[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-16]
NAVY SHIPBUILDING ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS AND BUDGET
REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAVY'S
SHIPBUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
PLAN
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 9, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TODD YOUNG, Indiana CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Mary Kate Cunningham, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011, Navy Shipbuilding Acquisition Programs
and Budget Requirements of the Navy's Shipbuilding and
Construction Plan.............................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 9, 2011......................................... 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 2011
NAVY SHIPBUILDING ACQUISITION PROGRAMS AND BUDGET REQUIREMENTS OF THE
NAVY'S SHIPBUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION PLAN
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Coffman, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Colorado, Subcommittee
on Seapower and Projection Forces.............................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2
WITNESSES
Labs, Eric, Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons,
Congressional Budget Office.................................... 5
O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 3
Stackley, Hon. Sean, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development & Acquisition; VADM Terry Blake, USN,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of
Capabilities and Resources; and Lt. Gen. George Flynn, USMC,
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.... 20
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Akin, Hon. W. Todd, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces.......................................... 51
Labs, Eric................................................... 89
McIntyre, Hon. Mike.......................................... 53
O'Rourke, Ronald............................................. 55
Stackley, Hon. Sean, joint with VADM Terry Blake and Lt. Gen.
George Flynn............................................... 120
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 144
Mr. Smith.................................................... 145
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 139
NAVY SHIPBUILDING ACQUISITION PROGRAMS AND BUDGET REQUIREMENTS OF THE
NAVY'S SHIPBUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION PLAN
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 9, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:10 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W. Todd Akin
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE COFFMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Mr. Coffman. The hearing of the Seapower and Projection
Forces Subcommittee is called to order. Representative Akin is
tied up in a Budget Committee hearing process, so I want to
enter his remarks into the record. Let me quickly go over them.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This hearing will
come to order. Thank you for joining us today as we consider
the fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of the
Navy's shipbuilding acquisition program.
We have two panels of witnesses testifying today. The first
panel are national defense experts specializing in naval issues
from the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional
Budget Office. They are Mr. Ron O'Rourke and David Eric Labs,
respectively. Our second panel will be officials from the Navy
and Marine Corps, which I will welcome later.
Reviewing the Navy's shipbuilding budget request for both
this year and what is projected in the out-years, there are
many things to be concerned about, and probably the most
worrisome aspects of the Navy's budget is that it will require
near-perfect execution in cost control, schedule adherence and
risk-mitigation efforts to obtain the force structure necessary
to deter hostile threats, show force when needed, and, as a
last resort, employ lethal operations.
Among the concerns I have revolve around issues as such:
The new Ford-class carrier program, EMALS [Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System] integration and forthcoming cost growth
to the overall program; Ohio-class submarine replacement
regarding its aggressive schedule and optimistic cost estimates
so early in its program's development; our attack submarine
inventory being nine submarines short of the requirement in the
out-years; a shipbuilding budget estimated by CBO
[Congressional Budget Office] that may not permit the Navy to
achieve the 313-ship floor; and a shipbuilding industrial base
in which 50 percent of major U.S. shipyards' future viability
and ability to perform as needed to meet the Navy's acquisition
plan remains in question.
My last concern focuses on congressional and Department of
Defense collaboration, or should I say the apparent lack
thereof. Too many times in the recent past we have been
excluded from Department of Defense deliberations or approached
with hasty requests that do not afford us the luxury of
effectively evaluating decisions, most recently, LCS [Littoral
Combat Ship] and EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle]. Bottom
line, this must change.
Lastly, we are part of this problem, too. The Congress must
finish fiscal year 2011 defense appropriations legislation
because the implications of funding the Navy and Marine Corps
at fiscal year 2010 funding levels in a year-long continuing
resolution would be almost irreparable.
All of our men and women in uniform deserve more from this
body. It goes without saying we have the finest, most
professional combat-honed sailors, marines, airmen and soldiers
that any modern military has ever had within its ranks, and our
responsibility as a subcommittee is to ensure that we provide
them the equipment and tools necessary in meeting our Nation's
national security requirements.
In conclusion, I would like to note that although our
subcommittee has had a number of closed events already, this is
our first public hearing of the year. It is an honor to chair
this subcommittee and to follow in the footsteps of a number of
previous chairmen who did much to make sure that our Nation
maintains strong sea services.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the
Appendix on page ?.]
Mr. Coffman. With that, I turn to my good friend and
partner, the ranking member from North Carolina, Mike McIntyre,
for any remarks he wishes to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE McINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you very much, and also thanks to our
chairman in his absence, and thank you all for the opportunity
to let us question you today.
Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke from Congressional Research Service
and Dr. Labs from the CBO for being here. We all look forward
to your expert opinions about where the Navy is heading with
regard to shipbuilding and acquisition strategy. I also welcome
our Navy and Marine Corps friends who will be appearing as part
of the second panel.
As we begin to analyze the detail of the Navy's fiscal year
2011 shipbuilding and acquisition plans, it is important that
we look not only at what it proposes for this coming year, but
also what it presents for the following out-years. Many of the
proposed efficiencies that were recently announced depend
heavily on our future acquisition strategy, whether that be
multiyear procurement on ships or the development of a new
amphibious vehicle. I am hopeful the Navy will be able to
adhere to their proposals so that savings in those difficult
choices may be realized.
Like our chairman, these are areas that I remain concerned
about. The stated goal of the Navy is a sustained fleet of 313
ships. There has been some debate on how much it will cost per
year to achieve this goal and to maintain it. So I am
particularly concerned about whether the current plan is
sustainable, especially as new programs such as the SSBN(X)
[Next-Generation Ballistic Missile Submarine] begin to come on
line and demand a larger portion of the shipbuilding budget.
The fact that our submarine force, both attack and guided
missile submarines, continues to decline is a concern, because
their demand, as we know, is constantly increasing. I look
forward to hearing what both panels have to say in regard to
our future gaps in submarine requirements.
We know our shipbuilding industrial base remains very
fragile. We have seen how even minor changes in shipbuilding
plans can have major impacts on the industrial base. It is
critical that the shipbuilding workforce move to a more stable
situation in order to provide what our great Navy needs.
We are very aware of the stresses that the current
continuing resolution has put on the Navy, and we have heard
that in testimony before the larger full committee as well. I
am hopeful that we will be able to achieve in the 2011 fiscal
year appropriations bill--that we will be able to do what we
need to do, but in the meantime, I appreciate any
recommendations that you may have that would mitigate the risk
in the interim.
Thank you for your service. We look forward to hearing your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
Now we will hear from our witnesses in the first panel: Mr.
Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional
Research Service. Mr. O'Rourke.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL DEFENSE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Navy
shipbuilding programs.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to submit
my written statement for the record and make a couple of brief
points.
First, it should be noted that the Navy has revised some of
its ship force structure goals over the last 5 years, and these
goals no longer add up to a fleet of 313 ships. In this sense,
the 313 figure is no longer a fully accurate summation of Navy
ship goals.
The Navy expects to soon complete a new force-structure
assessment which could support an official replacement for the
313-ship plan. A replacement plan would support effective
congressional oversight of the Navy shipbuilding by giving
Members an official and fully accurate set of force-level goals
against which to assess proposed Navy programs.
My testimony outlines a number of potential shipbuilding
execution challenges including those that would arise under the
scenario of a year-long CR [Continuing Resolution], the
possibility of cost growth on ship designs that are planned to
start procurement in future years, the question of the
disposition of Northrop's shipyards, and execution challenges
that are specific to individual shipbuilding programs.
But right now the one point I would like to focus on are
the shortfalls in attack submarines and in cruisers and
destroyers that are projected to occur in the 2020s and beyond
even if the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully
implemented. These projected shortfalls are significant. If
they occur, they could made it difficult or impossible for the
Navy to fully perform its projected missions.
The additional destroyer that the Navy has added in fiscal
year 2014 will mitigate the cruiser-destroyer shortfall at the
margin, but it would take a lot more than one extra destroyer
to substantially redress this shortfall. Similarly, the Navy
hopes to restore the second Virginia-class boat in fiscal year
2018, but it would take more than one additional boat to
substantially mitigate the attack boat shortfall.
These projected shortfalls have been on the books since
last year, but they haven't received much attention in public
discussions of the Navy's shipbuilding plan. This might be
because they look like they are far in the future, but in terms
of issues they might pose for policymakers, that is not
necessarily the case.
Substantially redressing these shortfalls could involve
putting additional destroyers and attack boats into the
shipbuilding plan or extending the service lives of existing
cruisers, destroyers and attack boats. These options, which
could be combined, pose near-term policy issues for
policymakers.
Based on past information from the Navy, substantially
mitigating the attack boat shortfall for wartime as well as
peacetime operations would require adding four boats to the
plan, and that assumes that pressures on the shipbuilding
budget caused by the Ohio replacement program don't cause any
currently planned Virginia-class boats to drop out of the
shipbuilding plan, which is a real possibility.
Substantially mitigating the even bigger cruiser-destroyer
shortfall might require adding at least 10, and possibly closer
to 20, additional destroyers to the plan, and that assumes no
increase to the current force-level goal for cruisers and
destroyers to reflect the Navy's newly expanded missile defense
responsibilities.
Because of the pressures that the Ohio replacement program
could place on the shipbuilding budget, one option would be to
add at least some, if not most or all, of these additional
destroyers and attack boats to the shipbuilding plan in the
years prior to the Ohio replacement boats. If so, then the
question of whether to add these ships to the plan could become
a near-term issue for policymakers.
The alternative of extending the lives of existing
cruisers, destroyers and attack boats by 10 or 15 years beyond
their currently planned lives poses serious questions of
feasibility and cost-effectiveness, especially for the attack
boats. If this option were feasible, implementing it could
require increasing, perhaps starting right away, funding levels
for the maintenance of these ships to help ensure they will
remain in good enough shape to eventually have their lives
extended for another 10 or 15 years.
This additional maintenance funding would be on top of the
funding that the Navy has already programmed to help get these
ships out to the end of their currently planned lives. Because
this additional funding might need to start soon, it could
again pose a near-term issue for policymakers.
Implementing either of these options within the Navy's
currently planned top line would likely compel the Navy to
reduce other critical programs below desired levels. So the
question of what to do about these two projected shortfalls is
not only a potentially near-term issue for policymakers, but
one that could also raise fundamental questions for
policymakers about the value of naval forces in defending the
Nation's interests and the priority that naval forces should
receive in the allocation of overall DOD [Department of
Defense] funds.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify. I will be pleased to respond to
any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke can be found in the
Appendix on page ?.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Eric Labs, Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons,
Congressional Budget Office.
Mr. Labs.
STATEMENT OF ERIC LABS, SENIOR ANALYST FOR NAVAL FORCES AND
WEAPONS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
Mr. Labs. Mr. Chairman, Representative McIntyre, members of
the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss
the Navy's 2012 shipbuilding plan.
My written testimony, which I submit for the record,
focuses on the costs and force structure implications of the
Navy's fiscal year 2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. CBO cannot
yet provide a detailed analysis of the Navy's fiscal year 2012
10-year shipbuilding plan, as it was just released early last
week. However, because the observed changes between the two
plans are minor, I can still speak to the long-term
affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding program and some
specifics about the 2012 plan.
If the Navy receives the same amount of funding for ship
construction in the next 30 years that it has over the last 30
years, which is about $15 billion a year for all activities
related to ship construction, which means new builds, carrier
refuelings, and outfitting and postdelivery, it will not be
able to afford all of the 276 ships that are advertised in the
2011 shipbuilding plan.
CBO's analysis of the 2011 plan shows that the Navy would
need $19 billion a year in new ship construction alone and $21
billion a year for all necessary activities in the Navy's
shipbuilding accounts. Under its 2012 plan, the Navy plans to
buy 106 ships over the next 10 years, compared to 104 ships
under the same period under the 2011 plan.
The breakdown between combat ships and support ships is
essentially the same in the two plans. Both would buy 30
support ships between 2012 and 2021, although the composition
of those ships varies slightly. The 2012 plan would buy 76
combat ships versus 74 under the 2011 plan.
Over the next 5 years, the Navy plans to spend 9 percent
more in real terms on new ship construction compared to the
last 5 years. The Navy's estimates over the next 5 years,
however, do place them in line with the longer historical
average of about $15 billion a year in 2011 constant dollars.
CBO's preliminary analysis of the Navy's 2012 10-year
shipbuilding plan does not substantially change the assessment
that the Navy continues to have a long-term funding challenge,
particularly in the 2020s when the new class of ballistic
missile submarines are built.
Still, there are several reasons to believe that while the
overall costs of the Navy's shipbuilding plan are likely to be
somewhat lower over the 30-year period, they will be
substantially higher than the historical average.
The reasons why the costs might be somewhat lower include
the following: SSBN(X) cost-reduction efforts. The Navy has
announced that through various refinements to the preliminary
design of the SSBN(X), it has reduced estimated costs of those
ships by an average about $1 billion per boat. CBO has not yet
conducted its own analysis of those changes and their potential
impact on costs, but it is reasonable to conclude that CBO's
estimate for those ships could go down as well.
Second, the LCS competition and subsequent dual-award
contracts. The reduction in the average price of the LCS from
about $550 million in CBO's estimate of the Navy's 2011 plan
per ship to $450 million per ship under the Navy's dual-award
strategy for the ship's purchase from 2010 to 2016, if carried
forward beyond 2016, would reduce the overall cost of the
Navy's shipbuilding plan slightly over the next 30 years.
Third, projections of long-term ship inflation declined,
making ships in the far term less expensive than they had been
projected last year. As CBO reports have detailed for several
years, shipbuilding inflation has been substantially higher
than price inflation in the economy as a whole for quite some
time. However, projections of long-term Navy shipbuilding
inflation declined between the 2011 plan and the 2012 plan such
that if all other things remained equal, average annual
shipbuilding costs would be less by about $1 billion over the
long term. Nevertheless, even accounting for that change, that
would still place the Navy's funding requirements well above
the historical average.
Overall, one can expect the Navy's total requirements for
shipbuilding, new construction, carrier refueling and
outfitting costs are still likely to be in the range of $19 to
$20 billion a year.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a quick
observation about the overall number of ships in the Navy's
fleet. Echoing what Mr. O'Rourke said, under the 2012 plan, the
Navy's implied ship requirement of about 322 ships would be met
by 2020, but then fall back below that force level by the late
2020s. Significant shortfalls in the late 2020s and beyond in
the number of surface combatants, attack submarines and
amphibious ships would remain under the Navy's 2012
shipbuilding plan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any
questions the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Labs can be found in the
Appendix on page ?.]
Mr. Coffman. Thank you. Let me begin.
First of all, I think, Mr. O'Rourke, you mentioned the
service life extension program for some of these--I think you
were referring to cruisers and destroyers, a shortfall in
cruisers and destroyers--and you said that would have to go on
top of what is currently planned to be expended.
Can you give an idea, just any kind of rough estimate, on
the cost burden of doing a SLEP [Service Life Extension
Program] program?
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You are correct. I was
referring to the fact that you would have to put additional
maintenance funding on top of what the Navy has already put
into their budget to help ensure that those ships at least make
it out to the end of their currently planned lives. How much
more they would have to add, I don't know. It would depend in
part on the condition of the ships themselves over time and
also exactly how many extra years they wanted to add to the
lives of those ships.
What the Navy would need to do is come up with a new
integrated maintenance strategy that was designed in
anticipation of keeping a ship in service, a destroyer or an
older cruiser, for 40 or 45 years as opposed to some shorter
figure. And I don't know what the delta would be in terms of
the maintenance funding, but it would very possibly require the
addition of that funding on top of what the Navy has in its
budget already.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Labs, do you have any comment on using the
Service Life Extension Program in lieu of or extending out the
time in which we would have to build new ships, replacement for
replacement?
Mr. Labs. Well, I would agree with Mr. O'Rourke in that we
don't know exactly how much that would cost, and that would
indeed vary from ship to ship. Certain ships will be in better
material condition than other ships, and the level of
investment that would be required is going to vary, and not
only just on the maintenance side, but whether more updates to
the combat systems would be necessary to make sure that not
only the ships can serve out 40 or 45 years, but they are going
to be effective in a wartime environment out 40 or 45 years.
In terms of being able to meet the Navy's shipbuilding
goals, certainly maintaining existing ships in service longer
would be less expensive than buying new ships to replace them,
but then it becomes a question of what is the relative
effectiveness that you are buying for the amount of money that
you are spending, and that is something that the Navy would
have to assess.
Mr. O'Rourke. And it is also a less permanent solution. It
is essentially a way of kicking the can down the road another
10 or 15 years, but those ships, if they had their lives
extended, would still eventually retire, and the problem with
the cruiser-destroyer shortfall could recur at that point.
Mr. Coffman. Just a question about the LCS and how that--
the fact that we had sort of the two-track policy, that we had
competition between two variants of the LCS. But in doing so,
are we having two separate training programs to do that? And
from a career standpoint, in terms of training and the fact
that you can't necessarily cross-deck those personnel, although
maybe with additional training you can, to what extent is that
a problem, and is that configured in terms of the cost savings?
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. The Navy acknowledged in their testimony
last year in support of the dual-award plan that sticking with
the production of both designs would create this situation. The
Navy argued that they have had classes in the past of 12 ships,
and that at a minimum they would have at least 12 ships of each
design. They tended to argue that the costs that would be added
on to the Navy's budget for maintaining two logistics systems
and so on would be there, but that when calculated in net
present-value terms, that the figure would come to about 295
million additional dollars over the life cycle of the ships.
