[Senate Hearing 112-56]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-56
POPULAR UPRISING IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Burns, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC....................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Responses to questions submitted for the record by:
Senator Robert Menendez.................................. 37
Senator Johnny Isakson................................... 38
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
(iii)
POPULAR UPRISING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb,
Lugar, Corker, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Good morning,
everybody. Happy St. Patrick's Day to all and welcome to this
hearing on the Mideast--on events within the Mideast.
And I am particularly pleased, the committee is
particularly pleased to welcome here one of our most able and
distinguished diplomats. And he will be discussing what is
obviously one of the most pressing regions of concern and one
of the areas of greatest consequence to the foreign policy of
the United States at this particular moment in time.
Under Secretary Bill Burns has served in the Foreign
Service for nearly 30 years, including as Ambassador to Jordan,
Russia, and as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.
And in the years that I have served on the committee, I am sure
Senator Lugar shares this and Senator Corker, I think he is one
of our more capable diplomats, Foreign Service professionals
that we have had the occasion to be able to work with.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary, for making time to be with us
today when we know that you are enormously pressed and we look
forward to your filling us in on the inspiring and troubling
events that are unfolding in the Arab world.
From the experiences that you have had in Jordan and
elsewhere in the Near East as Secretary, clearly you have as
strong a perspective on the changes that are sweeping across
the Middle East as anybody, and we are fortunate to have your
experience at this historic moment.
In 2 short months we have seen stirring triumphs in Tunis
and Tahrir Square, unprecedented protests in Sana and Manama,
brutal crackdowns in Tripoli and obviously concerning events
unfolding with respect to Benghazi now. And these uprisings
clearly constitute one of the most remarkable, momentous
developments of our time. They also present a huge challenge
for all of us, for the people of the region and for America's
relationship with the people in the region.
So how we respond, as I said yesterday in comments I made
at the Carnegie Endowment, how we respond is really going to
shape our strategic position with respect to the Middle East as
well as how people in the Middle East and around the world, and
particularly Muslims, are going to see us. And I think it will
shape that view for years to come.
Clearly the remarkable transition that took place in Egypt,
the events of Tahrir Square, that transformation was a victory,
above all, for the people of Egypt. They did it. And they did
it in a most amazing way. But, it was also a victory for
democrats, small ``d'' obviously, democrats around the world,
because it showed that political change, even change of that
level of consequence, can be brought about peacefully.
If this now can be translated, the liberation that has
taken place in Egypt can be translated, and Tunisia, into
lasting democracy, then the entire new Arab Awakening is going
to carry a vital message, and that is that ordinary people can
take their future into their own hands and have the ability to
be able to command it, have a huge impact and determine for
themselves how they are going to be governed.
I want to also underscore, and again, I pointed to this
yesterday but I want to repeat it, because I think it is an
important concept, that the developments of Egypt and Tunisia
represent a huge blow against extremism. A successful democracy
in Egypt will demonstrate that al-Qaeda's belief that change
requires the cowardly violence of terror is wrong and it will
weaken the position of states like Iran that repress their own
people and use terrorist organizations to advance their
interests.
Also, just as we did in Eastern Europe immediately after
the fall of the Berlin Wall, I think we have the ability to
play a hugely constructive role in what happens and how events
unfold in the Middle East and we can affirm the values of
democracy as well as serve the larger strategic interests of
our friends and allies, and of the people of these countries as
well as ourselves by seizing this moment and recognizing the
opportunity that it presents. And that is why I am working with
Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman on legislation to support
these new and fledgling democracies in that region.
I call people's attention to the SEED Act. In 1989 it was
signed by President George H.W. Bush, and it was legislation
that was aimed at helping governments reform out of the
autocracies that they once were. Well similarly, we want to do
that. We want to help governments reform their security
sectors, build transparency, strengthen the rule of law and
help their leaders incorporate the aspirations of their people
into the day-to-day work and life of those countries.
Ultimately we want to support the transition to democratic
rule in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as these other countries
that are still struggling, and we want to encourage movement
toward democratic reform in the Middle East as a whole.
Our approach to the Middle East I think--I think this may
be stating the obvious, but the obvious doesn't always get
translated into reality around here and it needs to. Our
policies toward the Middle East are going to have to change.
For decades we were driven by our--purely, mostly by our
addiction to oil, foreign oil. And democracy and human rights
were frankly overshadowed to some degree by the political
realities created by that economic and addictive reality. And
too often over the past decade we saw regimes in the region
chiefly as tools in the fight against terrorism, while looking
away from abuses that we knew were unconscionable. Yes, we
would raise them privately, myself included, but the result was
that we had relationships that focused mostly on leaders rather
than people. That is part of the price we pay, folks, for our
energy paradigm that we are locked into.
I have said for years that we would liberate American
foreign policy if we could liberate ourselves from that
dependency. And so now we cannot afford to continue to simply
see the Middle East in the context of 9/11, we have to see it
in the context of 2011 and of this changing reality.
As the people of the region demand reform our approach to
the region has to embody the core values of our country. And at
the most basic level that means that we have to be consistent
in encouraging governments everywhere to respond to the hopes
and needs and rights of their citizens. We need to emphasize
the programs that will strengthen our engagement with people,
which is one of the core objectives of the legislation that
we're working on.
So, does that mean you have a cookie-cutter approach to
every country? The answer is, ``No''; every country is
different. Egypt isn't Jordan and Jordan isn't Libya and nor
are any of them Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. Each has its own
culture, its own sectarian realities. But we have to push back,
in all cases, against a consolidation of power that has bred
economic stagnation, corruption, popular dissatisfaction and
governments that are really, in many--in some cases, quite
divorced from the needs, concerns, and hopes of their people.
We need to encourage the establishment of institutions that
translate the will of the people into action and that promote
transparency and accountability.
Now, obviously the story coming out of the Arab world today
is not all good news. So we will be especially interested in
the Secretary's views on the troubling events unfolding in
Libya and Bahrain. In Libya, after the brutal attacks on his
own people, by Colonel Qaddafi, has been completely discredited
as a leader by every other--certainly by most of the friends
and allies of the West as well as Arab countries--the Arab
communities having spoken out in a rather remarkable way in the
last weeks.
The international community cannot simply watch from the
sidelines as the Libyan people's quest for democratic reform is
met with violence. The Arab League's call for a U.N. no-fly
zone is an unprecedented signal, a rather remarkable
transformation and statement that the old rules of impunity for
autocratic leaders don't stand.
But time is running out for the Libyan people. The world
needs to respond immediately, the United Nations Security
Council should act now, today, to pass a resolution that the
United States has shown real leadership in helping to craft,
that would provide the range of options necessary to avert a
humanitarian disaster. And whatever the final outcome, Qaddafi
has no legitimacy to govern, will have no legitimacy to govern,
he will govern, if he does, by force and force alone, and the
will of the Libyan people, in my judgment, will ultimately
prevail.
In Bahrain, soldiers backed by helicopters and tanks have
cleared Pearl Square. But it is clear, violence will not solve
the underlying problems of Bahrain, it will in fact most likely
make them worse and it risks a regional escalation. So we urge
the parties to engage in the national dialogue that is so
critical to chart a path forward of real reform.
Under Secretary Burns, I know that you have given an awful
lot of thought, and are now, to each of these issues over many
years. So we look forward to hearing from how you think the
situation in the region is developing and how the United States
ought to respond to it.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. I join the chairman in welcoming Secretary
Burns. I am very pleased that the Foreign Relations Committee
is engaged in this timely meeting to discuss the challenges
stemming from the upheaval that has swept the Middle East over
the past 3 months. There has been dramatic change, but we are
only at the very beginning of a long process.
How these movements develop and coalesce into organized
political parties and how the governments of the region respond
to their citizens' demands, will impact the United States
interests for decades. There is a long-term opportunity for a
more peaceful, stable, and prosperous Middle East as a result
of this popular movement, but we have been encouraging more
representative and tolerant governance throughout the region
for many years. As Americans, we should honor those in the
region who are speaking out in defense of values that we hold
dear.
At the same time we should acknowledge that the movements
are not about us. Our response needs to reflect this reality,
and should encompass a broader public debate about the goals
and limits of the United States role in the Middle East,
especially as it pertains to potential military intervention.
During the last 2 weeks, I have expressed my deep concern
that discussions of the United States policy options in the
Middle East have focused on a no-fly zone or other military
intervention in Libya. Clearly the United States should be
engaged with allies on how to oppose the Qaddafi regime and
support the aspirations of the Libyan people. But given the
costs of a no-fly zone, the risks that our involvement would
escalate, the uncertain reception in the Arab street of any
American intervention in an Arab country, the potential for
civilian deaths, the unpredictability of the endgame in a civil
war, the strains on our military, and other factors, I am
doubtful that United States interests would be served by
imposing a no-fly zone over Libya.
With roughly 145,000 American troops still in Iraq and
Afghanistan and with a budget that, according to the
President's own proposal, will carry a deficit of approximately
$1.5 trillion this year, we have to recognize that war spending
is especially difficult to control. In this broad context, if
the Obama administration decides to impose a no-fly zone or
take other significant military action in Libya, I believe it
should first seek a congressional debate on a declaration of
war under article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
I also have made the point that if American forces go to
war in Libya, we should ask Arab League governments and other
governments advocating for American military action to pledge
resources necessary to pay for it. This is not unprecedented.
More than $50 billion in foreign contributions were received to
offset United States costs in association with the first gulf
war in 1991.
Beyond the civil war in Libya, it is important for our
country to focus on the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia,
security in the Persian Gulf, and the potential impact the
instability is having on our efforts to counter terrorist
threats, particularly emanating from Yemen.
I am concerned that there has not been sufficient
discussion and debate about the constitutional reforms needed
in Egypt, and that reports indicate only the former ruling
party and the Muslim Brotherhood have come out in favor of the
proposed referendum, to be held in less than 48 hours. I
appreciate that the administration has encouraged the Egyptian
Government to seek election help from groups like the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Elections are
difficult to organize. They require planning and technical
expertise. From my own experience monitoring democratic
transitions, as far back as the Philippine People Power
Movement in the 1980s, I can attest to the importance of
getting elections right. Egyptians will make their own
decisions, but I hope we are doing everything possible to give
them the tools to be successful.
Similarly, it is important for us to support Tunisia's
transition. We must not forget that the wave of popular
movements was sparked by a Tunisian example, and the
establishment of a stable, democratic Tunisia would similarly
reinforce the power of peaceful protest. In the midst of their
own political challenges, the Tunisians have made remarkable
contributions to the safety and well-being of refugees fleeing
the violence in Libya, and they deserve our support.
Developments this week in Bahrain are a cause of concern.
The deployment of Saudi forces to Bahrain is reportedly
designed to secure vital infrastructure. What are the prospects
for meaningful dialogue between the government and the
opposition? Not only will events in Bahrain affect the wider
Persian Gulf region, but that country hosts a critical United
States naval presence, vital to ensuring freedom of navigation.
We must remain vigilant in the fight against terrorists who
seek to kill Americans. The most recent attempted terrorist
attacks on United States soil have come not from Pakistan or
Afghanistan, but from Yemen. How is the administration reacting
to continuing instability in Yemen? What are the implications
for our fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? I will
appreciate, as will all of our members this morning, the
insights of Secretary Burns on these very difficult issues and
we look forward to our discussion.
I thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, good
morning and thank you very much for this opportunity to appear
before you again.
Less than 3 months ago a desperate Tunisian street vendor,
tired of too many indignities and too many lost hopes, set fire
to himself and sparked a revolution still burning across an
entire region. That single act, at once tragic and noble, has
brought the Middle East to a moment of profound transformation
as consequential in its own way as 1989 was for Europe and
Eurasia. It is a moment of enormous promise for people and
societies long denied freedom and dignity and opportunity. It
is a moment of great possibility for American policy. A moment
when the peaceful, homegrown, nonideological movement surging
out of Tahrir Square offers a powerful repudiation of al-
Qaeda's false narrative that violence and extremism are the
only ways to affect change.
