because there were no other
political prisoners in the prison, there was no one else with
whom Wang could share a cell.\188\
In July, the Supreme People's Procuratorate reported that
in the first six months of 2009, procuratorates found 6,430
violations relating to the management of detention facilities
and prisons, a 114-percent increase from the same period in
2008.\189\ Deputy procurator-general Sun Qian stated that, as
of mid-July, 291 people reportedly had been charged as a result
of 243 investigations.\190\
MEDICAL CARE
The U.S. State Department observed in its report on China's
human rights situation for 2008 that ``adequate, timely medical
care for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official
assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical
treatment.'' \191\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders reports that
there is ``extremely limited medical care'' available to
inmates in RTL centers.\192\ Authorities have reportedly denied
imprisoned legal advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng
adequate medical treatment.\193\ Both Chen and his wife (on
Chen's behalf) have applied for medical parole, but with no
result.\194\ Hu Jia's wife, Zeng Jinyan, has expressed ongoing
concern over the health of her husband, who suffers from
hepatitis.\195\ After visiting Hu Jia in prison in April, Zeng
wrote on her blog that Hu continues to lose weight, and that he
told her he was unable to eat.\196\ Huang Qi, the Sichuan
province-based human rights activist who was tried on ``illegal
possession of state secrets'' charges in August, reportedly has
been denied access to medical attention.\197\
Access to Counsel
Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process
without the assistance of an attorney, despite the right to
legal assistance provided under Article 14(3)(d) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
China has signed, but not yet ratified.\198\ The Chinese media
recently reported that less than 30 percent of criminal cases
proceed with the involvement of a defense attorney, and several
lawyers interviewed indicated that in some places, the rate is
between 10 to 20 percent.\199\ The lawyers, including prominent
criminal defense attorney Tian Wenchang, attributed the low
rate of defense attorney involvement to several factors,
including the risks and difficulties criminal defense attorneys
face and the low compensation for criminal defense work
compared with other areas of law.\200\
As Professor Jerome Cohen recently observed regarding pre-
trial detention in China, ``most accused remain detained
throughout the trial and appellate process. Bail applications
are seldom granted. . . .'' \201\ Detained suspects and
defendants who do have legal representation continue to face
substantial obstacles in meeting with their attorneys. In
December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture noted ``with
concern the lack of legal safeguards for detainees, including .
. . restricted access to lawyers.'' \202\ More than a year has
passed since the implementation of the revised PRC Lawyers Law,
which was amended in part to address the longstanding ``three
difficulties'' (san nan) facing defense attorneys (i.e.,
gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors'
case files, and collecting evidence).\203\ Some of the
provisions of the revised Lawyers Law conflict with the PRC
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), however.\204\ For example, with
respect to gaining access to detained clients, the revised
Lawyers Law provides that a lawyer need only show the ``three
certificates'' (i.e., lawyer's license, certificate from the
lawyer's law firm, and a power of attorney or legal aid papers)
in order to meet with a detained suspect or defendant after the
first interrogation, whereas the CPL stipulates that if the
case involves state secrets, the lawyer must first obtain
permission from the investigating entity (i.e., public security
bureau or procuratorate).\205\ The Lawyers Law prohibits the
monitoring of attorney-client meetings, while the CPL provides
that investigating officers, when it is deemed necessary, have
a right to be present at such meetings.\206\
Since the revised Lawyers Law took effect, access to
detained clients in ordinary, nonsensitive cases reportedly has
improved in Beijing and some other large cities.\207\ The chair
of the Beijing Lawyers Association Criminal Defense Committee
stated that lawyers in Beijing now have better and easier
access to detained clients, and that they are able to see
clients in detention centers with just the ``three
certificates.'' \208\ He noted, however, that permission was
still necessary in state secrets' cases.\209\ Beijing's Haidian
District Public Security Bureau reported that it has
implemented several practical measures to facilitate attorney-
client meetings, such as setting up special meeting rooms and a
lawyers' ``reception room,'' which has a full-time staff member
to assist with, among other things, arranging attorney-client
meetings.\210\ In addition, Beijing judicial authorities
abolished an internal rule operative in detention centers that
two lawyers had to be present for meetings with a detained
client (now a single lawyer can meet a client on his or her
own).\211\
The revised Lawyers Law has been less successfully
implemented in other jurisdictions. In May 2009, the Legal
Daily (Fazhi Ribao), Legal System Net (Fazhi Wang), and the All
China Lawyers Association (ACLA) conducted an online survey
regarding the right of lawyers to meet with detained
clients.\212\ Of 1,610 respondents (comprised of 1,080 lawyers,
187 individuals from the public security system, procuracy, and
the courts, and the rest from other professions), 73.4 percent
indicated that the situation had not improved at all after the
implementation of the revised Lawyers Law. Only 8 percent of
the respondents believed that the right of lawyers to meet with
detained clients was being implemented entirely consistently
with the new Lawyers Law.\213\
One challenge to the protection of lawyers' professional
rights is the belief among some law implementation agencies
that because they are responsible for implementing the Criminal
Procedure Law (CPL), they must follow the current CPL,
irrespective of the revisions to the Lawyers Law, which they
also view as being a ``lesser'' law that regulates only the
legal profession.\214\ While some experts contend that the
provisions of the revised Lawyers Law governing lawyers'
professional rights can be fully realized through amendment of
the CPL, others believe more fundamental change is
necessary.\215\ Professor Chen Ruihua, a prominent criminal
procedure professor at Peking University Law School, believes
that the ``three difficulties'' are a product of China's
judicial system itself and that ``without reform of the
judicial system `the three difficulties' will never be
resolved--revising the CPL won't make any difference.'' \216\
In politically sensitive cases, authorities continue to
frequently deny detained suspects and defendants access to
counsel. For example, authorities unlawfully denied well-known
criminal defense attorney Mo Shaoping permission to see his
detained client, prominent intellectual and Charter 08
signatory Liu Xiaobo, from early December 2008 through mid-June
2009--the duration of Liu's (illegally prolonged) residential
surveillance.\217\ Under Chinese law, an individual subject to
residential surveillance does not need to obtain permission to
meet with his or her attorney.\218\ [See Section II--Freedom of
Expression, for a discussion of Liu Xiaobo's detention and
arrest.] In late March 2009, Jiang Tianyong and Tang Jitian--
two of the human rights lawyers whose licenses to practice law
were not renewed by the May 31 deadline this year--were
prevented from meeting their detained client, Ge Hefei, a Falun
Gong practitioner, in Hebei province.\219\ Jiang and Tang, who
had been entrusted to represent Ge by Ge's family, were told by
court personnel that Ge had not hired them and had not
requested to see them. The lawyers argued that they had a right
to see Ge and ask him directly whether he agreed to their
representation and that Ge had a right to access to defense
counsel.\220\ [See Section III--Access to Justice--Harrasment
and Intimidation of Human Rights Lawyers.]
In its February report on reeducation through labor (RTL),
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) stated that many former
RTL inmates the organization surveyed complained of lack of
access to counsel and legal remedies. Although some of the
former RTL inmates may have qualified for legal aid, CHRD
observed that ``government-funded lawyers are unwilling to
advocate for RTL detainees because they are on the `wrong side'
of the local government.'' \221\ Individuals who have
``disappeared'' incommunicado into black jails (including those
held in psychiatric hospitals) are deprived of their right to
access to counsel.\222\
Although most criminal cases in China proceed without a
defense attorney's involvement, in high-profile cases,
authorities generally endeavor to ensure that defendants have
some form of representation. The main access-to-counsel issues
presented in such cases are whether the defendants or their
family members are able to hire counsel of their own choosing,
and whether government-assigned attorneys are, in fact, working
in the defendant's best interests. The Commission reported on
this issue in the context of the defense of Tibetans detained
after the protests in March 2008. The Tibetans were prevented
from hiring attorneys of their own choosing and instead were
assigned government-selected attorneys.\223\ This year,
following the July 5 demonstration in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region and outbreaks of violence starting that day,
the Beijing Justice Bureau issued an urgent notice calling upon
Beijing's law firms and lawyers to ``clearly recognize the
nature'' of the July 5 ``beating, smashing, looting, and
burning'' incident in Urumqi and to ``resolutely stand on the
side of protecting national unity and harmony among ethnic
groups'' and exercise ``caution'' with respect to receiving
requests for legal advice and representation.\224\ The
government-controlled Xinjiang Lawyers Association likewise
warned Xinjiang attorneys against getting involved in July 5-
related cases.\225\ [See Section IV--Xinjiang.]
An important issue in the Yang Jia case was whether Yang
had access to counsel of his own choosing. As discussed above,
Yang Jia killed six police officers and injured several others
at the Zhabei district police station in Shanghai in July 2008,
possibly in retaliation for police abuse he reportedly suffered
in the fall of 2007 at the Zhabei police station.\226\ Yang
Jia's mother, Wang Jingmei, with whom Yang had been living in
Beijing before the attack, disappeared the night of the
killings and was locked up in a Beijing public security-run
psychiatric hospital (ankang) until just before Yang Jia was
executed.\227\ During Wang Jingmei's detention in the ankang,
officials reportedly presented her with a document authorizing
an attorney named Xie Youming to represent Yang Jia; Wang
signed the document.\228\ Xie had ties to the Zhabei district
government, which raised doubts about his ability to fairly and
vigorously represent Yang.\229\ Yang Jia's father did not agree
to Xie representing his son, and instead lined up a group of
Beijing criminal defense lawyers to act on his son's behalf,
but Shanghai authorities prevented the Beijing lawyers from
seeing Yang Jia. Judicial authorities reportedly told the
lawyers from Beijing that Yang Jia already had defense
attorneys and that he did not want new ones.\230\
Another high-profile case in which local officials appeared
to have had a hand in selecting defense counsel (and sidelining
lawyers from Beijing) is the Deng Yujiao case.\231\ In May
2009, Deng became an Internet sensation after news spread that
she had stabbed a local official in Badong county, Hubei
province to death and injured another while defending herself
against an attempted rape.\232\ After Deng was taken away to a
psychiatric hospital,\233\ two Beijing lawyers, Xia Lin and Xia
Nan (no relation), volunteered to represent Deng Yujiao pro
bono.\234\ Deng's mother hired the two lawyers. On May 21,
after the two lawyers met with Deng Yujiao, Xia Lin filed a
petition with the Badong Public Security Bureau demanding that
the police press charges against the injured official, Huang
Dezhi, for sexual assault.\235\ Xia Lin and Xia Nan were
promptly fired. The lawyers learned of their dismissal as Deng
Yujiao's attorneys from the Badong county government's Web
site.\236\ Deng's mother then hired two local attorneys.\237\
Prominent intellectual and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo,
who has been detained since early December 2008, was also
denied counsel of his own choosing. Liu's family had retained
the well-known defense attorney Mo Shaoping to represent Liu
Xiaobo.\238\ After public security officers formally arrested
Liu on June 23 for ``inciting subversion,'' Mo Shaoping was
informed that he was prohibited from representing Liu because
he had also signed Charter 08.\239\ Two other attorneys from Mo
Shaoping's law firm, Shang Baojun and Ding Xikui, are currently
representing Liu.\240\
Fairness of Criminal Trials
The ``three difficulties'' faced by criminal defense
lawyers discussed above has serious consequences for the
fairness of criminal trials. In addition, because of the risks
presented by Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (the lawyer-
perjury statute), most defense attorneys reportedly engage in
passive defense; they focus on finding flaws and weaknesses in
the prosecutors' evidence rather than actively conducting their
own investigations.\241\ According to well-known criminal
defense lawyer Tian Wenchang, because of these challenges and
risks, it is difficult for defense attorneys to present
evidence of innocence or of a lesser crime.\242\ Moreover,
there is a strong presumption of guilt, especially in
``politically sensitive'' cases.\243\
The failure of witnesses to appear in court to present
testimony is a longstanding problem in China and is widely
recognized as such by lawyers, scholars, officials, and the
media.\244\ In late June 2009, the Chinese magazine Caijing
reported that ``the physical presence of a courtroom witness is
rare in China.'' \245\ Most criminal cases proceed solely on
the basis of written witness statements that the prosecution
presents to the court; the defense attorneys have no
opportunity to question and cross-examine the witness who made
the statement about its contents.\246\ The PRC Criminal
Procedure Law states only that witnesses have a duty to
testify; it does not require that witnesses appear in court to
present live testimony, and there is no punishment for failure
to appear.\247\
Chinese Government and Communist Party interference in
court proceedings and decisions is common, particularly in
``politically sensitive'' cases.\248\ While the Caijing report
on the absence of witnesses in courtrooms noted that no
eyewitnesses appeared at Deng Yujiao's trial, the eyewitness
testimony in Deng's case would have mattered only if the trial
actually had been an attempt to determine innocence or guilt
and assess whether Deng Yujiao's self-defense was justifiable
or ``excessive'' under Chinese law. But the outcome of Deng's
two-and-a-half-hour trial appears to have been a deal arranged
in advance.\249\ Immediately upon conclusion of the trial, Deng
was found guilty of inflicting intentional harm, but was
exempted from punishment because, the court ruled, she had
acted in self-defense and had turned herself in, and because
she was found to have suffered from a mental illness and thus
did not bear full criminal responsibility.\250\ Prominent human
rights attorney Pu Zhiqiang told the South China Morning Post
that there was no debate over evidence during the trial; it was
``like the actual case itself was not important. What was
important was to achieve a result acceptable by all sides.''
\251\ Pu opined that while the case may have been something of
a victory for public opinion, it was ``definitely not a victory
for the law.'' \252\
Lengthy pre-trial detention and the reliance of public
security officers and prosecutors on confessions to
``establish'' guilt remain the norm. Consequently, the
widespread use of torture to extract confessions, a
longstanding problem acknowledged by the Chinese Government,
persists.\253\ Confessions coerced through torture and other
illegally obtained evidence continue to be admissible in
courts, with obvious implications for the fairness of criminal
trials.\254\ In August 2009, an official from the Supreme
People's Procuratorate (SPP) announced that the SPP would soon
introduce a new regulation making confessions coerced through
torture inadmissible in death penalty cases.\255\ The
regulation purportedly will also mandate that prosecutors
investigate and prosecute law enforcement personnel who may
have coerced a confession through torture or otherwise used
violence to obtain evidence.\256\
Although Chinese law requires that first-instance trials be
held in public, there is an exception for cases involving state
secrets.\257\ Politically sensitive cases are routinely closed
to the public, even to family members of the defendant.\258\
Yang Jia's murder case was not a ``state secrets'' case, but
officials barred Yang Jia's family and friends from attending
his trial.\259\ Yang's mother was detained illegally in a
psychiatric facility in Beijing during Yang's trial and appeal,
and the lawyers from Beijing that Yang's father had hoped could
represent his son were also prevented from observing Yang's
first-instance trial.\260\ Yang Jia's father attended the
appeal, as did Beijing lawyer and blogger Liu Xiaoyuan and Ai
Weiwei, the artist and blogger.\261\ Yang had a new attorney on
appeal, who expressed concern about the fairness of that
proceeding.\262\
In another death penalty case during this reporting year,
Wo Weihan, a Chinese citizen, was convicted of military
espionage for Taiwan and endangering state security in May 2007
and sentenced to death.\263\ In March 2008, the Beijing High
People's Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence; the
Supreme People's Court approved the death sentence in November
2008, and he was executed later that month. Wo's case
apparently was plagued by procedural irregularities; he was
denied access to his lawyer for 10 months following his initial
detention, and evidence used against him was not made available
for his defense, allegedly because it involved ``state
secrets.'' \264\ Wo reportedly made a confession while he was
detained without access to his lawyer, because officials told
him he would not be prosecuted if he signed a confession.\265\
Wo was tried behind closed doors.\266\ The first and only time
Wo's family was permitted to see Wo since he was first detained
in 2005 was the day before Wo was executed in late November
2008.\267\
Capital Punishment
During the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic
Review of the Chinese Government's human rights record in
February 2009, several delegations raised issues relating to
China's use of the death penalty; most of the recommendations
focused on transparency and reduction in the number of crimes,
particularly non-violent crimes, for which the death penalty
was available. The Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review notes that the Chinese delegation stated that
the use of the death penalty is strictly controlled, and that
in practice, it ``is only applied to very serious crimes and is
not used in most of the applicable crimes.'' \268\ China stated
that it would review the recommendations ``to reduce the number
of crimes subject to [the] death penalty, especially for non-
violent crimes.'' \269\ In its 2009-2010 National Human Rights
Action Plan, the Chinese Government stated that the death
penalty ``shall be strictly controlled and prudently applied.''
