

**ENCOURAGING INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE
CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, Pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Leahy, Whitehouse, and Sessions.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Chairman LEAHY. Good afternoon, and I apologize that we had to change the schedule around because of Congressman Murtha's memorial service this morning. Congressman Murtha and I had served together for over 30 years, and our spouses have been friends most of that time. So like many others, both Republicans and Democrats, we were there for that memorial service. And I appreciate Senator Sessions and Senator Whitehouse accommodating that schedule.

One of the things we have done many times in this Committee—and seeing so many police officers here reminded me of this—is we turn to the critical issue of finding the best strategies to reduce crime. I chaired a hearing on this in the last Congress.

We want to hear about innovative approaches that are working in police departments and criminal justice systems across the country. We want to examine what the Federal Government can do to encourage the adoption of approaches that make our communities safe, because every one of us relies on our police to keep us safe, and every member of our police departments puts their lives on the line to do just that. We want to effectively and efficiently reduce crime and keep those neighborhoods safe.

In the 1990's, with the leadership of then-Senator Joe Biden and others, we passed legislation to create and fund the COPS program and other important initiatives that put thousands of new officers on the street, but it also, just as importantly, encouraged some innovative policing techniques and training. Law enforcement leaders in cities and towns throughout the country, bolstered by this National support, revolutionized the way policing was done throughout the country. And we saw the unprecedented drops in violent crimes during the 1990's.

Unfortunately, that progress stalled in the last decade as Federal funding for State and local law enforcement dried up and Federal

attention to finding the best approaches to reducing crime wavered. Rates of crime stayed largely stagnant, despite skyrocketing incarceration rates, and some communities saw, and very frighteningly, significant resurgences in violent crime.

One of the factors that prevented the crime problem from worsening in the last decade was continuing innovation at the local level. Enterprising police chiefs, hard-working law enforcement officers, judges, and community leaders worked together to find new and more effective crime reduction strategies. A lot of communities saw this pay off in many, many ways.

Now, the economic downturn has put an even greater strain on our communities' efforts to keep crime rates down. In response to this, Congress and the President acted decisively, including \$4 billion in Federal assistance to State and local law enforcement in last year's stimulus legislation. I fought hard for that funding, and the results are being felt. Crime rates are coming down as police departments are adding or retaining officers and again implementing new initiatives as we go into this new decade.

Even with this help, though, many police departments and criminal justice systems remain short on resources. We know that money alone does not solve the problem. You have to find innovative ways to work together to solve it.

So we are going to hear from leaders in the field who have set good examples for how our communities can make their law enforcement and crime reduction efforts work well. Chief Mike Schirling from Burlington, Vermont, has brought significant innovation to a small city police force. I am well aware of Burlington. My main office when I was a prosecutor was there in Burlington. I have seen the changes that have taken place over the last three decades. Chief Schirling has implemented comprehensive community policing and partnerships with all levels of law enforcement and also with schools and community groups. He is exploring the use of alternative sanctions to set low-level offenders on the right path before they enter the criminal justice system. He has targeted programs to address mental health needs. He has consolidated resources to help police departments function more efficiently, and he has pretty much led our State in the use of new technology to share information more effectively.

Chief Rodney Monroe has made great progress in Richmond and now Charlotte with initiatives like using technology to pinpoint law enforcement efforts and integrating law enforcement with economic development and job training.

Colonel Dean Esserman has made Providence into a national leader in community-based policing.

Chief Patrick Berarducci has also brought innovation to a small city police force.

Now, these are good examples from across the country. Cities like Los Angeles and Chicago are seeing results with gang outreach and mediation initiatives. Thinkers on crime reduction strategy like Jeremy Travis and David Kennedy with the National Network for Safe Communities have helped communities effectively tackle what have been intractable crime problems. The HOPE program in Hawaii has shown that probation supervision with swift and certain consequences—let me emphasize that from my own experi-

ence—swift and certain consequences can greatly reduce recidivism.

Today's witnesses come from communities that look very much like all of America. They have proven these approaches can work.

I believe that the Federal Government can help. We have seen in Burlington in my own State and many other cities that an initial Federal investment can make possible initiatives that might not have otherwise been possible. These programs are inexpensive and cost-effective. I have to think that, over time, they pay for themselves. Certainly for those who had worried about crime before and now do not worry about it, they feel it pays off.

Senator Sessions.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF ALABAMA**

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a good panel of people who have actually worked in the field over a number of years and who I think can share some very valuable insights with us.

I would say one thing I have learned throughout my career in law enforcement is that we must begin to see law enforcement as a unified whole, an enterprise in which there are a number of component parts that work together to make our people safer and reduce the threat of crime, to ensure that people who deserve punishment are punished in an effective and appropriate way.

I believe you are correct, Mr. Chairman, that swiftness and certainty is critical to law enforcement in terms of punishment. I also believe that sometimes that is more important than precisely how long they might serve. I would rather have people serve a little less time, frankly, if the case were processed promptly and efficiently, and I think you would achieve something close to the same deterrent effect. But I have difficulty in that crime arises from the multiplicity of jurisdictions that are involved in it.

First, we have to recognize, as this panel indicates, that the State and local law enforcement officers represent overwhelmingly—Federal people are not close in the amount of resources and personnel committed to it. Probably 90 percent of law enforcement is State and local. And what is it composed of? I see chiefs of police here. You have got the chiefs of police and police departments that are hired and funded by the city. Most areas or virtually every area have sheriffs. They are elected by the county and get their funding through, I guess, mostly, in Alabama, the county commission or what other fees and all that they charge.

Then you have got the district attorneys. In Alabama, district attorneys are primarily paid by the State of Alabama even though they prosecute cases in the counties.

And then we must not forget things like the forensic science departments which support you in so many ways and in many cases a bottleneck in that police officers go out and make a good case but nobody can give them the chemist's report to say the powder is cocaine or the fingerprint report or the ballistic report that could help bring the case to indictment, all of which delay the system.

Then we must not forget the judges. How much money do we spend on judges? How much money do we spend on probation offi-

cers, usually funded by the State? And they do background work on helping to determine what the right sentence should be as well as supervising people on release, and they answer, in Alabama, to the State.

So I guess what I would say is nobody is in charge of the system. It is just nobody is in charge of it, and we need to figure ways to work more cooperatively and effectively as a team. And when we do resources, we need to analyze what area in this system is in most need of resources and what institutions in the system could benefit the most from that and what precisely should additional resources go for. It may not be more policemen. It might be. It may not be, the shortage that you need.

I have seen in Alabama incredible shortages in the DA's office so that cases are made by huge numbers, and they are not properly being disposed of because there are not sufficient prosecutors. And then you have got some areas where you do not have jail space for people that need to be in jail.

I would note as an undeniable fact that not a lot of people are murderers, robbers, and rapists. And to the extent to which those are identified early and detained and jailed, you will make the streets safer. It is a mathematical fact. And I am not too worried about increased jail population if crime is going down. I think that is an argument for incarceration, frankly. But we do not need to have anybody in jail any longer than it makes sense for them to be there, and good research can help us to determine that.

So I look forward to hearing from this panel. I think it is a good group, and we need to make sure that we are spending our money wisely, and we look forward to hearing your ideas for that.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

One of the reasons why Senator Sessions, Senator Whitehouse, and I work very closely together on a lot of these things, we have each had a chance to serve in various levels of law enforcement.

I mentioned Michael Schirling is here. He has been the chief of the Burlington Police Department since January 2008. Previously he ran the department's Administrative Services Bureau, including emergency management and homeland security, the Detective Services Bureau, Training and Recruitment, and he started off as a uniformed officer in 1993. He helped found the Vermont Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force, and he has continued as the coordinator of that task force ever since.

I would like to think there is no need for such a task force. Unfortunately, the reality is there is, and it has served Vermont well.

He has been a State leader in computer forensics, was a co-founder of the Digital Forensic Technology Program at Champlain College in Burlington. He received his bachelor's degree in political science and his master's in leadership and policy development from the University of Vermont.

Chief Schirling, please go ahead, sir.

**STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. SCHIRLING, CHIEF OF POLICE,
BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, BURLINGTON, VERMONT**

Chief SCHIRLING. Good afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you here again and to discuss the challenges currently confronting small cities and U.S. law enforcement and how innovative

and cost-effective strategies could benefit public safety and the Government bottom line. I agree with you, Senator Sessions, that encouraging best practices and resource utilization is a key factor for us, and it may not be for all municipalities necessarily increasing the number of law enforcement officers on the street. I am actually going to talk about other issues today.

By way of background, Burlington is a community of approximately 40,000, located on the eastern shores of Lake Champlain about 35 miles south of the Canadian border. It is the central hub of activity and commerce for northwestern Vermont, which encompasses a population of about 150,000. So we are a rural law enforcement agency that has a little bit of city atmosphere to it.

We believe that critical law enforcement innovation can occur not just in traditional policing endeavors but also in other areas. Beyond traditional law enforcement, increasingly, law enforcement, together with the communities they serve, must focus on education and prevention as well as outreach and intervention to stem the tide of crime by reaching youth and the disenfranchised at a neighborhood level.

We have faced a variety of challenges in our area over the course of the last few years, and they range from recruitment and retention of qualified police candidates to shifts in violent crime from urban areas, challenges posed by computer and Internet crime, and diminishing resources to support offender reentry, among others.

Responses to those challenges I believe must be crafted using creative, collaborative approaches—as this hearing's title clearly states—innovative, cost-effective law enforcement strategies. And while there are literally dozens of things we could talk about, I have chosen a few that are sort of snippets or cross-sections of alternatives that we could embrace. Clearly, alternatives will differ in various regions of the country.

To begin with, integrated justice system models that take into account the idea that investing early on in changing the path of an individual away from entering the justice system are often going to be more cost-effective than prosecuting them if we fail. So education and prevention initiatives, and then outreach and intervention types of programs like pre-arrest diversion, municipal tickets, community justice centers, traditional court diversion—all could provide swift, meaningful, community-based alternatives to the traditional justice system potential at a lower cost.

Second, the consolidation of services and regionalization. As outlined to some extent in the introductions, the idea that we can consolidate some of our operations is one that I think is important to take a hard look at. We have been talking in Chittenden County in Vermont for over 40 years about consolidating the 13 law enforcement agencies in one realm or another, whether it is information technology, communications infrastructure, or simply consolidating all of the departments into one. That conversation has been going on for years. Yet there is nothing to entice local governments to take the initial steps into that consolidation arena. There is nothing to break the surface tension to get those kinds of program moving and begin implementation of the best concepts that could potentially result in enhanced operations and long-term cost savings.

One of the areas of potential innovation is in information technology and the consolidation of information technology infrastructures. There is extensive duplication of effort in core office technology, e-mail, and computer-aided dispatch and records management systems that contemporary technologies—increases in bandwidth and the ability to network multiple departments together—could achieve significant savings. Creating regional IT centers that host information technology infrastructure for multiple agencies could leverage technology to enhance information sharing and open doors to better services.

Among the other items that are outlined in my written testimony, the idea that unified strategies for offender housing could be a viable alternative; instead of duplicating facilities and trying to provide robust services to offenders that are either housed in facilities or reentering society, meshing those things together under one roof to provide sort of all of the necessary tools at a potentially lower cost rather than running, as we do in Vermont, multiple decentralized facilities at significant cost.

So all of these things potentially have merit as ways to encourage innovation, potentially decrease costs, and there are a variety of others that could potentially be embraced.

So, in closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, for taking the testimony on this important set of issues and for your continued leadership and assistance to law enforcement matters nationwide.

[The prepared statement of Chief Schirling appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Chief.

I was sort of sitting here thinking, and I whispered this to a couple of the others just now. I wish we had time to take the Committee out of here and go to some of these departments, whether it is Alabama or Vermont or anywhere else, and see some of the things that are happening.

As I said, Rodney Monroe, is the chief of the Charlotte—and I have difficulty saying “Char-lot”, Chief, because in Vermont we have a “Char-lot” and it is pronounced—it is spelled the same, obviously pronounced differently. But it was an example in a campaign by somebody who moved into the State to run for an office and was asked by his opponent—he was saying how well he knew Vermont, and the opponent gave him a list of ten names of Vermont municipalities, asked if he would just read them, and he mispronounced eight of the ten. That was one.

But he is the chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. He has led the largest municipal police department in the State of North Carolina since June of 2008. Before that, he was chief of another very large police department, Richmond, Virginia. His work resulted in the lowest number of homicides in more than a quarter century.

I might say parenthetically my son-in-law was born and raised in Richmond, Virginia.

Partly as a result of Chief Monroe’s community-based policing initiatives, Richmond’s crime rate decreased by around 10 percent in his 3-year tenure there. He began his career working for 21 years for the Metropolitan Police Department here in Washington,

rising to the rank of Assistant Chief of Police. He received his bachelor's from Virginia Commonwealth University and has graduated from the FBI's National Academy and the National Executive Institute.

Chief, please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF RODNEY MONROE, CHIEF OF POLICE, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Chief MONROE. Thank you and good afternoon, Senators. As chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, it is an honor to have the opportunity to discuss the tremendous progress that can be achieved by partnering and collaborating with other law enforcement agencies to leverage resources and strategic efforts in order to implement a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to reduction of crime.

In today's police environment, law enforcement professionals have an ongoing responsibility to identify strategies that are both efficient and effective in addressing crime and disorder within the communities we serve.

As an agency, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department has made it one of its highest priorities to maximize these relationships in order to enhance our capabilities and use of resources to fight crime. Moreover, experience has proven to me that crime is most effectively prevented and reduced through a multi-agency approach that encompasses a broad array of resources, skills, and expertise.

In particular, when focusing upon violent crimes and the offenders responsible for committing these crimes, our agency and the community as a whole receive great benefits when we formally organize our Federal, State, and local partners to share in that responsibility.

For the purpose of this discussion, I will provide examples of experience that has allowed us to see these labors bear fruit for our cities.

In my former role as Richmond Police Chief, as a result of the efforts to bring law enforcement agencies together, I led the coordination to establish the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Partnership to coordinate the prevention, deterrence, intervention, and the accountability of all of our policing efforts. The centerpiece of the CVRP was to coordinate those local, State, and Federal law enforcement to include FBI, ATF, DEA, Marshals Service, U.S. Attorneys, and others with the focus of sharing intelligence and strategically looking at various areas within the city that needed our attention.

The FBI, under their Safe Streets initiative, was responsible for identifying the most prolific gangs in our city. ATF, under their Violent Crime Interdiction Teams, addressed the top two violent neighborhoods. DEA, under their Drug Task Force, focused on our major open-air drug markets.

Other agencies' resources and expertise were also utilized. The U.S. Marshals hunted down our fugitives; Probation focused on conducting home visits of our probationers; the Sheriff's Department helped identify gang members through their jail intelligence

network. Our U.S. Attorney's Offices monitored and prosecuted firearm, drug, and conspiracy cases.

To sustain and continuously assess the effectiveness of this strategy, we made the point to meet every 45 days to make sure that we were achieving our stated goals.

I am proud to report that we experienced great success in realizing significant crime reductions in Richmond. In 2007 and 2008, Richmond experienced the lowest number homicides in over 30 years—from an average of 100 to a low of 35.

One particular element of the partnership was our "Call In" program. Under this program, we identified approximately 20 offenders that were called into Federal court before a Federal judge.

In the presence of the heads of the partnering agencies—FBI, DEA, and others—under the direction of the Department of Probation, it was made clear to these offenders that we, as a group, were watching them and their associates very closely to determine the level of criminal activity. And, further, we told them that we were going to use our combined resources to investigate and prosecute all of their crimes.

In addition, they were shown pictures of their associates and the amount of prison time that they received for their crimes. We had victims come before them to give personal accounts of the impact of the crimes upon them and their communities.

But, in addition to that, we offered them an opportunity to do the right thing, to refrain from engaging in criminal activity with a different approach. In those cases, offenders received services to support them in their efforts to rehabilitate and to change their lives. Those services included GED training, job training, substance abuse counseling, assistance in exiting gang life, and helping them to reunite with their families.

As law enforcement professionals, we understand that our primary role must always focus on crime reduction and making sure criminals are held accountable for their activities and the negative impacts on our communities. But we also understand that there is a greater role for our agencies to play when we work together to be effective in reducing crime and that criminal activity.

So, with that, we understand that other organizations that can work with offenders but also need the support of law enforcement need to be our partners also. Sometimes we can see even greater results in reaching out to these other partners than we can in bearing the load by ourselves.

I thank you for the opportunity to bring forth these ideas and strategies, and I hope that they will find root not only here in Charlotte but in other cities across America. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Chief Monroe appears as a submission for the record.]

Senator WHITEHOUSE. [Presiding.] Thank you, Chief Monroe.

As you will notice, the Chairman has stepped out. We have two votes on right now, and he has gone to vote the first time. Then when he comes back, I will go out and vote the first and second votes, then come back and relieve him. So if you see us getting up and down, that is the reason.

I am very proud now to have the chance to introduce Colonel Dean Esserman, who is the chief of police for our capital city, Prov-

idence, Rhode Island. Colonel Esserman is truly one of our most valued public servants in Rhode Island. He did not follow a traditional path to his job. He graduated from Dartmouth College and NYU Law School, served as an ADA in Brooklyn, and is general counsel to the New York Transit Police. There he ran across William Bratton, who is one of our Nation's most innovative police chiefs, and from there he became assistant police chief in New Haven, chief of police for the MTA Metro North Police Department, and chief of police in Stamford, Connecticut, before he ultimately came to Providence.

Our Providence Police Department has been transformed under the leadership of Colonel Esserman and his very impressive command team. Since arriving in 2003, Colonel Esserman has implemented key programs to decentralized the department and place greater focus on community policing. He is a leader on reentry of incarcerated persons into our communities and a key supporter of the innovative Providence Street Workers Program. He has established new community substation offices, encouraged police officers to interact more directly with citizens out in the highest-risk parts of our city, and partnered with local nonprofit organizations to help turnaround distressed neighborhoods.

Hardly a week goes by that the local newspapers do not report on successful programs developed with the Providence Police Department. This is in addition to an array of institutional reforms within the department which are not relevant to today's hearing, but have made a vastly improved police department. We in Rhode Island are very fortunate that Colonel Esserman accepted a position in our capital city 7 years ago. It is a testament to his skill and innovation that he has been called upon to testify before this Committee and a tribute to the selfless dedication of the officers of the Providence Police Department that that department now serves as an example for other police forces across the Nation.

I want to add just a particular personal word for that command team. The men and women of that command team are people who I have known for many years. Some of them served through quite dark days in the Providence Police Department. But they kept their honor, they kept their hope, and when the day came that new leadership was there, they have flourished and assisted in leading their department to brighter days. It is a truly inspiring human story of honor through difficulty and redemption through leadership.

So, Colonel Esserman, I am delighted to have you here.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL DEAN M. ESSERMAN, CHIEF OF POLICE, PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

Colonel ESSERMAN. Thank you for those words about my command team. It is good to surround yourself with people who are better than you. I have learned to do that.

Good morning to Senator Whitehouse and Senator Sessions. I am grateful for the opportunity to testify before your Committee. I sit here in front of you as one of America's police chiefs. I have been the chief of police of the city of Providence for 7 years. Providence is the capital of Rhode Island and the second largest city in New

England. The city of Providence proper encompasses a very high concentration of our metropolitan area's residents living in poverty; we are, in fact, one of the poorest cities in the United States for children, and for too long we were also a city that saw too much violence, especially violence among our young, among our children.

I am very proud to say that the men and women of the Providence Police Department who I proudly represent today, "Providence's Finest", have been making a difference turning the tide. For more than 7 years, crime has been going down in Providence. Led by an energetic and reform-minded mayor, David Cicilline, the Providence Police Department has done more than transform its strategies and tactics. The department has undergone extensive re-engineering and has fundamentally changed the way it thinks about itself and its work.

In the past, the department saw itself like many police: armed referees who kept an authoritative distance—to the point of being almost anonymous—while trying to maintain order in a community that was not their own.

I was recruited by the mayor to change that. In our re-engineering efforts, we have adopted the lessons learned over the past two decades in American policing of what works. First, we have embraced and instituted community policing, decentralizing the department, and dividing the city into neighborhood police districts. Each district has a community-donated neighborhood sub-station office and a commander accountable to the residents and to the department.

Second, the management tool adopted by the department to oversee our newly decentralized operations is weekly detective and command staff meetings driven by timely and accurate statistics—often known as the New York City model of Compstat.

The results speak for themselves. Over the past 7 years, crime is down 34 percent. This represents the lowest level in more than 30 years. And behind every statistic is a story, and behind every number is a name. Thousands of less victims in the city of Providence. And just as importantly, there is a strong and growing sense of trust and partnership between the community and their police department. When we form community partnerships, we are not just meeting, we are not just visiting. We are now staying.

I like to tell this story so that we do not abandon what works but, rather, build on it as we seek out new and additional and innovative, cost-effective crime reduction strategies for the future.

It is in these tough economic times that our city, like so many communities across our country, have been severely tested. These times cause us to seek out the most cost-effective crime reduction strategies and invest in what we know makes a difference. And so I am here to tell you today that cops count, that your investment in local policing has made a difference, that the framework of community policing works. America's police no longer work alone, nor need they.

In partnership with the United States Justice Department, whether conducting research or understanding best practices through the different arms of the Office of Justice Programs, such as the remarkable NIJ, BJA, or OJJCP, or the newly refurbished COPS office, or targeting offenders through the local United States

Attorney; whether in partnership with LISC, the Local Initiative Support Corporation, to transform distressed neighborhoods into vibrant and healthy places to work, and building our way out of crime; whether in partnership with the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence, pursuing an initiative first born in Boston in the 1990's, of working with former street gang members to intervene in violence and teach peace; whether in partnership with the Family Services of Rhode Island to replicate and enhance the community policing-child development program of police and mental health clinicians first pioneered by the Yale Child Study Center in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1992; or whether in partnership with the Department of Probation and Parole in the State of Rhode Island; and, finally, in 2006, with the National and Rhode Island Urban Leagues who approached this department about an idea from Professor David Kennedy at John Jay College. I am a charter member of the executive board of the National Network for Safe Communities created by John Jay College and David Kennedy. It has been brought to Providence, and it has worked.

All I mentioned, these many initiatives, and others, were born from federally sponsored research and started with Federal grant funds from the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the COPS office, or Project Safe Neighborhoods, and Edward Byrne Memorial grant assistance, they were innovative then and they are innovative now.

These investments directed by Congress in local policing make a difference. They bring dollars back to the neighborhoods of our many communities and to those who work and live in them. They save communities money, and they save Government money.

And so the future of innovative and cost-effective crime reduction strategies must be focused on the twin pillars of prevention and partnership with the community, as my colleagues before me have just said. The investment in children, families, and neighborhoods impacts crime and violence. It is cost-effective, it is well researched, and it is right.

And so an increased investment in technology, as is often raised in today's environment, would only be a step in the right direction, so long as the investment in technology does not replace the workers in the field but supports and augments them. The working officer on the street is the face of America's police departments. The working officer is the face of the working partnerships with our community-based agencies. The technology that can be developed to enhance ever more timely and accurate information, whether reactive or predictive, must be delivered to the officers on our beats. Only if it is relevant and helpful in the day-to-day work of America's front line police officers will it make the difference.

And one example is the BlackBerry I hold in front of me which, with Federal money that came from this Congress, is now called the "pocket cop", which is in the hand of every police supervisor in the city of Providence, and in the future, the near future, will be in the hands of every police officer in Providence.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Esserman appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. [Presiding.] Thank you. I might note that even the President carries one of those.

You may have noticed, Colonel, it was not because of something you said that Senator Whitehouse left or Senator Sessions. Those lights on the clock behind you indicate we have been having a series of votes, and we have been doing tag team. We actually have to have at least part of you on the floor of the Senate physically to vote. That can sometimes raise interesting things. I once had an unexpected vote, was out playing—

Colonel ESSERMAN. You are kind to allay my concerns.

Chairman LEAHY. I was out playing softball with my office team, and I arrived in shorts, a T-shirt, and sneakers, and I never had the courage to do that again.

Chief Patrick Berarducci has been the chief of police in Medina, Ohio, since August 2009. Prior to joining the Medina police force, he served as the chief of Police in Boardman, Ohio, and as an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. During his time with the ATF, he was highly decorated, received the Treasury Department's Medal of Valor and at least 11 other service and achievement awards. He worked extensively in the South Florida Violent Crime Task Force and the Caribbean Gang Task Force, which had to be an education in and of itself, where he led investigations covering a wide range of major crimes.

Chief Berarducci, please go ahead, sir.

**STATEMENT OF PATRICK J. BERARDUCCI, CHIEF OF POLICE,
MEDINA POLICE DEPARTMENT, MEDINA, OHIO**

Chief BERARDUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEAHY. Incidentally, everybody's full statement will be made part of the record.

Chief BERARDUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It may surprise you, looking at me, I know I do not look that old, but I am in my 37th year of law enforcement, and so I am proud to be here before you. I have been a fan for a lot of years. Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Some of us are entering our 36th year in the Senate, and we do look older.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead.

Chief BERARDUCCI. Thank you very much. Do I still have to count that time, sir?

Chairman LEAHY. No. No.

Chief BERARDUCCI. The city of Medina is 12.5 square miles, and we have a population of about 26,000 people. Eight years ago, the city of Medina was nearly bankrupt. We had to lay off police officers. We had to lay off city employees. Our bond rating was terrible. We had our battles with drugs and violence and disorder. But today, thanks to strong leadership, we have turned that around.

Medina was recently ranked 40th on the list of America's best small towns by Money Magazine. The ranking was no surprise to people of Medina. We have always known it was a great place to live and work and raise a family.

The architect of the community policing program in Medina was then Police Chief Dennis Hanwell, who served for 13 years. He is now the new mayor in Medina, and my boss, so I think it is impor-

tant that I mention that he set up this whole community policing thing. He instilled the philosophy of “broken windows” in our community, and in our community we adhere to the community-oriented government model also. So, basically, we are doing the same as all of the other chiefs have related to you today. We may call it something different, but it is the same basic type of policing.

One of the most important reasons for our success is our 5-year budget and the stability that it provides us. I already know what my budget is going to be in 2014, and I can plan accordingly. Every decision to hire, purchase, innovate, or participate is weighed against the effect on our budget. When cuts need to be made, we know well in advance and we can plan for them.

I would suggest our 5-year budget operates like a “broken windows” program for government by establishing minimal levels of order in our finances and maintaining the stability with the 5-year budget. As a result, our community is stable, and I am convinced it is an important key to our success.

As Colonel Esserman said, you know, our most important asset are our officers on the street, and I take very personally the responsibility to keep them from being laid off, to keep them working, and to keep them safe. I think this 5-year budget gives me those tools.

One of the things we did in 2009, we were looking for ways to engage the community, and the answer came from a young patrol officer named Sara Lynn, and her suggestion was to use Facebook to capture fugitives. And I have to confess, Senator, I did not even know what Facebook was when she brought it to my attention.

We began quietly putting the fugitives’ photographs on there, and we did not really even publicize it, but it caught on in our community. And today we have gotten well over 2,400 people who are listed as fans and follow us on a daily basis. We have arrested several of our fugitives, and we have other fugitives who turn themselves in rather than have their photo and their name placed on the page. So, you know, we really are getting a nice extra bounce out of Facebook.

The beautiful part about it for me as the chief is that when I have 2,400 people listening to what we say, we can then impart our different philosophies, tell them about our programs. We have an autism seminar coming on to teach law enforcement how to deal with the autistic and their special needs. We have people enrolling from all over the community based off of seeing that on Facebook. So in a small town, it gives us access to our community that we would not even normally have in our local newspaper.

Chairman LEAHY. And what is the population of Medina?

Chief BERARDUCCI. The population is just over 26,000.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Chief BERARDUCCI. We also use the services of A Child Is Missing, which is a nonprofit organization in Fort Lauderdale, and it is dedicated to helping law enforcement find missing children, the elderly, people with Alzheimer’s.

We made one call to A Child Is Missing, and they sent out an alert to 4,000 people in a geographic area in our community when we had a missing child. We found that child as a direct result of

that call and the calls that came in to us because of it. There is no charge to law enforcement. I think it is a great tool.

The other thing that we are doing is trying to use the things that we have more efficiently. We shut down our city jail, and we now take our prisoners to the county jail. That lets me alleviate the liability and the costs of running a 40-year-old jail and take advantage of a jail operation that is an accredited operation just a mile down the road from us. It saves us all a lot of money.

We do centralized dispatching for several communities out of our dispatch center, and the revenue that comes in from that helps us keep updated on our software and our equipment needs.

The last suggestion I have here for you today, Senator, we have over 400,000 police officers in the United States. They are trained, they are certified, they qualify on a regular basis, and yet every day there are officers getting on flights anywhere in this country who are off duty, and so they are not allowed to carry their firearms. Those firearms have to be stored in the luggage hold or not even taken on the flight. It just seems like such a waste to take 400,000 trained officers at a time when people are begging you for more money to protect our skies and make them sit in the coach section unarmed and have no effect on an outcome. So I would encourage you to look very seriously at that issue and look at the potential cost savings involved with that.

Thank you very much. I am sorry I ran over.

[The prepared statement of Chief Berarducci appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. I apologize for—the day started off early. I apologize for especially mispronouncing Medina, especially after I had talked with Chief Monroe about “Char’lot” and “Char-lot”. And I should note my staff had it written phonetically correctly in my notes. You have to understand, Chief, that Senators are merely constitutional impediments to their staff.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. So often we totally screw up. You probably have never heard that from your officers about the chief.

Chief BERARDUCCI. I have not heard that.

Chairman LEAHY. You might not have.

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEAHY. But thank you.

Dr. Muhlhausen is here. David Muhlhausen is a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis. He has testified before Congress on several previous occasions about law enforcement grant programs, particularly the COPS program. We sometimes agree and we sometimes disagree, but I want to say on a personal note, Doctor, I do appreciate you being willing to take the time to come here and testify any time we have asked you to, and I realize you have a pretty intense schedule, and I appreciate your taking that time. And I also apologize to you, as I did to the others, that we had to change things around today.

Dr. Muhlhausen received his Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Maryland Baltimore County and his bachelor’s degree in political science and justice study from Frostburg State University, and he is currently an adjunct professor of public policy at George Mason University.

Please go ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN, PH.D., SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Thank you for your kind words. My name is David Muhlhausen. I am a senior policy analyst in the Center for Data Analysis at the Heritage Foundation. I thank Chairman Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member Jeff Sessions, and the rest of the Committee for the opportunity to testify today on innovative crime reduction strategies.

The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of the Heritage Foundation.

This morning I want to lay out the case that innovative policing strategies and the leveraging of law enforcement assets can significantly reduce crime, but first I must caution Congress against further Federal funding for the routine activities of State and local law enforcement. The Congressional Budget Office recently warned Congress, again, that Federal spending in an unsustainable course. The national debt is set to reach 67 percent of GDP by the end of fiscal year 2010.

While the debt is driven largely by entitlement spending, Congress' funding of routine law enforcement activities and all the other programs Congress just cannot say no to only moves the Nation closer to fiscal insolvency. Given that public safety from ordinary street crime is almost exclusively the responsibility of State and local governments, and in light of the severe burden of the Federal Government's debt, State and local governments need to be weaned off their dependence on Federal funding for the provision of basic law enforcement. Simply put, it is not a Federal responsibility to pay police departments to be police departments.

Now I would like to discuss innovative policing and leveraging strategies that communities across the Nation should consider adopting. Innovative strategies such as problem-oriented policing, "hot spots" policing, and focusing on repeat offenders can effectively reduce crime. Unlike broader strategies that concentrate on community relations, these three approaches share a common focus of targeting high-risk locations and repeat offenders.

In particular, problem-oriented policing is a systematic process used by the police for inquiring into the nature of problems and then developing specific tactics to address these problems. During the 1990s, the Jersey City Police Department implementing a problem-oriented policing strategy that included aggressive order maintenance. An experimental evaluation funded by the Department of Justice found that the strategy was effective at reducing crime.

In addition to innovative policing strategies, local law enforcement, through leveraging assets with other criminal justice agencies, can develop effective strategies that have greater potential for reducing crime than if they acted alone.

While I discuss the pulling levers approach in my written testimony, I would like to take this time to focus on immigration enforcement partnerships under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Section 287(g) acts a force multiplier for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. This provision allows State and local agencies to assist in the process of identifying, detaining, removing from the country illegal aliens arrested for crimes. Before the implementation of Section 287(g), ICE frequently failed to take custody of the individual, thus setting in motion the individual's release. This inaction meant that the Federal immigration law was unenforced.

Based on 25 participants in the program, a General Accountability Office report found that ICE detained approximately 34,000 illegal aliens, put about 14,000 in removal proceedings, and assembled about 15,000 to be voluntarily deported. Congress should support the expansion of this program.

While State and local law enforcement resources wax and wane as the priorities of State and local officials change, States and localities have fully within their powers the ability to effectively allocate resources to strategies that have a proven track record of success. With the national debt equaling two-thirds of America's entire economic output, the Federal Government can no longer afford to subsidize the routine activities of State and local law enforcement. Such subsidies fall outside the responsibilities of the Federal Government. Under America's system of constitutional federalism, State and local law enforcement should never be made dependent on the Federal Government.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Muhlhausen appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. Well, of course, I have always felt that the safety of the public is a shared responsibility of all of us. I wish that those who are as concerned about the national debt now, something that I am not prepared to blame on law enforcement, I wish there has been as much concern expressed when this country entered into two wars and for the first time in history said we will pay for it with huge tax cuts, the only time in our history we have not found a way to pay for wars we were in. Perhaps the—well, anyway, I do not blame it on law enforcement. In fact, I feel that one of the things that may improve the economics of any area is that people feel safe in the area and they feel they have good law enforcement. And trust me, I will give you plenty of time to respond to that.

I want to go to Chief Schirling. You talked about the justice system integration model, and let me give you a quick thumbnail, part of an overall approach to crime reduction, including education, community outreach, and use of alternative sanctions in low-level cases. Can you tell us a little bit more about this? Burlington is sort of the hub of a county which has about a quarter of our State's population. Why do you believe this is the best approach for Burlington? How do you feel that has worked or has not worked?

Chief SCHIRLING. Certainly. Thank you. We have been involved in a variety of pilot projects to date that, in partnership with our Community Justice Center, seek to find alternative routes for people that are involved in low-level crime and disorder. So the concept is that rather than taking somebody in their first, second, or third offense retail theft or disorderly conduct or some other low-

level offense, rather than putting them into a justice system that at present, candidly, does not deliver swift or sure sanction—and it is widely agreed that that is a critical component to the system having any kind of deterrent effect. Rather than doing that, we are able to deliver a much quicker, more sure community-based restorative process in hopes of not allowing that person—or guiding that person for their behavior not to deteriorate further into more substantial crime.

The idea is that you bring together a variety of potential sanctions ranging from civil and municipal tickets to time with restorative panels that are made up of community members and victims of crime and educate the person to the impact of their actions and then give them some kind of alternative sanction or community service, restitution for damaged property or stolen property, things along those lines. And the idea is that if you can change their path through those low-level alternative sanctions, hopefully they will not enter the justice system, which is much more costly and potentially less effective for those low-level offenses.

Now, clearly those things do not work relative to high-level felonies and violent crime, but we have had some success in turning people away from the traditional justice system by investing in those low-level, community-based approaches.

Chairman LEAHY. If you were to commit an armed robbery or something like that, you would go through the regular judicial system.

Chief SCHIRLING. Correct. Part of the concept is that you reserve—

Chairman LEAHY. If it was vandalism or something like that, you might go to the other.

Chief SCHIRLING. Correct. In Vermont, we suffer from a lack of capacity. The police can arrest more people than can be prosecuted. The prosecutors can convict more people than can be incarcerated. It is a problem that exists in many places in the country. So you have to have some alternative models. They have to be swift and sure to be effective. They do not necessarily have to be severe, but they have to be meaningful.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Chief Monroe, you have used various technology to try to make sure you are doing the best possible use of law enforcement. It is a little bit different than the days when some of us first started in law enforcement. Can you tell us some of the examples of how you have used technology?

Chief MONROE. Well, one of the things that I think all law enforcement needs is the ability to be able to target its resources in a sure and certain manner with information that is both accurate and timely. And what we embarked upon both in Richmond and now here in Charlotte is predictive analytics where we take a host of different data sources, whether it is arrest data, crime data, call for service data, even weather, and put it into a model whereby we can refresh it every 2 hours to start looking at where do we think the most likelihood of crime to occur is, certain types of crime, whether it is burglaries, robberies, other thefts, and be able to start deploying our resources ahead of time.

Also, rather than having two or three robberies that may be committed by the same individual, being notified through the system to say that you have had that second robbery, and these are the dynamics associated with that robbery, the type of locations, the type of victims, the type of suspect information and be able to deploy your resources so that you do not see that third or fourth robbery in the particular case.

So predictive analytics serves to allow us to put our resources where they need to be based on information that we already have at our disposal.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Chief Schirling, can you name one or two things that you feel is the most effective in the technology you have used?

Chief SCHIRLING. My colleagues have outlined a variety of cutting-edge technologies that are in play now. I think one of the things that could potentially be leveraged to a greater extent to supplement and enhance what has been described and potentially reduce costs is the development of more contemporary computer-aided dispatch and records management systems that feed data into those predictive analytics systems. Right now, law enforcement spends millions of dollars annually to purchase and maintain computer-aided dispatch and records management systems that are often built on aging technology. Technology changes rather quickly.

In addition to that, our prosecutors, our courts, corrections, our public defenders all build parallel systems, and then we spend money to connect those systems together rather than looking at it as one integrated justice information system, one scalable record that could exist about an event that starts when a dispatcher takes a call in the 911 center and ends when potentially someone ends up in a correctional facility, one thread of common information that could be fed back into giving us robust information about predictive analytics and other information.

Chairman LEAHY. And wouldn't it be possible to do that in a way to have enough safeguards for the obvious privacy concerns?

Chief SCHIRLING. Absolutely. Contemporary technology will allow you to create silos of access within that integrated system to ensure that information only flowed in the directions that were applicable.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. I am going to turn the gavel over to Senator Whitehouse, and I will be back.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman.

I wanted to ask a number of questions. First, I wanted to ask Chief Monroe, going back to your days in Richmond, I remember Richmond as being the birthplace during the Clinton administration of the Federal firearms enhanced prosecution initiative, that it was that district and the U.S. Attorney that began that project, that gave it sort of a name and branded it and put in on the sides of buses and all that.

We did a similar project up in Rhode Island, but it was more informally. It did not have a name, and it did not have the publicity.

By the time you became the chief and through your time there, you know, some of these programs, they start very well and then after time goes by for a while, they begin to lose their luster or new programs come along.

How was the duration of that program in Richmond? And what was it like when you were there? Was it still going on? And how effective has that been?

Chief MONROE. We are speaking of Project Exile, and we rebirthed Project Exile in Richmond. It was part of our comprehensive violence reduction strategy that involved our Federal counterparts. And we used that law from two perspectives: one, to really go after individuals that were illegally possessing handguns that were convicted felons within the city, and had them face the Federal system, whereby when Senator Leahy talked about swift and certain justice, that is what we saw in the Federal system with those gun-related cases, and we publicized that information.

When I spoke about our Call In program, when we called individuals in, we spoke about Project Exile and the amount of time that individuals were receiving for the mere possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and that served us well in reducing the amount of gun violence that we saw in Richmond. Our homicides reduced from over 100 a year to an all-time low of 35, as well as our shootings, and we primarily attribute a great deal of that success to Project Exile.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Good. I know that the Clinton administration initiative was actually expanded during the Bush administration, but I believe Richmond is the place where it has the longest track record, so I am delighted to hear your experience that it has stood the test of time there.

Chief MONROE. Yes, it did.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Chief Esserman, you mentioned specifically your relationship with LISC, the Local Initiative Support Corporation. I am aware of some of the activities that you have worked with LISC on and some of the successes you have seen, but I do not think that the Committee is, and I would like to have the record of the Committee reflect some of that activity, if you could describe it in a little bit greater detail, both as to the nature of the partnership, the nature of the activity, and the nature of the success that you found through it.

