[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AUTHORIZING THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEARS
2012 AND 2013
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 2, 2011 and JULY 12, 2011
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Serial No. 112-28
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Mo Brooks, Alabama Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Thomas McDaniels, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 2011
STATEMENT
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
WITNESS
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers of Alabama for John S.
Pistole........................................................ 29
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for
John S. Pistole................................................ 33
TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2011
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 49
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 50
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Thomas L. Farmer, Assistant Vice President for Security,
Safety, and Operations, Association of American Railroads:
Oral Statement................................................. 63
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
Mr. Martin Rojas, Vice President for Security and Operations,
American Trucking Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 70
Prepared Statement............................................. 72
Ms. Wanda Y. Dunham, Assistant General Manager and Chief of
Police and Emergency Management, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 76
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
Mr. Raymond J. Reese, Corporate Health, Safety, and Security
Leader, Colonial Pipeline Company, On Behalf of The Association
of Oil Pipe Lines and the American Petroleum Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 80
Prepared Statement............................................. 81
Mr. John Risch, III, Alternate National Legislative Director,
United Transportation Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 85
Prepared Statement............................................. 87
Panel II
Mr. Nicholas E. Calio, President and Chief Executive Officer, Air
Transport Association of America, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 102
Prepared Statement............................................. 104
Mr. Mark Van Tine, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Jeppesen, On Behalf of the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 107
Prepared Statement............................................. 108
Mr. Stephen A. Alterman, President, Cargo Airline Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 113
Prepared Statement............................................. 114
Mr. Christopher Witkowski, Director of Air Safety, Health, and
Security, Association of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO:
Oral Statement................................................. 117
Prepared Statement............................................. 119
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Letter From the Airforwarders Association...................... 53
Statement of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association........ 55
Letter From the Air Line Pilots Association, International..... 57
Statement of the National Air Carrier Association.............. 59
Letter From R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President,
Government Affairs, Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America................................................... 61
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
List, ``2011 In-Flight Incidents Involving Flight Attendants''. 51
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers for Thomas L. Farmer......... 131
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Thomas L.
Farmer......................................................... 131
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Martin Rojas 131
Question From Chairman Mike Rogers for Wanda Y. Dunham........... 132
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Wanda Y.
Dunham......................................................... 132
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Raymond
Reese.......................................................... 132
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for John Risch,
III............................................................ 132
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Nicholas E.
Calio.......................................................... 133
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers for Mark Van Tine............ 133
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers for Stephen A. Alterman...... 133
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher
Witkowski...................................................... 133
AUTHORIZING THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEARS
2012 AND 2013
----------
Thursday, June 2, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:03 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Walberg, Cravaack, Jackson
Lee, and Davis.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to welcome everybody to this
hearing and thank our witnesses for being here.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss priorities for
authorizing TSA to carry out its mission to keep America's
transportation system safe from terrorists. This year, the
committee plans to develop a TSA authorization bill which would
enhance and streamline TSA's transportation security
initiatives. For the record, Mr. Pistole, we are going to try
to have that in July, early July, to develop that authorization
bill.
TSA, like all organizations, has offices that could
function more efficiently and effectively. It is the
subcommittee's goal to improve TSA operations through oversight
and legislation and to fulfill our responsibility to
constituents by ensuring that taxpayer dollars are being spent
in a cost-effective manner.
We appreciate the TSA's collaboration and input throughout
this effort. Administrator Pistole, I agree with your vision
for TSA, to develop a more risk-based approach toward passenger
screening. A ``trusted traveler'' program would allow TSA to
determine the level of threat posed by an individual and
dedicate more resources to unknown or high-risk passengers.
I look forward to hearing an update on the status of the
plan and the proposed parameters of a pilot or a larger-scale
implementation. I hope TSA will consider this committee as a
partner in the development and implementation of this type of
passenger-screening reform.
Additionally, I hope to hear more about the priorities that
we have discussed both publicly and privately, such as air
cargo security, information sharing, and rail security
initiatives.
Since the foiled Yemen cargo plot last October, TSA has
been working with private industry to develop and implement
short-term security directives which seem to be successful in
addressing certain vulnerabilities. However, no long-term plan
has been formally outlined, and challenges remain.
In addition, the intelligence gathered from bin Laden's
compound serves as notice that terrorists continue to target
our surface transportation systems. Given the threats we face,
it is critical that the resources that are available are spent
effectively and with stakeholder input.
Mr. Pistole, I look forward to your testimony on this and
other critical issues. I also want to highlight that the
committee developed a TSA authorization bill last Congress, as
well as H.R. 2200 under Ranking Member Jackson Lee's
leadership. I look forward to working with her on a bipartisan
basis throughout this effort.
Ms. Jackson Lee is on her way, and when she gets here, I
will recognize her for a statement. But you are up, Mr.
Pistole.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Chairman Rogers and Members
of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
to discuss TSA's operations as you continue your important work
in putting together a TSA authorization bill.
Much has happened since the last time I appeared before the
subcommittee on February 10. Most significantly, Osama bin
Laden is no longer with us. While his killing is significant,
it does not, of course, mark the end of our effort to fight
violent extremism. We have always known that the threat we face
is bigger than any one person, just as we know that there are
more terrorist groups plotting against us than al-Qaeda. So we
remain vigilant in pursuing our vital mission of protecting the
traveling public and safeguarding our Nation's transportation
systems.
Since 9/11, together, we have implemented multiple layers
of risk-based, intelligence-driven security measures: Dedicated
transportation security officers, TSOs, continue working as the
last line of defense; Federal air marshals patrolling the
skies; behavior detection officers observing suspicious
activity; mass transit and passenger rail security experts
partnering with local authorities to deliver the tools they
need to do their jobs; VIPR teams using K-9 assets to patrol
all transportation venues, adding another layer of security
against the terrorist threat. Our transportation security
inspectors and other members of the TSA workforce continue to
play their key roles in keeping us safe.
All of these individual measures, and others, combine to
create a multilayered system of transportation security that
mitigates risk. No measure on its own solves all of our
challenges, but, in combination, they create a strong,
formidable system. This is an approach with which you are
intimately familiar. Indeed, your support for these operations
has contributed immeasurably to their success.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you ways to
improve our existing efforts and to explore new and innovative
techniques for Congress to consider in a TSA authorization
bill, all in our current budget climate.
Now, two brief points regarding the budget. First, I am
critically assessing TSA's operations at our headquarters level
and in our field operations, with the goal of achieving
efficiencies across the board. Second, the President's budget
includes a $1.50-per-passenger fee which is critical to funding
the security operations we employ to keep the over 1.7 million
passengers safe and secure each day in the United States. I
strongly urge this committee to support that fee, thereby
saving taxpayers approximately $590 million in fiscal year 2012
alone.
Regarding risk-based security, since I became TSA
administrator nearly a year ago, I have solicited ideas from
people with diverse backgrounds and disciplines, from our
dedicated workforce to our counterparts abroad, to airport and
aviation executives and, of course, this subcommittee, about
how TSA can work better. I have watched with great interest as
specific proposals have been offered up by highly regarded
voices in the security community.
As I stated previously, I believe that TSA must develop and
implement smarter ways of performing its risk-based,
intelligence-driven operations. If we can do that, we can move
away from what seems to be a one-size-fits-all approach and
stay ahead of the terrorists who are continually seeking new
ways to undermine and defeat our security.
As we look for ways to evolve, we will move forward with a
few fundamental principles--three principles. First, we must
ensure than any new step we take strengthens security. Second,
we must recognize that the vast majority of the hundreds of
millions of people who use our transportation systems every
year present little to perhaps no risk of committing an act of
terrorism. Then, third, while we can mitigate risk, we must be
honest with ourselves and the public in acknowledging that we
will never fully eliminate all risk.
With these principles in mind, we have been exploring ways
we can get smarter, improve security, and enhance the travel
experience for most people. For many, a change in TSA's
approach cannot come soon enough, and the proof will be in how
any changes are designed and implemented. We all wish it were
simple and that we could make significant changes tomorrow, but
you know as well as I that that is not the case. So while we
pursue a new approach to passenger screening, we still have a
job to do today.
I would like to take a moment to thank the transportation
security officers and all the men and women of TSA, who
continue to faithfully and diligently perform their duties in
the face of negative reporting and even efforts to criminalize
their jobs. Effective TSOs result in effective security, both
today and in the future. So this will be an on-going
collaborative effort.
In the nearly 10 years since 9/11, we have done important
work to keep the travelling public safe with this committee's
support. So I look forward to building on our already-strong
relationship as we continue, together, to work to improve
security in the next decade. Thank you for your support and
constructive engagement.
[The statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
June 2, 2011
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today as the subcommittee begins
consideration of a Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
authorization bill.
TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to
maximize transportation security to stay ahead of the evolving
terrorist threat while protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating
the flow of legitimate commerce. TSA works collaboratively with
industry partners to develop and implement programs that promote
commerce while enhancing security and mitigating the risk to our
Nation's transportation system. We also work closely with other Federal
agencies and maximize participation from State, local, Tribal, and
private sector stakeholders to work toward a common goal of securing
all modes of transportation, including aviation and surface
transportation systems.
TSA has implemented an effective and dynamic security system in the
aviation domain consisting of multiple layers of risk-based measures.
In the aviation arena, our security approach begins well in advance of
a traveler's arrival at an airport, with our vetting programs and
intelligence analysts, cargo and compliance inspectors ensuring that
airport security plans are followed, and our law enforcement and
intelligence community partners working to detect, deter, and prevent
terrorist plots before they happen. The security system continues at
the airport, including, but not limited to, the work of our Behavior
Detection Officers (BDO); Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and
the technology that supports the screening of passengers and baggage;
Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO); and canine teams, as well as our
partnerships with local law enforcement. In flight, thousands of
Federal Air Marshals (FAM) and Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO)
protect the traveling public. The traveling public also plays an
integral part role in the security system. For example, the DHS ``If
You See Something, Say Something'' campaign engages the public and key
frontline employees to identify and report indicators of terrorism,
crime, and other threats to the proper transportation and law
enforcement authorities.
In the surface transportation arena, we continue to work with our
law enforcement and security partners to reduce vulnerabilities and
strengthen resilience against a terrorist attack. TSA works with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency Grants Program Directorate to
direct Federal grants to the most at-risk transit properties. Our
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors assist with the development
of specific security programs. Our Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams are deployed on thousands of mass transit,
pipeline, maritime, and highway missions annually to enhance security,
provide deterrent and detection capabilities, and introduce an element
of unpredictability in security practices and procedures in order to
prevent or disrupt potential terrorist planning activities.
TSA also conducts protection, response, detection, and assessment
activities in airports and other transportation systems; trains and
manages all armed pilots; and coordinates all TSA canine assets. Our
personnel are continually adjusting and adapting security practices and
procedures to best address evolving threats and vulnerabilities, and
disrupt the ability of terrorists to plan and execute attacks.
TSA SECURITY OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENTS
TSA works diligently to protect the U.S. transportation domain
against evolving threats to security. We continue to modernize our
technology, including Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). We have
deployed nearly 500 AIT machines at domestic airports throughout the
country to enhance security by safely screening passengers for metallic
and non-metallic weapons and explosives--including objects concealed
under layers of clothing, while protecting the privacy of the traveler.
We will procure and deploy an additional 500 AIT units using fiscal
year 2011 funds for a total of 1,000 AIT units, which will allow us to
screen an estimated 60 percent of passengers using this technology. We
have also deployed new portable explosive trace detection machines,
Advanced Technology X-ray systems, and bottled liquid scanners to
enhance our security technology in the aviation domain. This suite of
technologies represents the most effective means of detecting current
threats available today.
In order to continue the deployment of this critical layer of
security, the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request includes
$105.2 million in base and additional funding to deploy and staff 275
additional AIT units, bringing total coverage to 1,275 AITs by the end
of 2012 and providing coverage to 80 percent of passengers.
Congressional funding directly affects our ability to deploy this
critical technology.
While we are rapidly deploying AIT machines to U.S. airports, we
also are exploring enhancements to privacy protections and operational
utility. Specifically, TSA has field tested auto-detection software for
AIT machines, referred to as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR). ATR
eliminates passenger-specific images of a passenger and instead
highlights a detected anomaly on a generic outline of a person. Pat-
downs used to resolve such anomalies are limited to the areas of the
body displaying an alarm unless the number of anomalies detected
requires a full-body pat down. If no anomalies are detected, the screen
displays the word ``OK'' with no icon. With ATR, the screen will be
located on the outside of the machine and can be viewed by the TSO and
the passenger.
As with current AIT software, ATR-enabled units deployed at
airports are not capable of storing or printing images. The ATR
software eliminates the need for a TSO to view passenger images in a
separate room because no visual image of the passenger is produced,
reducing associated staffing and construction costs. ATR software
represents a substantial step forward in addressing passenger privacy
concerns, while maintaining TSA's standards for detection. TSA plans to
continually update and test enhanced versions of the software in order
to ensure that technology with the highest detection standards is in
use.
In addition to deploying the most effective technology, we have
also deployed additional BDOs, FAMs, and explosives-detection canine
teams at airports throughout the country. We have implemented security
measures for all air carriers with international flights to the United
States that use real-time, threat-based intelligence to better mitigate
the evolving terrorist threat. Last November, we achieved a major
aviation security milestone: 100 percent of passengers on flights
within, departing from, or bound for the United States are now checked
by TSA against Government watch lists through the Secure Flight
Program, as recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report. Continuous
Secure Flight vetting begins 72 hours in advance of flight and
continues until the flight departs, consistently providing insight into
potential threats and enabling TSA and our law enforcement partners to
counter these threats accordingly.
State Laws That Could Adversely Impact AIT Deployment
It is fitting that, as this subcommittee considers new authorizing
legislation for TSA, we address an issue that has recently received
some media attention. Since the deployment of AIT and the
implementation of our revised pat-down procedures at airport
checkpoints Nation-wide to better detect prohibited items and resolve
anomalies that are detected on passengers, some State legislatures have
introduced legislation that would ban AIT units and even criminalize
certain TSA pat-down procedures. It is TSA's position that, since TSA
is a Federal agency, individual States are preempted from interfering
with the deployment of TSA personnel and equipment in carrying out
statutorily mandated security programs that are necessary to keep our
aviation security system strong and safe for the traveling public. It
is also important for our workforce to know TSA will stand by them as
they execute their important responsibilities. State law proposals that
would attempt to restrict cooperation between airport authorities and
TSA in performing security measures diminish aviation security and
leave the aviation system more vulnerable to a real and continuing
terrorist threat.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
TSA's efforts in the surface transportation domain are undertaken
to reduce security vulnerabilities and to strengthen resilience against
a terrorist attack. TSA works with its partners to secure and safeguard
the surface transportation domain--which includes subways, bus transit
systems, ferries, pipelines, the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (AMTRAK), commuter railroads, and freight railroads, among
others--through a variety of programs. Many of these programs enhance
security by addressing policy gaps and obstacles, enhancing
coordination and unity of effort, and maximizing the strengths and
capabilities of our partners, keeping with the themes that guided the
March 2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment.
Because mass transit and passenger rail systems serve large
populations in major metropolitan areas, many with substantial
underground infrastructure, bridges, and transportation staging areas,
or hubs, which can include other forms of transportation, these systems
remain a target for terrorist groups. The characteristics essential to
mass transit and passenger rail--i.e., an inherently open architecture
moving large populations in major metropolitan areas through multimodal
systems and infrastructure--create potential security vulnerabilities.
TSA uses a collaborative approach--working with State and local law
enforcement and transit authorities--to assess risks and enhance
security.
TSA's role in surface transportation security involves direct
engagement with surface transportation owners and operators to
establish security standards, provide grant funding, share current risk
information and assess security measures. For example, TSA uses the
Transportation Systems Sector Risk Assessment to evaluate threat,
vulnerability, and consequence in a wide range of terrorist attack
scenarios for each mode of transportation. To help address the results
of these assessments, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) provides awards to eligible
transit agencies to assist State and local governments in devising and
implementing initiatives to improve security. The TSGP promotes a
sustainable, risk-based effort to protect critical surface
transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of
terrorism. In 2011, DHS announced a new model for TSGP to focus limited
resources on ``shovel-ready'' projects hardening the highest-risk
transit infrastructure, while prioritizing operational deterrence
activities such as training, exercises, canine, and mobile screening
teams.
TSA also currently operates 25 VIPR teams across the transportation
sector, and the fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding for 12
additional multi-modal VIPR teams. These teams consist of personnel
with expertise in inspection, behavior detection, security screening,
and law enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout
the transportation sector to deter potential terrorist acts. There have
been more than 3,000 VIPR operations in the current fiscal year, 70
percent of which occurred in the surface transportation sector.
In addition, structural vulnerability assessments are currently
being conducted on the Nation's most critical highway, bridge, and
tunnel infrastructure. These assessments, performed for TSA by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, are the most comprehensive assessments that
have ever been performed. Additional assessment visits are also taking
place at the State level and in conjunction with the companies that
transport goods and passengers across the country. Finally, TSA is
delivering security awareness training to the highway transport
community; more than 200,000 individuals have been trained by the TSA-
directed ``First ObserverTM'' program and similar TSA-
sponsored training. Further, in response to a strong demand, TSA has
distributed counterterrorism guides throughout the trucking, motor
coach, school transportation, and infrastructure community.
Air Cargo Security
TSA has and will continue to focus air cargo resources to ensure
continued compliance domestically with the 100 percent screening
requirement, and to work toward further risk-based screening of
international inbound air cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft.
Along with its participation in the DHS Air Cargo Security Working
Group established by Secretary Napolitano, TSA is continuing its
leadership role in partnering with industry and other Federal
Government partners to develop strategies to strengthen air cargo
security while facilitating the flow of commerce. In January 2011, TSA
issued proposed air carrier security program changes to increase
security measures for air cargo, most notably, to require 100 percent
screening for in-bound international air cargo transported on passenger
aircraft by the end of this calendar year. TSA is currently finalizing
its analysis of industry comments. TSA is also working closely with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the air cargo industry to
receive and process pre-departure, advanced air cargo information about
shippers earlier than is currently required so that we can increase the
focus of our screening resources on high-threat cargo. TSA will also
continue its efforts to test, evaluate, and qualify air cargo screening
technologies.
TSA EXPLOSIVE DETECTION INITIATIVES
TSA continually seeks to enhance capabilities for explosives
detection as part of its risk-based and intelligence-driven strategy.
To enhance our application and deployment of explosive detection
canines, TSA partners with academic, research, and professional
organizations with the appropriate research capabilities to develop,
explore, and implement emerging explosive detection methodologies that
have been subjected to extensive, rigorous research and testing.
Further, TSA works with these organizations to determine how to harness
these methodologies to gain the maximum explosives detection efficiency
in the transportation system.
Last January, TSA, in partnership with the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate, initiated a pilot program to evaluate 10 air
scenting explosives detection canine teams, utilizing the methodology
developed by Auburn University known as ``vapor wake'' explosives
detection. The methodology relies on the canine's ability to process
air currents and recognize odors that it is trained to detect, whether
the scent emanates from a person who is moving or standing still, or an
inanimate object. Neither the canine nor the handler needs to come into
direct physical contact with a person who may be a potential target--in
fact, the canines can detect a scent even if the potential threat has
left the immediate area and track the scent to its current location. A
major advantage of this methodology is that the handler is trained to
read the canine's behavioral changes to determine when and where the
canine is alerting to an explosives odor, on a subject, without the
knowledge of the targeted subject.
A RISK-BASED STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE
TSA's existing security measures create a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. No layer on its own solves
all our challenges, but, in combination, they create a strong and
formidable system. In the months ahead, I am optimistic that we will be
able to brief this subcommittee and others in Congress about some
initial steps we are taking to further enhance security by becoming
even more risk-based in our approach to aviation security.
As our risk-based approach evolves, we must ensure that each new
step we take strengthens security. Since the vast majority of the 628
million annual air travelers present little to no risk of committing an
act of terrorism, we should focus on those who present the greatest
risk, thereby improving security and the travel experience for everyone
else. Since I became TSA Administrator a year ago, I have listened to
ideas from people all over the world, from our dedicated workforce to
our counterparts abroad, about how TSA can work better and smarter.
Last fall I directed the agency to explore ways to develop a strategy
for truly risk-based security. That strategy will examine the
procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures
are carried out, and how screening is conducted. While TSA currently
implements a risk-based security system, we must continue to assess our
programs to evolve our security approach to stay ahead of tomorrow's
security threats.
To that end, we are working to expand our ability to conduct more
identity-based screening. This is evident in our work on a new
crewmember screening system. We are currently testing an identity-based
system to enable TSA security officers to positively verify the
identity and employment status of pilots. We hold pilots responsible
for the safety of the traveling public every time they fly a plane. It
just makes sense to treat them as trusted partners, as well.
While the initial iteration of this risk-based screening focuses on
pilots, we are also looking at long-term concepts to focus limited
resources on higher-risk passengers, while expediting and enhancing the
passenger experience at the airports whenever possible. This will be an
on-going, collaborative effort with law enforcement, airport
authorities, and the traveling public. As our risk-based screening
evolves, we will continue to incorporate random security steps as well
as other measures both seen and unseen.
2011 AUTHORIZATION BILL
As the subcommittee considers a TSA authorization bill, two issues
that deserve close consideration include the following:
Aviation Security Service Fee
Since its establishment in 2001 as part of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, the Passenger Civil Aviation Security
Service Fee has been limited to $2.50 per passenger enplanement with a
maximum fee of $5.00 per one-way trip and has not been adjusted for
inflation or the increased costs of providing security over the past 9
years. Despite Congress's original intent that the security fee cover
nearly all costs related to passenger and property screening, the fee
currently offsets less than a third of the total cost of aviation
security. At the same time, costs of security have continued to
increase. In fiscal year 2010, the average cost for the TSA to screen a
passenger and baggage was nearly $9; in 2000, the cost was less than a
dollar per passenger.
We ask that the subcommittee give serious consideration to the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget proposal to permit DHS/TSA to
gradually increase the Passenger Civil Aviation Security Service Fee.
This adjustment will ensure that we are able to continue the
significant progress we have made in enhancing aviation security while
fulfilling Congress' intent to do so in a fiscally responsible manner
that does not penalize American taxpayers.
Procuring and Installing EDS Equipment with ASCF Funding
As you know, current law requires the first $250 million derived
from passenger and air carrier security fees in fiscal years 2004
through 2028 to be deposited in an Aviation Security Capital Fund
(ASCF).
The ASCF is distributed to airports through grants for airport
security capital improvement projects. These projects typically include
facility modifications, design and build-out for integrated baggage
handling, and Explosives Detection Systems (EDS). These grants cannot
be used for the procurement and installation of the actual explosives
detection equipment that these modifications are designed to
accommodate, however, because TSA, and not the airports who receive
these grants, is responsible for the procurement and installation of
that equipment.
TSA has already funded, or is currently funding, most of the
projects eligible for ASCF funding and does not expect applications for
many new eligible projects in the foreseeable future. A critical need
exists, on the other hand, for TSA to procure and install large
quantities of the EDS equipment itself, in order to replace aging and
less up-to-date security technologies. TSA currently has approximately
2,000 EDS units deployed Nation-wide. By 2013, almost half of those
units will have reached the end of the anticipated useful life of 10
years. Because the EDS equipment is an integral part of the projects
Congress intended to fund with the ASCF, we ask this subcommittee to
give serious consideration to correcting this situation by adopting a
provision to permit the ASCF to be used for the procurement and
installation of EDS equipment.
Additionally, current law requires TSA to issue letters of intent
(LOI), which are agreements to provide funding over a period of several
years. Again, the major projects for which such funding would be
appropriate have already been funded. On the other hand, there is a
need to fund smaller capital projects through single-year funding. We
request this subcommittee consider amending the law to permit use of
the ASCF in this manner. With these two amendments to the ASCF
language, TSA could more effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously
plan and implement the necessary acquisition and replacement of
existing EDS units, and provide funding to airports for smaller capital
aviation security projects that do not require multi-year funding.
CONCLUSION
I want to thank the subcommittee for its continued assistance to
TSA and for the opportunity to discuss our programs as the subcommittee
initiates its work on a TSA authorization bill. I am pleased to answer
any questions you might have.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
We will go ahead and move to questions. I do want to go
ahead and let you know that we are probably going to be called
for votes around 4:45, 4:50, somewhere in there. So we are
going to try to move this along and get as much in the record
as we can.
First thing, as you know, I am very interested in the
known-traveler program and doing some things to focus our
limited resources on the real threat-based risk. What I would
like for you to do is give us a report on the status of the
development and implementation of that known-traveler program.
Some people call it the ``trusted traveler'' program, but
whatever.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, some people
refer to a ``trusted traveler,'' which may imply that everybody
else is not trusted, and some people refer to ``known.''
Whatever we call it, we look at it as a risk-based security
initiative within TSA and the Department of Homeland Security
where we can focus our limited resources on those that we know
the least about, who may cause us the most problem.
So the idea is, in very general terms, that those people
willing to share information with us about their travel
histories, their travel patterns, perhaps what is in their
frequent-flyer account, that we can make informed judgments
about them that may expedite their security screening.
That may look different at our 450 airports around the
country, just because of the checkpoint configuration. But the
idea would be to allow that person who has shared information
with us, that we can make an informed judgment about, that that
person would be allowed to be expedited in how they are
physically screened.
The first example that we have of this is with the actual
pilots of the aircraft that we are trying to finalize. We are
in the process of finalizing the system with the airline
associations and the pilot associations to do an identity-based
screening for them. We also are working with the Flight
Attendants Association to do the same thing with them, after
the pilots' program is working, because they are the most known
and trusted--the pilots and then the flight crews.
As we work through those that we know more about, then we
can make similar judgments, allowing us to improve security, I
believe, by focusing on those that we don't know much about.
Obviously, in Secure Flight, we know the three data fields--
name, date of birth, and gender--which allows us to determine
whether somebody is on a watch list or not, but it does not
really give us much more information.
Again, for those who are willing to share information with
us, then we will work through that to provide that streamlined
processing, using more intelligence on the front end, more
identity-based, and, frankly, getting away from some of the
physical screening that we have come to be known for in doing
our thorough security.
There is a lot more to it, but that is where we are now. We
hope to be doing some more testing this summer, doing some
education and training for our workforce on how this would
look. Then in the fall, we hope to try some pilot projects on
this in certain airports and just see what it would look like,
recognizing, again, that some airports may be able to have a
dedicated lane for these people who are in the known- or
trusted-traveler program, but it would not be the same in every
airport. So we need to manage expectations with the traveling
public.
The one thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that it would
not be a program that people would pay a fee to join, a program
such as Global Entry. But people in Global Entry, for example,
where we already know a lot about them, would be part of this
known group. They have already submitted to a background, they
have been interviewed and things like that. There are other
groups of people, obviously, those both in the private sector,
the public sector, people with Top Secret security clearances,
any number of people that we can look at and--a lot more
detail, but that is it in a nutshell.
Mr. Rogers. All right. So, the pilot programs by the end of
this summer. Then what time line do you think you will be able
to take the lessons learned and incorporate that into a more
global----
Mr. Pistole. So, actually, we would do the internal work
this summer, in terms of enhanced behavior detection work and
training our workforce in how would they handle these people,
because there are a lot of issues in terms of the hand-off and
who goes where for what. So we will spend the summer making
sure that is working.
So we are actually looking at the fall of doing these trial
efforts in several airports, working with several airlines. So
we are really looking at this fall for that and then much more
expanded as we go into 2012.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
I wanted to ask you a little bit about an update on the air
cargo aircraft after the Yemen terrorist attack. What kind of
modifications have you made to prepare precautions for that
kind of attack again?
Mr. Pistole. So, since the Yemen cargo plot of October 28
and 29 of last year, we have worked very closely with industry,
in terms of coming up with, again, a risk-based approach to
what makes sense that they can provide, we and they and host
countries can provide, the best possible screening for those
unknown shippers or unknown shipments. Those are the two
criteria that we are looking at.
So, as opposed to having just an across-the-board rule that
says, this will be the same screening for every package, every
piece of cargo, every piece of mail that goes in passenger
planes and things, we are trying to tailor it. Having some
great work by industry, FedEx and UPS domestically, DHL, other
cargo carriers, working very closely with us to implement and
effect those changes that provide for better security so we
will have the best intelligence-based reasons for doing
screening, as opposed to just a blanket screening protocol
across the board.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from
Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. I appreciate you coming here today and advising
us about this very important aspect of our National security.
Sir, in your written testimony, you mention that the TSA is
rapidly deploying AIT machines to the U.S. airports and
exploring enhancements to the privacy protections. Do you have
a time line for how long this is going to take, to fully fit
all the AIT machines with automatic target recognition software
that would eliminate passenger-specific images from being
generated during the TSA screening?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Congressman Cravaack. Thank you.
We have approximately half of our nearly 500 machines out
there right now, which have the capability for being upgraded,
if you will, to the automatic target recognition. We have done
pilot work in three airports--Atlanta, Las Vegas, and Reagan
National--with good success. So, by that, I mean, our expected
rates, in terms of detection and false positives and
throughput, some of the basic criteria, have all been positive.
So, for half of those machines, so about 240-plus, the plan
is, assuming a couple more things are done in the next week or
2, that we would modify those throughout the rest of this year,
the calendar year, 2011.
The other manufacturer that has not quite developed that
protocol with the software and the depiction of the generic
outline of a person, we are doing lab testing over the next
couple months and hope to field-test their software in the fall
and, assuming everything goes well, follow very shortly with
the rest of those machines, which, as you noted, completely
address, I believe, the privacy issues because there is not an
image of a person, it is just a generic outline of a person,
with an area of any anomalies highlighted.
So that is where we are.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Thank you, sir, on that one.
The other thing I have is a question in regards to--the
complaints that I hear from the majority of people that I speak
with regarding TSA usually are person-to-person type of issues,
going through the checkpoints, things like that. What kind of
standardization process--I mean, and I experience--obviously, I
am on the road quite a bit. I experience it, myself. I have to
take off my belt, at this station, at this city, sometimes. I
was wondering, how can you address the standardization issue?
The other aspect is, your personnel that work at these
checkpoints, do they get training on how to basically interact
with the public? You see some stations that are extremely
professional, and then you have other stations that look like a
bunch of high schoolers having a fun day on a break. Could you
comment on that?
Mr. Pistole. So, on the standardization issue, part of it
may be driven by whether they have the advanced imaging
technology, which does require a belt to come off and
everything to come out of pockets, whereas--and we have that in
75 airports or so. I will have to check on that, the exact
number. So if they just have to walk-through metal detectors,
you probably don't have to take your belt off unless it has a
large metal buckle or something like that, but typically not.
So that is one issue.
In terms of the training, every new TSO goes through
training in terms of, not only as a security apparatus and
protocols, but in customer service. Some, as you note, do it
better than others. We try to do retraining for those that we
have issues with or that people have complained about,
basically. Then, if appropriate, we take disciplinary action if
it rises to a level of unprofessionalism as opposed to just not
being good customer service.
The bottom line is, we tell them to focus on the security
aspects, but the better they can engage a passenger, you know,
the 1.7 million every day--the vast majority are positive. I do
receive some positive comments, from time to time, from
passengers who get my e-mail or something. But those that we
learn about are often the ones that have not been the most
positive.
Mr. Cravaack. I appreciate that. Just to clarify, what I
was talking about was going, actually, through the scanners
themselves. Some places, I do; some places, I don't. Being a
part of this committee, it just adds a little bit of a question
mark in my mind, what is the proper standardization? Being an
old Navy pilot, standardization is the key, and so I just
wanted to comment on that.
But, otherwise, sir, thank you for everything that you do.
Thank you for all the great TSA agents that do their job
exceptionally well every day.
With that 10 seconds, sir, I will yield back.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you for your support, Congressman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I would love to have seen the investigation into who leaked
your e-mail address in-house. I bet it was vigorous.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, let me turn to another area. I would like to
turn to the rulemaking for frontline surface employee training
and security assessments, which are required by the 9/11 Act.
These regulations are more than 2 years overdue. Can you tell
us what has been causing the delay in getting these rules done?
I ask because the scope of the rulemaking will determine
the amount of surface inspectors required for both regulatory
and industry stakeholder consultation purposes. So I would
appreciate knowing what is holding that up.
Mr. Pistole. So, just to clarify, Congressman, the
rulemaking as it relates to--what was the specific area?
Mr. Davis. Rulemaking, training, and security assessments.
Mr. Pistole. So, if I understand the question, in terms of
our surface transportation inspectors, is that where you are
focusing?
Mr. Davis. Right.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. So there has been a lot of work done in
terms of a workforce assessment. Then I am, frankly, not quite
sure on the rulemaking as it relates to that, so I will have to
get back with you on that. I am not following exactly what that
is.
But I would be glad to talk about the surface inspector
program, in general, and the training with that, if that is
what you are----
Mr. Davis. Yeah.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. So, as you know, we have nearly 2,000
inspectors overall, some in aviation, some cargo, about 400 or
so in surface, 120 in K-9 cargo, 84 international inspectors.
The surface inspectors, of course, do much in the area of rail,
both passenger and freight rail, in terms of working with the
industry to assess vulnerabilities.
One of the key areas of success has been in terms of the
toxic inhalation hazard and working, in a voluntary way, with
industry, where we identified some vulnerabilities and gaps
through what is known as BASE, which is a baseline assessment
security evaluation. Because of those vulnerability
assessments, industry, on their own, decided to make some
changes in the way that railcars with toxic gases and things,
where they sat overnight, for example, or how much time they
spent, for example, going through downtown Washington, DC, and
could they re-route and things like that.
So industry actually made a number of substantial changes
that reduced the risk 50 percent in the last 2 years and over
90 percent in the last 5 years, without regulation. So it is
that type of partnership that we are looking for with industry
to address those issues.
Mr. Davis. All right.
Let me ask you, regarding the new grant guidance that was
released by the Department last month, a revised risk formula
will be used when considering applicants.
My question is twofold: What was TSA's role in developing
the new grant guidance with other Department components and
stakeholders? Second, how do you anticipate this new grant
guidance will impact mass transit agencies across the country?
Mr. Pistole. The TSA's role in the development of the
guidance was to work closely, particularly with FEMA and with
the Department of Homeland Security, to look at a couple of
broad areas.
One is, do we take these funds and try to spread them out
across the country, even including areas that have not been
identified as high-risk and try to do what some people describe
as a peanut-butter approach: Do we just spread it out evenly
across the country without regard to risk?
Or, my preference was, and is, that we look at what the
intelligence tells us to be a risk-based organization and say,
let's focus our money that is administered through FEMA in
areas that we know are the greatest risk, so whether it is
Chicago, whether it is New York, the District of Columbia, Los
Angeles. My hometown in central Indiana is a great hometown,
but it has never once come up in the threat matrix. So it is
just something that--the idea is, how can we use our money
intelligently to augment and enhance those efforts?
So that is our role in it. As it relates to mass transit,
the idea is to provide those funds to those mass transit
components, such as the New York transit system with over 5
million passengers every day in the subway; Chicago, obviously
the L and the Chicago Transit Authority, a lesser number. But,
still, those are higher-risk areas. So that is the approach.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Pistole, for being here with us today. Thank
you for the work you do. Thankless, in many cases, but so
necessary.
I don't like going through AITs. It is not because of the
laughter as I am standing on the yellow footprints. But it
certainly takes some time, it takes additional support staff,
TSA staff there. It is discretionary to some point and not
always objective, it appears. But it is what it is.
My question is: There are other technologies that are out
there, some that are being used to ascertain explosives, drugs,
you name it, used by other entities, including the DOD. Are
there any of those technologies that you are looking at that
would supplement and/or replace AIT-type machines, including
the nonspecific image, which would be great to get, but, as an
alternative to that, something that is being used effectively
in a field situation now and with a high degree of certainty?
Are you entertaining those?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Congressman.
Let me apologize for the laughter up front. That should not
be the case, if that ever is.
So----
Mr. Walberg. You don't know me.
Mr. Pistole. So, I view AIT, the advanced imaging
technology, as the best technology we have at present to detect
the non-metallic-type device that we saw on Christmas day 2009,
where, you know, we have something that if somebody walks
through a walk-through metal detector and doesn't alarm at all
because there is no metal in that improvised explosive devise.
That being said, it is not a panacea, it is not a silver
bullet. It is one of the tools we have. Other tools that we
have are explosives trace detection, whether it is on the hands
for somebody, whether it is on a bag in case there are
explosives in the bag. The use of K-9s--we use and we are
wanting to use more of the vapor-wake dogs that can pick up the
scent, if you will, the molecules of explosives even though
they don't hit on the bag itself. If the bag has gone by,
whether it is a backpack or whatever else, like we saw with the
July 7, 2005, bombers going into the London Tube. So we are
interested in all those, along with behavior detection, along
with all those other things.
One of the things--the AIT and now the automatic target
recognition is actually increasing the throughput; we are
getting people through more quickly. But I would just note
that, because of the increased carry-on bags that people--I am
sure you have never done this. But in carry-on bags, people are
jamming a lot of things in there so they don't have to pay a
fee for some airlines with a checked bag. The denser the bag,
then the more challenging it is for our security officers
looking at the X-ray to say is there something bad in there.
So, actually, we are finding that is taking longer, to resolve
those issues, than it is for the passenger themselves.
Just as an example, in the last 2 years, we have gone from
about 1.25 million carry-on bags every day that we screen to
2\1/2\ million. It has literally doubled. So you think of that
in terms of what the security officers are trying to look at.
If you haven't seen the demonstration of what we actually
do, I would encourage you to do that. Because when I saw what
the security officers are looking at on the screen in trying to
discern, this is a bad item, this is okay, it is very
difficult. So I have a great deal of respect for these officers
who do that.
Those are some of the technologies, but we are always
looking for other opportunities. We do work with DOD, we work
with DARPA, in terms of some of the cutting-edge technologies
that haven't been proven yet. What I want to make sure, though,
is we are using taxpayers' dollars in a wise way to get to the
best technology as one of the many layers of defense.
Mr. Walberg. Well, I would encourage that, because if the
figures are correct that you give us, that we have gone from
less than a dollar to now $9 per passenger, on average, to
screen people since 2000--and we understand the main reasons
for that. But there certainly has to be ways that we can speed
up, do very accurate, and get away from that challenge of what
you are saying is inside the bags right now.
You know, I have been told that there are passive-screen
effective modes right now that are being used by DOD, in
extreme situations, that would be used on every passenger, no
one getting by that, and yet would be less intrusive and maybe
even quicker. So I certainly would encourage that.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you. Yeah, I am very much interested in
that, and I will follow up with DOD on that.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I appreciate that.
I want to go back to the air cargo issue we were talking
about at the end of my last section of questions. You know, we
have had a lot of discussion in this committee and the full
committee over the years that I have been a Member about the
need to achieve 100 percent screening of all cargo, not just on
domestic passenger planes but passenger planes that are inbound
from foreign countries and for domestic cargo planes.
There has been a lot of discussion about the fact that they
just don't think that, from a technical standpoint, it is
feasible to achieve 100 percent. What are your thoughts on what
is do-able in the area of air cargo?
Mr. Pistole. I think we can achieve a high level of
screening and performance with those highest-risk packages. In
dealing with industry, really since the Yemen cargo plot of
late October last year, what we have learned is that to do a
piece-by-piece screening of each item of cargo or, say, mail
parcels over 500 grams, whatever it may be, would really shut
down the global supply chain, which we have no interest in
doing.
What we are interested in doing is working with industry
and, frankly, with CBP, Customs and Border Protection, in terms
of advanced information about packages, particularly coming
from overseas, from what may be determined to be high-risk
areas, those that we assess that the screening is not as
thorough as it is here in the United States, the concern,
obviously, being for cargo and those parcels that end up on
passenger planes. As we know, the majority of cargo does end up
on passenger planes.
So what additional scrutiny can be applied to those from
the two criteria of, is it a known shipper--that is, does the
shipper have a business relationship with the carrier, with the
shipper; and then, is it a known shipment, meaning is it
something that is just coming in over the counter--for example,
the Yemen cargo plot, where the one young woman comes in. She
is completely covered, other than her eyes. She presents the
package with the toner cartridge, the two packages. She gives a
false identity, false ID. The freight forwarder there that
forwarded it on to Dubai did what they were supposed to do at
that time, just do a physical inspection. ``Yeah, it is a
printer and some clothing, and so we will go ahead and ship
it.''
What we have done with industry and what they have done on
their own is to develop some rule-based protocols to say, does
this make sense, that somebody is paying $500 to ship a
computer printer and some books and clothes from Sanaa, Yemen,
to Chicago? Does that make any sense? So it is that combination
of getting advanced information, similar to the API, the
advanced passenger information, passenger name records, that
construct, for cargo.
So, to answer to your question succinctly, I think we can
achieve a high percentage of cargo coming to the United States.
But to get to 100 percent with any confidence would require
substantial additional resources for us to not only trust but
verify----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Pistole [continuing]. What is happening on the ground
in all those last points of departure around the world.
Mr. Rogers. That is my concern. I think if you are going to
use some sort of technology to screen, as opposed to the K-9
detection that I support, as you know, I just don't know how we
would ever afford the kind of infrastructure we would have to
have just for the domestic cargo, not to mention the in-bound
foreign flights.
But I want to go back to your opening statement. You made
reference to the fact that you do want to see us move to a more
risk-based approach. How can the Congress, how can this
committee in this reauthorization, how can the Congress help
you achieve that change in the way you focus your energies and
resources?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman.
Before I answer that, if I could just--one more point on
cargo. We work with countries to develop National cargo
screening programs, so we can recognize the country's program,
similar to what we do here in the United States, to address
that, so we are not actually out there inspecting at each last
point of departure.
On the risk-based security, I think the best way for this
subcommittee and committee and the Congress as a whole is to
provide us your ideas, your thoughts, about what works best
from both a security standpoint but also from the--what makes
good business sense, and as we talk about some of these ideas
further, to work with us in a collaborative fashion.
I don't think--one of the beauties of this proposal that we
are pushing is that, right now, there is no rulemaking that is
required, there are no fees required, there is no legislation
that is required. So, at least in the initial iteration, it is
simply to have your support as we move forward on this.
As we engage industry, we are getting very positive
feedback. So I think we are on the right track. But I do want
to manage expectations and, frankly, under-promise and over-
deliver as we move forward.
Mr. Rogers. Well, the reason I ask is, as you know, we are
about to draw up an authorization bill. I would like
particularly the intelligence segment of your organization to
be thinking, is there going to be some sort of authority that
we are going to need from the Congress to do something
different?
Mr. Pistole. Okay.
Mr. Rogers. It is just, this is the time to be thinking
about any language----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. And not next year, when we have
already----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Mr. Rogers. So, anyway, that is all I am asking for.
I am thrilled to announce that my good friend from Texas,
who has been over at the White House with the President, has
been able to make it back before the end of the hearing. I
don't know if she wants to offer a statement or just go to
questions. But she is occupied right now.
Do you want to offer a statement or go straight to
questions?
Ms. Jackson Lee. No, I would like to----
Mr. Rogers. Wait? Okay.
Mr. Cravaack of Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to kind of dovetail a little bit about what you were
talking about earlier, sir, being an airline pilot, I was just
wondering if you can elaborate a little bit about the known-
crew-member program and when you feel like it will be fully
implemented?
Mr. Pistole. We have tested this through what is known as
``Crew Pass'' in three airports--Pittsburgh, BWI, and Columbia,
South Carolina--with good success, in terms of having the
technology at the checkpoint where the pilots literally go
through an identity-based screening. The key for us is making
sure that we have that technology available at each checkpoint,
particularly the 28 Category X airports and the Cat 1 airports,
the largest airports, where the greatest number of pilots are
going through.
I have actually approved the policy. It is simply a matter
of working out the technology end of it between, again, the
pilots associations and the airlines. So they are working
through that.
My only requirement is that we have one common system. I am
agnostic as to what company or anything like that. But as long
as we can have one system that, as you as a pilot come to the
checkpoint, you are in uniform, you present your
identification, that a security officer there at the checkpoint
can either use a smart phone or a laptop to verify that you are
in good standing at the time you are checking in there, and
then we would proceed with that.
I do want to have several months of success Nation-wide
with the pilots before we move on with the rest of the flight
crew.
Mr. Cravaack. Excellent. I appreciate that.
Will biometric be incorporated in this pilot early-on type
of program in order to identify the pilot? Or how do you see
it, just a card ID or----
Mr. Pistole. We have talked about biometrics, and that
might be an end-state we build to. But because of the
additional cost and time that is involved in that for
everybody, I wanted to do something, initially, recognizing
pilots as the most trusted people on the aircraft, regards of
what prohibited items they may have.
I think I testified previously, in my last job in the FBI,
I worked on the Egypt Air 990 crash off the coast of Rhode
Island, Halloween night of 1999--I was stationed in Boston at
the time--where we learned later, of course, it was the co-
pilot who put the flight down, killed 232 people on board. So
no amount of physical screening would have detected what was in
his head, and so what if a pilot has a prohibited item? I mean,
not being crass, but that is what it comes down to.
So that is where we are going toward. I am very hopeful
that we will have something here in the near future.
Mr. Cravaack. Yeah, I always found it kind of ironic they
were taking my nail clippers when I have a crash axe this big
behind me, you know, with a spike and a serrated edge.
But my next question is just kind of a side note, as well.
