[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IS DHS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY TO COUNTER EMERGING THREATS?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2012
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Serial No. 112-64
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 4
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Paul A. Schneider, Principal, The Chertoff Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Sharon L. Caudle, PhD, The Bush School of Government and
Public Service, Texas A&M University:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Panel II
Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst, Emergency Management and Homeland
Security Policy, Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Team, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Mr. Alan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 58
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Statement of the Texas Border Coalition........................ 32
IS DHS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY TO COUNTER EMERGING THREATS?
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Friday, February 3, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Keating,
Clarke of New York, and Davis.
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order. Good morning.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the strategy
documents produced by the Department of Homeland Security
pertaining to emergency--emerging threats and the
implementation of those strategies. I now recognize myself for
an opening statement.
In December 2009 Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano gave a speech to her Department. She said, ``I see
one DHS as a strong, efficient, and focused department--one
where all the talents and skills that we possess as individuals
and as components come together and come together in new and
exciting ways to serve our missions.''
The Department of Homeland Security is the third-largest
department in the Federal Government, with more than 200,000
employees and an annual budget of more than $40 billion. Its
transformation, according to the GAO, is critical to achieving
its homeland security mission. However, the agency has been
criticized for excessive bureaucracy, waste, ineffectiveness,
and lack of transparency that have hindered its operations and
wasted taxpayer dollars.
For example, the DHS inspector general, in a November 2011
report, concluded the Department has major challenges, mainly
in the area of management, including acquisition, information
technology, grants, and finances. These challenges hinder the
Department's efforts to become a cohesive, effective, and
efficient organization.
The GAO concludes many DHS management functions are high-
risk, including acquisitions, information technology, finances,
human capital and integration, all resulting in performance
problems and mission delays. Unless we fix these types of
problems we will continue to see failures in DHS programs such
as the Secure Border Initiative virtual fence, where in the end
taxpayers received little if any return on a $1 billion
investment. Secretary Napolitano will certainly not attain her
goal of One DHS until financial and management systems are
integrated.
Our subcommittee begins a series of hearings examining the
challenges DHS faces. We will begin focusing the hearings on
three basic questions: One, what challenges does DHS face? Two,
why is it taking so long to become One DHS? Three, do DHS
shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core mission of
securing the homeland?
Today we begin with the basics by examining the DHS
strategy and its implementation to counter emerging threats.
What is the DHS strategy? The Congressional Research Service
concludes there are several homeland security strategic
documents with differing goals, priorities, and definitions.
These examples incorporate both White House and DHS strategy
documents including the National Strategy for Homeland
Security; the National Security Strategy; the National Strategy
for Counterterrorism; the Strategic Plan--One Team, One
Mission, Securing Our Homeland; the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review.
In the 9/11 Recommendations Act of 2007 Congress mandated
DHS to develop a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review to
upgrade strategies related to homeland security and align the
strategy with the Department's programs and activities. The
Department developed a QHSR and supplemented it with a Bottom-
Up Review.
The GAO analyzed both of these documents and determined DHS
only fully addressed three of the nine 9/11 Commission Act
reporting requirements. DHS only partially addressed the other
six through the QHSR and other reports.
But most notably, DHS did not identify how these reports
are consistent with other National and DHS strategies. All
these different strategies are confusing to both Congress and,
more importantly, the components which have to implement these
strategies.
Just as important as identifying what the strategy is, is
understanding how DHS will implement it. How does DHS translate
words into reality?
The Wharton Business School has a model of best practices
for successful strategy implementation. Specifically, is there
an action plan? Is the headquarters' organizational structure
the correct size? Is there monitoring and control from
headquarters for implementing the strategy? Are core missions
and initiatives linked together to prevent duplication?
The bottom line is that DHS needs a single strategic
document which subordinate agencies can follow and make sure
the strategy is effectively and efficiently implemented. This
single document should conform to the National Security
Strategy in the United States, and if the agencies do not have
a clearly-established list of priorities it will be difficult
to complete assigned missions.
We understand DHS has a wide diversity of missions
including controlling our borders, securing transportation,
protecting the President, conducting sea search and rescue, and
researching radiation technology, to name just a few. Because
of this diversity it is important to have a single
comprehensive strategy.
Additionally, we must ensure each agency, whether it is
Customs and Border Protection, Secret Service, TSA, or Coast
Guard, is effectively implementing the strategy by making sure
headquarters has the proper monitoring and controls in place.
We ask these questions today to assist the Department and
determine what Congress can do to move the Department toward
the goal, as the Secretary said, of becoming One DHS.
So with that, I recognize the Ranking Minority Member who
appeared at this hearing in just the nick of time.
Bill, welcome.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
January 25, 2012
In December 2009, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano gave
a speech to her Department. She said, ``I see One DHS as a strong,
efficient, and focused Department--one where all the talents and skills
that we possess as individuals and as components come together and come
together in new and exciting ways to serve our missions.''
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third-largest
Department in the Federal Government with more than 200,000 employees
and an annual budget of more than $40 billion. Its transformation,
according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), is critical to
achieving its homeland security mission. However, the agency has been
criticized for excessive bureaucracy, waste, ineffectiveness, and lack
of transparency that have hindered its operations and wasted taxpayer
dollars.
For example:
The DHS Inspector General, in a November 2011 report,
concludes the Department has major challenges mainly in the
area of management, including acquisition, information
technology, grants, and finances. These challenges hinder the
Department's efforts to become a cohesive, effective, and
efficient organization.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concludes many
DHS management functions are high-risk, including acquisitions,
information technology, finances, human capital, and
integration, all resulting in performance problems and mission
delays.
Unless we fix these types of problems we will continue to see
failures in DHS programs such as the Secure Border Initiative virtual
fence, where in the end taxpayers received little if any return on a $1
billion dollar investment. And Secretary Napolitano will certainly not
attain her goal of ``One DHS'' until financial and management systems
are integrated.
Our subcommittee begins a series of hearings examining the
challenges DHS faces. We will be focusing the hearings on three basic
questions:
What challenges does DHS face?
Why is it taking so long to become ``One DHS?'' and
Do DHS shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core
mission of securing the homeland?
Today we begin with the basics by examining the DHS strategy and
its implementation to counter emerging threats. What is the DHS
strategy?
The Congressional Research Service concludes there are several
homeland security strategic documents with differing goals, priorities,
and definitions. These examples incorporate both White House and DHS
strategy documents including:
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security,
2010 National Security Strategy,
National Strategy for Counterterrorism,
Strategic Plan--One Team, One Mission, Securing Our
Homeland,
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and
Bottom-Up Review.
In the 9/11 Recommendations Act of 2007, Congress mandated DHS
develop a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, a QHSR, to update
strategies related to homeland security and align the strategy with the
Department's programs and activities. The Department developed a QHSR
and supplemented it with a Bottom-Up Review (BUR).
The GAO analyzed both of these documents and determined DHS only
fully addressed three of the nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting
requirements in the QSHR. DHS only partially addressed the other six
through the QHSR and BUR reports. Most notably DHS did not identify how
these reports are consistent with other National and DHS strategies.
All these different strategies are confusing to both Congress and
more importantly the components which have to implement the strategies.
Just as important as identifying what the strategy is, is
understanding how DHS will implement it.
The Wharton School of Business has a model of best practices for
successful strategy implementation. Specifically, is there an action
plan, is the headquarters' organizational structure the correct size,
is there monitoring and control from headquarters for implementing the
strategy and are core missions and initiatives linked together to
prevent duplication?
The bottom line is that DHS needs a single strategic document which
subordinate agencies can follow and make sure the strategy is
effectively and efficiently implemented. This single document should
conform to the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America. If the agencies do not have a clearly established list of
priorities it will be difficult to complete assigned missions.
We understand DHS has a wide diversity of missions including
controlling our borders, security transportation, protecting the
President, conducting sea search and rescue and researching radiation
technology, to name just a few. Because of this diversity, it is
important to have a single comprehensive strategy. Additionally we must
insure each agency--whether it is the Customs and Border Protection,
Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, or the Coast
Guard--is effectively implementing the strategy by making sure
headquarters has the proper monitoring and controls in place.
We ask these questions today to assist the Department and determine
what Congress can do to move the Department toward the goal of becoming
``One DHS.''
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for convening this hearing.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for their
participation and giving their time with us this morning.
Eleven years ago the heinous attacks of September 11 served
as the impetus for changing the way we approach homeland
security in the United States. Following the tragic day, 22
separate agencies, many with challenges all their own, were
combined to form the Department of Homeland Security. The
Department was tasked with carrying out the strategy that
defined the Nation's homeland security agenda.
Since that time, numerous National strategies were released
and further refined through time. Last year the Department of
Homeland Security released its first-ever Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review, which we will refer through acronyms, which I
hate afterwards, so try and remember all that that was. The
framework of this document, along with the President's National
Security Strategy, which, for the first time, included homeland
security as an integral component of our National security, has
set the Nation on a course to address not only counterterrorism
but emerging threats, such as National disasters Nationally,
climate change, and cybersecurity, as well.
Now that a more comprehensive National strategy approach is
defined, what are we doing now to really ensure that this is
going to be carried out? That is the question we are asking
today, but before we do that we have to determine whether the
requirements, roles, and responsibilities at the Federal,
State, and local levels are properly aligned, and above all,
the proper resources are allocated.
This past Congress the Department of Homeland Security has
suffered significant cuts, especially at the management level.
Furthermore, the Office of Policy, which is responsible for the
preparation of the QHSR and for developing and assessing the
implementation of the Department's long-term strategy, was one
of the hardest-hit office in the last rounds of cuts. Adding
insult to injury, the Department is still without a financial
management system that is integrated, functional, and up-to-
date, resulting in Department-wide struggles with fund
balances, improper payments, and Anti-deficiency Act
violations.
Although improvements have been made, the workforce
responsible for acquisition oversight is understaffed and its
procurement, information technology, and human capital
functions remain high on GAO's risk list. Furthermore, we are
still many years and many more dollars away from finishing what
was started in terms of consolidating the Department's
headquarters at St. Elizabeths.
These challenges may seem unrelated to strategy, but unless
these management challenges are fixed-mission execution will
suffer. That all being said, I look forward to today's hearing
and testimony, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. We have two very
distinguished witnesses on the first panel, and I would like to
go ahead and introduce them before their testimony.
The first is the Honorable Paul Schneider. He is a
principal at the Chertoff Group, which focuses on the defense
and aerospace industries, cybersecurity, systems engineering,
and major acquisition procurement and financial management.
Prior to joining the Chertoff Group, Mr. Schneider was the
deputy secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, where
he managed the day-to-day operations of a Department with over
200,000 employees and an annual budget of over $52 billion.
While at DHS he was also under secretary for management.
Thank you, and welcome to our committee.
Next we have Dr. Sharon Caudle, who is the faculty member
at a school that is near and dear to my heart, the Bush School
of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where
she teaches in the master of public service and administration
program and the certificate in homeland security program.
Before joining the Bush School she was with the U.S. GAO where
she focused on homeland security and National preparedness
strategic policies and programs.
So welcome, both of our witnesses.
With that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Schneider for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER, PRINCIPAL, THE CHERTOFF GROUP
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Keating, and Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to
appear before you today.
Based on my observations, former position, and years of
experience, I am here to provide my views about DHS's current
strategy and what direction they should be--they should
consider taking in the future. I believe the most serious
dangers facing our Nation today involve biological, cyber, and
nuclear threats. I know DHS takes these threats very seriously
and has instituted several programs to address these dangers,
but I am concerned that in some cases fiscal reality will limit
the resources that are available to counter these threats.
Biological is at the top of the list in terms of risk
because of the relative ease of accessibility to materials and
know-how, the potential consequences, and relatively low level
of National preparedness. Cyber, because of its pervasiveness
and difficulty in pinpointing attribution, has rapidly emerged
as a threat to all critical infrastructure areas.
Both nuclear and biological threats--for these what we need
is a very strong National preparedness posture comprised of a
very highly integrated group of stakeholders supported by
realistic plans and frequent exercises that provide confidence
in our preparedness and ability to respond.
I have several recommendations. First, emphasize
cybersecurity in the private sector with practical help. While
DHS continues to focus its funding on defending the Federal
Government networks there is an additional need for investment
support to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to our
mostly privately-owned critical infrastructure and key resource
systems as well as the State and local governments and
infrastructure providers.
I recommend establishing public-private partnerships in
order to perform the following: Create and institute IT portals
that easily convey Government requirements to large and small
businesses that will enable them to easily explain what they
have to offer. That is the seat of innovation in this country.
Set up programs with and for small and mid-size businesses
as well as State and local governments to educate them about
what they can do to protect their networks. Help in the
creation of private sector-run security operation centers to
provide cybersecurity services for small and mid-sized
businesses and for certain public sector utilities and entities
that will allow them to protect their network.
Establish a robust modeling and simulation effort. Focus on
resilience. Examine the need for more agile contracting
strategies to work inside of the stimulus-response cycle that
is needed for cyber issues.
No. 2: Restructure the focus of science and technology.
Significant budget cuts imposed on the Department's S&T effort
has led me to conclude that the whole nature of this function
has to change dramatically. After accounting for the existing
manpower levels, major laboratories, university research
centers, there are very little discretionary funds left to use.
So what I recommend doing in that particular case is to do
a restock and prioritization of the efforts that they focus on.
I know it is hard to make some adjustments, especially in
manpower, but in this budget scenario it certainly dictates
that.
We need to have a more focused and deliberate test and
evaluation effort in order to inform users of whether or not
the stuff they are buying works. It is not clear to me what
State and local and private organizations do in terms of buying
equipment that there is any competent technical authority has
said that the stuff is okay. That means shifting to threat-
based T&E as opposed to standards-based T&E, which is driven by
the industry.
I think you have to--they have to recognize that the
Department of Defense has a tremendous amount of talent, and so
what I think we need to be doing is harvesting that talent. I
would put together a team of people made up of the laboratories
at DOD, FFRDCs, DHS operational people, DHS FFRDCs, and look at
each of these operational areas and see what technology could
be immediately harvested.
No. 3: Consolidate the information technology effort under
the CIO. No matter what system you are talking about, DHS--the
underpinnings are a massive IT system. Frankly, they all are
interdependent, multiple databases, but yet individual
programs.
This needs to be consolidated. Put the funding under the
CIO. Then not just let programs individually decide what
modernization has to take place, but rather, let the CIO move
the Department in an integrative phase approach to maximize the
use of resources.
Fourth, consolidate the operations. When I was the dep sec
I was asked about basically: Should the Department have a
Goldwater Nichols? I always said at the time that at some point
it should, but it was too premature. At this point in time I
think it is important to start seriously considering how to go
do that.
Department of Defense did that in 1986 followed by the DMR
in 1989, and the fact of the matter is it now works. So from an
operational warfare--from an operational law enforcement
standpoint and from a headquarters integration standpoint that
is the thing to do. I realize that that is very hard to do, and
it would enable some operating components to lose some
individuality, but the fact of the matter is it needs to be
done.
I think the Department has come a long way since its origin
and will continue to improve over its years. I think as we look
to the future we need to make some of these improvements.
I want to conclude by thanking you for the opportunity to
be here today, your significant support of the Department and
its thousands of people, and I would be happy to answer any
questions that you might have.
[The statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul A. Schneider
February 3, 2012
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congressman Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee. It's a pleasure to appear before you today.
It has been approximately 3 years since I have left office as the
Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Since that time, I been consulting for the U.S. Government (except for
DHS); am a Principal in The Chertoff Group which is a company that
provides consulting, security, and merger and acquisition (M&A)
advisory services for clients in the security, defense, and Government
services industries around the world; and, I also currently serve on
several boards and advisory groups, including as Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Applied Science Foundation for Homeland Security.
My role with the Foundation and other small companies is done on a pro
bono basis.
Since leaving my position at DHS, I have had the opportunity to
observe the changing and challenging budget environment and assess its
impact on DHS operations and those of the homeland security enterprise.
Based on my observations, former position, and years of experience, I
am here today to provide my views about DHS' current strategy and what
direction they should consider taking in the future.
threats
I believe the most serious dangers facing our Nation today involve
biological, cyber, and nuclear threats. As you know it is very
difficult to convince the general public of the importance of these
threats. I know DHS takes these threats very seriously and has
instituted several programs to address these dangers, but I am
concerned that in some cases, fiscal reality will limit the financial
resources that are available to counter these threats.
Biological is at the top of the list in terms of risk because of
the relative ease of accessibility to the materials and know-how; the
potential consequences; and relatively low level of National
preparedness. Cyber because of its pervasiveness and difficulty in
pinpointing attribution has rapidly emerged as a threat to all critical
infrastructure areas.
For both nuclear and biological threats (and the wider range of
catastrophic threats) what we need is a very strong National
preparedness posture comprised of a highly integrated group of
stakeholders supported by realistic plans and frequent exercises that
provide confidence in our preparedness and ability to respond.
I think it is appropriate for DHS to accelerate ``fixing'' critical
infrastructure issues. The tiered approach to identifying the critical
facilities can serve as a map to developing and implementing a
mitigation plan.
emphasize cyber security in private sector with practical help
I am pleased that cyber security continues to receive the political
and financial support it does from the Congress. However, the extent of
this problem is huge. While the Department of Homeland Security
continues to focus its funding on defending the Federal Government
networks (the .gov domain), there is an additional need for investment
and support to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to our mostly
privately-owned critical infrastructure and key resource systems, as
well as State and local governments and infrastructure providers.
I find it amazing that within a 50-mile radius of this building
there is a nexus of expertise in this area that is without peer: The
Ft. Meade complex, major cyber security centers set up by the major
corporations, cyber incubators in the State of Maryland, the University
of Maryland Cyber Research and Development Center, etc.
To support the constantly evolving and persistent cyber threat, I
would recommend establishing a public-private partnership in order to
perform the following:
1. Create and institute IT portals that easily convey Government
requirements to large and small businesses that enable them to
easily explain what they have to offer. The rigid small
business methods and forums cannot match the near-real-time
speed that is required to keep up in this world; and yet there
is a tremendous amount of innovation and capability that can be
tapped.
2. Set up programs with/for small and mid-size businesses, as well
as State and local governments, to educate them about what they
can do to protect their networks.
3. Help in the creation of private-sector-run security operations
centers to provide cybersecurity services for small and mid-
sized business, and for certain public sector entities, that
will allow them to protect their networks.
4. Establish a more robust modeling and simulation effort that
allow relevant parties to strategize the threat space, model
the implications and determine risk mitigation approaches.
5. Consistent with the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
implementation program, focus on resilience to look at means to
quickly recover from a cyber-incident.
6. Examine the need for more agile contracting strategies that work
inside the stimulus-response cycle needed for cyber issues.
restructure the focus of science and technology
The budget cuts imposed on the Department's Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) have led me to conclude that that S&T must change its
entire nature in order to reflect its new budget reality. After
accounting for the existing manpower levels, major laboratories that
are funded by these appropriations and the University Centers of
Excellence, very little discretionary funds are remaining.
Therefore I believe the focus of DHS S&T should be as follows:
1. Emphasize a more focused and deliberate test and evaluation
program to inform users of the right equipment and systems to
deploy for the right mission. Work with the users to understand
the threat environment, their operational concepts for
operations to make sure the test procedures and environments
are relevant. Right now we have public and private institutions
around the country buying stuff and it is not clear if any
competent technical authority knows if it is any good.
2. Based on an aggressive T&E program to meet users' needs, develop
standards for devices and systems that could be procured by the
private and public sectors, not the devices themselves, because
it is impractical to think that the Government will get enough
procurement dollars to field the equipment themselves. This
means using T&E and threat-based standards as the basis to
inform users of the right equipment for the right mission
application. This moves away from the standards-based
(industry-driven) approach which is not the correct approach
for this situation.
3. Recognize that State and local governments and the public
sector, not just the DHS operational components, are the
recipients of S&T investment dollars and include their
priorities in the resource allocation process.
4. Aggressively harvest the enormous amount of technology that the
Department of Defense has been/is developing and with the
correct set of innovative people look at how to adapt it to DHS
uses. In this regard I recommend that consideration be given to
forming a team with representatives from Department of Defense
(DoD) laboratories and Federally Funded Research and Develop
Centers (FFRDCs) and the DHS Systems Engineering FFRDC with DHS
operational personnel to evaluate specific scenarios that DoD
technology could be readily adapted to enhance mission
effectiveness.
5. While DNDO is a separate organization, these recommendations
also apply to the work and RDT&E they do.Within DNDO, the
process was and I believe still is to work with State and local
law enforcement to determine how they would use detection
systems and then to test them using those Concepts of
Operations (CONOPs) against threat material and in
operationally relevant environments.
6. Readjust funding allocations from manpower, laboratories, and
University centers to S&T that directly and more immediately
supports the users.
consolidate information technology (it) under the chief information
officer (cio)
The Under Secretary for Management and the Chief Information
Officer (CIO) has made DHS the leader in data center consolidation and
the migration to the cloud. Once you have worked with the IT
underpinnings of DHS, you realize it is one massive IT system that many
different operational users use, with the bulk of the databases serving
multiple users under multiple systems and many are interdependent.
So, whether it is E-Verify, US-VISIT, TECS, and TTAC with all of
its component systems, there is interlocking because many of the same
databases are accessed in order for the Government to make
adjudication. Yet, observing on the outside, as I have, systems
modifications, modernizations, and upgrades are executed by individual
components that happen to be responsible for their programs and
systems.
While coordination and oversight can be effective, I think the
current environment dictates a different business model of centralized
command and control.
The IT area has and will continue to sustain large financial cuts
due in some part to the belief that IT is an enabler and therefore iris
investment ought to achieve savings. I agree that IT is enabler, but
the business management model that governs is as much of an enabler as
the technology itself.
Therefore I recommend the following:
1. Consolidate all of the IT funding under the DHS CIO;
2. Empower the CIO and the Under Secretary for Management to
determine how best to incrementally phase in a new IT
infrastructure building on what they have done with the data
center integration and cloud migration, by using the
appropriated funds for the individual systems, modulating
individual program priorities for the overall good of the
Department and the betterment of the overall IT infrastructure.
For this to succeed DHS will have to continue to make substantive
and sustained progress in developing a functional command and control,
communications, and requirements development.
change the business model for scanning equipment
Scanning is an essential part of the security architecture for
aviation security and in my view the technology is dynamic, driven in
large part to significant advances in the medical field. And as nano
technology emerges, to an even greater extent technology enables
enhancements in fidelity for screening in terms of quality and speed of
the throughput which will be highly desired and valued by DHS. Now,
these systems are procured and upgraded by the Government.
Given funding realities and the speed of which the commercial
sector can quickly develop and respond, this dictates shifting to a
business model whereby the Government specifies the requirements and
leases the equipment with stated service-level agreements regarding
performance like commercial IT contracts, including upgrade and refresh
requirements. DHS would essentially pay for this as a fee-for-service
lease. I am acutely aware that OMB has definite views of this type of
arrangement that may not be as supportive because of scoring
considerations.
In my view however, the changing nature of the technology, evolving
threat scenarios and the budget realities, demand that the current
business model be changed to one of a more commercial nature.
consolidate operations
While serving as the Deputy Secretary, I was frequently asked by
those Members of Congress who were on Homeland Security Committees and
Department of Defense Committees whether or not DHS needed ``Goldwater
Nichols (GN)'' legislation.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 Pub. L. 99-433, made the most sweeping changes to the United
States Department of Defense since the Department was established in
the National Security Act of 1947 by reworking the command structure of
the United States military. It was subsequently followed by the Defense
Management Review of 1989 which fully implemented the Packard
Commission's recommendations and the Goldwater-Nichols Act to
substantially improve the performance of the defense acquisition
system; and to manage more effectively the Department of Defense and
our defense resources.
I replied that the time was definitely not correct to do that
because DHS was still in its infancy, not all the requirements of GN
were appropriate to be considered for DHS, and that the Act's
operational and acquisition fundamental changes should ultimately be
considered and adapted for use by DHS, but timing was key.
At this point in time I think it is appropriate to start thinking
seriously about how to accomplish a modified version of GN for DHS,
since I think only a few major provisions as discussed below are
applicable at this time. The factor that drives me to this conclusion
is that I believe currently, no unified command structure exists for
DHS components in the field. Each component has individual field
structures with unique geographic boundaries and independent chains of
command. These lines of authority do not converge until they reach the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary.