Colonel ESSERMAN. Thank you, Senator. LISC, the Local Initiative Support Corporation, is housed in many communities across our Nation, and Rhode Island is one. And it is one of the foundational partnerships we have in rebuilding neighborhoods, home by home, community development corporations, officers working to redesign neighborhoods, streets, parks.

The commanding officer of the poorest neighborhood in the State of Rhode Island, Olneyville, who grew up in that neighborhood and now commands that neighborhood district, is probably the greatest proponent, as he has worked side by side with LISC to redesign the neighborhood he grew up in, to rebuild the park that you presided over at the reopening of it, to hear Professor Herman Goldstein, probably the old sage of the new American policing movement of problem-oriented policing and community policing, sit there and cheer in the audience as he watched that ribbon being cut, designing your way out of crime, building your way out of crime.

It is an unusual partnership that has brought crime down in that neighborhood over 75 percent. The neighborhood that was the busiest in the city and ate up the most calls for service in our large

police department is now a department that is patrolled alone by an officer who is not rushing from call to call. It is one of the partnerships that I believe matters as I hear my colleagues who I know speak about better catching, it must be coupled with better prevention, and better prevention is the business we are in as much as it is better apprehension. And LISC or the other partnerships we speak about and that we are all involved in is really a story of prevention, just as it must be coupled with successful and strong apprehension.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I will yield to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Colonel Esserman, I know you favor the “broken windows” policy, the community policing concepts. I remember when those began, and they struck me at the time as very effective techniques. Based on your experience—I guess I will follow up on the Exile-type question—do you think they are proven techniques that they should be adopted as good policies throughout the country?

Colonel ESSERMAN. Senator Sessions, I do. I first met George Kelling and James Q. Wilson when I read their article on the cover of the Atlantic when I was in law school in 1982. Several years later, I got to work with them when they brought their thinking, through Bill Bratton, to the New York City Transit System, a system that was known, that had a reputation for disorder, for fear, for lack of safety.

It was a neighborhood under the streets of New York, a neighborhood that I used every day as a child growing up in New York to go to school on that subway.

Compared to what was going on aboveground on the streets of New York, where there were more than 2,000 murders a year in that day, there were never a dozen murders underground. But when you spoke to the people who used that subway system, both regular commuters or children like me or shoppers or visitors, there is a sense that the most dangerous property in the city of New York was a subway that ran underneath, that moved 3.5 million people every day.

It turned out that when Chief Bratton had George Kelling in and had us start thinking about the environment, the graffiti, the dirt, the sense of abandonment, the sense that no one was in control of the subway environment so how could you be safe in an environment that was lawless, that it did not just cause crime, it provoked fear, we started to take advantage of that thinking.

There was a time in New York City when you took the subway as an adventure to see graffiti when you were an out-of-town visitor. We knew we were doing the right thing when visitors were complaining that they could not find graffiti trains because we started to focus on the environment. We started to focus on the graffiti and the broken glass and the disorderly beggars and the garbage overflowing from the pails, and those who would jump the fare rather than pay at the token booth, who rarely committed any crime but jumping the fare in front of people waiting on line.

The crime decline in New York City, as many know, did not start on the streets of New York. The crime decline in New York City started on the subways of New York and moved upstairs. And the

story of what happened in the transit police is the story of broken windows to another venue in the subway, so much so that my boss, Bill Bratton, was asked back to New York City several years later to now do what he did in the New York City subways for the streets of New York. And the first person he brought with him was George Kelling, who wrote "Broken Windows", to say let us look at the disorder on the streets of New York, that the small things will impact the sense of community and environment on the big things, and I believe he was proved right.

Senator SESSIONS. History shows, I think, that that did prove correct. I remember making the speeches, more than one, to law enforcement officers in my State on the question of drugs. Somehow had gotten in the idea of local police that they should only focus on the higher-ups. Do you remember that mentality? And I remember contending that if you allow open drug sales in your communities on street corners, dismissing them because they are small crimes, you are creating a climate that is irreversible, that you are going to have big dealers. And I think we have learned from that more and more that that mentality is being adopted and has made a big difference.

Project Exile, I am very familiar with that. We did something similar to that when I was United States Attorney in the 1980's, and it really picked up a number of years later in the Richmond program, and violence went down.

So there is a myth out there—I call it the "Hill Street Blues" myth—that, oh, it is just a revolving door and we just catch them and they get released and they go commit other crimes and it is a hopeless thing. But that is not so. Neighborhoods are revitalized when the proper application of multiple factors occur that really reduces crime.

Chief Berarducci, you have had a remarkable ability to reduce some costs and do some things. I noticed one of the things that you did was consolidate your city and county jails. I hear that more and more in my State. I do not know about other States. Do you think that is a trend that should be continued and actually saves money and is more efficient?

Chief BERARDUCCI. Yes, sir, I absolutely do. There is quite a bit of fixed cost in operating a jail just in the physical plant, and then when you look at personnel and training and all of the other things that go into that equation, it just does not make sense to keep duplicating it in the same geographic area when you could adequately fund one and service everybody.

Our sheriff has done a great job with our county jail. It is a nationally accredited county jail. And so for me to go a mile and a half down the road is just a good use of resources.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is so good, and, Chief Schirling, you talked about the different police departments and so forth. I think you are correct. Honest discussions—I know some departments will not like to hear it—of actual consolidation are important. But if you do not actually consolidate the departments, there are such things as jails, training, forensics, computers, communication technology that could be bought in larger quantities, and everybody would have the same system. Don't you think—it is dif-

difficult for the Federal Government to mandate, but it should occur at the local level and more and more it should occur?

Chief SCHIRLING. I do, Senator. And on my wall is a little home-made poster that says, "Small victories to achieve momentum." The concept is if you do it a piece at a time—if I try to get all 13 municipalities and organizations that have police departments in Chittenden County to say on January 1, 2011, we are going to flip the switch, we are going to go from 13 to 1, it is never going to happen. But if we do small things to create the momentum, if you start with information technology and then you roll that into communications, then you consolidated investigative functions and purchasing, one piece at a time over the course of a longer period, you can ultimately end up with efficiencies that are tailored to the region that you are in. For us, that may mean eventually we have one department. That may not. That may mean that we share communications and IT and a couple of other things and we keep 13 departments. It makes it more customizable.

The role for the Federal Government, in my eyes, is not to fully fund those things but to simply dangle a carrot, if you will.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, what if we took some of the money we are spending on things—heaven knows that we would cut a dime from the COPS program. But let us say some Federal programs that—and we created grant money, and it said if you want to make a move toward consolidation, we have a grant that will help fund a study of that and maybe some of the transition, would that be a decent Federal policy?

Chief SCHIRLING. I think it would, Senator, for many areas of the country. It is just that that would be something that would allow us to—

Senator SESSIONS. Send in a carrot.

Chief SCHIRLING. Exactly. It would break the surface tension to allow folks to step into that arena a little bit further and maybe get some small victories to achieve momentum and ultimately, hopefully cost savings.

Senator SESSIONS. My time is about up, but do you think that that kind of targeted leadership policy, Federal program, are more legitimate for the Federal Government than actual subsidization of local law enforcement? And do you have any suggestions that you would make from the scholarly analysis?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Well, I think the Federal Government should not pay police departments to be police departments. They should help out, think of it as a value-added approach, do something that the community cannot do themselves. The communities should be fully capable of raising their own revenue to fund their own programs. But in a sense, taking money and helping local law enforcements coordinate across jurisdiction is one way that could be a Federal role. But just paying a police department to fund its police officers, that sets up a cycle of dependency where, as soon as those grants disappear, instead of the community picking up the tab for those additional officers, they go back to the Federal Government and say, "We are going to lay off these officers unless you give us more money."

Senator SESSIONS. I think I agree with that fundamentally. One question. I have to go, and I thank my Chairman for his indul-

gence. Immigration has a 287(g) program which fundamentally allows the Federal Government to partner with local law enforcement. I think there are 12,000 Federal law officers and 600,000 or so State officers. And it allows them to access those to help be eyes and ears in the local community to deal with crimes related to immigration. Do you think that is a good policy and is consistent with maximizing productivity and would help us get a better handle on the illegal immigration in the country?

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Absolutely. It is a way to leverage assets. Basically what it does is it is a force multiplier. You have ICE, which has around 6,000 agents. They are busy doing customs, helping protect other areas. They do not have enough manpower to do internal enforcement within the borders of the United States. So you partner with local law enforcement, and it gives them assistance to where they can get up to speed in being able to help enforce immigration law. And you can help in some way compensate them for their efforts. But as long as it is not paying them to do the normal enforcement duties, I think it is a very good program because it multiplies the effectiveness of ICE. And what is the point of having, you know, immigration law without having some enforcement to enforce the law?

So I think it is a good way to enforce the laws that we have on the book.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. I very much agree.

Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Dr. Muhlhausen, I told you earlier that certainly you would have time to respond in any way to anything I had said earlier. If you would like to, feel free.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. I appreciate that. Just to be quick, in my testimony I admit that our Nation's budgetary problems are mainly due to entitlement spending. However, spending on programs that are not a unique core function of the Federal Government also adds to that debt.

Now, law enforcement is a very noble profession, but everybody considers themselves entitled or in need of Federal funding. So we have so many hands in the jar of the Treasury that we can never get control of our spending. And so what I would could say is we are living beyond our means, and one of the ways that we can start to live within our means is for the Federal Government to spend taxpayer dollars on things that are core functions and not subsidize what used to be the case where State and local police departments actually funded their own officers instead of relying on the Federal Government.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. I am going to put a statement by Senator Feingold in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears as a submission for the record.]

Chairman LEAHY. Chief Monroe, I have other questions. I will keep the record open in case others want to ask questions. I think every one of us has to be torn apart when we see crime by young people. They often do not realize they have got their whole life

ahead of them. This is not a conservative or a liberal issue. You just look at them and you say, "You have got your whole life ahead of you. What are you doing screwing it up?"

I introduced the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act to reduce juvenile crime, to advance programs to keep juveniles out of the system, get them back into a track if they do break the law, where they can be back in the community. And I think of what Chief Schirling said about the alternative ways of handling minor crimes.

What about in your jurisdiction? Have you taken steps to reduce crimes committed by children and youngsters?

Chief MONROE. Well, there are a couple of different thoughts with that. In Richmond, we partnered with a couple of organizations, the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise and the Richmond Outreach Center, whereby there was a model out there that looked at some of our high schools where kids were dropping out of school, high truancy rates, high suspension rates, crime in and around the school campuses, and whereby we went to the private sector in Richmond and were able to raise a little over half a million dollars in order to hire outreach workers to place into those schools. And those outreach workers had a special training that was done, and in many cases, along with ex-offenders and former gang members, to really understand what some of the problems and challenges that our young people were facing in high school.

Unfortunately, our teachers are struggling not only with trying to teach our kids but also trying to maintain a certain level of discipline within our schools. These 15 outreach workers went into one of the toughest schools in Richmond, Virginia, George Wythe, whereby they worked with this high-risk population, whereby they became the mentors, they became the disciplinarians, they became the ones that really focused on their behavior and building upon their life skills, whereby we saw significant improvement in the truancy rate, in the suspension rate, a 37-percent reduction in crime in and around that school campus.

I think those types of innovative programs are things that we have to partner with both the private sector and nonprofit organizations that can sometimes bring about greater changes in that youth environment than we can in law enforcement or any other government agency. But I think we just have to have the willingness and the fortitude to support those types of initiatives to allow them to work in their own environment.

So I think that there are enough challenges out there involving our young people that we have to look to support those organizations that can build the capacity.

Chairman LEAHY. I think I know the answer to this, but in the long run, does it save you money?

Chief MONROE. Yes, it does.

Chairman LEAHY. Colonel Esserman, I think you wanted to add something to that, and anybody else who wants to, feel free.

Colonel ESSERMAN. Senator, I thank you for allowing us to speak to this issue, because I go to every shooting in my city I go to every emergency room intake, I go to every wake and funeral. And in the past 7 years—

Chairman LEAHY. I am glad to hear that. I did the same as State's attorney in my jurisdiction. Every single shooting I went to, every emergency room, I went to every wake.

Colonel ESSERMAN. And you see for yourself, Senator, what you must have seen for yourself, not the stories that are told but what you see. And what I have seen in the past 7 years as the chief of Providence is what my officers have seen, that the violence is getting younger, and that that is disturbing to any American police chief, that is disturbing to any patriot who loves his country, a father who loves his children.

In my city I have lost 200 people to murder since the beginning of this century, since the 1st of January 2000—200 as of a month and a half ago.

Chairman LEAHY. And a population of—

Colonel ESSERMAN. Approaching 200,000, and over those 10 years, my officers have seen what I have seen in the past 7 years, that the face of violence in our city—and I believe the face of violence as I talk to my colleagues around this country—is getting younger, getting younger on both sides of the violence, getting younger on those who are victims, getting younger on those who are victimized.

And I thank you for calling attention to it because what you do not want is America's police chiefs to be distracted—not to be distracted by issues of 287 and immigration, which is not the issue. There is a reason less than 100 of America's more than 17,000 police chiefs have any interest in 287(g) at all. It is a distraction from the issue.

The issue of violence and crime in our community is an issue today of youth, and though I do not have every answer, I do know more youth prisons is not the answer, Senator. It must be about prevention. It must be not about a life of crime but a life of deterrence. Not only is that more thoughtful, it is certainly less expensive.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.

Does anybody else wish to add to that? Chief Berarducci.

Chief BERARDUCCI. Senator, thank you for bringing up the topic. I brought with me today to this hearing an officer who has served for 27 years, Detective Scott Thomas, and a large portion of that career has been dedicated to the young people. He currently runs our PAL program. He has been involved in our juvenile enforcement efforts. He was the face of DARE in Ohio for a decade.

As we drove here yesterday, we got a call from the department. We had to arrest a 13-year-old for taking a gun to school. He took his mother's gun, and he was going to shoot at a couple other young men over a girlfriend.

Chairman LEAHY. Thirteen?

Chief BERARDUCCI. Thirteen years old. You know, we have him in custody. We have the gun in custody. And now we are going to have to do things to try to impact that in that school. But I think Detective Thomas would tell you that the time that we all spend, each of us, with these children is probably our most important time. And, you know, the 65 that we have in our PAL program are 65 kids who do not have anybody to help them with homework, probably are not getting a meal when they get home from school,

and do not have positive role models, and that is what we give them with the officers from the Medina Police Department. And I think each of us have found that to be the case, and that is a top priority in my city.

Thank you.

Chairman LEAHY. Dr. Muhlhausen.

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. I have some more comments on juvenile justice issues. During 1990, I worked in juvenile corrections in Baltimore, Maryland, and one of the things I noticed when I worked with youth coming out of Baltimore City was that in a secure facility a lot of these youth would behave very well, when they had a parental figure, an authoritative figure telling them how to behave or making sure that they were behaving well. And a lot of these kids would just bring a smile to your face.

But when they were released from the correctional facility and went back into the community, they had no supervision in their lives, and I am speaking primarily about families, and they would return back to a life of crime. And they would come back in, and I would look at them and go, you know, I would say to this young man, "Why are you back?" And he goes, "Mr. Muhlhausen, I went back to my old ways." I am, like, "Why?" He is, like, "Because back home I have no supervision, I have nothing in my life, somebody sitting there and telling me, you know, to put a check on me."

Chairman LEAHY. Doesn't that go to what Chief Berarducci—

Mr. MUHLHAUSEN. Yes. I think in a lot of cases with youth, it comes down to the family and positive mentoring that can help guide these young people, because a lot of times a lot of these individuals will behave or be very nice people to be around, very pleasant people when they have the appropriate restrictions or sort of self-control placed on them. But then when that is absent, peer pressure can lead them to a negative lifestyle.

Chairman LEAHY. I happen to agree. You see this with your own kids. You see this with—those who are in law enforcement see it. It is a difficult thing. Everybody wants to talk about the good old days, but it was different growing up in a small city in Vermont when I did because everybody knew everybody else, and if you did misbehave, five neighbors would call your parents, and that was usually far more frightening, with all due respect to these law enforcement people, than anybody in law enforcement. And now you have by necessity both parents working. Sometimes you do not have both parents with the children. That is why I think these mentoring programs, Boys and Girls Clubs, things like that, are very, very important and give some positive role models but give somebody who can say, "Wait a minute. Do not do that. You are stepping over the line."

Sometimes young people can do some very terrible crimes, and we forget they are young people, and they needed somebody to put them on the straight path before the crimes. After the crimes, you have lost your opportunity.

I think every police officer here would say that they would rather prevent a crime from happening than have all the resources in the world to investigate it after the fact to go after somebody.

Chief Schirling you are going to get the last word on this. Go ahead, sir.

Chief SCHIRLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have heard from all of my colleagues about partnership, and policing does not exist in a vacuum. It does not exist in a vacuum in creating community safety and health. The cyclical nature of crime, whether it is in a neighborhood or potentially in a family, as you have seen as a prosecutor, the sort of generational recidivism that can occur and that is observed on the street each day has its roots outside the criminal justice system. And innovative strategies that we have discussed today I think have to have in mind the concept that comprehensive strategies need to involve investments in education, in the health care system, in mental health in particular, and other core needs in order to change the course of some of the youth that are on the path to potential tragedy.

I gave Colonel Esserman a book earlier today by Mark Kleiman, who is a professor at the University of California. It is entitled "When Brute Force Fails, How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment", and one snippet of that book sort of encapsulates this for me. He said, "The more credible a threat is, the less often it has to be carried out." And I do not think that he is talking exclusively about the threat of punishment from the criminal justice system but the threat of some structure, the threat of some sanction on the part of the youth that Mr. Muhlhausen described that was back in the system because they did not have someone setting boundaries.

Chairman LEAHY. You know, it is interesting. This is not necessarily directly related, but I recall once at the University of Vermont when I was a prosecutor, it was a time of great tension over Kent State and Vietnam and Cambodia and so on. A very, very large rally and a march in downtown Burlington was going on. And a number of other parts of the country were turning violent, and we were hoping to avoid all violence, and we did. But I recall a lot of the professors and others marching along and saying, "Hi, Jim. Hi, Sue. Hi, Bob." And the psychological effect of that, "Ooops, I am not a nameless person in a crowd of people. Somebody has spotted me." I mean, that is just one thing, but it was more effective than sending a lot of police officers, even though we had the police officers to control traffic and everything else and basically urge people to go into one thing. In fact, one very innovative sergeant in the Burlington Police Department led them with the blue lights flashing down the hill from the campus, back up the hill, down the hill from the campus, back up the hill. For those who have not seen it, it is a very steep hill. About the fourth time of that—it was a chilly day, a chilly evening. He was in his cruiser driving up and down. About the fourth time, three-quarters of that crowd was gone.

With that, we will recess. I will keep the record open for a week. Obviously, any one of you, feel free to add anything more to the record you want, and I thank you for taking the time.

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

"Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies"

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HERB KOHL

BY

Patrick J. Berarducci
CHIEF OF POLICE
MEDINA POLICE DEPARTMENT
Medina, OHIO

1. *For many years, we have been asking law enforcement to do more with less, and our ability to fight crime has been undermined as a result. With the recent increased support in the stimulus bill as well as the FY11 Budget, what can law enforcement officials do to ensure the taxpayers that the funds are being used in a responsible and effective manner?*

Forming effective partnerships with other communities, other law enforcement agencies and community groups whenever possible is a good place to start. Also develop a plan which leverages the increased funding in a manner which would reduce future costs such as the investment in shared technology or facilities used by several jurisdictions can lead to future savings. In other words, don't accept the status quo. If we are not partnering we are wasting money.

2. *The COPS program is vital to local law enforcement agencies to help provide additional officers, prosecutors and technology needed to keep their communities safe. However, law enforcement agencies cannot rely on this funding source alone and for an indefinite amount of time.*

- a. *Do you agree that local law enforcement agencies should be responsible for fully funding these positions after the allotted period of funding time?*

No, I do not agree. First, law enforcement agencies do not control their appropriations. The funding control rests with elected leadership not the police chief. If a community needs the COPS program to hire police officers, chances are they already know they cannot afford to keep the officers when the funding ends. The requirement only causes a "shell game" of robbing Peter to pay Paul when the local funding requirement kicks in.

- b. *If you agree, how can local law enforcement agencies sustain officers who are hired using COPS funding once the funding has ended?*

Reducing labor costs, reducing fixed costs, obtaining an additional revenue stream, or prioritizing the movement of funds from one city department to another are the only means of which I am aware. Each presents its own set of problems and limitations. Many are almost always outside the control of the police chief and are political decisions.

3. *Some critics of COPS, Byrne Justice Assistance, and other local law enforcement programs say that the Federal government should not be supporting local law enforcement. How do you respond to critics of these programs who argue that such funding creates a "cycle of dependency" through which state and local jurisdictions become unable to stand on their own?*

I disagree with those critics. Many of the issues which a local police chief deals with are either caused in whole, partially caused by or at least aggravated by Federal policy or the lack there of.

Gun control, drug control, immigration issues and unemployment are just a few examples. Homeland security and terrorism have caused a renewed interest in interoperability of communications which is another very expensive issue to tackle.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has mandated that all Part 90 Business, Educational, Industrial, Public Safety, and State and Local Government VHF (150-174 MHz) and UHF (421-512 MHz) private PLMR (Private Land Mobile Radio) system licensees convert from what has been known as "wide-band" (25 KHz) operation to "narrow-band" (12.5 KHz or equivalent) operation by January 1, 2013. This is another very expensive issue for local law enforcement since many of the radios currently in service must be discarded and replaced. When this unfunded mandate was handed down to state and local governments, each community should have been funded to bring their systems up to compliance. This was not done.

The Federal government reminds me sometimes of being back in school when each of my teachers assigned homework which should take only about an hour or two to complete. They did not take into consideration was there were 8 teachers making those assignments. You can do the math.

Congress should adopt a policy of attaching funding to every rule or law which affects local law enforcement. I believe then the true costs of all the unfunded mandates can be determined.

4. *How do you respond to the argument that programs such as COPS should be funded at lower levels due to the decrease in crime in many major cities?*

It is very difficult to think of the future when every day you are presented with another crisis. I believe if we can sustain a steady decrease in the crime rate then we have a unique opportunity to begin to retool our criminal justice system. We can begin diverting funding to projects such as regionalized communications, regionalized jails and or regionalized law enforcement. These efforts take longer to plan and accomplish, but going forward offers the best hope at long-term cost reductions.

Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on "Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies"
Wednesday, March 3, 2010

The following are **Colonel Dean M. Esserman's** responses for the record to questions posed by **Senator Russell D. Feingold**.

1. Federal dollars are limited this year and so any dramatic increase in Byrne program through appropriations is unlikely. Besides increasing the amount of Byrne money available, what other suggestions do you have for how the federal government can support state and local law enforcement efforts to reduce crime, while also saving money?
 - The federal government needs to continue funding evidence-based crime prevention and reduction strategies that are built on strong community partnerships. Smart investment in crime strategies geared toward young people, families, and neighborhoods, coupled with technology that supports community-based efforts will reduce crime and make a measurable difference in the quality of life of the citizens that law enforcement serves. Additional federal investment is needed to expand prisoner reentry initiatives, fund justice and mental health collaborations, and fight substance abuse.
2. There appeared to be some disagreement during the hearing about the use of state and local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration laws through partnerships such as the 287(g) program. I would appreciate your views whether the federal government should rely on state and local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws. What concerns do you have about the delegation of immigration authority to state and local law enforcement through 287(g) and other programs, such as the Secure Communities Program, which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) expects to rollout nationwide by 2013. What impact do you believe these programs will have on community policing initiatives?
 - Requiring local police departments to enforce immigration laws weakens the trust between police and the community which is the foundation of any effective community policing initiative. For example, undocumented people who are crime victims are afraid to report a crime for fear of deportation thereby destroying this element of trust. Finally, during these difficult economic times, local police departments do not have the resources to enforce federal immigration laws while remaining vigilant in reducing crime and increasing homeland security awareness in local neighborhoods.

The following are Colonel Dean M. Esserman's responses for the record to questions posed by **Senator Herb Kohl**.

1. For many years, we have been asking law enforcement to do more with less, and our ability to fight crime has been undermined as a result. With the recent increased support in the stimulus bill as well as the FY11 Budget, what can law enforcement officials do to ensure the taxpayers that the funds are being used in a responsible and effective manner?
 - First, local police departments need to work in partnership with state and federal law enforcement agencies and also the community to conceptualize, implement, and evaluate evidence-based crime-fighting strategies. Second, the latest in information technologies should be used to provide police leaders with information in "real time" so they can deploy police officers and assets more efficiently and cost effectively and meet the needs of the community. Third, police leaders need to meet periodically with community leaders to build trust, transparency, and impress upon local leaders that the police cannot do it alone, and that the community plays a vital role in safe guarding our neighborhoods.
2. The COPS Program is vital to local law enforcement agencies to help provide additional officers, prosecutors and technology needed to keep their communities safe. However, law enforcement agencies cannot rely on this funding source alone and for an indefinite amount of time.
 - A. Do you agree that local law enforcement agencies should be responsible for fully funding these positions after the allotted period of funding time?
 - Yes, it is essential that these positions become part of the Department's permanent staff because at the end of the grant's three year funding period, the officers will have received significant patrol experience and extensive training which enables them to be very effective police officers out in the neighborhoods.
 - B. If you agree, how can local law enforcement agencies sustain officers who are hired using COPS funding once the funding has ended?
 - COPS grants provide three years of funding to pay salary and fringe benefit costs for a newly hired officer which provides sufficient time for local officials to develop a long-term financial plan supported by local revenue streams to sustain these positions. The additional officers help build a safe and vibrant community that attracts capital investment which generates future economic growth resulting in an increase in tax revenues.

3. Some critics of COPS, the Byrne Justice Assistance, and other local law enforcement programs say that the Federal government should not be supporting local law enforcement. How do you respond to critics of these programs who argue that such funding creates a "cycle of dependency" through which state and local jurisdictions become unable to stand on their own?
 - It is imperative that the federal government provide funding to local law enforcement to encourage the creation of effective evidence-based crime-fighting strategies that can be replicated nationally. Many of today's effective crime-fighting programs were born from federally sponsored research and started with federal grant funds from the COPS Office, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Institute of Justice. These federally funded programs greatly improve the quality of life within our communities by providing the necessary funding to not only create and implement programs and strategies but enable them to be cost-effectively replicated nationally. The many positive impacts that these programs have made in our neighborhoods have led to the costs being absorbed at the community level by local funds, donations and/or in-kind services.
4. How do you respond to the argument that programs such as COPS should be funded at lower levels due to the decrease in crime in many major cities?
 - The decrease in crime is a result of the various COPS Office and Byrne JAG programs that provide needed funding to implement crime strategies, hire police officers, train officers, purchase equipment, and state-of-the-art technology. Today, police departments and local communities need federal funding more than ever to reduce crime, maintain vigilance concerning homeland defense, and implement new and innovative crime-fighting strategies. The need for increased federal funding is evident by the overwhelming \$8 billion in requests submitted by local police departments for funding consideration under the recent \$1 billion COPS Hiring Recovery Program. In addition, federal funding is necessary to foster innovative and evidence-based programs/strategies that can be efficiently and cost effectively replicated nationally.

Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on "Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction
Strategies

Wednesday March 3, 2010

Questions for the Record from Senator Russell D. Feingold
For Chief Rodney Monroe

- 1. Federal dollars are limited this year and so any dramatic increase to the Byrne program though appropriations is unlikely. Besides increasing the amount of Byrne money available, what other suggestions do you have for how the federal government can support state and local law enforcement efforts to reduce crime, while also saving money?**

I think the federal government can play a strong role in encouraging partnerships between federal law enforcement agencies and law enforcement at the state and local level. I believe that one of the most effective ways to address issues such as gangs, drugs and firearms, which cross geographic and jurisdictional boundaries, is through task forces which bring together both federal and local law enforcement. Combining those resources, with their different fields of expertise and their national and local perspectives, makes for much stronger investigations than if those agencies were to work in isolation of one another. Since September 2001, the missions of many federal law enforcement agencies have been necessarily broadened to address issues related to domestic security; however, it is important for the federal government to help its law enforcement agencies define their core mission and focus on how they can partner with local law enforcement to make communities all across the country safer places to live and work.

The federal government can also continue to fund research into what works in reducing crime and disorder and publicize best practices from across the country. Many of the discretionary grant programs are designed to fund new and innovative programs. Those programs that are successful should be publicized and technical assistance made available to those cities and law enforcement agencies that may wish to replicate a program that has been successful in another location.

Questions from Senator Herb Kohl

- 1. For many years, we have been asking law enforcement to do more with less, and our ability to fight crime has been undermined as a result. With the recent increased support in the stimulus bill as well as the FY11 budget, what can law enforcement officials do to ensure the taxpayers that the funds are being used in a responsible and effective manner?**

First of all, I think you must have some tangible results to show for the funds and then you must publicize those results. We use every available opportunity to let the citizens of Charlotte know what we are doing to reduce crime and the role that grant money plays in that process. Our officers and command staff attend over 100 community meetings per month throughout the community to provide updates to citizens on what we are doing in their areas and the successes and challenges of our crime reduction efforts. We also send out e-mail newsletters to citizen subscribers that are tailored to each of our 39 patrol response areas with updated information on what is occurring in each small area of the city. Our website also gives citizens access to a considerable amount of information including updated crime statistics for their neighborhoods.

The City of Charlotte is aware of the public interest in how stimulus funds are used and has taken extra steps to keep citizens informed. The City has a special section on its website devoted to the stimulus program. That portion of the website defined every grant program for which the city applied for stimulus funds and runs updates on the status of each grant. As the funded programs are kicked off, they are spotlighted in feature stories in a quarterly newsletter, "Stimulating Times". Stories on our department have included the 50 officers we received under the COPS program and one of the afterschool programs we funded under the ARRA Justice Assistance Grant. The newsletter enables our citizens to track all of the City's involvement in the economic stimulus program.

2. The COPS Program is vital to local law enforcement agencies to help provide additional officers, prosecutors, and technology needed to keep their communities safe. However, law enforcement agencies cannot rely on this funding source alone and for an indefinite amount of time.

a: Do you agree that local law enforcement agencies should be responsible for fully funding these positions after the allotted period of funding time?

Yes, because it forces municipalities and their police departments to make more thoughtful decisions on whether to apply for grant funds and, if so, how many officers to request.

b. If you agree, how can local law enforcement agencies sustain officers who are hired using COPS funding once the funding has ended?

When cities make the decision to apply for COPS grant funding, they must do detailed budget projections on the cost of adding additional officers to their budgets when the grant funding ended. We do this in Charlotte and the City Council has those cost projections in front of them when they vote on whether or not to approve the grant application. There are a number of things that can be done to maintain officers including transferring funds from other City accounts to the Police Department's operating budget and evaluating the effectiveness of various programs, eliminating those that are not effective, and applying those savings to the officer positions. In Charlotte, no City

department's budget is created in isolation. All of the budget requests are ultimately prioritized by the City Council and public safety needs almost always come out as the top priority. This forces some hard decisions in terms of the entire city budget. The key to maintaining the new positions is advance planning on the part of municipalities and police departments.

3. **Some critics of COPS, Byrne Justice Assistance, and other local law enforcement programs say that the Federal government should not be supporting local law enforcement. How do you respond to critics of these programs who argue that such funding creates a "cycle of dependency" though which state and local jurisdictions become unable to stand on their own?**

I think it is inaccurate for critics of grant funding to assume that all crime problems are localized. Many of the crime problems that we are experiencing, especially in urban areas, are nationwide in scope. These issues include gangs, drugs, firearms, cyber crime, etc. With the mobility of our society and the dissemination of information through so many formats, crime trends that begin in one area of the country rapidly spread to other areas. At one point in time, we thought the Crips and the Bloods were gangs that affected only Los Angeles. Now they are all over the country, including Charlotte.

In reality what affects one of us affects all of us. Local law enforcement is routinely assisted by federal law enforcement agencies that bring their resources and national perspective to crime problems that touch all segments of the country. In many cases, those problems are addressed through grant funded task forces that are comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement. They do tremendous good; in Charlotte, we are looking at ways to more objectively measure the outcome of the work of these joint task forces. They are just one example of what is done with federal funding. Obviously there are many other examples of what state and local law enforcement is able to do with the positions, equipment, and technology that federal grant funds provide.

Safe communities are one of the most important priorities of all of our citizens. To that end, we are not in a cycle of dependency so much as we are in a cycle of interdependency to create these safe communities and address the crime problems we have in common. Federal, state, and local governments are all a vital part of that cycle and each benefit from the other's resources and expertise.

4. **How do you respond to the argument that programs such as COPS should be funded at lower levels due to the decrease in crime in many major cities?**

In 2009, Charlotte experienced its lowest level of crime per 100,000 population in 31 years. None of us in Charlotte's law enforcement community are naïve enough to think that we no longer have any more work to do. On the contrary, all of us understand that crime is cyclical and that these dramatic decreases in crime will be difficult, at best, to

maintain. When we reduce the funding for new officers, we reduce police visibility and the opportunity to deploy resources to address emerging crime trends at their earliest stages. We decrease the opportunities for officers to build effective partnerships with citizens and engage them in taking responsibility for their own safety. We reduce the opportunities to address some of the disorder issues that help create an environment that is conducive to crime. When we cut funding for new technology, we reduce our opportunities to make information a powerful weapon in the fight against crime.

Crime can go up much quicker than it comes down. All you need is for one prolific offender to be released from jail or an emerging gang feel it needs to leave its mark on the area it considers its turf; the result is an emerging crime trend. To reduce the capacity to address crime problems and to assume that crime reductions will be stable for an extended period of time does a disservice to all of our citizens.



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Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies
Chief Michael E. Schirling

Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold

1. Senator, your Bill entitled Prevention Resources for Eliminating Criminal Activity Using Tailored Interventions in Our Neighborhoods Act or the PRECAUTION Act would be a useful tool for law enforcement that could, if properly implemented, result in long term cost savings not only for law enforcement, but also for communities as a whole. The manner in which creative initiatives would be studied to validate their effectiveness and then added to a resource library of new ideas seems like a prudent approach to spreading important concepts and ideas to improve the criminal justice system in a meaningful way.

I will add two thoughts to this discussion that I believe are worthy of consideration regarding this bill. First, that exploring the best existing initiatives should be supplemented by an ongoing search to develop new ones.

Second, that the oversight Commission and it's authority should be tailored and empowered to be adaptable, able to react and move swiftly, to be "light on it's feet" so that new, fresh ideas can be explored quickly and effectively. Crime and social disorder ebbs and flows, often quickly – facilitated by the instantaneous flow of information in the technology age. There is always a new challenge. Our responses must have the ability to be tried and tested with equal speed.

2. I think the answer to this question lies partly in the types of initiatives contemplated in the PROMISE Act. Federal funding can be used as an effective tool to create incentives for innovation and cost savings. Creating mechanisms for agencies to partner together to build programs and initiatives that address root causes of crime, address crime reduction strategies, and creative response methodologies are possible. For example, the Justice Department could create smaller, competitive, seed funding programs to encourage innovation. Once a variety of creative initiatives have been

identified, regional conferences and workshops could be held to bring law enforcement leaders together to share and “cross pollinate” and build upon ideas. This concept, or a version of it, could be utilized to gather law enforcement leaders and their ideas about how to create incentives and smartly invest in law enforcement during these difficult economic times.

3. I believe that the broad responsibilities of State and local law enforcement, coupled with limited resources, and significant call volumes largely preclude the use of these agencies to enforce immigration laws. They certainly should not be relied upon by federal agencies as a primary means of enforcement. To the extent that State and local agencies come into contact with those committing criminal acts that may also have underlying immigration status issues, these agencies can be a source of information for federal authorities. Simultaneously, in an effort to ensure that local crime is not driven “underground” or under-reported as a result of State and local agencies being tasked directly with reporting any and all immigration issues, I believe it is important to State and local agencies to have the latitude to refrain from inquiring about the immigration status of victims and witnesses of crime. Put simply, victims and witnesses must feel free to cooperate with law enforcement in investigations regardless of their status.

Responses to Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl

1. I can only speak directly to this issue at a local level. At our Department stimulus funding has been directed to innovative programs designed to reduce crime and reduce the number of people entering the traditional criminal justice system by diverting them to community-based interventions and sanctions. The hope is to reduce justice system costs, or at least flatten the steep trend line of costs, over the long term. These initiatives include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Use of street level mental health professionals in lieu of police officers to handle calls in which unmet mental health needs is a factor in disorder or crime
 - b. Use of a graffiti remediation coordinator to reduce the incidence of vandalism and ancillary crime that goes with urban blight
 - c. Use of technology to allow crime reports to be taken and crime reports to be seen online, freeing critical policing resources for other core functions

To date, the first two initiatives have begun to reduce crime (new vandalism reports) and repeated responses by law enforcement to incidents in which mental health is a key factor. The technology initiative is currently under development.

2. Our Department has not been in a position to take advantage of COPS funding streams in a number of years. This is because of the requirement that the agency fund the position after the allotted period of federal funding. While I agree that the use of Federal funds should be as “seed capital” to assist agencies to add officers if their communities need additional law enforcement resources, I believe

it is critical for those communities to plan for sustaining critical safety services in the long term. Circumstances may arise in which communities may need an infusion of resources but be unable to afford the resources that are immediately needed.

Creation of “inverse funding stream” plans to allow local funds to slowly replace federal “seed” funds over the cycle of the grant is one way for communities to slowly ease into the costs of additional officers and safety services. By budgeting small increases over the course of the federal grant cycle, the grantee could gradually grow resources to cover the ongoing cost of the resources initially funded through COPS or other Federal funding sources. For example:

	Federal Portion	Agency Portion
Year 1	100%	0%
Year 2	75	25
Year 3	50	50
Year 4	25	75
Year 5	0	100

Using this approach, agencies or communities that have identified the need for an infusion of new resources (for example 10 new officers) could slowly ease into that expense (2.5 officers annually).

3. While the critics of COPS and Byrne may be correct that in some cases a cycle of dependency may be created in which local jurisdictions do not stand on their own. Budget pressures coupled with rising expectations about the role of law enforcement in our communities seem to create an ever-expanding demand for resources. Key to mitigating that expanding demand is the creation of smart strategies, and a need to ensure that law enforcement is not tasked with providing services previously done by agencies, government and otherwise, that cannot keep up with demand. Mental health services are one quick example of the expanding role of law enforcement and criminal justice due to shrinking capacity in the mental health system.

I believe it is possible to craft meaningful ways to infuse resources like COPS funding to jurisdictions that are in need of critical assistance while building mechanisms to ensure that they plan accordingly for the future. That can be accomplished by setting specific standards for use of this type of funding with continuation planning as a core tenet in the competitive selection process.

4. In my opinion there are many factors that weave together to decrease crime rates in major cities. One of the factors that may relate to measurable decreases is the displacement of crime to sub-urban and rural areas as effective strategies and more robust resources take hold in more urban areas. There are, of course, other reasons for these decreases as well. However, more significant and complex crime problems, led by drug trafficking and technology-facilitated crime, are

making their way into our suburban and rural communities. The agencies responsible for policing these areas may need Federal support, at least on a short-term basis, to “seed” new officers and support staff in response to these changes. It is examples like this, where crime trends and system needs change rapidly (compared to community / government capacity to respond) as a result of things like displacement and new technology needs where Federal assistance to State and local law enforcement is most critical.

111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To provide information, resources, recommendations, and funding to help State and local law enforcement enact crime prevention and intervention strategies supported by rigorous evidence.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. FEINGOLD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To provide information, resources, recommendations, and funding to help State and local law enforcement enact crime prevention and intervention strategies supported by rigorous evidence.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Prevention Resources
5 for Eliminating Criminal Activity Using Tailored Inter-
6 ventions in Our Neighborhoods Act of 2010" or the
7 "PRECAUTION Act".