Mr. Coffman. Any comment on that?
Mr. Labs. No. I would have echoed the same statements from
the same facts from the Navy's testimony of last year. Let me
just sort of address the issue of cross-decking sort of the
personnel, if you will.
Yes, it makes that slightly more complicated to cross-deck
personnel from one type of LCS versus the other, but in my
judgment it wouldn't be that much different than a Flight I
destroyer versus a Flight IIA destroyer on an Arleigh Burke
class, or even when we used to have Spruances in the fleet, a
Spruance versus an Arleigh Burke. There are challenges there,
but they are challenges the Navy is well familiar with.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
Just some clarification. Mr. O'Rourke, you mentioned the
idea of adding destroyers and attack submarines to the
shipbuilding program to reduce the projected shortfalls in
these two categories of ships. How would those additional ships
be funded, given the constraints on future defense spending
that we are likely to be looking at?
Mr. O'Rourke. That is the broader issue that I mentioned
that I think would need to be confronted if you were to embark
upon that kind of plan. I think the reason why those ships
don't show in the 30-year plan right now is exactly because the
Navy is trying to show they are balancing their requirements
while fitting under a top line. So if you were to undertake a
project like this, it would, I think, very likely lead to a
broader debate about the value of naval forces in defending the
Nation's interests and what share of the DOD budget should go
to the Navy.
That is an argument that some observers have begun to
articulate in recent weeks and months, and it is something that
might be expanded on and pursued further as a part of or one
way of getting at this situation of what to do about these
shortfalls.
But my focus has been to at least highlight the existence
of these shortfalls, which have gone relatively unmentioned
even though they were present in the 30-year plan that was
submitted last year, and to highlight the fact that even though
they look like they are several years in the future, the
options for addressing them include things that may require us
to begin making decisions in the nearer term.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Dr. Labs, in your written testimony,
you state that CBO's estimate for required funding to reach the
313-ship minimum, the Navy will require approximately $3
billion more than what the Navy currently plans for. What is
the basis of your estimate, and, in your opinion, if the Navy
remains at its currently planned levels of funding, how many
ships do you believe the Navy will be short of its 313-ship
planned procurement?
Mr. Labs. Mr. McIntyre, CBO goes about estimating the cost
of the Navy's shipbuilding plan through a variety of factors.
We start off with sort of historical cost-to-weight
relationships to estimate each individual ship in the program,
and then we adjust that for the effects of learning. As you
build more ships, you learn how to build them more efficiently
and less expensively, hopefully. Also we adjust those estimates
by rate, how many ships are being built of the same type in the
same yard at the same time. The more you build, you can spread
overhead costs, and that would come down.
Then we also apply the effects of this as a growth factor
on the higher long-run shipbuilding inflation over the economy
as a whole. To my mind, that represents a real sort of cost to
the taxpayer that needs to be accounted for in the way you
project the long-term costs of a shipbuilding plan. And you are
right, our estimate as of right now is $3 billion more than
what the Navy is estimating.
So what force results from that, if the Navy is stuck with
the historical average of $15 billion, in other words they must
cut substantial numbers of ships out of their program, would
depend very much on the composition of those cuts. If they
choose to cut very expensive ships, you could end up having a
force not of 313 or 322, but maybe somewhere around the force
we have today of 280. If you cut more of a mix of less
expensive ships, it could range anywhere from 200 to 250 ships
in the fleet. It would depend very much on what whoever would
be the deciding authority, whether it would be the Congress or
the Navy, what they decide to remove from the shipbuilding plan
in order to bring that overall budgetary level over the next 30
years into sort of an historical average line.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke, and also Dr. Labs, for being here
today and for your contribution to keeping our Navy strong.
Let us see, the first question, Dr. Labs, I would like to
direct to you. Are there any maintenance or docking space
requirements that are unique to the aluminum-hull LCS, and, if
so, what are the cost and basing decisions, impacts rather, to
the Navy?
Mr. Labs. The aluminum-hulled ship is certainly one that
is--there are fewer maintenance yards, as I understand it from
briefings from the Navy, there are fewer yards on either coast
of the United States or even around the world that are capable
of performing maintenance on those types of ships. So it is not
that there aren't yards available, but there is going to be a
lot less of them. So there is going to be more challenges
involved on the part of the Navy that if a sudden breakdown
occurs, to have a system in place where the ship receives the
necessary maintenance that it would otherwise need to have. I
don't have an assessment of what the costs that would be
associated with that.
Mr. Rigell. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke, in your opening statement you mentioned that
the Service Life Extension option--and it is intriguing, being
able to extend the life of a ship by 10 to 15 years. And I know
this is an option that has been carefully examined and
considered by the Navy. And though it is very costly, it
doesn't seem that the essential design for hulls has changed
that radically. That is not like an airframe, for example.
So what price do we pay in terms of performance or
lethality of the ship being able to project power by more of a
comprehensive overhaul and extending the life by 10 to 15 years
rather than going with an all-new ship?
Mr. O'Rourke. One of the things that you pay for, one of
the downsides of this option, is that you are working with a
ship that has probably less growth margin remaining in it than
a brand new ship would, and consequently it is not just a
matter of examining the material condition of the ship and
making the ship mechanically able to operate, it is also a
matter, as Dr. Labs mentioned, of maintaining the mission
effectiveness of the ship and whether the ship has enough space
and weight and power and cooling and so on to support the kind
of modern combat systems that would keep it mission-effective
in the future threat environment.
Mr. Rigell. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Labs, you mentioned that you haven't done an analysis
yet of the revised Ohio estimates that the Navy just released.
When do you think that will be completed?
Mr. Labs. Well, I plan to request that information, sort of
get a detailed briefing from the Navy, and I hope that will
occur over the next--sometime that briefing would get scheduled
sometime over the next month. Typically those briefings occur
with both Mr. O'Rourke and myself. And then as a follow-on to
that, I will be doing an analysis of the Navy's then 2012 10-
year shipbuilding plan, and it would be incorporated into that
analysis sometime over the next few months.
Mr. Courtney. And I am just trying to remember what your
estimates were before this revision. As I recall, you were
still higher than the Navy in that instance as well?
Mr. Labs. That is right. Allow me to recap for a moment. In
the 2011 plan, the Navy had an average price of their 12
boomers [Ballistic Missile Submarines] at $7.2 billion, which
actually broke out to about $9 billion for the lead ship and
6.7- or so for the follow-on ships. Today what the Navy is
saying, they have actually--and CBO's numbers in comparison
were about 13 billion for the lead ship and 7 or so--7.8 or so
billion for the follow-on ships, with an average of sort of
8.2- for the entire class, 7.2- versus 8.2- for the entire
class.
Now, the Navy's estimate as of this year, what they have
been advertising so far, they said that the follow-on ships are
now 5.6 billion, at least they think they have gotten it down
to that point, although their lead ship did come up. Their lead
ship is now $11.6 billion because they have increased the
amount that was going to be allocated, sort of nonrecurring
detail design and engineering. So they have actually come
closer to the CBO estimate in the lead ship, and we have sort
of parted company, at least for now, on the follow-on ships.
Mr. Courtney. That is a pretty wide gap between what you
have always consistently projected, which, to your credit, has
always been consistent. Can you sort of explain where you guys
are so divergent?
Mrs. Labs. Well, in terms of the comparison between the
numbers under the 2011 plan, when they had sort of a classwide
average of 7.2- and we had a classwide average of 8.2-, our
methods were actually fairly similar, and really the difference
between us was sort of how we treated that long-run
shipbuilding inflation.
The Navy did not sort of account for--how should I put it--
they did not sort of attach an additional cost on their ships
in constant-dollar terms to account for that long-run inflation
the way I did. If I would factor that inflation issue out of my
methodology, our numbers would have been exactly the same, or
very close to being exactly the same.
Now that the Navy has sort of gone through and what they
have said is refined their preliminary design, they have done a
number of things to it, like going from a 20-tube submarine to
a 16-tube submarine, reducing the diameter of the tubes and
several other things, they have stated that they have managed
to reduce the costs of at least the follow-on ships somewhere
in the neighborhood of about $1 billion a boat.
What I don't know yet, and it could be that once I sort of
see how they have done that and understand those details far
better, it could be the CBO estimate could come down in a
similar fashion, or not. I just don't know enough of the
details to know whether that will be the case.
Mr. Courtney. And, Ron, your report again talks and the
chart shows what you are projecting out. If this CR somehow
ends up with a disaster scenario where we don't implement the
upgrade in terms of the Virginia class and also--well, we will
set the Ohio aside--but if we don't get that through this year,
that really just kind of creates--will that create a domino
effect in terms of what those numbers are going to look like
even before the shortfall that you were describing?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think it would add an extra challenge to
that situation, because the scenario of a year-long CR would
create complications for both the Virginia-class program and
the Ohio-class program, the Ohio replacement program.
In the Virginia class, a year-long CR scenario jeopardizes
the awarding of the second fiscal year 2011 boat, which in turn
jeopardizes the continuation of the fiscal year 2009 to 2013
multiyear procurement contract, which is a major source of cost
constraint on those boats. Those boats would be subject to
having price renegotiation, and the cost of those boats could
go up, which would undermine a lot of the savings that were to
have been achieved as a result of the multiyear plan.
The scenario of a year-long CR would also cause a problem
potentially in the Ohio replacement program because the amount
of R&D [Research & Development] funding requested for that
program in fiscal year 2011 was about 40 percent more than the
amount that was provided in fiscal year 2010.
So if R&D work on the Ohio replacement boat was funded in
fiscal year 2011 at fiscal year 2010 levels, it would probably
cause the Navy to postpone some of the work that had been
planned for fiscal year 2011 into a future year. That could set
back the development schedule for the Ohio replacement boat and
make it more difficult for the Navy to meet what the Navy says
is its very tight schedule for completing the development
boat--the development of that boat in time to support an fiscal
year 2019 lead ship procurement, which the Navy says is the
last year that you can think about procuring the lead boat
without causing at some point the boomer force to drop below 12
boats at some point in the future.
Mr. Courtney. Not good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Labs, Mr. O'Rourke, thank you so much for joining us
today, and thank you for your service to our Nation.
Dr. Labs, I want to begin with you. In your written
testimony, you talk about the CBO estimate for the Navy
shipbuilding plan at 313 ships, and you say that essentially it
is about $3 billion short of being able to meet that 313-ship
Navy.
In your opinion, where does that fall short as far as their
cost estimates, and where do we end up at the current level of
funding as far as total number of ships?
Mr. Labs. Mr. Wittman, in terms of where they fall short,
there is no one particular place. It is across most of the
shipbuilding programs. There is just in some cases very
incremental differences between this and in other cases larger
ones. The boomers being one example under that plan, there is
$1 billion worth of difference. In carriers, there is about $2
billion worth of difference per carrier, but there are only
half a dozen carriers in the plan.
There were other programs that we were very similar.
Virginia-class program costs estimates, and CBO's and the
Navy's are virtually identical now, so it just depends. So it
all kind of accumulates over a 30-year period.
If the Navy is stuck with sort of the $15-billion-a-year
sort of current level of shipbuilding, as I mentioned earlier,
how that would fall out in terms of the long-term inventory of
the fleet by 2030, 2040 would depend very much on where cuts
would be made. Would you be making it in very expensive ships,
would you be making it in less expensive ships, or some mix of
the two?
Obviously if you cut out a lot of the cheap stuff, you
could have the Navy that falls to 200 ships. If you cut an
aircraft carrier and maybe a couple of ballistic missile
submarines, you save a lot of money in a big way, so you don't
cut nearly as many ships from the inventory. So it would
depend. The range is a considerable one, depending on what
decisions are made.
Mr. Wittman. But you also stated that the plan frontloads
the less expensive ships and backloads the more expensive
ships. So under that scenario would you say the way it is
currently planned now that that would have any necessary
effects as far as what would actually be built according to the
plan?
Mr. Labs. Because of that frontloading, one could certainly
surmise that when the boomers start being acquired in the
2020s, and that is where your real funding crunch hits, is that
you are more likely going to be forced to cut more expensive
ships from the plan, and that means destroyers and attack
submarines most likely, simply because that is where the money
is in that time period.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. O'Rourke, under the current scenario,
there are some changes going on in the shipbuilding industry.
You see what is happening with the Northrop Grumman yards and
some of the uncertainties that are going on there.
Can you give us your estimate based on this current change
scenario that we are seeing with our yards, especially there at
Northrop Grumman, what effect would that have on the Navy's
shipbuilding plan and their capability to carry out the
shipbuilding plan?
Mr. O'Rourke. In terms of assessing possible execution
risks for the Navy's shipbuilding plan, it is worth noting as a
starting point that the yards in question that are currently
owned by Northrop build many of the large and complex ships for
the Navy, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers and
amphibious ships. So there are a number of programs whose
execution is something that you would want to watch as this
divestiture occurs.
The Navy's interests in what the new entity turns out to
be, I think, would be principally, although not exclusively,
twofold. First, I think they would want to ensure that the new
entity has the managerial skills that are necessary to properly
run these yards, and especially the nuclear shipbuilding
activities at Newport News, over which the Navy, I think, has a
particularly strong interest in making sure are run without
problem. And to the extent that the Navy is satisfied with the
current management team at these yards, the new entity can then
seek to satisfy the Navy on those grounds by showing that these
people will be transferred over to the new entity.
The Navy, I think, also will have an interest in the
financial strength of the new entity to make sure that it can
absorb unforeseen losses that might occur on its shipbuilding
program, and also have enough money to make the kinds of
investments in workforce and capital plant that the entity
would want to make to remain competitive against General
Dynamics' yards. So the Navy will be looking at the financial
strength of the entity in that connection as well.
Issues that in the press have been reported to be at issue
as among the things that could affect the financial strength of
the new entity include the question of pension costs and the
question of possible cleanup costs at Avondale, should Avondale
cease operations as an industrial facility entirely. If the new
yard is encumbered in terms of managerial skills or financial
strength, it could increase execution risks for the various
kinds of ships that are built at these yards.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Rourke, you had mentioned that I guess it is the 2006
313-ship Navy plan is, for using rough language, no longer the
valid figure that is being talked about; that the Navy is going
to revisit that and come back with an adjusted number, which I
think you mention is probably in the 320-321 ship range.
Now, is that something that you foresee you estimate, or is
that something you are hearing that is the direction the Navy
is going?
Mr. O'Rourke. It is what I am hearing. The Navy has
actually stated that publicly in some of their testimony this
year, and they have also communicated that in briefings, that
they do expect to be coming forward relatively soon--although
exactly what that means, I don't know--with a new replacement
plan. But I do think from the standpoint of ensuring the
effectiveness of congressional oversight of Navy shipbuilding,
it would facilitate that oversight to have an updated plan that
has a fully accurate set of numbers against which to measure
the Navy's proposed programs.
Mr. Critz. Okay. And, Dr. Labs, you had mentioned that we
are about $3 billion short a year, and I am trying to figure
this out. I am a little confused, because obviously the
shipbuilding plan that we have seen ranges from 313 down to
about 280-285; that there are these hills and valleys.
Now, the $3 billion short, will that, in your estimation,
hit the 285 number, or does that get to the 313-ship level?
Mr. Labs. The $3 billion shortfall is in reference to what
I stated in my written testimony. It is against what I call the
implied requirement that the Navy has not officially signed up
to, but they have talked about it in other things, of around
322-323 ships. So it is against that requirement.
Mr. Critz. Now, the 320-322 ship, there is obviously some
issues that it seems that the Navy is a little shy on
amphibious ships. Does this extra eight to nine ships address
the amphibious issues?
Mr. O'Rourke. In general, no. The changes in the plan that
Eric and I have been tracking over the last 5 years do not
contemplate moving beyond the 33 ships, although it did move it
from 31 up to 33. But if you have been briefed on this higher
38 number, Eric and I have not seen, I don't think, any
evidence to show that a new set of numbers will necessarily go
to 38. I think it is going to stay at 33.
Mr. Labs. If you look under the 2011 plan, which is the
last 30-year plan that we had, the Navy reaches 33 amphibious
ships about sort of midway in the period for about 8 or 9
years, as I recall, and then it falls below that thereafter. It
is important to note that between the 2009 and 2011
shipbuilding plans, the Navy actually reduced the number of
ships they were purchasing. Their implied requirement went up
to 322 or so, but the number of ships that they were going to
purchase to try to meet that requirement went down. So as I
said earlier, after around the midpart of the period, you fall
below the requirement, and you don't return to it beyond 2040.
Mr. Critz. Is it in your estimation that the Navy is
looking at it in financial terms or in actual needs of the
Navy? Are they trying to, in essence, predict what the Congress
will be able to appropriate and then trying to fit their number
within that, or is this actually a reevaluation of the true
needs of our Navy?
Mr. Labs. It is hard for me to sort of know what is the
motivation of the Navy on that part. Certainly Navy officials
have stated in terms of discussing at least the 2011 plan that
they were mindful of trying to put together what they called an
affordable shipbuilding plan, and they also have begun to
discuss the issue of sort of how do you pay for the ballistic
missile submarine in the 2020s when there will be severe
pressure on the Navy's shipbuilding budget. At the same time,
they have stated this implied requirement of 322 ships, you
know, 313 plus some additional extra. So how they are balancing
those two, I can't tell you for sure.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
While we are on the shipbuilding budget, I would like to
just turn to the Navy's decision to restart the DGG-51 [Arleigh
Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyer] line versus purchasing
more of the DDG-1000s [Zumwalt-class destroyers]. The Navy
obviously is basing its decision on a set of assumptions that
they can restart the DDG-51 line as well as incorporate all of
the enhanced capabilities it is going to need versus going with
more of the 1000s.