But it is also a moment of considerable risk, because there
is nothing automatic or foreordained about the success of such
transitions. Helping to get them right is as important a
challenge for American foreign policy as any we have faced
since the end of the cold war.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the starting point for
sensible policy is to understand clearly what is at play and
what is at stake in the Middle East today. The revolutions that
began in Tunis and in Cairo are not about us, they are about
the brave, proud, and determined people of Arab societies
intent upon better governance and more economic opportunities,
intent upon erasing the disconnect between the rulers and the
ruled that for so long had been so stifling for so many. And
they are about the universal values that the President spoke
about 2 years ago in Cairo, the right of peaceful assembly,
freedom of speech, and the right to determine one's own
destiny.
The most intense impression I had 3 weeks ago, after
visiting Tahrir Square and meeting youth leaders, was the
remarkable sense of public empowerment. It is fueled by a
communications revolution that stripped governments of their
old monopoly on the flow of information, made people more aware
of what others had in other societies that they didn't and
helped them mobilize without central leadership or conventional
political organizations.
If the indigenous energy and drive of the new Arab
Awakening is its most potent ingredient, it is also a vivid
reminder that stability is not a static phenomenon. Political
systems and leadership that fail to respond to the legitimate
aspirations of their people become more brittle, not more
stable. Popular pressures to realize universal values will take
different shapes and different societies, but no society is
immune from them. Political systems are a little like bicycles,
unless they are peddled forward they tend to fall over.
The long held conceit of many Arab leaders was that there
were really only two political choices, the autocrats you know
or the Islamic extremists you fear. That proposed a convenient
rationale for blocking real political outlets or broaden
participation and it ultimately produced the spontaneous
combustion of Tahrir Square.
The inconvenient truth is that many, if not most of us
involved in American policy in the Middle East in recent
decades have sometimes fallen prey to that same conceit. We
recognize the tinder that was accumulating in the region, the
combustible mix of closed systems and corruption and alienation
and indignity, documented so eloquently in the Arab Human
Development reports. We tried to drive home that concern to
leaderships in the region, but we didn't always try hard
enough. So it is good to apply a little humility as we enter
this new era unfolding before us.
The honest answer, also, is that as much as it is in our
long-term interest to support the emergence of more transparent
and more responsive governments, who will ultimately make
stronger and more stable partners, the short term is likely to
be pretty complicated and unsettling. As in other democratic
transitions in other parts of the world, there is a danger of
authoritarian retrenchment, especially if economic stagnation
persists and newly elected leaders don't produce practical
improvements in people's daily lives.
Successful transitions are about a lot more than just
elections. Institutions have to be built, too, with checks and
balances and an independent media to hold people accountable.
There will be plenty of vulnerabilities to exploit and no
shortage of predatory extremists ready to take advantage. And
there will be plenty of hard trade-offs for American
policymakers with popularly elected governments sometimes
taking sharper issue with American policies than their
autocratic predecessors did and elections sometimes producing
uncomfortable results.
None of that argues for pessimism, in my view, although it
is a fact that the Middle East is a place where pessimists
rarely lack for either company or validation. I actually see
considerable cause for optimism in what is underway in the
region. I am not naive, and nearly three decades of experience
in the Middle East have stripped me of most of my illusions,
but there is no mistaking the very real opportunities before us
if we employ a thoughtful, carefully integrated strategy.
The key to a successful strategy, it seems to me, is to
make common cause with people and leaders in the region, as
well as our partners outside it, in pursuit of a simple,
positive agenda. We should contrast that with the fundamentally
negative agenda of violent extremists who are much better at
describing what they are against than what they are for, at
describing what they want to tear down, rather than what they
want to build up.
Beyond our obvious interests in developing greater energy
independence and leading by the power of our own democratic
example, there are at least four main elements for such a
positive agenda.
First is support for peaceful democratic change. In
countries that are taking decisive steps away from old systems
and toward democracy, we have a deep stake in stable
transitions. Secretary Clinton emphasized our commitment to
Egypt's success, in Cairo earlier this week, underscoring the
hugely important demonstration affect of Egypt's experience for
the rest of the region. The Secretary stressed that same
reality in Tunisia today, noting that no one will ever forget
where this wave of change began.
In countries where protests have emerge, but change is
uncertain, such as Bahrain, we will continue to urge serious
political reform as well as urgent, peaceful dialogue between
governments and opposition leaders. In countries working to
stay ahead of the wave of popular protests, such as Jordan and
Morocco, we will continue to emphasize the importance of taking
reform seriously now as a way of creating positive avenues of
citizen engagement and avoiding sharp conflicts later on. And
in the sad and violent case of Libya, we are working hard to
maximize international pressure for Qaddafi's departure and to
support the courageous Libyans who have risen up to regain
their rights.
Following the Arab League's important and unprecedented
call for urgent measures to protect civilians in Libya and
establish a no-fly zone, we are pressing for a new U.N.
Security Council resolution to authorize a range of further
actions against the Qaddafi regime.
A second element, closely connected to the first, is strong
support for economic modernization. In the short run, that
means helping Egypt and Tunisia, for example, to navigate past
significant difficulties created by political turmoil and the
temporary collapse of tourism. But that also means thinking
boldly and ambitiously about how we can promote genuine long-
term modernization. We strongly support the Enterprise Fund
that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators McCain and Lieberman have
proposed. Secretary Clinton just announced that the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, will provide up to $2
billion to stimulate private sector investments in the Middle
East and North Africa.
It is also crucially important to consider trade
liberalization initiatives for key Arab States in transition,
ideally in cooperation with the European Union. In the process
we can help encourage intraregional trade and integration in a
region in which both are in short supply. We can help produce
private sector jobs desperately needed to keep pace with
demography and expectations. And we can help spread the
benefits and opportunities of economic growth across Arab
societies rather than just to a narrow circle at the top.
The success of political transitions will require strong,
practical economic results and creating a sense of economic
hope. Much of that obviously depends on Arab countries
themselves who need to put themselves in a better position to
compete in a very unsentimental global marketplace, but it is
deeply and urgently in our self interest to do all that we can
to help.
The third element of a positive American agenda for the
Middle East is renewed pursuit of comprehensive Arab/Israeli
peace. The status quo between Arabs and Israelis is no more
sustainable than the sclerotic political systems that have
crumbled in recent months. Neither Israel's future as a Jewish
democratic state, nor the legitimate aspirations of
Palestinians can be secured without a negotiated two-state
solution. While it is a truism that only the parties themselves
can make the hard choices necessary for peace, there is also no
substitute for continued, active American leadership.
A fourth element is our own huge and enduring stake in
regional security, in strengthening ties to the GCC states, in
fighting terrorism and preventing Iran from developing nuclear
weapons and setting off a catastrophic regional arms race, in
not losing sight of Iraq's own critical democratic transition
and reintegration into the Arab world. We have to remain clear-
eyed and resolute about the threat that Iran's behavior poses
across a number of areas and equally straightforward in our
support for the aspirations of Iranian citizens for freedom and
dignity.
Beneath Tehran's bluster the truth is that nowhere in the
region is the disconnect between rulers and ruled any greater
than it is in Iran. It is the height of hypocrisy for Iran's
leaders to profess their enthusiasm for democratic changes in
the Arab world while systematically denying them to their own
people.
Mr. Chairman, this is one of those moments that come along
only very rarely in the course of human events. It is full of
historic opportunities and some very large pitfalls for people
in the Middle East and for the United States. It is a moment
which demands our attention and our energy and as much
creativity and initiative as we and our partners around the
world can generate.
I look forward very much to working closely with you and
Senator Lugar and the members of the committee in the weeks and
months ahead.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before
you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Under Secretary William J. Burns
Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you again.
Less than 3 months ago, a desperate Tunisian street vendor, tired
of too many indignities and too many lost hopes, set fire to himself
and sparked a revolution still burning across an entire region. That
single tragic act, has brought the Middle East to a moment of profound
transformation, as consequential in its own way as 1989 was for Europe
and Eurasia.
It is a moment of enormous promise for people and societies long
denied full freedom and dignity and opportunity. It is a moment of
great possibility for American policy, as well as a moment when the
peaceful, homegrown, nonideological movement surging out of Tahrir
Square offers a powerful repudiation of al-Qaeda's false narrative that
violence and extremism are the only ways to effect change. The result
of all these reform movements could be greater peace, democracy, and
prosperity in the region, which would advance all of our interests. But
is also a moment of considerable risk, because there is nothing
automatic or foreordained about the success of such transitions.
Helping these countries' reformers to achieve their goals is as
important a challenge for American foreign policy as any we have faced
since the end of the cold war.
While the spark that launched the Tunisian revolution was a
spontaneous act born of one individual's feelings of frustration and
disenfranchisement, the underlying regional demographic, economic,
political, and environmental challenges he faced remain a longstanding
concern of ours. The Middle East faces the profound problem of a
massive youth bulge coming of age in an environment without economic or
political opportunity. Youth unemployment in some cases is greater than
30 percent. Many college-educated urban youth are unable to find jobs.
Widespread corruption and lack of free speech fuel a sense of
individual disenfranchisement, a sense shared across the region. The
revolutions that began in Tunis and Cairo are about the brave, proud,
and determined people of Arab societies, intent upon better governance
and more economic opportunities, intent upon erasing the disconnect
between the rulers and the ruled that for so long has been so stifling
for so many. And they're about the universal values that the President
spoke about 2 years ago in Cairo--the right of peaceful assembly,
freedom of speech, and the right to determine one's own destiny.
If the indigenous energy and drive of the new Arab awakening is its
most potent ingredient, it is also a vivid reminder that stability is
not a static phenomenon. Political systems and leaderships that fail to
respond to the legitimate aspirations of their people become more
brittle, not more stable. Popular pressures to realize universal values
will take different shapes in different societies, but no society is
immune from them. As Secretary Clinton said, ``the challenge is to help
our partners take systematic steps to usher in a better future where
people's voices are heard, their rights respected, and their
aspirations met. This is not simply a matter of idealism. It is a
strategic necessity.''
The long-held conceit of many Arab leaders was that there were
really only two political choices--the autocrats you know or the
Islamic extremists you fear. That provided a convenient rationale for
blocking real political outlets or broadened participation, and it
ultimately produced the spontaneous protests in Tahrir Square and
elsewhere throughout the region. We have long recognized the tinder
that was accumulating in the region, the combustible mix of closed
systems and corruption and alienation and indignity documented so
eloquently in the Arab Human Development Reports. We tried to drive
home that concern to leaderships in the region, with President Obama
underscoring in his June 2009 Cairo speech that nations that protect
universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful and secure.
Secretary Clinton left no room for ambiguity when she warned regional
leaders in Doha earlier this year that they needed to embrace reform or
see the sands shift underneath their feet. At the same time, successive
administrations have sought cooperation on crucial shared priorities,
such as combating terrorism, curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions,
promoting Middle East peace, and securing stable energy supplies.
As much as it is in our long-term interest to support the emergence
of more transparent and more responsive governments, who will
ultimately make stronger and more stable partners, the short term is
likely to be complicated and maybe even unsettling. As in other
democratic transitions in other parts of the world, there is a danger
of authoritarian retrenchment, especially if economic stagnation
persists and newly elected leaders do not produce immediate practical
improvements in people's daily lives. Successful transitions are about
a lot more than just elections; institutions have to be built too,
supportive policies, effective checks and balances, and an independent
media to hold governments accountable.
There will be plenty of vulnerabilities, and no shortage of
predatory extremists ready to exploit them. And there will be plenty of
hard tradeoffs for American policymakers, with popularly elected
governments sometimes taking sharper issue with American policies than
their autocratic predecessors did, and elections sometimes producing
uncomfortable results.
Secretary Clinton just returned from Egypt and Tunisia; in both
countries, she listened to the concerns and goals of civil society,
political activists, and government officials, and emphasized the
enormous importance we attach to their success in building new
democratic and durable political structures. In responding to the
changes in the region, we are guided by clear core principles. We
support the universal right to freedom of expression, association, and
speech, as well as to be free from fear of harassment, reprisal,
intimidation, and discrimination. We oppose violence as a tool for
political coercion. We support the right of each country to determine
its own path, recognizing the unique context of each situation. We
believe political transitions should be deliberate, inclusive, and
transparent, with a broad and inclusive dialogue that engages women,
minorities, and people from all religious, economic, and social
backgrounds.
