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CUBA'S GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERRORISM, INTELLIGENCE, AND WARFARE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 17, 2012

Serial No. 112–158

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

74–240PDF WASHINGTON : 2012

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
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CUBA'S GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERRORISM, INTELLIGENCE, AND WARFARE

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Connie Mack (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. MACK. The subcommittee will come to order. I first want to thank everyone, especially our witnesses for coming today and being with us and we look forward to hearing your testimony and offering your insight.

After I recognize myself and the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member of this committee for 5 minutes for opening statements, I will then recognize the members of the subcommittee for 2 minutes each for their opening statements. We will then proceed directly to hear testimony from our distinguished witnesses. The full text of the written testimony will be inserted into the record.

Without objection, members may have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the record. After we hear from our witnesses, individual members will be recognized for 5 minutes each for questions of our witnesses.

I would now like to recognize the chairman of the full committee, my dear friend from Florida, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her remarks.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Mack. Thank you for holding this important hearing to highlight the continued threat to U.S. foreign policy priorities and U.S. national security interests posed by the Castro regime which is a state sponsor of terrorism operating 90 miles from our U.S. shores.

And I'd like to point out and wish him much success that our chairman, Connie Mack, will be appearing at the Heritage Foundation jointly sponsored by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation tomorrow at 11 to 12:30 to talk about an act of solidarity with the people of Cuba, the struggle for freedom continues. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also would like to thank Ranking Member Engel for his continued support for the freedom and democratic aspirations of the Cuban people. Mr. Engel has had a lifelong record of solidarity with the Cuban people, even when it is difficult for him politically back home. He errs on the side of freedom, justice, liberty, and re-

spect for human rights. So thank you, Mr. Engel, for the political courage that you show every day.

But Mr. Mack, thank you, because the timing for your hearing could not be more appropriate as it raises grave questions about the administration's policies toward the Castro dictatorship and the threats to our homeland. I'd like to focus, in particular, on the appalling open-door policy that the administration appears to have adopted for regime officials and operatives. We're talking about agents of a State Department-designated state sponsor of terrorism, agents of a regime that seeks to destabilize our democratic partners in our hemisphere, and agents of a dictatorship that has a long-standing alliance with the Iranian regime. We're talking about agents of a regime that has an active espionage operation against the United States.

And one of your witnesses, Mr. Simmons, certainly knows about this act of espionage operation. It includes members of the Wasp network, convicted for trying to penetrate U.S. military installations. It also includes cyber attacks in the United States, State Department officials who were turned into spies for the Cuban regime and compromised important U.S. foreign policy information, and an espionage network that included a former senior defense intelligence official who provided highly classified information to the Cuban regime about U.S. military activities and whose spying may have caused the death of a U.S. serviceman operating in Latin America. This is serious stuff indeed.

This is a regime responsible for the murder of three American citizens and the U.S. resident in 1996 in the Brothers to the Rescue shootdown. So it is incomprehensible and indeed appalling to see the Department of State facilitating access to our nation for these enemies of the United States. From Washington, DC, to San Francisco, Castro operatives want to travel to the United States and the State Department will grant them a visa.

Just today, earlier today, news reports confirmed that State did, in fact, issue a visa to the daughter of dictator Raul Castro, Mariela Castro, to attend a conference in California next week. Mariela Castro is a communist regime sympathizer. She's part of the regime. She has labeled Cuban dissidents as despicable parasites. Those are her words.

There are also reports that Eusebio Leal tasked by the regime to expand tourism to the island under the guise of serving as a historian of Havana is also being granted a visa to speak at the Brookings Institute tomorrow, Friday. Just a few weeks ago, Josefina Vidal-Ferreiro, from the regime's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose husband was expelled from the United States for espionage activities, was also given a warm welcome by the Department of State. This disturbing pattern that is developing where the doors of the United States are opened to officials and activists from state sponsors of terrorism countries must not be allowed to continue.

Three of our colleagues and I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton and it was drafted by our colleague Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart and signed by the three Cuban-American Members of Congress, Albio Sires, David Rivera, and me, saying that this is just inconceivable that such visas and such a wonderful welcome had

been given to these individuals. And in that letter, we affirm the intent and the requirements that are in U.S. law that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General is supposed to enforce and that is a prohibition or a granting, on the granting of visas to Cuban regime or Cuban community party officials, operatives, or designees. That is the law. And now we're faced with the possibility that State may seek to thwart congressional oversight over decisions regarding travel by Cuban regime officials. State employees and officials have indicated that they may stop to honoring a commitment. It's been a long-standing agreement with me on behalf of the House Foreign Committee requiring notification of State actions concerning travel by Cuban regime officials. And this agreement was established in 1997 and it was adopted in lieu of legislative mandate that I had included in funding legislation and was honored by successive administrations except for this one.

So I strongly urge the Department of State to immediately reverse its course, consider the threats to our nation's security interest posed by the Cuban regime that will be discussed later today, right now, by Congressman Mack's subcommittee. The administration must stop bending over backwards to accommodate the needs, the whims, the requests of state sponsors of terrorism that again is located just 90 miles from our shores.

So thank you, Mr. Mack. Thank you Mr. Engel and thank you to the witnesses for appearing today and I thank you for leadership, sir. And Albio, I talked about you, and discussed the letter that we signed.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you for your leadership, not only in obviously with Cuba, but in all foreign affairs. You are a strong advocate for the ideals of freedom and democracy and the belief in liberty and so we are very fortunate to have you as a chair of the full committee. And with that I want to say thank you.

And also, without objection, would like to enter into the record the letter that you mentioned that the four of you had authored to Secretary Clinton, so without objection, that will be included into the record.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Now I recognize myself for 5 minutes. And as I begin, let me just say this: It's shocking to me, shocking to me to think that we will give a visa to Raul Castro's daughter and at the same time withhold visas from Hondurans who fought for their constitution and their freedom. I think this just shows how backwards the administration is in its dealings with friends and allies in Latin America. So on one hand, we allow a visa to a woman that clearly doesn't believe in the ideals of freedom and democracy, but we continue to turn our back and punish those who stood up in Honduras to fight for their freedom, to fight for their democracy, to fight for their constitution. Now let me begin.

It is important to note that when it comes to Cuba, there is much more than meets the eye. This is illustrated by the Cuban doctors who are shipped around the world to provide medical services while spying for the Castros' benefit.

Recent assertions that U.S. policy toward Cuba is a relic of the Cold War would indicate that the Castro regime has changed its

ways since that time. Today's hearing will reaffirm that it is the same regime operating in Cuba today that was alive and well during the Cold War.

Let me be clear, Cuba is no friend to the United States. We are enemy number one. And although Cuba is a small island, it has a global reach that aims to undermine U.S. interests and security through terrorism, intelligence, and irregular warfare.

Cuba has built key relationships that help the island expand its reach. Experts have identified that China has, and I quote, "developed a special relationship with Cuba for several reasons, ranging from loyalty to intelligence gathering." However, these same experts explain that the public is often kept in the dark on such nefarious activity, because officials do not often testify on strategic concerns.

Yet, the facts remain. The Cuban Intelligence Service ranks among the very best in the world and continues to engage in espionage operations in the United States. For example in June 2009, the FBI arrested Kendall Myers, a retired State Department official, and his wife, after they spied for the Cuban Government for over three decades. The

DIA analyst, Ana Belen Montes, convicted in 2002 of espionage, provided classified U.S. military information to the Cuban regime. Meanwhile, the harm this has caused to U.S. troops goes unreported.

Additionally, Cuban intelligence agents purposefully provided false leads "worldwide" in order to misdirect the U.S. investigation of the September 11th terrorist attacks. We also know that Cuban intelligence strives to create a perception in the United States that Cuba is not a threat, that we should normalize relations. Let's not be fooled. Cuba is an enemy of the United States that has infiltrated our Government, steals classified information, trafficks information around the world, and counts Iran, Syria, Venezuela, China, and Russia among its best friends. We will never be able to quantify the level of harm Cuba has done against our men and women serving around the world.

Despite all of this, the Obama administration is easing travel and remittance restrictions, and engaging the Cuban regime. President Obama is giving legitimacy to the Castro model and allowing negotiations to occur on the regime's terms. And once again, the fact that we are going to give a visa to Raul Castro's daughter in this model is just astonishing to me.

This is just another example where U.S. foreign policy is backwards in Latin America. The goal of this administration has been reach out to our enemies, turn our back on our friends and allies. And this approach has hurt our national security. The Obama administration has abandoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross in prison while making concessions to a corrupt and lying regime.

At the recent Summit of the Americas where Cuba took center stage, those of us in attendance saw firsthand how the Cuban regime continues to wield its influence. The Cuban people deserve to live in freedom. Once the Castro regime embraces freedom, Cuba can be included in the gatherings of free societies.

I have repeatedly asked the Castro regime to start with three simple actions. First, release political prisoners including Alan

Gross. Two, hold free and fair elections, And three, permit freedom of speech and a free press. Until the Castro regime can take these three steps, there should be no negotiations or talk of normalizing relations with Cuba. There is nothing holding them back but their own actions.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses to shed light on the terrorist activity and irregular warfare engaged in by the Castro Regime. And I urge everyone to take note of this serious and ongoing threat as the security of U.S. citizens depends upon it.

Now I'd like to recognize Mr. Engel for 5 minutes for his opening statement.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the chair of our full committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and her kind words about me. As you know, I take a back seat to no one when it comes to being critical of the Cuban regime. I was critical of them when I was chairman of the subcommittee for 4 years, and as ranking member, both before I was chairman and now after. I have been critical of them. I was critical of them even before I entered Congress. The bottom line for me is if a regime doesn't permit political pluralism or fair and free elections or runs their country with terror, I'm opposed to the regime. I don't care if it's a right-wing dictatorship or a left-wing dictatorship. To me, a dictatorship is despicable.

And so I think the bulk of what you and our chair had to say on Cuba, I certainly agree with it.

But I must depart from some of the characteristics of the Obama administration. I just came back from the Summit of the Americas with the President and you, Mr. Chairman, and I and others were there. And I saw first hand, the United States being virtually the only country standing up to a lot of these other regimes that want to normalize everything with Cuba and Cuba doesn't have to do anything to get it. I've seen our administration, the Obama administration demand of the OAS that before Cuba can be admitted it has to adhere to democratic principles and Cuba chooses not to do that, so Cuba remains a pariah and is not admitted to the OAS.

