[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-82]
ARMY ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 26, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
TOM ROONEY, Florida JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina BILL OWENS, New York
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Scott Bousum, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, October 26, 2011, Army Acquisition and Modernization
Programs....................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, October 26, 2011...................................... 27
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2011
ARMY ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
WITNESSES
Lennox, LTG Robert P., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-
8.............................................................. 4
Martin, Belva M., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 6
Phillips, LTG William N., USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).. 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G...................................... 31
Lennox, LTG Robert P., joint with LTG William N. Phillips.... 37
Martin, Belva M.............................................. 50
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre........................................ 34
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 71
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 75
Mr. Owens.................................................... 82
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 79
ARMY ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 26, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G.
Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you for joining us. Today the Tactical
Air and Land Force Subcommittee meets to receive an update on
Army acquisition and modernization programs.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
They are Lieutenant General Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Army, G-8; Lieutenant General William Phillips,
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; and Ms. Belva Martin,
Government Accountability Office, Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Team.
Since the subcommittee last received testimony from Army
leaders, there have been many programmatic changes to major
Army programs. In addition to what I have stated before, major
reductions in the Federal budget need to be a major element of
correcting the Federal budget deficit. The Department of
Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in these
reductions. That process is already taking place under the
Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts
planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years.
Further cuts beyond the $400-$500 billion are possible, up to
approximately one trillion dollars total over 10 years, under
what Secretary Panetta has called the doomsday mechanism
sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act.
It remains unclear how DOD would apportion funding
reductions and how funding reductions will impact Army
modernization programs.
The purpose of today's hearing is to get an update from the
witnesses as to what changes may have to be made in their
proposed acquisition programs in fiscal year 2012. We would
like to hear from our witnesses what their major issues and
concerns are. What should our Members be most aware of as the
fiscal year 2012 request is finalized in Congress?
Finally, we would like to know the views of our witnesses
on what potential impacts to Army capabilities could occur,
particularly in light of the possible reductions in the Army's
procurement and R&D [Research and Development] budgets.
A couple of examples of our concerns are what we understand
to be the Army's top two modernization priorities, the Ground
Combat Vehicle [GCV] and the network.
The GCV program received Milestone A approval, entry into
the technology development phase, in August of 2011. Although
the program is currently under a General Accounting Office
[GAO] protest, we do expect to learn more about the GCV
acquisition strategy and requirement stemming from the most
recent Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] acquisition
decision memorandum. And for the network, we would like to
learn more about how the recent Network Integration Exercises
at Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range are helping the
Army make informed budget decisions.
Most recently, Congress was informed that the Ground Mobile
Radio [GMR], part of the Joint Tactical Radio System [JTRS] and
the network, was terminated as a result of the Nunn-McCurdy
process.
I thank all of you for your service to our country and for
being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.
Now to my very good friend from Texas, the ranking member,
Mr. Reyes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me add my
welcome to all of the guests here this afternoon.
Today's hearing on Army modernization comes at a critical
juncture for the future of the U.S. Army. On the one hand, with
the end of war in Iraq, the Army may finally have a chance to
improve dwell time for troops and their families and also to
repair worn-out equipment.
At the same time, the war in Afghanistan continues, and the
Army still has to be prepared to deploy troops to Korea and
other potential flash points.
And finally, laid on top of those demands, the Army is
conducting a planned drawdown in the size of the Army from
567,000 Active-Duty troops to around 520,000.
Balancing those three factors will no doubt, as the
chairman pointed out, be difficult.
When one turns to the issue of modernizing the Army's
equipment, I think it is important to remember what has been
accomplished over the past 10 years.
First, the Army has fielded hundreds of UAVs [unmanned
aerial vehicles] and other ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] platforms that give today's soldiers far more
capability to find the enemy and to understand their
intentions.
Second, the Army has upgraded almost its entire vehicle
fleet from Abrams tanks to trucks to Strykers to MRAPs [Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles].
Third, the Army now provides personal soldier equipment
vastly improved over what the troops were issued in 2001,
including better body armor and personal weapons.
Fourth, the Army continues to invest in aviation
capability, increasing both the quantity and the quality of
helicopters in its force.
Fifth, the Army is working hard to get more network
communications equipment in the field, including the large-
scale ``Network Integration Exercises'' at Fort Bliss in my
district.
Sixth, so while some programs didn't work out as planned, a
lot of very smart investments were made and today's Army is
better equipped than ever before.
However, the Army must continue to modernize in critical
areas, to stay ahead and to plan for future threats. I felt
that the modernization plan presented the Army at our hearing
in April was a solid one, integrated plan for moving the Army
forward on its top priorities which were pushing the network
down to the soldiers, continuing to expand aviation capability,
and third, investing in programs for the future.
However, since that hearing, Congress passed the Budget
Control Act that will cut $450 billion from DOD's budget over
the next 10 years. Additional cuts may come from the
supercommittee and certainly are a concern, since they may be
possible.
How the Army plans to deal with those reductions in fiscal
year 2012 is a major issue, I believe, for today's hearing.
While I am confident the Army will do its best to adapt, I am
concerned that disproportional cuts to modernization may be
doing real damage to the future of our Army.
Too often discussions about, quote unquote, what the Army
needs are focused exclusively on today's fight, even though
Army leaders have to also focus on being ready for whatever the
next challenge or conflict may be.
The Ground Combat Vehicle is one example. With the Army
planning only incremental upgrades to Abrams and Bradley
fighting vehicles in the future, it is clear that the Army must
start investing now in the vehicle it will need in the 2020s.
Despite the need, the GCV has already been delayed for months
by contract delays and protests. If it does not move forward
soon, then the Army won't have any new combat vehicles in
development.
The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, or JAGM, is another
example. While Hellfire missiles are doing a great job today,
in the future the Army will need a more capable missile to
defeat advanced countermeasures from longer ranges. If it is
terminated, as some press reports have suggested, then the
future Army won't have the best missiles available and the
Nation might lose critical missile research and development
capability.
Overall, I am concerned that the Army's investments in
critical future capabilities could bear the brunt of reductions
in the Army's budget.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing
from our panel about the future of those programs and other
concerns that may be on their minds. And with that, I yield
back to you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. We will proceed now with
the panel's testimony and then go into questions. Without
objection, all witnesses' prepared statements will be included
in the hearing record.
General Lennox, please proceed with your opening remarks
and you will be followed by General Phillips and Ms. Martin.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT P. LENNOX, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY, G-8
General Lennox. Good afternoon Chairman Bartlett,
Congressman Reyes, and members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on Army
acquisition and modernization. We will be providing the
committee with an update on our Army's Affordable Modernization
Strategy, its processes, and the changes in key programs since
our last meeting in the spring.
On behalf of Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, I would
like to take this opportunity to thank the members of this
committee for your steadfast support and shared commitment in
this endeavor to provide the more than 1 million men and women
in our Army with world-class weapon systems and equipment to
ensure mission success in combat.
The Army's equipment modernization goal is to develop and
field a versatile and affordable mix of equipment to allow
soldiers and units to succeed across a spectrum of conflict
both today and tomorrow, and to maintain our decisive advantage
over any enemy that we face.
Our first priority is to win today's fight. We currently
have over 70,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and about 50,000
soldiers still serving in Iraq. And we must not forget them as
they continue to serve them in harm's way, and I know this
panel feels the same way.
Our second priority is to prepare for the future. To do
this, our equipment modernization strategy provides a balanced
approach and features really three aspects.
The first is we look at our portfolios in an integrated way
trying to balance requirements, resources, and the acquisition
process. And we have very consistent reviews of those
portfolios.
Secondly, we are focusing on incremental modernization. We
are trying to deliver improved capabilities as technologies
mature, resources are available, and necessity dictates.
And third, we feel that in an ARFORGEN [Army Force
Generation] matter, and that is really trying to match
equipment with the mission that the soldiers are going to
deploy on. So we will match equipment that they need,
modernized for the mission that they have got.
We look forward to discussing our priority modernization
programs which include the network, Ground Combat Vehicle,
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle [JLTV], the Paladin program, Kiowa
Warrior, and others.
We recognize that we must shape the Army of 2020 with the
understanding of our national security obligations and the
current fiscal crisis. We will constantly reform how we do
business to remain good stewards of the resources that are
provided to us, and we recognize that we may have a smaller
Army in the future, but that smaller Army must be trained and
equipped to defeat any adversary.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again
for your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men
and women of the United States Army, of Army civilians and
their families, and we look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Lennox and General
Phillips can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. General Phillips.
STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND
TECHNOLOGY)
General Phillips. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes
and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you and to discuss Army
acquisition modernization and our acquisition strategies. I am
really proud and honored to be here with my battle buddy,
Lieutenant General Bob Lennox, and Ms. Martin from the GAO
[Government Accountability Office].
Throughout our Affordable Modernization Strategy we are
dedicated to meeting the needs of our soldiers around the world
and around the clock.
We thank you for your wisdom and your strong support for
our soldiers and their families. The Army acquisition community
is committed to delivering enhanced capabilities to our
soldiers in a timely and affordable manner. The Army has
undertaken a number of efficiencies, initiatives, including
streamlining the acquisition process to focus on collaboration
among stakeholders early and upfront in the process, to
properly align requirements and resources with our acquisition
strategy, and we are closely examining technological maturity
to achieve realistic program goals.
We are encouraging competition and innovative contracting
strategies in order to control costs. We are a full partner in
the Department of Defense Better Buying Initiatives. In fact,
we are now and we have been for the past year changing the
paradigm within Army acquisition and within the thought process
of Army acquisition leaders as it relates to cost, schedule,
and performance. We are aggressively challenging requirements
and seeking tradeoffs that achieve greater affordability and
executability of programs. We cannot afford any requirement at
any cost.
We are implementing smarter test and evaluation strategies
to get real-time soldier feedback, leveraging the Network
Integration Exercise at White Sands Missile Range in Fort
Bliss, and certainly we invite all of you, the members of this
committee, to visit us out at Fort Bliss and White Sands
Missile Range.
We are codifying our rapid acquisition procedures and
introducing testing and prototyping earlier in the development
cycle as other ways to reduce costs and risks, and to achieve
more agile acquisition strategies. We must have realistic cost
estimating from the very beginning of a program that provides
insights into individual requirements. We take our fiduciary
responsibilities to Congress and the American people seriously,
and we will take full advantage of every dollar that you
provide us.
Our progress and successes are detailed in the written
statement, and I won't go into them. General Lennox just
mentioned some of them. MRAP M-ATV [Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected All-Terrain Vehicle] and Stryker Double V Hull are
those that are serving today in Afghanistan and saving lives.
There are others like counter improvised explosive devices
[IED]. We do continue our efforts to improve soldier protection
in body armor and vehicles, to bring the power of the network
to the individual soldier, and to lighten the load of our
soldiers as well.