The key to a successful U.S. strategy is to make common cause with
people and leaders in the region--as well as our partners outside it--
in pursuit of a simple, positive agenda. U.S. assistance and leadership
has a crucial part to play in meeting the crescendo of challenges in
the Middle East and North Africa. Whether building international
support for the swift and unanimous imposition of strong sanctions on
Colonel Qadhafi and those who still stand by him--imposing a travel
ban, an assets freeze, and an arms embargo--or securing the
unprecedented recommendation of the Human Rights Council for suspending
Libya's membership from the Council as well as a consensus decision of
the U.N. General Assembly to suspend Libya, which is the first time any
country has been suspended from the Council--U.S. interests have been
enhanced in multilateral channels.
The first element of our approach to the Middle East is support for
peaceful democratic change, reflecting the very different situations
that are unfolding. In countries that are taking decisive steps away
from old systems and toward democracy, such as Egypt and Tunisia, we
have a deep stake in stable transitions. As the traditional bellwether
for the Middle East--politically, economically, and culturally--Egypt's
success is vitally important to the region and to us. We will continue
to support civil society voices urging the immediate lifting of the
Emergency Law and encouraging real oversight of the new National
Security Agency, in the wake of Egypt's very positive decision to
dissolve the discredited State Security Investigations Agency. We
support a thoughtful sequencing of a constitutional referendum and
elections that will provide the time and space necessary to allow
political parties to organize, build support, and campaign--which we
also see as critical steps in helping the Egyptian people truly have a
choice when they turn out to vote. We acknowledge the Egyptian
military's valuable role in overseeing the transition process and look
forward to continuing three decades of cooperation with that
institution. We will hold its leaders to their commitment to genuine
reform in Egypt. The same holds true in Tunisia, a middle-income
country with an educated population and tradition of tolerance, where
we can provide important support in strengthening civil society, the
media, and the understanding of a sound framework for elections.
In countries such as Bahrain and Yemen, where we are witnessing
escalating protests but change is uncertain, we will continue to press
vigorously for serious political reform as well as productive dialogue
between governments and opposition leaders. This is particularly
critical in Bahrain, where there can be no military solution to the
lack of trust across Bahrain's sectarian divide. This is not just a
simple matter of restoring law and order, but addressing real political
grievances. Aggravating sectarian divides will only lead to decreased
security over the long term. A focused dialogue that produces
meaningful constitutional reforms addressing the legitimate grievances
of the Shia population would be a defeat for those, including Iran and
al-Qaeda, seeking to co-opt regional sectarian strife for their own
benefit. The stakes are high. In Yemen, terrorist violence from al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula threatens the security and well-being of
the Yemeni people, the broader Arabian Peninsula, the United States
homeland, our friends and allies. Declining water and petroleum
resources, a fractured polity that few have confidence in, an
underdeveloped civil society, and institutions too weak to mediate
competing tribal and regional demands make combating terrorism and
promoting sustainable development that much more difficult. The
international community must promote dialogue and reforms that will set
the stage for a Presidential election in 2013, in which President Saleh
has pledged not to participate.
In countries working to stay ahead of the wave of popular protests,
such as Jordan and Morocco, we will emphasize the importance of taking
reform seriously now as a way of creating positive avenues of citizen
engagement and avoiding sharp conflicts later on. As always, timely
reform is the best possible antidote to subsequent upheaval. Both King
Abdallah and King Mohammed have announced significant reform
initiatives. In Morocco, these include a popularly elected Prime
Minister with greatly enhanced powers; a fully independent judiciary;
strengthened Parliament and civil society; greater public
accountability and other measures to combat corruption; more
institutionalized protections for human rights and civil liberties;
significant transfers of power from appointed administrators to elected
municipal and regional officials; and institutionalized protections for
Amazigh (Berber) rights. In Jordan, the King has called for new laws
that will yield a more representative Parliament and facilitate the
formation of new political parties. Implementing these reforms in a
credible and transparent manner will build confidence and credibility
in both governments as agents of responsible change.
And in the sad and violent case of Libya, we are working hard to
maximize international pressure for Qadhafi's departure, and to support
the courageous Libyans who have risen up to regain their rights. We
also worked tirelessly for the adoption of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1970, which required the freezing of assets of Qadhafi and
several family members and banned their travel, as well several other
key Libyan leaders. At the same time, the United States froze the
assets of the Government of Libya. We are now moving as rapidly as we
can in New York to see if we can get additional authorization for the
international community to look at a broad range of actions. As the
President stated, all options remain on the table. At the same time, we
are working with our partners to identify and disrupt the flow of
mercenaries into Libya, in order to deny Qadhafi another weapon against
his own population. We will continue to respond to the humanitarian
crisis unleashed by Qadhafi, with our $47 million in emergency relief
providing food, water, shelter, medical supplies, and evacuation
assistance to those fleeing the violence.
A second element of a successful U.S. strategy, closely connected
to the first, is strong support for economic modernization. In the
short run, that means helping Egypt and Tunisia, for example, to
navigate past significant difficulties created by political turmoil and
the temporary collapse of tourism. In Egypt, for instance, it means
helping the authorities sustain, and build popular support for, the
hard-fought structural reforms of the last decade that produced 7
percent annual growth rates and $10 billion a year in foreign
investment, while also helping to extend the benefits of economic
growth to all parts of Egyptian society. Not only in Egypt, but across
the region, economic growth needs to be restored in a way that provides
opportunity to the young, the unemployed, and those who have not been
part of the formal economy. In the longer run, that also means thinking
boldly and ambitiously about how we can promote genuine modernization.
We strongly support the Enterprise Funds for Egypt and Tunisia that
you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators McCain and Lieberman have proposed.
Secretary Clinton just announced that the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation will provide up to $2 billion to stimulate private sector
investments in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition, the U.S.
has established unique outreach efforts under the State Department's
Global Entrepreneurship Program to catalyze private and public
resources in building an effective ecosystem for innovation and
business startups.
It is also crucially important to consider the expansion of trade
opportunities for key Arab States in transition, including trade
liberalization initiatives, ideally in cooperation with the EU, to help
the Arab world compete globally, provide education relevant to market
needs, create an environment conducive to private sector investment,
and alleviate poverty among large segments of the population. In the
process, we can help encourage intraregional trade and integration in a
region in which both are in short supply. The U.S. is actively engaging
with Egypt, for example, to address outstanding issues in order to
expand the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) program, which allows duty-
free entry to the U.S. for Egyptian products. Through initiatives like
this, we can help produce private sector jobs desperately needed to
keep pace with demography and expectations. And we can help spread the
benefits and opportunities of economic growth across Arab societies,
rather than just to a narrow circle at the top.
The success of political transitions will require strong, practical
economic results, and creating a sense of economic hope. Much of that
obviously depends on Arab countries themselves, who need to put
themselves in a better position to compete in a very unsentimental
global marketplace. But it is deeply and urgently in our self-interest
to do all that we can to help.
A third element of a positive American agenda for the Middle East
is the pursuit of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. The status quo
between Arabs and Israelis is no more sustainable than the sclerotic
political systems that have crumbled in recent months. Neither Israel's
future as a secure Jewish, democratic state nor the legitimate
aspirations of Palestinians can be secured without a negotiated two-
state solution. While the parties themselves must ultimately make the
hard choices necessary for peace, there is also no substitute for
continued active American leadership. We continue the persistent, day-
in-and-day-out, high-level American engagement, working privately with
all parties to create an environment for resumed, meaningful and
substantive negotiations on all core issues. We are committed to
ensuring that political changes on Israel's borders do not create new
dangers for Israel and the region, and we welcome the Egyptian
leadership's rapid and repeated reaffirmation of its international
treaty obligations.
A fourth element is our own huge and enduring stake in regional
security--in strengthening ties to the GCC states; in fighting
terrorism; in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and
setting off a catastrophic regional arms race; in maintaining our
partnership with Iraq as Iraq goes through its own crucial democratic
transition and reintegration into the Arab world. We have to remain
clear-eyed and resolute about the threat that Iran's leaders pose
across a number of areas--and equally straightforward in our support
for the aspirations of Iranian citizens for freedom and dignity. The
truth is that nowhere in the region is the disconnect between rulers
and ruled any greater than it is in Iran. The hypocrisy for Iran's
leaders to profess their enthusiasm for democratic changes in the Arab
world while systematically denying them to their own people is clear to
all, including Iranian citizens.
Working with Congress and our international partners, we will
continue to intensify efforts to hold Iran accountable for its
persistent failure to comply with its obligations under 6 UNSC
resolutions and 10 IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Iran's refusal
to enter into a constructive dialogue with the P5+1 helped forge a
strong international consensus behind the toughest set of U.N. Security
Council resolutions to date. Working with the EU, Australia, Norway,
Japan, Canada, and South Korea, we have tightened those sanctions
further. Even as we have left the door open to engagement, we have
sharpened the choices confronting the Iranian leadership. Since July
2010, we have designated 90 entities and 25 individuals for their
involvement in and support of Iran's nuclear program and terrorist
activity. We have also designated 10 individuals for their involvement
in human rights abuses in Iran, and along with a number of other member
states, we strongly condemned Iran's record at the Human Rights
Council. Finally, we have used the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions
Accountability and Divestment Act to disrupt Iran's energy sector by
sanctioning one of Iran's most important oil companies. Sanctioning
this firm, which secures much of Iran's foreign investment and supplies
of refined petroleum, has chilled its relationships with foreign
traders and investors. We have also secured the withdrawal of five
major international oil companies from Iran using CISADA's special rule
provision. With the drying up in Western energy investment in Iran, we
have denied the regime the profits, the technology, and the know-how
that comes with it.
Mr. Chairman, this is one of those moments that come along only
very rarely in the course of human events. It is full of historic
opportunities, and some very large pitfalls, for people in the Middle
East, and for the United States. It is a moment which demands our
attention and our energy, and as much creativity and initiative as we
and our partners around the world can generate. I look forward very
much to working closely with you and Senator Lugar and the members of
this committee in the weeks and months ahead.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.
The Chairman. Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are
delighted to have you, as I said.
How would you characterize the progress to date and the
process as it goes forward in Egypt, with respect to the
military council?
Mr. Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think Egyptians have made
remarkable progress in recent weeks, especially when you
consider that it was only a little less than a month again that
the Mubarak era ended. The military and the Supreme Armed
Forces Council has played a responsible role. We have in place
a new transition government that I think has widespread
credibility amongst the population. A few days ago the Egyptian
leadership took the significant step of disbanding the state
security apparatus which was a long-held demand of the youth
activists and many of those in Tahrir Square. And as Senator
Lugar mentioned earlier, there have been amendments drafted in
the Constitution, a referendum scheduled in a few days for
Egyptians to vote on that.
Having said all that, I think Egyptians themselves
recognize that there are a number of challenges before them. As
you look at experiences around the world and Senator Lugar
mentioned the Philippines, it takes time and space to organize
new political parties and so elections require very careful
preparation, especially for the Parliament and that's a theme
that many thoughtful Egyptians have stressed and Secretary
Clinton discussed that when she was in Cairo a couple of days
ago.
The Chairman. Did she get a response from them with respect
to the timing?
Mr. Burns. I think there is a discussion that is going on
within the leadership about, you know, how best to sequence
these steps. Obviously these are decisions that Egyptians
themselves have to make, but I think they are weighing
carefully all of those considerations.
The Chairman. Well, I'm going to be there on Sunday and I
will be meeting with them and I hope we can weigh in and
encourage that. I think the advisability of having the
Presidential race before the parliamentary race is obvious and
everybody I have talked to seems to indicate that that would be
better, but it is not certain at this point. Is that correct?
Mr. Burns. No, sir. I think that is an issue that the
Egyptians are still debating amongst themselves, but it is a
healthy debate that is going on.
The Chairman. Right. What is your sense of the degree to
which the civil society, which has always been present but
under the radar screen in Egypt, to what degree is it now
surfacing with--I mean what is the level of robustness of that
and the energy within it? What do you sense? Are people seizing
this moment?
Mr. Burns. Well, I think Egyptians are seizing it with
enormous pride and enthusiasm. And it is very hard not to come
away from, not just Tahrir Square, but discussions with
Egyptians, especially youth leaders, civil society activists,
and not feel not only impressed but their feeling of optimism
about what is possible in Egypt.
You know, as I said, there are a number of challenges on
the road ahead but I am convinced that Egyptians are entirely
capable of solving those problems and building the kind of
political system that they deserve.
The Chairman. Can you share with us, I know it is not the
place to go into all of the specifics, but Secretary Clinton
met with Mahmud Jibril, the representative of the Libyan
opposition. And many people have been sort of saying, well who
is the opposition and so forth. Can you describe that a little
bit--what her conclusion was or the State Department's sense of
that meeting and the opposition itself, perhaps?