1 SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

2 The purposes of this Act are to—

3 (1) establish a commitment on the part of the
4 Federal Government to provide leadership on suc-
5 cessful crime prevention and intervention strategies;

6 (2) further the integration of crime prevention
7 and intervention strategies into traditional law en-
8 forcement practices of State and local law enforce-
9 ment offices around the country;

10 (3) develop a plain-language, implementation-
11 focused assessment of those current crime and delin-
12 quency prevention and intervention strategies that
13 are supported by rigorous evidence;

14 (4) provide additional resources to the National
15 Institute of Justice to administer grants, contracts,
16 and cooperative agreements for research and devel-
17 opment for promising crime prevention and interven-
18 tion strategies;

19 (5) develop recommendations for Federal prior-
20 ities for crime and delinquency prevention and inter-
21 vention research, development, and funding that
22 may augment important Federal grant programs, in-
23 cluding the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assist-
24 ance Grant Program under subpart 1 of part E of
25 title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
26 Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.), grant

1 programs administered by the Office of Community
 2 Oriented Policing Services of the Department of
 3 Justice, grant programs administered by the Office
 4 of Safe and Drug-Free Schools of the Department
 5 of Education, and other similar programs; and

6 (6) reduce the costs that rising violent crime
 7 imposes on interstate commerce.

8 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

9 In this Act, the following definitions shall apply:

10 (1) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission”
 11 means the National Commission on Public Safety
 12 Through Crime Prevention established under section
 13 4(a).

14 (2) RIGOROUS EVIDENCE.—The term “rigorous
 15 evidence” means evidence generated by scientifically
 16 valid forms of outcome evaluation, particularly ran-
 17 domized trials (where practicable).

18 (3) SUBCATEGORY.—The term “subcategory”
 19 means 1 of the following categories:

20 (A) Family and community settings (in-
 21 cluding public health-based strategies).

22 (B) Law enforcement settings (including
 23 probation-based strategies).

24 (C) School settings (including antigang
 25 and general antiviolencc strategies).

4

1 (4) TOP-TIER.—The term “top-tier” means any
2 strategy supported by rigorous evidence of the siz-
3 able, sustained benefits to participants in the strat-
4 egy or to society.

5 **SEC. 4. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PUBLIC SAFETY**
6 **THROUGH CRIME PREVENTION.**

7 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a com-
8 mission to be known as the National Commission on Pub-
9 lic Safety Through Crime Prevention.

10 (b) MEMBERS.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall be
12 composed of 9 members, of whom—

13 (A) 3 shall be appointed by the President,
14 1 of whom shall be the Assistant Attorney Gen-
15 eral for the Office of Justice Programs or a
16 representative of such Assistant Attorney Gen-
17 eral;

18 (B) 2 shall be appointed by the Speaker of
19 the House of Representatives, unless the Speak-
20 er is of the same party as the President, in
21 which case 1 shall be appointed by the Speaker
22 of the House of Representatives and 1 shall be
23 appointed by the minority leader of the House
24 of Representatives;

1 (C) 1 shall be appointed by the minority
2 leader of the House of Representatives (in addi-
3 tion to any appointment made under subpara-
4 graph (B));

5 (D) 2 shall be appointed by the majority
6 leader of the Senate, unless the majority leader
7 is of the same party as the President, in which
8 case 1 shall be appointed by the majority leader
9 of the Senate and 1 shall be appointed by the
10 minority leader of the Senate; and

11 (E) 1 shall be appointed by the minority
12 leader of the Senate (in addition to any ap-
13 pointment made under subparagraph (D)).

14 (2) PERSONS ELIGIBLE.—

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—Each member of the
16 Commission shall be an individual who has
17 knowledge or expertise in matters to be studied
18 by the Commission.

19 (B) REQUIRED REPRESENTATIVES.—At
20 least—

21 (i) 2 members of the Commission
22 shall be respected social scientists with ex-
23 perience implementing or interpreting rig-
24 orous, outcome-based trials; and

6

1 (ii) 2 members of the Commission
2 shall be law enforcement practitioners.

3 (3) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The President,
4 the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the mi-
5 nority leader of the House of Representatives, and
6 the majority leader and minority leader of the Sen-
7 ate shall consult prior to the appointment of the
8 members of the Commission to achieve, to the max-
9 imum extent possible, fair and equitable representa-
10 tion of various points of view with respect to the
11 matters to be studied by the Commission.

12 (4) TERM.—Each member shall be appointed
13 for the life of the Commission.

14 (5) TIME FOR INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—The
15 appointment of the members shall be made not later
16 than 60 days after the date of enactment of this
17 Act.

18 (6) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the Commission
19 shall be filled in the manner in which the original
20 appointment was made, and shall be made not later
21 than 60 days after the date on which the vacancy
22 occurred.

23 (7) EX OFFICIO MEMBERS.—The Director of
24 the National Institute of Justice, the Director of the
25 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-

1 tion, the Director of the Community Capacity Devel-
2 opment Office, the Director of the Bureau of Justice
3 Statistics, the Director of the Bureau of Justice As-
4 sistance, and the Director of Community Oriented
5 Policing Services (or a representative of each such
6 director) shall each serve in an ex officio capacity on
7 the Commission to provide advice and information to
8 the Commission.

9 (c) OPERATION.—

10 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—At the initial meeting of
11 the Commission, the members of the Commission
12 shall elect a chairperson from among its voting
13 members, by a vote of $\frac{2}{3}$ of the members of the
14 Commission. The chairperson shall retain this posi-
15 tion for the life of the Commission. If the chair-
16 person leaves the Commission, a new chairperson
17 shall be selected, by a vote of $\frac{2}{3}$ of the members of
18 the Commission.

19 (2) MEETINGS.—The Commission shall meet at
20 the call of the chairperson. The initial meeting of the
21 Commission shall take place not later than 30 days
22 after the date on which all the members of the Com-
23 mission have been appointed.

24 (3) QUORUM.—A majority of the members of
25 the Commission shall constitute a quorum to con-

1 duet business, and the Commission may establish a
2 lesser quorum for conducting hearings scheduled by
3 the Commission.

4 (4) RULES.—The Commission may establish by
5 majority vote any other rules for the conduct of
6 Commission business, if such rules are not incon-
7 sistent with this Act or other applicable law.

8 (d) PUBLIC HEARINGS.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall hold
10 public hearings. The Commission may hold such
11 hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take
12 such testimony, and receive such evidence as the
13 Commission considers advisable to carry out its du-
14 ties under this section.

15 (2) FOCUS OF HEARINGS.—The Commission
16 shall hold at least 3 separate public hearings, each
17 of which shall focus on 1 of the subcategories.

18 (3) WITNESS EXPENSES.—Witnesses requested
19 to appear before the Commission shall be paid the
20 same fees as are paid to witnesses under section
21 1821 of title 28, United States Code. The per diem
22 and mileage allowances for witnesses shall be paid
23 from funds appropriated to the Commission.

24 (e) COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF EVIDENCE-BASED
25 CRIME PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall carry
2 out a comprehensive study of the effectiveness of
3 crime and delinquency prevention and intervention
4 strategies, organized around the 3 subcategories.

5 (2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under
6 paragraph (1) shall include—

7 (A) a review of research on the general ef-
8 fectiveness of incorporating crime prevention
9 and intervention strategies into an overall law
10 enforcement plan;

11 (B) an evaluation of how to more effec-
12 tively communicate the wealth of social science
13 research to practitioners;

14 (C) a review of evidence regarding the ef-
15 fectiveness of specific crime prevention and
16 intervention strategies, focusing on those strate-
17 gies supported by rigorous evidence;

18 (D) an identification of—

19 (i) promising areas for further re-
20 search and development; and

21 (ii) other areas representing gaps in
22 the body of knowledge that would benefit
23 from additional research and development;

1 (E) an assessment of the best practices for
2 implementing prevention and intervention strat-
3 egies;

4 (F) an assessment of the best practices for
5 gathering rigorous evidence regarding the im-
6 plementation of intervention and prevention
7 strategies; and

8 (G) an assessment of those top-tier strate-
9 gies best suited for duplication efforts in a
10 range of settings across the country.

11 (3) INITIAL REPORT ON TOP-TIER CRIME PRE-
12 VENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES.—

13 (A) DISTRIBUTION.—Not later than 18
14 months after the date on which all members of
15 the Commission have been appointed, the Com-
16 mission shall submit a public report on the
17 study carried out under this subsection to—

- 18 (i) the President;
- 19 (ii) Congress;
- 20 (iii) the Attorney General;
- 21 (iv) the Chief Federal Public Defender
22 of each district;
- 23 (v) the chief executive of each State;
- 24 (vi) the Director of the Administrative
25 Office of the Courts of each State;

11

1 (vii) the Director of the Administra-
2 tive Office of the United States Courts;
3 and

4 (viii) the attorney general of each
5 State.

6 (B) CONTENTS.—The report under sub-
7 paragraph (A) shall include—

8 (i) the findings and conclusions of the
9 Commission;

10 (ii) a summary of the top-tier strate-
11 gies, including—

12 (I) a review of the rigorous evi-
13 dence supporting the designation of
14 each strategy as top-tier;

15 (II) a brief outline of the keys to
16 successful implementation for each
17 strategy; and

18 (III) a list of references and
19 other information on where further in-
20 formation on each strategy can be
21 found;

22 (iii) recommended protocols for imple-
23 menting crime and delinquency prevention
24 and intervention strategies generally;

1 (iv) recommended protocols for evalu-
2 ating the effectiveness of crime and delin-
3 quency prevention and intervention strate-
4 gies; and

5 (v) a summary of the materials relied
6 upon by the Commission in preparation of
7 the report.

8 (C) CONSULTATION WITH OUTSIDE AU-
9 THORITIES.—In developing the recommended
10 protocols for implementation and rigorous eval-
11 uation of top-tier crime and delinquency preven-
12 tion and intervention strategies under this para-
13 graph, the Commission shall consult with the
14 Committee on Law and Justice at the National
15 Academy of Science and with national associa-
16 tions representing the law enforcement and so-
17 cial science professions, including the National
18 Sheriffs' Association, the Police Executive Re-
19 search Forum, the International Association of
20 Chiefs of Police, the Consortium of Social
21 Science Associations, and the American Society
22 of Criminology.

23 (f) RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING INNOVATIVE
24 CRIME PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES.—

25 (1) SUBMISSION.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days
2 after the date of the final hearing under sub-
3 section (d) relating to a subcategory, the Com-
4 mission shall provide the Director of the Na-
5 tional Institute of Justice and the Attorney
6 General with recommendations on qualifying
7 considerations relating to that subcategory for
8 selecting recipients of contracts, cooperative
9 agreements, and grants under section 5.

10 (B) DEADLINE.—Not later than 13
11 months after the date on which all members of
12 the Commission have been appointed, the Com-
13 mission shall provide all recommendations re-
14 quired under this subsection.

15 (2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The recommenda-
16 tions provided under paragraph (1) shall include rec-
17 ommendations relating to—

18 (A) the types of strategies for the applica-
19 ble subcategory that would best benefit from
20 additional research and development;

21 (B) any geographic or demographic tar-
22 gets;

23 (C) the types of partnerships with other
24 public or private entities that might be perti-
25 nent and prioritized; and

1 (D) any classes of crime and delinquency
2 prevention and intervention strategies that
3 should not be given priority because of a pre-
4 existing base of knowledge that would benefit
5 less from additional research and development.

6 (g) FINAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF INNOVA-
7 TIVE CRIME PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATE-
8 GIES.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Following the close of the 3-
10 year period for the evaluation of an innovative strat-
11 egy under section 5, the Commission shall collect the
12 results of the evaluation and shall submit a public
13 report to the President, the Attorney General, Con-
14 gress, the chief executive of each State, and the at-
15 torney general of each State describing each strategy
16 funded under section 5 and the results of the strat-
17 egy. The report under this paragraph shall be sub-
18 mitted not later than 5 years after the date of the
19 selection of the chairperson of the Commission.

20 (2) COLLECTION OF INFORMATION AND EVI-
21 DENCE REGARDING RECIPIENTS.—The collection of
22 information and evidence by the Commission regard-
23 ing each recipient of a contract, cooperative agree-
24 ment, or grant under section 5 shall be carried out
25 by—

1 (A) ongoing communications with the
2 grant administrator at the National Institute of
3 Justice and other appropriate officers at other
4 components of the Department of Justice;

5 (B) visits by representatives of the Com-
6 mission (including at least 1 member of the
7 Commission) to the site where the recipient of
8 a contract, cooperative agreement, or grant is
9 carrying out the strategy funded under section
10 5, at least once in the second and once in the
11 third year of the contract, cooperative agree-
12 ment, or grant;

13 (C) a review of the data generated by the
14 study monitoring the effectiveness of the strat-
15 egy; and

16 (D) other means as necessary.

17 (3) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report sub-
18 mitted under paragraph (1) shall include a review of
19 each strategy carried out with a contract, coopera-
20 tive agreement, or grant under section 5, detailing—

21 (A) the type of crime or delinquency pre-
22 vention or intervention strategy;

23 (B) where the activities under the strategy
24 were carried out, including geographic and de-
25 mographic targets;

1 (C) any partnerships with public or private
2 entities through the course of the period of the
3 contract, cooperative agreement, or grant;

4 (D) the type and design of the effective-
5 ness study conducted under section 5(b)(4) or
6 section 5(e)(2)(C) for that strategy;

7 (E) the results of the effectiveness study
8 conducted under section 5(b)(4) or section
9 5(e)(2)(C) for that strategy;

10 (F) lessons learned regarding implementa-
11 tion of that strategy or of the effectiveness
12 study conducted under section 5(b)(4) or sec-
13 tion 5(e)(2)(C), including recommendations re-
14 garding which types of environments might best
15 be suited for successful replication; and

16 (G) recommendations regarding the need
17 for further research and development of the
18 strategy.

19 (h) PERSONNEL MATTERS.—

20 (1) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—The members of the
21 Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, includ-
22 ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates author-
23 ized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of
24 chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while

1 away from their homes or regular places of business
2 in the performance of service for the Commission.

3 (2) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—Members of
4 the Commission shall serve without compensation.

5 (3) STAFF.—

6 (A) IN GENERAL.—The chairperson of the
7 Commission may, without regard to the civil
8 service laws and regulations, appoint and termi-
9 nate an executive director and such other addi-
10 tional personnel as may be necessary to enable
11 the Commission to perform its duties. The em-
12 ployment of an executive director shall be sub-
13 ject to confirmation by the Commission.

14 (B) COMPENSATION.—The chairperson of
15 the Commission may fix the compensation of
16 the executive director and other personnel with-
17 out regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and
18 subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United
19 States Code, relating to classification of posi-
20 tions and General Schedule pay rates, except
21 that the rate of pay for the executive director
22 and other personnel may not exceed the rate
23 payable for level V of the Executive Schedule
24 under section 5316 of such title.

1 (4) DETAIL OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.—With
2 the affirmative vote of $\frac{2}{3}$ of the members of the
3 Commission, any Federal Government employee,
4 with the approval of the head of the appropriate
5 Federal agency, may be detailed to the Commission
6 without reimbursement, and such detail shall be
7 without interruption or loss of civil service status,
8 benefits, or privileges.

9 (i) CONTRACTS FOR RESEARCH.—

10 (1) NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE.—With a
11 $\frac{2}{3}$ affirmative vote of the members of the Commis-
12 sion, the Commission may select nongovernmental
13 researchers and experts to assist the Commission in
14 carrying out its duties under this Act. The National
15 Institute of Justice shall contract with the research-
16 ers and experts selected by the Commission to pro-
17 vide funding in exchange for their services.

18 (2) OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.—Nothing in this
19 subsection shall be construed to limit the ability of
20 the Commission to enter into contracts with other
21 entities or organizations for research necessary to
22 carry out the duties of the Commission under this
23 section.

1 (j) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
 2 are authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 to carry out
 3 this section.

4 (k) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate
 5 on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the
 6 Commission submits the last report required by this sec-
 7 tion.

8 (l) EXEMPTION.—The Commission shall be exempt
 9 from the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

10 **SEC. 5. INNOVATIVE CRIME PREVENTION AND INTERVEN-**
 11 **TION STRATEGIES.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General may fund
 13 the implementation and evaluation of innovative crime or
 14 delinquency prevention or intervention strategies through
 15 coordinated initiatives, as described in subsection (b),
 16 through grants authorized under subsection (c), or a com-
 17 bination of the coordinated initiatives and grants.

18 (b) COORDINATED INITIATIVES.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General, act-
 20 ing through the Director of the National Institute of
 21 Justice, may coordinate efforts between the National
 22 Institute of Justice and other appropriate compo-
 23 nents of the Department of Justice to implement
 24 and rigorously evaluate innovative crime or delin-
 25 quency prevention or intervention strategies.

1 (2) SELECTION OF STRATEGIES.—The Director
2 of the National Institute of Justice, in consultation
3 with the heads of other appropriate components of
4 the Department of Justice, shall identify innovative
5 crime or delinquency prevention or intervention
6 strategies that would best benefit from additional
7 funding and evaluation, taking into consideration the
8 recommendations of the Commission under section
9 4(f).

10 (3) PROGRAM OFFICE ROLE.—The head of any
11 appropriate component of the Department of Jus-
12 tice, as determined by the Attorney General, may
13 provide incentives under a contract, cooperative
14 agreement, or grant entered into or made by the
15 component, including a competitive preference pri-
16 ority and providing additional funds, for a public or
17 private entity to—

18 (A) implement a strategy identified under
19 paragraph (2); or

20 (B) participate in the evaluation under
21 paragraph (4) of the strategies identified under
22 paragraph (2).

23 (4) NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE EVALUA-
24 TION.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the
2 National Institute of Justice may enter into or
3 make contracts, cooperative agreements, or
4 grants to conduct a rigorous study of the effec-
5 tiveness of each strategy relating to which an
6 incentive is provided under paragraph (3).

7 (B) AMOUNT AND DURATION.—A contract,
8 cooperative agreement, or grant under subpara-
9 graph (A) shall be for not more than \$700,000,
10 and shall be for a period of not more than 3
11 years.

12 (C) METHODOLOGY OF STUDY.—Each
13 study conducted under subparagraph (A) shall
14 use a study design that is likely to produce rig-
15 orous evidence of the effectiveness of the strat-
16 egy and, where feasible, measure outcomes
17 using available administrative data, such as po-
18 lice arrest records, so as to minimize the costs
19 of the study.

20 (c) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National
22 Institute of Justice may make grants to public and
23 private entities to fund the implementation and eval-
24 uation of innovative crime or delinquency prevention
25 or intervention strategies. The purpose of grants

1 under this subsection shall be to provide funds for
2 all expenses related to the implementation of such a
3 strategy and to conduct a rigorous study on the ef-
4 fectiveness of that strategy.

5 (2) GRANT DISTRIBUTION.—

6 (A) PERIOD.—A grant under this sub-
7 section shall be made for a period of not more
8 than 3 years.

9 (B) AMOUNT.—The amount of each grant
10 under this subsection—

11 (i) shall be sufficient to ensure that
12 rigorous evaluations may be performed;
13 and

14 (ii) shall not exceed \$2,000,000.

15 (C) EVALUATION SET-ASIDE.—

16 (i) IN GENERAL.—A grantee shall use
17 not less than \$300,000 and not more than
18 \$700,000 of the funds from a grant under
19 this subsection for a rigorous study of the
20 effectiveness of the strategy during the 3-
21 year period of the grant for that strategy.

22 (ii) METHODOLOGY OF STUDY.—

23 (I) IN GENERAL.—Each study
24 conducted under clause (i) shall use
25 an evaluator and a study design ap-

1 proved by the employee of the Na-
2 tional Institute of Justice hired or as-
3 signed under subsection (e) and,
4 where feasible, measure outcomes
5 using available administrative data,
6 such as police arrest records, so as to
7 minimize the costs of the study.

8 (II) CRITERIA.—The employee of
9 the National Institute of Justice hired
10 or assigned under subsection (e) shall
11 approve—

12 (aa) an evaluator that has
13 successfully carried out multiple
14 studies producing rigorous evi-
15 dence of effectiveness; and

16 (bb) a proposed study design
17 that is likely to produce rigorous
18 evidence of the effectiveness of
19 the strategy.

20 (III) APPROVAL.—Before a grant
21 is awarded under this subsection, the
22 evaluator and study design of a grant-
23 ee shall be approved by the employee
24 of the National Institute of Justice

1 hired or assigned under subsection
2 (e).

3 (D) DATE OF AWARD.—Not later than 6
4 months after the date of receiving recommenda-
5 tions relating to a subcategory from the Com-
6 mission under section 4(f), the Director of the
7 National Institute of Justice shall award all
8 grants under this subsection relating to that
9 subcategory.

10 (E) TYPE OF GRANTS.—One-third of the
11 grants made under this subsection shall be
12 made in each subcategory. In distributing
13 grants, the recommendations of the Commission
14 under section 4(f) shall be considered.

15 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
16 are authorized to be appropriated \$18,000,000 to carry
17 out subsections (b) and (c).

18 (e) DEDICATED STAFF.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National
20 Institute of Justice shall hire or assign a full-time
21 employee to oversee the contracts, cooperative agree-
22 ments, and grants under this section.

23 (2) STUDY OVERSIGHT.—The employee of the
24 National Institute of Justice hired or assigned under
25 paragraph (1) shall be responsible for ensuring that

1 recipients of a contract, cooperative agreement, or
2 grant under this section adhere to the study design
3 approved before the contract, cooperative agreement,
4 or grant was entered into or awarded.

5 (3) LIAISON.—The employee of the National
6 Institute of Justice hired or assigned under para-
7 graph (1) may be used as a liaison between the
8 Commission and the recipients of a contract, cooper-
9 ative agreement, or grant under this section. The
10 employee shall be responsible for ensuring timely co-
11 operation with Commission requests.

12 (4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
13 There are authorized to be appropriated \$150,000
14 for each of fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to carry
15 out this subsection.

16 (f) APPLICATIONS.—A public or private entity desir-
17 ing a contract, cooperative agreement, or grant under this
18 section shall submit an application at such time, in such
19 manner, and accompanied by such information as the Di-
20 rector of the National Institute of Justice or other appro-
21 priate component of the Department of Justice may rea-
22 sonably require.

23 (g) COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION.—A per-
24 son entering into a contract or cooperative agreement or
25 receiving a grant under this section shall cooperate with

1 the Commission in providing the Commission with full in-
2 formation on the progress of the strategy being carried
3 out with a contract, cooperative agreement, or grant under
4 this section, including—

5 (1) hosting visits by the members of the Com-
6 mission to the site where the activities under the
7 strategy are being carried out;

8 (2) providing pertinent information on the lo-
9 gistics of establishing the strategy for which the con-
10 tract, cooperative agreement, or grant under this
11 section was received, including details on partner-
12 ships, selection of participants, and any efforts to
13 publicize the strategy; and

14 (3) responding to any specific inquiries that
15 may be made by the Commission.

16 **SEC. 6. FUNDING.**

17 Section 524(c) of title 28, United States Code, is
18 amended by adding at the end the following:

19 “(12) For the first full fiscal year after the date of
20 enactment of the PRECAUTION Act, and each fiscal year
21 thereafter through the end of the fifth full fiscal year after
22 such date of enactment, there is appropriated to the Attor-
23 ney General from the Fund \$4,750,000 to carry out the
24 PRECAUTION Act.”.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

"Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies"

WRITTEN TESTIMONY

BY

Patrick J. Berarducci

CHIEF OF POLICE

Medina POLICE DEPARTMENT

Medina, OHIO

Good morning Mr. Chairman, committee members. My name is Patrick Berarducci, and I am the Police Chief in Medina, Ohio. I am honored to testify before your committee. In February of this year, I began my 37th year in law enforcement. I began my law enforcement career as a patrolman on the Youngstown, Ohio, Police Department in 1974. I served my country for more than 29 1/2 years as a Special Agent with the United States Justice Department, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and its predecessor, the United States Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). Serving as both a Federal law enforcement officer and a local police officer, has given me a unique perspective and shapes my approach as Chief of Police.

I came to my current position in the Medina Police Department in August, 2009, after serving 2 ½ years as Police Chief in Boardman Township, Ohio.

To begin my testimony, for perspective, I will give a brief background of Medina, Ohio. I will then describe seven innovative and cost-saving techniques for improving law enforcement at the local level—TECHNIQUES THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT ANY COST TO CONGRESS—including setting budgets years in advance, taking advantage of social network sites such as Facebook to help police communities, purchasing vehicles in more cost-effective ways, utilizing valuable services provided by non-profits to assist in locating missing children, and teaming up with neighboring communities to provide certain specialized services. These strategies can be utilized in other communities across the country to maintain or increase efficiency while reducing cost. Finally, I will end by offering you a proposal that, I think will help protect the skies at little-to-no cost.

Background of Medina, Ohio

The City of Medina is 12.5 square miles with a population of 26,200 residents and a population density of 2,540 per square mile. Because of a large amount of retail business, schools, and light manufacturing, the city has a service population in excess of 50,000. Officers of the Medina Police Department daily patrol 190 curb lane miles in the city.

Eight years ago, the City of Medina was nearly bankrupt and had to lay off police officers and other city employees. We had our battles with drugs, violence and disorder, but today, thanks to strong local leadership, including then Mayor Jane Leaver, then Police Chief and current Mayor Dennis Hanwell, the city council, the finance director, and the various department heads, a turnaround has occurred. By implementing strategies I will discuss today, we have been able to achieve high standards while reducing costs. Even in the midst of the current recession, which has hit northern Ohio with particular severity, the Medina Police Department is able to show a substantial surplus for the current year.

Medina was recently ranked 40th on the list of "America's best small towns" by Money Magazine. The ranking was no surprise for long-time residents of Medina, who know it as a

great place to live, work, and raise a family. Compared to other cities in the survey, the city is ranked high, due to its low crime rate, excellent schools, affordable housing, general low cost of living (ranging 12-20% below the national average), and tremendous local and regional health care system.

The architect of the community policing program in Medina was then Police Chief Dennis Hanwell. During his 13 years as Chief of Police, he instilled the philosophy of community policing and "broken windows" in our department and our community. Chief Hanwell is now Mayor Hanwell, and he is committed to a Community Oriented Government Model in which we will be cross training employees from various departments in aspects of our community policing program.

To quote Dr. George Kelling, "Put simply, broken windows argues that for a community to be safe and prosperous minimal levels of order must be established and maintained." As a community we subscribe to Dr. Kelling's 'broken windows theory' of policing.

Today, the City of Medina offers a wide selection of recreational opportunities and currently has 800 acres developed for park use at 12 different sites. A strong youth sports program utilizes the park fields and the Medina Community Recreation Center through the year.

Regionally, our residents are minutes away from professional sporting events, some of the finest museums in the country, a great theatre district, the world-renown Cleveland Orchestra, and the 3rd most visited national park system in the U.S.

The City of Medina is the county seat for Medina County, one of the fastest growing counties in the State of Ohio. While our location offers an easy drive to Cleveland, Akron, and Columbus, the same highway system reaches 60% of the population of the U.S. in a days drive.

BUDGET AS A CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY

In my opinion, one of the most important reasons for our success is our five-year budget. Each department in the city has their future appropriations extending forward for five years. I already know what my budget is in 2014 and can plan accordingly. Every decision to hire, purchase, innovate or participate is weighed against its affect on our budget. When cuts need to be made, we know well in advance and can plan for them.

I would suggest our five year budget operates like a "broken windows" program for government by establishing minimal levels of order in our finances and maintaining the stability which the five year budget provides. As a result, our community is stable. I'm convinced it is an important key to our success.

FUGITIVES ON FACEBOOK - MEDINA POLICE USES SOCIAL NETWORKING

We believe that the protection and policing of our city is a shared effort between the police department and the citizens we serve. We looked for innovative ways to engage the community. The answer came from a young patrol officer named Sara Lynn and her suggestion to use Facebook to capture fugitives.

Beginning in late October of 2009, the Medina Police Department began quietly posting the photographs of 109 people wanted on a variety of criminal charges. People with information on the location of the fugitives can tip police off by email, phone or posting a comment on the Facebook page.

In the past, arrest warrants sat in dusty file drawers and resided in the police-only computers. Many times arrests were made only after chance encounters with police or after days of time consuming searching. Now we regularly receive information on fugitives, which saves us time and money.

But, the value of Facebook goes well beyond any arrests that are made. It has enabled us to get instant feedback on our events, our work and issues of concern from the community we serve.

We have fans in 21 countries who speak 11 foreign languages. 61% of our fans are women and 34% of our fans are 35-44 years of age. 25% of our fans are 25-34 and young people between the ages of 13 and 24 represent 13% of our base. As of February 27, 2010, we had over 2,403 fans and the list is growing. So powerful is the influence of this online community that fugitives have come in to surrender, so we don't post their photograph and name on our page.

As I read the comments posted by our fans, I came to realize that we were reaching people at a different level and establishing true two-way communication. Let me read to you some of the comments our fans have posted:

"It's great to know we live in a safe community. Our Police dept;[SIC] is on top of things. This is a great idea posting the warrants. (And I am glad they aren't for more violent crimes.) Our dept does a great job."

"this is the best thing you guys could've done. Mega-kudos to the police dept!!"

"Thanks Medina for keeping us safe!!"

To access the page go to www.facebook.com/medinapolice. Fugitive photographs are displayed on the page and in an album titled, "Warrants." Place your cursor on a photograph and it will display the fugitive's name, the charges and the date the warrant was issued. We also have an album of registered sexual offenders which can be viewed.

We also post links on Facebook for our news releases, upcoming events, and crime prevention tips for the public. This winter we used it to alert the public to severe weather emergency alerts. Facebook has allowed us to have an ongoing dialogue with our community and friends around the world.

A CHILD IS MISSING

A Child Is Missing (ACIM) is a Fort Lauderdale-based non-profit organization founded in 1997, which was created because no community-based program existed for locating missing children, the disabled, and elderly during the crucial first hours of a disappearance. ACIM can place 1,000 telephone calls in sixty seconds and can process multiple cases simultaneously.

On October 6, 2009, we were working a sensitive case involving a missing 11 year old girl who suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. She had gone missing from school after getting in trouble. The girl had been missing for about 4 hours when we were first notified. We were concerned not only that she was missing, but felt she might be in need of medical attention. Our dispatchers called for assistance from other police agencies, our fire department and the Life Support Team (LST) in the search. We called A Child Is Missing, and they activated the Alert Program which resulted in nearly 4,000 alert calls being placed to the area surrounding where the

young girl had last been seen. As a result of those alert calls, Medina Police received information that led them to the girl who was found safe.

The assistance is provided to law enforcement at no charge. To duplicate their calling ability would cost a police department thousands of dollars in phone equipment, special software, and staffing expense. For us, all it took was a phone call.

OPERATION TEAMWORK - POLICE SPECIAL TEAMS TO WORK TOGETHER

We have a strong history of working together in Medina County, which is only growing stronger in these difficult financial times. We have a regional view of cooperation that extends well past the city borders of Medina. We constantly look for ways to more efficiently use the resources we have. One program that has come from this philosophy is operation teamwork with the Medina County Sheriff's Department.

Operation Teamwork is aimed at reducing costs and improving the effectiveness of several components of our operations that are low-frequency but high-liability. Under the program we have combined our SWAT Teams and Jail operations with neighboring communities in an effort to provide more efficient law enforcement operations for the residents of Medina County and the City of Medina. The approach is expected to lower overall operating costs for involved agencies by combining our special enforcement teams and forming a closer working relationship.

The swat team is now a county-wide operation, with our officers joining forces with officers from the Medina County Sheriff's Office, Montville Township Police Department, Medina Township Police Department, and Wadsworth Police Department. Teaming up with our neighbors provides increased staffing of the county-wide SWAT team, which enables a quicker response with the ability to sustain a critical operation for longer periods and provide relief shifts for the officers. Assignment to the team is an extra duty for all the officers. We all save personnel, training, and equipment costs, while gaining the ability to call on the services of the county team. Under the plan, each department is responsible for equipping its own officers.

The other part of operation teamwork involves jail operations. Medina Police Department previously had two temporary detention cells and a jail range. Like the police department building that houses it, the city jail was built over 40 years ago in a different time. Nationwide jail litigation and a variety of adverse court decisions combined to change the standards for operating all jails, making it a much more difficult and costly operation.

In response to these difficulties, the Medina Police Department has again joined forces with the neighboring communities. Medina Police closed its two temporary detention cells and jail range and instead takes all prisoners to the Medina County Jail for processing and detention. Taking our prisoners down the road a mile to the Medina County Jail only makes good sense. In Ohio the sheriff is required to maintain the jail, and our Sheriff, Neil Hassinger, is among the best. The jail is nationally accredited, and its personnel are trained and staffed to deal with the difficult issues that arise in a jail setting. We have now put this asset to work for Medina City.

Teaming up with the County Jail is very beneficial to the city. The operational costs are reduced, because the city pays a fee only when we charge a suspect with a local ordinance; if the suspect is charged with a state violation, we pay no fee. In addition, we will be able to convert our old jail space to other uses, and, because we will not be responsible for overseeing detainees, our officers will be able to return to patrol much more quickly. But the true savings to the city come from the fact that we no longer are exposed to civil liability due to jail operations, and we also

will no longer face the associated costs of regulatory enforcement and training of officers in jail operations.

CENTRALIZING DISPATCH SERVICES

Several years ago, then Chief Hanwell realized that Medina City had excess dispatch capacity, but, at the same time, was in need of upgrades to the dispatch equipment. Chief Hanwell turned to neighboring departments to join forces. The Medina Police Department would provide dispatch services for neighboring departments, while those departments would pay a fee set by contract, for those services. The arrangement would make the needed equipment upgrades affordable, while at the same time promising more efficient services in the future.

Our neighboring departments agreed to the arrangement, and the dispatch center has been operational since 2004. The Medina Police Department provides dispatch services for the Medina Township Police Department, the Montville Police Department, and the Medina Township Fire Department. The dispatch center also provides dispatch services for all emergency medical calls, through an agreement, with the Medina Life Support Team, which is run by Medina Hospital. The group continues to share in the costs of operating such a center and meets regularly to discuss any issues that arise.

Overall, the partnership has proven to be a substantial cost savings to all parties, while providing the residents quality, efficient service. The program has also led to additional savings by combining training for employees from all three jurisdictions.

CARS FOR COPS

When I was the Police Chief in Boardman, Ohio, I saw an opportunity to save money for the department as well as help local businesses during very difficult financial times.

Instead of purchasing new, expensive police cars for detectives and department administrators, we purchased used cars from local dealers. We reasoned that detectives and administrators did not put the same hard miles on a vehicle that basic patrol does, so there was no need for heavy-duty radiators, transmissions, and suspensions.

We were able to purchase these cars from local dealers at or below the wholesale price, which in most cases was less than half the original cost of the new vehicle. We set our criteria for purchase at a vehicle one-year old and no more than 20,000 miles. Vehicles purchased in this manner should give five to six years of dependable service before needing to be replaced.

We saved substantial money, helped our local businesses, and gave our detectives vehicles that truly matched our community. Our goal was to make suspects wonder if every car they passed on the highway was a detective.

A SUGGESTION – POLICING THE SKIES

Finally, I'd like to present you with my final suggestion for a cost-saving and innovative program to make our air travel much safer. Unfortunately as a Police Chief, I do not have the authority to enact this suggestion, but you can.

This nation has well over 400,000 trained and certified police officers regulated by their individual states. Those officers qualify with their firearms every year and walk armed among our communities everyday to protect us. They are armed off duty as well as on duty. They go armed to our houses of worship, our schools, our businesses, and our hospitals, always prepared to confront an assailant and to protect innocent lives.

These officers are not paid when off duty and armed, but they take on the added responsibility because of a sense of duty.

These same officers are required to disarm on every off duty trip they take on commercial aircraft, and their firearms are stored in the baggage hold if taken at all. Over 400,000 trained officers are routinely disarmed by antiquated policies while you are beseeched for more money to make our skies safer.

There is already a procedure for armed Federal Agents and Police Officers on duty to register with the ticket agent before each flight. There is already a procedure to notify the gate, the crew, and the captain of each flight of the fact you are armed and what seat you are in. You are not permitted to have alcohol nor are you offered any while armed. In the rare case, a Federal Air Marshal is also on the flight, there is already a procedure to make sure they know you and you know them. The Federal Government has a training program for officers and agents to teach them best practices of "Flying Armed." I know this because I did it for almost 30 years and hundreds of flights.

This nation's law enforcement officers represent a tremendous ongoing investment made by every individual community, state, and the Federal Government. We train, regulate, and equip our nationwide population of law enforcement. They represent hundreds of thousands of years of collective experience. Use them wisely and effectively.

If congress is looking for cost-effective ways to increase public safety, then it doesn't get much easier—or much cheaper—than this. The Federal Government can get a substantial free-rider effect from the years of training provided by state and local law enforcement. I accordingly recommend that all qualified law enforcement officers be permitted to fly armed regardless of duty status.


Mr. Chairman and committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today, and I am available to answer questions. Thank you.

**SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ENCOURAGING INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE
CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES**

WRITTEN TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS

BY

**COLONEL DEAN M. ESSERMAN
CHIEF OF POLICE
PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT
PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND**



Dean M. Esserman
Chief of Police

David N. Cicilline
Mayor

**Providence Police Department
325 Washington Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02903**

GOOD MORNING MR. CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE MEMBERS, MY NAME IS DEAN ESSERMAN AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOUR COMMITTEE. I SIT HERE IN FRONT OF YOU TODAY AS ONE OF AMERICA'S POLICE CHIEFS. I HAVE BEEN THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE FOR SEVEN YEARS. PROVIDENCE IS THE CAPITOL OF RHODE ISLAND AND THE SECOND LARGEST CITY IN NEW ENGLAND. THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE PROPER ENCOMPASSES A VERY HIGH CONCENTRATION OF OUR METROPOLITAN AREA'S RESIDENTS LIVING IN POVERTY; WE ARE IN FACT AMONG THE TOP FIVE POOREST CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR CHILDREN, AND FOR TOO LONG WE WERE ALSO A CITY THAT SAW TOO MUCH VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY VIOLENCE AMONG OUR YOUNG, AMONG OUR CHILDREN.

I AM VERY PROUD TO SAY THAT THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT WHO I PROUDLY REPRESENT TODAY, "PROVIDENCE'S FINEST" HAVE BEEN MAKING A DIFFERENCE TURNING THE TIDE. FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS CRIME HAS BEEN GOING DOWN IN PROVIDENCE. LED BY AN ENERGETIC AND REFORM-MINDED MAYOR, DAVID CICILLINE, THE PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAS DONE MORE THAN TRANSFORM ITS STRATEGIES AND TACTICS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS UNDERGONE EXTENSIVE REENGINEERING AND HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED THE WAY IT THINKS ABOUT ITSELF AND ITS WORK.

IN THE PAST, THE DEPARTMENT SAW ITSELF LIKE MANY. POLICE WERE LIKE ARMED REFEREES WHO KEPT AN AUTHORITATIVE DISTANCE – TO THE

POINT OF BEING ALMOST ANONYMOUS – WHILE TRYING TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN A COMMUNITY THAT WAS NOT THEIR OWN.

I WAS RECRUITED BY THE MAYOR TO CHANGE THAT. I WAS ASKED TO BRING THE COMMUNITY POLICING PHILOSOPHY TO PROVIDENCE. COMMUNITY POLICING MEANS BECOMING ENMESHED IN THE COMMUNITY. OUR IMPROVEMENT AS A POLICE DEPARTMENT HAS DIRECTLY COINCIDED WITH OUR ABILITY TO MAKE THAT TRANSFORMATION. WE ARE AS PROFESSIONAL AS ANY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE COUNTRY, BUT WE REJECT THE IDEA OF BEING ANONYMOUS REFEREES. WE ARE PART OF THE COMMUNITY.

IN OUR REENGINEERING EFFORTS, WE HAVE ADOPTED THE LESSONS LEARNED OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES IN AMERICAN POLICING OF WHAT WORKS. FIRST, WE HAVE EMBRACED AND INSTITUTED COMMUNITY POLICING, DECENTRALIZING THE DEPARTMENT, AND DIVIDING THE CITY INTO NEIGHBORHOOD POLICE DISTRICTS. EACH DISTRICT HAS A COMMUNITY DONATED NEIGHBORHOOD SUBSTATION OFFICE AND A COMMANDER ACCOUNTABLE TO THE RESIDENTS AND TO THE DEPARTMENT.