\270\
As noted in last year's Annual Report, in early May 2008,
the Supreme People's Court (SPC) reported that there was a 30-
percent drop in death sentences during 2007, the first year in
which SPC review of death sentences was restored, compared with
2006.\271\ And in late June 2008, the SPC announced that it had
overturned 15 percent of all death sentences handed down by
lower courts during 2007 and the first half of 2008.\272\ At
the end of July 2009, the SPC stated that only an ``extremely
small number'' of serious criminals would receive the death
penalty and that death sentences with a two-year reprieve
(sihuan) would be used more often, but the SPC did not release
figures comparing the 2007 and 2008 execution rates or the
percentage of death sentences the SPC overturned.\273\ The
number of executions carried out annually remains a state
secret.\274\ Based on publicly available reports, Amnesty
International concluded that there was a 260-percent increase
in the number of executions in China in 2008, compared with
2007. Amnesty International stated that 1,718 people were
executed in China during 2008 (compared with 470 executions in
2007), and that 7,000 individuals were sentenced to death.\275\
In late August, the Dui Hua Foundation estimated that there
will be approximately 5,000 executions in China during
2009.\276\
In June 2009, China Daily reported that by the end of the
year, all those sentenced to death in Beijing would be executed
by lethal injection, rather than a firing squad.\277\ Hu
Yunteng, director of research at the SPC, was quoted as saying
that lethal injections were ``cleaner, safer and more
convenient.'' \278\ Lethal injection was legalized in China as
an alternative to shooting in the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law.\279\ Lethal injections were first used in Yunnan province,
and then gradually were used elsewhere in China.\280\ The SPC
indicated that eventually lethal injections would be used
nationwide as the sole form of execution.\281\ Liu Renwen, a
criminal law scholar at the Institute of Law at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, who advocates for the abolition of
the death penalty, wrote that he believed the developments in
Beijing were a step toward the eventual abolition of the death
penalty.\282\ Donald Clarke, professor of Chinese law at George
Washington University Law School noted, however, that the
public discussion of lethal injections in China seemed to
sidestep issues regarding the potential problems with death by
lethal injection.\283\
During this reporting year, it was evident that procedures
regarding family visits and information transparency for
individuals facing imminent execution were in need of an
overhaul. Wo Weihan's family, who had not been able to see him
since Wo was first taken into custody in 2005, met with Wo for
the first time on November 27, 2008, after the SPC had approved
his death sentence.\284\ The authorities told the family that
they would be able to have a second visit with Wo before he was
executed. Wo was instead put to death the next day, on November
28, before the promised second family visit.\285\ In Yang Jia's
case, Yang's father only had one visit with Yang since he was
detained after the killings on July 1, and that was in October
2008.\286\ Yang's father was not able to see his son before he
was executed, and only learned of the execution after Yang had
been put to death on November 26, 2008.\287\ On November 23,
Chinese officials suddenly took Yang Jia's mother, Wang
Jingmei, from the psychiatric hospital in Beijing where she was
being held to Shanghai to meet with her son.\288\ She knew
absolutely nothing about his case, let alone that the SPC had
already approved Yang's death sentence. Wang also did not know
that her meeting with Yang on November 24 would be the last
time she would see her son.\289\
Freedom of Religion
Introduction
The Chinese Government continued during the Commission's
2009 reporting year to strictly control religious practice and
repress religious activity outside of state-approved
parameters. Local governments implemented measures to prevent
``illegal'' religious gatherings and curb other ``illegal''
religious activities, in some cases
destroying sites of worship and detaining or imprisoning
religious believers. Government efforts to discredit the Dalai
Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into a doctrine that
promotes government positions and policy escalated, resulting
in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the
Dalai Lama's return to Tibet.\1\ Buddhist communities outside
the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism also faced continued
government controls, and unregistered Buddhist temples remained
subject to closure and demolition by government authorities.\2\
Catholic bishops in China's unregistered church community
remained in detention, home confinement, under surveillance, in
hiding, or in unknown whereabouts, while authorities
strengthened rhetoric on the state-controlled Catholic church's
independence from the Holy See.\3\ The government maintained
its longstanding ban against the Falun Gong spiritual movement
and other religious and spiritual groups deemed to be cults,
subjecting some members to detention, imprisonment, and other
abuses.\4\ Repression of Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened as authorities strengthened
security campaigns targeting ``religious extremism,'' and
outside the XUAR, the government also maintained broad controls
over the practice of Islam.\5\ The government continued to
subject registered Protestant congregations to tight state
control over their internal affairs and officials continued to
target some unregistered Protestant churches for closure and to
harass, detain, or imprison some church leaders and members.\6\
Authorities maintained restrictions over the activities of
registered Taoist priests, and unregistered Taoist priests were
subject to penalties for failing to submit to state control.\7\
Other religious and spiritual communities remained without
legal recognition to practice their faith.\8\
During the Commission's 2009 reporting year, the government
also continued to use legal measures to restrain, rather than
protect, the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens.\9\
Children faced continued restrictions on their right to freedom
of religion, and parents and guardians faced restrictions on
their right to impart a religious education to children.\10\
The Chinese Government continued to deny its citizens the
freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts.\11\ The
government has permitted, and in some cases, sponsors, the
social welfare activities of state-sanctioned religious
communities, but in the past year, authorities also took steps
to block some social welfare activities by unregistered
religious groups.\12\
The Chinese Government and Communist Party maintained an
antagonistic stance toward religion in the past year and
continued to affirm basic policies of control over religious
practice.\13\ In addition to imposing controls over religion
upon all citizens, the Party also maintained prohibitions on
Party members' belief in or practice of religion, thereby
cutting off religious adherents from career opportunities,
including high-level government and enterprise jobs, contingent
on Party membership.\14\ In an October 2008 speech, State
Administration for Religious Affairs Director Ye Xiaowen called
for deepening study of Marxist and Communist Party viewpoints
toward religion and for ``keeping tabs'' on religious leaders,
religious activity, and sites of worship.\15\ Late 2008
anniversaries within the state-controlled Catholic and
Protestant churches reaffirmed the government and Party roles
in defining theology and controlling interaction between
Chinese religious adherents and foreign religious
institutions.\16\ Authorities continued to soften some rhetoric
toward religion by articulating a ``positive role'' for
religious communities in China, but used this sentiment to
bolster support for state economic and social goals.\17\ At the
same time, officials and central government directives
continued to warn against foreign groups ``using religion'' to
``interfere'' in China's affairs and ``sabotage'' the
country.\18\ A press communique from the PRC Embassy in the
United States included ``freedom of religious belief'' among
``sensitive issues'' to ``properly handle'' in order to advance
progress in U.S.-China relations.\19\
The Chinese Government's legal and policy framework for
religion violates the protections for freedom of religion set
forth in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and other international human rights
instruments.\20\ Although the PRC Constitution states that all
citizens enjoy ``freedom of religious belief,'' it limits
citizens' ability to exercise their beliefs by protecting only
``normal religious activities,'' \21\ a vaguely defined term in
both law and practice that has been used as a means to suppress
forms of religious activity protected under international human
rights law.\22\ In addition, the government has created a
regulatory framework that in practice recognizes only five
religions--Buddhism,
Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism--for limited
state protections for religious activity.\23\ Variations in
implementation of government policy have enabled some
unrecognized religious groups to carry out activities,\24\ but
arbitrary toleration by some local officials does not amount to
Chinese Government protection of these communities' freedom of
religion. In addition, the government has continued to formally
outlaw some religious and spiritual groups,\25\ thereby wholly
denying members of these communities the right to practice
their faith openly. Despite creating space for some citizens to
practice their religion within government-approved
parameters,\26\ where some, but not all, Chinese citizens are
allowed to do so, and where members of China's five government-
sanctioned religious communities remain subject to tight
controls over their affairs, the Chinese Government has failed
in its obligation to protect Chinese citizens' right to freedom
of religion.
The Legal Framework for Religion in China
The Chinese Government uses law as a tool to restrain
rather than protect Chinese citizens' right to freedom of
religion. Although the national Regulation on Religious Affairs
(RRA) and local government regulations provide a measure of
protection for some religious activities, such protection is
limited in scope and applies only to state-sanctioned religious
communities.\27\ Under Chinese regulations, religious
communities must apply to register with the
government and must submit to state control over their
affairs.\28\ Registered groups must receive government approval
to establish venues for worship.\29\ Religious and spiritual
groups that do not meet registration requirements and groups
that choose not to submit to government control through
registration risk harassment, detention, closure of sites of
worship, and other abuses.\30\ Members of registered groups
also risk repercussions where authorities deem their practices
to fall outside vaguely defined legal protections for ``normal
religious activities.'' \31\
Based on Commission analysis, the pace of legislation on
religious affairs at both the central and provincial government
levels slowed in the past year, a trend with potentially
negative consequences despite the use of law as a means to
restrain religious practice. Chinese Government efforts in
recent years to legislate on religious practice have lent some
formal transparency and consistency to government policies on
religion, including as they relate to the limited number of
legal protections for religious practice. The slowed pace of
legislation also means that local government officials may
continue to regulate religious affairs based on older, local
regulations inconsistent with the RRA, creating a confusing
legal terrain for citizens who aim to understand their rights.
After eight provincial areas reported issuing new or amended
regulations in 2005 and 2006 in accordance with the RRA, three
provincial-level areas reported taking such action in 2007. In
2008 and in 2009, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and Hubei provinces issued
amended or new regulations on religious affairs.\32\
The RRA does not include criminal penalties for violation
of its provisions,\33\ but the Chinese Government uses the PRC
Criminal Law and related legal provisions as a means to punish
and detain people for forms of religious practice deemed to
fall outside of approved parameters.\34\ In addition, the
Chinese Government uses administrative punishments, including
reeducation through labor, to fine or detain citizens outside
the formal criminal justice system.\35\ Authorities also have
penalized or detained religious citizens without adhering to
formal legal processes.\36\
In this reporting year, the Commission observed an increase
in official pressure, harassment, and abuse of lawyers who
defend religious adherents, among other groups. Although some
religious communities and their lawyers have had some success
in recent years in using the legal system to challenge official
abuses,\37\ events from the past year underscore continuing
challenges that communities face in defending their rights and
that lawyers face in carrying out their work. [See Section
III--Access to Justice for detailed information on the
harassment of attorneys and see China's Religious Communities--
Falun Gong and China's Religious Communities--Protestants
within this section for specific information on attorneys
harassed and detained for their activities defending members of
these communities.]
Restrictions on Children's Freedom of Religion
In the past year, children continued to face restrictions
on their right to freedom of religion, and parents and
guardians faced restrictions on their right to impart a
religious education to children. The various restrictions lack
basis in national Chinese law and contravene protections in
international human rights law, including in treaties the
Chinese Government has signed or ratified.\38\ In some cases,
authorities extended restrictions to young people and college
students above the age of 18, who are considered adults under
Chinese law.\39\ While a government spokesperson said in 2005
that no laws prohibit children from believing in a religion and
that parents may provide a religious education to their
children, some provincial legislation continues to penalize
acts related to imparting religion to children.\40\ Though
variations in local government practices have enabled children
in some localities to access religious sites and religious
education,\41\ the Commission in the past year tracked reports
of ongoing efforts to prevent children from participating in
religious activities.\42\ For example, local authorities in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have continued to impose
restrictions on children's freedom of religion through measures
such as monitoring their activities outside of school and
launching a campaign to ``weaken religious consciousness''
among young adults and juveniles. [See China's Religious
Communities--Islam in this section for more information.]
Authorities also have condemned Western religious organizations
perceived to focus their activities on Chinese youth. An August
2008 speech by an official in Jiangxi province cautioned
against ``Western hostile forces'' using religion to carry out
``ideological infiltration'' of young adults and juveniles,
expressing concern about Christian organizations in
particular.\43\ The references to ``young adults'' (qingnian)
illustrated efforts to extend restrictions on children's
freedom of religion to people over the age of 18. In fall 2008,
authorities targeted house churches near college campuses in
Beijing and Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, detaining students in
attendance, accusing church members of ``preaching to
students,'' and ordering four church leaders to serve
reeducation through labor.\44\ A report from Shaanxi province
made available in January 2009 referred to a notice implemented
in recent years on ``prohibiting Catholic catechism classes for
young adults and juveniles.'' \45\
Controls Over Religious Publications
The Chinese Government denies its citizens the freedom to
prepare and distribute religious texts,\46\ and Chinese
authorities continue to punish religious adherents who publish
or distribute religious materials independent of government
controls. In June 2009, a Beijing court sentenced bookstore
owner Shi Weihan to three years' imprisonment for ``illegal
operation of a business,'' a crime under Article 225 of the
Criminal Law,\47\ because Shi had printed and given away
Bibles.\48\ Six other people connected to the case also
received prison sentences.\49\ Authorities had held Shi in
detention since March 2008 and earlier detained him between
November 2007 and January 2008 in connection to the same
activities.\50\ The government controls the publishing and
distribution of approved religious materials, and some churches
have reported an insufficient supply of Bibles.\51\ Authorities
have confiscated Bibles imported to the country,\52\ and in the
past year, officials confiscated Bibles in raids on house
churches.\53\ In 2008, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region made ``illegal'' religious and political
publications the focal point of a censorship campaign in the
region.\54\ [See China's Religious Communities--Islam in this
section for more information.]
Social Welfare Activities by Religious Communities
In the past year, the Chinese Government continued to
permit, and in some cases, sponsor, the social welfare
activities of state-sanctioned religious communities, but
authorities also took steps to block some activities by non-
registered groups. The national Regulation on Religious Affairs
permits registered religious organizations to engage in social
welfare activities, as have earlier regional regulations.\55\
In addition, the Chinese Government's 2009-2010 National Human
Rights Action Plan, released in April 2009, also states support
for religious organizations' social welfare activities.\56\ In
the aftermath of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, religious
communities in China provided aid to earthquake victims,
including in partnership with overseas religious
organizations,\57\ but some groups, especially unregistered
organizations, met with official sanction. In October 2008, the
Shifang city, Sichuan province, United Front Work Department--
the Communist Party office that among other tasks oversees
religious communities in China--described taking steps to curb
``illegal proselytizing'' in accordance with provincial-level
directives on blocking proselytizing at disaster relief sites,
one of which singled out underground Protestant groups in
particular.\58\ In November, the U.S.-based organization
ChinaAid reported that the Ministry of Civil Affairs ordered
the abolition of the organization known as the Chinese House
Church Alliance, on the grounds that the group, which had
engaged in earthquake relief work among other activities, was
operating without registration as a social organization.\59\ In
December 2008, public security officers in an earthquake-
affected village in Beichuan county, Sichuan province,
disrupted reconstruction activities led by house church
volunteers, detaining some people and confiscating property
including religious materials.\60\ Zhang Xiuzhi, a registered
church member who inquired about official mishandling of
earthquake relief donations, reportedly was ordered to serve
one year of reeducation through labor in April for ``disturbing
social order.'' \61\ In June 2009, authorities in Nanbu county,
Sichuan province, detained house church members Wei Sanhong and
Wu Han and imposed administrative punishments on them in
apparent connection with their earthquake disaster relief
activities through their church.\62\
China's Religious Communities
BUDDHISM
Although few reports of repression of Chinese Buddhists in
non-Tibetan areas reach the international community, the
Chinese Government and Communist Party exercise control over
the institution and practice of Buddhism by ethnic Han citizens
in much the same manner as for religions that demonstrate much
higher levels of protest against state control of religion.\63\
The government requires all Buddhist monks, nuns, and
institutions to register with the state-run Buddhist
Association of China (BAC) in order to practice Buddhism
legally.\64\ Officials often harass unregistered Buddhist
groups, forcibly close their meeting sites, detain their
leaders, and in cases where authorities brand such groups a
``cult,'' punish them with detention or reeducation.\65\
Communities under the BAC encounter rules and regulations that
cast nationalism and loyalty to the Communist Party as
religious obligations with which Buddhists must comply and
prohibit religious practices from being carried out at temples
that the government deems ``superstitious activities.'' \66\
The BAC imposes rules governing personnel, practice, and
teaching in registered Buddhist communities, examples of which
include a BAC monopoly on issuing ordination licenses, the use
of political criteria to judge ordination eligibility,
prohibitions against certain traditional ordination rituals,
restrictions on cross-provincial monastic study, restrictions
on interactions with foreign Buddhists, requirements that
prospective monastics receive parental and family approval
before being ordained, and a prohibition against citizens under
the age of 20 or over the age of 60 entering a monastic
institution.\67\
Authorities in a number of localities continue to target
unregistered Buddhist temples and lay communities for closure
or demolition.\68\ A 2008 report to the Daqing Municipal
People's Congress in Heilongjiang province urged local
officials to ``strengthen strikes'' against ``unlawful
religious activities,'' and expressed concern that ``illegal
Buddhist meetings have not stopped despite repeated attempts to
ban them.'' \69\ Officials also warned that some residents had
opened their homes to ``traveling monks and wild Buddhas'' who
gave unauthorized teachings and some of whom ``spread feudal
superstitions.'' \70\ Party officials in Gansu province
cautioned cadres against ``indulging'' or being ``softhearted''
toward those engaged in illegal religious activities and
insisted that action must be taken to stop the ``chaotic''
construction of unauthorized Buddhist temples and sacred
statues.\71\ Official reports indicate that a concerted effort
is underway to clamp down on unregistered Buddhist temples and
meeting sites in Jiangxi province.\72\ For example, officials
in Jiangxi's Ningdu county authorized ``special disciplinary
work'' in order to rein in unregistered Buddhist temples. As of
December 2008, 25 unregistered temples had been forcibly
merged, 68 had been forcibly closed, 56 had been forcibly
converted to non-religious use, and 3 had been demolished as a
result of the crackdown.\73\ The government continues to
enforce a ban against at least one Buddhist group that it has
designated a ``cult organization'': a Taiwan-based sect known
as the Quan Yin Method (Guanyin Famen).\74\ The 6-10 Office, an
extralegal Party-run security force that suppresses banned
religious groups, has stepped up efforts in some provinces to
gather intelligence on Guanyin Famen and curb its spread.\75\
In June 2009, local media in Zhangye city, Gansu province,
reported that authorities there detained six members of Guanyin
Famen during the first six months of 2009.\76\
TIBETAN BUDDHISM
Chinese Government and Communist Party interference with
the norms of Tibetan Buddhism and unremitting antagonism toward
the Dalai Lama, key factors underlying the March 2008 eruption
of Tibetan protest, continued to deepen Tibetan resentment and
fuel additional Tibetan protests during the Commission's 2009
reporting year. The government and Party used institutional,
educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan
Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations.
Officials adopted a more assertive tone in expressing
determination to select the next Dalai Lama, and to pressure
Tibetans living in China to accept only a Dalai Lama approved
by the Chinese Government. Escalating government efforts to
discredit the Dalai Lama and to transform Tibetan Buddhism into
a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy have
resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of
religion and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. [For more
information, see Section V--Tibet.]
CATHOLICISM
The government seeks to control Chinese Catholics through
mandatory registration with the Catholic Patriotic Association
(CPA), a state-controlled entity established to monitor and
direct Catholic doctrines and practice and manage Catholic
property and personnel. The CPA denies members of registered
churches the freedom to pursue full communion and free
communications with the Holy See and other Catholic
institutions outside of China, and security forces regularly
harass Catholics who resist CPA control. Since the 1950s, the
government has prohibited traditional episcopal consecrations
and insisted that the Holy See lacks authority to select
Chinese bishops.\77\ In 2009, the Commission observed ongoing
harassment and detention of unregistered bishops, priests, and
lay Catholics in China, as well as enduring tensions between
the Holy See and the government over the scope of papal
authority in China.
Controlling Catholics in Shaanxi and Hebei provinces
In the past year, authorities in Shaanxi and Hebei, the two
provinces with the highest concentration of Catholics, have
engaged in campaigns to suppress the activities of unregistered
Catholics and to coerce unregistered clergy to accept CPA
control over their communities.\78\ An official report from the
Web site of the Shaanxi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission
in January 2009 outlines
details of an ongoing crackdown that has led to the ``dramatic
weakening of underground Catholic forces.'' The report
described the formation of a ``Catholic work leading group''
that had ``effectively driven'' the provincial effort to
control Catholics in accordance with a nationwide campaign that
began in 1999.\79\ In the past decade, Shaanxi has ``greatly
strengthened the construction of patriotic organizations'' and
now counts 44 CPA branches throughout the province.\80\ The
Shaanxi report underscores the progress the government has
achieved in suppressing unregistered Catholics through using
coercive tactics:
[We] have carried out comprehensive management of
underground Catholic forces, and adopted measures to
capture, beat, and suppress core members. We have
forcefully struck against illegal activities,
frightened core members of the underground forces, and
driven a segment of the underground priests to
experience a relatively significant ideological
conversion, which has brought about obvious changes. In
five parishes within our province that previously fell
under the control or influence of underground forces,
political power has been seized by the patriotic
forces, 90 percent of Catholic laity has eventually
taken the road of loving the motherland and loving the
church, and the patriotic forces have been greatly
strengthened.\81\
The Shaanxi report also indicates that some unregistered
priests and bishops relented under sustained government
pressure to undergo ``transformation.'' One such crackdown
reportedly yielded the ``transformation'' of 13 unregistered
priests, and more than 10 other priests achieved ``new heights
of ideological awareness.'' \82\ Shaanxi authorities also note
that the ``transformation through reeducation'' of an
unregistered bishop named Li Jingfeng was ``still being
handled,'' while the ``illegal activities'' of another bishop,
Yu Chengti, had been ``effectively contained.'' \83\ Shaanxi
authorities detained unregistered Bishop Wu Qinjing of the
Zhouzhi diocese in March 2007, and his whereabouts still are
unknown.\84\ Foreign media and Chinese Government reports
suggest that public security forces in Hebei province, in
coordination with the CPA, have engaged in a multi-month
campaign targeting unregistered priests and bishops in 2009 and
stepped up ``guidance work'' for registered Catholic churches.