Mr. Burns. Well the Secretary had a long and quite thorough
discussion with Mr. Jibril and I think came away impressed with
his seriousness. We are familiar with a number of the other
members of the Libyan National Council and have been similarly
impressed, at least with those with whom we have spoken, about
their commitment to building a stable Libyan society. We are
still in the process of trying to talk to other members of the
council and developing a clearer picture, so I don't want to
pretend that we have a full picture in which we have total
confidence. But we have been impressed so far with, you know,
what they've said, about what their ambitions are and what
their sense of how the outside world can help.
The Chairman. And what kind of future are they describing
to you for Libya?
Mr. Burns. Well, what they have described, at least so far,
is a future in which they want to build democratic
institutions, a secular future for Libya in which, you know,
the broad range of Libyan citizens are able to participate in a
way that they haven't been for the last four decades. So it is
easier, certainly, to paint a picture like that than it is to
construct a new system. But, in terms of what they have said to
us, it has been generally positive.
The Chairman. What is the impact of the French recognition
of the opposition?
Mr. Burns. Well, what we are focused on, Mr. Chairman, is,
you know, much more the building of practical ties to the
Libyan National Council, quite apart from the formal issue of
recognition. We have authorized the Libyan National Council to
open a representative office in Washington----
The Chairman. Now, I'm not suggesting that we do that. I am
not at all suggesting, I am just asking what the impact is on
the thinking of some of our allies with respect to the events
unfolding and the ability to try to put pressure on Qaddafi, et
cetera, as we go forward.
Mr. Burns. Well, I think it is a step along side the
practical measures that we and others are taking with the
Libyan National Council to enhance their credibility and to
underscore the importance of building an alternative future for
Libya.
The Chairman. What do you understand the situation to be
now with respect to Qaddafi's forces in Benghazi?
Mr. Burns. Well, it is a very fast moving situation, as you
know very well. Qaddafi's forces have made significant strides
on the ground, over the course of the last 24, 48 hours. I
believe they are only about 160 kilometers from Benghazi right
now. So the situation is very fluid, but they have made
advances, taking full advantage of their overwhelming
military--or superiority in military firepower, at least.
The Chairman. I understand that is principally articulated
through a certain number of tanks and a certain number of
artillery pieces. Is that correct?
Mr. Burns. Yes. In addition to the capabilities of the
Libyan Air Force. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And the Air Force, there have been I think
slightly less than 20 but somewhere in that vicinity of sorties
per day?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir; I think that is right.
The Chairman. Yes. With respect to the situation in
Bahrain, it has obviously taken a dangerous turn in the last
couple of days. What is your sense of the ability now of the
Crown Prince to convene a meaningful national dialogue given
the violence that has taken place and the movement of Saudi
troops into Bahrain?
Mr. Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is obviously a very
complicated situation. I mean we have strongly supported, we
continue to strongly support the Crown Prince's efforts to
begin a serious national dialogue. We have urged both the
government and the opposition parties to engage in that
dialogue.
As Secretary Clinton said yesterday, we and many others
around the world are alarmed and troubled by the situation we
see and we have continued to emphasize that there is no
security solution to the legitimate aspirations of Bahraini
citizens, that there has to be a political solution which you
can only arrive at through dialogue. And that is a point we are
going to continue to emphasize, particularly when we see
excessive use of force against demonstrators. And we have
continued to call on all parties, including hard-line
oppositionists to avoid violence.
The Chairman. Do we have any leverage besides our voice? Is
there any--I mean if you connect the dots, are there ways in
which you believe we have an ability to be able to have an
impact or are we kind of on the sidelines watching? And if so,
what do we do with respect to the balance of the principles
that we espouse with respect to Tahrir Square versus now?
Mr. Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are committed to applying
those universal principles in every situation that emerges,
whether it is in Bahrain or any place else. As I said in my
opening remarks, in the case of societies like Bahrain where
protests have begun, change is still uncertain. We are going to
continue to do everything we can. We are not the only voice in
this, there are others in the international community voicing
similar concerns, to urge a resumption of political dialogue,
the dialogue the Crown Prince has tried to start. Because that
is the only way, I think in which you can produce the kind of
outcome that Bahraini's deserve.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Burns, I'm very much concerned, as my opening
statement pointed out, not only about recent events in Libya or
Bahrain or Yemen, but likewise about potential United States
involvement in any of these situations and the conditions in
which we could become involved.
We had long discussions in this committee before our
participation in Iraq, for example. One can say that
undertaking was of a different magnitude altogether, but the
idea was to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and to bring
about a democratic Iraq as a shining symbol in the Middle East.
Now we are at a point in which, as I understand it, our
Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, is quoted as
saying yesterday, ``We are interested in a broad range of
action, which would protect civilians and halt the killings.''
She said the Security Council needs to, ``be prepared to
contemplate steps that include but go beyond a no-fly zone.''
One press account says that the draft resolution introduced
by the British and the French contains controversial language
authorizing, ``all necessary measures,'' to protect civilians.
This could be interpreted as permitting strikes against
government ground forces and the use of combat forces on the
ground in Libya.
Now, I mentioned the Arab League endorsement of the no-fly
zone in my opening statement. The Arab League in its statement
reportedly opposed any ``foreign intervention'' in Libya. The
Arab League later noted that its approval of a no-fly zone
would expire, ``at the end of the crisis,'' whatever that may
be defined as.
I mention all of this simply because I want to ask you
precisely what authorities are we seeking in New York? Assuming
the Security Council would vote in favor of the resolution,
whether it is supported by the French or the British or
ourselves, what role do you envision the United States military
forces and, separately, those of other countries, having to
play?
And furthermore, the President has not yet really spoken
directly to United States national interests at stake in Libya,
aside from our opposition to Qaddafi and the protection of
innocent civilians. Does the President plan to spell out what
our national interests are in Libya that might justify the use
of our Armed Forces?
And finally, there is at least a report that Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates have agreed to participate in a no-fly
zone. Does this Arab commitment include financial support of
this operation, which will be expensive? Even the no-fly zone
alone, without the no-drive zone or the rest of it, is
expensive. We're having huge debates every day on the floor of
the Congress about our national budget and yet this seems to
proceed in a manner entirely divorced from this. It will not be
that way for long.
So, I ask you all of this in one set of questions because
of the constraint of time. But could you explain, generally,
what the administration's view is?
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar and those are
all very fair concerns and very fair questions.
I'd make several points in response. First, as I said we
and others in the international community have been
increasingly concerned, over the course of the last few days,
with what is developing in Libya. The Secretary General of the
United Nations warned yesterday of the dangers of a true
humanitarian catastrophe, given the past behavior of Mr.
Qaddafi and his regime.
Second, as you said, the Arab League, last Saturday, took a
quite important and unprecedented step when it called for the
United Nations to authorize measures to protect civilians in
Libya, including a no-fly zone. Since that time we have been
working actively in the Security Council to pursue such a new
resolution, which the Lebanese, along with the British and
French, have put forward. And as Ambassador Rice described
yesterday, among the options that are being discussed today are
measures including a no-fly zone, but not limited to that, to
protect civilians from bombardment by Qaddafi's forces.
I don't know what the Security Council ultimately is going
to produce. We are working hard to try to produce a serious
resolution and produce it quickly, given the pace of events on
the ground.
We have emphasized, in addition, two things. The first is
that we want this to be an international response with
authorization from the Security Council. We are not seeking a
unilateral effort here. And second, beyond the statement that
the Arab League issued, we are interested in active Arab
partnership in such an effort, both in the measures that would
be taken and also, potentially, in the financial support for
them. And those are discussions that we have begun, including
with particular Arab States that have expressed an interest and
a willingness to participate in this.
My final comment would simply be to emphasize that I know
the President and Secretary Clinton take very seriously the
importance of continued close consultation with the
congressional leadership on these very important issues and I
know the White House will remain in touch with the
congressional leadership on this in the days ahead.
Senator Lugar. Well, let me then be more direct in terms of
congressional consultation. That is important and certainly
welcome. My view is that there should be considerably more than
that. There should be congressional participation.
Specifically, if we are going to declare war against Libya,
then we ought to have a congressional declaration of war. Now
what I question is, Is the administration authorized,
constitutionally, to simply proceed into a conflict in Libya
involving American forces without a declaration of war?
We have unfortunately, I think, participated in some wars
in recent years in which there was not a declaration of war by
the Congress. I would like to prevent that from occurring
again. And I think we are on the threshold, not only with
regard to Libya but also the stream of civil wars currently
taking place in the region. Now is it our policy, generally,
that the administration might simply participate in select
civil wars on behalf of what it believes is the best interest
of the country by simply citing humanitarian concerns? What is
your view about the congressional debates and a declaration of
war against the sovereign State of Libya, if that is our
intent?
Mr. Burns. Well, I'd say two things, sir. First, I agree
with you that we need to be extraordinary careful in how we
approach these kind of situations and we also need to approach
them with a sense of humility about our role and our influence.
And the President and Secretary Clinton and others have been
very, very careful in how they have looked at the situation
that has emerged in Libya as well as elsewhere in the region.
That is why we have attached so much emphasis to making
this an international response authorized by the U.N. Security
Council and attach so much importance to active Arab
partnership, not just declarations, in any such effort.
So I agree with you, we need to be very, very careful on
these issues. And I understand the seriousness of the concern
you raised about the nature, not just of consultation but of
efforts between the administration and the Congress and I will
convey that very directly to Secretary Clinton and the White
House.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Under Secretary Burns, thank you for being here, for your
great service to the country.
I wanted to ask, in light of the previous questions you've
answered about the region I want to ask you about two places in
particular, one is Iran and one is Lebanon.
First of all, with regard to Iran, we know that last year
we made tremendous progress, not just here in Washington, but
in other parts of the world as well, to get sanctions in place.
I wanted to ask you about ways that the administration either
is planning to, or believes we should, increase our ratchet up
the sanctions on Iran. And I know, on page seven of your
testimony, the bottom of that second full paragraph, you talk
about the impact of sanctions and some of the results. I'd ask
you to speak to that.
But then second, how do we, on a parallel track, but even
as important, how is the administration going to continue to
support the democratic opposition, domestic opposition,
sometimes known as the Green Movement, even as we are
implementing and I hope, increasing sanctions?
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.
As you know, as we have discussed before, we are continuing
to work very hard to apply the unprecedented sanctions which
are already in affect against Iran, building on the platform of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, but also making full use
of our own new national laws, as well as what the European
community has done. And I think we're making significant
progress in that direction and we're going to continue to push
quite hard, I think it's had an impact on the capacity of the
Iranians to attract new investment in their energy sector, it
has had an impact on what is already a very badly mismanaged
Iranian economy. So we are going to continue to press very hard
on that front.
With regard to human rights and the rights of Iranian
citizens to the same kind of freedom and dignity and
opportunity that you see sweeping across the Arab world, as I
said, it really is the height of hypocrisy for the Iranian
leadership to on the one hand applaud those kind of steps in
the Arab world and at the same time deny those same rights to
their own people. We have designated 10 senior Iranian
officials, just over the course of the last few months, for
human rights abuses and that is a process that we are going to
continue.
As you know, we will continue to try to apply,
constructively, assistance in expanding Internet freedoms, for
example, for Iranian citizens to help them find their voice and
pursue the kind of rights that people elsewhere in the region
are pursuing right now.
Senator Casey. And I appreciate that answer. It seems as if
everywhere you look in the region you see the impact that Iran
is having. The regime is having an impact, just by way of one
example, Hezbollah and the destabilizing impact that has on
Lebanon and the region, Hamas, wherever you look you see
Iranian fingerprints, Afghanistan, Iraq. So I would urge the
administration to do everything possible to increase sanctions,
even as the ones that are authorized now are being implemented.
Let me move, and I know we don't have a lot of time, but I
wanted to move to the question of Lebanon. I was there in July.
It is remarkable, just my own sense of it, but it is remarkable
the heavy presence in that country and especially in Beirut
that Hezbollah has, almost as if it is an organized crime force
that has a really intimidating influence on leaders. You are in
a meeting with a government official, you just mention the word
Hezbollah and you can see them almost physically recoiling or
becoming tense.