Our strategy to meet these needs include conducting
capability portfolio reviews, and as a result of the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act, we have also implemented
configuration steering boards [CSB], of which last year the
Army completed 100 percent of all of the required CSBs mandated
by statute.
Mr. Chairman, the Army is committed to improving our
acquisition processes and delivering affordable programs that
meet the needs of our soldiers today and tomorrow. We cannot
fail. Our soldiers trust us that we will provide them the very
best equipment so that they can succeed on the field of battle
and that one day they can return home safely to their families
and their friends. We cannot betray their trust.
In executing our responsibilities we will ensure that the
Army remains the Nation's force for decisive action.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this
subcommittee, your deep and abiding commitment to our men and
women in uniform is widely recognized throughout our ranks. We
thank you for your continued support that ensures mission
success and the safe return home of our soldiers.
I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of General Phillips and
General Lennox can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Ms. Martin.
STATEMENT OF BELVA M. MARTIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Martin. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes and
members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss the Army recent modernization efforts. I will summarize
my prepared statement.
As background, the Army has faced some struggles in its
modernization program since terminating their Future Combat
System, known as FCS, in June of 2009.
I would now like to highlight four key areas.
First, when GAO testified before this subcommittee in
March, we raised issues about GCV in the areas of urgency of
the need, cost and affordability, analysis of alternatives to
meet the need, and plausibility of delivering a production
vehicle in 7 years. While DOD and the Army have increased their
oversight of the program, these questions are still relevant,
and it is expected that they will be fully explored during the
current technology development phase. The Army has a challenge
ahead to identify a feasible and cost-effective solution to
meet its needs.
Second, during the recently completed technology
development phase, the Army and the Marine Corps learned that
some of their original projected requirements for JLTV were not
achievable. The services are now planning to have industry
build prototypes for testing before a production decision to
save time and money. However, there is a risk with this
strategy. Even with demonstrated prototypes, skipping the
detailed design and development testing process could result in
the services discovering late that the vehicles are still not
mature.
In a related effort, the Army is modernizing portions of
its Up-Armored Humvees [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle] to improve blast protection and extend its service
life by 15 years, among other requirements.
Third, the Army has moved away from its plan for a single
network program and is now using an incremental approach where
it builds on capabilities already in place and is getting
soldier feedback, as you mentioned, White Sands and Fort Bliss.
This is a positive development. However, to avoid potentially
wasting resources by developing a number of stovepipe
capabilities that may not work together, it is important for
the Army to define requirements for the network.
One network program that has been in development for over a
decade was recently terminated, and you referred to the Ground
Mobile Radio Program, and it was expected to be a key component
of the network. The Army still has a need for software defined
radios, and they expect industry to provide capability to meet
some of this need through a competitive market but has not yet
defined an acquisition strategy.
Finally, as we have discussed, there is still much to be
determined on GCV, JLTV, and the network. For example, what is
the best option for Ground Combat Vehicles? Is it a new vehicle
or modification to a current one? Can the services afford both
the JLTV and the Humvee Recap effort?
The Army has gotten positive results from its capability
portfolio reviews, and, as General Lennox mentioned, they are
able to look beyond the individual program to identify overlaps
and set priorities. On both JLTV and GCVs, as the requirements
have been examined more closely, the Army is finding that it
can live with less in terms of capabilities, and has been able
to reduce costs. It is important that these reviews continue in
the future and that the Army considers a broad range of
alternatives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my short statement.
I will be happy to answer questions from you or members of the
subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Martin can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your testimony.
As is my usual practice I will reserve my questions until last,
hoping they will have been asked. So I now turn to my ranking
member, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with the
Ground Combat Vehicle, which is the Army's number one priority,
vehicle development program.
And now we know that in an unusual move, the Army has
awarded two contracts to begin design work on the vehicle. But
we are also told it is also evaluating current off-the-shelf
options, including a modified M2 Bradley and an Israeli-
designed personnel carrier.
So three questions that I have. What is the expected cost
of these off-the-shelf vehicle evaluations? When will the Army
have results that it can share with the committee? And third,
did the Army want to do these evaluations or were they forced
on the Army by OSD acquisition officials?
General Lennox. Congressman Reyes, if I could take one or
two of those parts, and then ask General Phillips to help on
the costing information.
We in conjunction with OSD came up with this strategy and I
think it is a very good one. As you know, the Ground Combat
Vehicle is the vehicle that carries our infantry soldiers, the
ones closest to combat. It is going to be the one that has to
provide the requisite protection, and we have learned over the
last 10 years that protection--every vehicle we make, we end up
adding more to it to increase protection for soldiers. And this
will be the first vehicle that will be built from the ground up
to do that protection.
We think we have a very good path that looks at both
developmental systems and non-developmental systems over the
next 2 years, approximately 2 years. And I think by this time
next year, we ought to have a good idea of looking at
alternatives and costing them to see what path might be the
best and, at the same time we are doing that, looking at
developmental systems and non-developmental systems, we are
going to be looking at requirements.
As Ms. Martin said, do we have them right, are they
affordable, how much extra power or how much protection is
enough, and all of these things come with costs, so do we have
this right or not. And we will be reviewing that and we think
we have a very good approach for getting that protection that
we need for our soldiers.
General Phillips. Sir, I would add a couple of things.
Through all the costing that Ms. Martin actually defined very
well, that we went through on GCV, we found out that we think
we could bring this vehicle in for about 9-10.5 million and
that is actually what was inside the RFP [request for proposal]
and what we are holding the two industry partners to the
standard. We don't yet know what the non-developmental items
will cost yet. That's why we are going to go out and take a
more deeper look at the vehicles that you just described, the
stretch Bradley and others, and potentially a Stryker that we
will take out to the desert.
Most importantly, we will take those vehicles out to White
Sands, and we will be able to put them in the hands of soldiers
and let them crawl around on them, use them in an operationally
relevant environment so we can learn as much from them as
possible.
Sir, I will make one other statement. We were not forced to
do this in any way. It was a full partnership with OSD and the
Army to go down this path.
And one other statement, sir, real quick. GCV is incredibly
important to the Army. After 10 years of war, we know that we
need an advanced infantry fighting vehicle to better protect
our soldiers, and this will be the first vehicle built from the
ground up to operate in an IED environment. When we look at
attrition of vehicles down range, the Bradley is the second-
most attrited vehicle. Now, we haven't had them in combat since
I believe 2007, 2008. So early up in the conflict, they were
getting attrited because of combat losses. We need a vehicle
that can withstand the rigor of combat full spectrum. GCV we
think is that vehicle.
Mr. Reyes. So again, building one from the ground up and
also testing, for instance, the Israeli vehicle and also the
stretch Bradley, as it is commonly called, moving on parallel
paths, at what point do you think that we are going to be able
to make a decision? Is that within the next 12 months?
General Phillips. Sir, probably in about the next 18
months. It will be 24 months to Milestone B, through the
technology development phase. So in about 18 months, we will
have better informed ourselves of the requirements, what type
of NDI [non-developmental item] solutions might be out there.
And that might inform us is there another vehicle out there
with an NDI-like solution that we could use. So, sir, in about
18 to 24 months, we will be able to come back to the committee
and let you know where we stand on that piece, sir.
Mr. Reyes. Are there any concerns or reservations
budgetwise in being able to keep this on track? I know it is
Army's number one priority, but all of us are very much
concerned as to what comes out of this in the next 30 days or
so.
General Phillips. Sir, I will let General Lennox jump on
this. But GCV is fully funded throughout--beyond the budget
years and through the POM [program objective memorandum] years
as well, so we are fully confident that we can execute the
strategy, the acquisition strategy, and that we will work with
our partners to able to make sure that it remains affordable.
What is critical getting to Milestone B is that we want the
best information possible as we execute Milestone B in 24
months. So we might refine the requirements and do more cost-
informed trades as we go down the path. That is why the NDI
solutions and taking the vehicles out and putting them out in
the desert and putting them in the hands of soldiers will
inform us better to make those potential trades.
General Lennox. Sir, you asked if we are worried about
funding and the answer is yes. Clearly we don't know the future
for 2012 and out. We have prioritized this in the Army's
funding, as you mentioned, but there is a lot of unknowns ahead
for all of us, I think.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you.
I will reserve my other questions for later, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
your testimony.
You kind of answered in a roundabout way my first question
about there not being procurement in fiscal year 2012 for the
Humvee, but as you talk about up-armoring these vehicles, what
is the life expectancy of the vehicle and are you actually
wearing on it more by up-armoring it?
General Lennox. I think you have hit upon an important
tradeoff for us. We are doing three things with our Light
Tactical Vehicles. We are doing a recap today of the existing
vehicles that are coming out of combat, and we are worried
about the weight of those vehicles carrying armor. They are at
about their capacity. So that is a big concern.
The second thing we are doing is we are looking at
potential of what you can do with this fleet of 150,000 Humvees
we have today in a program we call the MECV, and I hate to
confuse everybody with acronyms. It is the Modernized Expanded
Capability Vehicle, and we are experimenting over the next
couple of years to see if there is something you can do with
this platform that could bring new life to this vehicle. So
that is a second thing that we are doing.
And the third is we are looking at the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle, and we just recently worked very, very hard with the
Marine Corps to come to reasonable, affordable requirements of
this vehicle. And our strategy is to do that side by side with
the MECV, the JLTV and the MECV, in about 2 to 3 years, after
looking at what industry can do, make a decision about the way
forward informed by what industry can provide us.
Mr. Runyan. So in that decision process, are you--is your
readiness at a disadvantage there? Are you going to have an
influx of MRAPs or whatever in there also?
General Lennox. In the interim, sir, you are exactly right.
We will be leveraging the MRAPs and the MRAP ATVs. We have
about 25,000 of those, compared to 150,000 Light Tactical
Vehicles. So it is not enough with MRAPs and MRAP ATVs but it
is a sufficient mitigator for soldiers in combat today. That is
what we are using in combat.
Mr. Runyan. Next question I had was more--obviously, the
Abrams is going to be in service for, what, another 34 years,
and we kind of fell short on updating that in its full
efficiency. How do you guys look forward to actually making
that feasible because the numbers I am looking at, it saves
about a billion and a half in efficiencies over the lifespan.
General Lennox. Congressman, I think that is a big concern.
How do you modernize all of your combat vehicles while you are
trying to transform and get a new combat vehicle, the Ground
Combat Vehicle? How do you improve the ones you have to keep
them relevant? And then we have another grouping in there that
simply have to be replaced, our M113s.
So what we have tried to do is prioritize, and because the
Abrams is still the most capable main battle tank in the world,
we have prioritized that lower than some of the other things.
And what we approach it with is to do an engineering change
proposal and get at some of the space, weight, and power issues
now, and then look for a longer-term improvement that gets at
some of the concerns that you raise--energy usage, better
capabilities for the future.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Mr. Kissell.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our panel
that is here today for a very important conversation.