Practically speaking, in the field, there are independent operating
components. I think this hampers operational effectiveness. While I am
aware there are several informal teaming arrangements in various ports
and cities, it is not the same as an integrated command-and-control
structure. Therefore, I recommend:
1. Develop a unified field structure with appropriate command-and-
control or coordination authority. This would provide an
opportunity for greater stability in State/local relationships
and ability to better coordinate DHS operations in the field.
2. Consideration should include various alternatives, such as
States, regions, ports, interfaces with DOD, and unique State
and local considerations and authorities.
3. Maximizing the collective effectiveness and use of joint assets,
both operationally and in the planning and execution of
logistics support functions.
I am aware that certain operating component statutory authorities
need to be addressed to make this work, but integration of assets at
the pointy end of the spear is essential in order to maximize
effectiveness in addressing the evolving threat scenarios.
The second major element of a GN move would be to examine
centralizing major acquisition programs in a ``DOD Systems Command''
type of structure separate from the Operational Components. This would
enable operating components to focus on operations and build upon the
critical acquisition mass currently available, while ensuring major
cross-component acquisition initiatives are executed in an integrated
manner (as many current operations are actually executed). As part of
this effort a total review of the acquisition process, its successes,
lessons learned, and next steps would be a useful step to help shape
the structure of this organization. All of this will eliminate
redundancy, while complying with an integrated enterprise-wide
architecture and offers the potential for tremendous financial
economies.
The basis for this recommendation is simple. The majority of DHS
operational people wears badges and carry guns. Is it smart to hold a
major component head, for example the head of CBP, with approximately
65,000 people, responsible for his 24-hr 7-day law enforcement
responsibilities around the world and at the same time, ask him to be
responsible for developing and fielding complex systems that must
integrate with other complex systems? Is this the correct model for the
future? I think the answer to both questions is no and that is why I
think this different structure is much more conducive to enhancing
effective operations.
In DoD they learned this a long time ago. That is why the Air
Force's Air Combat Command deploys planes and does not develop the F-
35, and why the Navy's COMSUBLANT operates submarines but does not
develop the Virginia Class Submarines.
I am aware that many organizations within DHS will disagree with
these recommendations and argue vociferously against any changes to the
status quo to protect their legacy functions and independence. So, it
would be the challenge to leadership to steer changes of this
magnitude. The DOD was created in 1947; GN was authorized in 1986, but
really didn't happen until the DMR in 1989 when the majority of the GN
changes took effect. It would be unreasonable to assume that this type
of change would be any different in time scale in DHS.
overlaps in the assignment/interpretation of homeland security roles
I think the issue of ambiguities and overlaps in the assignment/
interpretation of homeland security roles, responsibilities, and
authorities among Federal stakeholders are a continuing obstacle to
unity of effort within the Federal Government and our allied countries.
These overlaps and ambiguities also have the effect of fundamentally
undermining the credibility and ability of Federal agencies to
effectively engage with State and local governments and the private
sector.
As you're well aware, this is a very difficult and politically
charged issue that is difficult to rationalize. While, barring some
major catalyst, a holistic attempt to comprehensively frame and address
all roles/responsibilities/authorities issues is near impossible.
What is needed is a systems approach to identifying the overlaps
and ambiguities having the most significant implications for our
strategic outcomes (e.g., DHS/DOJ re: terrorism prevention and borders;
DHS/HHS re: Bio/mass casualty event preparedness & response; DHS/DOD
re: catastrophic response support to civil authorities). The challenges
with these issues is that agencies and components would rather live
with and work around current ambiguities than risk losing equities they
consider vital. Yet these same ambiguities significantly undermine
unity of effort, and increase risks of failure in preventing or
responding to potentially catastrophic events. I doubt many in the
administration or Congress have energy on this, but it is a necessary
factor that should be addressed.
conclusion
I think DHS has come a long way since its inception and will
continue to improve over the next few years. I believe as we look to
the future we need to make refinements along the lines I have
recommended before you today to meet the many challenges that lie
ahead.
I urge you to adapt these recommendations and direct their
implementation.
Thank you for your leadership and your continued support of the
Department of Homeland Security and its programs, and your support and
commitment to the thousands of men and women who dedicate themselves to
the defense of our great country.
Thank you for this opportunity to be here today and I am happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I appreciate your
comments about our support for the Department. We do.
The reason we are having these hearings is to find out how
we can reform the Department so it works more efficiently and
better for its employees. So I appreciate you saying that.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes Dr. Caudle for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHARON L. CAUDLE, PH D, THE BUSH SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Ms. Caudle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
be here today. I will specifically focus my remarks on DHS's
National preparedness approach as components of an overall
strategic framework, taking a look at what the requirements
are, expectations are for the homeland security community--
Federal, State, local, private sector, non-Governmental,
individuals, families, and communities.
First, there are major themes in DHS's strategy that
provide the context for challenges I will mention shortly.
These themes include, for example, homeland security, now
clearly a part of National security; the whole homeland
security community, including the Federal Government,
responsible for preparedness, from prevention to recovery,
including mitigation; all-hazards and the maximum capacity for
a catastrophic event as benchmarks for preparedness; core
capabilities and performance targets update past prescriptive,
detailed individual tasks, and target capabilities; and
finally, another homeland security management system crafted
with performance expectations and assessment mechanisms.
There are three challenges I see in the overall
preparedness strategy for subcommittee consideration. The first
challenge is whether there should be a fundamental change in
the capability-based approach to achieve National preparedness
to confront threats.
Federal policies to date, reinforced by legislation, center
on building and sustaining robust capabilities--skilled people,
material, and processes, and partnerships. This approach drew
on the experience of the defense community.
Over time DHS has attempted to link the billions of dollars
spent on preparedness with the development of these
capabilities. However, valid assessment remains elusive.
In my view, Federal funding constraints and similar
challenges for other levels of Government and related homeland
security partners present an opportune time to consider the
cost-effectiveness of other policy options. These would be
compared with the current capabilities approach.
I suggest that one option is adopting National and/or
international disaster and emergency management system
standards. As with management standards, such as the ISO 9000
quality standards, these can be applied to all organizations.
Already in place is DHS's PS-Prep National voluntary
program that does apply preparedness standards to the private
sector. Also, the current Emergency Management Accreditation
Program, EMAP, also based on standards, is targeted at State
and local emergency management programs.
If these disaster and emergency management standards were
adopted in lieu of the capabilities requirements, the entire
homeland security community would share common preparedness
standards, language, and assessment parameters. Of course,
still to be resolved would be if the standards should be
mandated as a National standard of care and how certification
or accreditation against the standards might occur.
The second challenge is whether implementation by the whole
community for what FEMA calls maximum of maximums, or mega-
disaster scenario, is pragmatically achievable. FEMA advocates
that modern disaster planning should be for a meta-scenario
that overwhelms all levels of government, including the Federal
Government. Worse-case planning under this strategy requires
the expertise and resources of the entire emergency management
community, from the Federal Government, to the private sector,
to the NGOs, to individuals and communities.
One visualizes all preparing for a catastrophe akin to a
mega-Hurricane Katrina, the Japanese earthquake tsunami and
nuclear event, or world-wide pandemic. It is not clear to me
how the Federal Government will operationally craft whole-of-
community preparedness for such a mega-disaster scenario.
Implementation details to date are sparse regarding how
members should interact to achieve mega-disaster capability
targets or make decisions regarding the investment of scarce
resources. Sound implementation would call for complex,
coordinated action, assessment, and the commitment of funding
that may be overwhelming and marked by imprecision.
The third challenge is whether DHS should include longer-
term emerging threats as priorities for action beyond near-term
strategies. Current DHS strategies narrowly target threats,
including a meta-scenario, with a distinct beginning and end--
think earthquake or terrorist attack. Left out by design are
conditions that are longer-term in their emergence as direct
threats to National security.
These include, for example, the impacts of global climate
change, global illicit trafficking and related transnational
crime, social disruptions, and economic and financial
instability. It is not clear how near-term threat capabilities
will prepare the country for the challenges of these longer-
term threats, often called ``global shocks.'' DHS certainly
understands the need for action anticipating these global
shocks under FEMA's Strategic Foresight Initiative, currently
underway.
Throughout these three challenges I urge the subcommittee
to consider the opportunity costs in DHS continuing to pursue a
comprehensive capabilities approach, insistence that the whole
homeland security community is being prepared for a mega-
disaster scenario, and delayed action on confronting longer-
term threats.
Thank you again for the opportunity, and I look forward to
any questions the subcommittee may have.
[The statement of Ms. Caudle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sharon L. Caudle
February 3, 2012
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee
today. My name is Dr. Sharon Caudle. I am the Younger-Carter
Distinguished Policymaker in Residence and Visiting Lecturer, The Bush
School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. I am
also a Senior Fellow at The George Washington University's Homeland
Security Policy Institute. This testimony represents my personal
opinions and not necessarily the opinions of the Bush School or the
Homeland Security Policy Institute.
Today's hearing focuses on whether the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is implementing an effective strategy to counter
emerging threats to the security of the Nation. In my statement today,
I first highlight the DHS policies and overall approach for
preparedness--from protection to recovery--currently in place as the
result of Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8 National
Preparedness). Then I focus on what I see as three challenges the
subcommittee should consider: (1) Whether there should be a fundamental
change in the operational approach to meeting a National preparedness
goal, (2) whether implementation of capabilities by the ``whole of
community'' from the Federal Government to individual citizens to
address the ``maximum of maximums'' threats is pragmatically
achievable, and (3) whether DHS should include other longer-term,
emerging threats as priorities for action in its near-term strategies.
current national preparedness strategies and approach
In the 5 years following the issuance of President Bush's first
National homeland security strategy, the administration and Congress
clarified the scope, mission areas, and responsibilities for homeland
security. National strategy objectives were consistent in four areas:
(1) Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, (2) protect the American
people, critical infrastructure, and key resources, (3) respond to and
recover from incidents that do occur, and (4) continue to strengthen
the management foundation of homeland security to ensure long-term
success.
President Obama's administration has continued the refinement of
homeland security policies and strategies, consistent with
Congressional action. In February 2010, DHS released the legislatively-
required Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report.\1\ As was the
case with earlier policies, the Report called for a National framework
of collective efforts and shared responsibilities to build and sustain
critical homeland security capabilities. The grave security environment
(beyond terrorism) identified in the Report clearly supported a broader
security stance: It was expected that violent extremist groups would
use terrorism to attack United States targets, social, and/or political
instability would continue, health threats would be more difficult to
prevent, technological developments, and cyber threats would pose
threats, climate change would increase weather-related hazards,
multiple simultaneous crises were likely, and complacency would be a
danger as major crises receded from memory.
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\1\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2010. Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure
Homeland. [February 2010].
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As the subcommittee knows, President Obama released a new National
Security Strategy that reflected the homeland security policies and
concepts identified in the Report.\2\ The Strategy reaffirmed the
``whole of Government'' approach, which is the need for all levels of
Government, if not the entire country, to strengthen National
preparedness. The Strategy retained the earlier policy notions of a
homeland security enterprise (Federal, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector entities, as well as
individuals, families, and communities sharing a common National
interest in American safety and security) and a culture of
preparedness.
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\2\ Obama, Barack. 2010. National Security Strategy. [May 2010].
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Presidential Policy Directive-8
The 2010 Report and the newer National Security Strategy set the
stage for both a restatement and revitalization of the Presidential
direction for National preparedness. President Obama's March 2011
Presidential Policy Directive 8 National Preparedness (PPD-8) replaced
the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) issued by
President Bush,\3\ which had been codified by Congress. The new
directive reaffirmed past policies and direction, calling for the
development of: (1) A National preparedness goal identifying the core
capabilities necessary for preparedness, and (2) a National
preparedness system guiding activities enabling the Nation to achieve
the goal. National preparedness was defined as actions taken to plan,
organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the
capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from the threats posing the
greatest risk to the Nation's security.
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\3\ Obama, Barack. 2011. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8
National Preparedness. [March 30, 2011].
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Specifically related to the subcommittee's interest in addressing
emerging threats, PPD-8 required that a new National preparedness goal
address specific threats and vulnerabilities. This overtly reduced
reliance on National planning scenarios issued several years earlier as
yardsticks to measure preparedness capabilities. The goal was to define
the core capabilities necessary to prepare for incidents posing the
greatest risk to the Nation's security. This made concrete a new policy
emphasis on maximum capacity for any major disaster or catastrophe.
The directive also mandated a new piece to the National
preparedness system--planning frameworks for each of the five
preparedness objectives--from prevention to recovery. It was envisioned
that each planning framework would include a basic plan to address all-
hazards. There would be roles and responsibilities at the Federal
level, but annexes would address unique requirements for particular
threats or scenarios. The directive also required a ``campaign'' to
build and sustain preparedness. This would integrate community-based,
non-profit, and private sector preparedness programs, research and
development activities, and preparedness assistance.
The PPD-8 Implementation Documents
DHS has issued a flurry of documents in response to PPD-8's
mandates. In May 2011, DHS issued the Implementation Plan for
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness.\4\ Under the
Implementation Plan, DHS was to perform a strategic, National-level
risk assessment applicable to National, regional, and local levels. The
assessment would help identify where core capabilities and associated
performance objectives for the entire homeland security community
should be placed, topped by the maximum preparedness capacity needed to
respond to a catastrophic event.
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\4\ DHS. 2011. Implementation Plan for Presidential Policy
Directive 8: National Preparedness. [May 2011].
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Thus, developing ``whole of community'' core capabilities for
catastrophes would not necessarily be restricted to specific threat and
hazard scenarios described in earlier National planning scenarios. FEMA
administrator Craig Fugate described the change as planning for a
``meta-scenario'' (or maximum of maximums) disaster. The basis for
planning was a worst-case scenario involving multiple factors to plan
for different hazards that challenges preparedness and overwhelms the
response capabilities of every Governmental level.\5\ As I understand
it, the scenario, a no-notice event, contemplates the impact area of at
least 7 million population and 25,000 square miles, and involving
several States and FEMA regions. It results in 190,000 fatalities in
its initial hours, with 265,000 citizens requiring emergency medical
attention. There is severe damage to critical infrastructure and key
resources, including transportation. The fiscal year 2011 Regional
Catastrophic Grant Program guidance uses the meta-scenario to promote
preparing for a catastrophe where extraordinary levels of mass
casualties, damage, and disruption overwhelm traditional and well-
established response and recovery plans and procedures.
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\5\ Fugate, Craig. 2011. Evolution of Emergency Management and
Communication. Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. [June 8, 2011].
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In September 2011, DHS issued the National Preparedness Goal First
Edition.\6\ The new Goal included detailed tables with core
capabilities for prevention through recovery (called mission areas) and
their preliminary targets. For example, prevention capabilities
included planning, public information and warning, operational
coordination, forensics and attribution, intelligence and information
sharing, interdiction and disruption, and screening, search, and
detection. Each capability was described; to illustrate, interdiction
and disruption is to delay, divert, intercept, halt apprehend, or
secure threats and/or hazards.
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\6\ DHS. 2011. National Preparedness Goal First Edition. [September
2011].
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The document made clear that these core capabilities presented an
evolution from the voluminous target capabilities list developed in
response to HSPD-8. The core capability targets would be the
performance thresholds for each core capability and the basis to
develop performance measures to evaluate progress in meeting the
targets. The description of the core capabilities and their preliminary
targets were significantly streamlined from the task and capability
lists issued in response to HSPD-8 and subsequently tied to Federal
homeland security funding. While still prescriptive, it appears the
notion was that streamlining should create more room for members of the
homeland security community to craft capabilities tailored to local and
regional considerations, as well as the National interest.
The Goal stated that a strategic National risk assessment should
confirm the need for an all-hazards, capability-based approach to
preparedness planning. DHS' December 2011 unclassified Strategic
National Risk Assessment grouped threats and hazards into National-
level events to test the Nation's preparedness.\7\ These included
natural, technological/accidental, and adversarial/human-caused threat
and hazard groups:
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\7\ DHS. 2011. The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of
PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach Toward a Secure and
Resilient Nation. [December 2011].
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Natural.--Animal disease outbreak; earthquake; flood; human
pandemic outbreak; hurricane; space weather; tsunami; volcanic
eruption; wildfire.
Technological or Accidental.--Biological food contamination;
chemical substance spill or release; dam failure; radiological
substance release.
Adversarial or Human-Caused.--Aircraft as a weapon; armed
assault; biological terrorism attack (non-food); chemical/
biological food contamination terrorism attack; chemical
terrorism attack (non-food); cyber attack against data; cyber
attack against physical infrastructure; explosives terrorism
attack; nuclear terrorism attack; radiological terrorism
attack.
The Goal did not address emerging or longer-term threats or drivers
of threats such as climate change identified in the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review Report. This was purposeful. The unclassified
Strategic National Risk Assessment said it evaluated the risk from
known threats and hazards. Those events, it noted, had a distinct
beginning and end and were clearly linked to homeland security
missions. Thus, political, economic, and environmental, and societal
trends possibly contributing to a risk environment but not National
events for homeland security were excluded from the assessment.
Nevertheless, the document said non-National-level threats, such as
droughts and heat waves, could pose risks to jurisdictions and should
be considered in preparedness planning.
In November 2011, DHS released a brief description of a new
National Preparedness System.\8\ Its components included: (1)
Identifying and assessing risk, (2) estimating capability requirements,
(3) building and sustaining capabilities, (4) planning to deliver
capabilities, (5) validating capabilities, and (6) reviewing and
updating. To identify and assess risk, the System document stated that
the Strategic National Risk Assessment would analyze the greatest risks
to the Nation. The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
guidance under development at that time would provide a common,
consistent approach to identify and assess risks and associated
impacts.
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\8\ DHS. 2011. National Preparedness System [November 2011].
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Measuring progress toward achieving the National Preparedness Goal
could be done through tools such as exercises, remedial action
management programs, and assessments. The National Exercise Program was
deemed the principal mechanism to measure readiness, supplemented by
exercises done by individual organizations. Training and performance
during actual events would test and validate achievement of desired
capabilities. On-going sharing of lessons learned and monitoring would
also occur through a remedial action management program and a
comprehensive assessment system of the whole community. A National
Preparedness Report is due in November 2012.
Major Themes in National Preparedness Expectations
Up to this point, I have briefly described the current National
preparedness policy, strategy, and guidance. It has highlighted a
number of major themes:
Homeland security placed within National security.
All-hazards as the centerpiece for preparedness for threats,
including terrorism.
Preparedness defined with the full coverage of objectives:
Prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery,
with response and recovery no longer the centerpieces of
preparedness.
The whole homeland security community in addition to the
Federal Government with the responsibility to protect National
interests and way of life.
Maximum capacity for a catastrophic event (a meta-scenario)
as the benchmark for preparedness.
Known threats and hazards with a distinct beginning and end
central to homeland security risk management and preparedness.
Core capabilities and targets for a National effort update
past prescriptive, detailed individual tasks and target
capabilities.
A homeland security management system to accomplish homeland
security and crafted with specific components, performance
expectations, and assessment and adjustment requirements.
Assessment of preparedness progress primarily through
exercises and actual events.
challenges in strategy and implementation
Now, I will turn to the challenges I see in the overall
preparedness strategy and its implementation to counter emerging
threats that the subcommittee should consider. The first: Should there
be a fundamental change in the operational approach to meeting a
National preparedness goal? The second: Is implementation of the
``whole of community'' for the ``maximum of maximums'' pragmatically
achievable? The third: What other emerging threats should DHS set as
priorities for action?
Alternative to the Current Capabilities Development Approach
The current and earlier National Preparedness Goal and their
supporting documents, as well as Federal legislation, have identified
the need to build and sustain specific preparedness capabilities for
the entire homeland security community. Federal, State, and local
governments, non-Governmental organizations, private organizations, and
the general public are that community. National preparedness comes from
capabilities across this whole community.
DHS in large part adopted the capabilities approach from the
Department of Defense where it was used by the defense community in
many countries.\9\ HSPD-8 required a National preparedness goal to
define measurable readiness (preparedness) priorities and targets, but
also with a caveat about the resource investments. PPD-8 called for
actions to achieve a preparedness approach to optimize the use of
available resources.
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\9\ Caudle, Sharon L. 2005. Homeland security capabilities-based
planning: Lessons from the defense community. Homeland Security Affairs
I, no. 2 [Fall 2005].
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Developing capabilities may have been the optimal route at that
time towards achieving preparedness, but whether other alternatives
that were better investments were considered was not made explicit--if,
in fact, they were even considered. In the interim, as the subcommittee
knows, DHS has provided billions in preparedness grants intended to aid
States, urban areas, Tribal governments, and non-profit organizations,
supposedly to strengthen their capabilities to meet threats associated
with potential terrorist attacks and other hazards. Over time, the
Department has attempted to link dollars spent with the development of
capabilities.\10\
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\10\ See, for example, the report Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
Preparedness Task Force. 2010. Perspective on Preparedness: Taking
stock since 9/11, Report to Congress [September 2010].
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Assessing preparedness based on National preparedness capabilities
remains very elusive. Summing the difficulties, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) \11\ found that evaluation efforts that
collected data on National preparedness capabilities faced limitations
such as data reliability and the lack of standardized data collection.
According to GAO, FEMA had problems in completing a comprehensive
assessment system and developing National preparedness capability
requirements based on established metrics. GAO \12\ continues to cite
these operational and implementation weaknesses, even though the
assessment of capabilities and evaluation of preparedness is a
legislative requirement. In addition, the GAO \13\ specifically found
problems with at least one tool mentioned by the new National
Preparedness Goal as central to measuring progress--the National
Exercise Program. FEMA's implementation of the National program has
consistently run into problems, such as ensuring if Federal and State
governments had addressed deficiencies identified by the exercises. In
March 2011, FEMA developed a new National Exercise Program Base Plan
that extensively revised the program, with major changes in
requirements and leadership.\14\ The verdict is still out whether the
past history of the Department of Homeland Security in failing to
adequately measure progress will be reversed.
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\11\ Jenkins, William O. 2010. FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in
Efforts to Develop and Implement a System to Assess National
Preparedness Capabilities. Letter to Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations [October 29, 2010].
\12\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2011. Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing
Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. GAO-11-881 [September
2011].
\13\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. National
Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and
Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. GAO-09-369 [April
2009].
\14\ U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2011. National
Exercise Program [March 18, 2011].
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Thus still left unanswered is the most significant question: What
preparedness did the billions of dollars buy? With Federal funding
constraints and similar challenges for other levels of government and
other members of the homeland security community for the foreseeable
future, this is an opportune time to consider if other policy options
might be more cost-effective, or, at a minimum, justify the current
policy of capabilities development and sustainability.
The capabilities approach is not etched in stone. There is at least
one policy option the subcommittee might consider to contrast with the
capabilities approach. This option is already grounded in Congressional
legislation and administration policies: Simply, it is the application
of National and/or international management system preparedness
standards applicable to all organizations, which I have advocated in
the past.\15\
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\15\ Caudle, Sharon L. 2011. ``National Preparedness Requirements:
Harnessing Management System Standards,'' Homeland Security Affairs,
7(14) [June 2011].
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There are two National voluntary programs where management system
preparedness standards, not elusive core capabilities, are used as the
benchmark for preparedness requirements. Legislation implementing many
of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations (Section 524 of the August
2007 Pub. L. 110-53) called for DHS to create a voluntary private
sector preparedness program with standards, including accreditation and
certification processes. In June 2010, DHS produced the Private Sector
Preparedness Accreditation and Certification Program (PS-Prep). Three
management system standards were approved for adoption in the program:
ASIS SPC.1-2009 Organizational Resilience: Security Preparedness, and
Continuity Management System; British Standard 25999-2:2007 Business
Continuity Management; and National Fire Protection Association 1600:
2007/2010 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs. At the end of September 2010, DHS announced a
certification program tailored to the needs of small business.