SECOND, THE MANAGEMENT TOOL ADOPTED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO OVERSEE OUR NEWLY DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS IS WEEKLY DETECTIVE AND COMMAND STAFF MEETINGS DRIVEN BY TIMELY AND ACCURATE CRIME STATISTICS (OFTEN KNOWN AS THE NEW YORK CITY COMPSTAT MODEL). ACCOUNTABILITY IS EMPHASIZED BY DETECTIVE AND PATROL SUPERVISORS GATHERING WEEKLY TO REVIEW INCIDENTS, EVENTS, COORDINATE ACTIVITIES,

AND SHARE CRITICAL INFORMATION. MOREOVER, THE DEPARTMENT HAS EMBRACED THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN PROFESSOR KELLING'S WORK, WELL KNOWN AS "BROKEN WINDOWS." WE FOCUS OUR RESOURCES ON SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIMES AND NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY OF LIFE OFFENSES WITH EQUAL EFFORTS.

THE RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS CRIME IS DOWN 34%. THIS REPRESENTS THE LOWEST LEVEL IN MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS. AS IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS A STRONG AND GROWING SENSE OF TRUST AND PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. WHEN WE FORM COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS, WE ARE NOT JUST MEETING, WE ARE NOT JUST VISITING, WE ARE STAYING.

I TAKE THE TIME TO TELL THIS STORY SO THAT WE DO NOT ABANDON WHAT WORKS BUT RATHER BUILD ON IT AS WE SEEK OUT INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE.

IT IS IN THESE TOUGH ECONOMIC TIMES THAT OUR CITY, LIKE SO MANY COMMUNITIES ACROSS OUR COUNTRY HAVE BEEN SEVERELY TESTED. THESE TIMES CAUSE US TO SEEK OUT THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES AND TO INVEST IN WHAT WE KNOW MAKES A DIFFERENCE. AND SO, I AM HERE TO TELL YOU TODAY THAT COPS COUNT, THAT YOUR INVESTMENT IN LOCAL POLICING HAS MADE A DIFFERENCE. THAT THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY POLICING WORKS, AMERICA'S POLICE NO LONGER WORK ALONE, THEY WORK IN PARTNERSHIP:

- IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, WHETHER CONDUCTING RESEARCH OR UNDERSTANDING BEST PRACTICES THROUGH THE DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OR TARGETING OFFENDERS THROUGH THE LOCAL U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICES AND THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.
- IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE RHODE ISLAND LOCAL INITIATIVE SUPPORT CORPORATION (LISC) TO TRANSFORM DISTRESSED NEIGHBORHOODS INTO VIBRANT AND HEALTHY PLACES. WE WORK WITH OUR LOCAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS ENCOURAGING HOME OWNERSHIP AND PROVIDING CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR REAL ESTATE PROJECTS. THE PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE LISC SPONSORED COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF PERSISTENT CRIME, DISORDER, AND FEAR. THE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED THREE METLIFE FOUNDATION COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP AWARDS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.
- IN PARTNESHIP WITH THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE. PURSUING AN INITIATIVE FIRST BORN IN BOSTON IN THE 1990s, INSTITUTE STAFF, KNOWN AS STREET WORKERS ARE CERTIFIED NONVIOLENCE TRAINERS AND VETERANS OF LIFE ON THE STREET – OFTEN FORMER GANG MEMBERS – TEACH THE PRINCIPLES OF NONVIOLENCE DEVELOPED BY DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. FOR RECONCILING CONFLICT. STREET WORKERS INTERVENE IN POTENTIALLY VIOLENT SITUATIONS, OFFERING MEDIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

SERVICES, AND HELP PREVENT RETALIATION OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE BY OFFERING NONVIOLENT SOLUTIONS. STREET WORKERS VISIT SHOOTING SCENES AND EMERGENCY ROOMS IN AN EFFORT TO QUICKLY STEM-OFF RETALIATION. STREET WORKERS OFFER SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY-BASED CRISIS INTERVENTION, MEDIATION, AND SERVE AS MENTORS TO AT-RISK YOUTH. THE PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE STREET WORKERS WORK IN TANDEM TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH SOME OF THE MOST VIOLENT CITY COMBATANTS IN REAL OR PERCEIVED DISPUTES. STREET WORKERS APPEAR IN "FULL FORCE" IN TIME OF CRISIS AND IN OPEN DISPUTES. BY WORKING ALL "HOT-SPOTS," THE STREET WORKERS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE FEUDING SIDES AND ARE EQUIPPED TO ASSIST IN PARTICULAR CASES.

- IN PARTNERSHIP WITH FAMILY SERVICE OF RHODE ISLAND WHICH IS THE OLDEST AND LARGEST NON-PROFIT HUMAN SERVICE AGENCY IN RHODE ISLAND TO REPLICATE AND ENHANCE THE COMMUNITY POLICING-CHILD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF POLICE AND MENTAL-HEALTH CLINICIANS FIRST PIONEERED BY THE YALE CHILD STUDY CENTER AND THE NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT POLICE DEPARTMENT IN 1992. TOGETHER, WE CREATED A "POLICE GO TEAM" IN WHICH A TRAINED SOCIAL SERVICE CLINICIAN IS CALLED TO A CRIME SCENE TO TREAT VICTIMS AS WELL AS PROVIDE FOLLOW-UP SERVICES TO THE VICTIM, THE VICTIM'S FAMILY, AND THE POLICE OFFICERS RESPONDING TO THE SCENE. THESE

CLINICIANS RIDE IN PATROL CARS EVERY NIGHT AS PARTNERS WITH OFFICERS ON ACTIVE PATROL.

- IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND'S DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION WHERE PROBATION OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED TO NEIGHBORHOOD POLICE DISTRICT OFFICES AND THEIR CASELOAD IS SPECIFIC TO THAT NEIGHBORHOOD. THEY SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE RETURNING TO THE COMMUNITY, PARTICIPATE IN MEET AND GREET ORIENTATION MEETINGS, AND PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED OVERSIGHT AND DIRECTION TO THOSE RETURNING TO THE COMMUNITY.
- AND FINALLY, IN 2006, WITH THE NATIONAL AND RHODE ISLAND URBAN LEAGUES WHO APPROACHED THE DEPARTMENT ABOUT WORKING TOGETHER TO IMPLEMENT A DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION INITIATIVE IN THE LOCKWOOD PLAZA NEIGHBORHOOD OF PROVIDENCE. THE DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION INITIATIVE IS BASED ON THE INITIAL WORK OF JOHN JAY PROFESSOR DAVID KENNEDY IN HIGH POINT, NORTH CAROLINA.

I AM A CHARTER AND EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES CREATED BY JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK. THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES IS A COALITION OF POLICE CHIEFS, PROSECUTORS, COMMUNITY LEADERS, SERVICE PROVIDERS, MAYORS, STREET WORKERS, SCHOLARS AND OTHERS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF CRIME AND CURRENT CRIME POLICIES ON COMMUNITIES. AS A MAJOR CITY CHIEF, I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS WHERE THE COUNTRY NEEDS TO GO ON THESE ISSUES.

MANY OF THE INITIATIVES THAT I HAVE OUTLINED TODAY, AND OTHERS THAT TIME DOES NOT PERMIT, WERE BORN FROM FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH AND STARTED WITH FEDERAL GRANT FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, AND SPECIFICALLY, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT FUNDS.

THESE INVESTMENTS DIRECTED BY CONGRESS IN LOCAL POLICING MAKE A DIFFERENCE. THEY BRING DOLLARS BACK TO THE NEIGHBORHOODS OF OUR MANY COMMUNITIES AND TO THOSE WHO WORK AND LIVE IN THEM.

THE FUTURE OF INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES MUST BE FOCUSED ON THE TWIN PILLARS OF PREVENTION AND PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COMMUNITY. THE INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND NEIGHBORHOODS IMPACTS CRIME AND VIOLENCE. IT IS COST-EFFECTIVE, IT IS WELL RESEARCHED, AND IT IS RIGHT.

AN INCREASED INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, SO LONG AS THE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT REPLACE THE WORKERS IN THE FIELD, BUT SUPPORTS AND AUGMENTS THEM. THE WORKING OFFICER ON THE STREET IS THE FACE OF AMERICA'S POLICE DEPARTMENTS. THE WORKING OFFICER IS THE FACE OF THE WORKING PARTNERSHIPS WITH OUR COMMUNITY-BASED AGENCIES. THE TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE DEVELOPED TO ENHANCE EVERMORE TIMELY AND ACCURATE INFORMATION, WHETHER REACTIVE OR PREDICTIVE MUST BE DELIVERED TO

THE OFFICERS ON OUR BEATS. ONLY IF IT IS RELEVANT AND HELPFUL IN THE DAY-TO-DAY WORK OF AMERICA'S FRONT LINE POLICE OFFICERS WILL IT MAKE THE REAL DIFFERENCE.

THE FUTURE OF INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES BUILDS ON WHAT WE KNOW WORKS, AND WHO WE ENTRUST TO BE DOING THE WORK.

WITH THE RIGHT SUPPORT FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, TODAY'S POLICE DEPARTMENTS CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF OUR CITIZENS OF OUR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES. GOOD POLICING THAT IS WELL DESIGNED AND WELL MANAGED SHOULD BE EMBRACED AND SUPPORTED. IT WILL SAVE LIVES, AND STRENGTHEN COMMUNITIES. MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY HERE TODAY, AND I AM AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. THANK YOU.


EXHIBITS

1. Providence Part I Crime Charts
2. Providence Police Department receives 1st Place MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award for Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative
3. National Network for Safe Communities Brochure
4. *Annuals of Crime: Don't Shoot, A Radical Approach to the Problem of Gang Violence*, by John Seabrook. The New Yorker, June 22, 2009.
5. Providence Police Department & Family Service of RI, Police-Social Work Partnership Fact Sheet
6. Providence Police Department and Family Service of RI Partnership article by Ellen Liberman
7. Special Strategy Award: Gang Prevention & Youth Safety, Innovative Solutions to Youth Violence. *Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence and the Providence Police Department Partnership*
8. Providence Journal news article entitled "Closing 'crack highway,'" highlighting the Lockwood Drug Market Intervention Initiative. March 11, 2007.
9. Providence Journal news article entitled "Police, residents work to lower crime at Providence's troubled Chad Brown project." January 10, 2010.
10. Providence Journal news article entitled "Providence police supervisors issued BlackBerry smartphones." December 2, 2009.

EXHIBITS


1. Providence Part I Crime Charts
2. Providence Police Department receives 1st Place MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award for Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative
3. National Network for Safe Communities Brochure
4. *Annuals of Crime: Don't Shoot, A Radical Approach to the Problem of Gang Violence*, by John Seabrook. The New Yorker, June 22, 2009.
5. Providence Police Department & Family Service of RI, Police-Social Work Partnership Fact Sheet
6. Providence Police Department and Family Service of RI Partnership article by Ellen Liberman
7. Special Strategy Award: Gang Prevention & Youth Safety, Innovative Solutions to Youth Violence. *Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence and the Providence Police Department Partnership*
8. Providence Journal news article entitled "Closing 'crack highway,'" highlighting the Lockwood Drug Market Intervention Initiative. March 11, 2007.
9. Providence Journal news article entitled "Police, residents work to lower crime at Providence's troubled Chad Brown project." January 10, 2010.

Providence Part I Crime: 2008-2009



03/02/2010 3:25PM

Providence Part 1 Crime: 8 Year Comparison



03/02/2010 3:25PM

Part I Crime 2002-2009

Providence, RI

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Murder	23	20	18	22	11	14	13	24
Rape	95	107	84	99	45	34	35	46
Robbery	560	520	414	433	393	392	523	426
Aggravated Assault	603	678	559	591	489	500	545	624
Burglary	2,206	1,697	1,688	1,878	1,790	1,746	2,026	1,845
Motor Vehicle Theft	2,950	2,781	2,300	2,359	1,788	1,654	1,495	1,100
Larceny	7,602	6,819	6,412	5,808	5,313	5,481	5,787	5,181
Total Crime	14,039	12,822	11,485	11,190	9,829	9,821	10,424	9,246

Note: These figures reflect incidents and not the total number of offenses that occurred during each incident.
 Collated on January 25, 2010.

Providence Homicides: 2008-2009

Over the past two years, the city's homicide victims have been overwhelmingly young men who died from gunshot wounds. The majority were slain on weekend nights, particularly in the early Sunday morning hours - many as the night clubs closed. These graphics provide insight into the key factors of Providence homicides.

In addition, in 2009 there were eight domestic violence homicides versus zero in 2008.

03/02/2010 3:25PM



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PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT
325 WASHINGTON STREET
PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND 02903

Telephone: 401-243-6401
Fax: 401-243-6464

FAX COVER SHEET

TO:

NAME Sarah Nixon and Susan Renaud
COMPANY Senate Judiciary Committee
TELEPHONE NUMBER 202-228-6661
FAX NUMBER 202-228-6362
DATE March 2, 2010
TIME 3:30 PM
NUMBER OF PAGES 22
(INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET)

RE: Colonel Esserman's Testimony and Exhibits

This transmission is the second and is 22 pages long. If you have questions I can be reached at (401) 243-6372. Thanks, Michael O'Toole

03/02/2010 3:47PM




Riverside Gateway Initiatives

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

LEAD PARTNERS

Olneyville Housing Corporation
 Providence Police Department



Bikers using the new recreation path in Riverside Park now pass by townhomes built by Olneyville Housing Corporation on the newly re-opened Aleppo Street. These neighborhood improvements were made possible by the CPTED strategy and advocacy by community-police partners.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

A diverse set of stakeholders, led by the Olneyville Housing Corporation (OHC) and the Providence Police Department (PPD) in the Olneyville neighborhood of Providence, Rhode Island advanced a comprehensive revitalization agenda that transformed what had previously been a forgotten, crime-ridden section of the city into a revitalized, vibrant neighborhood. Vacant lots that once harbored drug users and prostitutes have been replaced by a nine-acre park and new, affordable homes.

A Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) strategy, undertaken by a host of creative partners and building on the core OHC-PPD collaboration, was critical to Olneyville's remarkable turnaround. In fact, the CPTED efforts persist today as police continue to weigh in regularly on community development plans and, conversely, to structure their own crime-combating strategies around the growing number of community development projects taking shape throughout Providence.

NEIGHBORHOOD BACKGROUND

Olneyville, one of the oldest neighborhoods in Providence, is located in the central-western section of the city. It runs along the Woonasquatucket River, which fueled mill development along its entire length during the 1800s. The second half of the 20th century, however, saw the mills deserted. With the river significantly polluted, the adjacent area was virtually abandoned.

After years of neglect, the section of Olneyville closest to the river (between Aleppo Street and Manton Avenue) was filled with vacant lots and abandoned properties that had become

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2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards for Neighborhood Revitalization / FIRST PLACE WINNERS

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havens for drug dealing, drug use, prostitution and related incidents of violence. In the year 2002 alone, there were 805 calls for service regarding prostitution, drugs, loud parties, shots fired and persons with a gun, and 831 reported incidents of crime including murders, sexual assaults, robberies, burglaries, vehicle thefts, larceny and vandalism.

Residents who remained in the neighborhood represented a diverse ethnic and racial mix. According to the 2000 census, 57% of the population was Hispanic and 63% of public school students spoke a language other than English at home. In the year 2000, Olneyville's median family income was measured at a mere \$19,676 - the lowest in all of Providence.

The Olneyville Housing Corporation was founded in 1988 to promote the revitalization of Olneyville through the development of affordable housing for residents. Since that time, OHC has worked to stabilize the neighborhood by addressing the problems associated with an aging housing stock, decline in owner occupancy and increasing gap between housing costs and residents' income. OHC's core agenda is to build a safe, healthy and stable community through the empowerment of Olneyville residents. While OHC's primary function centers on physical redevelopment, the organization takes a holistic approach to community strengthening which includes economic development, individual wealth building and collaboration with residents and similarly charged organizations to build a strong, viable neighborhood.

PROGRAM STRATEGY & ACTIVITY

Comprehensive Community-Based Planning

In 2001 and 2002, the OHC, in conjunction with the then thirteen (now twenty-one) member Olneyville Collaborative, conducted a comprehensive planning process funded by a neighborhood planning grant from the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation.

Of the many significant needs identified through this planning process, the area between Manton Avenue, the neighborhood's main street with a mix of commercial and housing uses, and Aleppo Street stood out. Much of this swath was filled with

"I have always believed that community policing is about being a part of the support structure for families and neighborhoods. The work of these organizations - improving where people live and how they deal with conflict - is something the police must support however we can. We need partners who are working to strengthen their communities. The stronger the community is, the closer we all get to our goals."

- Colonel Dean Esserman, Chief of Police, Providence Police Department

vacant lots and abandoned properties which were at the center of the neighborhood's prostitution, drug dealing and drug use problems.

In the midst of this blight, the City of Providence began the environmental remediation and planning for a nine acre public park along the river - in part, adjacent to the worst strip of Aleppo. The plans called for a bike path passing through with connections to downtown Providence and a statewide network of bike paths. This effort was conceived as part of a broader effort to reclaim the Woonasquatucket River from downtown Providence throughout its watershed area. The Collaborative's work built on the work of the Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council which had begun a more intensive community organizing effort to reclaim the river both as a recreational asset and as an economic development engine in the early 1990s. Part of the Council's vision was to capitalize on the park's immense potential and promise for the Olneyville community and for the city as a whole.



Vacant and boarded properties contributed to the crime problems in Olneyville prior to the OHC-police intervention.

Participants in the planning process concluded that without an aggressive development strategy for the Manton-Aleppo portion of the neighborhood, the transformative impact the park could have on the neighborhood would be lost and public investment wasted. The strategy would need to be focused on development and programming to bring resident engagement and near round-the-clock positive activity to the park and adjacent area.

Police Spur An Innovative Approach to Property Acquisition

In 2003, OHC began assembling property to develop housing on the park that would meet two important objectives: the creation of quality, affordable homes for the area's low-income residents, and in turn, a more populated area that would provide "eyes" on the park, thereby helping to deter crime. OHC purchased property from private owners in traditional transactions while several city-owned properties were also made available. The city further supported OHC's efforts by foreclosing on tax titles and demolition liens.

But perhaps the City's greatest support came through the Providence Police force. Long an ally of OHC and its many community-based collaborators, the PPD began to understand the power of OHC's development plans for building away some of the department's most serious crime control challenges.

A key structure through which the police participated was the R.I. Attorney General's Nuisance Task Force. The NTF, bringing together representatives from Police, Fire, and Building Inspection departments, helped facilitate acquisitions by encouraging negligent landlords of dilapidated or crime-infested units to sell their properties to OHC or be held accountable. Two tactics in particular were central to the NTF's success: First, was its trust in and conscientious responsiveness to residents' complaints – residents served as the primary reporters of hot spot crime properties and building code violations.

The second "tactic" was simply the diversity of the Task Force itself. By sending a team of City officials and representatives of multiple agencies to survey property neglect and address a variety of violations (including but not limited to problems with plumbing, sanitation, infrastructure, fire hazards and criminal activities), the Nuisance Task Force was able to convince previously uncooperative landlords to sell their property. The option to sell property was seen by these owners as the most viable alternative on the table when faced with the burden of evicting criminal tenants, the cost of repairing distressed properties and the threat of steep fines, court cases, arrests and other punitive measures proffered by the NTF in the event of noncompliance.

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2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards for Neighborhood Revitalization / FIRST PLACE WINNERS

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
The role of the NTF - but in particular, the role of the Providence Police - cannot be overstated. Police were invested in and understood the goals of the community planning process, their cooperation came easily, and they proved critical in the acquisition of several key properties. Among them, the following three stand out.

1. On Manton Street, a key corner in the neighborhood and entry point for the future park on the neighborhood's main arterial street, a negligent absentee landlord and a mentally ill elderly tenant had allowed the building to be overrun with nuisance activities. The property became a magnet for drug use, prostitution, loud parties that led to fights, vandalism and even a murder in 2001. OHC believed this was the property that, left unabated, might singularly undermine its redevelopment efforts. With targeted and saturated police intervention and a visit from the Nuisance Task Force in 2003, the owner was persuaded to sell.
2. On Hillard Street, an investor who had not previously owned inner city real estate inherited three tenants who used this property as a base for criminal activity. With the attention of police enforcement activities, he quickly determined that he was not up to the challenge of managing these issues and sought out OHC to purchase the property.
3. A property on Aleppo Street was physically isolated from the rest of the neighborhood. It was the only house within several hundreds yards and had a landlord who was notorious as the owner of problem properties throughout the neighborhood. For many years the property was very attractive to tenants who capitalized on the isolation for illicit activity. Police provided saturated enforcement and worked closely with other City officials to confront this owner and successfully encourage him to make this property available for OHC's revitalization initiative.


The police role in both planning and in Nuisance Task Force action was instrumental in advancing OHC's property development initiatives, which required a sustained improvement in public safety for their potential value to be maximized. To cement the already strong police-development relationship, OHC has, more recently, added a local police Lieutenant to its Board of Directors.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
The acquisition of these properties was the first step towards disrupting and discouraging crime. Next would come the transformation: conversion of the once blighted properties into livable, attractive homes for the area's low-income families.

To dovetail with OHC's long-term housing plans, a staff member from the local LISC office (who was already working through LISC's Community Safety Initiative to facilitate greater dialogue between the Providence Police Department and Olneyville Housing Corporation) initiated a focused CPTED training. Experienced in this practice which emphasizes opportunities to combine physical design with program



2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards for Neighborhood Revitalization / FIRST PLACE WINNERS [13]




...ing to minimize crime opportunities. LIISC believed this training would represent a convergence of OHC's residential vision and the neighborhood collaborative's (led in large part by the Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council) aspirations for the new park.

Financed by the Watershed Council with additional resources from LIISC, LIISC worked to help the local partners mobilize more than 40 residents, police officers, OHC staff, City staff, architects and other planners for two-days to discuss ways in which development and physical design of the park and its surrounding area could deter crime and foster more vibrant, economically sound and lasting change. At this CPTED training, led by a nationally respected expert from the National Institute of Crime Prevention, participants walked through the park's site, expressing their concerns and recommendations for the area's design. It became clear that everyone's seemingly separate interests were in fact interrelated, and that no one party's problems could be solved without considering the others'. OHC wanted the police to successfully maintain public security (to ensure their new properties would be safe for residents);

the Police wanted the new housing stock to retain its value to avoid it again becoming attractive for criminal activities; and the residents themselves wanted the area to be freed permanently of the loitering, drugs and prostitution that had flourished during the previous years of neglect.

As such, the CPTED training served to strengthen the community-police bonds and cement a collaborative partnership among all of Olneyville's many stakeholders as they discovered they shared many common goals. In addition, the participants crafted an explicit list of recommendations for the park-- items for immediate and long-term action. First up: the local police lieutenant immediately arranged for a boulder to be moved to close a cave that was used by drug dealers and prostitutes. Other key recommendations included: spreading park amenities throughout the nine acre site, rather than in one or two concentrated areas; changing the planting plan for the park to include dense vegetation in the area adjacent to a high retaining wall to inhibit criminal activity; and placing bathrooms at the Riverside Mills building in a more public area facing the street and the office reception spaces, rather than behind the building facing the park.

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Pictured left to right: U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse celebrated the Olneyville transformation with local dignitaries and partners at the MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award ceremony; New homes built by OHC now border the playground at Riverside Park, redeveloped with input by a broad range of public and private partners who participated in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design training

One of the chief negative issues identified through the CPTED process was the City's decision to abandon a project to extend and pave a portion of Aleppo Street adjacent to the park (from Pelliam to Bosworth.) Cost overruns on the park's construction due to environmental contamination had reduced the budget available for other expected infrastructure, and Aleppo was the chief victim. Opening up the closed sections of Aleppo Street, and consequently creating better sightlines into the park, would enable the police to maintain proper surveillance of the whole nine-acre parcel and would provide emergency vehicles with direct access to the new housing being built. The Olneyville partners also anticipated that it would impede the kind of loitering and criminal activity that can take hold in dead-end, poorly patrolled zones. Further, OHC development staff needed the street frontage for new homes; and neighborhood residents felt that the whole area would be safer with access and travel along that portion of the park.

Opening Aleppo Street quickly became the CPTED group's highest priority for design change in the area. All parties began lobbying the city for a change in investment policy. Residents, police, representatives from OHC and representatives from

IJSC all took part in the advocacy efforts, writing letters to public agencies and repeatedly calling city officials until the project was ultimately approved and given an adequate budgetary allotment. Aleppo was re-opened, paved and now serves as frontage for new townhomes built by OHC.

This advocacy campaign was particularly successful because of the project's unique preventative characteristic: in lieu of asking the City for funding to put more police on the streets (and other such requests), the advocacy group was able to make its case by illustrating how this one-time investment in re-opening the street could have lasting effects that would thwart a future drain on resources. Opening the street would safeguard the new park, housing and public safety investments for the long-term.

Reported crime fell by 70% within 300 feet of the problem properties targeted by the Olneyville partners.

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2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards for Neighborhood Revitalization / FIRST PLACE WINNERS



In October 2006, OHC Director Frank Shea (left) celebrated the ribbon cutting for problem properties redeveloped into affordable housing with local and national supporters, including Congressman Patrick Kennedy, Mayor David Cicilline and RI LISC Director Barbara Fields.

PROGRAM IMPACT

Public Safety

Crime statistics confirm the positive impacts that the changes in property ownership and the CPTED efforts have had on the area. In 2001, the area experienced three murders, two of which occurred at properties deemed neighborhood menaces which have since been purchased by OHC. Since OHC's involvement, there have been no murders in the area, and reported crime within 300 feet of these addresses has fallen by a total of 70 percent. In the entirety of Olneyville, there were 253 fewer reported crimes in 2006 than in 2003 (dropping down to 662 reports in 2006 from 915 reports in 2003). Similarly, calls for service also fell, declining by almost 59% percent within 300 feet of these addresses between 2002 and 2006 (versus a 13% reduction neighborhood-wide).

These results are visible. Walking through Olneyville, one no longer sees drug dealers and prostitutes, but instead children and families on their way to school or the park playground.

Community Development and Building

In addition to the impact OHC, the Providence Police and their many local partners had on ridding the area of public safety nuisances, the property renovation currently underway will also soon provide affordable housing for low-income residents, creating a minimum of 70 new housing units in three separate developments. These units will also serve to fulfill the original plan's vision to create more activity in the area and provide "eyes on the park," further advancing the already successful drop in crime and improved perception of public safety. Already completed is a 31 residential, 2 commercial unit, and construction is now complete on the Riverside Townhomes development, transforming a former brownfield site into 20 new condominiums for purchase by first-time homeowners. Furthermore, three historic worker cottages from the 1860s

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2007 MedLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards for Neighborhood Revitalization / FIRST PLACE WINNERS

will be rebuilt, providing homes for seven working families; and 39 additional families will move into homes being built on a large, vacant lot located between the park and a neighboring public housing project.

Also exciting is the former Riverside Mills office building, which will soon be converted, possibly into artist housing units with space for meetings and performances. Artists selected as tenants would first have to demonstrate a commitment to engaging with neighborhood residents and the new park. "We are committed to reusing that building in a way that brings the most life and activity into the area," said Frank Shea, OHC Executive Director.

In 2006, construction of the new park commenced, with more than 300 community volunteers showing up to plant trees, build a canoe launch, remove invasive plants, install creative mile markers fashioned by local artists along the bike path and to create artistic sculpture using debris gathered from the river - an apt and inspiring commemoration of the past years' transformative work.

Developer-Police Partnerships

The impact on the core developer-police relationship has been undoubtedly less tangible but no less potent. Today, the relationships forged from an awakening around mutual need, the potential for synergistic effect and the mechanisms and structures necessary for collective action are stronger than ever. Staff and leadership of OHC meet regularly and in wide-ranging strategic sessions with personnel at the street and command levels in the PPD. Together, they address new development challenges, advocate for policy change and new funding and collaborate in increasingly formal ways to "build their way" out of ongoing public safety problems as they encounter them.

It is a partnership born of interdependent goals, tested in the real world and solidified by mutual respect and a growing track record of success. And it is one that has become a model for public safety work throughout the City of Providence.

PARTNERSHIP INFORMATION

WINNING PROGRAM

Riverside Gateway Initiative

APPLICANTS

Oneville Housing Corporation
Providence Police Department

INCEPTION DATE

2003

KEY PARTNERS

Rhode Island DDO
City of Providence Planning Department
Parks Department
Inspector's & Standards Department
Providence Housing Authority
Rhode Island Attorney General Nuisance Task Force
Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corporation
Providence Weeds Seed
The Steel Yard
Shriver Bros. Floors & Floors
Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council
Oneville Collaborative

FUNDERS

Rhode Island DDO
National Equity Fund
Rhode Island Housing
City of Providence
United Way of Rhode Island
Rhode Island Housing Resources Commission
EPA
Bank of America
Candle Mee Corporation
American Communities Fund
Federal Home Loan Bank Affordable Housing Program

PRIMARY POLICE CONTACT

DL 906 Lepore
401 255 4751
Providence Police Department

PRIMARY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CONTACT

Frank Shea
401 351 8719
Oneville Housing Corporation

Photos courtesy of Oneville Housing Corporation

COMMUNITY SAFETY PAPER SERIES



MetLife Foundation

LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORPORATION – COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE

LISC is the nation's leading community development support organization. Since 1980, LISC has helped resident-led, community-based development organizations transform distressed communities and neighborhoods into healthy ones – good places to live, do business, work and raise families. By providing capital, technical expertise, training and information, LISC supports the development of local leadership and the creation of affordable housing, commercial, industrial and community facilities, businesses and jobs. LISC established the Community Safety Initiative in 1994 to support strategic alliances between community developers, law enforcement and other key stakeholders in troubled neighborhoods. The partners' work creates strong, stable and healthy communities by reducing persistent crime and disorder and spurring economic investment.

METLIFE FOUNDATION

MetLife Foundation, established by MetLife in 1976, is a long-time supporter of LISC's community revitalization programs. In 1994, the Foundation made a \$1 million leadership grant to pilot the Community Safety Initiative. MetLife and the Foundation have also made below-market rate loans and grants of almost \$77 million to the organization. For more information about the Foundation, visit www.metlife.org.

COMMUNITY SAFETY PAPER SERIES

This publication is part of a series published by LISC's Community Safety Initiative as part of the MetLife Foundation Community Safety Initiative Awards program. Sponsored by MetLife Foundation since 2002, the Awards celebrate and promote exemplary community safety strategies bolstered by collaboration between police and neighborhood leaders. For other case studies and papers in this series, please visit www.lisc.org/resources.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge MetLife Foundation for continued support of the Community Safety Initiative and strong dedication to public safety partnerships around the country. Under their leadership, we have been able to expand this unique awards program this year, as well as produce a variety of papers highlighting themes that cut across many of our past award winners' work.

We would like to also thank the police and community development leaders who participated in the awards process as application readers: Lisa Belsky, Jim Bueermann, Bill Geller, Charles Gruber, Mossik Hacobian, Bill Jones, James Jordan, Tom Lattimore, Ken Miller, Lisa Mueller-Levy, Gregory Saville and Jerry Williams.

The authors and publishers are solely responsible for the accuracy of the statements and interpretations contained herein. Such interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of MetLife Foundation.

Writing: Karin Anderson

Design: B. Boye Design

Cover photos: (Left) Volunteers in Cincinnati's Over-the-Rhine neighborhood paint murals to change perceptions and increase community pride. (Center) LISC Community Development. (Right) Lieutenant Herb Lopez celebrates the Olneyville MetLife Foundation Award with police leaders in the President Police Department.



NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES

The National Network for Safe Communities is a coalition of police chiefs, prosecutors, community leaders, service providers, mayors, street workers, scholars, and others concerned about the impact of crime and current crime policies on communities.

COMMITTED TO SAVING LIVES, SAVING COMMUNITIES

The National Network for Safe Communities believes:

THE LEVELS OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA ARE UNACCEPTABLE

Each year, 16,000 people die from violent crimes in America. The levels of homicide are four to seven times higher than in Europe. Among young men of color living in high crime neighborhoods, the risk of becoming a homicide victim is 65 times higher than the national average.

THE REALITIES OF DRUG MARKETS ARE UNACCEPTABLE

In many neighborhoods, drug dealers and drug buyers have taken over the streets, forcing residents to stay in their homes. These drug markets are violent and volatile, undermining community safety and inhibiting development of local economies.



NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES



STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES



COMMITTED TO SAVING LIVES, SAVING COMMUNITIES

CENTER FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL
JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
899 Tenth Avenue New York, NY 10018
Tel: 212.464.1923 Fax: 212.237.8937 www.jjay.cuny.edu/ccpc

THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES ARE UNACCEPTABLE

Police and residents of minority neighborhoods too often distrust one another, which undermines respect for the law and impedes enforcement of the law.

THE LEVELS OF INCARCERATION IN AMERICA ARE UNACCEPTABLE

The four-fold increase in the rate of incarceration in America since the late 1970s has caused enormous strain on the same minority neighborhoods that are living with excessively high crime rates. These neighborhoods are given a false choice between lower crime rates and fewer arrests.

THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES is committed to building a new standard of practice aimed at

- Reducing levels of violent crime
- Eliminating overt drug markets
- Promoting racial reconciliation between minority communities and police
- Reducing high levels of incarceration

A STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE OVERT DRUG MARKETS

Pioneered in High Point, NC, this strategy brings together drug dealers, their families, law enforcement and criminal justice officials, service providers, and community leaders to eliminate overt community drug markets, arrest and prosecute violent drug dealers; offer non-violent dealers education, job placement, and other assistance; and establish clear, predictable, and meaningful consequences for those who return to dealing.

- The original intervention in High Point eliminated drug markets citywide, and reduced violent crime in the first neighborhood in which it was implemented by 57 percent

- In Providence, RI, calls for police service in the city's worst drug market fell 58 percent; reported drug crime 70 percent; and drug calls to police 81 percent

- In Hempstead, NY, drug arrests dropped 87 percent in the year after its drug market was shut down

Both the group and gang violence and the drug market strategy directly address, reduce, and even reverse the profound tension between minority communities and police. The most important benefit of this work," says High Point Chief of Police James Esley, "is the reconciliation that emerges from the dialogue between the minority community and police. It's nothing short of miraculous.


The National Network for Safe Communities is dedicated to implementing these strategies nationally; to institutionalizing them; to continuing to evaluate and improve them; and thereby to dramatically reduce crime and incarceration in America.

The new standard is to be rooted in the systematic implementation of two proven crime prevention strategies:

A STRATEGY TO PREVENT HOMICIDE AND SERIOUS VIOLENCE

Pioneered in Boston, MA, this strategy brings together offenders, their families, law enforcement and criminal justice officials, service providers, street workers, and community leaders to set clear community standards against violence; help offenders leave the streets; and establish clear, predictable, and meaningful consequences for groups whose members commit homicide and serious violence.

- The original Boston Ceasefire intervention cut youth homicide by two thirds, and homicide citywide by half
- In Indianapolis, the strategy cut homicide citywide by over a third, and homicide victimization among young black men in the city's five most dangerous areas by 70 percent
- In Chicago, a variation of the strategy cut homicide in two of the city's most violent neighborhoods by 37 percent



We are guided by an Executive Board
Our Executive Board is comprised of leaders from the national, state and local level who have been involved in testing and evaluating the strategies of the National Network for Safe Communities over the past several years; have seen the positive results first-hand, and are committed to sharing their experiences and insights in a larger network.

- co-chairs**
- Mr. Jeremy Travis
Assistant Director
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
 - Professor David A. Kennedy
Director for Crime Prevention
and Control
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
- co-coaches**
- Dr. Anthony Braga
Program in Criminal Justice Policy
and Practice
Rutgers University
 - Dr. Elizabeth Olesari
Chief, Community Justice
Initiative
New York State
Attorney General's Office
 - Dr. Doug Thornberry
Department of Sociology
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
 - Mr. Stewart Walling
Project Director/Principal
Investigator
Public Health Institute
- co-consultants**
- Professor Timothy Meares
Wilton Hall Hamilton Professor
of Law
Yale Law School
 - Ms. Meg Petts
Executive Assistant/Clinical Attorney
and Program Director
Massachusetts
District Attorney's Office, NY
 - Mr. Mark Schoch
Follow-Up, Stability, Restore
Dr. Ellen Schmeier
Chief, Community Justice
Initiative
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
 - Mr. Paul Stone
Director
Office of the Attorney General
California
 - Chief Thomas H. G. Hatcher, II
Cincinnati Police Department
Cincinnati, OH
 - Raymond J. Gentry
Executive Director
High Point Community Against
Violence
High Point, NC
 - Dr. Doug Thornberry
Department of Sociology
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
 - Mr. Stewart Walling
Project Director/Principal
Investigator
Public Health Institute

ANNALS OF CRIME

DON'T SHOOT

A radical approach to the problem of gang violence.

BY JOHN SEABROOK

In April, 2006, two brutal street killings in the Over-the-Rhine section of Cincinnati spread fear through the city. A white suburban mother of three, who was trying to buy drugs at the corner of Fourteenth and Race, got into an argument with the dealer, and was shot and killed. A few days later, on the same block, four white kids, also from the suburbs—a boy at the wheel, three girls in the back—were buying drugs when a black man walked up to the car and shot the boy in the head.

These incidents, coming within days of each other, contributed to the public's impression that violent crime in the streets was out of control. In fact, much of the violence was occurring between people who were closely connected. Young black men were shooting each other over drug deals gone bad; in the majority of cases, the victims and the shooters knew each other. Nevertheless, although the average Cincinnati had little chance of getting shot on the street, citizens perceived potential killers everywhere. And that presented Chief Thomas Streicher and his assistant chief, Lieutenant Colonel James Whalen, of the Cincinnati Police Department, with two problems: a crime spree and a public-relations crisis.

The killings were perpetrated mostly by gangs, or "groups"—the expression preferred by Cincinnati civic leaders. "Not real organized gangs such as your Crips and Bloods and whatnot," Whalen told me. "More like loose-knit groups of guys hanging out on street corners." In the summer of 2006, Streicher and Whalen implemented a "zero tolerance" plan. They assembled an elite sixty-man crime-fighting squad code-named Vortex, which began making sweeps of high-crime areas, or "hot spots," arresting people not just for serious crimes but also for misdemeanors, like jaywalking and loitering. By the end of September, more than twenty-six hundred arrests had been made.

The drawback of zero tolerance is that it tends to make law-abiding citizens in

hot spots almost as fearful of the police as they are of the criminals. As Whalen, a big, bearlike man with a friendly Irish face, put it to me recently, "You say, 'O.K., we're going to arrest everyone who jaywalks.' So who do you arrest? Someone's grandmother, or the milkman, or some guy who has just worked a sixteen-hour day and is trying to get home as fast as he can. It's bullshit. Even in high-crime neighborhoods, there are a lot of honest people living there. Meanwhile, the real bad guys—they know a sweep is on, so they just stay inside until things cool off."

The Cincinnati Police Department's relationship with the black community had been a poisonous issue for years. In March, 2001, the A.C.L.U. and a local civil-rights group filed a lawsuit against the city for racial profiling and excessive force. Three weeks later, after a police officer chased and fatally shot an unarmed nineteen-year-old black man, the city was engulfed in three days of riots, arson, and looting. Whalen was the commanding officer of the riot-response team, and he saw firsthand the utter breakdown of trust between the cops and the community. In 2002, as part of an agreement reached to settle the A.C.L.U. lawsuit and in response to a Department of Justice investigation, a federal monitor was appointed to oversee reforms in the police department. Some progress had been made since the riots, but Operation Vortex threatened to undo it.

Vortex did reduce street crime, according to the police. But it had little effect on the city's murder count, which, with twelve murders in September of 2006 and a deadly spurt over the holidays, finished the year at eighty-nine, the highest number since recordkeeping began.

After the 2001 riots, the Cincinnati police heard from dozens of academics and criminologists, who proposed a variety of policy initiatives aimed at improving relations with the community.


Captain Daniel Gerard, who took over Vortex in the fall of 2007, didn't put much stock in their ideas. As he said, "Academia and law enforcement are at opposite ends of the spectrum. They like theories, we like results."

Therefore, when David Kennedy, a professor in the anthropology department at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, in New York City, came to Cincinnati in the fall of 2006 to pitch a program he had devised to counter gang violence, the cops didn't expect much. Kennedy was tall and slim, and in the dark clothes he favored there was something about him of the High Plains Drifter—the mysterious stranger who blows into town one day and makes the bad guys go away. He wore a grizzled beard and had thick, unbound hair that cascaded halfway down his back. "What's some guy who looks like Jesus got to tell us about crime in Cincinnati?" was the line around police headquarters.