Can you give us your assessment of how that decision is
playing out, and what the cost assumptions are in terms of the
restart of the line, and are those figures on target?
Mr. O'Rourke. When the Navy first announced their desire to
do this in July of 2008, they put together--they put forward a
few arguments, and these arguments have evolved a little bit
over the 2 or 3 years that have elapsed since then.
But essentially if I were to take what the Navy has said
and boil it down, I would say that what the Navy decided to do
was to move to a destroyer procurement plan that, in their
view, better met future mission emphases within the amount of
money they had available, while also maximizing the number of
hulls that they could get for that money.
Now, in terms of how that question is playing out, that is
going to depend on what the construction cost turns out to be
for these restart DDG-51s, and the higher that cost turns out
to be, then I think the more pressure the Navy might come under
in terms of defending that decision. But the way the Navy
looked at it at the time and estimated the costs of restarting
the 51 versus continuing the 1000 and modifying the 1000 into a
design that would more closely meet these changed mission
needs, using the numbers they had at the time, that is what led
them into that decision. But we don't have a lot of evidence
yet on what the restart of 51s will actually cost to build,
because we are just getting into that now.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. In terms of the Navy being able to
incorporate--I should say the 51 line being able to incorporate
all the enhanced capabilities it is going to need to meet, for
example, missile defense needs, is that going to be an
effective decision? I guess maybe I will point to the fact that
the Navy plans, obviously, to replace its Ticonderoga-class
cruisers with the DDG-51 lines modified to the Flight III
configuration. In order to incorporate the larger, more
powerful radar, the Navy will have to increase the amount of
power and cooling to the radar.
My question on this particular thing is what is your
assessment of risk to the Navy being able to accommodate the
new radar on Flight III ships, and what alternative do you see
as options for the Navy meeting missile defense requirements if
the Navy is unable to do so?
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes, I understand what you mean now. You are
referring to the Flight III ships that are scheduled to go into
procurement starting in fiscal year 2016. There are a few risks
that the Navy faces and which they have to manage and overcome.
One is they need to develop the air and missile defense radar
on a schedule that would be congruent with the first of these
ships being procured in fiscal year 2016. There have been some
observers who have expressed concerns about the ability of the
radar to be developed on a schedule sufficient for that.
If the radar turns out to take longer to develop than what
the Navy anticipates, the Navy can manage that risk by simply
putting off the start of Flight III procurement into a future
year and continuing to procure Flight IIA DDG-51s.
There is a second challenge that the Navy faces, which is
can they put the radar and the other new or revised equipment
into the existing DDG-51 hull, including the power-generation
and cooling equipment that you mentioned, without lengthening
the hull? The early indications that I get from the Navy is
they think they can do that. If that does not turn out to be
possible, and they have to lengthen the hull and turn it into a
slightly longer ship, that could result in a design that is
more expensive than what the Navy might be anticipating.
The third risk concerns the capabilities that you wind up
with once you develop this ship and begin procuring it and
introducing it into the fleet, and the aggregate capability
that the Navy has as a result for air and missile defense
operations. The Navy made a decision to go ahead with the
Flight III ship instead of the CG(X) [Next-Generation] cruiser,
reportedly in part because they concluded that they would be
able in the future to augment the data collected by the ship's
radar with data collected by off-board sensors.
Now, if it turns out, for example, that these off-board
sensors are not as capable as what the Navy anticipated when
they originally made their decision, then it would raise the
question of what your other options might be to augment the
data on the Flight III destroyer with data collected by certain
other now off-board sensors.
One option for that would be to build an adjunct radar
ship, which is a ship in auxiliary with a very large and
powerful radar on it, somewhat similar perhaps to the Cobra
Judy replacement ship, and some small number of these adjunct
radar ships might be put into the shipbuilding plan and added
to the fleet to make up for any deficiency that might emerge in
the amount of off-board data that is available to be merged
with the data collected by the Flight III destroyer's own
radar.
Two other things to look for in the Flight III destroyer is
whether the Navy intends to design that ship to support an
electromagnetic rail gun, because the Navy has recently stated
that that weapon has the potential for air and missile defense
operations, not just for naval surface fire support, and
whether the Flight III destroyer will be designed to support a
higher-power, solid-state laser, like a solid-state laser with
a power of 200 to 300 kilowatts. A laser of that strength could
have air defense applications and could help reverse the cost-
exchange ratio that the Navy now faces in terms of trying to
shoot down targets at an affordable cost.
So these are issues that are potential matters of oversight
concern for the subcommittee as the Navy begins to get into the
design of the Flight III destroyer, and it is my understanding
from the Navy that they are going to begin preliminary design
work on the Flight III destroyer during fiscal year 2012.
Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired. Thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Coffman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, and thank you all for being here. I
am sorry that I wasn't here earlier.
I wanted to go back to the question of how many ships are
being built and when we can reach the desired numbers. I know
you have had concerns for some time that the Navy perhaps was
underestimating the cost of those ships.
Could you expound a little bit more on what you think
really ends up being the problem? Is it a question of our
failure to rein in spending in the shipbuilding accounts per
se, that it is a difficult thing to do? What role does the
Congress play?
I know that in many cases there is a real desire to have
some of the shipbuilding contracts more front-loaded so there
is consistency in terms of work being done in a timely fashion.
What are some of the things that you believe are really the
issue here? If we are taking so much time, I think, to get to
where we want to go, it seems that other priorities that we
might have that come along really get put on the back burner in
a fashion that might not be helpful. I am trying to figure out
how we deal with that question.
Mr. Labs. In terms of what is sort of at the root cause of
why there are differences between the Navy's cost of ships and
sort of CBO's, or why ships are so expensive--if I understand,
that is sort of the core of your question--I think there are a
myriad of factors that are going into this.
For one thing is that the shipbuilding industry itself is
proving to be--it is an expensive industry. Labor and materials
cost a lot more, as we have seen in the economy as a whole, so
that adds to the cost of the ships. The rates at which we buy
these ships are relatively small, and that is going to force
more overhead costs in the yard into those ships.
The desire for a high degree of requirements on the ships,
do we make them more and more capable, has been driving up the
cost of the ships. Indeed, that was partly what motivated the
rise of the LCS program was the desire to find a ship that was
less expensive and more affordable that the Navy could buy in
numbers to do a lot of the sort of the day-to-day-routine type
of operations, so you are not sending a destroyer to chase down
a drug runner or something like that.
So there is a whole host of issues that sort of go into
that. I personally can't sort of pinpoint necessarily one or
two that is doing it. I would certainly not----
Mrs. Davis. I don't expect a silver bullet. I am just
trying to make sure that we are asking the right questions in
some cases in terms of oversight, and whether there is just a
real disconnect there in terms of what is really needed for the
job and what perhaps is being put into the budgets.
I think the other thing, just to follow up really quickly,
the other issue really is one of the line items that a lot of
the procurement of the Navy ships require, and I think the
issue of flexibility, while we are not able to move some of
that funding as well, does that, in fact, contribute to this
problem, or is it part of the problem that we are not able to
do that in as timely a fashion perhaps as we should?
Mr. O'Rourke. Well, that is a problem clearly under the
scenario of a year-long CR, because funding for shipbuilding,
unlike funding that is appropriated for other defense
appropriation accounts, is not funded at the full-account or
lump-sum level. It is funded at the line-item level, and
therefore it is managed by the Navy at that level.
And as the Navy has pointed out, even though the total
shipbuilding request for fiscal year 2011 was only about $1.9
billion higher than the total amount provided in fiscal year
2010, the funding is misaligned at the line-item level if you
were to try to meet the specific needs of shipbuilding programs
in fiscal year 2011. So for fiscal year 2011 programs that
would require a funding increase over the fiscal year 2010
level, the shortfall or the misalignment, if you will, of these
funds totals about $5.6 billion.
So whether it is done as a special provision in the CR or
through some freestanding piece of legislation, the Navy would
need transfer authority so that it could move this funding in a
way that would better align the amount of fiscal year 2010
funding with the specific line item needs of fiscal year 2011
shipbuilding programs. And they would also need authority for
quantity increases as well. This is sometimes referred to as
the new start authority, but you can also just call it
authority for a quantity increase.
Mrs. Davis. You would suggest trying to figure out a way to
change this?
Mr. O'Rourke. Whether it is done as a part of a year-long
CR or through some other legislative vehicle, the Navy has made
it clear that these are the two forms of authority that would
go a long way, although not entirely, but a long way toward
mitigating the challenges they would face in executing their
fiscal year 2011 shipbuilding programs.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. [Presiding.] Thank you.
It is a pleasure to have you back again, Mr. O'Rourke. You
did a wonderful job last hearing. This was a month ago or so.
Very good.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Rourke, time ran out before I was able to get to a
follow-up part of our discussion. In all the things that you
laid out in terms of analysis of alternatives that the Navy is
going to have to go through, being able to incorporate these
new enhanced capabilities, particularly the amount of power and
cooling on the radar, I wanted to know, in your estimation, can
all of these enhanced capabilities be easily added to,
incorporated by the DDG-1000 versus the 51?
Mr. O'Rourke. The most amount of work I think that would be
needed, or the biggest single piece of work I think that would
be needed to modify the DDG-1000 to better meet these changed
mission emphases that the Navy has in mind would be to give the
DDG-1000 a BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability. And to
do that, they would need to do a lot of code writing to put a
new module into the ship's computer programming for BMD
operations. And they might also need to make changes to the
radar, especially because they have taken away one part of the
dual-band radar that the ship was supposed to carry, and they
would need to do some rewiring in the VLS [Vertical Launch
System] cells on the ship.
But it would be especially the modifications to the combat
system and to the computer program, to include a module that is
not there right now for doing BMD operations that might be the
single largest change, that the Navy would have to contemplate
making to that ship. There would be other changes as well.
The baseline question is could that ship be modified into a
design that would meet the Navy's newly changed areas of
mission emphasis, and the answer is yes, and there would be a
certain cost for doing that. The Navy reviewed those costs as
part of the destroyer hull radar study. They briefed Eric and I
on that. It was the Navy's conclusion that they preferred to do
this through the DDG-51 line rather than modifying a 1000.
Mr. Langevin. But there would be less physical
modifications that would need to be made to the 1000 versus
physical design changes that would need to be made to the 51 to
do the same mission?
Mr. O'Rourke. I guess I would answer by saying that the
1000 has a lot more growth margin on it than the 51 hull does
at this point, because the growth margin on the 151 hull is
already partially consumed.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
I am sorry I am a little bit late getting here. I was just
up at the Budget Committee, and they are thinking of all kinds
of dastardly things to do to the defense budget, so we were
doing some battle up there.
I think because of the fact we have another set of
witnesses coming, I am going to pass up the questions. I have
the luxury of being able to ask a lot of these questions to
staff and to those of you simply when I need them. So I am just
going to pass that up and thank you all for joining us and for
all the good work that you do.
Let us go ahead and take a 2-minute recess, and we will
send the next panel up.
[Recess.]
Mr. Akin. The committee will come back to order. And we are
going to proceed immediately to panel two. I am going to
dispense with any comments.
Sean, do you want to go first, or are you going to have
some of your witnesses? Why don't you choose whoever wants to
go first and proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY
VADM TERRY BLAKE, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR
INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES; AND LT. GEN. GEORGE
FLYNN, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today with Vice Admiral Blake and Lieutenant
General Flynn to discuss Navy shipbuilding. And thank you, of
course, for your steadfast support to our sailors and marines
and your commitment.
I have an opening statement for the combined team here. I
would propose to submit a longer statement for the record and
go to our remarks.
Mr. Akin. That will be fine. Submit it for the record, and
then go ahead with your opening. Without objection.
Secretary Stackley. Today's Navy is a battle force of 288
ships, as many as half of which are under way on any given day,
providing presence and maintaining readiness to respond to
crisis or conflict wherever our interests are challenged.
Our Navy's ability to reliably meet the demands that come
with global presence and readiness rely upon three enduring
qualities: The size of the force measured in numbers of ships
and aircraft; the capabilities designed and built into these
ships and aircraft; and the skill, dedication, and
resourcefulness of our sailors and marines who put to sea in
these ships and aircraft.
The Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps have defined the force necessary to meet our
Naval requirements in what has been referred to as the 313-ship
Navy. In fact, the CNO has emphasized that 313 ships is the
floor. So to this end, the fiscal year 2012 budget request
includes funding for 10 ships.
Equally important, the shipbuilding program includes 55
ships to be constructed over the 5 years of the 2012 Future
Years Defense Plan, an increase of 5 ships over the plan of a
year ago. This increase reflects a priority placed on building
the force called for by the 313-ship plan, and reflects efforts
to improve affordability within our shipbuilding program,
efforts which must be sustained and which must prove effective
if we are to succeed in recapitalizing ship classes which were
constructed during the build-up of the 600-ship Navy.
Our budget request supports the Navy's build plans to
deliver a new carrier every 5 years, while also refueling the
Nimitz class, sustaining an 11-carrier force from the
commissioning of CVN-78 [USS Gerald R. Ford] through to 2041.
We continue with Virginia-class fast-attack submarine
procurement at two boats per year. Sustaining this build rate
is essential to recapitalization of our submarine force,
essential to affordability on the program, and essential to
ramping up the critical skills of our submarine industrial base
as we approach construction of our next-fleet ballistic missile
submarine.
We sustained DDG-51 production, which adds both capability
and capacity to our sea-based missile defense. We have been
able to increase our plan for DDG-51 construction with the
addition of a 2014 destroyer, which, with a planned proposal
for a multiyear procurement in 2013, will leverage the
stability of this mature production program, improve build
rates for our two combatant shipbuilders, and improve
affordability.
The Aegis modernization efforts are equally critical to
rapidly increasing capacity in missile defense, starting to
increase the number of missile defense platforms from 21 today
to 41, 36 ready for tasking by the end of the FYDP [Future
Years Defense Program], while also improving their material
condition to meet readiness demands in the second half of their
service lives.
With the strong support of this subcommittee, we are
executing the dual-award strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship,
increasing our build rate to four ships per year in 2012.
Efforts to stabilize design, improve production planning,
invest in shipbuilder improvements, and leverage long-term
vendor agreements, all within the framework of a competitive
fixed-price contract, have returned this program to the level
of affordability necessary for the Navy to move forward with
construction at efficient rates in support of the 55-ship LCS
requirement.
We increase our amphibious lift capability with the
procurement of the 11th LPD-17 [San Antonio-Class Landing
Platform Dock] class ship, and are extending service of the USS
Peleliu to maintain nine operationally available large-deck
amphibious ships, while awaiting fleet introduction of the lead
ship of the America class, LHA-6.
We are also increasing our logistics lift capability with
the procurement of second of three Mobile Landing Platform
class ships, or MLPs, and a joint high-speed vessel. With the
2012 budget request, the Navy has effectively accelerated the
MLP program to one ship per year, which should significantly
approve affordability for this class while also directly
addressing the workload valley confronting the shipbuilder.
In the second half of this decade, we will need to proceed
with recapitalization of three major ship programs. As
announced last fall, we are accelerating introduction of our
next fleet oiler with procurement of the T-AO(X) [Next-
Generation, Double-Hulled Fleet Oiler] beginning in 2014. T-
AO(X) will bring modern commercial design to our refueling-at-
sea capabilities, while also providing critical stability to an
important sector of our industrial base.
We plan to commence procurement of the replacement for the
LSD-41 [Whidbey Island-Class Dock Landing Ship] class
amphibious ships in 2017, following definition of lift
requirements for this new ship class.
Most significantly, we will procure the lead ship of the
Ohio-class replacement in 2019. It has been a quarter century
since completing a higher class construction, and it is vital
that we sustain development activities for the next ballistic
missile submarine sufficient lead times to ensure our ability
to produce this highly complex, uniquely capable ship on
schedule.
It is equally vital that we address cost-risk on this
program through every stage of its development, or we place
other ship programs at risk. To this end we have carefully
defined the capabilities necessary to ensure the ship's
abilities to meet its requirements, and we have embarked on a
focused design for affordability effort to capitalize on
lessons learned of the Virginia program at a much earlier stage
in the Ohio replacement program.
The Navy shipbuilding program outlines the challenges we
confront today and for the long term in meeting our Navy's
force structure requirements. In the most pragmatic terms, and
balancing requirements of risk and realistic budgets,
affordability controls our numbers. So to this end we are
focusing on bringing stability to the shipbuilding program,
finding the affordable 80 percent solution when 80 percent
meets the need. We are strengthening our acquisition workforce,
increasing not just our numbers, but our core competency in
critical skills.
We are increasing emphasis and fidelity on cost estimates
in our requirements definition process to better inform
critical decisions at the front end to avoid breakage on the
back end. We are continuing to improve our ability to
affordably deliver combat capability to the fleet through open
architecture. We are clamping down on contract design changes,
and we are placing greater emphasis on competition and fixed-
price contracts. The benefits of competition are compelling in
every example.