The other National effort using management system standards is the
current Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), a voluntary
review process for State and local emergency management programs. EMAP
certifies Government programs against standards directly based on NFPA
1600. State and local entities can use Federal homeland security grant
funding to pay for EMAP activities. Interestingly, at one time, FEMA
used the EMAP standards to administer its National Emergency Baseline
Capability Assurance Program. If there truly is to be a ``whole of
community'' effort, it would seem to be a necessary condition to have a
compatible approach for all the entities involved.
Still to be resolved would be whether adoption of the management
system preparedness standards should be mandated, perhaps tied to
Federal funding or regulations, and how certification or accreditation
against the standards would be conducted. Normally, management system
standards such as those under the PS-Prep program or EMAP are
voluntary, although compliance with such standards may be seen as part
of a legal standard of care across an industry.
Government agencies such as DHS could implicitly mandate standards
by using them as guidelines for complying with regulatory requirements.
Or the agencies may forego a mandatory regulation if they view
voluntary compliance as meeting policy goals. This seems to be the
Legislative and Executive branch approach taken with the PS-Prep
voluntary standards for the private sector. There are established
provisions that can be invoked for mandatory adoption as part of
National regulatory frameworks or legislation. The National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 and resulting Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119 (revised in 1998) mandated Federal
agencies use management system standards developed by either domestic
or international standards bodies instead of Federal Government-unique
standards (e.g., the National Preparedness Goal) in their regulatory or
procurement activities.
Implementing Whole of Community for the Maximum of Maximums
A second challenge is realistically implementing a ``whole of
community'' effort in anticipation of a ``maximum of maximums'' effort,
at least within 72 hours of a catastrophic incident. In June 2011
testimony, FEMA Administrator Fugate \16\ stated that emergency
management historically planned for scenarios to which Government could
respond and recover from. Instead, he testified that modern disaster
planning should be for a ``meta-scenario'' (or ``maximum of maximums''
event) destined to overwhelm all levels of Government. Such worst-case
planning would require the efforts of a ``whole community'' approach
intended to leverage the expertise and resources of Governmental and
non-Governmental stakeholders--the entire emergency management
community from the Federal Government to individuals, families, and
communities.
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\16\ Fugate, Craig. 2011. Evolution of Emergency Management and
Communication. Written statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security [June 8, 2011].
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The definition of ``whole of community'' is the same as ``all-of-
Nation'' in the new National Preparedness Goal: ``a focus on enabling
the participation in national preparedness activities of a wider range
of players from the private and nonprofit sectors, including
nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction
with the participation of Federal, state, and local governmental
partners to foster better coordination and working relationships.''
As the subcommittee knows, the emphasis on shared responsibility
and coordination is not new. President George W. Bush's June 2002
proposal to create DHS expressed hope that the agency would make State,
local, and private sector coordination one of its ``key
components.''\17\ The first National Strategy for Homeland Security
viewed homeland security as a concerted National effort. The approach
was based on shared responsibility and partnership involving the
Congress, State and local governments, the private sector, and the
American people in a concerted National effort to prevent attacks.\18\
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\17\ The White House. The Department of Homeland Security. June
2002. p. 3.
\18\ Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland
Security. July 2002, p. 2.
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Is the ``whole of community'' approach rooted in a mega-disaster
scenario realistic or, more particularly, cost-effective? One
visualizes all homeland security actors anticipating a catastrophe such
as Hurricane Katrina, a nuclear event, or a worldwide pandemic, that
will overwhelm all local and regional partners for a good length of
time. It is not clear to me how the Federal Government will actually
strategically and operationally determine ``whole of community''
preparedness for a mega-disaster going forward.
PPD-8 calls for planning frameworks with basic plans for all
hazards--presumably a maximum of maximum effort, plus specific threat
or scenario annexes. The Implementation details to date do not provide
the information on how members of the ``whole community'' should
interact to achieve these capability targets and what scarce resources
practically can be invested. It is expected that those details will
await the finalization of the National Preparedness System and the
publication of all National Planning Frameworks, also required by PPD-
8. The National Preparedness System will ``guide domestic efforts of
all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors and the
public.''\19\
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\19\ PPD-8. p. 2.
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In sum, the focus on ``whole of community'' may well be noteworthy,
but its implementation calls for complexity of coordinated action,
assessment, and funding that may be overwhelming and marked by
imprecision. A return to ``whole of Government'' may be more realistic,
simply because of the ties to Federal funding. Despite the uncertainty
of Government funding, it is reasonable to assume that preparedness
will retain its importance, although not perhaps to the hoped levels of
National capabilities for a meta-scenario.
Emerging Threat Priorities
A third major challenge I see that the subcommittee might consider
in the DHS strategy is addressing threats that are longer-term in their
emergence as a direct threat to National security. Among other things,
the September 2010 Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task
Force \20\ report to Congress called for: (1) Improving the ability to
strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and
associated policies and/or capabilities, and (2) develop a strategic
policy planning process that prepares for future challenges by
performing long-range assessments. The Task Force said that the
complexity of the envisioned homeland security and emergency management
enterprise, especially in terms of non-Governmental roles, means that
desired preparedness outcomes often may take years to achieve. In their
view, a range of dynamic issues--such as the environment, demographics,
economics, and health trends--are likely to play increasingly important
roles. Preparedness policies, therefore, should be anticipatory, not
reactionary, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.
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\20\ Local, State, Tribal and Federal Preparedness Task Force.
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I mentioned earlier, the hazards listed in the National
Preparedness Goal reference well-known, specific event hazards and
attacks determined by the current Strategic National Risk Assessment.
However, the current National Security Strategy and Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review Report explicitly define a strategic threat
environment and global trends that appear to have National preparedness
implications, although they are not described as imminent. These
include the gradual emergencies and disasters that result from
dependence upon fossil fuels, global climate change, fragile and
failing states, and global illicit trafficking and related
transnational crime, and economic and financial instability.
In a 2009 article on National security strategies,\21\ I discussed
drivers of changes in security on a National and global scale, such as
pandemics, population changes, and economic stress. These drivers
translate into threats to security, whether individually or
collectively, which countries have incorporated into their strategies.
In other countries, the security environment includes these longer-term
threats. In general, their National security strategies (including
those covering homeland security or domestic security) incorporate them
into the strategies and follow-on policy and operational requirements
and guidance. For example, climate change or environmental change pose
dangers that may occur on a National or global scale, such as more
frequent heat waves, droughts, flooding, reduced crop yields, and
wildfires.\22\ The Goal and supporting documents target building and
sustaining capabilities narrowly for the near-term threat of a meta-
scenario. It is not clear how these capabilities will prepare the
country for the challenges of the longer-term threats.
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\21\ Caudle, Sharon. 2009. ``National Security Strategies: Security
from What, for Whom, and by What Means,'' Journal of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, 6(1), article 22.
\22\ Hough, Peter. 2008. Understanding Global Security. 2nd ed.
London: Routledge.
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There have been a multitude of studies on these drivers or changes
with recommendations for immediate action. The Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) presented an analysis of
``global shocks''--cascading risks that become active threats as they
spread across global systems.\23\ These included pandemics, financial
crises, critical infrastructure disruption, and cyber risks,
geomagnetic storms, and social unrest. As the OECD study pointed out,
surveillance is central to risk assessment and management. In addition,
security agencies, working with regulatory agencies, should use, adapt,
and implement risk-assessment tools to design more resilient National
and international systems. Emergency management of future global
shocks, OECD said, called for policy options such as: (1) Surveillance
and early warning systems, (2) strategic reserves and stockpiles of
critical resources, (3) addressing where countermeasures to systemic
threats have been weak, and (4) monitoring of future developments that
could pose potential risks. OECD cited challenges such as insufficient
skills and knowledge to manage global shocks and obstacles to
international cooperation and coordination.
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\23\ OECD. 2011. Future Global Shocks: Improving Risk Governance.
OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, OECD Publishing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS certainly understands the need for action anticipating these
global shocks. FEMA's Strategic Foresight Initiative, initiated in
2010, emphasizes the importance of understanding and addressing the
drivers of future change.\24\ FEMA urges the emergency management
community to establish a foresight capability--identifying key future
issues, trends, and other factors with an eye to executing an agenda
for action over the next 20 years. Not surprisingly, FEMA identifies
well-known drivers--universal access to and use of information,
technological innovation and dependency, shifting U.S. demographics,
climate change, global interdependencies and globalization, Government
budget constraints, critical infrastructure deterioration, and the
evolving terrorist threat. The FEMA study says that through the
foresight process, over the next few decades very rapid change and
complexity will define the emergency management environment. FEMA says
that even slow-moving and predictable trends such as demographic
changes could be radically changed because of drivers such as climate
change or pandemics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ FEMA. 2012. Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2020:
Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty. Office of Policy and
Program Analysis [January 2012].
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FEMA sees a number of emergency management capabilities as needed
as part of strategic foresight that could be included in preparedness
efforts (pp. 13-20). For example, these include addressing dynamic and
unprecedented shifts in local and regional population characteristics
and migratory flows; anticipating emerging challenges and develop
appropriate plans and contingencies; employing alternative surge models
to meet the challenging confluences of social, technological,
environmental, economic, and political factors and conditions; and
remediating hidden vulnerabilities in critical supplies from water to
energy to medical products to offset threats to the full scope of
emergency management activities.
Throughout these three challenges, I urge the subcommittee to
consider if the current DHS strategies overweigh the opportunity costs
in continuing to pursue a comprehensive capabilities approach,
insisting on the whole of community being prepared for a maximum of
maximum event, and delaying action on confronting longer-term threats.
This concludes my statement. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee today and look forward to any questions you may
have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Caudle.
The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questions.
Yes, Dr. Caudle, in our home State of Texas we have many
homeland security operations on the ground. We have the largest
stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border, so we have CBP down there,
we have ICE--immigrations is obviously a huge issue in the
State of Texas--and then FEMA. Between hurricanes and the
wildfires that we saw out at Bastrop and all across the State
of Texas FEMA plays a huge role.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, though, there are
about probably five to 10 different, you know, documents of
strategies out there that doesn't unify the DHS mission. So my
initial question is: How does this lack of a comprehensive
strategy impact these operations that I talked about on the
ground and what can we do to fix that strategy so it works?
Ms. Caudle. I think overall is coming up, really, with,
what is the goal on the border? You know, certainly, as you
have mentioned, we are seeing issues around whether or not it
is border security, closing the border, stopping illegal
immigration or cargo or items that are coming across the
border, but then we also have a policy of immigration
enforcement in the interior that sometimes is counter to it.
I think overall, looking at what is the overall goal there
in terms of the border security and making sure that whether it
is ICE or the border security agents there, or the technology,
as Mr. Schneider talked about, are all ones that are looking to
that security aspect. Right now you do have different types of
opinion about what the actual goals are there, and certainly
the Texas Department of Public Safety has similar concerns when
they talk about border.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you.
Mr. Schneider, you talked a great deal about the DOD model,
Goldwater-Nichols, and how we could apply that model to the
management and strategy of the Department of Homeland Security.
I have been a big advocate for leveraging existing technologies
within the DOD to use within DHS--for instance, sensor
surveillance equipment that we use in Afghanistan, using that
on the Southwest Border. We talked to the generals in
Afghanistan on a recent CODEL--Mr. Duncan was with me--about
that very issue.
Can you elaborate more on this DOD model that you think
would be effective?
Mr. Schneider. Sure. Thank you.
Quick background: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made very sweeping changes
to Department of Defense since it was established in 1947. It
reworked the command structure of the United States military,
and that has led to the origin of why you have combatant
commanders, like CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, et cetera.
That fundamentally removed the responsibility from the
service chiefs from fighting of the war to these combatant
commanders that could put together adaptive packages--Army,
Navy, Air Force, Special Ops, et cetera--in those regions
responding to those unique threats. A fundamental change. Did
not go over easy; very difficult, busted a bunch of rice bowls.
But the fact of the matter is, if you take a look at how that
has progressed since the 1990s, to 2000, to the way we operate
today, I personally think it has been a huge success.
It was subsequently followed by the Defense Management
Review in 1989, which fully implemented the Packard Commission
Report, which led to Goldwater-Nichols. But basically it
substantially improved the performance of the defense
acquisition system and managed acquisition resources across the
Department. I think by any measure it has worked.
For example, the Air Force's Air Combat Command basically
operates aircraft. It does not manage the development and
production of the F-35. The COMSUBLANT operates nuclear
submarines. It does not manage the acquisition of the junior
class submarines.
So the two questions that I ask in my own mind when I look
at this relative to the Department is this: Do we want the head
of CBP, with 65--excuse me, roughly 65,000 people, 24/7
responsibilities, to keep the incorrect people and the bad
stuff out of the borders at the same time that we hold him
responsible for putting together very complicated C4 audios or
persistent surveillance systems along the border? Is that the
right model for the future?
In my mind, the answer to those two questions are
absolutely not, and that is why I think it is time to take a
hard look at what the operators do, what the warfighters do,
operate, and basically provide good law enforcement, and have
those people that are smart put together integrated systems
using the maximum amount of technology available and satisfy
those user requirements.
Mr. McCaul. That is a very interesting concept that I know
that this committee will be taking a close look at. Have you
had any discussions with the Department about using this model?
Mr. Schneider. When I was in the Department I was--I had
the opportunity--and part of my blood is probably in on this
floor somewhere--to have that type of discussion. I was
frequently asked by Members of the committee that both were in
the Homeland Security Committee and very knowledgeable at the
Department of Defense whether or not it is time for Goldwater-
Nichols.
My answer has always been, at some point in time it is the
right thing to do. I thought 4 years ago it was not the right
thing to do because it does create a lot of churn and frankly,
the Department was still in its infancy. If you take a look at
how long it took DOD to actually go implement it after it has
been started by any measure I thought 4 or 5 years ago was not
the right time. So I have always been consistent in saying that
and talking about that.
I think at this point in time, roughly 3 or 4 years later
since I was in the Department, it is probably a good time to
start thinking about it.
Mr. McCaul. Have you had any discussions with the current
administration about this?
Mr. Schneider. No. No. I really, for the most part, stay
hands away from the Department.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Schneider. That is by choice.
Mr. McCaul. I see my time has expired. I know the Ranking
Member is going to follow up on a line of questioning that I am
very interested in, as well, and that is the recent cyber
markup of the National Information Sharing Organization.
So with that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to get into those questions, but I do want to
follow up on just what you were saying, Mr. Schneider, too. You
know, I have seen CENTCOM work in the counterterrorism and it
was a wonderful thing to see, frankly, the way so many
different areas of government and the--and defense worked
together in one room, in one central command. I was so
impressed and pleased.
The trouble I have, as great as that model is--and I have
seen it happen and I have seen it work--we can't get the basic
jurisdictions of homeland security settled first. So, you know,
I agree with you in theory about that is a great approach, but
do you honestly think in this time frame that we mentioned,
since we haven't even set the jurisdictional problems that were
still there from the 9/11 recommendations and still
unfulfilled. In that framework how could we, at this time, ever
overcome that without dealing with the jurisdictional issues
that have to be dealt with first?
Mr. Schneider. Well, thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
I think the way to do that is to accept, basically,
something less than 100 percent solution. So if you go at--I
used to travel a tremendous amount of time on the weekends when
I was the deputy secretary. If you go visit many of the major
ports and key city areas--I don't care whether it is Detroit,
San Diego, Charleston, Seattle, Miami, et cetera--what you see
is, frankly, the individual organizations with, I will call it
the alphabet soup labels, informally working together--working
together. Not just within the DHS, but go to San Diego, they
work with the Navy, they work with the San Diego Harbor Police,
they work with local law enforcement.
The reason is basically is this: You have all these
organizations, you have sea assets, you have got air assets,
and things like that, so the smart people that are at a lot of
these places informally figure out a way to basically--figure
out how to maximize the effective use of all of those assets.
So I think you could do it, quite frankly, in--at not, maybe,
100 percent, but at least within the context of making
substantial progress. That is why I really believe that you
could do it.
Mr. Keating. Okay. I would love to see that happen in
reality, but I would say we would be lucky to get 10 percent
the way things are going.
But in any case, I have a question: We had a field hearing
earlier this year in the Port of Houston, and, you know, there
really struck me a great deal of how important that is to our
security in so many respects and the economic impact these
could have. Now, the President included the Nation's homeland
security agenda within the National Security Strategy, and in
that he included climate change as well as violent extremism,
but also natural disasters.
Dr. Caudle, how has this, you know, revamped whole-of-
government approach to homeland security strengthened the
Nation's preparedness? Because I think we saw first-hand what
could happen if there was a--not only a terrorist attack but a
natural disaster in something like the Port of Houston or in
Cape Cod.
Ms. Caudle. You know, certainly in theory the whole-of-
government, the whole-of-nation, whole-of-community I think is
fine as a theory. My problem with the language around that is
how do you practically leverage, really, the resources and
goals of all of the different communities all the way down to
the individual level?
It is one of those things that I think it is a principle
that we have seen consistently, in fact, since 9/11, if not
before, about having everyone working together. The practical
implications of the new National preparedness goal that the
President issued that really is a continuation, if not an
enhancement of what President Bush issued in his Presidential
Directive. I ask for what does this really look like in terms
of preparedness on the ground because you still have, as you
mentioned, jurisdictional issues, you still have issues with
resources, you still have people that are concerned with
existing capabilities, equipment, hazmat suits, and the like.
How do they sustain that and where is the money going to
come--anyway, and then the other thing is this whole issue of
whether or not the Federal Government can put together this
preparedness approach that really does not have an existing
framework and hasn't had, really, a strong existing framework
for management for the past decade.
Mr. Keating. Yes. I think, you know, just quickly, and a
common theme I have seen is the idea that we are retrofitting
our security issues with budgets.
You know, what I am afraid of is the next disaster that
comes we will just start spending and reacting to it and no one
will be objecting then, but I really think that in the larger
sense that this is very interesting here, and I appreciate both
your efforts to try and do what I call retrofitting the budget
we have. I really think, you know, the explanation has to be
more expansive than, say, ``Here is what we are facing,'' and I
think the American public will agree that that is a great
investment of our tax resources.
I have run out of time. If you get to fit into it, you
know, Mr. Schneider, we did have a hearing and a markup
recently on this committee where we moved forward with a
public-private approach to cybersecurity. I don't know if you
have a--can comment now or later, but that is something that we
have basic agreement on in this committee.
Mr. Schneider. If I may, briefly, cybersecurity is very,
very difficult, and I realize, frankly, from the perspective of
the committee there are so many different committees with
different jurisdictions of cyber, and you have to rational--you
know, my answer here would be this: I would also agree to--or
proceed to accept the half a loaf or a quarter of the loaf
rather than solve the world hunger problem.
The reason is this: You have to rationalize so many
different things. If we talk about cybersecurity in the
utilities, what about the FERC? If you talk about cybersecurity
and the companies on the exchange what about the regulation of
the SEC?
What about the privacy issues? If somebody basically
secures a network, how are they identified in case there is a
problem in this massive exfiltration and economic loss? You
have the economic trade issues and things like that.
So I would urge you to do this, quite frankly: I know how
hard this thing is, and I think if you can make some
incremental progress area by area this year, accept that as
success and then move on.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I am over my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you for your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Long.
Mr. Long. I have only got 14 seconds left.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony here today. Just because I
am an auctioneer they always want me to talk fast.
But, Mr. Schneider, to follow up a little bit on that, how
can we better handle cybersecurity? You are talking about all
these different committees and all these different
cybersecurity jurisdictions, and we all know that it is a huge
problem and I think that Leon Panetta is the one that said that
our next Pearl Harbor is going to be a cyber attack. You see
attacks every day and they are just going to get more egregious
so we really, really need to get ahead of the curve on this if
we can.
I know in my hometown of Springfield, Missouri we had some
folks that--I think it was $440,000, they owned a little tiny
title company, a land title company, and there was $440,000
removed from their bank account over the weekend, and I can't
remember now what country it--Afghanistan, I think it ended up
in, but what is your suggestion? What is your recommendation
for getting ahead of the curve on this? Everybody gives it a
lot of lip service but I never really hear anybody drilling
down on it.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you for the question. I appreciate
that.
I think you have to do two things. No. 1, you have to
recognize--and this is my own personal opinion, and I spent
most of my life in DOD, is that when DOD talks about
cybersecurity they are really talking about, in many cases, a
potential for cyber warfare, and what is the escalation curve--
--
Mr. Long. You spent most of your life in what?
Mr. Schneider. In Department of Defense.
Mr. Long. Okay. I thought you said DOT----
Mr. Schneider. No, no, no, no. No, I was----
Mr. Long. I don't like acronyms. I am still trying to
figure out what D.C. stands for, so--spell it out for me.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Long. I thought you said DOT. I am sorry----
Mr. Schneider. No, I am sorry. I wasn't clear. So
Department of Defense.
When they talk about cybersecurity a lot of what they are
talking about has to do with cyber warfare, escalation,
attribution, and what do you do. When DHS, much to their
credit, though they have the spearhead responsibilities, a lot
of what they talk about is, frankly, securing dot-gov. Dot-gov
is that domain that basically is the Government's network. The
problem is you have the DHS piece and then you have all these
other departments.
What I think we need to be doing is to focusing on not the
big defense companies, because they have millions of dollars to
spend on network security. I am talking about the small, the
mid-sized companies. I am talking about the State and local.
I think we need to figure out a way so that the Government
can assist in the development of these cyber secure operation
centers that can be done locally, regionally, in many ways like
physical security except it is cybersecurity. Come up with a
commoditized scheme by which a lot of these State and local,
small, mid-sized companies in these jurisdictions can have
affordable cybersecurity for their networks.
That takes a fundamental shift in focus from the big DOD,
DHS, dot-gov, dot-mil systems to the rest of the country. I
believe that, if properly incentivized, the industry, which--
with its expertise in this area, could make a financial market
to invest in this area and expand. That is just one thing I
would do.
The other things you could do is just self-education. There
is a lot of bad information that is out there about what you
have to do, and if one could sponsor a series of forums--
educational events and seminars and things like that would have
widespread regional and local distribution, that would go a
long way for basically informing the general public of the
seriousness of the problem.
Mr. Long. Say that again, that last part again. If you had
regional what?
Mr. Schneider. Cybersecurity operational centers and
educational forums. I think it would help raise the educational
level of awareness of the public of the severity of this
problem.
I honestly believe that until you personally get hacked and
pay a price, like happened to me about 2 weeks ago, it becomes
real, okay? So what you have to do is raise the awareness of
the general public, not just the high-profile players like DHS
and DOD and the dot-gov, dot-mil folks, but the rest of the
population.
Mr. Long. But if we have got too many people trying to
watch the pot how do we correct that? I mean, if we have----
Mr. Schneider. You have always got to have--you are always
going to have the people. There are so many different
jurisdictions of this and there are so many potential impacts,
and to be honest with you, you have a reluctance, as happened
yesterday, I heard on the radio, of companies that have serious
problems--cyber attacks--from divulging that. The reason is
they don't want to affect their stock price; they don't want to
see a run on their investors, and things like that.
So there has to be some sort of a truth in discussion
ground rules that are set up for this. This is a massive
problem that is not going to be solved in a year, and that is
why I really think the right thing to do is agree on a
consensus on a couple small pieces that make a difference,
approve them, and then start working on the next set.
Mr. Long. Okay. Thank you. I am past my time.
I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Just to follow up, the sharing of information, that is
something we try to put forth in this bill--and I know
Intelligence Committee has one as well--to protect that
information so that these companies can share that with the
Government without it being divulged. You are right, they have
a duty to their stockholders.
I think on the education and awareness piece, I know NSA
has said that probably 70 percent of this could be through
education and awareness computer hygiene--proper, you know,
computer hygiene, so--with that, I now recognize--Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Schneider, in your testimony you propose that the
Department should shift its business model for scanning
equipment outside of the Government and focusing on outsourcing
to commercial vendors. As you also rightly note, this is a
model that is frowned upon by the Office of Management and
Budget due to the cost.
Would it not be wiser to keep those funds in house or
inside and use them to build on science and technology within
the Department, and perhaps we get a little bit more mileage
out of that?
Mr. Schneider. Thanks. Thanks for the question.
This is one of those situations I feel that unless you had
the job I had, it is not very obvious to the outside world.
When you take a look at the budget, this is the budget of
reality, and Congress has been kind enough to increase, over
the years, the amount of operational law enforcement people.
