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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
MARCH 1, 2012



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FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2012.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You know with the busy schedule we have had the last couple of weeks I inadvertently overlooked the fact that we have a new Member of our committee, my colleague from California, Jackie Speier. We want to officially welcome you to the committee and are happy that you are here with us.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States PACOM [Pacific Command], more than 38 years of service, almost 39. You have distinguished yourself as one of our top military leaders, one of our top pilots. I understand that your claim to fame is wearing the black hat, flying the enemy plane in “Top Gun.” Congratulations you survived that.

Admiral Willard, thank you for your long, distinguished service to our Nation. And thank you to Donna, your spouse, your partner. She has also been a great support of the Navy. I know when we were down there she was the—I don’t know the title but it was kind of like you did everything for the USS *California* and their crew.

Admiral WILLARD. Sponsor.

The CHAIRMAN. Our newest attack submarine and I was able to participate a little bit in that and saw the love that the crew had for you and those who built that boat. So it was good to see Admiral Willard taking your picture and fitting in the role reversal model.

Admiral, with your retirement next week I know you have been very busy handing over command to Admiral Sam Locklear. So I thank you for taking the time to appear before this committee one last time. I apologize in advance, we will be having some votes. I know Members will be leaving, but we do really appreciate you taking the time to be with us.

Our economy and security has never been more dependent on our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The President's new strategy focuses on a so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific. While I don't quite question the critical importance of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may not be properly postured to support this ship. The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current levels. Over the next 5 years we cut 16 ships out of our new construction budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain our forces.

This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear deterrent, but the Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral reductions below New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] levels. As you have discussed often with us, quantity does have a quality all of its own, especially in a theater that covers half of the Earth's surface.

We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how the new strategy will meet these goals. Events in Asia can change rapidly as we saw in December with the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside our South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to deter further North Korean provocation.

China's growing influence creates concern for many of our regional allies. The balance of power against the Taiwan Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more than \$5 trillion in trade passes each year. Deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. forces from operating along China's periphery is still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army. As China's military budget continues to grow annually by double digits, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] is focused on improving their capacities to counter U.S. military capabilities and exploit any potential weaknesses that we may have.

We also see the growing threat of terrorism in the region as aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand beyond their traditional border disputes.

In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and defend our regional allies and security interests.

We look forward to your testimony and shedding the additional light on the matters and the range of security challenges that we face in the Pacific.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join you in welcoming Ms. Speier to the committee. It is great to have her on. We have already worked on some issues that she has been interested in on the Armed Services Committee. It is great to have her on the committee and welcome. It is great to have you join us.

I also definitely want to thank Admiral Willard for being here today, but also for his service. He is retiring soon, his last opportunity to testify before us, and we certainly want to thank Mrs. Willard as well. It is a total team effort, a career like the one that you built. And we really appreciate all of have both done for our country.

I also appreciate talking to Mrs. Willard before and she said that her presence she always thought it would make the Members be nicer to Admiral Willard, but she did point out that it never actually worked, but it is still sentiment. We really appreciate all that you both have done, great service to our country. And your last command incredibly important in the Asia-Pacific theater, we have a number of allies and partners in the region and a number of challenges in the region. I agree with the list the chairman rolled out, trying to figure out how to deal with the rising China, the unpredictability of North Korea, a number of different terrorist groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere. It is a critically important region.

The Navy is one of our best, best allies in terms of delivering a positive U.S. message; it shows our presence in the region. I think that is the most important thing about our strategy going forward. The President has said we are a Pacific power. We want to make it clear to everyone in the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that we will continue to be a Pacific power, and the Navy is one of the best ways that we demonstrate that. Our presence there builds those partnerships and builds those relationships.

I remember reading somewhere that last year alone there were over 700 port calls in Asia by the Pacific Command, and all of those are opportunities to build relationships and build friendships and build partnerships. Of course our Pacific Command has responded to many natural disasters in the area, most recently that earthquake and tsunami in Japan but certainly the earthquake and tsunami before that in Thailand and Indonesia.

You put the best face on U.S. policy in the region and we really appreciate that work. It is critical that we give you the resources to enable that mission to go forward.

I look forward to your testimony, look forward to your answers to our questions, and again thank you very much for your service and your leadership.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Admiral.

**STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER,
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much, Chairman McKeon. Mr. Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee's questions sooner, I will keep my remarks brief and ask that my full statement be included for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss United States Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific region. I would like to begin by thanking you for recognizing my wife Donna and her sponsorship of the USS *California*. She is present today and has been at my side for nearly 38 years. She is an outstanding ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our military and their families. Together we have thoroughly enjoyed this experience both with our counterpart foreign friends and with all of you who advocate for our men and women in uniform. Thank you.

I would like to acknowledge this committee's enduring support for our joint forces and by your actions their contribution to our Nation's security. Your visits to the region have been and will continue to be an important reminder of the United States' national interests there.

North Korea, the world's only remaining nation divided by armistice, continues to threaten peace and security in Northeast Asia now under the leadership of a 29-year-old son of Kim Jong-il. There we are observing closely for signs of instability or evidence that leadership transition is faltering. As General Thurman will attest in his testimony to you, we believe that Kim Jong-un is currently tightly surrounded by KJI [Kim Jong-il] associates and for the time being that the succession in North Korea appears to be on course.

With that said, we also believe Kim Jong-un will continue to pursue his father's course of strategy that embraces nuclearization, missile development, WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian control over North Korean society.

As you stated, management of the China relationship continues to be a challenge to U.S. Pacific Command on many levels. Our military-to-military relationship is still not where it should be. Although a strategic level exchange of views with DOD [Department of Defense] persisted throughout 2011, the PLA continues to advance its military capabilities at an impressive rate, is growing bolder with regard to their expanding regional and global presence, and China continues to challenge the United States and our partners in the region in the maritime, cyber and space domains.

President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta recently reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific and our Nation's future focus on its security challenges in the document "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." It appropriately addressed the opportunities and challenges that PACOM faces in a region covering half the world and containing the majority of great powers, economies, populations, and militaries.

Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand, together with many regional partners, represent the greatest opportunities for the United States and Pacific Command to contribute to a broad security association in the region. Of particular note we seek to advance our important relationship with India in South Asia.

We are making progress in adjusting PACOM's force posture toward Southeast Asia, following overtures from Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable and increased rotational military presence in this important subregion.

As was evidenced by United States support to Japan during the epic triple disaster last March, close military cooperation, frequent exercises, and interoperable systems merged to create the type of partnerships that take us to levels of cooperation such that we are ready and effective.

Throughout the Asia-Pacific numerous transnational threats, such as bio and extremist organizations, proliferation, trafficking, piracy and perpetual natural and manmade disasters, challenge our Nation and our allies and partners in the region. Across this wide spectrum of current and potential future threats PACOM must provide persistent overwatch, ensuring our Nation retains continued strategic access and freedom of movement in the global commons.

Amidst this challenges everyday our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians devote their efforts to contributing to Asia-Pacific security. Their success has long been enabled by this committee's enduring support, including the resources and quality of life that you provide them to accomplish their important missions. During the 2½ years that I have been in command you have allowed me and my commanders to share our perspectives with you, sought to understand the dynamics of this complex region, and traveled and met with our military families and foreign partners. Yours has been a powerful message and demonstration of U.S. commitment to the 36 nations in the Asia-Pacific. On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify one final time. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral, and again thank you for your distinguished career, your tremendous service to the Nation. I think this command that you are retiring from is one of the most important to our Nation and to the world. And with the President's new switch in strategy and moving, as he said, moving, I don't know exactly how he put it, but moving more emphasis on the Pacific region, I think as we have had other chiefs coming in and testifying talking about the budget cuts and how we are going to be asked to do more with less, it seems that no region will be asked to do more with less than your command. And what I would like is if you could lay out for us are you gaining any additional capacity or ability to carry out this new effort? And could you let us know what in your best military judgment the requirements, capabilities, any potential gaps that we should be looking at as we

go through the budget process and reaffirming this announcement by the President. Please.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. And I think one of the relevant questions of the day, given both the budget that has been presented and the strategy that has been articulated by the President, by Secretary of Defense Panetta. U.S. Pacific Command in the 2½ years that I have been in command and in my previous assignment as U.S. Pacific Fleet, has been well served I think by the Nation in terms of the force structure that is there. And while we have been there we have been endeavoring to adjust posture to optimize the forces that we do have. We have been at war for 10 years and during a decade of warfare we have given to the theater, as all the combatant commanders have, such that particularly our Army and our Marine Corps have been decremented by about 10 percent as they have rotated in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 10 years.

When you ask the question will we gain more, I think as we draw down from two wars that are now a decade old, we will see a recovery of particularly the ground forces that have been so dedicated to those conflicts. As well the strategy that has been laid out by the President and Secretary of Defense prioritize the security environment globally, and I think that is very important to both recognize and then track to ensure that we actually take the actions that those words I think so appropriately establish. And it provides focus on the Asia-Pacific region as one of those important security environments globally. And your summary of the rationale, the reasons why I think was very accurate.

So I think what is important is to recognize that even in a situation where the budget will cause for force reductions postwar and given our current economic environment within the country, that where we bias the forces that we do have will be most relevant, and given the focus on the Asia-Pacific and the focus on the Middle East, I think that in the future we should anticipate that the force structure that we attempt to optimize will be biased in those directions. So I expect U.S. Pacific Command to continue to be well served.

So to the extent that the budget focuses on particular capabilities, ballistic missile defense, cyber and others, I think all the combatant commanders will enjoy increased emphasis there, but in the Pacific Command I look forward to the ground forces in particular, our special forces, returning to the region on a permanent basis and for the focus to be represented by a biasing of other forces such as our Naval forces and Air forces there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Admiral, give us a little bit of a look at the repositioning of troops between Okinawa, Guam, mainland Japan and Hawaii. And I was particularly concerned with how it impacts Guam and when those plans are going to be finalized, and how you see us resolving the continuing difficulty on Okinawa in terms of how we place Marine Corps base there, trying to shut down Futenma but we can't find a new place. How do you see that coming out? The sooner we can figure it out the better for all involved, but certainly for Guam and particularly to understanding

exactly what they are going to have. Just give us a little bit of a preview on what is happening with that.

Admiral WILLARD. As you know, we are still in discussions with the Japanese on this. We have working groups on both sides that are attempting to finalize plans for the 8,000 or so marines that we committed in 2006 to redistribute from Okinawa. And you refer to a Futenma replacement facility, the air field that actually contains the rotary wing lift for the marines that are currently on Okinawa and, as a separate issue within the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the shift of the location of that airfield from the urban area in Okinawa to Camp Schwab, an area further north on the island.

In the past within the Defense Policy Review Initiative, DPRI, the two were linked together, FRF, the Futenma Replacement Facility, and the movement of the 8,000 marines. One of the agreements between Japan and the United States recently was to delink the two so that the challenges, the policy challenges that have been posed that have caused delays and the Futenma replacement facility could be dealt with separate from the issues of Guam and other sites for our Marine Corps. And at the same time, the Marine Corps, Secretary Panetta and U.S. Pacific Command, in the course of deliberations of optimum sites for our marines, given both the economic environment that we are in and the specific strategic needs of U.S. Pacific Command in the region to have those marines sited properly, have been working on the distribution of both the headquarters elements from Okinawa and the marine troops from Okinawa and where they should be located. And presently the view is for about 4,700 marines to be located on the island of Guam and others to be distributed to sites such as Hawaii and, as you know, a rotational presence out of Darwin, Australia. Those combinations are part of the ongoing working group deliberations with Japan and the United States.

There is a way to go with it and the Futenma replacement facility issue has resulted in strong advocacy by Tokyo, by the government there, and continued challenges locally in Okinawa. And we think that Camp Schwab remains the best option. The Government of Japan appears to sanction that. We will continue the deliberations with them and attempt to see progress made over the coming year.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are well into the first vote. Looks like there is going to be five votes. What I am going to do is call on Mr. Bartlett and then we will resume questioning as we return back from the vote.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Admiral, thank you very much for your long years of service to our country. For several years now I have been watching a global phenomenon that could enormously affect your area of responsibility and I wanted to get your insights into it. The United States has only 2 percent of the known reserves of oil in the world. We use 25 percent of the world's oil. China has even on its mainland less oil than we have. They do not yet use as much as we. But last year they bought more auto-

mobiles than we bought in this country so their use of oil is increasing.

China is very aggressively buying oil all over the world. While we are an enormously larger user of oil than China, we are buying oil reserves nowhere in the world. And I am wondering why you think China is buying oil reserves all over the world. Sir, it doesn't make any difference today who owns the oil, the person who comes with the dollars, and let's hope it stays dollars, who comes with the dollars to the global oil auction gets the oil they need. Why would we not be buying oil when China is very aggressively buying reserves of oil all over the world?

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman Bartlett, I can't speak to U.S. rationale for its oil energy policies in their entirety. I would certainly direct you to the Department of Energy to answer that question, but I would offer to your point China is very much interested in energy sources globally, as is India. We have more than one nation, as you know, in the Asia-Pacific region that are both industrial, growing, expanding economies and very much interested in energy resources worldwide. Energy security is a concern of the United States Pacific Command; both the security of the energy as it moves around the world and the potential disputes that challenges and competition over energy could generate. And so we pay a great deal of attention to the issues in regions such as the South China Sea and emerging regions in the Indian Ocean where energy is being tapped. And again to your point, there is great competition for this; China, India, Japan and others very much concerned about their access to energy and their ability to secure it globally.

Mr. BARTLETT. At the same time that China is buying oil reserves all over the world, they are very aggressively, as you know, sir, building a blue water navy. They don't really need a blue water navy if they are only interested in protecting their shores, do they? Won't a brown water navy do just fine there?

Admiral WILLARD. The Chinese have been fairly clear in their desire to not only have a navy that can project itself within the region immediately surrounding China, but also be influential enough to both protect its interests and contribute to global security concerns elsewhere beyond the first island chain region and out into the Pacific as well as in the Indian Ocean. As you know, they have committed now for several years to counter piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden. I think that their focus is on sea lines of communication that they consider to be vital to their commerce and to their economy.

Mr. BARTLETT. They have 1,300,000 people, 900 million of them in rural areas that through the miracle of communications know the advantages of industrialized economy, and they are saying, Hey, guys, what about us?

Do you think that there is a possibility that with their need to satisfy the needs of this huge population that the time would come and they would say, Hey, guys, I am sorry but we own the oil and we can't share it? Wouldn't that require a big blue water navy to make sure they control the sea lanes so that they could absolutely certify that the oil was theirs and they would not need to share it with the rest of the world?

Admiral WILLARD. Again, I think China's view of the need for a blue water navy as they see their economy expand and their great power status establish itself, they would reflect on other great economies and great powers and the use of navies and other arms of their military to secure and protect what is theirs.