And I want to follow up a little bit, kind of in the same
neighborhood, and maybe rephrasing the question a little bit
about how we evaluate our needs. And we know that we have lots
of equipment left over that we are currently using that will be
left over. We know that we are engaged in active combat in
Afghanistan, pulling out of Iraq.
How much do you feel constrained to base your decisions
upon the equipment we have now versus what you think we might
need as we anticipate where the next challenge may be? Are we
making decisions based upon what we have and kind of thinking
maybe the next situation will be similar? Or would we really
rather break with what we have and go to new systems and trying
to figure out how to do that? I know that is somewhat a
complicated question, and I just wonder what your thoughts are
towards how you see this conflict.
General Lennox. You have hit the nail on the head in terms
of the challenges that we face when you do modernization. And
one of the officers that works for me said it better than
anybody else. We have kind of an unknown future. We don't know
what the threats will be that the Nation faces, but you have to
be ready for those both today and tomorrow. He likens it to
driving down a steep cliff in the dark and you can only see out
as far as your headlights. And I think that is a good analogy.
So we try to do incremental modernization so that you make
sure that what you have today is capable of fighting today, and
you make the incremental improvements that you can. But in
several cases, we are trying for transformation in our
technologies. An example is the network, our number one
priority, to get that down to the soldier and empower a soldier
today with digital information, with data, with voice
capabilities. We think that will be a transformation.
And additionally, the Ground Combat Vehicle. We think that
vehicle where we have the most soldiers right in the middle of
facing combat, we think we need to transform that capability as
well.
So those are really our capabilities that are focusing on
transformation. And by and large, the rest of them are focusing
on incremental improvements in this period of unknown threat in
the future.
Did that answer your question, sir?
Mr. Kissell. Yes, because obviously there is not a right or
wrong answer here. It is more of where our thoughts are going
and how we look at balancing this out. And I was just looking
for insight to that. And I thank you for that.
Someone mentioned to me--and I welcome anybody answering
this. Someone mentioned to me that we are cutting back on our
R&D, that there is so many more ideas we have out there that
could be useful, but we are cutting back on them because we
feel constrained, and maybe in part to keep using what we have
had. Maybe we don't want to put more resources over to R&D. But
it was said to me in a way that concerned me, because R&D is
the lifeblood of--someone mentioned we have got to learn to
live with less. Well, that living part is what it is all about,
because that is our soldiers. And we have got to have them
living with less but we can't--we have got to make sure we are
giving them what we need.
So do you have any concerns, any of you guys, in terms of
R&D; are we cutting back too much, are we missing some things
that we could utilize by not pursuing R&D.
General Phillips. Congressman, I will start and ask General
Lennox to weigh in.
Up front, we are concerned about the budget and how the
budget will work its way through, and what that will mean for
R&D; because as you said, most importantly, work on the
projects that we want to make sure that we maintain a world-
class Army and our soldiers with the best equipment in the
world, which is what they have today. And we can't stop
investing into their future.
It also has a tremendous impact on small businesses, and I
meet quite often with small businesses. And the first thing
they bring up is, what is going to happen with the R&D budget
and with SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] programs and
others that are so critical to the innovative research that is
ongoing in small businesses today? So as we look at the budget
it certainly becomes a balance as was just described, a balance
in how much you have in R&D and how much you have in the rest
of the program to be able to push Army modernization forward.
We have to sustain that balance. But we must continue to invest
at a certain level with our R&D programs.
Mr. Kissell. I know my time is running out but it is so
important that--you know, if you look at so many of our systems
now, like the UAVs; at one point in time that was R&D, and look
what it means to us now.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen and
ladies, once again.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Now, Mr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Contained in my district is Fort Polk, excellent Army base,
has the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Brigade of the 10th
Mountain Division. Though I served in the Navy, I am told by my
Army friends, my Marine friends, that your most important tool
is your rifle. For me in the Navy, it was chow. But for my Army
and Marine friends, they say it is your rifle. So I want to ask
about that.
Can you elaborate on the Army's strategy for procuring a
new carbine and for improving the current one? I understand
there is a dual strategy going on with that. Are these
strategies affordable and do you have adequate funding
available in fiscal year 2011 and projected in fiscal year
2012? Will this satisfy the requirements of USASOC [United
States Army Special Operations Command], and if not, can you
outline their modernization strategy for procuring the new
carbine?
General Phillips. Congressman, I will take the question.
As you said, we do have a dual strategy to upgrade the M4
carbine. And I will say up front, the M4 carbine is a
remarkable weapon. The experience that we have in combat
operations, we continue to measure that. The requirement for
the M4 is to have 600 mean rounds between systems abort. And we
are currently experiencing about 3,500. So it is more than five
times greater than the current requirement. So the current
carbine our soldiers are carrying down range is very good.
But we will continue to upgrade that carbine. We are going
through a series of upgrades. We have already done over 60, and
through full and open competition we are going to provide
additional upgrades for the carbine to enhance it in terms of
ambidextrous trigger and also a heavier barrel to give it more
capability to continue to improve.
And by the way, we are converting them from M4s to M4A1s.
Now the other piece of the strategy is we are going to go
out and look and see if there is an individual carbine that is
better than the M4 is today or the M4A1. So we issued an RFP
and put that on the street. We had an Industry Day back 30
March, issued the RFP on 29 June. It closes tomorrow. So we
will get feedback from industry and they will let us know what
carbine that they might be producing in the commercial world
potentially that might fit the bill for a new carbine inside
the Army. And we are going through various phases to be able to
determine whether or not industry has a better carbine than the
current M4A1 is today. And at the end of that process, we will
do a business case analysis to make sure that we are getting it
right, because again, our soldiers trust us that we are going
to give them the best equipment that we can.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you for that answer.
Also, I understand that the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio
Program has been canceled. Why? And what is the Army doing.
General Phillips. Sir, great question.
The Ground Mobile Radio went through a rigorous
comprehensive review between the Army and Office of the
Secretary of Defense that took about 60 days of intensive
review of the program itself. Up front I will state that the
GMR program itself is critical to the Army's network strategy.
We must have a GMR radio that will run the wideband networking
waveform and the soldier radio waveform. Absolutely critical.
So when we say ``termination,'' I will use these words. It
is a graceful termination. The current contract is with Boeing.
We are going to let that contract expire in March of 2012, and
it will terminate on its own. We are not going to renew the
contract. But the investments that the government has made in
GMR, which is significant, and what industry has also made, we
know through market research that there is a number of industry
partners out there that can deliver the hardware to run those
two waveforms that I just mentioned.
So part of our strategy is working with industry,
leveraging our investment, and we will soon put an RFP on the
street to ask for the hardware from industry, Ground Mobile
Radio to run those two waveforms, and that will happen probably
next month.
And sir, at the end of the day, this is positive for us. We
will get this radio quicker. It will be at a lower cost than
what the formal program would have delivered, and we will get
it in what we call capability set 13 and 14, so 8 brigades that
will deploy into combat operations will have a GMR radio
running those two waveforms. And we will test that out at the
Network Integration Exercise at White Sands as well.
So what we will do is put it in the hands of soldiers. And
when you put something in the hands of soldiers and you let
them run around with the equipment and use it, you get
remarkable feedback from our soldiers as to how well that
hardware will perform. We are excited about the strategy for
GMR, sir.
Dr. Fleming. Is that to say that the current Ground Radio
System we have is only one waveform?
General Phillips. No, sir. It was designed to run numerous
waveforms. The original program was a four-channel radio. We
will go in with a requirement for at least a two-channel radio,
and industry will come back with their solutions. And we think
we will get a much lower cost and capable radio that will
deliver those two waveforms. And also we are working with
legacy waveforms as well. They will be available at some point
to run on a GMR radio as well.
Sir, I hope that answers your question.
Dr. Fleming. Yes, it does. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here today to testify before us. Going
back to a couple of questions that Mr. Runyan had asked, one
regarding the Abrams that is going to be in service I expect
through 2045, talking about the commercial advances in engine
compressors result in significant fuel savings. Now, I know
that you weren't successful in getting the reprogramming to
initiate this program. But I am curious. You know, this is one
of the--fuel savings efficiency, extending the life
maintenance, is an issue that is important to me, along with--
when you talk about fuel savings, the APU [auxiliary power
unit]. I ask about this, I think, every time that we meet.
So I am curious about how the Army is going to fund this
effort to accelerate this critical cost-effective upgrade, and
I am looking back at the 2008 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act]: Establish an Army product improvement
program to implement reliability improvements. And I was
wondering if the Army is going to use this authority to address
these issues.
General Lennox. Sir, we didn't think that it fit in this
case. The requirements are that you have to have payback within
a year. We think in order to do this, this is going to take a
considerable effort. It may take 4 or 5 years of research and
development in order to get this capability. So what we have
done is deferred it, frankly.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Another issue that came up as you were
talking about the MECV and the JLTV concurrent development.
Now, I think it was just this week that General Odierno
believes that the renewed JLTV efforts are actually going to
produce a vehicle that is more capable, better, and almost as
inexpensive as recapping a Humvee. Now, would you agree that
the JLTV procurement over the Humvee recap is still the best
value for the government? Why, or why not?
General Lennox. Sir, I think we have a good strategy.
Mr. Critz. You are talking 2 to 3 years, right?
General Lennox. Yes, sir. To look at it in that time period
to make sure we have got it right, test those things, test to
see if they can protect soldiers, what kind of weight can they
carry, and see what industry can do.
General Phillips. Congressman, if I can add one comment. We
have learned a lot through the acquisition processes and
lessons learned from some of the challenges that we have had in
the past. So what you see with JLTV today and what we have also
described with GCV and with Paladin and with the M4 carbine, we
have brought the requirements and the resourcing and the
acquisition communities together to really drive after what
requirements are driving costs, what is necessary, what is
absolutely essential, and if it is not essential and it is a
high driver of cost, then we need to eliminate that
requirement.
That is exactly what we did with the Marines. When we
pulled the Marines inside the process that we used for GCV, it
was really overwhelming and powerful in terms of how we got to
the requirements for JLTV today. So I would just add that we
are very excited about what we can do with JLTV.
Mr. Critz. Okay. Quick question about the AMPV [Armored
Multi-Purpose Vehicle] program. Now it was 2007 when the M113
was terminated. I know the fiscal year 2012 budget includes
$31.4 million to start an M113 replacement program with LRIP
[low rate initial production] not happening until fiscal year
2016.
Now, looking back at how the Stryker vehicle was handled
was that 1999 chief of staff announced his intent to acquire
2000, an award is made, 2002 it is in production, or in
service, actually.
So is the Stryker model going to be used for the AMPV
program as to how we move this very quickly? Because certainly
in these trying budgetary times it would be most prudent, I
believe.
General Lennox. We are trying to figure out who can take
this one. I want to move it much faster, so I agree with you,
Congressman. I think this is a critical capability. We have
soldiers in combat today that are operating on vehicles. Then
we are going to ask them to come home and they are going to go
to their motor pools and they are going to see 113s and they
are going to change the oil on them, and they know they are not
going to take these things to combat. So we have got to figure
out a way to move faster on it.