If you take a look at the Department, the amount of dollars
required for salaries, throw in a couple of billion for the
Disaster Relief Fund, throw in a couple of billion for the
grants, that is about 70 percent of the dollars that are
appropriated. That doesn't leave much money. A big chunk of
what that remaining money is is IT.
So when you are faced with massive scanning equipment that
is out-of-date and you need to refurbish it or you need to
update it you are talking about big bills. From my standpoint,
when I was there and especially today, the Department will
never get that amount of money to do this. These are very
expensive machines.
We are very fortunate that medical technology--imaging
techniques and things like that--drive innovation. I am hopeful
that with the advent of dental technology and the like it will
increase the capability of the machines, but the simple fact is
when you are there you just don't have the money, and my take
is you will not have the money in the future, to actually go
out and buy these machines and then worry about refresh,
update, et cetera, and maintenance.
So my recommendation would be change the business model.
Not basically outsource it, but get a long-term lease with--
just like the IT providers do today, you have service level
agreements, reliability, refresh requirements, and things like
that, and pay as you go. It is a financing matter, in my mind,
and it accepts budget reality that you will never get the big
chunk of money you will need.
Frankly, I had great difficulty with the folks at OMB in
this matter, and this gets back to--this gets to the issue of
whether it is a capital lease or an operating lease, and I have
been away from it too long to remember the differences, but the
one that they don't like is what they consider this type of a
scheme. I, personally, at the time, thought that they were
wrong.
So you are not outsourcing, you are basically leasing. You
can call that an outsource, but it is no different than your
car.
So I just am heavily biased by the budget reality that I
lived under, and more importantly, the more stringent budget
reality today. I think this really needs to be looked at.
Mr. Davis. Well, thank you very much. It seems to me that
we do a great deal of experimenting, I mean, almost every time.
I mean, the airport that I use most frequently and there seems
to be a different approach.
But thank you very much, and let me thank you.
Dr. Caudle, let me ask you, is it safe to say that the
National Security Strategy released by President Obama was
drastically different from the strategy that was released by
President Bush?
Ms. Caudle. In terms of tall--I mean, calling it drastic, I
think in both strategies there is recognition of the strategic
threat environment that the Nation faces. The difference that I
saw in what President Obama put out was this emphasis on
placing homeland security within National security. You could
see it coming and I think it--to my mind it certainly made a
lot of sense to do that because homeland security, as you know,
doesn't stop at the borders, is a cliche that we normally will
say, and so extending the borders out in terms of National
security and what we do overseas internationally, what we do
with our defense establishments, as well, has implications for
homeland security. So that is what I saw as a--the major
feature.
There also was an emphasis on some other areas in engaging
partners that was a stronger emphasis, but by and large, at
least from my area of expertise, that encompassing homeland
security--and what it said to me, as well, was that it was
likely we will not have a National strategy for homeland
security. The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report that
tended to replace the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland
Security--I think now we will only see that National Security
Strategy, so taking it as the document for, really, what are
the goals that are laid out there, but then how do you
operationalize, you know, as I am sure others will talk about.
Many of these National strategies are almost statements of
principle. What the SEVA committee is focusing on is: What is
this boots on the ground? What are the realities? What is the
management scope that you really need to start paying attention
to? What is the oversight? Where is the money going? Where is
the personnel going?
So that is where--the strategies are fine, the new emphasis
on homeland security, but how do we drive it down now for the
preparedness, for the security that the Nation is asking for?
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. It is a little build on
what we are already doing, I would assume. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
timeliness of this hearing, especially coming in the wake of a
hearing yesterday in Foreign Affairs where we talked about the
Iranian threat within the hemisphere and globally.
I want to thank you for mentioning the trip to Afghanistan
because since we were there in November I have given a lot of
thought to our border security here in this country, and it is,
you know, no secret that I believe that one of the roles of the
United States Government is to defend the sovereignty of this
country, and I look simply at our porous Southern Border and
wonder what we can do, what we should be doing, what we can do
more of, and where we are making mistakes.
So as we talk about the effective implementation of a
strategy I wonder what is the actual strategy of the Department
of Homeland Security with regard to the border, because I read
report after report that says we should put our emphasis here
or should put our emphasis here. Mr. Chairman, I think about
that Pakistani-Afghan border where there is a natural port of
entry on Main Highway 1 that we saw, but then the berm that was
created and the, I think, 60 cuts in that berm that allowed
illicit activity to come across.
When we think about Afghanistan we think about IEDs and
Taliban fighters and enemy combatants coming across, but what
we were told is what is trying to circumvent that natural
border crossing was money, drugs, and weapons. It really wasn't
the Taliban or enemy combatants or IEDs, that most of those
were attempting to come through that natural port of entry.
So thinking about that and thinking about the September
2011 GAO report that cited DOD officials who are concerned that
there is no comprehensive Southwest Border security strategy
and the National Guard's role has been ad hoc, and then I look
at this Texas Border Coalition's January 2012 recent report
that talks about--we have put a lot of our emphasis on border
crossings outside of the natural ports of entry. It has really
brought my focus back to the border crossings and the ports of
entry.
Reading this I learned that there are 52 border crossings
in the Southwest, eight of which are rail, 43 are roadways,
there are 24 bridges, two dams, 17 roads, and one ferry. So
when you go to approach a problem you look at what are the
easiest things to do, you address those first, then you broaden
your scope until you solve the problem.
This year I have had the opportunity to go to Israel and
look at the West Bank border crossings, what Israelis have done
with fencing and ports of entry, and interdiction back in their
country and the timeliness of it. So the question I have for
you guys is why, based on this Texas Border Coalition's report
saying our problem, most of the drugs and illicit activity that
are coming across are not circumventing those ports of entry
and coming across that no man's land, so to speak, on our
border; a lot of it is coming through that natural port of
entry where we have got the personnel.
You all have mentioned the number of--the increase in
Department of Homeland Security Custom and Border Patrol
personnel just in the last decade, and my gosh, from $400
million to $3.6 billion we have spent a lot of money on
focusing on the Southwest Border, but are we not being
effective if we are not focusing on the easiest thing, and that
is where we are funneling that traffic through a natural port
of entry where we already have systems in place? So what should
we be doing there? How can we start there and then expand it to
the fencing, the areas of surveillance and other things in the
no man's land, so to speak, where we don't have a port of
entry?
So my question to you, Mr. Schneider, is what should we do
on the ports of entry? How can we make sure we do the easy
things first?
Mr. Schneider. Congressman, first, I am a little dated
because I have been out of office for 3 years, but I can tell
you that based on what I experienced when I was in the
Department that the more we basically put up fencing, the more
we used air assets, it focused people on the ports of entry.
That is why what we saw, in many cases, at some of the ports,
the--I will call it the frustration by the bad people to
actually force their way, brute force, bad incidents right
through the ports of entry.
So I know what we did at the time was to really beef that
up relative to the security, beef that up relative to at the
ports, the entry procedures that they have to do to basically
get approval to cross, and frankly, rely heavily on
intelligence and awareness and things like that. That is true
of the personnel crossings and that is true of especially the
border crossings with heavy automobile traffics, from the large
ones, like at San Ysidro, to some of the small ones----
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this, because we are about out
of time, but do you feel like they are just overwhelmed based
on the amount of traffic that comes through those port of
entries?
Mr. Schneider. Traffics are huge, and they are going to get
huger. I know there is a modernization plan to expand that.
I think a lot has to do with intel. I don't know what is
classified and unclassified; I am removed. But I can tell you,
when you start talking about interfaces with DEA and ATF and
things like that, and who passes what, and different analysis
techniques and things like that, when I was there we were using
that and using that effectively. I can only assume that just
based on a lot of how that technology has evolved over the
years and greater workings with some of these other
organizations on intel that the performance in responding to
that threat has gotten greater. But again, I am a little dated.
Mr. McCaul. Thank the gentleman.
I have been informed we have votes coming up in just a
couple of minutes. I think this worked out perfectly.
So the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
Cybersecurity Subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, from New York.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul.
Thank you to our panelists for your testimony today. I just
wanted to note that with respect to the GAO report, General
McCaffrey also stated that as part of the strategy we need to
include comprehensive immigration reform, and that is always a
major part of a missing link when we are talking about our
border security.
But my question goes to you, Mr. Schneider, and it is with
regards to the references that you have made in your testimony
specifically around Goldwater-Nichols. I know that you are a
proponent of DHS adopting Goldwater-Nichols.
Some of us disagree with the assertion that Goldwater-
Nichols' framework is applicable at DHS, because as you rightly
stated, it has still not reached its maturity. By your own
testimony, DOD was established in 1947 but Goldwater-Nichols,
although authorized in 1986, did not take effect until 1989--so
42 years after DOD was stood up.
So given this time frame, do you think that DHS is still
not ready, especially--don't you think that it is not ready,
especially in light of its other challenges, for Goldwater-
Nichols?
Mr. Schneider. No. I think it is ready, and the reason is
if you take a look at the long historical basis for a lot of
the services--Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, et cetera--I
think it was a tougher nut to crack, to put it mildly. I fought
the world change, quite frankly, when in the late 1980s I was
watching TV and I think it was Haiti I saw on the helicopters
flying off the decks of the United States Navy aircraft
carrier. So fundamentally things worked better, packaging the
right amount of people from the different specialties, et
cetera. That is why Special Ops gets a lot of credit to these
days, and that is why I think these combatant commanders do a
good job.
I am not sure that there is any right time, and I am not
sure how long it is, but the fact of the matter is, the longer
you wait on something like this the less possibility you are
going to have of reaching some earlier amount of effectiveness
than if you waited. So I think it is different, quite frankly.
Law enforcement is different than the military, and I learned
that from being in the Department.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Dr. Caudle, for the first time ever
President Obama including the Nation's homeland security agenda
within the National Security Strategy. Furthermore, he included
in his strategy climate change, violent extremism, and National
disasters. How has this revamped the whole-of-government
approach to homeland security and strengthened the Nation's
preparedness?
Ms. Caudle. You know, certainly at present we don't see the
follow-on of those emerging threats in the current National
preparedness system that DHS has put up. The new National
preparedness goal, the capabilities, and so on, specifically
talked about only near-term threats, a beginning and end. So
these emerging threats, they are saying, are something that
will be under consideration with the next Strategic National
Risk Assessment Review.
Certainly it is important. FEMA is working on their
Strategic Foresight Initiative, which has identified that as an
issue that should be addressed.
So we will have to wait and see how it is actually
incorporated. There is some discussion in the National
preparedness goal documents about mitigation, but they tend to
be still for only a near-term, beginning-and-end-type disaster.
So hopefully we will be seeing that emerge hopefully over the
next several years.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Let me ask--and this is to you, Dr.
Caudle--the previous administration's National Security
Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security excluded
response to natural disasters from its definition of homeland
security. How has the inclusion of this term in new strategies
strengthened our response system, and as efforts are taken to
further reconcile definitions of homeland security should there
be an effort to make sure natural disasters continue to be
included in the definition?
Ms. Caudle. Well, certainly. The new homeland security
definition, although it is not in legislation, really speaks to
the all-hazards approach, from terrorism, natural disasters,
accidents, and the like, so you really have encompassed in
homeland security all of the threats and hazards or drivers of
those threats and hazards that are important.
The inclusion or non-inclusion almost became moot after
Hurricane Katrina because the country realized that natural
disaster--the Deepwater Horizon oil spill also was another
indicator of these are the types of threat and hazards that are
not just terrorism that the country should be paying attention
to.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank you.
Let me just--I would like to enter into the record, if
there is no objection, the Texas Border Coalition report. It
basically says without strategy America's border security
blunders facilitate and empower Mexican drug cartels. It says
America's border security effort lacks strategic direction and
operates on an ad hoc basis. So without objection, I would like
to enter this report into the record, as well.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the Texas Border Coalition
January 12, 2012
without strategy: america's border security blunders facilitate and
empower mexico's drug cartels
The United States Government spent about $90 billion over the past
decade to secure the U.S.-Mexico border.\1\ The results are mixed, with
apprehension rates up to 90 percent for undocumented persons seeking to
cross the frontier between designated U.S.-Mexico border crossings, yet
the Mexican drug cartels continue to enjoy commercial success smuggling
more drugs than ever into the country through the legal border
crossings.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``$90 billion spent on border security, with mixed results,''
Boston Globe, June 26, 2011, Martha Mendoza, Associated Press.
\2\ Ibid.
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``America's border security effort lacks strategic direction and
operates on an ad hoc basis.''
A significant part of the $90 billion Government expense has been
the deployment of U.S. military forces, including the National Guard,
to supplement Border Patrol and Customs and Border Protection forces on
the Mexican border. A recent Government Accountability Office briefing
on the costs and benefits of the Department of Defense role in securing
the Southwest land border reported that DOD officials ``are concerned
that there is no comprehensive southwest border security strategy'' and
the National Guard's role has been ``ad hoc.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased
Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land
Border, GAO-11-856R September 12, 2011.
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As the United States spent $90 billion seeking to secure the
Southwest Border, the Mexican cartels have continued to smuggle
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine through the legal border crossings
in California and South Texas, and marijuana between border crossings
in remote areas of Arizona.\4\ They generally smuggle smaller loads of
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine in non-commercial vehicles (cars,
SUVs, and pickup trucks) to blend in with cross-border traffic.\5\
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\4\ U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center
``National Drug Threat Assessment 2011'' August 2011.
\5\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, the White House,
``National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy'', June 2009.
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As the Mexican drug cartels flourish in the face of $90 billion
spent to secure the border through which they conduct their trade, the
United States continues to focus on border security tactics grounded in
operation that began in the 1990s when an anti-immigration backlash
fueled crackdowns code-named ``Operation Gatekeeper'' and ``Operation
Hold-the-Line.'' Debates in Congress focus on building more fences and
walls and whether to snuff environmental protections for public lands
on the Southwest and Northern Borders.
``The legal border crossings on the U.S. southwestern border have
become America's weakest border security link.''
As reported by the Department of Defense and the Government
Accountability Office, America's border security effort lacks strategic
direction and operates on an ad hoc basis. Without a strategy, America
will continue to lose the border security war to the better financed,
equipped, more mobile and agile drug cartels. Our National success
depends on defining and executing a strategy to defeat the cartels
attacking our Nation.
The legal border crossings on the U.S. Southwestern Border have
become America's weakest border security link. Since the cartels choose
to smuggle most of their products through the border crossings, a
sensible strategy would be to attack their trade where it occurs and
anticipate where their smuggling operations might move in response.
Yet, the Department of Homeland Security has chosen to ignore these
developments and refused to develop a strategy to confront them.
Budget forecasts by Department of Homeland Security officials
suggest no new funding for border security infrastructure at the
official border crossings for many years and personnel accounts will
essentially remain static during that time.\6\ While new equipment may
become available, some cannot be utilized because the electrical
facilities at the border crossings are outdated and inadequate to
support the expensive new tools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Meeting Land Port of Entry Modernization Needs in Constrained
Budgetary Environment,'' presentation by Mikhail Pavlov to the Joint
Working Committee, October 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress and the administration confront a choice when considering
strategic directions for securing the U.S-Mexican border. At a minimum,
the Texas Border Coalition recommends that Congress and the President
have a strategy rather than addressing this challenge ad hoc.
``Spending additional billions of dollars on more fencing-walls or
exempting the Border Patrol from the rule of law should be
lower priorities until the border crossings can be made
functional in securing our borders.''
The strategic paths forward offer a choice between closing the gaps
between the border crossings, where criminals face a 90 percent
likelihood of apprehension, or addressing the inadequate
infrastructure, technology, and law enforcement personnel at the
Southwest Border crossings where criminals are less challenged by an
apprehension rate of merely 28 percent.
The Texas Border Coalition suggests that the only reasonable path
forward is to refocus our border security priorities where our Nation
is most vulnerable: At the legal border crossings. Spending additional
billions of dollars on more Border Patrol agents, fencing-walls, or
exempting the Border Patrol from the rule of law should be lower
priorities compared to making the official border crossings functional
in securing our borders.
To choose the other path and continue to fight the border security
war where it has been won (between the border crossings) and to
continue to surrender the war where we are losing (at the border
crossings) is to threaten our National and border security and resign
our Nation to defeat.
This document is focused on the security aspects of border
strategy, especially as they related to Mexican drug cartels. There are
additional benefits to improving the security at America's border
crossings, including facilitation of legitimate trade and travel with
Mexico, providing a major benefit to the American economy and jobs.
U.S. manufacturers and consumers depend on ready access to Mexican
markets and goods. U.S. exporters serve the Mexican market and profit
from foreign sales. Border region businesses in Arizona, California,
New Mexico, and Texas tie their livelihoods to trade and create jobs
for American workers. Mexico is America's third-largest trading partner
behind only Canada and China.
U.S.-Mexico trade totals $400 billion, a nearly five-fold increase
since the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
with most goods crossing via commercial truck. More than 13,000 trucks
bring over $630 million worth of goods into the United States from
Mexico every day. U.S. exports to Mexico total $163 billion.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign
Trade Division annual report, 2010, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a matter of general strategy, America cannot solve our budgetary
problems solely by cutting expenses. We must increase our revenues.
Making our border crossings more efficient in conducting legal trade
with both Canada and Mexico will increase our National revenues and
give us the resources to fight the other problems we face in our
borders.
border security background
The U.S. Government divides its effort to enforce the land border
with Mexico into two parts: One at the border crossings and the other
between them. Along the nearly 2,000-mile border with Mexico, 42
official border crossings--located on bridges in Texas and on highways
in California, Arizona, and New Mexico--connect the two nations, under
the command of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The CBP has
multiple responsibilities, including facilitation of legal travel
across the borders as well as defending against terrorist intrusions.
Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol has responsibility for policing the
vast areas that separate the border crossings. CBP Officers handle
traffic through the official border crossings.
``The probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended by law
enforcement between the border crossings is about 90 percent;
the probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended
attempting to enter the U.S. at the border crossings is about
30 percent.''
Since 1993, the United States has engaged in a long-term effort to
increase enforcement on the Southwest land border with Mexico. It has
invested heavily in manpower, technology, transportation, and
infrastructure to arrange a multi-layered defense against illegal
activities, but that investment has lacked balance.
The investment in deterrence has been greatest between the border
crossings; in contrast, the investment at the border crossings
themselves has been relatively small. This imbalance has produced a
substantial differential of risk to those who seek to penetrate the
border to cause harm to U.S. security. While there is admitted weakness
in some of the data, the probability of an illegal crosser being
apprehended by law enforcement between the border crossings is about 90
percent; the probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended
attempting to enter the United States at the border crossings is less
than 30 percent.
This imbalanced deterrence contributes to America's vulnerability
to the Mexican drug cartels, terrorists, and traffic in people and
contraband at the designated border crossings.
between the border crossings
Since 1993, the number of agents deployed to secure the borders
between the border crossings has more than sextupled from 4,000 to a
projected total of 24,285 in 2012.\8\ The Border Patrol budget has
increased nine-fold over the same period from $400 million to $3.6
billion.\9\
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\8\ Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal 2012, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, February 2009.
\9\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``In 2010, the value of cross-border travel at the U.S. border
crossings and exports with Mexico and Canada totaled more than
$791 billion.''
The vastly expanded effort between the border crossings accelerated
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 2003
incorporation of the Border Patrol into the new Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol's priority was
to prevent the illegal entry of people and contraband into the United
States between the border crossings. After the September 11 attacks,
fighting terrorism was established as one of the agency's prime
responsibilities.
In addition, Congress funded construction of 670 miles of border
fence, now completed at a cost to taxpayers of over $2.4 billion,\10\
and an electronic detection system that has been canceled and restarted
at a cost exceeding $1 billion.\11\
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\10\ GAO-09-896 Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment
Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
Washington, DC, September 2009.
\11\ Ibid.
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at the border crossings
Despite expanded responsibility and an exponential increase in
legitimate trade and tourism across the Southwestern Border as a result
of the North American Free Trade Agreement's ratification in 1993, the
enforcement budget for Customs inspection personnel has seen a paltry
boost when compared to the sharp increase in funding for the Border
Patrol. Funding for inspectors increased from $1.6 billion in 1993 to
$2.9 billion in 2012.\12\ Of that 80 percent increase over 19 years,
nearly three-quarters was consumed by rising inflation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal 2012, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, February 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has 163 official border crossings. The General
Services Administration (GSA) owns 96.5 and leases 22.5. The National
Park Service owns one. CBP owns the remaining 43, of which 39 are
located on the Northern Border. The CBP border crossings are relatively
low-volume entry points, such as those on the Canadian border that
handle fewer the 100 vehicles a day, while the GSA border crossings
tend to be larger and have higher traffic volumes, such as at Laredo,
Texas, which sees several hundred every minute.\13\
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\13\ OIG-10-05, Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Expenditure Plans for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Depart of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General,
Washington, DC, October 22, 2009.
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On the U.S.-Mexico border, there are 52 border crossings in all, of
which 8 are rail lines, 43 are roadways (24 bridges, 2 dams, and 17
roads), and 1 is a ferry. For record-keeping purposes, the Government
divides the crossings into 26 crossing groups, with data from a set of
neighboring crossings aggregated under the name of a master port.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Atlas of the Land Entry Ports on the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Border Policy Research Institute, Western Washington University,
Bellingham, Washington, Fall 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``The emphasis on Border Patrol enforcement between the border
crossings has shifted factors of risk associated with illegal
crossings.''
United States and Mexico facilitate 240 million legal crossings a
year, nearly 30,000 per hour. The United States' two largest export
markets are Canada and Mexico. In 2010, the value of cross-border
travel at the U.S. border crossings and exports with Mexico and Canada
totaled more than $791 billion.\15\ Three out of four of all legal
entries into the United States occur at an official border
crossing.\16\
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\15\ U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Trans-Border Freight Data, http://www.bts.gov/programs/
international/transborder.
\16\ GAO-08-329T: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Border Crossings: Statement of
Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
Washington, DC, January 3, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
roles not interchangeable
The operational roles of the Border Patrol and CBP inspection
officers are not interchangeable. Few recommend attempting to solve the
imbalance between the two forces by reassigning Border Patrol agents to
the border crossings. Besides weakening security between the border
crossings, the training and outlook of the two forces does not qualify
Border Patrol agents to substitute for CBP officers.
The primary activity of a Border Patrol agent is to Line Watch: To
detect, prevent, and apprehend terrorists, undocumented aliens and
smugglers. The Border Patrol does not recognize any legitimate activity
in crossing the border between the border crossings.
``Apprehensions of persons seeking to enter the United States between
the border crossings--where all entries are illegal--has fallen
to levels not seen since 1970s, as the enhanced manpower,
mobility, communications, technology, and infrastructure have
been brought to bear on the traffic.''
While CBP officers also defend against terrorist intrusion by
identifying high-risk individuals who are attempting to enter into the
United States at the border crossings and stopping criminal activities,
they have additional responsibilities that are quite different from the
function of Border Patrol agents. CBP officers are responsible for
regulating and facilitating legitimate international trade and travel,
collecting import duties, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations,
including trade, drug, and immigration laws. CBP officers must be able
to distinguish between legitimate activities and those that violate our
laws as they interact with the public in a polite and respectful
manner.
multi-layered strategy
The multi-layered strategic deterrence built by the Border Patrol
between the border crossings has increased the difficulty of illegal
crossings, although controversy remains about the deterrence associated
with individual layers or whether the effort actually deters migrants
who are determined to the enter the United States to improve the
economic state of their families.\17\
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\17\ Evaluating U.S. Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican
Migrants Can Tell Us, Wayne Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative
Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, CA, April 14,
2009.
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The emphasis on Border Patrol enforcement between the border
crossings has shifted factors of risk associated with illegal
crossings. Interviews with migrants show that the use of ``coyotes''
\18\ for illegal crossings has increased markedly, which boosts the
probability of successful illegal entry. This demand has also increased
the cost of services.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ A coyote or pollero is a professional criminal specializing in
smuggling humans across the United States border from Mexico for a fee
paid in advance.