Kennedy had been approached by Dr. Victor Garcia, the head of the trauma unit at Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, who was seeing almost daily the effects of the city's violent gangs: the stabbings, shootings, and beatings, and the injuries to innocent children caught in the crossfire. "Children with their eyes shot out, children paralyzed," Garcia told me. "I started to wonder, instead of treating injuries, how can we prevent them from happening in the first place?" Garcia and a local councilman named Cecil Thomas arranged a conference call between Kennedy and Mark Mallory, Cincinnati's recently elected mayor. Two months later, Kennedy outlined his plan to the city's officials and community leaders.

Ceasefire, as Kennedy's program is sometimes known, begins with the fact, commonly recognized by criminologists, that a small number of hardened criminals commit a hugely disproportionate number of serious violent crimes. Often, much of the violence is caused by gang dynamics: score settling, vendettas, and turf issues, all played out according to the law of the streets. Arresting the shooters doesn't generally stop the killing, nor does threatening them with long prison sentences. But one thing does work, Kennedy had discovered: telling them to stop.

In Cincinnati, Kennedy explained, the police would first identify gang members on parole or probation and compel them



David Kennedy told Cincinnati that gang-related murders could be cut in half.

to attend a meeting. There the cops would deliver an ultimatum: the shootings must stop. "And if they do not stop," Kennedy said, "the consequences will be swift, and certain, and severe, and punishment will be handed out not just to the individual involved in the shooting but to everyone in that individual's gang."

The young men in the gangs would also be given a phone number that they could call for help. The city would make life coaching and job counseling available to those who wanted out of the thug life.

"We don't promise them jobs—we promise to do the best we can for them," Kennedy said. Clergy, ex-gang members, and victims and their family members would be on hand to deliver the moral component of the message to the offenders:

"What you are doing is wrong, and we know you can do better."

Like many politicians, Mallory was concerned about being branded soft on crime, especially at a time when citizens were calling for more police, longer prison terms for offenders, and the construction of a new jail. But the police seemed unable to reduce the homicide rate, and Ceasefire offered a fresh approach to the problem—Kennedy all but guaranteed the Cincinnati civic leaders that if they followed his plan the city would reduce its gang-related murder count by forty to fifty percent in a year. At the end of the meeting, the Mayor, the city manager, and the city council gave their support to the plan, and about five hundred thousand

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dollars was budgeted over two years.

The police remained skeptical. To Chief Streicher, a blond and youthful fifty-five-year-old with a military bearing, whose demeanor and posture, and even the ring of his name (pronounced "striker"), signal a man of action, Ceasefire sounded like a social program promoted by do-gooders. And the cops did not like the idea of being on a team with social workers. Whalen explained to me the C.P.D.'s distinction between social workers and cops: "Social people hug thugs. We kick their butts."


Cincinnati has always had a strong conservative streak, and its police force is no exception. In responding to crime outbreaks, police tactics hadn't changed much since Whalen's father was a cop, battling Vietnam War protesters in the sixties. "Peace through superior firepower," Gerard told me. The C.P.D. relied heavily on its fleet of vehicles; "send another car" was standard operating procedure when dealing with disturbances. Whalen explained, "You've got a problem at Fourteenth and Vine, so you send a couple of cops out there to that corner." But even within hot spots crimes were viewed as isolated incidents. "We'd say, 'We've got a problem with Jerry, or Frank—we got to pick that individual up,'" Whalen said. Little effort was made to aggregate crime data, so that the information could be analyzed for patterns, which would situate Jerry's and Frank's offenses within a context and a network. The beat cops often understood the context, but their captains and commanders rarely asked for their advice. As a result, Streicher and Whalen and the rest of the C.P.D. leadership had no hard data about how many of the murders in the city were gang-related, what the real motives for the killings were, and how the shooters and the victims were connected.

In May of 2007, beat cops and investigators were summoned from Cincinnati's five districts to the new regional Homeland Security Center to meet Kennedy and participate in two eight-hour information-gathering sessions, overseen by Dr. Robin Engel, the director of the University of Cincinnati Policing Institute. Everyone gathered in the command room, where large maps of each of the districts were spread out on tables. The researchers began a "gang audit"

with the first district. Cops were asked to draw on the map the location of any gangs they were aware of, which would be represented by numbered circles. The officers relied on anecdotal information that they had picked up on the streets. Engel and her students peppered them with questions. Where is the group located? How many members does it have? Is it allied with any other gangs? Does it have any conflicts or "beefs"—which tend to be ongoing vendettas sometimes triggered by a long-forgotten slight—with other gangs? What kinds of criminal activity is it involved in? How organized is it? How violent is it? Does the gang have any identifying "tags" (graffiti) or colors? Are there any standout individuals? A form containing some of these questions was projected on a giant video screen on one wall.

"You could see the cops were wary of us at first," Engel said. "They saw us as outsiders—which we were." But soon the cops from the other districts started marking up their maps and answering the questions on the form even before Engel and her students reached them. "That's when I knew we were going to win them over," Whalen said.

The researchers collated and analyzed all this information. They identified and mapped sixty-nine gangs, which the cops estimated to contain a thousand individuals altogether, over the coming months, the cops managed to name eight hundred of these. The researchers also prepared "sociograms"—visual representations of the dynamics among the different gangs—in which gangs allied with each other were connected with green lines, and gangs pursuing conflicts were connected with red lines. With the names of the gang members, the researchers were able to mine the cops' field-incident reports, surveillance records, and arrest sheets to flesh out patterns of criminal behavior. Among the facts they discovered about the gang members was that a



third of them had ten or more felony charges, and ninety-one per cent had a prior arrest for a violent crime.

David Kennedy is not a cop, or an academically trained criminologist, and his lack of formal schooling in either the practice or the theory of crime control may be his strongest qualification for his job. In the bifurcated world of criminology, Kennedy is able to speak to both cops and academics. His 2008 book, "Deterrence and Crime Prevention," has been described by scholars as a landmark rethinking of public policy, but it can also be read as a primer on twenty-first-century policing. George Kelling, the co-author, with James Q. Wilson, of the influential 1982 essay "Broken Windows," told me, "Cops put on a tough front about crime, but they really do care, and David speaks with passion, and with the credibility that comes from spending hours in the back of squad cars, so cops respond."

Kennedy's father, Christopher, a mechanical engineer, was born in the Clinton Hill neighborhood of Brooklyn, not far from where David lives now, in Fort Greene, but Kennedy was raised in a suburb of Detroit, where his father worked in the auto industry, designing suspension systems. The family valued "ruthless common sense," Kennedy told me. "Good thinking" was the highest compliment David and his two sisters could receive from their parents. He attended Swarthmore College, where he studied moral philosophy.

The idea that the threat of punishment can act as an effective deterrent to crime goes back to the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria and the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Beccaria's 1764 essay, "On Crimes and Punishments," was among the first works in Western literature to argue for a humane and rational system of criminal justice and against torture and the death penalty. Beccaria thought that punishment should be proportional to the crime and preventive, not retributive. In order for the threat of punishment to be an effective deterrent, he wrote, the punishment itself had to be swift, severe, and certain; Beccaria added that certainty and swiftness were the most important of these qualities, and severity the least. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Bentham elaborated on Beccaria's ideas, arguing that rational

men, faced with the choice between pleasure and pain, freedom and incarceration, and benefits and sanctions, will make the choice that yields the greater happiness. This assumption is one of the foundations of the American criminal-justice system.

Immanuel Kant, on whom Kennedy wrote his senior thesis, also considered the role of deterrence in matters of crime and punishment. From his reading of Kant, Kennedy said, he internalized the idea that "morality predicated on external pressures alone is never sufficient." But Kennedy never anticipated that Kant's ideas would help shape the core of his life's work: designing a modern system of deterrence that includes a moral component.

After graduating, in 1980, Kennedy moved to Boston and became a freelance writer. He spent a year working on science and technology pieces before taking a salaried job as a case-study writer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. One of his early assignments was to prepare case studies for the Harvard Executive Session on Community Policing, a

series of meetings attended by police chiefs, criminologists, and criminal-justice experts, who were brought together by Mark Moore, the founder of the school's criminal-justice program. Many in the group agreed that the two traditional approaches to crime—the liberal remedy, which was to attack root causes like poverty, education, and social and economic injustice; and the conservative approach, which was to rely on the criminal-justice system—had proved insufficient, especially in dealing with inner-city drug and gang-related crimes. A third approach was needed, incorporating traditional elements and deploying police resources in new, creative ways.

Among the participants, who met periodically over five years, were Edwin Meese, then Reagan's Attorney General; Ben Ward, the commissioner of the N.Y.P.D.; Daryl Gates, the chief of the L.A.P.D.; George Kelling, and Herman Goldstein, a University of Wisconsin law professor. Goldstein argued that enforcement alone is inherently limited, and

in confronting chronic street crime he stressed community involvement and a heavy reliance on the skills of beat cops and line officers. Goldstein named this approach "problem-oriented policing."

In the mid-eighties, Kennedy, while researching his case studies, accompanied two Los Angeles beat cops to a housing project in the Watts area called Nickerson Gardens. The crack epidemic was just beginning, and Nickerson Gardens had become one of the most dangerous places in the city. As Kennedy got out of the squad car and looked around, "I couldn't believe my eyes," he told me, dropping his voice and slowing down. "I stood there on the sidewalk and watched civilization coming apart. Drug dealers on the street, drug runners, old guys guarding the stashes. People with thirty-year-long heroin addictions wandering around, serious crack addicts, with that manic look. And I had this strongly visceral response: This is not O.K. This has got to stop. And it was immediately obvious that nothing the police were doing was going to work."

In 1988, Moore and Malcolm Sparrow, a Kennedy School professor who was a former detective chief inspector with the British police, asked Kennedy to work with them on a book about new ideas in policing. "So that's where I got my graduate-school education," Kennedy said. "I read everything, and talked about this stuff constantly." He had always intended to return to freelance writing, he said, "but I realized that I was too committed to the work I was doing." He asked Moore if he could become part of the criminal-justice program at the Kennedy School, and Moore hired him, in 1992.

"It was just a magical time," Kennedy said, of the early nineties. "There was a sense that something profound had been figured out, and it was going to change everything. We had been dead wrong about crime for so long, and we could see we were at a point of transforming these institutions."

In fact, nothing changed. Kennedy's timing was terrible. From 1987 to 1990, during the peak of the crack epidemic, youth homicides in cities across America rapidly escalated; in Boston during that period, youth homicides increased two hundred and thirty per cent, and from 1991 to 1995 the city averaged about forty-four youth homicides a year. Across the country, from the smallest county judgeship to the Presidency of the United States, political races hinged more and more on the question of who could be tougher on crime. From 1980 to 2000, the prison population in the U.S. increased from three hundred and nineteen thousand to 1.3 million. Federal corrections expenditures, driven by new federal drug-sentencing changes, went from five hundred and forty-one million dollars in 1982 to more than \$6.9 billion in 2006, and state corrections expenditures that year totalled more than forty-two billion dollars. California now spends about two and a half times as much per prison inmate as it does per student in the University of California system.

By the mid-nineties, crime rates were dropping in cities around the country, nowhere more dramatically than in New York City, where Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton were pioneering the zero-tolerance approach and drawing attention to Kelling and Wilson's "broken windows"

HUBRIS AT ZUNZAL

Nearly sunset, and time on the water
of 1984. Language its tracer.
No image like the image of language.

I had waded out about thigh deep.
Then a shout from the beach.
I held in my hand half a coconut shell

of coconut milk and 150-proof rum
and dumped it white into the waves
when it came on ine how sweet it had been,

then the idea I was not finished,
then the act of reaching down
with the idea I would get it back.

—Rodney Jones

theory by aggressively pursuing minor crimes. Advocates of longer sentencing and "three strikes" legislation cited those measures as the main reasons for the decline. Subsequent analysis by social scientists has suggested that the increase in incarceration was only a small factor in the great crime decline; other reasons, such as changing demographics and economic circumstances, and the waning of the crack epidemic, were collectively more important. Nonetheless, by the late nineties, incapacitation—locking a lot of people up for long terms to prevent crime—was the new ruling principle in criminal justice. Deterrence, in the classical sense of the word—using the threat of punishment to prevent crime—had become an even smaller part of public policy.

In 1994, the National Institute of Justice gave a grant to Kennedy and Anne Morrison Piehl, a colleague from the Kennedy School, to work out a problem-oriented approach to youth violence in Boston. They were joined by Anthony Braga, who was then a doctoral student in criminal justice at Rutgers University. Kennedy was eager to talk to cops who had the most street knowledge, and eventually he was directed to Paul Joyce, the leader of the police department's Youth Violence Strike Force. Over the next six months, Joyce gradually revealed his methods for dealing with violent gangs. He had observed that the use of force and the threat of prison seemed to have little effect

in deterring gang members' behavior. But certain moral authorities from within the community—clergy, ex-cons, outreach workers with street credibility—could sometimes get through to the offenders, especially when their pleas were coupled with the promise of help. Joyce had also figured out how to use the gangs' own internal dynamics against them. Joyce was cryptic about this part of his operation; when Kennedy asked how he had managed to calm down one gang in particular, Joyce would say only, "We just told them the truth." The truth, it turned out, was that if one more gang shooting occurred, by any one of their members, the whole group was going to take the blame.

"I just said, 'Holy shit!'" Kennedy told me. "This is incredible! Do you realize what this means?" Joyce's techniques, he believed, could be used to formulate a method of "focussed deterrence"—a systematic, repeatable version of the ad-hoc working methods that Joyce and his partners had developed in the streets.

Kennedy also discovered that Joyce's strike force knew how the victims knew the shooters, and what the beefs between them were. "I said, 'Oh my God, you know all this stuff!'" Sure we know it," Joyce replied. "It's just that nobody asked us for it before."

In order to broadcast the messages that Joyce imparted informally to gangs citywide, Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl came up with the idea of group forums,

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or call-ins. "We went to the Boston police command structure and presented it, thinking, 'This is never going to fly,'" Kennedy said. "But they heard us out, and then said, 'Yep, that'll work.'"

The first call-in was in the spring of 1996, a few months after Joyce had been succeeded by Gary French. By the second round, that summer, youth homicide had dropped dramatically. Just eight homicides were committed over the five months following the first call-in, compared with twenty-eight in the same five months of the previous year—a seventy-one-percent decline. In October, there were no youth homicides at all. Things got so quiet that French thought his pager had stopped working. "I almost took my beeper in to have it checked," he said at the time. "It just stopped going off."

The Ceasefire team in Cincinnati came together during the first half of 2007. It included members of the police department and the U.S. Attorney's office, the district attorney, and the

county sheriff, as well as Hamilton County probation and Ohio state parole officers. It also encompassed an array of social-service providers and a dozen or so outreach workers, who served as liaisons with the gang members. The cops, social workers, and outreach workers, some of whom were ex-cons, would all have a stake. The group acquired a name—C.I.R.V. (Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence)—offices downtown, and a project manager, S. Gregory Baker, a civilian who handles community relations for the C.P.D. Several former executives from Procter & Gamble, which is based in Cincinnati, volunteered their "best practices" management expertise to the group. Eventually, the C.I.R.V. team numbered almost fifty partner agencies.

The first Cincinnati call-in was held on July 31, 2007, in a large courtroom in the Hamilton County Courthouse. The C.I.R.V. team assembled in the courtroom first. Then about thirty men, mostly young, were admitted. Heads bent, avoiding eye contact, and sullenly postured like

the punctuation at the end of a question for which there is no answer—What the fuck?—they filed into the benches reserved for courtroom spectators. A few who were already in lockup wore handcuffs and leg shackles. They sat down, and the team in the front of the room looked at them. No one spoke.

Call-ins are intensely dramatic events, like modern-day morality plays. At the one I attended, there was a palpable, almost evangelical desire to make the experience transformative for the gangbangers. An older ex-gang member named Arthur Phelps, whom everyone called Pops, wheeled a thirty-seven-year-old woman in a wheelchair to the center of the room. Her name was Margaret Long, and she was paralyzed from the chest down. "Seventeen years ago, I shot this woman," Phelps said, weeping. "And I live with that every day of my life." Then Long cried out, "And I go to the bathroom in a bag," and she snatched out the colostomy bag from inside the pocket of her wheelchair and held it up while the young men

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stared in horror. When the final speaker, a street worker named Aaron Pullins III, yelled, "Your house is on fire! Your building is burning! You've got to save yourselves! Stand up!" three-quarters of the group jumped to their feet, as if they had been jerked up like puppets on strings.

At the initial call-in, Victor Garcia was the first to speak. He told the young men that he loved them, that they had value to their community, and that he knew they were better than their violent actions implied. Afterward, Chief Streicher addressed them, thanking them for coming, and making it clear that "this is nothing personal." He then delivered the message: "We know who you are, we know who your friends are, and we know what you're doing. If your boys don't stop shooting people right now, we're coming after everyone in your group." To reinforce this message at a later call-in, surveillance footage showing some of the invitees selling drugs was projected on a screen at the front of the courtroom. "Raise your hands when you see yourselves," Streicher said. One by one, hands went up.

The young men were introduced to the social workers, who were available to help them get jobs and educational assistance, if they called the phone number that had been provided to them in an information packet. And two mothers of sons murdered by gangs spoke of their pain and loss.

Michael Blass, a public official who was then with the Ohio Department of Public Safety, wrote an account of his experience as an observer at this first call-in. He described the invitees' "awkward attempts to project confidence, indifference, in some cases, perhaps, hostility. . . . These angry young men, used to being in control in the incredibly brutal environment of the mean streets, were noticeably off-balance and unsure of themselves." Blass wrote, "I saw a few young men choke back tears. . . . Over the course of a couple of hours, their facial expressions changed from those of cynicism or polite boredom to attention and curiosity." One young man raised his shackled hands above his head and cried out, "I never knew there was this much love out there. . . . seriously, I never knew it."

One of the gang members invited to the meeting was Dante Ingram, twenty-nine, who had been selling drugs and stealing since he was fifteen. "That's how

we was brought up," he told me recently. "When your mom's a crackhead, your dad's in the joint, your brother sells drugs, and your best buddy got a Cadillac and Jordans—what else you going to do? You got no other role models." In 2006, Ingram had been caught with a large amount of marijuana and several guns in his house, and sentenced to ten years in federal prison, but it was his first felony conviction and the judge released him on probation. His probation officer had ordered him to attend the call-in.

Ingram told me that he was more influenced by the community-services aspect of the Ceasefire strategy than by the threat of swift and certain punishment. "During the cops' presentation, I wasn't really listening," he said. "Some guys around me were snoring. They were being the typical tough cops, threatening us and wharrior. But you got to understand—threats mean nothing to these guys."

Ingram kept the card with the phone number. "For the next three weeks, I looked at it every day," he told me. Finally, he called, and left Titan Ross, the head of the street workers, a message: "If this shit is for real, give me a call." Ross called, and within a month Ingram had a job in sales with a telemarketing firm.

Kennedy had cautioned the C.I.R.V. team that the murder rate would fall only moderately after the first call-in; it was after the second set of call-ins, "the second turn of the crank," as he put it, that the mechanism would really take hold. By the end of the year, homicides in Cincinnati in 2007 were down twenty-four per cent from 2006. The trend continued into 2008—by April, there had been a fifty-per-cent reduction in gang-related homicides. Kennedy had made good on his guarantee to the Mayor.

The fourth call-in, held in June, 2008, was a disaster. In contrast to the previous call-ins, during which the young men had been split up into smaller groups, this time a hundred and twenty of them were brought together at the same time, in the same room. In retrospect, this was one of several mistakes that the team made. "We lost control of the room," Whalen said. Also, for the first time, the team hadn't rehearsed, and, partly as a result, "We went off script," he said. Some street workers cursed, and one started flirting with a gang member's girlfriend.

"Girl, you fine. What you doin' hangin' with these thugs?" Other street workers referred to gang members as niggas, which the cops saw as a violation of propriety and state authority.

Kennedy told me, "Some people within the group had become hungry for that personal transformation, when the individual offenders jump up and declare themselves done with the thug life, and everyone cries. At the June meeting, they didn't get that reaction, and they ended up pushing too hard."

In the months after the call-in, the murder rate spiked upward. "We almost provoked them to violence," Whalen told me. "They went out of the room challenged."

Streicher threatened to pull the cops off the team if their concerns were not addressed. The Mayor assured Streicher that the mistakes would not be repeated, and persuaded the police to stay involved. Thanks to Greg Baker's work as project manager, C.I.R.V. did not go off the rails. The next call-in, scheduled for the fall of 2008, was moved back to December, in part to give the team a chance to regroup. For Kennedy, the important thing was that "the system self-corrected," he said. "That's huge."

Since its success in Boston, Kennedy's anti-gang-violence strategy has been tried in some sixty other cities. (Kennedy's method should not be confused with one devised in Chicago by Gary Slutkin, a physician and epidemiologist, which is sometimes referred to as CeaseFire. Slutkin's strategy employs community members to mediate potential shootings while also pushing for behavioral change in high-risk individuals and communities.) Kennedy helped Minneapolis implement a violence-prevention strategy in June of 1996, and homicides in the summer months fell from forty-two that year to eight in 1997. But in Minneapolis "the team lost focus," Kennedy told me, and "all the complicated parts of the mechanism didn't mesh." A similar thing happened, over the next five years, in Indianapolis and Stockton, California. Spectacular early results proved difficult to sustain. "Ceasefire takes a lot of manpower," Wayne Hose, a former chief of police in Stockton, told me. "And you have to have people who believe in it. You have to have someone who will call the

D.A.'s office and say, "Why aren't your people coming to the meetings?" Even in Boston, Ceasefire didn't last; the program was abandoned in 2000, partly as a result of a personality conflict among team members. By 2001, the number of homicides had risen more than a hundred per cent over the 1999 level, and it has remained high. In 2007, Gary French began to implement a renewed Ceasefire approach, and so far the results have been promising.

Franklin Zimring, a professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley, who is a leading deterrence scholar, told me that one reason that Ceasefire's effectiveness is difficult to predict in any given city is that Kennedy's results have not been subjected to a rigorous independent analysis. "Ceasefire is more a theory of treatment than a proven strategy," he said, adding, "It's odd that no one has ever said, 'O.K., here are the youths who were not part of the Ceasefire program in Boston, let's compare them to the youths who were. And no one has followed up with

any long-range studies of the criminal behavior of the group that was in the program, either. We just don't have the evidence, and until we do we can't evaluate how effective Ceasefire really is."

When I relayed Zimring's comments to Kennedy, he laughed. "Frank still doesn't get it," he said. "There's plenty of research, but it's not focussed on the impact on the people in the call-ins, because the strategy isn't just about the people in the room." He added, "When you have a couple of meetings and homicide city-wide goes down forty per cent, it's not because the forty guys you've talked to have turned their lives around. There are a thousand guys on the street you haven't talked to. But the forty get the word out to the thousand—which ruins them as controls for the kind of evaluation that Frank's talking about."

Perhaps Kennedy's greatest success to date has occurred in High Point, North Carolina, a small city, of some ninety thousand people, that is known for producing furniture. (The entire city smells

like varnish.) The High Point Strategy, as it has come to be known, was aimed at public drug dealing, not gang violence, but the methodology was largely the same. In 2004, Kennedy persuaded Jim Fealy, chief of the High Point police, to apply his problem-oriented approach to a long-standing open-air drug market in a neighborhood called West End. Fealy and his predecessor had tried for years to shut down the market with periodic sweeps and stings. "We would go in and arrest 'em, and things would quiet down for a few months, but then new guys would be back," he said. The Reverend Jim Summey, who was at the time the pastor of the English Road Baptist Church, in the center of West End, told me that on Sunday mornings there were so many drug dealers, prostitutes, and johns on the sidewalk in front of the church that worshippers coming for services couldn't steer their cars into the parking lot.

Fealy was seated at his desk when I spoke to him; a photograph behind him showed him in full SWAT regalia. "Ev-

everyone knows I'm as conservative as they come," he drawled. "My approach as a cop had always been either arrest the problem or scare the problem away with high-profile prosecutions. You know, 'Cuff 'em and snuff 'em.' But in West End the problem always came back." When he first heard about Kennedy's strategy, he thought it was ridiculous, but he agreed to meet him. "David said, 'Give me a half hour before you decide I'm crazy.' And at the end of that half hour I was still sitting there."

Kennedy's strategy not only closed down the West End drug market; the drug market disappeared the day after the first call-in. "We had worked on these problems for twenty years and got nowhere, and in one day it was over," Fealy said. "In one day. Honestly, I never would have believed it if I hadn't seen it with my own eyes."

It's unclear whether any of the dozen or so High Point drug dealers who called the services number ultimately left behind the life of crime. None of the root-cause problems behind drugs and crime were solved; drug dealing may have moved indoors, or to other neighborhoods, or to nearby cities. But public drug dealing never returned to West End, and, once the threat was removed from the streets, the community reclaimed its neighborhood. Within weeks, residents were planting flowers in their gardens, and in the spring of 2005 the community threw a barbecue for the police.

Colonel Dean Esserman, chief of the

Providence Police Department, brought Kennedy's strategy to open-air drug markets in his city, beginning in 2006, and so far the results have been spectacular and sustained. Esserman, a former assistant district attorney in New York City, now gives a speech he calls "Getting Ready for David Kennedy." When I asked Esserman what it takes to get ready, he responded with one word: "Failure." By that, he said, he meant "the failure of the idea that you can deal with the problem of drugs by arresting it." It had taken Esserman years of work on narcotics cases in New York to reach this state of readiness. "As a younger prosecutor, I wasn't ready. Maybe as a younger cop, Chief Streicher wasn't ready, either."


The next step for Kennedy and his colleagues is to expand these regional successes into what he calls a "national standard of practice." To that end, Kennedy is working with Jeremy Travis, the president of John Jay College, on a national network of people trained in the use of Ceasefire-style gang-violence and drug-market strategies. Kennedy, who is now the director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay, has submitted a white paper to Eric Holder, the Attorney General, outlining the proposal, and he and Travis plan to announce the National Network for Safe Communities on June 15th, at the annual meeting of the United States Conference of Mayors, in Providence.

"Clearly this stuff works," Travis said. "David has proved that when you communicate directly with offenders, tell them their actions have consequences—not abstract consequences but direct, immediate ones—and then offer them a way out, that it can have an enormous deterrence value." He added, "The last ten years have served as a proof of concept. In the next ten, we need to build a network that can institutionalize and sustain these practices around the country."

Could a methodology that works on gangs also work on other groups—terrorists, say? "The group dynamics are similar to the gang dynamics Ceasefire deals with," Kennedy said. "People don't think you could deter terrorists with a moral argument, but maybe you could." Marc Sageman, a terrorism expert who is the author of the 2008 book "Leaderless Jihad," told me, "There is quite a lot of evidence in the terrorism literature that this type of gang-intervention program can work, if you apply it to terrorists in the early stages of the radicalization process. Then it could very well work—because there's nothing deterministic about becoming a terrorist. But at a certain point, once terrorism becomes something one does for a higher cause, I don't think this type of method would work." Scott Atran, an anthropologist who has done field work with jihadist groups and is also on the faculty at John Jay, told me that Kennedy's "community-based ideas seem to jibe with what I see works with young people in neighborhoods where friends go off in bunches to jihad. Few ever join jihad alone, and they almost always commit to it, including suicide bombings, for love of friends and family." He added, "There's also a strong dose of 'jihad' coof that clerics can't penetrate too well, unless they're plugged into the youth culture."

Stakes were high at the December, 2008, call-in. Kennedy went to Cincinnati for a rehearsal the week before, in an effort to avoid the mistakes of the disastrous June call-in. On December 10th, I accompanied him to the Hamilton County Courthouse. Kennedy wore his usual dark shirt, dark suit, and dark tie. The hall outside the courtroom was crowded with the heterogeneous group that makes up the C.J.R.V. team.

Jim Whalen was there, with his nineteen-year-old daughter, Amy, a student



"I'm saving that one for someone really special."

at the University of Cincinnati works for Robin Engel at the policing institute. Chief Streicher was also there, scanning the crowd. His gunmetal gaze alighted on the Reverend Pete Mingo, a former serial robber and gang member, who is now one of the C.I.R.V. street workers. "When I was a younger cop, I used to chase Pete all over the city," Streicher said. He laughed softly. "Now look at us."

Members of the Vortex unit, in white dress shirts and creased blue pants, were on hand to provide security. Captain Gerard excitedly told Kennedy about the unit's recent crackdown on the Northside Taliband, one of the largest and best-organized gangs in the city. Some of its members had been warned at an earlier call-in, they didn't listen, and now an example was being made of them. But, unlike the Vortex unit's zero-tolerance strikes of two years earlier, which enraged the community and provoked widespread criticism of the police, the Northside Taliband roundup used social-network-analysis software to identify and target only key players in the gang. The software, which can be used to map interpersonal dynamics in anything from business organizations to infectious-disease outbreaks and terrorist groups, represents people as nodes and assigns numeric values to their connectedness. If Joe knows Peter and Peter knows Bob, then the link between Joe and Peter gets a value of two; the connection between Joe and Bob gets a one. "The guiding theoretical principle is that the nodes that are more central in the network have certain advantages over other nodes, which enables us to predict that they will perform better than others," Steve Borgatti, a professor at the University of Kentucky who created the software, explained to me.

As in the earlier gang audits, the University of Cincinnati researchers collected information from the cops, but this time they focussed on relationships between individuals in one gang, rather than on connections between gangs. Engel's group asked questions like "Where do this one's friends live? Who was with him in the car when he was arrested? Who bailed him out of jail?" Using this information, they were able to identify the central nodes of the Northside Taliband, whose removal would severely damage the gang's structure.

In order to affect all the smaller so-

cial networks within the Northside Taliband group, which numbered ninety-six members, the cops needed to arrest twenty-five men, who were identified by name, and by photograph. Their pictures, along with their positions in their social networks, were displayed on screens in police cruisers (cops could click a tab to see a suspect's tattoos); ultimately, the police were able to arrest all twenty-five. The prosecutors on the C.I.R.V. team expedited their indictments; three had already been indicted under federal drug and weapons charges, and were facing long prison sentences. Other members of the Northside Taliband were so impressed by the cops' precision that they had started turning themselves in, hoping to make a deal while there was still time. So many were showing up at district headquarters, Streicher told Kennedy, that the cops had to put a sign-up sheet at the desk.

As a policing tool, Kennedy's methodology had been a big success in Cincinnati. In 2008, murder was down over all, arrests had declined, and morale in the department was high. (The murder count was up slightly in the first quarter of 2009, but was still significantly lower than comparable periods in 2006 and 2007.) Whalen had experienced his own personal transformation: "We will never engage in this kind of gang work again without academic support," he told me fervently. "No police department should." The initiative had also been a public-relations coup for the cops; the media coverage of the Northside Taliband strike had been very favorable—in contrast with the reception that the Vortex unit had got in 2006. In November, during the Northside Taliband crackdown, Gerard and other members of his unit attended a community-board meeting in the Northside and received a standing ovation.

The social-services piece of Ceasefire has been less successful. More than three hundred and fifty people have called the C.I.R.V. phone number, seeking help and employment—far more than the service providers can find jobs for. A hundred got jobs, but only fifty-three of them remain employed. C.I.R.V. did persuade the city to change its policy of not hiring convicted felons, and three were placed in low-level city jobs; one of those men sub-

sequently failed the mandated regular drug tests. Cincinnati is a center of the health-care industry, and Victor Garcia had hoped to persuade some companies that do contract work in the city's health-care sector to hire convicted felons, but he has had no success.

Garcia has grown disenchanted with what he sees as Kennedy's over-emphasis on the deterrence component of Ceasefire, which he believes comes at the expense of the program's social-service aspect. "I'd like it to do more to save the kids on the street," he told me, with some frustration, in January. When I mentioned that to Kennedy, he said tersely, "Look, we would all like to save everyone, but we can't. We don't know how to do that yet, and Ceasefire is fundamentally about what can be done. It's engineering, not evangelism." In May, Garcia was dismissed from the Ceasefire team.

Dante Ingram, who was also at the courthouse that day, lost his job in phone sales in December, 2008, when he was arrested in a domestic-violence incident and spent eighteen days in jail and twenty days under house arrest. After that, C.I.R.V. managed to place him in another job, in the receiving department of a warehouse. Ingram was unable to hold that position, either, and was considering returning to the gang. Despite Ingram's difficulties, Stan Ross, who was impressed by his determination to change his life, offered him a job as a C.I.R.V. street worker. "I love it," Ingram said of his work. So far, he had found jobs for two other men, one in a gas station and one as a janitor. Among his new duties is making sure that these men get to work on time, and he sometimes takes them and picks them up himself. "A lot of these guys have never had a job before," Ingram said.

Streicher told Kennedy that he had found employment for one young man himself. The man had approached the Chief after an earlier call-in, saying that he wanted to get out of the gang, but he had a felony conviction and doubted he could get a job. "I'll get you a job," Streicher said. "You want to be a roofer? My friend can get you on a roof tomorrow." The man accepted, and, so far, he has been gainfully employed.

As the Chief walked away, Kennedy shook his head in disbelief and said, "That's not the Tom Streicher I knew two years ago." ♦



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FAX COVER SHEET

TO:

NAME Sarah Nixon and Susan Renaud
COMPANY Senate Judiciary Committee
TELEPHONE NUMBER 202-228-6661
FAX NUMBER 202-228-6362
DATE March 2, 2010
TIME 3:45 PM
NUMBER OF PAGES 22
(INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET)

RE: Colonel Esserman's Testimony and Exhibits

This transmission is the third and is 22 pages long. If you have questions I can be reached at (401) 243-6372. Thanks, Michael O'Toole

03/02/2010 4:10PM

Providence Police Department & Family Service of RI Police-Social Work Partnership

In 2003, Providence, RI Mayor David Cicilline hired Colonel Dean Esserman to become chief of the Providence Police Department—and, most importantly, to introduce a culture of innovative policing.



In 2004 Colonel Esserman met with Margaret Holland McDuff, CEO of Family Service of RI, an acclaimed non-profit based in the city. Together they created a partnership to serve victims of crime using best practices, adopting a model developed at Yale with the guidance and assistance of Colonel Esserman: the Child Development-Community Policing Model.

Beginning with the training of police and Family Service of RI staff at the Yale Child Study Center, Providence became a replication site for serving children and families traumatized by crime and violence.

A Family Service of RI worker is on a nightly ride-along with the police when they respond to a domestic violence call. While the officers question the mother, the worker spends time with three young girls found huddled together in a bedroom: one has just thrown up. The worker provides crisis intervention and—because the worker is Spanish-speaking—the mother is more willing to give information to the police than in the past. The girls reveal there is a loaded gun in the bedroom, and police seize it. Soon the perpetrator is arrested. The worker and a police officer assist the family in enrolling in a social service program to reduce the trauma from the incident and help the girls cope with the arrest of their father.



The partnership continues to evolve and expand to respond 24/7 for specialized interventions for

- drug busts where children are present;
- frail elderly in crisis;
- neighborhoods on the verge of violence;
- domestic violence.



The partnership handles other types of calls, including homicide, home invasions, child abuse, sexual abuse, DUI/DWI, incest, carjacking, robbery, hostage situations, arson, drive-by shootings, larceny and, increasingly, homelessness. Follow up takes place at the weekly police command staff meeting, which is attended by Family Service of RI.

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Family Service of RI has developed a multicultural/multilingual team, including Spanish and Portuguese-speaking members, Cambodian team members, and back up team members with a multitude of languages and cultures represented.



The partnership includes attendance with police at neighborhood community meetings to provide information, listen to complaints, and to respond directly following a crisis. Family Service of RI also assists families in filing wayward petitions for unmanageable youths and provides families case management *before* court proceedings.

Each year the partnership serves about 300 crime victims and 200 other residents, of whom 55% are children 19 and under. About 50% of those served are Hispanic/Latino.

Does the partnership work? Victims overwhelmingly report it does and so do police officers, according to surveys. And violent crime has been trending down.

The partnership has been the catalyst for creation of a Safe Start project, funded by the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. It spurred development of the first-ever Rhode Island State Victim Assistance Academy funded by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime. The academy was created by Family Service of RI and the Justice Studies Program at Roger Williams University.

"Police and mental health workers are learning from each other. Officers can better handle situations with increased sensitivity."

---Providence police officer

"The police are doing amazing work under difficult situations. It is doubly positive to be able to help the families of victims and also help with the challenges officers face with victims of violence and other crimes."

---Family Service of RI worker

The U.S. Attorney for RI's office and the RI Attorney General's office have called upon the partnership to help in their work prosecuting criminals and assisting victims. And Family Service of RI is now working with the RI parole board, providing services to victims, and teaching victim impact classes at the RI Adult Correctional Institutions.

A serious car accident involving a Spanish-speaking husband, wife and 2 year old. Police arrest the husband for driving with an expired license. The man's wife is distraught and verbally combative. The Family Service of RI worker deescalates the situation and calms the mother down to prevent her arrest. She and her child are given a ride home by police. The worker educates her about police procedures and explains how to get her husband released. In addition, the worker secures a donation of emergency funds for the child's basic needs.

For more information, please contact Margaret Holland McDuff, CEO of Family Service of RI at 401-331-1350. More information may also be found at Family Service of RI's website: www.familyservice.org.

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Reporter

ELLEN LIBERMAN



Mother faced daughter, and social worker Carla Cuellar sat in between, at the sticky kitchen table on a Friday night. Three years ago, the sixteen-year-old had been raped. She could not bring herself to testify, so her attacker remained free, while the girl did the time. She had been in and out of a group home, was bunking school and disappearing from the apartment overnight.

Her mother was ready to thrust her back into the state's arms and the girl was ready to go. But the mother remembered how Carla had helped her daughter after the assault and she reached out again. Mother busied herself with the Family Court form to have her daughter officially declared wayward. Carla beamed all the gentle force of her four-foot-eleven-self at the girl: "What's going on?" she asked. -

The girl stared down at the Styrofoam cup in her hands, as though the answer — or an escape route — floated in her Pepsi. The latter seemed unlikely. Posted discreetly by the door was Officer Jeremy Doucette, Cuellar's partner in crime prevention. Five nights a week, the pair patrols the streets of South Providence, Doucette looking to bust criminals, Cuellar seeking to arrest the slow spread of poison that crime injects into the lives of young victims and witnesses at the moment of trauma.

This Friday night, Cuellar and Doucette interrupted their rounds to respond to the mother's plea for help. The girl's jaw slowly relaxed its defiant posture. Her school was too big, she complained. Her mother tried to keep her a prisoner. Cuellar agreed that having the teen declared wayward was a good way to connect the girl to mental health and other services. She promised to investigate a transfer to a smaller school.

"You've got to keep that court date," she warned, as she collected the paperwork. "Let's focus on solutions," she added brightly. "Solutions."

Six years ago, the Providence Police and Family Service of Rhode Island, a social welfare agency, entered into an unusual partnership that mixed law enforcement with social work. The target would be children exposed to violent crime and the goal would be to heal their lives before they graduated to an adulthood of dysfunction.

In October, the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention published the results of the first comprehensive national survey of children's exposure to violence. Overall, about 60 percent of children seventeen and younger reported witnessing violence; more than one-quarter had seen it in their homes, schools and communities; more than a third had been the victim of some sort of assault during the past year.

The effects can be widespread and long-lasting. A second study by health insurer Kaiser Permanente found that the greater the childhood exposure to violence, the more likely the adult will smoke, use IV drugs, suffer heart disease, diabetes, obesity, unintended pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases and alcoholism. In short, it concluded: "One does not 'just get over' some things, not even fifty years later."

Colonel Dean Esserman helped develop the partnership program in the early 1990s with therapists from the Yale Child Study Center during his stint as assistant police chief in New Haven. The partnership began its attempt to head off the long-term consequences of violence with some revelations about the shortcomings of police work and therapy.

"What we've learned is that traditional mental health services cannot fully address the needs of children caught up in violent

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circumstance," says Dr. Steven Marans, who worked with Esserman in New Haven and still heads the partnership there. "We aren't likely to see anything but the tip of the iceberg and not until years later. Who is? The police were an obvious resource. They were the only ones making house calls twenty-four seven. We've also learned that we can provide together what we cannot separately and alone."