The funding in 2012 is critical to that, frankly. We don't
currently have it designed on the pace and speed of Stryker.
There is a question of affordability, whether or not we can do
that, but frankly we have got to figure out a way of how to do
that faster.
General Phillips. Sir, we would certainly look at applying
the Stryker model and maybe doing it faster than Stryker did.
Stryker, I worked it from 4 years inside the building. And in
less than 4 years, 3/2 [Stryker Brigade Combat Team] out of
Fort Lewis deployed into combat, in less than 4 years from the
moment General Shinseki stepped on stage and said we are going
to do this. Really remarkable. And Army acquisition did that.
Light Utility Helicopter followed the model of Stryker. So we
can learn a lot from our successes in the past as well. We
would certainly look to use that opportunity.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I do have one more question on CROWS [Common
Remotely Operated Weapon Station], but I will wait for a second
round so others can get their questions in. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to cover some questions with force structure and the
soldier weight unit and the Stryker if we have time.
But with regard to force structure, and in terms of
equipping the force, what I would like to understand is the
relationship between the current requirement of 45 Active-Duty
brigade combat teams [BCT] and the cut to end strength of
27,000 soldiers between 2015 and 2016. So how do you plan and
program and budget for equipment, with a pending end strength
cut of 27,000 soldiers when it is conditions-based, and are
there plans to reduce the current requirement of 45 Active-Duty
BCTs and/or exchange for a current mix of heavy infantry or
Stryker brigades?
General Lennox. A short answer ma'am, yes, to all those
things. A challenge for us when you program for your equipment
for the future, and we are reducing in the last budget
submission 27,000 soldiers, we thought we had a pretty good eye
on what the end strength would be and the mix would be. And
obviously now with the change in the budget circumstances, we
are going through a process that says here is the national
military strategy, here needs to be the Army's strategy, here
is the force structure that supports that strategy, and here is
how we equip it. What is the mix of heavy, medium and light?
That work is going on right now, and it is a moving target
today. So I don't have a definitive answer for you, ma'am. It
has made our job a little bit tougher.
Mrs. Hartzler. I know it is a challenge and I empathize
with you and I wish it weren't so. I appreciate what you are
doing there.
As far as the soldier weight unit or weight-load capacity
and some of those issues, I know we had a hearing earlier in
one of my subcommittees on that, and I know there has been
efforts to try to reduce the weight reduction that our soldiers
carry. And from what some articles have said, there are 20,000
soldiers right now, non-deployable status due to muscle or bone
injuries that can be attributed to carrying heavy rucksacks
over rough terrain and often high altitudes over 15 months'
deployment.
So what improvements have been made in this issue to reduce
the loads since 2009? Where are we at on those initiatives?
General Phillips. Congresswoman, that is a great question.
General Lennox and I were just at a forward operating base not
far from the Pakistan border around Jalalabad, and we saw
soldiers that were on patrol that were walking around carrying
significant weight. We will never do enough to lighten the
weight of a soldier, but we put an incredible amount of R&D and
emphasis in it, everything from body armor to small arms to
ounces, taking off thermal weapons sights, and I will give you
just a couple of examples and ask General Lennox to join me.
Like the heavy machine gun, the M42 going to a lighter
machine gun, it saves about 36 pounds, and the tripod using
titanium and other alloy is obviously a little more expensive
but that saves about 16 pounds. If you add that up, it accounts
to about 50 to 55 pounds of weight saved off two soldiers
carrying that in combat operations. Thermal weapon sights that
save a pound or ounces. The enhanced combat helmet will save a
few ounces, 3 or 4 ounces itself. If we can give them a better
round that is more effective and they don't have to carry as
many rounds in combat operations, then that saves weight as
well.
Body armor. In Afghanistan they use the Soldier Plate
Carrier System. That saves on the average about 10 pounds from
soldiers when they have the authority to use the Plate Carrier
System.
Mountain boots. We were just there and we saw soldiers with
boots, so we have a better mountain boot headed to Afghanistan
today that is going to save about a pound each. And it is going
to actually wick moisture away and operate better in a high,
hot, mountainous environment. And there are lightweight mortars
and other systems that we are working on as well, ma'am. We
have to do more, though.
General Lennox. It is funny, ma'am. We have done all of
these things and when you go out and visit the soldiers like we
did, you find they are still carrying 100 to 130 pounds of
gear. So you take a little bit off and they will add something
on. Extra water, extra ammunition. So it is going to be a
constant challenge for us. We have requested about $80 million
in 2012 to look at further technologies and efforts to get
after those kind of things and continue the effort.
Mrs. Hartzler. We have a business in my district that is
doing some research on body armor, and the weight significantly
is less than what is currently out there. So I know there is a
lot of effort being made to try to do that. But it is still
shocking that you are carrying around 8-, 10-, 12-hour days,
whatever, that much weight.
General Phillips. Ma'am, we would be glad to hear from your
industry partners and their ideas.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. I guess we are done. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
your testimony. I know you are wrestling with some really tough
choices and I appreciate your great commitment to our country.
I had wanted to ask a question around the area of unmanned
systems. So given the successes we have seen I think in
protecting our men and women in uniform from IEDs and other
threats, I am concerned that the Army isn't fully invested in
the deployment of unmanned, future unmanned ground vehicle
systems to further support our troops. So I am just wondering,
is that the case? Is there a strategy in place? What do you see
coming?
General Lennox. Yes, ma'am. We had a program that was
producing a very large unmanned vehicle with autonomous
navigation system. It was very complex and expensive, and we
did stop that program.
We have sent to Afghanistan a variety of other programs
that have smaller vehicles, to try to get at understanding how
the soldiers would actually use those vehicles in combat. Are
they good replacements for trucks and to take some of the load
off off of the soldiers' backs or not. So we have some
experiments going in theater. We are hoping to learn from that
and inform us for the future in that regard.
Ms. Tsongas. So it is not necessarily a coherent strategy?
It is just sort of trying something, trying something else,
evolving with it?
General Lennox. I think we found what we were doing was
producing something that was not cost-effective, was very
expensive, and didn't produce the results we wanted. So really
what we are doing is seeing what soldiers want and what will
work as a way of informing us for the future.
Ms. Tsongas. I imagine there is some smaller--ways to deal
with this on a much smaller scale as well. I certainly have
companies in my district, in the robotics area, that are
constantly sort of coming at this in very different ways.
General Phillips. Ma'am, could I take that on for a second?
I would encourage the companies that you have within your
district or anywhere in the U.S. that are interested in this.
We are doing some remarkable work at the Network Integration
Evaluation out at White Sands and Fort Bliss, and we are asking
industry and partnering with industry to come and show us what
their great ideas are, based upon gaps that we have in the
Army. And General Lennox just described one of our gaps.
If there are companies that are interested in that, we
periodically will do this every 6 months, and will issue a RFI,
request for information, that will go out and is published on
the Federal Web pages. If companies have an interest in solving
one of those gaps, we certainly want them to come forward. And
those companies that you just described might be critical to us
identifying the right capability to meet a gap.
And what is important about White Sands is we can test it
in an operationally relevant environment before we take it down
range and then try to solve the problem with soldiers that are
in combat and performing combat operations. We can do that at
White Sands. So we want their feedback.
Ms. Tsongas. You raised an interesting issue. This past
week we had a district work period, and I have a lot--
Massachusetts is home to many, also clean energy companies, we
have a robotics cluster, we have a lot of clean energy
companies. And many of them were looking for ways to work with
the Defense Department. And we actually put together a session
in the morning in which representatives came to talk to these
companies. They are not in the SBIR community, they are not as
familiar with the processes. They are highly, highly
innovative, and see a real opportunity to work with the Defense
Department to solve some problems. So I can see where there are
many ways in which this is also in the robotics community as
well.
But it raises another issue, and that is I am going to
channel Congresswoman Giffords for a minute, and we do wish she
were here. But as you talk about modernization, how do you
think about energy consumption and how do you factor that into
your efforts going forward?
General Lennox. An important aspect, ma'am, an important
aspect in how we determine our requirements. We do look at
energy and energy consumption. And it is a factor as we look at
new purchases. So, for example, on the Ground Combat Vehicle,
one of our requirements is it needs to be more fuel-efficient-
per-pound a vehicle than its predecessor is. That doesn't mean,
unfortunately, it will be more fuel efficient overall, but we
will get a better aspect. And we are open to different kinds of
technologies, I don't know if I can talk about those
technologies, but different kinds of technologies that may come
with a program as a solution to that problem.
General Phillips. And, ma'am, we are ratcheting up our
emphasis on energy and energy efficiency. The JLTV has a
requirement similar to what General Lennox just described as
well. And we learned a lot from the technical development phase
which will all translate into the JLTV strategy that we are
pushing forward.
TRADOC, our TRADOC, Training and Doctorate Command,
continues to work on capability documents to address energy
efficiencies as well. And I think this will be an occurrence at
the NIE [Network Integration Evaluation], but we will ask for
companies to come forward and share with us their great ideas
on energy efficiency, it might be generators, it might be
something else, but to help us become more energy efficient. We
are taking that on and we are very serious about it as well.
Ms. Tsongas. I am glad to hear it. I can only see good
things coming with that. As you wrestle with the high cost of
energy, you have to look at ways to both conserve energy or use
alternative fuels, and the more you are able to work with the
private sector, and these very innovative thinkers out there, I
can only see good things coming. So I encourage you to continue
down that path. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Generals,
for being here today.
Can you talk a little bit or share what is the strategy or
plan to provide the Army with a modern Armed Aerial Scout
aircraft to replace the old OH-58?
General Phillips. Congressman, thanks. We are currently
looking for a fly-off over the next year, various commercial-
off-the-shelf, very limited adaptation platforms, that could
help us meet this requirement. It will be a challenge for us
with costing within our top line of the future. That will be a
big factor.
The capabilities of that aircraft, as you know, I think you
know better than anybody, our aircraft are being flown
significantly. The CH-47 Foxtrots are being flown
significantly. The Kiowa Warriors are being flown significantly
in theater. We have to find a replacement for the Kiowa
Warriors over time, it is an old platform. And this fly-off is
a little bit like the Stryker approach that we talked about
earlier, to try to see what candidates are out there.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Also, what is the Army strategy
going forward for the Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance
and Surveillance System [EMARSS]?
General Lennox. Under review right now, sir. I have said in
the press and probably spoke out of hand in the last couple
weeks, but we are looking seriously at a lot of these
capabilities. Can they be done in the Army? Should they be done
in the Air Force? How many of these platforms should be
purchased over time, and is the capability that is in theater
doing that mission today something that can be replicated very
quickly if you need it in the future?
So this aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft for example today,
has some SIGINT [signals intelligence] capabilities in the back
of it. Can that be replicated if you don't have a big
investment today? Can you rapidly replicate it in the future?