We know what has happened, we know that there is a
transition going on, Prime Minister Hariri is out and they are
in a transition phase. I guess in light of that change and the
destabilized environment, and in light of the direct threat
that Hezbollah presents for the region, for our own security,
what assurances, what checks can we put in place, as Members of
Congress, to make sure that when the administration comes to us
and says, we have been aiding the LAF, the Lebanese Armed
Forces and want to continue that dollars don't get in the hands
of forces that we don't want to end up in or that Hezbollah
will use our dollars. The administration has a request for 2012
of $227\1/2\ million, what assurances can you provide us and
what checks do we have to make sure that those dollars don't
aid and abet and benefit Hezbollah?
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much, Senator.
We have a number of safeguards and end-use checks in place
now to ensure that equipment and training that we provide to
the Lebanese Armed forces, which does play a very important
stabilizing role as a national institution in Lebanon, are used
properly and the way that we intend them to be used. And we are
continuing those training and equipment programs as the new
Lebanese Government is formed.
As you know, Prime Minister Makati is still in the process
of forming that government. And we have made clear that we are
going to review our assistance program once that government is
formed, once we see what its program is and its policy
statements are.
We have made clear to the Prime Minister-designate that we
will judge him and his government by their actions not just
their words. He said that he is committed to a unity government
that reflects the views of the wide spectrum of Lebanese. He
said that he is committed to fulfilling Lebanon's international
obligations. And as I said, we are going to judge by the
actions that flow from that. So once a new government is
formed, you know, once its platform is made clear, then we will
take a very careful review of our assistance program in light
of that. But in the meantime we will continue to apply the
safeguards and end use monitoring mechanisms.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Burns
for your great service to our country.
The declaration war question that was asked by Senator
Lugar, I noticed that was not answered and in other hearings
I've been in I notice people have been moving way beyond the
no-fly zone saying that in essence that really isn't enough to
protect civilians and now people are beginning to talk about a
no-drive zone, which obviously means a whole different level of
engagement.
So, I would just like a yes, no. Does the administration
believe that if we are going to have a military effort of any
kind in Libya, that we need a declaration of war by Congress?
It is a yes, no answer.
Mr. Burns. Senator, I can't give you a yes, no answer, what
I can tell you is that we take very seriously the concern you
raised and I will certainly convey it to Senator Clinton and
the White House and we will be in very close touch with
congressional leadership.
Senator Corker. Was that a legal question that we need to
ask? Or I mean it is a----
Mr. Burns. No, it is----
Senator Corker [continuing]. I mean it seems to me it is a
pretty clear cut yes, no. I mean do you all feel that you need
to come to us for a declaration of war or not?
Mr. Burns. It is----
Senator Corker. I mean you have to be talking about that, I
know.
Mr. Burns. Right. No; it is a very important question, I
can't answer it for you right now, honestly. But we certainly
owe you an answer to that. I understand.
Senator Corker. It seems like it would be a very important
answer if we are having serious dialogue with the United
Nations over committing forces there.
I mean you know, the other thing that has been sort of
interesting to me as we have had other briefings in classified
settings and in not classified settings, but no one seems to
know who the opposition is. I mean can you tell me who it is we
would be joining forces with on the ground or anything about
their ideology or what their goals are?
Mr. Burns. Well Senator, as I mentioned before, we have had
a number of contacts with the members of the Libyan National
Council, which was formed relatively rapidly in Benghazi a few
weeks ago. Secretary Clinton met with Mahmud Jibril one of
the----
Senator Corker. I understand about the meeting, but do we
know, from those meetings, I'm no really worried about the
chain of events, but do we know who the opposition is? Do we
know what their goals are?
Mr. Burns. We do have a sense from those--the leaders with
whom we have met in the Libyan National Council that their
goals seem to be to try to create a democratic system in Libya,
a secular symbol, that they seem intent upon realizing the
rights that Libyans are seeking. They are looking for outside
help in that effort.
But as I said before in response to the question from the
chairman, you know, we are still in the process of trying to
develop as full a picture as we can. Based on the meeting we
have had so far, that is the picture that we have had.
Senator Corker. Would it be good to--before committing U.S.
troops and military action and money--would it be good to sort
of know more fully who it is we are coming to the aid of?
Mr. Burns. I think we are developing a pretty clear
picture, but certainly we are trying to flesh out that picture
as fast and as comprehensively as we can.
Senator Corker. Are there potentially other extremist
groups that are coming into the area to fight against Qaddafi
that may in fact be the very people we dislike greatly? Is
there a chance that we actually could be aiding the efforts of
extremist groups who are potentially involved in the area?
Mr. Burns. There is certainly the potential that extremist
groups could try to take advantage of this or extremist
fighters could, and we are very well aware of that. On the
other hand, I think there is also a very real danger that if
Qaddafi is successful on the ground that you also face, you
know, a number of other considerable risks as well, the dangers
of him returning to terrorism and violent extremism himself,
the dangers of the turmoil that he could help create at a very
critical moment elsewhere in the region. But we are very
mindful of the risks that you mentioned about extremists taking
advantage of this.
Senator Corker. So in light of that, I know Senator Lugar
asked the question about national interest, could you, I know
the President hasn't yet stated what our national interest is,
but could you give a stab at that?
Mr. Burns. Sure. I think we have first, part of our
national interest is avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe in
Libya. That is not something that is shared only by the United
States, that is why there needs to be an international response
with active Arab participation. Second, I think at a moment of
truly profound change across the region, what we have an
important national stake in, is in demonstrating in places like
Egypt and Tunisia where people are moving in a positive
direction, that those transitions succeed. But in places like
Libya where there is a real danger of increasing violence and
turmoil and repression, that the international community, the
Arab world as a part of that, stands against that kind of an
outcome.
So what is at stake here, in terms of American interests is
about more than just Libya, it seems to me.
Senator Corker. And the genesis of what happened, what is
happening right now in Libya you consider to be similar to what
has happened in Egypt then, because again, it seems to me we
had a much better sense of what was causing activities in Egypt
and it seems to me we have a very vague sense of that in Libya.
But your judgment is that it is driven by the same things?
Mr. Burns. Yes, sir. My judgment is that it is the same
aspirations of people to realize their human rights that is at
the core of what is driving the situation in Libya right now.
Libya has always been a much more opaque society for us or
anybody else, including in the Arab world, to understand
compared to a place like Egypt. So you are right, there are a
lot of question marks but I think, honestly, that what is
driving this is the same aspirations that you see elsewhere in
the Arab world today.
Senator Corker. And do we have a sense of what China and
Russia might do at the Security Council as it relates to Libya?
Mr. Burns. It is hard to predict, sir. You know, they have
some concerns, I think, about some of the measures that are
being debated right now. And it is a debate that has literally
gone on as we speak.
Senator Corker. And is it your judgment that, like I think,
most people that we have heard from recently, that at this
point a no-fly zone really does no good with Qaddafi and his
troops being where they are. So really we wouldn't be talking
about a no-fly zone unless we were just trying to act as if we
had done something, we would really talking about much more
than that, aren't we, really dealing with the tanks that are on
the ground, moving into civilian populations? I mean that is
really what we would have to be talking about unless we were
just trying to act like we were doing something. Is that
correct?
Mr. Burns. That is exactly why, in the Security Council
right now the debate is about measures that include a no-fly
zone but go beyond it. I think a no-fly zone can have an
important, positive, practical effect but I think honestly we
have to look at other measures as well.
Senator Corker. Well, I appreciate your service and your
candor and certainly I always enjoy seeing you. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
I want to continue to pursue Senator Corker's line of
questioning, because I am still not sure what we support. It
seems to me a dangerous proposition to urge people to seek
democracy and revolt and then not help them. I am concerned, as
I listen to your answers, with what happens if Qaddafi
prevails. The situation in Libya is rather grave, and I think
we are going to miss an opportunity to promote democracy, with
a small ``d'', throughout the region, be seen as on the side of
those who have aspirations of freedom and ultimately be able to
help shape the course of events that flow from those ideals,
not only in Libya but beyond. And at the rate that it is going
Qaddafi is probably going to capture Benghazi if we don't see
some movement there by the international community.
So, what are we seeking to support? I read the statements
and get a sense it is like the Texas two-step; we want to
support this but we are concerned about that. So, are we
talking about acting if the international community was on
board, beyond the no-fly zone? Are we talking about targeted
airstrikes on Qaddafi's tanks and heavy artillery? Are we
talking about jamming Libyan Government radio signals? Are we
talking about using the $32 billion in frozen assets to provide
significant humanitarian relief? What are we talking about
here, if we are serious about trying to help and shape the
outcome here?
Mr. Burns. Senator Menendez, we are talking about a whole
range of measures that go beyond, including steps that go
beyond the no-fly zone. That includes a number of the steps
that you mentioned. That is what is being debated in the
Security Council right now. And we----
Senator Menendez. I'm sorry to interrupt you, sir.
Mr. Burns. Sure.
Senator Menendez. Beyond discussing it, are we advocating
it? Are we leading the effort at the Security Council or are we
just in eliciting mode?
Mr. Burns. No; we are, as Ambassador Rice said yesterday,
we are actively pursuing this because of our concern, not only
about the situation on the ground, the dangers of a
humanitarian catastrophe but in response to what was a quite
unprecedented call from the Arab League for action by the
Security Council to protect civilians. So we are trying to look
as urgently as we can at the situation on the ground and then
press for action in the Security Council, just as quickly as we
can produce it, ideally today.
Senator Menendez. And what are we seeking to pursue at the
Security Council? What is the scope? What would we be happy to
support?
Mr. Burns. Well, as Ambassador Rice said yesterday, we are
pursuing, along with the Lebanese, the British, French, other
partners in the Council, measures that include a no-fly zone
but could go beyond it. And I can't in this session, since the
debate is going on in the Security Council right now, go into a
lot of detail about that, but there are measures short of boots
on the ground that could be taken by the international
community, including active Arab participation to address some
of the very real dangers that mentioned. That is what we are
pursuing.
Senator Menendez. So let's say, God forbid, that Qaddafi
prevails at the end of the day. Do we have any doubt in our
mind having seen what the international community said but
didn't do, that he will revert to a series of views that will
not be in our national or security interests?
Mr. Burns. I think there is a very real danger of that and
I think there is a very real danger that you could see a
reversion to support for terrorism, you can see a very real
danger of efforts to destabilize the region that already faces
more than its share of challenges right now, with the political
transitions going on in the neighborhood. So I think there is a
great deal at stake here and that is what creates a real sense
of urgency on our part.
Senator Menendez. In a slightly different context, but
still in Libya, has the State Department engaged the former
Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil in a conversation and as
part of that conversation sought to verify his statements that
Qaddafi ordered the bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight?
Mr. Burns. I don't know, Senator, if that conversation has
taken place yet, but we certainly will pursue it with the
Department of Justice.
Senator Menendez. Well, as Qaddafi certainly has a price
tag on his head, while we have access to him along with an
opportunity to engage him and hopefully even video-tape a
conversation, I would hope that we don't lose a precious
opportunity to verify his public statements. We always had
suspicions to that effect, and this would be evidence that
Qaddafi ordered the bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight in which
several hundred Americans lost their lives, including many from
my home State of New Jersey.
And as someone who has pressed forth on this issue, I don't
want to lose a golden opportunity to ensure that we have
information that could lead to a prosecution regardless of the
results in Libya. So I really hope that you, i.e., the State
Department--I raised this with Secretary Clinton as well when
she was here--as well as the Justice Department will take
advantage of this opportunity. Can we get you to pursue that?
Mr. Burns. I agree with you, we will.
Senator Menendez. All right. Finally, I want to follow up
on Senator Casey's comments with reference to Lebanon.
Hezbollah is likely to have a dramatically increased role in
this new Lebanese Government. Where is the United States
redline in our relationship with Lebanon? Are we willing to
maintain a relationship with a government that is controlled by
a terrorist group?
Mr. Burns. Well, as I said, you know, Prime Minister
Mikati, the Prime Minister-designate, has asserted that he
wants to form a unity government which reflects the will of all
Lebanese. He has asserted that Lebanon is committed to
fulfilling its international obligations. It remains to be seen
what kind of government he is going to form and exactly what
platform that government is going to put forward. And as I said
before, we will judge that government, when it is formed, by
its actions.