Our goals for modernizing today's force and recapitalizing
the fleet affordably cannot be accomplished without strong
performance by our industry partners, and so we are working to
benchmark performance, to identify where improvements are
necessary, to provide proper incentives for capital investments
where warranted, and to reward sustained strong performance
with favorable terms and conditions.
Now, bringing stability to the shipbuilding program also
relies on stable budgets. So as we work with Congress on our
2012 budget request, it is important to emphasize that there is
an underlying assumption that the ships in our 2011 budget
request will be fully funded. While executing our shipbuilding
plan for 2011, we are making prudent decisions to mitigate the
impacts of operating under a continuing resolution; however, we
are rapidly approaching decision points where, absent necessary
funding and new start appropriations, we will run out of line
and need to pull back sharply on key programs.
Specifically, 2011 is the first year we increase our build
rate for Virginia to two boats per year. Likewise, we requested
an increase to construct two Arleigh Burke destroyers in 2011.
And the Mobile Landing Platform and LHA-7 Amphibious Assault
Ship are each a new start in 2011. As well, funding limitations
on development of the Ohio replacement and CVN-78 class
construction place those programs' schedules at risk. Virtually
every shipbuilding program and every shipbuilder is affected by
the uncertainty of our top line and the absence of a line-item
appropriation.
In sum, the Department is committed to building the fleet
required to support the National Defense Strategy, to which the
fiscal year 2012 budget request addresses near-term capability
needs, while also laying the foundation for longer-term
requirements. Ultimately we recognize that, as we balance
requirements, affordability, and industrial-based
considerations, it is vital that we, Navy and industry, improve
affordability within our programs in order to build the 313-
ship Navy needed by the future force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today, and we look forward to answering your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
Admiral Blake, and General Flynn can be found in the Appendix
on page ?.]
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
First of all, just in terms of the problems worked by the
continuing resolution, a number of us on this committee have
been working to see what we can do, as we talked about, and I
think there will be continued support to try to provide you
with the new starts and things that are necessary to keep
things running at least in a somewhat orderly fashion. So we
will continue to work on that, and that we will have to do off
line, I suppose, as different things develop and depending how
negotiations work out. But we are aware of those problems. And
particularly the problem that seems to be affecting
shipbuilding and the new starts and all is absolutely critical,
and I think there is at least some level of good support
particularly in the Armed Services Committee overall. And I
know Buck is working on that as well.
The second thing, I was just curious about one of the
things we have been paying attention to is the EMALS system on
new carrier, and that has to be built into the hull and
everything. And I gather the timeline on that is pretty tight.
How is that going, and do you see any problems with that or
not?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We have been managing EMALS
to the smallest detail. We were very concerned, about 2 years
ago, that the program was not on track. Basically we have
replaced the management team as well as ensure that the program
is properly funded both to complete its development and also to
support the in-yard need dates for the CVN-78.
Today we are at a point in system development that we have
turned over to the shipyard what is referred to as the Green
Book, which takes all the testing that has been conducted up at
Lakehurst, where we have a full-scale model in the ground that
we have used to launch aircraft. So we have developed the test
requirements, turned over that Green Book to Newport News on
schedule so that they can continue to build the CVN-78 to
support the test program.
On the production side, we are carefully watching each of
the components that need to be delivered to Newport News. We
have 2 in particular, 2 motor-generator sets out of 12 that
have very limited float on the in-yard need date, but we don't
see difficulties right now in terms of meeting that. And all
the other components have float on the order of 4 to 6 months.
So tight, yes; closely managed, yes. Do I think the risk is
acceptable? Absolutely. We have yet to complete the SDD [System
Design and Development] testing. As I described, we had
launched aircraft off the Lakehurst system in December to
really do--stress it and to drive learning early on. And coming
out of that, in fact, we have uncovered some dynamics
associated between the system and the aircraft's performance
that we have taken a pause to work more on the software side of
correcting that issue.
Mr. Akin. Software, in order to change the amount of force
relative to distance that the system develops?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir. What is beautiful about EMALS
is it is very scalable in terms of you dial in the load that
you are putting on it and what you want for speed at the end of
the runway, and EMALS will do the rest.
What we discovered in moving away from a dead load to an F/
A-18 is EMALS is a long--it is a number of linear motors that
are in series. And in the hand-off from linear motor to linear
motor, as the aircraft is accelerating, there is a slight gap,
and that can be tuned in terms of the way you ramp up the load
and then the way you drop it off to minimize that gap so it is
not perceptible to the pilot.
So that is an example of what we were not able to pick up
in dead load testing, but you put a pilot on an aircraft, and
that is the report that we received back. And so we dived into
that to figure out what is the best way to mitigate that so
that it is not a problem.
So the bottom line is the test program is, frankly, in good
shape. It is a fairly exhaustive test program. We did take a
pause, because we did not, while we were working on these
changes or corrections coming out of the live aircraft testing,
we did not want to have a standing army on the test side that
was performing inefficiently. So we took a pause. We are coming
back with corrections and picking back up the system functional
demonstration this month.
Mr. Akin. Sounds good.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Stackley and the witnesses, for
being here today.
Secretary Stackley, I want to also particularly applaud the
work that you have done with this CR crisis, really, in terms
of these new start programs. Obviously, the Block III contract
for Virginia class was supposed to have been funded at the end
of January, and you worked with EB [Electric Boat] and Northrop
Grumman to sort of, again, extend that requirement, which the
clock is still ticking, obviously.
You know, your testimony over the years here in terms of
the Presidential helicopter and now this issue, I mean, again,
I think a lot of us really appreciate how sort of level-headed
and unflappable you usually are with a lot of these problems.
Your language that you just used, however, a few moments ago,
saying that if this CR goes out through the rest of this year,
that you will have to, quote, pull back sharply from the new
starts, which, I mean, that--again, given your, again, approach
to things, I mean, can you describe what that means in a little
more detail? Really, at some point this is going to result in
shipyards having to pull back sharply in terms of their
workforce and obviously pull back sharply in terms of our fleet
growth.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me describe a couple of
things.
First, the effort to minimize the impact of the CR is a
collective effort between the Navy and industry, and, frankly,
dialogue with Congress in particular areas.
Some of the challenges that we have in 2011, first, we do
have new starts that bind us. Second, as you all are aware, we
are increasing our investment in shipbuilding. So in fact, the
2011 shipbuilding account is above our 2010 numbers. So when we
are executing at 2010 levels, then we don't have enough head
room or top line to support our 2011 requirements. So we need
both the top line amount as well as the authorities to go with
the new starts.
Now, in terms of contract execution and efficiency,
frankly, what I focus on is the start fab [start of
fabrication] date program by program, because if you line
everything up to support the start fab date, then you will
minimize any cost impacts, so neither the government nor
industry has a real issue. So where we have things like
advanced procurement or some amount of funding that allows us
to proceed with planning and ordering material to support start
fab and construction, then we are okay. Where we start to run
into trouble is when we come up to that start fab date, and if
we don't have full funding then you have some significant
impacts.
And there are a number of programs where we are challenged
right now. Mobile Landing Platform is the first one that comes
to mind. We had advanced procurement in 2010, so we have to
expend that, and we are doing it smartly, but we are going to
come up to a point where we don't have any further advanced
procurement funding, and now we have got a bridge to cross.
In the case of the Virginia, the start fab, we have the
first Virginia under contract. The start fab for the second
Virginia in 2011 is actually in the October timeframe. So it is
perilously close, and we have to, like I say, manage the
planning and material support to ensure we don't miss that
start fab date, or there will be impacts to construction and
impacts to the workforce.
So program by program, you go down the line. And if you
look at where you need to start fab, and if you have sufficient
funding to support that in the near term, then we are pressing
on. But, ultimately, we need both authorities in that
increasing the top line that goes with our 2011 request.
Mr. Courtney. As the chairman said, all of us are doing
what we can to try and avoid that at all cost.
Ron O'Rourke and Dr. Labs testified a short time ago about
the out-year shortfalls, even if we are hitting all cylinders
here, in terms of the increase in shipbuilding. And in
particular they talked about the fact that in 2024, Admiral,
the submarine fleet is going to fall below that 48-ship sort of
target that the Navy has repeatedly said is needed for mission
requirements. One issue which was pointed out with the earlier
panel was the 2018 issue of whether we buy one or two
submarines. I just wonder if you can comment in terms of what
benefit that would have if we were able to make it to two in
terms of that shortfall.
Admiral Blake. Well, if you are able to make it to two, you
would, of course, mitigate the situation to some degree because
you would be able to bring that boat on line when the shortfall
starts.
But I think if you take it in the larger context, the
challenge you have with the SCN [Shipbuilding & Conversion,
Navy] account in particular with buying that second boat is you
have to, if you will, come up with around $1 billion in the
years preceding the buy, in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, in
order to get economic order quantity as well as your advanced
procurement. And then you would have to come up with the
dollars in 2018 in order to be able to buy that boat. And what
really complicates it is that fact that you have got the
SSBN(X), which we are putting the R&D into for our strategic
forces, competing at that time. And, of course, as you are well
aware, we have brought that number in within our top line as we
were directed to do last year.
So when you look at it from that perspective, just from the
submarines alone, not just to take it in isolation, but then
you have also got the balance, because we have also got issues,
as you are well aware, with surface combatants both and as well
as our amphib [amphibious warfare] force. So when you take it
in that context, it is not an easy--you can't just take the
issue in isolation. You have got to take it across the entire
portfolio and then deal with it.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, this is to the Secretary. It is our
understanding that the Department of the Navy officials agree
that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully meet the
Marine Corps' two Marine Expeditionary Brigade amphibious
echelon lift requirement. Such a force would include 17
amphibious ships for each Marine Expeditionary Brigade plus
four additional ships to account for 10 percent to 50 percent
of the amphibious ships force being in overhaul at any given
time.
What risk is associated with maintaining the Navy's current
plan of a 33-ship amphibious force?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start by describing,
the 38-ship number has been an enduring requirement, and today
we are at 30. So the determination has been that 33 ships would
meet the requirement with acceptable risk. What we are
intending to do inside of the 313-ship plan and by the end of
this FYDP, if you look at the details inside the FYDP, is to
get back up to a 33-ship amphibious force that is made up of
notionally 11 big-deck amphibs, 11 LPD-17 class ships, and then
11 LSD-41, 49, or their replacements.
Where the risk comes in, and I am probably going to turn
this over to General Flynn to discuss the risk piece, is
associated with how much of the lift requirement you take to
the fight with you. So if you are dealing with a 2-MEB [Marine
Expeditionary Brigade] assault, if you have 30 amphibs that are
operationally available, you are not going to be able to bring
the full table of equipment associated with 2-MEB. And what the
Marine Corps looks at is some of the support elements coming in
at follow-on echelon.
Mr. Coffman. General Flynn.
General Flynn. Yes, sir. As Mr. Stackley said, the 38 ships
would give you 17 ships per brigade. And we believe that we
could effectively--because of the fiscal constraints we have,
we could do the assault echelon and load it out on 15 ships.
The other key part of that is it is not just for the major
contingency operation. It is also, we believe with 33 ships,
with an acceptable degree of risk, you can meet the day-to-day
requirements that we are seeing in regards to presence and
crisis response. But if you don't have that on the day-to-day
operations, what you run into is you run into challenges that--
to ensure that you have sufficient dwell time for the crews,
time for maintenance, and then your ability to meet emergent
requirements. Because right now what we are seeing, based on
the number of actions that we are having to respond to, is that
we are stressing the force. And we are meeting the
requirements, but that is where your risk would be in your
ability to continue to meet the demands.
Mr. Coffman. General Flynn, LHA-6, the next amphibious ship
to be delivered to the Navy, is more than 1 year late past its
planned delivery date. What impact does this have in meeting
Marine Corps lift requirements?
General Flynn. As Mr. Stackley said, we are on course to
make 33 ships here starting in 2017. A key part of that is when
the plans were built, there was the idea behind when a ship
would reach its expected service life and then when a new
construction ship would come on. So if there are delays in new
construction, you then also pressurize the need to be able to
do maintenance on ships to be able to continue their mission.
And, for example, because of the Continuing Resolution
right now, one of the challenges we have is the Peleliu was
supposed to begin a yard period about a week ago. And if we
don't have the funding to be able to do that, the Peleliu is
the ship that is going to help us bridge the delay in
construction in the LHA-6.
Mr. Coffman. Vice Admiral Blake, due to the Continuing
Resolution, the amphibious ship Peleliu's maintenance
availability was recently cancelled. Furthermore, the Navy
plans to extend Peleliu's decommissioning date by 1 year in
2014. What impact will this missed maintenance availability
have on meeting the Marine Corps' lift requirements, and what
options are being planned to mitigate this issue?
Admiral Blake. Sir, first, when you look at it, what we
will have to do is we will have to look at the ships as they
are coming up on these avails, and then we will have to juggle
them because of the loading within the yards. So it is not just
that there is a yard open, and we can, if you will, push
Peleliu in.
But it goes to even a bigger issue. Peleliu is only one of
five ships that will not be going in the yards by the end of
this month as the CR continues. So it goes across the entire
force.
In the case of Peleliu, what we are looking at right now is
extending her an additional year, as you know, in order to--
because of the late delivery of her replacement. And what we
will have to do is then juggle the global requirements in order
to make sure that we are able to meet all our commitments
worldwide.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to follow along the lines of Mr. Coffman's
questions concerning the amphib ship lift. I am assuming that
33 ships, which we are headed for, has the risk. But it is only
the risk gets greater if we go to a high optempo [Operations
Tempo] sort of thing. So do I understand correctly that 38 is
the ideal; 33 we can live with, but if we end up with high
levels of activity, that is where we would see the issues?
General Flynn. Sir, I think it is fair to say that, with
33, we should be able to meet all levels of activity with an
acceptable rate of risk. Because sooner or later, you know, you
have to make choices on your requirement, and we believe that
we can meet all the requirements with 33 ships.
Mr. Critz. And, Mr. Secretary, you had mentioned earlier
that a 313 fleet ship force is the floor, I think is the
terminology you used. And we were listening to testimony
earlier that the Navy is actually going to probably come back
with a level that is more like 320, 321, 322 as the ideal
number. Is that something that we are going to be hearing about
in the near future, or is this all just rumor?
Secretary Stackley. First, I want to attribute the term
``the floor'' to the CNO. And in terms of any future force
structure assessment, I think Admiral Blake should probably
address that.
Admiral Blake. Sir, we, in fact, during the past year have
done a force structure assessment. And what we are currently
doing is working through the leadership both on the Department
of the Navy side and the Department of the Defense side. And I
expect that we should be delivering that in the near future, as
soon as we go through the wickets with the leadership.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
And so based on what the CNO said as 313 as the floor, I am
looking at the 30-year plan of what the inventory is going to
be, and it seems like there is quite a lot of years where we
are well below the 313. And I am trying to figure out, as we
look forward, is this something that we need to start
addressing now to maintain that 313 floor?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me try to break this up
into a couple pieces.
First, when the 313-ship requirement was established, which
goes back to 2005, that was not 313 in 2013; that was looking
out to the 2020s, because at the time we had a 276-ship Navy.
So it was forward-looking to basically give us the ability to
build up the force structure. And if you take the long-term
plan, if you just look at the 30-year plan that the Navy
delivered to Congress last year and break it down to three
periods, the first decade is really a build-up period, and that
is where you see the Navy peaking out at about 324 ships in the
2020 timeframe. And that is good.
Now, but at the same time what you also see is the Ohio
replacement program entering the picture, and that has a very
significant impact on our ability to sustain the build rates
that you see in this first decade of the 30-year period. We
have worked with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to
basically put together a plan that allows some top-line
increase during the period of the high replacement program
construction to the tune of about $2 billion per year, but it
is such a substantial program that it really does suppress
build rates during that period, and so, in fact, what happens
in the longer term is we start to come off of the peak of 324
ships as other shipbuilding programs are drawn down in numbers.
So it is an extremely important concern on the part of the
Department of the Navy.
Our near-term focus, I think, is exactly correct in terms
of trying to drive affordability and stability into our plans.
We have a midterm issue of having to, one, ensure that the Ohio
replacement program does not escape in terms of cost; and then,
two, within our top line work priorities, and to the extent
possible, affordability to minimize the impact on the longer
term. But we don't hesitate to describe the concern and the
impacts to meeting our requirements in the long term associated
with that.
Mr. Critz. Before my time runs out, just so I have sort a
full understanding, the 313-ship level is a level that is a
goal, and it is a level that is based on our national security
interests; would that be correct?
Secretary Stackley. If I can share this response with
Admiral Blake. But 313 is a requirement that was established
that balances a couple of considerations. First is global
presence. We have today 288 ships; 142 of them are under way
today, and about half are under way at any given time. And of
those, 40 percent of our ships are deployed. In order to
sustain global presence, you need a force structure size that
allows the turnaround time and allows your maintenance and
upkeep for your force. And then the other is response to a
major combat operation.
So balancing those two, you arrive at the makeup of the
313-ship force. That is requirements driven. And then in our
shipbuilding plan, what you see is we will call it fiscal
constraints or budget reality. When you overlay on top of that
requirement what can we afford with reasonable expectations of
future budgets, then the picture starts to emerge in terms of
the build-up and then the long-term impact when the
recapitalization of retiring ships just becomes too much in a
limited period and has an impact on the overall size of the
force.
Mr. Hunter. [Presiding.] Mr. Rigell.
