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LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB, AQIM AND OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL–SHABAAB, AQIM AND OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. We are here today to examine the instability on the African Continent caused by the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, led by wanted war criminal Joseph Kony; also Boko Haram; also al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; and to conduct critical oversight of U.S. Counterterrorism efforts in the region.

The ranking member, Mr. Berman, and I are forgoing opening statements and submitting them for the record for today's hearing, and I have asked our members to do the same so that we may receive testimony, conduct member questioning, and be able to adjourn today's hearing by 10:45 at the latest in order to quickly go over to Statuary Hall and be able to participate in the memorial service for our friend and departed colleague, the late Don Payne. And that is all right with you, Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. Yes.

[The prepared statements of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Berman follow:]

CHAIRMAN ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
Opening Statement
"LRA, Boko Haram, al Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa"
April 25, 2012

The 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania marked the first major attacks directed against United States interests by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. Four years later, al-Qaeda operatives struck again, killing 15 people in an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa, Kenya, and simultaneously firing missiles at an Israeli passenger jet taking off from Mombasa's airport.

Further, the 2010 arrest of three west-African al-Qaeda operatives on drug smuggling charges demonstrated the link between South American narco-groups and Islamist extremist groups in western Africa. In short, Islamic extremist and terrorist organizations, many of whom are linked to al-Qaeda, have been aggressively increasing their operations in Africa. It is imperative that the U.S. remain vigilant and work to destroy al-Qaeda and others who threaten our security, our interests, and our critical allies.

The Lord's Resistance Army, or LRA, has spurred much attention largely due to the tireless efforts by young student activists to raise awareness about Joseph Kony, his circle of thugs, and the need to bring them to justice for the atrocities committed against innocent civilians. The LRA, which currently operates in remote border areas of Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has wreaked havoc.

The LRA targets remote villages, slaughtering innocent civilians and abducting women and children to serve as soldiers, porters, and sex slaves. Upon abduction, children are commanded to commit extremely violent and brutal acts in front of their families and then forced to fight on the front lines for the LRA. Under the direction of Kony, LRA commanders mutilate innocent victims by cutting off their lips, ears and noses in attempts to terrorize villages and silence any opposition to his agenda.

In May 2010, the President signed into the law the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. This law required the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal with the LRA and declared that it is the policy of the United States to provide political, economic, military, and intelligence support for multilateral efforts to protect civilians, apprehend or eliminate top LRA commanders, and disarm and demobilize LRA fighters.

The President's strategy was released in November 2010 and set four strategic objectives: increased protection of civilians, apprehension or "removal" of Kony and other senior LRA commanders, promotion of defections from the LRA and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA combatants, and provision of humanitarian relief to affected areas. On Monday of this week, the President announced that the U.S. will continue the deployment of a small number of U.S. military advisors to assist regional forces of countries combating this menace.

Contact: Committee Press Office, 202-225-5021

Turning to Libya, the situation there has created additional challenges to our counterterrorism efforts as weapons from Libya are trafficked throughout the region to extremist groups. In North Africa and the Sahel, after successfully acquiring weapons from Libya this year, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM), poses a significant threat to the region.

In 2006, AQIM formally merged with al-Qaeda and is now considered to be one of al-Qaeda's most robust affiliates and is pursuing a sophisticated, global jihadist agenda, including by targeting Western interests. A recent report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies warns that "With deepening roots in local communities and the regional economy, AQIM is developing enhanced resilience against counterterror efforts."

Al Shabaab, a U.S. - designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, is considered to be one of the most deadly extremist groups in the world and their recent merging with al-Qaeda only magnifies the threat and the need for increased cooperation. The merging of al-Qaeda and al Shabaab has made al Shabaab more sophisticated in its use of guerilla tactics and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The recruitment and fundraising activities of al Shabaab here in the United States is of extreme concern, as are reported links between al Shabaab with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram, which refers to itself as the Nigerian Taliban, has grown increasingly bold and deadly. Boko Haram's 2011 suicide attack against the U.N. headquarters in Abuja demonstrates its capability to attack international targets with tactics similar to those of al-Qaeda.

We cannot afford to ignore this threat. We must not allow al-Qaeda to establish a foothold in the region.

While Islamist extremism is on the rise in Africa, the State Department's FY 2013 budget request would decrease funding to the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership by 14.5% from the FY 2012 estimates. In comparison, the State Department's FY 2013 budget request for Global Climate Change Initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa is $79.4 million.

In 2008, the Government Accountability Office issued a report entitled, "*Combating Terrorism: Action Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.*" In the report, GAO found that, currently, no comprehensive strategy guides the implementation of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and documents used in planning do not prioritize proposed activities or identify milestones needed to measure progress. It has been almost four years since the report was issued and the State Department has taken no action to implement the recommendations. The inconsistencies on the issue of counterterrorism in a region where Islamist extremism is on the rise is extremely concerning. We ask our State Department witnesses to discuss the steps being undertaken to immediately address the critical deficiencies identified by the GAO.

Last month, General Carter Ham, commander of the U.S. Africa Command, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee stated that: "The potential for support and strengthening of ties between these three groups (al Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram) with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda senior leaders in Pakistan is of particular concern and requires constant monitoring." We must not turn a blind eye to Africa. I would like to applaud our current partners on the African continent for their constant vigilance and efforts to counter combat extremist ideology in the region. Responsible nations must always be on guard as Islamist extremist groups seek to extend their global reach.

Contact: Committee Press Office, 202-225-5021

Ranking Member Howard L. Berman
Statement for House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing on
"LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa"
April 25, 2012

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and welcome, Ambassadors Yamamoto and Benjamin. This is a very important opportunity to discuss not only some of the conflicts and destabilizing forces in Africa, but also the factors that drive and perpetuate these conflicts and the larger context in which they play out.

As we explore the threats posed by violent and extremist groups, and the destruction they have already wrought, it is critical to remember that the way we define the problem will to a large extent determine the way we choose to address it. For instance, if we view the problem as merely the existence of these armed forces, then we are led to a very narrow, military-oriented solution.

However, if we understand the problem as being a broader one -- one that involves poor governance, rampant corruption, extreme poverty and inequality, and competition over resources -- then we will obviously need to take a much broader approach.
Groups like the Lord's Resistance Army, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda in the Maghreb do not arise in a vacuum. They emerge and thrive in environments where there are few legal, peaceful and reliable methods for ordinary citizens to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.

When there are ethnic, religious or tribal groups who are excluded from the decision-making process, when local communities fail to reap the benefits of the rich natural resources below their feet, conflict is sure to follow. As noted by former Defense Secretary Gates, failed states – countries with abysmally poor government and dismal economic development – can turn into terrorist sanctuaries, with catastrophic consequences for the US.

One of the questions I hope we can examine today is the extent to which these extremist movements are home-grown, driven by local disputes and grievances, and the extent to which they are instigated and supported by international terrorist networks.

In either event, any solution will require helping African countries and communities to address the threats to their own human security. One of them is disease, such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, which not only take an enormous toll on human health, but also on economic productivity and institutional capacity. They have wiped out millions of parents, children, farmers, teachers, entrepreneurs, and in doing so have upended entire societies and cultures.

Another recurring source of instability is food insecurity. As we have seen in the Horn of Africa and now in the Sahel, food insecurity can cause massive movements of people, which facilitates

the spread of disease, pulls apart the social fabric in societies and puts pressure on already scarce resources, fomenting conflict. The protracted influx of Somalis into Kenya and Ethiopia is but one example of this dynamic.

Climate change is not only disruptive —forcing populations to move and land-use patterns to change– but exacerbates the already overwhelming problems of disease, food insecurity, and lack of access to clean water. The annual conflict between pastoralists and nomads over grazing rights perfectly illustrates this challenge.

Competition for control of mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, combined with poor governance, is another volatile mix that has led to high levels of sexual gender-based violence, widespread killing, and forced labor.

Inter- and intra-state conflicts continue to be some of the most powerful drivers of instability. The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, not to mention conflicts *within* South Sudan are further aggravating the other drivers I have already mentioned.

Many terrorist threats trace their origins to failures in development and governance. Many prominent Nigeria analysts have emphasized the fact that the grievances of Boko Haram in Nigeria are domestic, and that they recruit by capitalizing on the frustrations of a northern population that has been neglected by the government in the South.

In Mali, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has taken advantage of the breakdown in governance and an already-existing Tuareg rebellion to infiltrate the north of the country. Even al-Shabab in Somalia has been able to thrive as the only viable form of government in a State that has completely broken down.
Similarly, weak civilian control over the military and fragile democratic institutions has enabled coups, crackdowns and repression. The recent events in Mali remind us that empowering a nation's military to respond to terrorist threats and armed rebellions can also pose significant risks to domestic stability.

Dealing with such a wide range of threats requires a robust foreign assistance budget. As I have said repeatedly, it is infinitely cheaper to address these problems with economic and technical assistance now, rather than to wait until fragile states collapse or conflicts erupt in wide scale violence, and we have to call upon US forces.

We cannot continue cutting these critical programs and hope for better outcomes in the years to come. Improving health, education, governance, and professionalization of security forces will mitigate the entire spectrum of threats to stability, but it requires significant and sustained assistance. We must treat the disease, not the symptoms.

While it would be easy to focus our attention only on the threats and problems that face Africa, I hope we can also take this opportunity to review the progress that has been made and the successes that have been achieved in addressing the sources of instability. For instance, in 1989, there were only three democracies in Africa and today there are 19.

Just last month we saw a regional organization of states in West Africa act decisively to reverse the coup in Mali—something that may not have happened only a decade ago. Seven of the ten fastest growing economies over the last decade were in Africa. And in country after country, there are programs showing great promise in reducing corruption, strengthening civil society, building democratic institutions and expanding economic inclusion.

I hope the witnesses will also address what IS working and what we, here in Congress, can do to support effective solutions.

Thank you again, Madam Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished panel.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And I know, Mr. Smith, you will be speaking at the memorial service as well.

So the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First we would like to welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006; and U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti from 2000 to 2003. We welcome you, Mr. Ambassador.

Next we would like to welcome Daniel Benjamin. Ambassador Benjamin is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. Prior to his appointment he served as the Director of the Center of the United States and Europe, and as a senior follow in foreign policy studies at The Brookings Institution from December 2006 to May 2009. For 6 years he was senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, from 1994 to 1999, and he served on the National Security Council staff. Thank you, Ambassador.

And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome Amanda Dory. She is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to her appointment she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy from 2008 to 2011 and Principal Director for Policy and Planning from 2007 to 2008, and as a strategist from 1999 to 2002.

Without objection, the written statements of our panelists will be made a part of the record and we ask that you summarize your remarks. Without objection, we will begin with you, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and members of the committee. In the face of terrorist threats and insecurity in Africa, military solutions in the first instance, while important in some cases, may prove counterproductive if not implemented and addressed in the context of other measures. We must therefore consider addressing the wide range of economic, political, and social factors that heal conflict and insecurity and take a comprehensive, holistic long-term approach.

The situation in Mali for instance, represents a microcosm of the complex problems challenging Africa and the need to address security concerns within a wider context. There are four distinct yet interrelated crises facing Mali which must be managed separately yet simultaneously. First, a return to civilian authority and the reaffirmation of democratic institutions will ensure a strong, united country able to address other crises.

Second, a democratic government must reach out and engage and dialogue with the Tuareg people of the north, addressing their concerns.

Third, Mali faces a humanitarian crisis of well over 190,000 internally displaced as well as refugees in neighboring countries.

And fourth, Mali and its neighbors together have a stake in confronting the challenges posed by AQIM and other splinter groups such as Ansar al-Din.

These challenges cannot be addressed in isolation but as interrelated issues. Security is fostered by the establishment of sound leadership, accountability to the people, transparent and democratic processes addressing the needs of the population.

We look to security challenges through a wide lens, and that includes the five pillars articulated by the President in Ghana in 2009. Those five are: Strengthening democratic institutions, fostering broad-based sustainable growth, combating disease, improving public health and education, mitigating armed conflict, and helping Africans with transnational threats.

Whether it is AQIM, al-Shabaab, or Boko Haram, extremist ideology, even those masquerading in religious terms, are antithetical, illegitimate and repulsive to the vast majority of Africans. Extremism is a violent cancer that exploits porous borders, capitalizes on human suffering, and feeds in undemocratic environments. Our engagement will be difficult but necessary, and must be based on several fundamental principles.

First, regional ownership. Leaders must inspire their people and countries must own the process to address the challenges effectively. Our African partners have consistently said African security is Africa's responsibility.

Second, promotion of good governance. Our security engagements cannot be separated from our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control of security forces, and respect for human rights. Extremist ideology takes advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities. They destroy lives and strengthen instability. Building credible government institutions at all levels and assisting legitimate authorities to respond to the needs of their people are vital objectives.

And three and final, the development and economic opportunity. Investing in economic and social development is crucial for improving the security environment in Africa. Efforts to address insecurity are often hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability of national or local authorities to provide adequate services, educational and vocational opportunities.

The road that we face will be long. It will be hard. It will be difficult. But through patience, hard work, coordination with our African partners, and promotion of democratic values, human rights, and opportunities will make a significant difference in the lives of Africans and for future generations.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

Testimony of
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto,
The Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State
before
The House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 25, 2012
"LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa"

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This hearing is very timely, as we have seen a number of important developments during the past year that have influenced the security situations in East and West Africa. In East Africa, the African-led, internationally supported African Union Mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM, has helped Somalia address the terrorist challenges within its borders. AMISOM is working with Somali forces to advance our goals of stabilizing Somalia by pushing back al-Shabaab to create physical space for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and others to establish governance. In Central Africa, national military forces, in coordination with the African Union, and with assistance from U.S. military advisors, have renewed their efforts to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a weakened force, but it continues to abduct, terrorize and uproot communities across three countries – the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)

estimates that more than 465,000 people were displaced or living as refugees during 2011 as a result of the LRA threat. In West Africa, key countries in the region have intensified individual and regional counterterrorism efforts, but have had to respond to new challenges stemming from recent events in Libya and Mali.

Al-Qaeda (AQ) and other extremist groups' ideology and tactics are alien and illegitimate to the vast majority of Africans and key governments have repeatedly demonstrated their determination to frustrate the efforts of the extremists to exploit the region's peoples and resources. However, Africans are confronting a number of violent extremist groups who seek out opportunities to launch attacks against African and sometimes Western targets, mobilize recruits and finance through force or ideology, and secure safe-havens in isolated, ungoverned areas. While these disparate groups have unique histories, objectives, and methods of operation, they have a common modus operandi in exploiting porous borders and weak security institutions, and capitalizing on the inability or unwillingness of governments to protect their populations and respond to the aspirations of their peoples, particularly a quickly expanding number of young people.

The Threat

East Africa

In the Horn of Africa, al-Qaeda operatives historically used Somalia as a safe haven from which to launch attacks throughout East Africa. Attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and an Israeli jetliner and tourist hotel in Kenya in 2002 demonstrated the seriousness of this threat to Westerners and Africans alike. More recently, elements of the Somalia-based al-Shabaab have become the primary terrorist threats in East Africa. On February 9 of this year, al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Shabaab's emir released a joint video to formally announce a merger of the two organizations. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab is not a monolithic organization; while its senior leaders are committed to al-Qaeda and a global agenda, most of the group's lower ranking fighters have a more domestically-focused agenda based on clan loyalty and Somali nationalism.

Somalia's instability has had serious consequences for the region. Al-Shabaab conducts conventional and asymmetric attacks in Somalia and has pursued a diverse set of targets throughout the region. A small cadre of foreign fighters has used Somalia as a safe haven and training center, although their future role within al-Shaabab is unclear. Additionally, during the recent famine in Somalia, al-Shabaab blocked critical humanitarian organizations from operating in areas it controls thereby creating a more severe crisis and increasing the suffering

of the Somali people. Al-Shabaab's capabilities were demonstrated by two July 11, 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, the group's first international attacks. Illicit traffic and migration between Yemen and Somalia as well as the large numbers of Somalia refugees throughout the Horn of Africa, enable extremist efforts to use networks to transfer money, exchange tactics, and potentially relocate fighters between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab.

Central Africa

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been active since 1986, making it one of Africa's oldest, most violent, and most persistent armed groups. The Government of Uganda pushed the LRA out of Uganda in 2006, and the LRA moved west into the border region of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and what has become the Republic of South Sudan. Although the LRA has been weakened and its numbers reduced, it continues to pose a serious threat to the people of this border region. The LRA survives by preying on vulnerable, remote communities, and abducting youth to fill its ranks. Although the LRA has been weakened and its numbers reduced, it continues to pose a serious threat to the people of this region. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that the LRA launched 278 attacks in 2011.

The governments of Uganda, the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union and with assistance from U.S. military advisors, continue to dedicate significant materiel and human resources to end the threat posed by the LRA. They have made some progress in dispersing the LRA and reducing its numbers. However, there are significant challenges in apprehending the LRA's top leaders and ending the LRA threat. The LRA operates in very small groups across vast territory roughly the size of California, much of it densely-forested. The LRA exploits communal conflicts and attacks remote communities, which lack basic road, telecommunications, and governance infrastructure. The LRA is a destabilizing force in Central Africa, Joseph Kony is under indictment by the International Criminal Court, but the organization does not directly threaten the United States.

West Africa

The security situation in West Africa has evolved during the past year, but the ability of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or other extremist organizations to threaten U.S. interests outside North Africa remains limited. AQIM's leadership has remained in northern Algeria and the group continues to identify closely with its northern African roots, but severe pressure from Algerian security forces during the past year has forced the group to shift its area of operation to the northern Sahel. From isolated camps in northern Mali, AQIM

kidnapped as many as twenty hostages of various nationalities since 2010, engaged in smuggling, launched individual attacks against local security outposts in Algeria, Mauritania and Niger, and increased efforts to establish commercial and familial links with local communities in its areas of operation. The group has not demonstrated the capability to threaten U.S. interests outside of West or North Africa and it has not threatened to attack the U.S. homeland.. However, we have warned American citizens traveling in the Sahel to avoid a number of areas due to AQIM's practice of kidnapping Westerners.

We witnessed a number of important developments during the past year that affected the security situation in West Africa. AQIM accumulated substantial financial resources from ransoms paid for the release of European hostages. These resources have supported its survival in extremely austere conditions, financed purchases of a range of light and heavy weapons, and enabled the group to establish commercial links with local communities. At the same time, AQIM has clearly benefited from the proliferation of arms from Libya and the movement of heavily armed and trained fighters from Libya to several already over-burdened Sahelian countries. While AQIM has failed to mobilize a significant number of new recruits or generate popular support in the area, it has successfully maintained its foothold in northern Mali and resisted efforts to disrupt its supply lines. The recent coup in Mali and Tuareg unrest in the northern part of the country has

hampered counter-terrorism efforts in the area although the National Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and the vast majority of Tuaregs in the region have resisted AQIM efforts to establish closer ties.