I saw the President stand up in Cartagena, saying that Cuba knows what it needs to do in order to get invites to future Summits of the Americas. So I think Secretary Clinton as well, I've had many discussions with her and I think that this administration has stood up in behalf of democracy and has been critical unequivocally of what's going on in Cuba.

So I appreciate today's opportunity to discuss the situation in Cuba. When you ask most people in the United States about Latin America, one of the first things that comes to mind is the Castro dictatorship in Cuba. Their oppressive role for the past half century is undeniable and I've always argued, as I said before, that dictators from the left should be thought of no differently than dictators on the right. Those who try to romanticize Fidel Castro's rule of Cuba are simply fooling themselves. He's oppressed his people, restricted all forms of expression, and locked up all opponents of his rule. And these are basic violations of the universal declaration of human rights in the Inter-American Charter.

And even though Fidel Castro stepped down from day-to-day leadership of Cuba a few years ago, I think it's become very clear

by now that very little has actually changed in Cuba. There clearly remains a profound denial of political pluralism there, while fundamental freedoms are still denied to the Cuban people who cannot speak freely or live their lives outside of the threat of arrest by Cuban security personnel.

I support the continued embargo on Cuba, but regardless of where we stand on U.S. policy toward the island, we all want to see democracy in Cuba.

Mr. Chairman, you and I, as well as other members of the subcommittee recently traveled to the Summit of the Americas and I was honored to have been able to join President Obama on Air Force One and participate as part of the official U.S. delegation to the Summit. As usual with these meetings, Cuba was a major topic on the agenda, and I remain perplexed by some of the countries of the Americas which on the one hand state their commitments to the inter-American democratic charter and on the other hand believe Cuba should rejoin regional meetings and the OAS before it establishes a democratic system and protects human rights.

I say to my friends in the region, I think this is a mistake. It tells the Cuban dictatorship that it need not change to be accepted throughout the hemisphere. We need to be clear with the Castros that only when Cuba comes into compliance with the charter, should it be permitted to rejoin the bodies of the inter-American system.

When I spoke at the OAS several weeks ago, I reiterated much of what I've just said, not only with Cuba, but with Venezuela and Nicaragua and some of the other countries as well.

Now today's hearing is entitled "Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare." And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

But Mr. Chairman, I think this topic doesn't necessarily get to the heart of the question we need to explore with Cuba. I think the key issues on Cuba are different. I think pressing for democracy, human rights, a market economy and the choices for our country in a post-Castro Cuba seem to be important for the subcommittee to consider. I know you and I share similar views on that. So I do welcome the opportunity to discuss Cuba. I'm not too worried about their international outreach. I think during the Cold War they were much more dangerous than they are today. I don't diminish how dangerous they are, but I would rather concentrate on the utter lack of democracy and the oppression that the Cuban regime forces on its people.

And finally, I don't think we should let a moment go by without calling for the release of Alan Gross in prison. Mr. Gross did nothing wrong and should be released at once. Moreover, his health has deteriorated and, if for no other reason, he deserves to be released on humanitarian grounds; something which I think the Castros wouldn't know if it hit them in the head.

Mr. Chairman, I have to apologize in advance because I'll have to leave a little early from our hearing and my good friend, Mr. Sires, will assume the role of ranking member when I depart. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Engel, as you say often and I agree, you and I do agree on a lot of things and I think—

not on everything, of course, but on a lot of things. I think when it comes to Cuba, we're mostly together. So we appreciate the bipartisanship on this issue with you and others. And the assertion or the interest in another hearing that deals with other issues, we are certainly encouraged and would like to do that as well, so let's work together on a hearing to do just that because as you say, there are lot of important topics when it comes to Cuba.

I now would like to recognize Mr. Sires for 2 minutes for opening statement.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing and my colleague, Congressman Engel, we do share many issues and many topics here and we certainly correlate on a lot of ideas here.

Probably, I'll start by saying I'm the only one serving in this Congress who ever lived in Cuba. I entered this country in 1962 when I was 11 years old. I still remember very clearly when they took all of the books out of the schools and started the indoctrination process. And everything was based on getting rid of America. I remember when they started teaching how to march and they would march at the age of 11 and teach you how to take apart and put together a Czechoslovakian machine gun because the Americans were the evil empire.

So having had that experience and how I come to Congress and people still think that this is a government that is not a dangerous government. There's romanticism with this revolution. This is a dictator. Make no questions about it. This is a dictator that has over the years put spies in this country.

We all forget how close we came to nuclear war in 1962. So it's amazing to me how people still have this romantic idea about what the Cuban Government is. They are brutal. They don't exercise any control—observe any human rights whatsoever. You look at the people that are in prison. I deal with people that were in prison every day in my district. I represent the second largest concentration of Cuban-Americans in this country outside of Florida. And many of the political prisoners are living in my district. And I share firsthand with them their experiences, why they were put in jail, why they were given 20 years, who is in jail now, and the abuses of human rights.

You know, I was also at the Summit and it was very interesting to listen to some of the Presidents. But one particular President really opened up my eyes when he said to me, "You know, people know what Cuba is. People know what the Castro brothers are." But of the 35 people who were Presidents, of the 35 Presidents who were there and we met with a lot of them, not one of them would say anything about the Castro brothers. Why? Because they're afraid that the Castro brothers have the tentacles in their countries and they will stir up the students. They will stir up some of the organizations and before you know it, they have a problem in their own country.

So what do they do? They keep quiet. And this is told to us by a President of a country.

So I'm here to listen to what you have to say. I'm a strong supporter of the embargo. I think the embargo has morphed over the years and now it's just a matter of putting pressure on Castro so

we can have free elections, observe human rights and expressions in Cuba, which has none. But people say this embargo is from the 1960s from the Russian Cuba, but it's alright to call it sanctions when we talk about Iran. If we changed the name to sanctions in Cuba, I wonder how many people would say something, what they would say now.

So I thank you for being here. I thank the chairman for holding this hearing and I look forward to listening to what you have to say. Thank you very much.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I now would like to introduce our witnesses. First, the Honorable Michelle Van Cleave. Ms. Van Cleave served as the National Counterintelligence Executive under President George W. Bush. As the head of the U.S. counterintelligence, Ms. Van Cleave was responsible for providing strategic direction to and ensuring the integration of counterintelligence activities across the Federal Government. Currently, Ms. Van Cleave serves as president and co-founder of National Security Concepts, Inc. of Washington, DC. Thank you very much for being here.

Second, Mr. Christopher Simmons is the founding editor of Cuba Confidential, an online blog and source for news on Cuban espionage worldwide. Mr. Simmons is an international authority on the Cuban Intelligence Service and retired from the Defense Intelligence Agency with over 23 years of experience as a counterintelligence officer. Thank you very much for being here.

And now I'd like to recognize Ms. Van Cleave, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening comments. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHELLE VAN CLEAVE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS, INC. (FORMER NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE UNDER PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH)

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here this morning. I have to say it's nice to be back in the Rayburn Building. This is where I started my Washington career many years ago working for then Congressman Jack Kemp, a member of your delegation, Mr. Engel. So it is a special pleasure to be here. I do have a written statement for the record which has been provided to you. It will be ready for inclusion in the record as soon as it's been appropriately cleared by my former employer.

I'd like to speak to that for a moment. I did serve, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as the National Counterintelligence Executive which is not a position that many people are familiar with. So for one brief moment let me tell you how that position came about. It was created by the Congress in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 upon the recognition that foreign intelligence services were exploiting seams between the many counterintelligence agencies of the U.S. Government, principally the FBI, the CIA, and the military services.

The position was created in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case and it has been a real fascinating and I will say difficult assignment to try to bring strategic coherence to a group of very different agencies with different traditions and missions and not a real appreciation of what a strategic approach to countering foreign intelligence threats is all about and that has been the challenge of

the office which now is housed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Foreign intelligence threats to the United States have grown over the years and they remain very, very serious. In fact, one of the largest asymmetries I might suggest in the United States' position and the world is our relative vulnerability to espionage, particularly human espionage, because our free and open society is really a paradise, if you will, for foreign spies who will come here to try to acquire information and insights of value to them and to disadvantage us. So dealing with those foreign intelligence threats remains a very important element of U.S. national security and strategy. And I would say that those threats are, in fact, growing in an era where the United States is properly consumed with concerns over terrorist threats and is involved in wars abroad, some of our attention is properly diverted to those areas of concern which means that some of the more traditional espionage threats against us may receive less attention than they have in times past. And so in that window of vulnerability, adversaries may see opportunity and so we see, I would suggest, increases in that threat.

Among those increases is the presence of Russian intelligence personnel in the United States and active throughout the world. People do say properly, well, the Cold War is over, things must have changed and certainly that is true in many dimensions of our relationships with Russia. But one area where that has not changed is the behavior of the Russian intelligence services. Someone forgot to tell them that the Cold War is over and they're still as active, if not more so in the United States than they were at the height of the Cold War.

Many other intelligence services have gone to school, literally, on the practices of the KGB. And one of their star pupils, of course, was the Cuba intelligence service, the DGI. The DGI learned a great deal with the Russians and in fact, has an advantage perhaps over any other service in operating in the United States: Being so close by, having access, having familiarity with our territory, with our people, how things work here, they make it much easier to blend into American society and to score successes against us.

Mr. Simmons is going to go into some of those specific activities in more detail, but let me mention one to you in particular. The damage assessment of Ana Montes was accomplished and completed on my watch when I was in office. And I can tell you that she is one of the most damaging spies the United States has ever found. After 16 years of spying on behalf of Cuba, she compromised everything, virtually everything that we knew about Cuba and how we operated in Cuba and against Cuba. So the Cubans were well aware of everything that we knew about them and could use that to their advantage. In addition, she was able to influence estimates about Cuba in her conversations with colleagues and she also found an opportunity to provide information that she acquired to other powers. That is maybe the biggest concern about Cuba.

And I will close with this point and invite other questions which is that to the extent that Cuba is able to be successful against us, the intelligence insights they acquire here can be made available in a market, if you will, a market place of U.S. secrets. And those secrets are things that go to the heart of what keeps this country

free and safe and secure, and our men and women in uniform, able to operate in the dangerous places where we send them and our public here at home safe. So these are very serious matters and I commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the subcommittee for holding this hearing today and having this discussion. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Cleave follows:]

Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
"Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence and Warfare"

Statement submitted by
Michelle Van Cleave
Former National Counterintelligence Executive
May 17, 2012

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on a subject too often overlooked in otherwise thoughtful and thorough discussions of U.S. foreign relations. As the United States considers future policy and strategy in relation to Cuba, Cuban intelligence activities directed against the United States and our interests, as well as our efforts to counter them, warrant careful review and debate.