As you know, we are firmly convinced that Hezbollah is a
terrorist organization. We don't deal with Hezbollah, but we
will have to wait and see exactly what that government looks
like and what it stands for.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I guess I will start kind of with a question couched in a
statement and I want to be frank about it, because this is
really troubling. From everything I have read, from folks we
have been talking to, from all the accounts that are out there,
the United States, quite frankly, looks weak in this endeavor,
it looks unwilling or maybe even unable to act in this
capacity. Even worse, I think really calling attention to it
with Britain, France, the Arab League are all out there calling
not just attention to this but specifying specific actions they
would like to see taken. We have seen criticism from the Libyan
resistance and Libyan opposition as to our position, puzzlement
as to where the United States is a new phase.
I would ask you basically to comment, not just on the
Libyan situation, but on the impact that our inaction and quite
frankly, you know, our puzzling inaction to most of the people
around the world, what impact that is having on the image of
the United States in the region and around the world with
regards to future potential conflicts. Is the message that we
are sending that when future conflicts arise the United States
actions are difficult to predict, they may be none, that the--
that basically people--you know, leaders--that the way
basically to repress and bring down resistance like this is to
be brutal? What are we going to do if there is a bloodbath
after this?
The President of the United States has specifically said
Qaddafi must go, but has done nothing since saying that, except
have internal debates about it for a week and a half or two.
Congressional leadership in both parties have strongly called
for a no-fly zone and other actions and nothing has happened. I
mean all of this I think comes--is a toxic brew that is really
undermining the perception of the United States and our ability
to influence events, not just in this area of the world, but
all over the world.
Has there been any analysis done on the impact this is
having on the perception of the United States in the region and
around the world, the damage that this inaction is doing?
Mr. Burns. Well Senator, I guess I would say two things in
response. First, in general as I, you know, tried to emphasize
in my opening remarks, we understand exactly what is at stake
across the Middle East right now. What is at stake in terms of
doing everything we can to support successful transitions in
places like Egypt and Tunisia, which I think hold enormous
opportunities not just for the peoples of those countries, but
for the United States.
We also understand what is at stake at Libya and I believe
we have acted, the President, Secretary have acted quite
energetically in recent weeks to press for the first U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1970 to freeze more than $30
billion in Libyan regime assets in the United States, to
establish contact with the Libyan National Council, to work
actively with the Arab League, which as I said last Saturday
produced a quite unprecedented call for the Security Council to
authorize specific measures to protect Libyan civilians. And
that is what we are embarked upon in New York right now,
working very actively, leading an effort, along with the
Lebanese, the British and French, to try to produce exactly
those kind of specific measures. And we feel a real sense of
urgency about this for all the reasons that you mentioned.
Senator Rubio. But to say we are pressing the United
Nations and that is energetic action, the Security Council, is
to basically say the United States--and to say that is what we
are going to limit ourselves to, what we are basically saying
is the United States may feel strongly about something but we
are not doing anything that the Chinese and Russians don't
agree with.
Mr. Burns. I think what is important here, the
administration is committed to trying to make this an
international response. We have seen some significant steps
taking particularly by the Arab League, which are quite
unprecedented. And we believe that we are going to have a
greater impact and more effectiveness if we do this as an
international response rather than a purely unilateral one.
Senator Rubio. I understand. But Russia and China don't
care about this stuff, they are never going to get involved in
these things. I mean they don't care that Muammar Qaddafi is
going to massacre people. So if Russia doesn't care and China
doesn't care and we care but won't do anything about it, who is
it up to, the French?
Mr. Burns. Well, but Senator, I actually think it is
possible to produce a new Security Council resolution, I just
don't share the judgment that it is not possible. I think, you
know----
Senator Rubio. Well, when is that resolution going to
happen? After the bloodbath, in the middle of the bloodbath?
Mr. Burns. Well, I hope very much that we will see a vote
today. We are pushing very, very hard, along with others in the
Security Council, to produce that because exactly as you say,
the situation on the ground is moving very fast.
Senator Rubio. And do you think the administration's
ongoing deliberations on what to do as Qaddafi closes in and
basically seals the deal, is that strengthening our hand with
China and Russia? Are they--do they feel pressure now to go
along with this or do they--or are they sitting back and kind
of saying, well the President said Qaddafi must go, but Qaddafi
is not going anywhere and you guys don't have the guts to do
anything about it? I mean does that strengthen our hand in the
Security Council?
Mr. Burns. No; I think what strengthened our hand and that
of others in the Security Council is what the Arab League did
and I think the Russians and Chinese take that seriously and I
think they take seriously the, you know, very active effort
that we are making in New York right now to produce a new
resolution.
Senator Rubio. What is the administration's message to
Libyan dissidents and democracy activities that may be watching
or reading about this tomorrow? What is our message to them? Is
our message, hold on, we may have a Security Council resolution
in a few days, just--well what is our message to them?
Mr. Burns. Our message is that we support the realization
of the same universal rights in Libya that we are seeing
realized in Egypt and Tunisia and elsewhere in the region.
Senator Rubio. And we support it by the issuance of
forceful and strongly worded statements?
Mr. Burns. No. We support it by pushing beyond statements
for practical actions. We have taken some already, we are
seeking more in New York and working with Arab partners. And
that's----
Senator Rubio. So unless it is the dissidents and the
activists, the people that have the bravery to stand up to
Muammar Qaddafi and then maybe thinking to standing up to
people like the Iranian regime and in other places, our message
to them is, you guys go ahead and do this stuff and if we can
ever get the Russians or Chinese to come around, we may or may
not join you?
Mr. Burns. No; what the Libyan National Council,
representatives of the opposition with whom we have met, have
argued for is to work with the Arab League, with Arab States
and work with the Security Council.
Senator Rubio. The Arab League is saying do a no-fly--they
are saying do something now.
Mr. Burns. What the Arab----
Senator Rubio. So are the French and British.
Mr. Burns. What the Arab League said is that they want to
Security Council to authorize that kind of a step and that is
exactly why we are working actively----
Senator Rubio. I know, but I think all of us want them to
authorize it too, but they are not going to. Russia and China
are not going to do this. They don't care. In fact they--I
think they enjoy anything that destabilizes us because it
strengthens their hand around the world.
Mr. Burns. Yesh, I just don't share the assumption that we
can't produce a new resolution. I think we can.
Senator Rubio. So the bottom line, because I know my time
is running out and--the bottom line is that this
administration's strategy to Libya is the following. If we can
get Russia and China--we think we have a real chance to get
Russia and China to go along with strong action in Libya and we
are going to continue to work on that and hopefully we can get
that in place before Muammar Qaddafi massacres or continues to
massacre people in an all out bloodbath?
Mr. Burns. I think we can produce a new Security Council
resolution.
Senator Rubio. When? Today?
Mr. Burns. I hope we can today, that is exactly what we are
pushing for.
Senator Rubio. And what will the resolution be? What do you
think we can secure?
Mr. Burns. What we are pushing for is to secure a
resolution that includes a number of very specific measures to
protect Libyan civilians that includes, but is not limited to a
no-fly zone and we will see whether we can produce that, but
that's what we are at----
Senator Rubio. Do we have a timetable by when that needs to
be produced? I mean do we have a--is there a point in time
where we think, OK if we don't get a Security Council
resolution by this point in time then we have got to move on to
something else? Does such a thing exist?
Mr. Burns. Our hope is to produce a vote on a new Security
Council resolution along those lines as early as today. That is
what we are pushing hard for.
Senator Rubio. And if it fails is there a backup plan?
Mr. Burns. I am not assuming that it is going to fail. I
think we can produce a resolution.
Senator Rubio. So we don't--but assuming it fails, because
you know, let's say it does, because it is--just one member
could block it, assuming it fails, what do we do then? Do we
have a plan for that or we haven't had that----
Mr. Burns. Well Senator, we have thought through lots of
possibilities, but I just don't assume it is going to fail. I
think we can produce one.
Senator Rubio. So if it fails we don't have any idea what
we will do next?
Mr. Burns. We have lots of ideas about what we might do. I
just don't assume that it is going to fail. I think it is
possible to produce it.
Senator Rubio. Is there any ideas you can share with us
or----
Mr. Burns. As I said, our focus is to try to produce the
resolution that is what lots of people in the Arab world and
the international community support right now.
Senator Rubio. So there is not one idea you can tell me
about that we will do if it fails?
Mr. Burns. We are doing lots of things already that we will
continue to do to step up the economic pressure, sanctions on--
--
Senator Rubio. Not one idea? Not one you can tell me?
Mr. Burns. That is one I just mentioned.
Senator Rubio. OK.
Mr. Burns. And I do that we can produce a Security Council
resolution, which I think would provide the kind of platform we
need to step up effective international pressure on Qaddafi.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Secretary Burns, thank you very much for
your leadership and service, appreciate it very much.
The challenge we have in the Middle East is the fact that
we deal with so many countries that we need their strategic
relationship but they don't share our values. And we have to
make choices. Their strategic relationships are important for
our military, they are important for our intelligence
community, they are important for many, many different reasons,
including our war against extremists and terrorists. But there
is one country in the Middle East where we do not have to make
that choice and that country of course is Israel.
And it is clear that as countries have gone through
transition, there have been actions taken that could have an
impact on Israel. You saw in Egypt the use of the Suez Canal by
Iran and according to published reports that may have had a
consequence to Israel's security. There have been concerns
about weapons being made available to Hamas as a result of some
of the upheavals in some of the Arab States. There is a
question as to how Iran is operating within the region that
could also have an impact on Israel.
So my question to you is, Has the administration been in
close contacts with our Israeli allies assessing what impact
these changes are having on the security of Israel, our closest
ally in the Middle East?
Mr. Burns. Yes, Senator Cardin, we have certainly stayed in
close touch, particularly with regard to Egypt, given the
obvious security implications in Gaza and along the border. It
was encouraging that early on the Egyptian military leadership
and the Israelis worked out arrangements so that Egyptian
military units could replace police units close to the Gaza
border to help ensure security there.
It was also quite encouraging that the Supreme Armed Forces
Council in Egypt very early on, after the end of the Mubarak
era, reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to the Egypt/Israel peace
treaty.
But to answer your question, yes, we are in close touch
with the Israelis on all these issues.
Senator Cardin. We saw that--I mean it is clear that our
relationship with particularly the military in Egypt made it
clear of the conditions that must be met for the United States
to continue to be involved with Egypt from the point of view of
aid. I am concerned whether that message is going to be
continuously repeated.
It seems to me that the United States plays a major role in
the Middle East. We have foreign aid, military assistance,
development aid and the list goes on and on and on. I think we
have a right to expect accountability on the use of those
funds, not just that they will respect the rights of its
citizens, which to me is very important, but that it will join
us in our fight against extremists and terrorists.
Is that message being clearly delivered?
Mr. Burns. Sir, this is with regard to Egypt or----
Senator Cardin. Regards to all--any country in which we
have a substantial--have a significant relationship which is
going through a change.
Mr. Burns. Sure, yes sir, I mean because we believe that we
have shared concerns about violent extremists that aren't
limited to relations with particular leaders or particular
governments. And you know, whether it is Egypt or, you know,
other partners in the region, we certainly put a high priority
on those kind of concerns and those kind of goals and will
continue to do that.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me put it in the negative. I was
trying to do it in the positive. If we find that Egypt or any
country in the Middle East takes positions that are contrary to
their international commitments as it relates to the peace
process and to Israel, or they take steps that are counter to
our objectives in our fight against terrorists, are we prepared
to cut off our financial assistance to those countries?
Mr. Burns. Well, we obviously have to weigh, in terms of
our own interests, the nature of our relationships and our
assistance relationships with any country. But I guess what I
would emphasize with regard to Egypt is what we have seen
before is a reaffirmation of Egypt's commitments to its
international treaties, including the Egypt/Israel peace treaty
and a reaffirmation of its commitment to work with us and lots
of others against violent extremism, which is as much important
an interest of Egypt as it is of the United States.
Senator Cardin. Well Secretary Burns, you are giving a very
diplomatic answer. But let me just tell you, I think there is
concern here in Congress as to keeping a very close eye as to
developments in countries in which U.S. taxpayers are being
asked to provide help to make sure that there is respect for
the human rights of its citizens, including dealing with gender
equity issues and dealing with good governance and
anticorruption efforts, but also what these countries are doing
to fight extremists and terrorists and whether they are a
constructive partner in the peace process that we are moving
forward with in the Middle East. And we are going to be
watching that closely and we hope that message will be very
clear as to where we are on that issue.