These are all of the things we are considering now in the
ultimate decision about the EMARSS aircraft.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Martin, Generals, thank you all for being here today.
As Mrs. Hartzler was asking you questions and the new boots
weighing a pound less, I was thinking back to around 8 years
ago when I retired after 31 years, and it is exciting to me and
I want to thank you that we have multiple generations of
improvements to uniforms and equipment from just the time that
I served. And indeed I point out to people, and I mean this as
a compliment to you, that my uniform would be more appropriate
in a museum. So it is just exciting, what you do.
I want to put a bug in your ear, too, that in the district
I represent, which includes the Savannah River Site, there is a
great deal of research for modular nuclear reactors. And these
to me are safe, secure, clean, but have extraordinary military
application on facilities such as Fort Jackson or actually more
remote. When I was at Kandahar, to see the size of Bagram-
Balad; the size of facilities and the security that could be
provided in a wonderful place that I greatly appreciate, the
island Territory of Guam. So I hope that you all are looking
into the advancing technology of modular nuclear reactors.
General Lennox, currently the Army is considering two
program solicitations, one for a new individual carbine to
replace the M4 and M16 and another for product improvements to
the current platforms. In your judgment, does the Army have the
funds to do both?
General Lennox. Congressman Wilson, I think that is a good
question. What we are trying to do now is see what improvements
we can make to the current M4, the M4A1, and it is performing,
the M4 itself is performing magnificently in combat today. The
M4A1 we are continuing to improve. In the meantime, we think
doing this carbine competition will inform us about what the
best path is in the future.
Now, affordability is going to be a big issue, frankly. We
have got about 500,000 M4s, and to start over from scratch will
be a challenge for us and it will be influenced by what the
budgetary environment looks like when we come to make this
decision. I think in about 3 years is the time frame for this.
So we are going to continue along this path. We are going to
see what industry is capable of producing. We think there is a
lot of exciting things being done out there, but affordability
is going to be an important fact.
Mr. Wilson. Another factor. Is there any assurance that you
can provide, the Army did not conceive the new carbine
requirements without first examining already existing new
weapons platforms such as the Special Operations Command
carbine competition?
General Phillips. Sir, I can confirm that. We looked
through market research, what currently exists inside the Army,
Special Operations Command, and in industry we looked
holistically before we proceeded with the program, sir.
Mr. Wilson. I have three sons serving in the Army, so I
actually have a personal interest. Thank you again for what
both of you all are doing.
Ms. Martin, as the Army approaches the launch of the
technology development phase of the Ground Combat Vehicle, what
do you see as the major areas of risk for this program to meet
the performance expectations within a 7-year schedule?
Ms. Martin. Thank you, Representative Wilson. As I
mentioned in the testimony, we have identified a number of
questions. One, urgency of the need, cost and affordability,
the robustness of the analysis of alternatives, and, again, the
plausibility of delivering on that schedule. And in the
technology, the development phase, as the generals have
mentioned, there will be an opportunity to not only look at the
vehicles that are being developed, but also look at non-
developmental items as well as refining the requirements.
So to the extent that these activities take place during
the technology development phase, that should position the Army
to be in a better place in 18 months to 2 years to be able to
make a decision as to whether a new vehicle is the right
answer, or maybe modifications to a current vehicle.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you for that very thorough response.
Thank you.
To both generals, as the Army prioritized components within
the product improvement program, can you distinguish between
sustainment and improvement?
General Lennox. I think both those are important aspects of
incremental modernization, Congressman. I think increasingly we
are looking at sustainment costs--I don't know that we have
always done that--and weighing that versus affordability in
making the initial improvements.
So some of the earlier comments we made about the big
savings you could make if you did something to the Abrams
engine are absolutely true. The question is can you afford to
do them or not. So we are weighing sustainment costs as an
aspect of this as we make decisions.
Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you all for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
Actually, Congressman Wilson touched on the M4 issue which is
what I was going to focus on. I appreciate that update. We will
be anxious to see what the results going forward are. My son
and I shoot our M4s pretty regularly, and the fact it allows me
to hit 200 yards out with open sights speaks to what a great
weapon it is, because I don't have that great a shooting
eyesight. But it certainly has a proven record, and I think the
balance that you are taking of whether you can up-improve it,
but also within budget constraints, is an important one in
finding that right match going forward.
The final comment is a word of thanks. I know the
assignment you both have been given, and your colleagues, of
continuing to meet the needs of our Army in these budget times
with the cuts that are coming is a challenging one, and we are
grateful for your leadership and your efforts in meeting that
challenge. I appreciate your service.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
As anticipated, most of the questions I thought needed to
be asked have been asked. I have just a couple of questions. I
have a brief question for the record.
On August 1, in response to a letter to the Secretary of
the Army, we got the response, ``The draft addendum does not
include a KPP [Key Performance Parameter] against rocket-
propelled grenades.'' However, General Odierno stated in
testimony on 21 July of this year, and I quote, ``The
competitive Humvee Recap Program will incorporate scalable
protection and plan for additional protection against rocket-
propelled grenades.''
It would seem to me to only make sense that the Army would
provide similar or greater protection against RPGs [rocket
propelled grenade] for the MECV Humvee Recap Program as is
provided today for the MATV.
And my question is, and give me a one word answer today,
and if you want to amplify, do that for the record: Can you
confirm that the Army plans to include RPG protection as a
requirement as part of the MECV Humvee Recap Program? A one
word answer, and then amplify for the record if you wish.
General Phillips. Sir, I will answer. The answer is yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. And you can amplify for the
record.
General Phillips. Sir, we will amplify for the record. We
learned so much from operations down range.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 71.]
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you so much.
I have a couple of questions for our witness from GAO. You
mentioned the requirements for one of our developments was not
achievable, and I have a question about requirements. We need
to ask two questions about requirements that I am not sure we
ask and adequately answer in our developments.
The first question is just that question: Is the
requirement achievable? And the second question is maybe an
even more important question: After you decide that yes, it is
achievable, then we need to know, do we really need to do all
that? Maybe getting 95 percent of the way there for half the
cost will be quite adequate. At some point my farmer friend
would say, I am not sure the juice is worth the squeezing. Do
you think that we have an adequate procedure for addressing
these two questions in our development programs?
Ms. Martin. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, I think within the
acquisition process there is ample opportunity to develop and
refine requirements, and I think all three of us have talked
about that process a bit today.
We sometimes start out with requirements that may be nice
to have, but as we go through the technology development and
other phases of the acquisition process, there are ample
opportunities to refine those requirements because we match
them with costs, with schedules, and determine affordability.
Certainly we saw with the JLTV program that some of the
original projected requirements, when they went into tech
development, were not achievable. To get the protection that
they needed, you would not be able to be able to still
transport the vehicle because it would weigh too much. So there
were some trades there. So, again, the acquisition process does
allow for trades in requirements.
General Lennox talked about the portfolio reviews. That is
another opportunity to really look at capabilities, look at
programs across a spectrum, and kind of determine there what do
we really need with respect to capabilities, what can we live
without? And in doing that, you have the opportunity to drive
down costs.
Mr. Bartlett. Our procurement history I think indicates
that we may not be aggressive enough in asking these questions
and answering them, because it is only in very rare development
cases that we do not have a program that runs too long and
costs too much as compared to our original expectations.
So I would hope that we might have a more vigorous dialogue
on these two things: First of all, is it attainable; and,
secondly, do you really need that much at that cost? Answering
these questions in today's environment is going to be even more
important.
As the Army proceeds to implement its Network Investment
Strategy, what advice would GAO offer the Army on how to
proceed? What are the major areas of risk for the Army to focus
its management and attention on?
Ms. Martin. As I mentioned in my short statement, we think
the evaluations that are taking place at Fort Bliss are a good
step forward. They allow the Army to identify some baseline
capabilities. There is an opportunity for incrementally
building on the capabilities that are there. Obviously, getting
input from the soldier is very important because they are the
ones that are ultimately using this equipment.
A couple of independent test evaluators have talked about
the importance of being able to gather kind of objective and
measurable data, and I think that is something that hopefully
the Army will do as they continue these evaluations. And we
also mention the importance of having overall requirements for
the network so that you fully understand how the various pieces
fit together.
But, by and large, we certainly think that these
evaluations are a positive step forward and can glean a lot of
really useful information as the Army moves forward.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. I have another comment or question
or two, but we will do that at the end of a second round of
questions.
My ranking member, Mr. Reyes.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one other
question. It is regarding the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile. Does
the Army still have a requirement for this weapon?
General Lennox. Yes, sir, we do.
Mr. Reyes. While the program has been delayed, are you
aware of any technical problems or major requirement changes
that might lead to a potential decision to terminate it?
General Lennox. Congressman Reyes, what we are struggling
with now is we have a number of the highest priority programs
that we want to fund, and then there is another tier that we
have to ask ourselves can you afford these in the future. JAGM
as a program has been very effective and is working without
problems, but it will ultimately be a question of
affordability. No decisions have been made yet, but that will
be one of the programs we are going to have to ask ourselves,
do you continue with Hellfire, which is doing well in combat
today, or do you go to the next generation? Kind of getting at
some of the conversations we have had earlier is incremental
improvement--or should we go to the next generation, and can
you afford to do that? And that will be something we will be
wrestling with.
Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
Mr. Bartlett. Mr. Critz.
Mr. Critz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In talking about the Commonly Remote Operative Weapons
Station, the CROWS system, I have three questions that revolve
around the CROWS, and mainly because I am a little baffled.
In the first performance specs on both the Humvee Recap and
the JLTV, they included a requirement for the CROWS. Subsequent
updates to both performance specs removed the CROWS
requirement. The alternative to having a CROWS system leaves a
gunner exposed to snipers and IEDs. We know that. With the
Army's commitment to the CROWS system as part of the Stryker
and MRAP programs, why would this capability be removed from
the Humvee Recap and the JLTV?
So I guess there are three questions: Is this system
working? Two, why was it removed from the spec? And if we are
dedicated to it in the Stryker and the MRAP, why aren't we
keeping it on the Humvee Recap and the JLTV?
General Phillips. Sir, CROWS is working well and in use, as
you just described, in MRAPs and other vehicles in combat
operations today.
Number two, the reason it was removed is because it will
remain a part of the actual system, and whoever results from
the winner of the MECV program, the Humvee Recap, will actually
be charged to integrate the CROWS system inside the vehicle
itself. So CROWS is actually a part of our program going
forward, even though it might not be an integral part of the
phase one, which is the RDT&E [research, development, test, and
evaluation] that we want the companies interested in the MECV
program to be interested or to come forward with. So it will be
a part of the final solution for both JLTV and for the MECV.
Mr. Critz. Okay. All right. Thanks. And one quick question.
On the MECV program, General Phillips, you had said that--
you sort of snickered when I asked about could we mirror the
Stryker, but then you said maybe you could do it quicker. Is
there anything--are you hinting or intimating there is
something we could do on this committee to be helpful in that
aspect?