Similar programs are now offered in more than twenty communities in the U.S. and abroad — all requiring mental health workers and police officers to be cross-trained. The Providence initiative mobilizes on-call clinicians for emergencies; an \$180,000 four-year Department of Justice grant supports ongoing care for young crime victims; a city grant pays for Cuellar's second-shift patrols. Every Tuesday, Family Service Vice President Susan Erstling attends the police command staff meeting.

"The first thing we all learned is the level of danger police deal with. You are walking into a high-risk, fragile scenario," Erstling says. "We learned a great deal of respect for the police."

The respect is mutual. Cuellar, a native of Bolivia, is as much in demand for her skills as a translator as a social worker. And, on this Friday night, Doucette's radio occasionally crackles with a request for her presence.

"We drive alone and I was a little apprehensive to have someone looked upon as touchy-feely," Doucette admitted. "But I think everyone's jumped on board. We see the difference it makes. If we go on a domestic, the woman will sit down and tell Carla her whole life story. I wouldn't get any of that."

Even Cuellar wasn't totally sold on its value until the night she was called to a domestic disturbance. While the police questioned the adults, Cuellar tended to the three children in the other room. One volunteered that his father had a gun — which happened to be in the room where the children waited.

"That's when it hit me — hey, this could actually work," she recalls.

After a year as partners, Doucette and Cuellar exhibit an easy camaraderie, joking about snacks and each other, the way compatible workmates do. The whole enterprise runs on trust, says Esserman, who has made it into another cornerstone of the Providence Police Department's community policing efforts.

"A lot of policing is proactive and done in partnerships. These non-traditional partnerships are becoming traditional. But I don't believe they would be sustained because the police chief says so. They have to prove their worth."

The program has powerful fans. Corinne Russo, director of the state's Department of Elderly Affairs, says that it has transformed the legally mandated twenty-four-hour abuse hotline from a telephone recording to an actual after-hours response. Mayor David Cicilline has been known to call the clinical team himself, when residents bring their problems to night-time community meetings.

"The single most powerful tool to reduce crime is not a fancy computer — it's the trust of the community," Cicilline says.

In informal surveys conducted by Family Service, the program has gotten high marks from the community and the police department's management. There has been little hard research on whether these interventions in childhood lead to better adult lives, but some victims can attest to the immediate benefits. Jade was eleven years old when a guest preacher at her church repeatedly assaulted her on an extended visit. Cuellar was there for the first police visit and when her attacker was convicted. She connected Jade to a counselor, who keeps in touch, despite her move to another state.

"When Carla came to my house, I felt a little bit free. Finally, someone was on my side to release my heart," Jade recalls. She now plays on a soccer team, sings in the school choir and nurses her dream of becoming a fashion designer. Without Family Service, she says, "I would have been real big damage. I would have been ending up on the street or out of control or doing bad things because of my anger."

The second shift that Friday night is a yawner. Doucette and Cuellar drive ceaselessly up and around the streets of South Providence, but net only a couple of 911 hang-up checks. There are no immediate crimes to stop, let alone ones that might be perpetrated in the distant future by today's young victim of violence. The mayhem will no doubt erupt on the third shift, or the next night. But when no business is the point of your business, quiet is a good thing.

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SPECIAL STRATEGY AWARD: GANG PREVENTION & YOUTH SAFETY

Innovative Solutions to Youth Violence

Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence and the Providence Police Department

In cities whose neighborhoods are controlled by local gangs, one typically finds disproportionate levels of violence and crime.

Shootings occur between rivals disputing turf, vying for drug markets or simply acting on grudges. The disruption of public safety in these neighborhoods has a tremendously damaging impact on quality of life. Families and children are prohibited from safely traveling and playing in their own neighborhoods; local business owners are unable to develop a consistent and dependable customer base; and developers often look elsewhere for investment opportunities, driven off by fear neighborhood gangs instill in the communities that need help most.

Gangs are attracting members of increasingly younger ages, in some cases as early as elementary school. In places where a city's children are turning to gangs and

violence, a breakdown in communication between front-line practitioners (clergy, teachers, neighborhood police officers and even other young adults from the community) and poor integration of their critical services limit the effectiveness of even the most promising interventions.

There are, however, a growing number of valuable programs that work effectively. Many team front-line practitioners with law enforcement to reach youth that the road to success does not include drugs, gangs or violence. The Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence ("the Institute") in Providence, Rhode Island is one such initiative. A standout for its comprehensive approach and its extraordinary partnership with the Providence Police Department, the Institute garnered a 2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award. The Institute not only advocates for youth, but also has worked with the local business community and police to bring jobs and

safe after-school activities to its neighborhood and the adolescents it serves. The program's success is rooted in its ability to build critical community connections and offer wraparound services in school, home and community settings. The Institute has begun to overcome the violence initiated by the city's youth and gangs by combining street-level interventions with strong partnerships and new cross-agency communication.

2007 MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards

This publication is part of a series published by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation's Community Safety Initiative as part of the MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards program. Sponsored by MetLife Foundation since 2002, the Awards celebrate and promote exemplary community safety strategies bolstered by collaboration between police and neighborhood leaders. LISC and MetLife Foundation believe that public safety is an integral component of building strong and healthy communities. Law enforcement and community building—from economic development to youth programs to neighborhood beautification efforts—yield greater benefits for neighborhoods when they are strategically integrated. For more information about LISC or the MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Awards, please visit www.lisc.org. For more information about the Foundation, please visit www.metlife.com.



Streetworkers lead community outreach efforts in neighborhoods throughout the City of Providence.



MetLife Foundation



Tony Gross, Executive Director of the Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence points out gang graffiti in a Providence neighborhood.

HISTORY OF THE PROVIDENCE STREETWORKERS PROGRAM

The mission of the Institute is to teach by word and example the principles and practices of nonviolence, and to foster a community that addresses potentially violent situations with peaceful solutions. These principles are based on the Kingian Non-violence Model for conflict resolution, a philosophy and practice pioneered in the US by the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Institute's Streetworker program—the focus of the McLife Foundation Award recognition—has its roots in Boston during the early 1990s. At the time, Tony Gross, now Executive Director of the Institute in Providence, was a senior Streetworker based at the Ten-Point Coalition of Churches in Boston, which emerged as one of the main leaders of a new collaborative approach to address youth violence.

In 1990, the city of Boston suffered from 152 homicides, a tragic catalyst for the city's front-line practitioners to begin seeking change together. The major players who tackled this new, collaborative approach consisted of city youth workers, clergy, probation officers and police officials from the gang unit. Gross compares the collaboration to an ill-formed classical orchestra,

Taking care of the Streetworkers is building up a critical community resource while building a bridge to a disenfranchised population.

in which the individual musicians played beautifully but as a group, were out of tune. The different agents and institutions in Boston understood that they needed to forge new partnerships to address the escalating violence, coordinating deployment of their respective resources to influence

crime patterns and the young people involved. With interventions evolving into what Gross describes as a "beautiful and in-tune" symphony, the partners achieved what was referred to in national media as the Boston Miracle—a model for strategic crime reduction.

By 1998, the number of murders in Boston dropped from 152 to 31. The Streetworkers program was credited as an important piece of the puzzle. It positioned young people as paid conflict mediators and as coordinators of multiple resource pools. "The Streetworkers have a lot of power because they represent a priority for the policy-makers," Gross explained. "But the question is: Can you reach the kids? Can you influence the system to deliver for them? Too often, the system does not deliver for these high-risk kids. But we created a unique system that delivered fast."

In September 2001, Gross had the opportunity to bring his work to Providence, the second largest city in New England. In 2000, St. Michael's parish founded the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence after a teenage girl was murdered the evening before she was to testify as a witness in a murder trial. The man on trial was in prison, but his associ-

ates on the outside shot the young woman execution style outside her home to keep her out of court. Gross joined the team at the newly founded Institute.

As the Institute opened its doors, a new mayoral campaign got underway. Elected in 2002, David N. Cicilline pledged to pur-

2 McLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award Winner 2007 / SPECIAL REPORT: Quest for Peace and Public Safety

"The whole idea is to invest [in the Streetworkers] to be models of success who can compete with the drug dealers. It's more risky to have ex-offenders, but it's a risk you have to take. To some it's counterintuitive, so you need credibility and progressive leaders. You need integrity and hard work, which are simple things often overlooked."

— Terry Gross, Executive Director of the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence, Providence

sue a multi-faceted anti-violence strategy that would incorporate the Streetworker program, improve community-police relations, implement greater police presence in schools and expand recreational opportunities for young people. So, in 2003, the Institute launched an improved version of Boston's Streetworker program. With support from members of local churches, the new mayor and a new police chief, Colonel Dean Esserman, the Institute developed a plan to address youth violence and gang crimes that were plaguing the city. Under Gross's leadership, the Institute reached out to Colonel Esserman who was willing and eager to support the effort, as he implemented a new collaborative policing model. Gross credits the success of the

program to Colonel Esserman's leadership, risk-taking and willingness to work together as they laid out an initial plan.

AN INVESTMENT IN PEOPLE

When Gross discusses the Institute's program to curb youth violence in Providence, RI, he returns to one central idea – the importance of investing in human capital.

For Gross and the Providence-based Streetworkers Program, this means taking a chance and investing time, money and faith in former gang members – particularly teenagers who had been jailed or those who pushed drugs on the streets of Providence. Investing in these seemingly high-risk, young adults – whose lives formerly revolved around crime and violence – as models of hope for youth throughout the City might seem counter-intuitive or wildly progressive to those outside Providence. But over time, the strategy has proven so successful in Providence that at least seven other U.S. cities have attempted to replicate it.

The Institute pays thirteen Streetworkers a livable annual salary and provides them with cell phones, gas money and lines of credit or loans. These Streetworkers intervene in youth conflicts that arise from gang rivalries. They are trusting friends to Providence's school-aged kids while serving as ambassadors for public safety in the community. With professional training provided by the Institute, the Streetworkers dedicate their lives to ensuring that conflicts are resolved peacefully, before they escalate to deadly violence.



In an effort to expand their outreach to youth in the community, Streetworkers lead public events which offer skill-building opportunities around conflict resolution and other nonviolent solutions.

MetLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award Winner 2007 / SPECIAL STRATEGY AWARD: Gang Prevention & Youth Violence






Photo courtesy of Janet LeVelle

The relationship and support of the Providence Police Department has allowed the Institute to strategically intervene in gang conflicts while preventing increased violence in the community.

Streetworkers provide an outlet from a life of gangs and violence on several levels. On one hand, they act as nontraditional sounding boards for and confidants of city youth. Frequently born and raised in the communities in which they work, the Streetworkers can relate to the kids on levels that a middle-class, college-educated social worker or teacher might struggle to reach. On another level, the Streetworkers' persistence and results earn them credibility among the police and lawmakers, further enabling them to effectively link under-represented city youth to the City's network of service providers.

"The whole idea is to invest [in the Streetworkers] as models of success - actors who can compete with the drug dealers. It's more risky to have ex-offenders in these

roles, but it's a risk you have to take," Gross says. "To some it's counterintuitive, so you need credibility and progressive leadership. You need integrity and hard work, which are simple things often overlooked."

Gross adds that there is low turnover among the Streetworkers at the Institute because it understands the pressures they face (monthly rent, child support, and transportation, as examples) and ensures that they are cared for financially. By providing them with adequate job security, the program counters the pressure to return to drug dealing or other illegal ways to earn money.

"You have to invest in human capital," says Gross. "It's not just about what you do for the kids, it's what you do for the people working for the kids." The Institute under-

stands that the Streetworkers are critical to their work: they are the outreach, the intelligence, the service - the link to community connections. By taking care of the Street-



Streetworkers have become a true community asset. They are familiar with neighborhood issues and meet with youth on both a formal and informal basis to promote nonviolent solutions to longstanding gang rivalries.

"[The Streetworkers] are in every neighborhood. They have no offices, they work the street. Their credibility has been tested many times. I go to every shooting in this city, every emergency room, every funeral, every wake, and so do they."

— Colonel Dean Esserman, Chief of Police, Providence Police Department

workers, the Institute is building a critical community resource and establishing a bridge to a disenfranchised population.

The result of the Institute's efforts to provide opportunities to young people looking for a second chance has been notable. All evidence suggests that its work has contributed powerfully to new lows in youth crime. By the end of 2006, the violent crime rate in Providence had been cut in half, and in the past year, no one under the age of 20 has been killed. However, while Providence has made great strides in the safety of its children, there are still areas within the city that resist this downward trend, instead showing a recent escalation in youth violence. The Institute, in partnership with the Providence Police Department, is committed to addressing this ongoing challenge.

STREETWORKERS TAKE ON PROVIDENCE

In Providence, the Streetworkers capitalize on their ability to fast track troubled kids away from a culture that cultivates violence and hopelessness. The program relies heavily on others within the community and forms links between Streetworker outreach, police and relevant social services to bolster the work of its staff.

"I'm focused on results, and I'll leverage any resource around me to get those results," Colonel Esserman said. "The days of the lone cowboy are over, and if there's anything that has changed in policing, it's the idea [of implementing] collaboration."

The Streetworkers are a subtle yet large part of Providence's purposful police-community collaboration. The thirteen members of the outreach staff long-time

residents of the City, many of whom have had run-ins with the police themselves — are trained intervention specialists. Gross and others at the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence teach the Streetworkers conflict resolution and, equipped with their own street savvy, form a 24-hour presence to respond quickly to incidents and threats of violence.

"They are in every neighborhood. They have no offices — they work the street. Their credibility has been tested many times," Colonel Esserman said of the Streetworkers. "I go to every shooting in this city, every emergency room, every funeral, every wake, and so do they."

On a daily basis, the Streetworkers move about the City. Unlike social workers, they are not tied to a set of specific cases. They follow leads and pursue conflicts that may escalate without timely intervention. They visit middle and high schools daily, conduct court advocacy and visit juveniles in deten-

tion. The Streetworkers have connected interested youth to employment opportunities and offer support to those who have dropped out of school, are current gang members, or have recently returned to high-risk neighborhoods.

CONFRONTING CHALLENGES: DIVERSITY, DISTRUST AND DISINVESTMENT

Gross states that he and his team learned a lot from the mistakes made in the early Boston-based work. One of the most important factors: recruiting a staff diverse enough to represent Providence's multi ethnic population.


Providence is tied with New Orleans as the country's third poorest city for children, a statistic that could account for the dozen or so gangs prominent in the city: Six Asian gangs, as well as MS-13, Original Crip Gang (OCG), Latin Kings and other more neighborhood-based gangs all actively recruit city youth.

With many conflicts evolving from rivalries across these de facto organizations, it is critical for the Streetworkers to understand the myriad interests at stake in order to arbitrate disputes among Providence's individual — and aggressive — factions. For that reason, the Streetworkers themselves

BY THE NUMBERS: CITYWIDE CHANGE IN PART I CRIMES, 2005-2006

Courtesy of Providence Police Department

Crime Type	2005	2006	Percent Change
Murder	22	11	-50%
Rape	99	45	-55%
Robbery	433	393	-9%
Aggravated Assault	581	489	-17%
Burglary	1,878	1,790	-5%
Motor Vehicle Theft	2,359	1,788	-24%
Larceny	5,808	5,313	-9%
Total Part I Crimes	11,190	9,829	-12%



are Cape Verdean, Puerto Rican, Laotian, Cambodian, African American, Caucasian and Native American. Some once founded their own gangs, many are former rivals, and most have lost friends and family to violent murder. As Ajay Benton, Program Manager for the Streetworkers program explains, "These are all people who have a serious stake in stopping the violence."

Ironically, it was this very "pedigree" that set the program up for a bumpy start. In order to be effective, the Streetworkers - who are wired into the city youth - also needed to receive referrals from the police department. Trust was slow to develop - the officers' new partners would be some of the very same people they had arrested in prior years.

Chief Esserman, who still participates in weekly uniformed patrol, recalled one evening early into the program's tenure when he gathered some of his officers and sergeants for a coffee meeting with Gross and his team of Streetworkers. Esserman remembers the tension of the meeting, which stemmed from the fact that "my side

The Streetworkers themselves are Cape Verdean, Puerto Rican, Laotian, Cambodian, African American, Caucasian, and Native American. Some have founded the city gangs, others are former rivals and some have lost friends and family to violent murders in the City. "They have a serious stake in stopping the violence."

--- Ajay Benton, Program Manager for the Streetworkers program

of the table had arrested their side of the table," he said. It was an uncomfortable barrier to overcome but the relationships and results that followed are what carry the program to this day. A trusting partnership was built from that initial hostility, a partnership that sent a collective and unifying message to the community.



Tony Gross, Executive Director of the Institute for the Study of Practice of Nonviolence accepts a 2007 MelLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award for the Institute's Streetworker program. U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Mayor David N. Cicillini, Police Chief Colonel Dean Esserman and MelLife Vice President Michael Conery were all on hand to celebrate the community-police partnership addressing gang violence and youth safety in the City of Providence.

Strong leadership from Gross and Esserman was enough to break the ice. After Esserman came to know Gross and hear his strategy, he grew more comfortable with the idea of establishing a more formal partnership with the Streetworkers. He started by sitting in a basement for three hours, listening to their stories – the tremendous amount of loss they experienced, their philosophy, backgrounds, individual accomplishments and what brought them to become part of the Streetworker program. It was a moving experience for all. The Streetworkers were sitting face to face with a nationally renowned police chief who was interested in hearing about their past. “They come from a tough place, a place where you and I probably would not have made it,” Esserman says. “I have an enormous amount of respect [for the Streetworkers] after listening to their stories.”

Today, Streetworkers teach at the police academy and supervisory trainings for new sergeants.

“They teach about themselves,” Esserman said. “I want my rank and file to know who they are and what they do, not just read some memo from the Office of the Chief. They talk about their philosophy – of what they’re out there dealing with – and the presentations they have done have won over each and every skeptical audience I put them in front of.”

A COLLABORATIVE FIGHT FOR CHANGE

Perhaps the most tangible evidence of Providence's community collaboration can be seen at the police department's weekly CompStat (Comparative Statistics) meetings, at which crime patterns are analyzed, mapped, and prioritized. Local, state and

federal law enforcement join the table, as do representatives of the city public schools, social workers and the Institute. By opening participation to those beyond law enforcement, police can share concerns with groups that are connected to the city youth and to public safety more broadly. This allows the opportunity to resolve problems with alternative methods.

The Rhode Island Hospital and Hasbro Children's Hospital Trauma Team are two other key Institute partners. The Streetworker teams respond to every shooting or stabbing that occurs in the city. They are immediately notified by police and hospital administration and are at the scene to assist families, friends and youth and collaborate closely with their colleagues in the health care sector. Beyond solace, a Streetworker helps support the hospital team – and their youth clients – by building on medical intervention, making important contacts and

STREETWORKERS PROGRAM AT A GLANCE

► Staff

The Institute understands that the Streetworkers are critical to their work: they are the outreach, the intelligence, the service—the link to community connections. By taking care of the Streetworkers, the Institute is building a critical community resource and establishing a bridge to a disenfranchised population.

anticipating and addressing the potential for retaliation by the victim's network on the street. The result has been a drop in the back and forth shootings that often drive up murder rates and strap the hospitals' emergency services.

More recently, Gross and Chief Esserman have been aggressively pursuing partnerships with local businesses. Increasing job opportunities to the city's youth and spawning economic development in disadvantaged neighborhoods is just another tool to curbing violence before it has a chance to start. Such tactics return again to the central mission of the Institute — investing in human capital. Esserman and Gross together sent 4,000 letters asking members of the Providence Chamber of Commerce to help create 60 summer job for Providence teenagers. Traditionally, summer is the season in which youth violence spikes, as young people are out of school and those from poorer neighborhoods are less likely to have more productive and distracting things to do — jobs, internships, camps, etc.

Aramark, a major food distribution company, hired 15 Providence teens to work this past summer. Forty-two additional teenagers worked 20 hours a week in a variety of jobs obtained through the institute. To further support these employment efforts, the Institute also spends several hours per week offering job skill development and non-violence training. As a result, this non-profit has become the third largest summer youth employment system in the City.

For Gross, each strategy and partnership provides another opportunity for Providence's youth to avoid conflict and reach out to the people or services willing to help. "When these kids want an out, I need to immediately jump on it," says Gross. "I need to be an opportunist and find them a way out — that's where a lot of programs fail but where we succeed."

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Ajay Benton, Program Manager for the Streetworkers Program conducts outreach to youth in South Providence.

MeLife Foundation Community-Police Partnership Award Winner 2007 / SPECIAL STRATEGY AWARD. Buzz Preveden & Matt Smith

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Rhode Island news

Closing 'crack highway'

01:00 AM EST on Sunday, March 11, 2007



Providence police Lt. George Stamatakos, standing in front of his boyhood home at 297 Point St., spent the first 14 years of his life in the Lockwood neighborhood, on Providence's South Side. "It was a dangerous area," he says. "You had to be street smart. You knew where the boundaries were. Today, it's much worse because of the gun violence."

The Providence Journal / Kris Craig

For years, the Lockwood Plaza neighborhood in Upper South Providence has been plagued by drug dealing and other crimes that turned the area into a war zone. But residents in the South Providence neighborhood, where "crack highway" runs through, are beginning to feel safe, thanks to an initiative being tried by the police and Urban League of Rhode Island. The program hinges on an unusual partnership among the police, the residents and a small, select group of drug dealers who have been given a second chance. Time will tell how successful it will be.

In Sunday extra

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found ways to survive.

"At 9, what are you going to do when there's no food in your house, and no one to feed you, and you're not going to let your siblings starve?"

Now 30, Fletcher was still hustling. He didn't think much about the future. He never thought he had one. "In your mind, you think you're somebody important," he said, "but the people in the street don't look at you for who you are. They look at you for what you've got. The only thing you worry about is, are the police coming to get you?"

He ended up working Lockwood, where dealers have owned the street corners for a long time. They brazenly clustered in groups outside the Lockwood Market and N&H Grocery around the corner. They roamed up and down Pine Street — a tree-lined street with old houses that became known as "crack highway" for the drug dealers who trolled it and the customers who came off Route 95 looking for their fix.

There was a moment last July when a man pulled up to Fletcher in the Lockwood neighborhood looking for drugs. Something didn't feel right. Fletcher shook off the feeling.

He didn't know that the police had caught him on surveillance video — him and 103 other drug dealers across the city. The hammer of the law came down on all of them last fall, on convicted felons, on small-time dealers, on drug dealers carrying guns, on teenagers just getting into the business.

It was the biggest drug bust in Rhode Island's history. But it was more than just a sting.

Tied into this citywide sweep was a unique initiative to clean up the open-air drug dealing in the Lockwood Plaza neighborhood. The initiative, which is being tried in several other cities in the country, hinges on an unusual partnership among the police, the residents in the neighborhood and a small, select group of drug dealers.

The streets of Lockwood have been quiet for four months now. But this is a neighborhood that's seen decades of hard times. It's too early to know how long the hard-won peace will last.

PROVIDENCE IS ONE of six cities in the nation that are trying this unusual initiative, at the recommendation of the National Urban League.

The program is called the High Point Initiative, named for the small North Carolina city that used the pilot program on a ghetto in its West End nearly three years ago. The police there tried it for the same reason that Providence is testing it now — because nothing else stopped the plague of drug dealing in the poorest neighborhoods.

The idea came from a college professor who helped produce Boston's anti-gang project in the mid-1990s. But it took several years for David Kennedy, head of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in Manhattan, to convince any police department to give his anti-drug dealing initiative a try.

Map: the Lockwood neighborhood

"Making Communities Safer: Youth Violence and Gang Interventions That Work" -- David Kennedy, director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control, testifies Feb. 15 before a House subcommittee

High Point West End Initiative: Project description, log, and preliminary impact analysis, July 2004

The Criminal Justice Institute's management quarterly article on High Point, N.C., program, fall 2006

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"Overt, chaotic public drug-dealing is one of the most destructive things a community can have," Kennedy said, "whether there's somebody standing on the street corners or in the apartments, it doesn't matter."

The drug markets bring crime and violence into communities that are already struggling, Kennedy said, and police efforts to curtail the dealing, such as drug sweeps, usually cause distrust in the community. At the same time, children in the neighborhood are lured by the fast money of drug dealing — and real jobs are seen as the path of suckers.

His solution incorporates what the police are already doing, with something they've never tried before.

The police start by going after the street-level drug dealers and their hierarchy in the worst drug-plagued area, or "beachhead." The next step is unusual: The police select a few nonviolent offenders, the dealers who are young and have the potential to be rehabilitated. Instead of arresting them, the police give the dealers a second chance and turn them over to the community groups, such as the Urban League, which provide jobs, education and counseling.

The approach encourages the community to trust the police, Kennedy said, which leads residents to work with the police to prevent more drug dealers from returning. The dealers with a second chance serve as an example to the younger generation.

His initiative attracted the National Urban League, which invited Kennedy to its annual conference in the summer of 2005. He was on a community policing panel with Providence Police Chief Dean M. Esserman, whose department had been recognized as a model.

IT TOOK A YEAR before the Providence Police Department agreed to try the High Point Initiative, which is also being used in Winston-Salem, N.C., Kansas City, Mo., Tucson, Ariz., and Newburgh, N.Y. Kennedy, the Urban League, and High Point police officers visited Providence several times to explain the concept, and several high-ranking Providence officers went to High Point to observe.

"We were open to it because we were tired of being a narcotics-arresting machine," said Esserman, who knew Kennedy from when the professor was at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. "And there's something compelling about a second chance."

The Urban League of Rhode Island was eager to try it. "It seemed like an opportunity to transform the neighborhood," said Luis Aponte, an administrator at the Urban League and a Providence city councilman. "The conditions were also ripe. We had the presence of a police chief who demonstrated the willingness to work with the community, and the Urban League was often called in to be a conduit between the Police Department and the community."

However, in the beginning, none of the Providence police were buying the idea. When Kennedy explained it for the first time, "we were all skeptical. It didn't make any sense," Stamatakos said. "We said, 'You're not giving us anything concrete, anything we can grasp.'"

Sgt. William Dwyer and others questioned the logic of being lenient on drug dealers. "Originally, I never thought about giving somebody a second chance. I was always, 'Lock them up. Put them in jail,'" he said.

During a visit to High Point, Lt. Thomas Verdi, head of the Providence police narcotics unit, was

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struck by how different High Point was from Providence. The North Carolina city, 20 miles southeast of Winston-Salem, is half the size of Providence, and the ghettos there have more green space. "They don't have the housing developments, the high-rises. They don't have the [housing] projects like us," Verdi said. "They don't have the gang problems we do. We have dozens of 'beachheads.'"

But the High Point police said the problems were the same — drug dealers five deep on corners, gunfire, prostitutes, robberies and murders. After the initiative in May 2004, the decade-old drug markets closed and haven't revived.

Finally, the Providence police signed on, for the same reason. "Doing something is better than being skeptical and doing nothing," Stamatakos said.

The police decided to tie the initiative into an aggressive drug investigation that Verdi and the narcotics unit had been working on since early last year. The detectives were going after the drug-dealing networks across Providence — from the street dealers to those supplying the drugs. By the time the months-long investigation ended last fall, the detectives had caught 104 drug dealers, seized 4 kilos of cocaine and grabbed 4 handguns.

The dealers were arrested all across the city, but a third had been caught in one neighborhood — the Lockwood Plaza and surrounding streets in Upper South Providence. It was no surprise to the police or the residents.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD IN Upper South Providence has traditionally been home to working-class families and immigrants — a community that has produced governors, judges, lawyers and political leaders. Superior Court Presiding Judge Joseph F. Rodgers Jr. was born on Dudley Street, and spent the first 26 years of his life in the neighborhood. "I would not have wanted to have been brought up in another state or any other city than South Providence," Rodgers said.

The years have been hard on the Upper South Side. Construction of Route 95, which opened in 1964, ripped through a chunk of the neighborhood, taking down homes and a school, and dividing the South Side from downtown. The defection of a Greek church and the 1960s race riots drove many residents to the suburbs. Rodgers also blames the repeal of the residency clause, which required police and firefighters to live in the city, for causing an exodus.

"I can remember people not feeling safe anymore in the 1960s," said Stamatakos. When the Greek church moved, "my family and others wanted to be holdouts ... but it was a dangerous area, you had to be street smart."

Today, amid the colorful old homes and fenced pocket yards of the public housing complexes is the busiest open-air drug market in the city. A few city blocks attract the most attention from the police. But because the neighborhood is home to mostly Hispanic and black residents, white police officers have been seen as outsiders.

Route 95 has given drug customers easy access to the neighborhood. Crossroads Rhode Island is at one end of the neighborhood and Amos House at the other. The homeless and drug addicts are customers and a perfect cover for dealers trying to blend in, the police said. Smaller children in the neighborhood are used as lookouts and runners.

The youngest crack cocaine dealer ever arrested in Providence — 12 years old — was caught in the neighborhood. Teenage boys have been murdered here, often over drugs. Rodgers estimated that in the

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last 10 years, he's presided over trials for at least 10 murders that occurred within one tenth of a mile from where he grew up.

The crime has driven residents indoors and some even send their children away in the summer to keep them safe.

"There are so many children stuck in these homes, so many elderly stuck in these homes, so many people going to work, and they're all held down by just a few drug dealers," said Robert McCutcheon, an administrator in the Department of Corrections who grew up in the neighborhood.

AS THE POLICE PLANNED their extensive drug sweep, the Urban League of Rhode Island started to build the safety net that would sustain the handful of dealers selected for a second chance.

President Dennis Langley and Aponte knew the Urban League had to address the reasons the dealers were involved in crime in the first place — supporting a family, lack of a job and education, feeding a drug habit. The Urban League pulled together local religious leaders, social service agencies, school officials, political leaders, businesses and medical providers. The agency asked for services from some and for job opportunities from others.

Meanwhile, the police kept their investigation confidential. Only they would decide which neighborhood would be selected and which drug dealers would be eligible for the second chance.

When the investigation ended, Maj. Stephen Campbell, Verdi and Assistant Attorney General Bethany Macktaz reviewed the criminal records of the dealers caught in the sting. Of the 104 arrested or wanted for drug dealing, 60 were convicted felons, 47 were violating probation, parole or bail, and 19 were habitual offenders.

They rejected anyone with a violent criminal record or caught with a gun. They looked at the youngest dealers, those with otherwise clean records, and those with a chance to be rehabilitated. The list was narrowed to seven boys and men, ages 14 to 30, who'd all been dealing in the Lockwood Plaza neighborhood.

They were dubbed "The Lucky Seven."

CHIEF ESSERMAN WROTE letters to the Lucky Seven inviting them to a meeting at the police station, promising they wouldn't be arrested if they attended.

The police and members of the Urban League personally delivered the letters. The police expected to find what they usually found on drug raids — houses strewn with trash and drug paraphernalia, and families who knew or condoned their children's drug dealing. Instead, the officers found parents working, a father who was a minister, a mother working two jobs.

"One officer said to me, 'My God, what are they doing different from us?'" Langley said.

One mother told the Urban League she'd given up on her son: Take him, I can't do anything with him. Another parent said in disbelief, I call the police all the time on those drug dealers — and he's one of them.

A hard-working mother in the neighborhood was stunned that her nearly 16-year-old son was selling drugs. Not my son! she insisted to the police in her well-kept apartment. I'm on him all the time. But the boy confessed. He wanted expensive sneakers and his family couldn't afford them. He hid the

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sneakers at a friend's house.

"I don't think he had a sense of how wrong it was," Campbell said. "Is it the kid's fault, too, with all of the ways that kids are led to believe they need the clothes, the designer shoes, the jackets? Sometimes a kid gets swept up in all of this and doesn't realize until he's older that this isn't as important as it was at 16."

Fletcher heard from relatives and an ex-girlfriend that the police were looking for him. He met them in a parking lot. Expecting handcuffs, Fletcher walked away with the letter.

THE LUCKY SEVEN and their families were ushered into a room at the Providence Public Safety Complex. They were first met by clergy, community leaders and social services representatives, who told them their dealing was destroying the neighborhood. They also were offered help.

Then, the seven were ushered into the auditorium and seated in the front row. Behind them were poster-sized mug shots of the 26 other drug dealers from the Lockwood neighborhood who were under arrest or sought by the police. Those were the "ghetto celebrities."

"Is this something I want to live up to?" Fletcher asked himself. "No."

Law enforcement from Providence, the state, the federal government and corrections filled the room. The surveillance videos were played and the dealers were asked to acknowledge when they saw themselves on the screen — dealing drugs.

"It was shocking to me," Langley said later. "These were young guys whose future was terminated for something stupid."

When Fletcher saw himself on the screen, he started laughing. The cops gave him furious looks.

But he was laughing at himself. He was remembering that moment in the street, thinking he was "just chillin' " with the customers, but he was caught on tape by the police.

"You think you're the slickest person in the world, and you see yourself and you have to rethink yourself fast," said Fletcher, who apologized to the police chief for laughing. "How stupid was I to think I could do this?"

The dealers were told the police had the evidence and unsigned arrest warrants for each of them. Then they were told, "Tell us what you want."

They could go back to the corner and sell drugs and go to jail. Or they could take the second chance.

All seven took the deal.

LANGLEY AND APONTE, who is running the initiative here in Providence, quickly realized that the seven needed help in areas that were basic to mainstream life. Some needed driver's licenses. Some needed Social Security cards. Some needed help with housing and utilities. Some needed to be taught how to apply for a job.

The youngest, at 14, is now in school in Pawtucket. The Urban League is working to help his family with housing, food, social services and transportation. A 17-year-old boy is in school in Providence and being tested for special-education needs.

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A 20-year-old man is working at the Welcome Arnold Shelter in Cranston and taking a class at CCRI. A 16-year-old boy is in school in Providence and was given a part-time maintenance job through the nonprofit developer SWAP — or Stop Wasting Abandoned Property Inc.

An 18-year-old man is working in maintenance at Amos House and working on his GED. Getting caught and threatened with arrest scared him, said Evelyn Percira, whose daughter is dating the young man. Without the second chance, "oh, my God, he'd be lost," Percira said. "I've seen a lot of kids get lost in this system. It doesn't seem to teach them anything except to go out and do crazy things."

Fletcher has been given a \$22,000-a-year job as a peer counselor with the Urban League. He works at a desk outside Aponte's office and shadows Langley at his meetings. "I'm done with the streets," said Fletcher, wearing a light orange shirt, slacks and a striped tie he kept playing with. "I'm having fun getting on the phone with someone and saying, 'Man, I just got off work and I'm tired!'"

His smile is broad. He loves that he has a place to go every day, where people say "Good morning" to him. He says he doesn't have to look over his shoulder anymore. He's excited to be a leader for the younger kids.

"I'm getting leadership, respect for myself, pride," Fletcher said. "I always kept my head up, but not like it is now. It's been a learning experience, but it's a good one. I have father figures I can look up to. I feel better walking through these doors [at the Urban League] than I do in my own home."

But one of the seven is on the run. Carlton Barboza, 19, was a passenger in a car with stolen plates stopped by the police in December. The police said Barboza struggled with an officer, who used pepper spray to try to subdue him.

Barboza got away, but the police decided they wouldn't charge him in the struggle if he returned to the program. Time has run out. There's now a warrant to arrest him for assault and resisting arrest.

POLICE CRUISEKS AND unmarked cars troll Lockwood as often as the drug customers used to. Pine Street is deserted. The doorways of the N&H Grocery and Lockwood Market are empty of the teenage boys and young men who used to throng there. No one is hanging out on street corners. No one is hanging out anywhere.

Dwyer, who's overseeing the Lockwood Initiative, cruised through the streets one late winter afternoon. Usually, there'd be two to five dealers out, Dwyer said. Now, you can't turn a corner without seeing a police cruiser, he said.

Housing Officer Maxwell Dorley stopped to chat. "It's dead out here," Dorley said. "All I've seen is a kid cleaning up trash on Broad Street."

The Police Department has spent \$33,335 in overtime on the Lockwood Initiative since Dec. 1. The police began to scale back its overtime and coverage in the neighborhood in January. Then there were two shootings in the neighborhood last month, connected to a decades-old Mount Hope-South Side feud. The police stepped up patrols again.

"We've had a huge degree of success here and nobody wants to lose it," Stamatakos said. "It's kind of a point of pride. We said it wouldn't work, and we're working hard so it will."

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Undercover detectives have tested the market by trying to buy drugs from the streets. They've made four arrests for drug possession since Dec. 1, but the police have found no dealers, so far.

There's still skepticism. "Time will tell," Verdi said. "It's somewhat unrealistic to believe a year and a half from now there will be no drugs in Lockwood without police intervention. What's to prevent some of the inmates at the ACI that get released and go back to Lockwood — what's to prevent them from setting up shop?"

Isn't it possible that crime is down because so many drug dealers have gone to jail? Not necessarily, the chief says.

"I don't believe just the arrests would have eliminated the problem," Esserman said. "I believe this strategy has a chance. We have enormous support from the community, because these are their children being given a second chance. The Police Department is not seen as an occupying enemy."

COFFEE STEAMED in the back of the community room at the Lockwood Plaza high-rise one late January afternoon. Fletcher and another member of "The Lucky Seven" stood in an alcove as about 50 residents assembled in the brightly lit room to talk with the police. Esserman, Aponte and several high-ranking police officers told the residents they wanted to know whether the initiative was working.

Ken Cabral, a resident on Point Street, spoke first. "I take my hat off to the Providence Police Department."

He's lived in the neighborhood for years and saw how the dealers ruined it for other residents. But for the last few months, it's been quiet, Cabral said, so quiet that he's taken a walk in his own neighborhood at 2 in the morning and felt safe.

"The Providence Police Department has changed attitudes, changed race relations, and now we're getting the fruits of what we sow," Cabral said. "It could go either way, if we're not vigilant. That's on the part of the neighbors."

One resident after another talked about the peace that had settled over their neighborhood. "It's so quiet that I begin to wonder if we're in the same neighborhood," said Joseph Vileno Jr., a member of the 11th Ward Committee, who's lived here for 26 years.

Barbara Neal said the drug dealers who used to rush her car were gone. But she was worried the dealing had merely moved indoors to her Lockwood Plaza building, because security wasn't on all night and customers could be buzzed in.

This is the hard part, Stamatakos said, of maintaining the peace. The police were making every call from Lockwood a priority, but they needed the residents to call them if they saw any drug dealers trying to return.

"We've taken a lot of pride in this, too," Stamatakos said. "We don't want [the drug dealing] to come back."

The residents applauded the police and a few gave them a standing ovation. The police looked stunned. They'd never gotten a reception like this here. "I've been doing community policing for longer than anybody, and I've never heard this before," Cmdr. Paul Kennedy kept saying. "Never."

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At the back of the room, the two members of "The Lucky Seven" were quiet. "It was kind of sad," Fletcher said after most of the people had left. "Some of those women who spoke, they were my mom's age. You don't realize you're affecting people's lives like that."

He'd heard that some of the drug dealers in other neighborhoods were waiting to move into Lockwood. The warmer weather would bring more people out, he knew. This spring would be the test whether the peace in the neighborhood was a fluke or the real thing.

But on this night, Fletcher heard the sincerity in the residents' voices and their determination not to lose their neighborhood.

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FAX COVER SHEET

TO:

NAME Sarah Nixon and Susan Renaud
COMPANY Senate Judiciary Committee
TELEPHONE NUMBER 202-228-6661
FAX NUMBER 202-228-6362
DATE March 2, 2010
TIME 4:15 PM
NUMBER OF PAGES 16
(INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET)

RE:Colonel Esserman's Testimony and Exhibits

This transmission is the fourth and final and is 16 pages long. If you have questions I can be reached at (401) 243-6372.
Thanks, Michael O'Toole

03/02/2010 4:22PM




Portsmouth

Providence cookout celebrates community's progress

08:51 AM EDT on Wednesday, July 9, 2008

By Amanda Milkovits

Journal Staff Writer



Providence Patrolman Jose Pineda serves up hot dogs and hamburgers at a community barbecue yesterday on Lockwood Street. Viola Buchanan was one of the many residents who took advantage of the free food.