I had the privilege of serving as the National Counterintelligence Executive[1] under President George W. Bush. As head of U.S. counterintelligence, I was responsible for integrating and providing strategic direction to all U.S. counterintelligence activities. The statutory office of the NCIX, as it is known, was established by Congress in 2002 in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case. Congress was concerned that foreign intelligence services were exploiting seams among our several counterintelligence agencies, to the serious detriment of our Nation's security, and that the whole of our counterintelligence enterprise suffered from a lack of cohesion and strategic direction. That concern was – and remains -- more than justified.

The growth and pervasiveness of hostile intelligence operations is a striking and largely unappreciated feature of the modern international security environment. Foreign adversaries including the Russians, the Chinese, the Cubans, and many others use intelligence as an effective instrument of asymmetric power to advance their strategic objectives, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities to their collection and other intelligence activities.

In recent history, the United States has sustained stunning losses to foreign intelligence services, which penetrated through espionage and other means virtually every one of the most secret, highly guarded institutions of our national security apparatus. Any one of these major compromises

[1] Under the *Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002* as amended, the NCIX is the head of U.S. counterintelligence, subject to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence. The NCIX chairs the National CI Policy Board, and heads the Office of the NCIX. The statutory functions of that office include *inter alia* the annual production of the national CI strategy, the identification and prioritization of foreign intelligence threats, the review of all CI budgets and programs against strategic objectives, and the evaluation and professionalization of community performance. The Office is also responsible for damage assessments of espionage cases and other compromises of US national security information.

could have had devastating consequences in war. Thankfully, the Cold War ended, as President Reagan said, without either side firing a shot.

Yet for the past decade, our Nation has been at war, engaged in a conflict different in kind and scope than any in our past. Because we are at war, the potential consequences of intelligence and other critical information compromises are more immediate, placing in jeopardy U.S. operations, deployed forces and our citizenry. And the foreign intelligence threat is on the rise.

Intelligence operations against the United States are now more diffuse, more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially more successful than ever before. In recent years we have seen increasing intelligence operations within our borders facilitated by an extensive foreign presence that provides cover for intelligence services and their agents. Traditional foes, building on past successes, are continuing their efforts to penetrate the U.S. Government, while waves of computer intrusions into sensitive U.S. government information systems have confounded efforts to identify their source. We have also seen apparent attempts by foreign partners to exploit cooperative endeavors against terrorist groups to learn essential secrets about U.S. intelligence and military operations, along with an emerging "market" in U.S. national security secrets, which among other things enables foreign practices of deception and denial to impair U.S. intelligence collection. And perhaps most troubling, growing foreign capabilities to conduct influence and other covert operations threaten to undermine U.S. allies and national security interests.

I think most Americans would be astonished by the extent to which foreign intelligence services have been able to steal our Nation's national security secrets, often with impunity. The former Soviet Union was especially successful in stealing U.S. secrets, a tradition that continues unabated under Vladimir Putin's Russia. But the Russians are far from alone, especially as other hostile services have literally gone to school on the practices of the old KGB. Their star pupil is the DGI, Cuba's General Directorate for Intelligence.

Now some people may ask, how can the intelligence services of a small country like Cuba be a serious threat to the United States? When the Soviet Union was still using Cuba to stage SIGINT collection against the United States, and using the Cubans as proxy intelligence services doing its bidding around the world, the answer perhaps was more obvious. Now that the Cold War is over, conditions have changed. Does that mean we no longer have to be concerned about Cuba's intelligence operations? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

Hostile Intelligence Activities: the Cuban example

The work of clandestine services, engaged in intelligence collection and other activities, is an arena of international competition where the advantage does not necessarily go to the rich or the otherwise powerful. The use of intelligence operations by weaker powers to achieve advantage is a classic "asymmetric strategy" of applying one's strength against another's weakness. For the United States and other democratic countries, clearly our relative "weakness" is the openness of our society and our people. The opportunity for intelligence officers and their agents to move about freely, develop contacts, and operate in the dark is no more lost on foreign intelligence adversaries than it was on the nineteen hijackers.

Foreign emphasis on human collectors (HUMINT) over other means of collection is the single most distinctive asymmetry in modern intelligence structures. Foreign adversaries may not have a prayer of fielding costly and technologically demanding technical collection suites (and we have worked hard to keep it that way); but they can organize, train, equip, sustain and deploy impressive numbers of case officers, agents of influence, saboteurs, and spies. Cuban operations are a case in point.

As the Defense Intelligence Agency Director told the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, "Cuba remains the predominant foreign intelligence threat to the United States emanating from Latin America." I would add that measured by its reach, history, objectives and successes against us, Cuba is easily within the Top Ten list worldwide. I would like to give you some thoughts on why that is the case.

First, Cuba's old patron Russia is still very much in business against us. The Russian intelligence presence in the United States is now at or above its Cold War levels, a sizing decision presumably indicative of the return on investment. They are actively embedded in U.S. society, as the 2010 exposure and deportation of ten Russian so-called "illegals" – a spy logistics support network – made clear. While Moscow's intelligence liaison relationships with Cuba may have waxed and waned, it is prudent to assume they haven't gone away. Especially when they can be so useful.

Cuban intelligence operations in the United States have been enduring, aggressive and painfully successful. The United States is far and away Cuba's number one intelligence target. High on their list is the large Cuban exile community in the United States, but equally traditional national security targets such as American military and intelligence plans, intentions and capabilities. For example:

- Seven Cuban spies, the so-called Wasp Network, were convicted of or confessed to espionage or related crimes in June and September 2001. The group sought to infiltrate U.S. Southern Command headquarters. One was convicted for delivering a message to the Cuban Government that contributed to the death of four fliers from Brothers to the Rescue who were shot down in 1996 by Cuban MiGs in international airspace.
- An INS official, provided information in 2000 in a sting operation, thereafter passed the information to a business associate with ties to Cuban intelligence. As a corollary to this case, two Cuban diplomats were expelled from the United States for espionage activities.
- Over a 15-year period from 1983 to 1998, 15 members of the Cuban mission to the United Nations were expelled for espionage activities, including three who were handlers for the Wasp Network in 1998.
- Cuban spies have also found considerable success penetrating U.S.-based exile groups. A notable example is that of Juan Pablo Roque, a former MiG-23 pilot who "defected" to the United States in 1992, became a paid source for the FBI, and joined the ranks of the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR). He "re-defected" back to Cuba just days after the early 1996 BTTR shoot down, denouncing the exile group on Cuban television and accusing it of planning terrorist attacks against Cuba and Castro.
- A similar example involves the case of Jose Rafael Fernandez Brenes, who jumped ship from a Cuban merchant vessel in 1988. From 1988-1991, he helped establish and run the U.S.

Government-financed TV Marti, whose signal was jammed from its inception in March 1990, due in part to frequency and technical data provided by Fernandez Brenes.[2]

Two years ago, State Department official Kendall Myers and his wife Gwendolyn were sentenced to life without possibility of parole for conspiring to commit espionage and conspiring to pass national defense information to Cuba. Back in 1978, Myers was working as an instructor for the Foreign Service Institute where he met a Cuban "diplomat" (who was actually an intelligence officer), who invited Myers to come to Cuba. Two weeks in Cuba, and a follow up visit by the DGI officer the next year to Gwendolyn's home in South Dakota, and the Myers (both ideologically committed to the Revolution) were fully recruited. Kendall's career took him into the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he had constant and continuing access to sensitive intelligence of value to Havana. The Myers would serve as clandestine agents of Cuba for the next 30 years.

More damaging still was the espionage of Ana Bolen Montes, a DIA analyst convicted in 2001 of spying for Cuba. Few people realize the extent of the damage her 16 years of meticulous espionage caused this country – including putting lives at risk. As a graduate student in Washington D.C., Montes expressed sympathy for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which may have brought her to the attention of Cuban intelligence trolling for possible recruits. With encouragement from her handlers, she sought employment with the U.S. government, landed a job with the Defense Intelligence Agency, and rose to become DIA's foremost Cuba analyst – all the while spying for Cuba. She is now serving 25 years in prison.

In fact, Montes was one of the most damaging spies in U.S. history, owing to her far-reaching access to all Cuban-related intelligence matters and beyond. The damage assessment, which was several years in the making and remains highly classified, was completed on my watch. Montes compromised all Cuban-focused collection programs, calling into question the reliability of all U.S. intelligence collected against Cuba. She also served as an agent of influence on behalf of Cuba, to the extent her work as an analyst and her interactions within the analytic and policy communities were colored by her loyalties to Cuba. It is also likely that the information she passed contributed to the death and injury of American and pro-American forces in Latin America. She also compromised programs of broader scope – highly sensitive intelligence of limited value to Cuba, but potentially very high value to other adversaries.

There is a continuing market for such stolen U.S. secrets, which can be sold or bartered to third party states or terrorist organizations that have their own uses for the information. For example, the knowledge gained of U.S. intelligence sources and methods -- through spies, unauthorized disclosures, and even some authorized disclosures -- has aided in extensive concealment and denial programs that increase our uncertainty about foreign capabilities and intentions, and more effective foreign deception operations to mislead us. India's detonation of nuclear explosions in 1998 – which came as shock to U.S. intelligence -- was a prime example of such a successful effort.

As a result of sensitive knowledge gained about U.S. intelligence, many nations have learned how to deny and deceive the United States in order to present a false picture of reality. These foreign denial and deception practices may lead analysts to faulty judgments, when vital information has not been collected, or when deception distorts understanding. The danger is that useless or deceptive

[2] Fact Sheet, U.S. State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, DC, July 30, 2003

information – whether from human or technical collection -- may be integrated into U.S. intelligence and disseminated to policymakers, weapons designers, war-fighters and even the warning community as if it were true.

In short, the damage to the United States from the loss of sensitive national security information to Cuban espionage is not bounded by the national security threat presented by Cuba alone, but also by its value to potentially more dangerous adversaries.

What makes the United States such a favorable operational environment for Cuba's clandestine services? Access. Familiarity with the environment. The ability to move about freely. The ability to blend into the culture. Close cultural ties. A potential recruitment pool open to ideologically-based enticements. Linguistic compatibility. Tradecraft refined and honed over many decades. And the advantage the Cuban intelligence services have gained through past successes.