Mr. Rigell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Stackley, Admiral Blake, and General Flynn, thank
you for your service to our country. And I have the real
privilege of representing Virginia's Second Congressional
District, and, of course, just I like to think of it as the
epicenter of our Navy, certainly on the East Coast, the world's
largest naval base, and Naval Air Station Oceana, and the naval
amphibious base at Little Creek. So the equipment that you
procure and the ships that you are building enable our men and
women in uniform to accomplish the mission, and I am grateful
for your service in that regard.
My question addresses the fiscal year 2011 continuing
resolution and a program issue that I don't think has really
been discussed and gotten the attention that it merits. It is
my understanding that the CVN-78, the Gerald R. Ford, was
authorized to be funded incrementally over 4 years, beginning
in fiscal year 2008 with its procurement and finishing in
fiscal year 2011. As I review the budget from fiscal year 2010
for CVN-78, I know that approximately $737 million was
appropriated by the Congress, and that amount is presumably a
ceiling which the program is forced to live within while under
this continuing resolution. And I further note that the fiscal
year budget for CVN-78 was over $1.7 billion. So that leaves
us, the math is pretty simple on that, a delta of over $1
billion.
So, Mr. Secretary, I address this to you. What, then, is
the Navy's plan for funding the rest of CVN-78 if you are
forced to live within the continuing resolution? And as a
slight follow-up there, is there any specific legislation or
legislative authority that would be required by the Navy if
that, in fact, is the case?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. In my opening remarks, I
refer to both the CVN-78 and 79 construction impacts associated
with the CR, because we also have advanced procurement on the
79 that is affected in 2011.
With regards to the fourth year of incremental funding on
the 78, there is a $1 billion delta between the 2010 CR levels
and the 2011 request. So two things would have to happen if we
have to live within that cap in 2011. We would have to have the
balance of funding in 2012, and we would have to have the
authority that goes with an additional year of incremental
funding. Today we are authorized 4 years incremental funding.
We need that fifth year. The added funding doesn't come into
the picture until about the 2013 timeframe. So the funding that
is in the program today gets us, including 2011 at 2010
levels--would get us into 2013, but we would be getting into
2013 on fumes.
So there is a shortfall. We would have to have that
restored in 2012. We would have to have the authorities that go
with that. And, as you know, you have the 2012 budget request
in your hands. So any program impact associated with the CR on
shipbuilding, there is no room in 2012 unless you all make room
for it to fix it in 2012 without creating a cascading impact on
the total shipbuilding plan.
Mr. Rigell. I appreciate your clarification on that. And
what limited funds that we have, they are under stress because
of operating under the CR. And I have met with senior Navy
officers and procurement officials within the district, and we
are going to do everything we can to straighten this out for
you. It just pains me as a businessman who now serves in our
Congress to see that it is just so, in some ways, almost
irrational the way that we are going about this. So I assure
you that I am pursuing every option that I can, and I know my
colleagues are as well. Thank you for your testimony.
I yield back.
Mr. Hunter. Ms. Sutton.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your service and for your testimony here
today.
I am going to talk to you about something that we haven't
heard yet here and may come as a surprise. But I think a key
component of modernizing our infrastructure and preserving our
military assets and saving money in the process, which we hear
a lot about, saving money in the process, is adopting a robust
corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. And it is not a
glamorous topic, but it is one that is worth our time and
attention, and, frankly, it is something that DOD is doing
well, because they have invested in the Office of Corrosion
Policy and Oversight. It plays a really important role, just to
give people a little idea of the scope of corrosion in all of
our branches as well as all on our military assets. They all
face unique sets of challenges when it comes to corrosion.
But including the military as well as our roads, bridges,
highways, water systems, I mean, corrosion has a cost of some
$276 billion a year. Two hundred seventy-six billion dollars a
year. And for those of us in this body--that is according to a
GAO study. Those of us in this body who are concerned about
fiscal responsibility, it seems to me that one thing that I
would enjoy you expounding a little bit upon is this DOD
corrosion office that you have, because it is my understanding
that there have been a number of demonstration projects, some
150-plus demonstration projects, that show a return on
investment of somewhere in the neighborhood of 55 to 1.
So why is that important? Because it is important that we
make cuts that are smart cuts and we make investments that are
smart investments to get us where we are going. Specifically,
there was an article in the San Diego Business, I think,
Journal it was about the effects of corrosion causing us to
retire, I believe it was, the Spruance ships at a much earlier
date because of the lost ability to keep them viable because of
the impact of corrosion.
So in these days of continuing resolutions--and that is
also another issue, isn't it? Because if you let things
corrode, and you don't have the money to fix them now, you
sometimes lose the capacity to fix them later.
So if you could just sort of expand upon how we might be
smart in investing in these technologies up front and having
that money recaptured down the road.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, ma'am. At great risk, I will start
by saying that an old friend used an expression that, if you
want to get an argument out of me, you are going to have to
change the subject.
Corrosion control. I have seen extraordinary numbers in
terms of the cost impact associated with corrosion on our ships
and aircraft to the tune of 40 percent of our maintenance
dollars are tied to wrestling with corrosion issues. We do have
a concerted effort, DOD, OSD has a chair, and each of the
services contribute to a team that goes after best practices,
investing in developing new techniques, looking at materials,
and then how do we best implement these.
We spend a lot of our time talking about affordability on
the procurement side because we are trying to acquire our
platforms, but we are placing much greater emphasis these days
on life cycle costs, because it is starting to dominate our
ability to operate and maintain our ships and aircraft. And
corrosion is a key part of that.
So inside my office I have a corrosion czar that pegs to
the OSD team and works across programs and systems commanders
to target smart investments and to figure out how can we either
accelerate on what we call forward fit when we procure the
platform, and what do we need to do on backfit in terms of
maintenance and upgrade and also modernization.
When we look at extending the service life for ships, a key
part of a 313-ship Navy is holding on to the ships you have got
for their full service life. And, in fact, we are looking at
extending service lives on certain platforms. We don't have a
prayer of doing that unless we get out in front of issues like
corrosion.
So right now, when we go through the Aegis modernization
program, we are at the front end of the destroyers. So the
Flight I destroyers have just entered Aegis modernization, and
as we are tearing those ships down, we are getting a good
material baseline to capture what the first half of their
life's history is, but we are also looking at instrumenting so
that as we go through and press on with upkeep for the Flight I
ships, we are building the work package for the Flight IIA
destroyers, because those are the ships that we are looking to
extend beyond their initial service life. And so we are using
this period to figure out what are those investments that are
required, what are the key areas of the ship that need the
attention, and then ensuring that, in the longer term, the
dollars are there and the efforts are there to meet the service
life expectations.
So you hit some large numbers in terms of the number of
initiatives. There are a large number of initiatives that span
from investments in paint teams just to help the crews maintain
their ships to selecting some pretty exotic materials in key
areas where you don't have the ability to get at the point of
corrosion, and so you really need to rely on higher-tech
solutions.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you.
Mr. Akin. [Presiding.] Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Stackley, General Flynn, Admiral Blake, thank you
so much for joining us today, and thank you for your service to
our Nation.
Secretary Stackley, I want to pick up with your comment
about this entire picture, and I want to put it in context of
saying that I believe with the challenges this Nation faces
with its defense needs at the very top of the list is Navy
capacity. And capacity provides us the ability to project
force, and 313 is the bottom line. Obviously I think a larger
number of ships is needed. The key is how do we get there? And
I think it is critical that we get there.
We talk about building ships. I want to go to your point
about service life completion. If you look at it, it looks like
the Navy is getting back to basics and saying, listen, we have
got to do the training. We have to make sure that the manning
requirements are there. And so they are moving billets from
land back to sea. And I think that is the proper response to
what has been a failed optimal manning plan.
If you look at where we need to go in the future, I think
that I am concerned in that I refuse to believe that that just
happened overnight, that that realization was just there. To
me, that should have happened sometime past, and that we have
seen, I think, some history there where we have kicked the can
down the road on maintenance and training. And I think that is
finally coming to roost right now with where we need to be with
this entire plan of fleet capacity, and with where we are with
optimal manning, and seeing that that has been put by the
wayside, and where that decisionmaking has led us.
I just want to know, why are we just now going to general
quarters over this? And I want to know how long it is going to
take for our fleet to get back on course where we are going to
be conducting effective and thorough maintenance and materials
management and making sure that we are providing the necessary
training for our sailors to make sure that we never get back to
this position again. And we have seen some early science of
that, of those problems there. I want to make sure that we have
a clear understanding about why it took us so long to get where
we are, and how we are going to avoid this in the future,
because we do not get to the fleet capacity we need without
making sure that we have a robust program for training,
maintenance, and materials management.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. This is probably going to be
a two-part answer where Admiral Blake is going to have part
two.
This is actually a fairly complex issue, and the CNO and
Admiral Harvey, Fleet Forces Commander, have spent a lot of
time trying to get to the root of it and have launched a couple
of key fleet reviews to get a better understanding of what are
the root causes, what do they trace back to, how far back do
we, in fact, have to go to start correcting the issues. And
then you have a large population of issues. Now you have to
prioritize it, and then you have to resource it.
So several things emerged. One is we went through a long
period of implementing a number of initiatives that would bring
certain efficiencies from a budget perspective, but placed risk
on the fleet in terms of care and maintenance of our ships. And
they were done somewhat individually without a recognition of
what the cumulative impact would be, and then over time the
issues started to manifest themselves. So in the course of the
past, I would say, 1 to 2 years, we have been coming to grips
with it and reversing some of those initiatives that were laid
in place years ago.
You mentioned some of the manning, in terms of increasing
our ships' manning. We are looking at everything across the
board. You hit on training. That is a key element. Parts
support. We are going back to ensure that in our attempt to
reduce everything from inventory to just in time, we have got
the right understanding of reliability-based bearing, so that
whether it is a spy radar or whether it is an LM2500 [General
Electric gas turbine], when the trained sailor that is on board
ship now goes to the parts bin, he has got what he needs to
keep the ship running.
So we are looking across the board trying to ensure we have
got the right priorities in place while we--and it is going to
take time--while we resource the number of things that we need
to resource to increase our readiness and reliability system by
system, platform by platform.
Admiral Blake. The one thing I would add, I would say as
you have this series of initiatives taking place, I think if
you look back, you would say that not any one initiative taken
in isolation would have a debilitating effect. But when taken
in cumulation, what we started seeing, if you will, the
indications and warnings on the material inspection side, one
of the principal ones being in-serve, where we would go on
board ships. And, of course, in-serves are not done every year;
they are done over a period of time. And so you didn't get the
trend analysis until you started seeing them coming in. And
then the question came up, why are these ships not doing well
on in-serve? And then you had to focus on, all right, now that
they have not done well, have we got a trend here? So then we
had to look at it, and then we had to isolate it, and then we
started, if you will, working our way back.
You mentioned moving personnel from shore to sea. Not only
are we doing that, we are also putting a greater emphasis on
eye-level maintenance down on the piers so that we can put more
people there.
We have increased the training, we have increased the
dollars that we put in maintenance because we recognize that if
these ships are going to make it to the end of their service
lives, we have got to do that. And it is all the ships.
The best example I can give you is the midlife we are doing
on the LSD-41 class. We have got to get those ships. We tailor
those midlifes to each individual ship, so you will have
different amounts depending upon their material condition. And
that is absolutely critical if we are to get those ships to the
end of their expected service lives. Without that, you are
going to see that ships will not be able to get there, which
is, as one of your Members brought up earlier, why it is so
critical to get these maintenance windows done as we are
operating under the current CR.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. Admiral Blake and Secretary Stackley,
General Flynn, thank you all for your service to our country,
extraordinary service, and everything you have had to say here
today.
I was away from the beginning part of this panel, so I
apologize if my question has already been asked. But Admiral
Blake I would just start with you, if I could--with respect to
a follow-on to the Ohio-class submarine, the SSBN(X). Officials
within your organization recently described some of the
significant schedule and cost challenges that face the program.
Considering the importance of our ballistic missile submarine
force to our nuclear and strategic posture, obviously it is
clearly important that these boats be deployed on schedule. How
confident are you that the Navy will meet its cost and schedule
goals?
Admiral Blake. We have a very high confidence level that we
are going to be able to meet both our cost and our schedule
goals, and I will give you a couple of specific examples of why
we feel that way.
First of all, we are leveraging what has been done in the
past in the earlier submarine programs, specifically the
Virginia class. We are also leveraging for the SSBN(X), the D-5
SLEP program. So we are not starting out new. We have got a
proven program. We are going to do an extension on those, and
we are going to be able to put a proven system on those ships.
When I refer to the Virginia class, we specifically looked
at, not only their HM&E, hull maintenance and engineering, but
also their combat system suite, and we leveraged off those
programs in order to apply them to the SSBN(X). We recognize
that we have to have an SSBN(X) on station, certified, ready to
go in 2029, and we also realize that in order to do that, we
have got to start in 2019 with the building of the first ship
in that class.
So what we have done is we think we have built flexibility.
We have addressed issues up front. We have even gone to the
detailed design on this particular class of ship, and we have
it at the most mature level, as compared to say either the
Virginia or the Sea Wolf class, which were not at that high a
level in detailed design.
So when you take all those factors into effect, I think
what you see is that we think we are in a good place when it
comes to both the cost and scheduling to deliver that ship,
because there is no alternative. As you mentioned earlier, it
is the most survivable leg of the triad, and we have to deliver
that capability to the Nation.
Mr. Langevin. I agree, Admiral. Thank you for your answer.
Secretary Stackley, because of the strategic mission of the
SSBN(X) and the fact that it remains, as we have talked about
today, the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, some,
including the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Roughead, has
stated support for moving the SSBN(X) funding out of the Navy
shipbuilding into a conversion account to alleviate fiscal
pressures on other shipbuilding programs.
Given the fiscal pressures across all of the U.S.
Government, can you outline how that could be accomplished
without decreasing the top line of the Navy's yearly budget?
Secretary Stackley. I don't have good past examples of
being able to do that, but we have a couple of examples of
other major programs that have been set aside, if you will,
into a special fund. So we established--you all established the
National Defense Sealift Fund back almost 20 years ago now to
address the need to recapitalize our sealift fleet, and that
has proven very effective.
More recently, the Missile Defense Agency has been
separately appropriated, again to fund the investments required
on the development side and some procurement to address what is
in fact a national security priority. So those are probably the
two closest recent examples of separately funding something, a
requirement that is at that level of importance and, frankly,
that level, that size.
We, barring any other alternatives, we have brought the
cost of the high replacement to bear against the total
shipbuilding top line. If it does nothing else, it addresses
the--it brings the issue to light much earlier in the process
so that the administration and the Congress have the
opportunity to wrestle with, how do we fit the recapitalization
of the higher class within the other pressing priorities that
the Department is facing?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Secretary.
Turning to Virginia class, if I could, Admiral Blake, on
account of the sharp drop in our attack submarine force as the
legacy systems leave the fleet, the Navy is set to procure, as
you know, two Virginia-class submarines per year until 2018.
After that date, however, the force is going to begin to drop
below the Navy's requirement for a 48-ship fleet.
What are the possible mitigation strategies to counter this
shortfall, and in particular, what effect would procuring an
additional submarine in 2018 have in the Navy's attack
submarine shortfall?
Admiral Blake. Sir, that is sort of a two-part question.
What have we done to this point, first of all, we have
accelerated the delivery of the Virginia class. We have gotten
that down from 72 months down to 60 months.
Second, we have looked at the Virginia class, and not only
the Virginia class but all submarines, and determined which, if
you will, could be best in breed, and we might be able to get
extensions out of those boats.
Specifically to the 2018 boat, one of the real challenges
we have there is if we were going to be able to put that boat
in there, we would then have to come up with both economic
order quantity and advance procurement in fiscal years 2014,
2015, 2016 and 2017 to the tune of about $950 million to $1
billion in those years. Then we would have to come up with the
additional dollars in 2018 to buy that. And what really
complicates it is we have, as you know, within our top line all
the R&D and the initial dollars for bringing the SSBN(X) on
line. So when you couple that in there, that is where it comes.
If that boat were to be there, would it mitigate our
shortfall? Absolutely. But what you have to do is you have to
look across the entire portfolio, not only with the attack
submarines but also with the surface units, because we have to
balance within our portfolio; we have to be concerned about
getting our amphib numbers there. We also have the issue coming
between 2020 and 2030 when we have large numbers of surface
combatants going away, and we have to replenish those stocks.
So when you look at it, if you just take it in isolation,
anything is possible. But when you take it and look across the
entire portfolio, that is where the real challenge comes for
us.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
First, General, Admiral, Mr. Secretary, thanks for your
service and your dedication in working with us in trying to get
the Navy where we think they need to be at and the Marine Corps
as well.
The first question I guess would be for General Flynn, kind
of going off Mr. Coffman's and Mr. Critz' comments on the LHA-6
and 7. Do you think there is any commentary on the Marine Corps
right now, the fact that they don't have well decks, the fact
that they can't support any kind of landing craft going out of
them? Or do you think that kind of plays into the cancellation
of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and looking for a new one
there?
Is there any commentary there that the Marine Corps now has
LHAs with no well decks?
General Flynn. No, sir, I don't believe there is anything
like that there. The decision to build the LHAs without the
well decks was made probably I think about well over 5-6 years
ago, and at the same time, the commitment, we were moving ahead
with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. So I don't see any
commentary there at all, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Do you think it is wise to have LHAs with no
well decks?