\19\ Evaluating U.S. Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican
Migrants Can Tell Us, Wayne Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative
Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, CA, April 14,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
weakness of data
The lack of statistically reliable data related to the number of
undocumented aliens residing in or entering the United States year-
over-year hampers effective analysis related to border security. In
addition, in spite of the data's inherent weakness, Department of
Homeland Security agencies consider some volumes of related data to be
``law enforcement sensitive'' and restrict public and academic access
to it.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
For instance, estimating the flow of undocumented migrants is often
an approximation based on apprehension data reported by DHS. The
estimated probability of apprehension is often based on factors that
include the number of Line Patrol hours of Border Patrol staff and the
relative strengths and weaknesses of U.S. and Central American
economies. More recently, this data has been supplemented by classified
data compiled by DHS based on observation from unmanned aerial vehicles
patrolling the border. While the comparison of apprehensions at and
between the border crossings is not as precise as would be optimal, the
estimates included in this report are based on the best available
existing information, some of which has been publicly supplied by
Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin.
between the border crossings--90 percent probability of apprehension
Apprehensions of persons seeking to enter the United States between
the border crossings--where all entries are illegal--has fallen to
levels not seen since 1970s, as the enhanced manpower, mobility,
communications, technology, and infrastructure have been brought to
bear on the traffic.
In addition, increased apprehension rates in most Border Patrol
sectors, up to 90 percent according to Customs and Border Protection
Commissioner Alan Bersin, vastly impedes the trafficking of persons
from Mexico to the United States between the border crossings.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Border commissioner touts greater enforcement, San Diego Union
Tribune, January 5, 2011 by Elizabeth Aguilera, and The Border is Safe,
Federal Officials Say, Texas Tribune, August 17, 2011 by Julian
Aguilar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two notes of caution: The data remains weak, and 90 percent
apprehension rates do not mean only 10 percent of persons seeking
illegal entry gain it. In fact, most of those who attempt to enter the
United States illegally try more than one time, and eventually nearly
all make it through.
Another point: The old belief that for every apprehension, three
more gain entry (the getaway rate) is being proven untrue. Commissioner
Bersin says that as a result of more reliable data provided by airborne
surveillance vehicles deployed in the past several years by the Border
Patrol, the Border Patrol detects far more illegal entries and catches
a greater percentage of them.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``Immigrant arrests nearing 40-year low'' The Arizona Daily
Star, September 4, 2011 by Brady McCombs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Only 28 percent of `major violators' attempting to enter the U.S. at
the official border crossings are detected and apprehended.''
Finally, as the Border Patrol improvements in manpower, mobility,
communications, technology, and infrastructure have made illegal
crossings more difficult and hazardous, the criminal cartels operating
in Mexico have moved into the human smuggling market, forcing mom-and-
pop smuggling operations out of business and increasing the cost of
cross-border transport to would-be immigrants.
Without the infusion of many billions dollars more, the United
States has achieved about as much control of illegal entries between
the border crossings as possible without solving the core problem: Our
immigration system must be modernized to accommodate immigration needs
and provide adequate channels for people to legally enter the United
States so they do not try to go around a broken system. We must have
comprehensive immigration reform in order to achieve continued
improvement in the effective control of our borders between the border
crossings.
at the border crossings--28 percent probability of apprehension
According to the most recent data released by the DHS, only 28
percent of ``major violators'' attempting to enter the United States at
the official border crossings are detected and apprehended.\22\ In
addition, CBP reports only 50 to 74 percent success in improving the
targeting, screening, and apprehension of high-risk international cargo
and travelers to prevent terrorist attacks, while providing processes
to facilitate the flow of safe and legitimate trade and travel.\23\ The
Department, under the claim that the statistics are ``law enforcement
sensitive,'' has not released more recent data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ A major violation involves serious criminal activity,
including possession of narcotics, smuggling of prohibited products,
human smuggling, weapons possession, fraudulent U.S. documents, and
other offenses serious enough to result in arrest.
\23\ Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report for
Fiscal Years 2008-2010, Department of Homeland Security Office of the
Chief Financial Officer Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington,
DC, May 7, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strategic response of the enemy
``Nearly all of the drugs smuggled into the U.S., and the guns and bulk
cash smuggled into Mexico transits via official border
crossings.''
U.S. border security strategy should not operate in a vacuum. The
smuggling of drugs and humans into the United States and the smuggling
of money and firearms into Mexico fuel the criminal cartels operating
from the Mexican side of the border. The cartels are mature
organizations, possessing sophisticated communications, transportation,
and intelligence systems. They are richly informed about the
environment in which they conduct their criminal operations and highly
skilled at evaluating risk and executing strategic and tactical
operations based on risk judgments. One cartel, the Zeta organization,
``looks very much like any global business organization that can
quickly, flexibly, and effectively respond to virtually any
opportunity, challenge, or changing situation.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ A ``New'' Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security
Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies, Dr. Max G.
Manwaring. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle,
PA, September 25, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These criminal organizations are capable of discovering and
exploiting weaknesses between the border crossings, but the Border
Patrol has developed tactical mobility and agility to identify and
respond to such threats. When presented with a choice between one path
that presents a less than 30 percent risk of failure and another that
presents an up to 90 percent risk of capture, the cartels naturally
choose the less risky path. In the present environment, the cartels are
choosing to conduct their trade across the bridges and highways,
through the sanctioned border crossings and are rejecting the risk of
crossing the Rio Grande and open desert between the border crossings.
As reported by Los Angeles Times writer Richard Marosi, ``One of
the Sinaloa cartel's main pipelines runs through the antiquated U.S.
port of entry at Calexico, a favorite of smugglers. The inspection
station sits almost directly on the border, without the usual buffer
zone of several hundred feet, so inspectors have difficulty examining
cars in the approach lanes. Drug-sniffing dogs wilt in summer heat that
can reach 115 degrees . . . Drugs were brought from Sinaloa state to
Mexicali, Mexico, in bus tires. (The smuggler's) job was to move the
goods across the border and deliver them to distributors in the Los
Angeles area, about 200 miles away.
``The flow was unceasing, and he employed about 40 drivers,
lookouts, and coordinators to keep pace.''\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``Inside the Cartel: Unraveling Mexico's Sinaloa drug cartel''
The Los Angeles Times, July 24, 2011 by Richard Marosi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Threat
Assessment 2010, nearly 90 percent of cocaine, methamphetamine,
marijuana, heroin, and MDMA smuggled into the United States enters
through the border crossings. A joint project on U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation coordinated by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
Center and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego
indicates that bulk cash to fuel the Mexican drug cartels' illicit and
violent activities transits through the border crossings. And while
data on the smuggling of firearms is incomplete, available information
points to border crossings as the overwhelming point of entry into
Mexico.
The conclusion is irrefutable that nearly all of the drugs smuggled
into the United States, and the guns and bulk cash smuggled into
Mexico, transits via the border crossings, a strategic choice made by
the Mexican cartels because the likelihood of being detected or
apprehended is three times more likely between the border crossings
than at them.
strategic choices for the united states
Those who mean our Nation harm have adjusted their strategies and
tactics to reflect situational changes faster than DHS and Congress can
adjust. Because of the U.S. Government's relative lack of nimbleness,
DHS and Congress continue to pour billions of dollars of our National
resources into defending the vast expanses of land between the border
crossings, a path that the enemy has abandoned, while denying resources
needed to defend the border crossings that the enemy has chosen to
directly assault.
The choice for U.S. policymakers appears clear: Between (1)
continue on the strategic path that wastes resources and produces fewer
results by continuing to emphasize border protection between the border
crossings and (2) changing our strategy to defend against an adroit,
responsive enemy that is attacking us at the border crossings (while
preparing for the enemy's next logical move, most likely aimed back to
the water and the skies).
As Doris Meissner, former commissioner of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, put the choice: ``The more [money] that you
pour into the Border Patrol and into enforcement between land ports of
entry (border crossings) . . . the more pressure there is for people to
misuse the system that gets them through land ports. It's important to
have a balance of resources between both.''\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Border Security Falls Short In Audit, GAO Criticizes Staffing,
Training By Spencer S. Hsu, Washington Post, November 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``The more [money] that you pour into the Border Patrol and into
enforcement between border crossings, the more pressure there
is for people to misuse the system that gets them through the
legal border crossings.''
The scenario envisioned by former Commissioner Meissner has already
been in place for years: A field study conducted in the first quarter
of 2009 by the Mexican Migration Field Research and Training Program,
based at the University of California-San Diego, found that more than
one out of four (28 percent) of unauthorized Mexican migrants
interviewed for the study had entered the United States on their most
recent trip to the border through a legal border crossing, either
concealed in vehicles or using false or borrowed documents. The authors
noted that ``while crossing the border through a POE costs
significantly more than crossing in remote areas (people-smugglers can
charge $5,000 or more for POE crossings), that mode of entry is much
more likely to yield success.''\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Wayne A. Cornelius, David Fitzgerald, Pedro Lewin-Fischer, and
Leah Muse-Orlinoff, Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis: A
Transnational Perspective (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2009), pp. 61-62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have
described the situation at the border crossings as inadequate to the
task of protecting the Nation. GAO found that managers at 19 of 21
border crossing offices cited examples of anti-terrorism activities not
being carried out, new or expanded facilities that were not fully
operational, and radiation monitors and other inspection technologies
not being fully used because of staff shortages. At seven of the eight
major border crossings GAO visited, officers and managers told of not
having sufficient staff, which contributes to morale problems, fatigue,
lack of backup support, and safety issues when officers inspect
travelers--``increasing the potential that terrorists, inadmissible
travelers, and illicit goods could enter the country.''\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO-08-329T: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Border Crossings: Statement of
Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
Washington, DC, January 3, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although they refused to make the data publicly available for years
because they classified it as law enforcement sensitive, DHS officials
recently acknowledged publicly that for the border crossings to
successfully complete their mission, the agency needs 6,000 additional
personnel and $6 billion in funding for infrastructure and
technology.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``Meeting Land Port of Entry Modernization Needs in
Constrained Budgetary Environment,'' presentation by Mikhail Pavlov to
the Joint Working Committee, October 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``DHS officials recently acknowledged publicly that for the border
crossings to successfully complete their mission, the agency
needs 6,000 additional personnel and $6 billion in funding for
infrastructure and technology.''
In response, Congress has allocated zero dollars to border crossing
infrastructure in fiscal 2011 and is likely to refuse to add funds in
fiscal 2012. House and Senate appropriators have both approved adding
350 new CBP inspectors in fiscal 2012, but acknowledge that declining
customs revenues will force a reduction of an equal number available to
the agency, making the added personnel a net of zero. While technology
is in the pipeline for delivery to the border crossings, a lack of
adequate electric infrastructure often makes new equipment useless.
Instead of dealing with the strategic threat to the United States,
Congress has chosen to focus legislation to deploy more Border Patrol,
build additional walls and fences and exempt the Border Patrol from
regulations that protect communities' air and water, safeguard our
public lands and honor our cultural and historic heritage.
texas border coalition recommendations
The Texas Border Coalition suggests that mandating more Border
Patrol, fencing and waiving environmental law reflects an ineffective,
anachronistic strategy that has not kept pace with developments at the
border or with the risk assessments made by the criminal cartels. TBC
urges Congress and the Obama administration to restore balance to
border security at and between the border crossings by engaging in an
emergency program to provide the border crossings with $6 billion in
funding for infrastructure and technology and to employ 6,000 new
inspectors on America's front line over the next 4 years.
It is important that the new inspectors must be assigned to the
front lines of the border crossings where they are needed, not to
supervisory roles. According to GAO, prior personnel buildups at the
border crossings have resulted in a 17 percent increase in CBP managers
and only a 2 percent increase in the number of front-line CBP
officers.\30\ Anecdotally, there is evidence of this pattern over a
period of many years. The Nation's security cannot afford to see an
intended increase in front-line inspectors siphoned off to the
management level of CBP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO-06-751R, Information on Immigration Enforcement and
Supervisory Promotions in the Department of Homeland Security's
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection,
Washington, DC, June 13, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``TBC urges Congress and the Obama Administration to restore balance to
border security at and between the ports by engaging in an
emergency program to provide the border crossings with $6
billion in funding for infrastructure and technology and to
employ 6,000 new inspectors on America's front line over the
next four years.''
In addition, the TBC commends the leadership of many border
Representatives in Congress for their attention to developing a real
strategy for confronting the criminal cartels and security on the U.S.-
Mexico border. We especially wish to salute Michigan Representative
Candice Miller, Chair of the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, and Texas Representative Henry Cuellar, Ranking Democrat on
the subcommittee, for advancing legislation requiring the Department of
Homeland Security to develop strategy for securing borders within 5
years.
Finally, TBC agrees with CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin that public-
private partnerships (PPPs) are vital to fund the projects necessary to
handle the ever-increasing trade between the United States and Mexico.
Since CBP officials have announced that any PPP relationship would
require a new law, we propose legislation be enacted to authorize
public-private partnerships for expenses at border crossings.
summary
In a world of asymmetrical threats to U.S. security, the United
States cannot rely on outmoded tactics rooted in the past to defend the
homeland today. It is vital that Congress and the Obama administration
take immediate action to strengthen our Nation's weakest link in border
security: American Southwestern Border crossings must be strengthened
with a crash program of $6 billion to bring our infrastructure up to
requirements and the hiring of 6,000 additional Customs inspectors.
Mr. McCaul. I want to thank the witnesses for attending
this portion of the hearing, and, Dr. Caudle, for you flying
all the way out from my home State of Texas; I really
appreciate your testimony here today.
We have votes coming up so we are going to adjourn this
panel. We should be back around 11:45 to begin the testimony of
the second panel. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come back to order. I know
many of us have flights to catch so I would like to--the
Ranking Member will be here shortly, but I think in the
interest of time we are going to go ahead and proceed.
I would like to go ahead and introduce the witnesses and
then hear their testimony. First we have Mr. Shawn Reese, who
is an expert on homeland security policy at CRS. He has written
numerous reports for Congress at the Federal, State, and local
levels on homeland security policy issues.
He has testified before the House Government Reform and
Oversight Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee
on Federal counterterrorism training programs. Prior to coming
to CRS Mr. Reese was an officer in the United States Army for
10 years.
Welcome, Mr. Reese.
Next we have Mr. David Maurer, who is the director in the
U.S. GAO homeland security and justice team, where he leads
GAO's work reviewing DHS and DOJ management issues. His recent
work in these areas includes examining DHS management
integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret
Service financial management, DOJ grant management, the Federal
prison system, and an assessment of technologies for detecting
explosives in the passenger rail environment.
Welcome, Mr. Maurer.
Last we have Alan Cohn. He is deputy assistant secretary
for policy at the Department of Homeland Security. He was
formerly a director of emergency preparedness and response
policy in the DHS Office of Policy Development and counsel at
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, a very good Texas law firm.
He took part in the response to the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing as an emergency medical technician in New York City and
the response to the 9/11 attacks--and we thank you for your
service in that regard--then the 2005 hurricane season as a
member of FEMA's National Urban Search and Rescue Response
System.
I want to thank you all for being here today, and the
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Reese for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE, ANALYST, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Reese. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Congressional
Research Service I would like to thank you for this opportunity
to appear before you to discuss the homeland security strategy.
CRS was asked to discuss National policy on homeland security
as communicated in National strategic documents.
My written statement addresses key findings, which include
the absence of a consensus definition of homeland security and
varied strategic missions that may result in a vague homeland
security concept. I will briefly discuss the various homeland
security definitions and missions identified in National
strategic documents.
A consensus definition is necessary but not sufficient. A
clear prioritization of strategic missions is what is needed.
Prior to 9/11 the United States addressed crises primarily
through separate prisms of National defense, law enforcement,
emergency management. Nine-eleven prompted a strategic process
that included the debate over and the development of homeland
security policy.
Today, this homeland security policy debate and development
has resulted in a plethora of Federal entities with homeland
security responsibilities. For example, there are 18 Federal
departments with homeland security responsibilities excluding
DHS, and OMB states that approximately 48 percent of Federal
homeland security funding is appropriated to these Federal
entities.
The concept of homeland security evolved over the last
decade, and this evolution has been communicated in several
strategic documents. As stated earlier, they include the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the DHS Strategic Plan
of 2008, the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the 2010 Bottom-Up
Review, and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
While definitions and mission embodied in these strategic
documents have commonalities, there are significant
differences. Natural disasters are specifically identified as
an integral part of homeland security in only four of the six
documents, and only two of the documents--the Bottom-Up Review
and the Strategic Plan--specifically include border and
maritime security and immigration in their homeland security
definition.
All of these mentioned issues are important and require
significant funding. However, the lack of consensus about the
inclusion of these areas of policy may have negative or
unproductive consequences for National homeland security
activities.
A consensus definition is necessary but not sufficient. A
clear priority of strategic missions is what is needed.
So why is this important to Congress? As deficit reduction
causes demand for reduced Federal spending Congress will likely
pay more stringent attention to homeland security funding. With
reduced funds comes the need for higher degrees of
organization, focus, and clarity about the purpose and
objectives of homeland security.
Additionally, if homeland security policy priorities are
unclear Congress' ability to provide effective oversight may be
hampered. For example, how can policymakers determine whether
to authorize and fund additional personnel for such areas as
border security as opposed to aviation security?
What are the priorities of homeland security and how do
such priorities help determine the right choice between
additional border patrol agents or aviation security screeners?
Limited resources heightens the importance of prioritization.
Additionally, Congress, due to its oversight function,
evaluates the execution of current homeland security policies.
For example, do the DHS homeland security grant programs
provide a measurable impact on State and local security? What
strategic missions are expected to be fulfilled through the
expenditure of grant funds? Where do those missions fit
relative to one another in terms of priority?
In closing, a vague homeland security concept may hamper
Congressional authorization, appropriation, and oversight
functions. It may also restrict the Executive Branch's ability
to prioritize and implement policy initiatives. Failure to
effectively prioritize and utilize homeland security
investments today can affect the Nation's security and
potential vulnerability tomorrow.
I will conclude my testimony here. If CRS may be of further
assistance to you I and my colleagues are here to assist.
Once again, thank you for the privilege to appear before
you today.
[The statement of Mr. Reese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shawn Reese
February 3, 2012
introduction
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the Congressional Research Service I would
like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
National homeland security strategy.
The subcommittee requested that CRS discuss National policy on
homeland security as communicated in National strategic documents and
the report CRS is developing on Homeland Security Definitions, and
Missions.
Accordingly, my statement summarizes the salient portions of this
CRS work, and addresses key findings which include the absence of a
universal definition of homeland security and varied strategic
missions. Ten years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the U.S. Government does not have a universal view of ``homeland
security.''
Currently, different strategic documents and mission statements
offer varying homeland security missions. The strategic documents
framing the U.S. homeland security mission include National strategies
produced by the White House and strategy statements developed by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The White House has produced
documents such as the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
2010 National Security Strategy, and the National Strategy for
Counterterrorism. DHS has developed the Strategic Plan--One Team, One
Mission, Securing the Homeland; the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review; and the Bottom-Up Review.
Varied homeland security definitions and missions may impede the
development of a coherent homeland security strategy, and the
effectiveness of Congressional oversight may be hampered. This written
testimony discusses examples of the varying homeland security
definitions and missions identified in the aforementioned White House
and DHS documents, and analyzes the policy question of how varied
homeland security definitions and missions may affect the development
National homeland security policy. This testimony, however, does not
examine DHS' implementation of strategy.
issuance of homeland security strategic documents
The evolution of U.S. homeland security strategy produced a series
of White House and DHS documents. President George W. Bush's
administration's issuance of a National homeland strategy was
foundational in this process. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security was described as a grand strategy.\1\ Five years later, the
administration issued a second version and its purpose was `` . . . to
guide, organize, and unify our Nation's homeland security efforts.''\2\
Some critics, however, argued that while the 2002 version had merit,
the 2007 version of the strategy `` . . . obfuscates rather than
clarifies the government's homeland security mission. ''\3\ Conversely,
others state that the 2007 version was a comprehensive effort that
attempted to define America's homeland security mission.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Richard A. Falkenrath, ``Homeland Security: The White House
Plan Explained and Examined,'' Brookings Forum, Washington, DC,
September 4, 2002, p. 4.
\2\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, The
Homeland Security Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1.
\3\ James Jay Carafano, New Homeland Security Misses the Mark,
Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, October 10, 2007, http://
heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm1659.cfm.
\4\ Christopher Bellavita, ``Changing Homeland Security: Ten
Essential Homeland Security Books,'' Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 3,
no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent to these two versions of the National homeland security
strategy, President Barack Obama's administration issued the 2010
National Security Strategy and the 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism. DHS issued the Strategic Plan--One Team, One Mission,
Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review;
and the Bottom-Up Review.
These documents, collectively, are an example of the numerous
strategies that have been issued that address homeland security. These
strategic documents provide varied homeland security definitions and
missions. Additionally, some of the documents do not prioritize
resources to address the varied homeland security missions.
homeland security defined
It has been argued that homeland security is a ``uniquely''
American concept, developed because of geography and an American belief
in a distinct divide between events and issues inside and outside of
U.S. borders. Homeland security development as a strategic concept was
precipitated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Prior to those attacks,
National policy was typically described as law enforcement, emergency
response, and National defense. Discussions of the need to evolve the
way National policy was conceptualized occurred with such entities as
the Gilmore Commission \5\ and the United States Commission on National
Security (which referenced homeland security early in 2001).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For information on the Gilmore Commission, see http://
www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html. The Gilmore Commission was
established prior to 9/11, however, it released its fifth and final
report in December 2003.
\6\ For information on the U.S. Commission on National Security,
see http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nssg.pdf. The U.S. Commission on
National Security was established in 1998 and issued its final report
in February 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the 9/11, policymakers realized a new approach was needed to
address large-scale terrorist attacks. The establishment of a
Department, a Presidential council, and a series of Presidential
directives in the name of ``homeland security'' occurring after 9/11
further demonstrated that it was a distinct, although in these cases,
undefined concept.\7\ Later, the Federal, State, and local government
responses to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina expanded the homeland
security definition to include significant disasters, major public
health emergencies, and other events that threaten the United States,
the economy, and the rule of law, and Government operations.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Harold C. Relyea, ``Homeland security and information,''
Government Information Quarterly, vol. 19, 2002, p. 219.
\8\ Nadav Morag, ``Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United
States?,'' Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 7, September 2011, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security Definitions
The debate over the varied definitions persists as the Federal
Government continues to issue and implement homeland security strategy.
All of the strategic documents discussed in this written testimony
define homeland security as security efforts, however, each one defines
these efforts in different terms. Examples of these documents include
the 2007 and 2010 National Security Strategy, the Strategic Plan--One
Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review.
Additionally, these documents provide further information on the
homeland security concept. This information is not necessarily what
homeland security is, but rather what it entails or how it is achieved.
This conceptualization is both explicitly and implicitly implied, and
includes the following:
the homeland security enterprise encompasses a Federal,
State, local, Tribal government and private sector approach
that requires coordination;
that homeland security can involve securing against and
responding to both hazard-specific and all-hazards;
that homeland security activities do not imply total
protection or complete threat reduction;
homeland security includes the need to ensure that the U.S.
critical infrastructure, key assets, and economy are resilient;
and
that homeland security includes border, waterway, and marine
security.
The following table provides examples of U.S. strategy documents
and their homeland security definitions.
TABLE 1.--SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 National Security A seamless coordination among Federal,
Strategy. State, and local governments to prevent,
protect against and respond to threats
and natural disasters.\1\
2007 National Strategy for A concerted National effort to prevent
Homeland Security. terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce America's vulnerability
to terrorism, and minimize the damage
and recover from attacks that do
occur.\2\
2010 Quadrennial Homeland A concerted National effort to ensure a
Security Review. homeland that is safe, secure, and
resilient against terrorism and other
hazards where American interests,
aspirations, and ways of life can
thrive.\3\
2007 U.S. Department of A unified National effort to prevent and
Homeland Security Strategic deter terrorist attacks, protect and
Plan, Fiscal Years 2008-2013. respond to hazards, and to secure the
National borders.\4\
2011 National Strategy For Defensive efforts to counter terrorist
Counterterrorism. threats.\5\
2010 Bottom-Up Review. Preventing terrorism, responding to and
recovering from natural disasters,
customs enforcement and collection of
customs revenue, administration of legal
immigration services, safety and
stewardship of the Nation's waterways
and marine transportation system, as
well as other legacy missions of the
various components of DHS.\6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 2.