At least one-quarter of China's Catholic population resides in
Hebei, the ``seat of the underground church.'' \85\ On March
24, Hebei public security officials detained Ma Shengbao, an
unregistered priest, and his current whereabouts remain
unknown.\86\ The campaign reportedly has resulted in the
detention of 20 unregistered Catholic parishioners and 2
priests who organized demonstrations protesting the
imprisonment of Bishop Yao Liang.\87\ In December 2008, Chen
Huixin, Hebei's top religious affairs official, warned local
officials that their management of ``churches controlled by the
underground Catholic forces'' had become ``soft,'' ``lenient,''
and ``fallen short of the desired goal.'' \88\ In response,
Chen urged authorities to ``strengthen management awareness,
measures, and mechanisms.'' \89\ In April 2009, Wang Xuhong,
Secretary General of the Hebei United Front Work Department
(UFWD), inspected registered Catholic churches and met with
clergy in Wu'an city. While praising Catholics for various
charity activities, Wang reminded clergy that ``Catholicism
surely must merge into society, conform to China's national
conditions, and construct a harmonious church. Only in this way
will Catholicism enjoy better development.'' \90\ In October
and November 2008, a series of Party meetings in Hebei
concluded that authorities must ``strengthen standard
management of Catholic seminaries, monasteries, and
nunneries.'' \91\
Harassment, detention, and ``transformation''
Chinese Catholics who express their faithfulness to the
Holy See by refusing to join the state-controlled church, as
well as those affiliated with registered parishes that run
afoul of the Communist Party's policies, remain subject to
harassment, arbitrary detention, and imprisonment. Unregistered
bishops are particularly vulnerable to government persecution.
In 2009, at least 40 unregistered Chinese bishops were either
detained, under home confinement, under surveillance, in
hiding, or had disappeared under suspicious circumstances.\92\
The government has provided no information about the condition
or whereabouts of some unregistered bishops whom it has
detained for years, such as Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang.\93\ In
March 2009, security officials forcibly removed Bishop Jia
Zhiguo from his living quarters and took him to an undisclosed
detention facility.\94\ Bishop Jia, the 74-year-old
unregistered bishop of Hebei province's Zhengding diocese,
previously served two decades in prison, and since 2003,
authorities have detained him numerous times and kept him under
strict surveillance when not detaining him.\95\ Authorities
also took into custody Father Paul Ma, a 55-year-old priest
from a nearby Catholic village called Donglu, for celebrating
the Eucharist with unregistered Catholics.\96\ The mayor of
Xiangong township in Shaanxi province invited Father Gao
Jianli, a priest from the Fengxiang county diocese, to a
meeting at his office in March 2009 to discuss a land
dispute involving confiscated church property.\97\ When the
priest arrived at the mayor's office, two men locked him in the
office and beat him to the point that he required
hospitalization.\98\
In the past year, government officials continued to disrupt
and obstruct pilgrimage to the Sheshan Marian shrine in
Shanghai. In December 2008, the Longwan District Party
Committee in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, reported that the
religious affairs bureau had established a ``special work
group'' for monitoring Catholics and maintaining ``stability
and control'' during the May pilgrimage season.\99\ The Longwan
report indicates that authorities ``diverted 108 pilgrims
through persuasion,'' ``dispersed'' 20 others, and
``dissuaded'' 247 from undertaking the pilgrimage.\100\ Zhang
Jianlin and Zhang Li, two priests who were taken into custody
in Hebei province as they traveled to Sheshan in May 2008, are
believed to remain in detention more than a year later.\101\
In 2008 and 2009, Party and government authorities
continued to characterize unregistered Catholics as a threat to
``social stability,'' and in some cases, called for security
officials to ``strike against'' and ``transform'' unregistered
communities.\102\ In September 2008, an official report from
Fuzhou city, Jiangxi province, emphasized the need to
``transform'' and ``expand the patriotism'' of ``underground
Catholic forces'' as a top priority for the Party's United
Front Work Department (UFWD).\103\ The Fuzhou report describes
``underground Catholic forces'' as exerting a ``severe negative
impact on social stability.'' \104\ An April 2009 report from
the head of the Jiangxi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau
makes clear that Fuzhou city is representative of a larger
phenomenon, noting that authorities ``have continually launched
transformation through reeducation of underground Catholic
forces for many years throughout the province.'' \105\ Also in
April, Dalian Medical University posted a notice from the
Liaoning provincial UFWD calling for authorities to
``aggressively launch transformation through reeducation of
underground Catholic forces.'' \106\ In 2008, a county UFWD
office in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, was given an award
for ``striking against . . . underground Catholic forces'' and
``steadily pushing forward with transformation through
reeducation.'' \107\ In Henan province, the Sheqi county UFWD's
tasks for 2009 included ``transformation through reeducation of
underground Catholic forces'' and increasing local security to
prevent ``infiltration by foreign religious forces.'' \108\
Intelligence gathering and surveillance of Catholic
communities is widespread in China. Many Chinese Catholics
report that government agents have infiltrated both
unregistered and Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) churches,
and that they attempt to foment internal strife as a means of
inhibiting Church unity and growth.\109\ In December 2008, the
Ministry of Public Security posted a ``heroic life story'' of
an officer in Chongqing municipality named Wang Shuncai who was
lauded for ``throwing himself into the task'' of penetrating
and spying on religious groups.\110\ Wang was recognized for
``capturing'' an important unregistered bishop three times and
contributing to his eventual ``transformation through
reeducation.'' \111\ Wang conducted undercover stings against
religious groups in at least six districts in Chongqing and
traveled to Yunnan and Guizhou provinces to work on similar
cases. Wang is also credited with having cracked three
significant cases by ``directing secret forces'' that gathered
``behind the scenes, early warning intelligence.'' \112\ In
April 2009, the aforementioned Sheqi county report instructs
UFWD cadres to carry out intelligence activities against
unregistered Catholics in order to ``get a clear idea of the
situation and ferret out the truth.'' \113\
Bishop appointments, relations with Rome, politicizing Catholic faith
The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)
exercises control over bishop ordination for the registered
Chinese Catholic church, including through coercion of bishops
to officiate ordinations.\114\ In recent years, the government
has tolerated
discreet papal involvement in the selection of some bishops,
but without changing its insistence that the Chinese church
must be ``independent, autonomous, and self-managed.'' \115\ In
December 2008, the CPA co-hosted a celebration to commemorate
50 years of ``self-elected, self-ordained'' bishops, which
featured a speech by Du Qinglin, the head of the Party Central
Committee's UFWD.\116\ Du stressed that ``insisting on running
the affairs of the church in an independent way is an
inevitable path for the Chinese Catholic Church to adapt itself
to socialist society,'' and reminded CPA officials that it is
``necessary to put the scientific development concept in
command of religious affairs'' and ``work hard to stimulate the
patriotism of religious personages and believers.'' \117\ Some
CPA-registered bishops who received tacit papal approval are
under
increased government pressure to publicly support the Party's
policies. Bishop Li Shan of the registered Beijing diocese, who
was previously friendly toward the unregistered church and
faithful to the Pope, has incorporated CPA policy slogans such
as ``loving the motherland, loving the Church'' and warnings
against infiltration by ``foreign states'' in speeches
following his September 2007 ordination.\118\ Bishop Li
reportedly expressed regret for these speeches, one of which
was given under conditions of duress in front of top Chinese
Government and Communist Party officials on Christmas Eve
2008.\119\ In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI reiterated his call for
reconciliation between unregistered and registered Chinese
Catholic bishops, and the Chinese Government continued a
decade-long pattern of acting to undermine reconciliation that
does not occur on CPA-dictated terms.\120\ The detention of
unregistered Bishop Jia Zhiguo in March reportedly was linked
to the CPA's displeasure at a Vatican-brokered reconciliation
agreement between Bishop Jia and Jiang Taoran, the bishop of
the registered Shijiazhuang diocese.\121\ Authorities in
Shaanxi province also described cooperation between CPA bishop
Yu Runchen and unregistered bishop Yu Chengti as an
``intensification of foreign infiltration'' that played a role
in the ``ideological backsliding'' of some clergy.\122\ No
papal involvement in bishop selection occurred during the
Commission's 2009 reporting year and no progress was made
toward establishing formal diplomatic relations between the PRC
and the Vatican.
FALUN GONG
Since July 1999, the Chinese Government and Communist Party
have designated Falun Gong an illegal ``cult organization'' and
implemented a ``strike hard'' campaign of suppression against
it--the scope and intensity of which have been unrivaled in the
seven years since the Commission began its work. 2009 marked
the 10th anniversary of the government's formal ban on Falun
Gong, a spiritual movement based on the teachings of its
founder, Li Hongzhi, and Chinese meditative exercises called
qigong. Viewing the 10th anniversary as sensitive, the central
government held fast in 2009 with its 2008 pre-Olympics efforts
to ferret out and punish Falun Gong practitioners. Authorities
conducted propaganda campaigns that deride Falun Gong, carried
out strict surveillance of practitioners, detained and
imprisoned large numbers of practitioners, and subjected some
who refuse to disavow Falun Gong to torture and other abuses in
reeducation through labor facilities. International media and
Falun Gong sources also reported deaths of practitioners in
Chinese police custody in 2008 and 2009.
``Strike hard'' directives and ``sensitive'' anniversaries
The high priority that Party leaders place on the
``struggle'' against Falun Gong was demonstrated by its
inclusion as a principal target for a ``strike hard'' campaign
in a directive that set the agenda for public security bureaus
(PSB) nationwide this year.\123\ In February 2009, the Central
Committee on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security
circulated a directive that urged PSB forces to ``closely watch
out for and strike hard against . . . infiltration, subversion,
and sabotage by `Falun Gong.' '' \124\ In November 2008, the
People's Daily reported that the Communist Party Secretary of
Weifang municipality in Shandong province--a city where police
tortured at least 12 Falun Gong practitioners to death in 2000
and where more than 60,000 were estimated to reside before the
ban\125\--urged Party cadres not to relent in the crackdown:
``we must not loosen our hold on the struggle with `Falun Gong'
in the slightest way. [Officials] at all levels must firmly
grasp the objectives, go a step further to intensify measures,
increase the force . . . make great efforts to carry out deep
strikes against `Falun Gong' . . . [and] maintain a state of
high pressure from the beginning to end.'' \126\ In May 2009,
Gaoyou city in Jiangsu province issued an ``implementation
plan'' that aimed to ``raise the people's understanding and
support for the work of disposing of the `Falun Gong' problem .
. . [in order to] resolutely stop the spread of `Falun Gong.'
'' \127\ A lecturer at the Jilin Provincial Public Security
Bureau Academy recently described the ``anti-cult struggle'' as
an ``unrelenting protracted war,'' and reiterated the
government's ``determination'' to ``thoroughly eliminate the
cult cancer.'' \128\ The Wanquan County PSB in Hubei province
reported plans in May to ``forcefully strike against `Falun
Gong' diehard elements'' by ``strengthening patrols, forming a
tight network of control, obtaining deep, behind-the-scenes
intelligence, and getting to the point that we know when the
enemy will move, before the enemy can move.'' \129\
Chinese authorities placed the anti-Falun Gong campaign
prominently on the agenda of a special public security
taskforce called ``Project 6521,'' which reportedly was
established to maintain ``social stability'' during four
sensitive anniversaries in 2009, including the 10th anniversary
of the April 25 Falun Gong silent demonstration near the Party
leadership compound in Beijing.\130\ District officials in
Guiyang city, Guizhou province, reported on ``deployment
arrangements'' taken to implement two ``monitoring and control
measures'' during the 10th anniversary of the April 25 Falun
Gong protest: (1) ``take strict precautions to prevent `Falun
Gong' from conducting illegal activities and putting up posters
and distributing propaganda materials''; and (2) ``local police
stations, community neighborhood committees, and public work
units must strengthen efforts to root out and strike against
Falun Gong . . . and in a fundamental way, eliminate hidden
dangers.'' \131\ In Shanghai's Nanhui district, Party officials
called an ``emergency meeting'' to focus on the ``April 25
period,'' urging police and government
officials to ``sharpen their vigilance'' and ``strengthen
coordinated warfare'' against Falun Gong.\132\ In Tianjin
municipality, officials increased police patrols and
intelligence gathering focused on Falun Gong practitioners
during the 20th anniversary of the violent suppression of the
1989 Tiananmen protests.\133\
The 6-10 office
In the past year, the 6-10 Office--an extralegal, Party-run
security apparatus created in June 1999 to implement the ban
against Falun Gong--continued to consolidate its central role
in all aspects of the nationwide ``anti-cult'' campaign. A June
2009 official report from Henan province summarizes the role of
the Chenxi County 6-10 Office as ``taking charge of the
supervision, inspection, direction, coordination, and
implementation of the entire county's anti-cult work.'' \134\
The duties of the secretariat of the 6-10 Office include
``taking responsibility for protecting secrets'' and
``supervising and solving special investigations and
coordinating the work of striking against and disposing of
[Falun Gong].'' \135\ In December 2008, Li Xiaodong, the head
of the central 6-10 Office, visited Siyang county in Jiangsu
province for an inspection and told local officials: ``As for
the cult problem, the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau must
vigorously cooperate with judicial offices in conducting
strikes; as soon as you discover a group, simply attack it, as
soon as it shows its head, hit it right away, you must never be
softhearted.'' \136\ The 6-10 Office in Jiangsu's Suzhou city
conducted ``spot checks'' in December on community and school
``no-cult'' projects in the Canglang district.\137\ Officials
noted how the Canglang Party Committee and government ``attach
a high degree of importance'' to the 6-10 Office's work and
that it had received a ``full guarantee'' of funding and
personnel.\138\
The 6-10 Office and public security bureaus throughout
China surveilled and monitored communities, residences, and
workplaces in order to identify and isolate Falun Gong
adherents. In May 2009, the Qidong city 6-10 Office in Jiangsu
province conducted an ``investigation to get to the bottom of
the situation involving cults,'' which identified 176 Falun
Gong practitioners living in one township.\139\ In October
2008, Linxiang city in Hunan province gave credit to its ``24-
hour control and monitoring line of vision'' for
allowing authorities to ``thoroughly suppress'' two Falun Gong
incidents.\140\ In June 2008, Xuanwei city authorities in
Yunnan province called for strengthened patrols, greater use of
plainclothes
officers, and closer cooperation between public security forces
and residential committees in order to ``thoroughly shatter''
Falun Gong.\141\ Xuanwei authorities also authorized a
``powerful political offensive'' in all villages and
neighborhoods involving mandatory resident participation in a
propaganda campaign to ``effectively frighten'' Falun
Gong.\142\ In Shandong province's Huimin county, a 2008
workplan for ``implementing concentrated rectification'' of
Falun Gong requires various agencies to investigate all
religious personnel within their jurisdiction for involvement
with ``cult organizations.'' \143\ In March 2009, the head of
the Shashi District 6-10 Office in Jingzhou city, Hubei
province, during an inspection of sub-district offices, called
on officials to ``reinforce monitoring and control of `Falun
Gong' practitioners.'' \144\ In June 2009, Jiujiang city
officials in Jiangxi province described a surveillance system
focused on a group of 829 ``key figures,'' composed primarily
of former Falun Gong prisoners.\145\ In July, authorities in
Shandong province's Zibo city placed nine practitioners under a
``system of 24-hour monitoring and control.'' \146\
Identification and monitoring of Falun Gong practitioners
is also accomplished through the 6-10 Office's cultivation of
paid informants. The aforementioned circular from Xuanwei city
offered a reward of 10,000 yuan (US$1,464) for each Falun Gong
practitioner who is captured distributing ``reactionary
propaganda'' and 5,000 yuan (US$732) for informants who
``provide clues to crack a case.'' \147\ In March 2009, Linzi
district in Shandong's Zibo city unveiled a reward system for
citizen reports of Falun Gong activities.\148\ The 6-10 Office
in Liuyang, a county-level city under Hunan province's Changsha
municipality, launched a 24-hour hotline for informants in
March and announced rewards of between 50 and 1,000 yuan (US$7
and US$146).\149\ In April 2009, the Liuyang 6-10 Office issued
an open letter that called for residents to ``resolutely resist
cults'' and promised an ``appropriate material reward'' to
those who ``courageously report cult behavior.'' \150\ The
Wangcang County Communist Party Committee and government in
Sichuan province issued a joint letter in April to rural
residents that outlined the ``severe danger'' posed by Falun
Gong, provided residents with a ``cult'' hotline, and
guaranteed rewards for informants.\151\ Authorities in Anhui
province's Bengbu city credited an informant's call for
facilitating the capture of a 50-year-old disabled Falun Gong
practitioner named Yu Xiaoping who was distributing
leaflets.\152\
The 6-10 Office focuses on public schools and universities
as venues for spreading its ``anti-cult'' message. In May 2009,
the Xinjiang Agricultural University initiated a 10-month
campaign to ``build a durable ideological line of defense'' to
``guard against and resist'' possible ``sabotage and
infiltration'' by Falun Gong.\153\ In June, students and
teachers from middle schools all across Panji district in
Anhui's Huainan city participated in a ``surge of anti-cult
education'' that ``raised their political consciousness.''