And I will mention one other point. You mentioned of course
the United Nations and trying to engage the United Nations,
which I think is important, I hope this--we can get
international support for our policies.
There is another international organization that has a role
in the Middle East and that is the OSCE, it has a Mediterranean
dimension in which Egypt and Jordan and Israel, Tunisia are all
members. So it does offer us a platform that we could extend
getting the international community involved in more of the
institution-building where the United States has not always
been as effective as an international organization can be.
I hope you will take back the message that there is a good
track record within OSCE. And we would ask some of the other
countries, as they are going through transition, to look at
becoming a partner within OSCE that could help them in
developing the institutions they need to have open and fair and
free elections, to deal with freedom of expression and the
right of minority communities, et cetera, all which are
critically important for stability in these emerging countries.
Mr. Burns. Now, Senator Cardin, I agree with you
absolutely. I think there is a lot in the experience of some
OSCE member countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, in terms
of their building a democratic societies and how they navigated
complicated transitions that would be useful to people in the
Middle East wrestling with some of those same questions. And to
be honestly, they bring to that effort less of the baggage
sometimes than the United States does.
The only other comment I would make quickly back to your
earlier question is that I truly do believe, as I said in my
opening comments, that successful transitions, particularly in
Egypt but also in Tunisia, are in many ways the best antidote
to the narrative of violent extremists, whether it is al-Qaeda
or any place else, because what it does, I think, is put a lie
to the notion that the only way you can affect change in the
Middle East is through violence and extremism.
What it demonstrates is that through peaceful,
nonideological, home-grown movements you can produce what I
believe the vast majority of people in that region want. And so
that is why I think we have such a deep stake in doing
everything we can at least to help get those kind of
transitions, to help Egyptians get their transition right.
Senator Cardin. Well I agree with that. And again I thank
you for your service and your leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Burns,
welcome. You have a reputation, well deserved, of being one of
the finest diplomats in the State Department. You certainly
demonstrated that today under questions from both viewpoints.
I would tend to identify myself more closely with the line
of questioning you received from Senator Lugar and Senator
Corker. Before I ask you or discuss this, I can't not say that
today, if we were talking about humanitarian issues--clearly
not the subject of this hearing, but I think we would be
putting a lot more emphasis on what has been going on in Japan.
We have a situation over there where we have seen entire towns
obliterated, where tens of thousands of people are dead or
missing and half a million people are living in shelters. The
power grid has been damaged and the ability of the normal
institutional systems to handle that has really been affected.
They are an ally, they are a friend.
We have done some good work with our military and in other
areas, but I would hope we could get that up on the radar
screen much higher in terms of what our government's ability to
assist the Japanese can be. People tend to think this is a rich
country, and therefore they can handle this. But, when your
public services are designed on one level and you have these
multiple calamities, we really should be discussing that.
With respect to the subject of this hearing, I find your
testimony to be optimistic, quite frankly. I have been on this
committee now for 4\1/2\ years, there is a tendency when
somebody is coming over talking about an administration
position, we are talking about reform movements bringing
greater peace, democracy, prosperity. These certainly are
aspirations. But when you look at this region, I think you and
I both have been in and out and different hats for many years,
and we know that there is a lot more going on that are going on
vary in scope and intensity from country to country. They
involve sectarian factions, religious differences, and true
extremist movements which we cannot ignore. I think Senator
Corker had some good questions on that line that are bent on
manipulating these sorts of movements that are otherwise well-
intentioned. And I don't think we should take our eyes off
that.
I remember when I was a journalist in Beirut, when the
Marines were there in 1983. During one firefight a Marine
turned around to me and said, ``never get involved in a five-
sided argument.'' This tends to repeat itself in our policies
in this part of the world.
So any approach that we take to a situation, even with some
of the compelling circumstances in Libya, really needs to be
taken carefully with the understanding that there are down
sides, that these things are easily begun and very difficult to
end and to adhere to the principles of international law.
Could you describe the nature of our official diplomatic
relations with the Government of Libya?
Mr. Burns. Senator Webb, we have suspended the operations
of our Embassy in Tripoli and their operation in Washington. So
we no longer have diplomatic representatives accredited--I mean
accredited to that government. We have allowed--we have made it
possible for the Libyan National Council to open up a
representative office in Washington. And as I mentioned before,
at a whole variety of levels we have established contacts with
them. So, the short answer is we have suspended the
operations----
Senator Webb. But we do have diplomatic relations?
Mr. Burns. Yes, we haven't broken diplomatic relations----
Senator Webb. So we have official diplomatic relations with
the Qaddafi regime?
Mr. Burns. Yes----
Senator Webb [continuing]. In terms of international law?
Mr. Burns. Yes. I'd have to--I don't want to misled you,
Senator. Honestly I can try to get you an accurate answer on
that, but we have suspended the operations of our Embassy
there. We have not formally broken diplomatic relations.
Senator Webb. Right. That was the answer that I received to
the questions that we put forward last week that we actually
still do have diplomatic relations. So, in terms of
international law, it becomes rather awkward when we are
supporting a movement yet to be fully defined and in my view in
its attempt to overthrow a government which we still formally
recognize.
Mr. Burns. It is certainly a complicated proposition, but
it is----
Senator Webb. Oh, and that is--I don't mean to cut you off
but, that goes really to Senator Lugar's point--whether it is a
declaration of war or some other official signal that would
indicate that this is not a government that we recognize,
before we participate in any way in assisting an attempt to
overthrow it. This may sound clinical, but I think it is very
important in terms of how we address situations around the
world.
You mentioned the Libyan National Council and the
discussions that have been ongoing and the fact that they might
be opening up an office here. Can you tell us to what extent
the members of this counsel actually represent the totality of
the country and the ability to govern?
Mr. Burns. Well, to the best of our knowledge the 30-some
members of the council have been drawn from around the country,
not just in the east but the west as well, a fairly broad
tribal representation, because as you know Libya is a very
tribal society. And so they have clearly made a serious effort
to represent, you know, the vast majority of Libyans in the
council.
As I said before, you know, we have known a number of these
officials before in their previous capacities. We have had
extensive conversations with them since then. I do not want to
pretend that that enables us to have a full picture of the
entire membership of the council, but those with whom we have
met have struck us as being positive and serious.
Senator Webb. Can you identify other forces? Senator Corker
mentioned people coming in from the outside, but other forces
who are participating in the opposition that might have a
different view of the way that the Libyan National Council is
describing its aspirations?
Mr. Burns. There certainly are other forces in Libya
extremist groups including some who have fought in Afghanistan
and elsewhere who we have been concerned about for a long time.
It is certainly possible, as Senator Corker mentioned, that
they will try to take advantage of the chaos in Libya right
now. All I can tell you is we are being very, very careful in
whom we deal with and we are very mindful of the dangers of
extremist of one form or another trying to take advantage of
this situation. So the risk is present, you are right.
Senator Webb. Right. I would hope we take that same kind of
care in terms of how we would approach any direct involvement
in that country as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Let me just ask a couple questions. When we engaged in
Kosovo what was the diplomatic status?
Mr. Burns. In Kosovo I would have to check, I mean I think
we still had relations at that time with Belgrade.
The Chairman. And when we engaged did we have any
declaration of war or authorization of use of force?
Mr. Burns. I don't recall that there was a declaration of
war.
The Chairman. Right. And at this point in time, when we
bombed Serbia, did we have diplomatic relations?
Mr. Burns. I believe we did.
The Chairman. OK. I think we have to be really thoughtful,
and I know you are being, but I think all of us here need to be
recognizing the precedents that exist. When Ronald Reagan sent
cruise missiles into Qaddafi's palace and we killed his
daughter, did we have any authorization from Congress?
Mr. Burns. I don't recall that we did.
The Chairman. We did not. We had a--potentially a finding
but I am not even convinced there was a finding.
I do think the questions raised by my good friend and
ranking member and Senator Webb and others are valid, but I
think it is critical to measure the standard as we have applied
it and the exigencies as they face us at this particular
moment.
I don't think anyone is talking about the potential of
intervention as I think the Arab community has talked about it,
which would, in their mind, mean another occupation, troops
coming in, people being on the ground. And I think that is
their definition of intervention.
But it would be completely inconsistent to call for a no-
fly zone and not understand that there could be planes flying
and so forth. So again I think, you know, all of the questions
raised are valid. I'm confident the administration is going to
examine them very, very closely. I have always taken the
position, I think Senator Lugar knows this, that it is better
to proceed with the authorization and support of Congress if
you have the time and if the opportunity provides for it. It is
always better, because we represent the people and as a branch
of government that has the constitutional power with respect to
war or that kind of thing it is better. But life does not
always present us with circumstances that afford us the
opportunity to do that. And we haven't always--Republican and
Democratic Presidents alike have had to make tough choices,
faced with the moment.
I appreciate your testimony here enormously today. Let me
just ask you very, very quickly, the Bahraini situation,
obviously this is a redline for the Saudis, too, so it puts us
automatically into that relationship. And I wonder if you might
just speak for a moment to the--to sort of how you see that
playing out at this point in time. I know we have had
conversations with everybody. Is there a next step that is
clear to us, given the clearing of the square, Pearl Square,
and the violent turn of the last 24 hours?
Mr. Burns. Well Mr. Chairman, I mean the next step has to
be, in our view, resumption of the national dialogue that the
Crown Prince tried to start a couple of weeks ago. And that is
what we are going to press very hard, not just on the
government but on the opposition as well, to begin.
I know that is a very complicated proposition amidst the
recent violence and that is why we have spoken out, Secretary
Clinton spoke out again yesterday quite clearly against the
excessive use of force against demonstrators, because you have
to create an atmosphere in which you can have that kind of
serious political dialogue. There are legitimate concerns that
have been raised by lots of Bahraini citizens, and until they
are addressed it is going to be very difficult to see the kind
of stable future for Bahrain, which I continue to believe is
possible. And we will do everything we can, working with
others, to encourage that.
The Chairman. Well thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is fair to
say that I remember the celebrations of the early 1990s when
the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union ceased to be the
Soviet Union and the cold war effectively ended and everybody
jumped up and down and it was this terrific moment. And
obviously it has unleashed forces that were repressed for a
long period of time in many of those countries, which we are
still dealing with.
It is interesting to see how they have been able to
transition in Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world
they have sort of stayed static. It is very interesting to look
at the difference between Turkey and Egypt. They--in the 1950s,
in the age of Pan-Arabism and so forth, there was really almost
an equality of GDP, quality of per capita income and so forth
and here is Turkey soaring in so many ways, economically, a
major player globally, a democracy that is balancing itself and
hanging in there and a great contributor to so many efforts and
interests. And Egypt kind of just got stuck. And the people,
the difference between the standards of living and the
opportunities and the confidence of the country and so forth,
it really shows, you know, enormous juxtaposition.
So obviously this is a big moment and there is a lot that
can transition out of it. And I am convinced that if we can do
this well, and when I say ``we'' I don't mean us, I mean all of
us together, it is going to have a profound impact on people's
perception of the possibilities in a lot of other troubled
spots in the world. That is what I see. When you define
America's national interests this outcome can really make--you
know, we have been fighting this War on Terror for--since, well
it is 10 years now, and we have been doing things about terror
for a long time before that. But this global engagement on it--
and this is part of it, this is absolutely a big part of it,
with a new opportunity to redefine it in a very different way.
If that isn't in our national interest I don't know what is.
And I think as we look at Pakistan and Afghanistan, the
amounts of money we are spending there, to not fight for this
outcome would, in my judgment, complicate our lives even more
significantly in those places. So I do see it in a larger
strategic place and I think it is important for the
administration, Mr. Secretary, to be defining that a little
more. To be--I think the President needs to articulate that,
why is this important to us. Because a lot of Americans don't
have that automatic sense, I think even some of our very high
elected--not elected, appointed officials who are involved in
this debate right now have not necessarily either embraced or
expressed that view. And I think that short changes the
opportunities of this moment, that is just my perception. I
don't know if you would agree or disagree?