General Phillips. Sir, if there is something that we need
your help with, we will certainly come forward and ask for your
help and support.
If I can talk about the acquisition process just for one
second, sometimes we hide behind the laws and the rules and the
statutory and policy requirements. I think if we try to work
within them better and to better understand them, we might be
able to accomplish the mission. And that is exactly what we did
with Stryker, what we did with the Light Utility Helicopter,
and it is what we are trying to do today with rapid acquisition
and a more agile acquisition process, using White Sands and the
NIE effort that we have ongoing.
So first we will work within the process itself and try to
achieve efficiencies. Sir, if we need your help, we will come
and ask you.
Mr. Critz. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
At least to some extent, what you all are now doing and
what we are doing here today in this hearing and the series of
hearings that we are having in this committee, are exercises in
futility, because there are two questions to which we do not
have an answer and we really need an answer to these two
questions before we can rationally and intelligently proceed.
One of those is what will be our future strategy. There is
a considerable concern that we will not be able to use our
military in the future the way we have used it in the past, and
we have not really come to terms with that. We do not have a
strategy. Until you have a strategy, you do not know what kind
of military you will need.
Having decided that question, then the next question to
which we do not have an answer is, how much money will we have?
So I apologize for the uncertainties that we labor under. We do
not know what our national strategy for the use of our military
will be for coming years and we do not know how much money we
will have to implement that strategy. So thank you for
persevering and serving your country in these difficult times.
Thank you very much for your testimony. Do the members of
the subcommittee have any additional questions or comments?
Okay. Thank you very much for being with us today.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 26, 2011
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October 26, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 26, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
General Lennox and General Phillips. Yes, the Army plans to
incorporate the requirement of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
protection as part of the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle (MECV)
Program. The MECV Program fully incorporates the concept of scalable
armor with a base cab protection of small arms protection or greater,
and B-kit armor to achieve protection similar to what is provided
across the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain vehicle fleet
today.
The MECV Performance Specification is broken into two sections; an
unclassified performance specification and a classified annex to that
performance specification. Both address the scalable armor MECV
specifications. Below is an unclassified excerpt of the RPG requirement
from the classified annex:
[The information referred to is For Official Use Only and is
retained in the committee files.]
[See page 22.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 26, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
Mr. Bartlett. How does the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) and MRAPs
fit into the wheeled vehicle fleet along with HMMWVs and JLTVs? Why not
just use the M-ATV and MRAPs which have proven to be combat effective?
General Lennox. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and
MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) fit into the tactical wheeled vehicle
fleet by complementing the light, medium and heavy systems.
Approximately 15,000 MRAPs and 5,000 MATVs were produced and fielded to
provide protected mobility for Soldiers supporting Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn. Of those
projected to return from theater to the Army, the Army currently
intends to place approximately 37% of the M-ATV and MRAP vehicles into
unit Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and within the training
base, 59% into Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), and 4% into war reserve
and contingency retention stocks to be available for future conflicts.
The MRAPs being placed on unit TOEs are primarily for missions
outside of the scope of HMMWV and JLTV. For example, MRAPs will be used
as Route Clearance Vehicles (RCVs) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) missions where their heavy armor and limited off-road ability fit
well with the RCV and EOD mission requirements.
For those MRAPs/M-ATVs being placed in APS, they will perform
missions close to those being executed successfully in operations
today. These do have an overlap with the HMMWV and JLTV mission set.
However, MRAP/M-ATV are: 1) insufficient in quantity to cover all Army
protected mobility needs (i.e., current projected MRAP/M-ATV
requirements are 46,000); 2) have limited off-road mobility for the
broad range of missions sets executed by light tactical vehicles; and
3) are not cost effective to field further (the current cost projection
for JLTV is 33% of the procurement and sustainment costs of MRAP/M-ATV
costs). MRAP/M-ATV are not a practical replacement for our entire light
tactical vehicle fleet requirement. JLTV capability is still required
to meet all requisite missions.
Mr. Bartlett. The 7-year GCV program has significant risk and is
very costly. What will the Army do if significant funding reductions
are made?
General Lennox. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is the objective
vehicle of the Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy. The GCV
allows an infantry squad to accompany tanks in both open and complex
terrain from initial contact to the objective. The GCV will fill
capability gaps that currently exist in the formation for force
protection, survivability, network interoperability, mobility, and
lethality. The system has an iterative design that will allow for the
growth of additional capabilities. The Army is committed to fully
resourcing the GCV and has already made trades within the combat
vehicle portfolio to ensure full funding of the GCV program.
Current funding develops critical technologies and allows for an
analysis of alternatives that will further inform GCV requirements. The
program is scheduled for Milestone B in 1QFY14.
In the event of further resource constraints, the Army intends to
continue full funding of the GCV as it is one of the Army's most
important programs
Mr. Bartlett. What is the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle
(MECV) program and how does it align with the Army's light tactical
vehicle strategy?
General Lennox. The MECV program supports the Army's Light Tactical
Vehicle (LTV) Strategy by filling the capability gap for External Air
Transport requirement for Air Assault missions that will not be filled
by the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The Strategy states that
the LTV fleet will be comprised of unarmored vehicles, UAHs and JLTVs.
The MECV is part of the UAH fleet and will have a greater protection
level as well as have the capability to be air-moved by the CH-47
helicopter.
It is also part of our modernization effort of the existing Up-
Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) fleet. The
MECV program is focused on providing about 6,000 vehicles or 1/10th of
the oldest UAH fleet with improved protection similar to that of the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle; while improving or
maintaining adequate off road mobility to support maneuver forces and
provide payload capacity to support mission requirements. On 20 July
2011, a Materiel Developmental Decision was approved and authorization
was granted for the MECV Competitive HMMWV Recapitalization Program to
enter into pre-Milestone C. The Milestone C decision is scheduled for
4th Quarter of FY13.
Mr. Bartlett. In regards to the Stryker Double V Hull, how many
does the Army plan to procure and does the Army plan to go back and
retrofit any current Stryker Brigades with the Double V Hull as they go
through the reset process?
General Lennox. The Army has a current procurement target of 2
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) with Double V Hulls (DVH), totaling
742 DVH Stryker vehicles, based on minimum operational and training
needs. It would cost $14B and approximately 14 years to outfit our
entire current Stryker fleet with DVH, assuming 4 years of Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation and conversion of one SBCT per year.
While this is a possible course of action, the Army is currently
evaluating options for the composition and structure of its combat
vehicle fleet. The Army currently has no plans to retrofit any current
Stryker Brigades with the DVH as they go through the reset process.
Once the Army decides on the appropriate fleet mix and number of combat
vehicles, the number of DVH Strykers, and variants of Strykers, will be
finalized.
Mr. Bartlett. With the Army termination of the Autonomous
Navigation System (ANS) prior to the Army obtaining the Technical Data
Package (TDP), will the upcoming JIEDDO Requirements cost the Army more
than completing the ANS to TDP? Is there merit in reviewing the ANS
capability on various platforms besides the MM-UGV?
General Phillips. Based on our analysis, it will cost the Army more
to complete the ANS TDP than the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) plans to spend on a competitive evaluation
of autonomous Counter Improvised Explosive Device solutions. The
estimated cost to complete the ANS TDP ($20M to $27.5M) would be
additive to the cost of either a competitive or sole source effort. The
Army decision to cancel the Multi-Mission Unmanned Ground Vehicle,
consisting of the ANS and Common Mobility Platform, was based on two
critical pieces of information: (1) Performance of the competitive
autonomy systems, and (2) lack of a documented requirement for the
Unmanned Ground Vehicle, to include the ANS.
There is little, if any, merit in reviewing the ANS capability on
other platforms because as determined during the Vice Chief of Staff,
Army directed assessment; there are many on-going efforts capable of
providing similar autonomous navigation capabilities. The JIEDDO
recognizes this and is using an open competitive call to meet their
needs at a potentially lower cost than the cost of ANS described above.
Mr. Bartlett. How does the MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) and MRAPs
fit into the wheeled vehicle fleet along with HMMWVs and JLTVs? Why not
just use the M-ATV and MRAPs which have proven to be combat effective?
General Phillips. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and
MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) fit into the tactical wheeled vehicle
fleet by complementing the light, medium and heavy systems.
Approximately 15,000 MRAPs and 5,000 MATVs were produced and fielded to
provide protected mobility for Soldiers supporting Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn. Of those
projected to return from theater to the Army, the Army currently
intends to place approximately 37% of the M-ATV and MRAP vehicles into
unit Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and within the training
base, 59% into Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), and 4% into war reserve
and contingency retention stocks to be available for future conflicts.
The MRAPs being placed on unit TOEs are primarily for missions
outside of the scope of HMMWV and JLTV. For example, MRAPs will be used
as Route Clearance Vehicles (RCVs) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) missions where their heavy armor and limited off-road ability fit
well with the RCV and EOD mission requirements.
For those MRAPs/M-ATVs being placed in APS, they will perform
missions close to those being executed successfully in operations
today. These do have an overlap with the HMMWV and JLTV mission set.
However, MRAP/M-ATV are: 1) insufficient in quantity to cover all Army
protected mobility needs (i.e., current projected MRAP/M-ATV
requirements are 46,000); 2) have limited off-road mobility for the
broad range of missions sets executed by light tactical vehicles; and
3) are not cost effective to field further (the current cost projection
for JLTV is 33% of the procurement and sustainment costs of MRAP/M-ATV
costs). MRAP/M-ATV are not a practical replacement for our entire light
tactical vehicle fleet requirement. JLTV capability is still required
to meet all requisite missions.
Mr. Bartlett. The 7-year GCV program has significant risk and is
very costly. What will the Army do if significant funding reductions
are made?
General Phillips. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is the objective
vehicle of the Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy. The GCV
allows an infantry squad to accompany tanks in both open and complex
terrain from initial contact to the objective. The GCV will fill
capability gaps that currently exist in the formation for force
protection, survivability, network interoperability, mobility, and
lethality. The system has an iterative design that will allow for the
growth of additional capabilities. The Army is committed to fully
resourcing the GCV and has already made trades within the combat
vehicle portfolio to ensure full funding of the GCV program.
Current funding develops critical technologies and allows for an
analysis of alternatives that will further inform GCV requirements. The
program is scheduled for Milestone B in 1QFY14.
In the event of further resource constraints, the Army intends to
continue full funding of the GCV as it is one of the Army's most
important programs.
Mr. Bartlett. What is the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle
(MECV) program and how does it align with the Army's light tactical
vehicle strategy?
General Phillips. The MECV program supports the Army's Light
Tactical Vehicle (LTV) Strategy by filling the capability gap for
External Air Transport requirement for Air Assault missions that will
not be filled by the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The Strategy
states that the LTV fleet will be comprised of unarmored vehicles, UAHs
and JLTVs. The MECV is part of the UAH fleet and will have a greater
protection level as well as have the capability to be air-moved by the
CH-47 helicopter.