>

The Providence Journal / Ruben W. Perez

PROVIDENCE

Sterling Washington has buried two sons who were murdered in South Providence. But what he and other residents of Lockwood have been seeing lately has given them hope for the future of all children in their

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neighborhood.

These days, children, not drug dealers, are in the playground. Neighbors, not drug addicts, walk the streets and catch up with each other over the fences.

In less than two years, the police have created a community where there had only been fear and violence, Washington said. He praised Chief Dean M. Esserman and the officers for trying an unusual crime-prevention strategy and giving them their neighborhood back.

Related link
[Closing 'Crack Highway': Providence Police turn to a unique initiative to save a drug-infested neighborhood](#)

"I've been here 35 years, and I'm telling you, it's the first time that the people in the community actually trust the police," Washington said. "I feel so much safer today. We can come out, day or night. Any time we can celebrate this, it's a good thing."

Yesterday, the police and residents celebrated with a community barbecue on Lockwood Street that coincided with a Bureau of Justice Assistance conference being held in Providence to train other cities on the initiative. Law enforcement and community officials from Milwaukee, Dallas, Baltimore, Chicago, Indianapolis, and Durham, N.C.; Ocala, Fla.; New Haven, Conn.; and Cook County, Ill., are developing their own programs, following the lead set by Providence, Hempstead, N.Y., High Point, N.C., and other cities.

The other cities had heard so much about Providence's work that the agency within the U.S. Department of Justice decided to hold the conference here. Yesterday, the attendees were invited to Lockwood to see the neighborhood for themselves.

~~Police officers and workers on the Salvation Army canteen truck were grilling on Lockwood Street late yesterday afternoon as well over a hundred people gathered, some talking about the before and after of Lockwood.~~

The "before" goes back decades — with murders, gunfire, drug dealing and violent crime that kept the rest of the residents inside their homes and afraid.

"After" came a year and a half ago — when the police swept the neighborhood of its outdoor drug dealing and collaborated with the Urban League and residents to maintain the peace.

"Before, you weren't outside because of the drug dealers out here," said Squire Felder, who's lived here six years. "Since the cops came over, it's been safer."

In her 30 years of attending the Christ Church of Deliverance on Lockwood Street, Judy Galmer remembered how drug dealers would accost people, day and night. Someone shot a bullet into the church, she said. Children were always kept indoors.

Not anymore. The neighborhood is safe, she said. "I think the Police Department has done a wonderful job in cleaning up the community," she said.

Three little girls, arm in arm, nearly skipped out of their grandmother's apartment to the barbecue. Dynashia

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Hughes, 10, who lives in Lockwood, and sisters Aja Burris, 8, and Ashanti Dorsey, 10, who visit their grandmother nearly every day here, remembered when they were afraid to be outside. There were drug dealers everywhere, the girls said, and the streets smelled of their smoke. The grandmother always told the girls, be careful and stick together.

Now, the drug dealers are gone, and it's the police officers whom they see all the time. "I feel safe," said Briana Hutley, 14, who lives on Providence Street. "I haven't seen no violence. I see the police around and I feel protected."

The drug dealers have tried to come back. The residents and the police haven't let them. Lt. George Stamatakos, who grew up in the neighborhood and now runs the district, recalled a young man who rode a bicycle aimlessly around and was stopped several times by the police. The man, who'd been connected with drug crimes, had just gotten out of prison. Haven't you heard, Stamatakos said he told the man as he escorted him out, there's no drugs in Lockwood anymore.

THE INITIATIVE was developed by David Kennedy, the head of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, who believed that having the police and community work together to rid their neighborhood of open drug dealing could have lasting effects in reducing violence and crime.

The police start by arresting the street-level drug dealers and their hierarchy in the worst drug-plagued area. Then, the police select a few nonviolent offenders who have the potential to be rehabilitated. Instead of arresting them, the police give the dealers a second chance and turn them over to the community groups, which provide jobs, education and counseling.

The police also hold meetings with the community about what they're doing. The approach encourages the community to trust the police, which leads residents to work with the police to prevent more drug dealers from returning.

For this initiative in late 2006, the Providence police arrested 104 drug dealers, including one-third who were dealing in Lockwood. Of those, just seven boys and young men were given a second chance — and only two of them stayed out of trouble.

The program has been successful in keeping dealers off the streets in communities that have tried it over the last several years.

Now comes the other hard part — keeping the neighborhood going.

"What do the people need? They need to trust us," said Providence police Sgt. Glendon Goldsboro, who's been assigned to the neighborhood since last summer. "They need to know they'll be treated fairly. There's a lot of good people in this neighborhood, a lot of good people who want to work with the police. ... A lot of people, they recognize the drastic change that occurred and they don't want it to go back."

James Summey, the pastor of English Road Baptist Church in High Point, N.C., walked around Lockwood and saw the reflection of his own community. High Point was the first to try the initiative and targeted its most

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crime-ridden neighborhood four years ago. Crime dropped substantially, and the neighborhood came back to life, he said.

Some of the women living in Lockwood told Summey about how they'd always felt unsafe here. Now, they said, it's different. The drug dealers are gone, and the residents are free to walk. "That's the same way that it happened in my community," Summey said.

He called this conference the best one he attended. The police and community organizers from cities all over the country, in various stages of implementing the program, were sitting down together and sharing ideas about how they were making it work.

"Everyone has the same issues in common — the one thing they want is to be safe," Summey said.

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Police, residents work to lower crime at...



Providence

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Police, residents work to lower crime at Providence's troubled Chad Brown project

01:00 AM EST on Sunday, January 10, 2010

By Amanda Milkovits

Journal Staff Writer



Dresean Rivera, 10, Fortuna Ceballos, 7, and Elieza Lebron, 10, all Chad Brown residents, walk through the public housing complex in Providence. A stronger police presence and renovations have helped improve life in the project.

Providence Journal / Steve Szydlowski

PROVIDENCE

When Chanel Isom moved into Chad Brown eight years ago, she sent her toddler away at night to stay with relatives in safer neighborhoods.

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L.A. IZUMI

POLICE, RESIDENTS WORK TO LOWER CRIME AT...

The young, single mother was desperate to have her own place, but could only afford public housing. She refused the first apartment offered — on the main drag in Chad Brown — because it was too close to the drug-dealing and gunfire. She eventually took an apartment in Chad Brown that was off the drag, but it was still dangerous.

Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace, its sister housing complex across Chad Brown Street, have been strangled by poverty and crime for decades. "I used to hear the gunshots all the time," Isom says. Other mothers were losing their sons in the wars over turf and drugs. Isom wanted to protect her son, Adonis, now 9, and his baby sister, Anyah, 4.

Six months ago, Isom saw police officers out in the heart of Chad Brown, taking over where the drug dealers used to hang. Park benches were being installed, a new playground and water park were under construction, and landscaping, concrete patios and winding walkways were replacing the dirt and patches of grass that had always passed for yards.

The police — in a months-long blitz of arrests last year — brought down the drug hierarchy that had run Chad Brown. The Providence Housing Authority began spending millions of dollars on improvements in all of the city's projects, including Chad Brown, its oldest and most troubled.

THE TROUBLES have outlasted generations of Chad Brown residents — and police officers.

Lt. Daniel Gannon often parks his unmarked police car near the basketball court in the projects. "Admiral Street Boyz" and "Cut Throats" are spray-painted on a concrete ledge surrounding the court. The chain-link fence above is where memorials are built for Chad's murdered young men.

Fifteen years ago, Chad Brown was the responsibility of Gannon's father. Then-Police Chief Bernard Gannon incited frustration and anger when he refused to meet with residents and members of the Urban League and NAACP to talk about crime and complaints of police harassment.

Now, his son has inherited the problems. Gannon is working to keep the dealers off the streets, quell the turf wars and build trust among the police and wary residents.

He knows he cannot end the city's drug wars. And police officers can't fix the many serious social problems — broken homes, addictions and poverty.

But for six months, Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace have been quiet. People say they have not seen dealers on the streets or heard gunfire. Kids are playing outside and some of the 1,100 residents are learning to become neighbors.

Isom, who says she doesn't like police officers because many do not treat residents with respect, praises "Officer Dan."

She says Gannon knocks on the doors, asks about the kids, checks their report cards and wants to make sure they are staying in school.

"It's changed a lot," she says.

PEOPLE ONCE lined up to live in Chad Brown.

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PROVIDENCE POLICE, RESIDENTS WORK TO IMPROVE CHAD BROWN

The complex of two-story brick row-houses opened in 1942, northwest of the State House. Chad Brown Street divides the two housing projects, Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace, two enclaves of buildings that create small neighborhoods.

In his book, "A Community Apart: A History of Public Housing in Providence," Paul Campbell says Chad Brown was intended to provide decent housing for families of servicemen in World War II and help low-income families escape the slums in the city.

It was named for the patriarch of the prominent Brown merchant family, Campbell said, and was designed as a New England village.

A year after Chad Brown opened, The Providence Journal wrote about the close-knit neighborhood — with its community club, volunteer police force, and a weekly newspaper called the "Chad Brown Chatter."

"A spirit of small-town friendliness has developed among its citizens, accompanied by a burst of civic mindedness. It's as though 'Our Town' had cropped up overnight in the midst of a busy industrial city," The Journal wrote in a 1943 article headlined Life at Project is Example for Others to Copy.

By the 1960s, "Our Town" was in flames. Race riots were dividing and destroying city neighborhoods.

Thieves raced stolen cars into the heart of Chad Brown — an area that became known as "The Drag" and "The Baby Drag" — stripping the vehicles of parts and setting them ablaze. Vandals trashed and burned vacant apartments. Firefighters and police officers were pelted with rocks when they responded to calls.

Some cab companies and delivery people stopped driving into Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace, after drivers were attacked and robbed. A fish vendor was murdered during his rounds in 1974. In 1992, a Domino's deliveryman was shot and critically wounded. The police said the young man was shot for kicks.

THE CITY attempted to quell the violence and destruction in the 1970s, with multimillion dollar renovations and by training unarmed community protection officers for patrols in the housing projects.

But vandals broke into the revamped apartments and thieves cut the copper water pipes for resale, leaving tenants without water.

And, during their first patrol of Chad Brown, the community protection officers were assaulted and stripped of their walkie-talkies and mace.

Officer Paul "Porky" O'Rourke, who started as a community protection officer in 1972, and now-retired Officer Jack Costa, who started in 1976, eventually became full-fledged Providence police officers, working in the department's housing unit.

Residents who could were fleeing the projects. The vacancy rate in Chad Brown rose to 50 percent. "Once the ghetto atmosphere was created, vacated apartments were broken into within a matter of hours," Costa said. "Then more good people moved out, and it became impossible to keep up with [the criminals]."

The police and the residents hated each other. The residents saw the police as an occupying force, frisking and arresting anyone in the projects.

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"It was us against them," Costa said.

Slowly, O'Rourke and Costa say, they realized that they had to work with residents to end the standoff. They changed their tactics and recruited allies in the projects. The housing officers learned to be mediators and treat residents with respect.

In the 1980s, the crack cocaine epidemic swept through the poorest neighborhoods. The accompanying wave of violence claimed young victims, sending them to graveyards or prison. The police arrested drug dealers and new ones moved in.

The officers still dodged rocks and bottles, and O'Rourke was shot in the face with pellets in 1985 as he responded to a call in Chad Brown. He lost part of his sight, but remained on the job. In the hospital, he received get-well cards and fruit baskets from residents in the projects, including some whose relatives he'd arrested. Despite some progress, the drug trade never let go of Chad Brown.

The siege worsened over the decades with escalating gang violence and feuds that spanned generations.

ON THE OTHER side of the city, another neighborhood with a long history of drug crime and violence was turning around. In late 2006, the Providence police tried a strategy successful in other cities with high-crime neighborhoods, using community policing and major drug arrests to end the street-level dealing in the Lockwood neighborhood on the upper South Side.

A year into the Lockwood initiative, Police Chief Dean M. Esserman saw it was working and wanted to try elsewhere. Lt. Michael Correia suggested Chad Brown, where he was the district commander.

Drugs were claiming lives; innocents were caught in crossfire. Sixteen-year-old Dennis Hayes was murdered walking to his girlfriend's house two days before Christmas 2005. His death angered some Chad Brown youths, who started calling themselves Cut Throats and feuding with the East Side youths, Correia said.

Esserman turned police attention to Chad Brown early last year, the same time Correia was chosen to lead the narcotics bureau.

Correia began the drug investigation at Chad Brown, working with agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The police targeted the cocaine-trafficking hierarchy — from the major players to the street dealers. Correia called it Operation Cut Throats.

By June, the police arrested 20 men. The oldest was 45, the youngest just turned 18. Four men with long records were sent for federal prosecution; most of the others were convicted and sent to the Adult Correctional Institutions — including one for murder.

The police and prosecutors chose 3 of the 20 for a second chance. Instead of arrest, they were given an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.

One is a middle-aged man, nicknamed "Old School," who has a criminal record but the police thought he could serve as an example to the younger crowd if he stayed out of trouble. "Old School" agreed to stay clean and get a job.

Another was 17 when he was arrested. The police gave him a break so he could finish school, but he came close

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to another arrest and then moved out of state with his family.

The third, "Puerto Rico," took off after his arrest and hasn't been found.

AFTER THE drug sting, the police aggressively worked the streets of Chad Brown to keep the peace.

Lt. Gannon, who took over from Correia as district commander last January, was born and raised in Washington Park and attended the city's public schools before his family moved to the suburbs. He's comfortable working in the inner-city housing projects — as a rookie, Gannon was partnered with Officer O'Rourke — but he knows other officers are not. He wants to help officers and residents relate to one another, in a neighborhood with a legacy of mutual distrust.

One summer day as Gannon walks the neighborhood, a father of two boys stops to talk.

"Whatever you're all doing, keep up the good work. It's never been this quiet," says Jermaine Stuckey, who lives on nearby Clym Street.

A lot of money used to be made out here on the Drag, Stuckey tells Gannon. The kids saw it, and it made them want everything fast — money and the lifestyle of rappers.

After Stuckey leaves, Gannon talks about his ideas to rebuild the neighborhood, but admits, "I don't know if I can do it."

At the July community meeting in Chad Brown, a few weeks after the initiative began, City Councilman Nicholas Narducci, Gannon and several officers outnumber the few residents in the room. Gannon talks to the seven or eight women sitting with small children.

"In order to keep Chad Brown quiet, we need a lot of help. We can't do it by ourselves," Gannon says earnestly, as a woman translates in Spanish. "I need all of the neighbors to get involved and not turn a blind eye.

"Living here, you know who belongs here," he says. The women's faces are impassive. "We will respond to all of your calls, whenever you call — to loud music, to graffiti, to kids hanging around — we'll come and take care of it for you. You deserve better than to have drug dealers standing outside all night."

Narducci talks about the improvements in Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace: reopening the community center, landscaping and renovations in the houses.

"This is your home," he says, as a small boy snores on a woman's lap. "Don't tolerate the drugs. Don't tolerate the loud music. Don't tolerate the graffiti."

At last, one woman speaks up, and then another. One was afraid of the young men hanging around her stoop, another angry about a woman flashing her breasts at children.

Theresa M. Robinson remains quiet.

She's lived at Admiral Terrace for about 15 years. Afterward, she says she understands that residents fear repercussions if they speak up about crime. "You don't want to say anything. You can't defend yourself, and if you have small children, it's hard. ... It ought not to be that way."

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Police, residents work to lower crime at...

By September, attendance at the monthly meeting triples. The project's housing manager, Monica Almeida, says she's never seen anything like it.

Later that month, dozens attend a back-to-school hot dog roast sponsored by the police. The mother of a murdered boy stands apart from the crowd for a while, watching the children.

This is what we need, Candy Hayes says.

It was too late for two of her sons. Dejuan, 29, had been caught up in the drug sweep. Sixteen-year-old Dennis was shot and killed four years ago, walking up the steps to his girlfriend's house. No one has been arrested for his murder.

Hayes says her pain is endless. She volunteers for the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence. She walks into crowds of fighting teens and demands that they stop.

She hopes that having the police involved with the children in the neighborhood will help. "Give them something to do, keep them off the streets," she said. "Then we don't lose another life."

THE RUDOLPH TAVARES Community Center on Chad Brown Street is attracting more children. A handwritten poster hangs in the hallway: "Dear Lt. Gannon, Thank you for always making us feel safe. ..."

A large trophy from the first annual basketball competition in May between the police and the kids of Chad Brown is on the counter — proof that the kids won.

In the art room, volunteer Andrew Berrios helps the younger students with their homework. The 15-year-old has spent half his life in Chad Brown, where children carry the stigma of being from the toughest project in the city. "It used to be loud every night. There was fighting and shootings," he says. "Then it started getting quiet."

Statistics kept by the Providence police show that reports of crime have plummeted in Chad Brown since July.

The police efforts in Chad Brown are tying into the \$10.5 million of federal money in improvements that the Providence Housing Authority is making in housing projects across the city. The police are also aided by 200 surveillance cameras, including 18 in Chad Brown.

While some residents complain that the cameras create a "police state," they admit the cameras have helped — the troublemakers know they're being watched. The authority's director, Stephen O'Rourke, who is Officer O'Rourke's brother, calls the renovations and police work a "holistic strategy" for combating crime in the projects.

For every prospective tenant, the authority runs criminal background checks, conducts home visits and requires references.

But O'Rourke says he's realistic. "I'm not going to be Pollyanna-ish and say nothing's going to happen because we have programs and the place looks better. Things are going to happen."

Costa, the retired officer who is now manager of security for the housing authority, also says it's too soon to declare victory.

"Chad Brown will be Chad Brown for another 10 years," Costa predicts, "until the memory of the old Chad
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Brown fades.”

POLICE OFFICERS and housing improvements cannot give people jobs or a good education.

The day after Christmas, Isom was laid off from her job at a Wal-Mart in Warwick. Her only income now is \$200 a month in food stamps.

After graduating from Hope High School in 1996, she became certified as a nursing assistant, learned secretarial work through Joblink and took online classes through the University of Phoenix for work as a medical assistant. She says she applied for many jobs in these fields, but found nothing. Isom, 31, had worked for Wal-Mart since 2003.

Other residents in Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace are also searching for work.

Unemployment feeds the cycle of poverty and crime, Isom says.

“If half of these people could work, they wouldn’t be out trying to rob people to feed their family, or selling drugs,” Isom says. “Then, you have people who are convicted ... and they can’t get a job.”

Although her 9-year-old wants to be a rapper — he calls himself “Adonis the Don” — his mother dreams of a better life for him. She wants him to stay in school and go to college.

But getting a decent education is a struggle, she says. Her son’s fourth-grade class at Martin Luther King School has no textbooks to bring home, she says, and the teacher makes copies of the pages to send work home with students. Adonis goes to the recreation center after school to get help with his homework.

Isom gets her kids involved with every opportunity at Chad Brown and is thankful that they know and like “Officer Dan.”

~~On Thursday, as Adonis rushes to the recreation center — an oversized backpack on his shoulders — he passes Gannon and Councilman Narducci. They’re headed to an orientation meeting with two dozen teenage boys from Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace for a new program that brings together teens and the police for candid discussion about their lives and choices.~~

Paul Lewis, one of the co-leaders of the Youth & Police Initiative, was a former commissioner for the Providence Housing Authority and pushed to bring the program here — after a successful trial in Hartford Park. “I know Chad Brown,” he says. “You need to go directly to the belly of the beast.”

The teenagers listen as Gannon, Lewis and others explain the three-week program. The 12 teens accepted will be paid \$80 and they’ll get priority for summer jobs with the city.

None of them has a job. None is in afterschool sports. But they are hungry for jobs. They are hungry for something to do.

Derek Ardito, one of the two housing officers in Chad Brown, says the program is not about the police trying to pump the kids for information. “I don’t want to be chasing you guys,” he says. “I want to see you guys do better. We’re interested in you, because a lot of times I don’t know what you’re dealing with at home.”

One of the program organizers was born in Chad Brown. “The streets are very real, and the things you guys are
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dealing with now, we didn't have to do deal with when we were growing up," says Le' Garrett, an assistant director for the North American Family Institute which developed this effort six years ago.

The boys are told that the first 12 to sign up will get in. A few pull out their cell phones and immediately make the call. Others rush home to call. Within a half hour, seven boys sign up.

Officers Ardito and Jose Pinca, who patrol Chad Brown and Admiral Terrace, read the names on the attendance sheet. They put stars next to the names of boys whom they hope will sign up. These are boys who've been arrested. Boys who were friends with dealers caught in the sting. Boys with troubles at home.

All on the list are at a crossroads in their lives. And, Ardito says, "They are good kids. They are worth saving."Crimes by the numbers

Figures for each year are for a 10-month period, Jan. 1 through Oct. 31.

Crime	Citywide			Chad Brown/Admiral		
	2008	2009	Change	2008	2009	Change
Murder	11	15	+36.4%	0	0	-
Felony sex assault	38	40	+5.3%	0	0	-
Robbery with gun	92	102	+10.9%	6	0	-
Other robbery	342	257	-24.9%	4	1	-75.0%
Assault with gun	111	131	+18.0%	5	2	-60.0%
Other agg. assault	335	408	+21.8%	9	2	-77.8%
Burglary*	1688	1493	-11.6%	9	4	-55.6%
Auto theft	1238	889	-28.2%	13	11	-15.4%
Larceny from auto	2279	2095	-8.1%	9	12	+33.3%
Other larceny**	2554	2232	-12.6%	14	10	-28.6%
Simple assault	1946	1742	-10.5%	24	26	+8.3%
Drug related	1436	1122	-21.9%	15	14	-6.7%
Vandalism	2471	2209	-10.6%	37	17	-54.1%
Weapons violation	274	227	-17.2%	8	3	-62.5%
Shots fired	656	563	-14.2%	20	12	-40.0%
* Burglary includes unlawful entry, forced, or breaking and entering during nighttime.						
** Other larceny includes shoplifting, pickpocket, pursesnatch, from building, bicycle, motor vehicle parts or accessories.						
Source: Providence police and Providence Plan						

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Rhode Island news

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Providence police supervisors issued BlackBerry smartphones

01:00 AM EST on Wednesday, December 2, 2009

By Gregory Smith

Journal Staff Writer



The Curve 8900.

Research In Motion Ltd.

PROVIDENCE — Smartphones have become the new walkie-talkies.

Police Chief Dean M. Esserman has issued 92 BlackBerry Curve cell phones to all Police Department supervisors, from sergeant through major.

They will help to ensure that vital information is quickly and widely disseminated, hastening investigations and making it more likely that crimes will be solved, he said Tuesday.

Just as walkie-talkies have been a basic piece of equipment in police work for decades, keeping officers in

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touch with headquarters and one another even if they are running after a suspect, smartphones probably will be the indispensable item of the future, Esserman predicted.

"The BlackBerry technology is this department's newest crime-fighting tool, providing ... supervisors with complete and immediate access to the department's records management and communications systems any time, any place, allowing officers to have access to everything they need while working in the field," Esserman said.

Supervisors now can e-mail as well as talk. And they are able to view police reports, wanted-persons bulletins, active warrants with mug shots, crime-activity analyses, sex-offender registrations and news media advisories, among other information.

A BlackBerry Curve is a smartphone. Smartphones are the latest generation of cell phones, which function essentially as miniature computers with Internet access and an array of software applications, and include cameras.

"Over the years, we've moved the computer from the desk to the car," Esserman said. "Now, we're moving it from the car to the officer's hip."

As an example of the BlackBerrys' utility, Esserman cited his instruction some time ago to shift commanders to e-mail en masse alerts of major incidents to all supervisors. A blast e-mail includes supervisors who are not listening to the police radio and is useful for events that are not broadcast by radio lest eavesdroppers hear them. The BlackBerrys will receive those alerts.

An investigator working on a case would be able to use the BlackBerry to take photos and quickly distribute them as e-mail attachments, the chief noted. And that investigator, on the spot, could show victims and witnesses mug shots on a BlackBerry to see if they recognize a suspect.

About 30 top-echelon command staff have had BlackBerrys for months, but beginning in early November the department distributed upgraded BlackBerrys to those supervisors plus new BlackBerrys to the rest of the supervisors.

The department opted for the BlackBerry Curve 8900, which features a larger screen, with service provided by T-Mobile and Nextel. The Nextel-provided BlackBerrys have gone to members of the Investigative Division, allowing them to use Nextel's push-to-talk capability that enables conference calls within so-called talk groups. Since federal law enforcers also use Nextel phones, that makes it easier to communicate with them, too, said Maj. Steven M. Melaragno, police director of administration.

The exact cost of the BlackBerrys was not immediately available, but Melaragno said about \$95,000 was budgeted to get the phones and maintain service for two years. The money came from a law-enforcement grant financed by the federal economic stimulus law entitled the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

Esserman said he would like to see all sworn members of the police force have BlackBerrys some day.

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Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on "Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies"
Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Statement of U.S Senator Russell Feingold

Good morning and thank you to the witnesses for being here today and to Chairman Leahy for holding this important hearing. I have long believed that the federal government has an important role to play in supporting state and local law enforcement, particularly when it comes to promoting innovative, cost-effective approaches to solving crime. This is particularly true as state governments struggle to address tremendous budget shortfalls and are slashing law enforcement positions in an effort to balance their budgets. We need to help state governments figure out how to do more with less.

In the last Congress, I introduced a bill called the Prevention Resources for Eliminating Criminal Activity Using Tailored Interventions in Our Neighborhoods Act, or the PRECAUTION Act. The bill uses a long title to highlight the very important principle that is the focus of this hearing today; it is better to invest in precautionary measures now than it is to pay the costs of crime – both in dollars and in lives – later on.

The PRECAUTION Act is based on the premise that the federal government should play three major roles in the fight against crime. First, it should develop and disseminate knowledge to state and local officials regarding the newest and most effective law enforcement techniques and strategies. Second, it should provide financial support for innovations that our state and local partners cannot afford to fund on their own. And third, the federal government should create and maintain, among agencies at all levels of government, effective partnerships to address specific law enforcement challenges.

The PRECAUTION Act fulfills these three principles by creating a national commission to wade through the sea of information on crime prevention and intervention strategies currently available and to identify those programs that are most ready for replication around the country. The Commission's results will create a simple, accessible resource for over-taxed law enforcement officials to turn to that recommends a few, top-tier crime prevention and intervention programs. It will be a resource that will single out existing programs that are truly "evidence-based" and have been proven to be effective.

The current fiscal climate makes it all the more necessary to ensure that we are using our limited resources as effectively and efficiently as possible. We need to demonstrate that every dollar invested in prevention will save hundreds of dollars in litigation, incarceration, and re-entry costs down the road. I think the PRECAUTION Act's approach is essential to achieving this goal, but it is just one tool. I am pleased to be here this afternoon to learn more about what our witnesses are experiencing in the field and any recommendations they might have for cost-effective strategies to reduce crime.

Statement of

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

United States Senator
Vermont
March 3, 2010

Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.),
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Hearing On "Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies"
March 3, 2010

Today, the Committee returns to the critical issue of finding the best strategies for reducing crime. I chaired a hearing in the last Congress on this issue, and we now consider what the next steps can and should be.

We will hear about innovative approaches that are working in police departments and criminal justice systems across the country, and examine what the Federal Government can do to encourage the adoption of approaches that work to keep our communities safe. I hope we can make bipartisan progress on this issue. We all want to effectively and efficiently reduce crime and keep our neighborhoods safe.

In the 1990s, with the leadership of then-Senator Joe Biden and others, we passed legislation to create and fund the COPS program and other important initiatives, which put thousands of new officers on the street and encouraged innovative policing strategies. Law enforcement leaders in cities and towns throughout the country, bolstered by this national support, revolutionized the way policing was done throughout the country. These efforts led to the unprecedented drops in violent crime we saw during the 1990s.

That progress stalled in the last decade as Federal funding for state and local law enforcement dried up, and Federal attention to finding the best approaches to reducing crime wavered. Rates of crime stayed largely stagnant, despite skyrocketing incarceration rates, and some communities saw significant resurgences in violent crime.

One of the factors that prevented the crime problem from worsening in the last decade was continuing innovation at the local level. Enterprising police chiefs, hard working law enforcement officers, judges and community leaders worked together to find new and more effective crime reduction strategies, and many communities saw this work pay good dividends.

The economic downturn has put an even greater strain on our communities' efforts to keep crime rates down. In response to this growing crisis, Congress and the President acted decisively, including \$4 billion in Federal assistance to state and local law enforcement in last year's stimulus legislation. I fought hard for that funding, and the results are already being felt. Crime

rates are coming down as police departments are adding or retaining officers and implementing new initiatives.

Even with this help, though, police departments and criminal justice systems remain short on resources. More money alone will not solve the problem. It is important that cities and towns use their resources in the ways that have been proven to work best.

We will hear today from leaders in the field who have been setting good examples for how our communities can make their law enforcement and crime reduction efforts work well. Chief Mike Schirling from Burlington, Vermont, has brought significant innovation to a small city police force. He has implemented comprehensive community policing and partnerships with all levels of law enforcement and with schools and community groups. He is exploring the use of alternative sanctions to set low-level offenders on the right path before they enter the criminal justice system, targeted programs to address mental health needs, consolidation of resources to help police departments function more efficiently, and the use of new technology to share information more effectively.

Chief Rodney Monroe has made great progress in Richmond and now Charlotte with initiatives like using technology to pinpoint law enforcement efforts and integrating law enforcement with economic development and job training. Colonel Dean Esserman has made Providence into a national leader in community-based policing. Chief Patrick Berarducci has also brought innovation to a small city police force.

There are good examples from across the country. Cities like Los Angeles and Chicago are seeing results with gang outreach and mediation initiatives. Thinkers on crime reduction strategy like Jeremy Travis and David Kennedy with the National Network for Safe Communities have helped communities throughout the country effectively tackle intractable crime problems. The HOPE program in Hawaii has shown that probation supervision with swift and certain consequences can greatly reduce recidivism. Many jurisdictions have had great success with juvenile prevention and reentry programs.

Today's witnesses come from communities that look like much of America and prove that innovative and effective crime reduction approaches are not restricted to the biggest cities with the greatest resources. I hope that by highlighting these successes, we can encourage other communities to follow their lead.

I believe the Federal Government can and must help by spreading the word about strategies that work, and also by targeted funding and support. We have seen in Burlington and in many other cities that an initial Federal investment can make possible initiatives that would not be possible otherwise. These programs are inexpensive and cost effective. Over time, they should more than pay for themselves by reducing the costs of crime, improving local economies and creating jobs, and reducing the need for federal assistance.

I know there is disagreement about Federal support for state and local law enforcement. I hope there can be broad bipartisan agreement on supporting cost effective strategies that work to keep our communities safer.

**Statement of Rodney Monroe, Chief of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department**

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Encouraging Innovative and Cost-Effective Crime Reduction Strategies:

“The Value of Partnerships and Agency Collaboration in establishing a Comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy”

Introduction

As Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, it is an honor to have the opportunity to discuss the tremendous progress that can be achieved by partnering and collaborating with other law enforcement agencies to leverage resources and strategic efforts in order to implement a comprehensive, cost-effective approach to crime reduction. On behalf of the men and women of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department and law enforcement agencies nationwide, thank you for your continued support of our mission and work.

Cooperative Violence Reduction Strategies

In today’s police environment, law enforcement professionals have an ongoing responsibility to identify strategies that are both efficient and effective in addressing crime and disorder within the communities we serve.

As an agency, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department has made it one of our highest priorities to maximize various relationships in order to enhance our capabilities and use of resources for crime fighting. We understand that partnerships and outside collaboration are vital to our success and our efforts to combat criminal activities taking place in our community. Moreover, experience has proven to me that crime is most effectively prevented and reduced, through a multi-agency approach that encompasses a broad array of resources, skills and expertise.

In particular, when focusing upon violent crimes and the offenders responsible for committing these crimes, our agency and the community as a whole, receive great benefits when we formally organize our federal, state and local partners to share in that responsibility.

For the purpose of this discussion, I will provide examples of experiences that have allowed me, and my respective agencies, to adequately and effectively leverage partnerships to reduce crime.

In my former role as Chief of the Richmond Police Department, as a result of efforts to bring law enforcement partners together for a more comprehensive and effective policing strategy, I served as part of the team that established the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Partnership (CVRP) to coordinate prevention, deterrence, intervention, and accountability in our policing efforts. The centerpiece of the CVRP was the coordinated effort of local, state and federal law enforcement to regularly identify the most violent neighborhoods and habitual offenders in the city and deploy the team's combined resources to address the issues. The partnership called for each stakeholder to take ownership for a specific area of implementation and a specific criminal activity associated with a targeted geographic area identified as having issues with violence, gangs or drugs.

Sharing investigative, intelligence, and analytical resources, each agency played a vital role. For example, the FBI, under their Safe Streets initiative, was responsible for identifying the most prolific gangs while the ATF, under their Violent Crime Interdiction Teams (VCIT), addressed the top two violent crime neighborhoods and DEA, under their Drug Task Force, focused on the major open-air drug area.

Other agencies' resources and expertise were also utilized. The U.S. Marshals focused on current fugitives, the Probation Department focused on conducting home visits with probationers, the Sheriff's Department assisted with gang members' identification from the jail while the U. S. Attorneys' office monitored and prosecuted firearm, drug, and conspiracy cases involving gangs.

To sustain and continuously assess the effectiveness of our strategy, the heads of each of the partnering agencies met every forty-five days, ensuring each agency stayed on task and met the established monthly goals.

I am proud to report that we experienced great success in our efforts, realizing significant crime reductions in each area. In 2007 and 2008, Richmond, VA experienced the least amount of homicides in over 30 years – from an average high of 100 to a low of 35.

One particular element of the partnership of note was our implementation of a “Call In” program. Under this program, we identified and called in approximately 20 offenders currently on probation who would be summoned into Federal Court before a Federal Judge.

In the presence of the heads of the partnering agencies, including the FBI, DEA, ATF SAC, the Chief of Police, US Attorney, CA, the State AG, the Sheriff, and the Director of Probation, it was made clear to offenders that we, as a group, were watching them and their associates very closely to determine the level of criminal activity they may be involved in. Further, they [offenders] were told we were using our combined resources to investigate and prosecute all of their crimes.

Elements of this strategy also included:

- Regular and random home visits with drug testing;
- Offenders being shown pictures of their associates along with the amount of prison time they received for their crimes;
- And victims of crime giving personal accounts of the impact of crimes upon families and communities.

Community Support Collaboration

For those offenders that chose to do the right thing and refrain from engaging in criminal activity, we relied on a different approach. In those cases, offenders received other services to assist and support their efforts to rehabilitate and change their lives.

Those services included GED and job training, substance abuse counseling, assistance in exiting gang life, and helping them to reunite with their children and families.

After assessing the initial 20 participants in the "call-in" program, in which 80 percent eventually had their status revoked and returned to prison for various violations, we were able to measure the results of the impact of our support services efforts. In looking at subsequent participants who took advantage of the social services provided, we ultimately saw a greater success rate for the participants who did utilize the social supports.

As law enforcement professionals, we understand that our primary role must always focus on crime reduction and making sure criminals are held accountable for their activities and negative impacts on our communities. But we also understand that there is a greater role for our agencies to play and that we can be even more effective in reducing criminal activity when we partner and use our resources to support the work of community assistance organizations.

Organizations such as Boaz & Ruth in Richmond, VA, a faith-based nonprofit prisoner reentry-training program. This organization steps in and influences the lives of ex-offenders recently released from prison by helping them find stable jobs, safe homes and establish strong family and community connections. Programs like this empower ex-offenders and help them to rebuild their lives. They also play a significant role in providing and utilizing the resources of all key stakeholders, allowing the community support organization to help law enforcement to reduce crime while law enforcement plays a significant role in helping the organization to reach success in their efforts.

For example, in Richmond the police department helped to broker a partnership between Boaz & Ruth and the City's Department of Public Works to hire their clients as contract employees for jobs such as landscaping and bulk trash removal.

Located in a neighborhood with a high concentration of ex-offenders, Boaz & Ruth prepared its clients to be successful members of the workforce by providing training in such areas as proper dress etiquette, transportation, housing, job application and interview preparedness, and financial literacy.

The benefits of this relationship proved to be enormous, with none of the approximate 25 ex-offenders re-offending. In 2008, 46 of its 65 participants obtained stable housing; eight were able to purchase a car and seven enrolled in higher education. In addition, many of the participants were able to reconnect with estranged family members, an important component to helping them maintain their independency and motivation to continue to do well.

The community benefits have also been invaluable. Through the organization's employment services, eleven local buildings were purchased and renovated and crime in the surrounding community dropped 37 percent.

Another great benefit of this program is the fact that the ex-offenders serve as role models for others exiting prison and work hard to steer youth from making the same mistakes they made.

Another great example of a successful community collaboration is the partnership established between the Richmond Police Department and the Violence-Free Zone Initiative. The Violence – Free Zone is a national model for reducing youth violence and providing mentoring to high-risk youth.

Through its partnership with the Richmond Police Department, the Violence-Free Zone established Youth Advisors in a local high school, George Wythe High, to build trust and respect among staff and students. These advisors, who had often overcome many of the same challenges

being faced by the students, worked in a variety of roles including hall monitors, mediators, character coaches and role models. They also served as mentors to those high-risk students who faced the greatest challenges.

Since the implementation of the program at George Wythe High School, the community and law enforcement benefits have been tremendous. The school has seen a 16 percent decrease in incidents and a 14 percent decrease in its truancy rate. In addition, the police department has seen an 18 percent decrease in calls for service to the school, a 15 percent decrease in arrests at the school and a huge decrease of more than 60 percent in Motor Vehicle Thefts in the area surrounding the school campus.

Overall, the partnership has had measureable impacts in improving youth safety, reduction in suspension and truancies and increased academic performance among young people attending the George Wythe High School.

The partnerships established with Boaz & Ruth and the Violence-Free Zone are just two examples of how innovative community partnerships can be effective in preventing and reducing criminal activities in a community.


Closing

In closing, the opportunity to leverage both public and private partnerships are critical to the success of law enforcement agencies. Partnerships, as well as agency and community collaborations, have proven to be successful crime prevention strategies by allowing agencies to leverage resources, talent and expertise to more effectively address criminal activities and issues affecting the community.

Another key value is the ability these collaborative efforts give in allowing law enforcement agencies to maximize our sometimes-limited resources to save time and money while making a broader impact.

In particular, as Chief of Police in Charlotte, NC and in my past roles in Richmond, VA and in Washington, DC, my experience collaborating with our local, state and federal partners has allowed my agencies to be more effective in our approach to reducing crime. Through collaboration we have not only been able to maximize the use of our resources to prevent, intervene, and prohibit criminal activities but we've also had an opportunity to support the work of community assistance organizations in helping to rehabilitate and change the lives of ex-offenders.

Ultimately, our partnership and collaborative efforts show us the value of a comprehensive violence reduction strategy, where the more we do to work together in addressing common priorities, the more likely we are to be successful in achieving our overarching mission to reduce crime and improve quality of life in our communities.



CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**Statement of
David B. Muhlhausen, Ph.D.
Senior Policy Analyst
Center for Data Analysis
The Heritage Foundation**

Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate

Delivered March 3, 2010

“Promoting Innovative Policing Strategies without Busting the Federal Budget”

Introduction

My name is David Muhlhausen. I am Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. I thank Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member Jeff Sessions, and the rest of the committee for the opportunity to testify today. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.¹

My testimony focuses on the following points:

- Out-of-control federal spending;
- Testing and disseminating innovative policies;
- Innovative policing strategies; and
- Leveraging assets through collaboration.

Out-of-Control Spending

While the goal of reducing crime is admirable, Congress’s penchant for subsidizing the routine activities of state and local law enforcement continues the federal government’s march toward fiscal insolvency. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently warned Congress, again, that the trajectory of the federal budget is on an unsustainable course.² Yesterday, the General Accountability Office confirmed this diagnosis.³ For fiscal year 2009, the federal government reached the largest deficit—annual budget short

falls—as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) since the close of World War II.⁴ For fiscal year 2010, the deficit is expected to be the second largest since World War II.⁵ The national debt—the sum of all previous deficits—is set to reach 67 percent of GDP by the end of fiscal year 2010.⁶ Last year, the CBO warned that these “Large budget deficits would reduce national savings, leading to more borrowing from abroad and less domestic investment, which in turn would depress economic growth in the United States. Over time, the accumulation of debt would seriously harm the economy.”⁷

While the deficit and debt is driven largely by entitlement spending—Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security—Congress’s fondness for subsidizing the routine responsibilities of state and local law enforcement—a traditional responsibility of state and local governments—and all other programs advocated in Congress only move the nation closer to fiscal insolvency. In fiscal year 2009, Congress appropriated almost \$6 billion in state and local law enforcement assistance grants, including almost \$1.6 billion for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).⁸ Nearly all of this funding is dedicated to activities outside the scope, expertise, and responsibility of the federal government.