Mr. Burns. No, Mr. Chairman, I think there is an enormous
strategic opportunity here for the United States and for the
peoples of the Middle East, notwithstanding all the very real
risks that exist. And there are huge pitfalls out there as
well. But I think we have a very deep stake in helping, to the
maximum extent we can, peoples and leaders in the region to get
these transitions right.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Burns, I suspect that the Senators have utilized
your appearance to have our own very civil debate today on the
question of Libya, and likewise broader issues. I agree with
the chairman's comments about the need for the President to
attempt to articulate more clearly why not only Libya, but also
the other countries in the Middle East, are especially
important to us in terms of our national objectives or our
national aspirations and ideals.
I think, however, that it is probably clear to you as
you've heard the testimony and responded to questions today
from Senators that some Senators are indicating in a bipartisan
way that they feel the President and the administration have
not been forthcoming enough in meeting the problems of human
rights in Libya.
Perhaps the President feels some of this pressure. On the
other hand, some of us, myself included, are saying that
unfortunately we have been down this road before. The chairman
has illustrated previous examples, under different
administrations, where there was not the same call for a
declaration of war. Certainly the probing we went through prior
to the invasion of Iraq, and the resolutions that were offered,
demonstraated much more of a desire to have an argument about
these issues. Ultimately we went to war in Iraq, whether the
reasons were understood to be clear at that time or not, or
whether they turned out as Secretary Powell's testimony at the
time indicated. But I am just saying that you have to
understand, and I think you and the President do, that even as
we are having this hearing today on Libya, which is very
important, I believe, to our country and the world, the major
debate that has been going on on the floor of the Senate ever
since the beginning of this session has been with regard to the
budget of our country. This has taken place through passage of
continuing resolutions so the government doesn't shut down, as
it will tomorrow if we do not vote affirmatively today, and
threats that there will be no more continuing resolutions or
that there will be no increase in the debt ceiling. And as
people are pressed as to what this means, they say it means
what we say, which is no more borrowing.
This is the political situtation in our country that the
rest of the world is looking at as we argue about the Libya
situation today. I suppose I am saying, in terms of our own
domestic politics, that we need to get sort of straight where
we stand.
Now, if we have a debate and decide to declare war on
Libya, then Members of Congress who have voted that way have, I
believe, an obligation to fulfill that role with regard to our
Armed Forces, the State Department, and our diplomatic role.
Otherwise we have a debating point in which Republicans can say
that the President really doesn't have the force and the
ability to handle these tough situations. On the Democratic
side some may take the position of the chairman that we really
ought to be there because of the humanitarian component, while
others that we have heard this morning are somewhat more
cautious about that. That is why this debate is necessary, I
think, for our own domestic situation. And likewise, the
opinion of the Congress lends credibility to the rest of the
world as to the precise position of the United States with
regard to this conflict.
I am watching, as you are, resolutions being offered, and
even votes in the House of Representatives, regarding the
termination of foreign assistance and, among many, a desire
really even to vote country by country on how we handle our
foreign assistance going forward. Now that is a new business.
And you can say, well it is after all one House of the Congress
doing this and the other might reject any proposed legislation
mandating such cuts. However, this is not a comfortable
situation for those of you involved in foreign policy, as you
proceed to Egypt in a delicate way, to know really what large
numbers of Americans think about the level of funding we should
be dedicating to foreign assistance programs.
So, I appreciate very much your suffering through all of
our questions and answers today. However, the reason for my
pressing this issue is that we are going to have to have
clarity on how we feel in the United States of America, apart
from just the President or the Secretary of State or the
Ambassador to the U.N., who are doing the very best they can,
but the representatives of the American people more generally,
regarding the way we should conduct ourselves in the Middle
East in the midst of all this turmoil. Despite the fact that we
have not really gotten into the weeds today as to what we are
going to do in Bahrain, our strategic interests in that country
are apparent given that the Fifth Fleet is there. The Saudis
have moved 2,000 people into Bahrain, as they understand what
their national interest seems to be. And we certainly are very
supportive of our relations with Saudi Arabia, from Franklin
Roosevelt to the present.
But, do we have a new view with regard to how they handle
human rights? Are we going to articulate really what happens
with Yemen where you have a government that is authoritarian
but appears to be tracking down al-Qaeda? These are questions
down the trail, but not far down the trail, given the events in
the Middle East.
So I am hopeful that the President will, with your help,
articulate what our national interests are. But likewise, we
may in the Congress articulate where we stand with regard to
the budget that may follow through on this or really with
regard to the relationships we have discussed today concerning
Libya.
So, I appreciate your appearance and the chairman's calling
of this very timely hearing before we head out on a recess, out
visiting with our constituents, but I believe the
administration is not really engaging during a time in which
events are moving rapidly in Libya, Bahrain, and maybe
elsewhere.
And so I will not foster any more consternation with more
questions, but I appreciate, as always, your own diplomatic
efforts and most specifically the recent trip you took to Egypt
at a time when we really did need someone on the ground there
who had an understanding of the situation and has a vast array
of diplomatic successes under his belt. I think your effort has
brought some confidence with the Egyptian leaders in various
types. I hope that you will help illuminate more, as you can,
what you have found, who it is that we are going to be dealing
with moving forward, what the broader prospects are, and how we
can help foster democracy there.
I suggest maybe it is a little premature to be having so
many votes until you have established political parties and
some dialogue between them and the institutions of civil
society. That being said, I understand that this could be
construed as gross interference even as we are attempting to
help, as both parties have over the years with the
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute, and others.
So thank you for coming.
Mr. Burns. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Well, Senator Lugar, as always wise comments,
thoughtful and important. I think the questions you raised
obviously are ones that need to be answered. And I think your
suggestions are very well taken. I am confident the
administration does too. So thank you.
Again, Secretary thanks so much for coming today. I think
it has been helpful and it has helped to shed some light on the
dynamics here as well. So I think that has been good.
We stand adjourned.
Mr. Burns. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Under Secretary William J. Burns to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez
Question. In Bahrain, democratic protestors are calling on the
United States to demand that King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa make
immediate and real reforms. I recognize the value that the Bahrain
monarchy has played as a U.S. ally in the region and a bulwark against
Iranian influence, but the monarchy's inaction, its failure to address
the needs of its people, is feeding Iran's influence in Bahrain and
through the region--an outcome that cannot and does not serve Bahraini
or Americans interests.
What options are on the table to support democratic reform
in Bahrain and other nations? How are we going to reform our
support through State and AID to reach out to small ``d''
democrats seeking peaceful democratic change in their
countries?
Answer. The administration recognizes the urgent need for political
reform and further engagement with reform advocates in Bahrain. In
Bahrain, civil society organizations and activists are often subject to
government intimidation, censorship, and detention, to include
teachers, human rights activists, journalists, bloggers, medical staff,
and political activists. The U.S. Government is using all available and
appropriate channels both in Manama and in Washington to engage local
and international human rights groups, members of the opposition,
religious figures, and the Government of Bahrain on political reform, a
meaningful dialogue, and government transparency. We have called upon
the Government of Bahrain to commit to real reform by releasing and
accounting for those missing or detained, ceasing the attacks on
hospitals and medical staff, and immediately halting acts of
intimidation and harassment on civil society actors. In support of our
commitment to reform and civil society, we have a range of programs
that support civil society in Bahrain, including programming through
the Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) designed to train women in
nontraditional fields, prepare for political campaigns, gain and
develop the skills needed to advocate for human rights for women, and
foster entrepreneurship throughout the country.
united nations human rights council
Question. The United States reengaged with the U.N. Human Rights
Council with the idea that it would be easier to reform the body from
within than it was from the outside. Nonetheless, the Council continues
to be plagued by inaction and by the presence on the Council of some of
the most notorious human rights abusers in the world--Cuba is a Vice
President of the Council.
I welcomed the unprecedented decision of the U.N. General Assembly
to remove Libya from the Council, despite the fact that its initial
election to the body was an abomination. The fact that Syria is seeking
to replace Libya on the Council further defies logic.
The Libya resolution that I authored which passed this body by
unanimous consent on March 1 urges the U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations to advocate for improving Human Rights Council membership
criteria to exclude gross and systematic violators of human rights.
What steps are you taking to prevent Syria's election to the
Council and to improve membership criteria to exclude gross and
systematic violators of human rights?
Answer. As Secretary Clinton emphasized in Geneva recently,
membership on the Council ``should be earned through respect for human
rights. That is the standard laid out by the General Assembly. This
Council's predecessor, the Human Rights Commission, lost its
credibility in part because Libya was allowed to serve as its
president. It should not take bloodshed for us to agree that such
regimes have no place here.''
While no U.N. body can expect to have only countries with perfect
records on it, we are focused on keeping the most egregious and
disruptive human rights abusers off the Council, as we did last year
when Iran sought a seat. Countries that grossly and systematically
violate human rights have no place on the Council. We succeeded in
getting Iran to withdraw its candidacy last year and in suspending
Libya's membership this winter, and we firmly oppose Syria's candidacy
this year.
In creating the Human Rights Council, all Member States committed
to take ``into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion
and protection of human rights.'' The United States considers the human
rights record of each candidate for the Human Rights Council. While we
do not as a matter of policy reveal our votes, the record of Syria
speaks for itself.
Syria's candidacy particularly concerns us. Syria's human rights
record is deplorable. One can clearly see Syria's troubling approach to
human rights in its current violent and deadly crackdown on peaceful
protestors. The United States is deeply troubled by violence and
civilian deaths at the hands of security forces. We are concerned by
the Syrian Government's use of violence, intimidation, and arbitrary
arrests to hinder the Syrian people's ability to freely exercise their
rights. Syria's overall record makes it clear that Syria has no place
on the U.N.'s only political body dedicated to the promotion and
protection of human rights.
Question. Please also comment on our efforts at the Council to
establish a human rights monitor for Iran.
Answer. The United States is proud to have joined other nations
from around the world during the March 2011 session of the United
Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) to establish a Special Rapporteur on
Iran--something Secretary Clinton called for during her visit to the
Council at the beginning of the session. Creation of this position was
a signal achievement for the HRC, as it is the first country-specific
Special Rapporteur mandate authorized since the HRC replaced the
Commission on Human Rights in 2006.
The new Special Rapporteur mandate marks a significant step forward
for the people of Iran because their rights will now be supported
through international scrutiny by a country-specific U.N. mechanism.
Thanks to the action taken by the HRC in establishing this position,
the people of Iran will have a voice devoted to their human rights
within the international community despite every attempt by the Iranian
government to silence opposition and dissent.
______
Response of Under Secretary William J. Burns to Question Submitted by
Senator Johnny Isakson
Question. If Muammar Qadhafi is successful at violently
suppressing, through military and other tactics, the Libyan opposition
that is seeking a democratic transition in Libya, what implications
would that have for democratic transitions across the Middle East and
North African region? And more specifically do you think that violent
suppressions would spread across the region if Qadhafi is successful at
suppressing the Libyan opposition? And what would the U.S. policy
response look like if Qadhafi is able to suppress the opposition and
violence spreads?
Answer. A victorious Qadhafi would emerge unbowed and vengeful,
sending a signal to other governments in the region that brutal
repression and the use of force against civilians can be used to
successfully resist popular calls for democratic reform. The regime
would likely seek to retaliate by destabilizing the region and sowing
conflict through military and economic policies, propaganda, and,
possibly, support for terrorism. The fragile transitions to democracy
in Tunisia and Egypt, which have close economic and social ties with
Libya, would be especially vulnerable.
Inside of Libya, the Qadhafi regime would also likely effect
immediate, wide-scale, and bloody retaliation in the areas considered
sympathetic to the opposition, especially in eastern Libya and the
Berber regions in the West. We have already received credible accounts
that thousands of young men between the ages of 18 and 35 in areas
recaptured by the regime have been selectively abducted, held in remote
desert camps, and tortured.
The United States has embraced the goal of removing Qadhafi from
power and will pursue it in close coordination with our international
partners through nonmilitary means, including sanctions and
accountability measures. We have already imposed strong unilateral
sanctions, freezing over $33 billion in regime assets; we are also
coordinating with our European partners and the U.N. on applying
additional and rigid sanctions. By freezing assets, restricting travel,
and threatening prosecution at the International Criminal Court, we are
pressuring and isolating the Qadhafi regime and ensuring that its
members are held accountable for their actions. We are constantly
assessing our policies as this very fluid situation develops, and
future options may include increased diplomatic, economic, and military
pressure on the Qadhafi regime, efforts to mitigate reprisals and
killings within Libya, and additional humanitarian aid to help the
victims of Qadhafi's violence.