It is also part of our modernization effort of the existing Up-
Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) fleet. The
MECV program is focused on providing about 6,000 vehicles or 1/10th of
the oldest UAH fleet with improved protection similar to that of the
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle; while improving or
maintaining adequate off road mobility to support maneuver forces and
provide payload capacity to support mission requirements. On 20 July
2011, a Materiel Developmental Decision was approved and authorization
was granted for the MECV Competitive HMMWV Recapitalization Program to
enter into pre-Milestone C. The Milestone C decision is scheduled for
4th Quarter of FY13.
Mr. Bartlett. In regards to the Stryker Double V Hull, how many
does the Army plan to procure and does the Army plan to go back and
retrofit any current Stryker Brigades with the Double V Hull as they go
through the reset process?
General Phillips. The Army has a current procurement target of 2
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) with Double V Hulls (DVH), totaling
742 DVH Stryker vehicles, based on minimum operational and training
needs. It would cost $14B and approximately 14 years to outfit our
entire current Stryker fleet with DVH, assuming 4 years of Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation and conversion of one SBCT per year.
While this is a possible course of action, the Army is currently
evaluating options for the composition and structure of its combat
vehicle fleet. The Army currently has no plans to retrofit any current
Stryker Brigades with the DVH as they go through the reset process.
Once the Army decides on the appropriate fleet mix and number of combat
vehicles, the number of DVH Strykers, and variants of Strykers, will be
finalized.
Mr. Bartlett. With the Army termination of the Autonomous
Navigation System (ANS) prior to the Army obtaining the Technical Data
Package (TDP), will the upcoming JIEDDO Requirements cost the Army more
than completing the ANS to TDP? Is there merit in reviewing the ANS
capability on various platforms besides the MM-UGV?
Ms. Martin. In response to a recent request from this Subcommittee,
we are starting a review of the Army's decision to cancel further
development of the Autonomous Navigation System (ANS). At this point,
we have not seen the upcoming JIEDDO requirements and do not know if
the ANS capabilities are applicable. In our forthcoming review, we
expect to develop an understanding of the ANS and how it fits with
other initiatives in the unmanned ground vehicle arena.
Mr. Bartlett. As the Army proceeds to implement its network
investment strategy, what advice would you offer the Army on how to
proceed? What are the major areas of risk for the Army to focus its
management attention?
Ms. Martin. The Army's network investment strategy has a number of
major areas of risk that deserve management attention. In our written
statement, we highlighted risks to the Army's strategy of proceeding
without:
Clearly defined requirements for the overall network and
articulating clearly defined capabilities for network components. These
are important so that the various capabilities the Army is developing
will work together as a network.
Realistic cost and schedule projections for meeting
incremental network objectives. We think it is a good idea to build on
current capabilities in an incremental fashion. However, cost and
schedule projections are important so that decision makers can
determine if progress is being made, reset objectives based on that
progress, and make informed decisions about further program
investments.
A clear strategy to take advantage of the potential test
data and information available from the Network Integration Evaluations
(NIE) both in terms of the existing network and potential improvements.
In terms of manpower, equipment, and logistics, these NIEs are
expensive endeavors and it is important to have a strategy in place to
fully capitalize on the resources and time invested in these
evaluations.
A well defined acquisition and contracting strategy for
funding and rapidly procuring promising network technologies. Such a
strategy will position the Army to procure the emerging technologies in
a timely manner and at a fair price.
Well-defined plans for developing and maturing software
defined radios and waveforms. These plans are important so that the
Army can make timely decisions about procuring radios in sync with
technically mature waveforms.
As it proceeds to implement its network investment strategy, our
advice would be for the Army to focus on resolving these risks to fully
capitalize on current and emerging network capabilities.
Mr. Bartlett. Similarly, from what you know so far, how do the
Army's plans for the Ground Combat Vehicle differ from its plans to
develop the manned ground vehicles within FCS?
Ms. Martin. The Army's plans for GCV are very different from the
Future Combat System's (FCS's) manned ground vehicle (MGV) plans from
both a vehicle capability perspective and a program management
perspective. MGVs were to be a family of vehicles while GCV is expected
to be a single purpose vehicle. The Army's intent with the MGVs was to
replace vehicle mass with superior information. In other words, the
vehicles would be much lighter than traditional combat vehicles and
rely less on armor and more on information superiority for their
survivability, which was to be provided by an advanced information
network. After the FCS termination, the Army changed its position,
realizing it could not completely eliminate the ``fog of war'' with
networking, and it presented a GCV concept that was predicated on a
more traditional vehicle protection approach that utilizes heavy armor.
The Army also appears to have tempered its desire for revolutionary
capabilities whose development would add cost and schedule risk to the
program. With FCS vehicles, the Army wanted a number of capabilities--
advanced information network, lightweight armor, and active protection
system--that required significant advancements in technology. With GCV,
the Army cancelled the original request for proposals over concerns
that requirements were too demanding. Since then, the Army has revised
its requirements and is allowing contractors to propose alternative
ways to provide certain GCV capabilities.
The Army's acquisition plans for GCV are very different and much
more conventional than its earlier MGV plans. The FCS program entered
system development after a 1-year concept and technology demonstration
period. It was approved for development despite having immature
technologies and poorly defined requirements. Because of the FCS
program's ambitious goals, the Army did not feel that it had the
capacity to manage the program. As a result, the Army decided to employ
a lead systems integrator to assist in defining, developing, and
integrating FCS. The role of the integrator was not simply that of a
traditional prime contractor but also included some elements of a
partner to the government in ensuring the design, development, and
prototype implementation of the FCS network and family of systems
(including the MGV's). The FCS MGV's were 6 years into development
before the program had accumulated enough knowledge to consider having
a preliminary design review. At about the same time, the Secretary of
Defense decided to cancel the MGV portion of the FCS program. With GCV,
the Army is planning a 2-year technology development phase and is
encouraging the contractors to use mature technologies in their
subsystem designs. The Army plans to manage the GCV program in a more
conventional manner. The Army will be using at least two contractors in
technology development in an attempt to encourage innovation and
competition and expects to have competing contractors in system
development as well. The Army has shown flexibility on detailed GCV
requirements and plans to have a preliminary design review prior to
completion of the technology development phase.
Mr. Bartlett. As the Army approaches the launch of the technology
development phase for the Ground Combat Vehicle, what do you see as the
major areas of risk for this program to meet its performance
expectations within a 7-year schedule?
Ms. Martin. In March 2011, we reported that as it approached a
Milestone A review, key questions on GCV pertain to how urgently it is
needed, robustness of the analysis of alternatives, its cost and
affordability, plausibility of its schedule, and
whether mature technologies will be used. We noted the importance of
addressing such questions to getting a good start on demonstrating the
match between GCV requirements and resources by the end of the
technology development phase. In our October written statement, we
noted that while the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics agreed that the Army had a priority need for
a GCV, the number of caveats in the approval memorandum--which
permitted the start of the technology development phase--raises
questions about the soundness of the Army's acquisition plans and
timelines. The Army is now conducting a more robust analysis of
alternatives that considers non-developmental vehicles and their
potential to provide an infantry fighting vehicle capability instead of
a new vehicle program. The Army and its contractors will be expected to
continue making capability and requirements trades in order to achieve
a realistic vehicle design that can yield a first production vehicle
within 7 years. The Army will face a challenge in achieving a fixed
procurement cost target for GCV given that independent cost estimates
are at least 30 percent higher than Army estimates. The expected
reduction in the defense budget may impact GCV funding even with the
Army making adjustments in its combat vehicle portfolio to make funding
GCV a priority. While the Army has encouraged contractors to use mature
technologies, it is not clear whether this is happening. The use of
mature technologies can contribute to better acquisition program
outcomes, while the use of immature technologies can be a leading
indicator that programs are less likely to succeed within planned cost
and schedule resources. Delivering a feasible, cost-effective, and
executable GCV solution presents a major challenge to the Army. Over
the next two years during the technology development phase, the Army
faces major challenges in deciding which capabilities to pursue and
include in a GCV vehicle design and determine whether the best option
is a new vehicle or modifications to a current vehicle.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. In working with the bases in my state, I understand the
Army has a goal to have a joint multi-role aircraft for rotary wing
transport on the books by 2030. The concern is that emphasis has been
placed on modernizing our current rotary wing fleet and we may have
lost sight on moving to a new platform. Current platforms are going
limited even with modernization in several areas that we must move
forward including: need crafts to go faster than 200 knots, reducing
logistic footprint and reduce fuel consumption. With all of the
concerns of what the action of Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction will have on DOD appropriations, what will the possible
reduction in appropriations do in impacting that deadline?
General Lennox. Reductions in appropriations for the Department of
Defense could delay the development of technologies which could be
applicable to the Joint Multi-Role Aircraft (JMR). Stable funding is
key to developing and maturing these required technologies.
The Army fully intends to continue to pursue development of the JMR
in an attempt to fill capability gaps that cannot be addressed now
because current technologies are either infeasible or too immature.
These capability gaps are in the areas of survivability, lethality,
performance, maintainability, supportability, flexibility, and
versatility. Development of the JMR will lead to common aircraft
components that will be scalable in size and will provide a common
aircraft architecture that will support mission-specific equipment
packages to meet future vertical lift requirements.
While the Army pursues the development of the JMR, it must also
continue with modernization efforts on current platforms to ensure that
Army aviation units are modular, capable, lethal, tailorable, and
sustainable. These modernization efforts mitigate capability gaps until
the JMR technologies mature.
Mrs. Roby. I proudly represent the Second District of Alabama that
has Fort Rucker--the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence. Last week, we had the privilege of Chairman McKeon visiting
the base and to see the training that our rotary wing aviators go
through and the great work that our soldiers are doing there. Our
rotary wing war fighters have been key to our mission in the Middle
East.
However, helicopter incidents are the third-leading cause of
fatalities in the Iraq War. In Afghanistan, in 2008 helicopter-related
losses was the number 1 cause of deaths with direct fire being the
second cause and IED attacks as third. Weather-related issues,
disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes and
flying into terrain of which the pilot was unaware accounts for 80
percent of Iraq and
Afghanistan helicopter losses. Environmental conditions affect every
facet of rotary wing operations. However, many of these losses can be
mitigated with various new technologies, glass cockpit, and other
capabilities to give the pilot the necessary tools.
My question is how is the Army moving to encompassing these new
instruments and capabilities to provide the war fighter with the
necessary tools to mitigate many of these causes of helicopter
incidents?
General Lennox. Every aircraft currently under procurement has a
fully modernized cockpit which includes flight symbology for all modes
of flight, moving maps and enhanced flight controls improving
controllability.