\2\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, The National
Homeland Security Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1.
\3\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 13.
\4\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission,
Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2008-2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 3.
\5\ Office of the President, National Strategy For Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC, June 29, 2011, p. 11.
\6\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
DC, July 2010, p. 3.
Homeland Security Definition: Analysis
The common themes among the many homeland security definitions are
that National homeland security efforts are unified, concerted, and
coordinated across all levels of government. Thus, the importance of
the Federalism approach to homeland security is highlighted. This
approach is a combined effort of Federal, State, local, and Tribal
governments, however, individual Federal, State, local, and Tribal
government efforts are not identified in the documents. Another common
theme across all of the documents in defining homeland security is
preventing, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, which
is consistent with evolving homeland security policy after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The focus of the concept of homeland security communicated in the
strategy documents differs in regard to two areas that may be
considered substantive. Natural disasters are specifically identified
as an integral part of homeland security in four of the six documents,
but are not mentioned in the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland
Security and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.\9\ Two
documents--the Bottom-Up Review and the Strategic Plan--specifically
include border and maritime security, and immigration in their homeland
security definition. Homeland security issues such as natural disaster
prevention, response, and recovery; border and maritime security, and
immigration are important and require significant funding. Failure to
have consensus on their importance and role in homeland security may
result in the Nation's efforts being uncoordinated and
counterproductive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Obviously, the National Strategy For Counterterrorism would not
mention any hazard or threat other than terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The competing or varied views in these documents may indicate that
there is no succinct homeland security definition. It is, however,
possible that such definition exists among relevant policymakers and
just isn't communicated in the strategic documents. However, without
such a definition, homeland security stakeholders and policymakers may
not be able to coordinate and resource homeland security missions
necessary to secure the Nation. These differing definitions may also be
attempting to identify and counter every threat and risk with
prioritization.
In addition to these strategic document examples, DHS Deputy
Secretary Jane Lute recently stated that homeland security `` . . . is
operation, it's transactional, it's decentralized, it's bottom-
driven,'' and influenced by law enforcement, emergency management, and
the political environment. Conversely, DHS Deputy Secretary Lute stated
that National security `` . . . is strategic, it's centralized, it's
top-driven,'' and influenced by the military and the intelligence
community.\10\ Some see these comments as reflection of a DHS attempt
at establishing a homeland security definition that is more operational
than strategic and an illustration of the complexity of a common
understanding of homeland security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Christopher Bellavita, ``A new perspective on homeland
security?'' Homeland Security Watch, Dec. 20, 2011, http://
www.hlswatch.com/2011/12/20/a-new-perspective-on-homeland-security/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
homeland security missions
Varied homeland security definitions may result in all levels of
government identifying and executing varied missions. These efforts may
be competing rather than integrated and result in ineffective or
inefficient security. The examples of strategic documents in this
written testimony provide numerous homeland security missions such as
terrorism prevention, response, and recovery; critical infrastructure
protection and resilience; Federal, State, and local emergency
management and preparedness; and border security. As noted earlier,
none of these documents specifically task a homeland security entity or
stakeholder with these missions. The following table summarizes the
varied missions identified in these strategic documents.
TABLE 2.--SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS AND GOALS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document Missions and Goals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 National Strategy for -Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks.
Homeland Security. -Protect the American people, critical
infrastructure and key resources.
-Respond to and recover from incidents
that do occur.
-Strengthen the foundation to ensure long-
term success.\1\
U.S. Department of Homeland -Protect the Nation from dangerous
Security Strategic Plan, people.
Fiscal Years 2008-2013. -Protect the Nation from dangerous goods.
-Protect critical infrastructure.
-Strengthen the Nation's preparedness and
emergency response capabilities.
-Strengthen and unify the Department's
operations and management.\2\
Quadrennial Homeland Security -Prevent terrorism and enhance security.
Review. -Secure and manage our borders.
-Enforce and administer our immigration
laws.
-Safeguard and secure cyberspace.
-Ensure resilience to disasters.\3\
-Provide essential support to National
and economic security.\4\
Bottom-Up Review............. -Prevent terrorism and enhance security.
-Secure and manage borders.
-Enforce and manage immigration laws.
-Safeguard and secure cyberspace.
-Ensure resilience to disasters.
-Improve Departmental management and
accountability.\5\
2010 National Security -Strengthen National capacity.
Strategy. -Ensure security and prosperity at home.
-Secure cyberspace.
-Ensure American economic prosperity.\6\
National Strategy for -Protect the American people, homeland,
Counterterrorism. and American interests.
-Eliminate threats to the American
people's, homeland's, and interests'
physical safety.
-Counter threats to global peace and
security.
-Promote and protect U.S. interests
around the globe.\7\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, National
Strategy for Homeland Security, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1.
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission,
Securing the Homeland: U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2008-2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 6-25.
\3\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 2.
\4\ This mission of providing essential support to National and economic
security was not part of the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, but has been subsequently added as an additional mission. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review: Enhanced Stakeholder Consultation and Use of Risk Information
Could Strengthen Future Reviews, GAO-11-873, September 2011, p. 9.
\5\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington,
DC, July 2010, pp. i-ii.
\6\ Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC,
May 2010, p. 14.
\7\ Office of the President, National Strategy for Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC, June 2011, p. 2.
Homeland Security Missions: Analysis
The missions in these documents identify a consensus that
preventing, responding to, recovering from, and being resilient against
terrorist attacks are essential in securing the Nation. Additionally,
there is an agreement that the Nation's populace, critical
infrastructure, and key resources need protection from both terrorism
and disasters. This protection from both terrorism and disasters is
seen as a key homeland security mission. Some, but not all, of the
documents include missions related to border security, immigration, the
economy, and general resilience.
Some of these documents have been criticized. Senator Susan
Collins--current Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs--expressed disappointment in the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review and Bottom-Up Review because it does not
communicate priorities and stated that it does not compare favorably to
the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. \11\ The Quadrennial
Defense Review identifies National security and U.S. military
priorities and these priorities through a process `` . . . from
objectives to capabilities and activities to resources.'' \12\
Furthermore, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are
different from the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security\13\
missions, and neither identifies priorities, or resources, for DHS, or
other Federal agencies. Since the National Strategy for Homeland
Security and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are
differing and varied, and because the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review does not specifically identify a strategic process to achieve
the missions, one may assume that this document is solely operational
guidance. Additionally, critics found the Bottom-Up Review lacking in
detail and failing to meet its intended purpose.\14\
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\11\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Charting a Path Forward: The Homeland Security
Department's Quadrennial Review and Bottom-Up Review, 111th Cong., 2nd
sess., July 21, 2010.
\12\ U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,
Washington, DC, February 2010, p. iii.
\13\ The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security is the most
recent National strategy specifically on homeland security.
\14\ Katherine McIntire Peters, ``DHS Bottom-Up Review is long on
ambition, short on detail,'' GovernmentExecutive.com, July 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall, strategic documents intended to provide guidance do not
identify the same missions for any homeland security entity or
stakeholder. One example, however, of homeland security entities and
stakeholders being tasked with specific missions is the National
Response Framework. The National Response Framework is not a strategy
document but is a ``guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards
response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable
coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across
the nation, liking all levels of government, nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector.''\15\ Some policy makers may
view the National Response Framework as effective guidance regarding
all-hazards response and may be a model to develop a similar guide to
National homeland security missions. The National Response Framework,
however, does not identify National homeland security missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response
Framework, Washington, DC, January 2008, p. i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no evidence in the existing homeland security strategic
documents that supports the aligning and prioritization of the varied
missions, nor do any of the documents convey how National, State, or
local resources are to be allocated to achieve these missions.
Arguably, without prioritized resource allocation to aligned missions,
the Nation's homeland security activities and operations may be
haphazard and inconsistent. Another consequence of the absence of clear
missions is that available funding then tends to govern the priorities.
Thus the appropriations process may dictate National homeland security
missions.
analysis of consequences
Congress may wish to address the issues of homeland security
strategy, definitions, and missions, in light of the potential for
significant events to occur much like those of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 or natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.
These outstanding policy issues result from the varied definitions and
missions identified in numerous National strategic documents.
Additionally, these documents do not consistently address risk
mitigation associated with the full range of homeland security threats.
Finally, one piece arguably missing from these documents, and their
guidance, is a discussion of the resources and fiscal costs associated
with preparing for low-risk, but high-consequence threats.
Policymakers are faced with a complex and detailed list of risks,
or threats to security, for which they then attempt to plan. However,
managing those risks 99% of the time with even a single failure may
lead to significant human and financial costs.\16\ The actual end
product of any homeland security strategic process that involves
clarifying definitions and missions will invariably aid in this
planning process though a number of risks may still not be adequately
countered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and
American Politics, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, CQPress, 2007, p. 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland security is essentially about managing risks. The purpose
of a strategic process is to develop missions to achieve that end.
Before risk management can be accurate and adequate, policymakers must
coordinate and communicate. That work begins by developing a foundation
of common definitions of key terms and concepts. It is also necessary,
in order to coordinate and communicate, to ensure stakeholders are
aware of, trained for, and prepared to meet assigned missions. Finally,
this analysis leads to the conclusion that missions are most effective
when they are the product of a prioritization process based on National
homeland security interests.
It has been argued that homeland security, at its core, is about
coordination because of the disparate stakeholders and risks.\17\
Homeland security is not only about coordination of resources and
actions to counter risks; it is also about the coordination of the
strategic process policymakers use in determining the risks, the
stakeholders and their missions, and the prioritization of those
missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without a general consensus on the physical and philosophical
definition and missions of homeland security, achieved through a
strategic process, there will continue to be the potential for
disjointed and disparate approaches to securing the Nation. This
general consensus on the homeland security concept starts with a
consensus definition and an accepted list of prioritized missions that
are constantly reevaluated to meet risks of the new paradigm that is
homeland security in the 21st Century. These varied definitions and
missions, however, may be the result of a strategic process that has
developed an approach that adjusts Federal homeland security policy to
emerging threats and risks.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Reese. I want to thank the
outstanding work that CRS does for the Congress.
Next, Mr. Maurer is recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating,
other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here today to
discuss the findings from our prior work on strategic planning
at the Department of Homeland Security.
To set the stage a bit, it is important to remember that
DHS conducts a wide variety of operations every day--securing
the border, protecting the President, providing grants to local
governments, screening airline passengers, researching
technologies. DHS does all of this and more.
It costs about $56 billion a year to do this. DHS is now
the third-largest Department in the Federal Government and its
sheer size and scope can complicate efforts to develop a common
strategy to guide it all.
DHS needs to have a clear strategy because what it does is
so important. DHS and its various components need to have a
clear idea of what should be done, how daily operations align
with broader priorities, what resources are necessary to
achieve those goals, and how to assess progress along the way.
My statement for the record discusses our findings on DHS's
efforts to develop this strategy as well as the Department's
on-going work to build a single, unified Department that is
greater than the sum of its whole. Right now I would like to
briefly highlight three key points from our work.
First, DHS's strategic approach currently resides in three
documents. The QHSR explains what DHS should be doing. DHS used
the BUR to understand what it was actually doing and then
developed a budget plan to align resources to keep priorities.
Our work found that DHS conducted significant outreach to
various stakeholders and used their input when developing the
QHSR. However, we recommended that DHS do a better job next
time seeking input from non-Federal stakeholders and providing
all stakeholders more time to comment.
Second, DHS did not formally consider risk when studying
strategic priorities. For example, the QHSR identifies five key
missions for the entire Department but does not prioritize them
as called for in the 9/11 Commission Act. The QHSR also
discusses threats to homeland security but DHS did not conduct
a National risk assessment.
In addition, DHS used the BUR to identify 14 key
initiatives deemed a priority in the Department's fiscal year
2012 budget request. While DHS can be commended for identifying
a discrete list of priorities, the Department did not consider
risk information when making these key resource decisions. In
our September 2011 report we recommended that DHS improve its
consideration of risk during the next QHSR process and DHS
agreed to do so.
Finally, effectively implementing a common strategy
requires a unified Department. DHS has made significant
progress knitting itself together, but 9 years after its
creation DHS has not completed its transformation into an
integrated department.
When DHS opened its doors in 2003 GAO designated it as a
high-risk because building a new department out of 22 legacy
agencies represented a significant challenge. Most
significantly, the Department lacked an effective and unified
management structure to support its critically important daily
operations.
I am pleased to say that in recent years DHS leadership has
placed considerable attention and effort addressing these
issues, and as a result, DHS has made important progress
recognizing and addressing its management challenges. GAO has
worked closely with the Department in this regard.
In September 2010 we provided DHS 31 key actions and
outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges within
and across the Department's management functions. Since then
DHS has developed a series of plans to achieve these outcomes.
I believe these plans, if fully implemented, create an off-
ramp from our high-risk designation, but the key for DHS is
execution. DHS needs to implement its plans, align resources to
support key outcomes, and most importantly, demonstrate
sustained progress. A solid management foundation will help DHS
carry out its vital missions and help ensure the Department can
translate the words in its strategies into concrete actions.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer
February 3, 2012
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-12-382T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(9/11 Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal year 2009 and
every 4 years thereafter the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the
homeland security strategy of the United States. In February 2010, DHS
issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report,
outlining a strategic framework for homeland security. In July 2010 DHS
issued a report on the results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a
Department-wide assessment to implement the QHSR strategy by aligning
DHS's programmatic activities, such as inspecting cargo at ports of
entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals
identified in the QHSR. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to: (1)
Strategically plan its homeland security missions through the QHSR; (2)
set strategic priorities and measure performance; and (3) build a
unified department. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in
December 2010, February 2011, and September 2011.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other
things, provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the
QHSR process, examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from
non-Federal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be
used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and has
actions planned or underway to address them.
Department of Homeland Security.--Additional Actions Needed to
Strengthen Strategic Planning and Management Functions
what gao found
DHS's primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been
the QHSR. In September 2011, GAO reported on the extent to which DHS
consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input
from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS
officials, several stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of
the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder
consultations and outreach to non-Federal stakeholders. Specifically,
DHS consulted with stakeholders--Federal agencies; Department and
component officials; State, local, and Tribal governments; the private
sector; academics; and policy experts--through various mechanisms, such
as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR. DHS and these
stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS
receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified
challenges in the consultation process, such as concerns about the
limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR and the
need to examine additional mechanisms for including more non-Federal
stakeholders in consultations. By providing more time for obtaining
feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain non-Federal stakeholders'
input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations
and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate,
stakeholders' input during future reviews.
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR
initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include
risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAO's prior
work and DHS's risk-management guidance. Through the BUR, DHS
identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to serve
as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas. According to DHS
officials, DHS did not consider risk information in prioritizing
initiatives because of differences among the initiatives that made it
difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. In
September 2011, GAO reported that consideration of risk information
during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS's
prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR. Further, GAO
reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR
objectives and had plans to develop additional measures. However, with
regard to specific programs, GAO's work has shown that a number of
programs and efforts lack outcome goals and measures, hindering the
Department's ability to effectively assess results.
In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high-risk
because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with major management
challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address
DHS's management and mission risks could have serious consequences for
U.S. National and economic security. DHS has taken action to implement,
transform, and strengthen its management functions, such as developing
a strategy for addressing this high-risk area and putting in place
common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management
functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component
agencies. However, DHS needs to demonstrate measurable, sustainable
progress in implementing its strategy and corrective actions to address
its management challenges.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) strategic planning. Various strategies and
plans exist for guiding homeland security efforts across the homeland
security enterprise.\1\ For example, the May 2010 National Security
Strategy outlines key security priorities and the 2007 National
Homeland Security Strategy defined the homeland security mission for
the Federal Government. More specific to DHS, the Implementing
Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that
beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter DHS conduct
a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland
security strategy of the United States.\2\ In February 2010, DHS issued
its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report, outlining
a strategic framework for homeland security to guide the activities of
homeland security partners, including Federal, State, local, and Tribal
government agencies; the private sector; and non-Governmental
organizations.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share
a common National interest in the safety and security of the United
States and the American population.
\2\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 2401(a), 121 Stat. 266, 543-45 (2007)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. 347).
\3\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: February 2010).
Although the act requires the first QHSR to be conducted in 2009--see 6
U.S.C. 347(c)--the QHSR report was issued in February 2010 and we
refer to it in this statement as the 2010 QHSR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the QHSR, in July 2010 DHS issued a report on the
results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a Department-wide assessment to
implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHS's programmatic activities,
such as apprehending fugitive aliens and inspecting cargo at ports of
entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals
identified in the QHSR.\4\ The BUR report described DHS's current
activities contributing to: (1) QHSR mission performance, (2)
Departmental management, and (3) accountability. Subsequent to
publishing the BUR report, DHS identified priority initiatives, such as
strengthening aviation security and enhancing the Department's risk
management capability, to strengthen DHS's mission performance, improve
departmental management, and increase accountability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DHS, Bottom-Up Review Report (Washington, DC: July 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's on-going efforts to identify strategic goals and align key
missions and resources with those goals are supported by another key
Departmental goal: Building a unified department. In 2003, GAO
designated implementing and transforming DHS as high-risk because DHS
had to transform 22 agencies--several with major management
challenges--into one department. Failure to effectively address DHS's
management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S.
National and economic security. Our prior work, undertaken before the
creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large
organizations, even those faced with less-strenuous reorganizations
than DHS, can take years to achieve. DHS is now the third-largest
Federal department with more than 200,000 employees and $56 billion in
budget authority, and its transformation is critical to achieving its
homeland security missions.
My testimony today focuses on the findings from our prior work in
three key areas:
DHS's efforts to strategically plan its homeland security
missions Department-wide through the QHSR,
DHS's efforts to set strategic priorities and measure
performance Department-wide, and:
DHS's efforts to build and implement a unified department.
This statement is based on four past reports, issued in December
2010, February 2011, and September 2011, related to DHS's QHSR, GAO's
high-risk series, and DHS mission implementation.\5\ For these past
reports, among other things, we interviewed DHS officials; analyzed DHS
strategic documents; and reviewed our past reports, supplemented by DHS
Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its
operations in March 2003. We conducted this work in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed
information on the scope and methodology from our previous work can be
found within each specific report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder
Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future
Reviews, GAO-11-873 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2011); Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing
Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO-11-881 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 7, 2011); High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278
(Washington, DC: February 2011); and Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget
Planning Not Yet Completed, GAO-11-153R (Washington, DC: Dec. 16,
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs strategically planned its homeland security missions department-
wide through the qhsr, but stakeholder consultations could be enhanced
The QHSR identified five homeland security missions--(1) Preventing
Terrorism and Enhancing Security, (2) Securing and Managing Our
Borders, (3) Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, (4)
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and (5) Ensuring Resilience to
Disasters--and goals and objectives to be achieved within each mission.
A sixth category of DHS activities--Providing Essential Support to
National and Economic Security--was added in the fiscal year 2012
budget request but was not included in the 2010 QHSR report.
DHS's primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been
the QHSR. DHS approached the 9/11 Commission Act requirement for a
quadrennial homeland security review in three phases.
In the first phase, DHS defined the Nation's homeland
security interests, identified the critical homeland security
missions, and developed a strategic approach to those missions
by laying out the principal goals, objectives, and strategic
outcomes for the mission areas. DHS reported on the results of
this effort in the February 2010 QHSR report in which the
Department identified 5 homeland security missions, 14
associated goals, and 43 objectives. The QHSR report also
identified threats and challenges confronting U.S. homeland
security, strategic objectives for strengthening the homeland
security enterprise, and Federal agencies' roles and
responsibilities for homeland security.
In the second phase--the BUR--DHS identified its component
agencies' activities, aligned those activities with the QHSR
missions and goals, and made recommendations for improving the
Department's organizational alignment and business processes.
DHS reported on the results of this second phase in the July
2010 BUR report.
In the third phase DHS developed its budget plan necessary
to execute the QHSR missions. DHS presented this budget plan in
the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request, issued
February 14, 2011, and the accompanying Fiscal Year 2012-2016
Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), issued in May
2011.
In December 2010, we issued a report on the extent to which the
QHSR addressed the 9/11 Commission Act's required reporting
elements.\6\ We reported that of the nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting
elements for the QHSR, DHS addressed three and partially addressed
six.\7\ Elements DHS addressed included a description of homeland
security threats and an explanation of underlying assumptions for the
QHSR report. Elements addressed in part included a prioritized list of
homeland security missions, an assessment of the alignment of DHS with
the QHSR missions, and discussions of cooperation between the Federal
Government and State, local, and Tribal governments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO-11-153R.
\7\ We considered an element addressed if all portions of it were
explicitly included in either the QHSR or BUR reports, addressed in
part if one or more but not all portions of the element were included,
and not addressed if neither the QHSR nor the BUR reports explicitly
addressed any part of the element.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2011, we reported on the extent to which DHS consulted
with stakeholders in developing the QHSR.\8\ DHS solicited input from
various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS
officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR
noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations
and outreach to non-Federal stakeholders. DHS consulted with
stakeholders--Federal agencies; Department and component officials;
State, local, and Tribal governments; the private sector; academics;
and policy experts--through various mechanisms, such as the
solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR and a web-based
discussion forum. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from
these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives.
However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation
process. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-11-873.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO
noted concerns about the limited time frames for providing
input into the QHSR or BUR.
Nine other stakeholders commented that DHS consultations
with non-Federal stakeholders, such as State, local, and
private-sector entities, could be enhanced by including more of
these stakeholders in QHSR consultations.
Reports on the QHSR by the National Academy of Public
Administration, which administered DHS's web-based discussion
forum, and a DHS advisory committee comprised of non-Federal
representatives noted that DHS could provide more time and
strengthen non-Federal outreach during stakeholder
consultations.
By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining
mechanisms to obtain non-Federal stakeholders' input, DHS could
strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better
positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders'
input during future reviews. We recommended that DHS provide more time
for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process and examine
additional mechanisms for obtaining input from non-Federal stakeholders
during the QHSR process, such as whether panels of State, local, and
Tribal government officials or components' existing advisory or other
groups could be useful. DHS concurred and reported that it will
endeavor to incorporate increased opportunities for time and meaningful
stakeholder engagement and will examine the use of panels of non-
Federal stakeholders for the next QHSR.
dhs did not prioritize qhsr missions or use risk assessments to help
set strategic priorities and could improve department-wide performance
measures
The 9/11 Commission Act called for DHS to prioritize homeland
security missions in the QHSR.\9\ As we reported in December 2010, DHS
identified five homeland security missions in the QHSR, but did not
fully address the 9/11 Commission Act reporting element because the
Department did not prioritize the missions.\10\ According to DHS
officials, the five missions listed in the QHSR report have equal
priority--no one mission is given greater priority than another.
Moreover, they stated that in selecting the five missions from the many
potential homeland security mission areas upon which DHS could focus
its efforts, the five mission areas are DHS's highest-priority homeland
security concerns.
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\9\ 6 U.S.C. 347(c)(2)(C).
\10\ GAO-11-153R.
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Risk management has been widely supported by Congress and DHS as a
management approach for homeland security, enhancing the Department's
ability to make informed decisions and prioritize resource investments.
In September 2011, we also reported that in the 2010 QHSR report, DHS
identified threats confronting homeland security, such as high-
consequence weapons of mass destruction and illicit trafficking, but
did not conduct a National risk assessment for the QHSR.\11\ DHS
officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not
have a well-developed methodology or the analytical resources to
complete a National risk assessment that would include likelihood and
consequence assessments--key elements of a National risk assessment.
The QHSR terms of reference, which established the QHSR process, also
stated that at the time the QHSR was launched, DHS lacked a process and
a methodology for consistently and defensibly assessing risk at a
National level and using the results of such an assessment to drive
strategic prioritization and resource decisions. In recognition of a
need to develop a National risk assessment, DHS created a study group
as part of the QHSR process that developed a National risk assessment
methodology. DHS officials plan to implement a National risk assessment
in advance of the next QHSR, which DHS anticipates conducting in fiscal
year 2013. Consistent with DHS's plans, we reported that a National
risk assessment conducted in advance of the next QHSR could assist DHS
in developing QHSR missions that target homeland security risks and
could allow DHS to demonstrate how it is reducing risk across multiple
hazards.