General Flynn. Sir, I believe, when you have a limited
number of dollars to spend on shipbuilding, the more
versatility and flexibility you can get in the ship is what we
should look for, and that is why over the last year we have
been working with the Department of Navy and the Navy to, when
we build LHA-8 in 2016, we are going to put the well deck back
in, because that will give you the most flexibility and
versatility out of a limited number of assets.
So, I am a believer in a well deck, and when I testified
last year, I said we should be looking about putting the well
deck back in, and I think we are on the path to do that, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Mr. Stackley, you concur the LHA----
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We are basically doing an
analysis of alternatives right now looking at different
approaches towards restoring the well deck to the LHA-8,
considering, one, the timeframe and then, two, what is the most
affordable method to give that ship the capability.
Mr. Hunter. The next question is kind of broad. If you look
at world events and where we are based at, where the Fifth
Fleet is, countries we use for kind of bases of operations
because we have to, and as we start pulling away from those
places, let's say, if we start moving away from places like
Bahrain because of their style of government, which we don't
fully support, but we have to use them, and we do support them
in certain ways, but as we move away from that and as we move
into more of a, let's call it sea-based basing--last week I
think it was Admiral Roughead said the great thing about a
carrier or any other kind of ship is you create your runway on
the water there. So you are based out of the water, and you can
go anywhere, and you don't have to use these bases which we
might not like the people in those countries that they reside.
So the question is this: One, moving this conversation from
what I have just stated to things like the MLP, to things like,
hey, we have to sea base now, we are going to have to do it
more, I frankly think we should start doing it now. Secretary
Mabus didn't really have a great answer last week because he
said, well, what we are doing now is based on the QDR
[Quadrennial Defense Review]. Well, the QDR doesn't account for
Libya, and it doesn't account for Bahrain. It doesn't account
for Egypt. It doesn't account for all of these things that just
happened to blow up in the last month, right? This stuff all
just happened. It accounts for two ongoing operations but not
in the way that it is happening now.
So the question is, how much more important does it make
things like having an MLP--and General Flynn, please, and
Admiral, whoever would like to, this is my last question--so
how much more important does world scenarios, kind of the way
things are right now, play when it comes to total sea basing
and things like the MLP and being able to transfer cargo and
that thing in the ocean?
Admiral Blake. Yes, sir. I think if you look at the Navy-
Marine Corps team, we will have always been expeditionary in
our approach. So we like to say, we only like to play away
games. We don't like to play home games. By that we mean, we
want to be out there forward deployed and providing a
deterrence presence, if you will, as we are out there.
When you look at what we are able to do, Admiral Vernon
Clark, when he was CNO, used to say, oh, we can go anywhere and
we don't need a permission slip. And that is exactly where we
want to be.
So, as you have articulated, this combination of amphibious
and surface combatants and aviation is what gives us that
ability to be forward deployed and give that forward presence
to the country, and I think it is an absolutely critical
aspect.
General Flynn. Sir, a key part of that is I think our
approach to what we are doing with maritime prepositioning in
working with the Navy and getting the MLP going and also adding
the T-AKEs [Dry Cargo Ships] to the existing squadron is an
example, first of all, of frugality. We are taking existing
assets and we are making them more useful for the environment
we are about to receive or about to see.
So what you see by the addition of the MLP and what you see
by the addition of the T-AKE is we will have the ability
without going into port to do selective offload of the MPS
[Maritime Prepositioning] ships and also to be able to do at-
sea transfer of vehicles so that you can get them to the
connector that you need to have relevance ashore.
So, first of all, I think it was a frugal approach, and the
other part is I think it is going to tremendously increase our
capability.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you all for being here, and perhaps just
put in a plug for some front loading of that funding from time
to time when it looks like we could use it. I would certainly
ask us all; I think we have been looking at that for some time.
I wanted to ask about the reasoning behind carrier
homeporting decisions. I know that is a difficult one. I know
it is complex. I know a lot of things go into that. But it is
difficult to actually pin folks down about it, quite frankly.
So I am going to ask you if you could tell me exactly what goes
into the process of determining a home port, and what can
effect a change in those decisions? Because sometimes we see
that the Navy plans to home port ships in different locations
or move ships, and yet then it is determined that new ships are
coming online, so that is not a good idea to do what was
previously thought would work.
Tell me a little bit more about that and what we can expect
and how sometimes delays in shipbuilding negatively affect
those homeporting decisions as well.
Secretary Stackley. I am going to have Admiral Blake
address the homeporting issue, and then I will then talk about
delays in shipbuilding.
Admiral Blake. If we take the West Coast for an example, if
you look, we have three home ports on the West Coast that are
carrier-capable. We have the two up in the Northwest, and then
we have the one down in San Diego. And if you look, our
position to put one carrier in Bremerton, one carrier in
Everett, and then have up to three carriers in San Diego, and
additionally, because carriers have to go into the yard, what
we have is we have the ability to put a carrier up in Bremerton
in order to give it an extended yard period with a dry docking.
Our most recent example is the Nimitz class, the Nimitz
itself, actually. And what we have to factor in as we are, if
you will, moving the ships around is we like to have that
strategic balance and we like to make sure that we are filling
all the holes, if you will, as we are moving the assets between
locations.
With respect to the Nimitz, it was the only yard we could
use on the West Coast, so we pushed her up there, and then the
decision was made to leave her up there. But if you look
overall, the overall plan for the Navy in the long term would
be that we would continue to use the Everett yard, the Everett
facilities, the Bremerton facilities, and then we will also
have up to three submarines--three carriers, correction, in the
San Diego area. And that is how we do it. So we move them
around.
Mrs. Davis. But we also know that there are some delays or
questions whether a new carrier would be coming certainly to
San Diego. I am just trying to understand, again, whether even
though that may be the strategic desire to have three carriers
there, there is a reality that we are sort of waiting to see
what is really going to happen on that front. And it almost
feels as if there are some different decisions for the West
Coast and the East Coast which are also strategic balance.
Admiral Blake. I would say, if you look at San Diego, we
have 50 ships, 70,000 personnel in San Diego alone, and there
is no effort--not effort, that is the wrong term--but we are
not going to walk away from San Diego. And I think it is just a
matter of, as we move the assets around and we have to, if you
will, place them in the various locations, and as I mentioned
earlier, San Diego will always be up to three carriers because
it has the capability to do it.
Mrs. Davis. In the few remaining--just I think there is a
minute left, I wanted to ask a littoral comment, LCS question
as well, and whether there are any maintenance or docking space
requirements that are unique to the aluminum-hull LCS, and what
are the costs and basing impacts to the Navy?
Admiral Blake. Currently what we are doing right now is we
are looking at both East and West Coast options for the home
porting. The initial home ports are going to be San Diego on
the West Coast and Mayport on the East Coast. But I would tell
you, as the inventory fills out, you know, the end inventory is
55 ships, there is every reason to believe that we will expand
that because you have to, because you only have a limited
number of facilities within those two bases. So we will have to
do the environmental assessments, and then following that, we
will then look at additional bases.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. My time is up.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Akin. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today.
There is no doubt there is a lot of concerns on all of
Americans' minds, and they typically right now are centered
around jobs, creating American jobs, the economy, our national
debt. And they are all looking for solutions on how we are
going to solve these issues.
What really brings it home is when Chairman Mullen or
Admiral Mullen actually says that the greatest threat to our
national security is our national debt.
Many of my colleagues are looking for ways to reduce our
deficits and pay down our national debt. And I am afraid that
in the flurry of trying to find ways to reduce our deficit and
our debt, they are going to be looking at our Department of
Defense.
And as most of our colleagues are also, we are 100 percent
committed to making sure that our warfighters have the best
equipment, best training to the best value to the American
taxpayer.
So it kind of brings me to a question on Navy acquisition
strategy. So my question is going to be for Secretary Stackley.
Since coming to Congress, I have become aware of several
recent examples of multiyear procurement contracts in Navy
acquisition, and I am also aware that Ingalls Shipbuilding in
Pascagoula, which happens to be in my district, recently
completed its sea trials for its 28th Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer which was funded under a multiyear procurement
contract that started in fiscal year 2002. I believe the DDG-51
restart is good for the Navy and good for the Nation, and I am
looking forward to these ships being built very soon.
In today's tight budget environment and with increasing
pressure on these budgets in the future, it is important for us
to look at funding future ships like the DDG-51 restart in the
most efficient way possible. I understand the multiyear
procurements are generating savings for the taxpayer and
promoting stability for the defense industrial base. Simply
put, I believe we need to move toward more of these types of
contracts.
How can this committee assist you in enabling multiyear
procurements for programs such as the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer and other programs?
Secretary Stackley. Let me start by saying that the Burke
programs had two multiyears, both of which were very effective
in terms of yielding savings for the Department. And in
establishing the strategy for the restart on the 51, through a
series of discussions and decisions, we worked with industry to
initiate the restart at Ingalls. So, in fact, the DDG-113,
which is the first ship of the restart, is under negotiation
right now with Ingalls, and when we look ahead toward getting
past the restart and into stable production, in fact we are
targeting a multiyear procurement in 2013.
So in our budget exhibits, when you look out over the FYDP,
you will see a plan for multiyear procurement. The plan is a 5-
year multiyear, which includes nine ships in those years. And a
lot of effort went into our 2012 budget build to make room for
a second ship in 2014, which is right in the middle of that
potential multiyear window, to give both the volume and the
stability that the program needs in order to yield the savings.
So right now we are at the point in the process where we
are working inside of the Department to address all of the
issues that we need to certify before coming back to Congress
notionally 1 March 2012 with a legislative proposal for
multiyear procurement on the 51s.
Mr. Palazzo. And you will let this committee know if there
is any way we can assist in that acquisition strategy.
Are there any other additional or specific authorities
necessary for the Navy to continue pursuing this acquisition
strategy?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir. The 2009 WSARA [Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act] pretty well laid out what we need to do
to certify the multiyear, and we are attacking it up front.
Frankly, since it has been so long since we executed a 51
multiyear--it will be a 10-year period--we are having to
reengage portions of the Department to get back up to speed on
the 51 program in order to support that certification.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, gentlemen.
I definitely believe that a strong, robust Navy is key and
critical to the future of our national defense, as well as our
global force projection. So thank you all for your all's
service.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
Now we are going to go to Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you members of the panel for being here today.
I, too, understand how important it is to bulk up the
backbone of our ability to provide security for the Nation, so
I support this expansion.
History shows that a strong navy is critical to a nation's
defensive and offensive capabilities, as well as necessary for
the protection of merchant vessels and key sea lanes of
communication. And I think, with respect to the Navy, it is
better that we have and not need as opposed to need and not
have, given the amount of time it takes to build these ships.
I do have some questions, however, regarding the
shipbuilding program as it has been presented. I am concerned
that we may be prioritizing quantity at the expense of quality,
particularly given our short-term focus on light ships designed
for use in coastal waters.
I am concerned about unresolved questions regarding
survivability of the LCS. I am concerned by projected
shortfalls of cruisers and destroyers, the backbone of our
blue-water surface combatant fleet, in out-years of the long-
term shipbuilding program. And I am also concerned that
projected costs of expensive programs, like the DDG-1000 and
the Ohio-class submarine, may be unrealistically low.
Secretary Stackley, for years the Director of Operational
Testing and Evaluation has raised serious concerns regarding
survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship and whether the LCS
meets its level one survivability requirement. Why are LCS full
ship shock tests not scheduled until fiscal year 2014, when we
will have already produced 10 or 12 ships, and why would we
begin full scale production of this ship if there are serious
outstanding concerns regarding its survivability?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, let me first begin by
describing LCSs. LCS 1 and 2 are both designed to a level one
level of survivability, and all of the analysis and testing to
date supports the determination that they in fact meet their
survivability requirements.
The scheduling of the full ship shock trial on LCS in 2014
is about right compared to all the other shipbuilding programs.
In fact, typically in a major shipbuilding program, you don't
shock the lead ship; you end up shocking one of the first
follow ships.
So, for example, the last major shipbuilding program that
we conducted shock trials on, DDG-51, the first ship to be
shocked was DDG-53, which wasn't delivered until 2 years after
the 51, and by the time she was shocked, we had about 20 DDG-
51s under contract and in full rate production.
The nature of the beast in shipbuilding is that you have
such a large capital-intense structure that is building these
ships that you cannot afford to stop construction and wait for
the lead ship to be built, tested and then get around to the
full ship shock before you start construction again. So what we
do is we address, to the extent possible, through analysis and
surrogate testing and developmental testing, proof out the
design, so that by the time we get to the shock trial, the risk
has been retired.
In fact, if you go back and look at the results from prior
full ship shock trials, the change activity that is driven into
those ships' designs is relatively minimal because we have in
fact spent so much time on the front of end of the design to
retire that risk. And we see the same case here for LCS.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Admiral Blake, naval aviators will tell you that over the
course of a deployment or a career, engine failures are common
and twin-engine aircraft can make the difference between
ditching and saving the aircraft and maybe the life of the
pilot.
What steps are you taking to mitigate the risk of single-
engine carrier operations with the Joint Strike Fighter?
Admiral Blake. Well, first of all, there has been extensive
testing with respect to the engines, the engine for the Joint
Strike Fighter, so that the reliability in the single-engine
aircraft will be able to function and will provide a margin of
safety to those pilots as they are airborne. So what we have
done is we have taken the engine itself with the manufacturer
and gone into a series of scenarios in order to ensure that our
personnel are in fact safe when they are doing it.
You are absolutely correct; a multiengine aircraft is, you
have backup. But what we have essentially done is we have said,
all right, we are going to look at this engine, and we have had
single-engine aircraft in the Navy before. In the early 1960s
we had aircraft, such as the A-4 and the Crusader, the F-8, so
this is not new to us. We just have to deal with it from a
reliability perspective and make sure that it meets its goals.
Mr. Akin. Our last questioner is going to be Mr. Bartlett,
I believe, a former chairman. The best for last.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, and I apologize for being late,
but we had an Army modernization hearing that I needed to
chair, and I came here as soon as I could when that was over.
In looking at the clips yesterday from the press, I noted a
comment in one of the articles that wondered in this
constrained environment, fiscal environment, would we continue
to choose to spend money on things like the 20th-century
aircraft carrier, as they noted it.
This reminded me of a question that I have had about
technologies and which one will run faster. The carrier, for
instance, will our ability to defend it, for it to be defended,
run faster than the ability of an enemy to attack it; witness
the new Chinese anti-ship missile and the J-20 [ fifth-
generation stealth fighter aircraft], which some have suggested
may be designed to deliver a wave-skimming, supersonic cruise
missile.
Regina Dugan, the new head of DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency], was in my office the other day, and
I asked her if they could help with that kind of an analysis. I
was concerned about the deep strike heavy bomber and whether
our ability to be stealthy or the ability of the radars to pick
it up and the air-to-ground defenses to take us out would run
faster, and we really wouldn't want to have the momentum of the
past determining the future if that wasn't going to be very
productive.
She said, yes, they could do that kind of thing. In fact,
they had done it. And they were looking at cyber warfare, and
they noted that the lines of mal-code that the bad guys used
had not increased through the years, but the lines of code that
we were using to defend ourselves were increasing
exponentially. And if we cannot bend that curve, the day will
come when about all our computer systems will do, can do, will
be able to defend themselves.
Now, I am wondering, who in the Navy looks at that kind of
thing down the road, looks at these technologies and the rate
at which they will be running? And this will illuminate our
judgment in what we ought to be building, because it is pretty
silly to build something now that technology in 20 years from
now will be able to neutralize. Who does this, and how do we do
it?
Secretary Stackley. I will start. Let met first describe
that there are a couple pieces of this.
First is threat assessment, in terms of where is the
threat, and where are they going? So there is a fairly robust
number of organizations that are trying to project the threat.
Second is technology. Where is technology? Where is it
going? So that when we look toward planning, bringing
capabilities to bear against that threat, that we can target,
where is the technology? Where is the threat going to be?
Inside the Department of the Navy--you mentioned Regina
Dugan from DARPA--the lead organization within the Department
of the Navy, the Office of Naval Research, is responsible for
looking out ahead in terms of technology and projecting, what
are the opportunities in terms of where we can militarize
technologies to address future threats?
Separate from that is the requirements process, which I
think Admiral Blake will describe.
Admiral Blake. Yes, sir.
Well, as Mr. Stackley just mentioned to you, we have the
Office of Naval Research, which works in conjunction with
DARPA, and then they provide us on the N8 [Deputy CNO
Integration of Capabilities & Resources] side, which is the
requirements and the integration piece, where we think we
should be able to go or look at R&D programs where we think we
can address and, if you will, get inside a potential opponent's
OODA [Observe-Orient-Decide-Act] loop.
You mentioned earlier in the process, earlier in your
remarks, about in general anti-access. That is one of the areas
we are particularly concentrating on, but not only in the
scenario which you described but worldwide, because there is a
proliferation of systems, not only in the Pacific but
worldwide, that we have to deal with. And one of the biggest
issues when we go into that is we have to ensure that we can't
just look at it in isolation, if you will, in one particular
area. We have to look across the entire spectrum, and we have
to deal with it in the places we are likely going to have to
go.
So I would say, yes, you have organizations like DARPA. On
our side of the equation, we have the Office of Naval Research.
And then what they do is they provide us, we go into
memorandums of understanding with them in order to be able to
work on potential technologies in order to meet those
requirements.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Akin. Thank you.