The Army is demonstrating significant improvement in the most
damaging class of accidents attributed to Degraded Visual Environment
(DVE). This improvement may be attributed to the ongoing aircraft
modernization investment, however, DVE remains a significant factor in
the majority of non-hostile accidents. Despite noted improvements, the
Army continues to evaluate potential systems to enhance the pilot's
ability to maintain situational awareness when visual references are
lost. In addition, we are seeking focused solutions including active
radar penetrating sensors to ``see through'' brownout in the non-
modernized fleet which may also supplement our modernized fleet's
capability. As technology improves the Army will continue to develop
the right mix of mission planning systems, symbology, flight controls,
displays and sensors to turn DVE from a hazard to a tactical advantage
on the battlefield.
Mrs. Roby. In working with the bases in my state, I understand the
Army has a goal to have a joint multi-role aircraft for rotary wing
transport on the books by 2030. The concern is that emphasis has been
placed on modernizing our current rotary wing fleet and we may have
lost sight on moving to a new platform. Current platforms are going
limited even with modernization in several areas that we must move
forward including: need crafts to go faster than 200 knots, reducing
logistic footprint and reduce fuel consumption. With all of the
concerns of what the action of Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction will have on DOD appropriations, what will the possible
reduction in appropriations do in impacting that deadline?
General Phillips. Reductions in appropriations for the Department
of Defense could delay the development of technologies which could be
applicable to the Joint Multi-Role Aircraft (JMR). Stable funding is
key to developing and maturing these required technologies.
The Army fully intends to continue to pursue development of the JMR
in an attempt to fill capability gaps that cannot be addressed now
because current technologies are either infeasible or too immature.
These capability gaps are in the areas of survivability, lethality,
performance, maintainability, supportability, flexibility, and
versatility. Development of the JMR will lead to common aircraft
components that will be scalable in size and will provide a common
aircraft architecture that will support mission-specific equipment
packages to meet future vertical lift requirements.
While the Army pursues the development of the JMR, it must also
continue with modernization efforts on current platforms to ensure that
Army aviation units are modular, capable, lethal, tailorable, and
sustainable. These modernization efforts mitigate capability gaps until
the JMR technologies mature.
Mrs. Roby. I proudly represent the Second District of Alabama that
has Fort Rucker-the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence. Last week, we had the privilege of Chairman McKeon visiting
the base and to see the training that our rotary wing aviators go
through and the great work that our soldiers are doing there. Our
rotary wing war fighters have been key to our mission in the Middle
East.
However, helicopter incidents are the third-leading cause of
fatalities in the Iraq War. In Afghanistan, in 2008 helicopter-related
losses was the number 1 cause of deaths with direct fire being the
second cause and IED attacks as third. Weather-related issues,
disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes and
flying into terrain of which the pilot was unaware accounts for 80
percent of Iraq and Afghanistan helicopter losses. Environmental
conditions affect every facet of rotary wing operations. However, many
of these losses can be mitigated with various new technologies, glass
cockpit, and other capabilities to give the pilot the necessary tools.
My question is how is the Army moving to encompassing these new
instruments and capabilities to provide the war fighter with the
necessary tools to mitigate many of these causes of helicopter
incidents?
General Phillips. Every aircraft currently under procurement has a
fully modernized cockpit which includes flight symbology for all modes
of flight, moving maps and enhanced flight controls improving
controllability.
The Army is demonstrating significant improvement in the most
damaging class of accidents attributed to Degraded Visual Environment
(DVE). This improvement may be attributed to the ongoing aircraft
modernization investment, however, DVE remains a significant factor in
the majority of non-hostile accidents. Despite noted improvements, the
Army continues to evaluate potential systems to enhance the pilot's
ability to maintain situational awareness when visual references are
lost. In addition, we are seeking focused solutions including active
radar penetrating sensors to ``see through'' brownout in the non-
modernized fleet which may also supplement our modernized fleet's
capability. As technology improves the Army will continue to develop
the right mix of mission planning systems, symbology, flight controls,
displays and sensors to turn DVE from a hazard to a tactical advantage
on the battlefield.
Mrs. Roby. My understanding is that the Army had been looking to
have a new joint multi-role rotary wing aircraft by 2030. What are the
plans of the Army in continuing to move forward with this development
of a new platform? With current cuts and possible additional cuts due
to the Budget Control Act, what possible impact can it have to the 2030
timeframe?
Ms. Martin. Based on our previous work, we know that the Army
decided over the last few years to focus its attention and resources on
upgrading and maintaining its current rotary wing aircraft fleet. There
are several reasons for this decision. For example, that fleet was
being used extensively in the ongoing war efforts. The Army also
concluded that the current fleet would be sufficiently capable at least
for the near- and mid-term. In addition, the Army concluded that
developing a new generation of rotary wing aircraft would be a major
effort with significant cost and technical risks. Nevertheless, the
Army has recently released to industry a request for information on
potential capabilities for a Joint Multi-Role helicopter. With the
prospects for reductions in DOD and Army acquisition accounts, however,
it is unclear at this time when a rotary wing aircraft development
program will be started.
Mrs. Roby. I proudly represent the Second District of Alabama that
has Fort Rucker-the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence. Last week, we had the privilege of Chairman McKeon visiting
the base and to see the training that our rotary wing aviators go
through and the great work that our soldiers are doing there. Our
rotary wing war fighters have been key to our mission in the Middle
East.
However, helicopter incidents are the third-leading cause of
fatalities in the Iraq War. In Afghanistan, in 2008 helicopter-related
losses was the number 1 cause of deaths with direct fire being the
second cause and IED attacks as third. Weather-related issues,
disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes and
flying into terrain of which the pilot was unaware accounts for 80
percent of Iraq and Afghanistan helicopter losses. Environmental
conditions affect every facet of rotary wing operations. However, many
of these losses can be mitigated with various new technologies, glass
cockpit, and other capabilities to give the pilot the necessary tools.
My question is how is the Army moving to encompassing these new
instruments and capabilities to provide the war fighter with the
necessary tools to mitigate many of these causes of helicopter
incidents?
Ms. Martin. We are aware of the Army's attempts to address some of
its issues with operating helicopters in the Middle East through the
Joint Urgent Operational Needs/rapid acquisition process, but we do not
know the status or results of the Army efforts.
Mrs. Roby. In working with the bases in my state, I understand the
Army has a goal to have a joint multi-role aircraft for rotary wing
transport on the books by 2030. The concern is that emphasis has been
placed on modernizing our current rotary wing fleet and we may have
lost sight on moving to a new platform. Current platforms are going
limited even with modernization in several areas that we must move
forward including: need crafts to go faster than 200 knots, reducing
logistic footprint and reduce fuel consumption. With all of the
concerns of what the action of Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction will have on DOD appropriations, what will the possible
reduction in appropriations do in impacting that deadline?
Ms. Martin. Based on our previous work, we know that the Army
decided over the last few years to focus its attention and resources on
upgrading and maintaining its current rotary wing aircraft fleet. There
are several reasons for this decision. For example, that fleet was
being used extensively in the ongoing war efforts. The Army also
concluded that the current fleet would be sufficiently capable at least
for the near- and mid-term. In addition, the Army concluded that
developing a new generation of rotary wing aircraft would be a major
effort with significant cost and technical risks. Nevertheless, the
Army has recently released to industry a request for information on
potential capabilities for a Joint Multi-Role helicopter. With the
prospects for reductions in DOD and Army acquisition accounts, however,
it is unclear at this time when a rotary wing aircraft development
program will be started.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. I understand there has been some confusion as to who
will maintain control over the tactical ISR requirements and
capabilities for EMARSS, and about the future of the EMARSS program
itself. What is the Army's strategy going forward for EMARSS? Can you
provide similar analysis on the strategy for the Joint Air-to-Ground
Missile (JAGM) Program?
General Lennox. The Army is currently executing the Enhanced Medium
Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System (EMARSS) Program to
build four Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) aircraft,
and is on track to deliver these aircraft by December 2012. The Army
will conduct developmental and operational testing in support of a
Fiscal Year 2013 Milestone C decision. The Army's acquisition objective
at Milestone B was 36 aircraft.
Concurrently, the Army has placed the EMARSS program strategy under
review. The Army is taking a serious look at EMARSS and similar
capabilities, such as the Air Force's Liberty Project and the Army's
Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System. This review is
a coordinated effort with the Air Force to identify potential areas of
joint efficiencies, while continuing to provide the best possible
tactical aerial intelligence support to the Soldier on the ground.
Included in this strategy review are discussions on service oversight
and required quantities of aircraft across the services.
At this time, there are no Department of Defense (DOD) decisions
transferring or terminating the EMARSS Program, and it is still a
subject for program review. An Inter-service transfer of any of these
programs is one of many courses of action being considered. As the DOD
faces fiscal constraints, the Army is exploring joint interdependent
options to field the right mixture of aerial intelligence systems.
The Army intends to provide candid program updates as the EMARSS
strategy becomes more refined in the coming months.
Considering the JAGM strategy the Army is following a Three-Phased
Acquisition Approach:
1.) Technology Development (TD) Phase consisted of two contractors
being awarded fixed-price incentive firm (FPIF) contracts competing
over a 27-month period through Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Both
contractors successfully completed this phase and their Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) proposals are currently being reviewed
in the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) process. One contractor
team will be down-selected at Milestone B and awarded a 4-year EMD
Contract.
Mr. Owens. What is the strategy or plan to provide the Army with a
modern Armed Aerial Scout aircraft to replace the old OH-58? I would be
interested to see your analysis on the cost/benefit implications for
continually upgrading existing aircraft as opposed to fielding a new
platform.
General Lennox. The strategy or plan to replace the OH-58 has not
been fully determined. An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is currently
being conducted to analyze the question of whether to continue to
upgrade the OH-58 or to develop a more capable platform. Cancellation
of both the RAH66 Comanche Helicopter in 2004 and the Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) in 2008 required that the Army pursue a
two-fold strategy to address the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) capability.
First, the current OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) fleet needed various
upgrades to close existing obsolescence, safety, and weight issues
experienced during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through
the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP). CASUP is the
acquisition program that will upgrade the OH-58 aircraft. First Unit
Equipped (FUE) is slated for FY16 with a scheduled completion by FY21.
Secondly, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was needed to address
capability requirements for the AAS and to recommend solutions to
either replace or upgrade the KW. The Training and Doctrine Command
Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Leavenworth was tasked to perform the
AoA and to specifically research the costs/benefits of investing in
future upgrades to the OH-58F versus a new start program. Those results
will be published with the release of the AoA. Initial findings briefed
by TRAC in May 2011 stated that a new start program would provide
performance improvements, but at a significantly higher cost. A program
that offered a Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) or Government Off The
Shelf (GOTS) solution could potentially provide an affordable aircraft
with trades in performance and schedule.
The AoA was initially planned for completion in April 2011, but the
Army requested an extension of the AoA with a flight demonstration in
order to consider recent industry improvements in technology and
aircraft performance. This information must be considered in order for
the Army to make the most informed decision it can regarding the
benefits of staying with the OH-58 or moving to another more capable
platform. The data gained from the demonstration will provide
information necessary to enable the Army to decide to either retain the
OH-58F and invest in future improvements or to start a new AAS program.