I wouldn't speculate that China has designs on challenging the rest of the world with regard to what is on the waterways. In fact our military-to-military engagement with China is aimed at both learning to coexist with their military and also ensuring that at the end they are a constructive contributor to global security and not an impediment to it. So I would have a more optimistic view of the trends with regard to the PLA-Navy and what their goals are. We don't believe that their goals are to challenge other nations' access to energy or other commerce but rather to secure their own.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, sir. I hope you are right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will recess now for votes. We will return back as soon as the votes are done.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your patience. The committee will come to order.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral Willard, thank you so much for all of your service, all of these years. You have so many great experiences and reflections I am sure. If I get through my questions I want to ask you to give Congress a word of advice, if you might, from what you have seen in the give and take, and it doesn't all have to be positive. I want you to go out on a limb a little bit since you are retiring. Okay?

The first question I wanted to ask you was about the retiring seven cruisers. And I understand that we sometimes get about 35 years of service, most of these have 20, I know that some are in a state of disrepair that they don't want to move forward with, but on the other hand there is a concern about that. Do you share that? And what does it take to bring them back to service if in fact we do retire them?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, a great question. In my previous assignment I was a Pacific fleet commander and I spent a considerable amount of time worrying over life cycle maintenance and challenges associated with our surface ship Navy. And I have had the discussions fairly recently with our Chief of Naval Operations with regard to his plans and the 30-year shipbuilding plan in order to produce enough ships to be able to accommodate our security needs throughout the world. And as was mentioned earlier, as a combatant commander and especially one in a maritime area such as the Asia-Pacific, a quantity of surface ships has a quality all its own. And there is time distance factors in this area of responsibility that are unique in the world.

The overall ship count in my view matters, but matters less than what we do with those ships when we have them. And the Chief of Naval Operations I think would attest that his plan calls for a gradual increase in our ship count, but that it won't occur in the next several years, it occurs beyond that as a consequence of some of the decommissionings and retirements that are ongoing.

So the short answer is, am I concerned? We are always concerned about the number of ships and type model series of ships to meet our needs throughout the world. I have been well served both as a Pacific fleet commander and now as a Pacific Command commander that the forward-deployed Naval force and the other Naval forces concentrated in San Diego and Pearl Harbor and forward in Guam have been adequate to serve our presence needs in the region. I am confident that given the priorities that President Obama has established and that Secretary Panetta has very much supported, the Asia-Pacific will continue to get the number of and type of surface ships that it needs.

We will still have, I think, a little over 80 Aegis ships that will continue to serve our Navy. And I know a lot about the life cycle challenges that the Chief of Naval Operations faces and his need to retire some of these ships earlier than the ideal life cycle would have called for. But I think he does that eyes wide open. He does that knowing that eventually we will recover from this.

Mrs. DAVIS. Are they sometimes brought back?

Admiral WILLARD. They are sometimes brought back. I guess the most notable example would be our battleships that were retired after World War II and some of those were recovered, recommissioned four times in the course of my career. Actually as they were brought back into service for varying conflicts and at varying times when we were in buildup periods within our Navy. So it is possible to reconstitute the ships that we retire and we can actually put ships into lay-up status in a decommissioned status at varying levels so that we can bring them back quicker. Sometimes they take longer.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Admiral. I just wanted to say at the onset that San Diego is very proud to play the critical role they are playing now in the Pacific, and I think we anticipate being able to do that. We are not moving and neither is the Navy. So we appreciate that very much.

My time is up. I just want to, on personnel issues with families do you see particular challenges that families and personnel have in the Pacific that you would like to address? And you can do that with me at another time if you would like.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired if you could respond to her for the record, please.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, we do thank you for your service. We are going to miss you a great deal as you retire, but we thank you for all that you have done. This is probably one of the most delicate parts of your job in coming in here and testifying and knowing what you can say and what you can't say. But I know that when we established our network of bases in the region we did so partly to ensure that we would never have to fight our way in again. And the question I would ask you is what would be the impact on your ability to perform the duties that you need to perform if we were to bring especially the marines back on to the continental United States? Because you know we

have a lot of voices that say we ought to no longer have them forward deployed.

And the second thing is how much is it going to impact you if we do away with the prepositioned stocks that we have been having in the Pacific?

The third thing, I hate to give you three, but the third one is, I am concerned, like you said, sometimes numbers start becoming a serious thing in and of themselves. How do you see the comparison between the number of subs we are going to have and the number of subs the Chinese will have over the next 8-year period in the Pacific?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. Should the marines be withdrawn from their period presence in the Pacific to Garrison in the United States, it would be very impacting to the United States Pacific Command. The marines that are located in Okinawa now on paper, about 18,000 strong—they have been decremented over the course of the wars to 13,000 or so—are generally our first responders in the region, disaster response. We respond to natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region on the average of once every 8 weeks. Most recently we were in Thailand and the marines were in Thailand to handle some of the deflooding, some of the flooding challenges that they had when Thailand experienced the worst flooding in 50 years. And a year ago nearly today when Japan had its epic series of disasters, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force commander himself and the marines deployed immediately to northern Honshu to assist the Japanese ground forces in the recovery efforts following the tsunami and earthquake, continued earthquake series that occurred there.

Our marines are part of every contingency plan that we have. And when you consider the time-distance factors in the Pacific, the largest ocean in the world, it is very important that we maintain the posture and presence forward that we do. In fact I was asked, have been asked many times what is most important to you, and it is the forward presence within the Asia-Pacific simply because of the time-distance challenges that we face there and being able to be responsive as flexible as we need to be.

And I guess the last point I would make is our marines, our ground forces, the nations in the Asia-Pacific, even those that are some of the largest archipelagos in the world, like Indonesia, and Philippines, and even Japan, have militaries that are generally ground force centric, they are army centric, surprisingly. And the ground forces are a major tool for engagement and capacity building within these nations and our marines play a special role in that. So their forward presence to me is very, very vital.

Mr. FORBES. How about prepositioned stocks?

Admiral WILLARD. Prepositioned stocks, not just servicing our marines but servicing virtually any contingency in the area? Again very, very vital. I know that there have been discussions with regard to putting some of our prepositioned stocks into a lesser readiness status. Fortunately there is no plan to do that with our prepositioned stocks in Guam or Diego Garcia, and they are vital to me as well. So the prepositioned stocks are necessary in our contingency planning but they are also a source that we exercise with

our marines on a frequent basis to ensure that we know how to use them correctly.

Mr. FORBES. I only have 20 seconds left. Can you hit me with your forecast of where we are going to match up over the next 8, 10 years with our subs versus what you see happening with China in the Pacific?

Admiral WILLARD. Submarine activity in China, the growth in both capability and capacity has been impressive to watch in the submarine force. And our submarines fortunately are biased 60 percent in the Pacific and that is very helpful. So it is necessary, I think, that the United States maintain a substantial submarine force in the Pacific and the forward presence of our submarines as well in order to contend with all the challenges that we face there and the submarine community contributes to a lot of what we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard, thank you for appearing before this subcommittee today and for your many years of service to our Nation. As the chairman has mentioned and you mentioned yourself this morning, this will be your last appearance in a policy hearing before this committee as you will be retiring later this year. With that in mind, I just want to thank you again for your nearly 40 years of service to this country and to the sacrifices that you have made to ensure that we continue to have those freedoms that we all enjoy and that so many take for granted. You have our most sincere gratitude.

I would like to start, really to continue on with the discussion that my colleague Mr. Forbes just raised with the future of Naval assets. With the coming focus, added focus and the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and China's continued investments in power projection and A2/AD [anti access area denial] capabilities, can you speak to the future utilization of our submarine force? Specifically, can you discuss the need for the capabilities offered by the *Virginia* class submarines and the future challenges presented by a declining submarine fleet size?

Admiral WILLARD. First, I don't think there is a question that the United States possesses the finest submarine force the world has ever seen. And I have every confidence in our submarines in the Pacific and anywhere else in the world that they can perform the job that they perform and the very quiet way that they go about achieving that. So we rely on our submarines greatly for a great many things. They are multimission capable assets and we employ them globally, and again they serve to secure the Pacific in every way.

The *Virginia* class submarine is our newest, most formidable, and provides increased capacities in some cases that we very much need. I am not prejudiced because my wife has sponsored one. I would offer that the *Virginia* class subs are the best submarine the world has probably ever seen. And that is not to take away from the great service our *Los Angeles* class have performed. They have done remarkably well and they continue to perform remarkably well across our oceans.

Submarines happen to be an area where there is a proliferation in this part of the naval forces throughout the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is acquiring additional submarines, the Japanese are acquir-

ing submarines, Malaysia recently acquired submarines, Indonesia has designs on increasing its submarine fleet. India just took possession of a Russian submarine that is very capable. So we see the submarine forces in the region themselves proliferating, not to mention China's advancing submarine capability.

It is important that the submarine forces among our allies and partners are coordinated with our own efforts, and again I think we establish a pretty good benchmark for everyone to consider in terms of how to professionally employ that particular asset. Great boats.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. With regard to cyber security, which I focus a great deal on, I believe that we can no longer expect to have a single domain conflict. I am pleased that you mentioned that several times this morning, obviously it is on your radar, and you realize what a challenge we face in that area. And quite frankly, the low barriers to entry into the cyber arena means that any future conflict will have a cyber dimension. To that end I am very concerned about the capabilities of our basis to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure. So much is owned and operated by the private sector which we don't control, such as the electric grid. And I have had conversations with Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and many others before this committee about the resilience in the face of such a threat. Have you examined the ability of our bases in PACOM's AOR [Area of Responsibility] to operate and recover in the event of such an attack? Do you feel that our bases and networks are adequately resourced in the cyber domain and have the resilience to support full spectrum operations in the face of coordinated A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] cyber threats?

Admiral WILLARD. I have examined it. I think vulnerabilities exist and I am as concerned as you are with regard to the cyber threat. I think it threatens not only infrastructure broadly across the United States and elsewhere in the region among our allies and partners as well, but it also challenges every day my command and control capabilities in the region, whether that is to the bases or to the forces that are afloat or flying themselves. Cyberspace of all the domains is probably the most broadly challenged right now and most in need of very strong governance and the necessary authorities to defend it both passively and actively.

I think Cyber Command was a great initiative on the part of the United States. I work very closely with Keith Alexander. We are conducting a year long pilot in the Pacific right now trying to advance our cyber defense capabilities and we will continue to do that. We have done that for several years, and I think we are making progress. But across domains, I am concerned about the maritime certainly in the region, I am concerned about space, I think I am concerned about cyberspace most of all.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, very much for being here. My father served with the 14th Air Force, the Flying Tigers, in India and China. And so, as you know, military service impacts your whole family. And so I grew up with a real understanding and appreciation of how hardworking and ca-

pable the people of India and China are. It has been really good to see the developing relationship with India. Because of my dad's service I became the chairman of the India Caucus. So I have seen a relationship develop between our countries. What is the status of the partnership with India?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, great question, and thank you for bringing India up and South Asia as a very important subregion within the Asia-Pacific.

The relationship with India is strong and growing stronger. It is not without its challenges. We don't have a great, a long history between the countries, as you know. We went through a cold war without much of a relationship at all and following the nuclear tests in the late 1990s, we suspended relations government-to-government. So we have really only been acquainted with India in the past decade. And mil-to-mil we began at a pretty nascent stage and have progressed to the point that today we exercise with India across all the Services. It is one of the most significant security assistance programs that we have in the Asia-Pacific theater right now. I think government-to-government the United States and India have made great progress. And I have had the opportunity to be introduced into India's senior leadership and they are very interested in an ongoing relationship with the United States.

At the same time they pride themselves in what they term strategic autonomy, kind of a nonalliance philosophy. And as a consequence of that, we are challenged in the relationship by virtue of India seeking to balance its associations with many other nations as well. We are challenged in our relationship with Pakistan as a consequence of the animosity that has existed historically between India and Pakistan. And India is in a very challenged part of the world, as we all know, with Afghanistan close by, Pakistan is a neighbor, the Kashmir issue which has persisted for a long time, and disputed border between India and China. So there are a lot of issues on the plate and we are seeking to continue to dialogue with India, terror being one of them, and try to improve the relations where we can.

Mr. WILSON. I was grateful to be in Islamabad last week during the same time that the Speaker of the Indian Parliament of all things was visiting. And so to see the relationship and trade has resumed between India and Pakistan and to me a stable Pakistan, the greatest beneficiary would be India. So I hope that is the case. In fact too they have a joint enemy, that is LeT. And of course LeT led the murderous assault on Mumbai.

What efforts are being made to counteract that level of terrorism?

Admiral WILLARD. Yeah, thank you. We have currently special forces assist teams, Pacific assist teams is the term, laid down in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives as well as India, and we are working very closely with India with regard to their counterterrorism capabilities. And in particular on the maritime domain, but also government-to-government, not necessarily DOD but other agencies assisting them in terms of their internal counter terror and counter insurgency. Lashkar-e-Taiba is very dangerous, Pakistani based, very good operational security, and a lot of international design in terms of their aspirations. So it is a very impor-

tant threat and we are working very closely with the nations in the region to help contain it.

Mr. WILSON. That is really very positive. Another positive spot is Palau and the strategic significance of Palau with the territory of Guam that we appreciate so much. For America what are we doing working with Palau?

Admiral WILLARD. We just changed over the small team of engineers that we maintain in Palau on a continual basis. I think our Army engineers just turned over with Navy Seabees in a ceremony in the region. Palau is one of our compact association states. There are three, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Strategically the three provide a southern flank to Guam which is obviously a very strategic territory of the United States. I am obligated to defend the compact states, and we work closely with the compact states on many of their challenges. Small teams of engineers is one method of doing that, but we also frequently visit with Pacific partnership and Pacific angel, the hospital ship, and provide engineering, veterinary and medical services where we can.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard, thank you for your dedicated service and your testimony today, and I know this will be one of your last times before Congress. I want to take this opportunity to thank you and your wife Donna for the services to our country. I think you are the Navy's number one team.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you.

Ms. BORDALLO. As you know, the realignment of marines from Guam to Okinawa has recently undergone significant changes. And I appreciate DOD's recent efforts to address local concerns about the rotational forces. However, I do remain concerned that this decision was driven primarily by concerns raised in the Senate, not this committee, as well as budgetary considerations.

Can you elaborate on the strategic rationale for these proposed changes? Aren't we just potentially shifting costs from MILCON [Military Construction] over to O&M [Operations and Maintenance] accounts over the long term?

Admiral WILLARD. I have been part of the Global Posture Review by the Department of Defense over the course of the last couple of years. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, as you recall, called for that review following the last Quadrennial Defense Review. And the posture review has been a hard look at where United States Pacific Command forces are.

Notwithstanding defense policy review initiative with Japan, but where they are broadly. And there was a strong desire to balance the forces more effectively in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Right now as you know, all of the permanent forces, with the exception of those in Guam and those in Singapore, are by and large in Northeast Asia. Whether or not they are permanently based or rotational forces is inconsequential, frankly, to me. I can work with either one. There are benefits to both.

In general, when we think of our foreign partners and their appetite for permanent bases, there isn't one. So rotational force pres-

ence, for example in Darwin, Australia, I think will be very effective.

What is most important to me is that the forces that we have present in Guam and elsewhere are maintained at a readiness level where they can be the first responders in the region so they have to dwell there long enough to be trained and exercised and equipped, resourced and engaging on a fairly continuous basis.

So the duration with which they are present in Guam matters to me. And the work, the ability to lift those marines or other forces where they can do the most good matters to me as well.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. The next question I have is last year General Dunford testified before the Readiness Subcommittee that it would take seven consecutive miracles to move marines from CONUS [Continental United States] to respond to contingencies or operational plans in PACOM AOR if portions of the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Forces] were based in CONUS. Now, do you share this view and could you elaborate on some of the strategic considerations why III MEF, Marine Expeditionary Forces, need to remain in the PACOM AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, the Pacific Command AOR, just as a review, extends from the West Coast of the United States to a dividing line between India and Pakistan. But the fact that it covers half the world and that the Asia-Pacific theater extends entirely across the Pacific Ocean, the strategic imperative that the marines be forward and present exists. In fact that is true for all the Service forces.

So the fact that we have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces readily accessible, forward and present in the Asia-Pacific, very crucial because of the lift requirements at great expense and time to cover the distances involved in bringing them from garrison in the United States. So very, very important strategically to Pacific Command that the forces are forward and accessible.

And we talk about forces beyond the international dateline. Frankly, I think the forces that are located in Hawaii are strategic in terms of their ability to respond into the region. But forces on the West Coast become more problematic simply because they have to be mobilized and moved such a great distance.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral, and again thank you for your service to our country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for your service and certainly your distinguished career.

I chair the Strategic Forces subcommittee so as you go from that subcommittee we have nuclear weapons, missiles, missile defense, space—several areas that overlap within your area of expertise. I have three questions. Two I am going to lump together, even though they are not similar. The two I lump together I know you can provide an answer as your perspective on these occurrences.

Secretary Gates referenced when he was at the Shangri-la conference in June of 2011 a potential new North Korea mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. He said: With the continued developments of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nu-

clear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United States.

Admiral, I would like your thoughts on the development by North Korea of this ballistic missile technology, a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, and your thoughts on what must be done to counter such a threat.

And then secondly, our subcommittee held a hearing last year on Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization programs. And one hearing that I had I think was the first actually in Congress to discuss a report authored by Dr. Phil Karber, and the report detailed an unclassified report of the existence of a large Chinese tunneling program, perhaps 5,000 kilometers of tunnels. In fact, the tunneling seems to have doubled from 25 kilometers to 5,000 kilometers in the past 20 years.

Would you please discuss why you believe China is racing to construct these elaborate underground facilities and what are they trying to protect, hold at risk? How many of these tunnels are we able to hold at risk with our U.S. nuclear weapons technology? What do you propose or suppose the tunnel's purpose is, Admiral?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman. First on the issue of road-mobile, as you know we are challenged by mobile missile systems. That is why they are created. I mean, holding mobile missile systems at risk is always problematic for any armed force and we are no exception.

There is development within North Korea of a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system that we have observed. We have not observed it being tested yet, to my knowledge, and we are watching the development very closely.

The missile system is advertised to be significant in terms of its range capability, and I think it is something that we will continue to monitor very, very closely as it develops. And you know, what will it mean to us when it proves itself? There will be a decision made with regard to how we posture to deal with what could be something less predictable than Taepo Dong II or some of the other ballistic missile capabilities that are a little more easy to observe.

Mr. TURNER. Before we go on to China, as you just said, the ability to hold the missile at risk because it is mobile means I am presuming that there should be that much more of increased focus on defense, if this is a system that we should face in its use; is that correct?

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is one of the posture options that will have to be considered, yes.

Mr. TURNER. And the Chinese tunnels?

Admiral WILLARD. Many nations in the Asia-Pacific region utilize hardening of facilities in order to provide for their security, their defense. I would offer that North Korea is a prime example of this, where tunneling is very much a part of the defensive infrastructure in the—among the armed forces in North Korea with regard to their being hardened and defensible. We see it, frankly, in many locations. China, no exception. The tunneling activities associated with China's submarine force is very obvious and have been widely publicized.

When we anticipate the purpose of that, the purpose of that is generally to provide both a hardened environment for the force structure that they utilize there, whatever that happens to be.

Mr. TURNER. Which you presume to be?

Admiral WILLARD. I think we would take that into closed session and discuss it. But, again, there is the point of hardening. There is also the point of being able to move forces in tunnels, unobserved. So there are a variety of benefits that come from developing underground facilities to occupy the needs of the Armed Forces. And again, China is one example; there are many in the world.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral, for your incredible service to our country and to your spouse for standing with you.

I have a question. As we move into an era of shrinkage in terms of our fleets, and we look at new ways to be innovative and efficient, I am told that there are ways in which we can transfer our troops from our large ships by keeping them in the—in place, rather than spending 6 months getting to where they are supposed to be serving their time there, and then spending 6 months returning to the United States for maintenance and repair. And in particular, there is a suggestion that has been made by a number of people who are fairly noteworthy, that we could basically fly in new troops to these destroyers and cruisers rather than have them moving across the waterways long distances that take as much as 6 months. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Admiral WILLARD. Being a sailor and having deployed 6 or more months many, many times, I certainly have an opinion on it. I think that—a couple of important things to note. First of all, the suggestion that we can fly in, fly out crews and locate a ship in a distant port has been experimented with in fairly recent times within the last decade. We have attempted to at least demonstrate the capability to do this. It comes at some expense. There are disadvantages to it. And one of the disadvantages is the ability of that ship to be brought back to a location where it can be maintained properly.

So it is generally, if we talk about ships forward in Australia or ships forward in Singapore, there has to be a place to service those ships when they require it, in order to achieve the life cycle duration that we desire out of those ships. And there is the continuity associated with a crew manning a ship for a long period of time. So flying in, flying out crews is also a challenge that has to be overcome in that scenario.

That said, one of the discussions that we are having regarding the overture that Singapore made to perhaps utilize Changi Naval Base for our littoral combat ships, one of the concepts for doing that would be a rotational presence of the ship's crew. So it is possible, it comes with advantages and disadvantages. It is not without cost. And I think there are times when it is appropriate.

I think the rotational cycle that we have developed with the ships coming out of the major force concentration area, fleet concentration areas in the United States has been effective. And it is

not as if we are not conducting business as soon as we leave port, I mean, whether it is training and exercise or whether it is the opportunity to touch many areas across the Pacific. The transit of ships is not without utility to me I guess is the way I would put it.

Ms. SPEIER. So you are suggesting there is a cost associated to it. What I have been told is that you can do with 3½ ships what normally takes 5 ships and you can actually see an efficiency of 40 percent. So I am a little confused as to whether there are cost savings here or costs associated with doing that.

Admiral WILLARD. Well, there will be costs either way. Once again, the idea of rotating crews forward to man up a ship, leaving that ship in place, comes with its own dynamics in terms of how we manage that ship's maintenance cycles and so forth. So it is not without its challenges.

What you are referring to is what it takes to maintain a single ship forward in terms of the cyclical nature of deployment, when we are conducting forward deployment. And typically it is about four to make one, to your point.

I would again contend that there are advantages to that. One of the advantages is the ability to return the ship and return the crews to a home base and a level of continuity and maintenance continuity that advantages the ship. And it is not as if there is a point A, point B in this calculus. When ships transit the Pacific, we have them working the entire time they are in transit, whether it is in the southern Pacific, island nations, territorial areas, or whether it is forward in the western Pacific or whether it is in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region. So—

Ms. SPEIER. My time has expired.

Admiral WILLARD. Ships that deploy are continually in work.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard, thank you so much for joining us today. I deeply appreciated you hosting our congressional delegation that visited the Pacific Command during the summertime. That was one of the most eye-opening and rewarding experiences of my service here in Congress. So I thank you. And thank you for your 39 years of service to our Nation and to our Navy. From being a squadron commander to carrier commander, to fleet command, to being part of what I think is one of the greatest movies ever made, that is an absolutely stellar career. We deeply, deeply appreciate it. It is an honor to have men such as yourself leading our All Volunteer Force.

And Donna, thank you for your unlimited passion for our sailors and for our Navy and your commitment. You have been a stellar example of service and sacrifice to our Nation and to our military. So thank you so much. It is great to have such a great Navy family out there serving this Nation. So we deeply appreciate that.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. I wanted to ask this question. You had spoken about the new strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As we look at that, and we are looking at \$487 billion in reductions to defense budgets, my question is this: Are you going to be able to achieve that new strat-

egy with these reductions? And I think you are being asked to do an awful lot with a lot less.

And if we look at what is happening, you look at the SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] Navy account being reduced, you look at the number of ships being reduced. You also see some decommissioning of ships before the end of their service lives. You see a number of programs being moved to the right, outside of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the SSNs, we are going down 1 year to a single ship being built that year. The F-35, the SSBN(X). It seems like we are asking an awful lot.

And my question is: In the Pacific Command, will there be the assets, the ships, the planes necessary for you to be able to carry out that mission? It seems like we are asking an awful lot with this big shift, but we are doing it in a time of some pretty severe reductions in resources. I want to get your perspective on how you see that unfolding.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. First, Congressman, I think you characterize it very well. It should be a concern for all of us that the actions that we take with the fleet and with the other Service forces that we have are the right ones in accordance with a strategic design. I think that one of the real strengths of what President Obama and Secretary Panetta unfolded as a set of strategic priorities was to try and establish the places in the world that we felt from a security standpoint were of the greatest importance for our Nation, and I was pleased but not surprised that the Asia-Pacific was prominent in that discussion.

What that means is that the commitment we are making is that we will put the forces into those highest priority regions that are required. And I think that is the answer to your question. I would anticipate that my successor will vocalize his requirements very clearly to the Pentagon and elsewhere, and that by and large these requirements will be met.

I think in the Aegis we are challenged across the Services with regard to these budgets. And should, heaven forbid, sequestration or other very severe cuts take place, then I think the Department of Defense is going to be challenged to execute to these set of priorities. But I think the strength in the work that has been done is to try to establish a strategy whereby we can make the right decisions with regard to where the forces go.

Mr. WITTMAN. I want to get a little bit of your perspective about things that are happening currently with China. As your great career as a naval aviator, you spent a lot of time in the Asia-Pacific. You also were there at a time when we watched the buildup in Russia through the seventies and eighties. We watched that Cold War scenario. We have seen that wane. You have also been a part of watching a buildup in China, an exertion of China's influence in that particular region.

What do you see as the biggest challenge for us in the Asia-Pacific in years to come? And having that metric of the Russian buildup in the Cold War, where do you see the United States being 5 years, 10 years, 15 years down the road in the Asia-Pacific with what is currently happening in China and elsewhere, even in places like North Korea?

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman McKeon talked about the more than \$5 trillion of commerce, of which a sizable portion is U.S. commerce that is on the water in the South China Sea. As we look forward to our greatest challenges it is going to be the ability to coexist among all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region, China being one of them. And right now, one of my daunting strategic challenges is to engage effectively with China and with the People's Liberation Army in order to be able to coexist and both contribute to the security of this region for its future prosperity.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi, Admiral.

Admiral WILLARD. *Aloha*.

Ms. HANABUSA. *Aloha*. I was going to tell you the same thing. I won't repeat my colleagues, especially Congressman Wittman, but my *mahalo* to both you and Donna for everything that you have done. And I would like to add to that my *mahalo* on behalf of the people of the State of Hawaii. You have been absolutely great. You have embraced them and I think they have embraced the both of you right back.

Having said that, Admiral, you know one of the things that we take for granted is munitions. Do you have any concerns regarding the DOD's current inventory of munitions?

Admiral WILLARD. I do. The short answer is yes, I have concerns. When we look across our munitions inventories, notwithstanding what has been expended over the past 10 years, there exists gaps and shortfalls and insufficiencies in a variety of different areas. In the new strategic design in terms of priorities, there is emphasis on improving our missile defense capabilities, as one example, and our crew missile capability. So we think that there will be advances in some munitions inventories. But the short answer to do I have concerns? The answer is yes.

When we talk about major operations, nation state level operations, there are munitions, acquisition production rates, and in some cases insufficiencies that we have got to overcome.

Ms. HANABUSA. So how does that look in terms of the fiscal year 2013 budget request? Are we procuring a sufficient number of weapons to basically ensure you and other combatant commanders the sufficient numbers that you will need?

Admiral WILLARD. We have spent the last couple of years articulating the munitions status very clearly into the Department of Defense. And I have had a good association with Deputy Under Secretary Carter and others with regard to determining what to do about some of the munitions challenges that we face.

Again, the 2013 budget will improve some areas that we have regarded as critical in the past, specifically related to ballistic missile defense where the production rates of SM3s and other capabilities have been limited—and cruise missile inventories. There remain other areas in which we are challenged. And our responsibility has been and will continue to be to articulate those as clearly as we can so that the Services make the appropriate investments to try and overcome some of these shortfalls.

Ms. HANABUSA. I guess in another conversation before you retire, we can see where those other areas are.

Now, Admiral, we have had this discussion before, but I would like you to be able to walk us through. We talked about basically rotational bases and afloat. Now, we know kind of what that means, but can you use the remainder of this time to tell us what do you envision when we talk about rotational bases and we have basically service men afloat, especially since we are going to be forwarding them to areas where we don't have bases, traditional bases?

Admiral, WILLARD. Thank you. When we talk about posture, we are generally talking about where we are either permanently based or where we are able to rotate from. So Hawaii is a permanent base for us. We have a fleet concentration area there. We have some very significant strategic assets, such as the shipyard there that we are able to operate from and we deploy and we employ the forces that are stationed in Hawaii.

Elsewhere, such as the offering made by Singapore, Australia, in terms of the Darwin marines, and the discussions that we are currently having with the Philippines, may afford us opportunities to rotate forces—not fly, in fly out, but it is a term they use—but essentially bring forces forward, allow them to train and operate from those bases for a temporary period of time, and then replace them with other forces that will in turn rotate.

So we have the responsibility to posture correctly. And then there is the presence requirement, which is entirely different. This is where day to day, the forces should be operating to engage with other countries to exercise or to be present to help secure the Asia-Pacific region.

Ms. HANABUSA. So when we are talking about a rotational type of force and they are deploying from a particular area, like the Philippines or Darwin, are they envisioned to have—to live there for a period of time? To have actual quarters there?

Admiral WILLARD. They have quarters there, yes. We do not anticipate that they will be taking their families there, so there is not a permanence to their presence there. They will dwell there to exercise with their Australian counterparts and eventually deploy into the region where we need them.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Willard, thank you for being here and thank you for your service to your country. I was on Chairman Wittman's CODEL [Congressional Delegation] to PACOM and I would have to say it was—I echo everything that he said. Eye opening. It was very professional. Your staff was wonderful. It was definitely a learning experience and also ratified a lot of the concerns I guess we pick up in our day-to-day job. But it elevated it to put it on our radar, and that is what Secretary Panetta and the President and their new defense strategy kind of echoes as well; that we are looking at emerging threats, we are looking at the security and safety and safe passage of our shipping lanes because of the commerce and the economies and the fragile alliances that are out there. And there is no way to separate America's national security from our economic security and vice versa.

One of the things that I did pick up throughout—and many of my questions have already been answered—was talking to our friends in the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, was that they want to know what we were doing. They were looking to us for leadership. Not only just, you know, just the leadership that America has provided for hundreds of years, but of course they are wanting to know what our fiscal affairs are like and are we getting our house in order. Because my takeaway was that we have some very good friends over there, but at the end of the day they are worried about their personal security and stability of their nation and their sovereignty, and that if we had a reduction of force or we started doing some shifting back and forth, that these alliances could be put into jeopardy. Would you care to comment on that?

Admiral WILLARD. I think you make great points. And our alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region are the great opportunities that exist there. And our current alliances with nations such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand, to name our allies, are very, very important to the overall security of the region. And to your point, there is a refrain there that expresses concern about the staying power of the United States, the commitment to the region which has been allayed, frankly, in the last couple of years because of the very strong commitment that this Administration and our various secretaries have made to the Asia-Pacific.

But there is a concern, especially witnessing the economic situation that the United States finds itself in regarding our ability to sustain ourselves and be influential and continue to be a partner in the region, and I assure them that we will, and assure them that a presence—forward presence remains paramount to the United States.

So I am frankly, you know, very pleased to see the emphasis that the Asia-Pacific has received in this strategic design by this administration and our Secretary. And I think it is vital to the region to take that message and then to see us back it up with the actions that we take.

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, if the opportunity comes up again to go back on a PACOM CODEL, Mr. Chairman, please put my name and Ms. Bordallo's on there too, I think she would like to go. Because we just touched the surface and we would like to learn a lot more about our assets over there.

Now, knowing that this has become part of the emerging, possible emerging threats somewhere that we have to have on our radar, I am concerned that the Secretary and others, not just the Navy and the Army and other branches of Services, that their rhetoric is really not matching the reality or the level of concern that we may have in this region, because we are looking forward to the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Are we going to be at 313 ships, or is it going to be less than that? So we are all anxious to look at that.

Are we going to have the resources and assets in the theater to address this? But it looks like we are going to be decommissioning ships decades before their useful lives are up. We are pushing new shipbuilding to the right. A lot of these things just do not make a lot of sense. We are saying there are future threats, but at the

same time we are not going to address them currently. What do you see as your most important needs for the next 5 years?

Admiral WILLARD. The sustainment of the force structure and forward presence of that force structure that we have enjoyed in the past, and the additions that will come out of the conclusion of the last two wars that have occurred. So there is a reconstitution that is ongoing, and certainly the capacities that the United States Armed Forces have are important to us. That they be biased appropriately into the Asia-Pacific region is very important to the Asia-Pacific Command.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to see you, and thank you for hosting us a few months back, the small business panel, as part of this committee. We had a great set of visits out there, and appreciate the time out there.

I have four questions. They are kind of all over the place. I will be quick with each one of them and if you could answer them one at a time. Can you characterize the relationship with Indonesia?

Admiral WILLARD. Very strong, 140 or so activities annually with Indonesia. Very impressed, frankly, with President Yudhoyono and his democratic government and the progress that they have made, particularly in military reform. And we are reengaged with KOPASSUS [Indonesian Army Special Forces Command] at a pace, but nonetheless reengaged. They are effective in counterterrorism and they are reaching out to many countries but particularly to the United States.

Mr. LARSEN. Great. Second, we are shifting from P3s to P8s now, and Whidbey Island is part of that and Jacksonville is part of that. Can you just talk briefly about the role—what the P8s will be giving you versus moving from the P3s and what the P8s might give you in the Pacific Command?

Admiral WILLARD. I think in general we get dwell from those assets that we haven't—that we just can't enjoy from an asset like the P3. So we are very much looking forward to the fact that this is a jet that can move quickly, and it is going to come with a great deal of capability.

So the P8 will be a great addition in what is an inherently maritime area of responsibility. I have great use for them and we are very much looking forward to a P8 community out there.

Mr. LARSEN. Great. I think when you first sat down in my office when you first started as PACOM, we had this discussion about—PACOM had just started, or was in the middle of further discussions with the Government of Japan about ballistic missile defense and the operations of BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense], not necessarily the cooperation, but how it is going to be operating. Can you give an update on that?

Admiral WILLARD. I think the Japanese have advanced greatly. We continue to team in this, as you would expect, very much, 7th Fleet with the Japanese self-defense force. Able to work ballistic missile defense scenarios into many of the exercises that we perform. I right now regard the Japanese as a very credible BMD force and continuing to grow in its capacities.

Mr. LARSEN. So any issues left over from the operational questions that existed because of the—it was embedded—the problem

was embedded in the Japanese Constitution about self-defense and whether or not we could fully operate BMD if we needed to if there was a fly-over—to fly over the islands.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. I think these are manageable issues. What I have learned over the past 2½ years is that in working closely with the Japanese—and, frankly, their defense force appropriately brings their civilian oversight into the room frequently as we have these discussions—they have been very good about educating the Diet and others in the Ministry of Defense with regard to what it really takes to defend Japan. And as you know, I have that responsibility.

So in the deliberations that we have with the Japanese joint staff and others in developing the concepts to cooperate in ballistic missile defense, I think there has grown a good understanding of the requirements to accomplish this. There continue to be constitutional limitations in what those Japanese defense forces can do, as you know. But again I think in the way in which we have structured our tactics, techniques, and procedures we are able to work our way through those.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And finally, the last page of your testimony you discuss JPAC [Joint Personnel Accounting Command], specifically China, Burma, and DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. Could you maybe briefly touch on maybe Burma, what next steps we are going to be taking to continue recovery operations there?

Admiral WILLARD. We are going to move back into Burma—we have been there before, as you know—but looking very much forward to that opportunity. And with the level of cooperation that we have seen from the Burmese Government recently, the overtures that they have made and some of the reforms that they are committing themselves to, I think we will have less concern about the security of those forces when, in fact, they go in there. So the Personnel Accounting Command is very busy out in the Asia-Pacific and, frankly, globally right now, and ready to move back into the DPRK, to your point.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Ma'am, thank you for your service to our country. Admiral, I was glad to hear you say that China's goal, you thought, was to be a constructive contributor, if you will, to commerce and peace in the region. Did I understand that correctly?

Admiral WILLARD. I think they would certainly assert that, and despite the challenges that we face and continue to endeavor to overcome, it is my hope as well.

Mr. SCOTT. Could you speak to the cross-strait relationships between China and Taiwan? And I guess what you said is the first I have heard that, and certainly respect your opinion. But they keep approximately 1,500 missiles and rockets pointed at Taiwan which certainly would lead you to believe that maybe they weren't going to be such a constructive contributor, if you will, to peace in that region. Could you speak to that briefly?

Admiral WILLARD. There is very impressive combat power across the strait on mainland China. Whether that is integrated air de-

fense system, ballistic—offensive ballistic missile capabilities or force structure in their ports and airfields. It is very impressive. It has been there a long time now, several years, and has not diminished. They continue to improve the capability. So in terms of a balance of power, I mean, it is generally one-sided.

The cross-strait relations have improved since President Ma was elected in 2008 and reelected just last year, we have witnessed improved relationships between mainland—the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. And we anticipate that will continue with President Ma’s reelection. And we are encouraged by that, frankly.

That said, the combat power, as you allude, is somewhat incongruous to those improved relations cross-strait. But as they improve their relationship economically and diplomatically, we think that it should lower the likelihood of coercion or conflict taking place.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. And when I woke up this morning and saw the news, the comments about North Korea and our food aid in exchange for them stopping their nuclear programs, how optimistic should we be that there will be a long-term change, if you will, in the approach of North Korea’s leadership towards nuclear weapons, if you will?

Admiral WILLARD. First to clarify, in the ongoing negotiations that have been going on, there are discussions of food aid. There have been now for, by and large, the past year. And the United States has been engaged in discussions very recently with regard to quantities of food that we anticipate providing to North Korea on the humanitarian side. In the same discussion but a separate topic, has been the discussion of nuclearization and the efforts to verifiably denuclearize North Korea.

We have a new—a new successor in North Korea, as you know, since Kim Jong-il passed. He passed on leadership to his 29-year-old son, Kim Jong-un. We know something of him, not everything. We are observing closely the actions of the new administration in Pyongyang with regard to how they will deal with a variety of security and coercive strategy issues, nuclearization being one of them.

And we are encouraged by the outcome of the talks that talked about the possibility of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] being let back into Yongbyon [Nuclear Scientific Research Center] and the cessation of some of the activities, including ballistic missile development. But I think this is something that we need to watch very carefully, wait and see. In the past we have not seen much change out of what is now a third generation of leadership in Pyongyang.

Mr. SCOTT. Hopeful, but not optimistic; Is that it?

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is well said.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, Admiral, with 10 seconds left to go, I represent Robins Air Force Base, home of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System]. I know that they have flown many missions for you and I certainly would appreciate your support of that platform as we go forward.

Admiral WILLARD. It is a brilliant platform and you certainly have my support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard thank you so much for your service to our country and your role as the commanding officer for U.S. Pacific Command. And I wish you the best in retirement, which will be coming up pretty soon.

First, if I understand it right, we no longer have ground forces in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea; is that correct?

Admiral WILLARD. That is correct. We continue to—our United Nations commander, J.D. Thurman, General Thurman, continues to be responsible for the overall security across the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and maintenance of the armistice. But the forces that were previously forward on the DMZ have been relocated.

Mr. COFFMAN. And is there a plan to give operational control to the South Korean military?

Admiral WILLARD. In December 2015 is the currently scheduled date. As you will recall, the 2012 date passed and there was a delay. But right now, what we term operational control transition is scheduled to occur in December 2015.

Mr. COFFMAN. And am I right to understand—I think we have 28,000 U.S. military personnel, about that number—

Admiral WILLARD. Roughly.

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. In South Korea today?

Admiral WILLARD. We do.

Mr. COFFMAN. Now, is there still in place a plan for a multi-million-dollar military construction program to bring the families up, sort of as a program for tour normalization in South Korea? Where is that right now?

Admiral WILLARD. Somewhat in suspension, I guess is the best way to term it. And J.D., I am sure when he testifies, will provide you the details on that. But looking at the number of families that currently reside in South Korea with their service member, I think J.D. recognizes that in this fiscal environment, completing tour normalization as it was originally scoped is probably not viable, and he is continuing now to look at it and dialogue with the Pentagon with regard to what he perceives to be the right mix of families and service members, both accompanied and unaccompanied, on the peninsula.

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you know if they are having—one thing that the United States Army does versus the Marine Corps, and I served in both, is the Army tends to on some of its forward-deployed units rotate individuals in and out of those units, whereas the United States Marine Corps rotates units at the battalion level in and out of the area of operation. So is the Army having a discussion to move to more of a rotational basis for forces as opposed to assigning individuals? Are you aware of any discussion like that?

Admiral WILLARD. No, I am not, though there is an ongoing discussion with regard to the Army in the Asia-Pacific region writ large, and how, with a reconstituted ground force following the two wars, the Army intends to support my needs in the region.

I would offer that the Army forces on the Korean peninsula, especially given the decisions that have been made recently with regard to tour normalization and us, you know, slowing or stopping this now, are the dominant ground force on the peninsula, where the marines are down in Okinawa, Japan.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. After we reach—after we hand over operation and control to the South Koreans, if we are able to achieve that in 2015, are there any projections as to drawing down our forces at that point in time?

Admiral WILLARD. There are not. Operational control is at the leadership level. And this is now to say that rather than the United States commanding the defense of the Republic of Korea in wartime, that the Republic of Korea themselves will command and the United States will be in support. So that 28,000 or so ground forces that we have maintained on the peninsula throughout the period since the war and during armistice are intended to continue to support the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. COFFMAN. The South Koreans, as I understand it, are spending 2.7 percent of their gross domestic product, their GDP, on defense. The U.S. right now is about 4.7 percent. What kind of burden sharing—maybe you could get back to me because we are running out of time. I wonder if you all could get back to me, Admiral, as to what exactly the South Koreans are paying in terms to support our presence in the peninsula.

Admiral WILLARD. We will provide those numbers to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, Donna, once again on behalf of the entire committee, we thank you very much for your 39 years of service. Wish you all the best in the new venture that you will be embarking on shortly. And this committee stands adjourned.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your continued support for our Armed Forces.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 1, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 1, 2012

**Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services**

Hearing on

**Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget
Request from U.S. Pacific Command**

March 1, 2012

Our economy and security has never been more dependent on our military, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region. The President's new strategy focuses on a so-called “pivot to Asia-Pacific.” While I don't question the critical importance of this theater, I am concerned that our forces may not be properly postured to support this shift.

The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current levels. Over the next 5 years, we will cut 16 ships out of our new construction budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity will be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain our forces. This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear deterrent. But the Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral reductions below New START levels. As you have discussed often with us, quantity does have a quality all its own—especially in a theater that covers half of the Earth's surface.

We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed manpower and assets. As I stated at last year's hearing, it is important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, equipment, and the authorities they need to instill confidence in our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively to any contingency. It is not yet clear how the new strategy will meet these goals.

Events in Asia can change rapidly, as we saw in December with the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside our South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to deter further North Korean provocations.

China's growing influence creates concern for many of our regional allies. The balance of power across the Taiwan Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China Sea is a vital shipping lane through which more than 5 trillion dollars in trade pass each year. Deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. forces from operating along China's periphery is still a key goal of the People's Liberation Army. As China's military budget continues to grow annually by double digits, the PLA is focused on improving their capacities to counter U.S. military capabilities and exploit our weaknesses.

We also see the growing threat of terrorism in region, as aims of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand beyond their traditional border disputes.

In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must stand ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and defend our regional allies and security interests. We look forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these matters and the range of security challenges we face in the Pacific.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget
Request from U.S. Pacific Command
March 1, 2012

I would like to welcome Admiral Willard and thank him for making a long journey to be here with us today. I look forward to his expert testimony on a variety of important matters.

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, a shift that will surely call for additional resources and an enhanced role for U.S. Pacific Command.

The Asia-Pacific region is a vital region of the world that includes a number of important U.S. allies and partners. Without question, U.S. service men and women play a crucial role in maintaining these relationships and in promoting peace in the Pacific.

Many of our partners in the regions are concerned about the recent rise of China. While I do not believe that a conflict with China is inevitable, we should continue to work to promote mutual interests, mitigate concerns, and perpetuate multilateral cooperation in the region. We should also continue to develop our security relationship with India and continue to strengthen existing relationships with partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore.

Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-threats, and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weapons continue to menace the region. Disease, malnourishment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster do as well. The more we can do to defuse tensions through cooperative efforts with our many allies and strategic partners in the region, the more we can help to realize the immense potential for growth in the region.

The United States will continue to lead in the Pacific and to offer assurances through our forward military presence in the region, and the U.S. Pacific Command's flexible force posture will continue to be essential to surmounting security challenges now and in the future.

While I believe that the defense budget provides PACOM with the resources necessary for securing our strategic objectives, I would like to remind the Committee that the defense budget is consistent with the Budget Control Act that was passed by Congress. Although I did not support passage of that law, many members of the House Armed Services Committee did. The Department of Defense submitted a budget that complies with congressionally mandated funding levels and that supports our strategic objectives.

I look forward to receiving your testimony and to continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

1 MARCH 2012

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to present an update on United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). I consider myself fortunate to have served as its commander for the last two and a half years and look forward to providing what will be my final assessment of the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific Region. The President has directed his national security team to make America's "presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority." The testimony that follows will highlight the opportunities we seek to illuminate and address the challenges we must overcome to sustain U.S. leadership in this critical area of the world.

Strategic Environment in the Asia Pacific

The security of the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is of vital national interest to the U.S. - a fact underscored by the President's hosting of last year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting. The region contains the world's three largest economies and supports over 10 trillion dollars of annual bi-lateral merchandise trade, including more than 1 trillion dollars of U.S. commerce.

The Asia Pacific also hosts the world's largest populations, largest militaries, and includes three nuclear armed states (excluding the U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) which aspires to be a nuclear power. While the Asia Pacific has remained relatively peaceful and stable for the past six decades, myriad challenges to its future security will try U.S. resolve, raise the magnitude of our relationships with five treaty allies and many strategic partners, and test USPACOM as a principle guarantor of security in the region.

Seven major security challenges confront the U.S. across this region, which encompasses half of the earth's surface, including:

- Defense of the homeland, U.S. territories and compact states in the Pacific.
- The need to continuously manage and optimize U.S. alliances and strengthen regional partnerships, in particular, advancing the relationship with India.
- The threat posed by the DPRK's nuclear aspirations, proliferation, provocations, and potential to cause regional instability.
- China's military modernization – in particular its active development of capabilities in the cyber and space domains - and the questions all these emerging military capabilities raise among China's neighbors about its current and long-term intentions
- Three nuclear armed states, including Russia, China, and India, and North Korea's nuclear aspirations, together with the threat of WMD proliferation
- Numerous transnational threats, ranging from proliferation, trafficking of narcotics and persons, and piracy, to persistent natural and manmade disasters
- Challenges to freedom of access to, and security within, maritime and air domains, and space and cyberspace, by both state and non-state actors.

By contrast, the Asia-Pacific also affords immense opportunities, particularly through strong ally and partner associations, that can lead to a cooperative and constructive security environment for the foreseeable future. In large measure,

cooperative engagement activities leveraging USPACOM posture and presence contribute to advancing military self-sufficiency and security contributions by our partners in the region.

Force Posture Assessment. Generally, USPACOM has been well served with regard to on-hand, ready forces with the ability to respond to the demands in the Asia Pacific region. This has occurred despite a decade of wars in the Middle East, to include the Command's continual contributions to those wars. As a consequence of both history and the nature of challenges in Northeast Asia, USPACOM forward, permanently based forces are concentrated in Japan and the Republic of Korea. While affording a strong deterrent against challengers such as North Korea, this has placed a premium on USPACOM's ability to deploy and sustain forces elsewhere in order to maintain the required presence in sub-regions such as Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania.

USPACOM's input to the most recent Global Posture Review expressed a need to redistribute postured forces closer to Southeast Asia and South Asia, in order to more efficiently meet the force presence and response demands of those Asia Pacific sub-regions. The recent decisions to rotationally operate a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) from Darwin, Australia and to operate U.S. air forces from Australia's northern air bases were initial efforts to rebalance USPACOM force posture for the future.

While the Asia Pacific is often regarded as inherently maritime and contains some of the world's most expansive archipelagos, strategic chokepoints and largest seas and oceans, its militaries tend to be army-focused. For USPACOM, this generates posture and presence considerations to both adapt forces to the maritime challenges of

the region and to account for the necessary and effective role that Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces play in engaging with the dominant foreign services of our regional partners.

Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia (NEA) contains many of the most significant economies and militaries in the Asia Pacific and the world, including Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. U.S. forward presence, permanent basing in Japan and South Korea, habitual accesses, and host nation support in this important sub-region enable USPACOM's front line of homeland defense, extended deterrence for allies Japan and South Korea, regional deterrence against actors such as North Korea, and rapid response to natural disasters and other contingencies that occur in the Asia Pacific.

The DPRK continues to pose one of the most likely and persistent threats to the United States, its allies, and to peace and security in Northeast Asia. North Korea's conventional military threat to the Republic of Korea remains of serious concern and its nuclear program, missile development, proliferation activities, and asymmetric military provocations are destabilizing. Collectively, these threats demand that USPACOM Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and capacities be sufficiently robust to view across the DPRK's military apparatus and warn of unfavorable developments. North Korea's continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and advanced ballistic missile systems places a premium on USPACOM ballistic missile defenses and close cooperation with allies. Japan and the ROK are strong U.S. allies that host U.S. forces, benefit from U.S. extended deterrence, and stand with the U.S. in

containing DPRK aggression in addition to meeting other regional and global security challenges.

Japan. The 52-year old alliance between the U.S. and Japan remains a cornerstone of security in the Asia Pacific. As was evident in U.S. support to the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) during the epic triple disaster in eastern Honshu last year, the extremely close association and inherent interoperability between tenant U.S. forward forces and their Japanese hosts enable prompt and extremely effective contingency responses under the most trying of circumstances.

Despite delays in implementing some elements of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), including the Futenma airfield replacement facility in Okinawa, which has occupied policymakers for nearly 20 years, the alliance remains strong and is a powerful strategic stabilizing force in the region. It is important to note that of the 19 separate elements contained in DPRI, the vast majority are on track and progressing.

In the past year, Japan has increased its regional engagements and association with partners such as Australia, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and the ROK, to name a few.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.-ROK alliance remains a strong and visible deterrent to war on the peninsula. This alliance is also transforming in a variety of ways to remain current and relevant in the midst of an ever-evolving Asia Pacific region, changing leadership in North Korea and as a consequence of lessons learned following the deadly provocations by the DPRK in 2010.

Current alliance initiatives are underpinned by the planned transition of wartime operational control from the Combined Forces Command to the ROK in December

2015. Ongoing transformation also includes the repositioning of on-Peninsula U.S. forces, headquarters, and bases.

Like the JSDF, ROK military forces are engaging throughout the Asia Pacific at an increasing rate, and contributing to international security initiatives, such as peacekeeping, counter-piracy, and counter-proliferation efforts.

Trilateral Cooperation. While modest in scope, trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan and the ROK continues to progress. This important initiative seeks to strengthen the natural synergy among three powerful and interoperable Northeast Asia allies. While the countries will have to overcome longstanding historical, cultural, and political dynamics to fully realize the potential of trilateral cooperation, policy advances and increasingly frank dialogue among the three allies are encouraging.

Russia. Russia's Pacific armed forces are very gradually emerging from their diminishment following the end of the Cold War. Increased naval and strategic air force operations, cyberspace activities, and arms sales throughout the Asia Pacific are signaling Russia's emphasis on improved posture in the region. USPACOM enjoys a generally positive military-to-military relationship with Russia, particularly between respective Pacific fleets. In coordination with United States European Command and in accordance with the bilateral Military Cooperation Work Plan, USPACOM seeks improved engagement with Russia's Pacific forces in areas such as counter terrorism (CT), peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations.

Mongolia. Mongolia is a small but important partner in Northeast Asia. Its active military pursues close engagement with USPACOM through our annual KHAN QUEST exercise series and contributes effectively to coalition efforts in Afghanistan as well as

global peacekeeping operations. With Russia to the north and China to the south, Mongolia must finesse its relationships in NEA with its broader security interests. As a consequence of its experience as part of the Soviet bloc in the 20th century, the Mongolian armed forces continue to maintain ties to European nations such as Germany and even the DPRK, making them a USPACOM partner with unique and insightful perspectives.

The People's Republic of China. China's growing presence and influence in Asia, and the opportunities and uncertainties that have resulted from it pose the greatest test for USPACOM among its seven challenge areas.

In January 2011, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to "build a cooperative partnership based on mutual interest and mutual respect," which also included a commitment to develop "continuous, stable, and reliable military-to-military relations." To meet this mandate, USPACOM is effectively positioned to contribute to advancing military engagement with the PRC. However, military-to-military relations continue to lag well behind other U.S. - China engagements for three main reasons: differences in philosophy regarding the purpose of military-to-military relations in which China emphasizes strategic dialogue and the U.S. seeks comprehensive military contact from the strategic to tactical levels as a way to build confidence; China's tendency to suspend military-to-military following U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and, more generally, its linkage between certain U.S. defense policies and continuous bilateral military relations; and inherent Chinese distrust of U.S. regional intentions resulting in demands that perceived impediments to the relationship be conceded before military relations can advance.

Despite these challenges, China's increasing participation in regional and international security activities and forums such as multi-lateral exercises, counter piracy operations, and peacekeeping can foster informal, but useful U.S. – China military engagement.

Improvements in China's military capabilities and the regional uncertainties this has created also test USPACOM's ability to manage the evolving security dynamics in the Asia Pacific. Areas in which U.S. national interests or those of U.S. allies and partners are being challenged include cyberspace and space as well as maritime security in the international waters around China. China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities extend well into the SCS. China asserts these military developments are purely defensive in nature and that it poses no threat to neighbors in the region. Yet, combined with broad maritime and sovereignty claims and incidents with lawful operators in the SCS and ECS, there is ongoing international concern regarding China's activities in the South China Sea.

Taiwan. Following Taiwan's recent Presidential and Legislative Yuan elections in January 2011, many analysts are hopeful that improvements in cross-Strait relations will continue, with a focus on building economic and cultural ties. This is in the security interests of the United States and of Asia. It is important to note, however, that Taiwan remains the most acute sovereignty issue for China and the main driver of its military modernization programs. The military balance across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of China. USPACOM engages regularly with Taiwan's military within policy guidelines and in accordance with tenets of the Taiwan Relations Act and three communiqués.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia (SEA) is an extremely diverse sub-region, rich in natural resources, and strategically located at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is host to a mix of democratic and authoritarian governments, varied economies, contrasting military capabilities, and mixed cultures. Prospects for continued economic growth are promising, mainly due to China's substantial economic influence, steady U.S. regional investment and trade, and universal global interest, by the European Union and others, in capitalizing on Asia's rise. Many advancing U.S. partnerships and two U.S. treaty allies, the Republic of the Philippines and the Royal Kingdom of Thailand, are concentrated in this sub-region. Further, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its numerous forums, together with the East Asian Summit (EAS) and APEC, have advanced to become the most effective Asia Pacific multilateral organizations.

That said, SEA is not without its challenges. Disputed islands and features in the SCS, including territorial disputes with China, have generated broad unease in SEA, and maritime security has become a regular theme in multilateral forums. Transnational threats, including violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI); trafficking in narcotics and humans; piracy; proliferation; and natural and manmade disasters regularly combine to challenge USPACOM, U.S. allies and partners in this sub-region. Resources such as water, food and energy are being pressurized across the region, as illustrated by the Mekong River Delta crisis. Geography is also a factor as SEA contains some of the most extensive

archipelagos in the world, including Indonesia and the Philippines, and some of the world's most strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. Despite this vast maritime domain where naval capabilities and capacities are called for, most SEA militaries are army-centric and assigned internal security responsibilities.

Consequently, few nations are self-sufficient militarily. USPACOM's has focused its engagement on advancing the self-sufficiency of the partner militaries in the region. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) are vital to enhancing the education level of military leaders and promoting a network of military-to-military relations that contribute to broader security cooperation in SEA.

Philippines. Underpinned by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines alliance is an important strategic icon in SEA. Adjoining the SCS, this vast island nation straddles several strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and chokepoints, claims a number of disputed islands and features in the SCS, and contends with several internal insurgent movements and VEOs, such as JI and ASG, with assistance from U.S. forces. Possessing an army-centric military as a result of its internal security challenges, the Philippines has recently begun to focus on improving the ability of its navy and air forces to secure the vast maritime area defined by the Philippine archipelago. As a consequence, USPACOM security assistance is focused primarily on supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in CT efforts in southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, and advancing AFP naval and air capabilities. Improving maritime domain awareness is another primary focus of U.S. security assistance, and we hope to provide a second Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines this year.

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has operated in a strictly non-combat role in support of the AFP for the past 8 years in the largely successful efforts to contain ASG and JI VEOs. Additionally, USPACOM engages with the Philippines through the Joint Staff-sponsored exercise BALIKATAN, as well as through annual military-to-military consultations, periodic PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP missions, and numerous service component-led exercises.

We welcome recent U.S. – Philippine discussions regarding opportunities to increase joint training with our AFP counterparts, possibly supported by enhanced rotational access to AFP facilities by USPACOM forces.

Thailand. I would begin by offering my personal condolences to the Thai people for the losses they suffered in 2011 during the most devastating flood their country has experienced in 50 years. Their response to this disaster, particularly with regard to containment of potential infectious diseases, was a testament to Thailand's resilience and self sufficiency.

Thailand is an enduring U.S. ally in SEA and a valuable security partner. They are co-host (with USPACOM) to the largest multilateral exercise series in SEA, COBRA GOLD, and provide liberal access and logistics support for transiting USPACOM aircraft and ships at their military facilities. The U.S. and Thailand have twice partnered to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa, deploying Thai naval vessels with U.S. Navy personnel onboard to Combined Task Force-151, which Thailand will take command of in the coming year. Additionally, the Royal Thai Army assisted UN humanitarian relief operations in Darfur with a battalion of peacekeepers.

Despite facing challenges such as land and maritime border disputes with neighboring, Cambodia, refugee incursions from Burma, a longstanding ethnic insurgency in the south, and transnational challenges such as narcotics and human trafficking, the Thai armed forces are capable and generally self-sufficient.

Singapore. Our bilateral relationship with Singapore continues to strengthen and broaden. Singapore armed forces comprise a small, but extremely capable military. Their main focus continues to be security within the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait and they cooperate with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in conducting security patrols within the Straits against piracy and other illicit activities. Singapore's armed forces are also deployed to Afghanistan, working alongside coalition partners to develop the Afghan National Security Forces. Within the context of the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, both militaries are seeking to increase engagement across all USPACOM service components. Singapore's offer to host U.S. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at Changi naval station will enhance USPACOM's SEA posture.

Indonesia. As the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia—the world's fourth most populous nation, third largest democracy, and largest Muslim-majority country—continues to advance, the USPACOM – TI relationship is progressing, as well. Following a decade of political, economic, and military reform, Indonesia has surfaced as a vibrant democracy, an emerging economy, and a competent military power. In areas such as disaster risk reduction, CT, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping operations, Indonesia is increasingly recognized for its leadership role. Indonesia and the U.S. were recently designated co-chairs of the Experts Working Group on Counter Terrorism for the ASEAN Defense Ministers

Meeting - Plus. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional CT cooperation, build capacity, and collectively address regional security issues in an open consultative forum.

Following a 12-year hiatus, USPACOM has reestablished security cooperation activities with the Indonesian KOPASSUS army special forces. The measured pace with which this engagement has advanced has included key leader dialogue and small-scale subject matter experts exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning and law of war / human rights. More activities of this type are planned for 2012 and will gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in Indonesian Armed Force transparency and institutional reform.

Vietnam. Military relations with Vietnam continue to grow in areas such as disaster management, search and rescue, conflict resolution, personnel recovery and medical operations. Vietnam is modernizing its military and looks to the U.S. as a partner in maintaining security and stability in SEA, particularly in the SCS. Vietnam's successful chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 affirmed its emerging role as a leader and spokesman among SEA nations, as has been evidenced by their current role in lower Mekong River delta HA/DR initiatives. Vietnam and China have a long history of competition in the SCS. Both nations' disputes over islands and features, as well as natural resources, have led to confrontations in the past. Vietnam's continued leadership among SEA nations will be a critical component of eventual conflict resolution in this highly important and strategic area. USPACOM will carry on working closely with Vietnam to advance our military relationship and cooperation in providing

security across the Asia Pacific while remaining mindful of concerns about human rights.

Malaysia. Malaysia's vibrant economy, advanced military, strategic position near Malacca and the Singapore Straits, bordering both the SCS and Indian Oceans, and regional leadership combine to define it as an important partner for the U.S. and USPACOM, and a key actor within SEA. Malaysia contributes to Strait of Malacca patrols, maritime security in the SCS, and efforts to contain transnational threats, such as piracy, and VEOs, such as ASG and JI. Its direct action against pirates in the Gulf of Aden was evidence of increased confidence and capability. In 2011, Malaysia conducted its second deployment of medical support units to Afghanistan and remains committed to supporting coalition efforts there until 2014. U.S. naval vessels frequently call in Malaysian ports, and military-to-military exchanges and joint training have expanded over recent years.

Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Timor-Leste. The U.S. has extensive interests across the rest of SEA, and USPACOM seeks to continue advancing military relations with Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and Timor-Leste. Cambodia has been a strong supporter of U.S. military engagement in recent years and demonstrates a strong desire to increase military-to-military activities with USPACOM. Military engagements with Brunei, Laos and Timor-Leste have expanded, albeit modestly, over the past year with particular emphasis on relationship-building and enhanced regional cooperation.

Burma. To the extent that any military-to-military relationship exists with Burma, it is extremely limited due to U.S. policies and sanctions directed at the former junta and its actions. However, the Burmese government steps towards credible political and

economic reform and working toward ceasefires with armed ethnic groups in the past several months together have improved U.S.-Burma ties, resulting in several initiatives announced during Secretary Clinton's December trip to Burma. Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) recovery operations, is the first opportunity for military-related engagement with Burma since 2004. It is estimated that the WWII remains of as many as 730 Americans may be present there. Burma's assimilation into the broader Asia-Pacific regional security order would be a positive event..

South Asia

South Asia as a whole is of major strategic importance to the U.S. Anchored by India and containing major SLOCs for the transport of energy and other commerce to Asia and the Americas from the Middle East and Europe, South Asia security partnerships are increasingly vital to USPACOM's mission.

South Asia is home to a confluence of challenges, including nuclear armed rivals India and Pakistan, numerous transnational VEOs such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), piracy, trafficking in narcotics and persons, disputed borders, and insurgent movements that have plagued India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. South Asia is particularly prone to natural disasters, including cyclones, tsunamis, and earthquakes. Bangladesh has long suffered from annual cyclones and flooding and Nepal is expected to suffer a major earthquake in the coming years. USPACOM engages throughout South Asia, assisting its militaries to counter and contain VEOs such as LeT, cooperating in maritime security activities such as counter piracy, conducting disaster response planning and training, and exercising extensively, service to service.

India. Pursuing a U.S.-India strategic partnership through a close alignment of respective regional security interests is a priority for the U.S. Department of Defense and USPACOM. Our security relationship involves strategic to tactical-level dialogues, increasingly robust military exercises, security assistance, and personnel exchanges. The United States and India have made steady progress in military-to-military cooperation over the past decade.

It is important that the leadership and staffs of USPACOM and United States Central Command continue to coordinate our respective military activities in this sub-region, especially as they concern India and Pakistan.

Bangladesh. Bangladesh has emerged as a particularly effective partner in the fight against terror, cooperating with India as well as the U.S. to counter VEO activity by actors such as LeT. Further, Bangladesh's military is advancing its capabilities and contributes broadly to UN peacekeeping operations. Also, the Bangladesh army is primarily responsible for and has achieved major advancements in the protection of its citizens during the annual cyclone season and the inevitable flooding and related disasters with which Bangladesh repeatedly contends.

Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka. Although South Asian nations share similar concerns and challenges, they are uniquely individual.

Due to its proximity to major commercial sea lanes, the Maldives is concerned with piracy and other illicit activity in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For that reason, it is striving to advance its maritime security capabilities by reshaping its coast guard, marine and special operations forces. Further, curbing recruitment of its youth into VEOs and narcotics trafficking and addiction are Maldives' areas of focus.

Nepal has emerged from a lengthy Maoist insurgency in 2006 and is seeking to integrate some of the former insurgents into the Nepal Army. In partnership with USPACOM, Nepal's armed forces are preparing to respond to a future earthquake.

Sri Lanka, too, is focused on developing its maritime security capabilities while preventing a resurgence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. Sri Lanka's military forces continue to assist in de-mining and other recovery operations following 25 years of civil war. USPACOM's engagement with Sri Lanka will continue to be limited, until the Government of Sri Lanka demonstrates progress in addressing human rights allegations.

Each of these nations' militaries partner with USPACOM at varying levels, including leadership exchanges, exercise series, USPACOM Assist Team CT capacity building actions and activities, and security assistance.

LeT. While several VEOs conduct facilitation, recruitment, and seek safe havens throughout South Asia, LeT presents a particularly acute problem. Responsible for many attacks in India, including the horrific attacks into Mumbai, LeT is headquartered in Pakistan, affiliated with Al Qaida and other VEOs, and contributes to terrorist operations in Afghanistan and aspires to operate against Asia, Europe and North America. USPACOM's FY11 Indian Engagement Initiative that resourced and hosted Mumbai CT specialists for training, exercises, and exchanges throughout the U.S., together with capacity-building activities with South Asian partners are mainly focused on containing LeT and contributing to CT self-sufficiency of the sub-region's militaries.

Oceania

The U.S. alliance with Australia anchors USPACOM's strategy in Oceania. Australia, with additional contributions from New Zealand, invests extensively in security and assistance efforts in this sub-region. The Australian continent notwithstanding, most of Oceania is comprised of Pacific Island nations spread across the vast expanse of the South Pacific Ocean. Security challenges associated with natural resources in this sub-region tend to predominate. In particular, illegal fishing, resource damage attributed to climate change and global warming, and the susceptibility of low lying island nations to typhoons and tsunamis define USPACOM and U.S. Coast Guard approaches to engagement in Oceania, often in concert with Australian and New Zealand actions.

Two new Shiprider Agreements with the Pacific Island nations of Nauru and Tuvalu together with those already in place with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Tonga, and Kiribati enable transiting U.S. ships to assist in characterizing the maritime domains and providing a mechanism for shiprider-nation responses to irregularities within these island nations' territories.

Oceania is also home to the Compact of Free Association nations of the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, each of which USPACOM is obligated to defend as part of Compact arrangements putting their territory off limits to all armed forces except those of the United States (and other countries we have invited). Compact agreements with these three nations provide USPACOM a strategic buffer along the southern flank of the highly strategic U.S. territory of Guam. USPACOM is increasing its collaboration with the Department of the

Interior which administers federal policy in U.S. territories in Oceania and administers assistance funds to the Compact Nations. We soon expect to have a liaison officer from Interior join the USPACOM staff.

Australia. The U.S.-Australia alliance, our most significant partnership in Oceania, benefits from two new force posture initiatives, the rotational deployment of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to Darwin and enhanced access to airfields in northern Australia. These initiatives will enable deeper interoperability of our respective forces, expand training opportunities with third countries in the region, and improve access to SEA and Oceania. Australia is also the largest non-NATO contributor of forces to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan.

A trilateral relationship between Australia, Japan, and the U.S. continues to advance and has the potential to enable multilateral approaches to the region's challenges. Bilaterally, the U.S. and Australian militaries collaborate extensively in areas such as information sharing; ISR; HA/DR; combined arms training in exercise TALISMAN SABER; and space and cyber security.

New Zealand. New Zealand is also a recognized leader in Oceania. It is a strong partner of the U.S., and in accordance with the forward-looking spirit of the 2010 Wellington Declaration, USPACOM will continue to look for ways to further strengthen the relationship despite differences over nuclear policy. The U.S. and New Zealand share many security concerns and are cooperative partners in areas such as intelligence sharing, HA/DR and maritime security. In the interest of advancing the partnership, New Zealand is participating fully in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise for the first time in 2012.

We value New Zealand's contributions to Afghanistan. New Zealand also supports stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, Armistice enforcement in Korea, and UN peacekeeping efforts globally.

Exercise and Engagement Programs

Exercises. In order to maintain ready forces and to plan, train, and exercise to accomplish the full range of military contingencies, USPACOM requires annual Congressional support for the Combatant Command Exercise and Engagement (CE2) program. USPACOM's portion of this essential program consists of 18 major exercises involving joint military forces, interagency activities, and 27 of 36 USPACOM partner nations. CE2 directly impacts USPACOM's ability to conduct Joint training exercises and theater security engagement events across the Asia Pacific, and therefore plays a vital role in contributing to security of the AOR.

Engagement Programs. Two very significant engagement programs are PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP and PACIFIC ANGEL. In 2011, the USS CLEVELAND, with personnel from 11 nations, conducted a 4-month deployment to Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and Federated States of Micronesia. Combining medical, dental, and engineering support, the mission treated over 38,000 patients, conducted scores of community relations projects, and completed much needed engineering and infrastructure repairs. Likewise, PACIFIC ANGEL '11, utilizing C-17 aircraft, cared for thousands of patients and completed numerous civic action projects in Mongolia, Cambodia, Timor Leste, and Indonesia.

Both of these engagement programs serve to improve regional partnerships, while enhancing the resiliency of object nations to deal more effectively with their own

humanitarian crises due to natural disasters or other causes. Moreover, the experience that our service components gain by working alongside non-governmental organizations and other participating militaries in these controlled conditions improves their abilities to conduct disaster response when time is of the essence and lives are on the line.

USPACOM considers PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP and PACIFIC ANGEL to be high payoff engagements in the Asia Pacific region.

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)

The GSCF is a new tool available for USPACOM and country teams to develop and deliver security sector assistance in a coordinated fashion, enhancing the capabilities of military forces, other security forces, and relevant government agencies. The fund also supports the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts.

USPACOM Organizations

The following direct-reporting units (DRUs) uniquely contribute to the USPACOM mission:

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). APCSS fills a unique role in multi-national security cooperation and capacity-building efforts by equipping and empowering APCSS fellows and alumni to make substantive changes to their countries' security architectures. APCSS brings together communities of interest and influence, comprised of presidents, vice-presidents, ministers of defense and foreign affairs, chiefs of defense, and ambassadors, to enable collaborative solutions to critical regional security challenges. Because the Center engages regularly and often concurrently with Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as Hong Kong, it is uniquely

positioned to assist in moving the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship towards a “sustained and reliable” level of contact.

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The USPACOM and the USFK - CFC JIOCs deliver strategically-focused, operationally-relevant and predictive intelligence products to support Commander USPACOM and our subordinate commands. The JIOCs operate within a larger USPACOM intelligence federation that capitalizes on national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities as well as two-way information sharing activities with Allies and Partners. The JIOCs serve as a focal point of intelligence collaboration in close coordination with USPACOM Component Commands; National, Defense and Service Agencies; other Combatant Commands; Sub-unified Commands; and Allies and Partners. This federated approach to intelligence provides for invaluable theater situational awareness and advanced threat warning to enable decision-making.

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West). Through the execution of USPACOM’s counternarcotics program, JIATF West has significantly affected illicit methamphetamine precursor chemical trafficking originating in Asia ultimately bound for the Western Hemisphere by focusing its efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian, and other transnational criminal organizations in the USPACOM AOR. In FY11, JIATF West’s support to U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies resulted in the seizure of over 1,000 metric tons of illicit chemicals used in meth production. The seizures were critical in interrupting distribution within the U.S. and contributed to the disruption of Asian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). JPAC successfully accomplished 58 investigation and recovery operations globally last year and is projected to execute 78 investigation and recovery operations in 2012.


Expanded operations begin in FY 2012 as JPAC resumes investigation and recovery operations in the DPRK. JPAC is also preparing to resume discussions with the government of Burma to renew personnel accounting efforts there during FY 2013. JPAC accounting operations are ongoing in the People's Republic of China, while discussions between JPAC and the governments of India and the Philippines continue in an effort to resume investigation and recovery operations in those countries.

Conclusion

As characterized by the President, the U.S. "face[s] an inflection point." The evolving geopolitical climate and shifting fiscal environment, which are significant factors in this change, point toward the Asia Pacific and emphasize the ever increasing consequence of this theater. The preceding testimony highlights the importance of optimizing U.S. posture in this region and underscores the specific challenges USPACOM faces, as well as the opportunities USPACOM seeks. I have spent the majority of my career in the Asia Pacific and have never been more convinced of its remarkable nature, partnership capacity, and criticality to U.S. security.

In closing, your assistance has enabled the more than 300,000 members of USPACOM to accomplish their mission. Further, your personal interest in, and visits to the Asia Pacific have sent a strong signal to this region regarding U.S. national interests and staying power. On behalf of every USPACOM member, thank you for your enduring support for our armed forces and for this unique and important part of the world.

**Robert F. Willard, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command**



Adm. Robert F. Willard is the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Admiral Robert F. Willard is a Los Angeles native and a 1973 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has a Master's Degree in Engineering Management from Old Dominion University and is an MIT Seminar XXI alumnus.

An F-14 aviator, Willard served in a variety of west coast fighter squadrons; VF-24, VF-124, VF-2, and VF-51 aboard the aircraft carriers USS Constellation, USS Ranger, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson. He was Operations Officer and Executive Officer of Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) and aerial coordinator for the movie. He later commanded the "Screaming Eagles" of Fighter Squadron 51.