I do have a bill that is presented in identifying our service
members that are coming back or on PCS orders that are--the
catalyst was, going through the airport, I am seeing a young
troop coming back from Afghanistan, still had dirt of
Afghanistan still in his boots, and he has his pack as a
reservist, and he is coming home. You know, I saw him undo his
boots and go through all of the rigamarole of going through
TSA. I do have a bill out there that would expedite this
procedure.
Do you see this possibly developing into, like we were
talking about, a trusted-passenger type of program, as well?
Mr. Pistole. I think members of the military, especially
those in uniform and that we can have some positive
identification, make sure they are who they purport to be, are
a group of people that we would look at in some type of
trusted-traveler system. So it is something that we are looking
at and trying to assess how do we actually make that happen.
Now, members of the military who are in uniform are
supposed to be allowed to keep their boots on, so that is an
issue, if that was not the case. It gets back to that
standardization issue across the country.
But it is something that we are very much interested in,
recognizing that we train them and they are over there
protecting our freedoms, and yet we put them through--that
being said, also in my last job, I worked on the Major Hasan
investigation, and recognize that there are no guarantees, that
we are in the risk-mitigation business, not risk-elimination,
that any person in a trusted category may break bad, frankly,
at some point.
But, as a general rule, if there are things we can do in
terms of expediting, that is what we are interested in doing.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you very much, sir, for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, my good
friend from Texas, for her opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Let me express my apologies to my colleagues and the
Members here. We were engaged with the very extensive meeting
with the President and, as we speak, just finishing that
meeting. So I ask the administrator's indulgence and the
kindness of the Chairman and my colleagues.
Mr. Pistole, we live in a tough, tough time. I don't
believe that you have been before this committee since the
miraculous but also instructive taking down of Osama bin Laden.
The Chairman knows that, as often as I can comment on the
intelligence community, the Navy SEALs, the broad National
security team of the President, and President Obama, I do so.
It goes without saying that I, likewise, thank the men and
women of the Transportation Security Administration and TSOs,
who I have joined with as being on the front lines.
We say that because, in the materials that have since been
made public, interestingly enough, from the encampment that
Osama bin Laden had, it seems that a lot of materials, public
materials, focus on transportation. They focus on rail. There
is no doubt that there is an attraction to aviation.
As you will recall, after 2009, the Christmas day bomber,
the Secretary of Homeland Security made around-the-world trips
to begin to talk about the agreements that we have.
I am going to share my thoughts with you very briefly, and
then the Chairman is going to call on another Member, and then
I will have a line of questioning along the tough climate that
we live in.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have begun the very important process of drafting
legislation for the TSA. I welcome our witness today, who has
already been welcomed, Administrator Pistole.
TSA's scope of responsibility is broad, and its mission of
securing transportation against terrorist attack is critical to
the Nation's overall homeland security efforts. I believe that
there is a common agreement on this committee between myself
and with the leadership of Chairman Rogers. We work together.
Over the past several years, this subcommittee has
evaluated cargo security on passenger planes, passenger and
baggage screening technology processes, security at foreign
repair stations, general aviation, the Registered Traveler
program, and the administration of TSA's programs for surface
transportation and security.
We understand and support a layered approach to security,
whereby if one security protocol fails, there will be others to
mitigate the terrorist threat. I remind you, in my opinion, Mr.
Pistole, 9/11 was where the overlay did not work. There was not
redundancy, and, therefore, we found ourselves in this horrific
condition.
As we move forward in this authorization process, we must
not forget this basic homeland security tenet: Redundancy,
overlay, and ``I have your back.''
Furthermore, it is important to remember that our last line
of defense, the final layer against a terrorist threat is not
technology but people. These people are our Federal air
marshals, who have been authorized to protect the cockpit and
secure the aircraft cabin in emergency. These people are the
flight attendants, who, in just the last few months, have
subdued several unruly passengers in separate in-flight events
and who have consistently asked for required flight attendant
training. These are the people we must invest in by authorizing
criminal investigative training for FAMs and recurrent advanced
self-defense training for flight attendants.
Our pilots', including the Federal Flight Deck Officer,
participants are critical. Behind the hardened cockpit doors
authorized after the 9/11 attacks, pilots not only are
operating the aircraft but providing yet another line of
defense. We need to ensure they have the resources in the FFDO
program to support their mission.
Outside the aircraft, our people on the front lines are the
transportation security officers, who screen 2 million
passengers a day. For these TSOs, we need to afford them
excellent training and career advancement opportunities that
complement the collective bargaining framework.
Administrator Pistole, when you decided and moved quickly
to alter the screening techniques and called them ``enhanced
screening,'' I went out to my airport, one of the largest in
the world and certainly one of the largest in the United
States, to stand alongside of the SFD there and watch our TSOs
as the public traveled through to be able to ensure, first of
all, the confidence of our respect for their process, to ensure
that we wanted them to be professional, and also to watch the
traveling public accept the fact that we live in a different
time. It does not mean that we diminish and aren't concerned
about civil liberties and civil rights, about the inspection of
elderly and disabled and children, but it does mean that we
have to work together.
Speaking of people, Administrator Pistole, I understand
from my staff that we have received some of the information I
requested on TSA's executive-level diversity, but it may be
unbeknownst to you, it was incomplete. We will be working with
your office to get the exact type of information we need, and
we thank you for the first start that you have made.
Mr. Chairman, I know from my discussion with you that we
share the same commitment to securing our Nation's
transportation systems. In particular, we have discussed the
importance of focusing on securing mass transit and other
surface modes of transportation. I thank you again for your
commitment to working with this side of the aisle so that we
can approach these issues in a comprehensive manner. I
certainly hope that, together, we can look closely at my
legislation on surface transportation so we can find common
ground. We had broad bipartisan support for our TSA
authorization bill in the last Congress, and I hope you will
look at some of those provisions.
Might I also say, Mr. Chairman, that your concern and
interest in K-9s is well-placed, because, as I have traveled, I
have noted, from all perspectives, whether it is in the deep
bowels of some of our South and Central American friends,
looking at the issues of drugs and the overburdensome actions
of drug cartels, or whether it is in assisting the traveling
public, or whether it is actually bomb detecting, K-9s can be
very effective. So I look forward to working with you on that
issue, as I hope that we will focus on the needs of surface
transportation security and include that issue, along with
others, in this year's measure.
I will make just a final point as I close and say that I am
looking forward to working with you. I hope also--this is for
the whole Department of Homeland Security--that we will
unabashedly buy American. I will discuss that further as I
proceed in my questions.
But I also ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that a
statement from the National Treasury Employees Union be
inserted in the record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection.*
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* Information was not received at the time of publication.
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Ms. Jackson Lee. With that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Walberg for any
additional questions he may have.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Flowing from the Ranking Member's statements, Mr. Pistole,
I would ask, in light of the intelligence discovered in bin
Laden's compound, what changes or enhancements does TSA plan to
implement in terms of its surface security initiatives?
Mr. Pistole. Following the initial triage of documents
seized in that raid and the assault, we made some immediate
changes, particularly in three areas.
One is the information that we shared with our State and
local stakeholders in the rail arena, both the local police but
then particularly the Amtrak police. Because the one piece of
information from February 2010 was the notation that on the
10th anniversary there be some attack on northeast rail,
presumably Amtrak. So that was the first part.
The second was we increased our random and unpredictable
patrols through the VIPR operations, the Visible Intermodal
Protection and Response, along with Amtrak and then along with
other State and local police, in terms of just trying to be,
again, random and unpredictable for anything that may come as a
result from the killing of bin Laden. So, is there somebody
here in the United States currently who wants to do something
to ``retaliate''? So that was one of the issues.
Then the third area was to assess the--given the additional
intelligence that continues to come out of there--because, you
know, the initial triage has been done, and now the deep dives
are being done. So I get a daily intelligence brief--in fact,
this morning, new, updated information, which I would be glad
to provide in a classified setting--as to some more, not
specific threat information, but just background on bin Laden's
focus on the transportation sector, both the aviation and rail,
for the economic impact that it could have and which 9/11 had
and other things.
So we are basically rescrubbing from an intelligence
assessment to say, do we need to re-baseline where we say the
threats are and looking at the traditional equation of what is
risk: Threat, vulnerability, and consequence. So, how do we
inform our risk judgments based on those threats, the
vulnerability of those resources, and then the consequences of
a successful attack?
So those are the three actions that we have taken since
then.
Mr. Walberg. From a technology standpoint, what could
Congress do further to empower TSA and DHS as a whole to work
with the private sector to develop the necessary technologies
to ensure our rail and mass transit infrastructure is secure,
at least as secure as it can be?
Mr. Pistole. Yeah, so I think one of the keys there is, you
know, do we set up an airport-type apparatus at rail hubs and
transit points? That is a huge lift, I think, so I wouldn't ask
for that.
But I think where we can truly benefit, knowing that the
three areas that terrorists have identified as possible
deterrents, depending on whether it is a suicide bomber or not,
but the first two, uniformed officers and K-9s, those are
deterrents to any possible terrorist. The third deterrent,
CCTV, is only a deterrent for those non-suicide bombers. So if
you are a suicide bomber, as we saw on July 7, 2005 in London,
you know, the one terrorist looks right at the camera before he
goes down into the Tube and 10 minutes later is dead.
So I think anything that, from a technology standpoint, it
is as much--is there additional technology out there? I mean,
there are some things that are mechanical--vapor-wake dogs,
which there is research being done on that. I am a proponent of
the actual dogs because of their effectiveness. But I think it
really comes down to that human part, additional officers'
training, dogs, and CCTV. So those are the three critical areas
that I would see.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I am really glad to hear you mention CCTV.
There has not been much talk in this committee about it, but,
as we see over in Europe, it is a vital tool in trying to
particularly discover what happened when we have an attack.
But I now recognize the Ranking Member for any questions
she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
I am going to pursue my line of questioning that I followed
in laying the premise of the different climate in which we live
post the demise of Osama bin Laden. I do want to make it clear
that I think America is safer now than it has ever been. It is
just that the odds and the life that we are playing with, the
general atmosphere in which we are playing at this point, the
arena, is far different than 10 or 20 years ago.
So I would like to start first with what improvements you
think and what familiarity you have and the work that is being
done to secure our foreign repair stations. Because, over the
years, we view that as a great vulnerability, and it is
something that is not usually high on the radar screen.
Mr. Pistole. It is an important point, Congresswoman, in
terms of, if we don't have confidence in those foreign repair
stations, either in the screening of the personnel, the
mechanics who work there, or in their quality control of the
products that they are using--all things that industry,
obviously, has a keen interest in and regulates, you know, in
private industry's sense of the term.
I think we would have to really get into specifics as to
which foreign repair station, because of the ones that the TSA
has looked at, we have actually found a number to be
commensurate with U.S. standards.
That being said, you know, with over 285 or so last points
of departure to the United States and a number of repair
stations that are either at airports, such as in Europe where
many of the repair stations are actually at major airports----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Correct. My question is how many we have
been able to inspect and how many more we have and do we have
an at-risk standard.
Mr. Pistole. We do----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a big number.
Mr. Pistole. It is. I don't have the exact number. But our
challenge is to, again, have some level of confidence that what
they are doing is not just on the day or the week that we are
there inspecting, but that it is happening 365/24/7. That is
where we are lacking, frankly. That is one of our gaps. Just
based on resources, we can't do that.
So we work with both the country teams and industry in a
partnership to say, what are you doing to assess that, and then
what can we do to augment that, recognizing that it is one of
those areas of vulnerability.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How do you hold the airlines responsible?
What is the oversight there? What is the demand on the
airlines?
Mr. Pistole. So we have our baseline standards of what is
required at any repair station and, of course, working with FAA
on their certification of those stations. How that works is, if
they are not in compliance, then it is a combination between
TSA and FAA to make sure that they are in compliance, and if
they are not, then we can take regulatory action, either in
terms of a fine or even the ultimate of shutting that repair
station down for any work to be done on flights coming to the
United States.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you know how many TSA staff, personnel
you have on the foreign repair station and what kind of
partnership you have with FAA?
Mr. Pistole. I have some numbers in my head, but I am not
sure. I would like to check on those to make sure I am
accurate, so let me get back with on you that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I mentioned the difficulties that flight
attendants and passengers seemingly had, really it seemed in
the days after the demise of Osama bin Laden. Some of those
occurrences unfortunately involved individuals who are mentally
challenged.
I, frankly, believe that the training for flight attendants
should be required. That is not the case now. I would like to
know your assessment of that in terms of, again, a changed
neighborhood and a changed arena in which we live.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I agree, Congresswoman, that additional
training would be beneficial, whether it is required--and the
question of who pays for it. You know, do the airlines pay for
it? Do they provide the time off? Do they provide the travel
expenses?
So we have trained--I would have to check the number, but a
sizable number of flight crew, flight attendants, in terms of
basic defensive techniques and how to engage and work in terms
of defusing a situation. So some of that has been done
voluntarily.
But you raise a question about, if it is legislated or if
it is regulated, then, basically, who pays the cost of that? So
that is one of the issues that we have looked at.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me do something very unusual. Let me
ask you, Administrator Pistole, to make an assessment. FAMS, as
you well know, provides free training. Again, nothing is ever
free; there is probably some cost in your budget. But what I
would argue is, we didn't do a lot of things around 9/11, and,
ultimately, though we don't point to ourselves as the blame,
unfortunately a horrific act occurred. In this instance, I
think it is worthy of a review. I am certainly interested in
legislation.
But I would ask the question, is the cost more to require
airlines to be consistent in the training that flight
attendants get? Or is it more costly for some person attempting
to do harm, with all of the layers and redundancy we have, to
make it finally on the airplane and to be able to create a
horrific incident where our flight attendants could be ready
and prepared to have stopped it--as they did, possibly
untrained, with the shoe bomber and as they noticed the
Christmas day bomber acting erratic, and quick action was
taken. But consistency does not exist.
Would you consider moving internally, while some of us want
to rush ahead, which we might just do, but would you--you see
my point of the consistency issue.
Mr. Pistole. Oh, I do, madam. I think it is a good point.
It is a question--again, we do provide the training at no cost.
The question is--and if you have airline executives in, that
might be a good question for them, in terms of are they willing
to support that in terms of having time off. Is it for 4 hours,
is it for 2 days? Will they pay the travel expenses to where we
do the training and things like that? So those are questions.
But we do that training.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just make an editorial
comment. We are paying for pillows, blankets, hot dogs, potato
chips, drinks, and baggage. So the mere idea of time off cannot
be that excessive for the airlines.
I would commend to you, I would like to hear back from you
on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I am very interested in this, and I think it
is valid.
We are getting to go to the floor, and there has been some
discussion about collective bargaining rights for the TSOs. Let
me commend you for the deliberative and studious way in which
you have handled it. I hope everyone appreciates it.
I would appreciate if you would give a very quick summary,
and really quick, to say that you obviously made a decision--
why don't I just ask the question--after you studied it, that
this would not undermine, the way you have structured it,
undermine the first-responder security role that TSOs have.
Would you comment on that please, on the issue of
collective bargaining?
Mr. Pistole. So the issue came down to the authorities
granted to the administrator under the Aviation Transportation
Security Act of being able to decide what should be subject to
collective bargaining. In my judgment, the things that I
included, that allowed the security officers to vote on,
included those things that I would describe as more
administrative in nature--shift bids, uniforms, and things like
that, consistency and uniformity in evaluations, as opposed to
the actual security screening.
So anything that had a security nexus I said was not
subject to collective bargaining. That is obviously the way we
are moving forward in this run-off election that is taking
place right now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You feel comfortable that your men and
women in TSA were prepared to be on the front lines and not
inhibited by the structure of giving them basic rights that
would enhance their confidence and enhance their teamwork
through the collective bargaining process.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Last, on that issue, if there was a
catastrophic incident at one airport that then required a
massive moving of some to come in--and we have had it where
snowstorms have shut down, and individuals couldn't get to the
airport, but you could fly people in--you have that ability,
still, to move your personnel around to address the questions
of need in this country.
Mr. Pistole. With all security officers, except those
assigned to the 16 airports under the Security Partnership
Program, the SPP. So I don't have that discretion over those
individuals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay.
Let me just add this point about looking and ensuring that,
as you buy equipment and uniforms and gadgets and widgets,
that, at least under the procurement system that you have and
then taking the message back to the Department of Homeland
Security, that you will look to products that are manufactured
here in the United States.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I understand there has been some
discussion and perhaps a bill introduced in that regard by
another Member. So, yeah, obviously, we are interested in
following all the laws. As I understand--I got a briefing on
the way up--is that we are in full compliance with NAFTA and an
amendment to that. So, yeah, we obviously need to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, two last questions.
I think this committee should be aware of the fact, and you
should be aware, Mr. Pistole, that there are State legislators
and legislatures that have tried to pose legislation--my State,
in fact--about the inspection and the AIT. Fortunately, there
was a pushback.
I think we are going to have to be particularly attentive
to that kind of effort. I really think the outreach, your FSDs,
the National outreach in terms of your sensitivity to how you
address passengers is very important.
I would like you to comment on three questions put
together: That one; and TSA beginning to implement a risk-based
approach to passenger screening at checkpoints. Because, again,
I am told by some of your leadership that, because airlines are
charging for bags, that it has put a whole new burden on your
officers and the time frame, which many passengers believe you
are slow. I think it is important to acknowledge that there is
an extra burden.
But I would be interested in your assessment on the risk-
based approach. Then I would be interested in what work you
have done--this goes to the Christmas day bomber--on the last-
point-of-entry security that I believe is extremely important
to you.
If you could. The Chairman has been very indulgent. I will
just conclude; you may have to do this one in writing, just to
let me know, have there been any EEOC cases filed against TSA
and, if so, how many. That may be in writing.
Mr. Pistole. I will have to get back in writing on that
last point.
Just briefly, in terms of the legislation, we have been
engaged with Department of Justice. I am sure you are aware
that one of the U.S. attorneys in Texas sent a letter to the
Lieutenant Governor and to the legislature outlining some of
the legal perils and the supremacy issues involved in that.
There have also been some discussions and we have done some
briefings that have been helpful, I believe, in terms of
providing what the threats are. So that continues, and we watch
that closely. We have 3,500 security officers in the State of
Texas, and they are all concerned about that, obviously.
In terms of the risk-based----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would just say that this may be a
creeping activity across various States.
Mr. Pistole. Right. There are approximately a dozen States
that have some interest in this at various levels that I am
aware of.
I have covered in some detail the risk-based security while
you were at the White House. I would just summarize by saying,
we are very interested in moving forward with all deliberate
speed in terms of trying to provide the best possible security
by focusing on those that we know the least about as being the
highest risk. Those selectees and no-flys, obviously, we know a
lot about, and we do a proper, thorough screening with them.
But if we can expedite the screening experience for those
that are willing to share information with us or that we
already know a lot about because they have already provided a
lot of information, such as in Global Entry or those with Top
Secret security clearances or other groups of people, then we
are very much interested in that and working deliberately on
that.
So there will be more to come on that later this year and--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. On the at-risks?
Mr. Pistole. On the?
Ms. Jackson Lee. More to come on--I didn't hear what you
said.
Mr. Pistole. On the whole risk-based security----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. All right.
Mr. Pistole. The bag fees I touched on earlier, but, yes,
we are doing approximately twice as many checked bags now as we
did 2, 2\1/2\ years ago. So it puts an additional burden and
onus on the security officers reviewing each screen and seeing
what may be in there as a potential IED component, and so that
is a challenge for us. That is what is slowing it down, as
opposed to the passenger screening. So that is one aspect we
are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is important to--I mean, I
think in your discussions with airlines, your discussion with
the traveling public, you have videos that you put into
airports. I told you I would like it to be a little bit more
conspicuous. But it is very important in terms of setting the
tone for the traveling public.
Mr. Pistole. Right. Yeah, you may have heard my public-
service messaging in certain airports, encouraging the public
to work with us in a partnership, and the better prepared they
can be as they travel, the better job we can do and make it a
better travel experience for everyone.
On your last point, the last points of departure, we work
very closely with both the airport authorities, the civil
aviation authorities in those countries, and the industry
itself to ensure that their standards on any of the LPDs, as we
call them, are to the standards that we have in the United
States.
So, in many places, for example, at London Heathrow,
Terminal 5, which are the LPDs to the United States, they have
additional screening that flights to the rest of the world do
not have. So we do work very closely with them.
We are continuing discussions with groups such as ICAO, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, IATA, International
Air Transit Association, and all industry groups and
associations to try to make sure we have a baseline, common
standard that enhances security, given the current threat
environment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank you for that.
I will put another question on the record, Mr. Pistole, to
be answered in writing. That is whether or not you have any
specific programs, policies to increase diversity at the
executive and non-executive levels at TSA. As you well know,
diverse backgrounds are very helpful.
I do want to commend Colonel Testa, who was our FSD at IAH.
I understand that she may be detailed here to Washington. That
does not make us happy, but it does say what a credible and
responsible leader she is. I hope that we have the ability to
have her return, if that is at all possible.
To basically thank the overall team that you work with, and
that we will continue to work with them.
I think I have submitted this letter into the record. Is
this the statement here? Yeah, I think I have asked, and I
think the Chairman has already asked unanimous consent for this
letter to go in.
So let me yield back, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward to
some of the questions that I posed in writing.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest our common
agreement on the whole issue of ``Buy America,'' but also this
flight attendant training is something I hope we can look at
together, and that we can look at this last point of--this last
point of departure is a very important issue, in terms of
people coming into the United States by aviation travel.
I thank the gentleman for his indulgence.
Mr. Rogers. Count on it.
We have been called for votes. I don't know what happened;
the bells didn't go off. But I just got a note.
But I just wanted to close on one point and kind of get
your feedback, and that has to do with the behavior detection
officers. How is that going? I understand GAO had a report with
some criticisms. Where are you going with that?
Mr. Pistole. The GAO did come out with a report that
offered some constructive comments in terms of how we can
improve. DHS's Science and Technology Directorate looked at
that and, actually, has just published a report that, although
much of it is sensitive security information, strongly endorses
and validates the behavior detection program. I would be glad
to get, in a closed setting, into some specific details.
But I received a detailed briefing on it, actually, this
morning. It is notable in terms of the success that the
behavior detection officers have versus just random samplings,
if you will. So it is multiple times more effective than just
random. So I am encouraged by that.
That being said, I am interested in upgrading and
expanding, in terms of the backgrounds and the capabilities of
those behavior detection officers, that will then be wrapped up
into a risk-based security program that includes additional
behavior detection as part of that.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Well, listen, I am not going to drag you up here any more
often than necessary. You just have one of your staffers come
over, and let me and the Ranking Member know what you are going
to do. We will do it in a classified manner.
With that, we are going to adjourn this hearing. I want
everybody to understand, and you and your staff, that some of
the Members who were here may have some written questions. So,
in the next 10 days, I would ask you to respond to those in
writing, if you get them.
Anything else?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for,
again, the indulgence of some of us who had to come to the
hearing late. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers of Alabama for John S. Pistole
Question 1a. Is the total security approach currently in place at
U.S. airports integrated or fragmented? Is there one agency designated
with overall responsibility for security at any U.S. airport?
Are the images of approaching vehicles captured by airport security
cameras, monitored by TSA in real-time or by another security entity
separate from TSA?
Question 1b. Do you think TSA should have access and control of
airport CCTV cameras and systems?
Answer. Security at U.S. airports is a collaborative process among
several entities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
maintains responsibility for screening and ensuring compliance with
certain Federal regulations. TSA works with airport authorities at TSA-
regulated airports required to adopt and carry out a TSA-approved
security program under 49 CFR Part 1542, and collaborates with State,
local, and Federal law enforcement agencies on criminal matters. Among
other requirements, airports required to have a complete or supporting
airport security program must include a description of law enforcement
support.
Airports operate and monitor security cameras along with their
respective law enforcement and/or security response component as
outlined in their airport security programs. The placement, numbers,
and types of cameras, as well as the monitoring function (real-time or
exception-based), will vary depending on the airport's operational
characteristics and available funding. TSA's use of images generally
occurs following a security violation or incident, for forensic
purposes, and in conducting post-incident reviews and investigations.
While TSA personnel do not directly control the physical operation
of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, TSA has access to the
airport's CCTV cameras and systems. TSA coordinates with airports when
it is necessary to review camera footage in support of inspection,
investigation, and regulatory duties.
Question 2. Does the current passenger vetting process include any
engaged questioning by TSA, the answers to which might suggest
suspicious behavior or criminal intent on the part of the passenger? If
such intent is suggested but not conclusively established, does the
passenger move to another line where secondary screening is effectively
in place? If not, why not?
Answer. TSA's Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques
(SPOT) program trains Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) to engage
passengers in casual conversation throughout the screening process to
observe for behavioral anomalies that may be indicative of potential
terrorist or otherwise threatening behavior. If a passenger's observed
behavior rises to a pre-determined threshold, the passenger is
subjected to additional screening to include a more in-depth
conversation element and possible law enforcement notification for
resolution.
Question 3. Why is it that U.S. carriers operating abroad with U.S.
destinations utilize the enhanced screening approach and yet this
approach, while readily available from a private contractor, is not
utilized at U.S. airports?
Answer. The security measures referred to are contained in the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Aircraft Operator Standard
Security Program (AOSSP), as the ``passenger prescreening security
interview.'' These measures must be conducted by U.S. aircraft
operators operating in an overseas environment.
On August 15, 2011, TSA began an enhanced behavior detection proof
of concept at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS). TSA Behavior
Detection Officers at BOS have undergone additional training and
significant on-the-job training in the enhanced screening approach
available from a private contractor. BDOs piloting the proof of concept
at BOS engage passengers in casual conversation consisting of 3 to 6
brief questions relating to a passenger's trip. More thorough
interviewing may occur if concerns arise from the initial BDO
engagement.
In addition, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques
(SPOT) program operates in many U.S. airports.
Question 4. In which airport(s) are you currently piloting an
enhanced passenger vetting security feature based on TSA verbal
engagement with the passengers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is conducting a
proof of concept that tests an enhanced passenger vetting security
feature at Boston-Logan International Airport. If the proof of concept
is successful, these enhanced passenger vetting procedures will be
piloted at Detroit Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport (DTW). In
addition, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT)
program operates in many U.S. airports.
Question 5. Has TSA successfully implemented a reduced screening
requirement for known low-risk passengers such as frequent flyers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
undertaking efforts to focus its resources and improve the passenger
experience at security checkpoints by applying new risk-based,
intelligence-driven screening procedures and enhancing its use of
technology. TSA will be conducting a pilot program in the fall to
enhance TSA's identity-based, pre-flight screening capabilities and
provide lower-risk and known passengers with expedited screening. TSA
will test enhancements to TSA's pre-flight, identity-based screening
capabilities through a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) as well as U.S. air carriers.
TSA will continue to look for ways to enhance its layered security
approach through new state-of-the-art technologies, expanded use of
existing and proven technologies, better passenger identification
techniques, and other developments that will continue to strengthen our
screening capabilities.
Question 6. What are the screening protocols for individuals with
metal implants, prosthetic devices, or those who need additional care
due to special needs travelling in air transportation? Do you believe
that any of the protocols should be reformed to better ensure fair
treatment of these individuals?
Answer. Persons with disabilities and medical conditions are
screened in a manner to ensure they are treated fairly and courteously
while mitigating vulnerabilities that are inherent to some devices. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works closely with a
coalition of over 70 organizations to address the specific concerns
associated with medical conditions and disabilities, to include ostomy-
related products, prosthetics, and cancer-related treatments. Earlier
this year, TSA created a working group comprising of members from TSA's
Office of Disability Policy and Outreach and the Training and
Procedures divisions of the Office of Security Operations (OSO). This
working group regularly discusses screening policy for persons with
disabilities and ways to mitigate vulnerabilities while ensuring the
best customer service possible. The group also discusses emerging
technology and the best ways to screen medical devices. An important
outcome of this group was to change the way TSA screens insulin pumps
and other medical devices worn on the body. Individuals are no longer
required to undergo additional screening of their accessible property
or be subjected to an entire pat-down based solely on the presence of
one of those medical devices. TSA provides individuals with these
medical devices screening equivalent to that other passengers undergo
while ensuring the device itself is properly screened.
Specific screening protocols for screening individuals with metal
implants, prosthetic devices, or those who need additional care due to
access or functional needs are Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and
cannot be discussed in this response. However, TSA is available to
discuss these screening protocols in a closed setting.
Question 7. Is TSA considering reforming the current standard
operating procedures regarding screening children under 12? What are
some alternative screening methods other than a modified pat-down that
can be used when screening such a child?
Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
working on a risk-based screening model, and has begun testing possible
new procedures that may reduce, although not entirely eliminate, the
pat-down rate on children. Specific screening protocols are Sensitive
Security Information (SSI) and cannot be discussed in this response.
However, TSA is available to discuss these screening protocols in a
closed setting
Question 8. Are Federal Security Directors and relevant TSA staff
required to meet with law enforcement agencies serving the airport? If
so, how often are they required to meet? Do they ever exercise or train
together?
Answer. There is no specific mandate for Federal Security Directors
(FSD) to meet with law enforcement agencies serving the airport.
However, FSDs are encouraged to develop and maintain relationships with
their law enforcement stakeholders. The frequency of interaction varies
among different FSDs and law enforcement authorities.
In support to the FSDs, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Assistant Federal Security Director for Law Enforcement (AFSD-LE)
is expected to maintain daily contact with the local area law
enforcement community. This responsibility has been identified as the
primary duty of the AFSD-LEs serving at 82 airports Nation-wide.
Typical liaison contacts include the following: The airport police
authority; Transportation Security Officers (TSO); TSA regulatory
personnel; TSA's Office of Inspections; U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); Joint Terrorism Task Force; Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); United
States Secret Service (USSS); U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and other
Federal, State, and local agencies whose investigative interests may
have a nexus to the transportation systems within TSA's area of
responsibility. In this liaison capacity, the AFSD-LE ensures the
sharing of critical intelligence information, coordination of
investigations, support for security initiatives, and maintaining a
proactive law enforcement program to ensure the security of the airport
and the traveling public. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) also
assigns Federal Air Marshals (FAM) and Supervisory FAMs to serve as
additional airport liaisons between the FAMS, the FSD, and the other
agencies listed above.
Question 9. How does TSA determine when private industry should be
made aware of certain threats?
Answer. When our intelligence and security partners within
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the intelligence community
(IC) introduce or update threat information, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) executive leaders of transportation modal
subject matter experts and threat intelligence analysts decide
immediately whether private industry should also become aware of the
information. In many cases DHS and IC liaisons are already working on
notification processes out to private industry and coordinate these
measures with us. TSA has official relationships with the private
industry on global, National, and regional levels, so our capabilities
help ensure we are informing all the entities in that customer base.
The immediacy of the threat, the classification of the information
and the security clearances of our private industry customers determine
the manner in which we share this information. There are multiple
technical and organizational solutions available for this type of
information sharing. Examples include:
National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC).--The
NICC serves as an extension of the NOC, providing the mission
and capabilities to assess the operational status of the
Nation's Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR), supports
information sharing with the ISACs and the owners and operators
of critical infrastructure facilities, and facilitates
information sharing across and between the individual sectors.
Fusion Centers.--Fusion centers integrate relevant law
enforcement and intelligence information and coordinate
security measures to reduce risks in their communities. Fusion
centers serve as focal points for the receipt and sharing of
terrorism-related information. While fusion centers play a
vital role in disseminating terrorist information at the State,
local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) level, there are
prominent integrations with CIKR officials as well.
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).--JWICS
and SIPRNet are systems of secure interconnected computer
networks used to transmit classified information in a secure
environment.
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN).--Functioning as DHS's
secure communications infrastructure, HSDN allows Federal and
SLTT governments to share timely and actionable classified
information.
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and HSIN for
Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS).--DHS communicates in real-time to
its partners by utilizing HSIN, a highly secure network with a
common set of information-sharing functions and tools for
various private sector communities with common security
interests. System users include Governors, mayors, homeland
security advisors, State National Guard offices, emergency
operations centers, first responders, public safety
departments, and other key homeland security partners. TSA has
several portals on HSIN-CS that disseminate information to
stakeholders.
Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet).--The
NIPRNet is used to exchange sensitive but unclassified
information between internal users.
Intelink.--A highly secure intranet used by the IC which
provides the web environment for protected Top Secret, Secret,
and Unclassified networks.
National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS).--The NTAS
communicates information about terrorist threats by providing
timely, detailed information to the public, Government
agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation
hubs, and the private sector. These alerts include a clear
statement that there is an imminent threat or elevated threat.
Using available information, the alerts provide a concise
summary of the potential threat, information about actions
being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that
individuals, communities, businesses, and governments can take
to help prevent, mitigate, or respond to the threat.
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).--Composed on
multiple JTTFs sharing information at the regional level. TSA
Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) have representatives on selected
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Field Office JTTFs and
several of its resident office JTTFs.
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
(ITACG).--The ITACG consists of Federal intelligence analysts,
and State, local, and Tribal first responders, working at the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing
of intelligence with our State, local, Tribal, and private
sector partners through established mechanisms within DHS and
FBI.
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).--TSA works
with transportation industry ISACs on a daily basis to address
security issues. Various ISACs have access to and work with the
Transportation Security Operational Center (TSOC), and with
TSA's modal experts and intelligence personnel. ISAC personnel
have access to information and intelligence consistent with
security policies.
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
(CIPAC).--The CIPAC provides a legal framework for members of
the Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating
Council to collaborate on a broad spectrum of security
activities. This approach aligns with the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the corresponding
Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan (TS-SSP), the
Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan (ISE-IP),
and other information sharing guidance. The Sector Coordinating
Councils (SCC) plays an important role in providing the private
sector perspective on identifying and implementing the
information-sharing mechanisms that are most appropriate for
their modes of transportation.
Working Groups.--TSA partners with foreign transportation
security agencies to share best practices and lessons learned.
Examples include working groups within the International Civil
Aviation Organization and the International Working Group on
Land Transport Security.
TSA will use whichever system or combination of systems that proves
most effective in getting the threat information out to private
industry.
Question 10. If a TSO is at a checkpoint and fails to detect a
threat object during an operational or covert test, what happens to the
TSO? Does he remain at the checkpoint? How much discretion does an
individual FSD have when deciding how to discipline or when to dismiss
a TSO? Do you think there should be more standardized protocols for
Federal Security Directors in this area?
Answer. If a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) fails to detect
a threat item delivered by the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) Office of Inspection covert testing team or through the Aviation
Screening Assessment Program (ASAP), he/she is removed from screening
duties and placed in remedial training. TSA does not discipline TSOs
for covert testing or ASAP failures. These tests are conducted to
evaluate vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of screening procedures
and technology. However, Federal Security Directors have the authority
to address TSO performance failures outside the context of covert
testing and ASAP.
Question 11. The budget for FAMS has seen an increase each year,
yet the FFDO budget has remained relatively flat even though there is
wide interest in this program. Have you requested that the FFDO budget
be increased?
Answer. Although the administration recognizes the importance of
the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program (FFDO) Program, it realizes
that funding is limited and has made the difficult decision to
distribute scarce available resources elsewhere. The fiscal year 2012
budget request does provide a $313,000 increase to the program's base,
which will provide the resources to sustain the FFDO Program at a
current services level. The Transportation Security Administration will
continue to evaluate its base resource levels to identify efficiencies
in order to meet the program's priority requirements, and we will work
with the Department and stakeholders to ensure this occurs.
Question 12. In light of the recent revelations of al-Qaeda's
interests in attacking our rail infrastructure, what changes or
enhancements does TSA have planned in terms of its surface security
initiatives?
Answer. In light of the most recent intelligence that al-Qaeda had
plans to attack trains or railroad infrastructure, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) took several actions. In the freight rail
mode, TSA immediately communicated with the freight railroad industry
and advised them to continue a state of vigilance and awareness. The
effectiveness of this vigilance was demonstrated by the increase in
reporting of suspicious incidents detected throughout the railroad
industry.
TSA plans to continue conducting assessments of railroad
infrastructure, bridges, and tunnels, in particular to assist the
railroads with identifying potential vulnerabilities and options to
mitigate those vulnerabilities. TSA plans to continue conducting
assessments of railroad infrastructure, bridges, and tunnels, in
particular to assist the railroads with identifying potential
vulnerabilities and options to mitigate those vulnerabilities. TSA's
Office of Security Technology, in conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) S&T Office of Research and Development, is
identifying innovative technologies that can be used in the freight
rail environment for intrusion detection and early warning of tampering
or disruption of railroad infrastructure. TSA is conducting operational
demonstration/system evaluations of integrated, multi-technology
intrusion detection systems capable of protecting critical
infrastructure components. Examples of the technologies being
researched include intrusion sensors using fiber optics, wireless
reporting of ground disturbances, advanced infrared, millimeter wave,
conventional video, and other technologies to protect rail
infrastructure, rails right of ways, tracks, bridges, pipelines, and
tunnels.
In the mass transit and passenger rail mode, TSA encouraged the
transit and passenger rail agencies to increase the frequency and
number of Regional Alliance Including Local, State and Federal Effort
(RAILSAFE) operations. This program coordinates the activities of
multiple agencies who share in the responsibility of securing the rail
system against acts of terrorism. In 2010, the RAILSAFE program
expanded beyond the Northeast Corridor to other areas in the United
States and to Toronto, Canada, and began establishing partnerships with
other international transit and passenger agencies. RAILSAFE partners
share intelligence, establish prevention working groups, provide
incident response, and participate in coordinated efforts to detect,
deter, and prevent terrorist activities. TSA encourages continual
RAILSAFE operations on a random basis to practice preparing for
different types of security threats. Additionally, TSA will continue
issuing Security Awareness messages and conducting Operational
Deterrence Programs that include training, public awareness, K-9 units,
and Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams. The focus of
issuing Security Awareness messages and conducting Operational
Deterrence Programs will shift from extended periods of time to shorter
periods, such as months or weeks. TSA is also focusing on the
protection of mass transit and passenger rail right-of-ways through the
development of new technologies. In conjunction with the Transit
Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group, TSA has developed
recommendations for new protective measures based on most likely threat
scenarios that could be implemented as needed.
Utilizing the best available information, TSA will continue to
provide guidance to freight rail, mass transit, and passenger rail on
possible threats and provide support in developing realistic and
implementable measures to reduce vulnerabilities and increase the
likelihood of detection and prevention of terrorist acts.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for John S.
Pistole
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
Question 1. Earlier this year, the Department released new grant
guidance impacting the distribution of Transportation Security Grant
Program. The new guidance revealed a revised risk formula will be
utilized when considering applicants. What was TSA's role in developing
the new grant guidance with other Department components and
stakeholders? Second, how do you anticipate this new grant guidance
will impact mass transit agencies across the United States?
Question 2. With recent cuts aimed at the Transportation Security
Grant Program, even though 34 million rail and mass transit passengers
travel each day in the United States, surface programs only receive 2%
of the TSA security funding. How do you plan to address the significant
gap in resources between aviation and surface?
Question 3. In the June 2008 DHS OIG report entitled, ``TSA's
Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security Programs'' it
says ``Many State homeland security and transit security officials said
that TSA's risk management approach did not account for differences in
the infrastructures and needs of cities and their transit systems'' and
that ``Some stakeholders said they had the impression that grant
priorities were being set by political appointees, rather than by
subject matter experts with knowledge of the region.'' In developing
the fiscal year 2011 Transit Security Grant Program priorities and
evaluating submissions, how will DHS ensure transparency in the
evaluation and selection of projects and avoid discounting the risk to
a region due to differences in needs? What is TSA's role in ensuring
transparency in the program?
Answer. For fiscal year 2011, the Transit Security Grant Program
(TSGP) guidance reflects a revised framework that continues to
prioritize operational activities, but is more specific about targeting
funding for Nationally-critical transit assets to fully remediate
vulnerabilities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
worked closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in
developing the revised framework, which maintains the existing risk
formula, but revises how projects are prioritized and reviewed. Through
conferences, workshops, regional working group meetings, and conference
calls, TSA socialized proposals for changing the fiscal year 2011
process extensively in calendar year 2010 throughout the mass transit
stakeholder community, including transit systems, law enforcement
agencies, the American Public Transportation Association, and the
Sector Coordinating Council. TSA also discussed the revised framework
with the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group, which is
comprised of heads of security and/or police chiefs from transit
agencies across the Nation. As a result, the final fiscal year 2011
TSGP framework incorporated stakeholder feedback.
The intent of the revised framework is to connect funding to
measurable progress in reducing risk, while allowing transit agencies
to complete existing projects and provide the foundation for future
funding on new initiatives. All agencies that were eligible last year
were eligible this year (this eligibility was not affected by changes
to eligibility for the Urban Areas Security Initiative program) and all
project types that were allowable last year are allowable this year. In
that way, all agencies could continue security efforts they started
with funding from prior years.
Addressing security of passenger railroads and mass transit
agencies requires strong stakeholder partnerships and leveraging of
State and local resources in coordination with Federal requirements and
support. Various statutes and executive directives require that
transportation risk activities be determined and implemented
collaboratively in accordance with strategic plans developed with
security partners. As a result, addressing security in these surface
modes of transportation--as part of the Department of Homeland
Security's mission to prevent terrorist acts within the United States,
to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, to minimize damage from potential
attack and disasters, and to improve system resilience after an
incident--requires collaboration from planning through deployment of
resources.
Reflecting its collaborative relationship with stakeholders, TSA
works to ensure transparency in the grant programs through the
development of funding priorities that are presented publically in the
annual grant guidance, publishing of review criteria and the scoring
methodology also in the grant guidance, and reviewing and explaining
the criteria and methodology through workshops and conference calls.
Although FEMA facilitates and hosts the grant review panels, with
TSA input and assistance, grant priorities are set by TSA based on
extensive input from industry stakeholders, including transit systems,
law enforcement agencies, American Public Transportation Association,
and the Sector Coordinating Council. Further, TSA utilizes the Transit
Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group to ensure regional risk is
considered and reflected in the funding priorities.
In order to ensure transparency in the review and selection of
projects, the exact scoring methodology and review criteria are
included in the fiscal year 2011 TSGP Grant Guidance and Application
Kit. Further, this scoring methodology and review criteria, including
point ranges, is briefed extensively at regional workshops conducted
after release of the grant guidance (seven were held for the fiscal
year 2011 TSGP). All of these materials are also made available on
TSA's public grants website, so that applicants unable to attend one of
the workshops can access the materials.
Question 4. How do you plan to make resources available for testing
and development projects--directly impacting surface and mass
transportation security--at Pueblo or a similar facility?
Question 5. What are your plans for leveraging the excellent
training facilities available at Pueblo? Has there been any discussion
of housing training materials and courses there relating to the
forthcoming regulations for bus, rail, and transit employees?
Question 6. Last year, the White House released a Surface
Transportation Security Assessment that included 20 recommendations.
What are your plans for implementing those recommendations and what can
Congress do to help you in that endeavor? If possible, please elaborate
more than the implementation plan, or if necessary, please work with us
to schedule a security briefing to discuss your plans.
Question 7. Secretary Napolitano has made public statements
indicating that she wants to place more focus on surface and mass
transit security. (http://www.tsa.gov/weekly/13009.shtm) What actions
has TSA taken to focus resources within TSA for programs to support
mass transit security?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
maintained a robust and innovative program concerning surface and mass
transit security technologies since 2006. Beginning in 2008, through
means of an interagency agreement, TSA and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) have collaborated on projects related to rail
security at the Transportation Technical Center (TTCI), the Department
of Transportation rail test facility located near Pueblo, Colorado. TSA
is continuing this collaboration with FRA, as well as putting in place
a contract directly with TTCI for work efforts unique to TSA's
requirements.
There are two courses currently being facilitated at the Pueblo,
CO, facility in preparation for the forthcoming regulations and
assessments in the Highway and Motor Carrier modes that TSA
Transportation Security Inspectors for Surface (TSI-S) will be carrying
out in fiscal year 2012. The two courses are the Highway and Motor
Carrier Safety Compliance course and the Highway and Motor Carrier
Security course. Highway and Motor Carrier Safety Compliance is
designed to provide participants with the knowledge and skills to
successfully interact with stakeholders in the Highway Motor Carrier
(HMC) modes of surface transportation and familiarize them with the
equipment used by the HMC industry. Highway and Motor Carrier Security
is designed to provide participants with the knowledge and skills to
successfully interact with stakeholders in the HMC and Over-the-road
Bus (OTRB) modes of surface transportation and provides hands-on
training in proper search techniques of HMC and OTRB equipment; the
course also trains participants proactively in Highway Motor Carrier
Security Action Items.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) completed risk-based
implementation plans for each of the 20 consensus Surface
Transportation Security Priority Assessment recommendations, addressing
the potential risks to the surface transportation system and its four
subsectors (mass transit and passenger rail, highways and motor
carriers, freight rail, and pipelines). These plans focus on policy and
process improvements in the general areas of information sharing,
Federal agency coordination and grant programs. The timelines to
implement the recommendations vary in length; 10 recommendations have
been fully implemented and others are scheduled to extend into fiscal
year 2014. DHS and its security partners are implementing these
recommendations within current staffing and budget constraints and
require no additional resources.
In fiscal year 2010, TSA received 15 new surface Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams and the fiscal year 2012
President's request seeks 12 additional multi-modal teams. TSA also has
established a liaison position between the VIPR group and the mass
transit and passenger rail policy and stakeholder outreach group to
ensure a closer working relationship and enhanced TSA VIPR team
activity in the mass transit and passenger rail environment. This
position serves as the TSA Point of Contact for transit-related VIPR
issues, and facilitates collaboration with transit security partners to
develop risk-based deployment options and determine the VIPR team
configurations that will best augment transit security. Also, the
partnership between the research and development group and the mass
transit and passenger rail policy and stakeholder outreach group has
been strengthened through more frequent meetings and status briefs to
ensure new developments in technology are not delayed in reaching the
prototype stage and field tested at volunteer transit agencies.
GENERAL TSA
Question 8. Who is responsible for airport terminal and perimeter
security--TSA or the airport authority? How is this relationship
coordinated, and is this issue--coordination between airport operators
and TSA on incident response and any other security matters--something
that should be addressed in the authorization bill?
Question 9. In your testimony you mention the administration's
support for increasing the $2.50 passenger ticket security fee. What
operational expenses does this fee cover? What is the budget breakdown
between revenue generated from the fee and direct appropriations
received from Congress?
Question 10. In the wake of the Moscow Airport attack earlier this
year, what steps has TSA taken to improve terminal airport security at
U.S. airports which generally have a similar configuration? Are
statutory guidelines needed to establish baseline standards for
perimeter and terminal security?
Answer. Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
(Pub. L. 107-71), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
carries out its responsibility for the screening and inspection of
individuals, goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment before
entry into a secured area of an airport to ensure effective levels of
security at perimeter access to U.S. airports. TSA requires that each
airport operator regulated under 49 CFR Part 1542 carry out a TSA-
approved Airport Security Program (ASP) that prevents the unauthorized
entry, presence, and movement of individuals and ground vehicles into
and within the secured area and airport operations area. Airport
operators must also have incident management procedures. Functional
measures include ensuring that only those individuals authorized to
have unescorted access to the security identification display area
(SIDA) are able to gain entry; ensure that an individual is immediately
denied entry to a SIDA when that person's access authority for that
area is withdrawn and provide a means to differentiate between
individuals authorized to have access to an entire SIDA and individuals
authorized access to only a particular portion of a SIDA. TSA also
approves amendments to an airport's ASP to ensure that alternative
security measures still provide an overall level of security equal to
or greater than that which would be provided by the measures within the
regulation or applicable security directives.
Consistent with ATSA, the Transportation Security Administration
September 11 Security Fee is intended to cover the costs for the
following aviation security services:
A. Salary, benefits, overtime, retirement and other costs of
screening personnel, their supervisors and managers, and
Federal law enforcement personnel deployed at airport security
screening locations under 49 CFR Part 44901.
B. Training personnel described in (A), and the acquisition,
operation, and maintenance of equipment used by such personnel.
C. Performing background investigations of personnel described in
(A), (D), (F), and (G).
D. Federal Air Marshals program.
E. Performing civil aviation security research and development
under this title.
F. Federal Security Managers under 49 CFR Part 44903.
G. Deploying Federal law enforcement personnel pursuant to 49 CFR
Part 44903(h).
H. Security-related capital improvements at airports.
I. Training pilots and flight attendants under 49 CFR Part 44918
and 49 CFR Part 44921.
In fiscal year 2010, Congress appropriated $7.358 billion to TSA
(Pub. L. 111-83), of which $2.1 billion is eligible to be offset by the
Aviation Security Fee. During fiscal year 2010, TSA generated $2.10
billion in Aviation Security Fee revenue, of which the passenger
security fee accounted for $1.81 billion.
In light of the January 24, 2011 attack on Moscow's Domodedovo
Airport, TSA has increased security of the public areas of airports by
conducting both visible and covert operations. TSA has also developed
the Tactical Response Plan (TRP), which details the actions necessary
at the field level to support the overall TSA operational response to
various scenarios, including an improvised explosive device (IED)
attack. Under the TRP, each TSA Federal Security Director and Federal
Air Marshal (FAM) Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (SAC) is required
to formulate an Active Shooter Mitigation Plan. This plan describes
mechanisms to provide training to employees on how to report
emergencies, evacuation procedures, emergency alert systems, and how to
coordinate with local law enforcement in the event of an active shooter
emergency. All of these measures augment the existing unpredictable
security measures already in place at airports.
Question 11. In terms of enhanced pat-down screening, do you still
stand by previous statements by TSA that only about 2% of the traveling
public is subject to this procedure? Where are you in determining
special protocols for children, the elderly, and people with
disabilities?
Question 12a. There appear to be more operations between TSA and
transit agencies in conducting exercises and testing technology.
Please expound on what efforts TSA is undertaking with respect to
securing mass transit.
Question 12b. What has changed in TSA's approach to surface
transportation security following the discovery that al-Qaeda has
allegedly considered U.S. rail targets?
Question 13. Please describe TSA's efforts to secure pipelines in
the United States. Does TSA need statutory authority to further secure
the Nation's pipelines?
Answer. Recent data shows that approximately 2.5% of the traveling
public is subjected to the Standard Pat Down and .05% of the traveling
public is subjected to the Resolution Pat Down during the airport
screening process. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
developed a conceptual risk-based screening process that includes
testing new procedures that may reduce the pat-down rate on children.
Since 2004, TSA has maintained an active, on-going technical and
operational assessment and field piloting program of technologies to
enhance passenger rail security. TSA has evaluated a range of
potentially effective technologies, including those to detect Person
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED) and Vehicle Borne Improvised
Explosive Devices (VBIED), and those used for infrastructure
protection. Trace portal technology, and other ``checkpoint style''
screening technologies were extensively evaluated in 2004 and 2005 by
both TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science &
Technology (S&T) Directorate. However, resulting assessments determined
that ``checkpoint style'' screening is unsuitable for mass transit
rail, or any other high passenger volume mass transit applications.
TSA maintains an on-going program of technical and operational
evaluations of commercial-off-the-shelf or non-development item
standoff detection technologies. PBIED-related technologies have
included millimeter wave, terahertz, and infrared-based systems. VBIED-
related technologies have included backscatter portals and vans and
high-power X-rays.
Examples of on-going projects include the Resilient Tunnel Project
(RTP) and the Under Vehicle Screening System (UVSS). Through the RTP,
TSA, in partnership with DHS S&T, is working to create a low-cost
solution to limit the flow of water in the event an underwater tunnel
is compromised. DHS S&T has assumed funding responsibilities for the
RTP. Other partners include the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
ILC Dover, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and West
Virginia University.
UVSS is testing the feasibility and suitability of an under-vehicle
surveillance system in the railroad environment. Phase 1 of this
project, in partnership with the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, has been completed, and TSA concluded the technology performed
required. Phase 2 of the project, scheduled for July 2011, will test
the ability to remotely send images of the undercarriage of a rail car
to the Port Authority Trans-Hudson operations center to identify any
anomalies. This test is estimated to last approximately 3 weeks.
In light of intelligence that al-Qaeda had plans to attack trains
or railroad infrastructure, TSA took several actions. In the freight
rail mode, TSA immediately communicated with the freight railroad
industry and advised them to continue a state of vigilance and
awareness. The effectiveness of this vigilance was demonstrated by the
increase in reporting of suspicious incidents detected throughout the
railroad industry.
TSA plans to continue conducting assessments of railroad
infrastructure, bridges, and tunnels to assist the railroads with
identifying potential vulnerabilities and options to mitigate those
vulnerabilities. TSA's Office of Security Technology in coordination
with DHS's Office of Science and Technology is also assisting with
research and development of innovative technologies that can be used in
the freight rail environment for intrusion detection and early warning
of tampering or disruption of railroad infrastructure.
In the mass transit and passenger rail mode, TSA encouraged the
transit and passenger rail agencies to increase the frequency and
number of Regional Alliance Including Local, State, and Federal Effort
(RAILSAFE) operations. TSA encourages continual RAILSAFE operations on
a random basis to practice preparing for different types of security
threats. Additionally, TSA will continue issuing Security Awareness
messages and conducting Operational Deterrence Programs that include
training, public awareness, K-9 units, and Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response Teams. The focus of issuing Security Awareness
messages and conducting Operational Deterrence Programs will shift from
extended periods of time to shorter periods, such as months or weeks.
TSA is also focusing on the protection of a mass transit and passenger
rail right-of-ways through the development of new technologies. In
conjunction with the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group,
TSA has developed recommendations for new protective measures based on
most likely threat scenarios that could be implemented as needed.
Utilizing the best available information, TSA will continue to
provide guidance to freight rail, mass transit, and passenger rail on
possible threats and provide support in developing realistic and
implementable measures to reduce vulnerabilities and increase the
likelihood of detection of terrorist acts.
TSA's Pipeline Security Division has issued guidance and
implemented risk-based programs to enhance the security preparedness of
the Nation's pipelines. TSA has identified the pipeline systems of
highest consequence based on the amount of energy transported and
evaluated each operator's security program implementation.
Additionally, TSA has assessed the level of physical security at
critical pipeline facilities. In each case, where appropriate, TSA
provided recommendations for security improvements. Further, TSA has
established an effective communications network with the pipeline
industry to insure security information is promptly and efficiently
provided to stakeholders.
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Pub. L. 107-71
[November 19, 2001]), and delegated authority from the Secretary of
Homeland Security, TSA has broad responsibility and authority for
``security in all modes of transportation including security
responsibilities over modes of transportation that are exercised by the
Department of Transportation.'' We continue to consider whether
additional authority is needed with respect to securing our Nation's
pipeline infrastructure.
TSO WORKFORCE
Question 14. There was a GAO report last year that questioned TSA's
management of its training program, citing problems with TSO access to
computers, as well as TSOs not having the time to conduct training,
among other issues. Is TSA addressing the problems identified in its
training program? What type of authorization language would help
improve TSA's training program?
Question 15. Has TSA updated its training program to include new
technologies and procedures, including Advanced Imaging Technology
operation and enhanced pat-down screening? Can you assure us that all
TSOs are trained on the actual machines they operate?
Question 16. One of my chief concerns has become the need for
immediate remedial training when TSO's fail covert tests. It is my
understanding that although failures of tests are communicated to
Supervisors at checkpoints, information and remedial training does not
flow down to the TSO who may have failed the covert test. What steps do
you plan to take to ensure that a regimented remedial training program
is implemented to ensure that TSOs who fail covert tests are briefed on
failure and immediate action is taken to ensure the possibility of
human error is mitigated?
Answer. Although we are not aware of a Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report which specifically addressed training issues at the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), on October 26, 2010, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG)
released report OIG-11, an audit, of TSA's management of its screening
workforce training program. DHS OIG published four recommendations
associated with that audit. The recommendations and the action TSA has
taken to address them are as follows:
OIG Recommendation.--Documenting processes that are used to
determine when and what updates should be made to training
materials. TSA Action.--TSA is conducting an in-depth training
task analysis to be completed in fiscal year 2012 to support a
comprehensive review of officer new hire and recurrent
training. TSA is also documenting the process it uses to update
training materials based on a review of internal and external
covert testing results, annual officer certification testing
results, intelligence information, as well as updates to
operating procedures and deployment of new/upgraded
technologies.
OIG Recommendation.--Documenting program efforts underway to
formalize an on-the-job instructor training program. TSA
Action.--Development efforts were underway at the time of the
OIG audit, and in June 2011, TSA conducted an operational pilot
to determine what efficiencies and improvements in officer
effectiveness could be realized with adoption of the program.
The review of how this approach may better prepare new officers
for their assignments continues, and once completed, a decision
will be made on whether a National rollout will begin and
whether modifications are necessary before that rollout occurs.
OIG Recommendation.--Documenting a review of training
computer allocations. TSA Action.--The review is underway, and
TSA is taking into account the amount of training that requires
computer access, the number of officers at each airport, and
the space at airports for setting up computer training rooms.
OIG Recommendation.--Completing a study to determine how to
ensure airports provide sufficient time to TSOs to attend and
complete scheduled training. TSA Action.--TSA is reviewing how
it might be able to adopt a customized staffing allocation
model that can be used to assess the needs of each airport to
account for those locations where travel to and from training
locations are required because of off-airport training space,
and where airports have a larger inventory of technologies in
use and therefore require more time for training on each
specific type of equipment.
At this time, TSA does not believe legislation is required to
implement any of the recommendations made by DHS OIG.
TSA continually updates its training programs to include new
technologies and procedures, including operation of Advanced Imaging
Technology and the current pat-down screening process. TSA documents
all technical training completed by its officers, and each officer is
trained on each type of screening technology that they are assigned to
operate. Training is coordinated to ensure officers are trained on
machines manufactured by the specific manufacturers of the equipment
used at their assigned airports.
Remedial training for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who
fail covert tests remains a requirement throughout TSA. Upon such a
failure, the TSO is immediately removed from performing the failed
security function and may not return to duty to perform that function
until he/she has received the necessary remedial training and the
training has been documented.
TSA OMBUDSMAN
Question 17a. We have been told that the TSA Ombudsman lacks the
independence and authority to get personnel issues resolved. As a
result, employees often avoid the Ombudsman and withhold their
complaints for fear of retaliation.
To give this office the independence and weight it needs to resolve
personnel problems, do you agree that the Ombudsman should have its own
office in TSA that reports directly to the Administrator?
Question 17b. Would you support a provision like this in the
authorization bill?
Question 18. What will the TSA Ombudsman's role be under the new
collective bargaining framework?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Ombudsman
reports to the Administrator through the Office of Special Counselor
(OSC), headed by the Special Counselor. In accordance with the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Management Directive
100.0.1, OSC Roles and Responsibilities, one of the responsibilities of
the Special Counselor is serving as the principal advisor to the TSA
Assistant Secretary and senior leadership on significant issues and
concerns brought to the attention of the TSA Ombudsman from employees,
stakeholders, and the public, and through proactive engagement. OSC
also oversees the Office of Civil Rights and Liberties (OCRL), giving
the Special Counselor a unique, expansive view of the TSA workplace
through the informal and formal issue resolution lenses provided by the
TSA Ombudsman and the OCRL.
The details of the collective bargaining framework are still being
developed. In the TSA Administrator's February, 2011 determination
regarding Transportation Security Officers and Collective Bargaining,
it concluded TSA would develop a unitary dispute resolution system that
included both interest-based and neutral, third-party rights-based
options, and envisioned that such a system would permit the existence
of a confidential, neutral, informal issue resolution resource such as
the TSA Ombudsman. In that framework, the TSA Ombudsman will continue
to perform its role of providing confidential, neutral, informal
workplace problem resolution assistance to all TSA employees.
TSA AND TECHNOLOGY
Question 19. Administrator Pistole, many of the existing explosive
detection system (EDS) machines are reaching the end of their useful
life. As one of the first new aviation security technologies deployed
after September 11, 2001 many of the EDS machines have been in constant
service for nearly 10 years. Will you please provide a detailed plan
for the acquisition of new machines to replace the aging EDS machines
now in place?
Question 20a. I am increasingly concerned that TSA is taking a
stagnant approach to the utilization of innovative technologies in its
efforts to achieve 100% screening of air cargo on passenger planes. I
have heard from some companies that TSA is overly-reliant on incumbent
companies and not testing and approving innovative technologies from
other companies that might help us better secure air cargo.
What efforts is TSA taking to ensure that emerging technologies,
especially from small businesses, are being approved and used?
Question 20b. When will it next review potential air cargo
screening technologies?
Question 20c. Will you consider entering into more pilot programs
with innovative non-incumbent companies to test security technologies
in an operational setting?
Question 21. CQ noted that TSA is lagging in its efforts to utilize
non-contact trace detection for explosives in cargo pallets. The
article discussed some efforts undertaken by the Science & Technology
Directorate on this front but did not mention whether TSA has actively
engaged with companies already operating in this space to come up with
standards and requirements for non-contact trace detection. How is TSA
preparing to engage in the efforts underway at S&T?
Answer. While continuing to ensure 100% checked baggage screening,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will be shifting its
focus from completion of optimal airport systems to the replacement of
an aging Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) fleet of equipment. EDS
equipment is estimated to have a useful life of 10 years and it is
projected that approximately half of the EDS fleet will have reached
the end of its useful life by 2013, with up to two-thirds of the fleet
requiring replacement within 5 years. TSA is currently working to
finalize a Recapitalization and Optimization strategic plan, which will
prioritize airports based upon a combination of age and maintenance
data. To support this effort, TSA has requested an update to the
authorization language regarding the Aviation Security Capital Fund to
authorize the purchase and installation of EDS equipment.
TSA and the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) continuously explore both the
commercial marketplace and technology development arenas to find
innovative technologies that might assist in better screening of air
cargo. In addition, TSA maintains means to quickly assess promising,
technically mature innovations.
TSA and DHS S&T also have several means in place for small
businesses to propose emerging technologies. TSA maintains a Broad
Agency Announcement (BAA) encouraging submission of new technologies,
while also maintaining an on-going BAA specifically for air cargo
technology qualification. In accordance with the existing TSA air cargo
BAA, TSA intends to offer at least one qualification opportunity for
products in each of the major technological groups during fiscal year
2011 and fiscal year 2012. Through this process, businesses of all
sizes have equal opportunities for qualification, including several
small technology vendors whose products have been approved.
During fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, TSA intends to offer
at least one qualification opportunity for products in each of the
major technological groups. Solicitations for explosives trace
detection and X-ray technologies were recently conducted. TSA and DHS
S&T have several means in place for businesses to propose emerging
technologies which provides for review of inputs by technical experts.
If a proposal is deemed to have potential for being effective and
suitable enough to meet requirements for use in the field, TSA
considers the best means of further evaluation. There is full and
continuous collaboration between TSA and DHS S&T on all air cargo
technology initiatives. It should be noted that threat
characterizations and resulting standards and requirements are based on
the actual threats, not technology modes. TSA explores effectiveness of
all technology modes and qualifies those that are proven to be
successful in detecting threats.
TWIC
Question 22. Over the last several years, this committee has spent
significant amounts of time conducting oversight of TSA identity
management and security program--the Transportation Worker Identity
Credential. As we all know, this program has had significant challenges
over its short life--the latest of which is TSA's inability to conclude
the TWIC reader pilot program and deliver the Congressionally-mandated
pilot report. TSA's delays have caused Coast Guard to delay issuance of
the final TWIC reader rule. So, we have these very expensive biometric
identity cards, which are used as simple flash passes--and clearly,
this isn't the intent of the program.
My question is this--when will TSA provide TWIC reader pilot
program results to Members of Congress so that readers can be deployed
at our Nation's ports, and when will we see the benefits of this
program?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
reader pilot concluded on May 31, 2011. A draft of the TWIC Reader
Pilot final report is currently under Department review. The Coast
Guard intends to publish the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) after
the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) public comments are
analyzed and results from the TWIC pilot program are available. The
Coast Guard plans to have a full 90-day comment period for the NPRM and
have public meetings at various locations across the country. As the
Coast Guard evaluates the economic and operational impact on the
maritime industry, they will continue to seek input and recommendations
to develop and propose regulations requiring industry compliance.
Initial delays in the pilot program were encountered as the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) led a joint effort by
several Federal agencies, card and reader industry experts, and
maritime stakeholders to develop a specification enabling readers to
conduct a biometric match under the harsh conditions found at maritime
facilities. Later the field phase of the pilot was delayed due to the
voluntary nature of participation in the pilot. This limited the
Government's ability to influence the pace at which participants
completed site plans, obtained authorizations to expend pilot funds
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and award reader
installation contracts. Pilot participants also encountered delays due
to technical system installation or parts availability issues. Finally,
the recent economic climate and competitive concerns created
significant delays in commencing the pilot at a number of the larger
pilot participant facilities. Work force reductions and layoffs caused
some facility operators to postpone their participation until shipping
volumes increased following the economic downturn. Competitive concerns
with non-pilot facilities caused reluctance among some pilot
participants to disturb their operations to the extent needed to
register the TWICs of thousands of workers and truckers into their
access control systems. All of these challenges have now been overcome,
all data has been acquired and analyzed, and a final draft of the pilot
report completed.
Today, even before the Coast Guard finishes its rulemaking, there
are already benefits to the TWIC program, and ports are more secure.
Many facilities have already started using readers either installed
during the pilot or acquired independently to ensure workers have valid
TWICs. Some facilities are fully using the card's capabilities by using
biometric matching to verify identity; the facilities choosing to use
readers are doing so voluntarily in advance of the reader rule. Some
facilities have confirmed cost savings afforded by avoiding the cost of
providing facility badges and automating access control. The security
director at a major petroleum refinery in Louisiana reported savings of
$700,000 per year due to TWIC. The savings result from eliminating
costly employee background checks, using TWICs to replace facility
badges, and automation of the access process. The Coast Guard also uses
more than 200 portable readers to check TWICs during routine facility
inspections.
TWIC has already standardized the security threat assessment (STA)
conducted on workers, and providing one standardized biometric
credential, removing the need to have security personnel discern the
authenticity of multiple identity documents. Prior to the
implementation of TWIC, the identity document requirements for access
to secure areas of ports and vessels were dependent on each facility's
Facility Security Plan. Facilities often accepted a number of documents
such as a driver's license, passport, State ID, port/facility specific
security card, or a Merchant Mariner's Document (also known as a ``Z-
card'' and now known as the Merchant Mariner Credential or ``MMC'').
Without uniform credential issuance processes, most facilities were
unable to positively authenticate the identity of an individual or
determine the authenticity of the identity documents presented. There
also were no universal methods for determining if a once-valid
credential holder were no longer eligible for access privileges, or to
effectively revoke an individual's access permissions or credentials.
Truckers have specifically benefited from the TWIC as the one
common credential needed for access to regulated facilities. Prior to
TWIC some truckers had to obtain, and often pay for, background checks
and badges for multiple ports and facilities.
ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY (AIT)
Question 23a. There are several legislative measures that have been
introduced concerning AIT.
What is your position on prohibiting AIT use until the National
Academy of Science has conducted a study of AIT safety as related to
radiation exposure?
Question 23b. What is your position on limiting AIT use until the
Automated Targeting Recognition (stick figure) software is in place?
Question 24. To what extent would AIT have detected the hidden
explosives used in the Christmas day attempted bombing of Flight 253?
Question 25. To what extent has TSA surveyed passengers'
willingness to be screened by AIT and addressed public concerns related
to privacy and health risks? TSOs?
Question 26a. Since TSA is now planning to deploy about 10 new
technologies to passenger checkpoints, how will it ensure that these
different technologies are successfully integrated?
Has TSA updated its passenger checkpoint program strategy to
reflect the increased use of AIT?
Question 27. Could you provide the committee with a copy of the
updated AIT deployment strategy?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
commissioned the U.S. Army Health Public Command to perform radiation
safety surveys of currently deployed general-use backscatter X-ray
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems and a radiation dosimetry
study to exam the radiation doses to individuals undergoing screening
and to system operators. The surveys and study validated that doses to
individuals undergoing screening are well below the radiation dose
limits of the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics
Society (ANSI/HPS) N43.17-2009. Radiation Safety for Personnel Security
Screening Systems Using X-Ray or Gamma Radiation, a standard that
applies to systems used to expose people to X-rays for the purpose of
security screening. Potential doses to AIT operators were found to be
extremely small. At the maximum possible throughput, the doses to
operators are still below the public dose limits. The American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)--Accredited Standards Committee N43,
Equipment for Non-Medical Radiation Applications, administered by the
Health Physics Society (HPS), published the current version of the
American National consensus radiation safety standard for X-ray people
screening products in 2009. ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 Radiation Safety for
Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-Ray or Gamma Radiation
sets limits on dose to an individual being screened; sets limits on
dose to bystanders, operators, and other employees; requires a variety
of safety features; and establishes operational requirements for
organizations using these products. It was written, reviewed, and
approved by a consensus group that included Government regulators,
product manufacturers, and product users.
AIT addresses the significant security threat posed by non-metallic
explosives. Automated Target Recognition (ATR) is an important
improvement that addresses privacy concerns among some members of the
public. TSA is confident in the privacy protections offered by its
existing operational protocols and does not support limiting AIT use
during the transition to ATR-equipped AIT. TSA is preparing for
deployment of ATR software to all millimeter wave AIT units. The AIT
backscatter technology units do not yet have an approved ATR software
update.
AIT units address screening for small threat items and non-metallic
explosive devices and allow Transportation Security Officers to screen
passengers safely and effectively for both metallic and non-metallic
threats, including weapons and explosives. After analyzing the latest
intelligence and studying available technologies and other processes,
TSA determined that AIT is the most effective method to detect threat
items concealed on passengers, such as the non-metallic explosives used
by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in the Christmas day attempted bombing of
Flight 253.
Since TSA began piloting its use of AIT units in 2007, TSA has been
forthcoming with the traveling public about the technology, including
the strong privacy protections in place. To that end, TSA has conducted
dozens of press conferences in various locations reaching thousands of
passengers to inform the traveling public about the importance of the
technology and to advise them that the technology is an optional
screening method. In addition, multiple signs informing passengers
about the technology, including sample images, are provided in plain
sight at airport security checkpoints, in front of the machine, and on
the machine itself.
TSA seeks input from the traveling public in a variety of ways via
a contact center, feedback at airports and through the TSA website.
Polling by CBS, Gallup, Trip Advisor, Travel Leader, and the Wall
Street Journal demonstrate strong public support and understanding for
the need for the technology:
CBS poll: 81% of passengers support the use of imaging technology.
Gallup poll: 78% of air travelers approve of U.S. airports' using
advanced imaging technology on airline passengers.
Wall Street Journal poll: 73.9% of travelers said they would be willing
to undergo a body scan before getting on a plane.
TSA also had extensive internal communications regarding AIT
technology:
Developed and launched an intranet (iShare) page dedicated
to AIT and AIT safety.
Used ad space (``Flashbox'' images) on the intranet homepage
to highlight updates made to the AIT page.
Posted content to the Employee Communications Committee
(ECC) intranet (iShare) site--a site with 300 members across
the country including customer service managers, stakeholder
managers, AFSDs, and others--for local distribution of HQ-
produced AIT-safety products.
Collaborated with the Office of Security Operations (OSO)
Communications (Comms) team to push content through OSO
channels directly to the coordination centers, Federal Security
Directors (FSDs), and others at the airports.
Developed, posted, and/or published the following products
about AIT and AIT safety:
Wrote and posted AIT Facts You Can Use--concise list of
bullets with the most pertinent AIT facts, including facts
about safety (distributed through iShare, OSO Comms, ECC).
Wrote and published multiple internal stories about AIT
safety on the agency-wide news blog housed on the intranet
(iShare).
Linked to AIT-safety reports (linked from AIT iShare
page).
Linked to news reports about AIT safety (linked from AIT
iShare page).
Posted multiple videos about AIT and AIT safety.
Produced AIT and AIT safety content for the National shift
brief (distributed through OSO Comms).
Wrote FSD talkers--talking points that FSDs could use when
talking to stakeholders and staff (distributed through OSO
Comms).
The TSA Office of Occupational Safety, Health, and Environment
prepared and published a Radiation Safety monthly briefing package that
included AIT safety. Safety Week 2011 included the topic ``Radiation
Safety at TSA'' and presented AIT safety. Certified Health Physicists
from the U.S. Army Public Health Command continue to perform
independent radiation safety surveys of general-use backscatter X-ray
AITs. Part of the survey process includes question-and-answer sessions
with employees who operate and work near the systems.
TSA employs an agency-wide data management system called the
Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) to ensure that equipment
is successfully integrated. STIP provides a centralized focal point
connecting passenger and baggage screening security technologies to one
network, addressing current data, threat response and equipment
challenges. The goal of STIP is to remotely manage Transportation
Security Equipment (TSE) threat detection capabilities, which enhances
TSA's ability to respond to new and emerging threats. STIP will also
enable TSA to remotely monitor, diagnose, troubleshoot, and manage
TSEs, allowing TSA to address equipment issues and reduce the need for
on-site visits.
The TSA has incorporated AIT equipment and its increased usage into
the passenger checkpoint program strategy. This strategy is in the
final review/approval phase.
The AIT deployment strategy is sensitive security information
(SSI). TSA is willing to separately provide a SSI briefing and a copy
of the document to the committee.
AIR CARGO
Question 27. In your opinion, is industry experiencing any supply
dislocations due to the 100% screening mandate for cargo on passenger
aircraft?
Question 28. How are you ensuring or verifying that the private
sector is properly screening the cargo within its jurisdiction?
Question 29. Simply put, what are the biggest challenges to
implementing 100% screening of inbound cargo and how can TSA expedite
reaching 100% screening for international inbound cargo on passenger
aircraft?
Question 30a. Foreign air carriers have said that they can be
helpful in working with their own governments on harmonization efforts
for cargo screening.
Does TSA plan to work with foreign carriers to help establish
reciprocal cargo screening agreements?
Question 30b. Does TSA need statutory authority for this?
Answer. There has been no reported disruption to the air cargo
supply chain as a result of the 100% screening mandate implemented on
August 1, 2010, for cargo transported on passenger aircraft originating
from domestic airports. The Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) comprehensive air cargo screening strategy has successfully
distributed the burden of screening cargo across the supply chain; most
effectively through the implementation of the TSA Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP). Under the CCSP, TSA certifies cargo screening
facilities located throughout the United States to screen cargo prior
to providing it to airlines for shipment on passenger flights.
Participation in the program is voluntary and designed to enable
vetted, validated, and certified supply chain facilities to comply with
the 100 percent screening requirement. CCSP is a practical, supply
chain solution, which provides security while ensuring the flow of
commerce. Cargo is screened at the most efficient and effective point.
It is done before individual pieces of cargo are consolidated for
shipment. Up to and concurrent with the release of the 100% screening
deadline, Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF) have emerged
proportionately in geographic regions in response to demand in major
air cargo gateways; thus avoiding any potential supply dislocations.
The program allows for the use of multiple screening methodologies and
has been adapted as necessary to fit each individual situation rather
than restricting entities to a single universal solution. Because no
single technology is appropriate for every screening scenario, TSA has
approved a suite of technologies and associated screening protocols
from which screening entities may choose on the basis of their unique
requirements and commodities. This current suite of technologies
include various X-ray systems, explosive trace detection (ETD)
technology, explosive detection (EDS) systems, and electronic metal
detection (EMD) systems, as well as physical screening. TSA continues
to identify and evaluate various technologies that can efficiently and
effectively screen different types of commodities and configurations.
The percentage of cargo screened by CCSP participants indicates that
screening consistently occurs throughout the air cargo supply chain
without undue burden on any one entity (CCSFs account for approximately
50% of total screening).
TSA is actively conducting inspections and testing screening
protocols to ensure that CCSFs and aircraft operators are properly
screening 100% of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. These
inspections are carried out on a continuous basis.
TSA has established close links with the foreign air carrier
community through on-going direct communications via TSA's
International Industry Representatives (IIR). IIRs serve as liaisons
between TSA and foreign air carriers. TSA also interfaces with the
foreign air carrier community through various air carrier associations
and related forums.
TSA understands that foreign air carriers play a key role in
advocating harmonization of air cargo security requirements between
countries. However, TSA believes that global harmonization of cargo
security requirements, where and when appropriate, should be handled
through government-to-government channels as well as through relevant
regional and international organizations, that are responsible for
international civil aviation security and that establish the regulatory
requirements for air cargo security. Specifically, TSA is currently
engaged with a number of countries seeking recognition of National
Cargo Security Programs whereby TSA recognizes a foreign government's
cargo security programs. To effectuate bilateral and multilateral
partnerships and related initiatives in the air cargo security realm,
TSA uses already established means of communication, such as its
network of Transportation Security Administration Representatives
(TSARs) located in key locations throughout the world and through
participation in regional and international working groups and related
forums. Working through the TSARs, TSA has established close working
relationships with foreign government and other international partners,
through which we can jointly work on these critical security issues.
In addition to direct relations with foreign air carriers through
the IIRs, TSA will continue to leverage established relationships with
foreign air carrier associations and forums (for example: the
International Air Transport Association, the Air Transport Association,
and the Association of European Airlines, and the Association of Asia
Pacific Airlines) to advocate harmonization of cargo security
requirements on a global scale, as appropriate.
TSA does not believe that statutory authority is needed at this
time.
STAKEHOLDER INPUT
Question 31. It has been brought to my attention that the charter
of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (also known as ASAC) has
apparently lapsed (again) in April 2010. One of the primary functions
of the advisory committee was to facilitate stakeholder input across
TSA security policies. What is TSA doing to ensure consultation with
stakeholders on security policies, and will the ASAC be re-chartered
this year?
Answer. During review of the Department's advisory committees to
ensure they are effectively used and an efficient expenditure of
resources by the participants, charter renewal actions were placed on
hold and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) subsequently
expired on April 3, 2010. A new ASAC Charter was approved in May 2011,
and the Department of Homeland Security is now in the process of
appointing members. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
anticipates holding a committee meeting early this fall. TSA has always
engaged stakeholders, and will continue to do so, through regular
outreach and coordination including, but not limited to: Sharing best
security practices, including stakeholders in security planning
activities, participating in the Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC), web boards, conference calls, and email
alerts.
REPAIR STATIONS
Question 32. How will TSA assess air carrier security programs at
foreign repair stations? What roles or responsibilities will be
required of air carriers in terms of their own oversight of repair
stations where they outsource repair and maintenance work?
Question 33. What statutory authority does TSA need in terms of
working with foreign governments to conduct security assessments at
repair stations?
Question 34. Will there be harmonization agreements with certain
governments where TSA would allow a foreign government's security
oversight program to satisfy TSA requirements?
Question 35a. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the aviation
repair station security program lacked specificity on staffing
requirements to effectively oversee the repair station security
inspection program.
Will TSA conduct a staffing study to determine requirements for
effectively overseeing a repair station security program?
Question 35b. Some stakeholders informed the committee that they
have not been consulted on the repair station rulemaking in several
years.
Will TSA reach out to stakeholders for input on how to implement an
effective repair station security program?
Question 35c. How will TSA control the dissemination of sensitive
security information in its oversight of repair stations, particularly
those in foreign countries?
Answer. The Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,
Pub. L. 108-176, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44924, authorizes TSA to
develop and issue security regulations to improve the security of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) part 145 certificated repair
stations located in and outside the United States. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has established procedures for conducting
assessments outside the United States through its Foreign Airport and
Foreign Air Carrier Assessment Programs and intends to use those same
procedures when conducting inspections of FAA certificated repair
stations located outside the United States. These established
procedures require coordination with the U.S. Department of State and
the appropriate foreign government authorities. TSA has discussed and
will continue to discuss current and proposed security requirements
with its international partners through existing bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms in order to enhance the compatibility of
security regulations and standards, including the possibility of
developing protocols for reciprocity and mutual recognition of repair
station security regulations.
TSA has reviewed staffing requirements for the repair station
security inspection program. TSA continues to evaluate the resource
needs to implement, carry out, and enforce the proposed regulations.
Any staffing and resource requests will be transmitted as part of the
President's budget.
Throughout the rulemaking process, TSA has engaged the Repair
Station owners/operators and associations through meetings and site
visits, both foreign and domestic. These visits provided valuable
insight into the facilities and existing security procedures already in
practice. The proposed regulations were published for public comment in
the Federal Register and TSA received many comments from repair station
owners and operators. TSA has conducted numerous meetings with
representatives from major repair station associations, and
representatives from active repair station owners/operators, wherein
they were given the opportunity to review and provide feedback on the
draft Aircraft Repair Station Security Program (ARSSP). Meetings were
held in the United States; Portugal; Ireland; Singapore; Germany; and
Switzerland. TSA is continuing these outreach effort, including a visit
to Thailand on August 23, 2011.
Additional reviews will be planned as necessary. After the rule is
published, TSA will leverage headquarters and field inspector resources
to conduct significant outreach to all affected repair station
operators to ensure they understand, and are able to comply with, the
new regulations.
The only sensitive security information (SSI) that TSA will
initially generate in support of this rule is the ARSSP. This document
will only be provided to foreign and domestic repair stations that will
be required to implement a security program. TSA will follow all
appropriate markings, protections, and release protocols required by 49
CFR Part 1520 for each release of the document.
GENERAL AVIATION
Question 36. H.R. 2200, the TSA Authorization bill passed by the
House last Congress established a grant program for general aviation
airport operators for security improvements. Do you think this is
something that is needed in the general aviation community?
Question 37. What is the status of the final rulemaking for general
aviation security programs and what can you tell us about how it will
differ from the poorly received proposed rule issued in 2009?
Question 38a. What steps, if any, has TSA taken to identify and
prioritize the need for security enhancements at general aviation
airports?
Question 38b. What is the estimated cost of the improvements needed
to comply with the proposed regulations?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will work
with the Department of Homeland Security and the White House to assess
the feasibility of developing a grant program.
In 2008, TSA published the Large Aircraft Security Program Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), proposing rules for U.S. air carriers
and GA operators operating aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of
more than 12,500 pounds. In the NPRM, TSA noted the possibility that
large turbine-powered GA airplanes are capable of causing significant
damage if used in an attack. The 4-month comment period provided in the
NPRM was extended another 60 days to obtain additional comment from the
general aviation community. During the original formal comment period,
TSA conducted five public meetings throughout the country to facilitate
feedback by the general aviation community. The comments on the
proposals in the NPRM were generally critical of the approach in the
NPRM, and repeatedly noted that GA operations differ from air carrier
operations. Unlike air carriers, GA operators do not offer
transportation to the public for compensation or hire and, in general,
TSA has not required GA aircraft operators to adopt security programs.
The comments obtained pursuant to TSA's outreach provided additional
detailed insight into GA operations and possible alternative security
solutions for such operations from those proposed in the NPRM.
Based on careful review of all comments, TSA is drafting a
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) that will include
proposals tailored to GA operations, while maintaining an effective
level of security. The draft SNPRM is undergoing internal Government
review and certain provisions could change as a result of that process.
After that review is complete, the SNPRM will be published in the
Federal Register for public comment.
TSA has conducted an airport vulnerability survey to identify the
overall security posture at certain GA airports across the United
States. The survey was distributed to approximately 3,000 airports that
met certain criteria that TSA, in collaboration with industry,
identified as the airports that both groups are most concerned about.
These were public-use airports with high numbers of GA operations; the
ability to accommodate larger aircraft; and in close proximity to
densely populated areas, highly used airspace, or in close proximity to
sensitive areas or airspace. The results of the survey were analyzed to
discover the general strengths and weaknesses at GA airports, as well
as to identify and prioritize the security measures that airports might
implement if funding were available.
As part of the GA airport vulnerability assessment, certain
security measures were identified with their associated costs. The
security measures that would be appropriate to implement can vary
widely depending on an airport's characteristics and what is already in
place. Thus, many of the associated costs also vary widely depending on
the size and characteristics of the airport at which they would be
implemented. This wide variance in airport characteristics and levels
of security prevent a more specific cost estimate. TSA's security focus
regarding general aviation is centered around securing aircraft so they
cannot be used to do harm and the agency is not currently proposing any
regulations for GA airports.
SECURE FLIGHT
Question 39a. We have been told that Secure Flight would generally
fix the problem of innocent passengers being mistakenly matched to the
No-Fly or Selectee lists, due to a similar name.
Is this situation improving now that Secure Flight is fully
operational?
Question 39b. Are you keeping data on passengers requesting
redress?
Answer. Yes, Secure Flight has reduced the number of passengers
mistakenly matched to the No Fly or Selectee Lists. TSA requires
aircraft operators to collect each passenger's full name, date of
birth, gender, and Redress Number if available. The use of this data in
conducting watch list matching significantly decreases the likelihood
of passenger misidentification. Additionally, in May 2009, GAO
certified that the Secure Flight system generally met the condition
that the system does not produce a large number of passengers being
mistakenly matched to the watch list, as outlined in the 2005
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Act. The Secure Flight program
continues to succeed in reducing instances of passenger
misidentification.
DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) maintains travel
data submitted by travelers through the redress inquiry process in
accordance with the Privacy Impact Assessment for DHS TRIP. DHS TRIP
has received approximately 135,286 redress requests from the public
since its launch on February 20, 2007. The results of the redress
process are directly integrated into Secure Flight through the Redress
Number to prevent the reoccurrence of known passenger
misidentifications.
IN-LINE BAGGAGE
Question 40. Some airports have not been reimbursed for terminal
modifications made to install checked baggage explosives detection
systems because they made expenditures before a reimbursement program
was established by TSA, and now these airports are at the bottom of the
list for receiving reimbursement. H.R. 2200 directed TSA to establish a
claims process for these airports. Please comment on this.
Answer. To provide more effective security solutions, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes a risk-based
approach to investing in security programs at airports without
optimized baggage screening systems. The Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53, Section 1406)
requires TSA to establish a prioritization schedule for airport
security projects based on risk. In addition, TSA focuses on compliance
requirements--such as replacing equipment in the field that has reached
the end of its life-cycle--to minimize operational impacts. Due to the
number of airports that are awaiting the replacement of sub-optimal
baggage screening systems, and other competing program priorities, TSA
has been unable to address reimbursement requests. Any reimbursement of
previous efforts outside a formal agreement comes at the cost of
advancing current or future security measures.
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES: AUTHORIZING THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012 AND 2013
----------
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:08 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Cravaack, Brooks, and
Jackson Lee.
Also present: Representative Clarke of Michigan.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee of Transportation Security, will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to hear different industry
perspectives on authorizing the Transportation Security
Administration for fiscal years 2012 and 2013.
I would like to welcome everyone here to this hearing and
thank all of our witnesses for their patience. I apologize for
us being called for votes right when this hearing was supposed
to start, but it is what it is. But we look forward to your
testimony and greatly appreciate the time and effort you have
put into your opening statements and preparing for this
hearing. I know the Q&A is going to be very worthwhile.
As many of you already know, this year the committee plans
to develop a TSA authorization bill which is intended to
enhance and streamline TSA's transportation security
initiatives. A few weeks ago, Administrator Pistole testified
in front of this subcommittee to discuss his priorities. The
purpose of today's hearing is to hear different industry
perspectives on the on-going challenges in securing
transportation systems and what improvements could be made
through the legislative process.
TSA plays a critical role in keeping America's travellers
safe. However, its success hinges on the cooperation and
support of its public- and private-sector partners. We look
forward to continuing this conversation and hearing from some
of the diverse groups of public- and private-sector partners
that TSA relies on to fulfill its mission of protecting our
Nation's transportation systems.
An example of the important collaboration between TSA and
its partners has been the response to the foiled Yemen Air
cargo attack. Since October, TSA has been working with private
industry to develop and implement a short-term security
directive to address certain vulnerabilities. While challenges
remain, the open lines of communication between TSA and private
industry is commendable and should be recognized as such.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for some of TSA's
partners, including the rail, trucking, mass transit, pipeline,
and aviation sectors, to voice their insights as to how the TSA
authorization bill can improve overall transportation security,
enhance the effectiveness of TSA's transportation security
initiatives, and address inefficiencies that still may exist. I
look forward to an open dialogue that will allow those industry
partners that interact with TSA on a daily basis the ability to
inform this committee in its continued development of the TSA
authorization bill.
The committee considered a TSA authorization bill last
Congress as well, H.R. 2200, under the Ranking Member Sheila
Jackson Lee's leadership. I look forward to continuing to work
with her on a bipartisan basis through this effort.
With that, I now recognize the famous Ranking Member,
Sheila Jackson Lee, the gentlelady from Texas, for 5 minutes
for her opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much.
Again, let me thank you for the cooperation that we have
promoted on this issue of transportation security.
To the witnesses who are here, let me thank you very much
for your presence and take note of the fact of Members'
schedules that were skewed somewhat because of the long list of
votes and may be delaying some Members or cause some Members to
have some additional scheduling concerns. So let me just thank
you again.
The Chairman is right; we listened to Administrator
Pistole, and we now want to listen to the stakeholders. Rail
workers, transit security professionals, pilots, and flight
attendants are just a few of the many professionals who find it
within their job description the responsibility of securing our
Nation's railroads, skies, and pipelines against terrorist
attacks, including chiefs of metropolitan rail systems, are all
at the front lines.
When we talk about security, we are really talking about
people. The critical question for me then is, are
transportation workers in this country trained and equipped to
recognize and mitigate a potential terrorist act? Let me say,
just as I did in our first hearing on TSA authorization last
month with Administrator Pistole, that we simply cannot forget
the lessons learned from the past as we look to preventing
future terrorist attacks.
I think the Chairman and I agree that there are many tools.
We happen to be unified in our support on canines. Canine is
not present at the table today, so we won't ask any questions.
But what we are saying is that we need tools, we need
professionals persons used to canines, we need persons who are
professionals who are used to finding those threats that will
impact the American people.
As a Congress and as a Nation, we have taken many steps to
shore up the vulnerabilities in protocols and processes that
enabled the 9/11 hijackers to penetrate the system and destroy
thousands of lives. We have made great progress. We decided to
move away from a system with various security companies
operating checkpoint security to a Federalized system of
professional screeners who can quickly adapt to threats based
upon the latest intelligence. We implemented mandatory
screening for explosives, for checked bags and cargo on
passenger planes. We directed that cockpit doors be
strengthened, and we deployed more air marshals to secure the
aircraft cabin on high-risk flights. Frankly, I am a supporter
of increasing those air marshals on our flights
internationally.
However, Mr. Chairman, our work is not done, and to the
witnesses, our work is not done. Just this year alone, there
have been at least five incidents where a flight attendant has
had to subdue a passenger to secure the aircraft cabin. I
request to submit a list of these incidents for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
2011 In-Flight Incidents Involving Flight Attendants
UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 990
On June 1, 2011 Government and airline officials stated that a
United Airlines plane with 144 people aboard returned to Washington-
Dulles International Airport for an emergency landing after a fight
broke out between passengers. FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown says Flight
990 bound for Accra, Ghana returned to Dulles after a passenger lowered
his seat and a passenger behind him objected. Fighter Jets from Andrews
Air Force Base, Maryland, were confirmed to have escorted the flight
back to Dulles. United Airlines spokesman Mike Trevino stated that
``the Boeing 767 dumped fuel as a safety precaution to lighten its
weight on landing."
AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 1561
On Sunday May 8, 2011 on a late flight from Chicago to San
Francisco, passengers helped subdue a man whom authorities say was
pounding on the cockpit door during the flight. After banging on the
cockpit door and shouting during the flight, Rageit Almurisi, 28, was
pinned down by two flight attendants and two Air Marshals. Many aboard
the flight, airline attendees and security officials believe Almurisi
had mental issues.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 546
On Sunday May 8, 2011 on a flight from Houston to Chicago there was
an emergency landing in St. Louis, after Reynel Alcaide, a 34-year-old
passenger, attempted to open a plane exit door. Alcaide has been
charged with causing a disruption on board. Authorities believe this
was a suicidal attempt. Passengers subdued the suspect until the safe
landing was reached.
DELTA AIRLINES FLIGHT 1102
On Tuesday May 10, 2011 a passenger became disruptive and attempted
to open an emergency door on a flight from Orlando to Boston but was
subdued by passengers. The flight landed safely at Boston Logan
International Airport late Tuesday night. An off-duty police officer on
board assisted the crew in subduing the passenger and got the situation
under control quickly, according to airline officials.
DELTA AIRLINES FLIGHT 413
Olajide Oluwaseun Noibi, 24, a Nigerian-born man who was found with
the stolen ID and up to 10 old boarding passes containing various
names, was arrested Wednesday June 28 after attempting to board a
flight from Los Angeles to Atlanta; 5 days after passing through layers
of airport security at New York's JFK airport to board a plane with a
day-old boarding pass, Federal authorities said. It is unclear how
Noibi managed to get through security at both airports, and whether he
left the L.A. airport once flight 415 landed last week and when he
attempted to board Delta Airlines flight 46 to Atlanta Wednesday,
although he claims to have cleared security. Noibi was charged with
being a stowaway aboard an aircraft, according to FBI Special Agent
Kevin R. Hogg. He is being held at a Los Angeles Metropolitan Detention
Center and appeared in court on July 1.
Ms. Jackson Lee. While these were not terrorist incidents,
they reveal how important a layer of security the flight crews
represent. In fact, all of us who fly to work, as I tell my
elementary school children as I visit our schools, when I tell
them that I fly to work, depend upon those frontline but non-
armed flight attendants, along with our pilots, once those
doors are closed.
In the last Congress when we passed our bipartisan TSA
authorization bill, H.R. 2200, we recognized this and included
provisions to improve TSA oversight of air carriers' basic
security programs and directed that TSA work with the industry
to implement accessible, advanced security training for flight
attendants.
Let me be very clear: The airlines need to pay for flight
attendant security training, and it needs to be part of their
compensation package, on the airlines' package. Please
recognize you have the passengers in your hands.
I continue to support these concepts and continue not to
understand opposition to improving aircraft cabin security. As
we reinforce the pilot door, as we have provided for pilots to
carry arms if trained, let us do something for our flight
attendants. With a small investment in time and training, we
can take the next step in aircraft cabin security by ensuring
that the cabin crew are fully trained to meet today's very real
threat.
Let us not forget that when you are in the air, when there
are no air marshals on board, it is the flight crew that is the
very last line of defense. Let's let them work together, air
marshals and flight attendants and our very able pilot force.
I say again, nearly 10 years later, let us not forget the
lessons learned from 9/11 as we look to addressing the
persistent and evolving terrorist threat. Would we, in fact, be
even having a discussion on crew training on September 12,
2001? For instance, how many lives were saved when crew and
passengers foiled the hijackers on United Flight 93--although,
of course, they lost their lives--sending it into the ground in
Pennsylvania at 580 miles an hour, sacrificing themselves
instead of allowing the terrorists to kill thousands more. I
simply say, let us not be pennywise and pound-foolish when it
comes to security.
Regarding mass transit and pipeline security, I have
introduced H.R. 1900, the Surface Transportation Mass Security
Act, which establishes the Surface Transportation Inspection
Office and the Surface Transportation Advisory Committee for
stakeholder consultation on security programs.
I look forward to working with the Chairman and his
leadership on this issue. I might say that H.R. 1900 also would
increase the number of canine teams for transit security
purposes, for wherever I go, canines come up as a viable tool
to be utilized in security.
Let's be creative. Let's move forward in training flight
attendants, increasing professionalism, and using the tools
that are helpful. Given the consistent threat to our
transportation systems, as evidenced by information made public
following the demise of bin Laden, we simply must bring our
surface transportation efforts in line with aviation. I urge
the majority to consider this bill and to be part of the
overall TSA authorization.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I have requested a field hearing on
pipeline security, and I know that we are in discussion. I
thank you very much for your interest. I hope that we will have
one in Washington, as well. This is a serious matter, and it is
reflected by recent incidents in Montana.
I believe we can work together on issues of transportation,
pipeline security, both aviation and rail and all aspects of
it. It is important to hear from the stakeholders who are here.
Again, let me thank you so much very much for being part of
America's security. Let's overcome some of our disagreements
and follow through on behalf of the American people in securing
the homeland.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
I would like to remind other Members that if they have
opening statements, they may be submitted for the record.
At this time, I would like to, without objection, ask
unanimous consent to insert into the hearing record statements
from the Air Forwarders Association, the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the
National Air Carrier Association, and the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The statements follow:]
Letter From the Airforwarders Association
July 11, 2011.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chair, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland
Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20510.
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,Washington, DC
20510.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: The
Airforwarders Association (AfA), the voice of the freight forwarding
industry representing nearly 400 dues-paying member companies with
3,000 facilities and 20,000 employees, respectfully submits the
following comments in advance of the July 12 hearing on industry
perspectives on TSA reauthorization. Our members are directly and
indirectly regulated by TSA and must work with inspectors, compliance
officers and senior officials on a daily basis. As such, AfA applauds
the committee's efforts to reduce redundancy, improve efficiencies, and
encourage collaboration with the private sector.
The Airforwarders Association is committed to improving aviation
security and understands that the seriousness of the recent threats
necessitates a change in TSA policies. This commitment drives our
recommendations, which will improve security and eliminate redundancies
in TSA's air cargo security policies.
These areas of improvement AfA are:
Harmonization of Domestic Security Programs.--TSA has worked
diligently in partnership with CBP, as well as FDA and other agencies
to better understand security procedures or authorized agent protocols.
However, this understanding has yet to lead to action by TSA or other
agencies their security practices.
Recommendations:
1. TSA reauthorization should eliminate the inefficient and costly
practice of registering authorized agents by each forwarder
that may require their services. Oftentimes, such agents are
already known in the system due to their work with many
forwarders. Requiring reregistration of the same agent is an
expensive and redundant security procedure. Forwarders are
concerned about the costs to their business as well as the
``passed on'' cost to their customers in this volatile economy.
Once an agent is deemed to be ``known'' and passes the
necessary security checks, forwarders should no longer be
required to re-enter them into the system.
2. TSA reauthorization should include the Modern Credentialing Act
of 2011 (H.R. 1690). This legislation is effective in achieving
the goal of harmonizing redundant Government credentialing. AfA
supports H.R. 1690. This would lower costs for businesses, as
only one credential would have to be issued per employee or
agent.
3. CBP, TSA, and the FDA should work together to harmonize supply
chain security standards, audits, and applications so that all
agencies together can leverage the strength and membership of
their existing programs, and decrease unnecessary redundancy
for the private sector.
Advancement of National Air Cargo Security Programs with Other
Nations.--TSA has worked diligently with our international partners to
reach agreements on security protocols. However, this multilateral
diplomatic effort is not swift enough to include the majority of cargo
passing through the global supply chain en route to the United States.
Recommendations:
1. TSA should continue to aggressively review existing security
programs, including screening technologies and policies like
Known Consignor, and identify points of commonality to
streamline the international screening process. TSA should
approve other Nation's security programs and immediately list
the locations where a level of security commensurate to
domestic cargo screening can be verified.
2. TSA must be directed to harmonize security standards and
programs. For example, several European nations are using
pallet-screening technologies that have met security standards
within their nation. These methods should be recognized and
approved by TSA for a limited duration of time leading up to
and beyond the 2011 deadline to ensure cargo continues to move
efficiently through the supply chain.
Expansion of Existing CBP/TSA Pilot Program on Screening.--Advanced
data entry efforts are an important element of a threat-based security
program. Current efforts to gather advance predeparture information
have been largely successful because of the cooperative engagement that
all sides have displayed in the early stages of the pilot program with
CBP. AfA has been working closely with CBP to provide feedback and
encourage additional participants in the program. The pilot program
that has been established has led to positive outcomes already, and the
alliance should only get stronger.
Recommendations:
1. TSA and CBP should continue to move forward on the existing
pilot program and expand invitations to other forwarders and
carriers to participate. Congress should retain robust
oversight and be briefed regularly on the status of the
program, its successes and policy recommendations gained from
the pilot.
Improvement of Inspector Training.--AfA members often deal directly
with TSA inspectors in their facilities, where their security,
personnel, compliance, and other areas are observed. TSA inspectors can
issue guidance or penalize facilities. Compliance and enforcement are
necessary and important aspects of a strong cargo security program.
However, variations in training (or a lack of any formal training at
all) have led to inconsistent interpretations of regulations resulting
in unnecessary or inappropriate financial penalties and disruption in
small businesses.
Recommendations:
1. All TSA cargo inspectors should complete a mandatory training
course prior to engaging in field work. At one time, a training
manual was available for inspectors; it is our understanding
this was pulled out of circulation.
2. Inspectors should engage in regular retraining to remain up-to-
date with new regulations, interpretations from the regional
and National TSA offices and the changing security environment.
Formalization of Stakeholder Engagement.--AfA has worked in
partnership with the air cargo security team at TSA since the agency
was established by the 9/11 legislation. In this time, we have found
TSA officials to be sincere in their efforts to facilitate two-way
communication with the air cargo industry. AfA has also been a member
of the Aviation Security Advisory Council (ASAC) since its inception;
ASAC has served a valuable role in bringing private-sector concerns and
solutions to the forefront. Friday's announcement that ASAC was being
re-established and will report to the TSA Administrator is welcome
news.
Recommendations:
1. Congress should closely assess the re-establishment process. It
is our hope and belief that original members with a key
constituency, like AfA, will remain included in ASAC. Moreover,
the previous meetings of ASAC were inconsistent and ad hoc. We
recommend considering a requirement on a minimum number of
meetings per year to ensure feedback is regularly submitted to
the agency.
Expansion of Canine Detection Units in Pallet Screening.--AfA
advocated for the broad definition of screening, which includes
multiple methods and offers the greatest flexibility while improving
security. As such, AfA supports greater utilization of all screening
methods, including Third-Party Explosive Detection Canines (EDCs). TSA
has successfully deployed TSA-owned EDC Teams to conduct thorough,
timely, pallet-level screening to meet the 9/11 Act mandates. EDC has
been shown to provide highly accurate and efficient screening of cargo
at the pallet level (indeed, the only efficient pallet screening method
currently available and certified by TSA), thereby reducing the cost,
time, and operational impacts associated with ``de-palletization'' and
``re-palletization'' of cargo.
Recommendations:
1. AfA supports establishing standards for private-sector, third-
party EDC teams.
2. TSA should provide access to their TSA-owned EDC training center
for testing and certification of private sector dogs.
Fast-Tracking Technology Research and Certifications.--As AfA has
previously discussed with the committee, there are two difficulties in
TSA's current approach to certifying technology used for cargo
screening, as part of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). The
first is the lack of certification for pallet screening technologies.
The second concern of forwarders engaged or desiring to become a CCSF
is the lack of ``guarantees'' given by TSA. Screening technology is a
formidable financial expenditure for forwarders and TSA has been
unwilling to provide assurances that current certified technologies
will still be approved in the future. This uncertainty has surely
limited forwarder participation in CCSP.
Recommendations:
1. While AfA supports a policy that approves only technology that
is effective and provides security, there are several pallet
screening machines in use in the United Kingdom and European
Union. We urge Congress to continue to investigate why these
technologies are not approved in the United States and to
require TSA to focus on pallet screening technologies in the
R&D appropriations.
2. TSA should improve the speed of reviews and certifications of
all new, novel technologies currently in review by the R&D
department.
3. TSA should provide extended ``good until'' dates on all
technology currently certified. In order to improve
efficiencies in screening, we recommend a period between 3 to 5
years.
The Airforwarders Association looks forward to continuing our
dialogue on these issues with the committee.
Brandon Fried,
Executive Director, Airforwarders Association.
______
Statement of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
July 12, 2011
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) is a not-for-
profit individual membership organization representing more than
400,000 members. AOPA's mission is to effectively represent the
interests of its members as aircraft owners and pilots concerning the
economy, safety, utility, and popularity of flight in general aviation
(GA) aircraft. Each year, 170 million passengers fly using personal
aviation, the equivalent of one of the Nation's major airlines,
contributing more than $150 billion to U.S. economic output, directly
or indirectly, and employing nearly 1.3 million people whose collective
annual earnings exceed $53 billion. AOPA respectfully submits the
following recommendations in an effort to strengthen physical and
economic security while promoting the mobility and economic growth of
general aviation.
TSA ISSUED AIRPORT SECURITY DIRECTIVE (SD)
On December 10, 2008, TSA issued Security Directive (SD) 1542-04-
08F (SD-08F) to commercial service airports. The SD requires Security
Threat Assessments (STA) to be conducted on an expanded airport
population including all general aviation owners and operators.
Additionally, the SD requires all persons with regular and frequent
access to the Air Operations Area to meet the same requirements as
persons with access to commercial aircraft. The Security Directive
changed many provisions of existing TSA regulations outside the normal
regulatory process, bypassing critical input and comment from impacted
parties. This change was an abuse of the SD process which was
established to address specific threats of a finite duration. This
change has resulted in a patchwork of non-compatible procedures being
implemented at airports Nation-wide that have the potential to
significantly harm general aviation operators and the commercial
service airports where they are based. It has also resulted in concerns
and unanswered requests for guidance for transient pilots, especially
those landing after hours. Furthermore, security directives are
distributed as security sensitive information (SSI), limited to only
the regulated entities and those the TSA believe have a ``need to
know''. This has caused a lack of communication and misunderstanding
for airport tenants, flight schools, transient pilots, and maintenance
providers at airports with commercial airline service.
Many of the obstacles and problems with the regulatory changes in
the Security Directive could have been avoided had the TSA chosen to
implement them using the Federal rulemaking process, allowing those
most familiar with the intricacies of general aviation operations to
provide their comments. Because of the seriousness of the
aforementioned issues, we would like to see the TSA initiate the
required rulemaking process to implement a change of this scope. Our
group understands the need to secure America's airports and stands
ready to participate fully with the TSA in developing sensible security
regulations that will prevent unauthorized access to aircraft and
airport facilities.
THE ALIEN FLIGHT STUDENT PROGRAM (AFSP)
The Alien Flight Student Program was established giving the
responsibility for background checks of aliens seeking flight training
to DRS and the Transportation Security Administration. While AOPA
understands the reasons that led to this rule and the efforts by TSA to
streamline the process and procedures being utilized, problems
nonetheless remain and place an unnecessary burden on the flight
training industry. In particular, TSA's Security Regulations governing
``Flight Schools'' has imposed for several years a requirement that
individual flight instructors certificated by the FAA receive initial
and annual security awareness training. The FAA imposes on these same
flight instructors a requirement for the periodic renewal of their
flight instructor certificates. A commonly used method of meeting the
FAA requirement is the successful completion within the past 24
calendar months of an approved flight instructor refresher course
consisting of ground training or flight training. The AOPA Foundation
has for some time been conducting such refresher courses. These two
requirements, imposed on the same flight instructors, have timing
limitations that do not mesh, imposing a burden on most flight
instructors to attend two different training sessions when both
requirements could be satisfied in a single extended training session,
without serious derogation to aviation security or safety. It is
recommended that the TSA rule be amended to allow the requirement for
security awareness training to be satisfied at an FAA-approved flight
instructor refresher course. This would modestly extend the period of
effectiveness of the TSA training received from 1 to 2 years, but would
also ensure compliance of the security awareness training requirement
by all active flight instructors.
AVIATION SECURITY AS A RISK-BASED, MULTI-AGENCY INITIATIVE
Aviation and airspace security in the years since 9/11 has evolved
into a complex layered approach that relies on numerous Federal, State,
local, and private organizations, each with unique roles and
responsibilities. AOPA supports Administrator Pistole and his
intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to counterterrorism protection
of our transportation system. The Administrator fully understands that
a one-size-fits-all approach to aviation and airspace security is
ineffective and often counterproductive. Airspace restrictions,
Temporary Flight Rules, and their impact on the National Airspace
System must be carefully balanced against the risk and adjusted or
modified to reflect changes in the threat, developments in technology,
or actionable intelligence. AOPA urges the TSA to address aviation
security initiatives from a risk-based, multi-agency perspective and it
is essential to engage the general aviation industry in the development
and implementation of aviation and airspace security initiatives.
GREATER INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN PROCESS DEVELOPMENT
Many of the TSA's current policies, regulations, and procedures
that have been implemented in aviation security were hastily drafted
and have dramatically changed the security landscape of general
aviation and the aviation sector as a whole. Industry experts were
excluded from the process as the discussions and debates began to take
on a more law enforcement-centric approach to aviation security.
Involvement of industry experts early on in the rulemaking process and
on a regular and frequent basis would ensure workable solutions to
aviation security problems and add the private sector as a true partner
in the prevention, mitigation, and response process.
AIRPORT WATCH PROGRAM
AOPA worked in conjunction with TSA to launch a program that uses
America's more than 615,000 pilots as the eyes and ears for observing
and reporting suspicious activity at our Nation's airports. Airport
Watch is modeled after the highly successful ``Neighborhood Watch''
program and the initiative has been hailed by Members of Congress and
the TSA as a blueprint for Government-industry participation. In recent
years funding for this program has been curtailed and a renewed
emphasis should be placed on reinvigorating the program and expanding
its scope.
AOPA is committed to ensuring the security and economic viability
of our Nation's aviation transportation system. We thank you for your
time and consideration and look forward to working with the
subcommittee in the future.
______
Letter From the Air Line Pilots Association, International
July 12, 2011.
The Honorable Michael Rogers,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Transportation Security, H2-176 Ford
House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Transportation Security, H2-117
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: On behalf of
53,000 pilot members who fly for 39 airlines in the United States and
Canada, the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) would
like to provide you with the aviation security concerns that ALPA
believes should be brought to the subcommittee's attention during its
hearing on Industry Perspectives: Authorizing the Transportation
Security Administration for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013.
Threat-Based Security
The attempted bombing of Northwest (NWA) flight No. 253 on
Christmas day, 2009 served as a catalyst for ALPA to publish its white
paper: Meeting Today's Aviation Security Needs: A Call to Action for a
Trust-Based Security System, in January 2010 (attached).* In that
paper, ALPA articulated its belief that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) needed to change its post-9/11 philosophy of
screening all people equally for harmful objects to one that focused on
identifying individuals having evil intent.
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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We are pleased to acknowledge the positive response from a number
of industry partners, as well as from TSA leadership, expressing
agreement with our call for a philosophical change in underlying
aviation security philosophy. ALPA has been encouraged by support from
TSA Administrator John Pistole, and his call for the implementation of
``risk-mitigation'' security procedures, as well as his public
statements that a pilot flying an airliner should not be required to
undergo the same screening procedures as an unknown passenger. TSA's
support for the ALPA-conceived alternative screening program for pilots
known as CrewPASS, and its evolution into the TSA-endorsed Known
Crewmember (KCM) program has been a welcome change to previous ``one-
size-fits-all'' screening requirements.
We believe that initial steps have been taken by TSA to implement
more risk-based solutions to securing the aviation sector, and look
forward to working with our government and industry partners to
continue the expansion of KCM and the creation of other threat-based,
risk mitigation programs throughout the aviation security environment.
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program
The FFDO program, using Federally-credentialed, armed pilots
trained and managed by the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) to serve
as the ``last line of defense'' of the flight deck, has dramatically
increased in size since its inception in 2003. Unfortunately, TSA has
not requested or received any significant increase in program funding
since 2004. FFDO funding remains stagnant with an annual budget of
$22.5 million. Because this funding level is inadequate to support the
maintenance needs of the existing FFDO force and accommodate processing
new candidates, TSA/FAMS ceased accepting new applications in 2011 and
has announced its inability to accept applications to the program
during 2012, as well.
The FFDO program has been acknowledged by industry and Government
to be an extremely successful and cost-effective layer of aviation
security. Due to its funding deficiencies, however, coupled with the
inadequate number of FAMS fulltime employees (FTEs) assigned to manage
the program, it is one of the most under-appreciated, under-utilized,
cost-effective security programs implemented since the
9/11 attack on our homeland. We respectfully submit that the FFDO
program is in need of a significant increase in funding and managerial
oversight, and that Congressional action is needed to bring about such
change.
Threatened Airspace Management (TAM)
The failed attack against NWA flight No. 253 also demonstrated
deficiencies in ground-to-air communications during or following a
significant in-flight security event. Pilots in command of other
aircraft, either airborne or about to take-off, were not advised, real-
time, of the circumstances impacting NWA-253. This lack of
communications deprived these other aircraft commanders, in their role
as In-Flight Security Coordinators (ISCs), of critical information
which related to a potential security threat to their own flights, and
negatively impacted the ability of flight and cabin crewmembers to best
protect their passengers and aircraft.
On April 7, 2010 the FAA and TSA did a better job of communicating
information to other aircraft regarding an on-going security incident
involving a diplomat suspected to be assembling a bomb while in the
lavatory of an airliner traveling from Washington, DC to Denver, CO.
But even then, the flight decks of only selected airborne aircraft were
notified of the event. Since then, we have not witnessed the sharing of
security-related information with aircraft commanders that would be of
value to them in fulfilling their duties as pilots-in-command.
As recently as June 19, 2011, a bomb threat was made against a
Dayton, Ohio to Washington, DC-bound airliner while it was in flight.
The captain was not notified of the potential danger until landing at
Ronald Reagan National Airport. The aircraft, with its 44 passengers
and 3 crewmembers still on-board, sat on the ground for 29 minutes
before emergency responders arrived at the plane and the passengers and
crew were allowed to deplane.
In addition to this communications deficiency, we have seen no
evidence of a clearly-defined, prioritized plan to control the National
air space (NAS) in the event of another 9/11-type attack. The U.S.
economy and the domestic aviation industry cannot sustain the negative
financial impact resulting from a repeat of a Nation-wide shutdown as
occurred at that time.
ALPA urges the Congress to ensure the development of a prioritized
plan for control of the NAS in such circumstances, with the intent of
preventing a total or substantial closure.
All-cargo Airline Operations
In November 2010 law enforcement and intelligence agencies
interdicted attempts to bomb two U.S. all-cargo aircraft destined from
international locations to the United States. Successful detonation of
the explosives, hidden in printer cartridges shipped from Yemen, could
have resulted in catastrophic loss of life and the aircraft involved.
These attacks confirmed that all-cargo carriers remain a focus of
terrorists. Notwithstanding Government and industry awareness of a
variety of security vulnerabilities which still exist in the air cargo
domain, all-cargo operations remain exempt from a number of security
practices mandated for passenger air carriers. Examples include: No
hardened flight deck door requirement; no mandated All-Cargo Common
Strategy training for crewmembers; no requirement for fingerprint-based
criminal history record checks for persons with unescorted access
privileges to aircraft and cargo, and no uniform requirement for SIDA
restrictions on all-cargo air operations areas.
Although the Air Cargo Security Requirements; Final Rule, published
in May 2006, did much to improve the security of all-cargo aircraft and
operations, it fell short of the mark in a number of critical aspects.
A recent investigative report issued by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) on June 20, 2011 provides evidence of a number of these
remaining vulnerabilities and bolsters ALPA's argument that much work
remains to be done in this regard. Based on the unwillingness of
regulators Government and industry to adequately address these
deficiencies, we believe that Congressional action is required to bring
about needed change.
ALPA is grateful for the subcommittee's attention to these critical
transportation security matters and thanks the committee for its
leadership in this regard. We look forward to working with you as you
craft a TSA reauthorization bill.
Respectfully,
Lee Moak,
President.
______
Statement of National Air Carrier Association
July 12, 2011
National Air Carrier Association (NACA) appreciates the opportunity
to submit written testimony on the occasion of the hearing held on July
12, 2011, before the House Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee
on Transportation Security to consider the authorization of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for fiscal years 2012 and
2013.
NACA was founded in 1962. Its 17 current member carriers are: Air
Transport International, Allegiant Air, Atlas Air, Evergreen Airlines,
Kalitta Air, Lynden Air Cargo, Miami Air, National Airlines, North
American Airlines, Northern Air Cargo, Omni Air International, Ryan Air
International, Southern Air, Sun Country Airlines, USA 3000 Airlines,
USA Jet, and World Airways.
All NACA carriers are certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 121. They are a diverse group of air carriers,
providing non-scheduled and scheduled passenger and cargo services.
NACA members fill a unique niche in the air carrier industry, offering
services in response to ever-changing demands by the travelling public
and businesses.
NACA carriers are significant partners with the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. NACA
airlines currently carry nearly 95% of the military passengers around
the world and 40% of the military cargo.
We appreciate the subcommittee seeking industry views regarding
authorization for TSA. Aviation security is a tremendously important
facet in the operation of a commercial airline. Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates have continued to show an affinity for attacks on the
aviation system. Recent news reports and open-source intelligence
indicate terrorists are seeking the ability to conduct new attacks
involving body IED's that can evade current screening technology. It is
critical for the aviation industry and TSA to work closely together to
create, deploy, and maintain risk-based layered protections that
maximize security against these evolving threats. NACA strongly agrees
with Administrator John Pistole that a risk-based approach to airline
and airport security is the most cost-efficient and effective means of
mitigating the various threats facing the aviation industry.
On June 2, 2011, Administrator Pistole testified before this
subcommittee specifically on TSA's efforts regarding risked based
security: ``TSA has 2 implemented an effective and dynamic security
system in the aviation domain consisting of multiple layers of risk-
based measures. In the aviation arena, our security approach begins
well in advance of a traveler's arrival at an airport, with our vetting
programs and intelligence analysts, cargo and compliance inspectors
ensuring that airport security plans are followed, and our law
enforcement and intelligence community partners working to detect,
deter, and prevent terrorist plots before they happen. The security
system continues at the airport, including, but not limited to, the
work of our Behavior Detection Officers (BDO); Transportation Security
Officers (TSO) and the technology that supports the screening of
passengers and baggage; Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO); and canine
teams, as well as our partnerships with local law enforcement. In
flight, thousands of Federal Air Marshals (FAM) and Federal Flight Deck
Officers (FFDO) protect the traveling public.''
The broad array of capabilities and resources are designed to fill
any holes by coordinating multiple layers of technological and physical
security that exists throughout the system. NACA members endorse this
approach to ensure our aviation security system is strong, economical,
and flexible.
With the subcommittee and full committee considering the
development of a full Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
reauthorization bill, there is at least one area for which we ask
Members of Congress to make a change to public law.
Commercial air carriers providing private charter services must now
use their own flight crews or a TSA-certified private screening company
to screen sports and other private charters. There are times when
commercial charter carriers would like to use on duty TSA screeners to
clear passengers and baggage onto the aircraft. Carriers would pay TSA
for such services rendered.
This issue has long been a problem for commercial charter carriers.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires virtually anyone who
has contact with the aircraft to be a part of the carrier's Drug and
Alcohol Abatement Program (D&O Program) or be covered by an FAA-
certified program of their own. When private charters are performed on
short notice, commercial charter carriers have extremely limited
options for screening the operation as they are unable to bring on off-
duty TSA screeners onto their D&O Program on short notice. It is also
too expensive to bring a private screening company out to a small
airport, which requires long transit times.
NACA and its member carriers believe the best way to solve this
problem is to utilize on-duty TSA screeners who are covered by DHS's/
TSA's drug abatement program.
The program would work as follows:
1. Commercial air carrier submits a request to the Federal Security
Director (FSD) at the airport of departure and requests the use
of on-duty TSA screeners to conduct the screening of passengers
and baggage for charter flight;
2. Screeners are provided if FSD has personnel available for the
requested time;
3. TSA bills the air carrier for the use of the screeners at the
regular hourly rate plus any overtime chargers that may apply.
TSA does not believe it has the statutory authority to charge air
carriers for this requested service. TSA must be granted the authority
to charge air carriers for the use of on-duty screeners when requested
(and available).
NACA and its member carriers respectfully request the Homeland
Security Committee include language in the Chairman's mark that would:
(1) Permit TSA screeners to conduct screening of passengers and baggage
for commercial air carrier charter flights, and, (2) permit TSA to
charge the air carrier the regular hourly rate plus any overtime
charges for providing such screening service.
We now offer a comment on a matter of broader TSA policy. The
working relationship between the aviation industry and TSA has
continued to evolve since the agency was created in 2001. We believe,
however, there is always room for improvement that reflects the costs
of implementing security measures and the highest value of threat
detection, as well as countermeasures that add tangible value to our
security efforts.
NACA believes the subcommittee, and Congress as a whole, needs to
conduct stronger oversight of the TSA and its possible promulgations of
new regulations without industry input.
TSA regularly issues Security Directives (SDs) to the commercial
aviation industry in response to real-time intelligence suggesting an
`imminent' threat. SDs have an immediate or short-notice compliance
date assigned to them that mandate actions--often obtaining certain
equipment, changes in procedures, or restrictions on operations. TSA
rarely seeks industry input regarding how operations will be impacted
due to the issuance of an SD. TSA seems surprised when industry has
logistical problems with implementation after it imposes an SD. Some
issues could be worked out with minimal notice (a few hours) to
industry and granting it the ability to provide comment.
This lack of consultation on the pre-issuance of SD's has created
the impression that TSA uses SD's to bypass the normal rulemaking
process, which relies on industry comment and participation to craft
the best rule. We urge the subcommittee to examine TSA's use of SD's
and test whether rules are being set that would more properly be the
subject of a rulemaking.
We appreciate the committee's consideration of these requests.
Having the flexibility to use on-duty TSA screeners in certain
situations will provide tremendous economic value and flexibility to
the commercial charter carriers in this difficult business environment.
NACA also believes the subcommittee would benefit by learning about
TSA's system of issuing SD's and how that process has evolved. We stand
ready to work with you on this and all other enhancements to our
aviation security system.
In closing, National Air Carrier Association and its 17 member
airlines are committed to working closely with TSA, intelligence
agencies, and Congress in developing the best possible aviation
security system.
______
Letter From R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government
Affairs, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
July 12, 2011.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC 20515.
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the world's largest business federation
representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses and
organizations of every size, sector, and region, submits this letter in
advance of your hearing entitled ``Industry Perspectives: Authorizing
the Transportation Security Administration for Fiscal 2012 and 2013,''
and the Chamber commends your leadership in addressing these important
issues that impact the security and economic competitiveness of the
United States.
We offer these recommendations in the spirit of cooperation and
will continue to work with the subcommittee on a bipartisan basis to
solve these important issues.
Redundant Credentialing Process
Congress should strive to remove unnecessary burdens on American
businesses. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) should
move forward with harmonizing redundant government credentialing
requirements. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) and the Hazmat Endorsement (HME) are redundant credentials
administered by TSA. Both programs query the same databases for
criminal, immigration, and other violations, utilizing the same
disqualifying criteria, appeal, and waiver processes. Yet,
transportation workers must pay: $94 for a HME to carry hazmat; $132.50
for a TWIC to enter the ports; $50 for a FAST card at the border; and
$27 for a Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge at each
airport for a total cost of $303.50.
The Chamber believes that the redundant fees and background checks
of U.S. transportation workers is an unnecessary cost for businesses.
These sentiments are echoed by the U.S. Small Business Administration,
which added the TSA's inaction in implementing Section 1556 to its
Regulatory Review and Reform (r3) program's Top 10 list of most
egregious regulations on small businesses.
H.R. 1690, the ``Modern Credentialing Act of 2011'' would achieve
the goal of harmonizing redundant Government credentialing. The Chamber
would support H.R. 1690 and encourages its inclusion in the TSA
Authorization Bill.
Aviation Security Advisory Committee
All of TSA's regulatory action and inherent functions have a
dramatic impact on the private sector. Whether TSA is screening
passengers or air cargo, their activities and mandates significantly
hinder travel and tourism, and the domestic and global supply chain. A
more effective and efficient TSA would have a positive impact on the
global competitiveness of U.S. industry globally.
However, TSA has no formal advisory committee where the private
sector can engage in discussions regarding TSA policy. The Commercial
Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) reports to the Commissioner of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Treasury. The Chamber believes that a similar committee
reporting directly to the Administrator of TSA would be an effective
mechanism to ensure that private sector opinions are considered in
policy development.
While H.R. 1447, the Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation
Act of 2011, is a partial step toward this goal, we recommend that the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) report directly to the
Administrator of TSA. It is essential to the effectiveness of such a
committee that agency leadership is engaged in regular discussions with
industry stakeholders.
Furthermore, such legislation should not specify a subcommittee
structure. Members of the ASAC should be permitted to establish
subcommittees relevant to current issues at the beginning of their term
in office. Should these changes be made, the Chamber would support H.R.
1447, and would recommend that it be included in the broader TSA
Authorization legislation.
Multilayered Risk-Based Approach to Security
The Chamber supports Administrator Pistole's efforts to develop the
agency into a risk-based, intelligence-driven counterterrorism agency
dedicated to protecting the transportation system. We agree that a
multilayered risk-based approach is the most effective way to ensure
security and facilitate legitimate trade and travel. The TSA
Authorization bill should facilitate these risk-based methods. The
Chamber urges the subcommittee to stand firm in support of risk-based
approach and reject any 100 percent mandates.
Air Cargo Security
The Chamber has been encouraged by the work among the private
sector, CBP, and TSA in reaction to recent terrorist attempts on air
cargo planes. Efforts to gather advance predeparture information have
been largely successful because of this cooperative engagement. The
established pilot program has already led to positive outcomes, and the
alliance should only get stronger.
The collective reaction to these terrorist attempts is a model for
how Government and the private sector can work together to secure the
supply chain, without having a detrimental impact on business
operations. Rather than push for more regulation or legislation, the
Chamber supports the current pilot program and its gradual expansion to
more carriers.
Next Generation Global Supply Chain Security
The Chamber supports trusted shipper programs, which encourage
security investment while providing strong trade facilitation benefits
to members. These programs help focus limited resources on high-risk
shipments, and should be developed further.
However, the subcommittee should consider ways to harmonize and
streamline existing U.S. and international programs. For example, there
are striking similarities between CBP's Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, TSA's Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is also developing their own
trusted shipper program. International equivalent programs also exist
such as Canada's Partners in Protection (PIP) or the internationally
recognized Authorized Economic Operator (AEO).
All of these programs focus on the same mission, and have similar
mandates. Yet, rather than cooperate with applications, audits, and
other requirements, U.S. Government agencies appears to be siloed in
their approach. CBP, TSA, and the FDA should work together to harmonize
supply chain security standards, audits, and applications so that all
agencies together can leverage the strength and membership of their
existing programs, and decrease unnecessary redundancy for the private
sector.
Harmonizing and streamlining would help TSA efforts to reach the
100 percent screening mandate for international in-bound passenger
flights. Greater focus should be given to seeking harmonization with
international screening methods and international supply chain security
programs. Rather than creating new and redundant screening programs,
the TSA should work with their international counterparts, to leverage
the strength of existing programs. This effort would ensure that
resources are being used to improve security rather than being focused
on redundant screening methods.
Canine Inspection Programs
Industry shares the mission and goal of TSA to ensure the safe and
secure transport of cargo throughout the supply chain. Companies have
invested heavily in equipment, training, labor, and screening
technicians to administer the various screening programs, to meet new
security program requirements and to comply with emergency-based
security directives. The tight timelines for screening, increased
volumes from an economy emerging from economic recession, and lack of
screening alternatives have strained the private sector's ability to
efficiently and effectively meet the goal of securing the supply chain.
To best utilize the flexibility in the 9/11 Act and assist industry
in meeting the common security goals, the Chamber urges greater
utilization of all screening methods, including Third-Party Explosive
Detection Canines (EDCs). Canines were specifically included in the 9/
11 Act as an authorized screening method, and TSA has successfully
deployed TSA-owned EDC Teams to conduct thorough, timely, pallet-level
screening to meet the 9/11 Act mandates. EDC has been shown to provide
highly accurate and efficient screening of cargo at the pallet level,
thereby reducing the cost, time, and operational impacts associated
with ``de-palletization'' and ``repalletization'' of cargo.
With third-party EDC teams currently used to protect many Federal
facilities and screen cargo bound for the United States on commercial
ships and some air cargo locations, the Chamber supports standards for
private sector, third-party EDC teams. Further, TSA should provide
access to their TSA-owned EDC training center for testing and
certification of private sector dogs. Finally, the Chamber encourages
TSA to consider greater harmonization and mutual recognition of
internationally certified EDC teams to help address the challenge of
screening the high-risk air cargo bound for the United States at or
before the point of departure.
The Chamber remains committed to ensuring that the United States
remains secure, and prosperous. We look forward to working with the
subcommittee on this important legislation.
Sincerely,
R. Bruce Josten.
Mr. Rogers. We are pleased to have several distinguished
witnesses----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I have a
unanimous consent request.
Mr. Rogers. Please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would ask unanimous consent that the
gentleman from Michigan, a Member of the full committee, Mr.
Clarke, be authorized to sit for the purpose of questioning
witnesses during the hearing today.
Mr. Rogers. So ordered.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. We have several distinguished witnesses before
us today on this important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire statements
will be submitted for the record. So if you would like to
summarize those, we will get through the panel as quickly as
possible and get to the questions.
First, we have Mr. Tom Farmer, who currently serves as the
assistant VP at the Association of American Railroads. I have
enjoyed working with him during my tenure and am proud to have
him on the panel.
The floor is yours, Mr. Farmer.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. FARMER, ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT FOR
SECURITY, SAFETY, AND OPERATIONS, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
RAILROADS
Mr. Farmer. Thank you, sir, very much.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the
committee, on behalf of the Association of American Railroads,
thank you very much for this opportunity to appear today.
At the outset, I must emphasize that nothing is more
important to railroads than the safety of their employees--
safety and security of their employees, of their operations,
and of the communities that they serve.
As all of you know, the issue of rail security garnered
significant attention in early May with the reporting on al-
Qaeda interest in attacking trains following the operation in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, that ended with the demise of Osama bin
Laden. The reference to railroads as a potential terrorist
target is not surprising, however. Indeed, the extensive
efforts that we, as an industry, have devoted to rail security
enhancement since the 9/11 attacks have been premised very much
on this reality.
Immediately following 9/11, acting on their own initiative,
freight railroads formed a top-level security task force,
consisting of more than 150 industry experts, to conduct a
thorough evaluation of risk and security in the rail network.
Key focus areas included critical infrastructure, freight rail
operations, hazardous materials, communications and control
systems, and military shipments.
This effort produced the rail industry's ``Terrorism Risk
Analysis and Security Management Plan.'' It is a comprehensive,
priority-based blueprint of actions that the industry developed
to deal with the new realities. This plan was adopted by the
industry in December 2001, within just 3 months of the 9/11
attacks. It remains the foundation of our security efforts
today, updated as necessary based on experience in its usage
and on changing circumstances with the threat.
The plan defines four progressively higher-security alert
levels and details a series of actions to be taken at each
level. There are more than 50 permanent countermeasures that
were implemented as a result of the development of this plan.
In addition, those areas that those countermeasures cover focus
upon expanding the skills of our people, the effectiveness of
our procedures, and the use and the protection of technology.
In addition to regular exercises conducted both industry-wide
and by individual railroads, we test the effectiveness of this
plan under realistic terrorism prevention and response
scenarios.
A particular area of emphasis in what we do is intelligence
and security information. The railroads maintain for this
purpose the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and
Analysis Center and the Railway Alert Network, and these two
entities work in concert to provide effective means for timely
notification of security threats, incidents, and other
emergencies, to assure daily security awareness, and to expand
the understanding of terrorist tactics.
One of the key initiatives of these two bodies, in
partnership with the American Public Transportation
Association, is a daily brief called the ``Transit and Rail
Intelligence Awareness Daily.'' This product is a very concise
overview of the most significant matters of the day in the
areas of suspicious-activity reporting, terrorism analysis,
general security awareness, and cybersecurity. The information
provided by this means can be used by railroads to augment
training and awareness briefings for employees. It can also be
shared with local, State, and Federal authorities to expand
partnerships.
Now, the railroads set as a top priority working closely
with TSA and other Federal components to enhance our collective
effectiveness and security. In the written testimony, there are
several areas we address of concern. There are three I would
like to highlight here.
First, as we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11
attacks, the timing is right for a thorough review of rail
security strategy and programs. What are we doing? Why? How can
we be more effective in a sustainable way? The objective is
agreed security priorities that set the framework for how we
measure the effectiveness of our policies, our programs, and
our initiatives. TSA's freight rail division, very much to its
credit, has agreed to meet with the railroads for this purpose
next month.
Second, we need better information sharing between the
railroads and the Government agencies we work with. Railroads
provide a wealth of security-related information every day to
various Government entities, but we get too little back that
helps us perform the security mission effectively.
We have submitted to TSA and DHS an intelligence
requirement to close this gap, one that is focused on looking
for in-depth analysis of the preparatory actions that
terrorists take--in successful attacks, that they have tried in
foiled plots, they tried in failed attempts--looking for
insights into the mindset and the thinking of the adversary,
how they function, to enable better-informed and more effective
security measures.
Third, the railroads believe that security and efficiency
would be enhanced if there were more consistency and
standardization in TSA's inspection activities, especially in
the interpretation of TSA's security regulations.
Inconsistencies among field offices and departures from the
priorities and policies set by TSA headquarters are causing
adverse but avoidable impacts on rail operations. We believe
that the TSA regional security inspectors that have been
appointed as liaison to the Class I railroads and to Amtrak
offer a viable and a sustainable solution to these concerns.
I thank you for this unique privilege, and I am very happy
to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Farmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas L. Farmer
July 12, 2011
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee and
discuss the reauthorization of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and rail security issues generally. In freight
rail, AAR members account for 72 percent of track mileage, 92 percent
of the industry's employees, and 95 percent of revenue. North American
freight railroads provide the vital link for goods and commodities used
by industries and consumers throughout the continent and in the global
market. Indeed, one-third of all U.S. exports are transported by rail
at some point en route to their destinations world-wide. Amtrak,
America's National passenger railroad, is a member of AAR, as are
several commuter railroads. A joint Freight and Passenger Coordinating
Committee established by AAR provides a forum to advance an integrated
approach on matters relating to rail safety, operations, and security.
OVERVIEW OF THE RAIL INDUSTRY SECURITY PROGRAM
The Industry Commitment. Safety and security are top priorities for
railroads, freight and passenger, for their employees, for their
operations, and for the communities they serve. In early May, following
the raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden and the
seizure of a high volume of materials on al-Qaeda's operational status
and plans--an achievement for which all involved in the United States
Government and military deserve the highest commendation--widespread
media reporting focused on a document indicating al-Qaeda interest as
of February 2010 in attacking trains, potentially in connection with
the tenth anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001. This revelation produced a unique opportunity--
insight into the adversary's thinking, gained from a place believed
impregnable to intrusion or seizure. However, al-Qaeda's inclusion of
rail as a target is not surprising. The extensive efforts devoted to
security enhancement since the 9/11 attacks, by the railroads at their
initiative and by the Federal security and intelligence agencies, have
been premised on this reality.
In the immediate aftermath of those attacks, a security task force
consisting of some 150 officials representing railroads, supported by
experts in security and intelligence, conducted a comprehensive risk
assessment with the objective of developing an industry-wide security
plan. Using National intelligence community best practices, five
critical action teams scrutinized different aspects of the railroad
system: hazardous materials transport; rail operations; critical
infrastructure; information technology and communications; and military
movements. Collectively, this analysis examined and prioritized
railroad assets, evaluated potential vulnerabilities, and assessed
threats, and then identified a range of countermeasures.
This effort culminated in December 2001 with issuance of the
Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan, a comprehensive,
priority-based blueprint of actions that remains the foundation for the
industry's proactive, coordinated approach and for individual
railroads' security programs. The plan included more than 50 permanent
security-enhancing countermeasures that were immediately implemented
and provided for elevated security based on increases in the terrorist
threat.
Continuous Improvement. But no one is resting on laurels. The Class
I railroads, and many regional and short-line carriers, have adapted
the plan to their unique operating circumstances. Implementation of the
plan is exercised on a recurring basis--by railroads individually and
collectively as an industry on an annual basis. These exercises
appraise the effectiveness of the industry's security plan in realistic
terrorism prevention and response scenarios. The most recent industry-
wide exercise occurred on October 15, 2010; the next is scheduled for
October 13, 2011. For this year's event, we have invited direct
participation by Federal entities--TSA, DHS, FBI, and the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA)--specifically to assure effective
implementation of an efficient, understandable, and sustainable process
for sharing of intelligence on security threats and incidents with the
rail industry, freight and passenger.
The industry security plan is regularly evaluated and modified as
needed to ensure maximum continued effectiveness. Lessons learned from
exercises and experiences in actual security-related incidents inform
reviews and updates of the plan with the specific purpose of assuring
its viability to meet changing threat circumstances. A comprehensive
review completed in 2009 evaluated the plan's guiding assumptions, risk
methodology, and countermeasures, yielding an updated version that took
effect in November of that year. Indeed, railroads--in conjunction with
the TSA, other Federal security partners, rail customers, and others--
are constantly evaluating approaches to further enhance rail security
as part of a continuous improvement process.
Persistent Coordination. An integral element of this effort is the
Rail Security Working Committee, supported by AAR's security staff.
Reporting to the railroads' chief operating officers in the industry's
Safety and Operation Management Committee, the Security Committee
consists of senior executives, security officials, and police chiefs
with our member railroads, coordinates the overall rail industry
security effort, and reflects the industry's on-going commitment to
work in a coordinated fashion, amongst railroads and with government
agencies at all levels. Through monthly consultations, the committee
identifies issues of concern, develops and coordinates implementation
of solutions, and presents proposals for coordinated effort with the
Federal Government. The committee also participates in joint security
coordination meetings with TSA's Freight Rail Division under the
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). These
sessions sustain constructive relationships and effective communication
between the railroads' security and law enforcement officials and their
counterparts in TSA, DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection, FRA,
and the FBI. The I-STEP forum allows for open and candid discussion of
current programs and initiatives, future priorities, and prevailing
security issues and concerns.
Information Sharing. Essential to success in the security mission
is timely access to accurate and relevant intelligence and security
information--an area on which the rail industry security committee
places particular emphasis. To sustain effectiveness, the railroads
maintain two standing capabilities focused on the railroads security
information needs--the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) and the Railway Alert Network--and assign
highly experienced liaison officers with the FBI's National Joint
Terrorism Task Force and Southwest Border Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Originally established in the 1990s in coordination with the
Department of Transportation, the ST-ISAC applies analytical expertise
for threats and security incidents that either affect or have
significant implications for critical infrastructure, physical and
cyber. Working in secure facilities, the ST-ISAC taps a broad range of
sources daily, including analytical products from the Federal
Government (classified and unclassified), to develop and disseminate
material to aid in the protection of physical assets and information
technology networks and systems. Especially noteworthy are the ISAC's
efforts in cybersecurity. Each day the ISAC issues multiple advisories
to the railroads each day addressing potential vulnerabilities in
specific software or equipment and providing guidance on protective
measures. This material directly supports the extensive and effective
cybersecurity programs maintained by the major railroads. A standing
Rail Information Security Committee provides a forum for regular
consultations amongst professionals across the industry and a mechanism
for the sharing of effective security practices.
The Railway Alert Network (RAN) serves as the security information
center for the rail industry, focused on providing immediate alert
notification of serious incidents and emergencies and on analysis of
the implications to freight and passenger railroads of intelligence and
security information relating to threats, incidents, suspicious
activity, and terrorists' capabilities, tactics, and techniques.
Functioning within a secure facility with classified communications
capabilities, the RAN performs a daily review of information from a
broad range of sources for relevance to rail and homeland security.
Targeted security information and awareness messages are developed for
the railroads and shared with security partners in their operating
areas at the local, State, and Federal levels.
A particularly noteworthy initiative is the Transit and Rail
Intelligence Awareness Daily (TRIAD), produced jointly with the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), the ST-ISAC, and the
Public Transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC). TSA
supports this cooperative effort through a joint information sharing
working group and funding of the PT-ISAC, pursuant to the authorization
of section 1410 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act). The purpose of TRIAD is to present
the most significant matters of the day in the areas of suspicious
activity and incident reporting, counterterrorism analysis, general
security awareness, and cybersecurity. The target audience is senior
executives, and security and law enforcement officials with railroads
and mass transit agencies and local, State, Federal, and private sector
security partners.
Partnership for Security. Maintaining a constructive relationship
with TSA is a top priority of the rail security effort. In 2006, both
the freight railroads and passenger railroads, the latter in
conjunction with mass transit agencies, agreed with TSA on a series of
security action items and on inspection of the effectiveness of their
implementation by TSA Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface. The
action items focus on areas foundational to an effective security
program--planning, training, exercises, physical security, information
security, personnel security, means to raise security posture in
response to threats, and related matters. The cooperative program
proved quite effective. For passenger railroads and transit agencies,
TSA gained a wealth of information on security posture that informed
program development, grant program priorities and awards, and
identification of ``smart security practices.'' In freight rail, the
demonstrably successful partnership produced substantial reduction of
risk associated with transport of toxic inhalation hazardous (TIH)
materials. For the DHS Annual Performance Report (2008-2010), TSA
reported a 53.6% reduction in risk as of the end of 2008 against the
baseline defined in 2006. Significantly, all of this risk reduction,
which exceeded the 50% target set by TSA, occurred under the agreed
action items, without regulatory compulsion. AS of 2010, TSA reports
``an industry-wide risk reduction variance of 95.73% against the
original 2005/2006 baseline.'' Again, the measures and procedures that
made this significant achievement possible predated the promulgation of
the Rail Transportation Security Rule (49 CFR Part 1580), their having
been implemented by the railroads either on their own initiative
pursuant to the industry security plan or to meet the agreed security
action items.
Complimenting this progress are cooperative efforts with emergency
responders in local communities to enhance awareness and elevate
preparedness to respond to hazardous materials (HAZMAT) emergencies.
These initiatives include funded, in-depth, hands-on training under
realistic conditions for first responders at the Security and Emergency
Management Training Center, a component of the rail industry's
Transportation Technology Center, Inc., in Pueblo, CO. This premier
first responder training center is a member of FEMA's National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium. Individual railroads conduct training programs
and joint exercises with local and regional emergency response units as
well.
The rail industry remains committed to cooperative efforts with the
Federal Government for sustainable security enhancement. In this
context, there are several areas that warrant attention.
ISSUES OF SECURITY CONCERN TO THE RAILROADS
Rail Security Strategy. We are approaching the 10th anniversary of
the 9/11 attacks. The timing is opportune for a thorough review of the
strategy and programs for rail security generally (freight and
passenger). What are we doing? Why are we doing it? What are the core
priorities? How can we be more efficient and effective? TSA's Freight
Rail Division has agreed to discuss these issues at a meeting to be
held next month.
Intelligence Support for Rail Security. The foundation for the
effectiveness of any security strategy is intelligence. On multiple
occasions since May 2010, the rail industry has submitted, separately
to DHS and to TSA, a priority intelligence requirement seeking
expansion of the depth of analysis of past terrorist attacks, attempts,
and plots targeting rail. The objective is to know what we can know--as
fully as possible--through in-depth analysis of the preparatory actions
in successful terrorist attacks, failed attempts, and foiled plots that
have targeted rail. The purpose: To draw insights into the mindset and
thinking of the adversary, of how terrorist operatives function, and
thereby enable better informed and more effective security measures.
DHS and FBI intelligence products commonly reference the Terrorist
Planning Cycle as a means to ``assist organizations with their
development and implementation of protective measures to deter, detect,
disrupt, and defend against attacks from both domestic and
international terrorists.'' Substance needs to be added to this good
advice. For rail security, this substance entails a breakdown against
each phase of the cycle, in as much detail as the available information
allows, of the known or inferred elements of target selection,
planning, preparation, and execution, either by single operations
targeting rail or by a composite analysis of multiple such operations.
With preparatory and execution activities so delineated, opportunities
can be identified where particular types of security measures and
activities may prove effective in deterrence or disruption. In essence,
we are seeking to expand the concept of ``actionable intelligence'' to
include analysis that creates opportunities for security.
Rail Security Inspection Activities. In multiple forums over an
extended period, the railroads have expressed concern with inspection
activities by TSA's Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface. The
industry's principal concern is the inconsistency and lack of
standardization in inspectors' interpretations of TSA's security
regulations and expectations regarding rail security in general. There
are disparities between the policies and guidelines set by TSA's
Freight Rail Division and the actions of surface inspectors in the
field. Actions accepted by some TSA field offices result in official
citations as violations by others. Another problem is repeated
bypassing of the communication and coordination process--with the Rail
Security Coordinators (RSCs)--appointed pursuant to TSA regulations.
TSA, and other DHS components, sometimes directly engage with rail
employees in the field, who often lack the authority and means to
address the issues raised by the inspectors.
AAR believes the Regional Security Inspectors (RSIs) appointed as
liaison to the Class I railroads and Amtrak offer a viable and
sustainable means to resolve these concerns. However, organizationally
they are not in the chain of command of the surface inspectors in the
field. Yet, the official correspondence sent to the railroads that
announced the appointment of the RSIs defines a scope of authority and
responsibility well-tailored to attaining this objective. Key points
from these letters include:
``the RSIs-Surface will act as the points of contact for the
Class 1 and Regional Railroads'';
``to ensure consistent application of regulations both
nationally and across a railroad's operating system'';
``coordinate TSA field activities . . . to minimize negative
impact on your railroad operations''; and
``use your new RSI-Surface to the fullest extent.''
Substantively engaged, consistent with the above commitments, we do
believe the RSIs can bring about greater consistency and
standardization in inspection priorities and activities, with benefits
for the Government in quality of results and for the railroads in
operational efficiency. Further, this approach can assure early and
efficient resolution of issues of security concern--using the
communications process TSA has established by regulation and expressly
referenced in the RSIs' appointment letters.
Effective Deployment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) Teams. The rail industry acknowledges the potential value of the
VIPR program's random and unpredictable security measures for
deterrence and disruption of terrorist planning and preparations.
Indeed, some railroads, passenger and freight, have hosted deployments
and derived substantial benefits from the visible security enhancement.
Across the industry, however, inconsistency in the implementation of
this program remains a significant concern--in management (conflicts
and duplications between TSA field offices) and in execution of
operations (continuing instances of inadequate notice to and
coordination with railroads on operations). For mass transit and
passenger rail, TSA abides by agreed protocols for notice,
coordination, planning, preparation, execution, and after-action
review. A similar approach should be used for the rail industry as a
whole. Fundamental aspects of the program should include:
Prior notice to the railroad by TSA of all proposed VIPR
deployments at least 2 weeks in advance, unless a credible
threat or other emergency circumstances dictate otherwise.
Joint development by TSA and the affected railroad(s) of the
operations plan for each VIPR deployment or group of
deployments.
Integration of local law enforcement in the VIPR
deployment(s) to foster informed partnerships and elevated
preparedness for joint security enhancement actions.
Clearly stated risk-based justifications for the
deployments.
Analysis and Use of Reports on Significant Security Concerns
Submitted to the TSA Freedom Center (TSOC). The Rail Transportation
Security Rule, at 49 CFR section 1580.105 for freight railroads and 49
CFR section 1580.203 for passenger railroads, requires the reporting of
significant security concerns to the TSA Freedom Center. To date,
despite its substantial volume, this reporting has not produced
consistent analysis for trends of concern in rail security or for
educative value from the security awareness and heightened vigilance
perspective. However, the Freedom Center does widely disseminate the
railroads' reports to an extensive audience of Federal, State, and
local government officials, selected public transportation authorities,
and other private sector representatives. The criteria for this
distribution are unclear, as many recipients have no responsibilities
for rail security. Meanwhile, the railroads do not receive directly the
TSOC reports or any significant feedback on the analysis or
implications of the reports they submit. Yet, this reporting does
create an opportunity to identify potentially ``high value''
information, discern developing trends of potential concern or their
absence, and disseminate analyses that will inform steps to elevate
preparedness and capabilities to prevent and immediately respond to
acts of terrorism. A consistent process would enable a continuing
educational opportunity for application by railroads in their efforts
to assure continuous vigilance and security awareness. The existing
intelligence and security information dissemination process maintained
through the Railway Alert Network (RAN) would assure distribution of
these analytical products to appropriate officials with railroads
nationally, freight and passenger.
Flexibility in Grant Investments to Expedite Security Solutions.
DHS manages a wide range of grant programs aimed at enhancing
capabilities to prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism
and natural disasters. Often, investments in these capabilities yield
benefits for resiliency that offer advantages in both categories of
risk. Unfortunately, however, the rules associated with these grant
programs frequently impose limitations on the ability to apply them in
effective ways for expedited and sustainable solutions. As all of these
programs aim to achieve a similar purpose, the guiding principle should
be: Enable the grants to solve the most pressing problems instead of
allowing program rules to limit the problems that can be solved.
Wherever practicable, the benefits of unity of effort and economies of
scale should inform decisions on funding for projects. As a
representative example, TSA's Freight Rail Division has worked in
coordination with the railroads to complete vulnerability assessments
on more than 70 rail bridges in the Western Rivers System--principally
crossings of the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio rivers. The resulting
reports make recommendations on mitigation measures, ranking the
bridges in priority. A composite approach to Federal support through
grant funding of bridge-hardening projects--drawing upon not just the
Freight Rail Security Grant Program but also the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative where
applicable, the Transit Security and Intercity Passenger Rail Security
Grant Programs for structures with passenger train service, and the
Port Security Grant Program--can expedite redress of the potential
security concerns identified in the assessment process.
To TSA's credit, significantly broader flexibility has been shown
in the outreach forums to grant-eligible entities for the fiscal year
2011 cycle. Support has been expressed for composite projects, both
those integrating different functional areas, such as a single
application seeking funding of technological enhancements and
operational activities to enhance security at a critical rail station,
and those that offer the potential to link funds from the Freight and
Transit Security Grant Programs. We hope this positive trend continues.
Commuter Rail Security Enhancement. As noted at the outset, AAR has
established a joint Freight and Passenger Rail Coordinating Committee
to foster sustained, cooperative effort on issues of security concern.
Major terrorist attacks overseas have targeted commuter trains in major
cities, with the bombings in Madrid (2004) and Mumbai (2006) as
dramatic examples. In the United States, commuter rail has been the
subject of threats, notably the expressed interest in targeting
commuter trains revealed in November 2008. A collaborative project,
integrating Government and industry, focused on development of a
sustainable security enhancement strategy for commuter rail would
provide substantial benefits. This effort should combine varied joint
operations with local law enforcement departments and testing of
tailored security technologies, with resource support from security
grant allocations.
CONCLUSION
Assuring the security of the Nation's passenger and freight
railroads requires a multi-faceted, cooperative effort that taps the
full range capabilities--in the private sector and at all levels of
government--and applies them to best effect to assure preparedness and
enhance capabilities to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism.
Our Nation's railroads look forward to working with policymakers
and others in a true public-private partnership to see that this
objective is met successfully.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Farmer, for your testimony. We
appreciate you being here and know your time is valuable and it
took a lot of time to prepare for that. So I appreciate that.
Our second witness is Martin Rojas. He is the vice
president of the American Trucking Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Rojas for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN ROJAS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR SECURITY AND
OPERATIONS, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Rojas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be here again.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
the authorization of the Transportation Security
Administration.
The trucking industry is an integral component of our
economy, earning more than 80 percent of all domestic freight
revenues. It is important to note that the trucking industry is
comprised primarily of small businesses, with 97 percent of
trucking companies operating 20 trucks or less. In addition, 80
percent of all U.S. communities depend solely on trucks to
deliver and supply their essential everyday commodities.
Because trucking is such a vital link in our economy, it is
critical that Government requirements improve security without
curtailing our ability to deliver America's freight efficiently
and safely.
As this committee is aware, since the terrorist attacks of
9/11 Government agencies have implemented various security
initiatives impacting the transportation sector as a whole. In
today's multimodal, intermodal transportation system, this
means that a requirement on one specific mode can indirectly
impact the operations of other modes. This is certainly the
case in the trucking industry, considering that trucks and
commercial drivers operative at maritime facilities, rail
yards, airports, chemical facilities, and across our Nation's
international borders.
To mitigate the risk of future terrorist attacks and to
ensure both our National security and our economic security,
ATA agrees with the recent statements by TSA Assistant
Secretary John Pistole. In early June, Mr. Pistole testified
that we must reduce the vulnerabilities in our transportation
system by establishing risk-based approaches and by using sound
intelligence in making decisions and in carrying out our
operations. The trucking industry favors such an approach.
As this committee considers how to improve the security of
the country's transportation system, ATA suggests the following
four observations:
First, mandating more security requirements does not
necessarily improve the security of the transportation system.
As an industry already heavily regulated by safety and security
requirements, more regulations will only increase the
compliance burden on trucking companies, rather than improve
security. From multiple background checks and security plans to
overlapping security training and en route security, the
trucking industry is already saturated by such requirements.
Second, ATA encourages improving Government/industry
information sharing. Trucking companies have embraced several
initiatives by law enforcement agencies and the intelligence
community to exchange and better understand our mutual
information needs to improve our Nation's security. Today, ATA
members are involved in various programs including with the
Director of National Intelligence, the FBI's InfraGuard Program
and its Domestic Security Alliance Council, as well as the
Homeland Security Information Network. ATA believes that
enhancing information-sharing efforts at the Federal, State,
and local level will improve the security posture of the
trucking industry.
Third, Government agencies must continue to improve
coordination of their respective security regulations. ATA
recognizes that higher-risk operating environments must address
specific risks associated with such operations. Because of the
differing environments in which trucking companies operate,
applying a one-size-fits-all approach is not practical for the
trucking industry. However, Federal agencies must improve
interagency coordination to establish mechanisms that recognize
some basic common requirements or protocols in other security
programs. Complying with multiple security requirements by
various Government agencies is simply not suitable for motor
carriers.
Last, ATA believes that the TWIC Reader Rule must be
finalized and the program's application process must be
improved. TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard must finalize the TWIC
Reader Rule and ensure that the processes and systems are
hardened to prevent counterfeiting and the use of false
identity information to obtain a real TWIC.
ATA still believes that the TWIC should function as a
single security threat assessment and credential that satisfies
the background check requirement of multiple programs. In this
regard, I want to thank again this committee's bipartisan
leadership in addressing the multiplicity of background checks
and credentials. ATA is a strong supporter of the Modern
Security Credentials Act of 2011, and we look forward to this
bill becoming law.
On behalf of ATA and its members, I thank you for the
opportunity to share some comments, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Rojas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin Rojas
July 12, 2011
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on the Authorization of the Transportation Security
Administration for fiscal year 2012 and 2013. My name is Martin Rojas
and I am Vice President for Security and Operations at the American
Trucking Associations (ATA). Founded in 1933, ATA is the Nation's
preeminent organization representing the interest of the U.S. trucking
industry. Directly and through its affiliated organizations, ATA
encompasses over 37,000 companies and every type and class of motor
carrier operation.
The trucking industry is an integral component of our economy,
earning more than 80% of U.S. freight revenues and employing
approximately 7 million workers in trucking-related jobs, including
over 3 million commercial drivers. It is important to note that the
trucking industry is comprised primarily of small businesses, with 97%
of trucking companies operating 20 trucks or less, and 90% operating
six trucks or less.\1\ More importantly, about 80 percent of all U.S.
communities depend solely on trucks to deliver and supply their
essential commodities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends 2011
(March 2011).
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highway sector supports strong national and economic security
The U.S. highway and motor carrier sector has been defined by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of 19 Critical
Infrastructures/Key Resources (CI/KR). In 2006, various private sector
highway-related organizations established the Highway and Motor Carrier
Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). The SCC works in partnership with
public sector representatives established under a counterpart
Government Coordinating Council (GCC) under the auspices of the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Committee (CIPAC). The SCC
and GCC have met for the past 5 years on a quarterly basis to share
ideas and exchange information to improve the security of the Nation's
highways. In addition to the SCC, ATA and its members participate in
many industry and Government-led initiatives focused on enhancing
security and ensuring an open and efficient transportation system to
deliver America's freight.
Today's hearing takes place just 2 months away from the tenth
anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since that
day, the United States has undertaken various initiatives, both
domestically and abroad, to prevent our enemies from planning and
executing further terrorist attacks against us. From sending thousands
of heroic men and women to fight abroad, to implementing laws,
regulations, and strategies at home to reduce the risk of terrorist
attacks on U.S. soil, our country has mobilized an immeasurable amount
of public and private resources to defeat our enemies and secure our
country. To further mitigate the risks of future attacks, we must
continue to strengthen cooperation among Government agencies and
private sector entities, improve coordination among Government agencies
at the Federal, State, and local level, and we must coordinate closely
with our international trade partners and allies. Established by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS absorbed a number of Federal
agencies with the overall goal of improving coordination and
intelligence sharing under a single Federal entity. One of the main
early objectives of DHS was to ``unify authority over major Federal
security operations related to our borders, territorial waters, and
transportation systems.''\2\ After almost a decade since the 9/11
terrorist attacks, it is appropriate that we review and assess the
effectiveness of various security regulations and programs implemented
to improve our Nation's security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ President George W. Bush, ``The Department of Homeland
Security'' Proposal, June 2002, p. 2 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/book.pdf.
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implementing more security regulations does not increase security
As a key agency within DHS, TSA can have a positive impact by
strengthening the partnership with private sector counterparts instead
of seeking to increase the number of security regulations on industry.
As a country, we will never fully eliminate the risk and potential for
terrorist attacks. But the trucking industry believes that by working
together, we can improve our Nation's security posture without
sacrificing the need for an efficient and effective transportation
system hampered by excessive security regulations and requirements.
At a recent hearing before this committee, TSA Assistant Secretary
John Pistole stated:
``TSA employs risk-based, intelligence driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism . . . TSA works collaboratively with
industry partners to develop and implement programs that promote
commerce while enhancing security and mitigating the risk to our
Nation's transportation system.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pistole, John S.; Statement before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, June 2, 2011, p. 1.
ATA fully agrees with Mr. Pistole's approach and stands ready to
work with him, his TSA colleagues, and other Federal agencies to
improve the security and safety of the transportation sector. As we
have encouraged past TSA leaders, we recommend that Mr. Pistole perform
a review of all the security regulations and programs throughout the
Federal Government that presently affect all transportation modes so
that the agency has a better appreciation of the numerous security
initiatives in place today. Because of the ubiquitous nature of the
trucking industry throughout the transportation system, Government
mandates established to improve security in other modes or sectors have
both direct and indirect impacts on trucking operations.
As this committee considers the present security challenges faced
by the highway transportation sector and how to mitigate these risks,
it must also recognize that the trucking industry must also comply with
a number of other regulations. In addition to security regulations, the
trucking industry faces far-reaching and complex Federal safety
regulatory system. Increasing the regulatory burden on trucking
companies as they are struggling to recover from the ``Great
Recession'' does not help this critical industry improve its security
nor its ability to grow its bottom line to spur economic growth and
create more jobs. Since both Government and private sector resources
are finite, we must choose carefully how we invest them to ensure our
operations are secure, safe, and efficient.
At a hearing held on May 4, ATA expressed its gratitude to
committee Members for their efforts and bipartisan leadership in
addressing the continued multiplicity of Security Threat Assessments
(STAs) that commercial drivers undergo to deliver America's freight.
ATA and its members strongly support enacting the MODERN Security
Credentials Act of 2011 and we look forward to Congress passing this
important legislation. This issue remains ATA's top security policy
priority for its potential to bring relief to millions of truck drivers
and thousands of trucking companies from unnecessary and overlapping
background checks and the resulting excessive costs.
In addition to multiple STAs, there are several Government
regulations and programs that require trucking companies to develop
security plans, provide security training, develop en-route security
procedures and incorporate security designs at company facilities, many
with overlapping requirements, including the following:
HM-232F.--The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), an agency within the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), promulgated HM-232 soon after the 9/11
attacks. HM-232 required companies transporting placarded loads
of hazardous materials to develop security plans, security
awareness training (both general and in depth), and en-route
security requirements. In March 2010, PHMSA issued a final
rule, HM-232F, refining the list of hazardous materials that
require transportation security plans. Carriers that transport
this security-sensitive subset of hazardous materials must
perform risk assessments of their operations and facilities, as
well as provide in-depth security training to employees
handling these hazardous materials. The Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA) assures compliance with HM-232F
during regular motor carrier visits where safety and security
reviews are conducted. ATA supported PHMSA's rulemaking efforts
to establish a risk-based approach to the transportation of
hazardous materials.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).--U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) worked with industry
immediately after the 9/11 attacks to develop a ``supply-
chain'' security program to increase the security of
international shipments imported into the United States by all
modes of transportation, including trucks. Though C-TPAT is not
mandated by statute and remains a ``voluntary'' security
program, most carriers are required to become C-TPAT members by
their C-TPAT certified customers/importers with international
cross-border shipments from Canada and Mexico. The program
requires participating companies to conduct risk-assessments,
develop security plans, and implement specific security
recommendations made by CBP Supply Chain Security Specialists
(SCSS) to become certified and validated by CBP. As part of the
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, Canada implemented a
parallel program for imports called Partners-In-Protection
(PIP) that incorporates similar requirements and a separate
application and validation by Canadian officials.
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP).--TSA's CCSP
program requires participants to establish personnel security,
physical security, and procedural security requirements. The
CCSP recognizes other STAs such as the Hazmat Endorsement, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and the
FAST card. As with other programs, CCSP has security
requirements that are unique to the air cargo environment
regarding technologies for screening cargo as well as chain of
custody procedures.
ATA recognizes that higher-risk operating environments, such as air
cargo or cross-border operations, have security requirements that must
address specific risks associated with such operations. Because of
this, a ``one-size-fits-all'' security approach is not a viable
methodology for designing and implementing security requirements for an
industry with such diverse operations. However, Federal agencies must
improve inter-agency communication and coordination to establish
mechanisms that recognize basic ``common requirements'' in other
security programs. In essence, if a CCSP compliant carrier is applying
for C-TPAT certification, the carrier's application should undergo an
accelerated C-TPAT certification and validation process.
Because several Federal agencies already require motor carriers to
implement security measures, the trucking industry does not support
Federal agencies, including TSA, implementing additional security
regulations. Agencies that are considering implementing security
requirements for the transportation of specific types of regulated
commodities should first review all three of the above-listed
programs--HM-232F, C-TPAT, and CCSP--and consider if those programs
meet their requirements for the secure transportation of their
regulated commodities.
A positive example of the above scenario has been the
implementation of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS) by DHS's Infrastructure Protection (IP) office. In early
discussions between IP and transportation industry stakeholders, IP
recognized that commercial drivers already undergo various STAs when
transporting certain cargo, including chemicals, or when operating in
certain environments. Thus, DHS considers the Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME), TWIC and FAST screenings as compliant with the CFATS
background check requirement. DHS also recognized the oversight
authority of other Federal agencies over chemical products, including
DOT's regulations for the safe and secure transportation of hazardous
materials. Thus, DHS stated that CFATS regulations would not supersede
other Federal agencies' chemical security requirements.
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL: FOCUS ON OUTCOME NOT
ON OUTPUT
ATA views the TWIC as a single instrument that can satisfy the
needs of multiple agencies requiring background checks in various
operating environments. The original concept of the TWIC, as espoused
as far back as 2003, was to establish a single process, system, and
credential with broad application across multiple programs and
transportation modes requiring workers to undergo a STA. This concept,
known as ``enroll once, use many'', was included as one of the 20 key
recommendations in the Surface Transportation Security Priority
Assessment prepared by the Transborder Security Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC)\4\ with industry input and support.
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\4\ National Security Council, The White House, March 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 10, 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
released a study during a hearing held by the Senate Committee on
Science, Commerce, and Transportation to review the impact of the TWIC
on port security. The GAO report found a number of security concerns
with the implementation of the TWIC program, including the use of
counterfeit TWICs to gain access to maritime facilities and the use of
counterfeit identifications and fake identity data to apply and
successfully obtain authentic TWICs. As a result, some Members of
Congress are questioning if the TWIC has added any true value to the
security of maritime facilities and to the entire transportation
sector.
GAO has recommended a number of steps be taken by TSA and the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG), including the need for internal controls and
effectiveness assessments to evaluate compliance with the program's
original objectives. GAO also suggested that TSA analyze and determine
what cost-effective measures can be taken to ensure that the program
corrects the specific weaknesses found during the assessments,
especially as they relate to identity fraud and the use of counterfeit
TWICs. As a long-standing member of the TWIC private sector stakeholder
group, ATA is concerned about the GAO findings.
As long as TWIC is simply used as a flash-pass it will be no more
secure than a driver's license or any other photo identification. ATA
urges this committee to ensure TSA and USCG do not delay issuing a
Final Rule for TWIC readers so that maritime facilities can use the
technology established under the TWIC program to verify the identity of
the card holder prior to accessing a facility. The technology embedded
in the TWIC and the readers should help deter the use of counterfeit
TWICs. TSA and the TWIC contractor must also take the necessary steps
to ensure that TWIC applicants are presenting valid identification and
biographical data upon application.
INFORMATION SHARING TRUMPS SECURITY REGULATIONS TO FIGHT TERRORISM
Last February, an alert trucking company employee prevented a
terrorist plot involving explosives. A visiting Saudi student, Khalid
Ali-M Aldawsari, was arrested in Lubbock, Texas for plotting to bomb
several locations throughout the State, including the home of former
President George W. Bush. Luckily, Mr. Aldawsari was arrested and his
plans came to an end.
The incident reflected the positive effects of implementing
appropriate security training for employees, while encouraging them to
remain alert and report any suspicious activity or other concerns. In
this case, a trucking company employee recognized and researched some
of the materials listed in a package and alerted the company's security
team. Federal law enforcement personnel were brought in and the would-
be terrorist was eventually arrested when he tried to pick up the
package.
As with other terrorist plots inside the United States, this event
garnered much media attention. However, among the various media outlets
that covered the story, it was a CNBC story that truly captured the
essence of what transpired:
``In the end, it wasn't a TSA agent, a Homeland Security operative or
an FBI agent who first spotted alleged terror plotter Khalid Ali-M
Aldawsari. It was the employees of a private shipping company.
According to the Government, somebody at the shipping company called
local police after becoming suspicious about a chemical package that
Aldawsari was set to receive.
``Meanwhile, officials at the chemical company that sent the material
called the FBI with their suspicions about Aldawsari--and later worked
with an FBI agent who posed undercover as a company employee in
dealings with the suspect.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``How Two Companies Stopped a Terror Suspect'', CNBC.com;
February 24, 2011; http://m.cnbc.com/us_news/41766933.
What this story highlights is that all of us, Government agencies,
private industry, and concerned citizens all share the responsibility
for fighting terrorism. In the end, information sharing is the best and
strongest tool that we have to stop potential terrorist plots and to
fight terrorism at home and abroad.
As this event demonstrates, the private sector is an essential
partner and part of the solution for combating terrorism. We don't need
more regulation, we need more cooperation.
ATA and its members are presently participating in a number of
information-sharing initiatives to facilitate the flow of information
and intelligence to improve the security posture of our industry.
Initiatives involving the Homeland Security Information Network, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI's InfraGard
program, as well other Federal, State, and local efforts, are allowing
industry to share information directly with the intelligence and law
enforcement community. ATA urges this committee to support such
exchanges of information as a better alternative to establishing
additional security regulations on an industry already over-burdened by
safety and security regulatory mandates.
CONCLUSION
In the past 10 years, many legislative, regulatory, and voluntary
efforts have been implemented to minimize the threat of another
terrorist attack in the United States. Though well-intended, many
initiatives have resulted in a multiplicity of overlapping and
burdensome security requirements on trucking companies. Unfortunately,
rather than augmenting the security of the transportation sector, the
focus has been more on regulatory compliance rather than evaluating the
impact of existing security requirements.
ATA urges the committee to consider the following recommendations
as it deliberates TSA's Authorizations for fiscal year 2012 and 2013:
Do not mandate more security regulations.--As an industry
already heavily regulated by safety and security requirements,
more security regulations will not improve security but will
only increase the compliance burden on trucking companies;
Encourage information sharing.--Industry has embraced
several initiatives by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to exchange information and increase our mutual
understanding and information needs to improve our Nation's
security posture;
Improve agency coordination.--Increase the communication and
coordination among Federal agencies that have established
security requirements and programs that impact the surface
transportation sector. TSA's Transportation Sector Network
Management (TSNM) could play a role in such an initiative;
Ensure the TWIC reader rule is issued promptly.--TSA and the
USCG must finalize the TWIC reader rule and ensure that the
processes and systems are hardened to prevent counterfeiting
and the use of false identity information to obtain a real
TWIC.
Again, on behalf of ATA and its members, I thank you for the
opportunity to share some comments regarding our industry's perspective
and priorities as this committee considers authorizing TSA for fiscal
year 2012 and 2013. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Thank you for that remark. The fact
is, this issue was brought to the attention of this committee
by your association. So I really appreciate the fact you gave
us a heads-up and we were able to do something about it.
Our next witness is Chief Wanda Dunham. I am proud of
Wanda; she is an alumni of the same university from which I
graduated. She is just younger than I am. But it is good to
have her here. She is the chief of police for the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Police Department. We look
forward to hearing her testimony.
I will tell you, Madam Ranking Member, you are going to
hear about canines today after all. They have vapor-wake
canines in the Atlanta transit system.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Smart people.
You can advertise your school where you graduated.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Jacksonville State University. That is
where we went to school.
Chief Dunham. That is right.
Mr. Rogers. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF WANDA Y. DUNHAM, ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER AND
CHIEF OF POLICE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, METROPOLITAN ATLANTA
RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Chief Dunham. Yes, sir.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee
Members, and thank you for the opportunity to provide my
testimony on behalf of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority in Atlanta, Georgia, and as a representative of
public transportation systems throughout our Nation.
My name is Wanda Dunham, and I am privileged to serve as
the police chief and assistant general manager for police
services and emergency management to the ninth-largest public
transportation system. I speak to you as someone with more than
24 years of police experience in a mass transit environment and
as someone who collaborates with industry as a member of the
American Public Transportation Association's--that is
``APTA''--Committee on Public Safety. Sincerely, I truly
appreciate your interest in improving public transportation
security across the country.
Today, the Transportation Security Grant Program and other
Federal funding programs remain a significant resource in the
development and implementation of key countermeasures against
terrorist threats. Since 2003, MARTA has received approximately
$31 million in Federal funding in support of various target
hardening and security initiatives. With the support of this
investment, MARTA has been able to develop or expand key
programs, such as our CCTV camera system, as well as acquiring
15 bomb-detection canine teams, including three vapor-wake
canine teams that can actually detect the presence of odors
related to an explosive device.
I would like to spend a few minutes to discuss the canine
teams at MARTA. Proudly, I am pleased to report that MARTA has
been at the forefront in the use of this unique canine
application in the detection of explosive devices. We were the
first transit agency to be part of the canine explosives
detection program for TSA at Lackland Air Force Base in San
Antonio, Texas.
In August 2004, MARTA was asked to participate in a pilot
program for the first vapor-wake canine program in the country.
This program was spearheaded by the prestigious Auburn
University Canine Detection Training Center in Auburn, Alabama.
Our canine, Tabby, was the first graduate of this impressive
training program. Although Tabby was retired last year, we
recognize her today for her 6 years of dedicated service to our
department.
While there has been a great degree of progress made at
MARTA and other transit systems across the country, there is
still much work that is required to continue to keep our Nation
safe. Much of the efforts and focus of this investment to date
has been in the area of infrastructure and target hardening.
Many transit systems are experiencing the need for
additional funding and broader funding guidelines to leverage
existing capital investments with operational support. An
increase in the limitation on operational funding from 10
percent to 20 percent and allowing personnel costs where the
need can be strongly substantiated will be of great support to
many transit systems.
Additionally, recent intelligence information has
substantiated what we have known for some time: That transit
systems remain highly vulnerable for potential attacks. To that
point, it is highly recommended that Congress reauthorize the
Transit Security Grant Program at levels similar to those
authorized under the
9/11 Commission Act.
Finally, I cannot emphasize how important and critical the
financial support provided by Congress through the Transit
Security Grant Program has been to local and regional efforts
across the country in keeping our customers safe. As we prepare
at a regional level to ensure we are responsive and prepared
for new and emerging 21st-Century security threats, the support
of Congress and your continued commitment to keeping stride
with the financial needs are vital to our success.
I will entertain any questions. Thank you for your time.
[The statement of Chief Dunham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wanda Y. Dunham
July 12, 2011
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and committee Members, and thank you
for the opportunity to provide my testimony on behalf of the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, in Atlanta, GA and as a
representative of public transportation systems throughout our Nation.
My name is Wanda Dunham and I am privileged to serve as the Police
Chief and Assistant General Manager, for Police Services and Emergency
Management to the 9th largest public transportation system in our great
Nation. As you may be aware, MARTA is one of eight identified Tier 1
transit agencies in the Nation, which means that it warrants especially
high considerations for security investments. I speak to you as someone
with more than 24 years of police experience in a mass transit
environment, as a member of the TSA Peer Advisor Group and as someone
who collaborates within the industry as a member of the American Public
Transportation Association's (APTA) Committee on Public Safety.
Sincerely, I truly appreciate your interest in improving public
transportation security across the United States. My testimony today is
to speak to the growing demand and need for continued homeland
security-related investments.
MARTA OVERVIEW
There exists no priority higher than the safety and security of the
more than 500,000 unlinked passenger trips we deliver on a daily basis.
Our multi-modal transit system includes 48 miles of heavy rail serving
38 stations with 318 railcars and 505 buses on 91 routes. Our rail
system, which began service in 1979, has a direct connection to
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. As MARTA has expanded over
the last 3 decades to remain an economic engine for the region, so has
our attention to security-related needs and proactive strategies. MARTA
is the longest-serving transit police agency in the country designated
as a CALEA (The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement)-
certified agency. MARTA Police is a full-time, full-service agency with
321 sworn officers including detectives, uniform patrol, and explosive
detection units, etc. It is the availability of resources such as the
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) and a collaborative effort with
Federal, State, local agencies and community partners that has allowed
MARTA Police to implement multi-level, comprehensive strategies to
ensure the safety of our riders. Now, more so than ever, recent events
and intelligence regarding terrorist plans reinforces our need to be
all the more vigilant and continue to make security-related investments
a high National priority.
TSA & MARTA COLLABORATION
The Transit Security Grant Program and other Federal funding
programs remain a significant resource in the development and
implementation of key countermeasures against terrorist threats. Since
2003, MARTA has received approximately $31 million in Federal funding
in support of various target hardening and security initiatives. With
the support of this investment, MARTA has been able to develop or
expand key programs, such as the following:
The implementation of Homeland Security CCTV cameras in all
38 stations, with cameras soon to be installed in over 500
buses and 200 railcars.
Increased access control systems at a number of critical
infrastructures.
Conducted over 10 Homeland Security Emergency and Evaluation
Plan (HSEEP)-compliant security exercises within the last 5
years to include various State, local, and Federal partners.
Enhanced protective measures (e.g., fencing, lighting,
barrier gates) at critical and vulnerable infrastructures such
as rail yards and bus garages.
Secured & updated more effective bomb abatement equipment
such as a Total Containment Vessel (TCV) and a bomb robot.
Acquired 15 bomb-detecting canine teams, including 3 ``vapor
wake'' canine teams that can actually detect the presence of
odors related to an explosive device.
I would like to spend a few minutes to discuss the canine teams at
MARTA. Proudly, I am pleased to report that MARTA has been at the
forefront in the use of this unique canine application in the detection
of explosive devices. We were the first transit agency to be part of
the Canine Explosives Detection program for TSA at Lackland Air Force
Base, in San Antonio, Texas. Since our involvement with the TSA canine
program, our canine teams have received numerous ``Top Dog''
recognitions for their exemplary performance. In August 2004, MARTA was
asked to participate in a pilot program for the first vapor wake canine
program in the country. This program was spearheaded by the prestigious
Auburn University Canine Detection Training Center in Auburn, Alabama.
Our canine, Tabbie, was the first graduate of this impressive training
program. Although Tabbie was retired last year, we recognize her today
for her 6 years of dedicated service to our department. Since the
Auburn program's inception, we have had five additional canines who
have participated in this exceptional program.
We have discovered that transit riders report feeling safer when
Canine Units are present. Their presence and visibility has helped to
prevent the introduction of explosive devices and deter criminal
activity in the transit system, all the while providing a more secure
environment for our customers. I cannot say enough about the TSA Canine
Program. TSA is committed to this program and has done an excellent job
providing transit agencies such as MARTA with the resources to keep
this program viable and accessible to assist in the fight against
terror on our systems.
Furthermore, TSA has been responsive to many of our concerns within
the transit community. For example, we recognize and appreciate the
recent changes to the Transit Security Grant Program guidelines to
allow for maintenance and sustainability as allowable expenses, and the
revised timeline for the execution of capital projects from 36 to 48
months.
Most recently, the TSA Administrator, John Pistole, visited MARTA
to witness first-hand the many effective security measures made
possible through TSA grant funding.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH TSGP FUNDING
While there has been a great degree of progress made at MARTA and
other transit systems across the country, there is still much work that
is required to continue to keep our Nation safe. Much of the effort and
focus of the investments to date has been in the area of infrastructure
and target hardening. Many transit systems are experiencing the need
for additional funding and broader funding guidelines to leverage
existing capital investments with operational support. An increase in
the limitation on operational funding from 10 percent to 20 percent and
allowing personnel cost, where the need can be strongly substantiated,
will be of great support to many transit systems. For instance, a COPS
program specifically for transit has been a funding proposal strongly
supported by other Tier 1 agencies.
Additionally, recent intelligence information has substantiated
what we've known for some time; that is, those that mean to do our
country harm have not eased up on their determination. In addition,
we've also learned that transit systems remain highly vulnerable for
potential attacks. To that point, it is highly recommended that
Congress reauthorize the TSGP at levels similar to those authorized
under the
9/11 Commission Act. The eligible use of funds included in Section
1406(b) of the 9/11 Commission Act should be maintained and broadened.
This measure would allow for transit systems to continue to provide
security countermeasures at all vulnerable locations at risk of
terrorist attack versus having to prioritize vulnerable assets based on
funding restrictions.
Furthermore, the ability to communicate and coordinate with other
public safety agencies, such as police and fire, is vital to our
ability to respond and guard against any perceived or real threats.
Legislation in Congress to allocate spectrum to public safety agencies
has the potential to further the interoperability challenges among
transportation agencies. A change in the definition of public safety in
Section 337 is recommended to reflect the need of transit security and
emergency services to access the public safety spectrum for emergency
service purposes. MARTA also supports the allocation of the 700 MHz
spectrum (D-Block) to public safety, if the aforementioned change is
made.
Finally, we also urge the committee to support the security
legislative recommendations of the American Public Transportation
Association, including support for the Public Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC) and Security
Standards programs, which have been submitted to the committee under
separate cover.
I cannot emphasize how important and critical the financial support
provided by Congress through the TSGP has been to the local and
regional efforts across the country in keeping our customers safe.
Unfortunately, we cannot say that the threat today is any less than it
was 10 years ago. As we prepare at a regional level to ensure we are
responsive and prepared for new and emerging 21st Century security
threats, the support of Congress and your continued commitment to keep
in stride with the financial needs are critical to our success.
conclusion
I appreciate the committee for allowing me to provide testimony on
these critical security-related issues. MARTA and our fellow transit
agencies look forward to working with you and the Members of the
committee as you work to develop this next critical authorization bill.
I will be happy to answer any questions at this time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Chief Dunham.
Our fourth witness, Mr. Raymond Reese, is the corporate
health, safety, and security leader for Colonial Pipeline and
will be testifying on behalf of the Alabama--Alabama--the
Association of Oil Pipe Lines, of which I am sure Alabama is a
part.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Reese for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. REESE, CORPORATE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
SECURITY LEADER, COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES AND THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
Mr. Reese. Thank you, sir. Yes, it is. In fact, we have an
asset going through your fine State.
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson
Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. My name is Raymond Reese.
I am the corporate health, safety, and security leader for
Colonial Pipeline. I appreciate the opportunity to appear on
behalf of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, the American
Petroleum Institute, and as the chairman of the Oil and Natural
Gas Sector Coordinating Council.
America relies on a network of more than 170,000 miles of
liquid pipelines to move the energy that fuels our Nation's
economy and supports our quality of life. One of these
pipelines is Colonial. Colonial is headquartered near Atlanta,
Georgia, where we operate a system consisting of 5,500 miles of
pipeline. When measured by volume transported, Colonial is the
largest refined products pipeline in the world.
Colonial and the pipeline industry are committed to
delivering these materials safely and efficiently. We are also
committed to keeping our facilities secure. With regard to the
security of the pipeline system, the private and public sectors
share the same goal: Protecting our facilities from attack so
that we can avoid loss of life, disruption of service, damage
to assets, injury to our employees or the public, or harm to
the environment and National economy.
One key element to effectively managing these risks is what
TSA has properly called a partnership between the private and
public sectors. The success of this and any partnership is
dependent upon communication and collaboration. In my view, the
most effective security program will be one that is not static
but, rather, constantly adjusting to ensure we are staying
ahead of an increasingly sophisticated adversary. Regular
interaction with TSA through a strong industry partnership
provides this flexibility.
TSA's Pipeline Security Division, or PSD, regularly
conducts corporate security reviews of major pipeline operators
to assess their security plans, and critical facility
inspections of the most sensitive locations in the pipeline
industry to focus on implementation of security practices at
pipeline facilities. The results of these two reviews have been
used to develop security smart practices that are then shared
across the industry. I can personally attest to the thorough
nature of the CSR review and how extensive some of these on-
site visits can be.
TSA has also issued pipeline security guidelines which are
specific Federal recommendations for security practices
throughout the pipeline industry. These were built on previous
guidance and the requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act. Our
industry has worked with TSA in the development of these
guidelines.
Rarely will industry and regulators agree on every point or
proposal. The very nature of effective partnership necessitates
some level of mutual compromise. As mentioned, the pipeline
industry has a constructive working relationship with PSD.
However, we believe there are opportunities for improved
communication elsewhere within DHS.
Our industry seeks appropriate risk-tiering for gasoline
storage facilities in the CFATS program and a conclusion to a
process that has gone on for a very long time. Contrary to
initial indications from DHS, CFATS regulations were expanded
to include operators of gasoline storage facilities by the
incorporation of a flammable-mixtures provision late in the
regulatory development process. Comments were filed asking DHS
to review the technicalities of its rulemaking, and for over 2
years our industry has awaited a formal reply.
Another concern is with credentialing. The liquid pipeline
industry and others within the oil and natural gas sector
support effective risk-based security standards of high-risk
facilities to protect critical infrastructure. We support
credentialing programs that check personally identifiable
information against the terrorist screening database.
We are concerned, however, that DHS's proposal for a
personal surety program would create significant new
administrative burdens with little or no security enhancement.
Rather than creating a redundant credentialing program, it
would appear more logical for DHS to leverage the already
widely accepted and utilized TWIC program.
I want to thank this subcommittee and its members for
addressing this issue in your recent markup of H.R. 901. It is
our hope that this proposal will be a part of the final CFATS
reauthorization this year.
In conclusion, it has been my personal experience that
TSA's Pipeline Security Division has assumed a responsible
approach to pipeline security, working with industry to
identify effective and practical security practices for
pipeline operators. In my view, this partnership serves the
American public well.
And I thank you for the opportunity to comment, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Reese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond J. Reese
July 12, 2011
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee and
Members of the subcommittee, my name is Ray Reese and I am the
corporate health, safety, and security leader for Colonial Pipeline. I
appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today on
behalf of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL) and the American
Petroleum Institute (API). In addition, I serve as the Chair of the Oil
and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC), which I will
discuss in further detail below.
Colonial Pipeline is headquartered in suburban Atlanta, Georgia,
where we operate a pipeline system consisting of 5,519 miles of
pipeline, beginning in Houston and crossing the South and East before
terminating at the New York harbor. When measured by volume
transported, Colonial is the largest refined products pipeline in the
world, daily delivering about 100 million gallons of gasoline, diesel
fuel, jet fuel, and home heating oil and fuels for the U.S. military.
AOPL is an incorporated trade association representing 49 liquid
pipeline transmission companies. The American Petroleum Institute (API)
represents more than 470 oil and natural gas companies, leaders of a
technology-driven industry that supplies most of America's energy,
supports more than 9.2 million U.S. jobs, accounts for 7.7 percent of
the U.S. economy, and delivers more than $85 million a day in revenue
to the U.S. Treasury. Together, our organizations represent the
operators of approximately 90 percent of total U.S. oil pipeline
mileage in the United States.
Pipelines are the safest, most reliable, economical, and
environmentally favorable way to transport oil and petroleum products,
other energy liquids, and chemicals throughout our Nation.
Liquid pipelines bring crude oil to the Nation's refineries and
petroleum products to our communities, including all grades of
gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, home heating oil, kerosene, and propane.
AOPL's and API's member companies provide hydrocarbon feedstocks for
use by many other industries, including food, pharmaceuticals,
plastics, chemicals, and road construction. America relies on the
network of more than 170,000 miles of liquid pipelines to move the
energy that fuels our Nation's economic engine and delivers the
products to keep our Nation's industry in operation. Colonial as a
company, and the pipeline industry as a whole, are committed to
delivering these materials safely and efficiently.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide some perspective on
behalf of the liquid pipeline industry as the subcommittee conducts its
important oversight of the reauthorization of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).
PIPELINE OPERATORS INSIST ON SAFETY
Pipeline operators have every incentive to invest in safety.
Indeed, in our members' view, there are no incentives to cut corners on
pipeline safety. Most important is the potential for injury or loss of
life to members of the public, pipeline employees and contractors. As
an industry we also recognize the impact we could have on the
environment and to our country's economy. In addition to the public and
third-party impact, if a pipeline experiences a failure or a release,
there are numerous potentially harmful consequences for the operator
and its reputation. The operator could face litigation, fines, incur
potentially costly repairs and cleanup costs. Further, the pipeline
could suffer a significant loss of revenue and goodwill by not being
able to serve its customers for extended periods of time. In short,
when it comes to safety, pipeline operators have every reason to
operate in a manner consistent with the public interest.
Pipeline operators invest millions of dollars annually to maintain
their assets and comply with Federal safety laws and regulations. A
large percentage of liquid pipeline assets are inspected regularly and
all are monitored continuously. Safety measures include proper pipeline
route selection, design, construction, operation, and maintenance, as
well as comprehensive public awareness and excavation damage prevention
programs.
Pipeline safety is closely regulated by the Department of
Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA). PHMSA is responsible for establishing and enforcing
regulations to assure the safety of pipelines (Title 49 CFR Parts 190-
199). Operators face a rigorous set of PHMSA regulations pertaining to
pipeline construction, operation, and maintenance. Regulations also
cover public awareness, reporting, design standards, construction
methods, operational controls and limitations, pressure testing,
maintenance standards, qualification of personnel, and emergency
response. These same laws and regulations also address the leading
causes of pipeline failures, including corrosion, excavation damage,
materials and equipment failure, and operational errors.
PIPELINE SECURITY--OVERVIEW
With regard to the security of the pipeline industry, the private
and public sectors share the same goal: To protect our facilities from
attack so that we can avoid loss of life, disruption of service, damage
to our assets, injury to our employees and the public, and harm to the
environment and the economy. We must, however, also recognize that our
sectors share the same limitation: We must allocate resources through a
risk-based approach that properly assesses the likelihood and
consequence of an event at a facility.
I cannot stress enough that the key to effectively managing this
risk requires what TSA has properly called a ``partnership'' between
the private and public sectors. The success of this and any
``partnership'' is dependent upon communication and collaboration
between the parties. In my view, the most effective security program
will be one that is not static, but rather constantly changes and
improves to ensure that we are staying ahead of increasingly
sophisticated adversaries that would do us harm. Regular interaction
with TSA through a strong partnership ensures that we are evolving at
the greatest speed possible by taking advantage of the knowledge and
strengths that each sector can provide.
Prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pipeline safety
and security were both under the jurisdiction of what is now PHMSA's
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). On November 19, 2001, President George
W. Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security ACT (ATSA)
establishing TSA and designated it as the lead Federal agency for
transportation security including pipelines. Following these events,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created on November 25,
2002, transferring TSA into the newly created DHS. Federal guidance was
published by OPS on September 5, 2002, through a circular notice that
recommended pipeline operators identify critical facilities, develop
security plans, an implementation schedule for these plans, and the
need to review them annually. On December 17, 2003, President Bush
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive--7 (HSPD-7) that
required DHS and other Federal agencies to collaborate with appropriate
private sector entities to assist in the protection of National
critical infrastructure. Further, representatives of DHS and DOT signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in September of 2004, which
reiterated DHS's jurisdiction for the security of all modes of
transportation. In essence, the role of PHMSA's oversight is related to
the safe operation, construction, and maintenance of pipelines, and PSD
is responsible for ensuring that pipeline facilities are adequately
secure from security-related threats.
PSD is located within the Office of Transportation Sector Network
Management (TSNM) and has been directed to enhance the security
preparedness of the Nation's liquid and natural gas pipeline systems
by:
Developing security programs and conducting analysis to
maintain pipeline and domain awareness with particular focus on
critical systems and infrastructure;
Identifying industry best practices and lessons learned;
and,
Maintaining a dynamic modal network through effective
communications with the pipeline industry and Government
stakeholders.
PSD ACTIVITY
Following the direction of HSPD-7, PSD developed a comprehensive
security program that is predicated on the agency's interaction with
the pipeline industry.
PSD regularly conducts Corporate Security Reviews (CSR) of major
pipeline operators to assess their security plans and implementation.
As the PSD staff conducts on-site reviews, the CSRs also help to
establish working relationships with key security representatives in
the pipeline industry.
To date, PSD has conducted 115 CSRs of the largest operators in the
United States, and it has also conducted Critical Facility Inspections
(CFI) of the most sensitive locations in the pipeline industry. The
CFIs are in-depth reviews that focus on the implementation of security
plans and actual practices at critical facilities. The results of these
reviews have been used to develop security ``smart practices'' that can
be shared across the industry. According to the PSD, they completed
CFIs of all identified locations earlier this year.
PSD has also promoted the use of the Transportation Security
Operations Center (TSOC) as a point of contact for pipeline operators
to report any significant security incidents or suspicious activities.
The TSOC is staffed 24 hours per day and disseminates the information
it receives to the appropriate agency or division for response.
In May 2007, TSA issued the Transportation Systems Sector Specific
Plan and Pipeline Modal Annex that is part of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Pipeline Modal Annex has many
items, including: A description of risk-based security programs,
security program management, and site and program assessment.
Most recently, PSD completed more detailed and specific Pipeline
Security Guidelines in December 2010. The pipeline industry has worked
with PSD for several years in the development of the Pipeline Modal
Annex and generally supports the recently issued Pipeline Security
Guidelines. TSA built on the previous guidance issued in 2002 and the
requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to provide specific
Federal recommendations for pipeline safety security practices.
TSA AND INDUSTRY
Communicating and coordinating with stakeholders enables the public
sector to have an uninhibited view of the pipeline industry's approach
to security. With this enhanced perspective, PSD not only gains a clear
and accurate view of the industry's capabilities, but is also able to
identify any gaps that may exist. The private sector benefits from this
collaboration because any potential shortfalls identified by PSD can
quickly and effectively be communicated to the industry and acted on
immediately. Again, the goal of providing appropriate security for the
pipeline industry as a component of our Nation's critical
infrastructure is one that is shared.
Overall, PSD has assumed a responsible approach to pipeline
security. PSD has worked with other agencies, including DOT and the
Department of Energy (DOE), and with industry, through the Oil and
Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC) and the Pipeline
Sector Coordinating Council (Pipeline SCC), to identify effective and
practical security practices for pipeline operators.
In accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP), a Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC)
Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) Joint Sector Committee was established to
provide a legal framework for members of the Energy and Transportation
Sector GCC and ONG SCC to engage in joint critical infrastructure
protection discussions and activities, including those involved with
pipeline security. Nineteen industry trade associations came together
to form the ONG SCC to help facilitate communications between industry
security professionals and representatives of the Energy Sector
Government Coordinating Council. Soon after, the Pipeline Working Group
(Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council) was formed to further improve
communication and collaboration among pipeline operators and various
Government agencies.
The ONG SCC provides a forum for industry to discuss relevant
security issues and coordinate and communicate with agency
counterparts. Quarterly meetings are held with SCC representatives and
also jointly with members of the Government Coordinating Council (GCC).
The ONG SCC serves as a point of coordination for broad communication
with the security representatives of the oil and natural gas industry
as well as partners in State and Federal Government. Members of the ONG
SCC provided significant input to TSA during the development of the
Transportation Sector Specific (Security) Plan that was included as
part of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan process.
The ONG SCC has several different working groups that specialize in
key security areas, such as Information Sharing--Homeland Security
Information Network, Cyber Security, and Pipeline Security. The
Pipeline Working Group includes representatives of industry operators
and four of its major trade associations: AOPL, API, the American Gas
Association (AGA), and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America (INGAA). The Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council also meets
periodically with its counterparts in the Pipeline Government
Coordinating Council, which is chaired by a representative of PSD and
includes representatives of DOT and other Federal agencies. Members of
the Pipeline Working Group have provided substantial input to TSA PSD
to assist in its development of the 2010 Pipeline Security Guidelines.
The Pipeline SCC and GCC have proven to be positive venues to improve
communications between industry and the agencies.
PSD also interfaces with industry by providing important services
and tools, such as Pipeline Security Training videos, conferences, and
forums to share information and experiences to improve security at our
Nation's critical infrastructure. For example, TSA conducts an annual
International Pipeline Security Forum in partnership with Natural
Resources Canada that brings together pipeline security professionals
and representatives of other appropriate Federal agencies that have a
nexus. These programs have not only provided a means of evaluating the
actual security practices of the pipeline operators, but have also been
a means of promoting industry familiarity with the responsibilities and
personnel of the PSD.
AREAS OF SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENT
As I have mentioned above, the pipeline industry has a constructive
working relationship with PSD. In light of the oversight role today's
hearing will play in the reauthorization of TSA, it is important to
highlight a few areas of concern. Rarely will industry and regulators
agree on every point or proposal, however, we believe there are some
issues that could be resolved at DHS with improved communication and
reasoned decision-making.
For instance, this subcommittee is well aware of the need and
importance of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards, also
known as CFATS. Section 550 of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act
of 2007 required DHS to establish risk-based security standards for
chemical facilities. Contrary to initial indications from DHS, CFATS
regulations were expanded to include operators of gasoline storage
facilities by the incorporation of a ``flammable mixtures'' provision
late in the regulatory development process. AOPL, API, and the National
Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA) filed joint comments
asking DHS to review the technical deficiencies of its rulemaking, and
industry suggested the creation of a technical panel comprised of
independent experts to assist the agency in making its tiering
decisions. For over 2 years, industry has awaited a formal reply from
DHS in response to what we believe to be very legitimate scientific
concerns about how CFATS risk decisions were determined with respect to
flammable mixtures in above-ground storage tanks.
Another, and less technical, example at DHS is the issue of
proposed redundant background checks through proposals such as the
Personnel Surety Program (PSP). The liquid pipeline industry and others
within the Oil and Natural Gas Sector support strong and effective
risk-based security standards of high-risk facilities in order to
ensure safeguards are in place to protect critical infrastructure. Our
industry supports credentialing programs that can efficiently and
seamlessly check Personally Identifiable Information (PII) against the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). However, we are concerned that
DHS's proposal would create significant new administrative burdens by
making personnel vetting applicable to facilities rather than
individuals, with no enhancement to security. Rather than creating a
redundant PSP to be administered by the Chemical Compliance Division,
it would be more logical for DHS to leverage the existing
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program to
provide personnel security clearances at chemical facilities. The TWIC
program is already administered by TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, and is
widely accepted and utilized in the pipeline industry. Making specific
enhancements to the existing, in-place TWIC program as opposed to
initiating what appears to be a redundant and duplicative PSP effort is
a more logical approach. Despite the many talented and well-intentioned
individuals within DHS, this general lack of transparency in their
decision-making process hampers productive dialogue between Government
and industry, and ultimately, threatens to errantly commit precious
resources needed to help ensure a secure National infrastructure. I
want to thank this subcommittee and its Members for addressing this
issue in your recent mark-up of HR 901. It is our hope that this
proposal will be a part of a final CFATS reauthorization bill this
year.
In closing, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
you today and share my views and can personally attest to the
productive working relations the pipeline industry has with PSD. I
would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Reese, for your testimony. As I
pointed out a little while ago, your pipeline runs through my
district, so I really like it.
Our fifth witness Mr. John Risch. He is the alternate
National legislative director for the United Transportation
Union.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Risch for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN RISCH, III, ALTERNATE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTOR, UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
Mr. Risch. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
Members of the committee, on behalf of the 85,000 members of
the United Transportation Union, I would like to thank you for
the opportunity to address this committee today.
UTU represents thousands of transit and rail employees.
Each and every day, our members are on the front lines of the
battle to keep our transportation network secure. Our members
are committed to work with their employers and our Government
to improve our lines of defense against those who wish our
Nation harm. UTU has offered to work with our Nation's
railroads on security training and has had positive discussions
on possible joint partnerships.
A primary concern to our rail members is the lack of locks
for doors and windows on locomotive cabs. We believe it should
be a requirement that all locomotives be equipped with locks
for the doors and windows to prevent unauthorized entry into
the operating compartment. When windows and doors are closed
and locked, the locomotive cab needs to be air-conditioned.
Certainly, in cold weather, operating crews will close the
windows and doors. However, in hot weather, without air-
conditioning, operating crews are forced to open the doors and
windows, compromising their personal safety and that of others.
Currently, there is no Federal standards for equipping
locomotives with air-conditioning or for secure locks on doors
and windows. But we are pleased to say that the Federal
Railroad Administration is currently developing regulations
that address the issue of air-conditioning, but not on locks
and doors.
I would like to clarify, in my written statement I did
mention a terrible incident that happened in New Orleans last
year. I have now been told by the railroad involved that the
cab did have locks on the windows and that particular
locomotive cab did have air-conditioning.
In regards to our bus members, operations in the bus
industry, we recommend that bus terminals be secured with
fencing, video cameras, security personnel, or a combination of
all three. Many bus yards are not fenced, and many that are do
not have locked gates.
In regards to security training for employees, we need to
adequately train hundreds of thousands of transit and rail
workers across America so that they are ready in the event of a
terrorist threat or attack. In emergency situations, our
members are the first on the scene, even before police,
firefighters, and emergency medical responders, and what they
do in the first few minutes is crucial to minimizing
destruction and loss of life. These employees need to know how
to recognize a potential problem, what protocols to follow for
reporting and responding to potential threats, and how to
protect themselves and others from harm.
This committee worked diligently to address these concerns
by including comprehensive training in the 9/11 Commission Act.
That legislation mandated that all front-line transit, rail,
and over-the-road bus employees undergo live training
exercises, receive training on evacuation procedures, and be
instructed on crew and passenger communications and
coordination.
Unfortunately, these training mandates are nearly 4 years
overdue. In fact, this administration has failed to issue a
notice of proposed rulemaking on these essential training
issues. We believe this is unacceptable, and further delay only
perpetuates the existing dangers.
I worked as a locomotive engineer for 30 years on a large
freight railroad. In my entire career, my security training
consisted of watching a 30-minute video in a cubicle by myself.
The video was well-done, and it urged me to report any
suspicious activities and how to be more aware of my
surroundings. However, it was not tailored to my job
responsibilities, and I didn't learn any specific skills. That
video, while a good tool, did not constitute meaningful
training.
In our industry, training in general has evolved away from
the classroom and into the cubicle. Where we once had
discussions with coworkers and instructors, we now have hours
in front of computer screens with no opportunity to interact
and ask questions. It is tantamount to training on your own. We
need legitimate classroom training using security
professionals. Security training should also be redundant and
not a one-time, check-the-box exercise for employers.
In closing, workers must be treated as partners in the
battle to protect our vulnerable rail and public transit
systems, and, through proper training, they will be prepared to
do so. We appreciate this committee's efforts to push for
meaningful security initiatives. We strongly urge TSA to
implement the training mandated in the
9/11 Act to ensure front-line workers are prepared to assist in
the event of an emergency.
Thanks again for the opportunity to appear.
[The statement of Mr. Risch follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Risch, III
July 12, 2011
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the 85,000 members of the United
Transportation Union (UTU) thank you for the opportunity to testify
today at this important hearing on transportation security.
UTU represents thousands of transit and rail employees on our
Nation's freight and passenger rail systems, including Amtrak. Each and
every day these workers are on the front lines of the battle to keep
our transportation networks secure. Our members are committed to work
with their employers and our Government to improve our lines of defense
against those who wish our Nation harm. UTU has offered to work with
our Nation's railroads on security training and have had positive
discussions on possible joint partnerships.
A primary concern to our rail members is the lack of locks for
doors and windows on locomotive cabs. On June 20, 2010, in New Orleans
a conductor was shot to death and the locomotive engineer was injured
during an armed invasion and robbery in their locomotive cab. The lack
of a secure operating cab allowed that individual to easily enter the
cab and commit this terrible crime. Also in 1998 a commuter train was
hijacked when an intruder entered the unlocked locomotive cab. The
locomotive engineer was held at gunpoint and the train was hijacked to
Philadelphia. We believe it should be a requirement that all
locomotives be equipped with locks for the doors and windows to prevent
unauthorized entry into the operating compartment.
When windows and doors are closed and locked, the locomotive cab
needs to be air conditioned. Certainly in cold weather operating crews
will close the windows and doors; however, in hot weather without air
conditioning, operating crews are forced to open the windows and doors,
compromising their personal safety and that of others.
Currently there are no Federal standards for equipping locomotives
with air conditioning or for secure locks on doors and windows. We are
pleased that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is considering
the issue of air conditioning in a pending rulemaking, but
unfortunately requiring locomotive doors and windows to have locks is
not part of that rulemaking.
In regards to bus operations, we recommend that bus terminals be
secured with fencing, video surveillance, security personnel or a
combination of all three. Many bus yards are not fenced and many that
are do not have locked gates.
In regards to security training for employees, we need to
adequately train hundreds of thousands of transit and rail workers
across America so they are ready in the event of a terrorist threat or
attack. Properly training frontline workers is vital to surface
transportation security and is a cost-effective way to secure and
safeguard our transit and rail networks.
In the event of an incident or attack, our members are the first on
the scene--even before police, fire fighters, and emergency medical
responders--and what they do in the first few minutes is crucial to
minimizing destruction and loss of life. On the transit and passenger
rail side, workers are often called upon to evacuate passengers away
from an incident. On freight railroads, workers are needed to help
mitigate damage to facilities and equipment and alert first responders.
These employees need to know how to recognize a potential problem, what
protocols to follow for reporting and responding to potential threats,
and how to protect themselves and others from harm.
Officials from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have testified before
Congress on the need for, and the inherent value of, worker security
training. Yet too little has been done to actually ensure that
employees receive adequate security training because railroads and
transit systems are not currently required to provide adequate
training.
This committee worked diligently to address these concerns by
including comprehensive security training in the 9/11 Commission Act.
That legislation mandated that all front-line rail, transit, and over-
the-road bus employees undergo live training exercises, receive
training on evacuation procedures, and are instructed on crew and
passenger communications and coordination. Unfortunately, these
training mandates are nearly 4 years overdue. In fact, this
administration has failed to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) on these essential training issues. We believe this is
unacceptable and further delay only perpetuates the existing dangers.
In many cases security training consists of a pamphlet or a short
video. I worked as a railroad engineer on a large freight railroad for
30 years and my entire security training consisted of watching a 30-
minute video in a cubical by myself. The video was well done and it
urged me to report any suspicious activities and to be more aware of my
surroundings. However, it was not tailored to my job responsibilities
and I didn't learn any specific skills--I was simply instructed to be
more vigilant. That video, while a good tool, did not constitute
meaningful training.
In the railroad industry there are enormous amounts of operational
testing that takes place, where supervisors spy on workers hoping to
catch someone committing some petty infraction of the rules. We have
had supervisors sneak around in camouflage clothing, use unusual
vehicles and use other means to disguise their identity. Many of my co-
workers didn't report suspicious activities because they believed that
the person sneaking around was probably a supervisor.
Another concern to us is the way in which training in general has
evolved away from the classroom and into the cubical. Where we once had
discussions with instructors and co-workers, we now have hours in front
of computer screens with no opportunity to interact and ask questions.
This is tantamount to ``training on your own.'' We need legitimate
classroom training, using security professionals. While videos and
computer-based training can be supplements, they are not a meaningful
substitute for classroom training. Workers need the opportunity to ask
questions about their particular workplaces and need training that is
designed to fit their craft and work environment.
Security training should also be redundant, not be a one-time,
check-the-box exercise for employers. Workers cannot be expected to
retain and apply skills that they were exposed to only once. Regularly
scheduled follow-up training is critical to make sure workers are
effective on our Nation's front lines.
Some additional recommendations are:
The security of major rail terminals where chemicals are
stored requires increased protection whether by additional
fencing, video surveillance, security personnel, or a
combination all these tactics.
We recommend additional track inspections to verify the
integrity of the right of way as a cost-effective way in which
to protect our rail system.
We believe that the current FRA regulation on glazing
standards provides an insufficient level of protection for crew
members. Those standards require locomotive glass to withstand
the ballistic impact of a .22 caliber lead bullet of 40 grains.
This standard has been in effect for decades and is outdated.
Most firearms far exceed this level of protection. While there
are firearms that can penetrate almost any glass thickness, we
don't believe that is a legitimate reason to do nothing. If a
glazing is available that can protect operating employees from
most of the firearms available to today, then Congress should
require the installation of such glazing on locomotives.
In closing, workers must be treated as partners in the battle to
protect our vulnerable rail and public transit systems, and through
proper training they will be prepared to do so.
We appreciate this committee's efforts to push for meaningful
security initiatives. We strongly urge TSA to implement the training
mandated in the 9/11 Act to ensure front-line workers are prepared to
assist in the event of a transportation security incident.
Thank you for the opportunity to share the United Transportation
Union's views.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you for that testimony.
I thank all the witnesses.
We will start with questions now, and I will lead off.
I want to follow up on that point right there, because I
met with Chief Dunham before the hearing, and she talked about
the extensive training that her transit employees undergo.
Is it automated like that? Describe what your training is
for your transit security individuals.
Chief Dunham. Yes, sir. As we spoke earlier, we were
talking about the fact that you have to train every employee. I
think as we were talking about with the airlines, the flight
attendants, everyone, whoever is going to be the first person
there. So you have to train everyone, not just specialized
teams of people, but you have to train everybody. So we make
sure that every one of our employees is trained on any active
shooter----
Mr. Rogers. Is it just watching videos, or do they train--
--
Chief Dunham. Oh, no, no. There is live instruction. It is
a layered approach. So there is live instruction. There is
hands-on, because I think we learn from hands-on, as well. So
it is a lot of participation--a lot of participation in
whatever the training is.
So, I think it--and the good thing about it is that all the
training is grant-funded.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Risch, you talked about, all you had was a video to
watch. Do you still see that occurring in any of the
transportation modes that we are talking about here today?
Mr. Risch. Well, I only represent the bus and the rail
industry. It varies from railroad to railroad, bus company to
bus company. It is not uniform. Currently, there is nothing
requiring the length and type of training that is going on.
The Federal Railroad Administration is actually adopting
some regulations on training standards, but they only apply to
operational rules in Federal regulations. They don't apply to
security training. Through that process, we have urged more
comprehensive hands-on training.
Mr. Rogers. Well, that is why I wanted to visit that,
because my interaction with all the various transportation
sectors has led me to believe that the training is, today, more
detailed than having people watch a video. If that is
prevalent, you know, we want to know about it so we can work to
change that fact.
I want to go to Mr. Farmer.
You talked in your opening statement about the need for
better intelligence sharing, and you have told me that months
ago in a private meeting. Are you seeing any improvements? If
so, or even if not, what can we do in the reauthorization that
would facilitate better communication to and from TSA to the
rail industry?
Mr. Farmer. Sir, we are seeing improvement in at least a
willingness to discuss changes in approach.
We have presented our intelligence requirement to a number
of entities: TSA's Office of Intelligence, DHS's Office of
Infrastructure Protection. We even had a chance to participate
in a stakeholder outreach program with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
The problem is, there was a lot of nodding of heads that it
is a good idea, this focus on the preparatory aspects of
terrorist operations, but there does not seem to be a
willingness to make the necessary adjustments in priorities for
any one of those entities to take that on.
Mr. Rogers. Well, and that is what I am asking. Is there
something that you would like to see in the reauthorization
language that would set that framework so that you would have a
higher degree of confidence in this necessary back-and-forth of
information?
Mr. Farmer. I think what the authorization act could
discuss, in particular, are two areas: A rail security
strategy--let's boil this down to some fundamental priorities.
One of the best documents you can read is National Security
Decision Directive 75. It was put out by the Reagan
administration in 1983. It is now declassified. It was the
strategy that won the Cold War. It is 8 pages long.
Mr. Rogers. Uh-huh.
Mr. Farmer. Most of what you see coming from the Federal
Government is in the dozens to hundreds of pages in length. So
that is one area; let's talk about some very core, fundamental
priorities that we can measure each other against.
On the issue of information sharing, there is a lot of
volume shared but, often, it is after the fact. We are told
that on a certain date at a certain time an event happened, it
involved this type of explosive, and there were this many
casualties. What we are not getting is an analysis of, well,
what happened on the beforehand?
So, really, what we are looking for is some entity in the
Federal Government--and I think TSA is the best place to do
this, with its Office of Intelligence--to do that analysis, to
become for the Federal Government the resource for
transportation-related security intelligence.
DHS has an excellent tool; it is a diagram that shows the
various steps of the terrorism planning cycle. But what we have
never seen is someone break down an operation or a composite of
operations against that cycle. Then we can look at it and see
where opportunities for security existed that could have made a
difference.
So in terms of an authorization, setting as a priority for
preparing security professionals in railroads, in transit
agencies, in trucking, to understand the nature of the
adversary they face by knowing what we can know. These attacks
have happened. They have happened overseas. We have had
disrupted plots here. We are not drawing enough from what can
know about how this is done.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
My time is up, and I look forward to asking some more
questions in our second round.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have so many, and I am going to ask as many as I can. I
would ask you to help me with your answers so that I can ask
all of you questions based on some very, very important
testimony.
The continuing theme that I heard is we need training,
training, training, and we need access to information to help
us be able to interpret the threat that is around us. I thank
you for that, and I think that is going to be very important as
we move toward an authorization bill.
If I might ask Mr. Risch specifically, I have the privilege
of representing Houston, Texas, that has as its insignia or its
motto--insignia, let me say--is a railroad as the symbol of our
city. That means that we have rail lines through residential
neighborhoods and near schools and a lot of facilities where
people are ingressing and egressing.
Tell me, if you could create a training program for this
environment, what types of things would you focus on?
Mr. Risch. Well, certainly, you need to train people to be
vigilant and watch out for suspicious activity and a real
opportunity to report those to the right people so action can
be taken.
I think what you need is a classroom environment, where an
instructor is there, where the individual workers can interact
with the instructor and their co-workers saying, well, you
know, discuss things like there may be places where chemical
cars are parked or routinely stored, that you have to be very
diligent in those types of areas.
There would be a host of things--I think people that are
trained in security and know what to look for would be the
appropriate ones to do the training, not some----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Video.
Mr. Risch [continuing]. Railroad guy or video that really
doesn't understand the potential threats.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we need hands-on training.
Mr. Risch. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Reese, working with the pipelines
certainly is very familiar in the State of Texas. You had an
incident that just occurred in Montana. The potential for
terrorist threats against pipelines, I think, is great.
What specifically can we do to add to the securing of
pipelines, training and otherwise?
Mr. Reese. That is a great question, ma'am.
What I see going on right now with TSA is a lot like what I
have heard elsewhere: The default is a video, because it
leverages so much in such an efficient manner. I am not
necessarily opposed to video as a platform for training. I
think more importantly is knowledge transfer. So if there is
some kind of confirmation process to ensure that the instructor
is qualified and that the individuals who sat in on the
training actually understand the mission, I think video can be
incorporated in an overall training program.
What TSA chooses to do is provide video that is targeted
for both law enforcement and operators, which I think is
effective because the interests are slightly different, the
needs for information are slightly different, but they both
need to have training.
I also see more in-depth training being offered that would
be, by default, reserved for the Government, the public side of
the house, but that is extended to the private side based on
positions and so forth inside companies, where there are
security experts and so forth. That is helpful. There are also
forums and the clearance process that allows people in industry
to have access to classified information on a need-to-know
basis.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Maybe I will come back to you, because I
wanted to focus on what you can do to secure your pipelines.
But let me quickly ask--and I appreciate that answer.
Let me quickly ask the chief, Mr. Rojas, and Mr. Farmer:
Chief, what would happen to you with the underfunding of
the Transportation Security Grant Program?
Mr. Rojas, could you re-emphasize the importance of
streamlining TWIC, making it the single security document, in
helping us with security?
Mr. Farmer, can you tell us how we can harmonize TSA's rail
security standards and expectations with the issues and
concerns you have with the American Railroad Association?
Let me go to the chief first, please. Thank you.
Chief Dunham. Yes, ma'am, thank you. That is a great
question.
In the State of Georgia, we are one of the only transit
agencies to not really receive any grant funding--or, any kind
of subsidies from the State of Georgia. So grant funding is the
only thing that we have in order to target harden our system.
So, without that funding, you know, we would be left
susceptible to any kind of terrorist threats.
So it is very important for us, and that is why we really
need to continue this program and get more allocations. Because
we are considered a Tier 1 agency, which means that, you know,
a terrorist attack is likely to occur in our city. So we
definitely would need that funding.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We thank you.
Mr. Rojas.
Mr. Rojas. Thank you. We believe----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Microphone.
Mr. Rojas. Sorry.
We believe the TWIC credential can certainly function as an
excellent both security threat assessment and an access
credential for multiple facilities. As I explained in my
comments, the issue is that we enter so many different types of
facilities, from maritime to rail yards. As Mr. Reese explained
in his comments--and that was not purposely done so--was the
fact that there are so many areas that we have to gain access
to, that if each one of these different facilities required a
separate credential and a separate access card per se and a
separate background check potentially, we would find ourselves
wearing too many credentials and having to undergo too many
background checks.
So I think we can arrive at a point where we have a single
process and a single system. We recognize that we have to make
the credentialing process better, and I think TSA is aware of
that, too. So we are very supportive of the TWIC concept.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Farmer, quickly on my question. Thank
you.
Mr. Farmer. Yes, ma'am.
The challenge that the railroads face, because they operate
across many States, and particularly the Class I railroads and
Amtrak, is that, because the TSA surface inspectors are
supervised locally, the priorities they pursue, the
interpretations of the regulations that they bring to bear, can
vary significantly from place to place.
So we have had situations where railroads are taking
actions that are seen as compliant by some TSA officers in the
field and yet are treated as violations by others. We believe
some form of oversight from the headquarters level or through
these regional security inspectors that I referenced would be a
way to overcome that problem.
I will give you a very practical example of what happens.
The last statistic I heard, at a meeting we had with TSA in
March in Fort Worth, was that the agency had issued 17 letters
of investigation alleging potential violations of TSA security
regulations. Seven of those had to be withdrawn by TSA
headquarters because they simply did not state a meritorious
case. Yet when those letters show up at the railroad, they are
talking about fines measured at $10,000 per violation. Of the
remaining 10, none actually alleged any sort of noncompliance
with a substantive security issue at hand. They were alleging
errors in documentation.
The concern, again, is that, when these standards vary, you
have a situation where 40 percent of the letters of
investigation sent to railroads are kicked out because they are
simply not meritorious. Better coordination between the
headquarters, where the inspectors are following the
headquarters' priorities, can bring that consistency, so a
railroad, Class I freight railroad, Amtrak, can rely upon a
similar interpretation of a rule wherever it operates.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, on his point, I just can't imagine not having
consistent inspectors--which my legislation, H.R. 19, tries to
address--well-trained Federal inspectors that are consistent
all over America when they inspect these railroads.
Let me thank the witnesses.
Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognize the gentleman from Minnesota,
Mr. Cravaack, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thank you very much for being here today.
A real quick question. I understand that, from 2008 to
2011, we have gone from 175 inspectors to 380 inspectors.
In your opinion, Mr. Farmer, do you think that that has
increased the security of your system while, at the same time,
maybe the inconsistencies you were just speaking of are because
of the rapid deployment of the security force? What is your
opinion?
Mr. Farmer. The rapid increase of the force--and I think
now it is actually over 400, is the most recent statistic that
I heard. The rapid increase of the force has caused a departure
from what was the fundamental premise of the hiring of those
inspectors at the outset of the program back in 2005-2006.
There was very much then a focus on hiring people with a rail
background, a transit background. One of the concerns now is
that they are not getting those people into these positions.
They don't have extensive rail or transit experience. They are
not bringing to bear a familiarity with the environment.
That does create safety concerns, since, often, railroads
are the entities that are orienting the inspectors to the
dangers in the environment. But, more importantly, the lack of
familiarity with rail generally does create a situation where
these sorts of inconsistencies become more likely, especially
if there seems to be a disconnect, often, between what
priorities are set at the headquarters and what gets executed
in the field.
Mr. Cravaack. Mr. Rojas, do you feel the same way?
Mr. Rojas. The issue for us has to do with, obviously, we
have a much larger population of trucking companies out in the
field, with about 600,000 trucking companies registered with
the U.S. Department of Transportation for interstate commerce
and another 500,000 registered for intrastate commerce.
So we need to have some level of harmonization in that
area. I think it would be important, because we have had some
issues where inspectors have come up, some of the VIPR teams
actually, we have had some issues with VIPR teams asking truck
drivers if they actually have a TWIC, for example, and for no
specific reason. They might not be near a port.
So we have some issues in this area, and we certainly, you
know, look forward to working with TSA and the committee on
this issue.
Mr. Cravaack. So you probably think that training of the
inspectors themselves is the issue?
Mr. Rojas. Well, the problem is that we deal with a lot of
different law enforcement agencies. If you think about it, the
commercial vehicle inspectors are State troopers. We obviously
deal with different--on the highways, we deal with a number of
different law enforcement agencies. I think there is a concern
by the drivers sometimes, in dealing with too many law
enforcement people, you know, there is a sense that it is a bit
overwhelming for the drivers in how many law enforcement
agencies we have to deal with.
So, all of a sudden, they have one more inspector asking
them for yet another credential or another training component
or something like that. It gets a little overwhelming for the
truck drivers.
Mr. Cravaack. While they are trying to get their freight
delivered on time.
Mr. Rojas. That is correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Chief Dunham, could you expound, ma'am?
Chief Dunham. Yes, sir. Thank you.
One thing to keep in mind is that the increase in security
inspectors does not mean more security. I think people get
confused by that. They are kind of an oversight. Sometimes it
is a little bit much for them to come in, like Mr. Rojas said,
yet another inspector to come in. I need more boots on the
ground. I need more people in the field.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Reese, would you care to comment, sir.
Mr. Reese. I would echo Mr. Rojas' comments concerning
harmonization. I don't know that it is as much a training issue
as it is a standardization issue. If the collective inspectors
interpret their regs the same way, approach the work the same
way, then you get a more consistent application of the
inspection process. I will hold it there.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Farmer, I am very fortunate to have International
Falls, Minnesota, in part of my district, which is a big rail
point for border security.
Can you tell me a little bit about the TSA's rail security
inspection activities at points such as that, which has a lot
of rail go through it? I was wondering if you could expound
upon that a little bit?
Mr. Farmer. Well, I think, sir, in areas like that, you
would have inspections from the two DHS components, the TSA
surface inspectors, looking to any issues involving the various
action items they oversee or regulations, particularly
pertaining to transport of hazardous material. Obviously, you
also have potential interest from Customs and Border Protection
looking at issues there as commerce goes back and forth across
the border.
The railroads spend an awful lot of time and effort in
cooperation with both CBP and TSA in this area. In particular,
with Customs and Border Protection, there are joint working
groups that focus specifically on enhancing cross-border
security. Some of our railroads actually operate across border,
and particularly on the northern border, Canadian National and
Canadian Pacific.
Each of those railroads has their own rail police
departments. When the traffic crosses the border, when it goes
through the Customs and Border Protection checkpoint, there is
a screening system that evaluates those cars to look for any
indications of contraband.
So it is a good collective and extensive effort where
significant attention is paid both by the rail industry and the
Government to try to mitigate and minimize the use of a train
as a means to get something illicit into the country.
Mr. Cravaack. I have been up there to see those teams. They
are great teams up there.
With that, sir, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Clarke, for any--all right. Well, then we will go back to
the Chairman.
One of the things that I wanted to visit--and I have talked
with most of you about this privately--is, do you see any rules
and regulations that are still hanging out there that really
need to be pruned back that are no longer relevant or
applicable or are duplicitous?
Let's start with Mr. Rojas on that.
Mr. Rojas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the Obama administration actually issued an
Executive Order, 13563, in relation to this very issue of
overlapping regulations, and we certainly submitted comments.
Obviously, for us, the major one, the first one is the
credentialing, as you well know.
Some of the other issues that we have been dealing with
relate to some of the validation process of some of the audits
or visits that multiple agencies do sometimes. I know TSA has
been developing a corporate security review. At the same time,
the U.S. Department of Transportation has been doing security
compliance reviews. It just seems to us that there should be an
ability to coordinate and communicate a little closely as to
what the results of each are so we don't get multiple visits
per se.
At the same time, many of our carriers are also members of
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, and they have
undergone validations for C-TPATs. So the number of programs
out there is certainly a concern to our industry, in that
sense.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Farmer.
Mr. Farmer. In the area of security, one of the challenges
that you run into is overlap, at times, between regulations
maintained by the Department of Transportation and then those
subsequently put in place by TSA--or, to be put in place by
TSA. There was reference earlier to the rulemakings under the
9/11 Act for training, and there is also one that pertains to
security plans.
Specifically with TSA, the predominant regulation that has
an effect on the railroads is 49 CFR part 1580. It focuses on
reporting of security concerns, appointment of a security
coordinator, and, in particular for freight railroads, specific
requirements that pertain to the transport of toxic inhalation
hazardous materials.
We do believe that those regulations, now in effect for a
couple of years--the process to develop them started 5-plus
years ago--that there is an opportunity to look at some of the
specific processes under those rules to determine whether they
are necessary at this point.
In the area of training, the railroads are meeting already-
existing Department of Transportation requirements to emergency
preparedness training. As TSA looks to regulate in that area,
it is very important that you harmonize that or that one agency
takes the field so that you have one set of requirements that
pertain.
As Mr. Rojas has pointed out, DHS has acted upon the
Executive Order calling for a review. One concern we have,
though, is, the document that was accomplished in the Federal
Register seemed to indicate the focus of that review would be
only on rules that were 5 years old or more. With DHS, it has
not been in existence that long. Particularly in the area of
surface transportation, essentially any regulation that is put
out has come out within the past 5 years. So, in a sense, they
have taken that off the table.
We would hope that the Department would take a broader look
at that action on the President's Executive Order, look at
regulations as they exist, and also look at ones that have been
legislatively mandated for their necessity at this point.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
This will be for Mr. Farmer and Chief Dunham. Currently,
TSA has separate offices for freight, rail, and mass transit.
Do you support this structure or not?
Chief Dunham.
Chief Dunham. I do. I do support it, because we do totally
different things, and our challenges are totally different. So
I do support having two different structures for----
Mr. Rogers. How about you, Mr. Farmer?
Mr. Farmer. Sir, I think a split between freight rail and
mass transit is sound. We can run into difficulties in
coordination, however, with passenger railroads.
Often, freight and passenger railroads operate on the same
infrastructure. So it is important there is a common awareness
within Government of what the railroads are doing collectively
for security. Often, because they are on the same routes,
freight railroads are doing things that benefit passenger rail
security and vice versa. Some of the investments, particularly
through the grant programs that this committee has been so
instrumental in making happen, have benefits that accrue to
freight railroads when passenger railroads are recipients.
In the AAR, we have actually formed a joint committee, a
freight and passenger coordinating committee, specifically to
ensure that, from a security perspective, as well as operations
and safety, freight and passenger rails are working well in
concert together.
We would just ask that when TSA considers matters
pertaining to rail that they look at it from that integrated
approach, that these are not separate channels, that there is
many common synergies that can be gained in passenger and
freight rail security.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
My last question is for Chief Dunham.
Your system is literally a leading system on the security
front. It is just very impressive. You know, I feel strongly
about your closed-circuit cameras and how far you have come
with those and plan to go and, of course, canines, which is my
pet issue.
But I would like for you to speak briefly on how the VIPR
teams fit into your operations.
Chief Dunham. We are very fortunate in Atlanta to have a
really good working relationship with our VIPR team with the
FAM, under the Federal Air Marshals program. The VIPR teams are
a great resource for us, because when you don't have extra
resources, you can call the VIPR teams in. They are acclimated
to the rail environment, and so they come in, especially for
special events, large-scale events, they come in, and they
blend in to our environment.
So there are an extra resource, an added resource for us.
So we have been really fortunate and have a great working
relationship with the VIPR teams.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
That is all I have. The Ranking Member is recognized for 5
minutes if she has any additional questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much.
Mr. Farmer, you have raised some very important issues on
how we can make our inspectors really focus in on the work that
would secure the railroads. So I raise with you a question of
your support for the establishment of a surface inspector
office at TSA which would improve oversight and training and
would give greater attention to surface programs. The provision
is in H.R. 1900.
Mr. Farmer. Interestingly enough, I actually worked at TSA
when the program started. At its outset, it was very much
coordinated from the headquarters level, which did enable some
substantial progress in some key areas to take place: In
particular, the arrangements between the railroads and transit
agencies on security action items that each agree to, and then
the transit and rail communities agreed to have inspectors come
in and evaluate those.
In both areas, in freight rail and in mass transit and
passenger rail, a substantial value accrued from that
coordinated effort driven by well-defined priorities: Assessing
action items and producing reports that proved valuable to TSA
in developing its programs and certainly proved valuable to
railroads, passenger and freight, in looking at how well they
were doing and seeing where opportunities for improvement may
exist.
The regional security inspectors that I referenced earlier
were actually specifically appointed to achieve the purpose
that you have referenced, to bring that oversight, to bring
that consistency. In fact, the letters that appoint them are
very expressive in how the railroads should be willing and able
and, certainly, frequently take advantage of this position.
But, unfortunately, it seems that in the actual implementation
of those inspectors, the original inspectors have not been able
to do the job in the way that the letters indicated they would.
They are not even, actually, in the organizational structure
for the inspectors in the field.
So some approach that brings back a marrying of the
priorities that the field inspectors have with the policies and
priorities that are being set by TSA headquarters. Often, that
is a concerted effort between the modal divisions, like the
freight rail division, mass transit division, with the
representatives of the industry--railroad officials, transit
officials, people in my position.
So, whatever approach can get us back to that marrying of
priorities between the headquarters and the activities in the
field is one that I think would be beneficial across the board.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The intent of the surface inspector office
would be just that, and also to focus on the security side of
an inspection, things that would prevent harm from coming to
the railroad processes and their business. Certainly, I think
it is important to look at paperwork, but I think our resources
on the Transportation Security Administration should be focused
on what is there that is threatening that facility.
Would you agree to that?
Mr. Farmer. Absolutely, ma'am. I think the focus should be
on the substance of what is taking place in security in the
railroad. It is a very positive story of extensive effort on
the freight side and the passenger side to put in place
procedures to make that happen.
Documents are important, but when an inspector knows, as in
many of those cases I referenced, when an inspector actually
knows that the appropriate chain of custody and secure handoff
occurred with that tank car and yet makes an issue, a
significant issue, of an error in documentation, that is a
distraction. That is taking us away from those fundamental
priorities that should be driving our program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We want to make sure we comply with
regulations, but I understand what you are saying. We need to
find a way to ramp up one aspect and make sure we are complying
with the second aspect, which is paperwork and who transferred
it, but find a way to handle that in a manner that doesn't
interfere in the real serious work of securing that area. Thank
you for that.
Mr. Reese, let me pursue the questions on pipelines. We
know that pipeline systems are highly automated, and,
therefore, we are hoping that there is technology of the most
sophisticated kind that is now being used. So I would
appreciate you speaking to the latest security technologies
that may be used on pipelines and what discussions, if you have
had any, with the Department of Homeland Security regarding
dealing with improved pipeline security.
I raise the issue of the incident in Montana, which was not
a purposeful act, it was not an act by a terrorist, but our
pipeline system is vulnerable. What can we do, what are you
doing, what is happening with the security technology for
pipelines?
Mr. Reese. Yes, ma'am. First, the overarching challenge
with pipelines is they are so geographically diverse, there is
so much asset to protect. What it necessitates from the
beginning is prioritizing those facilities that are most
critical to you. TSA does have a pretty prescriptive process by
which operators are to determine. But, ultimately, the operator
knows, or should know, what is most at risk and so forth. So it
begins with prioritizing those things. Their CCTV systems and
the like can be applied effectively. Across miles and miles of
pipeline, it is very difficult.
There are some things working in our favor. For instance,
because of the DOT and EPA requirements about monitoring rights
of way, we do have--in our case, at Colonial, we have aircraft
that fly continuously. Those folks are well aware of the
security implications, and they know to report abnormalities
and so forth.
We still consider our greatest risk to be a third party
with a big piece of yellow iron, you know, digging a water well
or some kind of trenching that is outside of our company.
Basically, a third-party line strike is our greatest risk. But
it has the added effect of monitoring for surreptitious
activity, or if someone was out there to do us harm, it was
detected.
Beyond that, it is a lot of emphasis being placed on the
operators to understand what to look for and what to report,
suspicious activities. We do reach out to our local law
enforcement committees and invite them to our facilities. We
get together and look at the facilities and talk, so that those
folks have it in their mind what we are, what we are worried
about, what we are not worried about, and are able to respond.
It is a grassroots, knit-together awareness campaign across the
system. We even involve the general public and landowners in
that effort.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I know your challenge is vast. I
know pipelines are where we wouldn't even imagine that they
are.
Mr. Reese. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think, in working with the Chairman, I
would like to suggest that this is an important issue for this
committee, and working with our stakeholders, that we need to
focus on ways that we can ensure the highest level security for
this infrastructure that is everywhere.
Let me do a final quick question to the chief.
You made an interesting point, and it was really unique,
that you do not get funding from the State of Georgia. So you
are dependent on resources, I assume, that you might secure
through the fee process, but very dependent on Federal
resources. I am reminded, even though it was a strange set of
facts, of the Olympics and the incident that occurred there. I
know that you all were heavily rail--had initiated or boosted
your rail because of the Olympics.
So tell me, if DHS funding was zeroed out--we mentioned the
transportation security grants, but I know have you access to
others; I think you mentioned UASI grants--how devastating that
would be on a large metropolitan area like yours.
Chief Dunham. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
We are in a unique situation, as I stated, that the State
of Georgia does not fund transit. So every day is a challenge
for operating budget. So you can imagine that when you start
asking for target hardening, things, extra CCTV cameras, or
intrusion detection for our rail fence line, you know, you have
to get in line. So, you know, other things take priority.
So we always have to be conscious of the fact that, if we
don't have grant funding for certain items, we don't get them.
So if we would not receive any more grant funding----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Federal funding.
Chief Dunham [continuing]. Federal funding, then we would
be in trouble. I mean, our system would be left vulnerable for
attacks. Of course we would do as much as we could, but, of
course, we can do so much more with the Federal funding that we
need to receive every day.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Just to follow up on the Ranking Member's
question, what percentage of your security funding does come
from these Federal sources?
Chief Dunham. Oh, we have--75 percent of our funding for
target hardening comes from grant funding.
Of course, we talked about UASI. We get very little from
UASI because they know that we get a lot more from the
Department of Homeland Security, and so they go to other
agencies first.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota
from any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Cravaack. I will try to make it real quick, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you.
Just real quick, after 9/11 unfortunately we have now all
been incorporated in part of our National security system. All
of us have a due diligence to ensure the homeland security.
With that said, I was kind of wondering, in regards to the
different modals here, the ``See Something, Say Something''
campaign, have you seen that to be fruitful for us?
Could you start off, Mr. Farmer?
Mr. Farmer. Yes, sir, that campaign has been effective in a
number of modes of transportation, in particular passenger
rail. Amtrak has a very proactive program. A number of commuter
railroads around the country promote ``See Something, Say
Something.''
It is actually a program that started with the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. It has been widely laid
out across the country. Last year, DHS adopted it essentially
as a Nation-wide program and has introduced it in many critical
infrastructure sectors.
So we see it as a very effective means by which the
public--which is quite familiar with what goes on in a train as
they use it each day because of the time they spend on it--a
means for them to understand how to report security concerns.
The freight railroads have programs, as well, that entail
reaching out to those who live near their operations or have
interest in their operations and can become additional eyes and
ears for security, as well.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rojas.
Mr. Rojas. I would subscribe to your statement that
National security is embedded in everybody's psyche, and I
would say that everybody is much more alert now as we look out.
We had an incident back in February in the Ranking Member's
State, in Lovett, Texas, where a student was actually--a Saudi
student was actually arrested after trying to procure some
material to develop a bomb. The reason why the student was
actually arrested was because an employee of the carrier
company noticed that the elements--that the cargo was suspect.
He did some research on the person and decided to call. They
called in his security team within the company, and they called
law enforcement. At the same time, the chemical company also
called in the FBI.
So I think there is this level of alertness that is out
there that--that is part of that information-sharing component
that we are talking about. It goes both ways. It is very
important to ensure that that critical information sharing and
that component of, how can we communicate with law enforcement
to ensure that what we see--if we see something suspicious,
that we are able to call it in?
So I think I would agree, I think it is embedded into
everybody's psyche now.
Thank you.
Mr. Cravaack. Good to know. Thank you, sir.
Chief Dunham.
Chief Dunham. Yes, sir. ``See Something, Say Something''
has become a way of life. It is not just a program. You have to
embed it into your everyday operation. So, ``See Something, Say
Something'' is valuable.
One thing we did learn from 9/11 is that we can't do it
alone. Even the amount of officers, we can't do it alone. So we
need our customers to be our eyes and ears and to help us. So
this is something that we can ask them to help us.
We have a very aggressive ``See Something, Say Something''
program. But not only that, we have a ``Not On My Shift''
program for our employees. So they help us, as well, because
the employees are your first line of defense, and so they tell
us what is going on.
So we are very pleased with our ``See Something, Say
Something'' campaign. Tougaloo University just came down last
month to actually take a look at our program because it is one
of the cutting-edge programs for ``See Something, Say
Something.''
Mr. Cravaack. Thanks, Chief. You kind of sparked a memory
of when I was in Navy, ``Not On My Watch.''
Chief Dunham. Yes, that is right.
Mr. Cravaack. Got it. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reese, how about in the pipeline industry?
Mr. Reese. You know, most definitely applicable.
You know, pipeline plans are typically threat-based. So
there is a baseline of security measures, and then there are
additional measures that would be evoked based on threat.
However that threat information is obtained, whether it is
provided by the Government or whether it is a concerned citizen
or it is an employee who is alert and aware, that information
is valuable, and it ought to trigger.
In fact, I would suggest it is the cornerstone of any good,
effective pipeline security plan. ``See Something, Say
Something'' is an excellent tenet of security in general.
Mr. Cravaack. Good to know. Good information. Thank you for
that.
Mr. Chairman, due to the time, I will yield back, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, could I just----
Mr. Rogers. Go ahead. The Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I can't miss this opportunity. I want to
thank Chief Dunham for now publicly announcing a new National
effort--``Not On My Shift''--the Chairman and I have just made
an agreement, ``not on our time on this committee''----
Mr. Rogers. That is right. Not on our shift.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. That anything is going to
happen to the Nation's transportation systems. We just put a
heavy burden on ourselves. So let's see how fast and furious--
``Not On My Shift.'' I am going to take it to Houston, Texas.
That is a great one.
Mr. Rogers. It is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
Thank all the witnesses for your time and preparation. It
has been very helpful.
We have another panel; otherwise, I would keep asking
questions. But I would remind all the witnesses that Members
may have additional questions. The whole purpose of this
hearing is to lay on the record some facts that we then can
draw upon to justify changes in the authorization bill. So I
know I have some additional questions, and other Members may. I
would ask that when those are submitted to you, within 10 days
you try to get us back a written response to those.
With that, thank you. This panel is dismissed, and we call
up the second panel.
The Chairman now recognizes the second panel. We are
pleased to have with us several distinguished witnesses before
us today on this important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire statements
will be appearing in the record.
Our first witness is Mr. Nicholas Calio.
How did I pronounce that? I am sure I butchered it.
He is president and chief executive officer of the Air
Transport Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Calio for his opening
testimony.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS E. CALIO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.
Mr. Calio. Thank you.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here
today.
As the committee undertakes reauthorizing TSA, I think it
might be helpful to set a little perspective by recalling why
TSA was created to begin with: To protect the United States,
its citizens, our economy, and our way of life from terrorist
attacks.
The reason I mention this is because, as I travel around in
airports, I often observe travelers or passengers who, with the
passage of time, don't seem to understand why the screening
process is necessary. It is. Can it be better? Yes. ATA is
working with TSA to try to improve it.
Effective, efficient security is vital to the United States
airline industry in fulfilling our central role in propelling
commerce and economic vitality and global competitiveness of
the United States. Terrorist attacks either on or through
airlines underscore a simple fact: Aviation security is a core
homeland security function.
Our airlines appreciate the collaborative relationship we
have with TSA and their willingness to partner with us, which
has greatly improved the regulatory process and, we believe,
aviation security.
ATA supports the risk-based approach to security for
passengers, cargo, and crew that Administrator Pistole has
endorsed. Allowing TSA to focus its finite resources on that
which creates the greatest risk is both good policy and good
security. In conjunction with TSA's long-standing strategy of
multilayered countermeasures and the incorporation of random
measures, this approach allows the agency to further
concentrate resources on high-risk passengers and cargo.
Targeted security includes differentiating individuals and
shippers whose backgrounds are known.
The Air Transport Association, along with the Airline
Pilots Association and TSA, has developed a known-crew-member
program, which will begin a 90-day pilot program next month at
seven major airports. ATA has advocated and discussed with TSA
having flight attendants included in that program as soon as
possible.
Moving crew out of the regular security line also has a
secondary benefit: It speeds up the entire process, which is
something that we all, I think, recognize that we need to do.
Passengers could also benefit from a known-traveler program.
ATA strongly endorses TSA's intention of introducing such a
program. In our view, the sooner, the better.
Finally, we support a similar program for cargo. We are
working with TSA and Customs and Border Protection toward
further risk-based screening of international in-bound air
cargo. The goal is for TSA and CBP to receive and process
information about shippers earlier in the process so they can
do it more effectively and without stopping the flow of goods.
Everything we are discussing here today is about the safe
and secure transportation of the people and goods that make
America what it is today, connecting small and large
communities and connecting America to the global economy.
Today, U.S. airlines and their passengers continue to bear the
burden of funding a system that benefits the entire Nation.
Those who seek to harm our country by targeting commercial
aircraft are attacking the entire U.S. population and our way
of life, not just the airlines.
Yet, in 2010, passengers and airlines paid DHS $3.4 billion
in taxes and fees, $2 billion of which went to TSA. This is a
50 percent increase over what was collected in 2002. It is an
enormous contribution from a single segment of the private
sector. No other industry or mode of transportation, including
anyone on the previous panel, is required to fund their own
security, only the airline industry and its passengers. This
really has got to change.
In conclusion, the Air Transport Association will continue
to work with TSA to evolve our practices to ensure that we have
the best possible security so that U.S. airlines can continue
to move goods and people to the benefit of our Nation's economy
and our global competitiveness. We look forward to working with
you and with TSA to reinforce these mutual goals.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Calio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicholas E. Calio
June 12, 2011
INTRODUCTION
As the committee undertakes reauthorizing the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), some perspective is in order by
recalling why TSA was created . . . to protect the United States, its
citizens, and our economy and way of life from terrorist attacks. I say
that because I often observe travelers at airports who, with the
passage of time, seem to have forgotten why the screening process in
necessary.
A secure aviation system benefits all Americans. Effective,
efficient security is vital to a robust and financially sound U.S.
airline industry, an industry that propels more than 5 percent of our
Nation's Gross Domestic Product. The airline industry's central role in
commerce and the economy, and the terrorist strategy to attack America
by attacking airlines, underscores a simple fact: Aviation security is
a core homeland security function.
At the outset, I would like to state that the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA) appreciates the collaborative relationship
that we have with TSA. We understand that TSA is the regulator and that
airlines are the regulated parties, but TSA's willingness to work
cooperatively--to the point of partnership--has greatly improved the
regulatory process and ultimately, aviation security.
ATA's priorities in this reauthorization bill include enabling a
risk-based, intelligence-driven approach to aviation security that:
enhances security overall;
streamlines the passenger screening process, and;
expedites the movement of goods within the United States and
across international borders.
We want to continue to work closely with Congress and the TSA to
ensure implementation of the best possible policies to promote commerce
and travel while ensuring a secure aviation system.
ATA members understand that security measures are a necessary
factor in keeping Americans safe from another terrorist attack. The
Christmas day plot in 2009 and the October 2010 cargo plot highlight
the fact that aviation is still a terrorist target. However, experience
has demonstrated that increased security and facilitation of travel and
cargo are not mutually exclusive. Smart investments and policies can
make aviation security more effective and efficient and, in turn,
enhance travel and trade, thereby benefiting the traveling and shipping
public and our economy.
That, in turn, will improve the economic outlook of the U.S.
airline industry and realize the potential it holds for job creation.
This subcommittee can do its part in achieving that outcome by not
imposing new or increased security-related taxes and fees. Commercial
aviation is a cornerstone of the U.S. economy. It drives approximately
$1.2 trillion in annual economic activity in the United States, roughly
5.2 percent of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Airlines are
responsible for 10.9 million U.S. jobs and $371 billion in personal
earnings. Every $1 million of commercial aviation activity generates
24.6 jobs. Every 100 airline jobs help support some 388 jobs outside of
the airline industry.
Airlines in 2010 enplaned more than 720 million passengers and
operated more than 10 million flights. Exports by air in 2009 topped
$334 billion in value.
ENABLING A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO AVIATION SECURITY
A risk-based approach to aviation security is grounded in solid
intelligence and information sharing among Government and industry
stakeholders. It proceeds from an examination of the sources, nature,
and capabilities of potential threats, and the nature and extent of the
security systems and measures in place to defeat such threats. This
approach embraces disciplined analysis and recognizes the value it
brings to directing the intensity and allocation of security resources
where they are most appropriate. It inherently recognizes that ``one
size fits all'' security is inefficient and fails to direct finite
security resources appropriately.
Risk-based analysis is a widely accepted approach. The 9/11
Commission, for example, advocated thorough, risk-based analysis in
evaluating aviation-security issues. In its final report, the
Commission stated:
``The U.S. Government should identify and evaluate the transportation
assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for
defending them, [and] select the most practical and cost-effective ways
of doing so . . .'' Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, at 391 (2004).
Administrator Pistole's strong endorsement of a risk-based based
approach to aviation security in his June 2 testimony before this
subcommittee is gratifying. We support his efforts to lead the TSA to
develop and employ a more targeted, truly risk-based strategy. This
approach, in conjunction with the multi-layered strategy already in
place and the incorporation of random measures, will allow TSA to focus
its resources on higher-risk passengers and cargo and strengthen the
overall level of security while easing the burden of checkpoint
security on the vast majority of passengers and focusing cargo-
screening resources on shipments that may pose a higher-risk level.
Increased sharing of actionable intelligence information among
Government and industry goes hand-in-hand with a risk-based security
system. Such collaboration produces smarter security and improves the
performance of all parties. ATA's partnership with TSA must extend at
least to this degree of cooperation and confidence, and we are pleased
that our working relationship with TSA continues to grow in this
direction.
SPECIFIC RISK-BASED PROGRAMS THAT SUPPORT SMARTER SECURITY
A. Known Traveler Program.--Administrator Pistole has not only
embraced a risk-based conceptual approach to aviation security, he has
identified a specific goal of risk-based passenger screening which will
allow the TSA to focus limited resources on higher-risk passengers. We
commend him for pursuing this concept in order to shrink the
``unknown'' category of passengers.
Under a Known Traveler Program, passengers would volunteer
information about themselves, enabling TSA to create an alternative
type of screening for these passengers, which ultimately will reduce
the screening lines for everyone. This program should not simply allow
certain passengers to go to the front of the line as previous programs
have. Rather, TSA should use current databases of information such as
Advanced Passenger Information Systems, Global Entry and Secure Flight,
as well as other factors, to actually create a different, expedited
screening regime for these travelers. As noted above, screening
everyone equally squanders limited resources and detracts from focusing
on travelers who may present real risks.
B. Known Crewmember Program.--Smarter security includes recognizing
individuals who are in positions of trust, whose backgrounds are known
and who can be subjected to a different level of security. For example,
pilots fly the planes and many are Flight Deck Officers qualified to
carry handguns in the cockpit.
Several different systems have been tested and ATA is currently
working with TSA and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) to conduct
a 90-day test program at Miami, Phoenix, Minneapolis, Seattle, and
Chicago airports. This program is based on the current Cockpit Access
Security System (CASS) which enables a pilot of one airline to fly in
the jumpseat of another airline. This is an historical industry
practice that is safely and securely maintained with the help of the
CASS system. Under the CASS system, TSA personnel use a pilot's photo
identification to verify his/her identity and employment status by
checking it against a secure database. The Known Crewmember Program
would first move this concept to the security-screening checkpoint to
allow pilots to go through an expedited screening. ATA supports
expanding the program to include flight attendants once the pilot
program proves successful. Eventually, the program will move toward
biometric verification. ATA is working with TSA and pilots to test this
program and we look forward to the TSA evaluation at the test's
conclusion.
C. Known Shipper/Shipment Programs.--The passenger airlines have
met the
9/11 Commission Recommendations Act requirement to screen 100 percent
of air cargo departing U.S. airports. We achieved this with significant
support from the TSA Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCS) which
allowed validated air cargo supply-chain participants to prescreen
cargo before delivery to the airline dock. In addition, TSA has made
good progress in meeting the screening requirement for international
in-bound cargo, but dealing with foreign governments/entities creates a
unique set of challenges.
Administrator Pistole's work on complex cargo-security issues has
been crucial and we commend him for it. In the wake of the October 2010
Yemen cargo bomb plot, TSA has been working closely with cargo carriers
to focus on the highest risk cargo--unknown shipments or cargo coming
from unknown shippers. Screening cargo piece by piece would shut down
the global supply chain so TSA is working with industry and with
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to receive advance information on
packages delivered from high-risk areas. TSA recognizes, and we agree,
that to preserve the efficient flow of goods, cargo-security
enhancements should take place further up the supply chain--it cannot
all be done at the airline level without significant disruption and
economic harm.
Known Shipper/Shipment Programs leverage DHS information programs
and carrier and shipper information to expedite the clearance of
shipments that meet certain requirements. ATA supports on-going
initiatives to test aspects of such a program and provide valuable
information about how to construct an international system that meets
commerce and trade needs while efficiently protecting against security
risks.
Finally, ATA strongly supports increased use of canine teams as one
of the most effective and efficient methods of screening cargo. These
teams can be easily deployed and are quick at finding dangerous
materials. They may be ``low tech,'' but they are highly effective and
efficient. TSA should accelerate implementation of a certification
program that enables private canine-screening companies to conduct air
screening that meets TSA standards. International canine standards and
private-sector options could be leveraged to achieve a higher level of
air cargo security on U.S.-bound flights.
DEPLOYING EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND PERSONNEL
Given the number of passengers and the volume of cargo that
airlines transport, technology is an indispensable element in effective
and efficient screening. Such technology must perform its screening
function in a way that does not disrupt that carriage by air. Our
concern is not parochial: Our economy is dependent upon the speed and
efficiency of air transportation.
In late 2010, DHS announced more extensive deployment of Advanced
Imaging Technology screening equipment. According to DHS, there are 486
AIT machines deployed at 78 airports. The President's fiscal year 2012
budget request indicates that the administration plans to continue
their deployment and asks for funding for 1,500 scanners and 535
associated personnel. We encourage the deployment of effective and
necessary technology and particularly the Automated Target Recognition
software for the body-imaging machines that will only display a
person's body outline while identifying an area that needs to be
resolved.
ATA also recognizes that workforce considerations are an important
element in the security equation and appreciates the unflagging
dedication of TSA employees. They are key to civil aviation security in
our country. TSA employees have recently voted to bargain collectively.
We believe that TSA needs maximum flexibility to respond to threats and
that Congress must ensure that any bargaining agreement does not
interfere with TSA's ability to perform effectively and nimbly.
COSTS TO PASSENGERS AND THE INDUSTRY SHOULD BE LIMITED
Despite that fact that aviation security is a National security
function, airlines and passengers continue to bear the brunt of funding
a system that benefits the entire Nation. In 2010, passengers and air
carriers paid $3.4 billion to DHS in taxes and fees. This is an
enormous contribution from one segment of the private sector for what
is a National responsibility. It makes air travel far more expensive
for the consumer and is a substantial financial drag on U.S. airlines.
In this respect, ATA strongly opposes any increase in the aviation
passenger security fee. U.S. airlines and their passengers contributed
$2 billion in taxes and fees to TSA in 2010--a 50 percent increase from
the amount collected in 2002. The industry's Federal tax burden on a
typical $300 domestic round-trip ticket has nearly tripled since 1972--
from $22 to $63. Aviation security taxes and fees now constitute almost
25 percent of the industry's Federal tax burden.
To put this into perspective, the U.S. airline industry's total
profit last year was $3.7 billion, just one of three profitable years
over the last decade in which U.S. airlines lost $55 billion and shed
nearly 160,000 jobs. Due primarily to escalating jet-fuel costs, U.S.
airlines lost nearly $1 billion in the first quarter of 2011. Further
increasing our tax burden will further undermine the industry's
financial health, thereby undermining the overall economic recovery.
Aviation security costs should be borne by the Federal Government.
Basic fairness dictates that. Those seeking to harm our country
utilizing commercial aircraft are attacking the entire U.S. population
and our way of life--airlines are the surrogate, not the ultimate goal
of those attacks.
the u.s. government should harmonize international security protocols
International harmonization is critical and the U.S. airline
industry fully supports the DHS effort to achieve harmonization through
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), something that
both Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Pistole have vigorously
pursued. However, since there are so many governments with different
capabilities, ATA believes that the United States, Canada, the European
Union and other major trading partners should achieve a much higher
degree of coordination so that procedures can be mutually recognized,
thereby diminishing redundant requirements for airlines and their
customers. Greater harmonization and mutual recognition would minimize
the re-screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo from these
countries. It would also allow screening resources to be better
deployed and improve the movement of passengers and goods.
CONCLUSION
Since its creation nearly a decade ago, TSA has steadfastly
defended the United States from threats to its security. TSA also has
developed an extraordinary storehouse of experience that can be applied
to continue its mission and, in doing so, continue to improve the
efficiency of the processing of passengers and freight in ways which
will benefit our economy and our ability to compete globally. ATA looks
forward to working with the subcommittee and TSA to realize these
mutually reinforcing goals.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Calio. That was very impressive.
We appreciate you being here today.
We now go to our second witness, who is Mark Van Tine. He
currently serves as president and chief executive officer of
Jeppesen and is testifying on behalf of the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Van Tine.
STATEMENT OF MARK VAN TINE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, JEPPESEN, ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL AVIATION
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Van Tine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson
Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate this opportunity to sit before you and speak about
the efforts to reauthorize the Transportation Security
Administration.
Mr. Chairman, as you said, my day job, I am president and
CEO of Jeppesen. I do appear today on behalf of GAMA in my role
as the security committee chairman for the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association. GAMA represents 72 world-leading
manufacturers of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft engines,
avionics, and components.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the general
aviation community has worked diligently to increase security
measures and awareness of potential threats to the aviation
system. Numerous domestic and international initiatives have
been put in place by both Government and industry that
substantially mitigate security risks.
There are, however, areas which we believe the committee
should focus on for improving security and obtaining
operational efficiencies. I have three of note for you.
First is the Large Aircraft Security Program, LASP. The
Large Aircraft Security Program has received significant
attention from the general aviation community and members of
Congress since the notice of proposed rulemaking was published
in October 2008. Since introduction of LASP, the industry has
raised concerns and actively engaged with TSA to develop a
program that appropriately balances legitimate security risks
with the rights of citizens to fly their own airplanes. We have
made good progress together. GAMA asks that the administration
move quickly to incorporate the industry's input and finalize
this rulemaking, as it will enhance security without creating
negative consequences.
The second is around repair stations. Much like the LASP
rulemaking, the GA industry awaits completion of an aircraft
repair station security rulemaking by DHS. TSA has put forth
rulemaking that would implement security requirements for
repair stations in November 2009. We believe it is imperative
for TSA and DHS to move forward and complete this rulemaking,
which puts in place the kind and the type of risk-based repair
for repair station security that is good for the industry and
good for the country.
Third is around temporary flight restrictions and access to
airspace. Temporary flight restrictions, TFRs, are used
specifically to designate airspace around selected sporting
events and protect the travel of selected individuals. We
understand the desire for implementation of TFRs but suggest
that TSA needs to review their impact on the operator community
and the opportunities to enhance access for operators that have
this security programming in place.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for your leadership on these
issues and for inviting all of us to testify. I believe it is
essential for TSA, industry, and Congress to continue to work
together on general aviation security issues to ensure we have
an effective security system that supports the business and
private use of general aviation aircraft.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Van Tine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Van Tine
July 12, 2011
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, my name is Mark Van Tine and I am the president
and CEO of Jeppesen and the Security Committee Chairman of the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA). Jeppesen is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Boeing Company and is based in Englewood, Colorado.
For more than 75 years, Jeppesen has provided navigation charts,
electronic databases, and other information solutions to general
aviation and commercial airlines around the world. I appear here today
on behalf of GAMA, who represents 72 of the world's leading
manufacturers of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft, engines,
avionics, and components. Our member companies also operate aircraft
fleets, airport fixed-based operations, pilot training, and maintenance
facilities world-wide. On behalf of GAMA, I appreciate your convening
this important hearing and providing me the opportunity to discuss
efforts to reauthorize the Transportation Security Administration.
General aviation (GA) is an essential part of our transportation
system that is especially critical for individuals and businesses that
need to travel and move goods quickly and efficiently in today's just-
in-time market. GA is also an important contributor to the U.S.
economy, supporting over 1.2 million jobs.\1\ In 2010, U.S. general
aviation airplane manufacturers delivered 1,334 airplanes.\2\ The total
value of these aircraft was $7.9 billion, with 62 percent of that value
tied to exports.\3\ We are one of the few remaining manufacturing
industries that still provide a significant trade surplus for the
United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ General Aviation's Contribution to the U.S. Economy,
MergeGlobal, 2006.
\2\ 2010 General Aviation Statistical Databook and Industry
Outlook, GAMA 2011.
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the recent economic downturn, general aviation has also
been among the most successful industries at creating highly-paid,
well-skilled jobs that our economy needs. It is important that Congress
and the administration adopt policies that help GA to remain
competitive and continue to be a leading contributor to our export
base.
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY
GAMA has long advocated for general aviation security to be based
on risk analysis which focuses on measuring threat, assessing
vulnerability, and determining potential consequences. When higher
risks are identified, appropriate countermeasures and security postures
should be deployed in order to mitigate the situation. At the same
time, such measures should be operationally feasible and built upon
stakeholder input. We also believe that rulemaking should be
performance-based and adaptable based on experience and outcomes.
Finally, as we have seen in previous efforts by agencies to regulate
general aviation, one size does not fit all, meaning it is imperative
for Government and industry to work together to secure the GA fleet,
and all aircraft in our Nation's skies.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the general aviation
community has worked diligently to increase security and awareness of
potential threats to the aviation system. These efforts have been the
subject of review by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and Inspector
General with the IG concluding that, ``The current status of GA
operations does not present a serious homeland security vulnerability
requiring TSA to increase regulatory oversight of the industry.''\4\ We
appreciate this acknowledgement by the IG and believe we have been a
positive, proactive partner in addressing legitimate security threats.
It is important to note the GAO commenced another study of GA security
in early 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ OIG-09-69 TSA Role in GA Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numerous domestic and international initiatives have been put into
place by both Government and industry that substantially mitigate
security risk. For instance, some existing domestic programs include:
The continuous vetting of individual pilots and annual
security training for flight instructors.
An enhanced pilot license that includes the requirement to
carry a Government-issued photo identification and a proposal
to add a photo to the pilot certificate.
The DCA Access Standard Security Program that requires the
carriage of law enforcement officers on board aircraft entering
Washington National via a portal city airport.
The Twelve-Five Standard Security program for commercial
operators of large general aviation airplanes.
The See Something, Say Something program, and its
predecessor Airport Watch, that encourages the GA community to
report suspicious behavior.
Guidelines to assist in identification of suspicious money
transactions when purchasing aircraft in accordance with the
USA Patriot Act.
Guidelines published by the TSA to enhance general aviation
airport security.
The TSA Transportation System Sector Risk Assessment process
that helps prioritize resources based on threat, vulnerability,
and consequence.
The Least Risk Bomb Location program that designates the
area in aircraft where explosives should be placed to limit
damage.
Additional international programs include:
The Advance Passenger Information System that requires
general aviation aircraft to file flight information identical
to that of commercial operators when entering the United
States.
The International Waiver program that requires foreign
registered general aviation aircraft to file a waiver to
operate within the U.S. airspace.
All general aviation aircraft arriving from outside the
United States are subject to nuclear and radiological material
screening by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency.
The Secure Fixed Based Operator program is a pilot program
that provides for pre-departure clearances at foreign
locations, like Shannon, Ireland. Aircraft that depart from
Shannon meet all requirements, except Department of
Agriculture, for entry into the United States.
As a result of the aforementioned programs that focus on domestic
and international flights, flight training and pilots, GA aircraft have
operated in a safe and secure environment. In general, these programs
provide a baseline for GA security in combination with a GA community
focused on security. There are, however, areas where we believe the
committee should focus on for improving security and attaining
operational efficiencies.
LARGE AIRCRAFT SECURITY PROGRAM (LASP)
The Large Aircraft Security Program (LASP) has received significant
attention from the general aviation community and Members of Congress
since being published in October 2008 as a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM).
The LASP proposal is the first time that TSA has attempted to
regulate private air travel. We believe strongly that the TSA should
take pains to recognize this and ensure that LASP does not infringe on
the ability of general aviation pilots and passengers to exercise their
freedom to fly by properly introducing targeted requirements.
In this regard, GAMA believes that any final rule should recognize
that the vast majority of passengers who board general aviation
aircraft are known to the operator and crew, and are made up of
employees, guests, family members and clients who typically have close
ties to the operator of the aircraft. Unlike commercial operations,
passengers in this context are not ``revenue service passengers'' and
unknown, but warrant a uniquely different consideration from a security
vulnerability context. In assessing risk, the general aviation
``passenger,'' an individual known to the pilot, represents an inherent
and significant risk reduction which should be recognized and accounted
for by the TSA as it finishes drafting a final rule for LASP.
Since the 2008 NPRM was published, our industry has raised concerns
with the LASP and actively engaged with the TSA to help develop a
program that appropriately balances legitimate security risks with the
right of citizens to fly their own airplanes.
We have made good progress. During two industry working group
session in April and May of 2009 set up by the TSA Transportation
Security Network Management (TSNM) office we were able to agree on a
framework for the LASP rule. Assistant Administrator John Sammon has
committed to build upon what the TSA has learned from these two
sessions and issue a second NPRM that incorporates suggestions from
stakeholders. On May 12, 2011, TSA Administrator Pistole announced to
the GAMA board that the supplemental NPRM had been cleared by TSA.
The framework we have identified in our work with the TSA includes:
The establishment of a ``trusted pilot'' system that would
require pilots to meet certain requirements before operating
their aircraft if that aircraft falls within the TSA-defined
scope of LASP.
The trusted pilot would be responsible for conducting key
security functions for flights (like they are for all safety
functions) including identity verification of known passengers
and an established process for subjecting unknown individuals
to vetting through eSecure flight.
The ``securing'' of aircraft after landing and before
takeoff at all airports.
The establishment of a sensible restricted items list that
takes the place of the prohibited items list originally
proposed by the TSA.
We also appreciate the strong support we have received from Members
of Congress who have recognized our concerns and urged TSA to develop a
more practical and effective approach. GAMA is asking the
administration to move quickly to incorporate the industry's input and
finalize the rulemaking which is currently pending before the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Moving forward on this rule with
this input will enhance security without the negative impact of the
initial NPRM.
REPAIR STATIONS
Much like LASP rulemaking, the GA industry awaits completion of an
aircraft repair station security rulemaking by DHS. TSA put forth a
rulemaking that would implement security requirements for repair
stations in November 2009. GAMA filed comments about how to establish a
risk-based program for repair station in a constructive manner and we
sought to underscore the effect inaction has upon exports of U.S.
products and expansion into new markets given the majority of airplane
and equipment sales are to foreign customers.
It is worth noting in his recent appearance before this committee,
TSA Administrator Pistole stated during questioning that their
investigation had found foreign repair station security to be
``commensurate with U.S. standards''.\5\ We concur, and believe it is
imperative for the TSA and DHS to move forward and complete this
rulemaking which will put in place the type of risk-based for repair
station security that we support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Subcommittee Hearing: Authorizing the Transportation Security
Administration for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, Administrator Pistole
Remarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALIEN FLIGHT TRAINING
The Alien Flight Student Program, established in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act and amended by Vision 100--Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act, creates responsibility for DHS and TSA to
perform background checks of foreign nationals seeking flight training
in the United States. An interim final rule \6\ creating the program
was put forth on September 20, 2004, establishing four categories of
pilot training candidates based on the type of training being sought.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 49 CFR Part 1552, Flight Training for Aliens and Other
Designated Individuals; Security Awareness Training for Flight School
Employees; Interim Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAMA believes this rule is not proportional to the risk posed, or
mitigated, by the program. For example, the outcome has resulted in
international operators electing not to train in the United States, but
instead move their training contracts to foreign locations. This hurts
U.S. jobs, and the aviation industry as a whole.
GAMA has advocated for policies that properly frame pilot training
risk against the requirements placed on the pilot through the interim
final rule. We have worked to make better use of agency resources and
properly classify ``recurrent training'' to ensure minimal impact on
the ability to renew qualifications for existing pilots who already
know how to fly specific aircraft. We believe, however, that it is time
to build on the lessons learned during the program's 7 years in
existence and develop more targeted requirements, reduce the burden
created by TSA having to check the same person multiple times within a
couple of months, and allow U.S.-based flight training organizations to
compete on a more level playing field.
TEMPORARY FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS AND AIRSPACE ACCESS
Flight restrictions are used to protect critical infrastructure,
such as dams and nuclear power plants, and provide a geographic
boundary for general aviation aircraft operations. Similarly, Temporary
Flight Restrictions (TFR) are used to specifically designate airspace
around select sporting events, and protect the travel of select
individuals. We understand the desire for implementation of TFR's, but
suggest a needed review of their impact on the operator community.
TSA has successfully worked with industry to minimize the
ramifications that TFR's created to support Presidential travel. For
example, last year the agency worked successfully to mitigate the
impact upon flight operations around Martha's Vineyard during a
Presidential visit to the area. We applaud this step and believe it can
provide an example of how TSA and industry can work together to develop
procedures that allow GA operations to continue when TFR's are
implemented.
It is also important to note that a number of initiatives permit
operators to attain additional security clearances and therefore
operate in sensitive areas and these can serve as precedent for easing
TFR restrictions as well. In the National Capital Region, general
aviation pilots are required to undergo FAA-administered security
awareness training each year. Pilots operating in flight-restricted
areas, including the Maryland airports Hyde Field, College Park, and
Potomac Airfield, are required to obtain additional clearances to
access these airports. Similarly, the DCA Access Standard Security
Program subjects general aviation operators to a number of
requirements, including the carriage of a law enforcement officer on
board, and requires departure from one of a few dozen ``portal city''
airports. The Twelve Five Standard Security Program requires that on-
demand commercial aircraft operators using aircraft with a take-off
weight above 12,500 pounds to carry out an extensive security program.
Finally, the Private Charter Standard Security Program subjects any
aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight above 100,000 pounds additional
scrutiny of passenger baggage and requires a hardened cockpit door.
We mention these programs because each subjects operators to an
additional layer of security. It is our belief that TSA should permit
operators with any of the aforementioned clearances, as well as those
include under the pending LASP, the ability to obtain clearance to
operate in TFR's, as they have met a higher level of security
requirements. GAMA encourages TSA, and other Government agencies, to
evolve how restricted airspace can be accessed by general aviation
operators through procedural and possible regulatory changes.
At the same time, GAMA remains supportive of the effort by TSA to
broaden general aviation access at DCA. We appreciate that the agency
has dedicated time and efforts to expand the number of ``portal city''
airports and streamlined the existing procedures, as announced in March
of this year, both of which have permitted an increase in GA aircraft
operations. We are grateful for the effort, but remain cognizant that
impediments with other Government agencies remain. We encourage TSA,
and other Government and industry stakeholders, to continue their
efforts to improve access and maintain security.
GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORT SECURITY
Recently, the GAO released a report entitled General Aviation--
Security Assessment at Selected Airports. The report provided a review
of 13 general aviation airports using the TSA Security Guidelines for
General Aviation Airports which GAMA helped develop. The focus of the
assessment was the availability of physical security measures, such as
perimeter security, lighting, locked hangars, and closed circuit
television, that could prevent unauthorized access to airports. It
recognizes the strides that general aviation airports have made, on a
voluntary basis, to enhance security.
In response to the GAO study, the DHS states that the ``TSA
strongly believes that general aviation airports are complying with
recommended security measures to the extent that those measures are
practical and effective given the unique conditions at each airport,
and to the extent funding is available for desired security
outcomes.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ General Aviation--Security Assessment at Selected Airports,
GAO-111-298.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most general aviation airports have stepped up and voluntarily
established procedures and other mechanisms through which they are
hardened. As there are close to 18,000 general aviation airports around
the United States we believe that there is no practical way to fence
every perimeter or screen every visitor to the airport. Instead,
working with the TSA, the community has established procedures and
programs that identify suspicious behavior and prevent certain
individuals from flying GA aircraft. This includes the:
DHS ``See Something Say Something'' program.
The vetting of pilots like TSA's Alien Flight Program and
FAA's review of the pilot registry.
Specific programs for certain types of operations such as
the TFSSP and LASP mentioned previously.
These programs in combination with some basic voluntary steps taken
by airports provide the framework within which the GA community's risk
can be effectively managed.
TSA'S USE OF SECURITY DIRECTIVES
The general aviation industry is very concerned about the TSA's
liberal use of Security Directives to implement new requirements on
operators that are not subject to the rulemaking requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
The general aviation community strongly supports a risk-based,
threat vulnerability approach to securing our National transportation
system. However, we have seen the TSA repeatedly use Security
Directives to vastly expand existing security requirements without
consideration of the implementation challenges, operational impacts,
and economic burdens these mandates impose on the aviation industry.
Our most recent experience involves the expansion of security
credentialing requirements to tens of thousands of pilots and employees
at airports and aviation manufacturer facilities without input from
these constituencies or due process protections under the APA.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Security Directive 1542-04-08 revision F issued in December
2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recognize and respect TSA's authority to issue Security
Directives. However, we do not believe that TSA should use Security
Directives to make standing policy unless there is a compelling and
immediate National security risk that warrants it. This is an issue of
great concern to the general aviation community and we urge Congress to
implement mechanisms for review of security directives if they are not
temporary in nature.
CONCLUSION
In closing, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, thank you
for your leadership on these issues and for inviting me to testify. I
feel strongly that if TSA, industry, and Congress continue to work
together on general aviation security issues we will put in place an
effective security system that does not inhibit the freedom people
enjoy today to privately use general aviation aircraft.
Thank you and I would be glad to answer any questions that you may
have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Van Tine.
The Chairman now recognizes our third witness, Mr. Steve
Alterman, currently serving as president of the Cargo Airline
Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Alterman.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. ALTERMAN, PRESIDENT, CARGO AIRLINE
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Alterman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee. I am delighted to be here today, and we
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you as you move to
authorize the Transportation Security Administration.
The Cargo Airline Association is the Nation-wide trade
organization representing the interests of the Nation's all-
cargo carriers. Specializing solely in the transportation of
cargo, our members are the primary drivers of a worldwide
economy that demands the efficient time-definite transportation
of a wide range of commodities.
Every member of the aviation community recognizes that the
highest level of safety and security must be a cornerstone of
all of our operations. It is also important to understand that
the aviation industry is composed of a diverse group of
businesses with substantially different operational models. You
have heard some from Mr. Calio on the passengers; we have heard
some from GAMA. There are a whole host of different aviation
models. I believe Mr. Rojas said it earlier with respect to the
trucking industry, it is equally true with the aviation
industry: One size does not fit all.
Indeed, even within the all-cargo community, there are
substantially different operations. Some of our members offer
time-definite service and are generally known for their express
operations. Other companies concentrate on traditional freight
operations, providing the transportation function for the air
freight forwarder community. All of these different
characteristics are currently taken into account by the
Transportation Security Administration, as we all operate under
different security directives, different emergency amendments,
and different security programs.
Each of these different regulatory requirements is tailored
to address the unique threats and vulnerabilities of the
separate industry segments. This method of regulating the
industry should continue.
This multilayered, risk-based approach to aviation security
is clearly appropriate. As TSA Administrator John Pistole said
to you on June 2, 2011, ``The TSA employs a risk-based,
intelligent-driven operation to prevent terrorist attacks.'' We
absolutely agree with this statement.
We believe, however, that this approach to aviation
security should go a bit further. We actually think it should
be codified in any TSA authorization bill to ensure that the
theory and the practice of regulating the aviation industry
based on intelligence-driven, risk-based factors should, in
fact, be a cornerstone of the agency itself and should be part
of the authorization process.
We also agree with and appreciate Administrator Pistole's
commitment to work collaboratively with the stakeholder
community to develop the programs necessary to enhance
security. To his credit, the administrator has made good on his
promise to engage the industry in formulating policy as we move
forward.
However, we also believe that the TSA industry
communications interface should be strengthened and
institutionalized by legislatively establishing the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee. This is an advisory committee that
was in effect until a couple of years ago. Its charter has run
out. It has now being reformed and may have already been
technically reconstituted. But we can't gamble that this will
happen again, and we urge the committee to move forward in the
TSA authorization bill to institutionalize the existence of the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee.
I would like to talk just briefly about a couple of things
so I don't repeat what Mr. Calio said.
After the incident in Yemen in 2010, a lot of activity took
place. The result of that activity was TSA and the industry
working collaboratively to put a whole host of new programs in
place to secure our international transportation. I would just
like to talk about a couple of things that are on-going.
The Department of Homeland Security established air cargo
security working groups to deal with what we are going to do as
we go forward. We think one of the most promising areas of
inquiry is, again, the intelligence-sharing aspect of it. As
those working groups move forward, we urge you to let them move
forward and encourage them to move forward.
Another one of those committees dealt with how to get
better technology and better machines in there so we can screen
cargo better. We urge you to continue the funding, but we
absolutely recognize the funding problems we have in this
country now. So I would like to concentrate a little bit on
low-tech rather than high-tech.
A lot was said in the first panel about dogs, and we
absolutely agree that the canine program should be encouraged
and expanded. We specifically urge that this committee consider
forcing the TSA to expand the use of private canines in the
screening process and that we don't just rely on TSA dogs,
because there aren't enough of them. There is a program we can
put in place where TSA could actually certify the dogs and have
private screeners do it. We are in strong support of that.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. I would be happy to
answer any questions as we move forward. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Alterman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen A. Alterman
July 12, 2011
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Steve Alterman and I am
President of the Cargo Airline Association. We appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today as Congress moves to authorize
the activities of the Transportation Security Administration for fiscal
years 2012 and 2013.
The Cargo Airline Association is the Nation-wide trade organization
representing the interests of the Nation's all-cargo air carriers.\1\
Specializing solely in the transportation of cargo, our members are the
primary drivers of a worldwide economy that demands the efficient time-
definite transportation of a wide range of commodities. Our industry
segment has grown over the years to a point where, in fiscal 2011, it
accounted for 87.4% of the Revenue Ton Miles (RTMs) in domestic markets
(up from 70.0% in 2000) and 69.1% of the RTMs in international markets
(up from 49.3% in 2000). This expansion is expected to continue, with
the Federal Aviation Administration estimating a growth rate of
approximately 4.5% over the next 20 years.\2\
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\1\ Association members include ABX Air, Atlas Air, Capital Cargo,
DHL Express, FedEx Express, Kalitta Air, and UPS Airlines.
\2\ Statistics from the FAA Aerospace Forecast, Fiscal Years 2011-
2031, March 2011.
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GENERAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Every member of the aviation community recognizes that the highest
level of safety and security must be a cornerstone of all operations.
Failure to recognize this fundamental principle is both bad policy and
bad business. It is also important to understand, however, that the
aviation industry is composed of a diverse group of businesses with
substantially different operational models. For example, Cargo Airline
Association members, in their all-cargo operations, do not carry
``passengers'' in any generally accepted definition of that term, have
substantial operations that never touch U.S. soil (sometimes in the
livery of foreign carriers), provide substantial support services for
the U.S. military and in many cases, have control over the pickup and
delivery, as well as the transportation of cargo. Indeed, even within
the all-cargo community, there are substantially different operations.
Some of our members offer a time-definite service and are generally
known for their express operations, while other companies concentrate
on traditional freight operations providing the transportation function
for the air freight forwarder community. These differing
characteristics must continue to be taken into account in developing
and implementing security policy. Accordingly, all-cargo air carriers
today operate under a different Security Program and different Security
Directives than our passenger counterparts or the members of the
indirect air carrier community. Each of these different regulatory
requirements is tailored to address the unique threats and
vulnerabilities of the separate industry segments.
This multi-layered, risk-based, approach to aviation security is
clearly appropriate. On June 2, 2011, TSA Administrator John S. Pistole
testified before this subcommittee and stated that:
``TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to
maximize transportation security to stay ahead of the evolving
terrorist threat while protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating
the flow of legitimate commerce.''
We absolutely agree with this statement. We also believe, however,
that this approach to aviation security should be codified in any TSA
Authorization legislation and not left to the whim of future
Administrators. This codification should clearly indicate that, in
issuing regulations and other documents such as Security Programs,
Security Directives and Emergency Amendments, the administrator must
employ a risk-based, intelligence-driven, approach, taking into account
the nature and location of any threats to transportation security, as
well as the unique operational characteristics of the various segments
of the transportation industry and apply the appropriate security
measures to meet that specific threat.
We also agree with and appreciate Administrator Pistole's
commitment to work collaboratively with the stakeholder community to
develop the programs necessary to enhance security across the
transportation system. To his credit, the administrator has made good
on his promise to engage the industry in formulating policy as we move
forward. Having said that, however, we believe that the TSA/industry
communications interface should be strengthened and institutionalized
by legislatively establishing the Aviation Security Advisory Committee.
While this committee has existed in the past, and we understand that it
is about to be reconstituted, there has been a significant gap over the
past several years, leaving no formal way for the industry and the
agency to communicate. Therefore, we support the provisions of H.R.
1447, introduced on April 8, 2011, and urge that this proposed
legislation be folded into any TSA Reauthorization bill.
THE LESSONS OF OCTOBER 2010
In late October, 2010, terrorists in Yemen targeted the
international supply chain by placing explosive devices aboard two U.S.
all-cargo carriers. This plot was thwarted through the work of the
intelligence community, but it still sent a wake-up call to everyone in
the industry. Subsequent to the foiled attack, all participants in the
supply chain, as well as several U.S. Government departments, came
together to start a process that has led to substantial improvements in
international air cargo security. After a review of the vulnerabilities
exposed by the Yemen incident, TSA, working with industry stakeholders,
issued a number of new Security Directives and Emergency Amendments
designed to address any deficiencies uncovered. While the details of
these new provisions cannot be publicly disclosed, we can say that they
involve enhancements across the entire range of participants in
international commerce--carriers, forwarders, and shippers.
In addition, the incident spurred on-going analyses of other
potential enhancements that can be implemented if proven successful.
For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established an
Air Cargo Security Working Group to study, and make recommendations on,
various aspects of the security puzzle. Perhaps the most promising and
certainly most important areas of inquiry involve how to better share
and use information developed by the intelligence community and how to
develop and certify new technologies to screen high-risk air cargo
shipments. With respect to the latter project, we urge Congress, both
in the context of authorizing and appropriations legislation, to ensure
the funding necessary to continue research on promising new
technologies--especially those that might be able to screen
consolidated shipments.
It is also important not to overlook ``low tech'' initiatives to
screen air cargo--in both international and domestic markets.
Specifically, the use of canines has proven effective in the screening
of air cargo, but the use of dogs has been hampered by the relative
scarcity of TSA-trained animals. We firmly believe that the use of
canines should be aggressively expanded by permitting the use of
private, but TSA-certified, canines as a primary screening method. TSA
has begun to move in this direction and we encourage accelerated action
in this area, both at domestic and international locations.
In yet another development, TSA, in conjunction with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection and the air cargo industry, has also begun a
significant Pilot Program to determine the feasibility of submitting
data on international air cargo shipments earlier than presently
required. Such information holds the promise of enabling the Government
to target high-risk shipments before they are loaded on aircraft bound
for the United States. While initial results of this Pilot Program have
been promising, much more needs to be done before any regulatory or
legislative conclusions can be reached. At this point, the Program has
involved only the express segment of the air cargo community, and even
there, only at somewhat remote locations. More work needs to be done in
the high volume areas of the express environment and the Program needs
to be expanded to the heavy freight environment, as well as to the
passenger and air freight-forwarder segments of the marketplace.
Therefore, if this committee addresses this Program in any TSA
Authorization legislation, we urge that any provisions simply require
the continuation of the Program with a Report to Congress at its
conclusion. Now is not the time to prejudge the outcome of the Program
by mandating any particular pre-flight data submission requirements.
A final lesson of the incidents of October 2010 is that the United
States alone cannot ensure the security of international air cargo
shipments. The air cargo business is global--and it demands global
cooperation to thwart potential terrorist activity. TSA should
therefore be encouraged to continue its on-going efforts to work with
foreign governments to ensure that these foreign governments adopt
security standards substantially similar to those in place in the
United States. Over and above this unilateral initiative, every effort
should be made to arrive at harmonized international standards for
securing the entirety of the supply chain. Such harmonization is
necessary both for security and for facilitating the flow of commerce.
In a worldwide economy, businesses simply should not be required to
adopt widely differing security practices dependent solely on the
country of origin of the freight.
CONCLUSIONS
The all-cargo air carrier industry fully understands the importance
to maintain the highest possible level of security, while at the same
time providing our world-wide customer base the level of service it
demands. In accomplishing these twin objectives, we will continue to
work cooperatively with both TSA and CBP to develop and implement the
best possible security regime. We urge Congress to assist in this
effort by enacting TSA Authorization legislation that establishes
guidelines under which TSA must operate, but that does not ``over
regulate'', giving TSA and the industry the flexibility to assess
threats and vulnerabilities and to take appropriate action in each
individual circumstance.
Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Alterman. We are working to that
end, to do just that.
The Chairman now recognizes our fourth witness. Mr.
Christopher Witkowski is currently serving as the director of
the air safety, health, and security for the Association of
Flight Attendants.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Witkowski.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER WITKOWSKI, DIRECTOR OF AIR SAFETY,
HEALTH, AND SECURITY, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS--CWA,
AFL-CIO
Mr. Witkowski. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, for holding this hearing and allowing us to
weigh in on the safety and security issues that are important
to flight attendants and National security. We thank Mr.
Cravaack for being here, as well, to listen.
My name is Christopher Witkowski. I am director of the Air
Safety, Health, and Security Department of the Association of
Flight Attendants--CWA. We represent more than 60,000 flight
attendants at 23 U.S. airlines.
Before I begin, I would just like to mention that flight
attendants, an integral part of the crew in terms of safety and
security, have been subject to the same level of screening and
background checks as pilots, yet only pilots are being included
in a test of the known-crew-member screening process that
allows expedited crew-member screening at security checkpoints.
We thank the committee for their support of flight attendants,
and we hope this committee will continue to exert pressure on
TSA to include flight attendants in the program as it moves
forward.
I am here to talk about what has happened, or, in this
case, what has not happened, to flight attendant security and
self-defense training in the 10 years since the horrific
attacks of 9/11. Flight attendants are first responders on
commercial airplanes responsible for the protection and
preservation of the cabin environment as well as the lives of
tens of millions of people every year. They are also the last
line of defense in the aircraft cabin.
Recognizing their security role, Congress has on separate
occasions passed bipartisan laws mandating flight attendant
self-defense training. But corporate pressure and agency
prejudice have interfered with Congressional intent. I am here
to stay that training and equality for flight attendants
remains elusive and leaves passenger airplanes unnecessarily
vulnerable to attack.
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, flight attendants were
instructed to slow down their actions and comply with
hijackers, assuming the hijacker wanted to go to a destination
or wanted money or notoriety only. Two months after 9/11,
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
ATSA, which mandated a change to the training curriculum and
philosophy. No longer was the hijacker intent on going to Cuba.
The new hijacker would use the aircraft as a weapon of mass
destruction.
Part of the AFA's request to update the training included
basic self-defense maneuvers to allow flight attendants defend
themselves against a terrorist attack. We are not asking for
flight attendants to be certified martial arts experts. AFA
worked with the regulators and industry representatives to
create a training program that would allow flight attendants to
be provided with the appropriate and effective training
required to perform their duties.
With the passage of ATSA, AFA also urged Congress to change
the requirements for flight attendant security training to
include a provision that mandated a set number of hours for the
security training. These mandates would have to be enforced so
that all carriers would be required to provide the same level
of appropriate and effective security training for all flight
attendants.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security to issue a rule
mandating both classroom and effective hands-on situational
training covering 10 elements, among them: Appropriate and
effective responses to defend oneself, including the use of
force against an attacker.
It was Vision 100, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2003,
that eliminated the Department of Homeland Security requirement
for TSA to issue a rule requiring both classroom and effective
hands-on situational security training. Yet this was done
without the Homeland Security Committee review. Thus, Vision
100 left it to the individual air carriers to develop basic
security training originally to be done by TSA, including the
element related to appropriate responses to defend oneself.
Because Vision 100 took away TSA's obligation to develop a
basic security training rule for all carriers, it mandated that
TSA develop and provide an advanced voluntary self-defense
training program.
When we talk about mandatory basic security training in our
comments, we are generally talking about only a 5- to 30-minute
self-defense training module developed and provided by the air
carriers themselves. Air carriers appear to be checking the
boxes in relation to the required elements of training. Without
TSA-established standards, there exists a wide variance in the
amount of security training being allocated to self-defense.
The so-called advanced training that was developed by TSA
is the voluntary Crew Member Self-Defense Training. This
program offered by TSA is not advanced but, rather, an
introduction to basic self-defense. It is a 1-day course
conducted throughout the year at various locations and focuses
on hands-on self-defense training.
Unfortunately, it is difficult for our members to attend,
as it has become harder for them to take time off from work and
their flying duties. Flight attendants have been unwilling to
attend training that may require them to pay for hotel and meal
expenses. The result has been depressed participation in the
voluntary Crew Member Self-Defense Training Program. If flight
attendants were paid or even if the costs associated with
attending were covered, then participation could be higher.
TSA has the authority to implement comprehensive and
cohesive security and self-defense training for all flight
attendants but has failed to do so. There should be a mandatory
basic counterterrorism training that effectively prepares
flight attendants to deal with potential threat conditions, as
Congress has required since the enactment of ATSA in 2001.
Despite the best intentions, the ideas put forward by
Congress have been weakened and even ignored over time.
Comprehensive counterterrorism training must be enacted by
Congress in order to ensure implementation of what it has
required since 9/11.
As the uniformed crew member tasked by the TSA to defend
the flight deck at all costs, according to TSA's Common
Strategy, the flight attendant is a target for terrorist to
eliminate in order to successfully carry out an attack, the
elements of which are stated in the current law. Basic
counterterrorism training for flight attendants, if properly
required and implemented by TSA, would prepare the flight
attendants for potential threat conditions.
Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer
any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Witkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Witkowski
Thank you Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee for
holding this hearing and allowing us to weigh in on the safety and
security issues that are important to flight attendants. My name is
Christopher Witkowski and I am the Director of the Air Safety, Health
and Security Department at the Association of Flight Attendants--
Communication Workers of America (AFA-CWA). AFA-CWA represents more
than 60,000 members at 23 airlines and has been advocating for the
flight attendant profession for over 65 years.
I am here to talk about what has happened, or in this case, what
has not happened to flight attendant security and self-defense training
in the 10 years since the horrific attacks of 9/11. Flight attendants
are the first responders on commercial airplanes responsible for the
protection and preservation of the cabin environment as well as the
lives of over 630 million people annually. Safe and secure travel
depends on the ability of flight attendants to identify and respond to
threats to passenger health and the safety and security of the aircraft
cabin and flight deck.
Flight attendants are also the last line of defense in the aircraft
cabin. Recognizing their security role Congress has, on separate
occasions, passed laws mandating flight attendant self defense
training. While flight attendants have been waiting for mandatory
comprehensive security training, flightdeck doors have been reinforced
to resist intrusion. Some pilots have been armed under the Federal
Flightdeck Officer (FFDO) program. The number of Federal Air Marshalls
(FAMs) traveling on flights has increased--although there are still not
enough to protect every flight. Flight attendants, an integral part of
the crew in terms of safety and security, have been subjected to the
same level of screening and background checks as pilots. Yet only
pilots are being included in a beta test of the Known Crewmember
screening process that allows expedited crewmember screening at
security check points. Flight attendants are not yet included in this
process.
Flight attendant security issues have continually taken a ``coach''
seat when it comes to issues surrounding security training and
expedited crew screening. Congress intended for flight attendants to
receive training but, corporate pressure and agency prejudice have
interfered with Congressional intent. I am here to say that training
and equality for flight attendants remains elusive.
In 2001 just 2 months after the 9/11 attacks Congress passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) Prior to ATSA, flight
attendants were instructed to slow down their actions and comply with
hijacker requests.
ATSA required the FAA to update and improve flight attendant
security training requirements to reflect the current security and
hijacking situations that flight attendants may face onboard the
aircraft.
It was Congress' intention--and AFA-CWA's expectation--that
carriers would implement similar, if not identical, training programs.
Unfortunately, a 2002 survey of our Safety committee chairs we learned
that some airlines were giving their flight attendants a minimal amount
of training--in some cases 2 or 3 hours of up-dated hijacking training.
These discrepancies in the security training in the aviation system
left flight attendants unprepared for dealing with future terrorist
attacks on-board an aircraft in the post-9/11 environment. AFA-CWA has
been consistent in our advocacy that all flight attendants, regardless
of the carrier employing them, must receive the same level of security
training.
With the passage of ATSA, AFA-CWA began to urge Congress to change
the requirements for flight attendant security training to include a
provision that mandated a set number of hours for the security
training. These mandates would have to be enforced so that all carriers
would be required to provide the same level of adequate security
training for all flight attendants.
In early 2003, air carriers made an unsuccessful attempt to insert
a provision into the Omnibus Appropriations Act that would allow
carriers to design their own security training effectively making the
requirement by the TSA for self-defense training voluntary.
Fortunately, Senator John McCain spoke out against this provision and
it was defeated. The airlines had also tried to prevent industry-wide
standards for the security training and eliminate self-defense training
completely.
The airlines finally succeeded in crippling the training
requirements with the final language of Vision 100, the FAA
Reauthorization of 2003. This was done by eliminating the requirement
for TSA to issue a rule requiring both classroom and effective hands-on
situational security training. In its stead, Vision 100 created two
approaches to self-defense security training. To understand the two
approaches of training it is important to understand the basic elements
of the law and guidance that are required for crewmember security
training. Air carriers are required to provide security training.
Vision 100 required air carriers to provide training that included the
following elements:
Recognizing suspicious activities;
Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence;
Crew communication and coordination;
Psychology of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and
passenger responses;
Situational training exercises regarding various threat
conditions; and
Appropriate responses to defend oneself.
The carriers provide this basic security training on an annual
basis to flight attendants. As noted above, one of the elements is a
requirement for ``appropriate responses to defend oneself.'' Vision 100
originally required that TSA establish minimum standards in relation to
the training that would be provided to crewmembers including the
element related to an ``appropriate response to defend oneself.''
The subsequent result of the change in language is that the basic
security training provided by air carriers in relation to ``self
defense'' training includes anywhere from 5 minutes to 30 minutes of
actual hands-on self defense training. So when we talk about ``basic''
security training in our comments we are talking about a 5- to 30-
minute self-defense training module developed and provided by the air
carrier themselves.
TSA has the authority to implement comprehensive and cohesive
security and self-defense training for all flight attendants but, has
failed to do so. There should be a mandatory basic counterterrorism
training that effectively prepares flight attendants to deal with
potential threat conditions that Congress has required since the
enactment of ATSA in November 2001. What is being provided in the
voluntary ``Crew Member Self Defense Training'' (CMSDT) by TSA is not
advanced, but an introduction to basic self-defense. The law intended
for this type of security training to be provided in mandatory basic
security training for flight attendants. CMSDT was intended to train
more advanced techniques to volunteers who had previously been trained
to ``defend themselves, and to demonstrate what they have learned in
situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions.''
Flight attendant security and self-defense training was meant to
provide the appropriate and effective response to a threat to the
aircraft. When asked about the effectiveness of the training our flight
attendant representatives said it appeared the air carrier met the
requirements of the law. However, when asked if their air carrier's
security training prepared them to defend themselves and the flight
deck should a terrorist attack occur on their aircraft, they've said
``No, not really. Only superficially''. So while some would say that
flight attendants don't want additional security training, the opposite
is true. Our flight attendants actually believe that more training is
necessary to help defend themselves in order to protect the passengers
and flightdeck.
The second training developed in response to self-defense training
only is the voluntary CMSDT sponsored by TSA. This is a 1-day (6- to 8-
hour) course conducted throughout the year at various locations, such
as community colleges around the country and focuses on hands-on self
defense training. Unfortunately it is difficult for our members to
attend the training as it has become harder for them to take off from
work. The airline bankruptcies which resulted in dramatic pay cuts
requiring flight attendants to work more days for the same amount of
pay has made it is burdensome for flight attendants to attend the
training. Also, flight attendants have been unwilling to attend classes
that may require them to pay for hotel and meal expenses. The result
has been low participation in the voluntary CMSDT. If flight attendants
were paid or even if the costs associated with attending training were
covered, then participation could be higher.
Another issue with the advanced voluntary self-defense training is
that it is a one-time training that does not include a yearly recurrent
training. To fully learn the concepts of the course, a recurrent
training program should be made available for flight attendants to
reinforce and practice what was taught. AFA-CWA firmly believes that
many of the provisions of this voluntary self defense program should be
integral parts of an air carrier's basic, mandatory training program.
One flight attendant, when asked to compare the CMSDT to the basic
security training being provided by her carrier stated, ``I have taken
the TSA self-defense class more than 10 times and feel the repetition
has greatly enhanced my ability to defend myself. The few minutes in
recurrent training does not help flight attendants understand the self-
defense moves''.
Once Congress ensures that mandatory counterterrorism training,
deemed effective by a qualified subject matter expert, such as the lead
defensive tactics coordinator for the FAMs or the unit chief of the
operational skills unit at the FBI academy at Quantico, is finally
provided to flight attendants, CMSDT can indeed provide advanced
training. If CMSDT is to remain voluntary, then any crew member who
volunteers to enhance their ability to defend National security aboard
a U.S. air carrier and attends the training should be compensated for
their related expenses and training time, no less than to the extent
that FFDOs are compensated or may be so compensated in the future.
Ten years after the 9/11 attacks and almost 3 years after the
Christmas day bombing attempt there is still work to be done in all
four of these areas.
A subject matter expert looking at the existing statute would
ensure that the mandatory basic security training would train uniformed
flight attendants, exposed to potential threats in the cabin, on each
of the statutory elements of training to give them a reasonable chance
of survival, working as a team with the rest of the trained crew and
any identified able-bodied passengers, to defend themselves and the
aircraft. As the training is provided now, flight attendants are
sometimes told that the airline provides security training because they
are told to do so by TSA, but that they will likely experience nothing
beyond verbal or minor pushing events. Such an attitude of denial in
conducting so-called security training is worse than no training at
all.
Despite the best intentions, the ideas put forward by Congress have
been weakened and even ignored over time. Comprehensive
Counterterrorism Training must be enacted by Congress in order to
ensure implementation of what it has required since 9/11, but neither
the FAA nor the TSA has required. That ``Each air carrier providing
scheduled passenger air transportation shall carry out a training
program for flight and cabin crew members to prepare the crew members
for potential threat conditions.'' As the uniformed crew member tasked
by the TSA to defend the flight deck at all costs (Common Strategy II,
2005), the flight attendant is a target for terrorists to eliminate in
order to successfully carry out an attack. Basic counterterrorism
training for flight attendants, the elements of which are stated in the
current law, if properly required and implemented by TSA, would prepare
the flight attendants for potential threat conditions.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I thank all the panel for those thoughtful opening
statements and the time it took to prepare them as well as to
deliver them.
Our clocks aren't working, so we are going to wing it and
try to stay at 5 minutes.
We heard in the first panel, the ground panels expressed
frustration, as we heard in a couple statements on this panel,
they expressed frustration of a lack of communication of the
threat or the risks that industry folks need to be aware of
that TSA has not been sharing as fully as folks would like and
working on that.
Another thing that we have heard about, though, are--some
industry stakeholders have expressed frustration at technology
development and procurement, not bringing the private sector in
to help find solutions to the problems that folks are facing.
I would ask, and start with Mr. Calio, is your industry
being given timely information from TSA as to the technology it
needs and foresees needing and asking for feedback as to, you
know, how we can get from where we are to where we need to be?
Mr. Calio. Mr. Chairman, you always think in a situation
like this, with these types of situations, that communication
could be improved. I would say, in our view, communication with
TSA has improved significantly over the last couple years. They
are very collaborative with us. They act as a partner with us,
in many cases, and share information.
Do we think we would like to have more input at times?
Sure, we do. But we have been given a lot of opportunity to
have that input.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I know you mentioned in your opening
statement your desire to see not only the pilots and the
attendants be able to go through an expedited line but, as you
know, the trusted or known traveler. It is my understanding,
within the next couple of weeks or so, you are going to hear an
announcement with regard to all those things. But I think we
all agree that it is going to be a partnership between TSA and
the airports to try to make those things work and work
effectively, and it is going to benefit everybody.
How about any of the other panelists? Do you feel like you
all are being included by the TSA when you are doing, kind of,
thinking sessions about what kind of technology we need, how
can we procure it and get it in the field?
Mr. Van Tine.
Mr. Van Tine. Well, I think, as we look at it, I think one
of the concerns that we have is the use by TSA of security
directives. Certainly, we recognize the importance of using
security directives in contingencies and emergencies, but there
is this tendency to use it to influence standing policy, rather
than working with industry to look at the operational impacts
and the consequences of some of those directives.
So, we would ask that the TSA and Congress look at how we
can work closer with the industry and not use that as the
mechanism for creating a policy.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Alterman.
Mr. Alterman. Yeah, I think that, going back to your
original question is whether we are being consulted in terms of
the technology we need--well, in our instance anyway--to screen
freight, the answer is now ``yes.'' What may have been in the
past, I think, you know, there may have been some problems, but
that is not what we should be concentrating on.
The DHS cargo working groups that were formed within the
past year, one of those working groups, sub-working groups, is
specifically on the technology, how we get it, what needs to be
done, what the monetary/research things are going to be. The
industry is intimately involved in that.
So I think the answer to your question is, we are always
sometimes frustrated because we want to know everything and we
want to know it yesterday. But with respect to the technology
point, we have gotten to a point where we are involved in that
process.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Witkowski.
Mr. Witkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The AFA, in its written testimony, has talked about several
other important aviation security issues that need to be
addressed.
One of them is a communication device, discreet
communication device, that flight attendants could use to
communicate with the flight deck pilots in emergency situations
that affect the security of the flight. Because every second
you lose in response is going to put you more at risk of a
successful terrorist attack.
TSA had been looking at this issue because it was required
to be looked at in the Homeland Security Act almost 10 years
ago. I understand that they had been looking at different types
of devices that could be used for communication with the flight
deck by the flight attendants. But we were never invited or
included in those discussions directly affecting the flight
attendants' security aboard the aircraft.
We did participate in a panel that looked at the Federal
Air Marshal Communications System, and we contributed to that
quite extensively. But as far as the flight attendant issue
which we would understood they were discussing, we were not
included, and we felt we should have been.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Calio--and this will be my last question--we all heard
about the Virgin Airlines stowaway. You know, while we are
frustrated by that, I like to remind people that we get
millions of people right. The fact is, we have human error
because humans are running these filters that we use. I am
aggravated like everybody else is when we hear about somebody
getting through the system. But we also are doing it right in a
lot of ways.
But I want to talk about this particular guy for a minute.
What type of technology do airlines use at the gate to verify
that the boarding pass presented matches that at the flight
gate? Does the technology at the gate vary depending on
airline?
Mr. Calio. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does.
I can't speak for Virgin, where the error occurred, because
they are not a member of ours. I can, I think, explain somewhat
what happened. You had a dual error: You had a TSA agent error,
and then you had a gate agent error.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Calio. What happened with the gate agent, when he
scanned the boarding pass, it showed an error. Virgin's scanner
shows--just a red light goes on. For whatever reason, that gate
agent did not check any further as to what the problem was.
For ATA-member airlines, when a gate agent scans the bar
code, if it comes up red, there could be as many as a dozen or
more error codes that come up, which will then allow the gate
agent to figure out what is wrong.
I would point out, in this particular case, this same
individual who was traveling on Virgin was stopped at the gate
by a Delta agent, which is when he was arrested by the FBI.
Mr. Rogers. Right. That is my point. On this particular
case, this is very frustrating because there were several
elements of human failure. But thank you for that feedback.
With that, I will shut up and let the Ranking Member ask
her questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for what I thought were some very instructive questions.
Let me thank all the witnesses for their very, I think,
constructive remarks.
I would like to thank the cargo association, Mr. Alterman,
for your support of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. I
believe that that is an important issue. Both Mr. Thompson and
myself, the Ranking Member, have requested TSA to establish
that. We are hoping to codify that in legislation in working
with the Chairman of this committee.
In the earlier questioning, we said, not on our watch--at
least, I offered those words--as we look at the transportation
system throughout America. I think there are a lot of points
that have been made that would help us move forward together.
That is what I think is most important, a public/private
partnership.
Earlier today, I had the opportunity to speak to an
industry group on the issue of cargo security. Our commitment
there, along with the Secretary of Transportation, was
Government and the private sector working together. I want to
thank them for their policy hearing.
But I will always look to the rightness of some of the
things that TSA does. On their pilot program--I am not sure if
this is a lucky number--it seems like the State of Alabama and
the State of Texas has been left out. The Chairman did not ask
me to mention that. But I would wonder why that is the case. I
would like a review. I don't see why we couldn't have more in
the pilot program. Maybe there will be someone here to--not the
panelists, of course--but if we can get with TSA on that
choice. I think to include additional southern cities would be
very helpful, and busy cities as well.
But as I move forward, let me try to focus in on some of
the points that have been made in particular about issues that
are of concern.
The repair stations, I think, Mr. Van Tine, you spoke
about. We have no light here, so let me try to encourage your
answer. Is there an inconsistency in our oversight of the
repair stations? Would you want to articulate that again,
please?
Mr. Van Tine. So, again, when you look at the industry and
we produce, a large percentage of our product is going overseas
to international locations and are operated on an international
basis. So what we are looking for is consistency in application
of those security requirements.
The TSA has reviewed that and believes that there is
consistency. I believe that when Administrator Pistole
testified here a couple weeks ago that he noted that. So we are
looking for that, that that rulemaking be implemented and that
that be put in place so that there is that consistency.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You believe you have sufficient input on
the rulemaking, that it is one that is going to be constructive
in oversight of those repair stations?
Mr. Van Tine. Yes, we do, and we support it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are speaking about foreign repair
stations?
Mr. Van Tine. I am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Because that has been a
constant source of concern for this committee, as you well
realize that it is also a source of potential threat. I think
we need very, very strong oversight, but we need consistency.
Is that your position?
Mr. Van Tine. That is our position, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Let me go to the flight attendants--I have just heard the
bell here--very quickly.
First, let me say to personally to Mr. Witkowski that I
have been consistently fighting for what I think is common
sense. There are two aspects to that.
One, I would encourage that flight attendants have the
opportunity to have the same security access or ease of access
that our pilots do. I have never seen a plane take off without
a pilot or the sufficient flight attendants. I have been on
planes when we are waiting for flight attendants. So I know
that they are not flying but they are part of the team. I don't
see why we cannot get a full understanding of that issue.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So can you explain the devastation or the
potential danger of an untrained flight attendant for some of
the more serious incidents that might occur?
I imagine that the flight attendants that were on the
Northwest Airlines December 25 flight into Detroit were using
their basic instincts, unless you are going to tell me that
they had gone through the training that I have asked for them
to go through. If they did not, say they did not.
Mr. Witkowski. Well----
Ms. Jackson Lee. They did not go through a higher level of
training, is that correct?
Mr. Witkowski. They didn't go through the higher level of
training----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But they used their instincts, and that
training might have helped even more. So tell me what happens
without that higher level of training?
Mr. Witkowski. Well, their reaction was more of a
firefighting reaction, in terms of trying to get the fire out
that the terrorists had begun when they were trying to use the
explosives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Witkowski. But if there is a terrorist attack which
involves deadly force, the flight attendants will be the first
to go, as some were on 9/11.
TSA had tried to make a rule saying that you could allow
some items on board the aircraft, like scissors, that would
have less than, I think, 4\1/2\ inches or 5 inches of a blade.
But the idea of that was that, when you punch that in, you are
not likely to kill someone. Well, the problem is what they do
if they slice the arteries in the neck. Someone can bleed out
in a matter of 10 or 15 or 20 seconds.
So if flight attendants don't get that basic training to
react instinctively, or as trained--I am sorry--to block, you
know, those areas where they can be killed and they can bleed
out, then they will die and the terrorists will have control of
the cabin. Because we never know what other passengers or--FAMs
are not on most flights. So you are not going to be able to
control that, and the terrorists will have control of the
cabin.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what is your argument, what is your
bottom line about the enhanced training?
Mr. Witkowski. What is needed in the enhanced training?
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is your bottom line on the enhanced
training? How important is it?
Mr. Witkowski. It is absolutely critical to National
security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How difficult do you think it is for
airlines to do so?
Mr. Witkowski. It is not difficult. In fact, as I mentioned
earlier, the Homeland Security Act language, if that language
was just reinstated in the law, TSA was going forward with that
in developing a program that the carriers could have enacted in
2003 and beyond.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How costly, just from your own guess? Do
you think it would be enormously costly?
Mr. Witkowski. I don't think it would be enormously costly,
in terms of having that kind of a program. One of the
recommendations we made in our written testimony was that you
would make sure that someone such as the head of defensive
tactics for the Federal air marshals would ensure that it was
effective training, or someone that deals with----
Ms. Jackson Lee. While they are in their basic training, it
could just be a continuation. Would you assume that that could
work?
Mr. Witkowski. Yes. Yes. There could be a recurrent
training. Once you get down--you have to train in the initial
training so that the flight attendants can react immediately,
so they have built muscle memory from the training in order to
react if they are attacked in the cabin.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me move quickly. Let me just say
that I am interested in the issue of the security access.
Hopefully we will work with TSA to find out how that can be
expanded.
I have two quick questions for Mr. Calio and Mr. Alterman.
I apologize, too, if the name pronunciation is not correct.
But after 9/11--and let me just say, I have a great
appreciation for airlines. It brings grandmas together with
grandchildren. If you go into the airports, you know, people
are generally happy because they are going somewhere and they
are going to get there quickly.
I did not and I don't believe any Member of Congress
hesitated one moment after 9/11 to bail out the airlines. I was
here then. I understood the depth of devastation and the cry
from airlines that they needed a very large bailout, and this
Federal Government did so. So the idea of paying for security
is what patriots do. Patriots stand up for their country. There
is absolutely no other way that we can provide for security
without that assessment.
Now, whether we increase it, I have an open mind. I am
interested in not being enormously burdensome. But I cannot in
any way accept the fact that it is not the responsibility of
the airlines and those of us who are passengers--and we do pay
it. It is passed through to us. The passenger fee is passed
through to us, so it doesn't impact airlines at all.
But what I would like to find out is this issue of the
recurrent basic training to flight attendants and the idea of
this enhanced training. What would be the problem with that,
Mr. Calio? If you could pronounce your name correctly so we
could----
Mr. Calio. You got it right the first time. ``Calio.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. ``Calio.'' Thank you.
Mr. Calio. But I have heard it many different ways.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we shouldn't do that. So, ``Calio.''
Thank you.
Mr. Calio. Thank you.
I would say first that the safety of our crews and
passengers are always our highest priorities, and we won't
compromise that.
You know I believe that we have a disagreement about
whether the enhanced training is necessary. We provide basic
training and defensive techniques as part of our comprehensive
flight attendant training. We don't believe that training in
more aggressive measures would provide measurable security
benefits based on all the multilayered security procedures and
processes already in place.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I respect that. But why not have it to use
it if necessary? That is really the question that is not being
answered. Why not have it to use it if necessary?
I think the counter--the complement to that, of course, is
the appropriate use of it. I believe that you have well-
trained, well-selected flight attendants that would have the
right judgment. Certainly, we wouldn't want to use it on a
passenger that got up to the restroom at the wrong time if all
they were doing was going to the restroom. But I do think it is
appropriate, in the climate that we are living in, to have
that. I would like to keep an open mind. I am going to convene
a meeting of the airlines, that I hope maybe the Chairman will
join with me, on that issue.
Let me finish by just asking Mr. Alterman--thank you for
your answer.
Let me ask Mr. Alterman, we had packages that you know that
were coming in from Yemen on flights that were cargo. It opened
our eyes. Some of us had our eyes open before, but it opened
our eyes to the eye of the storm that cargo planes and your
staff and your personnel are in. What should we do more on the
cargo security side?
Mr. Alterman. Thank you.
I think that a lot of the answer to that question is what
has been done. You are absolutely correct, it opened all of our
eyes. Terrorists are not dumb. Terrorists are looking to
exploit weaknesses. It is virtually impossible to figure out
everything that they might do in the future. So this threat in
Yemen was an eye-opener for all of us.
What it did immediately, it set into motion a series of
events whereby the Transportation Security Administration, in
conjunction with the industry--and I have to give them credit.
I am beginning to feel like an apologist for TSA, and I don't
want to do that, I will probably get fired. But, to their
credit, they worked with the industry after the Yemen
incident----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is good.
Mr. Alterman [continuing]. To try to figure out where the
vulnerabilities are, what went wrong, and how do we avoid them
in the future.
The results of that work, I mentioned some of them. Some of
them are on-going projects that are on-going through DHS in the
working groups, that are on-going in the pilot programs that
have been described by Mr. Calio, to try to identify freight in
advance of it being loaded on the plane.
But let me go back to what was done immediately, because I
think that was very important and very unusual. TSA issued a
series of new security directives and emergency amendments as
it began to find out more information. What we learned clearly
from that incident is that intelligence is the best way of
thwarting terrorists. Those packages, all of them, were
screened three times. Guess what? They looked like printer
cartridges. They were actually thwarted by the intelligence
efforts of people overseas.
So one of the things we learned and we have tried to
implement--and we have talked about it before--is we need to
get better intelligence sharing. We need for the Government to
share with itself, among itself, and transmit that to the
industry as quickly as possible.
But over and above that, what we learned is that we need,
again, to employ the risk-based system, to understand that a
package from Yemen may not be the same as a package from
Dubuque, Iowa; that we need to take different measures based on
the threat, both on the location and the shipper; we need to
get a better trusted-shipper program overseas so that we know
who we are dealing with; and when we don't know who we are
dealing with, we need to take more intrusive and better care of
our freight.
Mr. Rogers. I hate to cut you off, but we have got 3\1/2\
minutes to get over to the floor. I want Mr. Cravaack to be
able to ask a question before we leave.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is more of a
statement than anything else.
Mr. Calio, I appreciate your being here today. Both as an
airline pilot, a commercial airline pilot, and also a Federal
flight deck officer, I have gone through a lot of different
training in this industry. I really think it is imperative,
what you brought out in your written testimony, that the air
crew, flight attendants and pilots, know who is on their
aircraft. It is imperative. I would just echo that, and I would
just compliment you on that.
Mr. Witkowski, I have just a couple quick questions for you
because, unfortunately, it is going to be abbreviated. I am a
strong proponent of ``known crew member.'' Flight attendants
are part of that crew, and I strongly support that.
Mr. Witkowski. Thank you.
Mr. Cravaack. But with that said, you are proposing
additional training. Some of the words you used are ``flight
attendants must know how to respond to deadly force; it is
imperative to National security.''
But as this rule is written right now, sir, what I have a
very big contention with, is that additional training, as
proposed, which prohibits any testing and allows any crew
member to opt out if they do not wish to physically
participate--is that correct, sir, or am I reading this wrong?
Mr. Witkowski. No, the Homeland Security Act that I
referred to did allow a crew member who believed that they
couldn't take the hands-on self-defense training was allowed to
opt out. That was in the Homeland Security Act language.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. I have a real big problem with that,
especially going through Federal flight deck officer training
and some of the training I have gone through. If they are going
to be a vital member of the team, as you proposed, in making
sure that they know how to use deadly force, and it is
imperative to National security--especially the deadly force.
You don't want to engage unless you know what you are doing.
The big thing is--and I have gone through enough physical
training to understand this--as much as you need to know to
give a punch or a block, you have to know how to take one and
respond.
So that was just my point. Did you have something to say,
sir?
Mr. Witkowski. I was just going to say that the way TSA
began to implement that, before it was taken away by the
following Vision 100, was that they were going to ensure that
all the crew members got the training or some level of self-
defense training so they could protect themselves.
Mr. Cravaack. Yeah.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay, I am sorry. I apologize. We have to go
vote.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I apologize to all of you. I have so many more
questions. Obviously, we all do. We have 54 seconds to get
across the street.
Having said that, we are leaving the record open for 10
days. I know I am going to supply some questions to you all,
and I know the Members will.
Again, as I told the first panel, all of this is about
putting stuff on the record to support our writing of the
authorization, so your answers are very important, just as your
testimony and presence is. So I really appreciate that.
I want to thank the witnesses for their time, and I
apologize for the delay and having to leave early. The Members
of the committee, again, will get you questions, and I
appreciate your answering them.
With that, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Question From Chairman Mike Rogers for Thomas L. Farmer
Question. Mr. Risch in his testimony stated that the training
provided to rail employees consists primarily of watching a brief
video, and is not substantive enough for the needs of the employees.
Can you outline in detail the security training initiatives of your
passenger and freight rail members? Including information that responds
to the following:
What does the training consist of?
How often do employees receive training?
How is the training assessed and validated?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Thomas L. Farmer
Question 1. Recently the Department of Homeland Security issued new
surface security grant guidance, which according to DHS will focus on
highest-risk assets. I am concerned that the grant dollars may be
concentrated only on major metropolitan cities. Can you please shed
light on the how commuter rail will be impacted by the new grant
guidance? How will security training programs relying on this funding
be impacted?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Do you believe the Department's grant priorities are
harmonized with State and local preparedness priorities in response to
enhanced security of the transport of hazardous materials?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. There appear to be more operations between TSA and
transit agencies in conducting exercises and testing technology.
Can you please share some of your experience with efforts under way
between TSA and rail stakeholders to enhance security? How are VIPER
teams facilitating our security goals in the field? How can this
relationship and collaboration improve?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. Have you perceived any changes in TSA's approach to
surface transportation security following the discovery that al-Qaeda
has allegedly considered U.S. rail targets?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The last TSA authorization bill, H.R. 2200, established
an office of surface transportation at TSA. Do you feel this is a
reasonable provision that would give surface security programs more
prominence at TSA?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Earlier this month, TSA announced that it would be
reinstating the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (also known as
ASAC). One of the primary functions of the advisory committee is to
facilitate stakeholder input across TSA security policies as they
pertain to aviation security programs. As some of you have testified
before us here today, DHS has facilitated industry stakeholder meetings
through its Infrastructure Protection initiatives; however, these
groups would generally focus on big-picture items and funding issues
associated with surface and mass transit programs. Therefore, would you
support the notion that a standing committee with active TSA leadership
housed within TSA, would benefit industry groups interested in active
participation in the development of surface and mass transportation
security policies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Martin Rojas
Question 1. TSA has been working towards growing situational
awareness programs for truckers that train truckers and mass transit
professionals to recognize and report security threats. In you
statement you call for improved coordination efforts and less
regulations for your members. In an effort to improve security goals,
how can TSA incentivize your members to participate in the situational
training programs made available today?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Please provide comment on the recent announcement that
the United States and Mexico have an accord on Mexican truck driver
operations in the United States, which includes new monitoring
procedures for trucks and traffic sign proficiency requirements for
truck drivers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Are you aware that TSA's Transportation Threat
Assessment and Credentialing division is considering an internal
reorganization, as well as a transportation worker credentialing
``harmonization'' that may change the cost to industry and workers for
transportation security credentials? Have you been consulted by TSA on
this process? Are you concerned that harmonization could lead to
increased fees for transportation security credentials?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman Mike Rogers for Wanda Y. Dunham
Question. A former CIA senior operations officer recently published
a book titled ``Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland
Security'''. This book specifically identifies an increase in bomb-
sniffing dogs and random bag checks as a critical piece to improving
mass transit security. How can TSA help transit systems to expand the
use of canines, and provide guidance as to best practices in canine
deployment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Wanda Y. Dunham
Question 1. In terms of responding to an emergency situation, give
us your thoughts on how communications and information sharing has
changed over the past few years between you, other law enforcement
agencies, and Federal and State authorities.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Please describe the types of projects and operations at
MARTA that are funded by Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funds.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Do you have any comments on the new grant guidance for
the TSGP?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Do you think reductions in TSGP funding could impact
security at transit systems Nation-wide?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Raymond Reese
Question 1. Does TSA need more authority to further secure the
Nation's pipelines?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How often do you participate in security exercises with
the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation and
local first responders? How do you ensure that first responders are
actively engaged in security programs with industry?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for John Risch, III
Question 1. TSA has recently made some structural and resource
changes to the Transportation Security Inspector program, including
changes in training and lines of report. Have your members been able to
engage with TSA on the Transportation Security Inspector program,
changes to its organization structure and how this program will play a
vital security role across rail operations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What changes in TSA surface security programs and
policies would better equip rail workers to recognize and address
terrorist threats?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Nicholas E. Calio
Question 1. We have heard from TSA that they have data showing that
checked baggage fees are contributing to a dramatic increase in carry-
on bags, which presents a security problem for screeners at the
checkpoint and flight crews at boarding. The media has reported that
air carriers will receive 3.4 billion dollars in checked baggage
revenue. What is ATA's position on this issue and what are air carriers
willing to do to help address the situation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Is it the air carrier's responsibility to regulate
carry-on bag size? Do you agree with some stakeholders that increased
carry-on bag volume adversely impacts security by increasing congestion
at security checkpoints and on the aircraft, and by reducing the
ability to detect anomalies in more densely packed carry-on bags?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Are your member carriers concerned at all with the
proposed reorganization of the Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing division at TSA and the associated ``harmonization'' of
the credentialing process, the result of which may lead to increased
fees for aviation worker credentialing?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What is your assessment of the progress being made on
the statutory requirement that air carriers screen all inbound cargo on
passenger planes for explosives?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers for Mark Van Tine
Question 1. In your testimony you talked about how TSA's security
directives tend to function as standing policy.
What processes are currently in place to allow your industry to
request a review of existing security directives?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In your testimony you also mentioned the redundancies
in the background checks that TSA performs for alien students attending
flight schools.
Can you outline in detail what changes you would like to see TSA
make to this program in order to allow U.S. flight schools to be more
competitive while maintaining security?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Mike Rogers for Stephen A. Alterman
Question 1. In your testimony you highlighted the importance of
sustained support to develop new technologies to screen consolidated
shipments. How can TSA better collaborate with your industry to support
this effort?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What changes, if any, would you like to see made to the
Air Cargo Security Working Group to improve its impact?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher
Witkowski
Question 1. Are flight attendants a lower risk population that
should participate in any crew access program to expedite security
screening--the one that pilots are participating in?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Please explain why it is difficult for flight
attendants to access the advanced self-defense training for crew.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Some have called the advanced crew training ``Judo''
training that is not effective. Do you agree?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Do you feel that like pilots, flight attendants are a
low-risk population that should participate in any programs to expedite
flight crews around security checkpoints so that TSA personnel can
focus screening resources on higher-risk populations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. In the 10 years since the 9/11 attacks, how has the
flight attendant profession changed in terms of security training and
preparation? Do flight attendants feel that they have more tools and
resources today than before to disrupt an in-flight terrorist attack?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.