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\11\ GAO-11-873.
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DHS Could Strengthen Its Use of Risk Information in Prioritizing
Initiatives and Planning and Investment Decision-Making
DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR
initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include
risk information as one of these factors as called for in our prior
work and DHS's risk management guidance.\12\ Through the BUR, DHS
identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission areas to help
strengthen DHS's activities and serve as mechanisms for implementing
those mission areas (see app. I for a complete list). According to DHS
officials, the Department could not implement all of these initiatives
in fiscal year 2012 because of, among other things, resource
constraints and organizational or legislative changes that would need
to be made to implement some of the initiatives.
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\12\ See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, DC: Dec. 15, 2005), and
Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger
Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation, GAO-
09-492 (Washington, DC: Mar. 27, 2009). For DHS risk-management
guidance, see DHS, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk
Management Doctrine (April 2011).
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In identifying which BUR initiatives to prioritize for
implementation in fiscal year 2012, DHS leadership considered: (1)
``Importance,'' that is, how soon the initiative needed to be
implemented; (2) ``maturity,'' that is, how soon the initiative could
be implemented; and (3) ``priority,'' that is, whether the initiative
enhanced Secretarial or Presidential priorities. Risk information was
not included as an element in any of these three criteria, according to
DHS officials, because of differences among the initiatives that made
it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. However,
DHS officials stated that there are benefits to considering risk
information in resource allocation decisions. Consideration of risk
information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen
DHS's prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including
assisting in determinations of which initiatives should be implemented
in the short or longer term. In our September 2011 report, we
recommended that DHS examine how risk information could be used in
prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and reported that
DHS intends to conduct risk analysis specific to the QHSR in advance of
the next review and will use the analysis as an input into decision-
making related to implementing the QHSR.
Further, in September 2011, we reported on progress made by DHS in
implementing its homeland security missions since 9/11.\13\ As part of
this work, we identified various themes that affected DHS's
implementation efforts. One of these themes was DHS's efforts to
strategically manage risk across the Department. We reported that DHS
made important progress in assessing and analyzing risk across sectors.
For example, in January 2009 DHS published its Integrated Risk
Management Framework, which, among other things, calls for DHS to use
risk assessments to inform decision-making. In May 2010, the Secretary
issued a Policy Statement on Integrated Risk Management, calling for
DHS and its partners to manage risks to the Nation.
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\13\ GAO-11-881.
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We also reported that DHS had more work to do in using this
information to inform planning and resource-allocation decisions. Our
work shows that DHS has conducted risk assessments across a number of
areas, but should strengthen the assessments and risk management
process. For example:
In June 2011, we reported that DHS and Health and Human
Services could further strengthen coordination for chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk assessments.
Among other things, we recommended that DHS establish time
frames and milestones to better ensure timely development and
interagency agreement on written procedures for development of
DHS's CBRN risk assessments. DHS concurred and stated that the
Department had begun efforts to develop milestones and time
frames for its strategic and implementation plans for
interagency risk assessment development.\14\
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\14\ GAO, National Preparedness: DHS and HHS Can Further Strengthen
Coordination for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk
Assessments, GAO-11-606 (Washington, DC: June 21, 2011).
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In November 2011, we reported that the U.S. Coast Guard used
its Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model at the National
level to focus resources on the highest-priority targets,
leading to Coast Guard operating efficiencies, but use at the
local level for operational and tactical risk-management
efforts has been limited by a lack of staff time, the
complexity of the risk tool, and competing mission demands.\15\
Among other things, we recommended that the Coast Guard provide
additional training for sector command staff and others
involved in sector management and operations on how the model
can be used as a risk-management tool to inform sector-level
decision-making. The Coast Guard concurred and stated that it
will explore other opportunities to provide risk training to
sector command staff, including on-line and webinar training
opportunities.
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\15\ GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but
More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and
Operations, GAO-12-14 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011).
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In November 2011, we reported that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) used risk assessments to inform
funding-allocation decisions for its port security grant
program.\16\ However, we found that FEMA could further enhance
its risk-analysis model and recommended incorporating the
results of past security investments and refining other data
inputs into the model. DHS concurred with the recommendation,
but did not provide details on how it plans to implement it.
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\16\ GAO, Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant
Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-12-47
(Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011).
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In October 2009, we reported that TSA's strategic plan to
guide research, development, and deployment of passenger
checkpoint screening technologies was not risk-based.\17\ Among
other things, we recommended that DHS conduct a complete risk
assessment related to TSA's passenger screening program and
incorporate the results into the program's strategy. DHS
concurred, and in July 2011 reported actions underway to
address it, such as beginning to use a risk-management analysis
process to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of
potential countermeasures and effect on the commercial aviation
system.
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\17\ GAO. Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched,
Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening
Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges. GAO-10-128. (Washington,
DC: Oct. 7, 2009).
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DHS Has Established Performance Measures, but Has Not Yet Fully
Developed Outcome-Based Measures for Many of Its Mission
Functions
In September 2011, we reported that DHS established performance
measures for most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop
additional measures.\18\ Specifically, DHS established new performance
measures, or linked existing measures, to 13 of 14 QHSR goals, and to 3
of 4 goals for the sixth category of DHS activities--Providing
Essential Support to National and Economic Security. DHS reported these
measures in its fiscal years 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. For
goals without measures, DHS officials told us that the Department was
developing performance measures and planned to publish them in future
budget justifications to Congress.
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\18\ GAO-11-873.
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In September 2011, we also reported that DHS had not yet fully
developed outcome-based measures for assessing progress and performance
for many of its mission functions.\19\ We recognized that DHS faced
inherent difficulties in developing performance goals and measures to
address its unique mission and programs, such as in developing measures
for the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter terrorist
attacks. While DHS had made progress in strengthening performance
measurement, our work across the Department has shown that a number of
programs lacked outcome goals and measures, which may have hindered the
Department's ability to effectively assess results or fully assess
whether the Department was using resources effectively and efficiently.
For example, our work has shown that DHS did not have performance
measures for assessing the effectiveness of key border security and
immigration programs, to include:
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\19\ GAO-11-881.
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In September 2009, we reported that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) had invested $2.4 billion in tactical
infrastructure (fencing, roads, and lighting) along the
Southwest Border under the Secure Border Initiative--a multi-
year, multi-billion dollar program aimed at securing U.S.
borders and reducing illegal immigration.\20\ However, DHS
could not measure the effect of this investment in tactical
infrastructure on border security. We recommended that DHS
conduct an evaluation of the effect of tactical infrastructure
on effective control of the border. DHS concurred with the
recommendation and subsequently reported that the on-going
analysis is expected to be completed in February 2012.
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\20\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-
1013T (Washington, DC: Sept. 17, 2009).
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In August 2009, we reported that CBP had established three
performance measures to report the results of checkpoint
operations, which provided some insight into checkpoint
activity.\21\ However, the measures did not indicate if
checkpoints were operating efficiently and effectively, and
data reporting and collection challenges hindered the use of
results to inform Congress and the public on checkpoint
performance. We recommended that CBP improve the measurement
and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness. CBP agreed and, as
of September 2011, reported plans to develop and better use
data on checkpoint effectiveness.
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\21\ GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's
Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance
Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, GAO-09-824 (Washington, DC:
Aug. 31, 2009).
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Further, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and CBP did not have measures for assessing
the performance of key immigration enforcement programs. For
example, in April 2011, we reported that ICE did not have
measures for its overstay enforcement efforts, and in May 2010
that CBP did not have measures for its alien smuggling
investigative efforts, making it difficult for these agencies
to determine progress made in these areas and evaluate possible
improvements.\22\ We recommended that ICE and CBP develop
performance measures for these two areas. They generally agreed
and reported actions underway to develop these measures.
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\22\ GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for
Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts
but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411 (Washington, DC: Apr. 15, 2011) and
Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources
to Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-328
(Washington, DC: May 24, 2010).
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dhs has taken action to implement, strengthen, and integrate its
management functions, but needs to demonstrate sustainable progress
In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high-risk
because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with major management
challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address
DHS's management and mission risks could have serious consequences for
U.S. National and economic security. This high-risk area includes
challenges in strengthening DHS's management functions--financial
management, human capital, information technology, and acquisition
management--the impact of those challenges on DHS's mission
implementation, and challenges in integrating management functions
within and across the Department and its components. Addressing these
challenges would better position DHS to align resources to its
strategic priorities, assess progress in meeting mission goals, enhance
linkages within and across components, and improve the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of the Department.
On the basis of our prior work, in September 2010, we identified
and provided to DHS 31 key actions and outcomes that are critical to
addressing the challenges within the Department's management functions
and in integrating those functions across the Department. These key
actions and outcomes include, among others, validating required
acquisition documents at major milestones in the acquisition review
process; obtaining and then sustaining unqualified audit opinions for
at least 2 consecutive years on the Department-wide financial
statements while demonstrating measurable progress in reducing material
weaknesses and significant deficiencies; and implementing its workforce
strategy and linking workforce planning efforts to strategic and
program-specific planning efforts to identify current and future human
capital needs.\23\
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\23\ A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or a
combination of significant deficiencies, in internal control such that
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the
entity's financial statements will not be prevented or detected and
corrected on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a deficiency,
or combination of deficiencies, in internal control that is less severe
than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by
those charged with governance. A deficiency in internal control exists
when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or
employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions,
to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements on a timely basis.
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In our February 2011 high-risk update, we reported that DHS had
taken action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management
functions, and had begun to demonstrate progress in addressing some of
the actions and outcomes we identified within each management area.\24\
For example, we reported that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Homeland Security, and other senior officials, have demonstrated
commitment and top leadership support to address the Department's
management challenges. DHS also put in place common policies,
procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as
human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. For
example, DHS:
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\24\ GAO-11-278.
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revised its acquisition management oversight policies to
include more detailed guidance to inform departmental
acquisition decisionmaking.
strengthened its enterprise architecture, or blueprint to
guide information technology acquisitions, and improved its
policies and procedures for investment management.
developed corrective action plans for its financial
management weaknesses, and, for the first time since its
inception, DHS earned a qualified audit opinion on its fiscal
year 2011 balance sheet;\25\ and,
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\25\ For DHS, obtaining a qualified audit opinion is a first step
toward achieving an unqualified audit opinion.
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issued its Workforce Strategy for Fiscal Years 2011-2016,
which contains the Department's workforce goals, objectives,
and performance measures for human capital management.
Further, in January 2011, DHS provided us with its Integrated
Strategy for High Risk Management, which summarized the Department's
preliminary plans for addressing the high-risk area. Specifically, the
strategy contained details on the implementation and transformation of
DHS, such as corrective actions to address challenges within each
management area, and officials responsible for implementing those
corrective actions. DHS provided us with updates to this strategy in
June and December 2011. We provided DHS with written feedback on the
January 2011 strategy and the June update, and have worked with the
Department to monitor implementation efforts. We noted that both
versions of the strategy were generally responsive to actions and
outcomes we identified for the Department to address the high-risk
area. For example, DHS included a management integration plan
containing information on initiatives to integrate its management
functions across the Department. Specifically, DHS plans to establish a
framework for managing investments across its components and management
functions to strengthen integration within and across those functions,
as well as to ensure that mission needs drive investment decisions.
This framework seeks to enhance DHS resource decision-making and
oversight by creating new Department-level councils to identify
priorities and capability gaps, revising how DHS components and lines
of business manage acquisition programs, and developing a common
framework for monitoring and assessing implementation of investment
decisions. These actions, if implemented effectively, should help to
further and more effectively integrate the Department and enhance DHS's
ability to implement its strategies. However, we noted in response to
the June update that specific resources to implement planned corrective
actions were not consistently identified, making it difficult to assess
the extent to which DHS has the capacity to implement these actions.
Additionally, for both versions, we noted that the Department did not
provide information on the underlying metrics or factors DHS used to
rate its progress, making it difficult for us to assess DHS's overall
characterizations of progress. We are currently assessing the December
2011 update and plan to provide DHS with feedback shortly.
Although DHS has made progress in strengthening and integrating its
management functions, the Department continues to face significant
challenges affecting the Department's transformation efforts and its
ability to meet its missions. In particular, challenges within
acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital
management have resulted in performance problems and mission delays.
For example, DHS does not yet have enough skilled personnel to carry
out activities in some key programmatic and management areas, such as
for acquisition management. DHS also has not yet implemented an
integrated financial management system, impeding its ability to have
ready access to information to inform decisionmaking, and has been
unable to obtain a clean audit opinion on the audit of its consolidated
financial statements since its establishment.
Going forward, DHS needs to implement its Integrated Strategy for
High Risk Management, and continue its efforts to: (1) Identify and
acquire resources needed to achieve key actions and outcomes; (2)
implement a program to independently monitor and validate corrective
measures; and (3) show measurable, sustainable progress in implementing
corrective actions and achieving key outcomes. Demonstrated, sustained
progress in all of these areas will help DHS strengthen and integrate
management functions within and across the Department and its
components.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have.
Appendix I: Bottom-Up Review Initiatives
Initiatives selected by DHS for implementation in fiscal year 2012
listed in bold.
mission one: preventing terrorism and enhancing security
1. Strengthen counterterrorism coordination across DHS
2. Strengthen aviation security
3. Create an integrated Departmental information sharing
architecture
4. Deliver infrastructure protection and resilience capabilities to
the field
5. Set National performance standards for identification
verification
6. Increase efforts to detect and counter nuclear and biological
weapons and dangerous materials
7. Leverage the full range of capabilities to address biological
and nuclear threats
8. Standardize and institutionalize the National Fusion Center
Network
9. Promote safeguards for access to secure areas in critical
facilities
10. Establish DHS as a center of excellence for canine training and
deployment
11. Redesign the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to better match
mission requirements
mission two: securing and managing our borders
12. Expand joint operations and intelligence capabilities,
including enhanced domain awareness
13. Prioritize immigration and customs investigations
14. Enhance the security and resilience of global trade and travel
systems
15. Strengthen and expand DHS-related security assistance
internationally (e.g., border integrity and customs enforcement
security assistance) consistent with U.S. Government security, trade
promotion, international travel, and foreign assistance objectives
16. Enhance North American security
mission three: enforcing and administering our immigration laws
17. Comprehensive immigration reform
18. Improve DHS immigration services processes
19. Focus on fraud detection and National security vetting
20. Target egregious employers who knowingly exploit illegal
workers
21. Dismantle human smuggling organizations
22. Improve the detention and removal process
23. Work with new Americans so that they fully transition to the
rights and responsibilities of citizenship
24. Maintain a model detention system commensurate with risk
mission four: safeguarding and securing cyberspace
25. Increase the focus and integration of DHS's operational
cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience activities
26. Strengthen DHS ability to protect cyber networks
27. Increase DHS predictive and forensic capabilities for cyber
intrusions and attacks
28. Promote cyber security public awareness
mission five: ensuring resilience to disasters
29. Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness
30. Improve DHS's ability to lead in emergency management
31. Explore opportunities with the private sector to ``design-in''
greater resilience for critical infrastructure
32. Make individual and family preparedness and critical facility
resilience inherent in community preparedness
improving department management
33. Seek restoration of the Secretary's reorganization authority
for DHS headquarters
34. Realign component regional configurations into a single DHS
regional structure
35. Improve cross-Departmental management, policy, and functional
integration
36. Strengthen internal DHS counterintelligence capabilities
37. Enhance the Department's risk management capability
38. Strengthen coordination within DHS through cross-Departmental
training and career paths
39. Enhance the DHS workforce
40. Balance the DHS workforce by ensuring strong Federal control of
all DHS work and reducing reliance on contractors
increasing accountability
41. Increase Analytic Capability and Capacity
42. Improve Performance Measurement and Accountability
43. Strengthen Acquisition Oversight
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Maurer.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cohn for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF ALAN COHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohn. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear before you today. You have my written
testimony; I will provide a brief overview of that testimony in
these opening remarks and I am happy to take your questions
after that.
As was noted, I am the deputy assistant secretary in the
Office of Policy. I head the Department's Strategic Planning
Office. I am a career member of the Senior Executive Service
and I have led the Department's Strategic Planning Office for
the past 4 years, since January 2008.
As the subcommittee has requested, I have focused my
written testimony and I will focus these opening remarks on the
Department's strategy for homeland security. Let me start by
stating clearly that the strategy that the Department of
Homeland Security has pursued for the past 3 years to ensure a
safe, secure, and resilient homeland is set forth in the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report 2010.
The QHSR provided the Department the opportunity to work
with its Federal interagency partners and stakeholders across
the homeland security enterprise in setting a strategic
framework for achieving a secure homeland. Subsequent planning
activities, such as the Bottom-Up Review as well as the
development of the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget
proposal and accompanying documents, filled in other aspects of
the Department's strategic approach; in particular that the
Bottom-Up Review provided the opportunity for the Department to
align its activities and its programs to the strategic
framework of the Quadrennial Review, and that the fiscal year
2012 budget process and the regeneration of performance
measures that were reported in our annual performance report
from that year filled in the budget alignment and performance
alignment elements of that strategy.
The Department's forthcoming fiscal year 2012 to 2016
strategic plan--our third DHS strategic plan--consolidates the
QHSR strategic framework with DHS performance measures and BUR
initiatives focused on maturing and strengthening DHS. However,
as a basic matter of understanding, the Department's strategy
for addressing emerging and enduring threats and challenges is
and has been the approach set forth in the QHSR report, and
that approach nests within the overall structure of the 2010
National Security Strategy.
The Department has also taken steps to develop and
implement a comprehensive strategic management approach. The
Office of Policy supports that approach through several
mechanisms, including annual strategic investment guidance,
support to capability development through portfolio management
bodies such as the Screening Coordination Office, and review of
major acquisition programs to ensure consistency and alignment
of mission needs to Department strategy and policy beginning
with the QHSR.
Finally, the Office of Policy is focused on enhancing the
Department's ability to develop strategy and conduct strategic
analysis through strengthened analytic techniques and
methodologies, including remedying some of the shortfalls that
were pointed out by the Government Accountability Office
relating to the last QHSR.
Congress' recent authorization for the Secretary to
transfer risk management and analysis functions to the Office
of Policy will help the Department's risk modeling analysis and
strategic planning functions and aid in ensuring that risk
analysis is most effectively informed strategy development and
strategic choice.
Thank you very much for your support of our efforts and our
people and hopefully for your support of our future efforts to
continue strengthening and maturing the Department. I am happy
to take any questions that you have.
[The statement of Mr. Cohn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan Cohn
February 3, 2012
introduction
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
implementing a strategy to counter emerging threats. As the
subcommittee has requested, we have focused primarily on how the QHSR
has provided a strategic foundation for DHS, and DHS strategic
management based on the QHSR.
I serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary and head of the Office of
Strategic Plans in the DHS Office of Policy within DHS headquarters.
One of the key responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy is to
ensure that the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Assistant Secretary for
Policy, and the senior headquarters and Component leadership of DHS are
provided with objective, analytically rigorous decision support. In
short, we help ensure that tough policy and strategy decisions are
informed by a consideration of viable alternatives, with a clear sense
of the associated risk and resource implications, and that those
decisions, once made, carry through to subsequent decisions concerning
investments and operations. For that reason, I am pleased to be able to
highlight how we do that at DHS and how we intend to continue improving
that process in the context of emerging threats.
The homeland security strategic environment is constantly evolving,
and while we have made significant progress, threats from terrorism
continue to persist. Today's threats are not limited to any one
individual or group, are not defined or contained by international
borders, and are not limited to any single ideology. Terrorist tactics
can be as simple as a homemade bomb and as sophisticated as a
biological threat or a coordinated cyber attack. In addition, broader
strategic trends such as the dramatic spread of internet and mobile
technologies around the world and the growing relevance of non-state
actors on the world stage suggest new opportunities and challenges that
must be accounted for in our current and longer-term homeland security
strategic planning.
Another defining characteristic of our strategic environment is the
tightening fiscal environment. It is increasingly important to define
clear priorities, develop and assess viable alternatives, and make
well-informed decisions involving difficult trade-offs. DHS has made
substantial progress in this regard, particularly with respect to
establishing an enduring strategic foundation for National homeland
security efforts, refining our strategic and policy analysis
capabilities and approaches, and improving strategic alignment through
focused management tools and processes. Together, these improvements
have positioned DHS to effectively address today's security environment
while ensuring that we are sufficiently flexible, agile, and capable in
the face of emerging threats and risks.
In my testimony, I will highlight our activities in each of these
areas. Specifically, I will: (1) Describe how the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report (2010) (QHSR) has provided a strategic
foundation and common framework to inform subsequent analysis and
planning; (2) describe targeted efforts aimed at enhancing strategic
alignment that ensure DHS is a strategy and policy-driven organization;
and (3) outline key improvements in our analytic capabilities and
approaches.
strategic foundation: the qhsr and bottom-up review
QHSR
The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007
directed the Department to begin conducting quadrennial reviews in
2009, and every 4 years thereafter. The QHSR and subsequent Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) were critical first steps in the process of examining and
addressing fundamental strategic issues that concern homeland security,
and establishing an enduring strategic foundation.
As the first review of its kind for DHS, the QHSR clarified the
conceptual underpinnings of homeland security, described the security
environment and the Nation's homeland security interests, identified
the critical homeland security enterprise missions, and outlined the
principal goals and essential objectives necessary for success in those
missions. I would like to highlight three elements of the QHSR that, in
particular, provided the strategy and planning foundation that have
positioned DHS to effectively address emerging strategic challenges.
First, the QHSR clarified the conceptual underpinnings of homeland
security. In defining homeland security as the intersection of evolving
threats and hazards with traditional Governmental and civic
responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law
enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration, the QHSR
emphasized the importance of eliminating traditional stovepipes to
achieving success in homeland security. The QHSR also established the
idea of the homeland security enterprise, which refers to the
collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State,
local, Tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector
partners--as well as individuals, families, and communities--to
maintain critical homeland security capabilities. Each of these
conceptual elements has infused all aspects of our strategy and
planning.
Second, the QHSR took a comprehensive approach to threats by
expanding the focus of homeland security to specifically address high-
consequence weapons of mass destruction; global violent extremism; mass
cyber attacks, intrusions, and disruptions; pandemics and natural
disasters; and illegal trafficking and related transnational crime.
Almost 3 years later, these challenges remain top priorities. At the
same time, DHS is assessing major trends and drivers in the strategic
environment in order to understand how these challenges may be evolving
and to anticipate emerging threats and risks.
Third, the QHSR adopted a mission structure designed to endure
across inevitable changes in the security environment. Our missions are
to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our
borders, enforce our immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace,
enhance resilience to disasters, and provide critical support to
economic and National security. Because tomorrow's security environment
will not necessarily look like today's security environment, the
missions provide a durable framework to effectively address whatever
risks and threats may emerge over time.
This framework has informed all subsequent DHS strategy and
planning efforts, whether they are DHS products or products that DHS
supports with partners across the enterprise. For example, the
recently-released Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future defines the ends,
ways, and means by which DHS and the homeland security enterprise will
meet the goals and objectives set forth in Mission 4 of the QHSR,
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace.
The BUR and Strategy Implementation
The QHSR and other strategic guidance within the Department are
implemented through the programming and budgeting process, and the
oversight of major acquisitions. As a first step in this process, the
BUR was initiated in November 2009 as an immediate follow-on and
complement to the QHSR. The BUR focused on three elements: (1) How to
improve DHS's operational performance within the five homeland security
missions; (2) how to improve Department management; and (3) how to
increase DHS accountability for the public funds entrusted to us.
The Department's fiscal year 2012 budget request began the process
of implementing the QHSR and specific BUR initiatives and enhancements,
and the corresponding fiscal year 2012-2016 Future Years Homeland
Security Plan set forth the budget plan required to provide sufficient
resources to successfully execute the Department's responsibilities
across the full range of homeland security missions as described in the
QHSR. The Department's approach to managing its annual performance and
its priority goals are guided by the QHSR and BUR, as reflected in the
fiscal year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report and Plan. In addition,
the forthcoming Fiscal Year 2012-2016 DHS Strategic Plan is founded on
the framework and methodological approach of the QHSR, reflects
performance measures aligned against the mission areas of the QHSR, and
emphasizes the initiatives concerning Department management and
accountability set forth in the BUR.