Following nuclear-power training, Willard served as Executive Officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), commanded the amphibious flagship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) in the Persian Gulf during "Operation Vigilant Warrior" for which Tripoli received a Navy Unit Commendation and commanded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

As a Flag Officer, Willard twice served on the Joint Staff, was Deputy and Chief of Staff for U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, commanded Carrier Group Five aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan. In March 2005, Willard became the 34th Vice Chief of Naval Operations; in May 2007, he assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; and on October 19, 2009, he became the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Admiral Willard's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit and various other awards.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 1, 2012

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

Admiral WILLARD. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
[See page 10.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN

Admiral WILLARD. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
[See page 28.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 1, 2012

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. A recent report issued by the Congressional Research Service points out that China has repeatedly suspended its mil-to-mil contacts with the United States as a retaliatory measure for various U.S. actions. It also describes the limitations of those relationships. The report does not suggest suspending mil-to-mil contacts, but what is your opinion on ways to improve them? Does the U.S. get as much benefit from mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA as they do? Are there different approaches that we could take to improve the value of those contacts?

Admiral WILLARD. The Department of Defense conducts mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA because we believe such contacts help build a cooperative capacity to address common security challenges, foster institutional understanding of each others' military doctrines and intentions, and build a common view of the international security environment. The PLA continues to suspend mil-mil contacts as a means to express displeasure for various U.S. actions that run contrary to PRC interests, a practice which indicates the PLA places less value on a sustained, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship with the United States.

One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and allies already either co-host or actively participate makes it increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to bring the PLA more frequently to the table, to demonstrate that it is better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart from the conversation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. I understand that China is becoming more economically involved in both Central and South American countries. What visibility does PACOM have on these activities and what are your greatest concerns involving these actions?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. REYES. Since 2002, it appears that the activities and the numbers of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf have decreased in the Philippines. What actions is PACOM taking in order to ensure that this group and others in the country are eradicated? Has there been an issue with drug trafficking out of the country in order to fund the terrorist groups? How are you engaging international partners on the terrorist groups in the area?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. REYES. What is the status of mil-to-mil engagements with China? How would you propose improving the value of such contacts?

Admiral WILLARD. Although the Defense Consultative Talks took place in December (an institutionalized dialogue) there have been no other bilateral mil-to-mil engagements since last September. However, some engagement still takes place sporadically along the periphery through a multitude of multilateral, rather than bilateral, venues across the Pacific theater.

When China's President, Xi Jinping, visited Washington in February and met with Secretary Panetta, the two sides agreed to move forward in developing the specifics of this year's program of military-to-military exchanges and also expressed support for an exchange of visits between Secretary Panetta and China's Minister of National Defense at an appropriate time.

During the week of 26 March 2012, representatives from the Department of Defense and the Chinese military will hold discussions detailing the bilateral military-to-military engagement plan for 2012 which will include Secretary Panetta's trip to China.

One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to increasingly conduct such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with multi-lateral engagements where the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of participation. One of the greatest strengths of USPACOM's forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners and allies, who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By inviting the PLA to mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and allies already either co-host or actively participate, makes it increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to bring the PLA more frequently to the table to demonstrate that it is better for the PLA to be a part of the conversation, rather than apart from the conversation.

Military engagement can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges that serve to enhance and deepen the mil-to-mil relationship. We should use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and Partners in addressing common security challenges.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. Given the limitations of the Harpoon, how would you assess the requirement for a new ASCM with greater range against other competing priorities?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. Despite describing the great potential of the UCLASS program in testimony for negating emergent A2/AD technologies, this program appears to be downgraded in the Navy's FY13 budget request and the FYDP. The UCLASS program was cut by \$240 million this year and the limited operational capability (LOC) date is being delayed by two years from 2018 to 2020. Also, UCLASS was not mentioned as a key program for projecting power in contested areas in the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices document nor was it identified in the written testimony of Secretary Mabus as a capability the Navy is investing in to counter advanced A2/AD challenges. How important does PACOM consider the capabilities found in the UCLASS program for meeting its mission requirements?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FORBES. What are the challenges presented to U.S. Navy undersea dominance by the numerical growth and modernization of the PLA(N) submarine fleet over the next 8–10 years. What risk assessment has been conducted relative to contingency plans given PLA(N) submarine force structure projections versus the projected U.S. SSN shortfall in the 2020–2030 timeframe? What mitigation strategies have been employed by the Commander to address the potential inequity in undersea warfare between the U.S. submarine force and the PLA(N) submarine force in the out years?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yesterday the State Department announced that North Korea agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including enrichment in exchange for food aid. While I'm sure all of us here will continue to carefully examine all aspects of the security situation on the Korean peninsula, how do you expect this announcement to affect PACOM's security posture, if at all, as well as that of our regional allies?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. During your testimony you mentioned a yearlong cyber pilot with CYBERCOM to advance cyber capabilities in the Pacific. Could you elaborate more on the progress and goals of this pilot? How do you plan on integrating lessons learned into future operations and capabilities?

Admiral WILLARD. 1. USPACOM established the Cyberspace Operations Command-Provisional (CYBERPAC-P) in February 2011 in order to bring together key PACOM stakeholders into a single entity for the synchronizing of cyberspace operations. With the pending approval of the Transitional Cyberspace CONOPS, CYBERPAC-P was renamed the Cyberspace Operations Center Pacific (CYBERPAC) to serve as the theater's Joint Cyber Center (JCC).

2. CYBERPAC's mission is to plan and conduct theater cyberspace operations by synchronizing regional, national and allied cyberspace capabilities in support of USPACOM objectives in order to maintain freedom of action in cyberspace for U.S. Forces, our Partners, and Allies while denying the same to our adversaries.

3. CYBERPAC's essential tasks include: a. Coordinate Theater DOD Global Information Grid Operations. b. Direct and coordinate Theater Defensive/Offensive Cyber Operations. c. Plan against designated cyberspace threats. d. Coordinate with Direct Reporting Units, Sub-Unified Commands, and appropriate U.S. government agencies for cyberspace effects. e. Synchronize Cyber Operations with Allies and regional partners.

4. As the Regional JCC, CYBERPAC continues to direct, coordinate and synchronize the planning and execution of regional cyberspace operations with USCYBERCOM, as the agent for global cyberspace operations. Over the past 13 months, the CYBERPAC has greatly enhanced PACOM's ability to integrate cyberspace operations into the full spectrum of operations and has emerged as the standard model for a regional JCC. Lessons learned and best practices continue to be integrated into the CYBERPAC construct through Tier 1 exercises and current contingency operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. In the discussion on the realignment the overall strategic imperatives of this move have not been adequately addressed. The key to these realignments is about strengthening our alliance with Japan. To that extent, what message are we sending the Japanese by utilizing U.S. Forces Japan as primarily a logistics and administrative function versus being an operational command like U.S. Forces Korea? U.S. Forces Japan did a tremendous job during Operation Tomodachi but how could the operation have been enhanced by an operational command based in Japan? If U.S. Forces Japan was being utilized as an operational command in every sense of the word, could they be assigned a mission of enhancing U.S.-Japan bilateral training?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you comment on your view of future Navy ship maintenance and repair requirements and capabilities required in the Western Pacific? In particular, do you foresee maintenance and repair requirements for submarines or the LCS on Guam?

Admiral WILLARD. The current Submarine repair model for Guam will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. As the number of Littoral Combat Ships home ported in the Pacific increases, more voyage repairs in support of Western Pacific deployments are likely. However, the support provided would be similar to that currently given to other Navy ships that transit in the vicinity of Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. With the increased military presence ramping up in the Asia-Pacific region, I find it concerning that the Department of Defense is cutting critical resources in that particular AOR. A recent example is the Air Force announcing the divestiture of the Global Hawk block 30, of which there are currently 3 aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base. Do you feel that you will still have adequate ISR capabilities in the PACOM AOR if these 3 aircraft and potentially other assets are divested from the inventory? What risk are we currently facing with ISR capabilities in the PACOM AOR and what steps are being taken to mitigate that risk?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current PACOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM's sourcing of functions and work between military, civilian and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable laws and statutes. USPACOM's FY 2013 budget requests, and associated civilian workforce reductions, reflect USPACOM's best judgment today. It represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the overall command strategy and policy, balancing operational needs and fiscal reality. USPACOM remains committed to meeting its

statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the USPACOM workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did PACOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM requested a SECDEF exception to the FY10 civilian personnel cap for 38 contractor-to-civilian conversions in the FY12 program. The 38 conversions were determined to be exempt from private sector performance for readiness/management needs. These in-sourcing actions were expected to result in net savings for USPACOM, as civilian performance has been estimated to be more cost-effective than contract performance.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has PACOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

Admiral WILLARD. HQ USPACOM's current workforce percentages are 50% military, 34% civilian and 8% contractor with the remaining 8% as over-hires and activated reservists. As a result of in-sourcing, USPACOM's rebalanced workforce has generated significant cost saving which is reflected in the USPACOM budget.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting PACOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

Admiral WILLARD. We have diligently scrutinized our contracted services and are convinced we have the right balance of support.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within PACOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

Admiral WILLARD. The civilian workforce and associated fiscal funding reductions are being managed through a functional assessment of workload priorities. USPACOM tracks manpower authorizations, personnel and associated funding to manage workload requirements for military, civilians, activated reserves, USPACOM-funded contractors and civilian overhires for the current and future fiscal years. When civilian employees resign or retire, the vacant position is reviewed based on organizational assessments, prioritization of missions and functions, and the associated risk and degradation to USPACOM readiness.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the PACOM plan for direct labor reporting, signed by your Chief of Staff on November 21, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, PACOM planned to incorporate manpower reporting language beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with this requirement since October 1, 2011?

Admiral WILLARD. No contracts, with this requirement, have been executed with this requirement since 1 October 2011.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions PACOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

Admiral WILLARD. The SECDEF approved the conversion of 38 contractors to civilian in the FY12 program which were previously approved and programmed in the FYDP. The 38 contractors consisted of 12 at USPACOM Headquarters, 21 for Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command and five for Defense Intelligence Agency/USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Command. None of USPACOM's requests were disapproved.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across PACOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM submits an annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activity (IG/CA) inventory of all appropriated funded military and DOD funded civilian manpower authorizations, categorized as either inherently governmental or commercial activities. Workload and functions tied to military or civilian authorizations that have been eliminated or divested are tracked and reported in the IG/CA inventory using the manpower mix criteria and functional codes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Mr. CONAWAY. Are DOD's ISR platforms appropriate for use in the contested air-space environment that we see in the PACOM AOR and if not, what should we be doing to prepare our ISR assets for the contested environment?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. CONAWAY. The PACOM AOR has some of the most technologically advanced nations in the field of cybersecurity. What can we do as a nation and in the PACOM AOR to defend and defeat any attacks on our network?

Admiral WILLARD. 1. Defending our networks and defeating attacks requires the following:

a. Exercise a Whole-of-Government or Whole-of-Nation Strategy. The DOD must partner closely with U.S. government departments, agencies and the private sector to enable a whole of government strategy to address diverse cyber threats to military targets, civilian infrastructure, personal identifiers and intellectual property. Many of the DOD's critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including internet service providers and global supply chains, over which the DOD has no authority to mitigate risk. The DOD is developing partnerships with the private sector and government agencies, including law enforcement, to best defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. For example, a memorandum of agreement has been signed between DOD and DHS to enhance inter-departmental strategic planning, synchronization of operations and mutual support for capability development.

b. Recruit, Train, Retain, Organize, and Equip a Cyber Workforce. Meeting the dynamic needs of cyber operations and managing cyber risks requires a talented, trained force to develop innovative capabilities and provide information assurance, real-time situational awareness and network environments that are secure and resilient to evolving threats. DOD will need to continually develop the integration and resourcing of cyber workforce requirements and make itself competitive to entice and retain skilled personnel.

c. Invest in the Development of Industrial Cyberspace Capabilities. Technological innovation is at the forefront of national security. The DOD will need to enhance its research, development, testing, evaluation and acquisition processes to employ rapid cycles of technological innovation. The DOD should focus significant investments on developing game changing approaches to strengthen its defense capabilities and make its systems unrecognizable to malicious activity. For example, we should focus research on mission assurance and maintaining effective cyberspace operations, including cyberspace maneuvering, active cyber defense and full spectrum cyberspace operations. We should also pursue new architectures to defend its critical networks, harden systems and create assured environments to protect current and future systems from attack.

d. Build Relationships with U.S. Allies and International Partners. The development of international shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will enable collective cyber self-defense and deterrence. By sharing timely indicators and threats, allies and international partners can increase collective cyber defense. Thus, DOD will need to build and improve relationships with key allies and international partners, including efforts to develop standard operating procedures for strategic communications, establish cyber centers of excellence and advance international cyberspace norms and principles that protect the free flow of information, goods and ideas.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Willard, with the new strategy to shift our focus to the Asia-Pacific how do the \$487 billion in defense cuts over the next 10 years affect your ability as the Combatant Commander responsible for the Asia-Pacific to execute this strategy? In my opinion you are being asked to do more with a lot less. The Navy's SCN account is decreasing, our ship count is decreasing, we are decommissioning ships before the end of their service life, and we are moving advanced weapons platforms like SSNs, F-35, and SSBN(X) further to the right and well outside the FYDP. Do you feel the Navy and Air Force will be able to provide PACOM the numbers and types of ships and aircraft sufficient to support PACOM's responsibilities under the Department's new strategic guidance?

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM has not assessed an "inability" to focus on Asia-Pacific issues in the near term. As DOD provides further details on future expectations, USPACOM will assess current readiness accordingly.

We believe USPACAF and USPACFLT will be able to provide USPACOM the numbers of forces sufficient to support our responsibilities. This assumes a commit-

ment by the Air Force, Navy and Department of Defense to focus investments in the Pacific and availability of partner nation capability. The fiscal realities will challenge all of us; however, USPACOM and this nation have a long tradition of meeting its responsibilities during tough times and will continue to do so in the future. The Navy and Air Force will find ways to work together in unprecedented ways to meet this challenge through efforts like the Air Sea Battle strategy. These efforts will identify requirements, establish ownership, find efficiencies and eliminate duplicative efforts. Ultimately, this will drive us towards better theater integration and coordination of efforts.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, in the '70s and '80s you dealt with the Soviet Union and operations that supported the Cold War. With China's rapid military modernization, do you see the United States entering into a Cold War-type scenario with China in the coming years? We have the number 1 Navy in the world, how do we mitigate Chinese Navy from securing a foothold in the Asia-Pacific that projects power and asserts their maritime dominance of the region? Particularly in areas like the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

Admiral WILLARD. The United States' relationship with China is more complex than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The U.S. and USSR bilateral relationship existed largely in the diplomatic and security realms. By comparison, in addition to our diplomatic and security relationship with China, we have robust economic, cultural, environmental, and other linkages that make the U.S. and China far more interdependent than the U.S. and USSR ever were. I don't think a return to the days of the Cold War is plausible and it is certainly not desirable. With regard to maritime dominance, the U.S. Navy asserts its right to free and unfettered access to the waters beyond the territorial seas of any nation in accordance with UNCLOS. We don't question the right of China or any nation to enjoy the same free and unfettered access to those waters in accordance with international norms and we consistently support the peaceful resolution of disputes. The East China Sea and South China Sea are congested waterways with multiple overlapping claims of sovereignty, including territorial and maritime claims. USPACOM conducts routine, coordinated presence operations in the Western Pacific in order to ensure a consistent presence, fulfill multiple operational requirements, and retain the necessary operational flexibility to address contingencies. Throughout the conduct of these operations, USPACOM is careful to strike the appropriate balance between operations that reassure allies and partners, operations which challenge excessive maritime claims, and actions that serve to deter behavior which is not consistent with international norms.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, the South China Sea continues to become a more contentious region with the convergence of sovereignty claims, vital international trade routes, expansive natural resources, and increasing military strength of multiple countries in the region. With the escalating tensions concerning oil and natural gas drilling plans, with potentially some American companies involved as well as American allies, it seems the question is when the region will spark, not if. My question is: What do you see ahead for the South China Sea in the next 2-5 years? What would you anticipate PACOM's reaction to be if a small kinetic conflict broke out between two countries' maritime assets in the region? Lastly, do you see the homebasing of 4 LCSs and marines in Darwin as a significant gamechanger in future South China Sea issues? Do you feel those shifts will escalate or decrease tension in the region?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH

Mr. HEINRICH. ADM Willard, please detail for the Committee the operational benefits that the capabilities being developed under the Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD offer in your area of operation. In addition, what would be the benefits of having additional resources to enhance those capabilities?

Admiral WILLARD. The Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD provides us with new approach to engage soft electronic systems with significantly reduced collateral damage on non-targets. This in turn allows us to engage critical targets that are difficult to engage due to location in sensitive areas currently on the restricted strike list. An attack by a CHAMP-like system also potentially reduces the post-conflict reconstruction over kinetic effects. The CHAMP JCTD was designed to demonstrate the benefits of engaging targets with High Power Microwaves. Additional resources would provide for a program of

record for the capability and incorporate the solutions to the identified deficiencies of the demonstrator system.

Mr. HEINRICH. CENTCOM's Urgent Need for ISR Data led to the development and launch of ORS-1, which went operational in January 2012 and is getting very high marks. Given the new strategic emphasis on Asia and the Pacific, with large areas of denied-access terrain, does PACOM have an Urgent Need for a similar capability?

Admiral WILLARD. The short answer to your question is "yes". USPACOM has been working closely with the Operationally Responsive Space program on a satellite of our own. ORS-2 is in development and scheduled to be launched in 2015. While it has a different payload than ORS-1, the capability will have a positive impact on USPACOM ISR collection gaps, most notably, those areas that are out of the reach of our airborne systems.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. There are proposed changes to the basing arrangement in the Pacific Theater. How will they affect PACOM's ability to address North Korea's nuclear ambitions? How will this affect our ability to respond to China's military build-up?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCHILLING. What are PACOM's plans to optimize our alliances and regional partnerships and do you have benchmarks you are trying to achieve?

Admiral WILLARD. In general, while cooperation with regional allies and partners is generally strong and on a positive trajectory, we recognize the need to continue to strengthen our alliances and regional partnerships while building new ones. Our bilateral alliances remain the cornerstone of regional security and U.S. policy. Our relations with our treaty allies have never been better. We aim to encourage Korea's increasing emergence as not just a regional power, but a responsible global leader. We're working closely with the government in Australia on a host of critical security issues and it is our indivisible bond with Japan that has driven the United States, especially our armed forces, to lead the world's effort to help our ally in its time of greatest need. In addition to our close cooperation and exercise with our Philippine and Thai allies, the United States is also transforming its mil-to-mil relations with a number of emerging partners, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and India. Our strategic partnership with India, in particular, holds immense potential for shaping a geo-political balance within and beyond the region that favors political and economic freedom. In short, the United States is well positioned in the Asia-Pacific region, both in terms of our expanding partnerships as well as our enduring capabilities, to promote our National interests in the dynamic 21st century.

The United States Pacific Command's Theater Campaign Plan is the mechanism used to manage security relations with allies and other countries and collaborative relationships with other organizations. The plan establishes both long and short term objectives all aimed toward achieving the strategic end states outlined in our national level strategic guidance. To mitigate risk this plan, and its execution, remain adaptive. Twice a year, USPACOM will formally assess the campaign. From this assessment, the Command will decide whether to adjust the resourcing, execution or priorities of the theater campaign.

Mr. SCHILLING. How do you see PACOM moving forward in our relationship with Taiwan?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to PACOM in 2011?

Admiral WILLARD. a. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, at the request of Pacific Command's Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, visited India and participated in a workshop held in Mumbai entitled "Exploring India-U.S. Cooperation, Safeguarding Prosperity in the Indian Ocean."

b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 worked closely with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to plan and conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but they also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.

c. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Command established a Coast Guard Reserve Unit at USPACOM. This Reserve Unit will ultimately have a complement of 17 Coast Guard Reservists assigned to various Pacific Command directorates.

d. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a few days away from having no fresh water, whatsoever, when Coast Guard Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak; consequently there was no loss of life.

e. Coast Guard District 14 participated with USPACOM in Operation Pacific Partnership, the theater's premier humanitarian civic assistance program. The program builds and strengthens alliances and partnerships with participating host nations and integrated partners.

f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-lateral maritime training events between forces from the United States and participating Asian countries.

g. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, a biennial field training exercise that includes ships, cutters, units and personnel from the United States (Navy and Coast Guard), Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. The exercise is designed to enhance interoperability of combined forces and improve war fighting capabilities.

h. Coast Guard District 14 conducted operations with USPACOM as part of the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Coast Guard Liaison Officers rode onboard Navy ships that transited Oceania for the purpose of Maritime Domain Awareness involving commercial fishing vessels in United States Exclusive Economic Zones and in waters of partner nations in Oceania.

i. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement patrols that included foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters. These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those of the Pacific Island nations; thus dove-tailing with Pacific Command's broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific Island nations, resources permitting.

j. At the request of USPACOM, Coast Guard Pacific Area Command provided support for and participated in various annual training exercises with the Republic of Korea.

k. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command's Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Pacific provided various intelligence products for the Pacific Commander:

1) Maritime Domain Awareness to Navy/Military Sealift Command vessels and submarines;

2) awareness regarding transnational crime, alien migration and living marine resources;

3) daily targeting products regarding foreign flagged ships with Chinese, Russian and Ukrainian crews; and

4) targeting products in support of Operation TOMADACHI, e.g., the tracking of vessels that may have been exposed to low level radiation when their transit was near Fukushima, Japan.

l. The Coast Guard acted as a "door opener" for USPACOM to various foreign nations—notably including (but not limited to) Vietnam and India—vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14 Maritime Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident courses. Topics for the Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership.

m. The Coast Guard maintained a Maritime Advisor in Indonesia to assist its maritime service with training, capabilities and professionalization.

n. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its territorial waters.

o. The Coast Guard Liaison Officer to USPACOM supported Pacific Command initiatives in a variety of instances, e.g., serving as the United States Co-Chairman of the Maritime Security Committee for the Republic of the Philippines–United States of America Military Defense Board/Security Engagement Board.

p. The Coast Guard funds seven active duty billets at Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF–W), at a cost of \$1,074,184.00. JIATF–W is the USPACOM Commander’s executive agent for counter narcotics. Other JIATF–W support includes:

—The USCG District Fourteen Intelligence Branch Chief attended the JIATFW daily intelligence brief once a week and worked closely with JIATFW staff on illicit trafficking events, and provided liaison to other Coast Guard and law enforcement entities in the region.

—During multiple smuggling events, the USCGC SEQUOIA and the Maritime Law Enforcement Team from Maritime Safety and Security Team Honolulu (91107) were on stand-by to conduct intercept and boarding operations against vessels suspected of smuggling.

—The Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit Hawaii provided direct intelligence support for JIATFW’s Illicit Tracking Cell and Collections Management Branch.

—The USCG Maritime Intelligence Center Pacific (MIFCPAC) provided living marine resources expertise which enabled JIATFW to determine the legitimacy of maritime targets, and a myriad of documentation-related requests for information concerning suspect vessels.

—Coast Guard Air Station Barber’s Point C–130 maritime patrol aircraft provided airborne maritime domain awareness during scheduled patrols for District Fourteen, which enabled JIATFW analysts to determine an accurate picture of what vessels were actually on the water at any given time.

—The Coast Guard Investigative Service worked closely with JIATFW’s Special Programs Application program manager, and this collaboration resulted in the seizure of 900 kilograms of marijuana; the confiscation of one fishing vessel suspected of drug trafficking; nine illegal migrants taken into custody, including one with an outstanding warrant in another state, and identified maritime smuggling routes from Mexico to the United States.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within PACOM and are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding?

Admiral WILLARD. The military bands within USPACOM are one of the most effective means of fostering relationships between allies, partners and even our adversaries. They use music to bridge language, cultural, societal and socio-economic differences. These bands provide a soft power projection tool for theater security cooperation efforts and helps build strong relationships with countries throughout the USPACOM AOR. Each band has objectives which include building partnerships, sustaining war fighter morale, encouraging and enabling coalition partners, providing precise ceremonial engagements, recruitment of talented service members and fostering military pride, patriotism and service.

In portions of the Pacific, there are times when a military band is the exact right instrument of national power to employ, especially when other combat capabilities are in short supply and better employed elsewhere. The USPACOM military bands have bridged gaps in relationships that are decades old, such as the Marine Forces Pacific Band being the first U.S. band to visit Cambodia since the Vietnam War or the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Band being the first U.S. band to travel to mainland communist China. During that trip, the band performed at the Shanghai International Music Festival where they were able to interact with the People’s Liberation Army Band, as well as bands from Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea. The band was able to positively influence relations with the people of these nations through their participation in the festival as well as engaging with the local schools by providing one-on-one instruction and training students how to repair and maintain the longevity of their instruments.

USPACOM military bands also perform multiple community relations roles through participating in humanitarian assistance and civic initiatives. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and Marine Forces Pacific Band both contribute to the annual Pacific Partnership deployment where they and other Services members work closely with host nations, partner nations, non-governmental organizations and other U.S. government agencies to leave a lasting impact through cooperative engagements in the region.

In 2010 the Acting Consul General of Russia, Patricia Miller, stated, of the 25th Infantry Division Band’s visit to Sakhalin Island region, “their concerts in three days did more to showcase America than what the Consulate could have done in several months. The Russians were able to see a very human side of the U.S. Army.”

Due to the unique capabilities of USPACOM bands and the ability to reach hundreds of thousands of people through the universal language and appeal of music, there is no other PACOM asset that can reach so many people in such a meaningful, peaceful and lasting way.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in building partnerships within PACOM's AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. a. The U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) 27,000 personnel in the Pacific Area frequently support USPACOM, engaging in a wide range of activities that support USPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan. In addition to USCG International engagements such as the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum and International Ship & Port Facility Security Code assessments, the USCG supports USPACOM's exercises such as Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a biennial Field training exercise that includes ships, cutters, units and personnel from the U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. The USCG also supports Pacific Fleet's CARAT exercise in Thailand, the multi-lateral Southeast Asia exercise Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) and the proliferation security initiative exercise DEEP SABRE.

b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense Working Group, Coast Guard District 14 (based in Honolulu HI) worked closely with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to plan and conduct maritime operations across Oceania. These operations were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but they also entailed the sharing of information at several levels.

c. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to USPACOM in a number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed fresh water to the New Zealand Territory of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a few days away from having no fresh water whatsoever when Coast Guard Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking water and a New Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C-130 aircraft transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall Islands (Marjuro) to combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed cases). This rapid deployment of control specialists was instrumental in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak; consequently there was no loss of life.

d. In 2011, the USCG supported U.S. Pacific Fleet's premier Humanitarian Exercise, Pacific Partnership, for the first time with two cutters, supporting engagements in Tonga and Micronesia. Pacific Partnership consisted of 600 military, interagency and non-governmental organizational medical professionals and engineers engaging the countries of Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua-New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the Federated States of Micronesia. The USCG is currently programmed to support Pacific Partnership 13, next year, which is scheduled to visit the Oceania region of the USPACOM AOR.

e. The USCG provided significant support to USPACOM by acting as a "door opener" to various foreign nations—notably (but not limited to) Vietnam and India—vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14 Maritime Training Team visits and hosting 34 students in resident courses. Topics for Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership. f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-lateral maritime training events between forces from the United States and participating Asian countries.

g. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM strategic partner, the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its territorial waters.

h. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider Agreements (there are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific Island nations by conducting commercial fisheries law enforcement patrols that include foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters. These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected vital marine resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those of the Pacific Island nations, thus dovetailing with Pacific Command's broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in establishing two more Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific Island nations, resources permitting.

i. The USCG International Training Detachment provides Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) on various maritime safety and security topics to countries throughout the

Pacific. Last year countries included Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands and Western Samoa.

Mr. SCOTT. How would you rate the performance of E-8C JSTARS aircraft within PACOM?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships *Comfort* and *Mercy* are high-demand, low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, would there be enough work for them to perform within PACOM's AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the current state of Taiwan's submarine fleet?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. Which aircraft is better suited in combat against China's J-20: an upgraded F-16 A/B or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. Besides the Republic of China, are U.S. Flag and General Officers banned from visiting any other country within PACOM's AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. State Department and OSD have strict policies that restrict U.S. Flag and General Officers from visiting Burma. Officers of the rank of O-6 and above require permission from the highest levels of OSD and STATE. The U.S. DOD policy on military engagement with Burma has not changed. The below excerpt is from OSD-P:

—DOD policy is not to engage with Burma's military. This policy includes, but is not limited to, a prohibition on any form of security assistance or cooperation, such as Foreign Military Financing or International Military Education and Training, arms transfers, foreign counterpart visits and bilateral meetings—State has the lead on diplomatic engagement with Burma and the Department of Defense is prepared to provide any necessary support.

Mr. SCOTT. Does the present ban on U.S. flag and general officers from visiting the Republic of Taiwan violate the Taiwan Relations Act?

Admiral WILLARD. No, the present restrictions on visits by U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan do not violate the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act does not expressly mandate such restrictions, nor does it expressly prohibit such restrictions.

Mr. SCOTT. What would be the deterrence value if Taiwan were to acquire 10 diesel-powered submarines?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. If Taiwan had 20,000 sensor fuzed munitions, would it greatly increase Taiwan's ability to deter a Chinese invasion force?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. Would MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) compatible (300km range) missiles offer Taiwan any numerous asymmetric advantages?

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. SCOTT. Will Taiwan require 5th generation fighters in the 2020s given the current security situation?

Admiral WILLARD. I believe Taiwan will require an inject of additional fighter aircraft in the future to address the decline of its overall fighter inventory and to ensure it can carry out its basic defense functions. Any such capability would still need to be part of a truly integrated air and missile defense system that is mobile and redundant to include an air force protection plan that promotes airbase hardening.