We are also carefully watching the security situation in northern Nigeria. A loosely-organized collection of factions known as Boko Haram has carried out attacks on Nigerian and international interests, and has attempted to exploit the legitimate grievances of northern populations to garner recruits and public sympathy. Boko Haram is not a monolithic group, although its various factions remain focused on discrediting the Nigerian government. Although some factions of Boko Haram have expressed a desire to attack Western targets, Boko Haram appears focused primarily on local Nigerian issues and actors, and to date the group's actions have responded principally to political and security developments within Nigeria. Attacks ascribed to members of this group have improved in sophistication and increased in number over the last few years, and we take the potential threat to American lives and interests very seriously. There are reports of contact between elements of Boko Haram and other extremists in Africa. While we are careful not to conflate these groups, we are monitoring the situation closely. It is vital to emphasize that religion is not the primary driver of extremist violence in Nigeria. While some seek to inflame Muslim-Christian tensions, Nigeria's religious and ethnic diversity is one of its greatest strengths.

United States Engagement Principles

Our approach to these security challenges reflects our recognition that a comprehensive long-term approach is required to address insecurity in Africa and military solutions alone are insufficient and at times are counterproductive. We have learned from experience that the threats in Africa are diverse and our allies' approaches to these threats reflect a range of perspectives, priorities, and capabilities. Our engagements reflect several fundamental principles:

Regional Ownership: The key countries in the affected regions must lead -- and be seen leading – efforts to address these challenges. Our regional partners have consistently emphasized that Africa's security is the responsibility of the Africans themselves and it is vital that the United States and other partners maintain supporting roles. It is crucial that our allies take responsibility for their own security. We will help them stave off legitimate terrorists but will avoid the trap of "Americanizing or westernizing" these counterterrorism fights. Violent extremists in Africa and elsewhere constantly seek to bolster their own legitimacy by attempting to draw us into the conflict and our allies have repeatedly stressed the importance of resisting these attempts to provoke counterproductive actions. Supporting regional leadership and engaging with our allies also helps us to understand how our actions could impact long-standing historical issues in

individual countries or regions and the intended or unintended consequence or our policy choices.

Promoting Good Governance: President Obama's first priority for Africa is to help build strong and stable democracies. Our security engagement cannot be separated from our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and respect for human rights. Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups are drawn to those locations where they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operations, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate criminals.

Our counterterrorism (CT) support for Somalia is embedded in an over-arching policy of support for political, economic, and social reforms to address the underlying sources of violence and strengthen national and regional stability. Achieving political stability, including a Somali government that demonstrates to the broader Somali population it is a viable alternative to al-Shabaab and is capable of sustaining itself, will be the best long-term counter to al-Shabaab.

Similarly, promoting democratic governance is an essential priority in areas threatened by AQIM. The region's youthful and better educated populations are demanding more transparency from public officials and expanded economic opportunities. These youth are increasingly aware of governance norms elsewhere in the world and yearn for the same basic rights in their societies. Rising governance standards in West Africa, in turn, are placing ever greater value on legitimacy and heightening intolerance of unconstitutional transitions of power. Civil society has grown in breadth, sophistication, and influence over the past few years. And the Sahel's democratic institutions have begun to put down roots. Parliaments have become more capable and autonomous, independent media is more diverse and accessible than ever, and elections are increasingly common and meaningful.

In Nigeria, the government must effectively engage communities vulnerable to extremist violence and promote the respect for human rights by its security forces, whose heavy-handed tactics and extrajudicial killings reinforce northerners' concerns that the Nigerian government does not care about them. The appointment of a credible northerner to lead the government response to northern grievances would be an important step in that direction.

Development and Economic Opportunity: It is also vital to reinforce the point that investing in economic and social development is crucial for improving

the security environment. In the Sahel, efforts to address insecurity are often hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability of national or local authorities to provide adequate services and educational and vocational opportunities in isolated areas. AQIM has attempted to exploit this weakness by providing food and other consumables to generate good-will. Although AQIM's attempts to recruit in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, the limited successes it has had in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational and employment opportunities. National and local authorities recognize these vulnerabilities and are often highly motivated to steer their societies in positive directions and our economic assistance can help.

As part of our strategy to counter the LRA, we are providing support to address the conditions that leave communities vulnerable to predatory groups such as the LRA. USAID and the State Department are supporting projects to increase civilian protection, enhance early warning capabilities, deliver humanitarian relief, and strengthen the overall resiliency of communities. As we have seen in northern Uganda and parts of South Sudan, development can play a critical role in pushing out the LRA and keeping it from returning. Northern Uganda has undergone a dramatic transformation since the LRA's departure in 2006. The population is able to move freely, markets are open, and fields are being cultivated. According to

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 95 percent of people once living in the camps have now left and moved to transit sites or returned home. The United States has led all donors in supporting the Ugandan-led recovery process.

Economic development also requires tearing down walls that stand in the way of progress – the corruption of elites who steal from their people; the red tape that stops an idea from becoming a business; the patronage that distributes wealth based on tribe or sect. We are helping governments by supporting anti-corruption commissions who are developing reforms, and activists who use technology to increase transparency and hold government accountable.

Enhanced Regional Cooperation: Promoting and enabling enhanced regional cooperation to address security threats is an important priority. The AMISOM presence in Mogadishu and its partnership with the TFG National Security Forces is one of the main reasons for the weakened al-Shabaab we see today. AMISOM counters al-Shabaab, protects Mogadishu, and provides political space for a Somali-led reconciliation process and our "Dual Track" policy. While Somalis reacted negatively in the past to the entry of foreign troops into Somalia, the population has generally not reacted negatively to AMISOM. We are also looking for opportunities to assist regional or sub-regional CT capacity-building efforts. For instance we are working with the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development's (IGAD) Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) to conduct programs that are aimed at building national capacity to resist terrorism and promote regional security cooperation through training programs utilizing international, regional and national experts.

In Central Africa, we are seeking to enhance the capacity and cooperation of the governments in the region as they work together to address the LRA threat. We believe their continued collaboration is essential to keep the pressure on the LRA and ultimately end this threat. The United States has deployed a small number of U.S. military forces to serve as advisors to the partner forces that are pursuing the LRA and seeking to protect local populations. Our advisors are helping the partner forces to enhance their cooperation, intelligence-sharing and fusion, and operational planning. We are also working closely with the African Union as it increases its efforts to address the LRA. Last month, the AU officially launched its Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA. Although many operational details are still being worked out, we believe the AU's involvement can strengthen coordination, information-sharing, and trust among the four militaries pursuing the LRA.

In West Africa, with the possible exception of Algeria, the countries in the region do not currently have the individual military capabilities to attack AQIM's established safe-havens in remote mountain areas or to effectively monitor and

control thousands of miles of open borders. It is therefore essential that they improve their cooperation and interoperability. The key countries in the region – Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger -- have increased bilateral coordination efforts during the past year and we will continue to promote an improved regional effort will tailor our assistance when possible to facilitate this process.

United States Counterterrorism Activities

The United States is committed to working with our Africans partners to address immediate threats and build durable security sector and development institutions required to achieve counterterrorism objectives over the long-term. We cannot rely on short-cuts when confronting the terrorism challenge in Africa and will instead work closely with our partners to build the long-term capacity of the region to frustrate al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups.

Our primary programs to build long-term counterterrorism capacity in Africa are the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), formerly known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in West Africa. PREACT is the U.S. Government (USG) strategy for long-term engagement and capacity building in East Africa to combat evolving terrorism threats in, and emanating from, the Horn of Africa and along the Swahili Coast. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Djibouti, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles,

Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. PREACT utilizes law enforcement, military, development, and public diplomacy expertise and resources to support the efforts of willing regional partners to build and sustain their own CT capability. PREACT is principally operated by the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD). Its overarching objectives are: 1) to contain and reduce the operational capacity of terrorist networks in Somalia; 2) to deter and reduce the appeal of and support for violent extremism across East Africa; 3) to reduce terrorist financing across East Africa; 4) to improve and expand border security in East Africa, particularly around Somalia; 5) to build sustainable security and counterterrorism capacities in partner nations; and 6) to improve inter-agency and international community coordination

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the USG's primary vehicle to support the long-term capabilities of the countries in West and North Africa to address the AQIM threat. Many members of TSCTP are counted among the poorest countries in the world and currently lack the capacity to effectively combat this threat over the long-term. We recognize that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the

among the poorest countries in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali also rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale. However, they have demonstrated critical political will to fight terrorism and will continue to benefit from U.S. assistance.

TSCTP was authorized in 2005 by the National Security Council to use a multi-year and multi-sectoral approach involving the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense to address the terrorism threat in West Africa. It is designed to support regional partner efforts in the Sahel to build long-term capacity to contain and marginalize terrorist organizations and facilitation networks, disrupt efforts to recruit, train, and provision terrorists and extremists, counter efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist organizations, and disrupt foreign fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the region. Partner countries include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

PREACT and TSCTP serve two primary purposes. The interagency identifies and mobilizes resources to support sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region for these two critical programs which reflect our recognition that sporadic engagements without adequate follow-up or sustainment would fail to achieve meaningful long-term results in a region with a multitude of basic needs. The emphasis is therefore placed on key capacity deficits that could

be addressed over a period of years. Individual activities supported by PREACT and TSCTP draw resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. Government including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID.

PREACT and TSCSTP are also designed to assist efforts to coordinate the activities of the various implementing agencies. The coordination takes place at several levels. Action officers representing the various agencies meet periodically in Washington to coordinate activities and share information. Representatives from Washington and the Africa Command (AFRICOM) also meet regularly with our Embassies in PREACT and TSCTP countries. The first line of coordination and oversight takes place at our embassies. While various assessments and inputs from throughout the interagency inform decisions regarding counterterrorism programming, Chiefs of Mission must concur with all proposed activities. They are ultimately the primary interlocutors with the host countries and are responsible for implementing cohesive policy.

Conclusion

We remain convinced that it is in our interest to focus on building the capacity of willing partners in Africa to counter terrorism and establish sustainable security, rather than just pursuing quick fixes. Clear victories against the

underlying security and developmental challenges in the region are unlikely to clearly announce themselves in the near term, but I am confident that a steady and patient approach provides the best opportunity for long-term success.

This process continues to be challenging and there are setbacks, but we can also identify a number of positive developments. For example, while a tremendous amount of work remains in Somalia, al-Shabaab's fortunes have been diminished by internal fractures within the group, pressure from AMISOM and TFG forces, Ethiopian and Kenyan military interventions, and its own failures to address the basic needs of people living in territory under its control. And while many living under al-Shabaab control continue to suffer horrendous conditions and are prevented from receiving humanitarian relief, al-Shabaab leadership has focused on establishing a merger with al-Qaeda rather than on improving the plight of the Somali people.

In Central Africa, the governments in the region have renewed their commitment to end the LRA threat once and for all. The African Union and United Nations are stepping up their efforts, and the United States is providing critical support to enhance both civilian and military capacity to address this threat.

In West Africa, Algeria's successes against AQIM have hampered the efforts of the group's leadership in northern Algeria to direct the organization and threaten targets outside of the region, but it has also resulted in increased activity in

the Sahel. While we have not witnessed an increase in spectacular attacks against U.S. interests in the Sahel, the group's ability to raise funds from ransom payments and acquire weapons is a concern. In response, the key countries in the region have clearly intensified their individual and collective efforts again AQIM. They have taken concrete action along Mali's borders with Niger and Mauritania and most recently along Niger's border with Algeria. Chad also stepped up efforts to disrupt AQIM attempts to transit its territory. TSCTP resources are contributing to training and equipping more capable and professional security forces in Mauritania and Niger. TSCTP resources are assisting the key militaries to improve their still rudimentary capabilities to monitor their borders and sustain their units in large frontier areas.

Equally important, AQ continues to struggle to attract public interest and sympathy for its activities. It has had limited success in developing temporary economic relationships with some communities and it continues to look for opportunities to develop familial relationships in some areas, but it has failed to make a credible case that has inspired significant groups should rally around its flag. We are convinced that long-term efforts to address economic and political conditions in these areas and persistent and patient efforts to build and sustain professional security forces will have long-term benefits.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today on this important issue. I welcome any questions you may have.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And I would like to tell our wonderful panelists that you will notice that not many members are here right now. But as I explained to you, at this time from 9 o'clock to 10 o'clock we have our party conferences, so all of the members are elsewhere. But we have got the committed crew here.

Thank you. Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I join my colleagues, Ambassador Yamamoto and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory, in welcoming the opportunity to discuss terrorism in Africa. I submitted testimony for the record that provides additional information about the Counterterrorism Bureau's programs and initiatives in Africa.

Terrorism is a real threat in Africa and we have a whole-of-government strategy to diminish that threat by building the capacity of our partners that have the will to take effective action and work cooperatively with their neighbors to deny terrorists the ability to move among their countries. This will require a sustained engagement, but we are already seeing positive results.

We are also working with the nations of the region to counter violent extremism, thereby denying terrorists new recruits. We use all the instruments available to us: Diplomatic, development, law enforcement, military and intelligence. And we work bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally through organizations like the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

In considering the various terrorist threats across East and West Africa, the challenge can appear daunting. The great expanses of desert, porous borders, under resourced governments, all of these create an environment that offers many advantages to terrorists. We also remain concerned by reported communications, training, and weapons links between AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula. These may have strengthened Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks; however, the lack of resonance of the al-Qaeda ideology within those communities and the commitment of the regional governments to join forces to counter the terrorist threat have helped contain these groups. If continued, these efforts will ultimately lead to their marginalization.

That said, a number of different factors have converged in recent years to create a new and worrisome set of openings for terrorist organizations, particularly in the Sahel, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The turmoil associated with the ousting of the former Libyan regime has profoundly affected parts of West Africa and East Africa. Loose Libyan weapons and the return of refugees and mercenaries to their countries of origin across the Sahel has greatly increased the internal pressures faced by these countries.

The current Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup in Mali was spurred by these events and they have created a vacuum in the north of that country that has provided AQIM with greater free-

dom of movement. AQIM has historically being the weakest of the AQ affiliates. Yet recently the group has managed to fill its coffers with ransom money from kidnappings. These new found resources, the arms and the money together, along with the recent instability in Libya and Mali, have raised concern about this group's trajectory.

In Nigeria, longstanding political and socioeconomic grievances in the north led to the creation of Boko Haram in 2001. The group's attacks in the north, including one in August against the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, signaled its ambition and its capability to attack non-Nigerian targets. U.S. Counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria is closely linked to the broader strategy of support for the Nigerian Government's reform efforts and increased respect for human rights. We are providing limited law enforcement training assistance to the Nigerian Government while also working to accelerate diplomatic efforts to convince them of the need to change their strategy with regard to Boko Haram from a primarily military response to one that also addresses the grievances felt by many in northern Nigeria.

Al-Shabaab also continues to threaten countries in East Africa. In February, al-Shabaab and AQ released a joint video to formally announce the merger of the two organizations. And while it has demonstrated a willingness and ability to conduct attacks elsewhere in the region, as we saw with the July 2010 attack in Uganda, al-Shabaab's attacks have primarily focused on targets inside of Somalia.

With the assistance of both the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, and Somalia's neighbors, the Transitional Federal Government has made significant gains in degrading al-Shabaab's capability and liberating areas from al-Shabaab administration over the last year. Yet much work remains to be done in the region to further reduce the threat of terrorism, while working to safely provide humanitarian assistance, including to those inside al-Shabaab-controlled territories who are denied access to outside aid.

The Department of State has a number of Africa programs to address the various emerging threats presented by these terrorist groups and other drivers of instability. And in this vein, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) are designed to strengthen the capacity of regional governments to combat terrorist threats and counter violent extremism while also fostering regional cooperation and building lasting partnerships.

We believe we are making progress with a number of partners. Algeria, Mauritania and Niger have achieved real results against AQIM in the last year; for example, with the defeat of AQIM twice in the Ouagadou Forest on the border of Mauritania and Mali, the defeat of AQIM in the Mauritanian town of Bessikinou, and the capture of arms convoys transiting from Libya by joint Algeria-Niger operations.

In the interest of time I am going to conclude my remarks here. Additional information on our various programs in Africa, including antiterrorism assistance, countering violent extremism, and counterterrorist financing are provided in my written testimony. Thank you very much.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB, AQIM,
AND OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA"

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

APRIL 25, 2011
9:30 am

Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing. I join my colleagues Ambassador Yamamoto and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory in welcoming the opportunity to discuss terrorism in Africa. Our views are closely aligned within State, and with the Department of Defense, on both the threat posed by terrorism in Africa, and the U.S. response to address terrorism and other threats to regional stability.

Regional Threats

A number of different factors have converged in recent years to create new and worrisome openings for terrorist organizations, particularly in the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa. Among these, the turmoil associated with the ousting of the former Libyan regime has reverberated across borders and profoundly impacted parts of West and East Africa. Loose Libyan weapons and the return of refugees and mercenaries to their countries of origin across the Sahel, greatly increased the internal pressures faced by these countries. The current Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup in Mali were spurred by these events, and have created a vacuum in the north of that country that has provided al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) with greater freedom of movement. That group has also benefited from an increased ability to raise funds, which has boosted its ability to exploit the current situation.

In Nigeria, long-standing grievances in the north led to the re-emergence of Boko Haram – and in Somalia, al-Shabaab, while weakened, continues to frustrate

efforts to establish a legitimate government and to threaten countries in East Africa. Across the Continent, the porous borders and limited resources to control them provide the opportunity for terrorist groups to expand their communication and training and to export their terrorist tactics, further increasing regional instability. The U.S. government is committed to helping the countries of the region turn the tide and lead the fight to eliminate this threat by strengthening their capacity to prevent recruitment, reduce terrorist safe havens, impede terrorist freedom of movement, and prevent additional attacks. Success in this effort will require long term engagement and work to build the capacity of partners to counter terrorists and other destabilizing factors, while maintaining respect for human rights and the rule of law. We recognize that military measures alone will not halt the terrorist threat in the region and that we must assist these countries in strengthening their civilian institutions, promoting the rule of law, and addressing the underlying conditions that fuel terrorism and violent extremism.

In Africa, where the appetite for al-Qa'ida's (AQ) brand of terrorism is limited, we have an opportunity to increase the group's isolation by identifying and responding to specific, localized conditions and factors that terrorists exploit as drivers of recruitment, radicalization, and mobilization to violence. We strive to address these threats comprehensively, to work together to support regionally-led efforts, and to tackle the challenge in a broad manner. Through attention to all of these measures, we will help our African partners counter both current and emerging terrorist threats and prevent the spread of extremism and future terrorist threats over more than just the short term.