\154\ In July, elementary school students in Leshan city,
Sichuan province, attended a ``lively'' speech from the local
Party secretary and viewed an ``anti-cult warning film.'' The
principal instructed students to study ``anti-cult'' materials
during the summer, take notes or write a comic book to
illustrate lessons learned, and return a form with a parent's
signature to verify completion of the assignment.\155\
Detention, abuse, and death in custody
Chinese authorities continue to employ an extrajudicial
system of incarceration known as ``reeducation through labor''
(RTL) to punish multitudes of Falun Gong practitioners. Public
security officials may order citizens who are suspected of
minor criminal or political offenses to serve up to three years
of RTL without establishing their guilt before a court.\156\
According to one scholar, authorities have ``maximized'' the
RTL system as an ``instrument for political control'' over
Falun Gong.\157\ In 2008, the Beijing Women's RTL Center
reportedly held 700 Falun Gong practitioners compared to only
140 prisoners accused of other crimes.\158\ In February 2009,
more than half of 13 former RTL inmates interviewed for one
study--none of whom were practitioners--noted that Falun Gong
constituted one of the largest groups of RTL prisoners and that
they are singled out for harsh treatment.\159\
As security intensified ahead of the 10th anniversary of
the ban, the ``strike hard'' campaign resulted in widespread
detentions and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners. In the
first half of 2008, Harbin municipality authorities in
Heilongjiang province placed 53 Falun Gong practitioners in
criminal detention, 23 in administrative detention, formally
arrested 23, and ordered 19 to serve RTL.\160\ In November
2008, Nanning municipality authorities in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region reported that they had taken 36 Falun Gong
practitioners into custody, formally arrested 10, held 15 in
administrative detention, and sent 3 to RTL.\161\ In December
2008, authorities in Pingjiang county, Hunan province, detained
two Falun Gong ``core elements'' and ``destroyed'' an
underground printing operation as part of a workplan to
``ruthlessly strike against'' Falun Gong.\162\ In February
2009, Dazhou municipality in Sichuan province disclosed that
public security officials had detained 114 practitioners and
``destroyed'' 11 Falun Gong ``gangs'' and 17 ``underground
nests'' in three years.\163\ Huai'an city officials in Jiangsu
province noted that they had ``cracked'' more than 20 cases in
the first half of 2009 that resulted in Falun Gong
detentions.\164\
In addition to forced labor, RTL for Falun Gong
practitioners involves a process known as ``transformation''
whereby they are subjected to various methods of physical and
psychological coercion until they recant belief in Falun
Gong.\165\ In January 2009, Sichuan Provincial Party leaders
inspected the Xinhua RTL center where 42 male Falun Gong
practitioners were detained. RTL
authorities told Party leaders that their ``unique model of
transformation'' had recently succeeded in reforming a group of
``die-hard'' practitioners.\166\ In June 2009, the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region Justice Bureau described the Hohhot
Women's RTL Center as a ``main battlefield'' in the
``struggle'' against Falun Gong, where a total of 518
practitioners had been ``transformed.'' \167\ The Assistant
Director of the Jiangxi Provincial RTL Management Bureau
pressed his subordinates to ``increase awareness of the
importance of this particular year to our transformation work
and understand the urgency of overcoming the current low rate
of transformation.'' \168\ In July 2009, Party leaders in
Heilongjiang's Tailai county redoubled their efforts to
``transform'' one local practitioner who was reportedly the
sole holdout among 212 others who had already ``thoroughly
transformed.'' \169\
Cases of torture and death of Falun Gong practitioners in
official custody, both confirmed and alleged, continued to
surface in the past year. Amnesty International reported that
over 100 practitioners died in detention or shortly after
release in 2008 as a result of torture or other forms of
mistreatment.\170\ In February 2008, a popular musician and
Falun Gong practitioner named Yu Zhou died in Beijing police
custody 11 days after he and his wife were detained.
Authorities refused to allow an autopsy and Yu's family
suspects that he was beaten to death.\171\ In March 2009, a
public security officer at the Shibei District Liaoyuan Road
PSB station in Qingdao reportedly beat Lu Xueqin, a Falun Gong
practitioner, for nine days until she was permanently paralyzed
from the waist down.\172\ In July 2009, a 45-year-old
practitioner named Yang Guiquan was reportedly declared dead
upon arrival at the Fuxin City Mining Corporation General
Hospital in Liaoning province after being held for 16 days by
police and reportedly beaten with electric batons and force-
fed.\173\
Harassment of attorneys, court irregularities, coerced confessions
In the past year, security officials in southwest China
reportedly assaulted attorneys who attempted to defend Falun
Gong clients facing charges in China's judicial system. On
April 13, 2009, public security agents in the capital of
Sichuan province intercepted and beat Beijing-based lawyer
Cheng Hai as he was traveling to meet the mother of a Falun
Gong client. The agents reportedly kicked and punched Cheng for
agreeing to defend Tao Yuan, a Falun Gong practitioner who was
seeking medical parole from Chengdu municipality's Hanyuan
Prison.\174\ On May 13, 2009, more than 20 officers from the
Jiangjin District Public Security Bureau (PSB) in Chongqing
municipality reportedly physically assaulted attorneys Li
Chunfu and Zhang Kai at the home of Jiang Xiqing, a Falun Gong
practitioner whose death in custody they were
investigating.\175\ Officers took Li and Zhang to the PSB where
they hung them inside iron cages, interrogated, and beat them.
Police reportedly told Li and Zhang that ``you absolutely
cannot defend Falun Gong; this is the situation in China.''
\176\
The Chinese Government's harsh treatment of lawyers who
defend Falun Gong has been most severe in the case of Gao
Zhisheng, a prominent human rights attorney who was last seen
being forcibly taken from his hometown by public security
officials on February 4, 2009.\177\ When public security
officials abducted Gao in September 2007, Gao was tortured in a
secret location outside Beijing for more than 50 days.\178\
Gao's account of the abduction describes how he was repeatedly
struck with electric batons all over his body, including his
genitals, and subjected to other forms of torture. Gao recounts
how his tormentors admitted that Falun Gong practitioners were
indeed tortured as Gao had previously alleged: ``you are not
incorrect in saying that we torture Falun Gong followers.
That's right, we do. The 12 courses we're serving you were
perfected on the Falun Gong followers.'' \179\ Gao was also
warned that he would be killed if he told anyone about being
abducted and tortured.\180\ He has not been seen since
February. [See Section II--Criminal Justice--The Disappearance
of Gao Zhisheng.]
In 2009, authorities in northeastern China reportedly
detained at least four attorneys on account of their defense of
Falun Gong clients. In Harbin city, the capital of Heilongjiang
province, authorities detained attorney Wei Liangyue and his
wife in February. Public security officials reportedly ordered
Wei to serve one and one-half years of reeducation through
labor for meeting with Falun Gong practitioners, which they
described as ``gathering a crowd to disturb social order.''
\181\ In July 2009, security officials abducted two lawyers
from Shandong province because of their involvement in Falun
Gong cases. On July 2, Jinan city officials detained Liu Ruping
outside of his residence and took him to an undisclosed
detention facility. Six days later, police in Pingdu city
reportedly detained Wang Ping, an attorney with the
Tianzhenping Law Firm.\182\ On July 4, plainclothes officers
raided the home of Wang Yonghang, a lawyer in Dalian city,
Liaoning province. Police detained both Wang and his wife, and
while she was released, Wang remains in custody.\183\
In cases where authorities did not physically assault or
detain attorneys who defend Falun Gong, officials often
harassed and intimidated them. The government sought to silence
Chinese human rights lawyers, many of whom have defended Falun
Gong practitioners, by threatening de facto disbarment through
the refusal to renew their licenses to practice. In May 2009,
authorities contacted senior partners at nine law firms and
demanded that they refrain from submitting license renewal
applications for certain attorneys or deliberately submit
incomplete applications that could be turned down on technical
grounds.\184\ In four cases, authorities advised that certain
lawyers should receive poor marks in their annual performance
evaluations, which would be used as a pretense to disbar
them.\185\ As of early September 2009, the government has used
the normally routine process of ``annual assessment and
registration'' to revoke the licenses of at least 21 rights
lawyers.\186\ The government also obstructed Falun Gong
practitioners' access to legal defense when it forced the
Beijing Yitong Law Firm to close for six months in March 2009,
largely on account of its role in human rights cases, including
on behalf of Falun Gong practitioners.\187\ [For more
information, see Section III--Access to Justice.]
In the past year, trials of Falun Gong practitioners
continued to display procedural irregularities and violations,
while justice bureaus took actions that subverted ordinary
legal protections. In
October 2008, the Wuhou District People's Court in Chengdu, the
capital of Sichuan province, sentenced 11 Falun Gong
practitioners to between three and seven years in prison. The
court reportedly barred family members from attending the trial
and prohibited the defendants' lawyers from speaking.\188\ More
than 15 lawyers joined together to appeal the ruling, but the
appeals court attempted to obstruct their access to court
records.\189\ The Harbin Municipal Justice Bureau issued a
directive in October requiring attorneys who defend Falun Gong
practitioners to report to and receive pre-trial ``guidance''
from the government-controlled lawyers association.\190\ In
January 2009, lawyers for two practitioners on trial at the
Shashi District People's Court in Jingzhou city, Hubei
province, alleged that torture was used to extort the
defendants' confessions and complained that the court
repeatedly interrupted the defense counsel's statements and
prevented them from finishing questioning.\191\ In February
2009, the Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau in Liaoning
province ordered several attorneys who had
prepared a not-guilty defense on behalf of six Falun Gong
practitioners to either withdraw from the case or cooperate
with authorities, and threatened to not renew their licenses if
they failed to comply.\192\ In March, during the trial of 12
practitioners in the Shibei District People's Court in Qingdao
city, Shandong province, the defendants' counsel objected to
the court proceedings because of unlawful procedural violations
committed by the court and procuratorate, and alleged that
authorities used torture to extort confessions from
defendants.\193\
The Party's 6-10 Office reportedly has interfered in the
adjudication of Falun Gong cases. In November 2008, defense
lawyers for two practitioners on trial at the Jiguan District
People's Court in Jixi city, Heilongjiang province, challenged
the court's independence when the presiding judge was seen
meeting with 6-10 Office agents during a court recess.\194\ In
February 2009, the Xi'an District People's Court in Liaoyuan
city, Jilin province, reported that when preparing for a trial
involving Falun Gong and other ``cult organizations,'' the
court must first ``petition'' the municipal 6-10 Office, and
only after receiving an affirmative response is the court then
permitted to hear the case.\195\ A document that appears to be
a ``secret'' directive dated February 10, 2009, from the 6-10
Office in Shenyang city, the capital of Liaoning province,
surfaced on a U.S.-based Chinese-language news Web site in
March. Among other things, the directive mandates that the 6-10
Office should ``dispatch personnel to audit court proceedings
of `Falun Gong' cases and assist with managing sudden
incidents.'' \196\
ISLAM
Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated in the
past year, and authorities maintained tight controls over the
practice of Islam across China. Muslims throughout China faced
state controls over activities including the interpretation of
theology, the content of sermons, the training of religious
leaders, and the freedom to make overseas pilgrimages.\197\
Inside the XUAR, religious repression increased as authorities
implemented harsher controls over religion as part of broader
efforts in the XUAR to strengthen security and guard against
perceived threats to stability. [See Islam in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region in this section and Section IV--
Xinjiang for more information.]
Authorities continued efforts to align aspects of Islamic
practice in China to government and Communist Party policy. An
official from the Islamic Association of China (IAC), the
state-controlled organization that, along with local branches,
controls Islamic practice in China, reported in December 2008
that the IAC had begun to establish a corps of liaisons within
each province to deal with matters involving the interpretation
of religious texts,\198\ a measure which builds on longstanding
IAC work to compile sermons and religious texts consistent with
government policy.\199\ A May 2009 report on an IAC Standing
Committee meeting described plans to launch activities in 2009
to promote the ``establishment of harmonious mosques,'' in
order for Muslim circles to ``better improve their quality''
and contribute to political objectives including China's
economic and social development.\200\ Authorities expressed
concern about aspects of Islamic practice deemed incompatible
with government and Party goals. A government report from
Qinghai province expressed concern that some people with
``backward, conservative religious viewpoints'' were
challenging the authority of the democratic management
committees formed within registered mosques.\201\ Muslim
religious leaders throughout China remained subject to
government- and Party-led political training classes.\202\ For
example, in April 2009, a district in Beijing described
enhancing efforts to train young Muslim religious leaders to
build a ``politically reliable'' corps of such leaders.\203\ In
the aftermath of the forceful police suppression of a
demonstration held by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of Urumqi on
July 5, and outbreaks of violence in the region starting that
day--events Chinese authorities cast as a ``riot'' and blamed
on U.S.-based Uyghur rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer and the
``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious
extremism\204\--Islamic associations in China reported
spreading Party policy on the incidents.\205\ [See Section IV--
Xinjiang, for more information on the July 5 demonstration and
related events.]
Chinese authorities continued to maintain restrictions on
Muslims' freedom to carry out pilgrimages to Mecca, Saudi
Arabia. Authorities allow Muslims to undertake trips only under
the auspices of official groups that impose political
requirements on participants.\206\ An official from the IAC
said that the IAC had made progress in curbing unauthorized
pilgrimages in 2008.\207\ [See below for details on pilgrimage
restrictions in the XUAR.]
Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) deteriorated in the
past year. Authorities continued to identify ``religious
extremism'' and ``illegal religious activity'' as key threats
to stability\208\ and took measures to further restrict Islamic
religious practice in the region. Government authorities
defined ``religious extremism'' and ``illegal religious
activity'' to encompass religious practices, group
affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international
human rights guarantees for freedom of religion, expression,
and association that the Chinese Government is bound to
uphold.\209\ Authorities tightened controls over Islam as part
of broader campaigns in the XUAR in the past year to strengthen
security and guard against perceived threats to stability. The
suppressed demonstration held by Uyghurs in the XUAR capital of
Urumqi on July 5, 2009, violence in the region starting that
day, and heavy security measures in the region, drew an
international spotlight on longstanding government repression
in the region, including controls over religion. Prior to the
July 5 demonstration, however, human rights conditions in the
region, including conditions for religious freedom, had already
declined throughout the year, maintaining a trend in worsening
conditions documented by the Commission in its 2008 Annual
Report. [See Section IV--Xinjiang, for more information.]
Tightened controls over Islam in the XUAR
Policy statements in late 2008 and 2009 from the XUAR
government and Communist Party indicated that heightened
controls over religion, along with other controls implemented
in the XUAR earlier in 2008, would remain an enduring feature
within the region and would be further strengthened. In a major
speech in September 2008, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri
outlined increased measures to ``strike hard'' against
perceived threats in the region including ``illegal religious
activity'' and ``religious extremism.'' \210\ He called for
``increasing the strength of punishment for illegal religious
activities and curbing, in accordance with law, underground
activities to teach religion and sermonize.'' \211\ He added
that ``we must never allow fanatic religious ideas to gain
ground, nor must we allow religious extremist forces to
flourish and see success.'' \212\ In March 2009, Nur Bekri
stated that the region's
battle against separatism would be ``more severe, the task more
strenuous, and the conditions for battle more intense,''
attributing security threats to ``Western hostile forces'' and
to the ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious
extremism.\213\ Authorities pledged tighter security measures
and carried out additional security controls in the aftermath
of the July 5 demonstration and
outbreaks of violence in the region starting that day. [See
Section IV--Xinjiang for additional information.]
Authorities at various levels of government in the XUAR
reported throughout the year on taking steps to tighten
controls over religion and punish ``illegal religious
activity,'' singling out aspects of Muslim identity and
practice in particular.\214\ Authorities integrated controls
over Islam into wide-scale anti-separatism ideological
campaigns launched throughout the region.\215\ In October 2008,
XUAR Communist Party Committee Standing Committee member
Shawket Imin called on Party cadres from the United Front Work
Department to take measures including strengthening
``leadership'' and ``education'' of religious people,
strengthening cultivation and training of religious leaders,
and curbing unauthorized religious pilgrimages and ``illegal
religious activities.'' \216\ Steps at the local level include:
In February 2009, the Hoten district
government announced plans to implement a series of
measures to deal with ``illegal religious activity,''
including by strengthening capacity to ``investigate''
and ``ferret out'' ``illegal'' activity, strengthening
oversight of students during vacation periods, and
holding open trials to punish ``illegal religious
activity'' and demonstrate its consequences to the
public.\217\
The same month, an official in Shache (Yeken,
Yarkand) county, Kashgar district, outlined measures to
deal with ``outstanding'' problems including the
discovery of unauthorized
religious classes, ``illegal religious activity''
extending across multiple localities, and ``inadequate
enthusiasm'' among some religious figures toward
contributing to the development of the rural
economy.\218\
Authorities in Yining (Ghulja) city, Ili
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, carried out propaganda
education activities to ``weaken religious
consciousness and uphold a civilized and healthy life''
among ethnic minority women, young adults, and
juveniles.\219\
A March report on steps to expand intelligence
information networks in Awat county, Aqsu district,
described mobilizing religious leaders and other groups
to enhance intelligence
collection efforts. According to the report, as a
result of intelligence leads, authorities prosecuted
cases of underground sermonizing, investigated
instances of suspected participation in ``illegal
religious activity,'' and stopped one case of
``religious interference into matrimony.'' \220\
Authorities temporarily detained and fined a
group of several hundred Uyghurs for worshiping at a
shrine outside their home village in March, on the
grounds that the gathering constituted illegal ``cross-
village worship,'' according to information from
worshipers and officials provided to Radio Free Asia
(RFA).\221\
The Uyghur American Association, drawing on
Chinese and other sources, reported on security
campaigns in spring 2009 in Kashgar and Hoten
districts, including security sweeps and wide-scale
detentions, that targeted acts including ``illegal
religious activity.'' \222\
In June, RFA reported that in March 2009, the
Ili Intermediate People's Court in the Ili Kazakh
Autonomous Prefecture gave prison sentences ranging
from three years to life to 12 men charged with
``splittism.'' \223\ The charges were connected to
their activities teaching religion to children,
according to the father of one of the men.\224\ [See
box titled Religious Prisoners below for more details.]