Based on the strategic foundation set forth in the QHSR and BUR,
DHS's Components complete their own strategies, strategic plans, and
other strategic initiatives. These efforts may be legislatively-driven,
or may be initiated within the Department in order to address a
persistent or emerging threat or challenge. However, all strategies and
strategic plans should reflect the overall framework set forth in the
QHSR and BUR. For example, the 2011-2014 FEMA Strategic Plan describes
the cascade from the National Security Strategy through the Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review Report to the FEMA Administrator's Intent
Priorities. Similarly the 2010-2014 ICE Strategic Plan draws its four
priorities from the QHSR mission structure. Likewise, efforts such as
the Border Intelligence Fusion Section at the El Paso Intelligence
Center, the supply chain security initiative, and the Balanced
Workforce initiative can be traced back to initiatives identified or
described in the BUR. DHS harmonized its account structure and reworked
its suite of performance measures as part of the BUR process, which
resulted in enhanced management effectiveness and accountability.
The Next QHSR
Under the schedule set forth in the Implementing the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, the Department will conduct its
next quadrennial review in 2013. While the first QHSR set a durable
framework of homeland security missions, the next quadrennial review
can focus on a more extensive examination of the security environment
and potential future trends and shocks, and provide a deeper review of
a few key areas. The review can provide a more in-depth look at those
key areas with respect to current strategic environment, future
strategic environment, National homeland security risk, strategy
options and alternatives, and capability and resource implications for
changes in strategy. In this way, the next QHSR can begin to look much
more like the Quadrennial Defense Review on which it is modeled. The
review will also reflect a greater integration of risk analysis into
all stages of the quadrennial review, as recommended by the Government
Accountability Office in their review of the first QHSR. The Department
has begun planning for the next QHSR and we look forward to working
with Congress going forward on executing this second quadrennial
review.
implementing the qhsr: ensuring policy and strategy inform resource
allocation
The Under Secretary for Management is leading the development and
implementation of a comprehensive, strategic management approach
focused on maturing organizational effectiveness within DHS. The
``front end'' of this strategic management system is really the ``back
end'' of the policy and strategy process. To that end, the Office of
Policy supports the Under Secretary for Management's efforts, not only
by ensuring clear statements of policy and strategy, but by translating
strategic guidance into investment guidance in the annual Integrated
Planning Guidance, supporting capability development and analysis, and
ensuring that the Department's major acquisitions are grounded in
mission needs derived from Department policy and strategy.
The Integrated Planning Guidance sets forth the Secretary's
specific investment guidance for Components to use in developing their
Resource Allocation Plans (RAP), consistent with the QHSR and other
strategy documents. The Integrated Planning Guidance marks the
transition from the planning to the programming phase of the
Department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
process. The Office of Policy also supports the Management
Directorate's Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation, which
administers the PPBE process, in conducting analysis of specific issues
for the annual budget cycle, reviewing Component RAP submissions for
consistency with the IPG, and raising issues as part of the Program
Review Board process.
The Office of Policy also supports capability development through
portfolio management bodies such as the Screening Coordination Office
(SCO). Portfolio management bodies help identify areas where better
coordination and a common set of goals can make DHS more efficient and
effective. For example, SCO, an element of the Office of Policy,
establishes standards for Departmental programs which deal with the
screening of people, and helps the Department meet those standards.
Working closely with DHS Components and the headquarters programming
and budgeting staff, SCO has helped increase information flow and
reduce duplication among screening programs. This not only reduces the
overall cost of such programs, it enhances the ability of programs to
share information and enhance our Nation's security. The Office of
Policy also conducts strategic requirements planning in support of
portfolio management efforts involving domain awareness and information
sharing. Ultimately, portfolio management bodies become the engines to
develop integrated, cross-Departmental requirements for homeland
security functions such as screening, domain awareness, and information
sharing.
Another place where policy and strategy intersect with Departmental
strategic management is the major acquisition oversight process. The
Office of Policy supports the Management Directorate in Phase 1 (Need)
and Phase 2 (Analyze/Select) of the acquisition review process, by
reviewing Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirements
Documents for consistency with Department policy and strategy. During
these reviews, Policy focuses on the following key questions:
1. Is the program consistent with approved policy, guidance, and
requirements (e.g. the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review;
applicable laws and regulations)?
2. Is the program duplicative of other similar capabilities
elsewhere in the Department?
3. Is there a coherent scope for the program, and clear mission-
oriented objectives, consistent with the QHSR and other
strategy documents?
4. Are the requirements set forth in the document best fashioned to
advance mission and functional needs, as articulated in the
QHSR and other strategy documents?
This ``back end'' involvement in the PPBE, portfolio management,
and major acquisitions oversight processes is an essential element in
the full cycle of policy and strategy development and implementation.
DHS is committed to ensuring that articulated policy and strategy
influences programming and budgeting, capability development, and major
acquisition decisions.
enhancing strategy and strategic analysis
Given the complexity of homeland security challenges and our
primary role in decision support, a consistent priority within the
Office of Policy is the application of rigorous and cutting-edge
analytic techniques and methodologies. The Office of Policy developed
and has been piloting a methodology for developing strategy. Informed
by best practices and insights from business, academia, the military,
and Government, including a highly valuable Government Accountability
Office report on developing counter-terrorism strategies, our
methodology stresses the importance of prioritization and choice, the
consideration of resource implications, and analytically-informed
insights in any strategy discussion. An anticipatory posture is
emphasized through a fulsome examination of both the current and future
strategic environment. The methodology is built around four basic
elements: (1) Setting the foundations for good strategy; (2)
establishing appropriate context; (3) developing viable alternative
solutions; (4) conducting analysis to support decision-making. Key
steps across these four elements include:
Obtaining leadership guidance regarding key priorities and
expectations for the strategy;
Developing a plan to execute the strategy that includes
identifying and engaging stakeholders, roles, and important
time lines;
Identifying the current strategy, including the implicit
strategy as expressed through the budget;
Framing the problem and identifying strategic assumptions
given a common understanding of the current and future
strategic environment;
Defining success through outcomes and strategic level
measures;
Generating viable alternative strategic approaches;
Identifying the resource implications of each alternative
approach; and
Assessing the degree to which each alternative would achieve
success and at what cost.
In addition, the Office of Policy has worked with the National
Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of Risk Management and
Analysis (RMA) as RMA has developed models for assessing strategic
National risk and capability--and program-level risk reduction. The
fiscal year 2012 DHS Appropriations Act authorized the Secretary to
transfer the risk management and analysis functions performed by RMA to
the Office of Policy in 2012. Such a transfer will enhance the
Department's risk modeling, analysis, and strategic planning functions,
and aid in ensuring that risk analysis most effectively informs
strategy development and strategic choice.
Effective strategy provides a unifying device through which an
organization's capabilities are integrated and employed efficiently,
resources are allocated toward the highest priorities, and different
organizational elements are collaborating in the pursuit of common
objectives, all of which are essential for a highly distributed,
operationally-focused enterprise like DHS. Our strategy methodology
represents a critical step in producing effective strategy.
conclusion
The best way to posture the Department to effectively address
emerging threats is to ensure that tough policy and strategy decisions
are informed by a consideration of viable alternatives, with a clear
sense of the associated risk and resource implications, and that those
decisions once made effectively influence subsequent programming and
budgeting, capability development, and major acquisition decisions.
I look forward to addressing your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Cohn.
You know, this is a critical mission of the United States
Government. It is clearly within the Constitutional
responsibility. I personally wish we could appropriate more
dollars, but we live within a tough budgetary time and so I
think we need to make best use out of the dollars that we have
and make it more efficient, and I think that is part of what
these hearings are going to be all about.
One thing, Mr. Maurer, you mentioned is that implementing
this strategic plan that risk is not taken into account, I
guess, as much as it should. Can you explain that a little bit
more?
Mr. Maurer. Sure. In our September 2011 report that we
issued on the QHSR we talked about risk in sort of two
different ways. First, in developing the QHSR the Department
started going down the road of developing a National risk
assessment, sort of pulling up at the National level what are
the risks to homeland security and trying to build that into
the overall analysis.
They developed a methodology but they didn't have the full
analytic framework in place in time to complete that for this
current QHSR. So in our report we recommended that they do it
for the next QHSR, and our understanding is that the DHS has
actions in place to do that.
The second aspect of risk that we looked at was in the
Department's decisions about which of these BUR initiatives to
prioritize. These were key initiatives coming out of the
Bottom-Up Review. What were the things that the DHS really
wanted to focus on as a priority?
There were a number of things that went into that equation
but there was not a formal risk assessment that was part of
determining what things sort of floated to the top. Part of
that reason was because some of these BUR initiatives weren't
really apples-to-apples comparisons. They ranged from very
large things like aviation security to more focused, narrow
things, like developing--improving the capabilities of canines
who can detect explosives.
So again, we recommended that DHS take this into account in
next year--in the next iteration of the QHSR and they said that
they would do so.
Mr. McCaul. Do you agree that that would make DHS a more
efficient agency?
Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. We think risk is one of several
inputs in these kinds of strategic decisions, but certainly
that is what DHS is in the business of doing, protecting the
homeland security, and risk needs to be part of that equation.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Cohn, are you willing to, in the next, I
guess this strategic plan will come out again this next year,
is that correct?
Mr. Cohn. So the strategic plan will be released with the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget, so on or about February
13. But we agreed with the recommendations of the Government
Accountability Office and are planning to incorporate both
elements into the next QHSR, which we will conduct in calendar
year 2013.
If I could just add to what Mr. Maurer said, in terms of
the overall strategic National risk assessment, we recognized
in the QHSR in the terms of reference that the Department did
not have the methodology to conduct that, and one of the things
we did in the first QHSR was charter a working group to
determine how we would go about approaching that problem. That
working group reported its results and part of that methodology
was actually used to develop the strategic National risk
assessment that informed our preparedness efforts that Dr.
Caudle referenced.
For the next Quadrennial Review we are planning to do a
full assessment of the homeland security environment to include
the current strategic environment, future strategic
environment, threat landscape, strategic National risk
assessment for a full-scope look.
In addition, in terms of the BUR initiatives, the challenge
that we had was the Department did not have a overall mechanism
for doing as Mr. Maurer noted, an apples-to-apples comparison
of dissimilar activities across missions and across
organizations. Certainly most of our organizations use robust
risk assessment processes in determining the thrust of their
activities. The challenge has been for the Department in
figuring out a holistic way to use risk at the capability,
program, or activity level to look not only within
organizations but across organizations, across missions and
portfolios.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I look forward to seeing that and I am
glad that you are taking Mr. Maurer's advice and his
recommendations. You know, we heard testimony from Mr.
Schneider, who has an interesting background both in the DOD
and in DHS, has a lot of experience in management.
Mr. Cohn, you would probably be the best, and maybe perhaps
Mr. Maurer, as well--what is your response to his idea of
looking at kind of a DOD model that is a Goldwater-Nichols
approach?
Mr. Cohn. So it is interesting. I think that Deputy
Secretary Schneider, both in his remarks and his written
testimony, pointed out the time line that DOD worked on to
reach the point of integration that it is at. Created in 1947,
9 years into the Department of Defense was 1956 and the
Department of Defense struggled with a lot of the same issues
that have been pointed out here.
In the early 1960s Secretary Robert McNamara implemented
the planning, programming, and budgeting process in DOD, which
was really an effort to get the Department to look holistically
across its organizations at its Nationally-oriented programs
from a mission perspective. It was not until 1986 with
Goldwater-Nichols and 1989 with the Defense Management Review
that you got to that heightened level of operational
integration.
What the Department is really focused on right now is
focusing on getting to that first step of being able to look at
our investment processes from an integrated perspective across
our Secretary and deputy secretary, the heads of our
directorates, our components, looking at making sure we have
cross-departmental perspectives and decisions on strategy and
policy, on requirements, on programming and budgeting, and on
acquisition oversight. That is a lot of the work that the
management director is doing and that they are working in
concert with the----
Mr. McCaul. I would like to follow up with that. I think it
is an interesting idea. You know, whether it is workable, I
think, you know--Mr. Keating and I can discuss that, but I--it
is certainly an interesting idea to take a look at.
Mr. Maurer, do you have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Maurer. Yes. I think it is absolutely an interesting
idea to look at, and I think that conceptually it makes sense
to try to do whatever you can to try to break down some of the
stovepipes across the various operational components of the
DHS. The Department is doing some things to go down that road.
They have, for example, recently consolidated the process
for developing an SES class. They used to have four separate
processes; now it is just--whole Department. One of the BUR
initiatives is looking at how the different components are
having a regional presence and trying to consolidate that
across the Department, as well.
I think there are definitely some lessons learned from
Goldwater-Nichols that could be applied to DHS, and that would
be something interesting to follow----
Mr. McCaul. I would like to follow up with Mr. Schneider.
Perhaps, Mr. Cohn, you and I can discuss it more.
One last question--I see my time is expired--but, Mr.
Reese, you mentioned an interesting fact that I was not aware
of, and how many agencies outside of DHS have a homeland
security mission?
Mr. Reese. The Federal department there are a total of 19,
just based on research that has been done, and that is
including Department of Homeland Security. The CRS Homeland
Security Department fiscal year 2012 appropriations has a table
in the back that I will be happy to provide to staff that
breaks down funding. DHS gets 51.7 percent of the funding and
then the rest is broken down in those other agencies with
Department of Defense being second, at approximately----
Mr. McCaul. I would like to see those agencies, because
what you are telling me is Homeland Security Department, which
has the primary mission of defending the Nation and the
homeland, essentially gets 51 percent of the funding for the
mission.
Mr. Reese. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. That is a very interesting fact. I would like
to follow up with you on that.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a great segue
to my question.
I think this discussion begins with, you know, the first
analysis being the 9/11 Commission Report. Earlier this year
our committee heard testimony from Lee Hamilton, from Tom
Ridge, and they said that one of the primary results of their
report is--still remains, even after these--this period of
time, unmet, and that is breaking down the jurisdictional
barriers that exist. I understand, you know, I am no novice to
Government, how difficult that is, but I want to tell you, it
is not only the inefficiencies that you are talking about and
the inability to get management in place when it is so
fragmented, but I want you to comment, if you could.
I think the first view of this is: What is the effect of
this fragmentation on our security itself? I look at that as
the primary question that remains--and whether we are talking
about, you know, the approaches that were mentioned by our
prior speakers and how to deal with it, if someone that was in
the trenches saying, ``Well, we have to take these small,
incremental approaches to work around all these''--how
important is it--we know we are wasting money; we know we are
not being efficient. But in terms of security--anyone--tell me
how serious that fragmentation of bureaucracies remains, in
terms of our National security.
Mr. Maurer. I think it is definitely--falls in the realm
of, there is not really a clear answer to that. You just don't
know, actually, what the results are because you can certainly
get better efficiency, better effectiveness if things are
better integrated and pulled together in a more cohesive way.
But to sort of answer your question, though, it is in the
realm of the unknowables. I mean, we don't really know what is
being lost by not taking advantage of some simple things, like
if you have a consolidated management approach it would be
easier for the Department leadership to understand the
tradeoffs when they are making resource decisions within the
Department of Homeland Security. If you had better performance
measures you would have a better handle on what parts of the
Department are working more effectively than others and make
changes accordingly.
When you don't have that kind of consistent management
framework it is really difficult to have an analysis to address
the question that you raised, which is a very key question.
Mr. Keating. I think it is the fundamental question. You
know, I look at, you know, with the President did with, you
know, incorporating emerging threats and natural disasters
under that same umbrella, I applaud that approach because I
think he is moving in that direction.
But we have to go further. I know there is legislation here
in front of the Congress that has bipartisan support, yet
nothing gets moved forward. To me, what we are left with, then,
with declining revenues--and you have all addressed this--is
the fact that we are looking at the monies we have and
determining our security strategy around those parameters
instead of looking at our security strategies and our needs and
our threats and saying, ``What is it going to take to fund
safety?''
I mean, the holes are gaping. You know, our primary person
in the panel this morning talked about his biggest threat being
biological threats and that there was no priority to that at
all.
Yet, that was the end of the discussion. We didn't get into
that beyond that. We are looking at the cyber threats and we
are trying to grapple with that on the public-private side,
too, and think of approaches there.
But am I wrong? But doesn't it seem like the tail is
wagging the dog here, that we are looking at our limited
revenues and saying, ``All right, how are we going to spread
this around to all these different agencies and
bureaucracies?'' Lost in all this is, what are we doing to
really put the premium on our security needs and risk
assessment, and then putting the money forward?
I represent a coastal community. The Chairman, here,
represents the region that includes Port of Houston, I
mentioned before. Those kind of natural disaster threats as
well as terrorist threats really have a fundamental economic
and security threat to our country.
Do you have any advice to us other than just do our job and
start reorganizing here? Do you have any plans? Can you come
out with what we should look at as a blueprint for
reorganizing, making sure we have--we are doing things the
right way instead of--there is another term that comes to mind;
I won't use it here.
But what are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Cohn. You know, from the Department's perspective, we
articulated a security environment that recognized the threats
that Deputy Secretary Schneider laid out. We articulated five
National missions that we need to engage in and we understand
we need to engage with almost the entirety of the Federal
interagency in accomplishing those goals as well as with a--
with an enormous stakeholder community across all of those
missions.
Obviously the fiscal environment is what it is. The
Department has articulated a strategic approach that it follows
and a priority of goals and objectives that we need to achieve,
but the fiscal environment requires us and requires our
Secretary to then carefully weigh what the relative priorities
will be and to allocate resources in the best way possible to
optimize to those goals and objectives.
Mr. Maurer. I think historically, in the early days of the
Department when it was first being stood up, it was undergoing
a period of significant growth. There was a recognition that
there was a substantial threat, and so frankly, there was a lot
of money thrown at the Department very quickly.
They are now starting to have to reposition themselves into
a more austere fiscal environment which forces them to do
exactly what you are talking about. They have to start--they
have to flip the lens. They have to start thinking about, what
are the predominant risks and the threats facing the Nation,
and align the resources and priorities accordingly. That is
going to take some time.
Now, the one thing that is encouraging, I have seen
evidence of that in some of the plans that DHS has put forward
to address the high-risk designation, so on paper those things
are there to put those things in place. But we need to see
execution on those plans and we need to see sustained progress
in doing so.
Mr. Keating. Thanks.
Mr. Chairman, I am over my time.
Mr. McCaul. That was a very good question.
Gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, is recognized.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member, and to our panelists.
My first question is for Mr. Reese: Emerging threats
represent a broad spectrum of possibilities. In your opinion,
are the strategies we have in place and the efforts of DHS
effective in confronting these threats?
Mr. Reese. Ma'am, first of all, working for CRS I don't
have an opinion.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reese. I would also say that the definitions identified
in the documents--getting a succinct definition is sufficient.
We can add what we want to the definition of homeland security;
what is important is identifying the missions that evolve from
that definition or our concept of homeland security, and then
through risk assessment and through threat evaluation then
prioritize those missions. I believe that is the important step
that has to be done here.
It was stated earlier that these are--these documents
provide principles or guidance. The next step is actually
prioritizing.
Ms. Clarke of New York. So I guess the follow-up would be:
Is there anything that you have observed that may be lacking?
Are there any missing components? I mean, again, you are
looking at so many different ways in which the homeland is
threatened today.
You know, we have talked about a few areas, but there are
so many more, whether it is radiological weaponry and things
that may be already resident in many of our communities. You
know, we have talked about the radiological transfers for
medical facilities. Is there anything that you have observed
that seems to be obvious but not so obvious?
Mr. Reese. Ma'am, everything that--especially when you look
at the missions and the goals identified in the Bottom-Up
Review and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, they do--
and as I stated earlier, seem to be nested in the 2010 National
Security Strategy. It seems that we understand what we need to
be doing; it is just figuring out how do we prioritize and to
achieve those goals.
So no, ma'am, I haven't observed anything that----
Ms. Clarke of New York. Very well.
Mr. Maurer, you sort of, like peeked up a little bit. Would
you want to comment here?
Mr. Maurer. Well, it is an interesting topic, of course.
Yes, I think what is really missing are sort of the things that
we have already talked about from the GAO perspective, which is
the National risk assessment and a more informed risk-based
foundation to these kinds of analyses, and the Department says
it is taking actions to do that, and that is good.
Also talked about the need for having improvements in
getting stakeholders more involved in the next process for
developing these kinds of strategies, giving them more time to
comment, as well as doing more effective outreach to non-
Federal stakeholders. We recognize that that is a key challenge
for the Department since there are so many. But State, local,
Tribal, private sector play a big role and we have to make sure
that they are a part of developing these strategies.
We would also like to see a little more detail in the
implementation plan. But the key thing from a GAO perspective
is we want to see execution on these plans and an--supported by
an integrated management foundation.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Very well.
Mr. Cohn, as a follow-up, it is well settled that the
multiple agencies must cooperate with each other when it comes
to homeland security and terrorism-related issues. The QHSR
should have included a thorough discussion of the status of
cooperation between Federal, State, local, and Tribal
government in preventing terrorist attack and preparing for
emergency responses to threats. This was not, however, included
in the final product, and it appears to be outside of the scope
of the BUR.
Does the Department plan to complete this statutorily
required analysis? If so, when can we expect to have it
delivered to Congress?
Mr. Cohn. As I think the GAO found in their review, DHS did
make an--did undertake to describe the interaction between the
Department and its external stakeholders as well as other
Federal agencies in fulfilling its mission to prevent terrorism
as well as the other missions articulated in the Quadrennial
Review. What we did not do was assess the status of cooperation
by other Federal agencies with their partners as opposed to
DHS.
That is a very difficult thing for an individual agency to
do with its peer agencies. That is a topic of conversation and
something we are looking to--to understand how we would fulfill
that obligation as the requirement to conduct the next
quadrennial review is coming up, and we will be looking and
working to figure out how we complete that portion of the
statutory requirement in the upcoming 2013 review.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Oh boy. That doesn't sound too
good. I say that, you know, in all honesty because that is
almost at the core of your mission, which is to coordinate,
right? So if you are not getting cooperation from other Federal
agencies to meet that mandate, there is a challenge there that
has to be met.
Mr. Cohn. We absolutely recognize our obligation, and to
coordinate with other agencies, and we do coordinate
extensively with our Federal interagency partners and with our
vast majority of stakeholders in the homeland security
enterprise. The challenge comes in evaluating the actions of
other Federal departments and agencies, and that is a similar
challenge to the challenge, I think, of jurisdiction that the
Congress is facing, of how different organizations, with their
own authorities, might look to one another and assess one
another's roles.
So it is a challenge that the Department recognizes in
terms of that assessment. It is a difficult process and it is
one that we will be working through.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Mr. Maurer.
Mr. Maurer. I certainly understand that DHS faces in trying
to assess the level of cooperation from other departments. It
is an important issue, though, and it is certainly vital to the
overall success of addressing homeland security threats.
I mean, we at GAO stand ready to perform that kind of
service for the Congress if that is something we have been
asked to do. We certainly have criteria analysis in place to
look at overall interagency cooperation.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Very well.
Mr. Chairman, before I yield back I just want to make a
quick correction. I was informed by Mr. Keating that a comment
I made earlier was not accurate, and it was about--with regard
to General McCaffrey's comments on comprehensive--the need for
comprehensive immigration reform. Those comments were actually
made in the context of responding to the Texas report that you
had submitted into the record. So I just wanted to clarify.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that clarification.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Let me thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony. I think this has been a very productive discussion.
You know, we are not here to play ``gotcha'' politics. We
really want the homeland security to succeed. It is the right
thing for the American people and for the mission.
I want to commend the witnesses. I also want to commend all
of the employees in the Department of Homeland Security for
their hard efforts. It is sometimes a thankless job and it is
an easy target sometimes, an easy whipping boy. But the fact of
the matter is they work long, hard hours. I know the Border
Patrol agents down on the border have a very difficult job, the
ICE agents, and really all across the spectrum at DHS. So I
want to just take this opportunity--they may not hear it very
often from Congress, but I want to say thank you to all of the
employees in the Department for your hard work.
With that, this hearing now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]