In recent years, as the AQ core has gotten weaker, we have seen the rise of affiliated groups around the world. In his testimony, my colleague Ambassador Yamamoto provides a detailed overview of the threats in Africa. We share the same views, but I would like to highlight several key points regarding the threats in Africa.

In the Sahel, AQIM has carried out a number of kidnappings for ransom and filled its coffers. These resources together with its efforts to take advantage of the recent instability in Libya and Mali have raised concerns about this group's trajectory.

The Libyan Revolution has profoundly affected countries in the Sahel, home to some of the poorest nations on earth. The resultant dispersal of arms, refugees, and the return of previously exiled fighters, has significantly changed the situation in Mali and also raised concerns in Algeria, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. The Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), made up of

returned Tuareg fighters from Libya, has rebelled against the Government of Mali. Regional governments remain concerned that this rebellion could spread to the larger Tuareg communities in all the countries, but it does not appear that this will occur -- at least in the short term.

The MNLA, in a relatively short amount of time, was able to overrun most of northern Mali including the major cities of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. A splinter faction from the MNLA, Ansar al- Din was assisted in combat operations by AQIM. As a result, AQIM has greater freedom of movement and access to resources than ever before. For the first time, AQIM has established a significant presence in major cities. We believe this will be temporary and that AQIM will return to their desert stronghold in the Tirgarghar Mountains of northern Mali.

AQIM has long held questionable regional aspirations. Its leaders hope to benefit from the current instability in northwest Africa, but what remains unclear is how they would actually capitalize on recent developments. Instability in Mali has temporarily provided them greater freedom of movement within the country. However, the historical rejection of AQIM's extremist ideology by the Sufi-dominated population in Mali and elsewhere in region will likely continue to frustrate their goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in West Africa. Nevertheless, it is clear that AQIM poses a threat in Mali and across the region. The Administration takes this threat seriously and continues its efforts to counter it.

In Nigeria, elements of the group known as Boko Haram (BH) have launched attacks in northern and central parts of the country, including one in August against the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, signaling their ambition and capability to attack non-Nigerian targets. Despite BH's threats of additional attacks on "Western interests" there have been no further attacks of this sort since the UN bombing. Boko Haram is not a formal AQ affiliate, but is rather a loosely organized collection of criminals, and militants, and terrorists. BH has historically focused on local Nigerian issues and exploits long-standing political and socio-economic grievances in the north. We remain concerned by reported communications, training, and weapons links between AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which may have strengthened Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. Through border security and other assistance efforts, we are working to disrupt the ability of these groups to share information and training.

Long-standing and still neglected political and socio-economic grievances are some of the drivers feeding the violence in the North. Eliminating this threat

requires us to address these issues. U.S. counterterrorism strategy is closely linked to the broader strategy of support for the Nigerian government's reform efforts, and increased respect for human rights. Through high-level engagement, including through the established U.S.- Nigeria Bi-national Commission, we are working to strengthen the Nigerian government's resolve and capacity to address the broader issues and to press for a change to its heavy-handed approach to the security threats in the north. We are also providing limited law enforcement training assistance to the Nigerian government under the auspices of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which I will discuss in greater detail below. The goal of this training is to increase the professionalization, enhance interagency communication and expand the capacity of the police to more effectively prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.

In East Africa, al-Shabaab remains a primary driver of instability. Earlier this year, in February, al-Shabaab's emir in Somalia, and AQ's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a joint video to formally announce a merger of the two organizations. While it has demonstrated a willingness and ability to conduct attacks elsewhere in the region with the 2010 bombing in Uganda, and threats against Kenya, Burundi and elsewhere, al Shabaab's attacks have primarily focused on targets inside of Somalia. With the assistance of both the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia's neighbors, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has made significant gains in degrading al-Shabaab capability and liberating areas from al-Shabaab administration over the last year. Yet much work remains to be done in this region to further reduce the threat of terrorism while working to safely provide humanitarian assistance, including to those in al-Shabaab-controlled territories who are denied access to outside aid.

Despite the AQ merger, al-Shabaab's leaders prioritize the creation of an Islamic state in Somalia, rather than an AQ-focus on external attacks. It remains unclear whether the February announcement of al-Shabaab's merger with AQ will provide any tangible benefits for al-Shabaab. Fractures within al-Shabaab, the deaths of key leaders, and the organization's unpopularity, due to its failure to address the basic needs of people living in their territory, have weakened the group, but it continues to pose a threat to civilians, humanitarian workers, the AMISOM, and the TFG.

Our counterterrorism support for Somalia is embedded in our support of political, economic, and social reforms to address the underlying sources of violence and to strengthen national and regional stability. Our policies recognize that resolving conflicts, reducing humanitarian emergencies, and improving governance also

further advance counterterrorism and national security goals. Achieving political stability, including a Somali government that demonstrates to the broader Somali population it is a viable alternative to al-Shabaab, is the best long-term way to counter al-Shabaab.

In Central and East Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been active since 1986, making it one of Africa's oldest, most violent, and longest lived armed groups. The LRA was founded in northern Uganda to fight against the government, and operated there from 1986 to 2006. At the height of the conflict, nearly two million people in northern Uganda were displaced. The Government of Uganda successfully pushed the LRA out of Uganda by 2006, and the LRA moved west into the border region of the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and what would become South Sudan. The LRA has continued to operate in this tri-border region to date.

U.S. military advisors have a clear goal – to enhance the capacity of local forces to succeed in their mission to end the threat posed by the LRA. At the same time, the United States does not believe there is a purely military solution in dealing with the LRA threat. Our military support is part of a broader strategy and complemented by civilian efforts to increase the protection of civilians, facilitate defections from the LRA, and help affected communities.

Addressing the Threats

All of our work goes on in the context of vigorous diplomatic engagement. We have formal bilateral counterterrorism consultations with numerous countries; these consultations have strengthened our counterterrorism partnerships so we can complement one another's efforts in pursuit of a comprehensive approach to our common challenges. Working bilaterally with our international partners allows us to promote a common understanding of the terrorist threat, improve coordination and cooperation, promote burden-sharing, build capacity, share best practices and support implementation of the UN counterterrorism framework.

The Department of State has a number of Africa programs to address the various emerging threats presented by these terrorist groups and other drivers of instability. These programs are about building the capacity of our partners to counter terrorist threats themselves, while maintaining respect for human rights and the rule of law. This involves helping countries develop their law enforcement and legal institutions to do a better job tracking, apprehending, arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists. Our work to degrade these drivers of instability involves

regional cooperation and significant efforts by our regional African partners to detect, deter, investigate, and counter terrorism within their borders.

TSCTP

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is an interagency effort to provide a platform of assistance to strengthen the capacity of regional governments to combat the terrorist threat and to stem the flow of new recruits to terrorist organizations. Through its programs – both civilian and military – TSCTP provides positive alternatives to those most vulnerable to terrorist messaging. In this politically restive region, a long term approach is the only one likely to work. We believe we are making progress with select partners. Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger have achieved real results against AQIM in the last year, namely, the defeat of AQIM twice in the Ouagadou Forest on the border of Mauritania and Mali, the defeat of AQIM at the Mauritanian town of Bessikinou, and the capture of arms convoys transiting from Libya by joint Algeria/Niger operations.

Despite Mali's recent coup d'état, Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger, retain a strong political will to fight terrorism. We believe that the best strategy for dealing with AQIM remains working with regional governments to increase their capability, foster regional cooperation, and counter violent extremism. TSCTP countries include Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, in the Sahel; and Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Maghreb.

PREACT

PREACT, formerly known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), is the East Africa counterpart to the TSCTP. This whole-of-government strategy takes into account the entire East African region through the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT). First established in 2009, PREACT is a U.S. funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats and address longer-term vulnerabilities. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, expanding border security, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security and intelligence organizations, improving democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

PREACT programming addresses existing and potential challenges directly and indirectly threatening U.S. interests in East Africa. PREACT provides the U.S. government with a flexible and well-coordinated plan to assist member countries' efforts to counter both current and emerging terrorist threats and prevent the spread of extremism and future terrorist threats over the medium and long-terms. The strategy reflects recognition that the predominate threat to the region and western interests is Somalia's chronic instability. Its goals complement ongoing stabilization efforts, while building regional capacities to address the terrorist threat in Somalia.

CT successes under PREACT have included the training and equipping of CT units in various East African countries, including a technical intelligence platoon in Kenya to conduct CT operations; as well as the provision of intermediate level maintenance training and spare parts for the Kenya Army 50th Air Cavalry Battalion fleet of helicopters, which further enhances the country's ability to effectively monitor border security and threats emanating from Somalia. In Djibouti, we have seen improvements in maritime security through the provision of training and equipment to the Djiboutian Republican National Guard on combat weapons and night equipment; as well as the provision of one defender class boat and trailer and four smaller boats and accompanying training to Djibouti for maritime CT operations.

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program

The Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) provides training, mentoring, advising, and equipment to African counterterrorism focused law-enforcement agencies with TSCTP and PREACT partner nations to help build effective law enforcement capacity, fair and impartial justice and the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

In conjunction with TSCTP, ATA enhances border security and investigative capacity for all partner nations in West Africa to better enable them to confront the trans-national movement of terrorist groups such as AQIM and Boko Haram. ATA also works to promote the institutionalization of ATA training in Senegal by supporting the country as a regional law enforcement training hub. A key ATA project initiative involves building Nigeria's counter incident countermeasures capacity as the level of terrorism and political violence at the hands of Boko Haram increases.

ATA is also working on the expansion of successful border security initiatives in East African PREACT partner nations, as a result of successful U.S. Customs and Border Patrol rural border patrol unit training this past year, which works to better secure vulnerable remote border regions and illegal crossings. ATA has started conducting leadership and management training for senior law enforcement officials from Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and will continue future courses with law enforcement officials from throughout Somalia in future training.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)

In Fiscal Year 2011, Counterterrorism Engagement program (CTE) funds were used to support a key initiative on the continent, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and its Africa-focused working groups. Launched in September, the Forum is a multilateral counterterrorism platform designed to tackle 21st century terrorism and violent extremism. It brings together counterterrorism coordinators, prosecutors, judges, police, border control, and prison officials from our traditional allies, emerging powers, and Muslim-majority countries (29 countries plus the EU) to identify threats and weaknesses, devise solutions, mobilize resources, and share expertise.

In the GCTF Horn of Africa Region Capacity-Building Working Group we are working with western partners and countries in the region, as well as key multilateral bodies such as the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to build on PREACT and enhance counterterrorism cooperation and capacities. In early February, Tanzania hosted the inaugural meeting of the group, which the EU and Turkey are co-chairing. The group is identifying civilian-focused capacity-building priorities and mobilizing the resources and expertise for projects to address them. Follow-on initiatives will include bringing together the region's relevant counterterrorism practitioners, including prosecutors for training on the use of the GCTF's Rabat Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism in the Criminal Justice Sector.

Through the GCTF's Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group we are working with western partners and countries in the Sahel to build on the TSCTP. Algiers hosted the inaugural meeting of the group last November; both Algeria and Morocco, as well as Sahel countries like Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, gathered to discuss how to strengthen CT cooperation and capacities in the region. Next, the group will bring together the region's relevant border security practitioners in Niamey in mid-May, to formulate further action. The objectives of the Niamey

workshop include: 1) to bring regional technical experts together (both from within and outside the region) to foster greater collaboration and reinforce the emerging network of border security practitioners in the region; and 2) to develop a set of good practices for border security that regional states can apply and that GCTF members and other extra-regional partners, including the United Nations and AU, can support with targeted capacity-building activities.

Countering Violent Extremism

Our Bureau has spent a great deal of time and effort to ensure that new and innovative Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) work is a focus for the U.S. interagency and our allies and partners overseas. Kenya is one of our priority CVE countries. In collaboration with our Embassy in Nairobi, we are working to assess the underlying factors that drive radicalization in specific Kenyan localities. The interagency will support this effort with the necessary expertise and program resources.

Through CVE activities in both PREACT and TSCTP, the U.S. government, working with non-governmental partners, forges partnerships in Africa to counter violent extremism and empower beneficiaries to resist the drivers of extremism at the individual and community levels. Projects related to countering violent extremism have provided for integrated community development activities and regional peace building activities, while focusing on providing tangible benefits to youth at risk for recruitment. Key programs for youth focus on employment, outreach, community development, and media activities. In addition to delivering tangible benefits, such as vocational skills training, programs aim to gather beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries to further support regional cooperation.

We also support UN efforts to build in-depth knowledge and promote implementation of the UN Global CT Strategy. The UN Global CT Strategy takes a comprehensive approach to CT, and the first of its four pillars – "measures to address the conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism" – is CVE-related. In FY10, we funded a series of five workshops – three of which were in Africa – through the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to raise awareness and promote implementation of the Strategy.

Counterterrorist Finance Program

The Counterterrorist Finance Program (CTF) is working with the interagency to develop and employ innovative programs. CTF provides a multitude of tools to build the capacity of regional governments to counter terrorist financing. In particular, we are working with our international partners to develop awareness of kidnapping for ransom as a source of terrorist financing and seeking the means to counter it.

Our Bureau's CTF program has a long standing relationship with the Government of Nigeria on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) matters. The State CTF program works with the interagency to provide the Government of Nigeria with an array of training to include Bulk Cash Smuggling, Terrorist Finance Investigations, Financial Intelligence Unit Analytical Training, as well as soft skill development targeting the financial regulatory system. Pending adoption of AML/CTF legislation that meets international standards, Nigeria may be one of the best equipped nations in West Africa to address the threat of money laundering and terrorist finance.

In an effort to build regional cooperation toward stopping the flow of illicit funds and illegal goods and substances through West Africa to Europe, from the Western Hemisphere, State will partner with the Department of Homeland Security in July 2012 to deliver a new program in partnership with both the Senegalese and Nigerian governments. The venue will serve as a platform for dialogue for each country to discuss common challenges presented by organizations such as Boko Haram and Hizballah.

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES)

The Counterterrorism Bureau, through its Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), is providing assistance to numerous African countries. TIP seeks to constrain terrorist mobility globally by providing participating countries with a computerized stop-list system known as PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System). TIP installs PISCES hardware and software at selected ports of entry in consultation with the host government, usually including international airports and major border crossings. The system enables host nations to register and screen travelers upon entry and exit and to identify suspect travelers against a current stop-list. TIP trains host nation personnel to administer, operate and manage their PISCES systems.

PISCES systems currently in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (and Yemen) strengthen the capacities of those countries to screen, in particular, for suspect travelers associated with Al-Shabaab, AQIM, AQAP, AQ, and in the case of Uganda, the LRA. The PISCES stop-lists are originated and managed by the host nations. In West Africa, PISCES systems are in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Offers of PISCES assistance have been made to the governments of Niger and Nigeria; we remain in diplomatic contact while these offers are under consideration. The potential for PISCES systems in Maghreb and other African countries is under consideration, as well.

Conclusion

In reviewing the various terrorist threats across the East and West of Africa, the challenge can appear daunting. But the reality is much more hopeful. The vast expanses of desert, porous borders and under-resourced governments create an environment conducive to terrorist groups. But the lack of resonance of the AQ ideology within most communities, and the commitment of the regional governments to join forces to counter the terrorist threat, have helped to contain it and – if continued – will ultimately lead to its marginalization. Regional cooperation, through joint capacity-building efforts in TSCTP and PREACT, consistent activities to counter the growth of violent extremism, and collaborative efforts with like-minded allies and regional governments through multilateral fora are having an impact. Joint operations between the Mauritanians and Malians to root out AQIM elements from the Ouagadou Forest border region would have been unheard of several years ago. The same can be said for the Somali National Security Force's ability, with the help of AMISOM, to force al-Shabaab to flee Mogadishu. This is progress that we must recognize and work to repeat through our continued commitment to support the efforts of the regional governments working to eliminate terrorism from their continent.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Dory.

STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. DORY. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the sources of instability in Africa.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the loss to the Nation and the committee of Congressman Payne.

At the outset, I would like to note that African states and regional organizations are making significant progress in developing the ability to address security concerns and sources of instability on the continent. We are seeing this dynamic reflected in the robust role of the African Union mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, as well as in the African Union's leading role in facilitating negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan, and in the economic community of West African states' work to facilitate a settlement in response to the recent coup in Mali. Nonetheless, our partners in Africa still lack key capabilities to address all the varying sources of instability across Africa.

Given this reality, the Department of Defense in conjunction the Department of State continues to assist our partners on the continent with building their capacity to respond to security threats. Our efforts in this respect take multiple forms, including security assistance, exercises, rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and equipping, as I will discuss in the context of specific threats.

By assisting capable and willing African partners to address threats like the Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and Boko Haram, we help our African partners to create the space necessary to continue developing political and economically, which benefits both Africa and the United States.

DoD's efforts are implemented in accord with two tenets from the recently released Defense Strategic Guidance. The first one is that acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qaeda and its affiliates under constant pressure wherever they may be. The second tenet is that wherever possible we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives on the African continent, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.

For example, in the operation to counter the Lord's Resistance Army, a small number of U.S. forces are supporting regional military forces in an advisory capacity and seeking to enhance our partners' capabilities to achieve their objectives against the Lord's Resistance Army. Elsewhere in East Africa, in response to the terrorist threats posed by al-Shabaab, DoD has provided training and equip support to African forces deploying as part of AMISOM, using section 1206 funding.

In the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress provided DoD with an additional important tool through an East Africa-specific train and equip authority, section 1207(n).

There is focus on building the capacity of the counterterrorism forces in the East Africa region.

These authorities complement the program goals and objectives of State Department's Partnership for Regional East Africa and Counterterrorism, PREACT, that Ambassador Benjamin has just referred to.

In the Maghreb and Sahel, DoD worked closely with the State Department to plan and implement the trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership to address the threat posed by AQIM. DoD's military-to-military activities under the TSCTP seeks to build the counterterrorism capacity of key partners in the region. These include section 1206 authorities to train and equip partner nations as well as joint combined exchange training events and an annual counterterrorism focused exercise on a regional basis, Exercise FLINTLOCK.

Based on proliferation concerns following the regime change in Libya, DoD has also incorporated Man Portable Air Defense System, or MANPADS, awareness and mitigation training in our mil-to-mil engagements.