The Commission found several reports indicating government
and Party oversight of the religious practices and traditions
of Muslim women, including women who play a prominent role in
funeral rites and other religious practices. Reports of efforts
to investigate or reduce the wearing of head scarves and alter
women's clothing habits continued in this reporting year.\225\
For example, a report from Toqsu county, Aqsu district,
describing ``outstanding problems'' in ``bizarre'' women's
apparel, said that an expert invited by the Party-controlled
XUAR Women's Federation provided a ``correct interpretation''
of the Quran's views toward women's clothes.\226\ In the past
year, an official from the XUAR Women's Federation proposed
bringing female religious figures (known as buwi in Uyghur) who
have played a prominent role in practices including funeral
rites under greater government control.\227\ In 2009, at least
two local governments in the XUAR reported on measures to train
or regulate the activities of buwi.\228\
Authorities in the XUAR continued to take steps to prevent
Muslims from making independent religious pilgrimages abroad,
while restricting the number of people on official trips and
subjecting them to tight oversight.\229\ For example,
government officials in Huocheng (Qorghas) county, Ili Kazakh
Autonomous Prefecture, reported requiring pilgrimage
participants to sign a contract agreeing not to do such things
as bring on pilgrimage religious garments that ``are not in
accordance with the traditional social customs and habits of
China's ethnic minorities,'' including certain types of women's
veils.\230\ The Wensu (Onsu) county government in Aqsu district
reported taking steps to monitor returnees from pilgrimages in
order to ``place them in the `line of vision' of the government
and Party committee'' and ``understand'' the activities they
participated in while abroad.\231\ Overseas sources continued
to carry reports that authorities confiscate Uyghurs' passports
in an effort to curb unauthorized pilgrimages and that
authorities create barriers to participating in official
pilgrimages.\232\
As the Commission has tracked in recent years, authorities
also restrict Muslims' freedom to observe Ramadan. Authorities
have placed curbs on students' and teachers' observance of the
holiday, for example, and have ordered restaurants to remain
open during the month-long period of daily fasting.\233\ News
of Ramadan restrictions continued in 2009, including reported
restrictions on government workers' observance of the holiday
and measures to make
restaurants stay open.\234\ In response to an August report on
the restrictions, a XUAR government spokesperson denied that
authorities forced government employees to eat during fasting
periods and was paraphrased as saying ``[t]he government has
never intervened with Uygurs' religious activities[.]'' \235\
Political training for Muslim leaders in the XUAR
The XUAR government launched wide-scale political training
for Muslim leaders in the past year. In a September 2008 speech
(discussed above), XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri
described plans to carry out a third cycle of training for
Muslim religious personnel,\236\ which was later reported to be
launched in February 2009.\237\ According to Nur Bekri, the
training will reach 29,000 religious figures between 2009 and
2012.\238\ In his September speech, Nur Bekri said, ``We should
always step up the ideological development of patriotic
religious personages and the building of their ranks as the key
link to be grasped in our religious work.'' \239\ In February
2009, an official in Shache (Yeken, Yarkand) county, Kashgar
district, described plans to expel religious leaders if they
missed three political study sessions.\240\ In the aftermath of
the July 5 demonstration and outbreaks of violence in the
region starting that day, XUAR Communist Party Committee
Standing Committee member Shawket Imin called on religious
leaders to strengthen their political consciousness and
outlined restrictions on their behavior and activities.\241\
Controls over religious expression in the XUAR
Authorities in the XUAR continued in the past year to
censor and confiscate religious publications. In 2008, XUAR
authorities made ``illegal'' political and religious
publications the focal point for that year's campaign to
``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal
Publications,'' and in 2009, authorities reported on the
continuation of censorship campaigns that included focus on
``illegal'' religious and political publications.\242\ A
district in Qaramay municipality reported in November 2008 that
the municipal government had issued a ``notice on confiscating
Muslim books such as `The Truth About the Holy Teachings' and
`The Call to Orthodoxy,' '' and that authorities had
investigated local book and music sellers in accordance with
the notice.\243\ Authorities in Urumqi and in Hoten district
reported confiscating ``illegal'' religious materials,
including ``illegal religious pictures'' in Urumqi, as part of
campaigns there to inspect cultural markets and curb
``illegal'' religious activity, respectively.\244\ In March
2009, official media reported that XUAR authorities would
coordinate with propaganda departments from provincial-level
areas including Gansu, Qinghai, and Shaanxi provinces and the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to establish a cross-provincial
mechanism to stop the printing and sales of ``illegal''
religious material. Media also reported that authorities
established a fund to reward efforts to ``purify'' the cultural
market, with focus on ``illegal'' religious and political
publications.\245\ Authorities also continued to regulate
religious speech by controlling the content of religious
publications, including sermons, and by directing
interpretations of religious doctrine.\246\
Controls over children's freedom of religion in the XUAR
The XUAR government took steps in the past year to
strengthen formal legal prohibitions over children's freedom of
religion. In June, the XUAR government deliberated over a draft
regulation on the protection of minors that would strengthen
curbs over children's right to practice a religion and receive
religious instruction.\247\ The draft regulation would replace
1993 legal measures in force in the XUAR that already include
the harshest legal restrictions in the country on children's
freedom of religion.\248\ According to a description of the
2009 draft regulation, it retains the prohibition that parents
or guardians may not permit minors to participate in religious
activities and adds that minors ``seduced into'' or ``forced''
to participate in religious activities can seek protection from
schools or government offices including public security
offices. Under the draft regulation, organizations approached
for help must not shirk their duties and must intervene
promptly.\249\
In addition to restrictions in law, authorities within the
XUAR also implemented steps in practice to restrict children's
freedom of religion. As part of measures to deal with ``illegal
religious activity'' in Hoten district implemented in spring
2009, authorities outlined measures to strengthen oversight of
students during their school vacation period through a system
of both fixed and unscheduled contact with them.\250\ In
February, authorities in Yining (Ghulja) city, Ili Kazakh
Autonomous Prefecture, targeted ethnic minority women, young
adults, and juveniles for propaganda education activities to
``weaken religious consciousness and uphold a civilized and
healthy life.'' \251\ A township in Bachu (Maralbeshi) county,
Kashgar district, described promoting education in topics
including atheism as part of the local school system's fall
2008 anti-separatism education.\252\
PROTESTANTISM
The Chinese Government continues to repress Chinese
Protestants who worship in unregistered congregations (house
churches) and to impose strict regulations on the registered
Protestant church. The Communist Party seeks to control
Protestants by requiring all congregations to register with and
submit to state-run entities charged with overseeing their
activities. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the
China Christian Council (CCC) are the official state-led
organizations that manage Protestants on behalf of the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and the Party's
United Front Work Department (UFWD).\253\ Registered
congregations are subject to state monitoring of church
members, interference in clergy appointments, mandatory
political study
sessions for pastors, and restrictions on doctrine and topics
for preaching.\254\ Officials continue to subject Protestants
who refuse to register to harassment, detention, imprisonment,
and forced church closure.
Controls over doctrine and theology
China's state-controlled Protestant church manipulates and
modifies doctrine and theology in an effort to eliminate
elements of Christian faith that the Party regards as
incompatible with its goals and ideology. The process whereby
this is achieved is called ``theological reconstruction.''
\255\ In 2008, the CCC president described the purpose and
function of theological reconstruction in the following terms:
In the past, Chinese theology for the most part
mimicked conservative Western theology. . . . This
negative and outmoded theology made it difficult for
believers to conceive of adapting to socialist society.
The initiative for theological reconstruction was meant
to get rid of the shackles of negative theological
thinking and open up a new situation in Chinese
Christianity. . . . It is an expression of Chinese
Christianity's move toward reason, an essential path to
adapting to socialist society, and a necessary trend in
the fusion of Chinese Christianity and advanced Chinese
culture.\256\
Chinese authorities often employ rhetoric in the
theological reconstruction campaign that construes nationalism
and loyalty to the Party as religious obligations with which
Protestants must comply. In a November 2008 report, the TSPM
argued that theological reconstruction seeks to ``strengthen
awareness that `a good Christian should be a good citizen' ''
and bring about a ``far greater understanding among Chinese
Christians of patriotism . . . protecting social stability,
ethnic solidarity, and the unification of the motherland.''
\257\ According to an April 2009 Party report, one of the
TSPM's greatest accomplishments is that it has led ``vast
numbers of Protestants to fervently love China, support the
leadership of the Communist Party, and support the socialist
system.'' \258\ Wang Zuo'an, Vice Director of SARA, drew the
link between patriotism and Party loyalty when he told a 2007
conference of registered Protestants: ``When Christians today
speak of patriotism, its concrete expression must be to uphold
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist
system.'' \259\
Chinese authorities further politicize Christian faith by
insisting that the Bible not only permits patriotism, but
requires it. When Party leaders compel Christians to ``adapt''
to the demands of socialism, TSPM leaders advise Protestants
that ``there is no reason to oppose this in terms of faith:
there is no conflict with basic biblical faith, nor is it
harmful to biblical truth.'' \260\ Ding Guangxun, the original
architect of theological reconstruction and former TSPM
chairman, has declared that ``the Bible wants us to love our
country.'' \261\ SARA leaders echo Ding in proclaiming to
Protestants that ``love of country is a revelation and teaching
found in the Bible.'' \262\ The dean of a TSPM seminary has
taught that the official policy of ``loving the country, loving
the church'' is ``an intrinsic and important part of Christian
faith, with a wealth of biblical evidence'' to support it.\263\
Authorities have raised Party Chairman Hu Jintao's ``harmonious
society'' slogan to the level of a divine mission. In 2008, the
CCC president stated that ``making Christianity an active agent
in building the harmonious society is both the leading of God
for the Chinese Church and the demand of the times for us.''
\264\
In 2008 and 2009, Chinese officials celebrated theological
reconstruction and pledged to continue promoting it. In
November 2008, the TSPM and CCC convened a national summit to
celebrate the 10th anniversary of theological
reconstruction.\265\ Ding Guangxun used the summit to urge
officials and pastors to ``maintain the development of
Theological Reconstruction as prima inter pares in every aspect
of their work.'' \266\ Wang Zuo'an delivered a speech on behalf
of SARA that stressed the importance of bringing about a
``theological system with Chinese characteristics and a unique
witness that conforms to Chinese society and culture.'' \267\
Wang told TSPM and CCC leaders: ``Christians not only must
connect with God, but they must also follow God's teaching to
connect themselves with the motherland and society.'' Giving
credit to a decade of theological reconstruction ``enriching
the information coming out of the pulpit,'' Wang noted that
``more and more Christians'' have become ``enlightened'' and
``gradually left behind the narrow faith that focuses on
personal salvation alone.'' \268\
In the past year, authorities wielded theological
reconstruction as an instrument to ``correct'' specific tenets
and traditions that are seen as out of step with Party policy
and ideology. In a report on the 10th year of the theological
reconstruction campaign, the TSPM identifies several Protestant
beliefs that are problematic and warns of potential risks if
they are not ``promptly corrected'': (1) A one-sided
understanding of the second coming of Christ; (2) denial of the
importance of works in this life; (3) using ``believer and
unbeliever'' to differentiate people; (4) using ``follow God
and don't follow men'' as a reason for despising national laws
and regulations; (5) misconstruing the TSPM as a movement to
unify the church and state; (6) one-sided emphasis on ``things
of the Spirit'' to the detriment of reason, which leads some
towards a fanatical and superstitious faith; and (7)
overemphasis on personal salvation.\269\ A core Protestant
tenet that theological reconstruction seeks to uproot is the
Lutheran (Pauline) doctrine of justification by faith alone
(sola fide).\270\ Ding Guangxun has argued that ``playing down
some theological views today is permissible, and in fact,
necessary,'' and identified justification by faith as a chief
concept to be downplayed
because it has been ``overemphasized'' in China.\271\
Controls over pastoral training and preaching
Chinese Government efforts to shape seminary education are
an important component of the theological reconstruction
campaign. In its summary report on the 10th year of theological
reconstruction, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM)
identified registered Protestant seminaries as the ``base''
that serves a ``key function'' in promoting theological
reconstruction. For seminary students and teachers who make
``outstanding contributions'' to theological reconstruction,
the report recommends measures to reward them.\272\ The China
Christian Council (CCC) also places priority on theological
education in its 2008 work report: ``Trained personnel are the
basis of everything. We must train for the church a large
contingent of a variety of outstanding personnel who uphold the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.'' \273\ In an
``important speech'' during an April 2009 inspection of the
East China Seminary, Yang Xiaodu, a high-ranking Shanghai Party
official, praised the seminary as a ``base for cultivating
patriotic clergy'' and expressed ``hope'' that the school would
continue its ``fine tradition'' of ``adapting to socialism.''
\274\ Also in April, authorities in Linfen city, Shanxi
province, underscored the need to ``strengthen patriotic
education and diligently train a team of religious teachers who
are politically reliable.'' \275\ Upon graduation from a state-
sanctioned seminary, new pastors encounter ordination
regulations that mandate acceptance of the Party's authority.
The Measures for Recognizing Chinese Protestant Religious
Personnel stipulate, as the first of five ``basic conditions''
for ordination in a registered church, that candidates must
``support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.''
\276\
The theological reconstruction campaign also aims to
restrict sermon content and control how registered pastors
interpret the Bible. In December 2008, authorities in Wuxi
city, Jiangsu province, provided unspecified ``support'' to the
local TSPM's ``preaching and scripture interpretation class''
for registered pastors.\277\ In its 2008 work report, the CCC
noted the distribution of ``sermon prompts'' intended to form
``the basis of sermon content,'' based on theological
reconstruction ``discussions'' held in registered
churches.\278\ Two publications highlighted in the CCC report--
``A Course in Christian Patriotism'' and ``Remembering the Past
as a Lesson for the Future''--are regarded as important
material for seminarians that ``should be studied and discussed
in all Christian Churches, among pastoral workers and in the
larger Christian community.'' \279\ The latter of the two is
described as a ``factual history of the manipulation of
Christianity by imperialism in its aggression against China.''
\280\ The ``promotion of theological education'' through these
publications will ultimately help Chinese Protestants, among
other things, ``establish a correct view of the Bible.'' \281\
In April 2009, the Shenyang TSPM and CCC in Liaoning province
designated theological reconstruction as this year's ``most
important task'' and vowed to strengthen it ``without a
second's delay.'' Its stated purpose was to correct
``ideologically backward'' pastors who fail to preach an
``interpretation of the Bible that conforms to the demands of
social progress.'' \282\
Restrictions on proselytizing, contact with foreign Christians
The Chinese Government restricts Protestants from
proselytizing beyond the physical confines of registered
churches, a prohibition that prompts many evangelicals to
worship in unregistered congregations and limits interaction
between Chinese and foreign Protestants.\283\ An ethnographic
study conducted in a major city in southern China found that
official policies ``significantly curtailed'' evangelization
efforts by both registered and unregistered churches.\284\
Authorities often punish Protestants who proselytize with
administrative detention, including reeducation through labor
(RTL). On December 16, 2008, Zhoukou city public security
officials in Henan province ordered three church leaders to
serve one year of RTL for ``illegal proselytizing.'' \285\ In
April 2009, public security officials in Henan's Xinyang city
raided a house church service and detained two Chinese
missionaries for holding an ``illegal'' church meeting and
possessing illegal foreign religious publications.\286\ In
February 2009, police stormed a meeting of house church leaders
from four provinces that was held in Henan and detained more
than 60 participants, claiming that the presence of two South
Korean pastors, whom the government deported and banned from
China for five years, rendered the meeting an ``illegal
gathering.'' \287\ In 2008, the Daqing Municipal People's
Congress in Heilongjiang province warned that the South Korean
Good News Missionary Society had ``infiltrated'' local
universities.\288\
Chinese officials routinely characterize contact between
Chinese Protestants and international Christian organizations
or individuals as dangerous incidents of ``foreign
infiltration,'' which security forces are tasked with
preventing.\289\ State regulations on religious activities
prohibit foreigners from engaging in missionary activity
outside of the physical confines of government-registered
churches and require foreigners to obtain government
authorization before preaching inside registered churches.\290\
The ``three-self principles'' (self-administration, self-
support, and self-propagation) of the Three-Self Patriotic
Movement (TSPM) embed suspicion of foreign Christians within
the basic institutional framework of the state-sanctioned
Protestant church. Chinese officials often speak of
foreign Christian groups in adversarial terms and credit the
``three-self principles'' for successfully severing the ``ties
of Chinese Christian churches with imperialistic invaders.''
\291\ The China Christian Council (CCC) wrote in a 2008 report
that ``infiltration by groups overseas undermines the
achievements of the TSPM. . . . Some of them attempt to use
Christianity as an entry point to `Westernize' or `split'
China. They continually devise new plans to infiltrate China,
using religion to disguise their political ideas.'' \292\ The
Guangdong United Front Work Department (UFWD) deputy head has
described the ``house churches and underground churches'' that
receive support from ``foreign enemy forces'' as a ``political
tool in a plot to subvert the Chinese Government.'' \293\ In
select cases, visits by foreigners to registered churches are
viewed positively by officials. In 2008, the UFWD praised the
Beijing Haidian District Christian Church, a TSPM congregation,
for cultivating foreign visitors as an ``important means for
disseminating overseas the Party's and government's policy of
freedom of religious belief.'' \294\
Harassment, detention, and closure of churches
The Chinese Government's pre-Olympics campaign against
Protestant activists and unregistered congregations in 2008
showed few signs of abatement in 2009. Instead, government
efforts to suppress house church activities in some areas
retained a relatively high level of intensity, as revealed by
official rhetoric as well as ongoing arrests and
detentions.\295\ Numerous Chinese localities carried out
``special investigations and studies'' in late 2008 and 2009
that sought to gather intelligence on Protestant groups,
strengthen the ban on house churches, and improve official
oversight and control of the activities of registered
churches.\296\ Clergy and laity from unregistered churches, as
well as those affiliated with registered churches that run
afoul of Party policy, remain vulnerable to harassment,
detention, and imprisonment. In 2008, authorities detained at
least 764 Protestant leaders and adherents, 35 of whom were
sentenced or ordered to serve terms of imprisonment or
reeducation through labor (RTL) exceeding one year.\297\ In
2008 and 2009, government and security officials frequently
targeted Pastor Zhang Mingxuan, president of the Chinese House
Church Alliance (CHCA), by detaining him several times,
confiscating money and personal belongings, evicting his family
from their home, formally ``abolishing'' the CHCA, and severely
beating his son with iron bars.\298\ Recent cases raise
concerns about access to justice and the abuse of Protestants
in official custody. In January 2009, officials told an
attorney representing Protestants in Zhoukou city, Henan
province, that the court rejected her lawsuit because it was
``acting on internal documents ordering them not to accept
cases involving religious groups.'' \299\ In December 2008,
another court in Henan, reportedly under pressure from above,
refused an appeal by Mao Minzi, a house church pastor who was
ordered to serve one year of RTL.\300\ Authorities have
harassed some attorneys who defend house church Christians, and
in March 2009, the government forced the Beijing Yitong Law
Firm to close for six months, which caused a setback to
Protestants' efforts to defend their rights.\301\ In February
2009, 79-year-old Shuang Shuying, mother of house church pastor
Hua Huiqi, was released after serving a two-year prison
sentence for protesting her son's detention and striking a
police vehicle with her cane.\302\ Upon release, Shuang wrote a
letter that told of torture that she suffered while in prison.