On this last point, it may be instructive to recall that in the late 1980s, U.S. intelligence learned from a defector, Major Florentino Aspillaga, that CIA's entire Cuban program had been compromised: all of the penetrations we thought we had of the Cuban government were in fact double agents working under Cuban control. Subsequent efforts to recover from that debacle were in turn compromised by Ana Montes. As a consequence, during much of Castro's time in office, U.S. intelligence has been put in the position of playing catch up. And that is not good.

Cuba's long history of support for anti-U.S. and anti-democratic elements in Latin America presents another serious concern for U.S. national security and counterintelligence. Cuban intelligence involvement in Venezuela is deep and wide, including embedded personnel in the Chavez government. Other nations who may have interests in Latin America inimical to the United States may turn to Cuban intelligence for help. Iran's growing presence in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America is a case in point.

Direct and close political ties between Cuba and Iran are yet another concern. Both are on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. Just last year, members of Iran's special operations Quds force mounted an assassination attempt against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States at a Georgetown restaurant (where some members of this Committee may have dined at one time or another). According to the affidavits filed in the criminal case, the Iranians turned to a Mexican drug cartel for local expertise. There is no suggestion that Cuba was involved, but the case does illustrate both the brazenness of Iran and the complex global interrelationships among criminal organizations and hostile intelligence services.

Finally, Fidel and Raul Castro have maintained power through the use of Cuba's formidable internal security forces. The Cuban people live under a totalitarian regime, where life is very difficult and individual rights are subordinate to the state. Following the Soviet KGB model, the same intelligence organization that goes abroad to spy – the DGI – is also responsible for suppressing the Cuban people at home. In assessing the threat posed by Cuba's intelligence operations, we should not overlook the threat they present to their own people.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy: the role of counterintelligence

At the start of the 21st Century, there are many more highly capable foreign intelligence services in the world than ever before, and we are only just beginning to understand their modern potential as an extension of state power. In the face of these changing intelligence threats, the several functions that U.S. counterintelligence performs have well established tactical objectives and processes; but their potential as an integral part of American national security strategy is only just beginning to emerge.

As the Committee considers larger policy and strategy toward Cuba, I would urge that you keep in mind the need to have a clear strategy and resources for countering the intelligence operations they direct against United States and our friends and allies.

This may seem obvious, but in my experience, the national security policy community seems largely unaware or unconvinced of the dangers to U.S. national security posed by the intelligence activities of foreign powers. As a consequence, plans and programs to counter those activities rarely factor into policy discussions. All the more reason why today's hearing is so important. To be sure, most nations spy on each other. But to acknowledge that fact is not to say that it does not matter.

America's deterrence and defense have long depended on strategic secrets. The locations of our hidden retaliatory forces. The codes by which we protect our military and diplomatic communications. Intelligence sources and methods that give us warning and permit us to understand the threats and opportunities we face. And the sensitive technologies that give us military and commercial advantage. Our political strength also turns on protecting our institutions and alliances from covert influence operations by foreign intelligence services. To survive at peace with our values intact, we need a clear appreciation of which secrets and other strengths we must protect, and the will do to so.

At a time when our Nation is engaged in a war against terror, and consumed with economic troubles at home, the actions of foreign intelligence services may seem a far distant matter. It is precisely in periods when our attention is diverted that adversaries may choose to exploit that perceived advantage. I believe that is what we are seeing today, with the expansion of foreign intelligence activities within U.S. borders, and the growing Latin America presence of foreign powers such as China and Iran.

The challenge for our nation's leadership is to tie policy decisions to a clear strategic vision to advance America's enduring interests and core values. I see today's hearing as part of such an effort, and I am grateful for the opportunity you have given me to contribute to your deliberations.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Thank you very much.

And so Mr. Simmons, you're now recognized for 5 minutes for your comments.

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, FOUNDING EDITOR, CUBA CONFIDENTIAL (RETIRED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUPERVISORY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER)

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to testify about the threat posed by the Castro regime. I would also like to thank you and the committee for the leadership on this key issue, one that sadly does not get the attention it deserves among the many competing foreign threats and policy priorities.

Underestimated and misunderstood for much of the last 53 years, Cuba continues to be a determined and deadly enemy of the United States. Its military and intelligence services continue their sustained offensive to carry their fight to our doorstep, most often using proxies to mitigate the risks posed by its reckless operations.

In many respects, Cuba can be accurately characterized as a violent criminal organization masquerading as a government. The island's five intelligence services exist not to protect the nation, but to ensure the survival of the regime. More importantly from the perspective of today's discussion, several of these services, as well as the Cuban military, continue to operate as profit-making entities. From the trafficking of U.S. secrets to running Cuba's tourism industry, this self-serving and hypocritical capitalism guarantees a continuation of the status quo. The financial livelihood of the mid- and senior levels of these organizations is tied to the existence of the regime. By incentivizing espionage, especially when fueled by the Castro brothers' visceral hatred of the U.S., Havana has nurtured an organizational culture prone to extraordinarily high risk endeavors. I will address the most important of these now.

Beginning with the intelligence threat. Cuba remains the world's sole "Intelligence Trafficker," providing America's adversaries with an endless stream of U.S. secrets collected by its Signals Intelligence sites, complemented with reporting from traditional human spies. The brokering of this information, which reportedly now generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually is one of the primary revenue streams sustaining the regime.

Cuba's Directorate of Military Intelligence runs one of the largest and most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. It collects against a wide range of U.S. Government and commercial communications, as well as the satellite links between the U.S. and Europe. Specific targets are said to be all White House communications, key military communications nodes, NASA and U.S. Air Force communications associated with rocket telemetry and commercial services dealing with financial and commodity communications. Virtually all U.S.

U.S. geosynchronous communications satellites are subject to DIM targeting.

Cuba's SIGINT efforts are then merged with the robust Human Intelligence capabilities of the Directorate of Intelligence, the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. At the height

of the Cold War, the DI was ranked the fourth best spy service in the world. Now, more than 20 years after the crippling loss of its massive Soviet subsidies, the DI is still assessed as among the top six services in the world.

Transitioning to the issue of terrorism, Havana takes a three-tier approach to its involvement in terrorism: Regime-directed, regime-supported, and finally, alliances with state sponsors. For regime-directed activities we're looking at specifically bona fide acts of terrorism, Cuban Intelligence Service targeting of the U.S. war on terrorism, and "Active Measures."

Moving on to regime-supported activities, this focuses on aid to any of the 40 groups the State Department currently lists as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Cuba currently has relations with four of those groups: Hezbollah; the Basque Fatherland and Liberty also known as ETA; and two Colombian groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the

National Liberation Army. Regarding state sponsors of terrorism, that definition is self explanatory and I'll continue to move right along.

In the written testimony before you, I've kept the most important aspects of the Cuban threat. You may read those details at your leisure. However, I would like to touch on a few issues with reference to the Cuban intelligence missions. First, Cuban intelligence targeting of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. From April 2006 into the weeks leading up to the death of Osama bin Laden, Cuba's mission Embassy in Pakistan was led by one of their premiere experts in the targeting of the United States. This officer who was thrown out of the United States for espionage is known as Gustavo Ricardo Machin. It is believed that Machin advised the Pakistani Government and their intelligence services using information supplied via Havana, the massive SIGINT and HUMINT capability we talked about earlier and provided much needed context to the Pakistanis to help them take their own operations against U.S. counterterrorism missions.

It is important to understand when talking about Cuba's collaboration with Pakistan is that the massive penetration of Pakistan's directorate for intelligence services intelligence also makes it almost a certainty that al-Qaeda received information from the Cubans via the Pakistani Government.

Transitioning to the Cuban intelligence targeting of U.S. operations in Iraq. In late 2002 through early 2003, Havana provided the Iraqi intelligence with information on U.S. troop movements and associated military activities. Cuba's high-risk adventurism in this endeavor occurred on the heels of the revelations of the American traitor Ana Belen Montes' espionage including her efforts to kill U.S. and host nations' soldiers during the secret war against leftist guerrillas in El Salvador.

Moving on to post-9/11, Cuba flooded U.S. Embassies with walk-ins claiming to provide intelligence on the terrorism threat. Of the normal 12 walk-ins we expect from the Cubans every year in the first 6 months they sent in almost 20 walk-ins to tie up U.S. resources. This is a 330 percent increase in the normal activities.

Last, but not least, of the highlighted issues, I'd like to address Operation Scorpion which was addressed earlier as a shootdown of

Brothers to the Rescue. While this mission on February 24, 1996 predates the other information I discussed, it is important because this act of terrorism involves highest levels of the Castro regime. On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiGs shot down two U.S. search and rescue aircraft in international waters. Code named Operation Scorpion, it was led by General Eduardo Delgado Rodriguez, the current head of Cuban intelligence. It was personally approved by Fidel Castro and supported by Raul Castro, the current President of Cuba. Four Americans were murdered in this act of terrorism.

Shifting to regime-supported activities, last summer you were briefed by Ambassador Noriego on his——

Mr. MACK. Mr. Simmons, if you could try to wrap it up real quick so we can have time for questions.

Mr. SIMMONS. In conclusion, through its intelligence trafficking or own terrorist acts, Cuba has willfully and intentionally murdered Americans in the past and it will kill again. Furthermore, I believe Havana will covertly facilitate attacks on U.S. personnel, installations or interests using proxies to create situations in which it cannot be implicated as a sponsor. I also suspect Cuba will continue its efforts to cripple and degrade U.S. counterterrorism operations. The Castro regime sees U.S. inability to respond to its aggression as a sign of weakness. As a result, the threat to our national security has increased because our failure to act and our failure to act only emboldens this dangerous dictatorship.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simmons follows:]

Written Testimony of
Christopher Scott Simmons
Founding Editor, *Cuba Confidential*
Before a Hearing of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Thursday, May 17, 2012

"Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare"

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about the threat posed by the Castro regime. I would also like to thank you and the Committee for your leadership on this key issue, one that sadly does not get the attention it deserves among the many competing foreign threats and policy priorities.

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In many respects, Cuba can be accurately characterized as a violent criminal organization masquerading as a government. The island's five intelligence services exist not to protect the nation, but to ensure the survival of the regime. More importantly from the perspective of today's discussion, several of these services, as well as the Cuban military, continue to operate as profit-making entities. From the trafficking of U.S. secrets to running Cuba's tourism industry, this self-serving and hypocritical capitalism guarantees a continuation of the status quo. The financial livelihood of the mid- and senior levels of these organizations is tied to the existence of the regime. By incentivizing espionage, especially when fueled by the Castro brothers' visceral hatred for the U.S., Havana has nurtured an organizational culture prone to extraordinarily high-risk endeavors. I will address the most important of these now.