In Nigeria, the expansion of Boko Haram's capabilities is a source of increasing concern. In January 2012, DoD participated in the inaugural meeting of a regional security working group under the auspices of the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission with a focus on our cooperation in response to Boko Haram's threat. Most recently our efforts are focusing on counter-IED and civil military operations, but our engagement and cooperation can support the usual goals of addressing Boko Haram. We will continue to explore further areas to build Nigerian counterterrorism capacities.

To sum up, in partnership with the State Department, the Department of Defense is working to address the range of sources of instability in Africa, from terrorism to piracy, with our partners across the continent and beyond. Thank you very much.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

The LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, AQIM and other Sources of Instability in Africa
Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 25, 2012

Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Madame Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about sources of instability in Africa.

At the outset, I would like to note that African states and regional organizations are making significant progress in developing the ability to address security concerns and sources of instability on the continent. We are seeing this dynamic reflected in the robust role of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in the African Union's (AU) lead role in facilitating negotiations between the two Sudans, and in the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) work to facilitate a political settlement in response to the recent coup in Mali. Nonetheless, our partners in Africa still lack important capabilities and the capacity to address all of the varying sources of instability across Africa. Given this reality, the Department of Defense (DoD), in conjunction with the Department of State (DoS), continues to assist our partners on the continent with building their capacity to respond to security threats. Our efforts in this respect take several forms, including security assistance, exercises, rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and equipping, as I'll discuss momentarily in the context of some specific threats. However, all of these efforts are implemented in accordance with the recent Defense Strategic Guidance, which calls for innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives in Africa. By assisting capable and willing African partners to address threats like al-Shabaab (AS), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Boko Haram (BH), we help them to create the space necessary to continue developing, politically and economically, which benefits both Africa and the United States.

Al-Shabaab

On February 9, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Shabaab's emir Ahmed Abdi released a joint video to announce formally a merger of the two organizations. AS seeks to undermine the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its supporters and establish an Islamic emirate in Somalia. In pursuit of this objective, AS employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United States and Europe. AS propaganda has increasingly been directed at U.S. and other Western recruits and has had some success attracting recruits from the United States; dozens of individuals have traveled from the U.S. to Somalia to fight with AS since 2007.

In response to this threat, the United States has supported AMISOM forces, which have now driven al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu. In concert with these efforts, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces have successfully maintained military pressure against AS elements along their borders. UN Security Council Resolution 2036 recently authorized an increase in forces to 17,700 and welcomed Kenyan force contributions to AMISOM. As soon as the AU and the Government of Kenya sign a memorandum of understanding officially re-hatting Kenya as a member of

AMISOM, U.S. Government support to Kenyan military activities in Somalia may proceed. The U.S. Government remains limited with regard to the support that it can offer the non-AMISOM Ethiopian forces within Somalia because of the UN Security Council-authorized Somalia arms embargo and other concerns.

Outside of Somalia, DoD supports the DOS's Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program by providing mentors. Separately, since FY 2011, DoD has provided training and equipment to African forces deploying as part of AMISOM under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2006, as amended.

In the NDAA for FY 12, Congress provided DoD an additional important tool through the new authority of section 1207(n). Pursuant to that authority, we are working with the DoS to plan our support to continue building the capacity of the counter-terrorism forces in the region. This authority complements DOS programs to train and equip African forces participating in AMISOM, as well as the program goals and objectives of the DOS's Partnership for Regional East African Counter-Terrorism (PREACT), which aims to defeat terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces.

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

For the past several years, the people and Governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan have worked to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), one of Africa's most violent and persistent armed groups, which has brutalized civilians in the region for decades. They have made progress, but there are significant challenges to pursuing LRA groups and protecting local communities across this vast, densely-forested region.

Consistent with the LRA legislation passed by Congress in 2010 and signed into law by the President, the United States continues to pursue a comprehensive, multi-year strategy to help our regional partners mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA. In October 2011, the President authorized approximately 100 U.S. military personnel to deploy to the LRA-affected region in October 2011 to serve as advisors to the forces pursuing the LRA and seeking to protect local populations.

To be clear, the deployed U.S. forces do not have an operational role and are focused on advising and assisting host nation forces. This deployment is consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance, which states: "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives on the continent, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."

Small teams of U.S. military advisors are now present with the Ugandan military and the other regional military forces in field locations in LRA-affected areas of Central African Republic and South Sudan. In these two countries, U.S. advisors have helped to set up Operations Fusion Centers to enable daily coordination, information-sharing, and tactical coordination among the partner forces. The U.S. advisors are also integrating local civilian leaders into the work of the fusion centers to improve civil-military relations.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.S. advisors are supporting efforts by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Congolese military (FARDC) to increase the protection of civilians and address the LRA. The advisors are working at MONUSCO's Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC), which serves as the intelligence fusion hub for these efforts. U.S. advisors are connecting the work of the JIOC and that of the Operations Fusion Centers to increase cross-border analysis and coordination on LRA movements.

DoD is satisfied with the progress of the deployment to date considering the complexity of the operating environment, the number of partners involved, and the remoteness of the operational areas. The U.S. advisors have established a good foundation, and President Obama announced on April 23 that the United States will continue the deployment of advisors. There will continue to be an ongoing review process to ensure our efforts are helping the region make progress in ending the threat posed by the LRA. In this respect, DoD appreciates the flexibility provided by the authority in Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, which allows for the expenditure of $35 million to provide enhanced logistical support, supplies, and services to the regional partner forces to increase their operational effectiveness.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that DoD's role in addressing the LRA threat is embedded within a broader strategy and complemented by civilian efforts, including encouraging members of the LRA to defect and peacefully surrender, and we continue to work closely with the DoS and USAID in this regard. We believe that the use of the State Department's War Crimes Rewards Program to target Joseph Kony and top LRA commanders would significantly enhance and complement the DoD rewards program. We support legislation that would expand the authority for this program for these purposes. This would provide an additional tool to help generate information about the location of LRA leaders and encourage more LRA fighters to defect.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

The DoD remains very concerned about the threat posed by AQIM to U.S. citizens and interests in West Africa. AQIM uses the under-governed spaces of the Sahel as a safe haven from which to attack Western interests and persons. Originally focused on overthrowing the government of Algeria, AQIM has evolved and begun to target Western interests in North Africa and the Sahel.

AQIM continues to increase its activities, including collecting large sums of money through kidnapping for ransom. The breakdown in security in Libya has generated a significant illicit flow of militants and weapons into the Sahel and decreased legitimate cross-border trade at a time of exceptional economic fragility and sociopolitical turbulence. The revolutions in Libya and Tunisia, and most recently the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, have created opportunities for AQIM to exploit instability and establish new and expanded safe havens. DoD is closely watching what this will mean for the stability of the region and the ability of AQIM to target U.S. interests.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the DoS-led interagency framework for coordinating U.S. efforts to address the AQIM threat. The TSCTP works with ten partner countries to build their capacity to combat the threat posed by AQIM. DoD collaborates closely

with the DOS to plan and implement TSCTP military assistance funds to train and equip TSCTP partners to address the AQIM threat. DoD's military-to-military activities under the TSCTP seek to build the counterterrorism capacity of key partners in the region. DoD also leverages Section 1206 authorities to train and equip partner nations and conducts Joint Combined Exchange Training events. Additionally, DoD has incorporated Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) awareness and mitigation training into DoD engagements. Finally, DoD conducts regional exercises focused on counterterrorism to enhance partner nation capacity and interoperability, such as Exercise Flintlock.

Boko Haram

The group known as Boko Haram (BH) in Nigeria is a source of increasing concern. Attacks associated with the group have grown dramatically in number, range, sophistication, and lethality over the last year. While Boko Haram is primarily focused on Nigerian government issues and actors, elements of the group have shown interest in attacking Westerners as well. Its attack on the UN headquarters building in Abuja last August demonstrated its capability to attack international interests. In January of this year, BH detonated a series of coordinated IEDs in the northern city of Kano, killing nearly 200 people. These attacks demonstrate Boko Haram's will and capacity to mount sophisticated terrorist attacks. BH enjoys little popular support among the people of Nigeria but exploits popular discontent (particularly in the north) to recruit members. There are also credible reports that BH receives training and other support from other extremist groups operating in the region.

Although DoD has a role to play in building the capacity of the Nigerian military, much of the effort required to defuse BH must focus on addressing the socio-economic, political, developmental, and governance challenges Nigeria faces. That effort falls clearly within the purview of the DoS and USAID, but DoD will provide support where it can. For example, in late January 2012, DoD participated in the inaugural meeting of the regional security working group established under the DoS-led U.S.-Nigeria Bi-national Commission. Although meant to address the full range of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation, this working group meeting focused on countering violent extremism. To date, our broader efforts are focused on counter-IED and civil-military operations, where our engagement and cooperation can support the mutual goal of addressing BH as a threat. We will continue to explore further areas of cooperation with Nigeria on counterterrorism issues as circumstances permit.

Other Sources of Instability

Beyond the organizations previously described, it has become abundantly clear that the instability created at sea by piracy off the Horn of Africa is directly tied to instability on land in Somalia. It has become a lucrative business; money from outside Somalia is invested in increasingly sophisticated equipment with the hope of extorting profit by threatening the lives of innocent merchant seamen.

The international community, including NATO and the European Union, is actively combating piracy, yet many African partners lack the maritime capability to address this threat effectively. DoD seeks to help partner nations build their capacity to increase maritime domain awareness and security in Africa as part of broader U.S. Government and international efforts. International

naval patrols have helped to decrease the number of successful hijackings, as have the steps taken by the commercial maritime community.

Another source of instability in Africa relates to illicit trafficking, from weapons proliferation to trafficking in narcotics and even humans. Narcotics are also a destabilizing influence in Africa, which serves as a transit point from South America into Europe. DoD activities complement the DoS's West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), which was designed to address transnational organized crime through a multi-layered approach to building security and cooperation with international partners and donors.

DoD objectives for addressing these threats include fostering regional integration and cooperation and increasing response capabilities. In addition to the authorities already cited, these activities are carried out pursuant to a variety of DoD (Title 10) and DoS (Title 22) authorities and funding streams, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In all cases, DoD is fully cognizant of and complies with the human rights vetting procedures contained in the relevant legislation.

Conclusion

The Defense Strategic Guidance provides the framework for DoD activities on the continent, including countering threats to stability by non-state actors. In tandem with the Department of State and other U.S departments and agencies, we will continue to work with our partners in the region to help them secure their territories and promote an environment that is hostile to terrorists and other threats to stability, enabling our African partners to focus their energies on democratic consolidation and continued economic development.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to each and every one of you for your excellent testimony. We will begin our question-and-answer period.

I wanted to ask about the Lord's Resistance Army. President Obama announced, following the completion of the Nation Security Council progress report, that the U.S. will continue the deployment of a small number of U.S. military advisors to assist regional forces of countries fighting the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army.

Please describe the goals and the status of U.S. efforts to counter the LRA and remove their operational capacity, the LRA leadership, and how is this success being gauged?

Also, if you could describe the relationship between private- and U.S.-funded efforts to establish local cell phone- and radio-based monitoring and alert systems for LRA-affected communities. What happens to nonleadership LRA defectors both with regards to their intelligence value and the psychosocial needs and the capacity to be integrated, if at all possible, into their home communities? And finally, how frequent have defections been since the initiation of the current program of U.S. efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. First is the goals and objectives of the teams—and I defer to Amanda Dory to give her explanations as well—is to build interoperability and build up the training programs of the 40 countries that are involved against the LRA. Right now the goals and objectives are really fourfold in order to isolate Kony and the other leaders, to support and assist those who are leaving, also to help with rehabilitation and reconciliation efforts.

One of the things that has been proven very effective is what you just said, Madam Chairman, and that is the cell phones. Not so much high-tech, but basic good work. The USAID has provided about $100,000 to $200,000 worth of cell phones, cell phone towers. What it does, it helps alert communities when LRA groups are in area.

The other thing, too, is on the number of defections. We have been working with the countries to do these—encourage defections, but also reconciliation and rehabilitation. As you know, in the beginning about 1.8 million to 2 million were displaced in Uganda. We have about 385,000 in the Congo and neighboring areas. The Ugandan forces themselves have spent about $15 million just since reconciliation. We are doing the same in those areas.

I think the success rate is good. The issue is that it is only a matter of time. And we also want to thank you, Madam Chairman, and this committee for the support on counter LRA legislation and programs.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Ms. Dory?

Ms. DORY. To amplify Ambassador Yamamoto's comments, the DoD deployment is in support of the broader counter LRA strategy, the comprehensive one across the U.S. Government. The first leg of that is focused on civilian protection. The second, as he has referred to already, is on acquiring defections and reintegrating LRA detainees back into society. A third leg is providing humanitarian access. And then the fourth—and this is where DoD is at the fore-

front—is working to support the removal of Joseph Kony and key leaders of the LRA from the battlefield.

So the advisory mission that DoD is engaged in is really working with and through the local militaries, four different military partners in the region. We have a variety of metrics of success and benchmarks that we are using, looking across the strategy, and it includes looking at the ability to provide humanitarian goods at the level of our access over time. It includes looking at the number of defections over time; the captures, the number of captures from the battlefield.

From the DoD perspective some of the metrics that are important to us: The building of trust and relationships with each of the partner militaries, the access that is provided. Things that we focus on are reducing the amount of time from information that is garnered, whether through defections or other means, to actionable intelligence for use by the tracking teams, the Ugandan forces in particular, and looking at how we shrink the time between the intelligence and information to actual operations conducted. So that is a key metric as far as we are concerned.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much. Thank you, and please keep the pressure up. Thank you. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much Madam Chairman, and I have a bunch of questions. I would like the first couple to be real quick answers, if possible, so I can get them in.

Ms. Dory, on the fourth objective can you—given 100 military advisors working with local militaries and military partners, why haven't we been able to kill or capture Kony?

Ms. DORY. That is an excellent question. One of our biggest challenges with the mission collectively is expectations management. And I think that is what you are helping us focus on. When you look at the operating terrain involved—and many use the comparison to the size of the State of California—heavily forested, very limited infrastructure, it is very challenging terrain in which to find a small number of needles in a haystack. So that is the terrain challenge that faces the operating forces in the area.

Mr. BERMAN. This does remain one of our objectives there, I take it?

Ms. DORY. Removing Joseph Kony from the battlefield, and his key lieutenants, remains one of our objectives. A second challenge relates to the level of logistics support for the fielded forces. So given the terrain challenges, given that you have four different regional militaries that are working in collaboration together, is a very challenging operation.

Mr. BERMAN. Second, maybe Ambassador Yamamoto, the Dodd-Frank legislation required the administration to provide a—prepare a map of mining areas and rebel-controlled areas to give us a sense of the relationship between—on the issue of conflict mining and support for these rebels. Where is that map?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We will be getting the mapping soon. We have been tracking all the mines and what type of materials are being produced. As you know, Mr. Berman, the Congo produces probably about 8 percent of all the minerals that are needed for cell phones and other types of high-tech equipment that we use in our daily lives.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, but the map?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And the map is coming out soon, sir.

Mr. BERMAN. Soon? Like—like?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I have seen drafts and we worked on it. One of the issues on the mapping is that these are artisan mines that kind of spring up and then they close, et cetera. And those very hard to calculate. But we do have mapping, et cetera, ready.

Mr. BERMAN. So you think we will see that by the end of May?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Before.

Mr. BERMAN. Before. All right.

A larger question: How do our executive branch agencies balance this desire to build cooperation on counterterrorism with the desire to promote human rights, good governance, civilian control of the military?

You take Uganda and Ethiopia. They are strong partners on regional security, but neither of these governments are tolerant of strong political opposition or civil society. They are both hostile to a free press. How do you ensure in building up the counterterrorism capabilities that we are doing no harm to democracy and human rights, and the integration of the different roles to rule of law programs, in coordination with the security and capacity programs for the security forces?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I will perhaps leave some of the specifics on Ethiopia, a country that Ambassador Yamamoto knows very well, and Uganda, to him. But I would say that an interesting part of our antiterrorism assistance is always human rights training. There is always a human rights component to what we can do. Dory can address what is done by DoD in its capacity-building efforts. And it is also an integral part of our message to these countries that if they wish to diminish radicalization that it is absolutely essential that they observe human rights norms and ensure that that first contact or the sustained contact between citizens and the agencies of the state are benign ones and not ones that will in effect have a radicalizing impact.

That is a core effort within what the CT Bureau is doing. And we have any number of different programs going on that are designed to underscore and promote human rights observance in all of these contexts. Perhaps Ambassador Yamamoto might have more details on this for you.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Just a couple of areas. In Ethiopia we have the NCO and officer training program, and what we have learned now is that those trained troops are better troops, they are bidding to civilian control, and they are very disciplined. They are one of the main peacekeeping troops in Darfur and Abyei and other places.

The second area, too, is that we have been working with Prime Minister Meles and his government on various committees and groups on how to——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could turn on your microphone.

Mr. YAMAMOTO [continuing]. On how to improve democracy, good governance, and various other programs. And so therefore, we are going to enter another program here in the United States. We did another program in Addis last year. I think these efforts and areas are getting the message out and we are having a lot better coordination and cooperation.

Mr. BERMAN. My time has expired.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Smith is recognized. And if I could ask each of you to hold that microphone really close.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony to our very distinguished panelists and for your service to our country.

Just again on Joseph Kony, if you could tell us what priority is being given by the United States and by the respective militaries in Africa to the killing or capture of Joseph Kony. We all know it is a priority, but how high is it? And how degraded is Kony's ability to murder and force young people into child soldiering?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right now, in the coordination of the four countries, the priority is very high. In our discussions with President Bozize and his defense minister, who is his son, they have been very high on the priority in trying to coordinate with Ugandans, the DRC and others, Southern Sudan, in order to cordon off his escape routes and try to capture him. So it has placed a very high priority, and they have taken the leadership and the ownership in that regard.

Mr. SMITH. How degraded is his ability to wage his war of terror?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. On Kony, we have been able to degrade his forces. It is now down to about 150 or so. There are about 800 that are accompanying him, but the number of defections has increased. The only problem, of course, in the last 3 months is the number of attacks by Kony's groups has increased, but we are trying to limit those areas of operation.

Mr. SMITH. What is the reward or rewards for information leading to his capture? And how is that information disseminated?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The information right now—again we thank the Members of Congress on the Rewards for Justice. That is a good program. What it has done is given more publicity and to really advertise. And also the Invisible Children have done a great job with their Kony 2012 to get the message out. And so there is nowhere for him to hide, et cetera, so therefore we are looking for much more publicity——

Mr. SMITH. How is that information gotten out? Is it by radio? And to whom do they bring the information to?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right. The average people in the areas. So therefore they know how to work to coordinate, to cooperate, and to further help in the capture of Kony.

Mr. SMITH. Have we gotten credible leads as to his whereabouts?

Ms. DORY. Could I add a few accompanying points? The message in terms of encouraging defections and being able to provide monetary compensation in response to information leads is going out through leaflets that are dropped by air, it is going out by radio, it is going out through linkages of the forces and the civilians in the area. So it is kind of moving along the different pathways of communication. The Intelligence Community assessments as well as what our partners are telling us in terms of how degraded is Joseph Kony, the common assessment is that he has been significantly degraded and is in a survival and evasion mode at this point and on the move on a regular basis. So I think those are encouraging signs to us that are shared with our partners.

Mr. SMITH. Two final questions, because I am almost out of time. In the late nineties I chaired a series of hearings on the bombings in Tanzania as well as in Kenya, and I will never forget when Admiral Crowe told us at the hearing right here in this room how disappointed he was that while on the short term there is a vigilance, that vigilance wears down. And with the now-emerging threat of home-grown terrorist organizations, how aware or vigilant are we to those threats?

And secondly, how has the consolidation of power by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic parties in Egypt the jihadist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, the nexus between Cairo and the south?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, sir, for those questions. On the issue of vigilance and home-grown or self-starters, I think we are as vigilant as we possibly can be. It is well-known that the challenge regarding the home-grown threat is the collection. Intelligence collection is very, very difficult if people are acting on their own initiative and communicating very little, if at all, with others who share their ideology. But we are extremely concerned about this and we know, for example, that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in its various publications is encouraging individual attacks, people not coordinating and the like, and we certainly share your concern on that and we are working as hard as we can on it.

Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, I think it is important to know that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not been associated with any violent attacks since the 1970s. In fact it has engaged in a very, very, sort of virulent debate with al-Qaeda over many years. It is certainly true that Egyptian internal security has been challenged somewhat in the aftermath of the revolutionary events in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but Egypt remains a close counterterrorism partner. As you know, the Internal Security Service was essentially replaced and the new one is being built. But we have not seen that the developments in Egypt having any notable effect on AQIM or al-Shabaab or others in one way or the other. And I don't think we expect to see any.

Those groups may benefit from some of the turmoil in a place like Libya, for example, because of loose weapons, but not because of what is going on in Egypt.

And I would just say in closing that if anything, the transition to democracy is a huge blow to violent extremist groups because it demonstrates that change can come through peaceful measures and not, as bin Laden and others always communicated, only through violent change. So we view this actually as a hopeful set of developments, not one without bumps in the road, but nonetheless a very positive turn.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Ms. Bass is recognized and she is now the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Africa.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member. Before I begin, I wanted to mention that Mr. Smith and I tomorrow will hold a hearing on the current and escalating crisis engulfing Sudan and South Sudan. It is clear that if we are to see real lasting peace and security we must address some of the underlying

causes of unrest and discord, not merely in Africa of course but around the globe.

So I had a couple of questions I wanted to pose in this regard. How are our development and diplomacy efforts at USAID and the State Department directly addressing some of the root causes to strife and unrest, and what good governance and democracy promoting programs are having real success?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much. I know that at your hearing tomorrow you will have Princeton Lyman and Errol Gass and they can address those in greater details. But generally we have been working nonstop on the diplomatic side, working with countries like the Arab League and China to disengage the forces between the north and the south, particularly on Heglig, et cetera, to bring stability to that region in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile region.

In the area the USAID is continuing—it is our largest humanitarian assistance program in Africa, and we will continue to address not only the humanitarian assistance issues but also development, the education and the health-care programs. And I think tomorrow you will get great details on the projects.

Ms. BASS. Great, thank you very much. Anybody else?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would just add to that and say, broadly speaking, we in the Counterterrorism Bureau view our mission as being focused to a large extent on the strategic dimensions of counterterrorism, and by that I mean that we are looking at the upstream factors. We are looking at those drivers of radicalization and trying to figure out what we can do to blunt them and to diminish the likelihood of there being more recruits. We are involved in quite a number of different rule-of-law efforts and in countering violent extremism efforts that are trying to provide alternatives, for example, threat risk populations, particularly youth. And we also are involved in the messaging side of things, and have been deeply engaged in the standup and the operations of the Counterterrorism Strategic Communications Center, which was created by an Executive order by the President, within the State Department. It is an interagency effort and we have great support from DoD and from others in the interagency that have meant to essentially challenge the vast amount of propaganda that is out there, especially from al-Qaeda-related groups, and try to prevent people from embracing the ideology and turning to violence.

Ms. BASS. Could you expand a bit more on what you were saying about the youth in terms of how you are specifically addressing the youth?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, we would be happy to give you a lengthier briefing on that. There is an awful lot going on. But we recognize that the people who are most at risk of becoming radicalized are the young. We are conducting programs that complement what AID does in the sense that they are doing the longer-term development work that is meant to provide key social services that obviously ameliorate the grievances that lead to radicalization.

We are looking at hot spots, areas where we see particularly intense areas of radicalization, and trying to figure out what we can do there on the level of a state, a city, even a neighborhood, and figure out what it is that is driving radicalization there and what

we can do to provide alternatives, often working with civil society organizations that are going to be better interlocutors with these young people and will be more credible with them and steer them away.

So there may be leadership programs for young people, other kinds—could even be sports. It could be something that is bringing them together to establish a better relationship with law enforcement——

Ms. BASS. Before I run out of time, I would appreciate it if you would give me more information at another time. Thank you very much.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We will.

Ms. BASS. I wanted to ask a couple of questions with regard to the Reward for Justice program. And as Mr. Smith was asking questions about the reward for the capture of Kony, I was just wondering in terms of defections, have you been able to have some of his major lieutenants defect? Have people been responsive to the rewards program?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is correct. And there have been defections especially of the lieutenants and other groups coming in and providing information about where locations—for example, Kony is such an elusive character and he travels very stealthily and it is very difficult. And they also do small groups.

Ms. BASS. When you mentioned he has stepped up efforts and attacks, has some of it been in retaliation of our efforts in terms of the cell phones where the leaflets have been dropped? Has he been attacking those specific areas?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think that needs further assessment but it is just basically random violence right now in areas.

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Bass. Mrs. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized.

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. I have three questions. The first is it how is State and DoD coordinating with resources to combat threats throughout the region?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think we have very close coordination from the working level on up to the Situation Room, particularly through two comprehensive programs, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which deals primarily with the Maghreb and the Sahel, and also the PREACT which is its corollary in East Africa. Our staffs work very closely to identify needs and important programs that can address those needs, both on the military and the civilian side. And we feel that there is really an excellent give-and-take on these issues. Perhaps Amanda has something else to add on that.

Ms. DORY. Just briefly to amplify from a DoD perspective what Africa Command has been able to do is develop crosscutting regional campaign plans that are part of the DoD approach to engagement and long-term planning. So we have a Northwest Africa campaign plan, for example, that fits and aligns with the State Department TSCTP.

Similarly, in East Africa there is an East Africa campaign plan that aligns with the PREACT countries. All of those benefit from State Department input but are written and promulgated in

DoD'ese so they are able to be understood and cascaded within the DoD structure.

Mrs. SCHMIDT. I know that AFRICOM is in parts of the continent of Africa. Where does it come in on stabilizing the region? AFRICOM, our military presence to help certain countries make their military more professional and it is a partnership and they—where is that coming in in all of this?

Ms. DORY. Sure. I can respond both in the mission space and then organizationally. From the organizational perspective what you see are three different nodes where the Department of State and Department of Defense are interfacing and developing the strategies and policies. So here in Washington clearly is one location. The second location is at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, where you have a very heavy interagency presence to include a State Department deputy to General Ham, alongside a military deputy and many State Department and AID personnel; and thirdly at the country team level, Ambassador-led, you have the senior Defense officials who are engaged with State Department officials there. So we have something of a three-legged stool.

Mrs. SCHMIDT. How are you measuring success, AFRICOM's success?

Ms. DORY. AFRICOM's success in the first instance is to prevent the threat of attacks against U.S. interests, against the U.S. homeland, against Americans overseas. By that metric I think we have a fair degree of success to report, but remain on guard and ever vigilant.

The next mission for the command is to focus on contributing to partner capacity to be able to extend regional stability. That is really where we are focused in the hearing today when we look specifically at terrorism. And I think capacity-building is one of those long-term objectives where you measure your inputs in terms of the training hours that you provide, the equipment that you provide, the advisory services that you provide, and then you look at security outcomes.

Some of the ones that we talked about in the opening statements include regional partners stepping up and acting in the threat. When faced with insecurity such as the Amazon mission in Somalia clear evidence, this is where we are able to successfully contribute and support our partners on the continent.

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Focusing on Boko Haram and the terrorism situation, I know that Representatives King and Meehan wrote Secretary Clinton requesting that the State Department list Boko Haram as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Executive order 13224. What is the status of the request and what criteria haven't been met to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We are very concerned about Boko Haram and are addressing this issue through a number of different means in terms of our engagement with the Nigerians and the like. But the State Department, as a policy, doesn't comment on potential or perspective designations. So I am afraid I can't give you any more insight into that right now.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Schmidt. Ms. Wilson, my Florida colleague is recognized.

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Madam Chair. The video, The Invisible Children, really captured the people of America, especially the child soldiers and all of the devastation that is happening. And it had me so upset I offered a resolution. I was just astounded.

And I am just wondering, last year we authorized—Congress authorized up to $35 million per year in the budget for 2012 and 2013 for increased support to regional counter-LRA efforts in the 2010 NDAA.

Does the DoD intend to obligate the full authorized amount? If not, how much? And to what extent will this funding offset State Department payments for logistics, or will it expand activities beyond the current State Department-funded logistics support package?

Ms. DORY. Thank you. The Department of Defense appreciated the authority provided under 1206 that is focused on countering the Lord's Resistance Army. The Department does intend to use the authority. It was not accompanied by an appropriation, so we are in the process of identifying the possibilities in order to fund the authority.

What we have at this point is well-defined requirements provided to us via Africa Command. I think we have agreement between the two Departments. As you know, this is a dual-key authority that requires the concurrence of both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. Our intent is to use the authority to provide logistics support to the regional partner military forces. This is something that the State Department is currently undertaking using peacekeeping operations funds. As DoD takes over that logistics support contract, we intend to increase the level of logistics support to the partner militaries.

The other thing we intend to use the authority to do is to provide additional supplies to the different operations fusion centers that have been set up with the partner militaries by the deployed U.S. forces.

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Just a follow-up, Madam Chair. We saw The Invisible Children in America and it was riveting. How many people do you think in the affected areas actually were exposed to that video to help them understand what was happening with their own families, their own surroundings, neighbors? How do we get that to them so that they can see and understand what is happening with Mr. Kony?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We were just talking to Ben Keesey, and on The Invisible Children, it is really—it galvanized the United States and people in Europe. If you talk to the people in the affected areas, they live it, they understand it. Sixty-six thousand, as you know, Representative, 66,000 kids have been abducted. You are talking about 2 million nearly displaced. And so the terror that Kony has launched in those areas are very much understood very well by the people.

And going back to your previous question as well: How do you measure success, how do you go after Kony? And the answer comes in is that the Africans themselves, they know. They have taken the ownership. They are going after Kony. They are taking the lead. And they are taking ownership of all of these programs to help co-

ordinate and cooperate. The issue is how can we help them with interoperability, communications coordination? You know, militaries of the CAR are probably less than what it is in Uganda. How do you bring those to the same level in cooperation?

To answer your first question, Representative, the people in these affected areas know very well, and they are very thankful to the United States for this effort, thankful to the Congress for doing legislation. And so what you are doing here in the House really resonates very well among the citizens in Africa.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Wilson. Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for having this hearing.

You know, I first off want to give kudos to the group Invisible Children, and raising global awareness, really, about the plight in Africa, in the Lord's Resistance Army and what it is and what Joseph Kony has done. And I understand our efforts from the United States to address those as well.

I guess I am concerned about what I see with Sudan, with what I continue to see with al-Shabaab and the radicalization efforts. I know this committee and Homeland Security have talked numerous times over the last Congress about radicalization and al-Shabaab's recruitment here in the United States.

And so I guess, Ms. Dory, the question for you—and this is going to be my only question today because I am interested in listening more than I am in interrogating you guys—but what types of U.S.-supported counter radicalization efforts have been most successful in your opinion?

Ms. DORY. I would be glad to start, and I know Ambassador Benjamin has ideas as well.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, could I please ask the witness to speak more loudly?

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. This is about my fourth request. Please, please, please. We are going to give you a multivitamin. Please speak right into the microphone. It makes for a better hearing if we can all hear you.

Ms. DORY. Can you hear me? Thank you.

I can give you a few insights from DoD perspective and I think State Department will have some to add as well. I think when we look at the counterterrorism mission space, recognizing the complex roots of the terrorism problem in the first instance, DoD has some very effective tools, as you are aware, to focus on training and equipping partner counterterrorism forces and to undertake counterterrorism missions directly ourselves. They complement those through efforts to counter violent extremism, counter radicalization, some of the things that Ambassador Benjamin has been referring to in terms of information operations, for example, and other efforts to outreach and engage.

I think it is a complex space, and to be able to identify any particular element as the particular piece that is the most effective is a challenging thing to do, given our limited understanding of how terrorism operates and expands over time.

But my short answer to you would be it is the complementarity of the different types of trying to focus on terrorist leaders and re-

duce them over time, and focusing on drying up the pool of recruits and prospects to diminish those who enter onto that path in the first place.

Mr. DUNCAN. Ambassador Yamamoto, do we see other countries in the region assisting us at the level I think that Americans would expect other countries to assist us in the antiradicalization efforts, our fight against al-Qaeda, and world threats?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think it is in different terms. Commitment? Yes, they are committed. But how—going back to your first question is how do you reduce radicalization in Africa and so many areas? And we can have all the programs in the world. What is going to be important is, A, are those countries addressing and meeting the needs of the people? Look at Nigeria, Mali, and other countries. We have problems of instability because of clans and groups, et cetera. And the issue is, can we work with government to address the needs of people who feel they are disadvantaged?

The other issue is education and health care. You know, living in Africa on a good day in East Africa, one out of every ten children will die before the age of 5. And if that is a concern for parents, a concern for kids themselves, then that is a concern for us. And working with these governments to address those needs, that has been important.

The other issue, too, is education there. If you talk about 70 percent of Africa's 1 billion people now are under the age of 30, and most of them are under the age of 25, is education is a big issue, and also job creation and economic development.

So in those contexts I think if you want to reduce radicalization, those are the areas: Holding governments accountable to their people; making sure that they are addressing those needs. And, two, working systematically with us on education and health care. And I think a lot of countries around the world are doing that and I think we are making a lot of good inroads.

Mr. DUNCAN. Ambassador?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may add to that a bit. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory said, the variety of pathways to radicalization is enormous. And so we find someone like an Abdul Matalib, who was educated in elite schools, being radicalized. We find people in poor villages where they are subject to inadequate education and extreme ideology being radicalized. There are really countless different pathways.

Ambassador Yamamoto is exactly correct that the high road to counter radicalization is putting pressure on governments and enabling them to provide services to their people. That will obviously diminish a lot of radicalization. Good governance and democratic institutions will make a big difference, the rule of law and the like. We can certainly talk at much greater length about this.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. And I have got to say, I met with a number of young people from my district earlier this week on the subject of Joseph Kony and the LRA, and I was very impressed and remain impressed at the mobilization online that has occurred throughout this country and indeed throughout the world on what otherwise

might be an obscure African issue far away. And I have to believe that, frankly, the mobilization of our young people on such an issue, focused on human rights, focused on the tragedy that has occurred in East Africa I think can only be to the good. And shades of my own youth in college on getting involved in Biafra and Bangladesh, I am on showing my age. But I think it is a great thing.

I met with one young man who is from Uganda and whose village was targeted by Kony and the LRA, and his brother was indeed abducted. He managed to flee into the bush, but one of the points he made was there was no protection.

Ambassador Yamamoto, you have mentioned, correctly, that there is a level of awareness through radio and other means, that certainly the word has gotten out about the need to avoid the occasion of trouble. But frankly, his point was there was no protection. The government isn't functional in large swaths, or wasn't at his time. He is not that old.

And so I want to focus on that. What about institution building? What about the capacity of the Ugandan Government to expand its writ and protect its citizens from these kinds of tragic deprivations?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And that is the heart of a lot of the issues that we are trying to work on. This person probably—the LRA, of course, started out of the Ocoee region of northern Uganda where you had over 1. 8 million people displaced, and how was the government coping with those really staggering numbers? And those are issues that we have been trying to help with capacity building. I know Ambassador Benjamin and his group have been——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I can, Mr. Ambassador, that is already sort of a consequence of the failure of the government. You don't have displaced people if the government has the capacity to in fact protect people and provide law and order.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And that is the issue, how to build capacity. That is one——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, how are we doing it?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think we have made tremendous progress in the last decade through a lot of programs and projects to build institutions, to build training programs. We have INL programs to train police; have military being more responsive; doing better coordination and cooperation. I think those are areas that we have done.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Those are all good metrics for our inputs, but what about the output? Is the Ugandan Government in your view showing—and other governments in the region—in fact more resilience, more efficacy, in providing protection and in deterring the ability of the LRA to operate.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right. Well, the LRA is not operating in Uganda anymore. They are now in Congo. But those troops from Uganda are in the CAR and other areas to help coordinate with those military forces to go after the LRA. And then its context is how to build up security in Uganda.

As you know, Congressman, Ugandan troops are also in Somalia, helping their stabilization. They have done a tremendous job in the last decade.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Part and parcel of this conversation also is building our partnership capacity efforts throughout Africa. We put a lot of money through 1206 into countries like Mali. Is it your same assessment that they have also proved to be effective?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Mali was a greater disappointment because this was a country that was on the right track and the coup basically set it back a great deal. So now we are starting from scratch to do rehabilitation and restore good governance. But there are people in place who can fill the void, but we are going to give them the opportunity.

Mr. CONNOLLY. A great disappointment. The coup leader in Mali was in fact trained by the United States, was he not?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. With funds under this program.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is correct.

Mr. CONNOLLY. So does that cause us to assess our own effectiveness in this program.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think that one person does not detract from the overall goodness of the program.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that one person overthrew an elected government.

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right. Just look at throughout Africa. We now have over about 200,000 trained troops through these programs, through INET, FMF, et cetera, and 80,000 are now in peacekeeping operations doing great jobs. So we cannot judge on Captain Sanogo and his insanity and what he did.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I think you will forgive the American people for wondering a little bit about how effective their tax dollars have been invested when that is the outcome, even if it is one guy. He sure did have a big impact on the country and, as you point out, set back in many ways many of the investments that were made since 2006.

My time is up, Madam Chair, thank you.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, Madam Chair, I believe that Mr. Royce was here before me.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. So sorry, I didn't see you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But I appreciate your consideration.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Sorry, he was not in my sight line.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I also appreciate your Cuban coffee.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Royce is recognized.

Mr. ROYCE. I thank my colleague in California and thank you, Madam Chair. Going back to the point of 800,000 people who are displaced in northern Uganda, there is a reason they are displaced. It is one man and one war lord. And when we think about what could be done to bring Joseph Kony to justice, one of the most important things is apprehending him.

Tomorrow, a very important event occurs, and that is the verdict from the War Crimes Tribunal is going to be read with respect to Charles Taylor. That is an issue that this committee worked for years on how to get him apprehended and then turned over to the bar of justice. Because no matter how much money we have spent in Sierra Leone, in Liberia, in the region, across West Africa, there

was no way to keep up with the mayhem he was able to cause. And certainly between now and tomorrow, there is going to be a lot of people in West Africa hoping—hoping that this decision tomorrow will see him put away for life.

But in terms of the apprehension of Joseph Kony, I have legislation, H.R. 4077, to allow for a rewards program. It has bipartisan support. Our military is interested in having it put into action soon. So I just mention that in the hopes that we can help move this legislation, get your views on that.

Also I wanted to ask about how involved al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is in terms of the drug trade, because one of the things we found in terms of the nexus with Taylor was his willingness to be engaged in the blood diamonds trade and these types of activities to get his hands on hard currency. So if I could ask that question as well.

Ms. DORY. If I could start on the Rewards for Justice program, just to express the support of the Department of Defense and General Ham at Africa Command's endorsement.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I appreciate it.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Good to see you again, Mr. Royce. On the issue of the drug trade and AQIM, AQIM has managed to fill its coffers quite effectively with kidnapping for ransom. In the last few years they have really acquired millions and millions of dollars through this practice.

Now, AQIM does operate in the same area that some of the smuggling and drug trading lines run through, and they may—there may be some racketeering, essentially, some effort to shake down the drug traders and extort rents from them to operate in those areas. But by and large, we haven't seen AQIM turned into a drug cartel or a drug organization.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you another question, then. This will go to Boko Haram in Nigeria. We saw the first suicide attacks there recently. And those are the first in Nigerian history. But if we look back at al-Shabaab as it began to morph, it launched its first suicide attacks back in 2006. And recently, you have got the full strategic alliance with the announcement, the public declaration recently that they are joining forces with al-Qaeda, that they are part of al-Qaeda. How similar is the fact that now we are seeing this change in tactics by Boko Haram?

I know a governor from northern Nigeria who has told me that he sees the Gulf State influence there in terms of radical ideology in some of the immans teaching locally and changing the culture to the type of culture that we saw with al-Shabaab being driven—being driven by radical ideology.

Tell me—I am trying to gauge where we are in this process, but what can we expect in a few years from Boko Haram in your opinion?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I don't have a crystal ball. I would say that it is clear that Boko Haram has gotten some training and adapted some of the tactics that are common to the AQ affiliates, and we believe that that happened principally from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb, not from al-Shabaab, although there are sporadic contacts there as well.

We have also seen Boko Haram has adopted—or has shown its ability to target non-Nigerian targets, as it did with the U.N., and that is a worrisome sign.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. But it is a still a heterogeneous group.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I would like to ask the Ambassador—it is nice to see you again, Mr. Ambassador. We have over the years had several major little confrontations of our own. I would like to ask you, do you believe that a lack of democracy and human rights feeds radicalism and terrorism? And is that so in Africa?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. There are always—I think fundamentally the issue is if a government is not accountable to its people, then that really goes against President Obama's first pillar, which is good governance, democracy, and institutions. And so the issue comes in as yes; without those accountability and democratic institutions, then you have problems.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I remember that we had some concerns earlier, the two of us—but just for the record you were Ambassador to Ethiopia from 2006 to 2009, and during that time period there were some major human rights issues in Ethiopia.

Can you tell us what the—my recollection is that the government got away with murder in Ethiopia and we let them get away with that. Did that in some way—has that in some way fed the radicalism of Africa today as compared to people who, if you would have had an honest democratic government in that huge country of Ethiopia, it might have been more of an example, a positive example, rather than something that fed terrorism?

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think Ethiopia, and specifically Africa in general, are different issues. But on the Ethiopia issue, we went in and had heart-to-heart talks. I met with all the NGO groups, the local communities, with all the opposition groups. We worked very hard behind the scenes. As you know, we had 21 of the people who were placed in jail, the political prisoners, released. That took a long time but we did it.

The other issue is that we started now intergovernment, intragovernmental issues, discussions with Ethiopia and the United States. We are heading to discussions this summer, and the topics are on democratic values and how we expand institution building and how we develop this relationship. Because, again, Ethiopia is an important country not only on counterterrorism issues but also as a symbol for what is the stability for that region. And one of the stability issues, you said Congressman, you have been a great advocate, is democratic values.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope that pressure from Congress and perhaps from this committee actually assisted you in having those prisoners released. And I would hope that our Government makes it clear to people like those who govern Ethiopia that we take this very seriously, and the corruption level and the repres-

sion level in that country and in other countries in Africa is unacceptable.

Let me ask a little bit about the financing of this, as my colleague has mentioned, blood diamonds. I saw that movie, it was a perfect film. But I tend to believe that perhaps there are other people to focus on in terms of the financing of these radical and monstrously violent groups that are marauding around Africa.

What role does—I mean, if we are talking about al-Qaeda and that in Africa, are the Saudis playing a role in financing this as they have in other parts of the world? And is China playing any role, positive role, a positive role at all, or are they playing a negative role in confronting these types of horrible attacks on decent government in Africa? To the whole panel. That would be fine.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you, sir. The primary finances for the radical groups that we are concerned with come from kidnapping for ransom and crime, different kinds of fraud, theft, you name it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No evidence that the Saudis are coming from the outside.

Ambassador BENJAMIN. With al-Shabaab, it is also such things as the charcoal trade and their control of the Port of Kismayo and the attacks they put on that port. There may be external donors, but it is a small part of the overall funding picture.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, thank you very much.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And our last questioner will be Mr. Rivera, another one of my Florida colleagues.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I will probably direct my questions to Ambassador Yamamoto and Ambassador Benjamin as well. It is my understanding that Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria have become a recruiting ground for al-Qaeda in Morocco, a hub for opportunistic Polisario drug traffickers, and a threat to the region and the reforms—some of the reforms that we saw in the Arab Spring.

Since 1990, international support for the camps has exceeded $1 billion is my understanding, and that USAID exceeds $300 million for the camps. So it appears that the U.S. taxpayer is being called upon to partly fund the operation of camps that are being increasingly exploited by regional terrorist groups. So how is the administration dealing with this appearance at least?

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, I have seen reports of al-Qaeda involvement in Polisario camps, and whenever we have dug deeper we have found that those reports were spurious. I am happy to go back and have a look again and see if there is anything new that has come in on this. But on a number of occasions we have investigated these allegations in the past and found that there was no substance to them. But why don't we get back to you on that to ensure that we have up-to-date information?

Mr. RIVERA. Ambassador Yamamoto, do you have anything to add? Okay. That is all, Madam Chair.

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And I would be interested in that information as well. Thank you so much.

We would like to remind the panelists and the audience and the members that at Statuary Hall at 11 o'clock, we will be walking from here to there for a memorial service in celebration of our de-

parted colleague, Don Payne's life, and I know that he was a very important person to each and every one of you.

So thank you very much. And with that, the committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman

April 23, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building **(and available live via the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov)**:

DATE: Wednesday, April 25, 2012

TIME: 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa

WITNESSES: The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin
Ambassador-at-Large
Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Bureau of Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State

Ms. Amanda J. Dory
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day *Wednesday* **Date** *4/25/12* **Room** *2172 RHOB*

Starting Time *9:30 A.M.* **Ending Time** *10:45 A.M.*

Recesses [ ] (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]
Electronically Recorded (taped) [✓]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:

LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Attendance sheet attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Jackson-Lee

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] **No** [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (SFR)
Rep. Berman (SFR)
Rep. Connolly (SFR)
Rep. Ros-Lehtien (QFR)
Rep. Sherman(QFR)
Rep. Rivera (QFR)
Rep. Carnahan (QFR)

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *10:45 A.M.*

Jean Carroll, Director of Committee Operations

Hearing/Briefing Title: LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa

Date: 4/25/12

Present	Member
X	Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL
X	Christopher Smith, NJ
	Dan Burton, IN
	Elton Gallegly, CA
X	Dana Rohrabacher, CA
	Donald Manzullo, IL
X	Edward R. Royce, CA
	Steve Chabot, OH
	Ron Paul, TX
	Mike Pence, IN
	Joe Wilson, SC
	Connie Mack, FL
	Jeff Fortenberry, NE
	Michael McCaul, TX
	Ted Poe, TX
	Gus M. Bilirakis, FL
X	Jean Schmidt, OH
	Bill Johnson, OH
X	David Rivera, FL
	Mike Kelly, PA
	Tim Griffin, AK
	Tom Marino, PA
X	Jeff Duncan, SC
X	Ann Marie Buerkle, NY
	Renee Ellmers, NC
	Robert Turner, NY

Present	Member
X	Howard L. Berman, CA
	Gary L. Ackerman, NY
	Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS
	Donald M. Payne, NJ
	Brad Sherman, CA
	Eliot Engel, NY
	Gregory Meeks, NY
	Russ Carnahan, MO
	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerry Connolly, VA
	Ted Deutch, FL
	Dennis Cardoza, CA
	Ben Chandler, KY
	Brian Higgins, NY
	Allyson Schwartz, PA
	Chris Murphy, CT
X	Frederica Wilson, FL
X	Karen Bass, CA
	William Keating, MA
	David Cicilline, RI

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-11)

HCFA Full Committee Hearing: Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa
Wednesday April 25, 2012
9:30am

LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)

On Monday, the President announced that the National Security Council completed its review of the United States' deployment of military advisors who were tasked with assisting partner forces with countering the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The President mandated this review take place 150 days after the October 2011 deployment. In the Monday announcement, the White House said:

> The Governments of Uganda, CAR, DRC and South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union, continue to dedicate significant material and human resources to bring an end to the threat posed by the LRA. They are leading this effort, and the United States is committed to their efforts to keep the pressure on the LRA's top leaders, encourage fighters to leave the group, and protect and assist civilians in need. Continuing the deployment is contingent on the continued leadership and collaboration of affected states.[1]

A 2005 arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) bolsters the case that Joseph Kony ought to be apprehended. The warrant outlines the myriad crimes against humanity for which Kony and his LRA are infamous, including war crimes, rape, "forced enlisting of children," and "intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population."[2] An examination of the President's decision to continue the deployment of about 100 U.S. servicemembers to Uganda to "[work] toward the removal of Joseph Kony in the battlefield,"[3] requires a reminder of the statutory rationale behind the decision.

Context shows that recent efforts by the United States to counter the violent atrocities perpetrated by the LRA are not new. According to the State Department, "since 2008, the United States has provided over $40 million in critical logistical support, equipment and training to enhance counter-LRA operations by regional militaries."[4] Moreover, section three of Public Law 111-172—The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009—states, among other things, that:

> It is the policy of the United States to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and other affected areas by—

[1] Office of the Press Secretary, *The White House*, "Fact Sheet: Mitigating and Eliminating the Threat to Civilians Posed by the Lord's Resistance Army," April 23, 2012.
[2] International Criminal Court, "Press Release: Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders." Available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/2005/Warrant+of+Arrest+unsealed +against+five+LRA+Commanders.htm.
[3] Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore.
[4] U.S. State Department, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord's Resistance Army," October 24, 2011. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175523.htm.

> (1) providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the Lord's Resistance Army, to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a negotiated solution, and to disarm and demobilize the remaining Lord's Resistance Army fighters;[5]

My colleagues and I are quite familiar with this text. One year ago, this Committee marked up the bill on which PL 111-172 is based—S. 1067—and passed it by voice vote. In accordance with section four of the law, the Administration subsequently sent a detailed strategy to Congress regarding U.S. efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord's Resistance Army. That strategy has three parts: protecting civilians, providing humanitarian assistance, and countering the LRA.[6]

All this brings us to the President's October 14 decision, in which he "authorized a small number of combat equipped U.S. forces [to] act as advisors to partner forces [with] the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and" his associates.[7] The President was explicit in stating that "U.S. forces...will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces."[8] In other words, U.S. forces have counseled our multilateral partners on the ground on how best to achieve the military goals outlined in Public Law 111-172, section three.

If this conflict escalates to a full-fledged military engagement on the part of U.S. forces, then Congress ought to reexamine the conflict, pursuant to the legislative branch's authorities outlined in Article I of the Constitution. I commend the Administration for producing witnesses before this Committee when the Administration initially made the October 14 decision.

AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM), BOKO HARAM, AL-SHABAAB

The principle that weak or failing states create the conditions where militant groups can thrive has been widely accepted in national security circles. I would stretch that principle and add a common principle of counterinsurgency—namely that a legitimate government that can provide services to its people is better equipped to deal with insurgencies. Though there is not a single cookie-cutter situation that can be applied to the militant groups in Africa, there are common elements, such as ungoverned spaces that provide safe havens or governments that do not have the capabilities to effectively combat militant groups.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) began as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) "as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria's [secular] military government."[9] In 2003, the group pledged its alliance to al Qaeda and changed its name to reflect its newfound status. The former "local Algerian Islamist group" has become a "pan-Maghreb jihadi organization" with goals to "pursu[e] a more global, sophisticated, and better-financed direction."[10] The affiliate status was approved by

[5] PL 111-172, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ172/html/PLAW-111publ172.htm.
[6] October 24, 2011 State Department fact sheet.
[7] Letter from the President to the Speaker.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Andrew Hansen & Lauren Vriens, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," *Council on Foreign Relations,* July 21, 2009, 1.
[10] Ibid., 1.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's second-in-command at the time. The group "has called for jihad against the United States, France, and Spain; and for the withdrawal of French troops from Afghanistan.[11] Like many Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), AQIM engages in criminal activity to finance its terrorist activities. According to the State Department:

> No group has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping for ransom business than al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which relies on ransom payments to sustain and develop itself in the harsh Saharan environment. AQIM carried out several attacks [in 2010] and continued kidnapping foreigners for ransom but is not an existential threat to governments in the region. The U.S. government urged its allies to refuse to pay AQIM and other terrorist group's ransoms, which have become a primary means of financial support for terrorist organizations.[12]

Another group in Africa is Boko Haram—an Islamist militant group based in Nigeria that has perpetrated several suicide bomb attacks in Nigeria, including a series of attacks in November 2011 that killed at least 150 people.[13] The group, created in 2002, "aims to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of criminal sharia courts across the country."[14] According to one analyst, Boko Haram "itself is not an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally repining into social chaos."[15] Some policymakers have called on the State Department to list Boko Haram as an FTO, but the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria has said "it is misleading to think of Boko Haram as an organized terrorist group or a conventional insurrection...in fact, Boko Haram more resembles a cloud of inchoate rage shaped by Islam."[16] One way to efficaciously confront Boko Haram would be for the United States to encourage the Nigerian President to deal with "poverty and the corruption-driven alienation felt by the population of northern Nigeria, factors that contribute to Boko Haram's popular support," according to the Ambassador.[17]

Lastly, for the purposes of this hearing, there is al-Shabaab—a group based in Somalia that merged with al-Qaeda in February 2012. According to one national security analyst, during the 1990s in Somalia, "the absence of central authority in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country."[18] In fact, groups in Somalia often have a cyclical nature—"Somali factions, including the so-called Islamist groups, often go through realignments or simply disappear from the scene."[19]

A brief analysis of the previously mentioned groups shows that legitimate governments that tend to the needs of their citizens can help address some of the conditions that help these groups continue

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[11] The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, *Memorandum to Committee Members*, April 23 2012, 4.
[12] U.S. Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Terrorism*, 10.
[13] Toni Johnson, "Boko Haram," *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 27, 2011.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Chris Ngwodo, quoted in Toni Johnson's "Boko Haram," *Council on Foreign Relations.*
[16] The Honorable John Campbell, "To Battle Nigeria' Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns," *Foreign Affairs*, September 9, 2011, 1.
[17] Ibid., 1.
[18] John Rollins, "Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, 24.
[19] Ibid., 24.

their existence. Ungoverned spaces are the new "Wild West" of the 21st century. Multilateral partnerships, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism, can also play an important role. Lastly, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) can provide an anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on how we can work with our African partners to combat instability on the second largest continent in the world.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#1)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

a. What are the goals of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) generally and of the disparate elements that make up its southern Sahara/Sahel zone specifically (AQIM/Sahara)? Is AQIM capable of overthrowing any government in the region?
b. What is the nature of the AQIM threat in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger?
c. To what extent is AQIM able to garner broad support and appeal among local populations in the region?
d. How large is AQIM's membership, overall, and in its Sahara zone in Mali, Niger, and far southern Algeria?

Answer:

AQIM's stated goals are to establish an Islamic state in Algeria, remove all non-Muslim and Western influence from the region, and expand their hold across northwest Africa. AQIM over the last year has tried to reinforce its status as the predominant terrorist group in north and west Africa by strengthening its ties to other extremist groups and exploiting an increasingly permissive security environment to boost its resources. Many AQIM elements in the Sahel provide logistical support to the northern elements to garner funding by using Kidnap for Ransom (KFR), but many of these same Sahel elements now serve as the group's overall operational arm as well. AQIM currently holds nine Europeans hostage while a splinter group, made up largely of Mauritanians, Malians, and perhaps Nigeriens, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), holds three hostages. While AQIM aspires to establish its dominance throughout Africa, this goal has remained unrealized. AQIM's attempts to expand into Europe have failed. While many AQIM activities have been criminal in nature, such as their KFR operations in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, they also conduct regular attacks against Algerian, Mauritanian, and Nigerien security forces, and are collaborating with elements of Nigeria-based Boko Haram. AQIM elements have attacked Mauritanian security forces but they have usually been defeated. AQIM's Sahel-based cadre has increased its presence and strength in recent months, particularly in northern Mali. Overall, AQIM's membership is probably around 1,000 supporters, with a few hundred in the Sahel region alone.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#2)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

The situation in Libya has created additional challenges to U.S. counterterrorism efforts as weapons from Libya are trafficked throughout the region.

a. What effects has the Libya crisis had on access to arms and recruitment by radical Islamist elements in the Sahel?
b. What is your assessment of regional security forces' capacities to secure their borders against the flow of Libyan weapons?