Shuang was beaten, deprived of sleep, shocked with electric
batons, forced to drink her own urine, and forced to stand
naked outdoors in a
stationary position for several hours at night.\303\ A U.S.-
based non-governmental organization documented 19 cases of
Chinese authorities abusing Protestants in custody during
2008.\304\
Raids of house churches persist in many localities. Public
security officials targeted house churches in at least seven
provinces during the 2008 Christmas season.\305\ Officers
raided a nativity reenactment in Henan's Yucheng county and
detained nine participants for ``organizing illegal religious
activities.'' \306\ On December 22, authorities in Dongzhi
county, Anhui province, raided an unregistered Bible school,
detained and interrogated 19 students and 2 leaders, and
announced plans to demolish or sell the building.\307\ In
Anhui's Bozhou city, a house church was raided during its
Christmas service and two leaders were detained.\308\ On
Christmas Eve, more than 40 public security officials attacked
Protestant volunteers engaged in housing reconstruction for
earthquake victims, took several into detention, confiscated
their Bibles, and threatened to demolish the newly constructed
homes.\309\ In Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, public security
forces were deployed to ``closely follow Christmas activities
at unauthorized sites and prevent illegal activities.'' \310\
On February 11, 2009, nearly 100 security officials in Nanyang
city, Henan province, forcibly disrupted a meeting of house
church leaders and detained more than 60 Chinese pastors and 2
South Korean ministers.\311\ In October 2008, Nanyang
authorities also dispersed a house church gathering and, after
holding the pastor for 15 days in administrative detention,
ordered him to serve one year of RTL for alleged membership in
an ``evil cult.'' \312\ In April 2009, security agents forcibly
shut down an Easter gathering of more than 1,000 unregistered
Protestants in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, and
detained 6 organizers.\313\
Detention and abuse of Protestants is often accompanied by
official efforts to shut down or demolish sites of worship. On
December 17, 2008, the Deputy General Secretary of the Yancheng
City Party Committee in Jiangsu province and public security
officials reportedly stormed the Chengnan Christian Church, a
registered congregation, and began to raze the building, in
violation of a court ruling in the church's favor issued the
day before.\314\ More than 10 church members were physically
assaulted during the demolition.\315\ In December, more than
200 people with bulldozers tore down a Protestant-run drug
rehabilitation center in Yunnan province without legal
justification.\316\ Authorities banned an unregistered
congregation in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) just before Christmas
and threatened to arrest the congregation's pastor if he defied
the ban.\317\ In January 2009, Three-Self Patriotic Movement
(TSPM) officials worked with government and public security
officials to seize the property of Chang Fengying, an
evangelist who hosted a house church in Muling city,
Heilongjiang province.\318\ In February, Shanghai authorities
ordered the landlord of the Wanbang Missionary Church to evict
the congregation within 30 days because its pastor refused to
cancel a seminar for urban house church pastors.\319\
Authorities closed unregistered churches dispersed across a
wide area of China in the past year and in some places
subjected house church leaders to a coercive ``thought reform''
process called ``transformation through reeducation.'' \320\ In
October 2008, local authorities reportedly issued an order
banning house churches in Heilongjiang's Yichun city.\321\ At
the same time, the Chengdu Municipal People's Congress reported
that local authorities had ``banned'' 161 house churches and
``successfully transformed'' 196 members of four Protestant
``cult organizations.'' \322\ Chongqing municipal authorities
also implemented a series of measures in October to ``ban'' or
``demolish'' 88 Protestant house churches, and called for the
``transformation through reeducation'' of unregistered
Protestants who serve as a vehicle for ``infiltration'' by
``anti-China political forces.'' \323\ In March 2009, officials
in Jiangsu's Taixing city vowed to ``attach great importance to
the transformation through reeducation of persons responsible
for unregistered Protestant meeting sites'' and ``help them
realize that freedom of religious belief does not equal freedom
of religious activity.'' \324\ In May 2009, Nanjing Party
officials pledged to ``ensure that there are no cult meeting
sites, no unauthorized Protestant sites, no self-proclaimed
missionaries, and that no religious conflicts reach higher
authorities.'' \325\ In April, authorities in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region declared that they would ``punish''
missionaries and house churches, while county-level officials
in Jiangxi province received orders to ``investigate and
prosecute'' the same groups.\326\
Banned Protestant groups and the 6-10 office
The Chinese Government continues to categorically prohibit
some Protestant groups from exercising religious freedom by
criminalizing their communities as ``cult organizations.''
\327\ The government has banned at least 18 Protestant groups
with adherents in multiple provinces, though many more
Protestant congregations and movements have been banned that
are active within only one province.\328\ The threat of
``cult'' designation is a powerful tool for authorities seeking
to intimidate and control unregistered Protestants. Three-Self
Patriotic Movement (TSPM) leaders have invoked the specter of
Falun Gong to persuade Protestants to embrace the theological
reconstruction campaign. Ding Guangxun, former TSPM chairman,
has warned Protestants that they ``will not have a future'' if
they ``begin to resemble Falun Gong or some other cult.'' \329\
In October 2008, an official report from Chongqing municipality
drew a link between ``cult'' prevention and the Party's drive
to remake Protestant theology: ``passive, conservative, and
backward theology is the ideological foundation that constantly
produces cult activities.'' \330\ Wang Zuo'an, the Vice
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs,
implied in a 2008 speech that failure to cooperate with the
TSPM would provoke a harsh response from the government: ``If
the three-self principle is abandoned, Chinese Christianity,
which has been moving smoothly along in the right direction,
will veer off track and meet with a calamity of historical
proportions.'' \331\
Chinese authorities harassed, detained, and physically
abused members of banned Protestant groups in the past year,
particularly the South China Church (SCC) and the Local Church.
The government banned the SCC in 1995 and executed its founder
in 2001.\332\ According to the Ministry of Public Security, the
SCC spread to 88 counties in 15 provinces and converted tens of
thousands within one year of its founding in 1990.\333\ In
November 2008, public
security officials in Hubei province detained more than 18 SCC
members, beat at least 8 of them, and raided the homes of their
families.\334\ Several detainees were abducted from their homes
or public places, four have since disappeared entirely, and at
least five were compelled to write statements recanting their
faith.\335\ Security officials have reportedly refused to
disclose the charges against the detainees, forbidden family or
legal counsel from visiting them, and declined their attorneys'
requests for information.\336\ Interrogators reportedly told
three of the detainees that authorities aimed to ``thoroughly
destroy'' the SCC and that ``except the TSPM [Three-Self
Patriotic Movement], all other organizations that believe in
Jesus Christ are cults.'' \337\ Zhu Yongping, an SCC missionary
who went missing in November 2008, previously spent three years
in a reeducation through labor facility where he was reportedly
tortured.\338\
In 2008 and 2009, the Chinese Government maintained its
longstanding campaign to suppress the Local Church, an
indigenous Christian movement founded by Watchman Nee in the
early 20th century which officials refer to as the
``Shouters.'' \339\ Throughout fall 2008, security officials
shut down at least 10 Local Church gatherings in the cities of
Beijing and Hangzhou.\340\ The raids of gatherings in
university areas resulted in the detention and interrogation of
more than 400 students, many of whom were later disciplined by
their universities upon release.\341\ In Hangzhou's Xiasha
district, authorities simultaneously raided nine services on
November 2 and detained more than 30 church members, 4 of whom
have been ordered to serve a year or more of reeducation
through labor.\342\ In Ningbo municipality, instructors used
cartoons to teach elementary school students about the
``dangers'' of the Local Church in ``anti-cult'' training
classes.\343\ Official reports from two localities in Fujian
province in early 2009 indicate that the Local Church has been
singled out as one of the targets that public security forces
must ``strike hard'' against.\344\ In January 2009, security
officials in Henan province arrested septuagenarian Yuan
Shenlun for responding to an anonymous call to pick up Watchman
Nee books and videos. Yuan previously served 14 years in prison
for his involvement with the Local Church.\345\
The Communist Party's 6-10 Office, an extralegal security
force that suppresses banned religious groups, leads the
clampdown on unregistered Protestant groups officially deemed
to be ``cult organizations.'' \346\ During a December 2008
visit to Siyang county in Jiangsu province, Li Xiaodong, the
head of the central 6-10 Office, urged local officials to
``strengthen the punishment of privately established, rural
Protestant meeting sites . . . ban the groups that should be
banned, and establish a management system that is effective
over the long term.'' \347\ An October 2008 report on official
efforts to regulate religion in the municipality that
administers Siyang cited government statistics that claim 90
percent of ``cult'' participants have a Protestant
background.\348\ A Beijing TSPM leader pledged in 2008 that the
state-sanctioned church would ``coordinate with the district 6-
10 Office . . . to effectively hold back the spread'' of the
Disciples Association, a banned Protestant group.\349\ In
Changsha, an April 2009 open letter from the 6-10 Office called
for cadres and residents to ``resolutely resist cults,''
specifically the Disciples Association, and promised an
``appropriate material reward'' for those who ``courageously
report cult behavior.'' \350\ The letter provides a window into
the Party's use of the term ``cult'' from its description of
their characteristics: ``using the name of `God' to incite its
members to oppose the government.'' \351\
TAOISM
The Chinese Government requires Taoist groups and religious
personnel to register with the state-run Chinese Taoist
Association (CTA) in order to legally perform ritual services
and hold Taoist ceremonies.\352\ The State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA) exercises direct authority over the
CTA, as it does for all ``patriotic religious organizations.''
\353\ Communities under the CTA face limitations on their
religious freedom such as regulations that mandate political
conformity, impose state scrutiny over doctrine, and prohibit
religious practices that the government deems
``superstitious.'' The CTA continues to compel Taoist
communities to support Communist Party propaganda campaigns and
policies; it
declared that ``strengthening the ideological education of
Taoist personnel'' would be the first of six work goals for
2009.\354\ In 2008, the CTA implemented measures for confirming
Taoist priests that rank ``fervent love of the motherland and
support of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party'' as
among the first of five basic conditions that must be met for
ordination.\355\ The measures also impose penalties on Taoist
priests for performing rituals in the homes of lay
practitioners without prior CTA authorization or engaging in
activities deemed to involve ``feudal superstition'' or
``cults.'' \356\ Unregistered Taoist priests--referred to by
some government reports as ``fake priests''--are subject to
various penalties imposed for failure to submit to official CTA
confirmation, including ``transformation through reeducation.''
\357\ In the past year, the CTA and SARA officials continued to
launch special administrative campaigns to bring Taoist priests
of the Zhengyi order, who typically marry and reside outside of
monastic communities, under the control of local and national
CTA authorities.\358\
OTHER RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
In the past year, the central government maintained its
framework for recognizing only select religious communities for
limited government protections, and it did not enlarge this
framework to accommodate additional groups. Despite lacking
formal central government recognition, however, some religious
communities have been able to operate inside China.\359\ The
Russian Orthodox Church holds services in some areas, and some
local governments recognize the Orthodox church within local
legislation.\360\ The Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill
met with a delegation from China's State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA) in February 2009. Kirill raised the
issue of rebuilding an Orthodox church and the shortage of
Orthodox clergy in cities with Orthodox communities.\361\
Orthodox church members in Shanghai continued to lack legal
recognition to hold services but were reportedly able to
participate in a feast day service at the Russian consulate in
Shanghai in June.\362\ Under current Chinese Government
regulations, foreign religious communities, including
communities not recognized as domestic religions by the
government, may hold services for expatriates, but Chinese
citizens are not allowed to participate.\363\
In recent years some local governments have passed
legislation that both recognizes and provides a measure of
protection for venues where Chinese folk belief activities are
practiced, but that also bring such venues under government
control.\364\ In 2007, Hunan province passed China's first
provincial-level legislation to recognize and regulate venues
for folk beliefs.\365\ In November 2008, SARA visited Hunan to
investigate the issue. A SARA official reported positively on
the province's regulation of folk beliefs and called for
gradually bringing folk beliefs under legal regulation.\366\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorities continue to detain, formally arrest, and in some cases
imprison Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of
religion.\367\ Such cases include: Alimjan Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti), a Protestant house church
leader in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whom authorities
have detained at the Kashgar Municipal Detention Center since January
12, 2008. The Kashgar Intermediate People's Court tried Alimjan Himit
on July 28, 2009, on charges of ``revealing state secrets or
intelligence to overseas organizations.'' The court has not yet
issued a verdict. Alimjan Himit had previously worked at a foreign-
owned company shut down for ``engaging in illegal religious
infiltration activities.'' A court in Kashgar first tried Alimjan
Himit's case on May 27, 2008, and returned it to the procuratorate
due to ``insufficient evidence.''
Dorje Khadro, a Tibetan Buddhist nun of Pangri Nunnery,
founded and headed by Phurbu Tsering and located in Ganzi (Kardze)
county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, and
one of more than 50 Pangri nuns detained on May 14, 2008, for
staging a political demonstration to protest against patriotic
education underway at the nunnery and demands that the nuns denounce
the Dalai Lama and their teacher, Phurbu Tsering. On November 20,
2008, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court sentenced ``Duoji
Kangzhu'' to seven years in prison for ``inciting to split the
country.''
Jia Zhiguo, the 74-year-old unregistered Catholic bishop of
Zhengding diocese, Hebei province, whom authorities detained in March
2009 and took to an undisclosed detention facility. Bishop Jia
previously served two decades in prison, and since 2003, authorities
have detained him numerous times and kept him under strict
surveillance when not detaining him, in connection with his religious
activities independent of the state-run Catholic Patriotic
Association (CPA). His most recent detention was reportedly linked to
the CPA's displeasure at a Vatican-brokered reconciliation agreement
between Bishop Jia and Jiang Taoran, the bishop of the registered
Shijiazhuang diocese.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liu Jin, a librarian at Shanghai Normal University, whom
authorities held for nearly a year in pretrial detention. The
Fengxian District People's Court in Shanghai convicted Liu under
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law for downloading Falun Gong
materials from the Internet and distributing them. She was sentenced
to three-and-a-half years in prison on November 14, 2008.
Merdan Seyitakhun, Ahmetjan Emet, Seydehmet Awut, Erkin Emet,
Abdujilil Abdughupur, Abdulitip Ablimit, Mewlanjan Ahmet, Kurbanjan
Semet, Dolkun Erkin, Omerjan Memet, Mutelip Rozi, and Ubulkasim, 12
young Uyghur men from the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, whom authorities detained between March and
June 2008 and sentenced on March 24, 2009, to terms ranging from
three years' to life imprisonment for ``splittism.'' The charges were
connected to their activities teaching religion to children,
according to the father of one of the men.
Paul Ma, a 55-year-old Catholic priest from a predominately
Catholic village in Hebei province called Donglu, whom authorities
detained in March 2009. Authorities reportedly took Father Ma into
custody because he celebrated the Eucharist with unregistered
Catholics. His current whereabouts are unknown.
Phurbu Tsering, a Tibetan Buddhist teacher believed by
Tibetan Buddhists to be a reincarnation, who founded and headed a
Tibetan Buddhist nunnery in Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture,
Sichuan province. Public security officials detained Phurbu Tsering
on May 18, 2008, after security forces detained more than 50 of the
nuns he taught for staging a peaceful political protest march. On
April 21, 2009, the Ganzi Intermediate People's Court put Phurbu
Tsering on trial for illegal weapons possession. One of his lawyers,
Li Fangping, said that Phurbu Tsering denied the charges and claimed
he was framed. On April 27, one of the judges contacted Phurbu
Tsering's other lawyer, Jiang Tianyong, to tell him that sentencing
had been postponed indefinitely. [See CECC, Special Topic Paper:
Tibet 2008-2009 for information on the political detention, criminal
prosecution, and legal defense of Phurbu Tsering.]
Shi Weihan, a Christian bookstore owner and Protestant house
church leader whom Beijing authorities arrested on March 19, 2008.
Authorities accused him of illegally printing and distributing
Bibles. On June 10, 2009, the Beijing Haidian District People's Court
sentenced him to three years in prison and fined him 150,000 yuan
(US$21,960) for operating a business illegally. Public security
officials have reportedly pressured Shi's family to refrain from
appealing his sentence. Shi is diabetic and has reportedly suffered
from poor health while in detention. Authorities have denied his
lawyers' requests for medical parole.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Religious Prisoners--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xu Na, an artist and poet, and her husband, Yu Zhou, a
popular musician, whom public security officials detained on the
night of January 26, 2008, for possessing documents and computer
disks containing Falun Gong materials. Yu died 11 days later in
police custody. The Beijing Chongwen District People's Court
sentenced Xu to three years in prison on November 25, 2008, for
``using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the
law'' (PRC Criminal Law, Article 300).
Yusufjan and Memetjan, a 27-year-old graduate student and 24-
year-old undergraduate at Xinjiang University in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, whom authorities detained along with five others
on May 10, 2009, as the students--members of a Muslim religious
group--met on the campus of Xinjiang University. Authorities ordered
the group members to serve 15 days of detention and fined them 5,000
yuan (US$732) for ``holding an illegal gathering.'' Five of the
students were released after 15 days, but Yusufjan and Memetjan were
reported to remain in detention as of June 2009, and their
whereabouts are unknown.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethnic Minority Rights
Introduction
The Chinese Government continued in the past year to
implement policies that undermine ethnic minority citizens'
rights. The government repressed expressions of ethnic identity
perceived to challenge government authority, especially in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Tibet Autonomous
Region and other Tibetan areas, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region. [See Section IV--Xinjiang and Section V--Tibet, for
additional information on Uyghurs and Tibetans. For more
information on Mongols, see Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region in this section.] While the Chinese
Government maintained some protections in law and practice for
citizens it designates as ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu),\1\
shortcomings in the substance and implementation of Chinese
laws and policies continued to prevent ethnic minorities from
exercising their rights in line with domestic law and
international human rights standards.\2\ Ethnic minorities did
not enjoy ``the right to administer their internal affairs''
\3\ as provided for under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy
Law.\4\ As in the case of demonstrations by Tibetans and
Uyghurs in early 2008, a demonstration on July 5, 2009, by
Uyghurs in the XUAR and outbreaks of violence in the region
starting that day--followed by harsh security measures--again
directed an international spotlight on grievances held by non-
Han ethnic groups, tensions in ethnic autonomous areas, and
longstanding problems in Chinese Government policies toward
ethnic minorities and ethnic issues. [See Section IV--Xinjiang,
for details of the July 5 demonstration.]
The Commission tracked several developments from the
Commission's 2009 reporting year that underscored the
continuing challenges ethnic minority citizens faced in
protecting their rights.\5\ First, in the aftermath of
demonstrations in 2008 and 2009 by Tibetans and Uyghurs that
highlighted systemic problems in state policies toward ethnic
minorities and ethnic issues, the central government continued
to attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while
asserting the effectiveness of government policies and
amplifying publicity in their support. Second, the government
continued to implement economic development projects that
prioritize government economic goals over broad protection of
ethnic minorities' rights and guaranteeing ethnic minority
participation in decisionmaking processes. The projects build
on longstanding development programs that have brought some
benefits to ethnic minority regions but also have introduced
additional threats to the protection of ethnic minorities'
rights. Third, although officials in the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region reported taking steps to promote the use of
the Mongolian language, they also continued to implement other
measures that undermine Mongol traditions and livelihoods and
punish people who defend Mongols' rights or who express
dissent. Fourth, the Chinese Government continued in the past
year to impose controls over how individuals and communities
define their ethnicity, interpret their history, and preserve
their culture and language.