Intelligence Threat

The world's sole "Intelligence Trafficker," Havana provides America's adversaries an endless stream of U.S. secrets collected by its Signals Intelligence ("SIGINT") sites, complemented with reporting from traditional human spies. The brokering of this information, which reportedly now generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually according to defectors, is one of the primary revenue streams sustaining the regime.

Cuba's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM) runs one of the largest and most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. It collects against a wide range of U.S. government and commercial communications, as well as the satellite links between America and Europe. Specific targets are said to be all White House communications, key military communications nodes, NASA and U.S. Air Force communications associated with rocket telemetry from the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral and commercial services dealing with financial and commodity communications. The DIM intercepts communications carried on satellite downlinks, by short wave and High Frequency radio, and by microwave. All U.S. geo-synchronous communications satellites are subject to DIM targeting.

Staffed by approximately 1000 personnel, the DIM's SIGINT effort at Bejucal, west of Havana, is complemented by covert SIGINT sites in key Cuban diplomatic facilities. Given Havana's collection priorities, it is almost a certainty that covert SIGINT sites are based in Washington, DC and New York City.

The DIM's SIGINT efforts are then merged with the robust Human Intelligence ("HUMINT") capabilities of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the foreign intelligence wing of the Ministry of the Interior. At the height of the Cold War, the DI was ranked the fourth best service in the world. Now, more than 20 years after the crippling loss of its massive Soviet subsidies, the DI is still assessed as the fifth or six best spy service in the world.

Support to Terrorism

Havana takes a three-tier approach to its involvement in terrorism: regime-directed, regime-supported, and finally, alliances with current and former State Sponsors of Terror.

- *Regime-directed activities*: Bona fide terrorist acts, Cuban Intelligence Service (CuIS) targeting of the U.S. war on terrorism, and "Active Measures," i.e., the use of disinformation, threats, and/or violence to discredit opponents or otherwise manipulate the behavior of an individual or group.

- *Regime-supported activities*: Aid to any of the 40 groups the State Department currently lists as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Four entities are currently said to receive Cuban support -- Hezbollah, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and two Colombian groups – the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

- *Allied State Sponsors of Terror*: Bilateral relations with countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan remain on the list. Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), North Korea, Libya (under Moammar Gaddafi) and South Yemen have been removed from the list.

Regime-directed activities

CuIS Targeting of U.S. Operations in Afghanistan

From April 2006 through at least April 2011, Cuba is suspected of targeting U.S. Counterterrorism (CT) operations in Pakistan. DI officer Gustavo Ricardo Machin spearheaded this mission. In his role as the Cuban Ambassador, he and his associates are believed to have served not only as information focal points, but also provided much needed context and insights on high-interest topics.

Machin had previously been expelled from the U.S., reportedly in retaliation for the 16-year career of Cuban spy Ana Montes, who was sentenced in October 2002. An expert in understanding and targeting the U.S. government, Machin is one of roughly four dozen "U.S. Targets" officers in the entire Cuban Intelligence Community. The placement of such a uniquely-qualified expert in Islamabad suggests the two counties exchanged intelligence on U.S. CT operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cuba could have offered unparalleled information on U.S. strategic military, political, and economic plans for the region, as well as ongoing deployments. Conversely, Pakistan probably offered equally unparalleled reporting on the area's U.S. and NATO tactical operations. The merger of this invaluable information would provide an adversary the ability to prevent, cripple, or degrade U.S. CT missions worldwide. Al-Qaeda's extensive penetration of Pakistan's primary security element, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, also makes it almost certain that U.S. secrets ended up in the hands of terrorists.

CuIS Targeting of U.S. Operations in Iraq

On May 13, 2003, the U.S. expelled 14 Cuban diplomats for espionage. This action was the largest expulsion of Cuban Intelligence Officers and the third largest ejection of diplomats in U.S. history. The expulsions occurred less than eight weeks after the U.S. and its coalition partners attacked Iraq.

A senior Pentagon official later told *Washington Times* columnist Bill Gertz that Havana provided Iraqi Intelligence with information on U.S. troop movements and associated military activities. This fact, coupled with the deadly nature of the intelligence Cuba provided to Iraq, strongly suggests that Havana's passage of time-sensitive intelligence on U.S. forces pre-dated the start of the war. Cuba's high-risk adventurism occurred on the heels of the revelations of Ana Montes' treachery, including her efforts to kill U.S. and host nation soldiers during the secret war against leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. This strategic blunder made a major U.S. response a fait accompli.

Post-9/11 walk-ins

In the six months following the 9/11 attacks, 15-20 Cubans walked into U.S. embassies around the world and offered information on terrorism threats. Eventually, all were discredited

as Cuban intelligence agents or collaborators attempting to supply false information. These walk-ins were intended to tie up precious U.S. intelligence resources in ``wild goose" chases that could cost lives at a time when Washington was reeling from the worst terrorist attacks in history. For comparison, Cuba normally sends about a dozen "walk-ins" to U.S. embassies around the world in any given year.

Operation Scorpion

On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiGs shot down two U.S. search and rescue aircraft in international waters. Codenamed *Operation Scorpion*, it was led by General Eduardo Delgado Rodriguez, the current DI Director. The targeted aircraft were flown by a humanitarian group called *Brothers to the Rescue*, whom the regime viewed as a destabilizing factor. Often cited as the world's most successful search and rescue organization, *Brothers* was wildly popular with Cuban-Americans and on-island Cubans as well.

Four Americans died in this terrorist act. Subsequently, the U.S. government indicted General Rubén Martínez Puente (head of the Cuban Air Force) and pilots LTC Lorenzo Perez Perez and LTC Francisco Perez Perez, on murder and related charges. Additionally, Cuban spy Juan Pablo Roque was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and espionage-associated crimes. He fled the U.S. and like the others, continues to enjoy the protection of the Cuban government. In contrast, another Cuban spy received justice. Gerardo Hernández, the leader in the massive *Wasp Network* spy ring, was arrested and convicted of conspiracy to commit murder.

Regime-supported

Hezbollah

On July 7, 2011, Ambassador Roger F. Noriega testified on Hezbollah operations in Latin America before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. In his excellent overview, the Ambassador reported that 80+ Hezbollah members served in at least 12 nations in the hemisphere.

Late last year, the Italian daily *Corriere della Sera* reported that Hezbollah was establishing a base in Cuba to extend its ability to reach Israeli targets in Latin America. Funded by a budget exceeding 1.5 million dollars, three of Hezbollah's Mexico-based staff were relocated to the island. Almost immediately thereafter, 23 fighters personally selected by senior Hezbollah official, Talal Hamia, were to join them in Cuba. According to the report, Cuba was to initially be used for logistics, intelligence collection and the creation of false documents.

Despite this recent development, Havana will continue to use Venezuela as its preferred proxy to publicly distance itself from Hezbollah. That said, the pervasive presence of Cuban intelligence personnel in Venezuela now appears to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides the Castro regime the ability to support its Hezbollah ally while hopefully maintaining

plausible deniability. Conversely, its huge and well documented intelligence support to the Chávez government virtually guarantees that Havana is intimately aware of Hezbollah operations throughout the region.

As Ambassador Noriega noted last summer, Chávez has "cooperated with Iran to provide political support, financing, or arms to Hezbollah, Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad in this Hemisphere and elsewhere. For example, Venezuela's Margarita Island has eclipsed the infamous "Tri-Border Area" – the region where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay come together in South America – as a principal safe haven and center of Hezbollah operations in the Americas"

The FARC & ELN

According to the U.S. State Department, Cuba provides the FARC with medical care, sanctuary, and political consultation. However, other sources paint a more comprehensive degree of support.

In March 2008, Mexican authorities began investigating alleged Cuban agent Mario Dagoberto Diaz. This agent came to the attention of government authorities after Colombian military forces entered Ecuador and raided a FARC camp. During the attack, a top FARC official and at least 26 others guerrillas were killed, including four Mexican students. Authorities claimed Diaz led the Mexican students to the camp, but left before the attack. Mexican Intelligence subsequently identified Diaz as a FARC financial officer who had previously traveled to Ecuador in 2007. Mexican authorities claimed over the last two years, Diaz maintained five bank accounts each averaging 80,000 dollars.

Former CIA officer Brian Latell noted that Cuban Intelligence has strongly supported the FARC since the 1960s, but the "availability of massive amounts of Venezuelan money" had triggered considerable growth in the depth and breadth of Havana's support.

The Havana-supported, pro-Cuban ELN was founded in 1965. Over the years, Havana has assisted, coordinated, or otherwise participated in unification efforts involving the ELN and other terrorist groups. According to the U.S. State Department, Cuba continues to provide the ELN with medical care and political consultation. Similarly, Cuba's close ally -- Venezuela, provides sanctuary to ELN forces.

The ETA

Cuba provides sanctuary to approximately 20 ETA members granted asylum by Spanish authorities in the 1980s. However, media reports from May 2011 identified several senior ETA members wanted by Madrid who enjoy Havana's support and protection. Thus far, Cuba has declined Spain's requests for extradition. According to some defectors, Havana also allows the regime's financial sector to launder ETA funds, for which it receives a commission.

Additionally, classified documents released by Wikileaks cited a State Department cable which reported "ETA members that assisted the FARC had spent time in Cuba." The cable went on to note that ETA and FARC "enjoy rest and recreation in Cuba and receive medical care and other services." The document also claimed the requirement for a secure safe haven will likely preclude the ETA and FARC from using Cuba to launch operational missions.

Alliances with State Sponsors of Terror

Iran

In 2007, Scott Carmichael, a senior counterintelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed continued intelligence sharing between Iran and Cuba. Additionally, Israeli sources reported that during the 2006 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Iranian and Cuban intelligence officers discussed increased collaboration in targeting the United States.

Close ties between Tehran and Havana have reportedly existed since Iran's revolutionary leadership came to power in 1979. Additionally, Iran's Interests Section and its Mission to the United Nations appear inadequately staffed for significant intelligence collection. This shortfall likely makes Iran even more dependent on Cuban intelligence trafficking.

In 2006, career DI officer Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz visited with senior Iranian government officials. This meeting followed his October 2003 meeting with President Mohammad Khatami on expanded ties between Havana and Tehran. At the time, Cabrisas served under cover as a minister without portfolio. During their discussions, Khatami said reciprocal visits by officials of the two countries would lead to further expansion and consolidation of mutual ties. The meeting called for the recurring visits by officials, scientists and others to develop these enhanced ties.