I was cheating just a little bit. I have I think a couple
of fairly quick questions.
The first was we had 10 carrier air wings. We have reduced
them now to nine. Is there any plan, if we are reducing carrier
air wings, does that suggest that we are not really fully
committed to the 11-carrier strategy?
Admiral Blake. No, sir. I think there might be a little
confusion on that point. When we put together the 2012 budget,
we reduced one carrier air wing staff and one carrier strike
group staff. We did not reduce the number of carrier air wings,
and we did not reduce the number of carriers. So I think that
is just a confusion point. So we would still have available the
11 carriers and 10 air wings. But as an efficiency, we take it
down by one, the staff.
Mr. Akin. Thank you for clarifying that.
My other question was sort of a larger view. Our earlier
panel talked about the CBO had been--they are pretty good at
estimating what things are going to cost--had been talking
about the fact they see that the budget we are looking at is
between $1 billion to $3 billion per year; they feel a little
too optimistic and that maybe you are suggesting every single
thing to go right from a cost point of view.
Do you think you have drawn it pretty close to the line or
maybe even a little over the line, or do you really have a good
sense you can bring things in and not be over $1 billion to $3
billion per year?
Secretary Stackley. Let me start by, I should first focus
inside of the FYDP, and the reality is that the closer the
programs that you are estimating are to real time, the closer
your estimates will be.
So we put a lot of attention on to the shipbuilding
programs that are in hand to ensure that the estimates on those
programs are appropriate, and then the issue becomes one of
execution.
So I could go program by program inside of the FYDP and
highlight where we feel very strongly in terms of our
estimates, but similarly, there are areas where we have got
some risk; one on the execution side, and there is another area
of risk associated with things that we forecast and then we
have to wrestle with, for example, escalation.
So I think Dr. Labs pointed out a difference between CBO's
estimates and the Navy's estimates; there is a difference in
terms of how we account for escalation. Well, in the near term,
that difference is de minimis. But then when you start to look
over the long term, there is a compounding effect. So that ends
up being a pretty significant driver in terms of the difference
between CBO and the Department of the Navy's estimates, simply
how we account for escalation. And that is less a matter of
real escalation inside of shipbuilding and more a matter of
what happens to escalation indices as programs get passed back
and forth between the Department, OMB [the Office of Management
and Budget], and Congress.
When we look out in the long term, there are several risk
areas that we have to address. We are working hard on
stability. If you have a lot of fluctuation in your program,
you are going to drive unnecessary cost increases to the
programs that we don't budget for and we try to avoid. And then
with that comes--there is an aspect associated with volume or
business base.
So right now we have a shipbuilding industrial base that is
oversized for the workload coming its way, and one of our
efforts is to, as best as possible, broadcast to industry, here
is our plan, and we are going to stay with our plan, so that
industry can make appropriate efforts to right-size itself so
it can perform more efficiently within that workload.
We also have to use every tool in the toolbox, and one that
I think has been underutilized for some time now is
competition. That is not just competition at the shipbuilder
level; that is also competition in the combat systems side of
the house and then competition down throughout the vendor base,
where it is possible. And then you always wrestle with the
volume issue versus the competition issue. So we look for the
sweet spot.
So we have put honest effort into, one, we have
strengthened our cost-estimating team. We have put honest
effort into estimating inside the FYDP where we are budgeting
and then also estimating the long term so we can wrestle with
the issues that are before us in terms of force structure
versus affordability versus top line.
But there are risks. And have we gone too far in terms of
allowing risk to persist inside of our shipbuilding plan? I
would say, not yet. The Department, frankly, is not satisfied
with the trends of cost in the shipbuilding program, and so
what we should not be doing is accommodating those trends of
increasing costs. What we have got to do is wrestle them to
ground and reverse those trends.
So it is not simply a matter of what you forecast in the
out-years; it is also what are you doing, Department of the
Navy, to wrestle those trends to the ground and reverse them.
And there is going to be 1,000 battles ahead to get there from
here. So we start now.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I appreciate your being there to fight all those battles as
well.
Thank you to our witnesses.
As you see, we have a pretty dedicated committee here to
last this long. So there is a lot of interest, and I appreciate
your help. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 9, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 9, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. Are we investing enough in our equipment to sustain
our position as the greatest Naval Force throughout the 21st Century?
As you all three of you know, our Navy and Marine Corps have conducted
cyclic combat operations for almost 10 years at a pace that we have not
seen in the history of our fleet. Ships and aircraft are constantly
deploying and critical life cycle maintenance is being affected due to
the high operational tempo. Knowing there is deferred maintenance and a
backlog of lifecycle management for our fleet, how is the past 10 years
going to affect the service life of our ships, submarines, and
aircraft? What is the affect going to be on the service life of an F/A-
18 super hornet that is above its planned airframe and engine flight
hours, or the DDG that has deployed so many times to support overseas
contingency operations, that critical hull, mechanical, electrical, and
weapons systems maintenance is neglected and pushed to the right? What
do you believe the long term affect is to our overall material
readiness? Furthermore, do you feel that we are allocating the
appropriate amount of money to focus on maintenance, modernization, and
modification?
Secretary Stackley. Keeping our ships, submarines and aircraft in
satisfactory material condition is essential both to supporting current
operations and ensuring that we are able to get the projected service
life from these valuable national assets. It has been central to the
United States Navy's mission to perform sufficient levels of
maintenance in each of these areas to ensure our fleet can ``answer the
bell'' when called upon. Certainly the last decade of high tempo
operations have been a challenge and there have been areas where we
were not able to do all of the maintenance we desired. However, even
with these challenges, the Navy's ships, submarines and aircraft have
responded to each call with the speed and efficiency desired from the
nation's military forces.
While we desire to do a complete maintenance package on each of our
platforms every time it is brought in for a maintenance availability,
there are different levels of repair and modernization required
depending on the platform involved. In the case of aircraft and
submarines, the nature of their operations and the inherent dangers in
their operating environments have lead us to develop a very rigorous
process to identify deficiencies, develop maintenance solutions and
perform that maintenance. The same is true for the nuclear power plants
in our aircraft carriers. Conventionally powered surface ships and non-
nuclear equipment on our aircraft carriers degrade far more gracefully
and can be recovered in a later availability. As a result, we have
taken more risk in these areas over the last decade as our operating
schedules and budgets have been stretched to accommodate the tempo of
demands placed on these assets.
We are in the process of assessing the actual condition of our
ships, submarines and aircraft today. There is no question that the F/
A-18 fleet has been operated much more demandingly than was anticipated
when they were procured. Since service life for aircraft is a function
of the number of hours flown, there will be an impact on the Navy's
ability to operate these aircraft at some point in the future and
service life extensions may become necessary. On the other hand, the
procurement of aircraft today and in the future may permit the Navy to
manage the remaining service lives of these aircraft and get them to
the end of their service life without taking any extraordinary
measures.
Our submarine fleet is already managing its service life margin and
we see very little likelihood that the operations of the last decade
will materially impact that force. Our aircraft carriers are undergoing
regularly scheduled maintenance and their refueling overhauls are
providing us with a window to do major overhauls to ancillary and
support equipment to ensure they reach the programmed end of life.
Surface ships will be our most significant challenge but this is
not insurmountable. Based on lessons learned from the submarine and
aircraft carrier maintenance processes, the Surface Maintenance
Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) activity was established to
provide the same engineered approach to surface ship maintenance.
SURFMEPP is in the progress of performing in-depth reviews of surface
ship maintenance requirements that have significantly improved the
Navy's understanding of the surface ship maintenance requirement.
In the end, we must balance current Combatant Commander force
allocation requirements against sufficient force reserves to surge in
response to operation/contingency plans. As the maintenance
requirements for the DDG 51 Class and other surface ships are further
defined, maintenance and modernization actions will be planned and
executed to maintain readiness levels and ensure the ships reach their
expected service life.
Mr. Wittman. Recently it has been announced that the Navy is
getting back to the basics with training and maintenance and that
billets that were on shore, will be transferred back to sea to fill
critical positions lost to a failed ``optimal manning'' plan. I know
that changes to manning and training were reactionary to budget cuts
and desires to move money elsewhere in the force, but I refuse to
believe that this is just an instant revelation by the U.S. Navy. We
have known for years that we were ``kicking the can'' on maintenance
and training while short changing our crews with this ``optimal
manning'' plan . . . as a result the material condition of our ships
has suffered. Why are we just now going to General Quarters over this?
How long is it going to take to get our fleet back on course when it
comes to conducting effective and thorough maintenance and material
management (3M) and providing our Sailors the training needed to
succeed?
Secretary Stackley. Surface Force readiness suffers from the
effects of decisions made over the better part of two decades.
Following troubling INSURV inspection results in 2008, the Navy
commissioned a Surface Force Readiness Fleet Review Panel. The Panel's
report, delivered in February 2010, provided a comprehensive review of
Fleet training, manning, and maintenance practices. Significant
findings included:
Surface Ship Class Maintenance Plans (CMPs) had not been
consistently and centrally managed or updated since Planning,
Estimating, Repair and Alterations (PERA) Surface was deactivated as
part of the 1993 BRAC.
In 1996, the Surface Force reduced CNO availabilities to
nine weeks to maximize operational availability leaving insufficient
time to complete required life cycle maintenance.
Optimally manned ships, a program started in 2001 to
minimize shipboard manning, are not sufficiently manned to maintain an
acceptable level of shipboard material readiness, especially in the
area of corrosion control.
The number of military personnel assigned to intermediate
maintenance had been reduced impacting military maintenance training
opportunity and organic capacity.
The number of third party assessments, inspections and
audits had decreased throughout the Surface Force.
In response to the Panel's findings, the Navy has initiated the
following actions:
Established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Maintenance
Activity in FY10, which was further expanded into the Surface
Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) activity in FY11,
to provide Navy with the same engineered approach to surface ship
maintenance that is successfully employed in the submarine and aircraft
carrier maintenance programs by:
Documenting all required life cycle maintenance in Class
specific Technical Foundation Papers.
Maintaining CMPs and ship specific long range
maintenance schedules (reviews of DDG 51 and LSD 41 CMPs were
completed in support of PB12; CG and LHD CMPs are scheduled to
be completed before PB13; remaining Surface Ship CMPs are
scheduled to be completed before PB14).
Creating and maintaining a surface ship corrosion
tracking database that details the condition of surface ship
tanks and voids.
Preparing maintenance availability work packages that
accurately reflect the preservation and corrective maintenance
needed.
Formally monitoring surface ship work deferrals.
Increased CNO availability durations from nine weeks to
fifteen weeks (or longer) to allow time to accomplish required life
cycle maintenance.
Increased the number of military billets on ships by
1,105 in FY12 to provide sufficient manning to perform required
organizational level maintenance.
Increased the number of military billets at the Regional
Maintenance Centers by 285 in FY12 to start reversing the loss of
organic intermediate-level capacity and improve military maintenance
training.
Launched pilot programs for Total Ship Readiness
Assessment beginning in FY11 to establish formal, periodic, total ship
material assessments to identify ship material conditions in time for
proper prioritization within upcoming maintenance periods while
training the Fleet to conduct ``self-assessments''.
Initiated corrosion control initiatives including:
Partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to
perform a detailed surface ships corrosion survey pilot that
used commercial technology and practices during FY10. Extended
the pilot to perform surveys on an additional 16 ships in FY11.
Formed Corrosion Control Assist Teams designed to
provide tools and training for ship's force corrosion control
starting in FY10.
Established the Painting Center of Excellence within the
Naval Sea Systems Command with responsibility for reviewing
commercially available corrosion control technology and
developing corrosion control technology and processes focused
on Fleet identified needs for longer life coatings and/or
reduced installation costs.
Since FY10 when these corrective actions were first implemented,
the number of Board of Inspections and Survey assessment failures has
decreased, and a majority (12 of 19) of the inspected surface ship
equipment areas are either trending upward or remaining in the green/
satisfactory area. Navy is actively monitoring the performance of the
above initiatives and the Fleet is trending in the right direction.
Navy expects to have the Fleet back on course in the next two to three
years.
Mr. Wittman. We have talked about investing in the crews and the
life-cycle maintenance and management of our fleet. I believe you need
a larger budget to reach your defined goals and set the Navy up for
success in the 21st century. However, I also believe it is time to
invest more money in government owned shipyards and modernize them to
meet the workload of the future. Can I please get your thoughts on
this?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy is continuing to sustain, restore and
modernize the Naval Shipyard infrastructure within today's fiscally
constrained environment. Naval Shipyard infrastructure includes both
mission and support facilities. The Navy has focused its investment on
the Controlled Industrial Area, which primarily involves shops, piers,
wharfs, and dry-docks. The most critical deficiencies are being
addressed within the current resourcing profile.
U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2476 requires that the Navy invest a
minimum of 6% of the average of the previous three years of
intermediate and depot maintenance revenue into the shipyard
recapitalization program. The Navy has provided investments of nearly
10% in FY08 and FY09 and 15.6% in FY10, and plans to invest another 10%
in FY11 if the funds are appropriated in a FY 11 appropriations act.
FY12 investments will likely be greater than the currently reported
9.6%, based on just-released energy special project information.
The Navy programmed $168.9M in Sustainment and Restoration and
Modernization (RM) projects in FY12:
Puget Sound--$6M Dry Dock Certification
Puget Sound--$5.5M Dry Dock Certification
Pearl Harbor--$7.8M Dry Dock Certification
Pearl Harbor--$37.3M Building Renovation
Pearl Harbor--$3M Dry Dock Repair
Pearl Harbor--$7.7M Dry Dock Repair
Norfolk--$0.8M RM Energy Projects (2)
Portsmouth--$100M RM Energy Projects (4)
The following Military Construction (MILCON) projects are
programmed in FY12:
Norfolk--$74.9M Controlled Industrial Facility
Puget Sound--$13.3M Integrated Dry Dock Water Treatment
Facility
The following equipment projects ($54M) are planned for FY12:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5464.087
Mr. Wittman. We currently have 29 amphibious ships. You have stated
the Commandant and the CNO have determined a force structure
requirement of 38 and the Dept of the Navy is willing to accept the
risk of a minimum of 33. My concern is that the mission load and need
for our amphibious fleet is not going away. I love that we are
investing heavily in BMD and our surface combatants, but I fear we are
not taking seriously the demand of what Gen Amos calls, the ``Ford 150s
of the fleet''. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are not
going away, and we are staring down a path that will see a MEU back in
the Mediterranean for the foreseeable future. For the past 10 years 6th
Fleet has been relatively quiet, I fear those days are over. There is a
legitimate possibility that we will have a MEU supporting 6th Fleet,
AND a MEU supporting 5th Fleet. Our ability to project power from the
sea and put Marines on the beach is not going away, so in my mind,
meeting the minimum number of amphibious ships is not the answer. We
have invested in the Arleigh Burke, Virginia Class, and LCS class of
ships . . . the expensive, hi-speed, technologically advance ships, but
I think it is time to divert more time and attention to our amphibious
fleet. Can I please get your thoughts on this?
Secretary Stackley. The 33 Amphibious ships programmatic goal has
been tested against DoD planning scenarios capturing the demands of the
most stressful combination of wartime and peace time missions expected
under our current strategy. The 33 ship amphibious goal meets the
requirements of two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.
The QDR and force structure assessments performed by the Navy show
that by prioritizing competing demands, the 33 ship amphibious
programmatic goal can generate operationally available ships to meet
the world-wide rotational demand or surge demand with acceptable risk.
This force will support individual war plans or provide two to three
continuously deployed Amphibious Readiness Group (ARGs) with embarked
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) to respond rapidly around the world,
and two additional ARG/MEUs ready to surge when needed.
The Navy and Marine Corps are continuously evaluating amphibious
lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements. The
enduring challenge is to provide sufficient capacity in the Assault
Echelon to lift the MEB's ground equipment and to accommodate the
capacity of an Aviation Combat Element with MV-22 and JSF. CNO and CMC
have determined that the force structure required to support a 2.0 MEB
AE lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. The 38 ship requirement
was communicated to the four chairmen of the Appropriations and Armed
Services committees by SECNAV/CNO/CMC letter dated 7 Jan 2009. Given
fiscal constraints, DoN will sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious
ships. The long range shipbuilding plan meets the 33 ship force level
by FY 2017.
Mr. Wittman. Do you feel that that approximately $15.8 billion per
year in FY11 dollars for the next 10 years is enough to sustain a 30
year shipbuilding plan with a goal of maintaining 313 battle force
ships? We have an aging Oliver Hazard Perry Class that accounts for 29
Frigates and over 40 LA Class submarines that are past their halfway
point of planned commissioned service (6 are currently at, or over 30
years of service). Most, with the exception of some of the LA Class,
will decommission 10 years from now. Is the plan for 313 battle force
ships a realistic number and do we have the ability to reach this
number when taking in to account the planned budget to reach that goal?
Admiral Blake. Yes. The requirement of 313 ships remains the floor.
The funding in place supports the Navy plan of reaching that level
within the next 10 years.
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Shipbuilding Plan included funding for
the ballistic missile submarine recapitalization from within its
anticipated Total Obligation Authority. During the years in which the
new submarine is being procured, the procurement of other ship types
will be reduced resulting in force level and industrial base impacts.