Also in the past year, the Chinese Government pledged to
increase protection for the rights of ethnic minorities in its
2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP).\6\ While
the HRAP outlines measures to support legislation, governance,
education, personnel training and employment, language use, and
cultural and economic development among ethnic minorities,\7\
domestic and overseas observers have questioned the likely
impact of the broadly worded HRAP amid the Chinese Government's
poor human rights record, including in the area of ethnic
minorities' rights.\8\ The UN Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, which examined the Chinese Government's
compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in August 2009, expressed
concern with government policies affecting ethnic minorities in
areas such as language rights, migration, government
representation, freedom of religion, non-discrimination,
development, and healthcare.\9\
In the past year, the Chinese Government continued to
hinder opportunities for dialogue on ways to protect the rights
of ethnic minority citizens. As the government heightened
propaganda in support of its policies toward ethnic minorities,
it amplified rhetoric against ``international hostile forces''
interfering in China's ethnic affairs.\10\ Government officials
continued to vilify the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama
and Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, both of whom aimed to
peacefully engage with the Chinese Government to improve
conditions for ethnic minorities in China.\11\ At the February
2009 session of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal
Periodic Review of the Chinese Government's human rights
record, the Chinese Government rejected recommendations to
review laws and policies toward ethnic minorities and to allow
international agencies and media greater access to Tibetan
areas of China.\12\
Government Affirms Policy on Ethnic Issues, Heightens Propaganda
In the aftermath of demonstrations in 2008 and 2009 by
Uyghurs and Tibetans that highlighted systemic problems in
state policies toward ethnic minorities and ethnic issues,\13\
the Chinese Government continued in this reporting year to
attribute outstanding tensions to its citizens while asserting
the effectiveness of government policies and amplifying
publicity in their support. In early 2009, the Central
Propaganda Department and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission
(SEAC) published an outline to strengthen general propaganda
and education on government and Communist Party policy on
ethnic issues. The outline affirmed the government's existing
policies and attributed perceived outstanding problems to
``contradictions among the people.'' The outline also called
for resisting ``international hostile forces raising the banner
of such things as `ethnicity,' `religion,' and `human rights'
to carry out Westernization and separatist activities toward
our country.'' \14\
Following the July 5 demonstration by Uyghurs in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region capital of Urumqi and
outbreaks of violence starting that day, the government again
emphasized the efficacy of its policies. At a press conference
in July, Wu Shimin, vice minister of SEAC, denied any
connection between events on July 5--which authorities have
blamed on U.S.-based Uyghur rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, the
World Uyghur Congress, and the ``three forces'' of terrorism,
separatism, and religious extremism\15\--and Chinese policies
toward ethnic minorities. He described the policies as ``a
long-term success'' and said the government had no plans to
reevaluate them.\16\
The government also heightened propaganda on ethnic unity
in the past year. In November 2008, the Ministry of Education
and SEAC issued a trial program directing schools throughout
the country to implement ``ethnic unity education'' in a stated
effort to promote Communist Party policy on ethnic issues.\17\
The program requires schools to guarantee 10 to 14 hours of
``ethnic unity education'' a year to students starting in grade
three of elementary school through the high school and
vocational school levels.\18\ The Central Propaganda
Department, Ministry of Education, and SEAC held a meeting in
late August again calling for measures to strengthen propaganda
and education on ethnic unity.\19\
The government reported taking some steps in the past year
to refine implementation of its existing framework for ethnic
autonomy, at the same time it affirmed the basic features of
the system. The government's 2009-2010 National Human Rights
Action Plan, issued in April 2009, pledged to ``expedite''
drafting of regulations related to the implementation of the
PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and to revise two existing
regulations related to ethnic minorities.\20\ From May to July,
central government and Party authorities reported investigating
problems in implementation of state policy on ethnic issues, in
accordance with directives issued in 2008 and 2009, and
reported the investigations included focus on preventing and
redressing discrimination toward ethnic minorities.\21\
According to Xinhua, SEAC announced plans in late July to
increase research on ethnic issues ``in order to better solve
minority disputes.'' \22\
Economic Development
The Chinese Government continued in the past year to
implement development projects that prioritize state economic
goals over protecting ethnic minorities' rights and
guaranteeing ethnic minority participation in decisionmaking
processes. Steps implemented in the past year build on
longstanding development efforts that have brought some
benefits to ethnic minority regions but also have introduced
additional threats to the protection of ethnic minorities'
rights.\23\ Development programs--such as the decade-old
central government Great Western Development project directed
at 12 provinces, municipalities, or autonomous regions\24\--
have been implemented in a top-down fashion that marginalizes
participation and decisionmaking by ethnic minority
communities.\25\ Such policies have undermined ethnic
minorities' rights to maintain traditional livelihoods, spurred
migration to ethnic minority regions, promoted unequal
allocation of resources favoring Han Chinese, intensified
linguistic and assimilation pressures on local communities, and
brought environmental damage.\26\ Development policies also
remain intertwined with political objectives to foster ethnic
unity and political stability.\27\ [For more information on
development projects in specific areas, see Human Rights in the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in this section, Section IV--
Xinjiang, and Section V--Tibet.]
In November 2008, the central government issued an opinion
on advancing science and technology development among ethnic
minorities and in ethnic minority areas,\28\ linking such
development to strengthening ``ethnic unity,'' the ``unity of
the motherland,'' and security in China's border areas. The
opinion includes potentially beneficial provisions, but lacks
measures to ensure ethnic minorities have meaningful
participation in determining development policies\29\ and
receive benefits that accrue from development efforts.\30\ The
government pledged in its 2009-2010 National Human Rights
Action Plan (HRAP) to devote 2 billion yuan (US$293 million) to
promote economic and social development among ethnic minorities
and in ethnic minority areas, including for infrastructure
construction and poverty elimination for populations living in
extreme poverty.\31\ The potential impact of the pledge remains
unclear, however, amid the Chinese Government's poor track
record in implementing equitable development projects and amid
doubts concerning the effectiveness of the HRAP.\32\
Identity, Culture, and Language
The Chinese Government continued in the past year to impose
government controls over how individuals and communities define
their ethnicity, interpret their history, and preserve their
culture and language. Chinese Government policy imposes fixed
ethnic identities on Chinese citizens and denies communities
the freedom to fully interpret and define their ethnicity free
from state intervention.\33\ Although state-determined
identities mesh to some degree with how communities self-
identify, and citizens have some leeway to change their formal
ethnic affiliation in accordance with state-defined
categories,\34\ the government's system of classifying ethnic
groups also has denied some communities the freedom to formally
identify as distinct ethnic groups.\35\ In the past year, the
government continued to impose official versions of Chinese
history, including the histories of different ethnic groups, to
legitimize the government's current borders and policies.\36\
In addition, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and
Television issued a notice in July that called for ensuring the
accuracy of historical dramas and called for greater scrutiny
of series touching on ``particularly sensitive subject matter''
like ethnicity and religion.\37\
The Chinese Government has used domestic and international
mechanisms for cultural heritage protection to preserve some
aspects of ethnic minority culture, but in accordance with
government and Party aims and definitions.\38\ One central
government official, speaking in 2006 on the protection of
intangible cultural heritage, noted, ``Protection of intangible
cultural heritage and maintaining continuity of the national
culture constitute an essential cultural base for enhancing
cohesion of the nation, boosting the national unity,
invigorating the national spirit and safeguarding the national
unification.'' \39\ In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
authorities launched a project in February 2009 to demolish and
``reconstruct'' the Old City area of Kashgar city after
determining most buildings in the nationally designated
historic area had little historic preservation value, a project
which has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and outside
observers for undermining heritage protection and forcing the
resettlement of residents.\40\ [See Section IV--Xinjiang, for
detailed information.]
The government and media publicized efforts launched in
2009 that were described as a means to promote ethnic minority
culture, but in some cases emphasized the importance of such
measures to meet state political goals. A June 2008 article
noting government steps to promote ethnic minority languages
and preserve endangered languages described such efforts as
playing an ``irreplaceable role'' in such areas as ``political
stability,'' ``social advancement,'' and ``ethnic unity.'' \41\
The Chinese Government included support for ethnic minority
cultural endeavors in its 2009-2010 National Human Rights
Action Plan,\42\ and in July, the State Council issued an
opinion to ``promote the development of ethnic minorities'
culture.'' \43\ The opinion includes calls for increasing
support in areas such as building libraries in ethnic minority
communities, promoting publications in ethnic minority
languages, and preserving cultural heritage, but also calls for
using media to disseminate information on Party policy and for
guarding against ``cultural infiltration'' by ``hostile
forces'' outside China.\44\
The government has increased educational opportunities for
ethnic minorities,\45\ but recent legislation and policy have
reduced support for education in ethnic minority languages
despite the regional ethnic autonomy system's support for
educational autonomy and school instruction in ethnic minority
languages.\46\ The 2005 implementing measures for the PRC
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) curbed the REAL's support
for education in ethnic minority languages\47\ in favor of
``bilingual'' education. The ``bilingual'' policy has been
implemented in some areas to focus primarily on instruction in
Mandarin Chinese. [See Section IV--Xinjiang, for more
information on implementation within the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.] Outside of the ``bilingual education''
framework, other localities, such as some ethnic minority areas
in southwestern China, have focused on educating ethnic
minority students in Mandarin Chinese.\48\ While Mandarin
education responds to a growing need for proficiency in the
language to obtain economic and social mobility, it also
underscores the shortcomings of the Chinese Government's ethnic
minority policies in securing a form of autonomy that enables
citizens to maintain economic and social opportunities in
ethnic minority languages. [See Human Rights in the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region in this section for information on
language policy in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.]
Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
As in other areas of China where authorities perceive
ethnic minorities to challenge state power and support
separatism, authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
(IMAR) have repressed independent expressions of Mongol ethnic
identity and punished Mongols who have protested government
policy and advocated for the protection of their rights. Ethnic
Mongols in the region have faced controls over traditional
pastoral livelihoods and barriers to protecting their
language.\49\ Mongols also have faced pressures from Han
migration,\50\ discrimination in job hiring,\51\ and, as
followers of Tibetan Buddhism, tighter controls over their
religious practices.\52\
The IMAR government continued in the past year to implement
policies to resettle herders away from grasslands and shift
them to new occupations, with the stated aim of improving
grasslands conditions. For example, a March 2009 article from
official media reported that authorities in the county-level
Urad Rear Banner have planned to shift 80 percent of herders
off grasslands to other sectors of employment, in order to
relieve pressure on grasslands.\53\ In a speech the same month,
the vice chair of the IMAR government called for better
systematizing measures to shift farmers and herders to
different sectors of employment.\54\ Also in March, the IMAR
government passed a directive to promote the employment of at
least one family member in a wage-based occupation by 2011,
among families with no members employed in secondary or
tertiary industries.\55\ The measures from the past year
continue older ``ecological migration'' policies in the IMAR,
sometimes reported to be compulsory, that have eroded Mongols'
pastoral livelihoods.\56\ Herding communities resettled to
towns and urban areas have faced challenges in preserving
traditions and adapting to new, government-imposed
livelihoods.\57\ Authorities have required those who stay on
grasslands to abide by government directives on fencing
grasslands and laying pastures fallow.\58\ Scholars have
questioned the effectiveness of these government policies in
ameliorating environmental degradation.\59\ [For additional
information, see Section II--Climate Change and Environment.]
After sustained implementation of policies that decreased
the use of the Mongolian language in the IMAR, authorities have
taken steps in recent years to spur greater use of the
language. The IMAR government implemented legislation in 2005
to promote the language,\60\ but reported in 2007 that problems
remained in implementation.\61\ That year, authorities issued
an opinion on strengthening work on ethnic minority education
that included measures to increase Mongolian-language education
within a three-year period.\62\ In the past year, authorities
in the IMAR continued to report on promoting efforts to expand
Mongolian language use, through measures including free
schooling and increased subsidies for students who receive
education in Mongolian.\63\ At the same time, in recent years,
including in 2009, authorities have targeted some Mongolian-
language Web sites and Mongol discussion sites for scrutiny and
closure,\64\ and a Mongol rights advocate in the IMAR has
reported on curbs over the use of Mongolian on a university
campus.\65\
Ethnic Mongols who aim to protect their rights or preserve
their culture continue to face the risks of harassment,
detention, and imprisonment. Mongol rights advocates Naranbilig
and Tsebegjab remained under illegal home confinement for part
of this reporting year after authorities held them in detention
in 2008 in two unrelated incidents.\66\ In addition,
authorities took steps in the past year to block Naranbilig's
participation in international forums to protect indigenous
rights, including through confiscation of his passport.\67\
Mongol rights advocate Hada remains in prison since receiving a
15-year sentence in 1996 after he organized peaceful protests
for ethnic minority rights in the IMAR capital of Hohhot.\68\
Following a trial in 2006, Mongol doctor Naguunbilig reportedly
continues to serve a 10-year sentence for cult-related
offenses, while his wife, Daguulaa, is under home confinement,
after authorities reportedly accused them of using healing
methods that were ``a Mongolian version of Falun Gong.'' \69\
Population Planning
Introduction
In the Commission's 2009 reporting year, central and local
authorities continued to interfere with and control the
reproductive lives of Chinese women through an all-encompassing
system of family planning regulations in which the government
is directly involved in the reproductive decisions of its
citizens. Population planning policies limit most women in
urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting slightly
more than half of women in rural areas to bear a second child
if their first child is female.\1\ In the past year, the
Commission notes that several Chinese municipalities are
allowing younger couples in which both spouses hail from one-
child households to have more than one child.\2\ Despite
progress in this regard, local officials and state-run work
units continue to interfere in the reproductive lives of
Chinese women by monitoring their reproductive cycles in order
to prevent unauthorized births.\3\ The Chinese government
requires married couples to obtain a birth permit before they
can lawfully bear a child and forces them to use contraception
at other times.\4\ Violators of the policy are routinely
punished with fines, and in some cases, subjected to forced
sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and
torture.\5\
China's population planning policies in both their nature
and implementation violate international human rights
standards. Although implementation tends to vary across
localities, the government's population planning law and
regulations contravene international human rights standards by
limiting the number of children that women may bear and by
coercing compliance with population targets through heavy
fines.\6\ For example, the PRC Population and Family Planning
Law is not consistent with the standards set by the 1995
Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the
Cairo International Conference on Population and
Development.\7\ Controls imposed on Chinese women and their
families and additional abuses engendered by the system, from
forced abortion to discriminatory policies against ``out-of-
plan'' children, also violate standards in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,\8\ the Convention on the Rights of the Child,\9\ and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.\10\ In December 2008, the UN Committee against Torture
expressed concern with Chinese authorities' ``lack of
investigation into the alleged use of coercive and violent
measures to implement the population policy'' and urged the
government to bring its population planning policies into
``full compliance'' with the relevant provisions of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.\11\ As a state party to all
of these treaties, China is bound to uphold their terms.
Fines for Violators and Rewards for Informants
Local governments have in some cases stepped up efforts to
impose penalties and fines against couples who give birth to an
unauthorized child. Officials refer to these fines as ``social
compensation fees'' (shehui fuyang fei), which for certain
couples pose a dilemma between undergoing an unwanted abortion
and incurring potentially overwhelming financial costs. In
February 2009, the Ganzhou municipal government in Jiangxi
province established a ``collection management program'' for
social compensation fees that requires officials to maintain a
file for each person who violates family planning regulations
and stipulates that violators who refuse to pay the fines
should be added to a credit ``blacklist'' in China's banking
system.\12\ The Ganzhou program also authorizes officials to
apply ``coercive measures'' such as judicial detention and
property seizure against those who refuse to pay the fines.\13\
In the same month, the Anxi county government in Fujian
province issued a circular ordering officials to seek court
authorization to carry out ``coercive measures'' when family
planning violators fail to pay fines.\14\ In its 2009 work
plan, the Qianguo County Population and Family Planning
Commission in Jilin province called on local officials to
``expand special punishments for illicit births, strictly
enforce the investigation and prosecution of illicit births,
and stress the strengthening of penalties for those who violate
[family planning policies].'' \15\
Authorities in some localities are levying social
compensation fees at higher levels according to the violator's
income and, in some cases, additional fines are imposed on
women who resist official efforts to ``implement remedial
measures'' such as abortion. In Chongqing municipality's
Tongliang county, for example, officials launched a multi-month
project in July 2008 that would impose fines of between 5,000
yuan (US$731) and 10,000 yuan (US$1,464) on women who resist
government efforts to compel them to have an abortion. This
fine is levied in addition to the ordinary social compensation
fee of 2,000 yuan (US$293) to 5,000 yuan (US$731).\16\ In
November 2008, the Shanxi Provincial People's Congress Standing
Committee passed an amendment to the provincial family planning
regulations that imposes stricter standards for social
compensation fees. For couples who have a second child in
violation of these regulations, the government will assess a
social compensation fee equal to 20 percent of a couple's
combined income once per year for seven years, which must total
no less than 7,000 yuan (US$1,025). If a couple has a third
child, the fine rises to 40 percent of their combined income
assessed for a 14-year period, which must total no less than
30,000 yuan (US$4,392).\17\ In March 2009, Xinhua reported that
authorities in Fuzhou city, Fujian province, fined two private
entrepreneurs from the Cangshan district 200,000 yuan
(US$29,275) and 300,000 yuan (US$43,912) each for ``illegal
births.'' Two other entrepreneurs from nearby districts paid
100,000 yuan (US$14,637) each in penalties for violating
population planning policies.\18\
Local governments also offer monetary incentives to citizen
informants who report violations of population planning
regulations. In March 2009, the Beijing Times reported that the
Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission had
begun offering rewards of an unspecified amount to informants
who report ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies and extramarital
pregnancies.\19\ In April 2009, the Chun'an County Bureau of
Population and Family Planning in Zhejiang province introduced
a system for providing informants with cash rewards of 1,000
yuan (US$146) per violation reported. The circular also states
that authorities will ``strictly protect the secrecy'' of the
informant's identity.\20\ In July 2009, Yangxin county
authorities in Shandong province released measures for
providing citizen informants with awards ranging from 300 yuan
(US$44) to 3,000 yuan (US$439) depending on the severity of the
reported violation.\21\
Implementation: Abortion and Sterilization
The use of coercive measures in the enforcement of
population planning policies remains commonplace despite
provisions for the punishment of official abuse outlined in the
PRC Population and Family Planning Law.\22\ The same law
requires that local family planning bureaus conduct regular
pregnancy tests on married women and administer unspecified
``follow-up'' services.\23\ The population planning regulations
of at least 18 of China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions
permit officials to take steps to ensure that birth quotas are
not exceeded; in practice, these steps can include forced
abortion and forced sterilization.\24\ In some cases, local
officials coerce abortions in the third trimester.\25\
``Termination of pregnancy'' is explicitly required if a
pregnancy does not conform with provincial population planning
regulations in Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin,
Liaoning, and Ningxia provinces. In 10 other provinces--Fujian,
Guizhou, Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi,
Shaanxi, and Yunnan--population planning officials are
authorized to take ``remedial measures'' to deal with ``out-of-
plan'' pregnancies.\26\ In the past year, the Commission
analyzed official reports from local governments in over a
third of China's provincial-level jurisdictions and found that
the term ``remedial measures'' (bujiu cuoshi) is used
synonymously with compulsory abortion.\27\
In the past year, authorities in various localities forced
women to undergo abortions, and in some cases, reportedly beat
violators of population planning regulations. In February 2009,
a woman in Guangdong's Shenzhen Special Economic Zone told
local media that officials subjected her to a forced abortion
six days prior to her due date because she was pregnant with
her second child (her first was a daughter) before the
officially mandated period between births had passed.\28\ Ten
family planning workers took her to a clinic where she was
injected in the abdomen with medication to induce an abortion.