Answer:

The Libyan revolution profoundly affected the region. Arms proliferation increased and former mercenary fighters in Qadhafi's military returned home to countries across the Sahel, where employment opportunities and assistance resources were scarce. This combination contributed to the ignition of the fifth Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. Extremist elements within that rebellion, Ansar al-Din, joined with elements of AQIM to attack Malian security forces. The rebels overran government forces and took control as far south as Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.

There is no question that arms proliferation has been a challenge for regional partners, but the will of partner states like Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to counter this proliferation remains strong. To this end, a National Security Staff-directed task force, to which the State Department is the primary contributor, has conducted assessments and training, and offered assistance throughout the region. Moreover, to assist in keeping border security elements in the field, the task force has provided funds for fuel and spare parts to border security forces. Together with our regional partners, we are exploring additional ways of enhancing regional border security and increasing the capacity of states to address weapons proliferation challenges.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#3)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Budget Cuts for Counterterrorism Programs in Africa

a. Does this Administration believe that combating violent extremism in Africa is a priority and, if so, is the FY13 budget request analogous to the threat?
b. Should a portion of the various funds requested for other initiatives, such as climate change, be re-directed to combating violent extremism?

Answer:

The State Department budgets for the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT), while relatively modest, are implemented in coordination with complementary programs funded through other offices and agencies to ensure that we are addressing the wide range of drivers of violent extremism in Africa. In addition, several international partners such as France, UK, EU, and Canada have provided resources. Countering violent extremism on the continent requires that we engage young and vulnerable audiences, improve educational opportunities, and increase job creation, all of which are objectives of many programs across the interagency that are implemented in conjunction with CT-funded programs. Initiatives that support good governance and rule of law, economic development, and that mitigate transnational crime are equally important as the CT programs. We are working to make a concerted investment in these key areas to advance our broader policy objectives, including counterterrorism.

While combating violent extremism in Africa remains a priority, the budget and our programs are tethered to the absorptive capacity of the partner states. We must remain careful not to "flood the engine" with assistance and unreasonable timelines for implementation. Evidence suggests that our regional partners are making good use of our assistance across the board. We continue to monitor and adjust how CT funds are used for combating violent extremism, communicating results across agencies, and sharing best practices across countries.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#4)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Citing the lack of coordination between key agencies, and the need for roles and responsibilities to be clarified, the GAO recommended in 2008 that a coordinated interagency strategy be developed for fighting terrorism in the Trans-Sahara region. However, as of 2012, it appears that such a strategy does not exist.

a. Why has a coordinated, interagency strategy not been adopted?
b. What is the Department of State's specific approach to this?
c. In the absence of such a strategy, how are U.S. efforts in the region coordinated?

Answer:

The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was established, and its initial strategy determined, in 2005. In 2011, the strategy was updated. Due to recent and unprecedented changes in the region, it is being reviewed to determine if it should be adapted to account for new priorities. TSCTP is promulgated by a Standing Interagency Working Group – Trans Sahara, which meets regularly to discuss program implementation. Key members of this standing working group include the State Department, USAID, and DoD, with other relevant agencies brought in as necessary, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security. Moreover, there is an annual interagency conference and semi-annual implementation meetings for TSCTP, as well as monthly VTCs with the core group and AFRICOM that effect coordination on a continuing basis. TSCTP and its military component, Operation Juniper Shield, remain a model of long-term interagency coordination.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#5)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

GAO reported that disagreements over whether State should have authority over DOD personnel hampered certain TSCTP activities in Chad and Niger. For instance, in Niger, according to DOD officials, the agency suspended most of its TSCTP activities in 2007 after the Ambassador limited the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the country.

a. Can you explain why the Ambassador limited the number of DOD personnel in the country?
b. How are the roles and responsibilities between agencies defined for TSCTP activities?

Answer:

TSCTP mobilizes resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. Government including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. Its annual budget includes allocations of Development Assistance; Economic Support Funds; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds; Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR) funds; and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds.

In 2007 in Niger, the Ambassador set limits on the number of DOD personnel because of concerns about the country's fragile political environment as well as limited space and staff available to support DOD personnel. In Chad, the Ambassador called for a "strategic pause" in implementing TSCTP activities, citing the need to reassess available personnel to support DOD activities in the country. Interagency cooperation over roles and responsibilities and overall U.S. presence in TSCTP countries has improved since the establishment of AFRICOM. In general, roles and responsibilities between agencies are determined by the funding sources of particular activities and through a consultative interagency process. The State Department regularly coordinates with AFRICOM and USAID on the development and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism policy and programming in the region.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#6)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

GAO reported that agencies frequently struggle to measure counterterrorism progress. For instance, while agencies generally measure outputs of their activities, such as the number of foreign military personnel trained, they do not measure the outcomes of their activities, such as reductions of extremism in targeted countries.

a. What steps have been made to improve the assessment of the outcomes of counterterrorism activities in the Trans-Sahara?
b. To what extent are such efforts coordinated across the interagency process?

Answer:

In late 2010, USAID conducted a mid-term evaluation of the TSCTP-related programs in the three countries with at least three years of activities, Chad, Mali, and Niger. The result showed a modest but statistically significant reduction of community support for violent extremist groups. The report of this evaluation is available online and has been presented widely within the U.S. Government and to implementing partners at a variety of events such as TSCTP-related meetings or at seminars focused on evaluation processes. Future evaluations are planned, building upon the metrics and methods used in this first process. The evaluation utilized measurements developed in an interagency process. In addition to this impact evaluation, USAID is a participating agency in an annual joint polling effort conducted in six key countries conducted by the Department of State and USAFRICOM.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#7)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

GAO reported that fluctuation in the distribution of funds for TSCTP activities hampered USAID's implementation of activities in Mali. For instance, GAO reported that USAID officials told them that fluctuation in funds for Mali made it difficult to plan over the medium to long term.

a. What efforts have been made to regularize TSCTP payments to address these issues?

Answer:

Since 2010, the annual budget request has included a bilateral allocation of funds for Mali to support TSCTP activities managed by USAID. In addition, since 2008, the budget request for the USAID West Africa Regional Mission has included funds to support TSCTP program activities in Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and more recently, Burkina Faso.

Question for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#8)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

a. Please provide an update on the situation in Mali.
b. Please provide a breakdown of all U.S. assistance to Mali.
c. Please provide a breakdown of all U.S. assistance that has been suspended to Mali.
d. What are the prospects for Malian stability and state integrity in the wake of the recent coup?
e. What are AQIM's role in and objectives with regard to the coup in northern Mali?
f. How do you assess regional security forces ability to contain the treat of instability from northern Mali?

Answer:

Regarding the coup, we are working closely with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as it leads regional mediation efforts to return Mali to civilian-led rule under the guidance of the interim government. We have condemned the coup and its extrajudicial arrests and detentions. We continue to insist that the junta leader Amadou Sanogo and his colleagues respect and comply with the directives of the interim government. On April 10, 2012, the United States formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali, consistent with coup restrictions in section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Appropriations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 2012.

The ability of the United States to resume full assistance, including military and security assistance, will depend on a democratically elected government taking office. The situation in northern Mali remains of concern. We continue to work with our international and regional partners to address the security issues in the Sahel.

The total amount of U.S. foreign assistance to Mali from the State Department and USAID is approximately $311 million, of which approximately $160 million is currently suspended or terminated. Continuing activities include humanitarian assistance (including food assistance), elections support, and health, pursuant to available legal authorities. This total includes all unobligated and/or unexpended funds from bilateral, regional, and centrally funded resources.

Breakdown of U.S Assistance Suspended:

- Peace and Security ($31.6 million): Suspended or terminated.

- Governing Justly and Democratically ($16.6 million): All programs are suspended or terminated, except approximately $1 million in election support activities

- Health ($107.5 million): Continuing.
- Education ($33.5 million): Suspended or terminated.
- Economic Growth ($80.4 million): All programs are suspended or terminated, except approximately $1.5 million in Food for Peace Title II resources.
- Humanitarian Assistance ($41.8 million): Continuing.

The State Department and USAID are currently undertaking a policy review of programs in order to determine if some may resume pursuant to available authorities.

In Mali's north, various armed groups, including Islamic militants, are exploiting the political instability in the capital and the resulting security vacuum. A lasting solution to the situation in the north will require negotiation between a democratic government in Bamako and groups representing Mali's Tuaregs in addition to a restoration of governance and security. To that end, we are coordinating with ECOWAS, Mali's neighbors, and key international partners to press Mali's interim government to hold presidential elections expeditiously and to take other steps to secure Mali's territorial integrity and ensure that Mali does not become a haven for Islamic militants.

The Department is not aware of any direct or indirect role of AQIM in the coup. However, AQIM has taken advantage of the military disarray and power vacuum to exert control in strategic population centers in the north of Mali in furtherance of their terrorist agenda. The weak interim government in Bamako and the current state of disarray in the Malian security forces increases the likelihood that the terrorist group will become further entrenched in northern Mali.

The key to successfully containing insecurity emanating from Mali will be to immediately bolster regional counter-terrorism efforts of partners such as Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria and in the longer term to work closely on a common international approach to legitimize and then strengthen the central government and security forces of Mali. Regional forces have varying levels of operational and logistical capacity and as such international partners will likely need to assist with training and material assistance.

In addition to working with these regional actors, an ECOWAS-organized force of sufficient strength in the short term can support stability and counterterrorism objectives by undertaking such tasks as protecting government officials and institutions in the south and preventing any further encroachment of rebel groups further south. However, Mali has not yet requested such a force.

Question for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#9)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Mali: Impact of Recent Developments on Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

a. What impact has the coup had on gains made under the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in Mali?
b. To what degree, if any, are resources and training provided to the Malian military under TSCTP being diverted for use in domestic counterinsurgency?

Answer:

On April 10, 2012, the United States formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali consistent with the coup restriction in section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 2012. This includes the programs under the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP). We continue to work with other TSCTP partners in the region, including Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso to support counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel.

Practically, the coup has undermined long-term engagement efforts focused on improving operational and logistical capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) in their fight against Al Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb. The coup has resulted in the breakdown in the military leadership and chain of command and reduced the MAF's capacity to support the Malian constitution and protect Mali's citizens.

We do not yet have sufficient reporting to be able to determine whether a major diversion of TSCTP-provided materials to Mali's military before the coup has been misused. The Department takes its responsibilities for end use monitoring seriously and will endeavor to track the use of previously provided materials and warn against inappropriate uses of U.S.-provided training and material. Of note, Mali's counterinsurgency efforts effectively came to a halt following the coup d'état. We continue to support other TSCTP partners, including Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso, who have been responsive in addressing the insecurity in the Sahel.

Question for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#10)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question :

Boko Haram

a. What is the current assessment of the threat of Boko Haram to U.S. interests and to stability in Nigeria and in the surrounding region?
b. What criteria hasn't Boko Haram met to be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization? What would be the impact of such a designation on U.S. authorities and effectiveness?

Answer:

We abhor the violence attributed to the group known as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. We support the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to bring the perpetrators of violent acts to justice, and stress the importance of protecting civilians in any security response to Boko Haram's violance. We are very concerned about ongoing attacks against Nigerians and threats against U.S. officials in Nigeria. The large-scale, coordinated attacks have disrupted economic and political activity in what is already the poorest region of Nigeria, and endanger President Goodluck Jonathan's "Transformative Agenda," his attempt to greatly increase economic activity and investment in the country.

The State Department does not publicly comment on prospective foreign terrorist designations for specific groups or organizations. However, we are fully committed to taking appropriate action against foreign groups engaging in terrorist activity in order to prevent such groups from carrying out violent acts, or obtaining financial resources or other sources of support.

Groups such as Boko Haram exploit legitimate grievances of the northern Muslims to garner recruits and public support. To address the political and socio-economic challenges of the north, the Nigerian government must effectively engage communities vulnerable to extremist violence and promote human rights practices among its security forces. Heavy-handed security tactics have been counterproductive, compounding the problem of northern distrust of government.

While Boko Haram is not a monolithic group, its aims are largely to discredit the Nigerian government. It is focused primarily on local Nigerian issues and actors, and responds principally to political and security developments within Nigeria. We are concerned about reports that Boko Haram is in contact with other extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and are monitoring these developments closely.

The United States engages regularly with our Nigerian counterparts on issues of violent extremism, among other issues, in an effort to improve their effectiveness. We convened a meeting of the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission in January to specifically

discuss Boko Haram and will continue to engage with our Nigerian counterparts on this issue through additional Binational Commission meetings that will take place in June.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto
by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#11)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Lord's Resistance Army

a. What is the Obama Administration doing to help make sure that the regional governments in LRA-affected areas are working together to help apprehend Joseph Kony and stop LRA violence?
b. What is the U.S. government doing to help support the protection of civilians in LRA-affected areas at the same time that it is helping to apprehend top LRA commanders?
c. What is the U.S. doing to help ensure that Joseph Kony is not able to find a safe haven in areas like Darfur?

Answer:

The governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Republic of South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union (AU), are working to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Continued leadership and cooperation by these governments are essential to keep the pressure on the LRA and keep it from rebuilding its forces. Although these countries have their differences, we believe they are bound together by their shared interest in ending the threat posed by the LRA to their populations. The United States is working bilaterally through our embassies to encourage each of the affected countries to strengthen their collaboration. The United States has participated in past quadrilateral meetings of the Chiefs of Defense from the four countries, and will pursue future opportunities to meet jointly with the leaders from the affected states. We also believe that the U.S. military advisors in the region are helping to strengthen information-sharing, coordination, and tactical collaboration among the partner forces.

We are also working closely with the AU as it increases its efforts to address the LRA threat. Last month, the AU officially launched its Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA. Although many operational details are still being worked out, we believe the AU's involvement can strengthen coordination, information-sharing, and trust among the four militaries pursuing the LRA. The AU can help the governments in the region develop coordinated approaches to promoting LRA defections, repatriating and reintegrating those who defect, and prioritizing the protection of civilians. Our military advisors in the field are coordinating with the AU staff as they stand up this

initiative on the ground, and our embassies are working closely with the AU's Special Envoy on the LRA issue, Francisco Madeira.

With all aspects of our strategy, the United States continues to place a strong emphasis on civilian protection. The LRA preys on remote, vulnerable populations in the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan who lack basic protection services and early warning capabilities. National governments bear responsibility for the protection of their citizens. Although they face significant challenges in protecting all populations given their limited resources, lack of mobility, and the poor transportation and communications infrastructure in the region, they can take steps to empower communities and reduce the risk of large-scale LRA attacks.

U.S. military advisors do not have a direct operational role, but they are seeking to emphasize the importance of civilian protection in their engagement with the partner forces. They are integrating civilian protection into training and operational planning and seeking to promote greater information-sharing and collaboration between military and civilian actors. U.S. military advisors are also coordinating closely with the UN peacekeeping missions in the region and other actors who undertake protection activities. For example, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) carries out unilateral and joint operations with the Congolese military to help increase civilian protection in LRA-affected areas of the DRC. U.S. advisors provided information fusion and planning support for a joint operation that was carried out in December to help deter the LRA from committing large-scale attacks in the DRC during the Christmas season, as it did in 2008 and 2009.

At the same time, the United States is funding civilian projects to help remote communities to develop protection plans, better anticipate LRA threats, and ultimately make their own decisions related to their safety. In the DRC, the State Department and USAID are funding projects to help approximately 48 remote communities in LRA-affected areas to develop community-based protection plans and connect with other communities as part of a broader High Frequency (HF) Radio Network. The Catholic Church currently manages an HF Radio Early Warning Network to which communities tune in twice a day to share information about LRA attacks and threats. In the CAR, USAID is funding a new project to establish a community radio correspondents' network, which will increase the availability of accurate information on the LRA for local community and humanitarian actors.

Finally, the United States is working with our regional and international partners to ensure that Joseph Kony and the LRA do not find safe havens. We are working with African Union and United Nations officials to ensure a united regional effort against the LRA. The LRA's leaders exploit communal conflicts and regional tensions. Strong regional collaboration is critical to keep the LRA from regrouping and rebuilding its forces. The United States and the international community as a whole would take very seriously any credible evidence of material support or safe haven being provided to the LRA.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#12)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question :

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

a. To what degree and through what means is Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) establishing an administrative or governing presence in areas that AMISOM is securing or capturing from the al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency in and around Mogadishu?
b. What progress is being made to incorporate Kenyan forces into the AMISOM force?
c. What is the status of Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia?
d. To what extent has the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia engendered a popular Somali backlash, was the case with respect to its invasion of Somalia in 2006?
e. To what degree, if at all, did the Obama Administration coordinate or technically assist the recent Kenyan and Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia?

Answer:

Since al-Shabaab fled Mogadishu in August 2011, AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) National Security Forces have been increasing security in the capital city and its environs. In taking Daynille district in March, they now control Mogadishu. The TFG is slowly working to capitalize on this success by extending its reach throughout Mogadishu. TFG officials from the national, regional, and district authorities have been working with peace committees from each of the 16 Districts of Mogadishu to help establish governance and otherwise stabilize those areas. We recently announced a $9.5 million joint development project with the TFG and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development to support this effort through the development of stabilization activities, promotion of district-level consensus building, and quick impact projects intended to demonstrate the ability of the TFG to provide services for its people.

For areas outside Mogadishu, the TFG has adopted a national policy for reconciliation and stabilization in the areas of South-Central Somalia where al-Shabaab has been pushed out. The TFG has committed to implement its policy through a series of operational plans, one for each of the three zones it has identified. We have made clear to the TFG that it must act quickly to put in place – or strengthen where they already exist – local political administrations in areas where al-Shabaab no longer maintains control. We are prepared to enable the implementation of short-term, quick impact projects that will improve the credibility of newly organized local authorities.

On February 22, the UNSC Security Council approved Resolution 2036 (2011), which provides the basis for Kenyan forces to be incorporated into an expanded AMISOM. Before Kenyan forces will be formally re-hatted as AMISOM forces, however, the Government of Kenya and the African Union must finalize a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU is under negotiation and we hope it will be concluded soon.

Ethiopia has consistently said it plans to withdraw its forces from Somalia as soon as AMISOM and/or TFG forces can replace the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) in Beledweyne, Baidoa, Huddur, and other areas of southern Somalia under its control. It is uncertain when additional AMISOM troops will be able to deploy to the areas that the ENDF controls.

The current Ethiopian military intervention has been more limited than its 2006 operations, going only as far as the town of Baidoa where Ethiopia enjoys relative support from local clans. The 2006 operation saw Ethiopia move quickly across the country, all the way to Mogadishu. Since the ENDF entered the Gedo region in February 2011, we have seen no evidence of an anti-Ethiopia backlash within the population. Ethiopia's engagement in Somalia against al-Shabaab, is backed by the TFG, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, and the regional organization the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes neighboring states. These organizations and countries are coordinating efforts to support the TFG and its efforts to liberate Somalia from al-Shabaab.