This plan will achieve a peak battle force inventory of 325 ships in FY
2022, after which the force level drops as legacy cruisers, destroyers,
submarines and amphibious ships retire, averaging about 308 ships
between FY 2022 and FY 2041. While the threats, demands, and mission
requirements for the far-term planning period (FY 2032 to FY 2041) are
not well understood, the Navy will continue to consider mitigation
strategies for these anticipated shortfalls in future plans.
The Navy must strike a balance between investing in new, more
capable ships for meeting current and future requirements and
maintaining ships to their expected service life. The Navy has made a
conscious decision to deactivate older, less capable ships that have
become increasingly expensive to maintain and operate in order to
support those investments in our future Fleet.
In the near-term, delay of the FY 2011 budget has directly impacted
maintenance, modernization and new construction of ships, which produce
greater delays in reaching the 313 ship battle force floor.
Mr. Wittman. Can you please talk about the two year probationary
period that has been placed on the F-35B and how that is going to
affect the Marine Corps Strike Fighter shortfall? If the F-35B
struggles through test and evaluation, is there a backup plan to
mitigate the risk of the F-35B being delayed in delivery to the USMC
(will the USMC SLEP the AV-8 Harrier to sustain a STOVL capability or
possibly invest in the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet?) How would any further
delay in this program impact the USMC amphibious lift requirements and
future planning and design for large deck amphibious ships?
General Flynn. The F-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter remains the
tactical aircraft we need to support our Marine Air Ground Task Forces.
Our requirement for expeditionary tactical aircraft has been
demonstrated repeatedly since the inception of Marine aviation and as
currently being demonstrated in Libya today.
Slowing down the production rate of the F-35B to allow for
responsible fixes to be designed and incorporated was prudent in light
of the progress the Joint Strike Fighter program has made to date. The
slower rate of production slows down our rate of transition. Currently
we are successfully managing our strike-fighter aircraft inventory to
meet our operational commitments. We are confident we will be able to
continue to manage our legacy aircraft appropriately with a variety of
service life management initiatives until the F-35B is fielded.
On 14 March the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps signed an agreement to
redistribute the F-35C procurement within the FYDP to take the most
efficient path available to optimize the department's Carrier Strike
capability. The earlier than anticipated procurement of the F-35C
allows the Marine Corps to simultaneously meet its enduring commitment
to carrier Tactical Aircraft Integration and continue our measured
transition to a 5th generation expeditionary capability while partially
offsetting the delay in F-35B procurement.
A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) similar to the F/A-18
requirement will not be required for the AV-8B due to the unique design
and composition of components that normally exhibit fatigue over the
service life of an aircraft. The F/A-18E/F though a perfect near term
fit for the Carrier Strike mission set it is a less than optimum match
for the expeditionary nature of Marine Corps operations. Essentially
the F/A-18E/F is about two-thirds the capability and service life of an
F-35 at three-fourths of the cost. Future threat and operational
environments requires a 5th generation strike-fighter with the
strategic longevity to avoid substantial F/A-18E/F SLEP costs for an
increase from 6000 to 9000 hours and the extensive technological
upgrades required for survivability.
The potential for further delays do not effect amphibious lift
requirements or designs of large deck amphibious ships, simply because
conventional carrier aircraft are not compatible due to requirements
for arresting gear and catapults that cannot be incorporated on lighter
amphibious ships without incurring a major expeditionary operational
capability shortfall by limiting amphibious troop and equipment lift to
accommodate the additional ship infrastructure required for carrier
operations.
Mr. Wittman. Has significant testing been done with regard to the
F-35B STOVL taking off and landing from the deck of an amphibious ship?
If not, when do you predict that testing will take place? Do we know if
the thrust and heat produced from the engine of the F-35B will have a
negative effect on the steel flight deck and I-beam support of the
deck...meaning will the deck buckle or become unstable over time?
General Flynn. The F-35B test program has made substantial progress
during CY 2011 to date and is on track for the first Developmental Test
Ship Trials scheduled in October through November 2011. The
environmental effects of the engine will be fully assessed during this
period. After 3 years of focused analysis and preliminary tests in
preparation for this event indicate no significant damage or
degradation is expected. The USS Wasp has been dedicated for this test
and instrumented to assess the flight deck, substructure, and ancillary
deck systems. The Marine Corps along with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and the Joint
Program Office has collaborated extensively to ensure F-35B L Class
operations are tested fully and representative of normal operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. We often speak about the strategic necessity of
maintaining amphibious force projection capabilities. To provide clear
guidance on strategic requirements, Congress mandates the number of
operational aircraft carriers and submarines that the Navy is required
to maintain. What are your thoughts on Congress also mandating the
number of operational amphibious ships the Navy is required to
maintain?
Secretary Stackley. I do not believe mandating the number of
operational amphibious ships the Navy is required to maintain is
necessary or desirable as it would affect the flexibility and force
structure decision-making going forward that the Navy and Marine Corps
share in providing a capable, adaptable, amphibious force. The Navy and
Marine Corps continuously evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet
current and projected requirements. Specifically:
In the January 2009 Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force
Structure, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps reaffirmed that 38 amphibious ships are required to lift
the Assault Echelon (AE) of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).
They agreed to sustain, resources permitting, an amphibious force of
about 33 total amphibious ships in the AE, evenly balanced at 11
aviation-capable ships, 11 LPD 17 Class ships, and 11 LSD 41 Class
ships. The 33 ship force accepts risk in the arrival of combat support
and combat service support elements of the MEB but has been judged to
be adequate in meeting the needs of all parties within the limits of
today's fiscal realities.
The recently completed Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force
Structure Review of March 14, 2011 concluded that: ``The dual demands
of sustained forward presence and sufficient lift for the assault
echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) result in a
requirement of 38 amphibious ships. Given fiscal constraints, however,
the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept the risk with 33 ships,
increasing the imperative to design a lean and effective force
structure. We will also explore options for employing Marines from a
wider variety of Navy ships, seeking innovative naval solutions to GCC
requirements.''
In addition to the Department of the Navy's internal reviews, the
Quadrennial Defense Review Report of February 2010 determined that the
main elements of the Navy force structure should include 29--31
amphibious warfare ships for the duration of the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP) (FY 2011--FY 2015).
Mr. Coffman. We often speak about our shipbuilding plan building
towards a minimum of 313 battle force ships. I am concerned about
certain assumptions being made about the long-term affordability of the
shipbuilding plan. The FY 2012-2016 plan seems affordable and
sustainable, but the production of the relatively inexpensive Littoral
Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels is overrepresented during
this period, relative to the long-term force structure goals. How will
you address cost growth in the near future when we are producing less
Littoral Combat Ships and more next-generation Ballistic Missile
Submarines (SSBN-X)? Additionally, there is reporting based on early
Navy testing that the LCS program is plagued by sever survivability
problems. What is the extent of this problem and how much will it
increase the unit cost of each variant of LCS?
Secretary Stackley. We continue to look for affordability and
efficiency opportunities as we go forward with the shipbuilding plan,
such as revising the acquisition strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) to maximize the advantage of the competitive pricing.
Additionally, prior to Milestone A approval for the OHIO Replacement
submarine, numerous capability trades were evaluated to reduce costs.
As a result, the Navy made trades in the number of ballistic missile
tubes, the diameter of those tubes, the number of torpedoes to be
carried, acoustic sensors, and other defensive features throughout the
design. These trades made the submarine more affordable while
maintaining the necessary level of capability, resulting in a reduction
of the projected cost from $7 billion to a current estimate of $5.6
billion for follow on hulls 2 through 12 (FY 2010$). However, we need
to go further in our efforts to drive cost out of this critical
program, and so we have established a ``Design for Affordability''
program to facilitate continued focus on cost through the design phase.
We have established a target price of $4.9 billion for follow on hulls,
to be achieved through this effort.
Both USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) and USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2) meet the LCS
survivability requirements outlined in the Capability Development
Document (CDD) that are consistent with the LCS operational concept.
Navy is working with the operational test community to ensure the LCS
CDD requirements are fully evaluated and validated in an operationally
realistic environment. Navy does not anticipate increased unit costs to
address survivability as both variants meet the stated requirement.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. What is the Navy's position with respect to the value of
the mission performed by tug boats? Has the Navy developed a long-term
plan for the use of tug boats in the execution of the overall mission
of the Navy? If so, what is that plan? Would you support an expanded
role for tug boats in the mission of the Navy?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake. The Navy highly values the
utility of tug boats and their mission in support of ship movements.
Our long-term plan is to continue to maintain Large Harbor Tug Boats
(YTBs) and Harbor Tug Boats (YTs) in Yokosuka, the Pacific Northwest,
Guantanamo Bay, and Portsmouth, N.H., as part of the current mix of
commercial and Navy-owned tug boats that support harbor operations and
ship movements. Currently, the Navy does not anticipate a requirement
for expansion of the current Navy-owned tug inventory and existing
commercial support.
Mr. Smith. What is the total requirement for tug boats and what are
the Navy's plans with respect to meeting this requirement? Based on
information submitted with the fiscal year 2012 budget request, the
Navy does not plan to purchase additional tug boats until fiscal year
2016. Is that true? During fiscal years 2006-2009, the Navy has
purchased at least one tug boat per year, with delivery of the last
boat scheduled March 2012--what is the rationale for not purchasing at
least one tug boat in fiscal year 2012 and the out-years? The last tug
boat construction contract was awarded in October 2010 and the next
planned construction award would, at best, be sometime in 2016. What is
the rationale for this 6-year gap in production? Do you anticipate that
such a gap in production will negatively impact the tug boat industrial
base and increase the total cost of the program due to work stoppage at
the construction site?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake. The Navy's total requirement
for tug boats is met through a combination of Navy-owned Large Harbor
Tug Boats (YTBs) and Harbor Tug Boats (YTs) in addition to commercial
tug services. The Navy owns and operates 15 YTBs and 5 YTs. Procurement
and recapitalization efforts for the Navy's YTB inventory included four
new replacement tug boats during Fiscal Years (FYs) 2007-2008. Two
additional tug boats were budgeted for FY 2009 which resulted in the
October 2010 contract award. This effectively equates to one tug boat
per year from 2007 through 2012. The next year Navy currently plans to
purchase tug boats is 2016.
The Navy does not anticipate that this production gap will have a
significant impact to the tug boat industrial base. Navy procurement
typically represents less than 5% of overall tug boat purchases. At
this percentage, the Navy does not anticipate that this production gap
will significantly increase the total cost of tug boats.
Mr. Smith. The Committee understands that the Government of Iraq
has approached the US Navy regarding the opportunity to purchase tug
boats for use in harbor and shoreline security. Is this true? If so,
what is the status of the inquiry made by the Government of Iraq? What
other nations, if any, have expressed an interest in purchasing
American-made tug boats? Do you believe that the type of tug boat
constructed for the US Navy would be of benefit to other navies around
the world? Is it the intention of the Navy to use existing acquisition
mechanisms (foreign military sales/foreign military financing) to
procure the tug boats for the Government of Iraq? If not, what is the
acquisition mechanism that the Navy intends to use?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake. The U.S. Navy was tasked with
assessing the U.S. industrial base to identify potential sources
capable of meeting the requirements of the Ministry of Interior (Iraq)
for the procurement of two 27--31m Tug Boats. A Request for Information
(RFI) was released via FedBizOps on April 5, 2010 with a closing date
of April 20, 2010. Based on the results, the Navy determined that U.S.
industry was able to build a tug that would meet Iraqi requirements.
The results of the RFI were presented to the Ministry of Interior
(Iraq) and in October 2010, the Navy began to develop a Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) case to meet the Iraqi Tug Boat requirements. The
FMS case, if accepted, would be financed using Iraq national funds. The
FMS case was offered in December 2010 and has not been accepted by Iraq
to date. If the case is implemented, Navy will develop an acquisition
strategy to meet the requirements of the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior.
Currently, there are no requests from other nations for the
procurement of new tugs. In January 2011, the Navy delivered the second
tug of the two boat procurement to the nation of Kuwait. The two 19m
tugs were built by Rozema Boat Works of Mount Vernon, Washington.
Mr. Smith. The Navy has been the most forward leaning service when
it comes to green energy initiatives. In particular, there have been
significant efforts focused on ``greening'' the fleet with an internal
Navy goal to convert 50 percent of its energy to fossil fuel
alternatives by 2020. As yard tugs are a critical component to the
fleet, particularly in areas of heavy naval vessel traffic, the
Committee is interested the efforts underway to acquire hybrid tugs or
other alternative fueled tugs as a means to help reach this goal? For
example, in a place like Guam, where the number of US personnel is
increasing significantly and there are multiple projects underway to
``green'' the base, it would appear to be a natural fit for the home-
porting of hybrid ships. Does the Navy have any plans to add hybrid
ships, particularly tugs, to the Fleet? If so, what is the timeframe by
which they intend to acquire them?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake. There are no efforts underway
to acquire hybrid harbor tugs or other alternative fueled harbor tugs.
Decisions to home-port additional ships in Guam have not been made.
Navy has two Hybrid Electric Drive systems for surface ships: the
USS MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8) Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS), already
deployed and incorporated into the new LHA 6 Class design, and the DDG
51 Electric Propulsion System (EPS), currently in proof-of-concept
phase. Many Navy auxiliary force ships operated by Military Sealift
Command use full Integrated Electric Drives with the most recent
examples being the T-AKE class ships built by NASSCO and the T-AGS 66
and T-AGM 25 being built at VT Halter. Similar green technologies, such
as energy storage and Propulsion Derived Ship Service (PDSS) power are
also under development. Lastly, the Navy is testing biofuels as an
alternative to petroleum that will serve as drop-in replacements for
existing fuels.
With the implementation of Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) systems, the
Navy is executing a key component of the Navy Secretariat's ``Great
Green Fleet'' energy goals, as well as demonstrating quantifiable
operational energy efficiencies.
Mr. Smith. The USMC LAV Program Manager met with HASC staff in
January 2010 and reported significant benefits associated with side and
wheel-well armor kits added to the USMC fleet of LAV's. These kits were
developed by Armatec and installed at the Barstow and Albany USMC
Depots. The Committee was informed that these kits added needed
survivability to the LAV's, while also extending LAV service life. The
HASC also understands that several allied countries are incorporating,
into their vehicle fleets, additional technologies developed by this
company such as Mine Blast Floor and Underbelly Protection Kits, Roof
Mounted Blast Attenuating Seats, and Armored Fuel Tanks. Are there
plans to evaluate the technologies from recent LAV survivability
upgrades for possible use in upgrade programs for the AAV or HUMMWV
fleets?
General Flynn. Yes. CD&I manages the capabilities included in the
Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy as a portfolio. AAV will
benefit from the lessons learned from LAV and all other USMC vehicles
in the portfolio, plus some Army vehicles such as the Bradley with its
Urban Survival Kit and Stryker with its new Double Vee Hull. CD&I is
actively connected to relevant intelligence from the National Ground
Intelligence Center and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and it
communicates with protection experts from Army Research Labs and TARDEC
to stay current on best practices with respect to Force Protection and
Survivability.
The AAV SLEP initiative is planned to improve protection against
roadside and underbelly IEDs through a host of upgrades, including
moving the fuel tank outboard or protecting it from catastrophic
rupture, integrating IED jamming technology, improving fire
suppression, adding internal and/or external belly protection,
improving the fragment resistance of the sidewalls, integrating blast
protected seats that are wall- or roof-mounted, while maintaining
current water and land mobility capabilities.
Analyses are ongoing to underpin AAV protection requirements, and
to ensure these requirements are balanced against others such as swim
capability, land mobility, etc. For instance, CD&I, PM AAVS, and MCOTEA
are assessing the feasibility of protecting the occupants of the AAV
during underbelly attacks through a deliberate study performed by Army
Research Labs. In this study, ARL is estimating the potential benefit
afforded by all-external applique, all-internal applique, and some
combination of the two, using 3D modeling and simulation. Given that
AAV has more strict swim mobility requirements than LAV, more attention
is being paid to the second order effects of adding heavy protection to
the belly of the AAV. CD&I anticipates leveraging Government (Naval
Surface Warfare Center) and academia (Stevens Institute of Technology)
to assess the effects of heavy upgrades on swim performance, and Nevada
Automotive Test Center to assess the effects on land mobility,
reliability, and ride quality. In addition, PM AAVS is participating in
blast testing against the baseline/legacy AAVP7 starting this month
(April 2011) at Aberdeen Proving Ground. This baseline data will be
crucial for understanding where effective improvements can be made
within cost and schedule constraints.
Likewise, future HMMWV upgrade initiatives will benefit from the
lessons learned from past initiatives, to include recent LAV upgrades,
experimentation on the SCTVC (also known as ``Capsule''), ongoing
experimentation on DARPA's Blast Mitigation System (also known as
Structural Blast Channel or Chimney), plus the ongoing technical
development of the new-start Joint Light Tactical Vehicle systems. The
USMC is actively pursuing better protection for a portion of the HMMWV
fleet, and ancitipates a recapitalization initiative that will likely
replace older cabs with more protected ones, while improving off-road
mobility in order to expand maneuver space, within established cost and
transportability constraints. Knowing that protected mobility for the
light fleet is an extremely difficult task within the USMC's unique
transportability requirements, it will continue to leverage the
experience of Science and Technology activities such as the Office of
Naval Research and DARPA, from Industry through our Materiel Developers
at Marine Corps Systems Command, and from Research and Development
Activities such as TARDEC and ARL, to ensure a balanced and effective
set of capabilities is fielded.