They reportedly kicked her in the stomach to expedite the
abortion.\29\ In April 2009, several male family planning
workers in Sihong county, Jiangsu province, reportedly took a
woman from her home and beat her repeatedly because she missed
the deadline for a mandatory pregnancy exam and intrauterine
device (IUD) inspection.\30\ Authorities in Guangdong's capital
forced three young surrogate mothers to undergo abortions when
they were discovered hiding there in April. Authorities
physically forced the women's thumbprints onto a consent form,
according to one woman's account.\31\ In June 2009, family
planning officials in Guan county, Shandong province, forced
35-year-old Feng Junhua to have an abortion in her ninth month
of pregnancy. The injection to induce abortion reportedly
caused massive hemorrhaging and killed the mother.\32\
In late 2008, officials in at least three provinces
(Jiangsu, Guizhou, and Anhui) and one provincial-level
administrative area (Chongqing), unveiled plans and circulars
launching family planning campaigns that mandate abortions of
``out-of-plan'' pregnancies. Chongqing's Tongliang county
government introduced a multi-month project in late summer 2008
with an ``overall objective'' to ``go further in reducing
unwanted and out-of-plan pregnancies and to implement first
term and mid-to-late term abortion remedial measures.'' \33\ In
November, officials in Qingshanquan township, Xuzhou
municipality, Jiangsu province, declared a ``month of
concentrated corrective activities'' for family planning
officials, the ``focus'' of which was ``the implementation of .
. . first-term and mid- to late-term abortion and other
remedial measures.'' \34\ The circular stressed that officials
must ``avoid just going through the motions'' and should
instead ``resolutely implement abortion and other remedial
measures, strictly standardize the birth policy, adopt remedial
measures for each and every out-of-plan pregnancy, and reliably
prevent out-of-plan births.'' \35\ Also in November, the family
planning ``leading group'' of Guizhou's Qiandongnan Miao and
Dong Autonomous Prefecture pressed local officials to ``take
forceful measures'' and ``resolutely adopt remedial measures
for out-of-plan pregnancies.'' \36\ It recommended
``strengthening'' pregnancy exams in order to ``remedy'' out-
of-plan pregnancies at an early stage and thereby reduce
``late-term abortions and control measures.'' \37\ In December,
authorities in Changfeng county, Anhui province, circulated a
directive that ordered comprehensive inspections in which ``no
village misses any group, no group misses any household, no
household misses any person, and no person misses any item.''
During these inspections, officials must ``resolutely carry out
remedial measures to the stipulated standard'' for households
with a son or more than one child.\38\
In 2009, authorities in some areas of Yunnan and Fujian
provinces also employed abortion as an official policy
instrument. In Yunnan's Yanjin county, Niuzhai township
officials developed a 2009 implementation plan that outlined
abortion targets for specific groups: ``strictly prohibit the
birth of multiple children; for women who have multiple out-of-
plan children and become pregnant again, the abortion rate must
reach 100 percent; for women who have two out-of-plan children
and become pregnant again, the abortion rate must exceed 90
percent; for women who have one out-of-plan child and become
pregnant again, the abortion rate must exceed 85 percent.''
\39\ In December 2008, Luxi city authorities in Yunnan decided
that village-level Communist Party secretaries must ``stand in
the front of the line and set an example in breaking through
difficult problems such as . . . abortions of out-of-plan
pregnancies.'' \40\ In February 2009, officials in Anxi county,
Fujian province, initiated a five-week campaign of
``concentrated service activities'' that designated the
``implementation of abortion remedial measures'' among its five
``primary tasks.'' The circular authorizing the campaign
instructs officials to ``adopt effective and comprehensive
punitive measures and ensure that remedial measures against
out-of-plan pregnancies are taken promptly and reliably.'' \41\
In May 2009, officials in Xianyou county, Fujian, detained 55-
year-old Wu Xinjie in order to pressure her daughter, who was
nine months pregnant with a second child and had fled the area,
to have an abortion.\42\ During the same period, Xianyou family
planning authorities told a reporter that they forced a 20-
year-old unmarried woman who was seven months pregnant to
undergo an abortion.\43\ In June 2009, the Wuyishan county
government in Fujian published village family planning
regulations that stipulate the following: ``In emergency
situations when pregnancies violate family planning policies,
report the matter to the village committee and promptly carry
out remedial measures (abortion).'' \44\
Some local governments specifically target migrant workers
for forced abortions. In April 2009, authorities in Jinyun
county, Zhejiang province, drafted an implementation plan for a
month-long family planning campaign in which villages would
``battle with themselves'' by conducting door-to-door
inspections to obtain ``clues'' about out-of-plan pregnancies
and determine the ``true whereabouts'' of migrant workers who
have left the villages. The plan urges county-level officials
to ``assist the township law enforcement group with the
implementation of remedial measures such as abortion and the
collection of social compensation fees.'' \45\ When migrants
with out-of-plan pregnancies are discovered, officials should
``promptly report to higher authorities and resolutely
implement remedial measures; the implementation rate for
remedial measures must reach 100 percent.'' \46\ In Kunming,
the capital of Yunnan province, family planning provisions
impose financial penalties designed to coerce migrant workers
with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo an abortion.\47\ The
provisions require enterprises that employ migrants and
officials from the residential committees where they live to
report out-of-plan pregnancies to the family planning
authorities and to attempt to ``persuade'' the migrant to
``take remedial measures.'' Local authorities then send the
migrant a formal written ``notification'' that she must ``take
remedial measures.'' If the migrant worker fails to have an
abortion after receiving the notification, authorities can
deduct a fine directly from her wages on a provisional
basis.\48\ After 15 days of the penalty period elapse, the
government can impose an additional fine, calculated at 3
percent of the total deduction from her wages for each day that
passes that she does not ``take remedial measures to terminate
the pregnancy.'' \49\
Local authorities continue to mandate surgical
sterilization and the use of contraception as a means to
enforce birth quotas. In November 2008, a township in Jiawang
district, Xuzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, released a
circular urging officials to ``take the rectification of hidden
dangers as your vehicle and ruthlessly seize the implementation
of intrauterine device (IUD) implantation measures.'' \50\ In
March 2009, township-level authorities in Fujian province's Sha
county issued family planning recommendations that call on
officials to ``strictly act on the demand to carry out tubal
ligation within one month'' for women who give birth to a
second or third child, and set the implementation target for
this group at 100 percent.\51\ Officials must also ensure that
IUDs are inserted in women within three months of the birth of
a first child.\52\ Officials from Guidong county, Hunan
province, reported in June 2009 the completion of examinations
conducted on 819 women, resulting in nine tubal ligations and
17 IUD implantations.\53\ A newspaper in Yunnan province
reported in February 2009 that officials there ambushed a woman
named Zhang Kecui in the street and forced her to an operating
room where she unwillingly underwent surgical
sterilization.\54\
Incentives for Citizens and Officials
Some local governments offer monetary incentives and other
benefits to couples who voluntarily undergo sterilization or
abortion procedures. In October 2008, the Panyu District
Population and Family Planning Commission in Guangzhou city,
Guangdong province, announced that women who undergo tubal
ligation are eligible to receive a monthly reward of 25 yuan
(US$4) starting from the month of the surgery until they turn
55 years old.\55\ In a November 2008 circular issued by the
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Population and Family Planning
Commission, authorities increased the one-time reward for women
with two daughters who undergo tubal ligation from 500 yuan
(US$73) to 1,500 yuan (US$220). Women who live in rural areas
and have two children of either sex can also receive a 1,000
yuan (US$146) reward for choosing surgical sterilization.\56\
In March 2009, authorities in Guangdong province's Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone issued a circular announcing that married
women who become pregnant without authorization are eligible
for ``subsidies'' if they volunteer for an abortion. The
circular specifies a reward of 500 yuan (US$73) for voluntary
abortions performed within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy and
700 yuan (US$102) for those performed after the first 14
weeks.\57\
Many provinces link job promotion with an official's
ability to meet or exceed population planning targets, thus
providing a powerful structural incentive for officials to
employ coercive measures in order to meet population goals.\58\
In January 2009, Wuyishan county in Fujian province published a
``family planning responsibility manual'' for township and
village officials that detailed a point system for performance
evaluations on family planning issues. For example, officials
receive 15 points for completing all of the tubal ligation
targets for the year and 10 points for meeting intrauterine
device targets.\59\ Five points are added for each mid- to
late-term abortion that an official oversees and two points for
each first-trimester abortion. Conversely, two to five points
are deducted from an official's evaluation for each child born
out of plan, depending on the number of children already
present in the household. Officials who score 90 points or
higher on their evaluations are rewarded with a bonus of 2,000
yuan (US$293).\60\ Dasi township authorities, in Yunnan
province's Fengqing county, issued a circular in April 2009
that notified local officials that a percentage point would be
deducted from their annual performance evaluations each time
they fail to ``promptly implement'' contraception measures for
all married women who give birth or have an abortion.\61\
Officials receive seven points if contraceptive measures
sufficiently control the total number of ``remedial
procedures'' to less than 21 ``first-trimester abortions'' and
less than 12 ``mid- to late-term abortions.'' \62\
Abuse of Advocates
Chen Guangcheng, a legal advocate and rights defender from
Linyi city, Shandong province, on whom the Commission reported
in 2007 and 2008, was sentenced to more than four years in
prison in 2006 for exposing widespread abuses by local family
planning officials.\63\ In 2007 and 2008, prison authorities
prevented Chen from communicating with his family, refused his
medical parole request, and accused him of having ``illicit
relations with a foreign country.'' \64\ In April 2009, Albert
Ho of the Hong Kong-based China Human Rights Lawyers Concern
Group reported that Chen's health while in prison ``continues
to worsen,'' and warned that ``[Chen's] life may be in
danger.'' \65\ Authorities have placed Chen's wife, Yuan
Weijing, under varying degrees of home confinement and
surveillance since 2005. In March 2009, investigative
journalist Wang Keqin and three companions were ``beaten out of
[Yuan Weijing's] village'' when they attempted to bring food
and toys to Yuan and her two young children.\66\ When Wang
telephoned Yuan to inform her that he could not visit, she
responded: ``[T]hese people have been around our home for more
than a year. . . . There are always 11 people around our home,
24 hours a day. . . . When we go shopping or work in the
fields, someone is watching us. At night, they even stoop
outside the window to eavesdrop on us.'' \67\ In April 2009,
Yuan tried to visit her grieving sister after her brother-in-
law's death in a car accident, but nine men forcibly escorted
her home where she was ``punched and kicked by the men while
being dragged back to her house.'' \68\ Authorities have
reportedly prevented Chen and Yuan's children from enrolling in
school.\69\
Demographic Crisis
China's skewed sex ratio presents a demographic challenge
that will continue to worsen over the next 20 years, according
to an April 2009 study in the British Medical Journal
(BMJ).\70\ The study estimates that in 2005, there were 32
million more males than females under the age of 20, and 1.1
million more boys were born than girls.\71\ Considering the
impact of China's population planning policies, the study notes
that ``the fact that the problem of excess males in China seems
to outstrip that of all other countries is perhaps no
surprise.'' \72\ Central government data from 2007 estimates a
greater imbalance in the sex ratio: 37 million more males than
females.\73\ In 2000, the most recent year for which national
census data is available, the male-to-female sex ratio for the
infant-to-four-year-old age group was reportedly 120.8 males
for every 100 females. This is far above the global norm of
roughly 105 males for every 100 females.\74\ At least five
provinces--Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hainan, Anhui, and Henan--
reported ratios over 130 in 2005.\75\ Some political scientists
argue that large numbers of ``surplus males'' could create
social conditions that the Chinese government may choose to
address by expanding military enlistment.\76\ In response to
government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a
traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese couples often
engage in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples
whose first child is a girl.\77\ The April 2009 BMJ study found
a steady increase in the sex ratio in China since ultrasound
technology--through which pregnant couples can determine the
sex of the fetus--became available in the 1980s.\78\ The study
attributes what it calls an ``imminent generation of excess
males'' largely to the practice of sex-selective abortion,
rather than under-registration of girls or infanticide.\79\ In
2006, the National People's Congress Standing Committee
considered, but did not pass, a proposed amendment to the PRC
Criminal Law that would have criminalized sex-selective
abortion.\80\ Provincial governments in at least five provinces
(Guizhou, Hubei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Jiangsu) have passed
similar measures; \81\ however, the central government has
taken no action at the national level.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Planning in Jiujiang: A Case Study
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout June and July 2009, population planning authorities in
Jiujiang, a prefectural-level municipality in Jiangxi province,
published policy statements, policy objectives, and statistical reports
which, taken together, illuminate the breadth and depth of population
planning measures in a local setting. Several themes emerged in these
reports, including: Concern for ``remedying'' unplanned births and insufficient
compliance rates. A June 17 report issued by the Jiujiang county
government emphasized the implementation of ``remedial measures'' to
``resolutely put an end to unplanned births and comprehensively raise
birth policy compliance rates.'' Officials and cadres were urged to
place special emphasis on abortions as a part of these measures. The
report said that ``First-trimester abortions or mid- to late-term
abortions must be performed on all individuals with unplanned
pregnancies within the allotted time period to ensure the birth
policy compliance rate reaches the standard.'' \82\
Statistics demonstrating the scale of population planning
measures in local communities. Governments submitted detailed
statistics regarding local implementation of population planning
measures to officials at higher level jurisdictions. These reports
typically contained information on the amount of fines collected and
the number of abortions, tubal ligations, pregnancy exams, and
intrauterine device (IUD) implants conducted in the first half of
2009. Yining, Huanggang, Quanfeng, and Sidu townships published
statistical reports on the Xiushui County Population and Family
Planning Committee (PFPC) Web site.\83\ On July 3, the Xiushui County
PFPC reported that 13,731 instances of the ``four procedures'' were
``implemented'' in the first half of 2009, including 6,766 tubal
ligations, 5,950 IUD implants, and 1,015 abortions.\84\ These
developments are characterized as a ``rapid surge of family planning
services'' resulting from the creation of an ``overwhelming
atmosphere'' of ``strengthened leadership . . . concentrated energy
and strengthened measures.'' \85\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Planning in Jiujiang: A Case Study--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A propaganda drive aimed at both residents and officials.
July was declared the ``All-County Implementation of First-Trimester
Abortion and Mid- to Late-Term Abortion Remedial Services Month'' at
a meeting held for Jiujiang county population planning officials on
July 7. Officials were told to ``ruthlessly master the implementation
of remedial measures, the control of unplanned births, and the
improvement of the birth policy compliance rate.'' \86\ Reports
issued by Yining, Huanggang, Quanfeng, and Sidu townships described
the use of propaganda vehicles, murals, banners, and slogans, and the
distribution of leaflets and audio/video tapes to raise awareness
about population planning policy.\87\ In Huanggang township, the
propaganda campaign focused on the ``two inspections and four
procedures'' (liangjian sishu), which refer to IUD inspections,
pregnancy examinations (the two inspections), IUD implants, first-
trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization
(the four procedures).\88\
Rewards and punishments for officials in charge of
implementing population policy. On June 14, Jiujiang county reported
that subordinate villages and townships would be ranked according to
their performance in meeting population planning goals, and the
leaders of the three lowest ranking areas would be required to give a
``situational accounting'' at the next county meeting and to sign a
written pledge.\89\ In Quanfeng township, two cadres were dismissed
from their positions for ``incompetence,'' but three villages under
the township received 2,000 yuan (US$293) bonuses for their
population planning performance.\90\ In Sidu township, two poorly
performing villages came under ``focused management'' and were
threatened with a 5,000 yuan (US$732) fine if their ``rectification
and improvement'' was unsuccessful. The villages that ranked first
and second were given a 2,000 yuan (US$293) and 1,000 yuan (US$146)
reward, respectively.\91\
Rewards and punishments to ensure citizen compliance.
Officials in Huanggang township were told to remind women of the
``preferential policies'' they would enjoy after undergoing tubal
ligation.\92\ Almost all jurisdictions, however, also discussed the
collection of ``social compensation fees'' to punish individuals who
violated population planning regulations.\93\ A July 3 report
indicates that Xiushui county in Jiujiang municipality collected over
10 million yuan (US$1.46 million) of social compensation fees in the
first half of 2009.\94\ The Huanggang township report described fines
for women who failed to undergo tubal ligation, IUD implantation, or
an IUD inspection/pregnancy examination when required by the policy
to do so. The report also stated that the fine would accumulate with
each missed deadline until the individual underwent the required
procedure.\95\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Planning in Jiujiang: A Case Study--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
A hierarchical accountability system. According to several
reports, cadres and officials are held responsible for their
subordinates' performance, with the lowest level officials personally
responsible for the population planning policy compliance of
residents in their neighborhoods or villages.\96\ In Yining township,
Communist Party members were also held accountable for the compliance
of their relatives, and residents were encouraged to enforce policy
with their partners under the slogan, ``Your partner is a
responsibility, and that responsibility must be fulfilled.'' \97\
Special emphasis on requiring mothers in ``two-daughter
households'' to undergo surgical sterilization. Local officials
consider households that already have two daughters a high-risk group
for population planning policy violations.\98\ Reports on population
planning measures from Jiujiang municipality jurisdictions included
the number of tubal ligations conducted on women in ``households with
two daughters'' or ``households with daughters and no sons'' as a
distinct subset of the total number of surgical sterilizations.
Xiushui county reported that out of 6,766 total tubal ligations, 296
were of women in two-daughter households.\99\ Sidu township reports
that officials ``pooled their strength to ruthlessly master the
implementation of tubal ligation measures,'' and required that every
village ``complete their management of the amount of tubal ligations
[and specifically] tubal ligations in two-daughter households.''
\100\
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Freedom of Residence
Introduction
The Chinese Government continues to enforce the household
registration (hukou) system it first established in the
1950s.\1\ This system limits the right of Chinese citizens to
choose their permanent place of residence. Regulations and
policies that condition legal rights and access to social
services on residency status have resulted in discrimination
against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas for
work. The hukou system exacerbates barriers that migrant
workers and their families face in areas such as employment,
healthcare, property rights, legal compensation, and
schooling.\2\ Central and local government reforms in recent
years have mitigated some obstacles to equal treatment, but
provisions that allow people to change hukou status have
included criteria that benefit those with greater economic and
educational resources or with family connections to urban hukou
holders.\3\ This past year, officials continued to introduce
limited measures that relax hukou restrictions. The
government's restrictions on residence and discrimination in
equal treatment, however, continue to contravene international
human rights standards.\4\
New Household Registration (Hukou) Policies in 2009
This past year, authorities continued to relax certain
hukou restrictions for Chinese citizens who meet specific
requirements.\5\ National-, provincial-, and municipal-level
hukou measures enacted this past year aimed to promote
employment amid the current economic downturn,\6\ but excluded
most migrant workers who did not have a college education or
any special skills.\7\ Recent hukou-related developments
include: