[Senate Hearing 111-254]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-254
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
march 10, 2009
Page
Blair, Hon. Dennis C., Director, National Intelligence........... 6
Maples, LTG Michael D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 41
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2009
U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan,
Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Graham, Thune,
Martinez, Wicker, Vitter, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, research assistant; William M.
Caniano, professional staff member; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr.,
deputy Republican staff director; and Paul C. Hutton IV,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer
Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; David Ramseur, assistant
to Senator Begich; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van
Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh and Erskine W.
Wells III, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Chip Kennett,
assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I'd like to
welcome our witnesses for today's hearing on current and
longer-term threats and challenges around the world. We're
delighted to have the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
Dennis Blair, for his first appearance before us as DNI; and
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, General Michael
Maples, for his final appearance before the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
General Maples, on behalf of the committee, thank you for
your great service to the Nation, and for your appearances
before this committee.
General Maples. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. This committee has a special responsibility
to the men and women of our Armed Forces to be vigilant on
intelligence programs, because decisions on whether or not to
use military force, the planning for military operations, and
carrying them out successfully depend so heavily on accurate
intelligence.
I want to focus my remarks this morning on a few major
challenges to our security. The situation in Afghanistan has
been deteriorating for several years and is now a serious
problem, necessitating the dispatch of additional U.S. forces
even before the new administration completes its strategic
review of the region and while it's working on a comprehensive
regional approach to the problem. This situation is the result
of: (1) years of large commitment of U.S. military troops in
Iraq; (2) a disorganized and underresourced international
effort in Afghanistan; (3) the disappointing performance by the
Government of Afghanistan; and (4) a resurgent Taliban enjoying
sanctuary in Pakistan across a border that the U.S. commander
in that region, Brigadier General John Nicholson, says is
``wide open.''
Indeed, the Afghan-Taliban forces under Mullah Omar operate
with impunity from Pakistan's Baluchistan province, crossing
unhampered into southern Afghanistan. Other large Pakistan
militant forces now dominate major portions of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Northwest Frontier
Province. It is in these regions that al Qaeda is based and
from which attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan itself are
launched.
The militant strongholds in Pakistan, however, are not
simply a threat to Afghanistan. They have also become a clear
threat to Pakistan's security and the source of major global
terrorist threat from al Qaeda. The United States and our
allies have to develop alternatives to address Pakistan's
security concerns and persuade Pakistan to make a fundamental
break with its past policies. I do not underestimate the
challenge that this could present to Pakistan. I have doubts,
however, as to whether Pakistan has the will or the capacity to
make significant changes in the near term. Achieving a basic
change in Pakistan's strategic security policy will take time,
but we cannot make progress in Afghanistan or the defense of
America against an al Qaeda attack dependent on a hoped-for
change in Pakistan's calculus and capabilities.
There are many things that we and our allies can do in
Afghanistan to protect the population, help them establish the
rule of law, and improve their lives, while seeking ways to end
the Pakistan safe havens. Can we fully succeed with an open
border and safe havens in Pakistan? No. But progress in
Afghanistan cannot await changes in Pakistan.
Relative to Iraq, the President has announced a timetable
for reducing force levels in Iraq and reorienting our mission
there. I look forward to the witnesses' estimates about likely
Iraqi political developments, including the prospects for
reconciliation and the peaceful settlement of the political and
territorial issues in the north.
Turning to Iran, the Obama administration has initiated a
new diplomatic approach to persuade Tehran to stop its uranium
enrichment program, forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
and behave more constructively in the region. Director Blair's
statement today indicates that the Intelligence Community (IC)
continues to believe that some combination of international
scrutiny, pressure, and incentives might persuade Tehran to
forego a nuclear weapon capability, but achieving this would be
``difficult.''
Secretary Clinton's invitation to Iran to participate in a
conference on Afghanistan at the end of the month is an
important test of whether Iran is willing to explore ways to
begin a less confrontational relationship.
The Obama administration is trying to reset relations with
Russia for multiple reasons. We have many common security
interests with Russia and our mutual security will be best
served if we cooperate to address our common security
challenges. One important opportunity is the exploration of the
possibility of cooperating with Russia on missile defense
capabilities to provide protection against Iran's ballistic
missile systems. A nuclear-armed Iran with ballistic missiles
would be a common threat to which Russia cannot be indifferent.
U.S.-Russia cooperation on missile defense would send a
powerful signal to Iran, perhaps helping to dissuade Iran from
continuing to violate U.N. resolutions.
Secretary Gates recently indicated that he thinks there is
interest in Russia on cooperation, and I look forward to
learning the views of the IC on this question as well this
morning.
Clarity on the status of Iran's nuclear program is also
crucial. Director Blair's testimony last month is consistent
with the last National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which
concluded that, while Iran had halted its efforts to seek a
nuclear warhead, Iran is continuing its uranium enrichment
program and ballistic missile development efforts. Moreover,
Iran has sufficient low-enriched uranium (LEU) to produce a
nuclear weapon if it chooses to further enrich that material to
weapons-grade levels. It would be useful for our witnesses to
clarify the IC's view of Iran's current activities and its
intent.
The other primary nuclear and missile proliferation
challenge remains North Korea. North Korea rejected the
verification protocol proposed in the Six-Party Talks in
December and has since made a number of belligerent threats and
appears to be preparing another attempt to launch a satellite
with a system that could demonstrate many aspects of a long-
range ballistic missile capability.
The question is whether North Korea will agree to
acceptable verification of its declaration, including the issue
of a suspected uranium enrichment program, and what that would
mean for U.S. policy. North Korea has a habit of issuing dire
threats when it does not get its way. To what lengths will the
regime go to try to extract concessions and attempt to get us
to re-engage on their terms?
The challenges confronting the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) are vast and complex: ungoverned or undergoverned
areas that offer potential havens and recruiting grounds for
terrorist extremists and nations immersed in or emerging from
conflict, where peace is elusive or fragile and international
forces are required to provide much of the security and
stability. Our thoughts are with all of the personnel of the
aid agencies and the nongovernmental organizations being
expelled from Sudan and the people they serve following the
International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for the
president of Sudan. I look forward to hearing our witnesses'
assessment of the implications of this decision by the ICC.
The challenges within our own hemisphere are complex. The
violence in Mexico is becoming reminiscent of the situation in
Colombia a decade ago. The root cause of the violence in Mexico
is the same as Colombia: trafficking and profiting from illegal
narcotics. The source of the vast majority of these drugs
remains Colombia, but the problems created from the trafficking
of these narcotics run from Panama City to Tijuana and includes
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
I would also appreciate it if you could add to your
presentations this morning any information that you can provide
us relative to the Chinese Government's intent and motive in
the maneuvers of their ships against the USNS Impeccable, a
Navy ship which was in the South China Sea and in international
waters.
We are going to have a closed session following this
session and will have a briefer from the Navy who is ready to
brief the committee during our closed session on this matter in
the China Sea. We've arranged, as I said, for that session and
it's going to be in Hart 219 following this open session.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
welcoming our witnesses today.
Director Blair, I'd like to acknowledge and appreciate your
willingness to return to government service and assume one of
the most important and difficult positions in the executive
branch.
General Maples, this is likely and on your part hopefully
your last appearance before the committee as the Director of
DIA. I know you will relinquish the directorship of DIA later
this month and retire later this year. Thank you for your
leadership of the DIA and for 38 years of distinguished service
in the United States Army.
This is an important hearing on the committee's annual
calendar. The committee has a special responsibility to look
closely at our Nation's intelligence analysis, the nature of
the threats we face today, and the intelligence programs that
support those in harm's way. We hope you'll describe the
complex nature of today's international environment and
identify those areas of risk, concern, and opportunity that are
critical to our national security.
I hope we will be able to discuss and you're prepared to
discuss security trends and prospects in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the capabilities and intent of al Qaeda, including threats to
the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests worldwide, and the outlook
for Pakistan, especially progress against extremism in its
FATAs and the possibility of an outbreak in military
hostilities with India.
In addition, Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a large and
enduring problem to our interests, and there are also ongoing
developments with respect to Russia, China, and North Korea.
Closer to home, there's a widening drug war on Mexico's
border with the United States and our Department of Justice has
identified Mexican gangs as ``the biggest organized crime
threat to the United States.'' We'd benefit from your views on
these issues.
The committee is also interested in your estimates about
the destabilizing impact of the global economic crisis on our
allies and adversaries, the domestic and international impact
of global climate change on our national security, and the
threats to the U.S. information infrastructure posed by both
state and non-state actors.
Our forces around the world, and especially in Iraq and
Afghanistan, put a premium on the intelligence support they
receive, especially those conducting counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. The committee is interested in the
state of our human intelligence capability, linguist resources,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capacities.
I thank the witnesses for their appearance today and I also
am interested in any public statements prior to our closed
hearing that you might make on the apparent confrontation at
sea with Chinese naval forces.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr Chairman, thank you.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
Director Blair, I would also like to acknowledge your willingness
to return to government service and to assume one of the most important
and difficult positions in the executive branch.
General Maples, this likely is your last appearance before the
committee as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). I
know you will relinquish the directorship of DIA later this month and
retire later in the year. Thank you for your leadership at DIA and for
your years of distinguished service in the United States Army.
This is an important hearing in the committee's annual calendar.
The committee has a special responsibility to look closely at our
nation's intelligence analysis, the nature of the threats we face
today, and the intelligence programs that support those in harm's way.
We expect you to describe the complex nature of today's
international environment and identify those areas of risk, concern,
and opportunity that are critical to our national security.
In that regard, we hope that you are prepared to discuss security
trends and prospects in Iraq and Afghanistan; the capabilities and
intent of al Qaeda, including threats to the U.S. Homeland and U.S.
interests worldwide; and the outlook for Pakistan, especially progress
against extremism in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the
possibility of an outbreak in military hostilities with India.
In addition, Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a large and enduring
problem to our interests, and there are ongoing developments with
respect to Russia, China, and North Korea. Closer to home, there is a
broadening drug war on Mexico's border with the United States and our
Justice Department has identified Mexican gangs as the ``biggest
organized crime threat to the United States.'' We would benefit from
your views on these issues.
The committee is also interested in your estimates about the
destabilizing impact of the global economic crisis on our allies and
adversaries, the domestic and international impact of global climate
change on our national security and the threats to the U.S. information
infrastructure posed by both state and non-state actors.
Our forces around the world, and especially in Iraq and
Afghanistan, put a premium on the intelligence support that they
receive, especially those conducting counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations. The committee is interested in the state
of our human intelligence capability; linguist resources; and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacities.
Mr Chairman, thank you and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator McCain.
Director Blair.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS C. BLAIR, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Blair. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain,
members of the committee, this morning General Maples and I
represent thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals,
the world's finest intelligence team. All these intelligence
agencies participated in compiling the information and analysis
that I'm reporting on this morning and the longer statements
for the record which we submitted.
My report is not simply of threats, but also of
opportunities and a tour of the complex and dynamic national
security landscape with which the United States must deal. Let
me start with the global economic crisis.
It already looms as the most serious one in decades. You
may have seen yesterday's World Bank estimates that both world
gross domestic product (GDP) and trade are declining at
unprecedented rates. Since September of last year, 10 nations
have committed to new International Monetary Fund (IMF)
programs and, unlike the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, no
country or region can export its way out of this one.
The stakes are high. Mexico, with its close trade links to
the United States, is vulnerable to a prolonged U.S. recession.
Europe and the former Soviet bloc have experienced anti-state
demonstrations. Much of Eurasia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan
Africa lack sufficient cash reserves and access to
international aid.
Economic crises increase the risk of regime-threatening
instability if they are prolonged 1 or 2 years, and we're
watching this closely. Instability can loosen the fragile hold
that many developing countries have on law and order.
There are some silver linings. With low oil prices,
Venezuela will face fiscal constraints this year. Iran's
president faces less than certain prospects for reelection in
June. However, a serious energy supply crunch may happen in the
longer range future if sustained low prices lead to major cuts
or delays in new investments in the near term.
This crisis presents challenges for the United States, who
is generally held to be responsible for it. The November G-20
summit elevated the influence of emerging market nations, but
the United States also has opportunities to demonstrate
increased leadership. Our openness, development, skills,
leadership skills, the mobility of our workforce, puts us in a
better position to re-invent ourselves. Washington will have
the opportunity to fashion new global structures that can
benefit all nations.
Turning to terrorism, importantly, we have seen progress in
Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups. Over the last
18 months, al Qaeda has faced public criticism from prominent
religious leaders and even from fellow extremists. In 2008,
these terrorists did not achieve their goal of conducting
another major attack on the United States and no major country
is at immediate risk of collapse from extreme terrorist groups.
Replacing the loss of key leaders since 2008 in Pakistan's
FATAs has proved difficult for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda in Iraq
continues to be squeezed. Saudi Arabia's aggressive
counterterrorism efforts have rendered the Kingdom a harsh
operating environment for al Qaeda.
But despite these setbacks, al Qaeda remains dangerous.
Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground. The
capabilities of terrorist groups in East Africa will increase
in the next year and we remain concerned about the potential
for home-grown American extremists inspired by al Qaeda's
militant ideology to plan attacks in this country.
There are many challenges in that region that stretches
from the Middle East to South Asia, and these challenges exist
despite the progress I outlined in countering violent
extremism. The United States has strong tools from military
force to diplomacy and good relations with the vast majority of
these nations and we will need all these tools in order to help
forge a durable structure for peace and prosperity.
The revival of Iran as a regional power, the deepening of
ethnic, sectarian, and economic divisions across much of the
region, the looming leadership succession among U.S. allies,
all these factors are shaping the strategic landscape.
Hezbollah and Hamas, with support from Iran, champion armed
resistance to Israel, a development that complicates efforts to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and undercuts the
legitimacy of moderate Arab states that support negotiated
settlements. Battlelines are increasingly drawn in that part of
the world, not just between Israel and Arab countries, but also
between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic
nationalist movements inside moderate states.
The Iranian regime views the United States as its principal
enemy and a threat to Iran. A more assertive regional Iranian
foreign policy coupled with its dogged development of a uranium
enrichment capability alarms most governments in the region
from Riyadh to Tel Aviv.
The Levant is the key focal point for these strategic
shifts. Recent fighting between Israel and Hamas on the Gaza
Strip has deepened Palestinian political divisions. It's also
widened the rift between regional moderates, led by Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and hard-liners, including Iran,
Hezbollah, and Syria. With Hamas controlling Gaza and Hezbollah
growing stronger in Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian-Israeli
accord is much more difficult. With Iran pursuing uranium
enrichment and Israel determined not to allow it to develop a
nuclear weapon capability, there is potential for an Iran-
Israeli confrontation or crisis. Moderate Arab states fear a
nuclear-armed Iran, but without progress on a Palestinian
settlement they are harder put to defend their ties to the
United States.
In Iraq, coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling
popular tolerance for violence have helped to sideline
extremists. Fewer Iraqis are dying at the hands of their
countrymen than at any time in the last 2 years. Nevertheless,
disputed internal boundaries, perceptions of government
repression, or increased foreign support to insurgent or
militia groups could reverse political and security progress,
and Baghdad also will be coping with declining oil revenues.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban-dominated insurgency forces
have demonstrated greater aggressiveness. Improved governance
and extended development were hampered in 2008 by a lack of
security. Afghan leaders must tackle endemic corruption and an
extensive drug trade. Progress has been made in expanding and
fielding the Afghan National Army, but many factors hamper
efforts to make the units capable of independent action. The
upcoming 2009 presidential election will present a greater
security challenge than the election of 2004 and insurgents
will probably make a concerted effort to disrupt it.
Improvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan's taking control of
their border areas, improving governance, and creating economic
and educational opportunities throughout the country are
linked. I agree, Chairman Levin, that that doesn't mean that
you can't do anything in Afghanistan without solving Pakistan,
but there is a linkage between these two that we have to
address in making our policy.
In 2008, Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts,
but its record in dealing with militants has been mixed. It
balances conflicting internal and counterterrorist priorities.
The government is losing authority in the north and the west
and even in the more developed parts of the country mounting
economic hardships and frustration over poor governance have
given rise to greater radicalization.
The time when only a few states had access to the most
dangerous technologies is long over. Often dual use, they
circulate easily in our globalized economy, as does the
scientific expertise. It is difficult for the United States and
its partners to track efforts to acquire components and
production technologies that are widely available. Traditional
deterrence and diplomacy constraints may not prevent terrorist
groups from using mass effect weapons, and one of the biggest
security challenges facing the United States is fashioning a
more effective nonproliferation strategy along with our
partners.
As the chairman mentioned, the assessments in our 2000 NIE
about Iran's nuclear weapons programs are generally still
valid. Iran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop
deliverable nuclear weapons. The halt since 2003 in nuclear
weapons design and weaponization was primarily in response to
increasing international scrutiny, and we assess that some
combination of threats and intensified international attention
and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security goals, might prompt Iran to extend this halt to some
nuclear weapons-related activities.
Let me turn to Asia, rapidly becoming the long-term locus
of power in the world. Japan remains the world's second largest
global economy and a strong ally of the United States, but the
global downturn is exacting a heavy toll on Japan's economy. To
realize its aspirations to play a stronger regional and perhaps
global role will require political leadership and difficult
decisions by Japan.
The rising giants, China and India, are playing increasing
regional roles economically, politically, and militarily. China
tries to assure access to markets, commodities, and energy
supplies needed to sustain domestic economic growth. Chinese
diplomacy seeks to maintain favorable relations with other
powers, especially the United States. The global downturn,
however, threatens China's domestic stability and Chinese
leaders are taking both economic and security steps to deal
with it.
Taiwan as an area of tension in U.S.-China relations has
substantially relaxed. Taiwan President Ma, inaugurated in May,
has resumed dialogue with Beijing, and leaders on both sides of
the Straits are cautiously optimistic about less
confrontational relations. Nonetheless, preparations for a
Taiwan conflict drive the modernization goals of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA).
But in addition to that, China's security interests are
broadening. A full civilian and military space capability, and
formidable capabilities in cyberspace are rapidly developing.
China will attempt to develop at least a limited naval
projection capability, which is already reflected in anti-
piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, and we can talk
about the incident that happened recently in the South China
Sea.
Like China, India's expanding economy will lead New Delhi
to pursue new trade partners, to gain access to vital energy
markets, and to develop other resources that sustain rapid
growth. India's growth rate will slow this coming year, but
ample reserves and a sound banking system will help ensure
relative stability.
Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to
improve relations could unravel unless Islamabad takes
meaningful steps to cut support to anti-Indian militant groups
and New Delhi for its part makes credible efforts to allay
Pakistan's security concerns. The increase in violent attacks
within India is a cause of great concern to its government, as
is instability in neighboring countries in South Asia, and I
think the attacks in Islamabad on cricket teams was the latest
instance of that.
On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow
an independent course. That we are both democracies does not
guarantee congruence of our interests. Nonetheless, good
relations with the United States will be important for India to
realize its global ambitions.
Although the Middle East and Asia have the highest call on
our attention, our concerns are broader. Russia is actively
cultivating relations with regional powers, including China,
Iran, and Venezuela. Moscow also is trying to maintain control
over energy networks to Europe and to East Asia. Russian
leaders have spoken positively about the possibilities for a
change in the U.S.-Russian dynamic, but the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement, the conflict over
Georgia's separatist region, and missile defense could pose
difficulties because of the combination of overlapping and
conflicting interests there.
In Latin America, populist, often autocratic, regimes pose
challenges to the region's long-term success. Basic law and
order issues, including rising violent crime, powerful drug
trafficking organizations, confront key hemispheric nations, as
do uneven governance and institution-building efforts in
confronting chronic corruption. The corruptive influence and
increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels impedes Mexico
City's ability to govern parts of its territory. Unless the
United States is able to deliver market access on a permanent
and meaningful basis, its traditionally privileged position in
the region could erode, with a concomitant decline in political
influence.
In addition, the United States has an opportunity to
partner with Mexico in promoting our common interests in the
region, including working against the drug cartels, stopping
weapons moving generally south along the border, and working on
other common issues.
Africa has made substantial economic and political progress
over the past decade and the level of open warfare has declined
significantly, especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the
Ivory Coast. However, the drop in commodity prices and global
recession will test the durability of the region's recent
positive growth trend. Even before the current crisis, the 6
percent GDP growth rate in Africa, although impressive, was not
able to bring the necessary structural changes to reduce
poverty and a number of intractable conflicts persist in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia.
In Darfur, peace talks remain stymied, the larger
peacekeeping force is slow in deploying, and the recent actions
that the chairman referred to have made progress there even
more difficult.
Let me finish with the long-term challenge of environmental
security and the threats to our information technology
infrastructure. Adding more than a billion people to the
world's population by 2025 will put pressure on clean energy
sources and food and water supplies. Most of the world's
population will move from rural to urban areas. They're seeking
economic opportunity and many, particularly in Asia, will
achieve advanced lifestyles with greater per capita consumption
and greater generation per capita of pollution.
According to the United Nations (U.N.) International Panel
on Climate Change, physical effects of climate change will
worsen in coming years. Multilateral policymaking on climate
change is likely to be substantial and will be a growing
priority among traditional security affairs. The world sees the
United States in a pivotal leadership role.
As effects of climate change mount, the United States will
come under increasing pressure to help the international
community set goals for emissions reductions and to help others
through technological progress.
Finally, threats to our information technology
infrastructure. It is becoming both indispensable to the
functioning of our society and vulnerable to catastrophic
disruptions in a way that the old decentralized analog systems
were not. Cybersystems are being targeted for exploitation and
potentially for disruption or destruction, and it's being done
by an increasing array of both non-state and state adversaries.
Network defense technologies are widely available to
mitigate threats, but they have not been uniformly adopted. A
number of nations, including Russia and China, can disrupt
elements of our information infrastructure. We must take
proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions before they
cause significant damage. We must recognize that cyber defense
is not a one-time fix. It requires a continual investment in
hardware, software, and cyber defenses.
In conclusion, the international security environment is
complex. The global financial crisis has exacerbated what was
already a growing set of political and economic uncertainties.
We're nevertheless in a strong position to shape a world
reflecting universal aspirations and the values that have
motivated Americans since 1776: human rights, the rule of law,
liberal market economics, and social justice. Whether we can
succeed will depend on actions we take here at home, restoring
strong economic growth and maintaining our scientific and
technological edge, and defending ourselves at reasonable cost,
while preserving our civil liberties.
It will also depend on actions abroad, not only how we deal
with individual regions, individual regimes, individual crises,
but also on how we develop a new multilateral system, formal or
informal, for effective international cooperation in areas like
trade and finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using
terrorism, in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), in developing codes of conduct for
cyberspace and space, and in mitigating and slowing global
climate change.
Mr. Chairman, subject to your questions, that concludes the
prepared remarks.
[The prepared statement of Director Blair follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dennis C. Blair
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of
threats to U.S. national security. I am pleased to be joined by my
colleague, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and I am proud to lead the world's
best Intelligence Community (IC). In addition to this unclassified
statement for the record, I have also submitted a classified statement
for the record.
far-reaching impact of global economic crisis
The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the
global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications. The crisis
has been ongoing for over a year, and economists are divided over
whether and when we could hit bottom. Some even fear that the recession
could further deepen and reach the level of the Great Depression. Of
course, all of us recall the dramatic political consequences wrought by
the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the instability,
and high levels of violent extremism. Though we do not know its
eventual scale, it already looms as the most serious global economic
and financial crisis in decades.
Forecasts differ significantly over the depth of the downturn.
Industrialized countries are already in recession, and growth in
emerging market countries, previously thought to be immune from an
industrialized country financial crisis, has also faltered, and many
are in recession as well. Even China and India have seen their dynamic
growth engines take a hit as they grapple with falling demand for their
exports and a slowdown in foreign direct and portfolio investments.
Governments worldwide are initiating monetary and fiscal stimulus
programs designed to stabilize and recapitalize their financial
sectors, cushion the impact of stalling economic activity, and
eventually jumpstart a recovery, perhaps as early as late 2009. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which recently released its revised
forecast for 2009 projecting an anemic 0.5 percent increase in the
global economy, warns that the risks to the global economy are on the
downside.
The financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a
wave of economic crises in emerging market nations over the next year,
prompting additional countries to request IMF or other multilateral or
bilateral support. Since September 2008, 10 nations committed to new
IMF programs intended to provide balance of payments support. All face
the task of tackling economic problems in a less benign global economic
environment. Unlike the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the
globally synchronized nature of this slowdown means that countries will
not be able to export their way out of this recession. Indeed, policies
designed to promote domestic export industries--so-called beggar-thy-
neighbor policies such as competitive currency devaluations, import
tariffs, and/or export subsidies--risk unleashing a wave of destructive
protectionism.
Time is probably our greatest threat. The longer it takes for the
recovery to begin, the greater the likelihood of serious damage to U.S.
strategic interests. Roughly a quarter of the countries in the world
have already experienced low-level instability such as government
changes because of the current slowdown. Europe and the former Soviet
Union have experienced the bulk of the anti-state demonstrations.
Although two-thirds of countries in the world have sufficient financial
or other means to limit the impact for the moment, much of Latin
America, former Soviet Union states and sub-Saharan Africa lack
sufficient cash reserves, access to international aid or credit, or
other coping mechanism. Statistical modeling shows that economic crises
increase the risk of regime-threatening instability if they persist
over a 1- to 2-year period. Besides increased economic nationalism, the
most likely political fallout for U.S. interests will involve allies
and friends not being able to fully meet their defense and humanitarian
obligations. Potential refugee flows from the Caribbean could also
impact homeland security.
The dramatic decline in oil prices--more than a two-thirds decline
from the July peak of $147 per barrel--is partially a result of the
market betting on a deep and perhaps protracted global recession. A
serious supply crunch is possible down the road if sustained low prices
lead to major cuts or delays in investment by national and
international oil companies, especially high cost unconventional oil
sources like oil sands. Nevertheless, lower prices benefit consumers,
and declining revenues may put the squeeze on the adventurism of
producers like Iran and Venezuela.
The crisis presents many challenges for the United States. It
started in the United States, quickly spread to other industrial
economies and then, more recently, to emerging markets. The widely held
perception that excesses in U.S. financial markets and inadequate
regulation were responsible has increased criticism about free market
policies, which may make it difficult to achieve long-time U.S.
objectives, such as the opening of national capital markets and
increasing domestic demand in Asia. It already has increased
questioning of U.S. stewardship of the global economy and the
international financial structure.
The November G-20 financial summit in Washington also elevated the
influence of large, emerging market nations. As was the case in the
Asian financial crisis, China has an opportunity to increase its
prestige if Beijing can exert a stabilizing influence by maintaining
strong import growth and not letting its currency slide. But the United
States also has opportunities to demonstrate increased leadership
domestically, bilaterally, and in multilateral organizations such as
the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Recessions are a relative game,
and historically the United States has proven more adroit at responding
to them than most. The U.S. tradition of openness, developed skills,
and mobility probably puts it in a better position to reinvent itself.
Moreover, in potentially leading recovery efforts in coordination with
the G-20, Washington will have the opportunity to fashion new
international global structures that can benefit all. Global
coordination and cooperation on many fronts will be required to rebuild
trust in the global financial system and to ensure that the economic
and financial crises do not spiral into broader geopolitical tensions.
turning the corner on violent extremism
I next want to focus on extremist groups that use terrorism. The
groups with the greatest capability to threaten are extremist Muslim
groups. In 2008 terrorists did not achieve their goal of conducting
another major attack in the U.S. Homeland. We have seen notable
progress in Muslim opinion turning against terrorist groups like al
Qaeda. Over the last year and a half, al Qaeda has faced significant
public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow extremists
primarily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics--
particularly those employed by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al Qaeda in
the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)--that have resulted in the deaths
of Muslim civilians. Given the increased pressure posed by these
criticisms, al Qaeda leaders increasingly have highlighted enduring
support for the Taliban and the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan and
in other regions where they portray the west being at war with Islam
and al Qaeda as the vanguard of the global terrorist movement. A broad
array of Muslim countries is nevertheless having success in stemming
the rise of extremism and attractiveness of terrorist groups. No major
country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands of extremist,
terrorist groups, although a number--such as Pakistan and Afghanistan--
have to work hard to repulse a still serious threat. In the next
section I will discuss at length the challenges facing us in Pakistan
and Afghanistan where militant have gained some traction despite the
successes against al Qaeda.
Because of the pressure we and our allies have put on al Qaeda's
core leadership in Pakistan and the continued decline of al Qaeda's
most prominent regional affiliate in Iraq, al Qaeda today is less
capable and effective than it was a year ago.
In Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), al Qaeda
lost significant parts of its command structure since 2008 in a
succession of blows as damaging to the group as any since the fall of
the Taliban in late 2001. Key leaders killed over the past year include
Khalid Habib, al Qaeda's military chief and the fourth man in its chain
of command; Abu Layth al-Libi, who directed cross-border attacks
against our forces in Afghanistan and was a rising star in the
organization; Abu Khabab al-Masri, the group's leading expert on
explosives and chemical attacks and a driving force behind its
terrorist plotting against the U.S. Homeland and Europe; and Usama al-
Kini who was involved in the bombings of our Embassies in East Africa
in 1998 and later became the chief planner of al Qaeda's terrorist
attacks in Pakistan.
The loss of these and many other leaders in quick
succession has made it more difficult for al Qaeda to identify
replacements, and in some cases the group has had to promote
more junior figures considerably less skilled and respected
than the individuals they are replacing.
Sustained pressure against al Qaeda in the FATA has the potential
to further degrade its organizational cohesion and diminish the threat
it poses. If forced to vacate the FATA and locate elsewhere, the group
would be vulnerable to U.S. or host-country security crackdowns as well
as local resistance, and probably would be forced to adopt an even more
dispersed, clandestine structure, making training and operational
coordination more difficult. Without access to its FATA safe haven, al
Qaeda also undoubtedly would have greater difficulty supporting the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It is conceivable al Qaeda could
relocate elsewhere in South Asia, the Gulf, or parts of Africa where it
could exploit a weak central government and close proximity to
established recruitment, fundraising, and facilitation networks, but we
judge none of these locations would be as conducive to their
operational needs as their location in the FATA.
In Iraq, we judge the maturation of the Awakening movement, Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) gains, and the subsequent spread of Sons of Iraq
groups, in combination with coalition operations against AQI leaders,
have reduced AQI's operational capabilities and restricted the group's
freedom of movement and sanctuaries. Nevertheless, we judge the group
is likely to retain a residual capacity to undertake terrorist
operations for years to come. I will focus on AQI in greater detail
when I discuss Iraq.
Saudi Arabia's aggressive counterterrorism efforts since 2003 have
rendered the Kingdom a harsh operating environment for al Qaeda, but
Riyadh is now facing new external threats from al Qaeda elements in the
region, particularly from Yemen. Senior al Qaeda leaders are focused on
resurrecting an operational presence due to Saudi security actions over
the past 5 years that have resulted in the death or capture of most
identified Saudi-based al Qaeda senior leaders and operatives. Senior
al Qaeda leaders view the Kingdom as a strategic target owing to Bin
Ladin's longstanding objective of unseating the al-Saud family and the
symbolic value of attacking Western and Saudi targets in the land of
the two holy mosques.
The Saudi Government counterterrorism approach includes law
enforcement efforts coupled with a complementary long-term program to
stem radicalization. Riyadh's multi-faceted ``counter-radicalization''
and ``de-radicalization'' strategy uses detainee rehabilitation
programs, the media, and religious scholars to combat terrorism and
build public support for its strong security posture.
Counterterrorism efforts by Indonesia, in some cases with U.S.
assistance, have led to the arrests and deaths of hundreds of Jemaah
Islamiya (JI) operatives, including top leaders and key operatives. In
November, Indonesia executed three JI terrorists--Imam Samudra,
Mukhlas, and Amrozi--for their role in the 2002 Bali bombings. While
the IC continues to assess that JI in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Philippines are the two terrorist groups posing threats to
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, efforts by Southeast Asian
Governments against both groups in the past few years have degraded
their attack capabilities.
The primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al Qaeda
and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct
attacks in Europe or the United States. We have had limited visibility
into European plotting, but we assess that al Qaeda is continuing to
plan attacks in Europe and the west. Al Qaeda has used Europe as a
launching point for external operations against the Homeland on several
occasions since September 11, and we believe that the group continues
to view Europe as a viable launching point. Al Qaeda most recently
targeted Denmark and the U.K., and we assess these countries remain
viable targets. Al Qaeda leaders have also prominently mentioned
France, most likely in reprisal for the 2004 headscarf ban.
The social, political, and economic integration of Western Europe's
15 to 20 million Muslims is progressing slowly, creating opportunities
for extremist propagandists and recruiters. The highly diverse Muslim
population in Europe already faces much higher poverty and unemployment
rates than the general population, and the current economic crisis
almost certainly will disproportionately affect the region's Muslims.
Numerous worldwide and European Islamic groups are actively encouraging
Muslims in Europe to reject assimilation and support militant versions
of Islam. Successful social integration would give most ordinary
Muslims a stronger political and economic stake in their countries of
residence, even though better educational and economic opportunities do
not preclude radicalization among a minority. Visible progress toward
an Arab-Israeli settlement, along with stability in Iraq and
Afghanistan, would help undercut radicals' appeal to Muslim foreign
policy grievances.
European governments are undertaking a wide range of policies to
promote Muslim social integration and counter radicalization. In
addition to pursuing socioeconomic initiatives aimed at all immigrants,
France, Germany, Italy, and several smaller European countries have
established various types of religious-based consultative councils
composed of leading Muslim groups. Additionally, the United Kingdom has
established the most diversified and energetic official outreach
program to Muslims, largely reflecting concern about homegrown
terrorism since the July 2005 London attacks. Among other initiatives,
the U.K. Government has promoted the creation of an advisory board on
mosque governance, a committee of Muslim theologians, and consultative
bodies of Muslim women and youth. It also has held multiple high
profile conferences with Islamic scholars and government
representatives from the Muslim world. British police have made a
conscious decision to seek the cooperation of non-violent radicals even
while political authorities have encouraged former radicals and Sufis
to speak out against hardline political Islam.
Core al Qaeda
Despite these successes, al Qaeda and its affiliates and allies
remain dangerous and adaptive enemies, and the threat they could
inspire or orchestrate an attack on the United States or European
countries. Under the strategic direction of Usama Bin Ladin and his
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda remains intent on attacking U.S.
interests worldwide, including the U.S. Homeland. Although al Qaeda's
core organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan is under greater
pressure now than it was a year ago, we assess that it remains the most
dangerous component of the larger al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda leaders
still use the tribal areas as a base from which they can avoid capture,
produce propaganda, communicate with operational cells abroad, and
provide training and indoctrination to new terrorist operatives.
We lack insight into specific details, timing, and
intended targets of potential, current U.S. Homeland plots,
although we assess al Qaeda continues to pursue plans for
Homeland attacks and is likely focusing on prominent political,
economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass
casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic
aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.
Increased security measures at home and abroad have
caused al Qaeda to view the West, especially the United States,
as a harder target than in the past, but we remain concerned
about an influx of Western recruits into the tribal areas since
mid-2006.
Al Qaeda and its extremist sympathizers in Pakistan
have waged a campaign of deadly and destabilizing suicide
attacks throughout Pakistan, including the bombing of the
Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September, which killed 60
people and wounded hundreds.
AQIM
Al Qaeda's other robust affiliate, al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is the most active terrorist group in
northwestern Africa and, in our assessment, represents a significant
threat to U.S. and western interests in the region. AQIM has continued
to focus primarily on Algerian Government targets, but since its merger
with al Qaeda in September 2006 the group has expanded its target set
to include U.S., U.N., and other western interests and has launched
progressively more sophisticated attacks, employing vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (VBIEDs), near-simultaneous bombings, and
suicide bombings.
AQIM has conducted nearly a dozen attacks against
Western targets to include a nearsimultaneous VBIED attack
against United Nations facilities and the Algerian
Constitutional Court in Algiers in December 2007, killing at
least 47 and wounding more than 100. AQIM associates also
attacked the Israeli Embassy in Mauritania in February 2008.
AQIM Europe-based cells act as financial support and
facilitation nodes, but these cells could possibly become
operational at the direction of AQIM leadership.
We assess that over the next year AQIM will continue to demonstrate
its increased capability and commitment to senior al Qaeda leadership
by attacking local and Western interests throughout North Africa and
the Sahel. AQIM traditionally has operated in Algeria and northern Mali
and has recruited and trained an unknown number of extremists from
Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other countries. We
assess some of these trainees may have returned to their home countries
to plot attacks against local and western interests.
Al Qaeda in Yemen
Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential
regional base of operations for al Qaeda to plan internal and external
attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives.
Al Qaeda leaders could use al Qaeda in Yemen and the growing presence
of foreign jihadists there to supplement its external operations
agenda, promote turmoil in Saudi Arabia, and weaken the Salih regime.
Al Qaeda in Yemen on 17 September 2008 conducted an
attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a. The coordinated
attack used two explosives-laden vehicles, suicide bombers, and
small-arms fire and killed six guards and four civilians. As of
September 2008, the group had conducted 20 attacks against
U.S., Western, and Yemeni targets, most carried out by the
splinter faction, Jund al-Yemen.
East Africa
We judge the terrorist threat to U.S. interests in East Africa,
primarily from al Qaeda and al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic extremists in
Somalia and Kenya, will increase in the next year as al Qaeda's East
Africa network continues to plot operations against U.S., Western, and
local targets and the influence of the Somalia-based terrorist group
al-Shabaab grows. Given the high-profile U.S. role in the region and
its perceived direction--in the minds of al Qaeda and local
extremists--of foreign intervention in Somalia, we assess U.S.
counterterrorism efforts will be challenged not only by the al Qaeda
operatives in the Horn, but also by Somali extremists and increasing
numbers of foreign fighters supporting al-Shabaab's efforts.
The Homegrown Threat
We judge any homegrown extremists in the United States do not yet
rise to the numerical level or exhibit the operational tempo or
proficiency we have seen in Western Europe. A range of factors inside
the United States may contribute to a lower incidence of homegrown
cells developing. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the potential
for homegrown extremists inspired by al Qaeda's militant ideology to
plan attacks inside the United States, Europe, and elsewhere without
operational direction from the group itself. In this regard, over the
next year we will remain focused on identifying any ties between U.S.-
based individuals and extremist networks overseas. Though difficult to
measure, the spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that provide
religious justification for attacks; aggressive and violent anti-
Western rhetoric; and signs that self-generating cells in the United
States identify with Bin Laden's violent objectives all point to the
likelihood that a small but violent number of cells may develop here.
Al Qaeda's propaganda efforts include messages in
English and those aimed specifically at an American audience
either in translated form or directly by al Qaeda's second-in-
command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, such as with his November 2008
video message following the U.S. presidential elections. U.S.-
born al Qaeda members such as Adam Gadahn, who was indicted by
a U.S. grand jury in October 2006 on charges of treason,
providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization, and aiding and abetting terrorists, also
participated in making these English-language propaganda
messages.
The Threat from Lebanese Hizballah
Lebanese Hizballah continues to be a formidable terrorist adversary
with an ability to attack the U.S. Homeland and U.S. interests abroad.
Hizballah is a multifaceted, disciplined organization that combines
political, social, paramilitary, and terrorist elements, and we assess
that any decision by the group to resort to arms or terrorist tactics
is carefully calibrated. At the same time, we judge armed struggle,
particularly against Israel, remains central to Hizballah's ideology
and strategy.
We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-U.S. attacks
overseas in the past, may consider attacking U.S. interests should it
perceive a direct U.S. threat to the group's survival, leadership, or
infrastructure or to Iran. However, we judge Hizballah would carefully
weigh the decision to take any action against the United States.
Hizballah probably continues to support proxy groups and individuals,
which could provide the group plausible deniability for possible
attacks against the West or Israel.
We assess Hizballah anticipates a future conflict with Israel and
probably continues to implement lessons learned from the conflict in
the summer of 2006. In a potential future conflict, Hizballah is likely
to be better prepared and more capable than in 2006.
the ``arc of instability''
The large region from the Middle East to South Asia is the locus
for many of the challenges facing the United States in the 21st
century. While we are making progress countering terrorism, the roots
and the issues related to the many problems in this region go deeper
and are very complicated. The United States has strong tools--from
military force to diplomacy in the region and good relationships with
the vast majority of states. There is almost universal recognition that
the United States is vital to any solutions, and these can be brought
to bear in ways that benefit the United States and the region. I will
begin with looking at individual states, but the IC analysis I present
here emphasizes the regional linkages exacerbating problems and
providing opportunities that are available for tackling the problems.
The Changing Geopolitical Landscape in the Middle East
In the Middle East, the revival of Iran as a regional power, the
deepening of ethnic, sectarian, and economic divisions across much of
the region, and looming leadership succession among U.S. allies are
shaping the strategic landscape. Hizballah and Hamas have successfully
seized the mantle of resistance to Israel from moderate regimes with
secular Arab nationalists being discredited in the popular mind. Battle
lines are increasingly drawn not just between Israel and Arab countries
but also between secular Arab nationalists and ascendant Islamic
nationalist movements inside moderate Arab states. Iran's influence in
Iraq, its enduring strategic ties to Syria, pursuit of a nuclear
weapons capability, and the success of Tehran's allies--Hamas and
Hizballah--are fueling Iran's aspirations for regional preeminence.
Arab Sunni leaders are struggling to limit Iran's gains; Saudi Arabia's
more activist regional diplomacy falls short of significantly
constraining Iran's freedom of maneuver. Iran's ambitions combined with
unresolved conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories
represent the principal flashpoints for intensified conflict in the
region.
Iran's longstanding foreign policy goals are to preserve the
Islamic regime, safeguard Iran's sovereignty, defend its nuclear
ambitions, and expand its influence in the region and the Islamic
world. Iranian leaders perceive that regional developments--including
the removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges facing the United
States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased influence of Hamas and
Hizballah, and, until recently, higher oil revenues--have given Tehran
more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a
regional power. This perception has produced a more assertive Iranian
foreign policy in which Tehran has focused on expanding ties in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Levant to better influence and exploit regional
political, economic, and security developments. Iran's pursuit of
nuclear weapon capability is another element in its more assertive
foreign policy--an aspect that I will discuss later.
In Tehran, Iran's conservative faction continues to dominate the
government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has consolidated political power in
his office, but his reliance on hardline conservative elements--the
IRGC, war veterans turned politicians such as President Mahmud Ahmadi-
Nejad, and selected clerics--to bolster his authority has upset the
earlier factional balance in Iranian politics.
Although the regime still comprises many competing
factions, only those that support the concept of a powerful
Supreme Leader and advocate revolutionary values now have a
significant voice in decisionmaking.
President Ahmadi-Nejad faces less than certain prospects for
reelection in June because his management of the economy and aggressive
foreign policy rhetoric have become sources of significant domestic
criticism and political friction. Ahmadi-Nejad's economic policies have
reduced unemployment marginally, but have fueled significant inflation,
providing his critics ample ammunition to question his competence. The
sharp fall in global oil prices will add to Iran's economic problems,
but Tehran has a substantial cushion of foreign reserves to support
social and other spending priorities. Less energy revenues may also
help to dampen its foreign policy adventurism.
We expect Khamenei will attempt to manipulate the presidential
election, largely by limiting the range of candidates. As he has in
past elections, the Supreme Leader probably will attempt to influence
the decisions of individuals to run, monitor the vetting and approval
of candidates, and influence media coverage of the campaign.
We do not know if Khamenei will actively support
Ahmadi-Nejad's re-election. The Supreme Leader publicly has
expressed support for Ahmadi-Nejad's administration, but we
judge his statements are intended more to minimize criticisms
of the regime than to endorse the President.
Although we expect that whoever is elected will be a
strong supporter of the Islamic Republic, we note that the
election of a more pragmatic figure may, over time, produce
some moderation of Iranian behavior by introducing into the
decisionmaking process a wider range of options than those
presented under Ahmadi-Nejad.
Militarily, Iran continues to strengthen the three pillars of its
strategic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rockets
and aircraft for retaliation; naval forces to disrupt maritime traffic
through key waterways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to
conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many of their statements
are exaggerations, Iranian officials throughout the past year have
repeatedly claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that
could threaten U.S. and allied interests and the ability to close the
Strait of Hormuz using unconventional small boat operations, anti-ship
cruise missiles, and other naval systems. Some officials, such as
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Major General Mohammad Ali
Jafari-Najafabadi, have hinted that Iran would have a hand in attacks
on ``America's interests even in far away places,'' suggesting Iran has
contingency plans for unconventional warfare and terrorism against the
United States and its allies.
Iran's goals in Iraq include preventing the emergence of a threat
from Iraqi territory, either from the Government of Iraq itself, or
from the United States. To achieve this, Iran probably seeks a
Government in Baghdad in which Tehran's Shiite allies hold the majority
of political, economic, and security power. Iran also has sought to
make the United States suffer political, economic, and human costs in
order to limit U.S. engagement in the region and to ensure that
Washington does not maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq or
use its military to pressure or attack Iran.
Iranian efforts to secure influence in Iraq encompass
a wide range of activities, including using propaganda,
providing humanitarian assistance, building commercial and
economic ties, and supporting Shiite elements fighting the
coalition. Iran has provided a variety of Shia militants with
lethal support including weapons, funding, training, logistical
and operational support, and intelligence training.
We judge Iran will continue to calibrate its lethal
aid to Iraqi Shiite militants based on the threat it perceives
from U.S. forces in Iraq, the state of U.S.-Iran relations,
Tehran's fear of a Bathist resurgence, Tehran's desire to help
defend Iraqi Shiite against sectarian violence, and to maintain
the ability to play a spoiler role in Iraq if Iran perceives
the Government of Iraq has become a strategic threat.
Despite Tehran's efforts, we judge Iraqi nationalism
and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi Government will limit
Iranian influence in Iraq. Baghdad, for example, signed the
U.S.-Iraq security agreement despite Iranian opposition.
In Afghanistan, Iran has focused on promoting a friendly central
government in Kabul and limiting western power and influence. Iran's
policy in Afghanistan follows multiple tracks, including providing
political and economic support to the Karzai Government and developing
relationships with actors across the political spectrum.
Iran has opposed Afghan reconciliation talks with the
Taliban as risking an increase in the group's influence and
legitimacy.
We judge Iran distrusts the Taliban and opposes its
return to power but uses the provision of lethal aid as a way
to pressure western forces, gather intelligence, and build ties
that could protect Iran's interests if the Taliban regains
control of the country.
In the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Lebanon
and expanding the capability of key allies. Tehran continues to support
groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge Israeli and
Western influence in the Middle East.
Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian
financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran's senior
leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant
groups. We assess Tehran has continued to provide Hizballah
with significant amounts of funding, training, and weapons
since the 2006 conflict with Israel, increasing the group's
capabilities to pressure other Lebanese factions and to
threaten Israel.
Iran's provision of training, weapons, and money to
Hamas since the 2006 Palestinian elections has bolstered the
group's ability to strike Israel and oppose the Palestinian
Authority (PA).
Worsening Conflict in the Levant
The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon are two places where the
multifaceted connections of which I spoke are most pronounced in this
arc of instability. Two non-state actors, Hamas and Hizballah, play
prominent roles, while individual states that oppose U.S. interests,
such as Iran and Syria, also are prominent. In both these countries, we
worry about worsening conflict and the potential for growing violent
extremism.
Fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip subsided in
mid-January, leaving in its wake hardened attitudes among Israelis and
Palestinians, deepened Palestinian political divisions, and a widened
rift between regional moderates--led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Jordan--and hardliners, including Iran, Hizballah, and Syria. A key
challenge for U.S. policy in the coming year will be finding ways to
strengthen moderates and renew the potential for peace negotiations,
lest post-conflict division and anger in the region further diminish
prospects for peace.
With Hamas in control of Gaza and Hizballah growing stronger in
Lebanon, progress on a Palestinian-Israeli accord is growing more
difficult. With Iran developing a nuclear weapon capability and Israel
determined not to allow it, there is potential for an Iran-Israeli
confrontation or crisis on that issue as well. Moderate Arab states
fear a nuclear-armed Iran, want progress on Palestinian settlement--the
absence of which deprives U.S. Arab allies of crucial political capital
to defend strategic ties to the United States and wish to sustain a
moderate, statecentered politics for the region. Progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian peace track would increase opportunities for the
United States to broaden its engagement with Arab publics, including
those aligning with the growing ideology of Islamic nationalism.
The Israeli public appears broadly supportive of
Israel's military action and believes Israel must act
decisively to prevent attacks from Palestinian-controlled
territory. At the same time, Israel's military actions in Gaza
have deepened Palestinian anger towards Israel, both in the
Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, and sparked outrage and
protests throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
Hamas and the PA are engaged in an intense
competition, with both sides seeking to emerge from the
conflict in a stronger political position, but relations
between the two organizations have been further embittered by
the crisis. The PA accused Hamas of needlessly provoking an
Israeli attack and Hamas, which has argued it ``won'' by
surviving the operation and continuing its control of Gaza,
accused the PA of essentially collaborating with the Israeli
assault.
The moderate Arab states and regional hardliners are
competing to shape the regional developments and public
attitudes in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis. The moderates
seek a reconciliation of the Palestinian factions and the
resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians,
while hardliners are encouraging Hamas to retain its
uncompromising stance toward Israel. These opposing regional
blocs are competing to take the lead in delivering humanitarian
aid to Palestinians in Gaza. Moderate states support U.S.
efforts to establish a ceasefire and border security regime
that will prevent the rearming of Hamas, while Iran is likely
to lead an effort to provide weapons to Hamas to build the
group's military capabilities.
Tensions between Hamas and Fatah have been elevated since Hamas
seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and efforts to achieve
reconciliation have failed. Both factions continue to attack, harass,
and detain members of the other group in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, deepening mutual resentment and making an accord between them
difficult. Reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas scheduled for
November in Cairo did not occur because Hamas refused to attend the
meetings, in part to protest ongoing PA security measures in the West
Bank targeting its members.
Disagreement between Fatah and Hamas about a range of
issues such as the timing of national elections and formation
of a unity government could lead Hamas to challenge the
legitimacy of Abbas's government and will remain obstacles to
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.
In 2008, longstanding tensions worsened between anti-democratic
Fatah elements, mostly but not exclusively the so-called ``old-guard''
and typically younger elements demanding internal reforms within the
faction, worsened in 2008 amid discussions over the location of and
attendance at Fatah's long-delayed sixth General Congress. These
internal conflicts threaten to fracture the party and damage its
prospects in the run-up to PA presidential and legislative elections in
2009 or early 2010. There is no consensus among Fatah officials
regarding a replacement for President Abbas, who has not groomed a
successor, and no potential leader has gained Fatah's full support.
In Lebanon, after a long stalemate, the political process showed
some movement last year that reasserted a fragile consensus giving
Hizballah and the opposition veto power in the Lebanese Government. The
Doha Accord in May ended armed clashes between Hizballah and Lebanese
civilians and 18 months of political stalemate. The accord also paved
the way for the election of former Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
Commander Michel Sulayman as President on May 25, 2008. Sulayman has
positioned himself as a consensus-builder between the March 14
coalition and the Hizballah-led opposition and has made progress on
some issues, including forming the national unity cabinet, drafting the
cabinet statement, and reforming the electoral law.
The Lebanese political scene has enjoyed a period of
relative calm and reconciliation since May, probably because
all Lebanese parties are focused on preparing and forging
alliances for the National Assembly election in June 2009.
Lebanese Christian voters, divided between the two political
camps, will be decisive in determining who wins a majority in
the election.
The security situation remains fragile in Lebanon, especially in
the north, which saw fighting between the Sunni and Alawi communities
last summer. The Hizballah-initiated violence in May has left all
sectarian groups--the Sunnis in particular--concerned about their
security. The LAF's limited response and the Hizballah-led opposition's
military strength have reinforced the view that sectarian communities
must defend themselves. All sides are working to develop sectarian-
based militia forces. Hizballah continues to bolster its military
strength; since the 2006 war, the group has rearmed and trained
additional personnel in preparation for possible future conflict with
Israel.
Hizballah's attempts to reconcile with other Lebanese parties are
an effort to show the group's commitment to a Lebanese nationalist
agenda in preparation for the election. They are also meant to reduce
the damage done to Hizballah's image by its armed takeover of parts of
Beirut in May.
Since becoming President of Syria in June 2000, Bashar al-Asad has
strengthened his hold on power in Syria. Asad's standing has been
augmented by his perceived success in weathering regional crises and
international pressure and by the regime's ability to highlight Syria's
relative insulation from violence in Iraq and Lebanon. Within Syria,
Asad has preserved the pillars of regime control established by his
father while gradually using personnel turnover to appoint loyalists
and expand his power base.
Syrian leaders continue to exploit ``resistance'' to
Israel and rejection of U.S. pressure to unify Syrians in
support of the regime, despite broad dissatisfaction with
economic conditions, some disappointment at the lack of
political reforms, and quiet resentment by some Sunnis at
domination by the Alawi minority.
Damascus continues efforts to cement its influence in Lebanon by
providing economic and other support to its allies in the Lebanese
opposition. Syria has exploited its role in helping secure the May 2008
Doha agreement, which ended Lebanon's political violence last spring
and ushered in a unity government, to improve relations with Europe and
moderate Arab states. Syria is poised to appoint an ambassador to
Lebanon, and we judge Syria will continue to interfere in Lebanese
affairs in pursuit of its own interests.
Syrian military cooperation with Iran, including trilateral
cooperation with Hizballah, has increased during the past year. Syria
views its links to Iran as a means to press and deter adversaries,
particularly Israel, and create leverage for achieving its major goals
of a lead role in the Arab world, maintaining influence in Lebanon, and
regaining the Golan Heights. For Syria's part, Iran has proven over the
last quarter century to be Syria's most reliable ally. Shared interests
over the past few years--support for Lebanese Hizballah, sustaining
Palestinian terrorists, and countering U.S. regional intentions--have
drawn Iran and Syria toward a closer alliance. Syrian military support
to Hizballah has increased substantially over the past 5 years,
especially since the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Damascus also supports
Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas, which base their
external leadership in Syria.
Syria probably will adjust its approach to the Iraq insurgency as
Iraq's situation evolves. As the United States withdraws, we assess
Damascus will seek improved political and economic ties to Baghdad and
is likely to support oppositionists opposed to a long-term U.S.
presence in Iraq. Syria will remain the primary gateway for foreign
fighters entering Iraq. Syria condemned the October 26, 2008, U.S. raid
that targeted AQI foreign fighter facilitator Abu Ghadiyah and staged a
temporary removal of some border guard forces. Damascus also closed
U.S. institutions in Syria, including the Damascus Community School and
the American Cultural Center.
A More Stable Iraq as Counterbalance
The positive security trends over the past year have endured and
expanded, and a more stable Iraq could counterbalance other negative
trends in the region. Extremists in Iraq have been largely sidelined by
coalition and Iraqi operations and dwindling popular tolerance for
violence, and their attacks are no longer a major catalyst for
sectarian violence. Iraqis now are less inclined to resolve their
differences through unsanctioned violence, and fewer Iraqis are dying
at the hands of their countrymen than at any time in the past 2 years.
Indeed, communal violence is now at the lowest sustained levels since
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Government came to power. Improving
security conditions in Iraq have given the Prime Minister an
opportunity to assert authority in previously denied areas of the
country. Meanwhile, the maturation of the Awakening movement, ISF
gains, and the subsequent spread of Sons of Iraq groups, in combination
with coalition operations against AQI leaders, have weakened AQI by
largely forcing it out of strongholds such as Al Anbar and much of
greater Baghdad.
The main factors that have contributed to these positive trends are
as follows:
First, coalition operations and population security
measures have been critical to reducing violence in Iraq. We
judge Coalition support in the form of a credible, politically
neutral security guarantor also has facilitated the ISF's
ability to deal with ethnosectarian issues.
Second, the Sunni insurgency has continued to wane.
Most Iraqi-led Sunni insurgent groups have largely suspended
operations against the coalition, favoring engagement with the
United States to protect their communities, to oppose AQI, or
protect against feared domination by the Iraqi Government,
although many are hedging by maintaining their organizational
structures and access to weapons.
Third, the threat from AQI has continued to diminish.
AQI, although still dangerous, has experienced the defection of
members, lost key mobilization areas, suffered disruption of
support infrastructure and funding, and been forced to change
targeting priorities. Indeed, the pace of suicide bombings
countrywide, which we consider one indicator of AQI's
operational capability, fell significantly during the last
year.
Fourth, the threat of violence from most Shiite
militants has declined. Many Shiite who looked upon Sadr's
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in early 2008 as defenders against Sunni
extremists eventually came to see the JAM as pariahs, leading
Muqtada al-Sadr to announce last summer that most of his
thousands-strong militia would set aside their weapons to
become a cultural organization and a counterweight to Western
influence. Some Shiite militant groups such as Sadrist-
affiliated groups and Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) probably will
continue anti-coalition attacks and may engage in sporadic
violence against Iraqi Government targets.
Lastly, the capabilities of the ISF have continued to
improve. The ISF's increasing professionalism and improvements
in warfighting skills have allowed it to assume more
responsibility for Iraq's internal security, as demonstrated by
the successful operations against Shiite militants in Al
Basrah, Sadr City, and Al `Amarah, and against Sunni extremists
in Diyala and Mosul. Despite these improvements, the ISF
remains dependent on the United States for enabling
capabilities such as logistics, fire support, and intelligence.
We assess political and security progress could be halted or even
reversed by a number of factors, particularly if these challenges occur
in combination.
Disputed internal boundaries. Resolving disputed
boundaries, primarily in northern Iraq, probably will be the
most fiercely contested political issue to face Iraq in the
next several years and poses the greatest threat to government
stability.
Perceptions of Iraqi Government repression. Policies
or actions of the Iraqi Government perceived by segments of
Iraq's ethnosectarian population to represent a broad and
enduring campaign of repression could lead to widespread
violence.
Increased foreign support to insurgent or militia
groups. We judge a large infusion of foreign support could
deepen and intensify the ensuing conflict if Iraqi militants
and insurgents sought external assistance to challenge or
destabilize the Iraqi Government.
In addition to these challenges, Baghdad will confront more
difficult choices about spending priorities as a result of declining
oil revenues as it simultaneously grapples with security force
modernization, infrastructure investment, and expanding public
payrolls. Iraq's economy will continue to depend heavily on hydrocarbon
exports, government spending, and continued security improvements.
We judge Iran will expand political and economic ties to Baghdad
and will continue to supply weapons and training to Shiite militants to
counter a Sunni resurgence, maintain leverage in Iraq, and keep
pressure on U.S. forces. Iraqi nationalism, however, acts as a check on
Iran's ability to project power in Iraq. Syria will focus on improving
relations with Baghdad and seek increased trade and energy exports but
also will continue to support Baathists and other non-AQI Sunni
oppositionists to try to gain leverage in Iraq. Turkey will continue to
focus on countering the Kurdistan People's Congress, a Kurdish
terrorist group based in northern Iraq. The Turkish military continues
to conduct cross-border air and artillery strikes in northern Iraq
against the Kurdistan People's Congress (KGK, formerly PKK), a Kurdish
terrorist organization waging armed conflict against Turkey. The KGK
appears to retain the desire to attack Turkish targets. In early
October 2008, the KGK launched an attack on a Turkish military outpost
that left 17 Turkish troops dead.
Turkish officials met with Kurdistan Regional
Government President Barzani in October 2008, opening the
prospect of closer ties between Turkey and the KRG. Like the
rest of Europe, the Turkish economy is feeling the effects of
the global financial crisis. In mid-November, Standard and
Poor's downgraded Turkey's credit outlook from stable to
negative.
Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors are starting to reestablish an Arab
presence in Baghdad, but Arab engagement is likely to be slow and
halting over the next year. Jordan's King Abdallah in August became the
first Arab head of state to travel to Baghdad since the fall of Saddam;
he dispatched an Ambassador to Iraq in October.
Afghan-Pakistani Linkages
In the past year, Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated insurgency has
increased the geographic scope and frequency of attacks. Taliban
reaction to expanded Afghan and North Atlantic Treaty Operations (NATO)
account for some of the increase in violence, but insurgents also have
demonstrated greater aggressiveness and more lethal tactics. Efforts to
improve governance and extend development were hampered in 2008 by a
lack of security in many areas and a general lack of government
capacity and competency. The ability of the Afghan Government, NATO,
and the United States to push back the Taliban and deliver security,
basic governance, and economic development will determine the continued
support of the Afghan people for the government and the international
community. Afghan leaders also must tackle endemic corruption and an
extensive drug trade, which erode the capacity of the government while
diminishing public confidence in its already fragile institutions.
Specifically, the security situation has deteriorated in many
eastern areas of the country and in the south and northwest. Taliban
and affiliated insurgent groups have expanded operations into
previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban-
dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite International
Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom military
operations targeting insurgent command and control networks.
Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the
Afghan National Army, but the shortage of international trainers in the
field, high operational tempo, attrition, and absenteeism hamper
efforts to make units capable of independent action. The Afghan
National Police remains a largely untrained force with high rates of
corruption and absenteeism. Limitations to training, mentoring, and
equipping combined with an ineffective Ministry of Interior and large
parts of the country that have not been effectively ``cleared'' hinder
the progress and effectiveness of the policy.
Kabul in 2009 must work closely with the national legislature and
provincial and tribal leaders to establish and extend the capacity of
the central and provincial government. The country faces a chronic
shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government
officials at the national and local level. In addition, continued
attacks undercut the national government's image as a viable guarantor
of security, persuading tribal and other influential nonstate actors to
either remain neutral or back insurgents. The 2009 presidential
election will present a greater security challenge than the 2004
election, and the insurgents probably will make a concerted effort to
disrupt it.
Kabul's inability to build effective, honest, and loyal provincial
and district level institutions capable of providing basic services and
sustainable, licit livelihoods erodes its popular legitimacy and
increases the influence of local warlords and the Taliban. The Afghan
Government has launched some initiatives, such as the Independent
Directorate of Local Governance, to address governance shortcomings,
but corruption has exceeded culturally tolerable levels and is eroding
the legitimacy of the government. Both law enforcement and judicial
capacity, although somewhat improved, remain limited, and Kabul remains
constrained in its ability to deploy programs at the provincial and
local levels.
The Afghan Government has no coherent tribal engagement strategy,
but where Pashtun tribal and government interests intersect, gains in
local security, stability, and development are possible. At the
provincial level, governors who have proven themselves effective
mediators of local disputes among tribes and other local groups in
their respective jurisdictions garner support from Afghan audiences and
the donor community.
The Afghan drug trade is a major source of revenue for corrupt
officials, the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating in the
country and is one of the greatest long-term challenges facing
Afghanistan. The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue
to undercut the government's ability to assert its authority outside of
Kabul, to develop a strong, rule-of-law based system, and to rebuild
the economy. Despite decreases in poppy cultivation in 2008, opium
production in Afghanistan remains historically high, and the country
produces over 90 percent of the world's supply with 95 percent of the
crop grown in five contiguous provinces of southwestern Afghanistan and
over 60 percent in one province alone, Helmand. In 2008, farmers grew
157,300 hectares of poppy, potentially producing an estimated 7,700
metric tons of opium. Almost every province outside the southwest was
either poppy-free or had a dramatic decrease in cultivation, due to a
combination of effective local anti-poppy campaigns, better security
unfavorable weather, and decreased opium prices relative to other
crops, and improved governance and security in key provinces. The
United Nations estimates that the total value to agricultural producers
of Afghan opium in 2008 was $730 million--although the gap in
profitability has narrowed. No improvement in the security in
Afghanistan is possible without progress in Pakistan.
No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking
control of its border areas and improving governance, creating economic
and educational opportunities throughout the country. The government is
losing authority in parts of the North-West Frontier Province and has
less control of its semi-autonomous tribal areas: even in the more
developed parts of the country, mounting economic hardships and
frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater
radicalization.
In 2008 Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but
Islamabad's record in dealing with militants has been mixed as it
navigates conflicting internal and counterterrorist priorities.
Pakistan's leaders are facing enormous socio-economic challenges.
Economic hardships are intense, and the country is now facing a major
balance of payments challenge. Islamabad needs to make painful reforms
to improve overall macroeconomic stability. Pakistan's law-and-order
situation is dismal, affecting even Pakistani elites, and violence
between various sectarian, ethnic, and political groups threatens to
escalate. Pakistan's population is growing rapidly at a rate of about 2
percent a year, and roughly half of the country's 172 million residents
are illiterate, under the age of 20, and live near or below the poverty
line. Among the needed reforms are measures to improve the transparency
of government expenditures and impose taxes on wealthy landowners. Such
reforms would reduce the opportunities for corruption among Pakistani
political leaders, help to establish a more level political playing
field, and help build the confidence of average Pakistanis in their
government.
The Pakistani Government's current plans will require intensified
and sustained efforts to orchestrate the administrative, economic,
educational, legal, and social reforms required to create an
environment that discourages Islamic extremism and encourages the
development of human capital. This, in turn, requires effective
political leadership focused on improving the capabilities of Pakistani
institutions for effective governance.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Exacerbating Prospects for
Middle East
The ongoing efforts of nation-states to develop and/or acquire
dangerous weapons and delivery systems in the Middle East and elsewhere
constitute another major threat to the safety of our Nation, our
deployed troops, and our allies. (The threat posed by North Korea's
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program is assessed below, in the
section on Asia.) We are most concerned about the threat and
destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. The threat from the
proliferation of materials and technologies that could contribute to
both existing and prospective biological and chemical weapons programs
also is real. Most of the international community shares these
concerns.
WMD use by most nation states traditionally has been constrained by
the logic of deterrence and by diplomacy, but these constraints may be
of less utility in preventing the use of mass-effect weapons by
terrorist groups. Moreover, the time when only a few states had access
to the most dangerous technologies is long over. Technologies, often
dual-use, circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the
personnel with scientific expertise who design and use them. Therefore,
it is difficult for the United States and its partners to track efforts
to acquire components and production technologies that are widely
available.
We assess countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will
continue to try to improve their capabilities and level of self-
sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons or the production technologies and materials necessary to
produce them may also be acquired by states that do not now have such
programs; and/or by terrorist or insurgent organizations; and by
criminal organizations, acting alone or through middlemen.
Iranian Nuclear and Missile Programs
The Iranian regime continues to flout U.N. Security Council
restrictions on its nuclear programs. There is a real risk that its
nuclear program will prompt other countries in the Middle East region
to pursue nuclear options conducive to the development of nuclear
weapons, and the advent of additional nuclear weapons programs might
lead countries in other regions to reassess their nuclear options.
I want to be very clear in characterizing the Iranian nuclear
program. First, there are three key parts to an effective nuclear
weapons capability:
(1) Production of fissile material;
(2) Effective means for weapon delivery; and
(3) Design, weaponization, and testing of the warhead itself.
We assessed in our 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
this subject that Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work
was halted in fall 2003, along with its covert uranium conversion and
enrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts were
suspended in 2003 but resumed in January 2006 and will enable Iran to
produce weapons-usable fissile material if it chooses to do so.
Development of medium-range ballistic missiles, inherently capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, has continued unabated.
We assess Iranian military entities were working under government
direction to develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Iranian entities
are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision were made to do
so.
Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium
enrichment technology, which can be used both to produce low-
enriched uranium for power reactor fuel and to produce highly
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
As noted, Iran continues to deploy and improve
ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.
We assess Iran since fall 2003 has conducted research
and development projects with commercial and conventional
military applications, some of which would be of limited use
for nuclear weapons.
We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and
weaponization activities and that the halt lasted at least several
years. We assess Tehran had not restarted these activities as of at
least mid-2007. Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends
to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping
open the option to develop them.
We judge the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's
previously undeclared nuclear work. This indicates Iran may be more
susceptible to influence on the issue than we had judged in the 2005
NIE.
We do not have sufficient intelligence reporting to judge
confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain indefinitely the halt
of its previously enumerated nuclear weapons-related activities while
it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific
deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those activities.
We assess Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity
eventually to produce nuclear weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian
political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons--and such
a decision is inherently reversible. I reiterate that two activities of
the three relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue:
development of uranium enrichment technology that will enable
production of fissile material, if Iran chooses to do so, and
development of nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems.
We assess convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual
development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership see between nuclear weapons and Iran's key
national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran's
considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop
such weapons. Our analysis suggests that some combination of threats of
intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with
opportunities for Iran to achieve its security and goals might--if
perceived by Iran's leaders as credible--prompt Tehran to extend the
halt to the above nuclear weapons-related activities. It is difficult
to specify what such a combination might be.
We continue to assess Iran does not currently have a nuclear
weapon. We continue to assess Iran probably has imported at least some
weapons-usable fissile material but still judge it has not obtained
enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad or will acquire in the future a nuclear weapon or enough
fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants
to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of
fissile material indigenously. We judge it has not yet done so.
Iran made significant progress in 2007 and 2008 installing and
operating centrifuges at its main centrifuge enrichment plant, Natanz.
We judge Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough
highly-enriched uranium for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015
timeframe. INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability
before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.
Iranian Missile Threat
Beyond its WMD potential, Iranian conventional military power
threatens Persian Gulf states and challenges U.S. interests. Iran is
enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with
ballistic missiles and naval power, with the goal of dominating the
Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity to
disrupt the operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the
region, potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding
support for U.S. policy, and raising the political, financial, and
human costs to the United States and our allies of our presence.
Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missiles--it
already has the largest inventory in the Middle East--and its
acquisition of anti-ship cruise missiles provide capabilities
to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its
conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its
strategy to deter and if necessary retaliate against forces in
the region, including U.S. forces. Its ballistic missiles are
inherently capable of delivering WMD and if so armed would fit
into this same strategy.
The Terrorist Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) Threat
Over the coming years, we will continue to face a substantial
threat, including in the U.S. Homeland, from terrorists attempting to
acquire biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and use them
to conduct large-scale attacks. Conventional weapons and explosives
will continue to be the most often used instruments of destruction in
terrorist attacks; however, terrorists who are determined to develop
CBRN capabilities will have increasing opportunities to do so, owing to
the spread of relevant technological knowledge and the ability to work
with CBRN materials and designs in safe havens.
Most terrorist groups that have shown some interest,
intent, or capability to conduct CBRN attacks have pursued only
limited, technically simple approaches that have not yet caused
large numbers of casualties.
In particular, we assess the terrorist use of biological agents
represents a growing threat as the barriers to obtaining many suitable
starter cultures are eroding and open source technical literature and
basic laboratory equipment can facilitate production. Terrorist
chemical attacks also represent a substantial threat. Small-scale
chemical attacks using industrial toxins have been the most frequent
type of CBRN attack to date. The chlorine attacks in Iraq from October
2006 through the summer of 2007 highlighted terrorist interest in using
commercial and easily available toxic industrial chemicals as weapons.
Al Qaeda is the terrorist group that historically has sought the
broadest range of CBRN attack capabilities, and we assess that it would
use any CBRN capability it acquires in an anti-U.S. attack, preferably
against the Homeland. There also is a threat of biological or chemical
attacks in the U.S. Homeland by lone individuals.
rising asia
As the terrorism and proliferation threats persist across the ``arc
of instability,'' East and South Asia are poised to become the long-
term power center of the world. China and India are restoring the
positions they held in the 18th century when China produced
approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world's wealth.
These two countries are likely to surpass the gross domestic product
(GDP) of all other economies except the United States and Japan by
2025, although the current financial crisis may somewhat slow the
momentum. Japan remains the second largest global economy and a strong
U.S. ally in the region, but the global economic slowdown is exacting a
heavy toll on Japan's economy. To realize its aspirations to play
increased regional and global roles will require strong leadership and
politically difficult decisions. All together--Japan, the ``tiger''
economies like South Korea and Taiwan as well as the rising giants of
China and India point to the ``rise of Asia'' as a defining
characteristic of the 21st century. China's reemergence as a major
power with global impact is especially affecting the regional balance
of power.
As in the Middle East, the United States has strong relationships
in East Asia--a network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and close partnerships with other
countries--and a longstanding forward military presence. Countries in
the region look to the United States for leadership and for ways to
encourage China to become a constructive and responsible player in the
regional and global communities. Although China will have ample
opportunity to play a positive role, it also poses a potential
challenge if it chooses to use its growing power and influence in ways
counter to U.S. or broader international interests.
China's Transformation
China is 30 years into a fundamental transformation that will take
many more decades to complete. Although there have been moments when
the government's effort to maintain control seemed on the verge of
failure--notably the crisis on Tiananmen Square in 1989--the government
has been remarkably successful in guiding reform. China has avoided the
fate of most other socialist countries, suffering neither the economic
and political collapse of the Soviet Union nor the stagnation of Cuba
and North Korea.
We judge China's international behavior is driven by a combination
of domestic priorities, primarily maintaining economic prosperity and
domestic stability, and a longstanding ambition to see China play the
role of a great power in East Asia and globally. Chinese leaders view
preserving domestic stability as one of their most important internal
security challenges. Their greatest concerns are separatist unrest and
the possibility that local protests could merge into a coordinated
national movement demanding fundamental political reforms or an end to
Party rule. Security forces move quickly and sometimes forcefully to
end demonstrations. The March 2008 protests in Tibet highlighted the
danger of separatist unrest and prompted Beijing to deploy paramilitary
and military assets to end the demonstrations.
These same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign
policy. China's desire to secure access to the markets, commodities,
and energy supplies needed to sustain domestic economic growth
significantly influences its foreign engagement. Chinese diplomacy
seeks to maintain favorable relations with other major powers,
particularly the United States, which Beijing perceives as vital to
China's economic success and to achieving its other strategic
objectives. But Beijing is also seeking to build its global image and
influence in order to advance its broader interests and to resist what
it perceives as external challenges to those interests or to China's
security and territorial integrity.
Taiwan as an area of tension in U.S.-China relations has
substantially relaxed since the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou. The new
Taiwanese President inaugurated in May has resumed dialogue with
Beijing after a 9-year hiatus, and leaders on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait are now cautiously optimistic that a new period of less
confrontational relations has begun. Many outstanding challenges
remain, however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront
issues such as Taiwan's participation in international organizations.
Beijing has not renounced the use of force against the island, and
China's leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as vital to
regime legitimacy.
PLA Modernization
Preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the
modernization goals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the
Chinese defense-industrial complex. It will likely remain the primary
factor as long as the Taiwan situation is unresolved.
At the same time, we judge that China over the past several years
has begun a substantially new phase in its military development by
beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go well
beyond China's immediate territorial interests.
For example, China's leaders may decide to contribute
combat forces to peacekeeping operations, in addition to
expanding the current level of command and logistic support.
China's national security interests are broadening.
This will likely lead China to attempt to develop at least a
limited naval power projection capability extending beyond the
South China Sea. This already has been reflected in Beijing's
decision in December to participate in anti-piracy operations
off the coast of Somalia.
Missile Capability
China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range
ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that can reach U.S. forces
and regional bases throughout the Western Pacific and Asia, including
Guam. China also is developing conventionally armed short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads
that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases. In
addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems, to include
communications satellite jammers, are among Beijing's highest military
priorities.
Counterspace Systems
China continues to pursue a long-term program to develop a
capability to disrupt and damage critical foreign space systems.
Counterspace systems, including antisatellite weapons, also rank among
the country's highest military priorities.
Nuclear Capability
On the nuclear side, we judge Beijing seeks to modernize China's
strategic forces in order to address concerns about the survivability
of those systems in the face of foreign, particularly US, advances in
strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile defenses. We
assess China's nuclear capabilities will increase over the next 10
years.
Indian Pragmatism
Like China, India's expanding economy will lead New Delhi to pursue
new trade partners, gain access to vital energy markets, and generate
the other resources required to sustain rapid economic growth. To
sustain rapid growth, Indian governments also must maintain the
political support for economic reforms needed to drive the expanding
economy.
On the global stage, Indian leaders will continue to follow an
independent course characterized by economic and political pragmatism.
New Delhi will not automatically support or oppose positions favored by
the United States or any other major power. Nonetheless, good relations
with the United States will be essential for India to realize its
global ambitions. Indian leaders will seek benefits from American
influence, trade, and technology. Strong ties to Washington also will
give India more confidence in dealing with China and in mitigating the
dangers posed by its long-time adversary, Pakistan. However, Indian
leaders often will adopt positions contrary to those favored by
Washington. India will be concerned about China during the coming
decade because of Beijing's political and economic power and its
ability to project military force regionally, but Indian leaders will
strive to avoid confrontation with China.
Indian-Pakistan Relations
Within South Asia, one of the world's least integrated regions,
India will strive to manage tensions with Pakistan, transnational
terrorism, and spillover from instability in small neighboring states.
Determined efforts by Indian and Pakistani leaders to improve relations
through the so-called Composite Dialogue over the last 4 years could
unravel unless Islamabad takes sustained, concrete, meaningful steps to
allay Indian concerns about Islamabad's support to anti-Indian militant
groups. This is the case particularly in light of the November 2008
terrorist attack in Mumbai. The attack has convinced many Indians that
Pakistani military leaders, in an effort to undercut India's emerging
international stature, now favor a strategy of allowing Pakistan-based
groups to attack targets that symbolize New Delhi's growing prominence
on the global stage or that could undermine India's prominence by
provoking religious violence in the country. In the absence of a
military response against Islamabad, the Indian public will look for
visible signs that Pakistan is actively working to punish those
involved and eliminate its domestic terrorist organizations. Pakistan-
based groups could carry out additional attacks against India and run
the risk of provoking an India-Pakistan conflict. In addition, India,
which has endured a series of major terrorist attacks without major
military response since 2003, is under domestic pressure to make rapid
and significant improvements in its counterterrorism capabilities.
India also will look for ways to safeguard its interests in light
of the concluding civil war in Sri Lanka and political uncertainty in
Bangladesh and Nepal, which have experienced dramatic transformations
in government during the past year. New Delhi generally will be
supportive of democratic forces in its smaller neighbors, while also
being sensitive to the opinions of the Tamil and Bengali communities
within India.
North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions
In addition to a possible India-Pakistan conflict, Pyongyang's
nuclear ambitions and proliferation behavior threaten to destabilize
East Asia. The North's October 2006 nuclear test is consistent with our
longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device. Prior to
the test, we assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium for at
least a half dozen nuclear weapons. The IC continues to assess North
Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in
the IC have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert
uranium enrichment program.
Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for
deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for
warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain
narrow circumstances. We also assess Pyongyang probably would not
attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless
it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and
risked an irretrievable loss of control.
Progress was made, albeit painstakingly, last year in Six-Party
Talks; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shut down
three core facilities at Yongbyon and has completed 8 of the 11
disablement steps. However, much work remains. At the latest round of
talks held in December in Beijing, the DPRK refused to agree to a Six
Party verification protocol needed to verify the completeness and
correctness of its nuclear declaration. Since then, Pyongyang has
issued hardline statements suggesting further challenges to
denuclearization.
On the proliferation side, North Korea has sold ballistic missiles
and associated materials to several Middle Eastern countries, including
Iran, and, in our assessment, assisted Syria with the construction of a
nuclear reactor. We remain concerned North Korea could again export
nuclear technology. In the October 3 Second Phase Actions agreement,
the DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials,
technology, or know-how. We assess Pyongyang is less likely to risk
selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than
nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or
non-state actors, in part because it needs its limited fissile material
for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably also perceives that it would
risk a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if
the nuclear material was used by another country or group in a nuclear
strike or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the
material back to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the North
might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material transfer more
appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme
economic crisis where the potentially huge revenue from such a sale
could help the country survive.
We assess that poor economic conditions are fueling systemic
vulnerability within North Korea. Public statements by the regime
emphasize the need for adequate food supplies. A relatively good fall
harvest in 2008, combined with the delivery of substantial U.S. food
aid--500,000 tons of grain have been promised and about one-third of
this has been delivered--probably will prevent deterioration in the
food security situation during the next few months. However, we assess
North Korea is still failing to come to grips with the economic
downturn that began in the early 1990s and that prospects for economic
recovery remain slight. In addition to food, shortages in fertilizer
and energy continue to plague the economy. Investment spending appears
is negligible, trade remains weak, and we see little progress toward
economic reforms. Pyongyang has long been in default on a relatively
large foreign debt and we assess that badly needed foreign investment
will not take place unless the North comes to terms with its
international creditors and conforms to internationally accepted trade
and financial norms, badly needed foreign investment will not take
place.
Pyongyang's strategic posture is not helping its
economy. Trade with Japan has fallen precipitously since the
nuclear and missile tests of 2006, and, while commercial trade
with South Korea rose in 2008, South Korean aid and tourism to
the north declined due to increased north-south tensions.
Despite this poor economic performance and the many privations of
the North Korean public, we see no organized opposition to Kim Jong
Il's rule and only occasional incidents of social disorder. Kim
probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several
weeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did before
the stroke. However, his recent public activities suggest his health
has improved significantly, and we assess he is making key decisions.
The state's control apparatus by all accounts remains strong,
sustaining the dismal condition of human rights in North Korea.
growing challenges in russia and eurasia
Russian challenges to U.S. interests now spring more from Moscow's
perceived strengths than from the state weaknesses characteristic of
the 1990s. U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and general anti-
Americanism have created openings for Russia to build alternative
arrangements to the U.S.-led international political and economic
institutional order. Russia is actively cultivating relations with
regional powers, including China, Iran, and Venezuela to increase its
ability to influence events. Moscow also is trying to maintain control
over energy supply and transportation networks to Europe to East Asia,
and protect and further enhance its market share in Europe through new
bilateral energy partnerships and organizing a gas cartel with other
major exporters. Russia appears to believe the continued heavy
dependence of European countries and former Soviet states on Russia's
state gas monopoly, Gazprom, provides Moscow with political and
economic leverage.
Russia continues to rely on its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory
capability to counter the perceived threat from the United States and
NATO. Moscow for the past several years has also been strengthening its
conventional military force to make it a credible foreign policy
instrument, both to signal its political resurgence and to assert its
dominance over neighboring states, like Georgia. Moscow has actively
engaged in foreign military cooperation with countries such as China
and Venezuela, in part to remind the United States and others of
Russia's global military relevance. Despite persistent challenges,
including a long-term decline in the numbers and quality of recruits
and difficulties in keeping pace with the demands of weapons
modernization, the Russian military defeated the Georgian military last
August.
Russian leaders recently have spoken positively about the
possibilities for change in the U.S.-Russia dynamic, but issues such as
NATO enlargement, the conflict over Georgia's separatist regions, and
Missile Defense will continue to pose difficulties for the relationship
and underscore the challenges of finding ways to engage with Russia.
Even as it seeks to negotiate a robust post-Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty agreement, Moscow consistently stresses that the accession to
NATO of Georgia and Ukraine would put existing arms control regimes and
negotiations at risk and could prompt Russian military countermeasures
as well as increased pressure against Tbilisi and Kyiv. Russia's strong
engagement with countries like Iran and Syria, including advanced
weapons sales, also has implications for U.S. nonproliferation
interests.
Eurasia/Caucasus/Central Asia
Six months after the fighting between Russia and Georgia over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia last August, the separatist regions remain
potential flashpoints. Moscow's expanded military presence in and
political-economic ties to these regions, along with continuing
violence increase the risk of provocation, overreaction, or
miscalculation leading to a resumption of fighting. Although the
political situation in Georgia has stabilized, President Saakashvili
faces increasing criticism from the domestic opposition, and his
reaction to that will either enhance or set back Georgia's democratic
development.
The continued difficulty of bridging fundamental differences
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh will also keep
tensions high in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan fears isolation in the wake
of Kosovo's independence, Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, and signs of improved Armenian-Turkish relations. Armenia is
concerned about Baku's military buildup and does not want to become
dependent on Russia. Both countries face the dual challenges of
overcoming inertia in democratic reforms and battling endemic
corruption in the face of an economic downturn.
An increasingly assertive Russia and the fallout from the global
financial crisis will combine to amplify the challenges facing Ukraine
as it heads for a presidential election in the winter of 2009-2010.
Ukraine has moved toward democracy and western integration despite
numerous political tests since independence. Progress will be difficult
because of weak political institutions, ongoing conflicts with Russia
over gas pricing and contracts and the new exigencies of the global
financial crisis, which has dramatically revealed the underlying
weaknesses of the Ukrainian economy and potentially Ukraine's
stability.
In Belarus, the Lukashenko regime appears willing to cooperate with
Russian efforts to counter U.S. missile defense plans with Prague and
Warsaw. However, Russia's continuing efforts to control key Belarusian
economic sectors could prompt Minsk to improve ties with the West to
balance Moscow. Lukashenko maintains an authoritarian grip on power and
could return to repressive measures if public discontent over the
worsening economy turns to protest.
The five Central Asian states--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan--with their highly-personalized politics,
weak institutions, and growing inequalities are ill-equipped to deal
with the challenges posed by Islamic violent extremism, poor economic
development, and problems associated with energy water and food
distribution. Energy helped make Kazakhstan a regional economic force,
but any sustained decline in oil prices would affect revenues, could
lead to societal discontent, and will derail the momentum for domestic
reforms. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have heavily depended on migrant
worker remittances from both Russia and Kazakhstan for a significant
portion of their gross domestic product--up to 45 percent in the case
of Tajikistan--and will be severely affected by the financial crisis.
Tajikistan, in particular, faces increased threats to internal
stability from the loss of these critical revenue streams. Ultimately,
these challenges to regional stability could threaten the security of
critical U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through
Central Asia.
The Balkans
Events in the Balkans will again pose the greatest threat of
instability in Europe in 2009, despite positive developments in the
last year that included Kosovo's peaceful declaration of independence
from Serbia, the election of pro-EU leaders in Serbia, and offers of
NATO membership to Croatia and Albania. The principal challenges to
stability will come from the unresolved political status of the Serb
minority in Kosovo, particularly in northern Kosovo, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina's (BiH) continuing uneasy inter-ethnic condominium.
More than 50 nations, including 22 of 27 EU members, have
recognized the new state of Kosovo. In the coming years Pristina will
depend on the international community for economic and development
assistance and to ensure Kosovo's territorial integrity. Belgrade
openly supports parallel Kosovo Serb institutions. It has used
political and legal means to challenge and undermine Pristina's
sovereignty and to limit the mandate of the EU's Rule of Law mission
(EULEX) in Kosovo, which is meant to help Kosovo authorities build
multi-ethnic police, judiciary, and customs systems. This has
reinforced the de facto separation of Kosovo into an Albanian-majority
south and a Serb-majority north and frustrated the Kosovo Albanians.
Kosovo Force's (KFOR) presence will help deter widespread violence,
however. Serbia's leaders espouse a European future, and President
Tadic desires quick progress toward EU membership, but they are
unwilling to abandon Belgrade's stake in Kosovo to achieve that end.
Belgrade still looks for Moscow's diplomatic support on this issue and
recently concluded a significant energy deal with Moscow, including
sale of a majority stake in its state oil refinery.
Bosnia's future as a multi-ethnic state remains in doubt, although
neither widespread violence nor a formal split is imminent. Ethnic
agendas still dominate the political process, and wrangling among the
three main ethnic groups over the past 18 months has stalled the
process of building a central government capable of taking the country
into NATO and the EU. Threats of secession by Bosnian Serb leaders and
calls by some Bosniak leaders to eliminate the Bosnian Serb entity have
increased inter-ethnic tensions to perhaps the highest level in years.
testing times for latin america
Latin American economies, following 5 consecutive years of solid
performance, are feeling the repercussions from the global financial
crisis. We expect the region's growth rate will fall substantially this
year to about 1 percent from 4 percent for 2008. Exports from the
region have averaged 20 percent growth for 5 years, but falling
commodity prices and slowdowns in major industrial markets have sharply
reduced export growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and into 2009.
Foreign direct investment flows through mid-year 2008 were on pace to
reach the record level of $110 billion in 2007, but are likely to have
diminished in late 2008 and probably will continue to do so in 2009.
Finally, after 10 years of worker remittances growing at an average
annual rate of better than 15 percent, remittances grew just 7 percent
in 2007 and grew only 1 to 2 percent in 2008.
Democracy in much of Latin America has established impressive roots
over the past decade or so. In countries that comprise the bulk of the
region's GDP and population--like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
Peru--pro-market policies have yielded important economic dividends
that help fortify democratic gains. Brazil is becoming a leading
regional power and, along with others like Argentina and Chile, is
trying to promote greater South American integration.
Developments in the last year, however, underscore the challenge
that populist, often autocratic regimes still pose in the region.
Venezuela attracts substantial, if declining, regional popular support,
but its influence is likely to diminish as its economic problems mount.
Cuba, though an economic basket case, can still influence the Latin
American left because of its so-called ``anti-imperialist'' stance.
Others like Bolivia, and to a lesser extent Argentina and Ecuador, have
embraced populist policies and are likely to also lag behind. Some,
such as Haiti, have become even poorer and still less governable. Basic
law-and-order issues, to include rising violent crime and powerful drug
trafficking organizations also confront key hemispheric nations, as do
uneven governance and institution-building efforts and performance in
confronting chronic corruption. To maintain our political and economic
influence in the region, the United States will be called upon to help
the region's governments address their growing security problems and to
deliver greater market access. Our use of bilateral trade agreements,
and foreign aid through the Millennium Challenge Account to less
developed countries, helps cement sound economic policies and more
effective governance.
As in Africa (see below), China has increased its outreach to Latin
America in recent years, primarily in pursuit of access to markets and
resources to fuel its economic development and growth. This is boosting
Chinese economic and diplomatic influence in the region, and generating
questions about Beijing's long-term intention in the developing world--
potentially as an alternative development model. Beijing's military
engagement in the region--while secondary to its economic and political
engagement efforts--also facilitates access to strategic natural
resources. People's Liberation Army outreach activities in Latin
America have included high-level strategic dialogue, personnel
exchanges, and sales of weapons and equipment. Nonetheless, Beijing has
made few arms sales to the region, outside of Venezuela, nor developed
significant military-to-military ties with any countries. For its part,
Tehran has made some progress over the last few years in improving
commercial ties and establishing embassies and cultural centers in
Latin America, with an aim to reducing Iran's international isolation.
Hizballah has long maintained a presence in the tri-border region
between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, a notorious region for
narcotics and arms trafficking.
Mexico
Mexico's sound fiscal and monetary policies will probably provide
some insulation from the current global economic volatility. With 80
percent of its exports destined for U.S. consumers and low
international oil prices, however, Mexico would take a strong hit from
a prolonged U.S. recession. Mexico's Finance Secretariat cut growth
estimates for 2008 to 1.5 percent, and Finance Minister Carstens has
openly acknowledged growth might contract by a percentage point this
year. Mexico last experienced a fall in GDP in 2001. Unemployment late
last year was almost 4.5 percent, up a point from 2007 and
underemployment is even higher. Employment in the construction sector
dropped more than 4 percent in the same time period, according to
Mexico's National Statistics Institute.
The sharp economic downturn as yet shows no sign of hurting
Mexico's debt posture or spurring northward migration. Mexico's
National Statistics Institute late last year indicated that Mexican
emigration had dropped 42 percent since 2006, probably due to the
decreased demand for labor in the United States. That trend probably
will lead to declines in remittances, the second largest source of
foreign currency after oil exports, and increase pressure on the
government to create jobs.
Mexico remains the most important conduit for illicit drugs
reaching the United States. As much as 90 percent of that cocaine known
to be directed toward the United States, and some Colombian heroin,
eventually transits Mexico before entering the United States. Despite
recent successful efforts to counter precursor chemical diversion and
drug trafficking, Mexico is the chief foreign supplier of
methamphetamine and marijuana to the U.S. market and produces most of
the heroin consumed west of the Mississippi River. The corruptive
influence and increasing violence of Mexican drug cartels, which are
among the most powerful organized crime groups in the world, impede
Mexico City's ability to govern parts of its territory and build
effective democratic institutions.
Nearly 5,500 people--mostly cartel operatives and to a lesser
degree local police--were murdered in 2008 in cartel-related violence,
far exceeding the record of about 2,700 drug-related murders in 2007.
Also, the cartels have shown their willingness and capacity to strike
Mexican Government officials, its leadership, and the military.
Nevertheless, sustained government pressure has disrupted established
transnational cocaine supply chains, interfered with day-to-day cartel
operations, and has started to fragment Mexico's powerful drug cartels.
We assess that significantly more cocaine is diverting to Central
America before moving into Mexico, a shift that, in our judgment,
mitigates some risks drug traffickers faced in Mexico but that also
complicates trafficking operations.
As trafficking networks have come under increasing strain from
President Calderon's counternarcotics efforts, elements of Mexico's
most powerful cartels have become more aggressive. The assassination of
the national police commissioner last May, the grenade attack in a
crowded plaza in Michoacan State last September and the execution of
Brigadier General marco Enrique Tello Quinonez this month indicate
cartel elements are increasingly willing to kill high-level Mexican
officials, retaliate against soldiers, and tolerate more collateral
damage among civilians not directly involved in the drug trade.
Calderon has demonstrated his determination to address the problem
of narcotics-related corruption at all levels of the government by
launching Operation Cleanup. Most notably, this has led to the arrest
of a former Deputy Attorney General and the head of Interpol in Mexico.
In addition, Calderon won approval in November of the 2009 Federal
budget, which increased outlays in real terms to the Public Security
Secretariat and the Attorney General's Office by 69 percent and 29
percent, respectively.
Colombia
President Uribe is committed to an all-out effort to defeat the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by the time his term ends
in 2010. His public statements indicate he is determined to use
Colombia's security forces to maintain the systematic military pressure
that has kept the FARC on the run, caused the FARC to lose territory,
and degraded FARC command and control. Among the major successes in
2008 were the deaths of key FARC leaders, including members of the
ruling Secretariat, a continued high number of FARC desertions, and the
2 July rescue of 15 hostages, including 3 U.S. citizens.
Despite these reverses, the FARC leadership has shown no signs it
seeks to end hostilities or participate in serious peace talks. The
group has a record of resilience, and its chances for surviving as a
viable insurgent force over the next several years will be aided by a
still-cohesive leadership structure, substantial drug revenues, and
cross-border sanctuaries in Venezuela and Ecuador.
Although the FARC is unlikely to make a sustained comeback, it will
still be able to conduct small-scale guerrilla and terrorist attacks
nationwide. Official and nonofficial U.S. citizens remain at risk.
The government's successes have contributed to a dramatic drop in
crime, terrorist acts, massacres, and kidnappings. Bogota has made
progress on providing better protection for labor unionists and
instituting policies to educate the security services on human rights
standards. Bogota needs to follow through, however, with its proposals
to strengthen the judiciary and prosecute the murders of union members
and human rights workers.
Bogota's counterdrug successes--including capture and extradition
of the leaders of the North Valley Cartel, the last remaining large-
scale drug cartel (besides the FARC), the targeting of mid-level
leaders, a strong security force presence in key drug transit and coca
growing zones, and its U.S.-backed coca eradication program--have
hampered FARC drug trafficking operations. Bogota's strides in tackling
corruption also have led to high-profile trafficker takedowns. Bogota
arrested or killed important traffickers such as the Mejia Munera
brothers, known as ``los Mellizos,'' in 2008 after the officials
protecting them were removed from office. Colombian interdiction
efforts resulted in an increase in seizures in 2008. Still, Colombia
remains the world's leading producer of cocaine and a key supplier of
heroin to the U.S. market. The U.S. Government's 2007 imagery-based
survey indicates 167,000 hectares in Colombia were planted with coca,
as compared to 157,200 in 2006, a statistically insignificant increase.
Although the total area under cultivation remained nearly constant,
aerial eradication reduced yield per hectare by killing some plants
inside of areas counted as fully under cultivation and causing some
farmers to lose harvests before they could rehabilitate the field. This
resulted in a reduction in potential cocaine production from 550 metric
tons in 2006 to 535 in 2007. Area under cultivation in 2007 was
slightly less than in 2001, the year when Plan Colombia support began
to take hold, but potential production is about one quarter less, due
to the effects of aerial eradication on yield. We are still compiling
and assessing the data from 2008.
Venezuela
President Hugo Chavez is focusing on shoring up public support at
home after his opponents won five key states and the capital in
November gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Chavez also must deal
with growing public concern about violent crime and worsening economic
conditions. Nevertheless, Chavez remains Venezuela's most popular
politician, according to a reputable local polling company, and
controls the country's key institutions. To consolidate his socialist
``revolution,'' Chavez has ordered a referendum for February aimed at
allowing indefinite reelection for all elected officials. His push
probably reflects concern over dwindling oil profits undercutting his
ability to maintain popular domestic programs.
Chavez probably will struggle to maintain economic growth in the
coming years as oil prices fall from their record highs. He has been
unable to control high inflation and his statist economic policies have
reduced drastically private-sector growth. Chavez also has failed to
make sufficient investments in infrastructure, especially in the vital
oil sector, necessary for sustained growth.
Venezuela's crude oil output of about 2.3 million b/d
and its exports to the United States are slowly declining;
prospects for a significant turnaround are limited unless
Caracas changes its current oil policies.
If the price of West Texas Intermediate oil stays
below $50 per barrel for most of 2009, Chavez probably will be
forced to make major cuts in domestic and foreign spending or
to devalue the Venezuelan currency and draw down government
hard currency reserves to avoid a major economic crisis.
Chavez is likely to face new constraints in 2009 as he attempts to
expand his influence in Latin America. His willingness to spend oil
revenue on foreign aid and his unstinting populist message have paid
some dividends, but repeated spats with foreign leaders have tarnished
his image and falling oil prices could further undermine his ability to
buy friends. Chavez's approval rating has been decreasing regionally,
according to the 2008 Latinbarometer, a highly regarded regional
survey. Chavez has provided significant financial and political support
to Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
Public disclosure of Chavez's close ties with the FARC, which were
reflected in documents from the hard drives captured after the death of
a FARC Secretariat member in March, have forced Chavez, at least
rhetorically, to improve relations with Bogota. We assess Chavez is
likely to maintain his decade-long ties to the FARC by providing them
safe haven because of his ideological affinity to the group and his
interest in influencing Colombian politics.
The United States in September designated two senior
Venezuelan Government officials and one former official under
the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for materially
assisting the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC.
Chavez's efforts to expand his reach beyond Latin America continue
to give priority to Iran, Russia, and China. The personal relationship
between Iran's President Ahmadi-Nejad and Chavez drives strengthening
bilateral economic and military ties, although the two countries are
still struggling to overcome bureaucratic and linguistic obstacles to
implementing accords. Venezuela also is serving as a bridge to help
Iran build relations with other Latin American countries. Chavez has
given special attention in recent months to deepening political,
economic, and military ties to Russia. In late 2008, he announced his
plans to build a nuclear power plant in Venezuela with Russian
assistance.
Despite Caracas's stated interest in purchasing more Russian,
Chinese, and Spanish armaments, worsening economic conditions probably
will force Chavez to slow such acquisitions. His $5.3 billion in
military purchases since 2005 have attracted notice within the region,
although Venezuela's overall military capabilities remain plagued by
logistic, maintenance and transportation shortfalls. Notable purchases
from Russia include 24 Su-30MK2 fighters, helicopters, and assault
rifles.
Chavez's growing ties to Iran, coupled with Venezuela's lax
financial laws and border controls, and widespread corruption have
created a permissive environment for Hizballah to exploit. In June
2008, two Venezuelan-based individuals, one a Venezuelan diplomat, were
designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as supporters of terrorism
for reportedly providing logistical and financial support to Hizballah
members.
Venezuela is second only to Colombia as the most important cocaine
departure country in South America, and it is the leading departure
country of air smuggling to world markets. Venezuela's share of the
cocaine departing South America has tripled from 5 percent in 2004 to
15 percent through the third quarter of 2008. Counternarcotics
cooperation has sunk to an all-time low in the wake of the expulsion of
the U.S. Ambassador by Chavez and his refusal to grant visas to new
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials to work in Venezuela.
Cuba
President Raul Castro's record since formally taking power in
February 2008 indicates his primary objective in the coming year will
be to make Cuba's dysfunctional socialist economy more efficient. His
task has been made more difficult, however, by the extensive damage to
the country's already weak agricultural sector and infrastructure by
three major and successive hurricanes last year. The global economic
downturn will further slow growth, diminishing the regime's options for
addressing public dissatisfaction with living conditions.
Havana's competent and immediate response to the hurricanes
underscores the effectiveness of regime controls and indicates that it
remains capable of preventing a spontaneous mass migration.
Nevertheless, we judge that at a minimum the annual flow of Cuban
migrants to the United States will stay at the same high levels of
about 35,000 legal and illegal migrants annually that have prevailed
over the past several years.
Raul almost certainly will continue to proceed cautiously on any
reforms to the economy in order to maintain elite consensus and avoid
raising public expectations beyond what he is able or willing to
deliver. We have seen no indication in the modest changes he has
implemented that he intends to abandon core Communist economic
principles, such as state ownership of production. On the political
front, all indications are that Raul will continue to deny elements of
civil society and pro-democracy dissidents the exercise of free
expression.
Venezuela's preferential terms for oil sales and payments for Cuban
medical personnel and other technical specialists will remain Cuba's
economic lifeline, despite Cuba's efforts to attract other sources of
foreign investment from countries such as China and Russia. President
Chavez probably will prioritize aid to Havana over other foreign policy
commitments.
We assess Raul will continue his efforts to bolster Havana's
international legitimacy by projecting a more moderate political image.
Nevertheless, Cuba almost certainly will remain heavily involved
behind-the-scenes in counseling and supporting authoritarian populist
governments in Latin America and otherwise seeking to undermine U.S.
influence across the region.
Bolivia
After nearly a year of sporadic unrest and rising tensions,
President Evo Morales and opposition legislators last October reached a
compromise to allow a referendum in late January on a draft
constitution that encapsulates much of Morales' social and economic
reform agenda. The compromise eased tensions following a string of
violent protests last fall, but some leaders in eastern departments
rejected the compromise. Nevertheless, the referendum passed by a
comfortable margin. The draft constitution leaves many contentious
issues vague, which several government and opposition leaders have
acknowledged probably will lead to further disputes over implementation
in the run-up to new presidential elections in December 2009.
Although the risk of violence against U.S. citizens has been
reduced for the time being, Morales consistently has accused official
U.S. organizations--the U.S. Embassy, DEA, and U.S. Agency for
International Development--of conspiring against him. Morales in
September expelled the U.S. Ambassador and in November expelled DEA
personnel. Morales in January publicly threatened to close Congress and
pass bills implementing the new Constitution by decree if legislators
refused to cooperate.
Chavez promised to protect Morales's government and provided La Paz
important financial assistance. Since 2006, Venezuela has provided
Bolivia more than $95 million in direct financial aid.
africa: falling further behind
Africa has made substantial economic and political progress over
the past decade. However, the durability of the region's recent
positive growth trend, particularly among countries dependent on
commodity exports and foreign capital inflows, will be tested by the
drop in commodity prices and recessions in the United States and
Europe. Even before the financial crisis hit, the 6 percent GDP growth
rate--although impressive--was insufficient to bring about necessary
structural changes in the continent's economy. Africa's economic growth
is led by a small number of oil-producing countries, but even those
countries without oil resources have experienced GDP growth rates far
above their historical rates. Agriculture, the foundation of most
African economies, is far from achieving self-sufficiency, but
technical solutions and infrastructure enhancement have demonstrated
their ability to boost production in Mali, Malawi, and Zambia. Further
transformations remain uncertain in light of the EU's continuing ban on
genetically modified foodstuffs.
In addition to fallout from the global financial crisis, Africa
faces other economic, societal and security challenges. Sub-Saharan
Africa is confronting a shortage of skilled medical personnel,
deteriorating health systems, and inadequate budgets to deal with
diseases like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Transnational crime,
especially the transshipment of illegal drugs to Europe, and corruption
are growing in various parts of Africa, weighing down the continent's
economic growth, reducing government efficiency, and undermining the
security services of African states.
China's presence has grown substantially over the past decade.
Total bilateral trade between China and the continent has increased
from less than $4 billion in 1995 to $100 billion in 2008, but the EU
and the United States still remain far larger economic partners for the
region. China's objectives are to secure access to African markets and
natural resources, isolate Taiwan, and enhance its international
stature, all of which it has made progress on. Nevertheless, China's
role has generated local resentment as Chinese firms are seen as
undercutting African competitors in securing commercial contracts and
falling short of standard local labor practices. Moreover, there is
little discernible evidence of Chinese investments being used to
incorporate Africa into the industrial ``global value production
chains'' that are becoming the hallmark of integrative trade and
foreign direct investment flows, especially in manufacturing in other
regions of the world.
The most serious problem confronting Africa is the continuation of
a number of serious and seemingly intractable conflicts in three of
Africa's largest and most important states: the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. The conflicts in the Congo and Sudan
have spilled across their borders and have at times taken on a regional
dimension. In the Horn of Africa, the ongoing conflict in Somalia and
the collapse of the country's economy have given rise to a piracy
epidemic in the Gulf of Aden and have created a terrorist safe haven in
southern Somalia.
Although African Governments' political commitment to peacekeeping
has increased significantly over the last 10 years, the capacities of
the African Union (AU), regional organization, and individual African
states to conduct peacekeeping operations have been stretched to the
limit. Major troop contributing countries are becoming more wary and
less capable of deploying peacekeepers to potentially dangerous
operations whose mandates and missions are unclear.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), President Joseph
Kabila has been unable to consolidate his control over the turbulent
eastern border region. In that area, rebel groups, undisciplined
soldiers, and ethnic militia have operated inside and outside of the
DRC largely with impunity for many years and have been responsible for
numerous acts of violence and human rights abuses. The trouble has
persisted, even with the help of the largest U.N. peacekeeping
operation in the world. Recently, however, Kabila has agreed to conduct
joint military operations with nearby countries in an effort to root
out some of these groups. As a result, Rwanda and Uganda have each sent
forces into different parts of the border region, Rwanda into the North
and South Kivu Provinces and Uganda into the extreme northeastern
region. In the Kivus, Kinshasa and Kigali are both concerned about the
remnant of the 1994 Hutu-led Force for the Democratic Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR). While not a military threat to the Tutsi-led government
in Kigali at this time, the force is a threat to local Congolese
communities. With Kinshasa's approval, Rwanda sent several thousand
soldiers into the area to defeat, demobilize, or repatriate the FDLR.
In return for Kinshasa's cooperation, Kigali appears to have dropped
its support for a Congolese Tutsi rebel leader, General Laurent Nkunda.
The Rwandans have arrested Nkunda and have him in custody. Moreover,
his forces have divided, some joining up with Congolese government
troops. In the northeast, the Ugandan-led military operation (with both
Congolese and Sudanese support) has so far been unsuccessful. Its
objective is to eliminate the threat posed by the Ugandan rebel group
known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony.
Congolese forces, in the near term, probably will not be able to
reassert sufficient control over territory occupied by the LRA and
other rebels groups or to stop sporadic outbreaks of violence.
Nigeria
Nigeria's oil-rich Delta region, which supplies 10 percent of U.S.
oil imports and accounts for America's largest investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa, has been engulfed in civil strife for nearly two
decades. Widespread violence, criminality, and corruption have
continued to disrupt Nigeria's oil and gas production, costing the
country millions of dollars in lost revenue. Inadequate governance and
a total lack of accountability has put billions of dollars in the
pockets of corrupt leaders rather than in much needed development and
infrastructure projects. Opportunistic militants, many of whom are
beholden to local political leaders who have armed them in the run-up
to Nigeria's last three national elections, have attacked oil
facilities, kidnapped Nigerian and foreign oil workers, and left much
of the Delta lawless and economically ravaged. As result of the
violence and criminal activity, Nigerian oil production declined about
10 percent in 2008. Unstable political conditions and the fall in the
price of crude oil probably will slow or deter additional foreign
investment in the Delta, contributing to further production drop-offs
in the future. A turnaround in the current security environment is
unlikely soon.
Sudan
Tensions are mounting between North and South Sudan as they
approach key milestones laid out by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), while Darfur remains plagued by violence. The National
Congress Party (NCP) and Sudanese People's Liberation Movement publicly
have said they intend to proceed with national elections required to be
held under CPA by July 2009. Recent military clashes on the North-South
border highlight the slippage of other CPA deadlines, including border
demarcation, troop redeployment, and integration of joint military
units. Potential election delays are unlikely to trigger a violent
collapse of the CPA, because both parties have strong incentives to
maintain the status quo until at least 2011 when the south will vote on
a referendum for independence, but small skirmishes are likely to
continue.
The Darfur conflict has become increasingly
complicated over the course of the past 5 years and is unlikely
to be resolved in the near future. While bureaucratic and
logistic constraints in New York and Sudan continue to delay
full deployment of a 26,000-person U.N. peacekeeping force, the
U.N. mediator's attempt to hold inclusive peace talks remains
stymied by rebel disunity and ongoing fighting, which, to date,
has displaced some 2.5 million people. Chadian-backed rebels
based in Darfur have advanced on the Sudanese capital in the
past year, risking an escalated proxy war between Khartoum and
N'Djamena.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is likely to
issue a warrant to arrest Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-
Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
possibly genocide on March 4, heightening Khartoum's distrust
of western intentions. Several other NCP members' vulnerability
to ICC charges is likely to keep them at Bashir's side.
Somalia
Somalia has not had a stable, central government for 17 years and
continues to be mired in conflict. A U.N.-brokered agreement between
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and key opposition
leaders in mid-2008 is unlikely to bring peace to Somalia in the near
term. Ethiopia has withdrawn the troops it deployed to protect the TFG
and oust the Council of Islamic Courts in late 2006 and resurgent
Islamic extremists are expanding their operations throughout the
country. The new unity government is facing multiple challenges,
including the continued dominance of clan politics and lack of a viable
security force. While the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops removed a key
rallying point for the extremist opposition group al-Shabaab al
Islamiyah, Islamic militants have shifted their focus toward attacking
a modest AU peacekeeping force charged with protecting the TFG.
Worsening violence as militias compete for territory is likely to
displace thousands of additional Somalis, adding to this humanitarian
crisis.
Lawlessness in Somalia already has prompted a surge in piracy in
the Gulf of Aden. The number of successful pirate attacks has increased
almost fourfold since 2007 after the pirates received several multi-
million dollar ransom payments in early 2008. Local authorities'
unwillingness or inability to stem piracy also has fueled the
proliferation of hijackings. The growing number and sophistication of
Somali pirate attacks threaten to restrict the options for countering
them, and they could take root in Somali society if left unchecked.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate under the brutal and corrupt rule
of President Robert Mugabe. Over half the population is food insecure
and public health facilities and schools have been almost completely
shut down. With over 60,000 infected, the recent cholera epidemic is
dramatic evidence of how far living conditions have plummeted in this
once-prosperous and relatively well-developed country. Zimbabwe's sharp
decline has generated problems throughout southern Africa as millions
of refugees have fled to South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique and as
the region's well-publicized economic and security concerns have
frightened foreign investors away. To date, Mugabe retains the support
of his senior military officers and appears to be using his recently
implemented power-sharing deal with the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) to co-opt the opposition and to reduce Western pressure on his
regime. Mugabe also has managed to hold on to the backing of South
Africa, a key regional player. Pretoria, which brokered the coalition
agreement between Mugabe and the opposition MDC, remains unwilling,
despite growing criticism at home and abroad, to apply stronger
pressure on Mugabe to step aside or to undertake fundamental political
and economic reforms. Mugabe and his ruling elite are likely to remain
in power until he loses the support of the security forces, South
Africa steps up its pressure, or social and economic conditions in
Zimbabwe become substantially worse. With both political parties
signing on to the recent power-sharing agreement, it will be up to
South Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the AU to
carefully watch Mugabe's actions and ensure that power is in fact
shared and the MDC is allowed to lead.
Drug Trafficking in West Africa
Drug trafficking has become a major problem in West Africa, and the
emergence of Guinea-Bissau as Africa's first narco-state highlights the
scope of the problem and what may be in store for other states in the
region. Away from the scrutiny of local and international law
enforcement, drug traffickers, often departing from Venezuela by air
and sea, have transported large quantities of drugs, predominantly
cocaine, from Latin America to European markets through the porous
borders of more than a half dozen West African countries. Traffickers
have successfully co-opted government and law enforcement officials in
these countries, further undermining weak and economically impoverished
governments who lack adequate law enforcement and judicial capacity.
The Economic Community of West African States sponsored a conference in
Cape Verde in late 2008 to address this issue and the Governments of
Great Britain and France have conducted limited law enforcement and
counternarcotics training in the region, but drug trafficking in West
Africa probably will continue to expand in volume and scope in the
absence of a concerted international effort to stop it.
the growing cyber and organized crime threat
Threats to the U.S. Information Technology Infrastructure
The U.S. information infrastructure, including telecommunications
and computer networks and systems, and the data that reside on them, is
critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. Threats to our
information technology infrastructure are an important focus of the IC.
As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to move
to networked operations, as our digital systems add ever more
capabilities, as wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as
the design, manufacture, and service of information technology have
moved overseas, the threat will continue to grow.
This information and communications revolution also is enabling an
unprecedented ability to spread ideas and influence large numbers of
people. Nation-states and non-state groups are taking an increasing
interest in the role of mass media in shaping international opinions.
Terrorists will continue to be motivated to conduct spectacular attacks
in part by the desire to achieve maximum media exposure for their
cause. Increasing global connectivity is enabling radical groups to
recruit and train new members, proliferate extremist ideologies, manage
their finances, manipulate public opinion, and coordinate attacks. In
the recent conflict in Gaza, for example, the media played an important
role for both sides in shaping public perceptions of the conflict. We
can expect future adversaries to similarly employ mass media in an
attempt to constrain U.S. courses of actions in a future crisis or
conflict.
Further, the growing connectivity between information systems, the
Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers
to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines,
refineries, financial networks, and other critical infrastructures.
Over the past several years we have seen cyber attacks against critical
infrastructures abroad, and many of our own infrastructures are as
vulnerable as their foreign counterparts.
A successful cyber attack against a major financial
service provider could severely impact the national economy,
while cyber attacks against physical infrastructure computer
systems such as those that control power grids or oil
refineries have the potential to disrupt services for hours to
weeks.
Network defense technologies are widely available to mitigate
threats but have not been uniformly adopted due to associated costs,
perceived need, operational requirements, and regulatory constraints.
This slow rate of adoption has allowed cyber attackers to keep up with
many defensive advances. Meanwhile, advances in digital communications
technology, such as the growth in wireless connectivity and the
acceleration of network convergence with a variety data increasingly
digitized and transmitted over the Internet, are creating new
vulnerabilities in our networks and new avenues for cyber attacks.
Malicious activity on the Internet also is rapidly increasing:
spam--unsolicited email that can contain malicious software--now
accounts for 81 percent of all email according to Message Labs
(Symantec); the Georgia Tech Information Security Center projects a
ten-fold increase in malicious software targeting data in the coming
year; and botnets--networks of hijacked computers used to deliver spam
or launch distributed denial of service attacks--are expected to
compose 15 percent of all online computers in 2009. Ferris Research
estimates that the total cost of spam and all of the types of fraud
that take advantage of spam's impact is $42 billion in the United
States and $140 billion worldwide last year, while McAfee estimates
that global companies may have lost over $1 trillion worth of
intellectual property to data theft in 2008.
State and Non-State Threats
A growing array of state and non-state adversaries are increasingly
targeting--for exploitation and potentially disruption or destruction--
our information infrastructure, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors
and controllers in critical industries. Over the past year, cyber
exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and
more serious. The IC expects these trends to continue in the coming
year.
We assess that a number of nations, including Russia and China,
have the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the
U.S. information infrastructure and for intelligence collection. Nation
states and criminals target our government and private sector
information networks to gain competitive advantage in the commercial
sector. Terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizballah,
have expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United
States. Criminal elements continue to show growing sophistication in
technical capability and targeting and today operate a pervasive,
mature on-line service economy in illicit cyber capabilities and
services available to anyone willing to pay. Each of these actors has
different levels of skill and different intentions; therefore, we must
develop flexible capabilities to counter each. We must take proactive
measures to detect and prevent intrusions from whatever source, as they
happen, and before they can do significant damage.
We expect disruptive cyber activities to be the norm in future
political or military conflicts. The Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks and Web defacements that targeted Georgia in 2008 and
Estonia in 2007 disrupted government, media, and banking Web sites.
DDoS attacks and Web defacements targeted Georgian government Web
sites, including that of Georgian President Saakishvili, intermittently
disrupting online access to the official Georgian perspective of the
conflict and some Georgian Government functions but did not affect
military action. Such attacks have been a common outlet for hackers
during political disputes over the past decade, including Israel's
military conflicts with Hizballah and Hamas in 2006 and 2008, the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year, the publication
of cartoons caricaturing the Prophet Mohammed in 2005, and the Chinese
downing of a U.S. Navy aircraft in 2001.
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
In January 2008, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative (CNCI) was adopted as national policy as part of National
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23). With bipartisan support, Congress
appropriated the vast majority of the CNCI funding request in the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2009.
The CNCI addresses current cybersecurity threats, anticipates
future threats and technologies, and develops a framework for creating
in partnership with the private sector an environment that no longer
favors cyber intruders over defenders. The CNCI includes defensive,
offensive, education, research and development, and counterintelligence
elements, while remaining sensitive throughout to the requirements of
protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. The
CNCI is now making considerable progress in building a better
understanding of the cyber threat, developing concrete solutions, and
approving detailed courses of action. The Adminstration is now
reviewing CNCI, to ensure it is consistent with its own cybersecurity
policy.
To be sure, significant work remains in order to protect, defend,
and respond to the cyber threat in a manner that markedly improves our
Nation's overall security. Yet there is reason to be hopeful. We are
witnessing an unprecedented unity of effort across a broad coalition of
government agencies, Members of Congress, and leaders of industry. To
succeed, however, the CNCI must remain a long-term national priority.
With sustained momentum and continued national resolve we can and will
build an enduring security framework capable of protecting our vital
national security, economic, and public health interests.
We cannot afford to discover successful cyber intrusions after-the-
fact, accept disastrous losses, and then seek merely to contain them.
It requires a broad alliance of departments, agencies, and industry
leaders to focus on countering the threat, mitigating vulnerabilities,
and enhancing resiliency in order to preserve our national security,
national economy, and public welfare.
Growing Transnational Organized Crime Threat
Most organized criminal activities increasingly involve either
networks of interconnected criminal groups sharing expertise, skills,
and resources in joint criminal ventures that transcend national
boundaries or powerful, well-organized crime groups seeking to
legitimize their image by investing in the global marketplace.
Organized criminals and groups will increasingly pose a threat to U.S.
national security interests by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists
and hostile governments.
Some organized crime networks, groups, and individuals also have
invested in energy and mineral markets in an effort to diversify and
legitimize their business activities. Criminals' coercive tactics,
underhanded business practices, opaque motives, and self-serving
loyalties can undermine the normal workings and integrity of these
global markets. The most powerful, highprofile Eurasian criminal groups
often form strategic alliances with senior political leaders and
business tycoons and can operate from a relative safe haven status with
little to fear of international arrest and prosecution. The leaders of
many of these groups go to great lengths to portray themselves as
legitimate businessmen and use front companies that give them more
market access and leverage. They also employ some of the world's best
accountants, lawyers, bankers, and lobbyists to deflect and frustrate
the efforts of authorities.
The change in the structure and types of activities conducted by
transnational criminal groups is making it increasingly difficult to
identify and attack them. In particular, the increasing prevalence of
loosely knit networks, the use of cyberspace and global financial
systems, and political corruption have made it easier for them to hide
their involvement, to thwart law enforcement efforts, and to create
images of legitimacy.
environmental security
Climate change, energy, global health, and environmental security
are often intertwined, and while not traditionally viewed as
``threats'' to U.S. national security, they will affect Americans in
major ways. The IC has increased its focus on these three critical
issues as a result of unprecedented developments in the last year.
Access to relatively secure and clean energy sources and management
of chronic food and water shortages will assume increasing importance
for a growing number of countries. Adding well over a billion people to
the world's population by 2025 will itself put pressure on these vital
resources. An increasing percentage of the world's population will be
moving from rural areas to urban and developed ones to seek greater
personal security and economic opportunity. Many, particularly in Asia,
will be joining the middle class and will be seeking to emulate western
lifestyles, which involves greater per capita consumption of all these
resources.
The already stressed resource sector will be further complicated
and, in most cases, exacerbated by climate change, whose physical
effects will worsen throughout this period. Continued escalation of
energy demand will hasten the impacts of climate change. On the other
hand, forcibly cutting back on fossil fuel use before substitutes are
widely available could threaten continued economic development,
particularly for countries like China, whose industries have not yet
achieved high levels of energy efficiency.
Food and water also are intertwined with climate change, energy,
and demography. Rising energy prices increase the cost for consumers
and the environment of industrial-scale agriculture and application of
petrochemical fertilizers. A switch from use of arable land for food to
fuel crops provides a limited solution and could exacerbate both the
energy and food situations. Climatically, rainfall anomalies and
constricted seasonal flows of snow and glacial melts are aggravating
water scarcities, harming agriculture in many parts of the globe.
Energy and climate dynamics also combine to amplify a number of other
ills such as health problems, agricultural losses to pests, and storm
damage. The greatest danger may arise from the convergence and
interaction of many stresses simultaneously. Such a complex and
unprecedented syndrome of problems could cause outright state failure,
or weaken important pivotal states counted on to act as anchors of
regional stability.
Six to 9 months ago we were worried about the implications of
increasing high oil prices: the situation has reversed sharply with oil
prices falling to close to a third of their July 2008 peak of $147 per
barrel in response to the sudden drop in world oil demand growth and
slower economic growth resulting from the global financial crisis.
Although we believe the longer-term trend is toward high oil prices,
the current lower oil prices reduce pressures on the global economy.
Emerging economies previously concerned about busting their budgets on
fuel and food subsidies are breathing a sigh of relief now that prices
have fallen substantially over the last 6 months. Most forecasters
expect global oil demand and oil prices to remain depressed through
2009 as the financial turmoil continues to unwind. The decline in price
may, however, lead to delayed or cancelled investments in the upstream
oil and gas sectors, creating the conditions for another spike in oil
prices once global oil demand recovers. We also are concerned that
lower oil prices may weaken momentum toward energy efficiency and the
development of alternative sources of energy that are important for
both energy and environmental security. The fall in energy prices also
has had the side benefit of undercutting the economic positions of some
of the more troublesome producers.
Assessing the Impact of Climate Change
According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), a failure to act to reduce green house gas emissions
risks severe damage to the planet by the end of this century and even
greater risk in coming centuries. In a fossil-intensive scenario that
IPCC examined (A1F1), global average temperatures increase by almost 4
degrees centigrade. In such a scenario, water stored in glaciers and
snow cover would decline significantly, reducing water availability in
regions supplied by melt water from major mountain ranges, where more
than one-sixth of the world population currently lives. Sea-level rise
could be up to 59 centimeters by the end of the century and would cause
substantial flooding. Individuals in densely populated and low-lying
areas, especially the mega deltas of Asian and Africa, where adaptive
capacity is relatively low, and which already face other challenges
such as tropical storms or local coastal subsidence, are especially at
risk. At a four-degree rise, according to the IPCC, up to 30 percent of
plant and animal species would be at risk of extinction, global
productivity in cereals would decline, intensity of tropical cyclones
would increase, and extreme drought areas would rise from 1 percent
land area to 30 percent.
The IC recently completed a National Intelligence Assessment on the
national security impacts of global climate change to 2030. The IC
judges global climate change will have important and extensive
implications for U.S. national security interests over the next 20
years. Although the United States itself could be less affected and is
better equipped than most nations to deal with climate change and may
even see a benefit in the near term owing to increases in agriculture
productivity, infrastructure repair and replacement will be costly. We
judge the most significant impact for the United States will be
indirect and result from climate-driven effects on many other countries
and their potential to seriously affect U.S. national security
interests. We assess climate change alone is unlikely to trigger state
failure in any state out to 2030, but the impacts will worsen existing
problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation,
ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions. Climate change
could threaten domestic stability in some states, potentially
contributing to intra- or, less likely, interstate conflict,
particularly over access to increasingly scarce water resources. We
judge economic migrants will perceive additional reasons to migrate
because of harsh climates, both within nations and from disadvantaged
to richer countries.
From a national security perspective, climate change affects lives
(for example, through food and water shortages, increased health
problems including the spread of disease, and increased potential for
conflict), property (for example through ground subsidence, flooding,
coastal erosion, and extreme weather events), and other security
interests. The United States depends on a smooth-functioning
international system ensuring the flow of trade and market access to
critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies
and partners. Climate change could affect all of these--domestic
stability in a number of key states, the opening of new sea lanes and
access to raw materials, and the global economy more broadly--with
significant geopolitical consequences.
In addition, anticipated impacts to the Homeland--including warming
temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and possible increases
in the severity of storms in the Gulf, increased demand for energy
resources, disruptions in U.S. and Arctic infrastructure, and increases
in immigration from resource-scarce regions of the world--are expected
to be costly. Government, business, and public efforts to develop
mitigation and adaptation strategies to deal with climate change--from
policies to reduce greenhouse gasses to plans to reduce exposure to
climate change or capitalize on potential impacts--may affect U.S.
national security interests even more than the physical impacts of
climate change itself.
Multilateral policymaking on climate change is likely to be highly
visible and a growing priority among traditional security affairs in
the coming decades. We observe the United States is seen by the world
as occupying a potentially pivotal leadership role between Europe,
which is committed to long-term and dramatic reduction in carbon
emissions, and a heterogeneous group of developing states wary of
committing to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, which they believe
would slow their economic growth. As effects of climate change begin to
mount, the United States will come under increasing pressure to join
the international community in setting meaningful long-term goals for
emissions reductions, to reduce its own emissions, and to help others
mitigate and adapt to climate change through technological progress and
financial assistance.
Global Health
Considerable empirical and theoretical studies have demonstrated
the links between the health of a population and economic growth and
development. Highly publicized virulent infectious diseases--including
HIV/AIDS, a potential influenza pandemic, and ``mystery'' illnesses
such as the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome--remain
the most direct health-related threats to the United States. The most
pressing transnational health challenge for the United States is still
the potential for emergence of a severe pandemic, with the primary
candidate being a highly lethal influenza virus. The World Bank
estimates that if the next pandemic virus is similar to the one that
caused the 1918 pandemic, it could kill 71 million people worldwide and
cause a major global recession with global costs exceeding $3 trillion.
Other estimates, applying the 2.5 percent fatality rate from the 1918
pandemic to today's population, reach 180 million deaths worldwide.
Current threats include H5N1 influenza, a virus that, while primarily a
poultry disease, continues to evolve and expand its geographic range.
Infectious diseases are not the only health indicators with
strategic significance. Chronic, non-communicable diseases; neglected
tropical diseases; maternal and child mortality; malnutrition;
sanitation and access to clean water; and availability of basic health
care also affect the U.S. national interest through their impacts on
the economies, governments, and militaries of key countries and
regions.
Terrorists and warlords have gained local and
international stature and even power by providing health
services governments could not. Widespread ill health in the
youth cohort may reduce a country's pool of healthy and capable
military recruits, a phenomenon that is currently playing out
in Russia and North Korea.
Looking at specific states, the inability of the central government
of Afghanistan to provide health-care and other services has helped to
undermine its credibility while boosting support for a resurgent and
increasingly sophisticated Taliban. Wide incidence of traumatic births,
malnutrition, and disease put children there at high risk of impaired
development, undermining their prospects of attending school, engaging
more productively in critical labor such as agricultural production,
and participating in other economic activity. In Iraq, a degraded
health sector, shortages of medical personnel, and infections stemming
from deficient sanitary conditions and lack of clean drinking water
have undermined the credibility of the central government.
Russia has the overall worst health indicators of any
industrialized country. Poor health of Russian children and young
people combined with falling birthrates threatens Russian military
readiness with a projected halving of eligible military recruits
between 2005 and 2018. China's high incidence of chronic disease
stemming in great part from heavy tobacco use threatens to slow
economic growth by incapacitating workers and incurring heavy health-
care costs. The health effects of environmental degradation are an
increasing source of discontent in China.
Venezuela and Cuba have been particularly adept at parlaying
provision of charitable medical services to nationals of other
countries into support in international forums such as the United
Nations. Hizballah's provision of health and social services in Lebanon
over the past 20 years has helped to legitimize the organization as a
political force in that country, while Hamas's delivery of similar
services was a factor in its legislative electoral success in the
Palestinian territories.
Turning to U.S. Homeland health security issues, existing
international resources and regulations will be inadequate to control
transnational disease spread at least through the next decade. Movement
of people, animals, and products through mass transportation,
smuggling, and commerce will continue to homogenize the already global
environment. Incidents involving chemical or bacterial contamination of
imported food or trade goods, whether accidental or intentional, are
likely to increase as China and other developing countries struggle to
implement effective monitoring systems. A similar challenge involves
ensuring the safety of imported therapeutic drugs and precursor
products, as contaminated and counterfeit pharmaceuticals continue to
be a worldwide public health threat.
conclusion
The international security environment is complex. No dominant
adversary faces the United States that threatens our existence with
military force, but the global financial crises has exacerbated what
was already a growing set of political and economic uncertainties. We
are nevertheless in a strong position to shape a world reflecting
universal aspirations and values that have motivated Americans since
1776: human rights; the rule of law; liberal market economics and
social justice. Whether we can succeed will depend on actions we take
here at home--restoring strong economic growth and maintaining our
scientific and technological edge and defending ourselves at reasonable
cost in dollars without violating our civil liberties. It will also
depend on our actions abroad, not only in how we deal with regions,
regimes and crises, but also in developing new multilateral systems,
formal or informal, for effective international cooperation in trade
and finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in
controlling the proliferation of WMD, developing codes of conduct for
cyberspace and space, and in mitigating and slowing global climate
change.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director Blair.
General Maples.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Maples. Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of
the committee: First of all, thank you for this opportunity to
appear with Director Blair today. I have submitted a statement
for the record and I will summarize my remarks, focusing
primarily on ongoing operations and military developments. But
before I do, I just want to thank the members of the committee
for your support of our service men and women around the world,
and in particular for the support that you have provided to DIA
and to our defense intelligence professionals, who support all
of our men and women in uniform who are engaged in conflict
around the world. Your support and what you have done for us to
enable us to support them truly has been remarkable and I thank
you for that.
Chairman Levin. We thank you.
General Maples. First of all, let me start with Iraq. The
security situation in Iraq does continue to improve. Overall
violence across the country declined in the last 6 months of
2008 and by January 2009 attacks were 60 percent lower than in
January 2008. While Iraqi leaders have reached accommodation on
a range of key issues, many of Iraq's underlying problems, such
as lingering ethno-sectarian rivalries, a weakened insurgency,
a still developing central government, and a lack of a shared
national vision, will continue to challenge Iraqis over the
next year and beyond.
Iraqi security forces (ISF) improved their overall
capabilities in 2008, demonstrating an increased ability to
plan, prepare, and execute independent counterinsurgency
operations. The ISF continues to rely on coalition support for
key enabling capabilities, including close air support,
intelligence, and logistics. A rapid degradation of the
security situation is unlikely in 2009, although the failure of
the Iraqi government to address key issues may erode security
over time. Control of disputed areas, particularly in Ninewah
and Kirkuk, may be the greatest potential flashpoint in Iraq
for 2008.
The security situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen
in 2008, driven by an increasingly proficient insurgency,
government inability to deliver basic services to portions of
the country, and insurgent access to safe havens in western
Pakistan. Although the Taliban lost several key commanders in
2008 and have not demonstrated an ability to conduct sustained
conventional operations, it has increased attacks. Enemy-
initiated violence in 2008 grew by 55 percent over levels in
2007. Statistics also show increases in suicide bombings, the
use of improvised explosive devices, and small arms attacks.
The AFA has grown from 49,000 to approximately 80,000 over
the last year, fielding 6 new commando battalions which are
specifically trained to handle counterinsurgency operations.
Half of Afghan's combat arms units can lead combat operations,
albeit with coalition support.
Afghan National Police (ANP) forces still require
considerable training and coalition support to fulfil their
mission. The ANP has reportedly grown from 75,000 to
approximately 80,000 over the last year. The Afghan Government
has initiated a program to improve police performance.
Over the next year, the Afghan Government will remain
vulnerable to insurgent violence, the narcotics trade, foreign
influences, and disruptive political maneuvering ahead of the
2009 Afghan presidential election. Afghan popular discontent
could worsen, especially in areas where tribes remain
disenfranchised and basic employment opportunities are not
provided.
In Pakistan, some senior Pakistani leaders have publicly
acknowledged that extremism has replaced India as Pakistan's
preeminent national security threat. India, however, remains a
high priority long-term concern. Strategic rivalry with India
continues to drive Pakistan's development of an expanding array
of delivery systems.
In the FATA, al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan-
based extremist groups continue to have vital sanctuary. The
area is used to recruit and train operatives, plan and prepare
regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda, and
obtain equipment and supplies.
Pakistan's military has expanded its paramilitary forces
and deployed additional troops to the area in an effort to
contain the threat. Although U.S. efforts to address Pakistani
counterinsurgency deficiencies are underway, it will take years
before meaningful capabilities are likely to be developed.
Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure,
expand nuclear weapons stockpiles, and seek more advanced
warheads and delivery systems. Pakistan has taken important
steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons, although
vulnerabilities still exist.
Al Qaeda is committed to imposing its own interpretation of
Islamic rule upon the Muslim world and is the biggest terrorist
threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Al Qaeda retains the
operational capability to plan, support, and direct
transnational attacks, despite the deaths of multiple senior-
level operatives. Al Qaeda continues efforts to acquire
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and
would not hesitate to use such weapons if the group develops
sufficient capabilities.
Al Qaeda also continues to further relationships with
compatible regional terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in East Africa, to
extend the organization's financial and operational reach.
Now I'll turn to military developments in regions of
interest. In Iran, Iran's military is designed principally to
defend against external threats from more advanced adversaries
and threats posed by internal opponents. However, Iran has the
capability to conduct limited offensive operations with its
ballistic missile and naval forces. Iran continues to develop
and acquire ballistic missiles that can range Israel and
Central Europe, including Iranian claims of an extended range
variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-kilometer medium-range
ballistic missile, the Ashura.
Iran's February 2, 2009, launch of the Safir space launch
vehicle shows progress in mastering the technology needed to
produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Iran has
boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing missile
systems with accuracy improvements and new submunition
payloads.
Ongoing naval modernization is focused on equipment such as
fast missile patrol boats as well as anti-ship cruise missiles
and naval mines. Iran continues to invest heavily in advanced
air defenses. Iran has deployed advanced SA-15 tactical
surface-to-air missile systems and continues to express
interest in acquiring the long-range SA-20.
With the rest of the IC, DIA judges Iran halted its nuclear
weaponization and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-
related work in 2003, but we assess that Tehran is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons.
China is strengthening its ability to conduct military
operations along its periphery on its own terms. That would
include the claims to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) where
the recent incident occurred. It is building and fielding
sophisticated weapons systems and testing new doctrines that it
believes will allow it to prevail in regional conflicts. The
navy operates a large surface fleet, an increasingly modern
submarine fleet, and appears likely to pursue an aircraft
carrier development program. The air force is developing an
extended range land attack cruise missile-capable bomber.
China's nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the
deployment of the DF-31 and DF-31 Alpha road-mobile ICBMs and
the eventual deployment of the JL-2 submarine-launched
ballistic missile. China is also expanding its space
capabilities, counterspace, cyber warfare, and electronic
warfare capabilities.
In North Korea, North Korea's large forward positioned, but
poorly equipped and poorly trained military is not well suited
to sustain major military operations against the south. As a
result of its limitations, North Korea is emphasizing its
nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles as a means to
assure its sovereignty and to deter technologically superior
opponents. The long-range artillery the North has positioned
near the demilitarized zone is complemented by a substantial
mobile ballistic missile force with an array of warhead
options, to include WMD, that can range U.S. forces and our
allies in the Republic of Korea and Japan.
After a failed July 2006 test launch, North Korea has
continued development of the Taepo Dong 2, which could be used
for space launch or as an ICBM. North Korea announced in late
February they intend to launch a communications satellite,
Kwangmyongsong 2. North Korea also continues to work on an
intermediate range ballistic missile.
North Korea could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons
from plutonium produced at Yongbyon and it likely sought a
uranium enrichment capability for nuclear weapons, at least in
the past.
Russia is trying to reestablish military power that it
believes commensurate with its economic strength and general
political competence, although the current global economic
downturn may limit Moscow's ability to achieve its goals.
Russian conventional force capabilities continue to grow at a
measured pace. Readiness improvements are seen primarily among
the conventional permanent ready forces. Development and
production of advanced strategic weapons continues,
particularly on the SS-27 ICBM and the Bulava SS-NX-32
submarine-launched ballistic missile that is still undergoing
testing.
Russia's widely publicized strategic missile launches and
increased out of area activities are meant to signal a
continued global reach and relevance.
Under a comprehensive set of reforms announced in September
2008, the Russian armed forces will be significantly reduced
and remaining units modernized and brought up to permanent
ready status by 2020. Emphasis reportedly will be given to
precision munitions, intelligence assets, submarines, and
elements of an aerospace defense system. These reforms, if
carried out, would improve Russian capability to respond to
limited regional threats, but reduce their capability for
large-scale conventional war.
Turning to global military trends of concern, the
proliferation and potential use of WMDs, often linked with
delivery system enhancements, remains a grave, enduring, and
evolving threat. Terrorist organizations will continue to try
to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear materials.
The threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is
likely to increase over the next decade. Ballistic missile
systems with advanced liquid or solid propellent propulsion
systems are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable,
accurate, and possess greater range.
Cyber attacks on our information systems are a significant
concern. Nation- and non-state terrorist and criminal groups
are developing and refining their abilities to exploit and
attack computer networks in support of their military,
intelligence, or criminal goals. The scope and sophistication
of malicious targeting against U.S. networks has steadily
increased and is of particular concern because of the
pronounced military advantages that the United States has
traditionally derived from information networks.
The international proliferation of space-related expertise
and technology is also increasing, largely through commercial
enterprises, and is helping nations acquire space and space-
related capabilities, including some with direct military
applications. Included are more capable communications,
reconnaissance, navigation, and targeting capabilities.
At the same time, countries such as Russia and China are
developing systems and technologies capable of interfering with
or disabling vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication,
and intelligence collection capabilities. In addition to direct
ascent, anti-satellite missile capabilities such as satellite
tracking, jamming, and laser blinding are also under
development.
The global economic crisis to date has not led to
widespread defense spending cuts, with the exception of some
Central and Eastern European nations. China's defense spending
growth in 2009 is supported by continued economic growth and
large international Reserves. China will likely continue to
downsize forces, freeing funds needed to meet modernization and
reform goals.
Russia's defense spending will continue to increase despite
recent declines in oil prices and domestic economic problems.
Iran will see government revenues decline in 2009 as oil prices
remain at low levels. Defense spending will have to be balanced
with social programs. North Korea will continue to divert
economic and aid resources to higher priority military projects
in spite of critical public welfare needs.
I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the
tremendous work done by thousands of defense intelligence
professionals who work very closely with their national
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement
colleagues. On their behalf, thank you for your strong support
and your continued confidence in our work.
[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today and for
your continued support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), many of whom are forward-deployed directly
supporting our military forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and around the
world.
Our Nation faces an unusually complex threat environment--one
marked by an accelerating operational pace and a broad spectrum of
dissimilar challenges and potential threats from nation-states and non-
state, transnational terrorist networks.
This testimony reflects DIA's analytical assessments, worldwide
human intelligence, technical intelligence, counterintelligence, and
document and media exploitation collection efforts along with
intelligence drawn from our close partners throughout the Intelligence
Community (IC), international allies, and open sources.
ongoing conflicts
Iraq
The security situation in Iraq continues to improve. With coalition
assistance, communal violence has reached its lowest sustained levels
since Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government came to power in 2006
and Iraqi leaders have reached accommodation on a range of key issues.
However, many of Iraqis underlying problems, such as lingering ethno-
sectarian rivalries, a weakened insurgency, a still-developing central
government, and lack of a shared national vision, will continue to
challenge Iraqis over the next year and beyond. A rapid degradation of
the security situation is unlikely in 2009, though the failure of the
Iraqi Government to address key issues may erode security over time.
Overall violence across the country declined in the last 6 months
of 2008; by January 2009, attacks were 60 percent lower than in January
2008. In the last quarter of 2008, the percentage of attacks which
targeted Iraqi politicians, security officials, and civilians increased
while the proportion of attacks targeting coalition forces declined to
their lowest level. Key strategic areas are now under Iraqi Government
control. This is largely the combined result of coalition and Iraqi
operations, more capable and assertive Iraqi leadership and growing
popular support for the Iraqi Government and security forces.
The Sadrist movement's influence has declined over the past year.
Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to cease Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant
activity against government forces combined with aggressive Iraqi
security force (ISF) operations against JAM have reduced the Sadrist's
ability to use force to control and influence the population. In
addition, over the past year the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
and the Dawa Party have successfully undermined the Sadrist movement,
limiting its ability to influence government decisions. In June, Sadr
announced his intention to prioritize his organization's cultural,
religious, and socioeconomic outreach while reducing its emphasis on
political and militant activity, likely in an effort to regain popular
support. This effort has been relatively successful enabling the
Sadrists to gain sufficient representation in Shiite-dominated
provinces to be a key partner in ruling coalitions in most southern
provincial councils. As a result, the Sadrists will likely increase
their influence at the local and national levels, which could bolster
their efforts to gain concessions on detainee releases and amnesty for
exiled Sadrists. The majority of JAM members appear to be complying
with Sadr's ceasefire orders, although some will seek other means to
violently oppose the coalition's presence in Iraq. JAM Special Groups
and other Shiite extremists continue to receive lethal support from
Iran.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other active Sunni Arab insurgents
continue to exploit anti-government and anti-Kurdish sentiment in
northern Iraq despite ongoing security operations in the region;
however, the group is increasingly forced to maintain a lower profile
to avoid further losses. Particularly in northern Iraq, like-minded
Sunni insurgent groups maintain a presence, leveraging AQI's
infrastructure, exploiting Sunni fears of Kurdish expansion and
destabilizing the region. The most notable of these groups is Ansar al-
Islam, which changed its name from Ansar al-Sunna in 2008 and has close
relations with AQI in the north.
AQI remains the most active terrorist group in Iraq. It continues
to target the Iraqi Government and coalition forces while also trying
to reignite sectarian violence, encouraging its most active and
ideologically committed members to remain steadfast. Active opposition
to AQI has grown since 2006 as backlash to the group's heavy-handed
tactics. Coalition efforts to reinforce indigenous resistance to AQI
have given the Iraqi opposition to AQI room to flourish. While AQI has
the capability to regenerate if given an opportunity to do so, its
operational tempo has steadily declined from 2006 levels with the
attrition of mid- and senior level operatives. As a result, AQI is
currently not able to achieve its strategic goals, and is instead
focused on mitigating the effects of these losses to maintain
viability. However, AQI's diminished operational tempo does not
preclude it from conducting sporadic, yet effective, attacks that have
lasting effects within Iraq. With its continued commitment to external
attack planning, AQI remains a threat beyond Iraq.
Attacks by Sunni insurgent groups have declined significantly,
although most violence remains attributable to the Sunni insurgency.
The Sunni Awakening and Sons of Iraq (SOI) local security movements
have limited the operational environment for Sunni insurgent groups in
central Iraq and forced them to explore new approaches, such as
participation in the political process. The operating environment is
more permissive for insurgent groups in northern Iraq. Across Iraq,
insurgents retain the capability for violence, making the insurgency a
long-term threat to the Iraqi Government unless it counters the
underlying motivations for insurgent activity, including employment,
provision of services, and security. Sunni insurgents currently operate
primarily at a local level.
SOI groups have proven themselves a critical force multiplier for
coalition and ISF. They provide vital intelligence and security
presence in many areas formerly dominated by extremists or militias.
The SOI initiatives have begun to bridge sectarian divides between the
Sunni and Shiite population, as groups embrace mutual cooperation to
improve security. The transition of Baghdad's SOI programs to
government control late last year proceeded smoothly. Twenty-percent of
the SOI will transition into the ISF, and 80 percent into other
employment. The transfer of responsibility for the SOI programs is a
key step toward reinforcing Government of Iraq (GOI) security
responsibility and Iraqi sovereignty.
Sunni Arab relations with coalition forces have greatly improved,
as have those between local Sunni security groups and the GOI despite
lingering mutual mistrust. Prime Minister Maliki's operations against
Shiite militants demonstrated to many Sunni Arab leaders that he was
willing to act in national--not sectarian--interests. Tawafuq, the main
Sunni Arab political coalition, returned to the Iraqi Government last
July. Iraq's Arab neighbors are establishing a diplomatic presence in
Baghdad for the first time since the fall of Saddam's regime.
Provincial elections were a key step to maintaining Sunni Arab
engagement, although the long-term provision of services to and
economic development of stabilized Sunni areas by the Iraqi Government
will be a more significant driver of reconciliation. Sunni Arabs widely
boycotted the 2005 provincial elections and as a result are
underrepresented in many provinces, including Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah
ad Din. Following the largely credible and legitimate provincial
elections in January 2009, Sunni Arabs have achieved a more equitable
political representation. Results generally reflected the provincial
ethno-sectarian demographics, which will likely help build Sunni
confidence in Baghdad. Sunnis may tolerate some political setbacks
provided they see improvements in their living conditions.
Provincial elections have changed the balance of power between
Shiite parties in Iraq. ISCI has lost its prominence and is unlikely to
have high level positions in provincial governments. The Dawa Party,
which led the State of Law coalition, has emerged as a stronger force
in local and national politics and will be able to use its control of
government resources to further its parliamentary election campaign
efforts in late 2009. The Sadrist Trend, largely marginalized in 2008,
will probably regain some influence due to a likely partnership in
several provinces with the State of Law coalition.
The ISF improved their overall capabilities in 2008, reaching
tactical proficiency in providing security as demonstrated by an
increased ability to plan, prepare, and execute independent
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. At the direction of Prime Minister
Maliki in March, the ISF began a series of complex, large-scale COIN
operations throughout Iraq. These high profile operations have been
effective in regaining Iraqi Government control over previously
contested areas. They also highlighted the relative progress of the ISF
maneuver elements over the past year as they have expanded in size,
capability, and ability to deploy.
The ISF still suffers from deficiencies in combat support and
service support to sustain large-scale operations. The ISF continues to
rely on coalition support for key enabling capabilities including close
air support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
logistics, transportation, medevac, legal and finance support, civil-
military affairs and engineering, as well as counterterrorism and force
protection assets. The greatest obstacles to ISF development continue
to be a shortage of qualified leaders, a lack of vehicles and basic
equipment and immature logistics and sustainment capability. Moreover,
the spontaneous creation of new units exacerbates existing shortages of
personnel and equipment. In addition, budget shortfalls will likely
affect the ISF adversely unless the Prime Minister and the legislature
can find salient ways to fund it.
The sectarian composition of the ISF will continue to hinder
operational effectiveness. The National Police, which will take on
increasing responsibility for internal security, is estimated to be
heavily staffed--maybe upwards of 75 percent--by Shiite. The Ministry
of Interior reorganized the National Police and the coalition provided
extensive retraining in an effort to counter corruption and abuses, but
many Sunni Arabs still associate the organization with targeting Sunni
Arabs during the sectarian violence that marked 2006 and early 2007. As
a result, the prospect of National Police deployments has increased
tension within Sunni majority provinces. Incorporating more Sunni
officer recruits into National Police units in Mosul and Anbar
provinces is helping to dispel some of the perceptions of the National
Police being a strictly Shiite-dominated force. In addition, as the
National Police continues to expand, the ethnosectarian composition of
the force is expected to be more representative of the population.
The Kurdish presence and claims across northern Iraq's disputed
territories is fueling ethnic tensions and potential violence between
Kurds and Arabs. The constitutional process for resolving disputed
territories outlined in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution has
stalled, and the U.N.'s three-phase plan to facilitate the Article 140
process has not achieved measurable progress. Political tensions
increased last August when Prime Minister Maliki challenged Kurdish
control of Khanaqin in northern Diyala province. Also, in early
December, Iraqi Army movements around Kirkuk--territory also claimed by
the Kurds--further increased tensions. Coalition engagement helped
diffuse the situation, but both GOI and Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) military forces remain deployed around the cities. Prime Minister
Maliki's assertiveness, combined with increasing opposition to Kurdish
territorial claims within the Iraqi parliament, will likely force the
Kurds to adjust their strategy for incorporating disputed territories,
including Kirkuk, into the KRG. The Kurds see their political leverage
on this issue diminishing and as a result, fear the GoI will attempt to
seize control of disputed areas the Kurds currently hold--especially in
Ninawa and Kirkuk governorates. This may be the greatest potential
flashpoint in Iraq for 2009.
Turkey remains concerned about Kurdish separatism as well as the
threat posed by the Kurdish terrorist group, the Kongra Gel (KGK).
However, historic talks last October between KRG President Masoud
Barzani and senior Turkish leaders may represent a thaw in Turkey's
hard-line stance and a growing recognition that long-term resolution to
the KGK issue will come through diplomatic efforts in addition to
military action. KRG action on Turkish demands will be critical to
continued diplomatic developments.
Iran continues to provide money, weapons and training to some Iraqi
Shiite militants despite pledges by senior Iranian officials to stop
such support. The weapons include Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs)
with radio-controlled, remote arming and passive infrared detonators,
mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, small arms
ammunition and explosives.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian
government and has a central role in carrying out Iran's policies in
Iraq through its special operations command--the Qods Force. The IRGC-
Qods Force holds the Iraq portfolio within the Iranian regime and posts
officers in Iran's diplomatic missions throughout Iraq, including
Iran's current Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, who is a Qods
Force officer. The IRGC-Qods Force covertly trains, funds, and arms
Iraqi insurgents and militias. It also offers strategic and operational
guidance aimed at undermining U.S. interests in Iraq. The IRGC-Qods
Force junior partner, the Lebanese Hizballah, has trained Iraqi
insurgents in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah provides
insurgents with the training, tactics, and technology to conduct
kidnappings, small unit tactical operations and employ sophisticated
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from
operations in southern Lebanon.
Iran is training Shiite militants in use of IEDs and EFPs and
efforts to defeat these weapons and the networks that design, build,
emplace, and fund them draw persistent counterresponses. The flow of
new IED technologies and highly creative emplacement and employment
methods underscore the enemy's ability to adapt and react quickly and
efficiently. Although there is a coercive aspect to Iranian policy in
Iraq--with Iran seeking to use all sources of national power to secure
greater influence in Iraq--Tehran and Baghdad generally enjoy a
positive relationship and there is no evidence that the Iranians are
seeking to topple Maliki's Government.
The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq and the number of
associated suicide attacks have declined, due in large part to
increased security measures and disruptions to the AQI network. At the
same time, the nations where foreign fighters originate or transit have
increased their counterterrorism efforts, especially targeting foreign
fighter transport networks.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
The security situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen in 2008,
driven by an increasingly proficient insurgency, government inability
to deliver basic services to portions of the country and insurgent
access to safe havens in western Pakistan. Through its use of violence
and intimidation, the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan continued
to undermine confidence in the government's ability to provide security
and justice. While the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun-
dominated south and east, it continued to expand over the past year to
some western areas that lack effective security and government
presence. As Afghanistan prepares for presidential elections in 2009,
these factors will contribute to a more challenging environment than in
2008. Across the border, Pakistan also faces simultaneous economic,
political, and security challenges. The government faces an expanded
militancy, which finds sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), and an economy beset by falling foreign exchange
reserves, a depreciating currency, and high inflation. Despite an
international economic aid package, the economy will continue to
struggle in 2009.
Although the Taliban have not demonstrated an ability to conduct
sustained conventional operations, it has increased attacks every year
since 2002. Enemy-initiated violence in 2008 grew by 55 percent over
levels in 2007. Statistics also show a 21 percent increase in suicide
bombings, a 106 percent increase in the use of IEDs, and a 33 percent
increase in small arms attacks. Some of these trends reflect the
International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) increased activities
in expanded operational areas.
Insurgents in Afghanistan have expanded their use of tactics and
techniques, such as kidnappings and suicide attacks, demonstrating the
adaptive nature of the threat. Despite pledges by some local Afghan
tribes to restrict border transit, insurgents continue to cross the
porous Afghan-Pakistani border to safe havens in western Pakistan.
Along Afghanistan's eastern border, Iran has sought to expand its
influence in Afghanistan. Iran advances its goals through legitimate
business and humanitarian efforts along with weapon shipments that
include EFPs, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, small arms
ammunition, and explosives.
While the Taliban lost several key commanders in 2008, steady
access to local Pashtun and foreign fighters has allowed them to
sustain operations. Al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan has increased to
levels unseen since 2001-2002. Al Qaeda collaborates closely with the
Taliban and other insurgent elements and supports the insurgency with
personnel, training and resources, particularly in Afghanistan's south
and east. Taliban and al Qaeda use of information operations have
played to both domestic and international audiences, raising the
profile of the insurgency and encouraging additional financial and
personnel support.
Afghanistan's army and police forces continue to slowly increase in
size and effectiveness, but this growth has not kept pace with the
Taliban's ability to exploit a lack of security presence. The Afghan
National Army (ANA) has grown from 49,000 to approximately 80,000 over
the last year, fielding 6 new commando battalions which are
specifically trained to handle counterinsurgency operations. Half of
Afghanistan's combat arms units can lead combat operations, albeit with
coalition support. The Afghan people generally view the army as one of
the most trusted Afghan institutions. In contrast, Afghan National
Police (ANP) forces still require considerable training and coalition
support to fulfill their mission. The ANP has reportedly grown from
75,000 to approximately 80,000 over the last year. The Afghan
Government has subsequently initiated a program to improve police
performance. As of January, police from 52 of the most violent
districts in Afghanistan have participated in training. Despite
measured progress, the government continues to struggle against
violence, corruption, and narcotics trade.
Over the next year, the Afghan Government will remain vulnerable to
insurgent violence, the narcotics trade, foreign influences and
disruptive political maneuvering ahead of the 2009 Afghan presidential
election. Without significant improvements in the government's ability
to deliver basic services and provide increased security, Afghan
popular discontent will persist and could worsen especially in areas
where corruption persists, select Pashtun tribes remain disenfranchised
and the economy does not provide basic employment opportunities.
In Pakistan, the FATA continues to provide vital sanctuary to al
Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based
extremist groups. Al Qaeda exploits the permissive operating
environment to support the Afghan insurgency while also planning
attacks against the U.S. and western interests in Pakistan and
worldwide. Together with the Afghan Taliban and other extremist groups,
al Qaeda uses this sanctuary to train and recruit operatives, plan and
prepare regional and transnational attacks, disseminate propaganda and
obtain equipment and supplies. All these groups consider U.S. and
western interests, as well as Pakistan's army and other Pakistani
Government interests as legitimate targets, as demonstrated by the
attacks against the Danish Embassy and Marriott Hotel in Islamabad.
Pakistan's military has expanded paramilitary forces and deployed
additional troops to the area in an effort to contain the threat.
Pakistani military operations in Bajaur Agency have been met with
fierce resistance by militants. While militants previously have been
unable to sustain attacks in the face of a military response, militants
in Bajaur maintain extensive networks and reinforcements, helping them
remain entrenched. In the Swat Valley, a ``settled'' district of the
Northwest Frontier Province, the government recently agreed to militant
demands to impose Shari'a law in the district, a move that could
embolden militant organizations in other parts of the country.
Pakistani leaders stress the importance of national sovereignty and
condemn cross-border military actions from Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
while Pakistan has allowed limited U.S. assistance in counterinsurgency
training, it is much more receptive to increased intelligence sharing,
technical cooperation, and equipment and armaments to improve its
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities. Although U.S.
efforts to address Pakistani counterinsurgency deficiencies are
underway, it will take years before meaningful capabilities are likely
to be developed.
While some Pakistani senior leaders have publicly acknowledged that
extremism has replaced India as Pakistan's preeminent national security
threat, India remains a high-priority, long-term concern. On matters of
external defense, Pakistan seeks stability and a balance of power
deterrent across the region through continued improvements to its
nuclear and conventional forces, although the economic decline will
likely slow progress in these areas.
Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand
nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery
systems. Pakistan has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear
weapons, though vulnerabilities exist.
Strategic rivalry with India continues to drive Pakistan's
development of an expanding array of delivery systems. Islamabad is
developing cruise missiles such as the Babur for ground-launch and the
Ra'ad for air-launch. Pakistan may pursue other launch platforms and
missions for these missiles.
Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to develop the Abdali short-range and
the Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles. Significant progress
was made last year in the Shaheen II's development and when deployed it
would become Pakistan's longest ranged ballistic missile, capable of
reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers. These two missiles will join
a missile inventory that already includes nuclear- and conventionally-
armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Transnational Terrorist Threat
Al Qaeda is committed to imposing its own interpretation of Islamic
rule upon the Muslim world and is the most significant terrorist threat
to U.S. interests worldwide.
Al Qaeda retains the operational capability to plan, support, and
direct transnational attacks despite the deaths of multiple senior
level operatives. The operating environment in the FATA--along with
supportive indigenous elements in Pakistan--not only allows al Qaeda to
support the Afghan insurgency, conduct attacks in Pakistan, and prepare
transnational attacks against the west, it also provides the time and
space needed to train and develop the next generation of al Qaeda
leadership.
Al Qaeda continues to recruit and train operatives who can travel
easily, without drawing scrutiny from security services. In addition to
being a target in its own right, Europe could be used as a platform
from which attacks against the United States could be initiated.
Al Qaeda continues efforts to acquire chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials and would not hesitate to use
such weapons if the group develops sufficient capabilities. CBRN-
related information is widely available on the internet and, in many
cases, small scale or crude agents are easy to construct. Al Qaeda and
its associates are most likely to use low-level CBRN agents such as
ricin, botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals such as cyanide
and chlorine.
In 2008, Osama bin Ladin issued 4 statements and al-Zawahiri issued
10. Each has issued one statement thus far in 2009. The continued
release of statements by the group's leaders and senior operatives who
have not previously appeared in propaganda, is an attempt to convey
health, a robust leadership core, and influence over the movement. The
wide array of speakers is likely meant to signal that al Qaeda's
viability transcends bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. The messages are
designed to encourage donors, enlist recruits, guide the movement, and
drive a wedge between the United States and its allies.
Al Qaeda increasingly lost operatives, including senior planners
and trainers, to counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. Mid-level
operatives rise to advance plans and operations; however, sustained
counterterrorism operations strain the group's ability to recuperate
from leadership losses, degrade transnational attack capabilities, and
disrupt regional attack planning. Nevertheless, capable al Qaeda
operatives remain.
Al Qaeda continued to further relationships with compatible
regional terrorist groups to extend the organization's financial and
operational reach. Al Qaeda uses such mergers to foster public
perceptions of its worldwide influence, pursue its transnational agenda
and to strike U.S. and western interests in new areas. As these mergers
multiply, the threat may increase as new franchises adopt al Qaeda's
targeting priorities, against U.S. and western interests.
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
expand its operational activities outside Algeria with several attacks
against western interests in both Mauritania and Tunisia. Despite
increased counterterrorism efforts by North African governments, AQIM
continues to improve its ability to conduct sophisticated large-scale
attacks in North Africa and the Sahel.
East Africa remains an environment conducive to large, casualty-
producing attacks such as the 1998 embassy bombings. Despite regional
counterterrorism operations since late 2006, senior East Africa-based
al Qaeda operatives remain at large and likely continue attack planning
against U.S. and western interests in the region.
Recent propaganda from both al Qaeda and the Somalia-based
terrorist group al-Shabaab highlighting their shared ideology suggests
a formal merger announcement is forthcoming. Al-Shabaab has conducted
near-daily attacks against regional government and security forces in
Somalia, including suicide vehicle born IED attacks in Puntland and
Somaliland. Cooperation among al Qaeda inspired extremists throughout
the region strengthens al Qaeda's foothold in Africa.
In South Asia, the November 2008 attack in Mumbai highlighted the
increasing ability of terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to
direct and execute terrorist attacks inside India. Besides raising
India-Pakistan tensions, the targeting of foreign nationals and Jewish
interests, as well as the coordination and complexity of the operation,
marked a departure from previous attacks and raised concerns in the
region.
In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) are the terrorist groups that pose the greatest threat to U.S.
interests. The JI, which is based mainly in Indonesia, works regionally
with other Islamic terrorist and separatist groups, including with the
ASG, based in the Philippines, to achieve its goal of establishing a
regional caliphate. Two JI operatives were arrested in Malaysia, but
other senior operatives remain at large. While JI has not carried out a
large-scale attack in Indonesia since the 2005 attack in Bali, raids
and arrests by Indonesian authorities in mid-2008 revealed caches of
bombs and explosives--clear signs that the group maintains the interest
and capability to conduct attacks.
A comprehensive peace accord remains elusive in the Philippines,
where the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Philippine
government continue to discuss conditions for resuming peace talks. The
breakdown in negotiations spurred MILF bombings in Mindanao; violence
likely will continue until both sides can agree on terms to resume
negotiations. While Philippine counterterrorism efforts have disrupted
some attacks, ASG and other terrorists retain the capability to conduct
operations.
Following the February 2008 killing of Hizballah terrorist leader
Imad Mughniyah, Hizballah publicly threatened retaliation. Reprisals
against those Hizballah believe responsible remains likely.
regional issues and military developments
Iran
Iran's military is designed principally to defend against external
threats from more modern adversaries and threats posed by internal
opponents. However, Iran could conduct limited offensive operations
with its ballistic missile and naval forces.
Diplomacy, economic leverage and active sponsorship of terrorist
and paramilitary groups are the tools Iran uses to drive its aggressive
foreign policy. In particular, terrorism is used to pressure or
intimidate other countries, and, more broadly, to serve as a strategic
deterrent. Iran assesses that its use of terrorism provides benefits
with few costs and risks. Iran continues to provide lethal aid to Iraqi
Shi'a militants and Afghan insurgents while simultaneously providing
weapons, training and money to Lebanese Hizballah, its strategic
partner.
Within the country's borders, modernization of Iran's conventional
military inventory has traditionally favored naval and air defense
forces over ground and air units, while all Services have worked to
improve their doctrine and tactics. Ongoing naval modernization is
focused on equipment such as fast missile patrol boats as well as anti-
ship cruise missiles and naval mines. Iranian broadcasts claim that
Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have monitored U.S. aircraft
carrier operations in the Persian Gulf. All naval elements have also
developed and practiced methods intended to counter U.S. technical
superiority.
Iran continues to invest heavily in advanced air defenses,
reversing decades of neglect in this arena. Iran has deployed the
advanced SA-15 tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and
continues to express interest in acquiring the long-range SA-20. Iran's
procurement of modern SAMs with automated command, control and
communications systems will improve its ability to protect senior
leadership and key nuclear and industrial facilities.
While not investing in major new ground systems since at least
early 2005, Iran is building an asymmetric capability to counter more
advanced, adversary ground forces, including enhancements to its Basij
volunteer forces, which would play a large role in an asymmetric fight.
IRGC ground forces are reorganizing to improve coordination in
preparing for and countering internal and external threats. Regular
ground forces may be included in that consolidation, and all ground
forces continue training to better defend against potential invaders.
Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the
country. Iran continues to develop and acquire ballistic missiles that
can range Israel and central Europe, including Iranian claims of an
extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,000-km medium range
ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ashura. Iran's February 2, 2009, launch
of the Safir Space Launch Vehicle shows progress in some technologies
relevant to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Beyond the
steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted
the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy
improvements and new submunition payloads.
With the rest of the IC, we judge that Iran halted its nuclear
weaponization and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work
in 2003, but we assess that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop its overt
enrichment program in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Iran is producing uranium enrichment feed material at Esfahan, claims
to be enriching uranium in 5,000 centrifuges at Natanz and is working
on more advanced centrifuges. It also continues to build a heavy water
reactor at Arak which will be capable of producing plutonium that could
be processed for use in a weapon if required facilities are developed.
DIA judges Iran's biological warfare (BW) efforts may have evolved
beyond agent research and development, and we believe Iran likely has
the capability to produce small quantities of BW agents but may only
have a limited ability to weaponize them. Iran continues to engage in
dual-use research and seek biotechnical materials, equipment and
expertise, which have legitimate uses but could also enable ongoing BW
efforts.
We assess that Iran maintains dual-use facilities intended to
produce chemical warfare agents in times of need and conducts research
that could have offensive applications.
Syria
Syria is trying to balance a complex mix of objectives throughout
the region, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, to both pursue its
interests and protect itself in the volatile regional environment.
Syria likely sees its foreign policies as successful, especially in
Lebanon, as it has engaged with a steady stream of world leaders since
it helped end Lebanon's political crisis in May.
Syria seeks improved relations with the Iraqi Government, in
particular lucrative renewed economic cooperation, while at the same
time harboring Iraqis with ties to insurgents and other oppositionists
in Iraq.
Syria in recent weeks took steps to normalize relations with
Lebanon, and in mid-October formally established diplomatic ties for
the first time ever and took initial steps toward opening an embassy in
Beirut. Yet Syria still seeks to strengthen its influence in Lebanon
through its continuing support to Hizballah and other pro-Syrian
allies. We judge that Syria will seek to expand its influence over the
Lebanese government, especially in the upcoming 2009 elections, so that
it can secure a role for itself in any wider Middle East diplomatic
efforts and continue to stymie any legislation that threatens its
interests, such as the United Nations' investigation into former
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri's assassination.
Internally, the regime is trying to counter Islamic extremists that
pose a threat to Syria, as highlighted by a car bombing in Damascus in
September that killed 17 people. Partly in response to western pressure
and in an effort to curb extremist threats to the regime, some foreign
terrorist movements from Syria into Iraq are blocked. Nonetheless,
Syria remains the primary gateway for Iraq-bound foreign fighters and
numerous terrorist groups operate from Syrian territory.
With regard to its external defense, Syria's military remains in a
defensive posture and inferior to Israel's forces, but it is upgrading
its missile, rocket, anti-tank, aircraft and air defense inventories.
We judge it is likely giving anti-tank guided missiles to Hizballah as
Syria remains committed to providing high levels of support to the
organization. Syria increasingly perceives Hizballah as an extension of
its own defense capabilities against Israel in potential future
conflicts.
Significant air defense related deliveries include at least two SA-
22 self-propelled short-range gun and missile air defense systems from
Russia in June 2008, out of a contract for several dozen. Recent Syrian
contracts with Russia for future delivery include new MiG-31 and MiG-
29M/M2 fighter aircraft, and the SA-X-17 medium-range SAM system.
Syria's chemical warfare program is well established with a
stockpile of nerve agent, which it can deliver by aircraft or ballistic
missiles. During the past several years, Syria has continued to seek
chemical warfare-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources.
Syria has the facilities and the expertise to domestically produce,
store and deliver chemical agents. Syria will continue to improve its
chemical warfare capability for the foreseeable future to counter
regional adversaries.
Based on the duration of Syria's longstanding BW program, we judge
some elements of the program may have advanced beyond the research and
development stage and may be capable of limited agent production. Syria
is not known to have successfully weaponized biological agents in an
effective delivery system, but it possesses a number of conventional
and chemical weapon systems that could easily be modified for
biological agent delivery.
Syria's ballistic missile inventory is designed to offset
shortfalls in the country's conventional forces. It includes older
Russian built SS-21s as well as SCUD B, SCUD C, and SCUD D missiles.
Syria continues to flight test ballistic missiles which it views as a
strategic deterrent against Israel.
Levant
The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed conflict.
Israel, Hizballah and Syria are internalizing lessons learned from the
summer 2006 conflict in preparation for potential future conflict.
While none appear to want fighting to resume now, they all view its
likelihood over the medium term. The period of high tension between
Israel and Syria during the summer of 2007 has subsided. Nevertheless,
Israel remains concerned over Syria's military posture. Similarly,
Syria fears an Israeli attack.
Senior Israel Defense Force leaders are driving an intense effort
to fix shortcomings in readiness, training, logistics, and combined
arms operations identified following the summer 2006 war.
Iran and Syria jointly continue to support anti-Israel terrorist
and militant groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.
However, the alliance between secular Arab Syria and theocratic Persian
Iran is not a natural one, and may erode if Syria is accommodated
significantly in any diplomatic agreement with Israel.
Israel's recent Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, Hamas' rise
to power in Gaza, the resultant bifurcation of control of the
Palestinian territories and the ongoing rivalry between Hamas and Fatah
complicate Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. Operation Cast
Lead, which took place 27 December--18 January, aimed at reducing Hamas
rocket fire into Israel and weapon smuggling into the Gaza Strip and
sought to deter future Hamas attacks on Israel. The resulting
ceasefire, details of which are still being negotiated by Egypt, is
likely to result in a period of calm over the next year or so but will
not address the long-term problems of Hamas control of the Gaza Strip.
Unless a political solution to the intra-Palestinian division and
Hamas' rejection of peace with Israel is found, another round of
fighting in the Gaza Strip is likely in the mid-term future. Hamas will
attempt to use the ceasefire to rebuild and improve its military
capability while seeking to control reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
Increased international cooperation against Hamas and Iranian arms
smuggling efforts will hamper Hamas' rearmament but will not affect
Hamas' ability to maintain control in Gaza.
After 18 months of political stalemate, former Lebanese Armed
Forces Commander Michel Sleiman became Lebanon's President on May 25,
2008. Sleiman's election followed the armed mid-May takeover of West
Beirut by Lebanese Hizballah and the subsequent May 21, 2008, Doha
agreement which quelled intra-Lebanese political in-fighting and ended
the political impasse over the election of a new President. Currently
Lebanese leaders are focused on the upcoming parliamentary elections
scheduled for June 7, 2009. However, significant destabilizing
influences remain: the rearming of militias and Syria's effort to
maintain its influence in Lebanon, as well as the status of Hizballah's
arms and its role, if any, in a Lebanese national defense strategy.
Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups have tried to develop
support and operate in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. They
have, however, encountered obstacles in attaining these goals.
China
China is strengthening its ability to conduct military operations
along its periphery on its own terms. It is building and fielding
sophisticated weapon systems and testing new doctrines that it believes
will allow it to prevail in regional conflicts and also counter
traditional U.S. military advantages.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly building its own
sophisticated aircraft, surface combatants, submarines and weapon
systems while still purchasing select systems from overseas. As an
example, to improve its air defenses China is producing the 4th
Generation F-10 fighter aircraft along with the PL-12 air-to-air
missile, yet has continued to import SA-20 surface-to-air missiles
(SAM) from Russia. China has developed and begun to deploy indigenous
SAM systems which, together with SAMs imported from Russia, provide a
modern, layered, ground-based air defense capability to defend
important assets. China bought a total of 16 SA-20 air defense
battalions, 8 of which have an increased engagement range from 150 to
200 km. China is developing a layered maritime capability with medium-
range anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines, maritime strike
aircraft and surface combatants armed with increasingly sophisticated
anti-ship cruise missiles.
The PLA has achieved moderate success in introducing these new
weapons. Additional integration probably will accelerate as the PLA
explores the full potential of new weapons.
China is looking beyond a potential Taiwan contingency and is
pursuing capabilities needed to become a major regional power. The navy
already operates a large surface fleet, an increasingly modern
submarine fleet, and increasingly appears likely to pursue an aircraft
carrier development program. The air force is developing an extended-
range, land-attack cruise-missile-capable bomber. However, China must
still integrate new doctrinal concepts and it also lacks the overseas
bases needed for extended operations. China will most likely increase
maritime patrols of disputed oil fields and its Exclusive Economic
Zone, although not achieve a true regional power projection capability
in the next decade.
Moving away from its historical reliance upon mass conscription,
China is trying to build a more professional military workforce--one
able to engage successfully in modern warfare. The PLA seeks to
rejuvenate its officer corps, strengthen military education, reform its
noncommissioned officer corps, improve military quality of life and
combat corruption.
China's deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed
intercontinental, intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles,
conventional medium- and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. China's nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the
deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs and the eventual
deployment of the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile. China
currently has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United
States; however the number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the
United States could more than double in the next 15 years, especially
if multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are
employed. China has also fielded over 1,000 CSS-6 and CSS-7
conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. It also is
developing more capable medium- and intermediate-range conventional
missiles able to range U.S. and allied military installations in the
region.
China's nuclear weapon stockpile likely will grow over the next 10
years as new ballistic missiles are activated and older ones are
upgraded. China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile
material to meet its needs for the immediate future. In addition, China
likely retains the capability to produce biological and chemical
weapons.
China's security strategy emphasizes strategic defense, which
integrates diplomacy, economics and information operations with
conventional military forces. However, growing capabilities in
counterspace, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and long-range
precision strike could enable China to achieve strategic surprise
While Chinese security strategy favors the defense, its operational
doctrine does emphasize seizing the initiative through offensive
action, including possible preemptive action. China does not view an
offensive operational doctrine within the context of a strategic
defense as contradictory.
China's total military-related spending for 2008 could be as much
as $120 to $175 billion. China has made marginal improvements in
military budget transparency, but the PLA's disclosed budget still does
not include major categories of expenditures. China's accounting
opacity is inconsistent with international standards for reporting
military spending. China also remains reluctant to share details about
its growing counterspace capabilities.
China maintains an active presence in the South and East China
Seas. Chinese operations in the South China Sea, covering areas such as
the Spratly and Paracel islands, include reconnaissance patrols,
training and island defense, air defense and service support exercises.
China also has conducted operations in the East China Sea area,
including patrols to protect its maritime interests and claimed oil and
gas resources.
In late December, China deployed naval combatants to the Gulf of
Aden to conduct counterpiracy operations. Since December, the navy has
escorted several Chinese merchant vessels through the Gulf of Aden.
While the duration of the deployment is expected to last approximately
3 months, Chinese press reporting indicates that replacement warships
could be made available to continue operations. This is the first time
the Chinese Navy has deployed conducting operations outside of East
Asian waters.
North Korea
North Korea's main goals are to preserve its current system of
government while improving its economic situation, albeit at a pace it
believes will not threaten internal stability. Pyongyang does not view
its nuclear ambitions, a large Active-Duty Force of about 1.2 million,
and improved relations with the United States, as mutually exclusive.
Rather they are the means Pyongyang uses to realize its goals.
North Korea's large, forward-positioned, but poorly-equipped and
poorly-trained military is not well-suited to sustain major military
operations against the south. We believe as a result of its comparative
limitations, North Korea is emphasizing improvements in its deterrent
capability and its ability to defend against technologically superior
forces. The long-range artillery the north has positioned near the
demilitarized zone is complemented by a substantial mobile ballistic
missile force with an array of warhead options to include weapons of
mass destruction that can range U.S. forces and our allies in the
Republic of Korea and Japan. North Korea relies upon these capabilities
to ensure its sovereignty and independence and occasionally to remind
the United States and neighboring countries of its military
capabilities in order to have its positions and demands taken
seriously.
After a failed July 2006 test launch, North Korea has continued
development of the Taepo Dong 2 which could be used for space launch or
as an ICBM. North Korea announced in late February that they intend to
launch a communications satellite, the Kwangmyongsong-2. North Korea
also continues work on an intermediate range ballistic missile.
Last year, progress in the Six-Party Talks was sporadic. In June
North Korea provided its overdue nuclear declaration of plutonium
activities and publicly demolished the Yongbyon cooling tower, but
began reversing disablement measures in August in response to its
continued presence on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
Although North Korea resumed disablement of its nuclear program
following its removal from the list in October, should the Six-Party
Talks break down, the North is likely to respond with resumed
production of fissile material at Yongbyon while also increasing
rhetoric intended to encourage a return to dialogue on the North's
terms. In such a scenario, additional missile or nuclear tests could
occur.
North Korea could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons from
plutonium produced at Yongbyon and it likely sought a uranium
enrichment capability for nuclear weapons at least in the past. It has
proliferated nuclear weapons-related technology abroad. North Korea may
be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.
North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program and we
believe North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities probably includes
the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and
blood agents. We believe Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of
agents.
North Korea is believed to have a longstanding BW program that
could support the production of BW agents. North Korea is party to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but has submitted only one
confidence-building measure declaration and has admitted to no
offensive BW activities.
Kim Jong Il reportedly suffered a stroke in August 2008 but appears
to have largely recovered, making frequent media appearences that are
likely meant to show international and domestic audiences that he
remains firmly in control. Leadership succession, should it occur due
to Kim's sudden death, is likely to progress smoothly in the near term
but, because the regime is structured around one-man rule, becomes
problematic in the longer term as key individuals and factions compete
for control.
Russia
Russia continues on the more assertive path set by former President
Putin, who passed the presidency to Dmitriy Medvedev in May but
continues to wield significant authority as prime minister. Russia is
trying to re-establish a degree of military power that it believes is
commensurate with its economic strength and general political
confidence--although the current global economic downturn may limit
Moscow's ability to achieve its goals. Perceived Western encroachment
into its claimed areas of interest and Islamic or insurgent threats
along its periphery are driving Russia's current military activities
and modernization efforts.
Russia's widely publicized strategic missile launches and increased
out-of-area activity are meant to signal Moscow's continued global
reach and relevance to domestic and international audiences. Recent
examples are the deployment of two Tu-160/Blackjack strategic bombers
to Venezuela in September, the Pyotr Velikiy cruiser strike group's
deployment to the Mediterranean during Russia's major exercise
``Stability-2008'' and to the Caribbean in November.
Russia opposes closer integration of former Soviet countries with
the West and wants to continue its presence in the so-called ``frozen
conflict'' areas. Russian peacekeeping forces in Moldova continue to be
a major source of friction. In August, the Russian military defeated
Georgian forces in operations around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
remain stationed in those separatist areas. During the Georgia
conflict, Russia demonstrated the ability to quickly mobilize and
respond with large numbers of ground and air forces. However, Russia
also experienced several significant weaknesses in its execution such
as a lack of air and ground coordination, the lack of precision weapons
and navigation aids, the inability to suppress Georgian air defense
forces, and a lack of UAVs.
Russian conventional force capabilities continue to grow, albeit at
a measured pace. Readiness improvements are seen primarily among the
conventional Permanently Ready Forces (PRF), such as those used in
Georgia. Russia has increased training and readiness levels in these
units above the lowest points of the mid-1990s. However, Russia is
finding it hard to improve training quality and modernize equipment
while also increasing recruitment and retention rates for the
volunteers needed in the PRF and the noncommissioned officer cadre.
In September 2008, Moscow announced a comprehensive set of reforms
for its Armed Forces, which, if carried out, would be among the most
extensive and far-reaching of any instituted since World War II. While
publicly connected with lessons learned from the August conflict with
Georgia, these reforms also reflect a much broader and long-term set of
evolving Russian threat perceptions and demographic and financial
considerations. Under these plans, by 2020 the Russian Armed Forces
will be reduced to 1,000,000 personnel, the number of officers slashed
from 355,000 to 150,000, military education facilities consolidated,
size of the general staff reduced, most if not all cadre units
disbanded and remaining units brought up to permanently-ready status,
and those permanently ready units reorganized, streamlined and
modernized. While Russia has begun implementing some of these reforms,
their ultimate success is problematic. Russia's worsening economy,
manning shortfalls, resource constraints, and potential re-think of the
reforms' impact on military capabilities will likely slow or even stall
some elements.
As part of the announced reforms, Russia plans to speed up the
modernization of its active forces. Emphasis reportedly will be given
to precision munitions, intelligence assets, submarines, and elements
of an aerospace defense system. Russia has made a major commitment of
almost 5 trillion rubles ($200 billion) to its 2007-2015 State
Armaments Program to develop and build new conventional and nuclear
weapon systems, with priority on maintenance and modernization of the
latter. Even after recently announced cuts to its proposed 2009 defense
budget, Russia plans to allocate nearly 1.1 trillion rubles ($45
billion) for the military in 2009. Adjusted for inflation, this
represents a 10 percent increase from 2008. However, a significant
percentage of this funding will likely be lost to the defense budget
due to corruption, mismanagement, and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
These reforms, if largely carried out, would improve Russian
capability to respond to limited, regional threats, but reduce their
capability for large-scale conventional war. Making all residual forces
permanently-ready and establishing the brigade as the basic ground unit
would facilitate rapid mobilization and deployment of these relatively
compact units to threatened areas. The decision to disband division and
army-level formations also may reflect a belief that any conflict that
PRF cannot handle would by necessity, escalate to nuclear. Russian
operational plans do provide for the first use of nuclear weapons.
Development and production of advanced strategic weapons continues,
particularly on the Bulava SS-NX-32 submarine launched ballistic
missile, still undergoing testing despite several publicized failures,
and the SS-27 ICBM. Russia deployed six SS-27s in 2008, in addition to
the six already placed on alert in December 2006 and 2007. Russian
Strategic Rocket Forces also deployed two more SS-27s in silos,
increasing the total to 50. Russian media reports say Russia flight-
tested its developmental RS-24, a MIRVed version of the SS-27, twice in
2007 and once in 2008, and expects to deploy it in December 2009 after
more testing. Russia claims the MIRVed SS-27 can penetrate any missile
defense.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is scheduled to expire
on December 5, 2009. Russian officials are eager to continue
discussions to replace the treaty with a new legally-binding agreement
in order to maintain strategic stability. Russia retains a relatively
large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear warheads. Nuclear material
diversion remains a concern despite increased security measures. Some
nuclear facilities and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal
theft, sabotage or a well-executed terrorist attack.
Russia continues research and development efforts that could
support its offensive chemical and BW programs.
Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales agreements in
2007, marking a second consecutive year of high sales. Russia recently
signed large contracts with Algeria, India, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela,
while new agreements with China have declined. Pending sales include
advanced weapons such as multi-role fighter aircraft, transport
aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, jet trainers, transport
helicopters, armored infantry fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, and
advanced surface-to-air missile systems.
Russia will continue to produce advanced fighter aircraft for
export to countries such as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia while also
seeking additional warplane sales to South America and the Middle East.
Moscow also continues to aggressively market its air defense systems,
short-range ballistic missile systems and related automated command and
control systems to Syria, Iran, Venezuela, China, and other countries.
Defense industry officials, however, have expressed concern that the
effects of the global economic crisis on many of Russia's arms
customers may result in declining exports. In the coming year at least,
Russia's defense industries will become more reliant on domestic
orders.
Turkey-Iraq
The Turkish Government has conducted numerous limited military
operations over the last several months, primarily involving air and
artillery strikes, against Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq in an
effort to disrupt their activities and degrade their capabilities. The
KGK continues to strike targets throughout southeast Turkey to include
a October 3, 2008, attack on a military outpost that killed 17 Turkish
soldiers. The 3 October attack generated intense media and public
pressure for additional military actions against KGK bases in northern
Iraq, which could lead to a small to medium-scale ground operation this
winter or early spring. A large-scale Turkish operation would run the
risk of upsetting stability in northern Iraq.
Balkans
In Kosovo, the security situation remains unsettled. February 17
marked the first anniversary of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence. Over the past year a constitution has been put in place
and in December the European Union's Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)
deployed to Kosovo. While modest progress is being made, EULEX will
continue to face challenges, especially in asserting authority in the
Serb areas of northern Kosovo. Pristina will continue to look to the
United States and leading European countries for reassurance and
support, to include calls for maintaining a robust international
military and police presence. In Bosnia, a political crisis is brewing,
as Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik is challenging the
country's state-central authorities, seeking greater autonomy and
possibly independence. This represents the most significant crisis
since the signing of the Dayton Accords of 1995. Dodik's challenge to
the central state and the international community could spark violent
incidents, but the prospects for widespread violence in Bosnia remain
low.
Africa
Beyond the threat of terrorism, the United States faces no major
military threat in Africa, although there are serious challenges to our
interests.
Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta will continue to be plagued by
violence as the root causes of the crisis--high levels of poverty,
ethnic tensions, and rampant corruption--persist. Militant attacks are
likely to expand beyond the immediate Delta region to affect
neighboring Nigerian states as well as offshore hydrocarbon facilities.
In Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government will likely
continue to weaken, resulting in a further erosion of order. Largely
ineffective, the Somali government is incapable of addressing the
social and economic causes contributing to the ongoing piracy threat
off the Somali coast. Unaddressed, piracy threatens to disrupt the flow
of humanitarian supplies as well as commercial traffic transiting off
the Somali coast. Warships from over a dozen nations currently conduct
anti-pirate patrols in regional waters and have apprehended over 40
suspected pirates this year; most have since been transferred to Somali
and Yemeni authorities for prosecution. Despite this, attacks continue,
but at rates lower than the peak of pirate activity in late 2008.
In Sudan, the slow deployment of peacekeeping forces and stalled
negotiations will continue to threaten the already desperate
humanitarian situation in Darfur. Meanwhile, difficulties surrounding
the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement will
remain a source of tension between north and south Sudan and could lead
to incidents of localized confrontation between the former civil war
rivals.
Latin America
While the United States presently faces no major conventional
military threats across Latin America, a number of concerns endure.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, energized by his win in the
February 15 national referendum that lifted presidential term limits,
vowed to continue efforts to advance his agenda and confront U.S.
regional influence. He has announced he will seek another 6-year term
in 2012. The significant drop in world oil prices will delay Venezuelan
plans to procure submarines, transport aircraft, and a strategic air
defense system. Nonetheless, Venezuela has already purchased advanced
fighters, attack helicopters, and assault rifles.
Colombian counterinsurgency operations have degraded Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) field units and operations, which has
led to a significant increase in desertions. The FARC, and other drug
trafficking organizations, have, however, maintained their dominant
position in the global cocaine trade. Since 2002, President Uribe's
national security strategy has dramatically bolstered the security
forces' capabilities to counter operations of illegal armed groups
nationwide. This security force buildup includes adoption and
implementation of a joint command doctrine, which has allowed the
police and military to decrease the FARC's manpower and capabilities
significantly. Moreover, over the past 6 years, government security
forces have removed numerous mid- and senior-level FARC leaders leaving
the insurgent organization demoralized and in its most precarious state
in the past 10 years.
Bolivian President Morales continues to consolidate power with
Venezuelan and Cuban assistance. He also won the January 25 vote on a
draft constitution. However, the fact that the constitution was
approved by a smaller margin than expected signaled that his popularity
may have dropped which has emboldened the political opposition. The
opposition continues to resist dialogue on key issues such as greater
autonomy for some provinces as well as the sharing of hydro-carbon
profits, and their efforts will challenge and perhaps destabilize his
government.
The broad support that Cuban President Raul Castro receives from
the military, security services and the Communist Party will likely
enable him to maintain stability, security, and his own position. The
Cuban military's support for Raul Castro shows no signs of reversing.
Recent cabinet changes tend to support this assessment. At present
there are no indications that a mass migration is imminent.
Growing strains on Mexican drug cartels from the Calderon
government's successes is increasing the threat against civilian,
military and law enforcement officials and, perhaps, against U.S.
counternarcotics personnel in country. Despite recent successes against
the Mexican drug cartels, drug-related violence continues to rise with
2008's drug-related murders almost double the 2007 figures.
Approximately 45,000 Mexican military personnel have been deployed
nationwide as the lead counterdrug force while the government
implements law enforcement and judicial reforms.
transnational issues of concern
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems
The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and ballistic missiles against U.S. forces, the American people,
our allies and interests remains a grave, enduring, and evolving
threat.
Qualitative and quantitative improvements in state nuclear
programs--often linked with delivery system enhancements, further
enhances the potential risk. Moreover, concerns remain regarding the
safety and security of nuclear weapons and materials worldwide, and the
potential diversion of fissile and radiological materials.
As technology progresses and becomes increasingly available in a
globalized world environment, the threat posed by chemical and
biological weapons could become more diverse and technically
sophisticated.
Terrorist organizations will continue to try to acquire and employ
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials in attacks
while nation-states expand their WMD capabilities and the
survivability, accuracy, and range of the associated delivery systems.
Since mid-2006, numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions have
authorized sanctions against Iranian and North Korean nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. While these actions have impeded some
acquisition and support efforts, they have not stopped the programs
themselves. Further frustrating sanction efforts is the inconsistent
interpretation and enforcement of the resolutions by several key
nations.
While some countries such as Russia and China continue to market
fully assembled Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-compliant
short range ballistic missiles, entities in China and North Korea,
motivated by economic and strategic interests, continue to supply
controlled technologies, components and raw materials in support of WMD
and missile programs, especially across the Middle East and South Asia.
While some of these transfers are proscribed under various WMD-
related control regimes, many others are dual-use with legitimate
industrial applications. Examples include multi-axis computer
numerically controlled machine tools that have applications in nuclear
and missile programs, but are also commonly used throughout legitimate
industry. Specialty metals such as 7000-series aluminum used in nuclear
and missile programs are also commonly used in aircraft and other
industries. Some chemicals used in fertilizer production are also
controlled chemical weapon precursors and much of the glass-lined
equipment used in pharmaceutical production is controlled due to its
applicability to chemical and biological weapons programs. These last
examples potentially could allow a state to embed an offensive chemical
or biological weapons mobilization capability within its existing
commercial infrastructure.
Since 1999, Russia has adopted stronger export control laws and
amended its criminal code to permit stricter punishment for illegal
WMD-related exports. Similarly, China has also moved to enact export
control laws to restrict proliferation of WMD-related materials.
However, both have been inconsistent in applying these regulations,
particularly regarding the sale of dual-use technology.
Nongovernmental entities and individual entrepreneurs also remain a
great concern. These organizations and the proliferation networks they
tie into are often able to sidestep or outpace international detection
and export control regimes. By regularly changing the names of the
front companies they use, exploiting locations in countries with more
permissive environments or lax enforcement and avoiding international
financial institutions, these organizations are able to continue
supplying WMD and ballistic missile-related and technology to countries
of concern.
Most state programs now emphasize self-sufficiency to reduce
reliance upon external suppliers, which also limits their vulnerability
to detection and interdiction. For example, Iranian weapon makers now
advertise their ability to manufacture guidance and control components,
such as dynamically tuned gyros. Instead of importing ballistic missile
systems, Tehran now produces the SCUD B and C, Shahab-3 and Fateh-110
even though it still depends on outside sources for many of the related
dual-use raw materials and components.
While these indigenous capabilities are not always a good
substitute for foreign imports, particularly for more advanced
technologies, they prove adequate in many cases. Consequently, as some
countries forego imports in favor of indigenous WMD-related production,
they position themselves anew as potential secondary proliferators.
Even though most advanced nations cooperate against WMD
proliferation, a number of trends beyond direct government control
still fuel the threat. They include commercial scientific advances, the
availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, scientists'
enthusiasm for sharing their research and the availability of dual-use
training and education.
Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is
likely to increase while growing more complex over the next decade.
Current trends indicate that adversary ballistic missile systems, with
advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are becoming
more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate and possess
greater range. Pre-launch survivability is also likely to increase as
potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception measures
and increasingly base their missiles on mobile sea- and land-based
platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting technical and
operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses. For example,
China, Iran, and North Korea exercise near simultaneous salvo firings
from multiple locations to defeat these defenses.
Computer Network Threats
The U.S. information infrastructure, which includes
telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the data that
resides on them, is critical to most aspects of modern life in the
United States, Russia, and China posses the most experienced, well-
resourced and capable computer network operations (CNO) capabilities
that could threaten the United States, but they are not the only
foreign entities that do. Other nations and non-state terrorist and
criminal groups are also developing and refining their abilities to
exploit and attack computer networks in support of their military,
intelligence or criminal goals.
The scope and sophistication of malicious CNO targeting against
U.S. networks has steadily increased over the last 5 years. This is of
particular concern because of the pronounced military advantages that
the United States has traditionally derived from information networks.
Potential adversaries that cannot compete directly against the United
States may view CNO as a preferred asymmetric strategy to exploit our
weakness while minimizing or degrading our traditional strengths. In
particular, overseas production of information technology components
provides opportunities for potentially hostile actors to access
targeted systems by exploiting the supply chain at its origin.
Russia and China have the technical, educational and operational
ability to conduct CNO against targeted networks. Russia remains the
most capable cyber-threat to the United States. Several high-ranking
Russian military officials have promoted CNO's potential against future
adversaries. Since 2005 China has been incorporating offensive CNO into
their military exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy
networks.
Recent hacking activities emanating from China underscore concerns
about potential hostile CNO intelligence collection activities. Several
foreign governments, to include Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and
South Korea, have publicly alleged government and corporate network
intrusions by actors in China.
Foreign Intelligence
Our peer competitors, traditional adversaries and today, terrorist
organizations pose a significant challenge to the United States and in
particular our military, as they attempt to steal our secrets, deter
our global military operations and influence our national policy. We
face a wide range of threats from the activities of foreign
intelligence services and terrorist groups which employ classic
intelligence tools and tradecraft to collect against U.S. military,
diplomatic, and economic interests at home and abroad. Some terrorist
groups are capable of conducting fairly sophisticated intelligence
operations, to include the conduct of pre-operational surveillance.
Foreign intelligence services directly and indirectly collect
unclassified and classified information on key U.S. technologies,
particularly military and dual-use, export-controlled items with
military application. Several of our traditional adversaries pose a
serious and persistent challenge; they have demonstrated exceptional
patience and skill in pursuing priority U.S. and military targets.
Industrial espionage has a profound impact which negates the
effectiveness of our weapons systems and puts our military forces at
risk.
The threat to our infrastructure, especially our computer networks,
remains a lucrative target to not only our adversaries' intelligence
services, but also to organized criminal groups and individuals whose
sole objective is to penetrate our network defenses.
Underground Facilities
We are witnessing the emergence of a new warfighting domain--the
subsurface domain. Changes in warfare have dictated that nations to a
much greater extent are constructing and relying on deep underground
facilities to conceal and protect their most vital national security
functions and activities. Two key factors driving these changes are
increased overhead reconnaissance capabilities and greater lethality,
range, and accuracy of precision-guided munitions.
In the past year, our potential adversaries have constructed dozens
of deep underground facilities for their ballistic missile forces,
including theater and ICBMs. The use of underground facilities
complicates the IC's ability to monitor ballistic missile activities,
and it improves the survivability of these weapons.
Iran and North Korea protect major elements of their nuclear
programs in underground facilities. In the 2006 conflict with Lebanon,
Hizballah complicated Israeli targeting by using underground facilities
to store weapons, conduct operations, and launch rockets; construction
of underground havens by terrorist organizations is continuing.
Contributing to a large increase in underground facility
construction are recent and rapid advances in commercially available
western tunneling technology. As potential adversaries improve their
ability to build underground facilities, the U.S will find it harder to
locate and successfully target these critical facilities.
Space and Counterspace
The international proliferation of space-related expertise and
technology is increasing, largely through commercial enterprises, and
is helping other nations acquire space and space-related capabilities,
including some with direct military applications.
Because most space technologies have both civilian and military
uses, this trend is providing a growing list of countries and non-state
groups with more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation,
and targeting capabilities. Insurgents in Iraq, for example, have been
captured in possession of commercial satellite imagery.
Russia and China are developing systems and technologies capable of
interfering with or disabling vital U.S. space-based navigation,
communication and intelligence collection capabilities. Other countries
have already deployed systems with inherent capabilities to support or
conduct anti-satellite (ASAT) engagements, such as satellite-tracking,
systems capable of jamming satellite communications, and laser range-
finding devices. However, these technologies are costly and most
countries that want them are not expected to buy them soon. Aside from
Russia and China, countries and non-state actors interested in
acquiring counterspace capabilities will likely develop denial and
deception techniques to defeat space-based imagery collection, conduct
electronic warfare or signal jamming, and conduct physical attacks on
ground-based space assets.
China's space and counterspace capabilities have significant
implications for U.S. space-based communications, ISR operations. China
operates communications, ISR, navigation and Earth resource systems
with military applications and will continue to deploy more advanced
satellites through the next decade. In addition to its direct ascent
ASAT program successfully tested in January 2007, China is developing
jammers and kinetic and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. By
adapting technologies from its manned and lunar space programs, China
is improving its ability to track and identify satellites--a
prerequisite for anti-satellite attacks.
Russia is making progress modernizing its already formidable space
and counterspace capabilities. Efforts are underway to improve Russian
navigation, communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and
intelligence-gathering satellites. Russia also is enhancing its
extensive space surveillance and tracking systems, and maintains a
number of systems, such as exoatmospheric antiballistic missiles and
satellite-tracking laser range-finding systems, with inherent
counterspace applications, and continues to research or expand
directed-energy and signal jamming capabilities that could target
satellites.
Advanced and Improvised Weapons
Improvised weapons and advanced weapons such as IEDs, long-range
rockets, and highly accurate guided missiles give non-state actors the
capability to inflict losses against technologically superior opponents
at a relatively low cost and with little training. The use of these
weapons can produce operational and strategic-level effects beyond the
battlefield when used to their maximum effect at the tactical level and
publicized through the media or internet. This exposure provides
terrorist and insurgent groups with a magnified politico-military
potential that exceeds their historical norm.
For example, Hizballah inflicted significant Israeli casualties and
challenged Israeli ground operations and plans while using scores of
advanced anti-tank guided missiles against Israeli ground forces during
the summer 2006 Lebanon conflict. Hizballah also heavily damaged an
Israeli warship with an anti-ship cruise missile, a military capability
once limited to nation-states that Hizballah was not known to possess
prior to the conflict.
Advanced shoulder-launched anti-tank missiles and manportable air
defense systems are increasingly available to non-state actors through
uncontrolled exports, falsified end-user statements, gray market
transfers, ransacked armories and/or direct supply from sympathetic
regimes. Of concern, these weapons are easy to conceal, transport, and
use; therefore, are ideal terrorist weapons. These weapons can be used
singly or in combination with other asymmetric warfare tactics against
high-value and lightly-defended targets such as distinguished
personnel, critical infrastructure, and civil transportation.
The threat posed by IEDs is significant. The September 2008 attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen combined small arms fire with multiple
suicide bombers and suicide vehicle-borne IEDs. The IED threat is a
function of the relatively low technological barrier for constructing
them, the relative ease in acquiring or manufacturing the explosives,
and the growing number of readily available training manuals that
demonstrate how to build and effectively deploy them. Terrorist and
insurgent groups regularly modify their tactics, techniques, and
procedures in an attempt to mitigate counter-IED efforts as well as to
avoid previous operational mistakes.
Terrorist and insurgent groups no longer are limited to using
stolen commercial explosives or military ordnance for building IEDs.
Many groups are using homemade explosives that are manufactured from
commercially available chemicals. Several terrorist groups are capable
of producing homemade explosive mixtures that equal or exceed the power
of military-grade explosives.
conclusion
While combat operations and operations against transnational
terrorists continue, other potential threats endure and evolve. Today's
focus against the terrorist threat does not preclude the potential for
conflict among major nation-states which could intersect vital U.S.
interests. In response, defense intelligence must remain able to
provide timely and actionable intelligence across the entire threat
spectrum to policymakers and military decision-makers so they can
maximize our Nation's opportunities while minimizing risks.
In close cooperation with the broader IC, DIA continues to
implement important structural and procedural reforms to strengthen
analysis and collection while also expanding information sharing across
intelligence disciplines, agencies and with our closest allies.
During this critical period of conflict and change, your continuing
support is vital. On behalf of the men and women of DIA and across the
defense intelligence enterprise, thank you for your continuing
confidence.
Our people take great pride in their work. They understand it is an
honor and a unique responsibility to conduct such sensitive work on
behalf of the American people. It is a privilege for me to serve with
them and to have this opportunity to represent their work to you today.
Thank you. I would be pleased to answer your questions at this
time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General. Again, thank
you for your great service to this country. This will be your
last visit to us, but we will long remember that service. We
very much appreciate it.
General Maples. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Let's try an 8-minute first round.
There has been some confusion and I think some apparent
inconsistencies in our assessment of Iran's uranium enrichment
activities and their intent. It's my understanding that uranium
for civil nuclear power production has to be enriched from 2 to
4 percent, but that highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is
necessary for a nuclear bomb or warhead needs to be enriched to
about 90 percent.
Let me ask you first, Director: Does the IC believe that as
of this time Iran has any HEU?
Director Blair. We assess now that Iran does not have any
HEU.
Chairman Levin. Now, on March--is your mike on, by the way?
Director Blair. It is now.
Chairman Levin. Thanks.
On March 1, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Mullen, was asked if Iran has enough fissile material to make a
bomb and he said: ``We think they do.'' Now, that seems to be
different from what you just said the IC thinks, which is that
you believe they do not. Have you talked to Admiral Mullen or
what is the explanation for that apparent difference?
Director Blair. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Mullen later issued a
clarification that he was referring to LEU, not HEU.
Chairman Levin. Now, does the IC assess that Iran currently
has made the decision to produce HEU for a warhead or a bomb?
Director Blair. We assess that Iran has not yet made that
decision.
Chairman Levin. In 2007, the NIE on Iran said that ``The IC
judges with high confidence that in the fall of 2003 Tehran
halted its nuclear weapons program.'' Is the position of the IC
the same as it was back in October 2007? Has that changed?
Director Blair. Mr. Chairman, the nuclear weapons program
is one of the three components required for a deliverable
system, including a delivery system and the uranium. But as for
the nuclear weapons program, the current position of the IC is
the same, that Iran has stopped its nuclear weapons design and
weaponization activities in 2003 and has not started them
again, at least as of mid-2007.
Chairman Levin. In 2007 that NIE said the following: ``That
we judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible
date that Iran would be technically capable of producing enough
HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that is very unlikely.''
Now, if your position is the same as it was in 2007, does
the 2009 now become 2011?
Director Blair. Our current estimate is that the minimum
time at which Iran could technically produce the amount of HEU
for a single weapon is 2010 to 2015. There are differences
among the IC; 2010 to 2015 brackets that uncertainty.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the Russian view of Iran, you
indicated that Iran's neighbors are threatened or would be
threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran. Russia is one of those
neighbors. Is it the assessment of the IC that Russia would be
concerned by a nuclear-armed Iran?
Director Blair. Yes, sir, Russia would be concerned. It has
a number of other interests with Iran that are also at play,
but it would be concerned about a nuclear-armed Iran.
Chairman Levin. Do you have an assessment as to whether or
not Russia has an interest in cooperating with us on missile
defense?
Director Blair. Russia has an interest in cooperating with
missile defense, we assess, Mr. Chairman. But they also have an
incentive to limit that cooperation on nuclear defense. So I
believe it will be a----
Chairman Levin. On missile defense or--I'm sorry?
Director Blair. Is that what you asked about, sir?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Director Blair. Missile defense?
Chairman Levin. You said ``nuclear defense.''
Director Blair. I'm sorry. Missile defense. They have some
positive incentives to cooperate with us. They have some ways
they'd like to limit our missile defenses and their
cooperation. So it would be a complex negotiation, but I think
it's one worth exploring.
Chairman Levin. General, here's a question for you. I think
you both have indicated that the greatest threat to
Afghanistan's security comes from the Afghan Taliban and other
militant forces that reside in sanctuaries on the Pakistan side
of the border, from which they are free to command operations
against coalition forces. First of all, would you agree with
our commander's assessment that the AFA is motivated, capable
of fighting, and generally respected by the Afghans?
General Maples. Sir, I would agree with that. In fact,
they're one of the most respected institutions in Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Could the Afghan Army be effective in
countering the threat of cross-border incursions from Pakistan?
General Maples. Yes, sir, they could.
Chairman Levin. Can you tell us what the reasoning is why
that army is not yet more focused on the border to stop those
incursions, given that it's the greatest threat to
Afghanistan--excuse me--yes, to Afghanistan, and given the
apparent situation that the border police are not an effective
force?
General Maples. Sir, I believe there are a couple of
factors that are involved in that. The first is the operational
priority that is given to security in the populated areas of
Afghanistan and the fact that the ANP are not at the point
where they can provide the kind of security in the cities that
is needed. So I think the prioritization of the effort is a
part of that decision.
I think the second part of it is simply the number of
trained AFA troops that are in place. I think eventually we
will reach that point where an operational decision will be
made to employ the AFA in a different way.
Chairman Levin. How soon can we reach that point of making
that decision?
General Maples. I know the decision has been made to expand
the size of the AFA to 134,000 and that a great effort is going
to be put into that to expedite it. I don't know the timeframe
that the 134,000 will be reached.
Chairman Levin. I guess this would be for you, Director, or
either one actually could answer this. Is it the IC's
assessment that the Afghan Taliban council, or Shura, operates
openly in Quetta, Pakistan, without interference from the
government? If so, why has the government or population so far
failed to take action to eliminate the activities and the safe
haven enjoyed by that Quetta Shura?
Director, let me start with you. I think either one of you
might want to comment on that.
Director Blair. It's true that the Taliban governing bodies
operate quite freely in Pakistan. The Pakistan approach to
handling that threat is a combination of lack of capability,
their overall approach in which they believe that there needs
to be compromise and cooperation with some groups in that area,
and their assessment of the threat of that group to Pakistan as
opposed to Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. General, do you have any answer to the
question, why Pakistan has not taken action against a terrorist
group that's operating openly in Quetta?
General Maples. Sir, the Quetta Shura is operating openly
in Quetta. I believe it is more in relation to the effect on
the Pakistani population, in particular the Pashtun population
in Pakistan, that causes the Pakistani government to move at a
slower pace, and they have not taken action against that Quetta
Shura.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses. Director Blair, on March 9, a
Washington Post report says that the United States probably
will not pull any more forces from Iraq this year beyond those
announced over the weekend, the number two U.S. general in Iraq
said Monday. About 12,000 U.S. soldiers will leave Iraq by
September. ``What we have right now is what we plan on having
for the foreseeable future,'' General Austin said.
Is that accurate?
Director Blair. I don't have additional information on
that, Senator.
Senator McCain. Surely you were consulted as to whether
that's a fact or not?
Director Blair. The announcement of, the President's
announcement set a level of 10 to 12 brigades that were
remaining, and I have not been in discussions on whether that
will be 10 or 12 and just what the drawdown plans are in the
future. I'm sure that the Department of Defense (DOD) has----
Senator McCain. Well, please get briefed up and tell us.
It's kind of an important item as to what our troop levels will
be for the rest of this year. I don't think it's a minor item.
Director Blair. No, sir. It's a very important item.
It's just not in my area of responsibility. It's the
Secretary of Defense----
Senator McCain. You are the DNI.
Director Blair. I am.
Senator McCain. So you would be informed as to our troop
levels in Iraq and our plans for troop levels in Iraq?
Director Blair. I'm asked to assess the effects of
different troop levels on the level of security in Iraq.
Senator McCain. Director Blair, please get back to me,
would you please, on that issue?
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I'd be very interested. I think most
Americans are interested in troop levels in Iraq as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator McCain. Last month Iran successfully launched its
first satellite into orbit and President Ahmadinejad proclaimed
in a televised speech ``The official presence of the Islamic
Republic was registered in space.'' Last Sunday, Iran tested a
precision air-to-surface missile with a 70-mile range. Does
that lead one to the conclusion that it's very likely that Iran
will be developing a nuclear weapon to go along with the
development of delivery vehicles?
Director Blair. I don't think those missile developments,
Senator McCain, prejudice the nuclear weapons decision one way
or the other. I believe those are separate decisions. The same
missiles can launch vehicles into space, they can launch
warheads, either conventional or nuclear, onto land targets,
and Iran is pursuing those for those multiple purposes. Whether
they develop a nuclear weapon which could then be put in that
warhead I believe is a separate decision which Iran has not
made yet.
Senator McCain. General Maples, do you have an opinion on
that?
General Maples. Sir, I would agree that the development of
the nuclear weapon tied to the missile launch and testing are
not necessarily related. I would say, though, that the Safir
launch does advance their knowledge and their ability to
develop an ICBM. The second test that you mentioned most
likely, that was in the press, most likely an air-to-ship
missile that was being tested.
Senator McCain. General Maples, do you believe that it is
Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons?
General Maples. I believe they are holding open that
option, sir. I don't believe they've yet made that decision.
Senator McCain. You don't believe that they have made the
decision as to whether to develop nuclear weapons or not?
General Maples. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Could I turn to Pakistan--Afghanistan with
you for a moment. Maybe you can clear up a little confusion.
What's the difference between and the commonality between
Taliban activity and al Qaeda activity in Afghanistan?
General Maples. Sir, there is al Qaeda activity in
Afghanistan. Generally al Qaeda from a central standpoint has
recruits that come into their training camps in Pakistan. Often
they will introduce al Qaeda individuals to provide supportive
activity in Afghanistan, but not directly linked to al Qaeda
activity.
There is a direct link between al Qaeda, the Quetta Shura,
the Haqqani, and the Miramshah Shura in particular with al
Qaeda in Pakistan. So there is an exchange of information, of
training, of expertise, and a sharing of capabilities in
producing trained individuals that later conduct attacks in
Afghanistan.
Senator McCain. So are they working more closely together?
General Maples. Sir, I believe they are working closely
together and I believe al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is
more significant, although still at a relatively minor scale,
than we have seen in the past.
Senator McCain. What kind of activity are you seeing on the
part of the Iranians in Afghanistan?
General Maples. Sir, the Iranians' primary activity is in
the western part of Afghanistan. There's a great deal of
economic investment that is pretty open in the western part,
around Herat and elsewhere in Afghanistan. We have seen
shipments of munitions that have been intercepted coming from
Iran into Afghanistan that have contained small arms, some
explosive devices coming in. However, that has been very
limited in nature. I believe that Iran is keeping open their
options in Afghanistan. They don't want to see a Taliban-
dominated Afghanistan, but they do want to have a presence and
ensure that their interests are represented.
We are seeing some increased activity between Iran and the
Haqqani network that we have not seen in the past. So they're
there, they're present, and they're trying to influence the
future.
Senator McCain. Director Blair, is it a true statement to
say that in Afghanistan, since we are not winning, the nature
of warfare and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is that
we are losing?
Director Blair. I think it's important to look at the
degree of government control over the various parts of the
country as a really key indicator towards that question, and
the amount of government control has been decreasing over the
past year, so it's a bad trend.
Senator McCain. So we really do not have control over the
southern part of the country of Afghanistan?
Director Blair. The reason for the deployment of the two
brigades that the President announced a short time ago was in
order to precisely stabilize that part of the country where the
trends were the most negative and the stakes were the highest,
with an eye towards the elections that are going to be taking
place in August. So the trends were negative and the deployment
was designed to stabilize the situation.
Senator McCain. You and the administration are in the
process of developing an overall strategy for Afghanistan?
Director Blair. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I know it's a difficult process you're
going through. Do you have any idea as to when we would
probably get an indication what that strategy is?
Director Blair. I can only say, Senator McCain, that the
President is more impatient than you are.
Senator McCain. I just would like to say that I believe
that a minimalist approach may be the most attractive one. I
also think it may be the most dangerous one. I think we proved
in Iraq that not only do you need a change in strategy, but you
need a robust military capability to first secure areas before
you make progress in the other aspects of counterinsurgency.
I hope that we will not view this as simply an exercise in
counterterrorism, because it is a counterinsurgency. Many argue
that it's the most difficult situation we've ever faced. I
don't think it's as difficult as we faced in Iraq at its worst
point before the surge. The government was on the verge of
collapse. The casualties were incredibly higher than they are
today. So I think that it would be a mistake to take a
minimalist approach without a strategy designed along the lines
of those strategies that have succeeded in other parts of the
world, and we should pay attention to those that have succeeded
and not repeat the mistakes of those that failed.
I certainly look forward to working with you and to
developing a strategy that will succeed. But I think also the
American people need to be told that this is going to be a very
difficult process, at least in the short term, and we should be
prepared for a very difficult time, at least for a period of
time in the near future.
Do you have any response to that, Director?
Director Blair. I couldn't have outlined it better myself,
Senator. I think what we're involved with now is trying to
think through not just the initial phase, but, as the President
clearly said, the brigade deployments were an interim
stabilizing action pending the development of the long-term
strategy, and that long-term strategy has to look all the way
out to an extended period of time in order to achieve success
and victory. That kind of thinking is going on now, and I think
you captured many of the important elements of it, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Director.
Again, General, thank you for your outstanding service to
the country. We're very proud of you.
General Maples. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director Blair. Thanks, General Maples. You've
been really a straight shooter all the way for us and we value
your service and really respect your credibility a great deal.
Director Blair, at the beginning of your testimony here
today you said something that I think a lot of people will find
surprising, but I think we all ought to take it seriously:
``The primary near-term security concern of the United States
is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical
implications.''
A little further down you say: ``Of course, all of us
recall the dramatic political consequences wrought by the
economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the
instability and high levels of violent extremism.''
Down a little bit further you say: ``Europe and the former
Soviet Union have experienced the bulk of the anti-state
demonstrations.'' I would add, so far.
Those are serious words and we ought to take them
seriously. I wanted to ask you if you would go from them to
what some of your specific concerns are. In other words, are
there particular regions of the world, for instance some of the
newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union, where you
fear that the global economic recession could cause
instability, perhaps violent extremism, or in that case a
reassertion of Russian dominance over some of those countries?
Director Blair. Senator, I think there are at least three
important categories of effects of this global recession that
will become more dire if it continues. The first are those
countries that are just holding on, barely providing economic
goods to their people, and they're quite vulnerable to economic
uncertainties undermining the thin progress they have made
recently, with all of the bad consequences that can come out of
that.
Senator Lieberman. Give us a couple of examples of that?
Director Blair. I'd rather save it for closed session,
Senator, if I could.
Senator Lieberman. Are they centered in one part of the
world?
Director Blair. They're generally in that arc from the
eastern Mediterranean across to Southeast Asia, in that area.
The second category I think are the ones that you referred
to in your question, are the countries which have fairly
recently emerged from authoritarian governments. The former
Warsaw Pact now have uneven levels of government in commitment
to representative government, and they're under heavy strain
from the Baltics all the way down to the Black Sea. As
mentioned in testimony and as you've seen, there have been
riots there. Governments have actually fallen in the Baltics.
Countries with IMF loans like Ukraine are scrambling to
maintain the conditions that gave them those.
With the fairly recent democracies in those, one is worried
about the fallout in terms of political gains and extremist
groups who promise simple solutions of the type we've seen in
the past.
Senator Lieberman. From an intelligence perspective, based
particularly on what I would at least call some of the economic
aggressiveness or even bullying of the Russian government, do
we have concerns that this economic vulnerability in some of
the newly independent nations of Central and Eastern Europe
might provide a further opportunity for the Russian Government
to extend its influence, this time economically?
Director Blair. Absolutely. It's quite clear that the
Russians have used oil and gas deliveries in the past for that
purpose. It's quite clear that they believe that they would
like greater control of what they call ``the Near Abroad.''
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Director Blair. This is an opportunity. So yes, sir, that's
definitely a concern there.
Then the third category are our traditional strong partners
around the world who are under strain. None of us have any fear
that there will be catastrophic consequences in those
countries. Democracies change governments and we've seen that
in places like Iceland most recently. But the economic times
make it difficult in countries from Japan to the U.K. to expend
resources on overseas development aid. We saw that when the
European nations met just 10 days ago, that they were reluctant
to help the Eastern European and Central European countries
right away. They held back there. Japan is somewhat constrained
in what it can do.
So in both economic assistance and certainly in helping
with deployed military power, we're soon going to be testing
that in the NATO summit concerning Afghanistan. When your
budget is under pressure, it makes it even more difficult to
pony up to deployable supportable forces overseas.
So I'd say those three categories are what we're looking
at. But what concerns us is we're not sure if the feet have
touched the bottom of the swimming pool yet.
Senator Lieberman. Correct.
Director Blair. That makes it a more difficult pattern.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. I appreciate the answer. I
share your concerns. I think from a geopolitical, geostrategic
point of view, unfortunately we may have to start thinking
about threats to our security and to stability in different
critical regions of the world which we may have to take action
in as a result of the instability caused by the economic
recession.
I'm going to leave that there. I'm going to go to a
different kind of question, Director. There's been a lot of
controversy about your selection of Ambassador Charles Freeman
to be the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Seven
of our colleagues on the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
(SSCI) wrote yesterday expressing their concern. I'm concerned.
The concern is based, to state it briefly, on two points.
One I think is a question about some previous business
associations that the ambassador has had that may raise
questions about his independence of analysis. The second are
statements that he's made that appear either to be inclined to
lean against Israel or too much in favor of China. In fact, I
gather yesterday or in the last few days some of the leaders of
the 1989 protests that led to the Chinese government's massacre
at Tiananmen Square wrote President Obama to convey ``our
intense dismay at your selection of Mr. Freeman.''
So I wanted to ask you for the public record this morning,
were you aware of these comments and associations by Ambassador
Freeman before you chose him for this position? The concern
here is that it suggests that he's more an advocate than an
analyst, which is what we want in that position. Second, what
are you doing about the concerns that have been expressed by
people about the selection?
Director Blair. Let me just make a couple of points about
my selection of Ambassador Freeman. First, as far as the
effects of business associations and the ethics rules,
Ambassador Freeman is going through the vetting that is done
with anybody joining the executive branch in terms of financial
and past associations. In addition, because of a letter from
some Members of Congress, the Inspector General is taking a
closer look at those associations than is normally done with a
Federal employee. So that's one piece of it.
As far as the statements of Ambassador Freeman that have
appeared in the press, I would say that those have all been out
of context and I urge everyone to look at the full context of
what he was saying.
Two other things, though. A mutual friend said about
Ambassador Freeman, who I've known for a number of years: There
is no one whose intellect I respect more and with whom I agree
less than Ambassador Freeman. Those of us who know him find him
to be a person of strong views, of an inventive mind from the
analytical point of view. I'm not talking about policy. When we
go back and forth with him, a better understanding comes out of
those interactions, and that's primarily the value that I think
he will bring.
On the effect that he might have on policy, I think that
some misunderstand the role of the development of analysis
which supports policy. Number one, neither I nor anyone who
works for me makes policy. Our job is to inform it. We've found
over time that the best way to inform policy is to have strong
views held within the IC and then out of those we come out with
the best ideas. Ambassador Freeman, with his long experience,
his inventive mind, will add to that strongly.
So that is the view that I had when I asked him to serve
and that's how I feel about it.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answer. My time is up,
but I will say this. Obviously, the IC is not a policymaker;
you're analysts and providers of intelligence information.
The concern about Ambassador Freeman is that he has such
strong policy views, and those are not only his right, but his
responsibility to express, that this position may not be the
best for him because he will have to separate his policy views
from the analysis.
I just want to say to you, I don't have a particular course
to recommend, but having been around Congress for a while my
own sense is that this controversy is not going to go away
until you or Ambassador Freeman find a way to resolve it. I'll
go back and look at the statements that are on the record. I've
read some at length and they are very decisive even in the
context. So whether I disagree or agree with him, he's very
opinionated, and it's a question of whether--I suppose in the
end--and my time is up; I have to end--that this puts a greater
burden on you to filter out opinions from analysis to make sure
that you're giving the President and the other leaders of our
country unfiltered intelligence information, not biased by
previous policy points of view.
Director Blair. Yes, sir; I think I can do a better job if
I'm getting strong analytical viewpoints to sort out and pass
on to you and to the President than if I'm getting pre-cooked
pablum judgments that don't really challenge.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I guess I would say, to be
continued. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first make the comment about General Maples. Of
course, I've felt closer to you than an awful lot of the rest
of them because of your service at Fort Sill, and you are still
talked about at Fort Sill and as soon as you retire you'll
become a legend. I suppose that happens. But it's been great
working with you and I appreciate all that you have done.
My questions are going to be around the continent of
Africa. But before doing that, let me just ask you, probably
you, Director Blair. I have often felt for quite some time that
our assessment of North Korea has not been quite as strong as I
think it should be. I recall back from this meeting right here,
from this committee, in August, it was August 24, 1998, we were
talking about what their capability was in terms of their
nuclear capability and their delivery systems.
At that time I asked the question, or we asked the question
as a committee, of the administration at that time, how long it
would be before North Korea had a multi-stage capability. The
answer was at that time--I think it might have been a NIE or it
may have just been a letter from the administration--somewhere
between 8 and 10 years. Seven days later on August 31, 1998,
they fired one.
Do you think that our assessment of their capability and
their threat is accurate today?
Director Blair. Senator Inhofe, I think we've learned since
those days--and I was in an Active-Duty role having to do with
the Pacific at that time, so I'm familiar with the issues you
raise. I think that we have learned that North Korea is willing
to field and deploy with less testing than almost any other
country in the world would think is required. So I think that
our estimates at that time probably gave the Koreans--or
thought that the Koreans would go through more of these steps
required to verify the weapons than in fact has proved the
case. So our timelines are much shorter now.
Senator Inhofe. I was one who had very strong feelings
about AFRICOM. To me, as significant as the continent is, it
didn't make any sense to have it in three different commands. I
think it's working quite well. General Wald did a great job,
and General Ward now is doing a tremendous job.
But things are happening there that we don't talk about as
much as we do as some of the other areas of threat. I have been
concerned about it for some time, and I wonder if you feel that
adequate resources are--first of all, it seems to me it would
make a lot more sense if we had had the command actually
located in Africa somewhere. I know the problems that are out
there right now. Most of the presidents would say, yes, we
would prefer that; we can't sell that to our people, though.
Do you think that they have adequate resources now to take
care of the real serious problems in terms of transportation
and other resources in that command?
Director Blair. Senator, I am pretty familiar with the
establishment of AFRICOM and the desire to make it an
integrated, not only militarily, but also military-diplomatic
construct. I think the problem was that the Africans, with
their history of colonialism and so on, did not see it the same
way and frankly to this day do not see AFRICOM, which I think
was very smart for all the reasons that you state--many African
countries are looking for a hidden agenda there in terms of
growing American military power. I think that is the biggest
problem that we have.
We started out behind the eight ball as we did. We have to
sort of win it back an engagement at a time.
Senator Inhofe. Don't you think the successes in the
Economic Community of West African States are somewhat
indicative that parts of certainly West Africa are coming
around? My experience is when you talk to the presidents of any
of these countries they all agree that it would have been
better that way, but, as you point out, the threat of
colonialism and all that was an obstacle.
Now, getting to some specific areas, you mentioned in your
written statement about Zimbabwe, Mugabe, and some of the
problems that are down there. When you go there and you
remember that Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of sub-Saharan
Africa for so many years, and how this guy has just brought it
down to nothing--do you feel that, because of the economic
problems and the political problems that are there--and
everybody recognizes it. I talked to President Kikwete of
Tanzania back when he was the head of the African Union. They
all understand that that's a problem.
But it seems like there is a fear there to get in there and
correct the problem. Part of that is the relationship, I guess,
with South Africa that Zimbabwe has. What obstacles do you
think we can overcome, will be trying to overcome? My feeling
is that in Zimbabwe, as bad as their condition is right now,
that that's a magnet for terrorist activity. What is your
thought?
Director Blair. Senator, I think the larger magnet right
now is Somalia rather than Zimbabwe. In Somalia, the governance
and law and order problems are even worse than they are in
Zimbabwe. There's also terrorist activity up in the Maghreb
with al Qaeda in Maghreb group. So it's really those two areas
that we're more worried about from a terrorist point of view
than we are----
Senator Inhofe. I'm really thinking about in the future,
though. I know right now that that's not the problem. I know
Somalia is a problem.
Let's move to Somalia, then. In your statement you talk a
little bit about Ethiopia and the fact that they've withdrawn.
As I recall, when they first went down there and they were on
our side, very helpful at that time and joining forces with us,
that it was really there for a limited period of time. They had
limited capabilities and they said that, we're going to go
down, we're going to help, but we won't be able to stay for a
long period of time. Now, maybe my memory doesn't serve me
correctly, but that's what I recall.
The reason I bring this up is that there is a movement in
both the House and the Senate that is somewhat punitive in
nature in terms of Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles, and others.
Most of it's around social programs. Would you evaluate just
the willingness of the Ethiopians to help us? Do you consider
them to be a real ally?
Director Blair. I think in their action in Somalia,
Senator, the important thing was that the Somalis didn't
consider it, or a large portion of Somalis, didn't consider it
to be helpful. They attacked the Ethiopians, including some
Somali Americans who went back and became suicide bombers
against Ethiopia. So whatever Ethiopia's own mixture of motives
in actually making that intervention, it was not supported by
important groups within Somalia.
Senator Inhofe. A lot of that was because of Eritrea and
their problems, too.
One last thing I'd like to observe in Africa is the problem
of China. As you go through Africa and particularly in the oil
states, Nigeria and the rest of them, anything that is new and
shiny was given to them by China everywhere you go there. I
know a lot of that is their quest for energy, for oil, and
they've made their deals. But also, China has not been our
friend in Somalia, or in Sudan and some of the other areas. I
would just hope that our IC could be watching very carefully
the activities of China on the continent of Africa.
Director Blair. Yes, sir. We are doing so and we will
continue to do so.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.
Director, I was struck by your opening comments. I've been
on this committee, been privileged to be here for many years,
and I served on SSCI even longer, and I quite frankly can't
recall a presentation from someone in your position that began
with words like ``trade,'' ``GDP growth,'' or ``IMF reports.''
Then after a discussion of the global economic situation, you
used the phrase ``turning to terrorism.''
I think that showed very clearly how economic and financial
matters are inextricably related to national security matters.
The same could be said for our energy dependency, our growing
fiscal dependency and growing debt to other countries. I hope
this is not just a manifestation of the current economic crisis
we face, but represents an integration of our thinking about
all aspects of national security. So I commend you for that
perspective and hope you will continue to share with us on this
committee when you're before us. I thought it was rather
striking.
You've been asked about North Korea a couple of times. The
reports about the upcoming launch that they say is ostensibly
for satellite delivery, there have also been indications that
that may tell us something about their capability of reaching
Alaska, for example, with a missile. What do you expect?
Director Blair. If it is a space launch vehicle that North
Korea launches, the technology is indistinguishable from an
ICBM. If a three-stage space launch vehicle works, then that
could reach not only Alaska and Hawaii, but also part of the
west coast of the United States, what the Hawaiians call the
mainland and what the Alaskans call the Lower 48.
Senator Bayh. Are you expecting that that's what they'll
test?
Director Blair. I tend to believe that the North Koreans
announced that they were going to do a space launch and I
believe that that's what they intend. I could be wrong, but
that would be my estimate.
Senator Bayh. It could affect the priority we place on
missile defenses against such a threat.
I'd like to ask you about Iran, something that Senator
Lieberman and I have focused on together, and that is, as you
well described, the clock is ticking with regard to their
nuclear capabilities. When you look back at the past history of
these things, whether it's India or Pakistan or other
situations, you have to say that perhaps the clock will chime
sooner rather than later.
One of the few leverage points we have on them is their
vulnerability to imports into Iran of refined petroleum
products. I would appreciate your assessment about that
vulnerability and if we had a serious and sustained effort to
try and impact that, what, if any, impact that could have on
their decisionmaking?
Director Blair. Senator Bayh, beyond the sort of general
discussion of a mixture of pressures and attention to Iran, I'd
rather wait for a closed session if we could talk about
individual things, sir.
Senator Bayh. Okay. The reason for my asking--that's fine,
Director. The reason for my asking is that time may be of the
essence here and so we need to think about what matters might
actually impact their calculus, and this seems to be one of the
ones at our disposal and something we perhaps should get
serious about sooner rather than later.
Director Blair. Yes, sir. I agree, it's one of them I'd
just rather discuss in a closed session.
Senator Bayh. That's fine.
Also focused on Iran, Senator McCain mentioned the recent
test, I think it was the 70-mile missile. What is the status,
if you can tell us--perhaps this has to wait for the closed
session as well. But there have been published reports about
Russia's intention to deliver even more advanced systems,
General, than the one you mentioned that they have deployed
around Tehran. Can you give us any update on the Russians, they
signed the contract, but they haven't delivered them. Can you
give us any update? Obviously, if they were to receive even
more advanced air defense systems that would complicate the
situation and might give us some insight into the willingness
of the Russians to truly cooperate with us in trying to resolve
this effort.
General Maples. Sir, I can give you a specific in the
closed session where we think they are. But we believe that
Iran still desires to obtain the SA-20s.
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you about this. Maybe you can
answer this in open session. If they were to deliver such a
weapons system, would that give either of you any insight into
how cooperative the Russians are really willing to be with us
in trying to contain this threat?
General Maples. Yes, sir, I believe it would.
Senator Bayh. That insight would be that perhaps they are
not as willing to be as cooperative as some might like to
think?
Director Blair. I would tend to say, Senator, that it's
going to be a bargain and that's one of the chips, and it's
hard to say which chip will be more powerful than the other.
General Maples. I think also that, with respect to Russia
and their defense industry, Russia is spending an awful lot of
time trying to market their products around the world in order
to keep their production lines open. That's a very important
factor to Russia right now.
Senator Bayh. They do have commercial interests there.
With regard to Pakistan, Director--thank you, General. Back
to you. Can you give us--is it still your assessment that the
most likely threat to our Homeland would emanate from the FATAs
there in Pakistan? We'd heard that previously from your
predecessor?
Director Blair. I would say that the planning for such a
mission would most likely emanate from al Qaeda, the leadership
of which is there. Which foot soldiers they would use to
actually make the delivery I think might widen the area.
Senator Bayh. But the central nervous system for the
planning would emanate from that place?
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. Or perhaps Quetta, which we previously
discussed.
Well, with that in mind and with the current political
turmoil in Pakistan being all too apparent, how would you
assess their capabilities for actually exerting some control in
those areas? Are their capabilities improving? Are they static?
Are they declining because of the political instability? How
would you assess that?
Director Blair. Let me start. General Maples has also been
studying it closely.
You see in the Pakistani approach to these different areas
along their northwest and southern border different approaches.
Sometimes it's troops going in to pacify areas. Other times
it's deals being cut, as was true recently in the Swat Valley.
Other times it's neglect which they hope is benign.
I think that when I talked with the Pakistani leadership
they are not satisfied with the capability of their armed
forces to conduct those sorts of operations. But I do sense
that they feel that it would be some combination of military,
economic, and bargaining that would achieve their goals towards
the area. So I don't see a big change in fundamental approach
when I talk to them.
General Maples. I believe that there is a change in view,
particularly among the senior military leadership, of the
importance of military engagement in that region, in the FATA
and in the Northwest Provinces. I think we have seen an
increase in capability somewhat in terms of the capabilities of
the Frontier Corps.
Most of Pakistan's military capabilities, though, remain
conventional. They are just starting on the path of developing
counterinsurgency kinds of forces and it's going to be quite
some time before those forces are developed and able to make a
difference in the area. But I do think that there is a will,
and I think there is a desire, to do the best they can with
what they have.
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you this, and I'll try and word it
in a way that perhaps you can be able to answer it, because
there have been numerous published reports about this. But
there seems to be some divergence in opinion between their
leadership and ours about direct action against al Qaeda
elements in the FATAs. They seem to think that if those kind of
activities take place it destabilizes the situation more than
it helps, and if those activities take place, some others think
that it's what we need to do to try and disrupt them
operationally.
Do you have an assessment about these published reports?
Director Blair. I think they draw distinctions between
groups and there are some that they believe have to be hit and
that we should cooperate on hitting, and there are others that
they think don't constitute as much of a threat to them and
that they think are best left alone. So when you discuss it
with them, Senator Bayh, it's really almost tribe by tribe,
warlord by warlord.
Senator Bayh. Thank you again, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow up on that, Director Blair, that's probably
the way--whether we agree or not with Pakistan's specific
recommendations, tribe by tribe, area by area, is probably the
only way we can deal in that tribal area that's never been
controlled by a central government before. Isn't that right?
Director Blair. No one I've talked to has come up with a
grand strategy for that area that seems to me to be very
realistic, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Gates here expressed a real
commitment to making sure that we have an Afghan face on the
difficulties in Afghanistan. Of course, when we add 15,000
troops I think that makes that a bit more difficult. What plans
do we have to utilize our forces effectively or to bring along
more rapidly the Afghan military and eventually to extract
ourselves from that effort? Can you give me any thoughts on
where you see we're heading in that direction?
Our ultimate goal, I think, is for a decent government to
be in place, that stands on its own, and that presents no
threat to the United States.
Director Blair. Senator, I think you express the objectives
that we all share quite clearly. From the American point of
view, of course, that kind of an Afghanistan would be an
Afghanistan that's not a haven for al Qaeda and other groups
who use it to come against the United States the way they did
in 2001.
I think the difficulties that the current review is
wrestling with are how do you do that and what sort of
resources and periods of time are needed to do that, although
it is the responsibility of Afghanistan, they themselves say,
and we feel that they need some help in order to get there. I
think one thing that's important is that the intelligence
capabilities to support that help are also pretty important. I
know those of you who have visited the region know that the
commanders say that the intelligence support provided in Iraq
has been an absolute key to being able to make the sort of very
precise, almost person by person kinds of operations that have
been the key to success in separating a relatively small group
of these violent extremists from the bulk of the population.
If we are to be able to provide that sort of intelligence
to support not only military operations, but also how do you
support the political and the social programs that are going to
be necessary to root out corruption, to get basic services to
Afghanis, which will provide support for the government which
is essential to reaching that goal? That's going to be pretty
detailed, pretty intense intelligence support.
Senator Sessions. Are you suggesting that you believe we
could do better in intelligence in Afghanistan--obviously, I'm
sure we could anywhere--and that you need additional resources
and any other structural changes to do a better job of
obtaining intelligence?
Director Blair. I think we have to increase our
intelligence effort on Afghanistan, yes, sir. Some of that may
involve a shift of resources from elsewhere. Some of it may
require additional resources. I think it's essential to----
Senator Sessions. On a cost effective basis, your analysis
would be, and I think most commanders would believe, that good
intelligence can reduce the need for manpower?
Director Blair. Yes, sir. If you have to catch them first
and sort them out later, it's a lot more expensive than sorting
them out first and catching only the ones you need to.
Senator Sessions. General Maples?
General Maples. Senator, on the defense intelligence side
we're already accelerating additional intelligence personnel
into the theater to provide analytic support to General
McKiernan on the ground and establish a greater analytic
presence, particularly in Kandahar in the southern part of the
country. The ISR task force the Department has had in place is
already moving on providing additional ISR capability to the
theater to support General McKiernan as well. We have a very
extensive dialogue going on on the structure, the intelligence
structure that we're going to have in place with the additional
forces that are going into Afghanistan.
It's critically important for us that we have that
intelligence because we're into intelligence-driven operations.
Senator Sessions. Would you express the tension that I
think tends to exist between increasing troop levels and
increasing the Iraqi face on the situation--an Afghan face?
General Maples. Senator, there is a tension there simply by
a larger presence of U.S. forces. But the intent to have a
larger Afghan face is absolutely what we need to do and where
we should be going. U.S. forces, as we have done elsewhere, can
improve the security situation, just as the latest arrivals
into country in the areas to the west and southwest of Kabul
are already making a difference in terms of the security of
that region. Of course, that's a great line of communications
and movement into the Kabul area.
So if we can help in that regard and then free up ANA
forces in order to do other things in the country and put them
in the lead, it will help lead to success, I think.
Senator Sessions. I once did a calculation on the cost of
an Iraqi troop versus an American soldier and it was about 20
to 1. You could field about 20 Iraqi soldiers for the cost of
one American soldier in Iraq. I think we learned in al-Anbar
that local people, motivated and supported, can have more
effect than the American military in many instances.
General Maples. To the point of your question to the
Director, a part of what we have to do--and it is part of the
planning process right now--is to increase the number of
trainers that we have in country who are dedicated to
increasing the capabilities of the Afghan National Army.
Senator Sessions. I thank you for that.
Director Blair, you indicated that the support in the
Muslim world for terrorism appears to be declining, more
hostility to that. Are there things that we can do to evidence
a respect for the people in the Muslim world and that could
help accelerate that? I don't think we have an ability to
direct them in any way, but are there actions that we could
take that could help eliminate or reduce the support for
terrorism?
Director Blair. Yes, sir, there are actions we could take.
Partly it has to do with showing respect to the religion itself
and distinguishing between the religion and those who misuse
it. We have to keep in mind that this is something that Islam
has to figure out for itself, and you don't sit there on the
outside and try to manipulate it, not only because you can't,
but also because that very action would probably be
counterproductive in terms of the resentment of those looking
at it.
So on the overall scale that's important. When we look at
polling data and we talk to people, another factor is the
Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, which gives support to those
who take the more radical view, the insurgent view, versus the
peaceful view in that context.
So that's sort of at the overall international level.
Also at the local level, it's extremely important, of
course, that by a combination of intelligence and basic
training and cultural awareness that we act in the right way on
the local level in order to help the people who are trying to
live normal lives and make sure that it's clear that we're only
going against those who are trying to disrupt that.
Senator Sessions. Hundreds of millions of Muslims go to the
mosque and are faithful, loyal, decent citizens in their
country, obey the law, don't participate in terrorism, and we
all ought to always remember that.
Briefly, General Maples, very briefly, the status of the
elections in Afghanistan, how serious of a dispute is that,
whether they should be held or delayed some?
General Maples. Sir, I think most everybody has reached the
conclusion that the election should be held in August of this
year. The real question for us now is what happens to President
Karzai when his term of office ends in May, in that period of
time between when his constitutional term in office ends and
the elections are held.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
Senator Sessions was talking about the importance of
intelligence, particularly as it relates to Afghanistan. I'm
wondering, in Iraq when we were trying to determine how we were
doing--we had people saying we're losing, people saying we're
winning, looking at the same set of facts at the same point in
time. Logically they couldn't both be right. To move beyond the
discussion about winning and losing in Iraq, we went to
benchmarks to be able to establish a metric as to how we were
progressing, to what degree, or not progressing on certain
things in Iraq. I think we moved to a better dialogue about
what was happening and not happening.
I've suggested this before and I've written to the
Secretaries of Defense and State suggesting that we establish
benchmarks. But I wonder if actionable intelligence measuring
our capabilities to see if we're increasing our capabilities or
whether we're at a standstill in establishing actionable
intelligence, I wonder if that wouldn't be the kind of a
benchmark that would help us to know what we've achieved and
what remains to be achieved.
I'll ask either of you to respond.
General Maples. Senator, let me just start on more of an
operational level and the fulfillment of the intelligence
requirements that were provided from the commander, because I
think you're exactly right. As we look at the intelligence
requirements from the commanders, we develop our collection
strategies. But we have to have a process at the end of that
that is an assessment of how well are we doing, are we actually
meeting the need or are we just producing information, and are
we producing the right kinds of information that are enabling
our commanders to make the right kinds of decisions and our
forces on the ground to take the right kinds of action.
So I think that process on the IC side is absolutely
essential.
We recently had a National Intelligence Board, and I'll
mention it for Director Blair, but I think he has already
adopted the idea of intelligence metrics. That is,
understanding what the objectives are we're trying to achieve
and then using the systems that we have and our own assessments
to do periodic assessments and see how well we are doing and
where we are, and to provide the necessary updates to
commanders and to policymakers as well. I think it's very
important for us to do that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Director Blair?
Director Blair. Yes, sir. I think that the whole business
of the role of intelligence and telling truth to power and all
of that revolves around two processes within an administration.
One is in the initial stages when the administration, like this
one, is looking at policies to determine what it's going to do
going forward, we have to lay out the situation on the ground
so it's clearly understood what we're dealing with.
We're often asked if-then questions. If the United States
does this, then what will happen? We use different tools to do
that. One that we've used quite well recently was sort of a
tabletop seminar of playing out some possible policy options by
the United States with members, knowledgeable members of the IC
playing the roles of both adversaries and friends, and to try
to see how this all shakes out. So that's sort of the role
we're in now.
Then once a policy is set, then I think the job of
intelligence is to tell in a clear-eyed fashion to the
policymakers, how is it doing, how is it working? We've talked
about Iraq. Iraq was based on a set of intelligence assumptions
about things going generally in a secure direction if things
happened on the Iraqi side and on the coalition, the American
side, and some possible dangers that might trip us up if they
developed in a certain way.
So our responsibility is to look at that, and we have a
formal process of reporting periodically were the judgments we
made correct, are the things that we predicted to happen
happening, or have things happened--and were supposed to be an
early warning indicator and certainly a current warning
indicator of whether things are working out as they were
anticipated. I think that's the big role at the policy level.
Then of course down at the--once you put diplomats, troops,
the Central Intelligence Agency agents, and aid workers into
the field, then we need to provide the information that they
need to get their job done. Your feedback on that one is pretty
quick. You have a dissatisfied customer who's saying, I went
out to this area, you told me this was going to happen, and
something else happened.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be the case with basic
services. For example, if your objective is to establish basic
services, you could measure to what extent that is accomplished
and how much more you have to do. The same thing I think would
perhaps be the case in taking over the southern region: how
much of it have you taken over, the major population centers,
or are there some that remain to be taken over?
Let me switch a little bit and go to cyber, because it's an
ever-expanding asymmetric threat to the United States. In every
aspect of our American life, and perhaps even in the world,
cyber is critically important. Do we have the capabilities of
deciding if something is an intrusion into our cyberspace here,
whether it's a criminal act or an act of war?
Director Blair. We do not have the absolutely unerring
capability to determine that. It often takes weeks and
sometimes months of subsequent investigation. We call that
process attribution, who did it. The attribution process, if
you're lucky, can be quick. Most of the time it's very slow and
painstaking, and even at the end of very long investigations
you're not quite sure. So it's not a ``we know who did it.''
Senator Ben Nelson. Are we working to try to improve the
speed with which we can establish that attribution?
Director Blair. Absolutely, yes, sir. I think as important
as attribution is having defenses up fast. We need to be able
to detect a type of attack coming in and be able instantly to
spread that information across a broad number of networks, not
just the military and intelligence networks that we use for our
business, but wider government, the ones that you all use for
your communications here in the Legislative Branch, and then
critical infrastructure. That can only be done by some very
fast automated systems.
Senator Ben Nelson. So it's better to be a defense against
the intrusion than try to deal with it after the fact. But that
obviously is a tall order.
Director Blair. Yes, sir, but we're working on it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Maples, let me add my word of thanks for your
service and wish you the very best in your future endeavors.
I want to shift to another area of the world, Latin
America, which is close to the State of Florida and important
to us in many respects. Director Blair, I wanted to ask if you
would assess for us Venezuela's current situation given the
international crisis, economic crisis, as well as the decline
in oil revenues that we have seen to governments like Venezuela
as a result of the declining oil prices.
Do you see that dramatic decline in oil revenues to the
Venezuelan government as becoming a factor and impacting the
politics or the policies internally and externally of
Venezuela's government?
Director Blair. Yes, sir, externally it certainly affects
it. We project that Venezuela will not be able to spread around
its oil wealth abroad for the various projects that we all know
about. Internally it's also having somewhat of an effect since
these oil revenues are being used to prop up Chavez's populist
approach. At least originally, it doesn't seem to make him any
more modest about his goals of trying to become a ruler for
longer than his constitution currently allows.
Senator Martinez. Along those lines, do you see, as he
retrenches in some of his international ambitions--what are his
goals really in the region? He was a big purchaser of arms from
Russia and others. Obviously--and perhaps, General Maples, you
might want to comment on this. Has that curtailed the purchases
of arms and his high ambitions, to include submarines, attack
jet fighters, all kinds of things, including a facility to
build AK-47s?
Anyway, where are we on all of those issues? Has any
curtailment occurred?
General Maples. We're starting to see some decisions taken
that would delay the purchase of some parts of that equation,
and in particular you mentioned the submarines. The larger
purchases, we are starting to see decisionmaking that would say
they are going to delay that.
The earlier purchases for arms manufacturing, AK-47s, put
the plant in place, 200,000 weapons that they were bringing in,
the fighters that he was bringing in, we still believe they are
on track, and we believe that he is getting some credits, in
particular from his major supplier, from Russia.
Senator Martinez. Now, those arms are obviously not just
for internal consumption, but I know that they find their way
into other venues. Particularly I know that the Venezuelan
government seems to have been complicit for a long time, and
made public last year, with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). Do you see any lessening of Venezuela's
cooperation in providing sanctuaries as well as Ecuador's
participation in providing sanctuaries for the FARC, and how do
you assess the FARC's current situation given the major
setbacks that they suffered last year?
General Maples. Let me begin with your last point because I
think the FARC has suffered some major setbacks. From a
military standpoint, that's resulted in a great number of
desertions, both of members of the FARC and leaders of the
FARC. Nevertheless, they're continuing on in their narcotics
effort, which is a part of what they do. But their activities
are less than they have been in the past.
President Chavez is still supportive of the FARC, but less
so than we saw a year ago. No real response in terms of Ecuador
at this point, probably because there's less activity of the
FARC crossing the borders to the south.
In terms of the weapons, we have not seen Venezuela
supplying weapons. Don't know what the purpose of their
purchase is, so they're making investments that we are watching
because we don't know exactly what the intent is of President
Chavez for the use of those.
Senator Martinez. Now, the Venezuelan government I
understand has been complicit in the cocaine flow through its
territory both in the direction of West Africa, but also
perhaps directly into Europe. Are you able to shed any light on
this in terms of the Venezuelan government being complicit in
drug trafficking?
General Maples. Sir, I don't have any information on that,
on the drug trafficking.
Senator Martinez. The same with you, Director Blair?
Director Blair. Yes.
Senator Martinez. We know that Venezuela is pretty much
Cuba's benefactor and as a result of their largesse through oil
and other assistance provides Cuba with pretty much the ability
to remain afloat in what is pretty much an economic basket case
I think generally acknowledged. Any change in that relationship
in addition to the fact that Cuba appears to have some 40,000
Cubans operating in Venezuela, many of them I've read reports
are involved in providing personal protection to Mr. Chavez, as
well as obviously providing training to local police?
Obviously, Cuba's police is not a democratic police force, but
it's more a force of repression.
Any light you can shed on those kinds of activities, both
the reciprocal relationship, Venezuela's assistance to Cuba and
Cuba's participation in Venezuela's increasingly autocratic
government?
Director Blair. General Maples mentioned Venezuela pulling
back its support a little bit because of the price of oil going
the way it is. It seems that its cooperation with Cuba, both
its supply of economic support to Cuba and the reciprocal flow
of Cubans into Venezuela, is the last thing that would go. It
considers it more important. So we have not seen the effects on
that that we've seen on some of these other areas we've talked
about.
Senator Martinez. Focusing on Cuba, a week ago today there
were some pretty dramatic changes to the Cuban hierarchy. In
fact, for the last couple of years many have claimed that Raul
Castro in fact wants to present a moderate image and would be a
harbinger of significant change. Last week Carlos Lage, who by
many has been viewed as the reformer within the system and many
viewed as a potential successor to Raul, was not only relieved
of his responsibilities, but in a Stalinist kind of action, he
and Felipe Perez Roque, the former foreign minister, both
signed letters of confession admitting to their mistakes and
resigning from all political posts. It's sort of reminiscent of
Stalin in the late 1930s.
But anyway, can you shed any light on what the IC makes of
these changes, as well as the perception of Raul Castro as a
moderate when in fact over the last 2 years anecdotal reporting
of increasing repression within Cuba and absolutely no change
in any respect, with this new purge, which has included
bringing into the government now more military and continuing
an aging leadership that seems to be essentially closing ranks
rather than filtering any new air into the room.
Director Blair. I think there are different explanations
going back in personal relations and policy positions that the
IC is debating about those personnel actions that you
described. But a move toward political moderation is not one of
the explanations that anybody thinks is a reason for it.
Senator Martinez. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To set the table for my questions, gentlemen, I assume that
in this economic climate internationally the use of our
resources in terms of our money flowing to these various
nations that are so important to our national security becomes
even more important. I assume that there wouldn't be any
disagreement about that.
Director Blair. I'm sorry? Which kind of money flowing to
these countries?
Senator McCaskill. Any kind of cash that we're giving to
these countries directly from the American Government. I'm
assuming that is a pretty strategic, important resource for us
to be spreading around right now?
Director Blair. It's more important in hard times than it
is in other times, yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Right. Relating to that, I know that we
have given Pakistan over $12 billion and I would like to focus
my questions on Lashkar-e-Taiba, the homegrown terrorist
organization in Pakistan, and find out whatever we can find out
in this forum, how confident you are of the cooperation of the
Pakistani government with Lashkar-e-Taiba, if in fact they have
been obstructionist in terms of our investigations, if you
agree that Lashkar-e-Taiba is indicated in terms of involvement
with not only Mumbai, but the cricket team deaths, obviously
the subway killings in London, the international flights from
Europe to the United States, the plots to blow those up, and
your take on how we attack this issue of, while we are giving
them billions of dollars, they're refusing to even provide
basic cooperation in our investigations of this international
terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Director Blair. I think many of the details ought to be
saved for a closed session, Senator McCaskill. But in general,
I don't think the picture with Pakistan's cooperation is quite
as bleak as you portrayed. In fact, the action after the Mumbai
bombing in particular has been greater from Pakistan's point of
view than many previous ones.
Leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba were arrested and Pakistan has
undertaken to prosecute them. It has asked for India to provide
the evidence that could be used in such a prosecution. The
United States is involved in trying to work with both sides in
order to make that happen.
So I think that particular trend is positive. But it has a
ways to go and it's not a simple progress.
Senator McCaskill. Let me ask about visa-free waivers as it
relates to disaffected Pakistanis and their ability to travel,
and whether or not there are any concerns about that. Also, if
either one of you have any ability to share with us whether or
not--I know there is a significantly influential American-
Pakistani community. A lot of professionals and leaders in
every community in this country are from Pakistan and
wonderful, loyal, patriotic American citizens. To what extent
have we utilized that resource in trying to identify any cells
of disaffected Pakistanis that maybe, unfortunately, have more
leeway to travel than someone, for example, that's Iranian?
Director Blair. I think we'll have to get back to you on
that, Senator McCaskill. I do know that, in working with
ethnic-American groups, whether they be Pakistani Americans or
others, we get a great deal of cooperation on the very precise
issues like the ones you mentioned. But I think on the
particulars related to Pakistani-Americans and visa-free
waivers we'll have to get back to you.
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Senator McCaskill. Let me also ask you, where are we in
terms of our challenges of our language ability in the IC and
the ability of our resources to speak fluently and indigenously
in terms of gathering the most valuable kind of intelligence
that we can get?
General Maples. I can talk from my own perspective there,
and I think it's true across the whole community. We have all
been focused on recruiting individuals who have native, near-
native language skills, cultural understanding, bringing them
into the organizations. I know in my organization we have more
than doubled the number of individuals that have the kinds of
language and cultural skills that we're looking for, and they
are being used right now both in our analytic arena to give us
the cultural understanding that goes beyond knowledge, so that
we really understand events as they're happening on the ground,
and then forward in our human intelligence collection as well.
Having those individuals who have the right background and have
near-native language skills proves to make a huge difference
for us in human intelligence-gathering.
Senator McCaskill. Is there anything else we can do to be
helpful in that regard? As a former prosecutor, I know where we
got the best information and it wasn't from tough
interrogations. It was from our ability to infiltrate and
integrate into certain criminal organizations people who could
give us real-time information.
Obviously, in this area, when prevention is so important, I
just want to make sure we're doing everything we can to give
you everything you need to get that kind of capability that we
have been so concerned about.
Director Blair. That's a very kind offer, Senator. But I
think it's not a lack of resources or effort at this point.
It's the difficulty of it. I was just, for instance, last week
at a meeting of what's called the Heritage Council, which is
the heads of many ethnic American groups--Iraqi Americans,
Afghan Americans, Burmese Americans. This is the third meeting
with that group, and I'm told by both my people and the
representatives in that group that it's taken almost that long
to get the trust of the IC, for these leaders to realize that
patriotic Burmese or Afghan Americans who went to serve their
country and bring invaluable skills, it's okay, you are doing
important work and you know all of the misperceptions and
television-based rumors that are there.
So we are making progress in that area. But I'm not sure we
could have speeded up that program with more money or more
effort. It's a high focus and I think we're making good
inroads.
Senator McCaskill. I think that the comment you made,
Director Blair, about the recognition in our country that it's
not the Muslim faith that's the problem, it's terrorists who
inappropriately mask their terror in a religious connotation.
So many of these leaders in America, wonderful--and it's not
just the American Pakistani community I'm referring to. We
have, as you say, so many Americans that still have family in
Iraq and Iran, so many Americans who have family throughout
this region.
I just think they have suffered greatly because they are
profiled, they are looked at suspiciously when they travel as
American citizens. I think they are anxious to be helpful in so
many ways, and I just hope it's a resource we continue to try
to expand upon, because I think it could be very, very
effective, not just in terms of our diplomatic efforts, but
also in our intelligence efforts.
Director Blair. I think you're right. In my background--and
I'm sure General Maples knows it--the most highly decorated
military unit in American history was the 442nd Regimental
Combat Team, Asian Americans, many of whose parents and
grandparents were in detention camps at the time that they went
to Italy, and won more medals than any other unit in action.
Senator McCaskill. I think there's some recruiting to be
done there.
Director Blair. I think there is.
General Maples. You're exactly right, and these are
Americans who want to serve our Nation.
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I may be about to
ask you to parse words, but I want to follow up on the
chairman's question about Iran's nuclear aspirations. Director
Blair, in your printed testimony you speak about Iran's pursuit
of nuclear weapons as one of the goals that fuels Iran's
aspirations for regional preeminence. You go on to mention
Iran's goal of defending its nuclear ambitions.
Yet in your answer to the chairman's questions, you agree
with the rest of the IC that Iran has halted its nuclear
weaponization program in 2003 and not resumed it. Explain their
pursuit of nuclear weapons capability and defense of its
nuclear ambitions in light of your answer to the chairman's
question?
Then I'd like to ask both of you if you are in complete
agreement, if your agencies are in complete agreement with each
other on the extent to which Iran has abandoned its nuclear
weaponization goals.
Director Blair. Senator Wicker, there are three components
to Iran's nuclear weapons program. One is the fissionable
material, HEU--their current supply of LEU under the
International Atomic Energy Agency supervision, which could be
the feedstock to HEU, which could result in having enough for a
weapon by some time 2010 to 2015, and there's a difference of
opinion among the intelligence groups within that range.
Senator Wicker. 2010 to 2015?
Director Blair. 2015, yes, sir.
So that's the HEU which forms the payload of the bomb. Then
there's the weaponization track of it, which has to do with
developing the ability to take the HEU, put it with high
explosives into a weapon that can go on a warhead. It was the
work on that track that was suspended in mid-2003 and as of at
least mid-2007 had not been resumed. So that's at a pause as
far as late 2007.
Then the third track is the delivery capability, which the
delivery weapon of choice in that part, in most of the world,
is a ballistic missile. Space launch technology is no different
from military technology, and the Safir launch last month shows
that Iran is mastering the use of ballistic weapons.
So it takes all three of those to build a capability. The
overall situation--and the IC agrees on this--is that Iran has
not decided to press forward on all three tracks, to have a
nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile.
Senator Wicker. Are they proceeding on the first track?
Director Blair. They're proceeding on the first. They're
proceeding on the LEU track. They have not gone to a HEU track.
Senator Wicker. It's your assessment that they are not
producing HEU at this point?
Director Blair. Yes, sir, that's the assessment.
Senator Wicker. General Maples, are you and the Director in
complete agreement on this assessment?
General Maples. We are in agreement on this. In fact,
across the IC we're in fundamental agreement on the assessment.
I think between the agencies there may be some difference in
the level of confidence, but we're in fundamental agreement on
where they are.
Senator Wicker. Is it fair to say that the Israelis
disagree with that assessment?
Director Blair. The Israelis are far more concerned about
it and they take more of a worst case approach to these things
from their point of view.
Senator Wicker. Naturally they would be far more concerned.
But in their assessment of the facts as they exist, do our
friends in Israel assess the facts differently?
Director Blair. The facts are the same. The interpretation
of what they mean, Israel takes a----
Senator Wicker. So it's a matter of interpretation?
Director Blair. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Let me move if I might, Mr. Chairman, to Mexico in the
remaining time I have. The testimony talks about, the
assessment that I have, talks about President Calderon's
success leading to the increased violence. How serious of a
problem is this for us? To what extent is our success in
Colombia causing the drug trade to move to Mexico? Is there a
connection there?
Are there lessons we can learn from Plan Colombia? Is it
time for the United States to consider a similar plan for
Mexico, Plan Mexico, to fully devote our efforts toward this
problem, which appears from these reports to be very, very
serious?
Director Blair. I think that the violence that we're seeing
in Mexico, the drug-related violence which resulted in some
6,000 deaths last year, is directly the result of President
Calderon taking on the drug cartel. So in a sense it's the
consequence of a positive development. I would emphasize that
President Calderon's initiative is not just against drugs per
se, as bad as they are, but he is motivated by seeing that the
lock that the money and influence of drug cartels have on his
country is a fundamental problem, on the judiciary system, on
the police system, on the political system in many cases.
So he came to the conclusion that unless he went after the
drug cartels he was not attacking fundamental challenges of
Mexico, and he's taken them on and it's been an amazing and
admirable initiative on his part.
I believe, the President believes, that it is important to
support President Calderon on his initiative in many ways as we
can, from the Merida Initiative which began under the previous
administration and will be carried forward, to the things that
we can do on an agency to agency basis, whether it's the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) within DOJ, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), or us in the IC who can assist the Mexican intelligence
authorities on this goal which is in both of our interests.
Senator Wicker. You see President Calderon's program as
successful if he stays the course, even though the immediate
result has been this huge spike in deaths and violence?
Director Blair. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker. I certainly hope so.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we'll be willing to be a teammate with
them, with our North American neighbor in this regard, because
it certainly at this point appears to be a sort of surprising
and very, very serious problem.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually I wasn't going to start here, but let me express
my concurrence with what Senator Wicker just said.
When we look at this violence that is going on principally
along the border--it's not simply along the border and it's not
totally because of what the Mexicans are doing, although I
certainly would express my appreciation for their taking that
on. These cartels make $25 billion a year in profit. They have
highly sophisticated military people working for them, people
in some cases who were trained by our own special operations
schools. They use automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades
and grenades.
They are already in our country. The Mexican cartels have
operations in 230 cities in the United States. There was an
article in The Economist about a year ago that said that, as I
recall, two-thirds of the outdoor marijuana plantations in
California are run by the Mexican drug cartels, and marijuana
has replaced wine as the number one agricultural product of
California.
So I would begin--actually, I wasn't going to begin, but I
would begin by requesting that you take a hard look at the
threat to our national security that these transnational
syndicates are bringing. It's not just the Mexican drug
cartels. Fairfax County, Virginia, right across the river here,
has several thousand gang members, principally MS-13, who are
involved in a lot of violence and a lot of trafficking.
That being said--I wanted to say it before Senator Wicker
took off--the first thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is for the
record I'd like to point out that Director Blair, Admiral
Mullen, and I are all from the same Naval Academy class. I've
known Director Blair since I was 18. I think there are few
people in this country who have developed the expertise that he
did early on in his career with respect to Russia. In fact, I
took Russian with Director Blair when I was a plebe. We got to
the third class period, I was still trying to figure out the
alphabet and he announced that he could now think in Russian.
He's a pretty smart guy.
Director Blair. Simple thoughts. [Laughter.]
Senator Webb. I welcome him back to serving our country.
I also would like to say that I appreciate the context in
which you answered the question with respect to Ambassador
Freeman. I was one of those who was very skeptical about the
creation of the position that you now hold, and we corresponded
about that. There is an inherent danger when you centralize
intelligence, and we saw that with respect to the lack of
divergence of opinions in terms of the run-up to Iraq. We
simply didn't have enough contrary and meaningful discussion in
the IC before we went in.
So I think that the idea of having informed divergent views
is very vital to how our decision processes work, and I
appreciate that point of view.
General, a question was asked to you about the relationship
between Iran and Afghanistan. Is it not true that Iran is now
also allowing NATO cargo shipments to pass through Iran into
Afghanistan?
General Maples. Sir, I'm not familiar with that.
Senator Webb. We have been briefed to that effect. So
you're not aware that that's going on?
General Maples. No, sir. I'll have to get back to you on
that, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Webb. All right.
With respect to the testimony about China, Director Blair,
I've had a long concern about the incrementalism with respect
to China. You do mention in your testimony that China over the
past several decades has begun a substantially new phase in its
military development by beginning to articulate roles and
missions that go beyond its immediate territorial interests.
I actually wrote a piece for the New York Times about that
in 1995 when they changed their doctrine from pure defense into
power projection. I'm very concerned. It ties in with the
incident that we saw with the naval ship. They have been
expanding their military. In many cases it's understandable as
you're expanding your economy, but in other cases it should
give us concern, particularly with respect to the South China
Sea. They claim Taiwan, obviously. They claim the Shinkaku
Islands, which are between Taiwan and Japan. Japan also has
sovereignty over those at this moment. They claim the Paracels,
which Vietnam claims. They claim the Spratlys, which Vietnam,
the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia claim. They claim lost
territories basically wherever you can find a piece of Chinese
porcelain from 500 years ago.
There have been a number of incidents with respect to all
of those areas that I just mentioned over the past 4 or 5
years. They have been known to build facilities in Indian Ocean
areas. Burma is a good example.
So how are you seeing all this in terms of how that fits
together for the position of the United States in that region?
Director Blair. Senator, you've been I know following
Southeast Asia very closely for a number of years. I think the
Chinese trajectory there has changed in a somewhat more
aggressive way in the past several years from what we had seen
earlier. You will recall that when the code of conduct was
agreed to with a lot of Association of Southeast Asian Nations
pressure on China, it seemed that perhaps China was taking a
diplomatic approach there. It settled its boundaries with
Vietnam, agreed to the code of conduct.
In the past several years they have become more aggressive
in asserting the claims for the EEZ which, as you pointed out,
sir, are excessive under almost any international code, and
this latest incident with fishing vessels and a PLA Navy vessel
involved is the most serious that we've seen since 2001, the
EP-3 incident.
So I would agree with you that as far as the South China
Sea activities of China, they seem to be more military,
aggressive, forward-pushing than we saw a couple of years
before. The buildup in the South Fleet out of Hainan has been
larger than other parts of the fleet. So I think that is a
trend that we are seeing.
The other big development, of course, is the Chinese
deployment of a couple of ships to take part in anti-piracy
patrols near Somalia. On that face it seems to be a good
positive use of Chinese military forces as part of a group who
are seeking common goals.
So I think the debate is still on in China as to whether as
their military power increases it will be used for good or for
pushing people around.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Blair, in your testimony you stated that the
primary near-term security concern of the United States is the
global economic crisis. That isn't usually how a DNI begins
testimony to us, so it has caught all of our attention.
A cyber attack on our financial institutions would
obviously greatly exacerbate that crisis. What is your
assessment of the capabilities of terrorists to launch a
catastrophic cyber attack on our financial system?
Director Blair. We know that terrorists are interested in
using cyber weapons just the way they're interested in using
most any weapon that they can use against us. We know that they
believe that our economic strength is one of the targets that
they would most like to attack. That's partly why they chose
the World Trade Center, in addition to the symbolic reasons.
We currently assess that their capability does not match
their ambitions in that area, although that's something we have
to work on all the time because as things become more
widespread, terrorists can find hackers to work with them. So
it is a concern. But right now I'd say their capability is low.
In addition, I think the more spectacular attacks that kill
a lot of people very publicly is what they are looking for
also.
Senator Collins. The Federal Government's Director of Cyber
Security resigned this week and he cited a lack of support and
funding as well as an overreliance on the National Security
Agency (NSA) for combating threats to our Nation's computer
systems. I know that you have not been DNI for that long, but
what is your assessment of the adequacy of our efforts to
combat cyber attacks?
Director Blair. Senator Collins, I'm familiar with the
remarks of the Director of the DHS Cyber Center as he left. The
NSA is the repository of the most technical skill in the area
of cyber defense, based in large measure on its ability to do
cyber attack, which gives it an understanding of what the tools
are so it knows what can be used against us. So I'm a strong
advocate of the NSA making its technical skill available for
defending other networks, both in the government and in the
country.
I'm also aware that this very much has to be done in a way
that those who supervise us here in Congress and American
citizens in general feel that that's being done under strict
controls with oversight, so that we are protecting the right
information and not gathering information that abridges civil
liberties and privacy of Americans.
I think unless we can work out that way to use the
capabilities of the intelligence agencies for the right
purposes, with confidence from those of you in Congress and the
American people that we're not using them for the wrong
purposes, we're not going to make the progress we need to on
defending the country against those kind of attacks.
I think we can do it technically. We have to do it in a way
that everyone has confidence in. There's a review going on
right now on that very subject, being led out of the White
House, to try to build that structure and to get that support.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Blair, thank you again for returning to active
service. But I particularly want to thank and commend General
Maples for his extraordinary service to the Army and to the
Nation.
I associate my comments with Chairman Levin and Ranking
Member McCain, but I want to make one augmentation to the
record. Senator McCain said 38 years of service and I have
firsthand evidence that you joined the United States Army on
July 3, 1967, which makes it 42. So thank you, General, for
your service and your friendship.
General Maples. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. You're even older than Senator McCain
thought. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I can't say anything because he looks younger
than me and we're classmates. So I have to be very careful
about this.
Let me return to a topic that I think was broached, and
that is the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. It's operating in
Pakistan. It was in my recollection essentially a creature of
Interservices Intelligence (ISI) to conduct operations in
Kashmir, so its relationship to the Pakistan Intelligence
Service is very disturbing. It conducted the operations in
Mumbai, but some have suggested that it poses a much, much
broader threat because of its ability to operate locally in
Pakistan, because of its connections to many Pakistani
nationals who reside outside of Pakistan in Europe and even in
the United States.
Can you give an assessment, is this the group that is
beginning to fill up the operational space being denied to al-
Qaeda?
Director Blair. Senator Reed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and its
affiliate, which I believe is called JUN, J-U-N--this is the
widows and orphans humanitarian wing of it. There is a typical
arrangement often between extremist groups and----
Senator Reed. The Hamas model.
Director Blair. Yes, sir, which is well established.
You're quite right, its long ties as being a means to hit
India over the Kashmir issue give it strong roots. The Pakistan
Government has changed its policy towards Lashkar-e-Taiba
partially, but it has not become a force for good in Pakistan
or in the region.
I don't assess that it is replacing al Qaeda as a worldwide
terrorist directed against western, American interests or
shares the al Qaeda messianic ideology of a greater pan-Islamic
state and driving conservative Muslim governments from power. I
think it's much more directed than that. But it certainly has
the capability and can still carry out acts which are against
American interests.
Senator Reed. General Maples, you have comments?
General Maples. I would just comment that Sayyed, who is
the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, does have a belief in the
establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state. Lashkar-e-
Taiba has been very involved in Afghanistan with that as an
intended purpose. So while there is still the focus on Kashmir,
a focus on India, there's also a focus in the other region. I
think that fundamentalism is an issue that makes Lashkar-e-
Taiba a real concern to us, because I think they do have
ambitions beyond that.
I don't know that they have reached the level of another al
Qaeda or a replacement for al Qaeda, but I think that their
beliefs are very similar in nature. I also believe that the
Pakistani government, as the Director has said, has distanced
themselves from Lashkar-e-Taiba and has taken some very
significant actions in the recent past towards the
organization.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me switch to a different topic. We are in the process
now of redeploying our forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. One of
the key issues that both General Odierno and General McKiernan
have is their force multipliers, their intelligence platforms,
their special operations forces, those things that allow you to
build up the effort in Afghanistan, but also as an economy of
force measure in Iraq to continue to keep the pressure.
Can you give me from your perspective, Director Blair and
then General Maples, sort of, do we have sufficient resources
in this area, the intelligence platforms, the analysts, not the
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) intelligence but those things that
make the BCTs work well, for the effort that is before us?
Director Blair. We had a meeting on that exact topic,
Senator Reed, of the executive committee of the IC about 2
weeks ago, in which we went through that analysis. The short
answer to your question is that we believe we have the
facilities that could be brought to bear. We have it largely,
but not entirely. I'm confident that we will be able to put
adequate support in to support the level of engagement that we
decide on.
The heart of it from the military point of view is the ISR
joint task force, which now covers both Afghanistan and Iraq.
General Maples is intimately involved in staffing that up.
Senator Reed. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, the answer to your question is yes, I
believe we have the resources to do what is necessary from a
defense intelligence standpoint in both locations. We are
working right now with Multi-National Force-Iraq on the plan
for the intelligence structure that will remain as we go
through the drawdown. Our belief is that our intelligence
structure, with the exception of those capabilities that are
organic to the BCTs, will remain in place. The only adjustments
we're going to make is based on capacity and demand for the
tasks that we're going to be performing. But we are not
dependent on those resources in order to build the capabilities
that we need in Afghanistan.
That said, for me as we drawdown in Iraq there's still the
issue of how do we cover those areas that the BCTs have been
operating in from an intelligence standpoint, how do we do the
handoff of the sources, how do we provide insight and knowledge
of what's going on in those areas. We're working through that
plan.
A big part of that, as the Director says, is going to be
the plus-up that the Secretary of Defense has directed in terms
of ISR capability going into Iraq. In Afghanistan, we are
structuring for the buildup of forces and we've already started
that process, putting more analysts in place in Afghanistan,
more ISR capability that is going into the country now.
The real issue for us is the duration and our ability to
sustain the kinds of deployments and the expertise that we need
for Afghanistan. We're having to build additional capability so
that we can sustain that over time.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
My time has expired, but let me once again conclude by
thanking you, General, for your service to the countless
soldiers you've led and inspired, and thank you so much.
General Maples. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Director, my thanks also to you for your many
years of service and for your continued service to our country.
We appreciate all that you do to keep our country safe and
secure.
Let me, if I might, Director Blair, direct a question to
you regarding a hearing last month in front of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in which
Congressman Miller asked you to address a potential security
threat of relocating the Guantanamo Bay detainees to facilities
in the United States, specifically the possibility that holding
detainees here in facilities stateside may encourage an attack
on a facility to free detainees.
As you perhaps know, last year the Senate passed a Senate
resolution by a vote of 94 to 3 expressing the Senate's view
that detainees at Guantanamo should not be transferred
stateside into facilities in American communities and
neighborhoods. The President's January 22, executive order to
close Guantanamo and determine the disposition of individuals
detained at Guantanamo Bay within a year requires that those
individuals detained at Guantanamo be ``returned to their home
country, released, transferred to a third country, or
transferred to another United States detention facility in a
manner consistent with law and the national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States,'' and that's a
quote.
That same executive order requires you, as the DNI, along
with other senior administration officials, to identify and
consider legal, logistical, and security issues relating to the
potential transfer of individuals currently detained at
Guantanamo to facilities within the United States, and that you
and other participants in the review work with Congress on any
legislation that may be appropriate.
You had told, I think, Congressman Miller at that hearing
you'd have to go back and see if the possibility that holding
detainees here in facilities statewide warranted a threat. I
guess my question has to do with that follow-up. Have you or
your staff identified and considered those legal, logistical,
and security issues relating to the potential transfer of
individuals currently held at Guantanamo to facilities within
the United States?
Director Blair. Senator Thune, I was at a meeting yesterday
in which, at the senior level, we reviewed the work that's
being done by the working groups on those exact questions. All
of the things that you mentioned are very much at the heart of
the interlocking set of decisions that have to be made. I can
also say, as was specified in the executive order, that there
is a commitment to consult with Congress as these tough
decisions are reached.
I can say that if there'd been any neat and tidy ways to
handle these conflicting goods that Senator Graham and others
are right in the midst of from both a legal and a policy point
of view, it would have been found. It's going to be a series of
tough decisions and it'll require Congress as well as the
executive branch to help make them.
Senator Thune. Have you made any conclusions or assessments
about the threat yet or identified any of the security issues
that are associated with that?
Director Blair. Sir, I think that it does somewhat raise
the threat level when a prison contains foreign terrorists as
well as others. I don't think that that threat level rises to
the level of the ambitions of al Qaeda and similar groups to
try to conduct a spectacular attack that would be as great as
or even greater than September 11 on the United States or other
countries. But it does raise that concern somewhat.
Senator Thune. My assumption is too that the resolution
passed by the Senate last year would figure into those
deliberations and send a statement with regard to having some
of these detainees in American communities and neighborhoods.
It affects the deliberations, my guess is?
Director Blair. Yes, sir. It has not passed unnoticed.
Several members of the meeting that I was in yesterday reminded
us that the Senate is very sensitive on that score.
Senator Thune. Let me shift gears for just a minute. There
was an article written by Secretary of Defense Gates and
published in the Foreign Affairs Journal in January of this
year, in which he wrote: ``Both Russia and China have increased
their defense spending and modernization programs, to include
air defense and fighter capabilities that in some cases
approach the United States' own.''
He goes on to explain that, with respect to China, improved
air defenses, coupled with investments in other asymmetric
capabilities such as cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, and
anti-ship weaponry, all threaten the way that the United States
projects power. Secretary Gates wrote that ``These asymmetric
capabilities will require a shift to long-range, over the
horizon systems such as the next-generation bomber.''
My question is, do you agree with the Secretary of
Defense's assessment that in some aspects Russia and China's
air defense and fighter capabilities approach our own, and is
it your conclusion that they are proliferating some of these
advanced capabilities? General?
General Maples. I do agree with that. In particular, China
from the air defense standpoint has developed a very modern,
layered air defense capability in depth and is seeking
additional air defense capabilities that will project even out
to a range of 400 kilometers, that significantly affects
potential U.S. operations in that region.
Russia, quite frankly, is the developer of most of those
systems and is exporting those systems both to China and to
other countries in the world.
Senator Thune. What's your general view right now about our
capabilities in terms of long-range strike, and does the next-
generation bomber figure into our ability to project power on a
long-range basis, I mean going forward? What's your overall
assessment, because that's a big debate about whether or not,
in terms of procurement and some of the weapons systems that
we're developing for the future? The 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) said we needed a next-generation bomber by 2018.
There are reports, of course, that that is being scaled back or
perhaps eliminated entirely as a requirement.
What's your overall assessment? Shouldn't we be pursuing
upgrades in our long-range strike capabilities?
Director Blair. Senator Thune, the question of whether the
bomber is the exact right system for the threat is really a DOD
decision to make. But I would point out that there has to be a
balance between your strike capability and your intelligence
capability. I am personally as concerned about our ability to
find the right thing to hit as I am about the ability to hit
it. Advances in cover and deception, advances in potential
adversaries' knowledge of how we go about our business, and in
understanding have made it much more difficult to be able to
feed those target points to the weapons deliverers, whether
they're firing missiles or cruiser bombers or, down at a lower
level, whether they're a special forces team trying to snatch
somebody who's out to hurt us.
So I think that, while you're absolutely right to be
worried about long-range strike systems, I really am frankly
more concerned about being able to tell them what to strike.
Senator Thune. General?
General Maples. Sir, with respect to the capabilities,
that's the dialogue that's going on in the Department right now
as to the capabilities that we'll require for the future. It'll
be a part of the QDR process this year.
I agree with the Director, what we have to clearly explain
is how those modernization efforts fit together and the impact
that that is going to have on the systems that we field and the
systems that we require.
Senator Thune. Thank you both very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to extend my congratulations and thanks for all
the service you gentlemen have given to this country. May God
continue to bless you.
Last Wednesday, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for the
Sudanese President Al-Bashir for directing the genocide in
Darfur. Shortly after the ICC announcement, President Bashir
moved to expel foreign aid groups that provided food, water,
medicine, and other crucial supports to more than 1 million
displaced people from the Darfur region.
General Maples and Director Blair, can you give us an
assessment of what is happening on the ground today and what
the IC is assessing as may happen in the coming weeks and
months for this region?
Director Blair. Senator Burris, we are aware of those
actions that you mentioned by the ICC and then President
Bashir's reaction. We have moved to try to assess more closely
the humanitarian impact of the withdrawal of the food aid and
so on. It really is a matter of how long it's sustained, and
what the subsequent events are. Those are pretty much based on
President Bashir's actions.
The ranges of what might happen could go from another
humanitarian crisis because of continued denial of food
supplies, continued lawlessness in the camps that would cause
great suffering and deaths, down to a relatively mild worsening
to what's already a bad situation if they were of a short
duration and the relief organizations were back in. So it's
something we're looking at and it's hard to make a call right
now.
Senator Burris. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I have nothing to add to that. I
agree.
Senator Burris. What is the situation then with the U.N.
and whether or not they're going to be able to get some
peacekeeping troops in there? Do we have any information on
what the United Nations and Sudan are working on? Chad is in
there and they're already up to the border, or Khartoum. I'm
wondering whether or not that's going to escalate. What
intelligence do we have of what's happening there?
Director Blair. Senator, a United Nations-blessed largely
African force has been negotiating with the Khartoum government
for the conditions under which it can increase its presence in
the area. Certainly the U.N. has intensified its efforts
recently. But the indictment and President Bashir's reaction
have made him less cooperative than he was before on that
score.
Senator Burris. Do you think this will extend the problem
with the U.N. trying to move in?
Director Blair. I think it will make it harder, yes, sir.
Senator Burris. Let me shift gears, gentlemen, for one
moment. You heard Senator Wicker raise a question about the
drug cartel--I think it was Senator Wicker--in Mexico. There is
a report this morning indicating that a local police chief and
a handful of officers in Mexico were killed in a blazing attack
by the drug cartels. This seems to be a reoccurring story in
recent weeks and months.
Gentlemen, can you discuss the capability gap of the
Mexicans in their fight against the drug cartel? Given the
recent statement by Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates with
regard to the military assistance--I'm particularly interested
in the gap within their military--can they be able to handle
this situation?
Director Blair. Senator, I believe that they can handle the
situation, given the determination that President Calderon has
showed. The resources that he has put against it, he has
increased the number of troops he's committing. He's increased
the resources he has made available to those, both to his army
forces that are involved in that and to the other law
enforcement bodies.
He is moving to remove corrupt officials. He's taken a full
range of actions which are necessary to do it. I think he can
succeed. I think we have the responsibility as being on the
other side of that same border and, as Senator Webb, Senator
Wicker, and others pointed out, sharing the bad effects of
those cartels in our country, to help him.
I believe there's a strong commitment out of President
Obama and his administration, and I sense just from talking on
Capitol Hill that there's a very strong commitment here in the
Senate and elsewhere to support that. I'm very optimistic we
can take these guys if we put the resources in and work
together.
General Maples. Sir, one comment on that. The chairman just
returned from Mexico and a visit to the region. On his return,
the Joint Staff has taken his report back and is working up
some recommendations on how we could provide some assistance to
the Mexican military.
I know that on the intelligence side, personally I've had
interaction with my counterpart in Mexico, which is pretty
significant in terms of the relationship between the
militaries, in looking for ways that we can share information.
The Navy has recently signed an agreement that will enable a
sharing of information, and I think the other services are very
close to having that done in the near term as well. So we are
looking for ways that we can support the Mexican military in
their effort.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Burris.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service to our country
past, present, and future.
Along the lines of military assistance to Mexico, it seems
to be just from listening to the news that the threats are
growing. Would a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle
assistance program be beneficial, Director, General?
Director Blair. Right now we're talking with the Mexican
Government on many different levels, Senator Graham. I'm not
aware of all of the eaches of what we've done, sir, and I
hesitate to shoot off the top of my head about something like
that.
Senator Graham. Fair enough.
Director Blair, a nuclear-armed Iran in terms of
destabilizing the Mideast and making the world a more dangerous
place. If that event occurred, how would you rate it in terms
of 1 being not so much and 10 being very destabilizing?
Director Blair. It would be up on the 8-to-10 scale,
Senator Graham. The countries in the region would react. They
would react I think by looking to their own defenses, by
looking for more involvement and protection from the United
States, and there would be a spin in the region which would not
make it any safer than it is now, quite the opposite.
Senator Graham. Potentially terrorist organizations might
benefit from that technology? Would that be a concern?
Director Blair. The more nuclear material, the more nuclear
weapons technology around, the greater the chances of it
getting into the wrong hands.
Senator Graham. I read your report about Iraq. Do you think
it would be in our long-term national security interest to
consider an enduring relationship with the Iraqi government and
people after 2011?
Director Blair. I hope all of the effort we put on Iraq
results in a long-term relationship and not just a [indicating]
``done that, get out of there.''
Senator Graham. I agree.
Director Blair. There's been a lot of blood shed by Iraqis
and by Americans there, and I'd hate to think that we didn't
turn that into something positive for the long-term.
Senator Graham. From the strategic point of view, it sits
between Syria and Iran. It's pretty good to have a friend right
there. It would allow--Turkey's been a good ally, so I think it
would have some benefit. I appreciate that answer. I think we
need to think in terms of long-term security interests and Iraq
could become a very stable partner in the future. That's the
hope, and I appreciate that answer.
Pakistan. I just read in the news, so I don't know any
details, this deal that was done or being proposed between the
Pakistan government and Taliban type organizations in the Swat
region about sharia law being applied, what's your take on that
and how do you feel about that proposal?
General Maples. Sir, an agreement reached by the governor
of the Northwest Province with the militants in the Swat Valley
has both some pluses and minuses to it. From a judicial
standpoint, the application of sharia law in some form--of
course, there are many forms of sharia law--provides a more
responsive approach to the citizens in the valley, and that's
how the Pakistanis see it.
There are some conditions of the Pakistan government that
go along with this.
Senator Graham. If you were a woman in Pakistan, would that
be unnerving to you?
General Maples. Absolutely, sir, it would. It is also
unnerving to us from the standpoint of what that means to other
militants----
Senator Graham. Right.
General Maples. --in the region.
Senator Graham. Exactly.
General Maples. We're very concerned about that.
Senator Graham. Is it just a practical accommodation
because of weakness or is this in the mind of the governor of
the region a win-win? What would make one engage in such an
agreement?
General Maples. I believe it was, at least initially, was a
belief that he could reduce violence by giving in to that. The
reality is it hasn't changed the activities of the militants.
Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, to me it is a very
disturbing event that could really send the wrong signal to the
wrong people at the wrong time.
General Maples. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to budgets, Director
Blair, I think you're well positioned to guide this Nation
through some very difficult times, both of you gentlemen. The
President's budget proposes a decrease in defense spending.
We're at 3.6 percent of GDP, I believe is the accurate number
in terms of defense spending to GDP, and over time that budget
would go down to 3 percent. Is that a wise move? What effect
would it have, if any, on the ability to defend our Nation?
Director Blair. I haven't sorted out the consequences from
that point of view, from an intelligence point of view. I can
comment that, at least in the budget negotiations that have to
do with the intelligence part of it, the national intelligence
program, there seems to be a strong understanding of the
importance for intelligence, and I'll be up here testifying
about the adequacy of that soon.
Senator Graham. The reason I asked that question is we
envision growing the Army and the Marine Corps, which I think
is a good move, but the highest cost of DOD is personnel costs.
So if you're going to increase the number of people and that's
your highest cost already, something has to give somewhere. I
would like if you could look at it and see what would give, and
does that make us weaker or stronger?
When it comes to Yemen--I saw your evaluation--do you
believe it would be a wise idea to release any detainee at
Guantanamo Bay back into Yemen?
Director Blair. That would have to be decided on a case by
case basis. But the initial experience that has been had with
detainees that have been released to Saudi Arabia and then have
gone to Yemen has been really, really mixed. Some of them have
taken part and returned to the fold. Some of them have made a
move and then come back again. So it doesn't inspire
confidence.
Senator Graham. General Maples, have you reviewed the
detainee operations in Afghanistan? If you have, could you give
us a brief assessment of detainee operations? It is my opinion
that the number of detainees will likely grow as we engage in
more fighting. What is the disposition plan for foreign
fighters held in Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, or do we know
yet?
General Maples. Sir, I don't know yet. We have had
discussions about the issue that you just raised, and that is
as we introduce more U.S. forces, particularly in southern
Afghanistan, that there may be a need to provide for additional
detainees that we would expect to come in.
Senator Graham. Thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
We're now going to adjourn to Hart 219 for a classified
session. We'll meet there in 5 minutes. I expect it will be
fairly brief, but let's see if we can all get there in 5
minutes.
We stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
cooperation with russia on missile defense
1. Senator Levin. Director Blair, in your prepared testimony you
indicate that ``some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran
to achieve its security and goals might . . . prompt Tehran to extend
the halt to [its] nuclear weapons-related activities.'' As I mentioned
in my opening statement, there may be an important opportunity now to
explore cooperation with Russia on missile defense as a new element of
our efforts to dissuade Iran from such activities.
If the United States and Russia could agree to pursue cooperation
on missile defense, could it help to dissuade Iran from taking the
nuclear weapons path?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Levin. Director Blair, given previous United States-
Russian discussions on possible missile defense cooperation, if Russia
is interested in improving its security relations with the United
States, do you believe Russia would have an interest in cooperating
with us on missile defense?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
reconciliation with taliban
3. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, it
has been reported that President Obama suggested a willingness to
consider reconciling with more moderate elements of the Taliban,
similar to the way General Petraeus was able to improve security in
Iraq by reaching out to local Sunni tribesmen who rejected the violent
tactics of al Qaeda in Iraq. In your view, is the Taliban in
Afghanistan a monolithic group?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Levin. Director Blair and General Maples, are there
different factions or tribes within the Taliban that could provide an
opportunity to achieve reconciliation without returning to a situation
in which al Qaeda and associated extremists are able to find safe haven
in regions of Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
an afghanistan version of sons of iraq
5. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, a
major new initiative in Afghanistan is the Afghan Public Protection
Program. The program works through community ``shuras,'' or councils,
to select local members of the Afghan Public Protection Force, who will
serve neighborhood watch-like functions in their home communities. The
program will be accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Some see
the program as an important program for improving security in tribal
areas, while others have expressed concern the program risks renewing
or supporting warlords. Is the approach of paying local tribes to
maintain security in their communities, along the model of the Sons of
Iraq, applicable in Afghanistan, or are the conditions in Afghanistan
too different for this model to work?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
lines of communication
6. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
significant attention has been focused on the lines of communication
(LOCs) used to supply the United States and other international forces
in Afghanistan. The ground LOCs through Pakistan have come under attack
by insurgents, and the Government of Kyrgyzstan has decided to close
the Manas air base used by United States forces. United States
officials have emphasized the need to establish and preserve multiple
options, and progress has apparently been made in exploring some
northern routes, several of which would reportedly involve the Russian
Federation. How willing is Russia to support the overall international
effort in Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
7. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, how
much of a liability might reliance on Russia prove to be, bearing in
mind that any transit agreements offer host nations ongoing potential
leverage?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
cooperation on counternarcotics operations with iran
8. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
according to the International Narcotics Control Board, illicit opium
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan dropped from its record level in 2007
and the number of provinces free of opium poppy also increased, from 13
to 18. Despite these improvements, Afghanistan continues to account for
by far the largest share of the world's illicit opium poppy
cultivation. Some reports suggest that much of this opium is
trafficking to and through Iran. Does the Iranian government have
concerns about the presence of the drug trade and drug use in its
country and are they undertaking any law enforcement or military
operations to counter the threat of narcotics in their country?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, as
the administration continues to review its policy vis-a-vis Iran, in
your assessment, are there opportunities for cooperation between the
United States and Iran on counternarcotics activities?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
al qaeda in pakistan
10. Senator Levin. Director Blair, your prepared statement asserts
that al Qaeda has been badly damaged by the air strikes in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. You proceed to
speculate about what would happen to al Qaeda ``if forced to vacate the
FATA and locate elsewhere.'' The implication seems to be that you
believe the air strikes are making al Qaeda's situation in Pakistan
untenable and that they may be thinking of relocating. Are you in fact
implying that al Qaeda is being hit so hard in Pakistan that it may
decide to quit the region?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Levin. Director Blair, do you have evidence for this?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Levin. Director Blair, what probability is assigned to
this?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
pakistan-india relations
13. Senator Levin. Director Blair, many experts believe that
Pakistan seeks to dominate the Afghanistan Government, by sponsoring
militant groups like the Taliban, in part because of Pakistan's belief
that India seeks to annihilate the Pakistan state. In this view,
Pakistan believes it must have a friendly regime in Afghanistan so that
Afghanistan can serve as a ``strategic rear'' for Pakistan's
confrontation in the east against India. Pakistan also sponsors violent
extremist groups as proxies against India in the dispute over Kashmir.
These experts conclude that Pakistan is very unlikely to adopt a more
cooperative stance on Afghanistan unless the India-Pakistan
relationship is fundamentally changed.
The Composite Dialogue between Pakistan and India has made
considerable progress in recent years. Moreover, it was recently
revealed that India and Pakistan pursued a very serious, secret
backchannel negotiation over Kashmir since 1999 under President
Musharraf that reached a high degree of maturity before being deferred
due to the political decline of Musharraf. Does the Intelligence
Community (IC) share the view that the Pakistan-India relationship is
key to altering Pakistan's behavior towards Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Levin. Director Blair, does the IC believe that a
breakthrough in India-Pakistan security relations is possible, given
what has been achieved in the Composite Dialogue and in the backchannel
negotiations?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Levin. Director Blair, is Pakistan politically ready to
resolve its strategic differences with India?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Levin. Director Blair, how should the militant attacks
on the Indian embassy in Kabul and Mumbai be interpreted in light of
the revelation about the backchannel Kashmir negotiations?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
prospects for political reconciliation
17. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
the Iraqi Government must still enact important legislation to achieve
meaningful and lasting political reconciliation and stability. What is
your assessment of the prospects that the Government of Iraq will be
able to enact legislation this year that will settle the internal
boundary issues in northern Iraq with respect to the Iraqi Arabs,
Turkmen, and Kurds; establish authorities for the control and
management of the Iraqi oil and gas industry and the fair distribution
of revenues; and continue the resolution of constitutional issues
regarding the powers of the central and provincial governments?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
fragility or stability of gains
18. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
diplomatic and military leaders in Iraq have cautioned that security
gains over the last year are fragile and subject to reversal. What is
your assessment of the stability of security gains and reduced
violence?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what, in your assessment, are the greatest threats to these gains and
what are the prospects of these threats materializing?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
General Odierno, the Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, has
indicated that if Iraq can peacefully and successfully get through the
district and parliamentary elections scheduled through 2009, then
political, economic, and security gains will have taken root. What is
your assessment of Iraqi elections as indicators of increasing or
decreasing stability and security in Iraq?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
are there other indicators that are better barometers of improving or
deteriorating stability conditions?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
potential of iraqi security forces
22. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, an
important aspect of the improved security conditions in Iraq is the
improved capability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). What is your
assessment of the overall capability and reliability of the ISF?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, in
your view, what are the enduring challenges or threats to the
establishment of a reliably professional and capable ISF?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what is your assessment of security conditions in those provinces where
ISF have already assumed responsibility for maintaining security?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what is your assessment of the infiltration or the risk of infiltration
of ISF by sectarian militias, al Qaeda-in-Iraq, and Iranian agents?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
muqtada al-sadr
26. Senator Levin. Director Blair, in your statement you indicate
that Shiite militant groups affiliated with cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are
adapting their objectives and tactics away from violence to become
``cultural organizations and a counterweight to Western influence.''
You acknowledge, however, that some Sadrist groups remain dangerous and
may engage in sporadic attacks. What is your assessment of Muqtada al-
Sadr's intentions and capabilities through the rest of this year,
especially with respect to the district and parliamentary elections?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Levin. Director Blair, what do you expect Muqtada al-
Sadr and his affiliated groups will do to respond to or take advantage
of the withdrawal of United States combat forces through August 2010?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
strength of iranian influence
28. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
how would you characterize the degree of influence Iran exercises over
the government, Shiite organizations, and the Shiite population as a
whole in Iraq?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, is
this influence growing or shrinking?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
iranian nuclear intentions
30. Senator Levin. Director Blair, on page 20 of your prepared
statement, you write that ``we do not know whether Iran currently
intends to develop nuclear weapons.'' However, on page 9 of your
statement, twice you remark about Iran's ``pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability.'' Are these statements contradictory? What distinction do
you draw between the intention to ``develop nuclear weapons'' and
``pursue a nuclear weapons capability''?
Director Blair. The full sentence from page 20 of the prepared
Unclassified Statement for the Record was ``Although we do not know
whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess
Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them.'' To
``pursue a nuclear weapons capability'' is consistent with Iran
``keeping open the option to develop'' nuclear weapons. In particular,
as noted on pages 19-20 of that statement, ``Iranian entities are
continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be
applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision were made to do so.
a. (U) Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium
enrichment technology, which can be used both to produce low-
enriched uranium for power reactor fuel and to produce highly-
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.
b. (U) As noted, Iran continues to deploy and improve
ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear
weapons.
c. (U) We assess Iran since fall 2003 has conducted research
and development projects with commercial and conventional
military applications, some of which would be of limited use
for nuclear weapons.''
syria-israeli peace prospects
31. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
Syria and Israel, with the assistance of Turkey, have been meeting to
discuss a possible peace agreement. Does the IC believe that Syria
would be willing to give up its strategic alliance with Iran in
exchange for regaining the Golan Heights?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
syrian nuclear reactor
32. Senator Levin. Director Blair, your prepared statement
indicates that the IC believes that the structure Israel destroyed in
Syria was a nuclear reactor supplied by North Korea.
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Levin. Director Blair, do you believe that this reactor
was intended to support a Syrian nuclear initiative, or was it in fact
intended to support Iran's nuclear program?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
egypt-gaza border--rocket/missile smuggling
34. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, in
bringing an end to the Israeli invasion of Gaza a few months ago, it
was clear Israel's number one decisionmaking factor was whether the
Egyptian government had the will and fortitude to attack aggressively
the tunnels along the border with Gaza and the smuggling network
throughout Egypt that enables weapons to enter Gaza. In recent months,
we have seen the Egyptians undertake a number of efforts along the
border to identify and counter the tunneling threat. However, we have
not heard reports of an aggressive counter-smuggling effort. What is
the IC's assessment of the current counter-tunneling effort along the
Egypt-Gaza border?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what is the IC's assessment of Egyptian efforts to attack the smuggling
operations throughout Egypt, particularly along its border with Sudan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
36. Senator Levin. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, if
the Israelis do not view the Egyptian's activities as adequate, do we
believe the Israelis will attack unilaterally?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
united states national security threats
37. Senator Akaka. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples, if
history has taught us nothing else, it is that significance can develop
from unpredictable sources that had previously received little or no
attention before it was too late. What geographic region of the world
or subset of space/cyberspace threats not identified during the hearing
has the biggest potential to be a future challenge to United States
national security?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
cyber attacks
38. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Maples, for decades the
United States has maintained full spectrum dominance in the sea, land,
air, and space domains. Due to the scope and sophistication of
malicious attacks to our computer networks, we must pay equal attention
to the cyberspace domain. What is your assessment of the Department of
Defense's (DOD) organization and integration of its cyber forces across
the DOD?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
iraq
39. Senator McCain. Director Blair, on February 27, President Obama
announced his withdrawal plan for Iraq. I believe the President's plan
is reasonable, but it is not without risk. We will need to be cautious
as we withdraw troops so as not to jeopardize these achievements, and
listen closely to the commanders on the ground as the administration
determines the pace of withdrawals. I was pleased that the President
was willing to reconsider a plan based upon conditions on the ground.
Did the IC participate in the Obama administration policy review
leading to the decision to withdraw troops from Iraq? If so, how?
Director Blair. The Intelligence Community provided key findings
and analytic assessments on Iraq to a series of policymaker meetings on
troop drawdown options leading up to the President's policy
announcement.
40. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what does the IC assess are the potential flashpoints in Iraq that
could still flare and possibly require an adjustment to the plan and
did the IC convey this to the White House?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
41. Senator McCain. Director Blair and General Maples, does the IC
have the resources necessary to adequately support the withdrawal plan
for Iraq while simultaneously increasing operations in Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
violence in mexico
42. Senator McCain. Director Blair, as a result of increasing
pressure from the Calderon government on the well-armed and capable
Mexican drug cartels, we have seen a marked increase in violence,
abductions, and arms smuggling near the United States-Mexico border.
Last week, Secretary Gates labeled the situation as a ``serious
problem'' and signaled a willingness to provide increased assistance to
the Mexican government in the form of military hardware, training, and
intelligence support. Former Central Intelligence Agency Director
Michael Hayden stated recently the violence in Mexico will pose the
second greatest threat to United States security this year, right after
al Qaeda. Do you agree with former Director Hayden's and Secretary
Gates' assessments about violence along the Mexican border?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
43. Senator McCain. Director Blair, will that emerge as the second
greatest threat to United States security?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
44. Senator McCain. Director Blair, please describe in what ways
the IC is working with the Mexican government to contain this growing
threat?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
45. Senator McCain. Director Blair, a recent report stated that a
large percentage of the weapons used by these drug cartels originate in
the United States. Secretary Napolitano stated last week that the drug-
related violence in Mexico was a ``top priority'' for her Department
and pledged to work closely with other United States agencies to
confront the weapons trafficking largely responsible for this growing
threat. What steps have been taken to integrate the efforts of the IC
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to track and combat the
trafficking of such weaponry and related hardware?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
al qaeda and the federally administered tribal areas
46. Senator McCain. Director Blair, in your statement you say that
sustained pressure against al Qaeda in the FATA has the potential to
further degrade its organizational cohesion and diminish the threat it
poses. What do you think will happen to al Qaeda in the FATA if
pressure there were relaxed or halted?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
47. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe that the al
Qaeda leadership could establish the network's headquarters elsewhere?
If so, where?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
48. Senator McCain. Director Blair, are there any members inside al
Qaeda that could effectively replace Bin Laden or Zawahiri?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
49. Senator McCain. Director Blair, absent a safe haven and/or the
demise of its principal leaders, what happens to the movement?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
50. Senator McCain. Director Blair, currently, which al Qaeda
affiliate or affiliates pose the most significant threat to the United
States Homeland and United States interests worldwide?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
51. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe our European
allies are adequately concerned and focused on the threat posed by al
Qaeda? If not, why not?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
pakistan
52. Senator McCain. Director Blair, Afghanistan's problems exist,
of course, in a regional context, and we must increasingly view them as
such. A special focus of our regional strategy must be Pakistan. For
too long we have viewed Pakistan as important because of our goals in
Afghanistan. Yet Pakistan is not simply important because of
Afghanistan; Pakistan is important because of Pakistan. We cannot
simply subordinate our Pakistan strategy to our Afghanistan policy.
What is your current assessment of the future of Pakistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
53. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what are the chances that the
state will fall further and further under the control of Islamic
extremists? If it does, what are the consequences?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
54. Senator McCain. Director Blair, can you describe the economic
situation in Pakistan and how it may impact stability in Pakistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
55. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how do we address Pakistan's
border concerns or insecurities?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
56. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what role can India play in
stabilizing Afghanistan and how are we engaging them?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
57. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe that while some
of Pakistan's civilian and military leaders recognize the threat that
growing militancy poses, many government leaders tolerate or employ
militant groups as important policy instruments for maintaining
stability in western Pakistan or exerting pressure on Kabul or New
Delhi?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
58. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do believe the new government
in Pakistan and its military leaders are preoccupied about a potential
war with India?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
59. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe Pakistan's
insecurities about India can be reduced? If so, how?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
kurd-arab friction in iraq
60. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, the Kurdish presence
and claims across northern Iraq's disputed territories are fueling
ethnic tensions and potential violence between Kurds and Arabs. The
constitutional process for resolving disputed territories outlined in
Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution has stalled, and the United
Nation's three-phase plan to facilitate the Article 140 process has not
achieved measurable progress. How would you assess the current level of
tension between Arabs and Kurds?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
61. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, is it increasing,
decreasing, or staying the same?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
62. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, is Kurdish political
leverage diminishing?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
63. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, is this troubling to
the future stability of Iraq?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
iranian activity in iraq
64. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian government and
has a central role in carrying out Iran's policies in Iraq through its
special operations command--the Qods Force. What do you assess to be
Iran's objectives in Iraq now? Have they changed?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
65. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, do you anticipate
Iranian meddling during Iraq's upcoming elections? If so, what do you
expect?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
66. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, does the IRGC-Qods
Force continue to covertly train, fund, and arm Iraqi insurgents and
militias?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
67. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, will this activity
continue as we withdraw?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
68. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, will the Qods Force
target our withdrawing forces?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
69. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, do you have any
evidence that there are more or fewer Iranian-made weapons or
explosively former penetrator components going into Iraq?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
cyber security and cyber threats
70. Senator McCain. Director Blair, the United States depends on
the cyber infrastructure heavily, possibly more than any other nation.
Our Nation's security and economic prosperity depend on the security
and stability of our communications and information networks. On
February 9, President Obama ordered a 60-day review of the Nation's
cyber security to examine a Federal organizational construct to address
issues related to United States and global information and
communications infrastructure and capabilities.
What do you think the greatest threats to the United States are in
terms of cyber security and communications infrastructure?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
71. Senator McCain. Director Blair, at the threat hearing before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 12 you said,
``I don't think the combination of terrorists and cyber is a nexus that
we are most worried about.'' In an age dominated by asymmetric warfare
I would not necessarily like to rule anything out. If a terrorist
organization had the capability to damage or attack our communications
networks or its supporting infrastructure, would they do it?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
72. Senator McCain. Director Blair, are there currently any
indications that any terrorist group has the intent or capability to
launch a cyber attack against the United States or our worldwide
interests?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
73. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how is the IC currently
organized to address cyber threats? Is that structure adequate to
address the threat? Last month, you told the House Intelligence
Committee that the National Security Agency (NSA), not the DHS, should
be put in charge of network defense. Why is the NSA best suited to lead
this effort?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
negotiating with the taliban
74. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
in late 2008 discussion about ``reconciliation'' with the Taliban and
other insurgents gained momentum. Last week, President Obama stated in
an interview that the United States was not winning the war in
Afghanistan and opened the door to a reconciliation process in which
the American military would reach out to elements of the Taliban.
President Obama told the New York Times, ``If you talk to General
Petraeus, I think he would argue that part of the success in Iraq
involved reaching out to people that we would consider being Islamic
fundamentalists, but who were willing to work with us because they had
been completely alienated by the tactics of al Qaeda in Iraq.'' Is it
valid to consider the Sunni tribes in Anbar to be ``Islamic
fundamentalists'' and to view them in a similar way to the Taliban?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
75. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
the situation in Afghanistan is more complex than Iraq. What are the
risks associated with opening negotiations with the Taliban at this
time?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
76. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
do you believe we are actually in a position to begin constructive
dialogue with elements of the Taliban now?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
77. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
to begin these talks we will need to have at least moderate confidence
in our intelligence about whom we are about to open negotiations. Are
we there yet?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
karzai and the central government of afghanistan
78. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
few would argue that the central government's limited writ and
perceived corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency, and
feeding pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. President
Karzai recently called for early elections in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's independent election commission subsequently rejected
Karzai's call for the election to be held by April, and instead
formally confirmed August 20 as the voting date. The commission cited
security problems as an important factor in its decision, saying it
hoped the Taliban insurgency raging in much of the countryside might be
better controlled by August. Is Karzai disconnected from what is going
on inside Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
79. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
will there be an effective electoral opposition?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
80. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
do you assess that Karzai will be able to address the issues of
corruption and narcotics in Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
81. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
does Karzai have constructive relationships with his regional
neighbors?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
82. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
can you describe relations between the governments in Kabul and
Islamabad now that Musharraf has left the political scene?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
iranian activity in afghanistan
83. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, Iran is trying to
restore some of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern
Afghanistan where Persian-speaking Afghans predominate, while also
gaining leverage over the United States and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) there. Although the government in Teheran has a
long history of opposing Taliban rule, should we view Iran's role in
Afghanistan with suspicion?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
84. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, what can you tell us
of the role the Qods Forces are playing in Afghanistan?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
drug trade and counternarcotics operations in afghanistan
85. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, one of the thorniest
problems in Afghanistan is its flourishing drug trade, which accounts
for an estimated 90 percent of the world's heroin supply. In October
2008, NATO defense ministers decided to allow International Security
Assistance Forces to take on the drug traffickers who are fueling the
insurgency, destabilizing Afghanistan, and killing our troops. Can you
outline the general pattern of how money and drugs are used to finance
the counterinsurgency?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
86. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, do you believe
Afghanistan is a narco-state, or approaching one?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
87. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, what immediate and
mid-term actions do you believe could be taken, by both the Government
of Afghanistan and NATO, against the drug trade in Afghanistan that
could assist in achievement of United States and NATO objectives?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
88. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what role, if any, does the IC
play in supporting military efforts to target and interdict drug lords
and labs in Afghanistan?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
89. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how does the IC interface with
drug enforcement organizations in this effort?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
suicide bombers
90. Senator McCain. Director Blair, Professor Robert Pape, in his
book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, argues
that foreign occupation is the key driving factor behind suicide
terrorist attacks. ``The data show,'' he writes, ``that there is little
connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any
one of the world's religions. . . . Rather, what nearly all suicide
terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic
goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from
territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.''
Professor Pape wrote his book before the increase of foreign troops in
Iraq during 2007 led to a reduction in the number of suicide attacks
inside that country. What is your assessment of his thesis and how the
surge in Iraq affects it?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
91. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how does the presence of
foreign military forces rank among the drivers of terrorism when
compared to, for example, the widespread availability of extremist
education, internal repression and lack of economic opportunity, and
perceived injustices in policy?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
russia
92. Senator McCain. Director Blair, where do you assess that
Medvedev and Putin are taking the country?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
93. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you assess that Russia can
become a partner in counterproliferation and counterterrorism?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
94. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Maples, what is the state of
Russian military modernization?
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
belarus
95. Senator McCain. Director Blair, numerous press accounts have
reported that the Government of Belarus has commenced a strategic
outreach to the West, including a large release of political prisoners,
in an effort to develop an alternative to its close ties with Russia.
The European Union has responded positively. How do you assess this
reported shift in orientation?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
china
96. Senator McCain. Director Blair, China has been steadily
building up its strategic and conventional capabilities since the
1990s. China publically says its 2008 defense budget was $61 billion,
though the Pentagon has historically challenged Beijing's reported
figures as being low. All that spending has built a capable submarine
fleet, an air force stocked with Russian warplanes, improved ballistic
missiles, as well as satellite surveillance, radar, and interception
capabilities. While China continues to stress that its military
modernization is in line with its peaceful rise in the world, what do
you assess China's long-term security objectives to be?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
97. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what are its objectives vis-a-
vis Taiwan and other territorial claims?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
terrorist groups in south america's tri-border area
98. Senator McCain. Director Blair, the lawless tri-border area
(TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay is a haven for drug smugglers
and other radical groups, including sympathizers of Hamas and Hezbollah
according to the 2008 State Department Country Report on Terrorism. The
ability of these groups to organize, train, and raise money with near
impunity should be of serious concern not only to these countries, but
also to the United States. To what extent have these violent groups
been able to solidify local support in the TBA?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
99. Senator McCain. Director Blair, in your view, are the
Governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay equipped to combat the
threat posed by these violent groups and break up their operational
capabilities? If not, where are their shortfalls?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
100. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what can the IC do to assist
this effort?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
iranian involvement in latin america
101. Senator McCain. Director Blair, in January, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated that he is ``concerned about the level of
subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of
places in Latin America, particularly South and Central America.'' Do
you share in the Secretary's concern?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
102. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what steps can be taken to
counter Iranian influence in the region?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
human intelligence
103. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
through the Cold War, we largely emphasized space and signals
intelligence and deemphasized human intelligence (HUMINT). On April 14,
2004, the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the 9/11
Commission that it will take ``5 more years to rebuild the clandestine
service.'' As we approach the fifth anniversary of that
prognostication, what is your assessment of the current state of our
HUMINT capabilities?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
intelligence sharing and cooperation
104. Senator McCain. Director Blair, before the attacks of
September 11, there were institutional impediments to intelligence
sharing and cooperation both between the IC and law enforcement; within
the IC of the United States itself; and with our allies and partners
around the world. You've been on the job a little over a month and a
half now. Do you have any initial impressions of the analytic
capabilities of the IC?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
105. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how would you evaluate the
current state of exchange between the agencies of the IC? With law
enforcement? With our allies?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
106. Senator McCain. Director Blair, what impediments, if any,
still exist and how would you propose remedying them?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
107. Senator McCain. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
what can you tell us about the presence of IC analysts in Afghanistan
and Iraq and the value any such analytic presence brings to the time-
sensitive needs of our Armed Forces?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
contractors
108. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you have an estimate on the
number of private contractors that are used by the intelligence
agencies to perform intelligence activities?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
109. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe that these
private contractors require rigorous oversight from the intelligence
agencies?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
110. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe the
intelligence agencies have personnel trained and resourced to ensure
that rigorous oversight is provided?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
111. Senator McCain. Director Blair, do you believe there are any
intelligence activities that are too sensitive or too important to be
conducted by contractors? If so, please identify them.
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
relations with the secretary of defense
112. Senator McCain. Director Blair, at your confirmation hearing
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 22, you
said ``I think we need to get rid of this artificial division in this
global campaign against terrorists when the tools that are available in
the DOD and the intelligence agency are both applicable and both need
to be put together to get the job done. I find that operational
effectiveness is in fact distorted by the way the authorities which are
written for a different era come down. So I very much think we need to
fix that problem.'' How are your relations with the Secretary of
Defense?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
113. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how serious are the divisions
you discussed between the DOD and the IC? What would you propose to fix
them?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
114. Senator McCain. Director Blair, how do your organizations make
major joint acquisition decisions?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
115. Senator McCain. Director Blair, are you satisfied with the
current process?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
iran's nuclear program
116. Senator Collins. Director Blair, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) recently issued a report on the Iranian nuclear
program asserting Iran now has more than 1,000 kilograms of Low
Enriched Uranium--which if further enriched to weapons-grade--would be
enough for a single nuclear weapon. In the past 3 months, Iran has
completed the installation of nearly 1,500 new centrifuges--an increase
of more than 40 percent and now has more than 5,000 operating. IAEA
inspectors lack sufficient access to key Iranian nuclear facilities,
and Iran continues to refuse IAEA requests for design information or
access to additional locations related to many aspects of their nuclear
program.
Israel's military intelligence chief said recently that Iran has
``crossed the technological threshold,'' and its attainment of nuclear
military capability is now a matter of ``incorporating the goal of
producing an atomic bomb into its strategy.'' Your assessment is
different from that of the Israelis, correct? Please explain.
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
pakistan
117. Senator Collins. Director Blair and Lieutenant General Maples,
the political instability in Pakistan, the recent concessions to the
Taliban, the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and
the near constant tensions between India and Pakistan highlight the
volatile security concerns in Pakistan and of its nuclear weapons. Do
you believe that Pakistan's nuclear inventory is at risk of falling
into the hands of terrorists?
Director Blair. [Deleted.]
Lieutenant General Maples. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]