Conclusion

Through its intelligence trafficking or own terrorist acts, Cuba has willfully and intentionally murdered Americans in the past and it will kill again. Furthermore, I believe Havana will covertly facilitate attacks on U.S. personnel, installations or interests using proxies to create situations in which it cannot be implicated as a sponsor. I also suspect Cuba will continue its efforts to cripple and degrade U.S. Counterterrorism operations. The Castro regime sees U.S. inability to respond to its aggression as a sign of weakness. As a result, the threat to our national security has increased because our failure to act only emboldens this dangerous dictatorship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much and before we get to questions, I'd like to have Mr. Rivera—2 minutes for an opening statement.

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rivera, if I could—I have to leave. I have a conflict in another committee. So I again want to leave our side in the able hands of Mr. Sires. And I want to thank our witnesses for providing extraordinary testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Mr. Rivera?

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of you for being here for this important hearing. Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I'm often amazed at just how naive we can be with respect to Cuban intelligence, not just by the fact that Cuba, of course, is on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but just the entire history of the DGI going back decades and decades. We're seeing in recent publications by Bryan Latell from the University of Miami how for decades Cuban intelligence has been involved in so many detrimental activities to U.S. interests from perhaps the Kennedy assassination going forward.

I can recall just over 20 years ago with radio and Television Marti, Agent Orion, I remember that case of trying to infiltrate the official U.S. broadcast services for the Cuban people. Of course the Brothers to the Rescue operation that you spoke about, the entire Wasp network, the Ana Belen Montes case, which of course, I know Mr. Simmons, you're very aware of as well. And you see this over and over and over again and you see decisions taken such as allowing Raul Castro's daughter to travel to the United States. And it seems like a continuing pattern of unilateral concessions that only hardens intelligence officers, I would imagine inside Cuba to continue to try to penetrate U.S. national security interests which runs a great risk to this nature because of the relationships that Cuba possesses with many enemies of the United States and potential for them to continue sharing this intelligence information with those enemies and just augmenting the threat to U.S. national security.

So I look forward to our colloquy, your question and answer session. And again, thank you for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. And now I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. And I want to, if I could, I am going to ask you both the same question and we'll start with you, Ms. Van Cleave.

I said in my opening statement I talked about that although Cuba is a small island that it's got a global reach. And I think what is fascinating or concerning to me is that many would believe that there is not a global reach by Cuba. So I wanted to see, one, if you would agree that there is a global reach with terrorism and intelligence in irregular warfare and if so, if you could maybe highlight that a little bit and then I'll also ask Mr. Simmons the same.

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with your statement that Cuba has global reach and there are many reasons for this. The principal reason is that the activities of concern—which is to say terrorist activities, as well as trafficking in intelligence and national security secrets—are themselves global activities. And what concerns me is that as we see foreign powers move

more into the Western Hemisphere—an increasing Chinese presence, for example, in Latin America, certainly Iranian presence in this hemisphere and activities here, and for that matter, perhaps a renewed Russian interest in this hemisphere—that the Cubans represent an on-the-ground highly familiar and capable intelligence service that can supply access and insight and support to others who also have interests here. So it's the nexus of all of those things that gives me pause.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Mr. Simmons.

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, I would agree with my esteemed colleague regarding Cuba's international reach. I'd like to put it in the context of two different complementary tracks, first being the SIGINT capability we addressed earlier. To intercept your adversaries' communications, satellite communications, the only thing necessary is for you to be in a downlink. Cuba is perfectly located to be in a downlink for all U.S. communications.

It is, in fact, the only place outside of Fort Meade in the Western Hemisphere where large-scale interception of communications is possible.

This ability makes it a lucrative broker for a lot of our enemies such as China which in and of itself is impossible for them to have their own SIGINT facility in this hemisphere and that I would suggest based on evidence that they don't need because their friends, the Cubans, run an exceptional operation.

Conversely, we have to put it in an economy of scale. The Wasp network, which was referred to earlier, involved a Cuban spy operation based in South Florida, but extending all the way to New York City and as far west as Louisiana and then also supported by Mexico. It involved approximately 42 officers and agents and its operating budget was $30,000 a year. I would suggest to you there are probably no other intelligence services that can run intelligence operations on the cheap as well as the Cubans can.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. I want to get to this issue because a couple of times we've talked about how the Castro regime is a profit-making center for them and I wondered if Mr. Simmons, if you wanted to talk to that. I believe you said hundreds of millions of dollars that they're making as a profit, in your opinion, do you think that is something that can be disrupted?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Several years ago, shortly, we believe, after the end of Soviet subsidies, the Castro brothers turned over the tourism sector to military intelligence services. And now it is run as just that, a profit-making center and we know from defectors that these services are actually allowed to take earnings and recycle it into their own budgets so they are further incentivized in what they do.

When you look at the tourism industry, virtually every facet from a visitor applying for the visa to arriving in Cuba on a Cuban airline to the Hotel Nacional and the other hotels, it funds nothing but the Cuban intelligence services and military and the regime's ability to repress it's own people.

It also, because of the structure, puts virtually every tourist in front of the intelligence services for assessment as future agents. I believe the tourism aspect could be crippled greatly by changing the rules of the game. The Cubans have no respect for America,

never had and you see that in the way their intelligence services operate. And so taking the ability to profit off of tourism would not only significantly hurt the intelligence services, but it would have a ripple effect on the government's ability to repress its own people.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. My time has expired. I'd now like to recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes for questions.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How can anybody respect us when we take Cuba so lightly? And that is, you know, they think they can do anything they want. How many criminals are there in Cuba now approximately? Somebody told me over 100, including from New Jersey. Joanne Chesselmar, who killed a state trooper. Would you have an idea who are seeking sanctions in Cuba currently?

Mr. SIMMONS. From everything that I have heard, criminals are American terrorists in Cuba today.

Mr. SIRES. I know that in New Jersey the Jersey troopers, they have a $1 million reward for Joanne Chesselmar for killing one of their state troopers on the highway and she fled to Cuba as she was being processed.

Everybody in Washington is concerned about cyber warfare and I was just wondering if do you think Cuba is receiving any assistance from other countries to establish and develop cyber war capabilities against us?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, Mr. Sires, I don't have specific information on that, but I am happy to speculate. And on the basis of my understanding of the extent of cooperation among intelligence services have concerned the United States, I would be very surprised if there wasn't cooperation in the arena of cyber exploitation. So I think one should assume that that kind of information exchange and assistance, in fact, takes place.

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Simmons, would you care to comment?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Just to add one specific example. Transitioning to signals intelligence, by and large, if you're able to intercept communications of any sort, you're also able to jam the very same communications or signals. And in July 2003, acting on behalf of Iran, Cuban intelligence jammed the transmissions of the National Iranian Television, Voice of America, and three other Iran-bound broadcast systems. The timing of the jamming coincided with Iran's crackdown on dissidents and the commemoration of the historic 1999 student uprising.

Moreover, Skynet, who owned the targeted satellite, was quickly able to identify the source of the jamming to a spot several miles outside of Havana, subsequently identified as the Cuban military intelligence base at Bejucal, head of their SIGINT program.

They then tried to relocate. Prior to Cuba broadcast jamming system, the Iranians had jammed a different platform from a geosynchronous satellite over Europe and when that was shut down that's when they moved to the U.S. communications and their Cuban allies were able to shut down those four programs. So yes, sir. They can do it at will and in that instance we know for a fact it was requested by Tehran.

Mr. SIRES. Did you say the town of Bejucal? What's the name of the town, Bejucal?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIRES. That's where I was born. As a young boy, I remember not being able to go to this hill because there was a lot of construction, so everybody assumed there was something going on because they basically gutted the mountain. It's not a mountain but—we could see the work actually being done from the town that I lived in and obviously it was all fenced off. Kids couldn't go up there like we used to go, so now you're telling me that there is a station there that's a communication center?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Those fields now grow satellite dishes.

Mr. SIRES. This relationship with Iran fascinates me because you couldn't have two more different countries, but yet there's one common ground and that is destroy America. So I was just wondering if you can expand on that relationship with Iran and Cuba. And what are their plans? Not what are their plans, but obviously, they want to extend to the rest of the Central America and South America, their influence. So can you speak a little bit about that relationship?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. In many respects, Cuban foreign policy and the influence of the intelligence services can be viewed as very pragmatic. And I say that in the sense that when it comes to Iran, the Castro brothers embrace the idea of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The relations with Iran actually go back to the earliest days of the Iranian revolution. Approximately half of the Cuban ambassadors who have served in Iran have been intelligence officers.

Most recently, for about the last 20 years, there's been a huge increase in Cuban-Iranian cooperation in biomedical technologies. As you're aware, Cuba currently holds over 400 patents in this arena, many jointly with the Iranians and the field of biomedicine is one of those that what is medicine today can be a terrorist threat tomorrow. So yes, sir. When it comes to a mutual enemy, we are their mutual enemy.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. And I now recognize Mr. Rivera for 5 minutes for questions.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin referencing what I mentioned earlier in terms of the Ana Belen Montes case and I'm wondering for both of you, particularly Mr. Simmons, if you believe that the DGI penetration of Defense Intelligence Agency or National Security Agency and all the different intelligence agencies that Ana Belen Montes was engaged with, if that penetration ended with Ana Belen Montes?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Mr. Rivera, allow me to begin and I know that Mr. Simmons will have more to offer on this point. The Montes damage assessment was something that I oversaw when I was in office as the National Counterintelligence Executive and that damage assessment took several years to compile. We learned a great deal about what she had compromised. The damage assessment itself remains highly classified. But among the things that she was able to provide to the Cubans was insight into activities of very high national security sensitivity that were of little use to the Cubans, but perhaps of greater use to other powers.

The trade craft of how the Cubans ran her was interesting, too, in that she was able to do a lot of reporting and meet with Cubans

here in Washington, DC, over a period of 16 years. That's astounding that they were able to operate that freely and I would suggest openly against American society. So what she did and the extent of her harm to the United States was enormous, but perhaps most disturbing is that they were able to recruit her so successfully and penetrate the highest reaches of our Cuban analytic community so well.

Mr. RIVERA. My understanding——

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I'm going to get to your punch line.

Mr. RIVERA. As far as her sentencing, my understanding is she cooperated.

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. She did.

Mr. RIVERA. So if she cooperated, then I'm wondering just how much did she cooperate? Did it lead to any other intelligence breaches? Are we done with intelligence breaches now that we were done with Ana Belen Montes?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Not even close. Now her cooperation, her plea agreement as is often the case with major spies, was accepted in order that we might gain understanding of what it is that she compromised and how that was done. So we did get a great deal from her about that, but my punch line to you is that the Cubans are so successful in going against the U.S. Government and have been able to do that for such a sustained number of years that there is no reason to believe that Montes, or for that matter the Myers team at the State Department are the last—they are simply the latest, they are the most recent that we have been able to talk about publicly.

Mr. RIVERA. And do you think we're trying to ferret out whatever remnants there may be post-Myers, post-Montes?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I know we are.

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Simmons, do you want to add anything?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Very quickly. Based on 53 years of Cuban intelligence protocols, it would be an anomaly for them to have only run one penetration of the Defence Intelligence Agency.

According to their doctrine, there should be three penetrations of the Agency. The logic behind that is Cubans are very hesitant to run singleton operations because there's no way to have feedback on the success or the veracity of the information being provided by the agent. In an organization like DIA, they would not run three analysts because then they're going to get redundant reporting. They would look at somebody like Montes, use her to report on the analytic realm and then penetrate other sectors of the agency.

Done correctly, all three agents would end up reporting on one another without the awareness that the others are actually agents. That according to the Cuban doctrine is the perfect way to run an agent operation. So yes, sir. There should be two more, at least two more penetrations of DIA. The Cubans have had decades to do it so it should not be a surprise.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. And if the witnesses won't mind, don't mind, I've got a few more questions and I'm sure that my colleagues may have other questions, too.

So I want to talk a little bit with you, Ms. Van Cleave, about policy and where—why haven't we done a better job? And what kind

of recommendations would you have for us for this committee as we look at how to deal with the problem with Cuba?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you very much for that question, Mr. Chairman. I believe that our vulnerabilities to Cuban espionage and indeed to other hostile intelligence services is a very serious national security matter. A major reason why we've had such losses to espionage in decades past is the way that counterintelligence grew up in the United States.

There was—it began and grew out of the inherent missions of the several agencies that execute counterintelligence. The FBI is responsible for enforcing our espionage laws within the U.S. CIA is responsible for counterintelligence to the extent that it needs to protect its own human collection mission abroad. And the military services also have their own counterintelligence elements that are responsible for force protection to look after their ability to execute their operations plans and be secure abroad. But what we haven't had historically is any entity in the United States that sits back and says what are the foreign intelligence threats to the United States and what are we going to do about those threats?

So I bring that down to the level of Cuba and I say here you've got a very aggressive, capable and successful intelligence service directed against us. It has been our practice to deal with these threats, these penetrations, these spies on a case-by-case basis as they show up here in the United States. What we haven't done is that we have not had a strategic look at what should we do as a nation about the threat that Cuban intelligence represents to the United States and our interests in this hemisphere and elsewhere in the world. We do not have a strategic counterintelligence program to try to assess and degrade their capabilities against us. And that is true with respect to Cuba and every other foreign intelligence service that may be of concern.

So from a policy perspective, I have to say that this hearing is fascinating to me because it is so infrequently the case, I'm sorry to say, that the intelligence threat presented by regional actors is factored into policy discussions. Maybe one reason is because understanding that threat and what they're doing is usually so very highly classified, so much of it, it's difficult to discuss.

But another reason is it seems that our national security policy community by and large is either unfamiliar with or not persuaded by the danger that these intelligence activities present to the United States. And so I commend you and the subcommittee for taking on this question very seriously. I would also urge you in your reports or any forward action that you might have to include as a question how we might not do a better job from a counterintelligence perspective in dealing with these threats as part of a larger U.S. policy and strategy toward Cuba.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Simmons, do you have some sort of guidance that you could give the committee?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. My guidance would be much more tactical in nature, if you will. In dealing with the Castro brothers, we need to bear in mind that dictators understand one thing and that is power. And so a surgical countermeasure to Cuban offenses is the best practice. An example that comes to mind is going back to the 2003 Cuban intelligence targeting of Iraqi Freedom, that May we

expelled 14 Cuban diplomats, all of whom were intelligence officers. Of the 14, two were husband-wife teams, so we actually threw out 16 spies which removed about a third of their intelligence presence serving under diplomatic cover and it crippled Cuban intelligence operations in the United States for about 18 months to 2 years.

Cubans understand focused, surgical—I should say the Castro regime understands focused, surgical countermeasures like that. And I would suggest that be used as a model to protect U.S. interests in the future.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. It sounds to me that both are good ideas. And that one of the things I think we want to try to do in this committee is begin to push the envelope a little bit on what we can do, what kind of policy positions that we can take to understand better and to disrupt what's happening in Cuba and elsewhere frankly, but for the purview of this committee and Cuba.

Mr. Sires, you're recognized for 5 minutes for questions.

Mr. SIRES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Last week, I think it was Wolf Blitzer, he had an interview with one of the foreign ministers in Cuba and all of a sudden Alan Gross—now is getting ready to talk about releasing Alan Gross. I'm just wondering, what do you think that's all about? All of a sudden after this poor man is in jail, now they're saying there possibly could be some talks to release him and talk about other things. What do you think that's about? I mean obviously, many people here are concerned that there will be a swap, you know, for Alan Gross. We're obviously all against it, but I was just wondering what's your reaction to a move like that all of a sudden? Because they don't make a move unless they think five moves ahead. So I was just wondering if you can surmise what they might be thinking.

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. I've maintained from the start that Alan Gross was grabbed and imprisoned for no reason other than to be used as a pawn in a future spy trade. That was my position when interviewed by the Miami Herald several days after he was initially imprisoned. My position has not changed.

When we look at the CNN interview you've referenced with Josefina Vidal who was thrown out of the United States for espionage activities, you may recall that in recent discussions actually in the initial discussions regarding access to Alan Gross and a subsequent trade, the head of the North American Division, Josefina Vidal, her deputy and the consular officer handling the Alan Gross situation were all intelligence officers thrown out of the United States. This, from its very inception, has nothing to do with Alan Gross' activities. He was simply in the wrong place at the right time and the Cubans needed—they need leverage.

Based on their disrespect for the United States, I believe that they've always known or believed that at some point the U.S. would relent and trade for an American because that's what we've always done in the past. They have no reason to think we won't do the same thing now.

Mr. SIRES. It's amazing to me this information that you have that she was thrown out of this country for spying, Josefina Vidal. I don't ever remember hearing anybody mentioning that when this interview was going on. It's just like we have, in this country, the shortest memory of anything, about everything. Why doesn't some-

body mention when they're doing this interview that this is a former spy—a former—yes, a spy that was chased out of this country? And all of a sudden she's now representing that the Cuban Government wants somehow to deal. It's just unfortunate, you know. Thank you, Do you have any comments on that issue?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. I will confess that I was thinking while you were asking the question that gee, I wish that we had a definitive answer to exactly what it was they planned to do. And the only way you can have a definitive answer is if you've got very good intelligence on Cuban discussions and planning and thinking. So I come back to the need to have increased resources going into our intelligence collection directed against the Cubans.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you.

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Mr. Rivera, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We've mentioned a few times in the hearing the fact that Cuba is on the list, the State Department's list of official sponsors of terrorism and I wonder if I could get your opinions regarding intelligence activity either being the sole purview of nation states or perhaps also activity that other actors engage in such as terrorist organizations. And so I wonder how many of the terrorist groups or terrorist organizations with which Cuba cooperates or perhaps activities on the island or off the island, but nexus with Cuba, how many of those organizations also engage in intelligence activity against the United States?

Ms. Van Cleave?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, Congressman, you are quite right that in traditional concept intelligence activities are practiced by many terrorist organizations throughout the world, precisely for the purpose of being able to gain the access, the insights, the information that they need to be successful in those terrorist operations.

So we have a very careful counterintelligence dimension to U.S. counterterrorism activities, for example.

Cuban involvement with terrorist groups, I would say, would be useful potentially to those terrorist groups depending on the kinds of insights that they were looking for and what they were planning to do.

I was struck by our conversation earlier about Iran which, of course, is a state sponsor of terror, but Iran itself trying to carry out a terrorist operation here in the United States. You may recall how Iran fielded through apparently a Mexican drug cartel an assassination team to try to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the United States at a restaurant in Georgetown where you've probably been, I've been. And it's amazing that Iran would escalate its aggressive actions and be so bold and brazen to come right into the U.S. and foster that kind of an activity.

Well, they don't have the insights within the United States, the ground expertise to carry that out. They need some help from an organization or an entity or people who do know the territory here.

Mr. RIVERA. And that's where the organizations come in.

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. They turn to the Mexican drug cartel, but you can speculate about how that kind of activity on—it's an example, if you will, of how local expertise can be valuable to others.

Mr. RIVERA. So organizations such as whether it be ETA or FARC or Hezbollah or Hamas, those types of organizations with which the Castro dictatorship maintains relationships. What is the activity or intelligence activity against the United States from organizations like ETA or FARC or Hezbollah or Hamas?

Ms. VAN CLEAVE. Well, certainly those organizations carry out terrorist operations against friends and allies of the United States and could find it very useful, may have themselves need for insight into specific national defense information, our relations, interactions, knowledge of activities that would be of value to them as they carry out their terrorist operations.

I am spinning a web that suggests that espionage is a very complex business and that the specific things that may be targeted by a source, an asset inside the U.S. Government that might be funneled through the DGI, for example, to another customer, if you will, abroad provide a rich playing field of possibilities.

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Simmons, do you want to add anything with the 30 seconds we have left?

Mr. SIMMONS. Yes, sir. Just very quickly. Terrorist groups are evolving animals, much like other entities. Cuba has historically been tied to well over 40 different terrorist groups since the 1960s and their basic protocol is to provide them intelligence training first, let them get on their feet so they can begin conducting their own operations and then once they're successful, migrate over to bilateral operations within their own lane of the road, if you will.

So in essence, it allows Cuba to conduct intelligence operations by proxy.

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. Mr. Smith, you're recognized for 5 minutes for questions and you're batting clean up.

Mr. SMITH. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for being late and I thank you for calling this hearing on this very important and very often under-focused-upon problem as it relates to Cuba. We do focus, as we ought to, you and all of us on this committee, on the human rights which is absolutely a priority, but the intelligence and the terror networks and all of that collaboration, I applaud you for doing that. I was late because I had a hearing of my own on Ukraine and the continued incarceration of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. So that's why I'm late.