The passage of the 1994 Crime Act marked a troubling milestone in the history of federal assistance for state and local law enforcement. Previously, federal assistance focused on helping state and local governments test innovative ideas, such as providing funding for demonstration programs. The 1994 Crime Act shifted federal assistance away from testing innovative ideas and towards subsidizing the routine operations of state and local law enforcement.⁹ Unfortunately, COPS and similar Department of Justice grant programs encourage state and local officials to shift accountability for local crime toward the federal government when they fail to devote adequate resources to fighting crime.¹⁰ This shift in responsibility is problematic because under our system of constitutional federalism almost all ordinary street crime is the primary responsibility of state and local government.

In addition, research by both The Heritage Foundation and the U.S. Department of Justice found that the COPS program is ineffective.¹¹ Contrary to its sponsors’ promises, COPS did not come close to actually putting 100,000 additional officers on the street.¹² Further, The Heritage Foundation found that the ineffectiveness of COPS grants awarded to large cities may be due to their misuse, with grants awarded to large cities used to supplant the cities’ own funding for local police expenditures.¹³ Supplanting occurs when federal funds are used to replace local funds, such as when federal funds intended for hiring additional police officers are instead used to pay the salaries of currently employed officers. This finding is supported by multiple audits conducted by the Department of Justice. Its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that cities failed to hire the number of officers required, and did not comply with other grant conditions.¹⁴ More importantly, Heritage Foundation evaluations have uniformly found that COPS grants had little to no impact on crime rates.¹⁵

Given that public safety from ordinary street crime is almost exclusively the responsibility of state and local governments, and in light of the severe burden of the

federal government's debt, state and local governments need to be weaned off their relatively recent dependence on federal funding for the provision of local law enforcement.

Testing and Disseminating Innovative Policies

The federal government has a history of producing and coordinating research and information sharing when the states are unable to do so in their individual capacities. When it comes to testing crime policies, many state and local law enforcement agencies do not have the same level of access to knowledge and information about ground-breaking policies as accessed by the federal government. For example, a given state may have only one or two large cities where it can collect crime data and test urban crime-reduction strategies. As a result, the states are often not in a position to test innovative policies in multiple jurisdictions.

As will become abundantly clear in this testimony, the federal government has played a crucial role in funding and evaluating law enforcement demonstration projects. Several of the innovative policing and leveraging strategies presented below received Department of Justice support for experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations.¹⁶

Innovative Policing Strategies

New law enforcement strategies have been developed to reduce crime. Beginning in the 1970s and early 1980s, law enforcement agencies began to develop alternatives to the traditional police model that emphasized motorized patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.¹⁷

Police officers serve as the frontline forces in preventing and deterring crime in America. The combined efforts of aggressive and intelligent local policing can reduce crime. But effective policing at the state and local levels does not require funding from the federal government. Policymakers can encourage more effective policing by focusing on results and proven strategies, rather than on only spending more money.

A review of the policing research by Professors David Weisburd and John E. Eck suggests a few innovative approaches that have proven results. Problem-oriented policing, "hot spots" policing, and focusing on repeat offenders can effectively reduce crime.¹⁸ Unlike broader strategies that concentrate on community relations, these three approaches share a common focus of targeting criminogenic factors, such as high-risk locations and repeat offenders.

Problem-Oriented Policing. In the problem-oriented policing strategy, the police develop a systematic process for inquiring into the nature of problems and then develop specific tactics to address these problems.¹⁹ Police officers engaged in problem-oriented policing do not simply respond to calls for service with an arrest or engage in public relations activities with the community. Instead, the officer takes steps to define the specific problem, whether it is purse snatching or gang activity, and to identify its causes.²⁰ After analyzing the problem, the officer then develops a plan to resolve the problem. By using this methodology, officers may be able to prevent further occurrences by solving the root

causes. For example, officers may encourage the community to exert more control over unruly youth to reduce gang activity.

Problem-oriented policing has been successful in some cities.²¹ During the 1990s, the Jersey City Police Department, in partnership with Rutgers University's Center for Crime Prevention Studies, and with the assistance of the National Institute of Justice implemented and evaluated a problem-oriented policing strategy intended to reduce violent crime.²² An experimental evaluation in Jersey City, New Jersey, found that problem-oriented policing was effective at reducing crime.²³ With the assistance of researchers, the police matched 24 neighborhoods based on their similarities on a number of demographic and related factors. By random assignment, these neighborhoods were selected for problem-oriented policing or traditional patrols. Problem-oriented policing interventions, such as aggressive order maintenance and crime prevention changes in the physical environment, reduced reported crimes and citizen emergency calls.

Another problem-oriented policing evaluation, using a less rigorous quasi-experimental design, found some evidence of success in Richmond, California.²⁴ During the mid-1990s, the Richmond Police Department targeted gun-related, drug-related, and gang-related violence through innovative enforcement and prevention strategies, including inter-agency collaboration. After the strategy was implemented, Richmond experienced a more than one homicide per month decrease.

"Hot Spots" Policing. "Hot spots" policing uses crime mapping technology to correlate the commission of crimes with the geographic location and time (time of day and day of week) at which they were committed. This enables police departments to focus resources where they are most needed. Some experimental and quasi-experimental studies indicate that hot spots policing can reduce the number of calls citizens must make for police service.²⁵

A hot spots policing approach, incorporating some elements of problem-oriented policing, in Lowell, Massachusetts, underwent an experimental evaluation.²⁶ With the assistance of researchers, the police matched 17 pairs of crime and disorder plagued locations based on their similarities on a number of demographic and related factors. By random assignment, these problem neighborhoods were selected for problem-oriented policing or routine policing strategies. All of the hot spots neighborhoods experienced environmental changes and aggressive order maintenance activities, including "cleaning and securing vacant lots, razing abandoned buildings, improving street lighting, adding video surveillance, performing code inspections of disorderly taverns, and the like" and "making arrests for public drinking, arresting drug sellers, and performing 'stop and frisks' of suspicious persons."²⁷ Compared to the control group locations, hot spots locations experienced decreases in assaults, robberies, and burglaries, while there was no difference in larceny-thefts and disorders/nuisances. Further analysis indicates that the intervention did not cause crime to spill over into surrounding neighborhoods.

Focusing on Repeat Offenders. Two randomized experiments indicate that a strategy of focusing on high-risk repeat offenders leads to the successful arrest and incarceration of

such offenders.²⁸ For example, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., created the Repeat Offender Project (ROP) in the early 1980s.²⁹ ROP consisted of officers specifically tasked with capturing career criminals. The experimental evaluation received support from the National Institute of Justice and a private funder. While the experimental evaluation did not measure the impact of ROP on crime rates, ROP was found to increase the likelihood of the arrest and prosecution of career offenders.

Leveraging Assets through Collaboration

Law enforcement agencies should not view themselves as isolated entities tasked with combating crime. Through the building of partnerships to more effectively leverage assets, law enforcement officials can develop innovative strategies that have greater potential for reducing crime. The coordination of tactics with other law enforcement agencies, probation and parole agencies, prosecutors, and community organizations means that each can take advantage of each other's strengths to reduce crime. Two such approaches are "pulling levers" partnerships and state and local law enforcement assistance in enforcing federal immigration law.

*Pulling Levers.*³⁰ Based on deterrence and problem-oriented policing, the "pulling levers" approach recognizes that chronic offenders frequently use drugs in public, violate their probation, and have outstanding warrants for their arrest.³¹ Thus, chronic offenders are exposed to ample opportunities for law enforcement to "pull every lever" to crack down on them. In order to leverage available enforcement actions, this approach has utilized inter-agency collaboration among federal, state, and local police agencies, probation and parole agencies, and prosecutors. In addition to inter-agency collaboration, it incorporates the use of research and data analysis to assess the nature of crime problems being addressed.

In Boston, Massachusetts, during the 1990s, Operation Ceasefire recognized that Boston's violent crime problem was disproportionately concentrated among gang members.³² Operation Ceasefire consisted of the Boston Police Department, Massachusetts probation and parole agencies, the Suffolk County District Attorney, the U.S. Attorney, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), community groups, and other organizations.³³ During meetings with gang members, the Operation Ceasefire taskforce promised the gang members that if they continued their violence, their actions would provoke an immediate and intense response. The task force used early prosecutions to show gang members how they could avoid the same punishment.³⁴ The working group also campaigned systematically to explain to gang members the consequences of their violent actions. The gang members were told that every legally available sanction would be used to punish them for committing violent crimes.

In addition, probation and police officers began to share information and patrol together to produce mutual benefits. Previously unknown to the police, probation officers had important information not only on which gang members were on probation, but also on the terms of their probation (e.g., curfews and area restrictions). For probation officers, the presence of the police allowed for instant arrest of gang members who violated the conditions of their probation.³⁵ This on-the-spot sanction meant that gang members could

no longer ignore the terms of their probation.

A quasi-experimental evaluation of Operation Ceasefire funded by the National Institute of Justice found that the intervention was associated with a 63 percent decrease in the rate of youth homicides.³⁶ Further, Operation Ceasefire was associated with a 25 percent reduction in the rate of gun assaults and a 32 percent reduction in the rate of shots-fired calls for service.

Federal prosecutors can play a key, but limited, role by prosecuting crimes that involve truly national interests, and their actions may have contributed marginally to the success of Operation Ceasefire. But state governments should not, for example, rely on the federal government to provide stiff sanctions for violent crimes. In fact, such a strategy may backfire. Relying on federal sentencing laws allows state governments to abdicate their primary responsibility for providing public safety. Members of criminal gangs and other wrongdoers would no longer need to take state law enforcement as seriously as they should. In 2004, the federal government arrested about 141,000 (1 percent) of the 14 million suspects arrested in the United States.³⁷

Sadly, Boston's Operation Ceasefire was ended in the late 1990s, apparently the victim of its own success, the transfer of experienced police officers from the program, and battles among the police, ministers, and criminologists to claim credit for the program's success.³⁸ With the incidence of violent crime having risen in 2006, Boston officials revived the program.³⁹

Communities suffering from gang crime can use Boston's Operation Ceasefire as a model. In Chicago, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)—a federal program—coordinated the activities of federal, state, and local law enforcement and used pulling levers—style warnings to offenders with a history of gun violence and gang membership. Compared to similar neighborhoods, a quasi-experimental evaluation found that neighborhoods receiving the PSN intervention experienced a reduction in gun-related and gang-related homicides.⁴⁰

In addition, the pulling levers and problem-oriented policing approaches were implemented in Stockton, California, and Rockford, Illinois, have undergone quasi-experimental evaluations.⁴¹ In Stockton, an inter-agency task force, called Operation Peacekeeper, attempted to reduce gun homicides by targeting gang-involved offenders. A Department of Justice-sponsored evaluation found that Operation Peacekeeper was associated with a reduction in gun homicide rates.⁴² Rockford developed a pulling levers strategy to address open-air drug markets. According to a Department of Justice sponsored evaluation, the strategy appears to be associated with reductions in nonviolent crimes, while the intervention had no effect on violent crimes.⁴³

By improving coordination among criminal justice agencies, developing partnerships with the community, and a no-nonsense approach to pulling every lever available to deter and incapacitate violent criminals, other communities may be able to replicate the success of the "pulling levers" strategy.

Immigration Enforcement Partnerships. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) provides a proper example of how local law enforcement can partner with federal authorities (in this case, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)) to enforce federal immigration laws and reduce crime. Section 287(g) functions as a “force multiplier” for an under-resourced ICE.⁴⁴ As of February 2009, 67 state and local law enforcement agencies were enrolled in the voluntary program.⁴⁵ The provision allows state and local agencies to enter into assistance compacts with the federal government so that they have the authority to investigate, detain, and arrest aliens on civil and criminal grounds. Specifically, local law enforcement agencies operating under 287(g) assist in the process of removing from the country illegal aliens arrested for crimes. Previously, when a local law enforcement officer detained an individual who could not demonstrate legal presence in the U.S., the officer would notify the federal government and wait for them to retrieve the individual. All too often, the federal government would fail to take custody of the individual, thus setting in motion the individual’s release. This inaction effectively meant the federal immigration law was not being enforced. Subsection (g)(9) of section 287 makes any participation by the states in this program strictly voluntary. Thus, participating in the program fits naturally with a proper constitutional view of state sovereignty as well as state and local jurisdiction over crime that is truly local in nature. Under section 287(g), state and local authorities may determine based on local needs and data whether and to what extent immigration violations correlate with other criminal activity such that participating in deportation will decrease the incidence of local crime. According to Heritage Visiting Fellow Matt Mayer, states and localities do not need permission to enforce federal immigration law.⁴⁶

In 2009, the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) found that of the 25 of 29 program participants reviewed, about 43,000 aliens had been arrested.⁴⁷ ICE detained approximately 34,000, put about 14,000 of those apprehended in removal proceedings, and assembled about 15,000 of those detained to be voluntarily deported.⁴⁸ The remaining 5,000 arrested aliens were either released or sent to federal or state prisons for felony offenses.⁴⁹

The GAO also concluded that that ICE lacked internal controls.⁵⁰ Specifically, the GAO found that the

program objectives have not been documented in any program-related materials, guidance on how and when to use program authority is inconsistent, guidance on how ICE officials are to supervise officers from participating agencies has not been developed, data that participating agencies are to track and report to ICE has not been defined, and performance measures to track and evaluate progress toward meeting program objectives have not been developed.⁵¹

Despite these issues, the successful performance of the 287(g) program can be measured by the number of immigration-law violators who were arrested and deported. The program should be subjected to a properly designed and scientifically rigorous evaluation to measure its effects empirically, but local law enforcement agencies report crime reductions resulting from participation in the program.⁵² The ability of 25 program participants to arrest and begin the removal process of so many immigration offenders demonstrates its effectiveness and justifies continued support for the program.

Yet instead of focusing on improving the oversight of the 287(g) program, the current Administration has taken actions to undermine the benefits for participating agencies by mandating that local prosecutors must prosecute illegal aliens for the underlying crime instead of processing them for removal.⁵³ By forcing 287(g) participants to start a costly and lengthy criminal process instead of beginning removal proceedings, the Administration is ensuring that local law enforcement will be less likely to participate in the program. The new mandate needlessly and counter-productively drains the resources of local law enforcement.

Conclusion

While state and local law enforcement resources wax and wane as the priorities of state and local officials change, the states have fully within their powers the ability to effectively allocate existing personnel and other resources to strategies that have proven track records of success. With the national debt expected to reach 67 percent of GDP by the end of fiscal year 2010, the federal government can no longer afford to subsidize the routine activities of state and local law enforcement. Such subsidies fall outside the responsibilities of the federal government. The federal government has contributed to identifying what works in law enforcement. However, under America’s system of constitutional federalism, innovative and effective state and local law enforcement should never be made dependent on the federal government.

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¹ Although all opinions expressed and any errors herein are my own, my Heritage colleagues Brian Walsh, Jena Baker McNeill, and Matt A. Mayer contributed much to this analysis, and sections of this testimony are based on papers I co-authored with Brian Walsh and Erica Little. E.g., David B. Muhlhausen, and Erica Little, "Gang Crime: Effective and Constitutional Policies to Stop Violent Gangs," Heritage Foundation *Legal Memorandum* No. 20, June 6, 2007 at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/lm20.cfm>, and David B. Muhlhausen and Brian Walsh, "COPS Reform: Why Congress Can't Make the COPS Program Work," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounders* No. 2188, September 26, 2008, at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/bg2188.cfm>.

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**TESTIMONY OF CHIEF MICHAEL E. SCHIRLING
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ENCOURAGING INNOVATIVE AND COST-EFFECTIVE CRIME REDUCTION
STRATEGIES
MARCH 3, 2010**

**WRITTEN TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS BY
MICHAEL E. SCHIRLING
CHIEF OF POLICE
BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
BURLINGTON, VERMONT**

Good Afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.

My name is Michael Schirling and I have the privilege of serving as the Chief of Police in Burlington, VT. I am pleased to be with you again. I want to take a moment to thank the Committee and the Chairman for recent support of local law enforcement through renewed availability of Justice Assistance and COPS funding streams in 2009. I also very much appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to discuss the challenges currently confronting small cities and U.S. law enforcement and how innovative and cost-effective strategies could benefit public safety and the government bottom line.

To provide some background information – which mirrors my testimony to set the stage during my last visit with you in January of 2009 – Burlington is a community of approximately 40,000, located on the eastern shores of Lake Champlain about 35 miles south of the Canadian border. We host, among other educational institutions, the University of Vermont and Champlain College. It is the central hub of activity and commerce for northwestern Vermont and the greater Burlington area, which encompasses a population of approximately 150,000 residents.

Through our 145-year history of providing law enforcement services to Vermont's largest City, our ranks have grown to 100 officers and 36 civilian personnel. Over the last eleven years our policing paradigm shifted from a response-based model to one embracing the core tenets of community policing – partnership and problem solving – with an eye toward preventing crime and mitigating disorder on our streets and in our neighborhoods, using a variety of methods and employing the resources of a host of stakeholders.

Over the last ten years our officers and staff have had a variety of successes utilizing the community policing model including:

- Successful neighborhood policing utilizing geographic assignment of officers and supervisors to ensure a greater sense of connection with the community and ownership of neighborhood-level problems
- Working with neighborhoods and businesses to address the community's safety and crime prevention needs, street by street
- More robust connections with youth via our School Resource Officer program and other youth initiatives
- Well-developed relationships with our local colleges and universities to foster better integration of students with traditional residents
- Successful efforts to support victims and survivors of crime utilizing a community-based Parallel Justice program
- Partnership with our Community Justice Center to create alternative, community-based, restorative sanctions for low-level offenders
- Creation of a Community Support Program that offers mediation and intervention services to citizens in conflict in an effort to reduce the number of crimes that occur and referrals to our already burdened Court system
- Partnership in a mental health street worker project in our downtown to help manage service-resistant individuals suffering from mental health and substance abuse problems, while ensuring a vibrant retail and entertainment district
- Participation in a grassroots community group (titled the Uncommon Alliance) working to mitigate the impact of real and perceived bias in policing and to foster trust with members of our increasingly diverse community
- Robust working relationships with Federal, State, and local agencies throughout Vermont to tackle tough issues and complex cases involving violent crime and drug distribution
- Work with the VT Department of Corrections and other stakeholders on cutting edge offender re-entry initiatives
- Partnership with Federal, State, and local law enforcement in a multi-disciplinary task force approach to child sexual exploitation and sexual violence against women – putting the needs of victims first
- Creation and ongoing operation of the Vermont Internet Crimes and Internet Crimes Against Children Task Forces providing education, law enforcement training, investigative support and computer forensics across a wide variety of technologically challenging crime trends

Many of these successful initiatives have been creative, cutting-edge ideas that have had the support of Federal funding. Many were created using critical Federal seed money for pilot projects to encourage innovation.

We believe that critical law enforcement innovation can occur not just in traditional policing endeavors but also in other areas. Beyond traditional law enforcement activities such as enforcement and investigative initiatives, increasingly, law enforcement, together with the communities they serve, must focus on education and prevention as well as outreach and intervention in an effort to stem the tide of crime by reaching youth and the disenfranchised at a neighborhood level. By expending resources to impact the paths or lives of our citizens (particularly youth) before crime

occurs, or crime reaches the level of serious and violent offenses, the cost to society in not only dollars, but in reducing tragedies, is immeasurable. Changing the direction of a single life or even an entire community can be accomplished with innovative strategies and resources to seed projects and initiatives to prove the efficacy of those strategies.

While we, like many law enforcement organizations in Vermont and across the nation, have met with success using a community policing model and adapting to the emerging needs of our jurisdiction, the changing face of crime coupled with the mobile and interconnected nature of modern society continue to pose significant challenges to our resources. Some of our contemporary challenges include:

- Recruitment and retention of qualified, service-oriented police officers and support personnel in an increasingly competitive national recruitment landscape
- Shifts in violent crime from large urban areas to smaller urban and rural jurisdictions have resulted from a variety of factors including offender displacement caused by successful policing initiatives
- Stresses created by the burgeoning drug trade, both in illicit drugs, in our area led by a resurgence in cocaine (powder and rock/crack), as well as the widespread trade and trafficking in prescription narcotics such as oxycontin
- An expansion of the number of property crimes, car breaks, burglaries, and armed robberies, particularly at convenience stores and pharmacies, stemming from the drug trade and attempts to directly or indirectly acquire prescription drugs
- Continuing challenges posed by computer and Internet crime and the emerging challenges on increasingly mobile communication devices used to facilitate crime
- Stresses on our resources, stemming from persons suffering from underlying mental health and substance abuse problems, being shuttled into the criminal justice system as a surrogate for mental health or health care systems that are overburdened or under-resourced
- Diminishing resources and support for offender re-entry which correlates to an increased risk of recidivism
- Shortages in correctional facilities in Vermont for pre-trial detainees and on both State and Federal charges
- Shifts in burdens to local governments and, in particular, police agencies caused by shortages in correctional facilities for convicted offenders
- Stresses associated with post-911 security for transportation infrastructure, highlighted by an array of Federal requirements at our airports
- Challenges related to the sharing of information and data exchange among law enforcement and other criminal justice organizations
- Challenges that relate to the vast increase in complexity – both scope and depth – of the issues that face law enforcement today versus what the landscape looked like 20 years ago

Responses to these challenges must be crafted using creative, collaborative, and cost-effective approaches – what this hearing's title states very clearly – innovative and cost effective law enforcement strategies. While there are literally dozens of possible topics to discuss in this realm, I have chosen a cross-section of items from a variety of areas that are representative of the concepts that could be embraced. Clearly, alternatives will differ in various regions of the country.

Among the creative and innovative approaches that could be explored:

1. **Integrated Justice System Models** – Embracing new, integrated models of justice system operation (attachment A details one view of justice system integration that we are working with) which emphasize lower cost, more effective strategies such as education/prevention efforts and outreach/intervention efforts in an attempt to mitigate the number of people whose behavior deteriorates to the point where traditional criminal justice system intervention is necessary. If those approaches fail and an individual's behavior rises to low-level crime, swift, meaningful community-based strategies can be employed. They include municipal/civil tickets, pre-arrest diversion via restorative justice models and community justice centers, and traditional court diversion models. Properly implemented, these initial responses to low-level events and low-level crime can mitigate the number of offenders entering the justice system for more significant crime. If offenders do enter the system for more significant, repeat, or violent offenses, the resources of the traditional justice system are reserved for swift, sure response.

To ensure that resources exist to enable meaningful interventions at earlier stages in the system investments, which could be offset by reductions in the cost of traditional justice systems operations, funding will be necessary in:

- Crime reduction strategies through education and prevention; and outreach and intervention
- Restorative and parallel justice programs to reduce burdens on Courts and jails through effective, community-based interventions for low-level offenders and support for victims of crime

Additionally, if individuals fail at these early stages and cases end up in Court at the traditional adjudication level, we must find creative ways for our Courts and Judges to have access to historical information about alternative approaches that have been used and have failed in order for Court action to be informed and meaningful. Without information about prior efforts to intervene at a community level, the Courts will arguably be less effective, operating in an information vacuum.

2. **Consolidation of services / regionalization.** In Chittenden County in Vermont we have been discussing the regionalization of public safety services for over 40 years. Examples of successful regionalization of emergency services on a variety of scales exist in a variety of areas of the country. The cost savings and enhancement of services that could be achieved from consolidating services ranging from information technology to communications to investigative functions to entire public safety departments is often discussed. Yet, in many areas of the country there is nothing to entice departments or local governments to take the initial steps into the consolidation arena. There is nothing to break the surface tension or to pay for the studies or seed money that may be needed to begin implementation of the best concepts.

Nationally, our 18,000 police departments and 800,000 police officers do an excellent job every day despite the duplication of effort and limited resources they often work with. Imagine the possibilities in leveraging economies of scale to produce better services at lower cost to the taxpayer.

- One example of this area for innovation is information sharing and consolidation of information technologies (IT) infrastructures. Technology and Internet bandwidth have evolved to the point where duplicating IT infrastructure at every agency is no longer necessary. We could reduce the extensive duplication of effort, equipment, and staff and, by extension, the explosive cost of IT through smart, simple, effective consolidation of core services and infrastructures. Creating regional IT centers that host core IT infrastructure for multiple agencies would leverage technology to enhance information sharing and communication and open doors to better services for the public through such things as online crime reporting and mapping.

3. **Technology incubators and partnerships.** An extension of the consolidation discussion in section 2, this concept stems from the specialized software that law enforcement agencies have come to rely on for daily operations.

First, one of the core costs of law enforcement operations is the reliance on computer aided dispatch and records management systems. These systems are complex, costly, and often duplicated multiple times over in small geographic areas. In the current paradigm law enforcement agencies spend millions of dollars annually purchasing and maintaining these systems. Simultaneously, prosecutors, public defenders, Courts, and corrections/jails purchase and maintain systems running parallel to the law enforcement CAD/RMS systems. In addition, we now look for software solutions (to purchase and maintain at additional cost) to move information from one system to another. These systems, while sometimes effective, are often built on aging technology platforms that make them less intuitive and more cumbersome to use than some contemporary platforms.

By partnering directly with skilled database and application developers, law enforcement agencies could create new, simple, intuitive, and powerful systems that help leverage the technology while making it easier to conduct daily law enforcement operations. This development model could be used in partnership with private companies or educational institutions and could yield more powerful applications, shared across networks by multiple agencies to enhance data exchange. Simultaneously, the creation of source code owned by law enforcement could allow for semi-open source development of CAD/RMS systems that are powerful and tailored to individual agencies needs based on a single robust platform.

If successful, once the initial phases of development of the CAD/RMS system are complete, exploration of expansion to allow prosecutors, public defenders, Courts, and corrections/jails to build upon this system could begin. Theoretically, this system could be used as a base for a single scalable, secure system that eliminates the need for duplicate data entry or transfer and allows an event to travel seamlessly through the criminal justice system as a single record.

In January of 2010, we issued a Request for Information looking for possible partners to develop a state-of-the-art CAD/RMS in partnership with Vermont law enforcement working as a consortium of agencies and users. Our hope is that this project could act as a "technology incubator" that could yield a core product that will be scalable to the need of law enforcement agencies on a regional or even national scale.

Another example is the realm of digital forensics and explosion of digital evidence into every facet of criminal investigation from sex crimes and domestic violence to drug offenses and burglary. Digital forensic tools need to continually be developed and refined, validated, and deployed with ongoing training provided to forensic examiners. The costs to build, staff, train, and equip digital forensics labs are significant. Partnerships between law enforcement and educational institutions (colleges and universities) could help to dramatically offset the cost of tool development, validation, and training. There are a variety of theoretical models we have discussed in Vermont, some put into practice as pilot projects between the Vermont Internet Crimes Task Force and Champlain College, in which research, tool validation, training, and even operational capacity is bolstered using practitioners and experts in the educational arena. Expansion of these types of partnerships as other types of "technology incubators" could have long-term cost savings and operational benefits.

4. **Unified strategies for offender housing (facilities) and re-entry.** In Vermont, we suffer from a notable lack of capacity, coupled with extensive expense, to house convicted offenders. That capacity appears to be on the precipice of shrinking further. At the same time, we lack housing to transition offenders released from facilities to work to successfully reintegrate them back to the community upon release. The costs to house offenders are staggering as Vermont operates a decentralized correctional system with multiple facilities duplicating efforts and costs a number of times over. Programming, education, and transitional initiatives are limited because of the extensive costs already present. Resources do not exist to change the system and the capacity continues to erode as costs continue to rise.

This lack of capacity has a direct impact not only on our State justice system but also on the Federal system and its costs of operation. Last week the U.S. Marshal for the District of Vermont told me that he has 40 beds available for federal detainees and that 200 are needed. He is currently utilizing 17 jails in 5 states to house defendants for appearance at 3 Vermont courts. This is indicative of the strains on the entire system in Vermont.

The street level result of this lack of capacity is a criminal justice system that is not respected by those who choose to commit crime. Consequences for crimes, repeat offenses, violations of Court orders, and violations of probation are often absent, and most commonly delayed. There simply is no threat of punishment via incarceration, which leads in many cases, to repeat offenses. This lack of capacity has direct effects on crime and disorder, especially for criminals who weave their way through our criminal justice system repeatedly. As Mark Kleiman describes in his 2009 book When Brute Force Fails – How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment: "The more credible a threat is the less often it has to be carried out."

Smart, innovative systems could be built to fix the problems of cost and capacity and achieve a myriad of goals. Imagine the cost savings in a single, central, state-of-the-art facility with right-sized capacity in a state like Vermont or region of similar size. Such a facility could provide contemporary secure housing for offenders and space for meaningful programming and education. Such a facility could allow for step-down housing to promote offender re-entry on site. For example, there could be tiered units from maximum security through apartment-based living (and steps in between) with privileges to work outside the facility for those nearing release dates.

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This type of facility could give offenders re-entering their communities critical tools to use as they re-integrate and begin living on their own once again. All of these goals could be achieved at a lower cost of overall operation.

5. **Use of specialized practitioners to supplement law enforcement officers and a re-investment in key social service functions.** The complexity of modern law enforcement has increased substantially over the last two decades. Contributing to that complexity are many issues previously handled through specialized means that have fallen victim to diminishing resources and are now borne by street-level law enforcement. Put simply, when other critical resources are absent, 911 becomes the intervention of last resort.

One example of this shift in responsibility is response to persons in crisis with underlying mental health issues. More and more the criminal justice system has become a surrogate for robust, meaningful mental health intervention and treatment as community-based mental health and institutional care capacity has eroded. Law enforcement officers (as well as emergency medical responders and hospital emergency rooms) regularly find themselves confronted by repetitive, significant challenges posed by many who suffer from mental illness. In the absence of other resources their needs are unmet and often behavior deteriorates as a result. Unmet needs, coupled with the deteriorating behavior that can occur, now result in arrest and prosecution to facilitate placement or treatment, and excessive displaced costs to emergency services. We are simply using the wrong resources, which do not produce desired results and increase costs. Similar descriptions could be made regarding substance abuse and other social service challenges.

As a result of Recovery Act Justice Assistance Funding we have been fortunate to partner with our community mental health agency to hire and deploy a Mental Health Outreach Interventionist. This civilian position is designed to solve long-term problems by responding with police officers, and sometimes in lieu of officers, to calls whose genesis is an underlying mental health issue. Additionally, this outreach practitioner acts as a de-facto case manager working to engage problem-solving for frequent service users, many of whom are resistant. Use of similar specialized civilian practitioners can assist law enforcement agencies at successfully solving long-term, repetitive problems rather than repeatedly responding to the same issues without successful resolution.

Other law enforcement agencies throughout the nation have embraced Crisis Intervention Teams to model best practices in dealing with those in mental health crisis. While we will never extricate law enforcement from dealing with these issues, the extent to which police officers are used to handle mental health crisis should be offset in much larger part by the mental health system through added capacity.

6. **Expansion of innovative adjudication strategies such as drug and mental health Courts.** Swift, sure intervention and consequences are among the most effective responses available to the criminal justice system according to criminologists and street-level police officers alike. The need for tailored responses that take into account the root causes of crime are arguably of equal importance. Strategies that provide targeted response and swift intervention have proven successful in pilot projects, including ones at the Chittenden District Court in Vermont. These pilot projects include drug and mental health courts that result in

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immediate interventions and wraparound services for offenders to immediately mitigate the impact of their respective addiction or illness and crime that manifests as an extension of those issues. These types of more surgically targeted interventions have shown success. Embracing expanded versions of these systems seems prudent at this stage to reduce the repetitive nature of entries into the criminal justice system by those suffering from substance abuse or mental health ailments.

As you consider how to support innovative and cost effective law enforcement operations in a way that will have a positive impact on crime control and public safety, it is important to note that policing does not exist in a vacuum. Not only are there key partners in direct community policing efforts such as community and restorative justice centers, neighborhood groups, businesses, and other stakeholders, but other critical pieces of the justice system that are essential to supporting the aftermath of successful policing efforts including prosecutors, courts, and corrections. Many of these partners and services have been noted in the examples contained in this testimony.


I believe it is equally important to note that the cyclical nature of crime and "generational recidivism" that we observe on the street each day has roots outside the criminal justice system. Innovative strategies to combat crime and disorder on our streets and in our neighborhoods must include comprehensive strategies and investments in education (with emphasis on early childhood education), healthcare (with special emphasis on mental health services and treatment), and other core needs. Education and health services, and other public policy discussions, must dovetail with public safety services to weave a tapestry to health and protection in our communities.

For example – recently, in partnership with our local prosecutor and the Boys and Girls Club of Burlington, VT, we began a unique project in an effort to provide critical support services to youth whose families may be experiencing stress as a result of a parent's entry into the criminal justice system. Cases in which youth are in the home are flagged on tracking sheets and sent to the prosecutor and information is shared with the local youth service agencies in an effort to ensure that support services are put in place when these stressors occur. The hope is that by providing support to youth whose family may be engaged with the justice system we can stem the tide of "generational recidivism" and prevent the younger generation from following the same path.

Federal, State, local, university and tribal law enforcement are doing all that we can to protect our communities from crime, disorder, and the specter of terrorism. As costs continue to grow and the specter of deficits and debt plague our governments large and small, innovative and effective strategies will be increasingly crucial to effective public safety.

In closing, I would like to thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, for taking testimony on this important set of issues and for your continued leadership and assistance on law enforcement matters nationwide.

ATTACHMENT A



Testimony of

Thomas H. StreicherMarch 16, 2010

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS H. STREICHER
POLICE CHIEF, CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT
AS WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH
DR. ROBIN S. ENGEL
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Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence
A comprehensive approach to address the challenge of crime in a free society

In April 2001, the City of Cincinnati experienced a series of race riots in response to an officer-involved shooting of an African American suspect. Over the following five year period, police-community relations were often hostile in nature and citizens continually questioned the legitimacy of police. Simultaneously, crime and violence increased dramatically within the city, the number of homicides tripled, culminating in 2006 with a record high of 89 homicides.

In response, the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) and other key stakeholders developed the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV, pronounced "serve"), a multi-agency collaborative effort based on the *Boston Gun Project* of the 1990s. The Boston project and similar "pulling levers" or "focused deterrence" strategies rely on delivering messages of specific deterrence to those who generate and sustain a culture of violence. These types of initiatives help communities set clear standards for acceptable behavior, and offer offenders social services to change their violent lifestyles. CIRV was inspired by a determination to expand beyond the Boston (and similar) project's emphasis on law enforcement by enhancing the community and social services components, and to build in mechanisms from the beginning to avoid the collapse of the strategy that occurred in Boston and many other jurisdictions.

CIRV's objective is to dramatically and quickly reduce the frequency of street violence in Cincinnati and continually reduce that frequency over time. To accomplish this goal, CIRV has established partnerships with multiple law enforcement agencies (local, state and federal), social service providers, university researchers, medical professionals, business leaders, and community members. The work of this partnership has led to a 40% reduction in violent group/gang homicides, with over 400 offenders self-selecting into a social services structure designed to help them change their violent lifestyles. Most importantly, as a direct result of CIRV, the ongoing relationship between the community and law enforcement can fairly be described as reconciliatory. For the first time, all sectors of the Cincinnati community – police leaders and officers, community activists, political figures, civil rights activists, ex-offenders, parents of murdered children, social service providers, medical personnel, business and civic leaders – agreed to stand on common ground in approaching these violent offenders.

CIRV is based on a number of key underlying assumptions regarding patterns of violence in Cincinnati. It was believed that a small number of highly active chronic offenders were committing a majority of violence in Cincinnati. These offenders were thought to be loosely organized in groups (i.e., gangs, posses, sets, etc.). Most of the violence associated with these group members was thought to stem from respect issues, rather than directly from drug market-related conflicts. The "street code," or the norms and narratives of the streets regarding issues of respect and manhood, appeared to be driving most of the violence in and among these groups. Through systematic research with front-line law enforcement officers partnered with social scientists, a vivid picture of a hyperactive offender population in Cincinnati was revealed: Approximately 0.3% of the city's population (with individual prior records *averaging* 35 charges) was associated with violent street groups/gangs. An initial review of 83 homicides recorded during a one-year period (June 8, 2006 to June 6, 2007) demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of victims were Black (76%), male (81%), and killed by firearm (82%). Most importantly, approximately 74% of the homicides involved a victim and/or an offender known by law enforcement to be associated with a violent street group. This homicide review lent empirical support to initial speculation that Cincinnati's homicide problem was largely related to dynamic group processes. In addition, the homicide review indicated that CIRV could potentially impact approximately three-quarters of the annual homicides in Cincinnati.

To reduce gun-violence long-term, CPD and its partners established an initiative to systematically identify the highly active, chronic violent offenders in the city, target these individuals and their associated groups for intervention, and develop a system for sustainability. In face-to-face offender notification meetings, identified members of violent groups were told that the violence must stop, there would be group-based consequences if it did not, and that the community would support these consequences. Violent group members were told there was social service help for all who wanted it, and that everybody, including law enforcement, hoped that it would be taken. The community firmly established that they needed the violence to stop and needed these young men alive and out of prison. The results of this effort have been extraordinary.

This high-performing and rapidly-moving project was designed from the onset to be institutionalized and to continue to improve and evolve. For the first time in any violence reduction initiative of its kind, senior political figures (Mayor Mark Mallory, City Manager Milton Dohoney, and Councilmember Cecil Thomas) are exercising active oversight, while a full-time executive level project manager within CPD (S. Gregory Baker) leads a senior interagency and community working group that is responsible for CIRV's daily operations and long-term planning. CIRV adds a robust operational structure, complete with corporate models employed for management, accountability, performance evaluation, and improvement. The City of Cincinnati and the CPD are approaching CIRV with the seriousness that its life-saving potential deserves, and this commitment has resulted in significant reductions in violence.

CIRV is now widely recognized as the model for innovative violence reduction strategies because of its strong social service component, systematic data collection, corporate principles

for sustainability, and strong leadership and commitment from CPD officials. In addition to the results on the ground, CIRV is serving as the model site in the National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC). CIRV's team members and academic partners have provided training to dozens of other jurisdictions across the country. The work and success of CIRV has inspired similar projects in London, England, Glasgow, Scotland, and Adelaide, South Australia.

In summary, over the last two and a half years, the CPD has successfully led a multi-faceted, multi-agency, community-based effort to reduce homicides. The CPD and its partners have successfully delivered a strong message to violent offenders that the stakes for being involved in a killing have dramatically increased. Services partners have successfully demonstrated that members of high risk groups who seek to leave violence behind will be assisted in their efforts. Community partners have worked together with CPD to spread the message that violence is no longer acceptable in their neighborhoods. Simultaneously, processes have been developed to ensure sustainability. CIRV's legitimacy within the target population and the community was also enhanced through the delivery of promised streamlined social services and job training for those willing to seek assistance. Since August 2007, over 400 offenders have self-selected for CIRV services. **All this has been associated with dramatically improved police-community relations and the lowest number of homicides in nearly a decade.** Homicides in the target population have been reduced by 40% comparing 29-months pre/post CIRV implementation. The CIRV team continues to evolve and incorporate new partners that will increase sustainability and further decrease group/gang member involved violence.

The concern for Cincinnati, however, is that in the current fiscal climate, the necessary funding to sustain our work will be unavailable. It is important that congress recognize and understand that the current challenges to the criminal justice system requires a multifaceted approach toward ending the violence that affects so many communities across the United States of America. We believe that CIRV provides a solid foundation upon which any community can build an effort specifically tailored to address the issues within their community. Sustainability is the key ingredient in any successful program and CIRV is no exception. A comprehensive partnership will ensure a long life for this and similar efforts. We believe that the total support of the Congress and the Senate of the United States of America will help to send a clear message across this country that the violence must and will stop as we forge ahead into the 21st century.

On behalf of the City of Cincinnati, the Cincinnati Police Department and our entire community partnership, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and address this esteemed gathering.