The Obama Administration did not coordinate or provide technical assistance for the recent Kenyan and Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#13)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

Al-Shabaab. Please describe the goals, means of implementing, and status of the Obama administration's October 2010 "dual track policy" in countering al-Shabaab and bolstering local security and stability in Somalia.[1]

a. How is al-Shabaab responding to the AMISOM offensive as an organization? Has it lost popular Somali support?
b. How have these dual track efforts been funded and what have been their effects?

Answer:

Just a year ago, al-Shabaab controlled large swaths of Mogadishu. Today, it controls no portion of Mogadishu and has had to resort to asymmetric attacks that terrorize ordinary Somalis. The AMISOM presence in Mogadishu and its partnership with the TFG National Security Forces is one of the main reasons for the weakened al-Shabaab we see today. Pressure from regional forces Ethiopia and Kenya has also pushed al-Shabaab from several critical cities in central and southern Somalia.

Al-Shabaab still presents a serious security threat to Somalia, the region, and U.S. interests. However, al-Shabaab is not a monolithic organization, and not all of its leaders support the formal link with al-Qaeda or external attacks. Fractures within an already divided organization, the deaths of key members of al-Shabaab, and al-Shabaab's unpopularity have weakened the group. Al-Shabaab has also become unpopular within Somalia. Several factors have led to al-Shabaab's increased unpopularity including its failure to address the basic needs of people living under its control, its refusal to allow outside humanitarian assistance during the recent famine, as well as increased terrorist attacks and brutal tactics that have killed and wounded countless Somali civilians.

Our assistance programs are an important tool in implementing our dual track policy in Somalia. For track one, the United States has obligated approximately $348 million in voluntary support for AMISOM, approximately $196 million for assessed contributions to the UN Support Office for AMISOM, and approximately $106 million in support for the TFG National Security Forces. These programs have been vital in creating space for the national-level political process to move ahead, particularly in

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1 Under track one, the United Stated pledged to support the Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and AMISOM. Track two centered on increased stability-focused engagement with the self-declared independent Somaliland, the semi-autonomous Puntland region, and regional and local anti-Shabaab groups in south and central Somalia.

Mogadishu. One of the largest programs for track two is USAID's Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS). This program, funded at approximately $38 million since FY 2010, implements quick impact projects on the ground in Somalia that foster good governance, economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism.

Over the past six months, we have conducted more frequent trips to Somalia, which has increased our engagement with the TFG and sub-regional authorities such as Somaliland and Puntland and allowed us to play a more robust role in advancing the political process, stabilization activities, and security sector reform. In September 2011, the current UN-led process to end Somalia's political transition resulted in the signing of the Roadmap to End the Transition by the TFG and three other important Somali political entities: Puntland, Galmudug, and the Ahlu Sunna Wahl Jama'a movement. The Roadmap process represents a convergence of the Dual Track policy, knitting together both local and national efforts.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (#14)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

U.S. Assistance to AMISOM

a. Please describe the manner in which the United States supports AMISOM.
b. What role has U.S. funding under the Global Peace Operations Initiative, Section 1206 programs, regional PKO, and other funding support or applied efforts played in enabling AMISOM to assert increasing control in Mogadishu?
c. What kinds of additional or different types of assistance, if any, may be needed to consolidate and extend the emergent gains against al-Shabaab that AMISOM and the recent regional military interventions in Somalia have produced?

Answer:

The United States utilizes State Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train all units deploying to AMISOM. The only exception is the Kenyan forces that are currently preparing to be re-hatted as part of AMISOM in Southern Somalia, as their initial deployment was not under the auspices of AMISOM. In addition to robust pre-deployment training for AMISOM-bound battalions, ACOTA has provided specialized training across the spectrum of AMISOM-related tasks, including force headquarters training, maritime security training, enhanced marksmanship training, and counter-improvised explosive device training. In FY 2011, the United States began supplementing ACOTA training with specialized counter-terrorist training for combat engineering battalions from Uganda and Burundi funded through Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, and implemented by U.S. Marine Forces Africa. In addition, contract mentors and advisors, funded through a grant to the Government of Uganda, reinforce the skills imparted through pre-deployment training while AMISOM forces are on the ground in Mogadishu.

Equipment is another vital component of U.S. support. We have provided a broad range of non-lethal equipment to AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), including armored personnel carriers, logistical vehicles (i.e. cargo trucks, fuel and water tankers), material handling equipment, water purification plants, generators, night vision devices, global positioning systems, and personal protective equipment. On select occasions, we have provided lethal equipment to AMISOM TCCs, including sniper rifles, which were intended to lessen AMISOM's use of indirect fire weapons (such as mortars) in the heavily populated urban environment of Mogadishu. Through FY 2011 and FY 2012 Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the United States is

providing military-grade counterterrorism equipment, including small, unmanned aerial systems, combat engineering equipment, and static surveillance systems for force protection.

Finally, the United States supports AMISOM through its assessed contributions to the United Nations (UN), which funds the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)'s logistics support package. The Department utilizes PKO funding (as Congress has specifically provided authority to utilize PKO to support UN assessed contributions to Somalia) to fund the U.S. share of UNSOA. UNSOA provides rations, fuel, water, power generation, medical evacuation flights, deployment flights, vehicle maintenance, facilities construction, and some forms of sustainment equipment. UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) also added the provision of reimbursement of contingent owned equipment (not donor provided) through UN assessed contributions.

Our support is part of a broader international effort to support AMISOM. Most notably, the European Union funds all troop stipends for AMISOM through its Africa Peace Facility at the African Union (AU). Additionally, the UK, France, and the Netherlands have all participated in the effort to provide pre-deployment training to AMISOM-bound battalions, which have been fully coordinated with ACOTA and other U.S. training efforts. The UK, Germany, France, and China have also contributed equipment on a bilateral basis, and twelve nations have contributed to the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, including sizable contributions from Denmark, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UK.

The U.S. has directly supported the efforts of AMISOM, along with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)'s Somali National Army (SNA), to secure Mogadishu. ACOTA training has provided critical skills required to conduct increasingly complex counter-insurgency operations against al-Shabaab to both AMISOM staff officers (at the battalion, contingent, and force headquarters levels) and individual soldiers. Marine Forces Africa, funded through Section 1206, have provided training on critical skills needed while deployed in Mogadishu such as reacting to ambushes and snipers, clearing and breaching obstacles, and countering indirect-fire. U.S.-funded contract mentors have helped AMISOM personnel apply these skills to their planning and operations more effectively, and have worked with AMISOM TCCs on the ground to adjust their plans and tactics in response to frequent changes in the operational environment. AMISOM has directly employed U.S.-provided equipment, including the APCs and logistics vehicles, in recent operations that have succeeded in pushing al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and some of the surrounding environs.

Under its revised Concept of Operations, AMISOM will be conducting operations in regions throughout southern and central Somalia, and we fully expect the requirement for mobility to increase significantly in the coming months. While the scale of U.S. equipment support has been sufficient to support operations within Mogadishu, we are now looking for ways to expand our provision of vehicles to the mission in order to ensure that AMISOM can move its personnel safely and effectively within the expanded area of operations. Other important requirements to enable AMISOM to operate effectively within its expanded area of operations include secure long-range communications and additional water patrol craft (i.e. rigid-hull inflatable boats). Section 1207(n)(1)(B) of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes an additional opportunity to provide enhanced equipment and specialized training to the

AMISOM troop contributors. Another important requirement is aviation assets, including rotary-wing airlift. The expanded UN logistics support package authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) includes provisions for reimbursement for air assets. We expect Kenya and Uganda will deploy airlift assets under AMISOM in the near future.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Brad Sherman (#1)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

The witnesses outlined how security issues in the region are worsening and some of the most vulnerable populations are at risk. I have follow-up questions about helping to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara. The Polisario-run refugee camps have been the site of a kidnapping of three European aid workers who are now being held for ransom by an al-Qaeda in the Maghrib (AQIM) splinter group. Media reports from the incident describe how the groups received assistance from some residents inside the camps. Other media reports describe how members of the camps have been involved in various trafficking activities in the region.

Are you concerned about these reports and are you willing to work with the Committee on ways to help this vulnerable population while at the same time working to resolve the larger dispute over Western Sahara?

Answer:

Though there have been reports of al-Qa'ida involvement in Polisario camps, the U.S. Government has looked into these allegations and found no evidence to substantiate these claims.

We remain committed to ongoing efforts to find a peaceful, sustainable and mutually agreed solution to the Western Sahara conflict and welcome opportunities to work with the Committee toward this shared goal. This includes the UN negotiation process led by the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Ambassador Christopher Ross.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Brad Sherman (#2)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

What more can the U.S. do to help resolve this dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty?

Answer:

We remain committed to our strong bilateral relationship with Morocco, and to working with Morocco on issues of mutual concern. We support ongoing negotiations in the United Nations, which are led by Ambassador Christopher Ross, the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. We urge the parties to the Western Sahara dispute to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that Morocco's autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald Yamamoto by
Representative Russ Carnahan (#1)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Question:

UN peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan have a clear stake in the defeat of the LRA. MONUSCO in the DRC, for example, has intensified patrols in and around areas where the LRA is active, and the U.S. has been working closely with the UN to build early-warning systems to alert civilians of LRA movements. Please speak to the importance of U.S. collaboration with the UN on this issue. How are U.S. efforts to marginalize the LRA, capture its leaders, and promote stability being augmented by working with UN peacekeeping missions in the region?

Answer:

The UN continues to be engaged in counter-LRA efforts through its Departments of Political Affairs (DPA) and Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and associated missions: UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNOCA is currently working with these UN missions and the African Union to develop a regional strategy to guide international humanitarian, development and peacebuilding assistance in the LRA-affected area, to enhance cross-border mechanisms to improve civilian protection, early warning capacity, humanitarian access and response, and appropriate reintegration support for those returning from displacement, abductees and ex-combatants, and to strengthen the overall capacity of affected States to extend their throughout their respective territories. We expect this strategy to be presented to the UN Security Council at the end of May 2012. We have been working with the UN as they develop this strategy, and look forward to helping the UN to move forward with implementation where possible.

The U.S. government continues to closely coordinate our counter-LRA efforts with the United Nations and seeks to support and collaborate when possible. Our efforts have a greater impact on the ground when we can work closely with other partners. We are working closely with the UN to help strengthen their efforts to increase civilian protection. For example, a small element of the U.S. military advisors who have deployed to the region are working at MONUSCO's Joint Information and Operations Cell (JIOC) in the DRC to help with information-sharing, synchronization, and planning efforts. At the JIOC, the U.S. advisors are assisting MONUSCO and the Congolese military to plan their operations in LRA-affected areas. U.S. advisors assisted with planning for a joint operation in December 2011 to help deter the LRA from committing large-scale attacks during the Christmas season, as they have done in the past.

The United States is also coordinating closely with MONUSCO's disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDR/RR) efforts. MONUSCO has been at the forefront of efforts on the ground to encourage and facilitate

defections from the LRA's ranks, developing sensitization campaigns and assisting those who manage to escape. It has recently set up assembly points in the DRC where LRA can safely surrender and it is publicizing the location of these points through radio broadcasts and leaflets. We are encouraging the UN to initiate similar, coordinated efforts to promote defections in the CAR and South Sudan, to the extent it is possible, and looking for ways that we can assist. The U.S. military advisors have recently helped to transport MONUSCO's leaflets encouraging LRA defections to the Central African Republic (CAR) for distribution there. In the CAR, the United States is coordinating closely with BINUCA, as it increases its efforts focused on the LRA.

CHARRTS No.: HFA-01-002
Hearing Date: April 25, 2012
Committee: HFA
Member: Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
Witness: DASD(S) Dory
Question: #2

Weapons Trafficking

Question: The situation in Libya has created additional challenges to U.S. counterterrorism efforts as weapons from Libya are trafficked throughout the region. What effects has the Libya crisis had on access to arms and recruitment by radical Islamist elements in the Sahel? What is your assessment of regional security forces' capacities to secure their borders against the flow of Libyan weapons?

Answer: While the Government of Libya and the many militias still active in the country have some measure of positive control over many weapons, responsible authorities in Libya lack full accountability and security over the vast stockpile of conventional weapons and munitions accumulated by the Qaddafi regime. This situation has increased the risk that Al-Qaida affiliated terrorists will gain access to dangerous weaponry. The USG is very concerned that AQ affiliates may gain possession of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and other arms that will further decrease regional stability. The ability of the Tuareg rebel groups with newly acquired weapons to wrest control of northern Mali with relative ease demonstrates the destabilizing effects of arms proliferation in the region.

States in the region are taking action to interdict weapons. Some, including those bordering northern Mali, are doing so with the support of U.S. equipment and training. The will of these partner states is not in question, but their territory is vast and no amount of outside support will entirely disrupt weapons trafficking across the region. As terrorist groups such as AQIM gain access to these weapons, they may become increasingly emboldened to mount attacks against Americans and American interests.

DoD collaborates closely with the Department of State to plan and implement the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) military assistance funds to train and equip TSCTP partners to address the Al-Qaida in the Maghreb threat. DoD's military-to-military activities under the TSCTP seek to build the counterterrorism capacity of key partners in the region. DoD also leverages Section 1206 authorities to train and equip partner nations and conducts Joint Combined Exchange Training events. Additionally, DoD has incorporated MANPADS awareness and mitigation training into DoD engagements in the region.

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Member: Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
Witness: DASD(S) Dory
Question: #5

TSCTP activities

Question: GAO reported that disagreements over whether State should have authority over DoD personnel hampered certain TSCTP activities in Chad and Niger. For instance, in Niger, according to DoD officials, the agency suspended most of its TSCTP activities in 2007 after the Ambassador limited the number of DoD personnel allowed to enter the country. How are the roles and responsibilities between agencies defined for TSCTP activities?

Answer: Positions that DoD maintains in U.S. embassies overseas such as Defense Attachés and Chiefs of Offices of Security Cooperation fall under Chief of Mission authority. Forces that are sent to Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) countries on a temporary basis, however, fall under the authority of the Geographic Combatant Commander. All TSCTP activities are, fully coordinated with and approved by the relevant Chief of Mission.

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Committee: HFA
Member: Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen
Witness: DASD(S) Dory
Question: #11

Lord's Resistance Army.

Question: What is the Obama Administration doing to help make sure that the regional governments in LRA-affected areas are working together to help apprehend Joseph Kony and stop LRA violence? What is the U.S. government doing to help support the protection of civilians in LRA-affected areas at the same time that it is helping to apprehend top LRA commanders? What is the U.S. doing to help ensure that Joseph Kony is not able to find a safe haven in areas like Darfur?

Answer: The governments of Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Republic of South Sudan, in collaboration with the African Union, are working to end the threat posed by the LRA. Continued leadership and cooperation by these governments is essential to keep the pressure on the LRA and keep it from rebuilding its forces. Although these countries have their differences, we believe they are bound together by their shared interest in ending the threat posed by the LRA to their populations. The United States is working bilaterally through our Embassies to encourage each of the affected countries to strengthen their collaboration. The United States has participated in past quadrilateral meetings of the Chiefs of Defense from the four countries, and will pursue future opportunities to meet jointly with the leaders from the affected states. We also believe that the U.S. military advisors in the region are helping to strengthen information-sharing, coordination, and tactical collaboration among the partner forces.

We are also working closely with the African Union as it increases its efforts to address the LRA threat. Last month, the AU officially launched its Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA. Although many operational details are still being worked out, we believe the AU's involvement can strengthen coordination, information-sharing, and trust among the four militaries pursuing the LRA. We also believe the AU can help the governments in the region to develop coordinated approaches to promoting LRA defections, repatriating and reintegrating those who defect, and prioritizing the protection of civilians. Our military advisors in the field are coordinating with the AU staff as they stand up this initiative on the ground, and our embassies are working closely with the AU's Special Envoy on the LRA issue, Francisco Madeira.

With all aspects of our strategy, the United States continues to place a strong emphasis on civilian protection. The LRA preys on remote, vulnerable populations in CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan who lack basic protection services and early warning capabilities. National governments bear responsibility for the protection of their citizens. Although they face significant challenges in protecting all populations given their limited resources, lack of mobility,

and the poor transportation and communications infrastructure in the region, there are steps they can take to empower communities and reduce the risk of large-scale LRA attacks.

U.S. military advisors do not have a direct operational role, but they are seeking to emphasize the importance of civilian protection in their engagement with the partner forces. They are integrating civilian protection into training and operational planning, and seeking to promote greater information-sharing and collaboration between military and civilian actors. U.S. military advisors are also coordinating closely with the UN peacekeeping missions in the region and other actors who undertake protection activities. For example, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) carries out unilateral and joint operations with the Congolese military to help increase civilian protection in LRA-affected areas of the DRC. U.S. advisors provided information fusion and planning support for a joint operation that was carried out in December to help deter the LRA from committing large-scale attacks in the DRC during the Christmas season, as they did in 2008 and 2009.

Finally, the United States is committed to working with our regional and international partners to ensure that Joseph Kony and the LRA are not able to find safe havens. We are working with African Union and United Nations officials ensure a united regional effort against the LRA. The LRA's leaders are savvy; they exploit communal conflicts and regional tensions. Strong regional collaboration is critical to keep the LRA from regrouping and rebuilding their forces. We are aware of public allegations that some LRA elements have moved into border areas of South Darfur, and we are discussing these allegations with Government of Sudan, AU, and UN officials. The United States and the international community as a whole would take very seriously any credible evidence of material support or safe haven being provided to the LRA.

Question for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Daniel Benjamin by
Representative David Rivera
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
April 25, 2012

Representative Rivera: It is my understanding that Polisario- run refugee camps in Algeria have become a recruiting ground for al- Qa'ida in Morocco, a hub for opportunistic Polisario drug traffickers and a threat to the region and the reforms or some of the reforms at least that we saw in the Arab Spring.

Since 1990, international support for the camps has exceeded $1 billion. It's my understanding in that USAID exceeds $300 million for these camps. So in essence, it appears that the U.S. taxpayer is being called upon to partly fund the operation of camps that are being increasingly exploited by regional terrorist groups. So, how is the administration dealing with this appearance at least?

Ambassador Benjamin: Though there have been reports of al-Qa'ida involvement in Polisario camps, the U.S. Government has looked into these allegations and found no substance whatsoever to these claims. We also see no significant, successful infiltration of al-Qa'ida elements into Morocco. We have found no specific evidence linking drug trafficking organizations to the Polisario camps.

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