I don't have any questions, but again, I want to thank you and I look forward to reading the testimony and I apologize for being late.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I want to thank the witnesses. My take away is we have so much more to learn as a committee on what we should be looking at from policy position on espionage and counterintelligence in Cuba. And frankly, it sounds like not just in Cuba, but many other places.

One of the things that you mentioned, Ms. Van Cleave, when you talked about Iran working with drug cartels, we—I and this committee are very concerned about the evolving nature of the drug cartels into a—these are my words that don't necessarily make people happy, but into an insurgency. And that they're being used by other terrorist organizations to affect not only Mexico, but the United States and other parts of Latin America. So I want to thank

both of you, Mr. Simmons and Ms. Van Cleave, for being here today, for your insight and we look forward to continuing to learn more and come up with some way to address this problem, so thank you very much and the meeting is adjourned.

Sorry, Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. I also want to thank you, but I also want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing. This is a topic that is not often spoken about here on the Hill and he's right on target to be concerned. So I want to thank you for holding this hearing today.

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. I always accept thanks. The meeting is now adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

HEARING NOTICE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

Connie Mack (R-FL), Chairman

May 15, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live via the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov)**:

DATE:	Thursday, May 17, 2012
TIME:	3:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:	Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare
WITNESSES:	Mr. Christopher Simmons Founding Editor Cuba Confidential *(Retired Defense Intelligence Agency Supervisory Counterintelligence Officer)* The Honorable Michelle Van Cleave President National Security Concepts, Inc. *(Former National Counterintelligence Executive under President George W. Bush)*

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *the Western Hemisphere* HEARING

Day *Thursday* **Date** *May 17, 2012* **Room** *2172*

Starting Time *3:04 p.m.* **Ending Time** *4:24 p.m.*

Recesses [ ] (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Connie Mack

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]
Electronically Recorded (taped) [✓]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:

Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Reps. Mack, Rivera, Smith, Engel, and Sires

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] **No** [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Rep. Mack: Opening Statement
Rep. Ros-Lehtinen: Letter

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *4:24 p.m.*

Subcommittee Staff Director

Subcommittee Members Attendance

☑ Mack, Connie

☐ McCaul, Michael T.

☐ Schmidt, Jean

☑ Rivera, David

☑ Smith, Christopher H.

☐ Gallegly, Elton

☑ Engel, Eliot L.

☑ Sires, Albio

☐ Faleomavaega, Eni F. H.

Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing:
Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism Intelligence and Warfare
Chairman Connie Mack
May 17, 2012

It is important to note that, when it comes to Cuba, there is much more than meets the eye. This is illustrated by the Cuban doctors who are shipped around the world to provide medical services while spying for the Castros' benefit.

Recent assertions that U.S. policy toward Cuba is a relic of the Cold War would indicate that the Castro Regime has changed its ways since that time. Today's hearing will reaffirm that it is the same Regime operating in Cuba today that was alive and well during the Cold War.

Let me be clear, Cuba is no friend to the United States, we are enemy number one. And although Cuba is a small island, it has a global reach that aims to undermine U.S. interests and security through terrorism, intelligence, and irregular warfare.

Cuba has built key relationships that help the island expand its reach. Experts have identified that China has, and I quote, "developed a special relationship with Cuba for several reasons, ranging from loyalty to intelligence gathering." However, these same experts explain that the public is often kept in the dark on such nefarious activity, because officials do not often testify on strategic concerns. Yet the facts remain:

The Cuban Intelligence Service ranks among the very best in the world and continues to engage in espionage operations in the United States. For example in June 2009, the FBI arrested Kendall Myers, a retired State Department official, and his wife after they spied for the Cuban government for over three decades. The DIA analyst Ana Belen Montes, convicted in 2002 of espionage, provided classified U.S. military information to the Cuban regime. Meanwhile, the harm this caused to U.S. troops goes unreported.

Additionally, Cuban intelligence agents purposefully provided false leads "worldwide" in order to misdirect the U.S. investigation of the September 11th terrorist attacks. We also know that Cuban intelligence strives to create a perception in the United States that Cuba is not a threat, that we should normalize relations. Do not be fooled. Cuba is an enemy of the United States that has infiltrated our government, steals classified information, trafficks information around the world, and counts Iran, Syria, Venezuela, China, and Russia among its best friends. We will never be able to quantify the level of harm Cuba has done against our men and women serving around the world.

Despite all of this, the Obama Administration is easing travel and remittance restrictions, and engaging the Cuban regime. President Obama is giving legitimacy to the Castro model and allowing negotiations to occur on the Regime's terms.

This is just another example where U.S. foreign policy is backwards in Latin America. The goal of this Administration has been – reach out to our enemies – turn our back on our friends and allies. And this approach has hurt our national security. The Obama Administration has abandoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross in prison while making concessions to a corrupt and lying regime.

At the recent Summit of the Americas – where Cuba took center stage- those of us in attendance saw firsthand how the Cuban Regime continues to wield its influence. The Cuban people deserve to live in freedom. Once the Castro Regime embraces freedom, Cuba can be included in the gatherings of free societies.

I have repeatedly asked the Castro Regime to start with three simple actions: One, release political prisoners including Alan Gross; Two, hold free and fair elections; and Three, permit freedom of speech and a free press. Until the Castro regime can take these three steps, there should be no negotiations or talk of normalizing relations with Cuba. There is nothing holding them back but their own actions.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses to shed light on the terrorist activity and irregular warfare engaged in by the Castro Regime. And I urge everyone to take note of this serious and on-going threat as the security of U.S. citizens depends upon it.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

May 17, 2012

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Madam Secretary,

We write to express our outrage that you have provided entry visas to Communist Party representatives from Cuba: Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, Eusebio Leal, and Mariela Castro Espin in flagrant disregard of express Congressional intent and established U.S. foreign policy.

Granting visas to these members of Cuba's Communist Party is directly contrary to Congressional intent as expressed in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (PL 104-114). Section 102(e) declares:

> It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to enforce fully existing regulations to deny visas to Cuban nationals considered by the Secretary of State to be officers or employees of the Cuban Government or of the Communist Party of Cuba.

In addition, Presidential Proclamation 5377, Section 1, prohibits nonimmigrant entry of—

> (a) officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba holding diplomatic or official passports; and (b) individuals who, notwithstanding the type of passport that they hold, are considered by the Secretary of State or his designee to be officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba.

Because Section 2(c) of this proclamation provides waiver of these restrictions only by the Secretary of State or her designate, we may only conclude that responsibility for these entries rests squarely with you.

Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, from the Cuban regime's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was married to one of fourteen Cuban diplomats stationed at the Cuban missions in Washington D.C. and New York that reportedly left the United States due to evidence that they were collecting information on U.S. preparations for the war in Iraq to pass along to Saddam Hussein. Although it is unclear whether she was asked to leave, her husband, Cuban consul Jose Anselmo Lopez stationed in Washington D.C. was declared *persona non grata* and expelled for his "activities

hostile to the national security." Since that time, Josefina Vidal Ferreiro has been one of the most vocal anti-U.S. mouthpieces of the Cuban regime. The primary duties of her high-level position appear to be spreading misinformation about U.S. foreign policy, defending the Cuban regime's deplorable human rights record, justifying the dictatorship's ruthless brutality against pro-democracy activists such as the Ladies in White, and maligning Alan Gross, a U.S. humanitarian aid worker whom the regime has held hostage without justification for more than two years. We also understand that she was invited to the Department of State to meet with U.S. officials, despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and the regime in Cuba since 1961. That the stated purpose of Josefina Vidal's trip was to participate in an anti-America propaganda event at the Cuban Interests Section, and that she nonetheless was permitted into the core of U.S. foreign policy-making, further highlights the remarkably poor judgment exercised by this administration in extending diplomatic courtesies to an agent of the Castro regime.

Eusebio Leal is a member of Cuba's sham, one-party National Assembly and was appointed by Fidel Castro to head Habaguanez S.A., a regime-operated corporation created in 1993 to sustain the failing dictatorship with tourism dollars. He is frequently tasked with escorting foreign dignitaries, such as President Carter in 2011, and has been a devoted member of Castro's Communist Party since 1972. His current priority is expanding tourism to channel hard currency to the Castro regime. The purpose of his trip was to headline an event at a Washington D.C. think tank aimed at encouraging tourism despite the express prohibition against tourism travel to Cuba in U.S. law. It is disgraceful that this administration would grant an exception for a Cuban regime operative to enter the United States for the express goal of undermining U.S. foreign policy.

Mariela Castro Espin, daughter of dictator Raul Castro, was appointed head of the regime's National Center for Sex Education (CENESEX). She is a devout member of Cuba's Communist Party who routinely rails against the "imperialist" United States and vilifies Cuba's courageous pro-democracy movement. She recently parroted regime propaganda by referring to pro-freedom activists as "despicable parasites" and insinuating that the activists were paid mercenaries of the United States simply because they questioned her refusal to defend basic human rights for the Cuban people. Other than the dictators themselves, there can hardly be a more Communist Party and regime "insider" in Cuba than Mariela Castro Espin.

Permitting entry of Cuban operatives into the United States is also dangerous. As you know, the Cuban regime is one of only four U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, and it engages in extensive espionage activities in the United States. Spies still serving prison sentences for conducting espionage against the U.S. on behalf of the Cuban regime include the five convicted Cuban spies of the "WASP" network (2001), Ana Belen Montes (2002), and two former State Department employees, Walter and Gwendolyn Myers (2010). Within this context, it is especially reprehensible that this administration would welcome the return of Cuban

operative Josefina Vidal Ferreiro into Washington D.C., the seat of our nation's government, and permit entry of other high-level operatives of this terrorist state into the United States.

Unfortunately, it appears that the Obama administration is continuing its failed policy of providing unilateral concessions to the Cuban regime despite its hostile actions against the United States, increased repression against its own people, and prolonged imprisonment of Mr. Gross for the "crime" of trying to connect Cuba's small Jewish community to the internet. Allowing entry of these regime operatives into the United States appears to be yet another gift to the regime in Cuba for continuing its atrocious behavior.

Allowing these Cuban regime operatives into the United States is dangerous, irresponsible, and contrary to longstanding U.S. policy toward a regime with one of the world's worst human rights records. We strongly urge you to exercise better judgment when reviewing entry requests from representatives of enemy states in the future.

Sincerely,

MARIO DIAZ-BALART
Member of Congress

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
Member of Congress

ALBIO SIRES
Member of Congress

DAVID RIVERA
Member of Congress

cc: Peter King, Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security
Mike Rogers, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Kay Granger, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs

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