

**ASSESSING U.S. POLICY AND ITS
LIMITS IN PAKISTAN**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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ASSESSING U.S. POLICY AND ITS LIMITS IN PAKISTAN

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Coons, Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Isakson, and Barrasso.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Thank you all for joining us. I apologize for being a moment late. I am coming straight from the dentist's chair to a hearing on Pakistan. Is there a parallel? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. This is the second in our series of hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan and I am very pleased to welcome another distinguished panel to help us explore the difficult issues that we face.

This is a particularly challenging moment in terms of American foreign policy. From the rising economic power of China to the upheaval across the Arab world, to North Korea and Iran, the Middle East peace process, and of course, Afghanistan and Pakistan, we face a very complicated and difficult set of policy decisions, all of which will affect our economy and our security.

But as we survey this complicated landscape, there are few countries as important to our national security right now as Pakistan, and the momentous events of the last week brought that into very sharp focus. The location and status of Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, a garrison city not far from Islamabad, perhaps 35 miles as the crow flies, raises real and serious questions for all of us.

What did Pakistan's military and intelligence services know?

What is appropriate to think they should have known?

What legitimate due diligence was exercised in order to try to find out or even to exhaust the possibilities of leads with respect to Osama bin Laden's whereabouts?

Who did they think was living behind those 15-foot walls?

Was there any level of curiosity?

How could bin Laden have gone undetected living next door to Pakistan's equivalent of West Point, where just last week General

Kayani gave a speech celebrating the Pakistani military “breaking the back” of terrorism?

It is simply honest to say that all Americans and many other people are troubled by these questions, and Pakistan has promised an investigation and answers. Like every other American, the members of this committee wonder whether the Pakistan military or its intelligence services—or some components thereof—were somehow either unaware of its infamous neighbor or were knowingly protecting him.

In the search for our answers, I want to emphasize no matter what we learn about the events that preceded the killing of Osama bin Laden, we still have vital national security interests in this region, and we have worked hard to build a partnership with Pakistan, fragile and difficult and challenged as it may be at times. We have worked hard to build a partnership that allows us to pursue common threats and interests.

Despite bin Laden’s death, the fight against al-Qaeda and other extremist groups that threaten the United States and our allies is far from over. Going forward, we have to act thoughtfully. And no matter what we have to remember the big picture, the larger strategic interest, and the full nature of our relationship with Pakistan. We should not rush into a situation that in fact hurts our own interests.

A legitimate analysis concludes that it is undeniable that our relationship with Pakistan has helped us pursue our security goals. More senior al-Qaeda terrorists have been caught or killed in Pakistan than in any other country, in most cases as the result of joint operations with Pakistani authorities. Keeping 100,000 troops in Afghanistan—or even half or a quarter of that number—depends on an enormous supply train that requires the daily cooperation of the Pakistani state. We rely on each other for intelligence, and often we work together to act on it. And we have some space in Pakistan to conduct drone strikes which have killed significant terrorists, significant leaders, perhaps 16 of the 20 top leaders of al-Qaeda, all of whom we know were still plotting against the United States.

So make no mistake. These strikes have relied on an expenditure of political capital of the Pakistani Government and they have certainly cost its leaders some of that political capital with their own population.

The truth is, even before bin Laden’s death, our relationship with Pakistan has been strained recently, even fragile. The Raymond Davis affair stirred widespread anti-American sentiment across Pakistan. In the numerous trips that I have made in my capacity as chairman of this committee, in the last one, when I was asked to go to help work on the question of Mr. Davis’ release, I will tell you I have never sensed as intense a level of anti-American feeling broadly felt across the country because of the way that incident had been handled. We need to be sensitive to both sides of this story. Nothing, obviously, would excuse the harboring of the No. 1 criminal in the world, but we need to explore carefully exactly what the facts are.

I might add that the relationship has been further diminished and serious questions have been raised as a consequence of news

about a dramatic increase in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and that has raised our concerns, as well as our allies' concerns, about nuclear proliferation and regional security. No matter what flows out of this, no matter what the consequences in the end that alter or improve our relationship, Pakistan will remain a nuclear state in a tinderbox of a region. This part of Asia is a dangerous and difficult neighborhood and two basic facts are central to understanding the situation and the solution.

First, the real conflict is not between the United States and Pakistan but within Pakistan itself. The battle is over what sort of nation Pakistan will become. Will the forces of violent extremism grow more dominant, eventually overpowering the moderate majority? If that happens, clearly our relations will get worse and our interests will be even more threatened. Or will Pakistanis recommit to the values espoused by the founder of their country, Moham-mad Ali Jinnah, and come together to build a stable, moderate democracy, an economically vibrant and socially tolerant nation at peace with itself and its neighbors? If so, friendship between our nations and the working partnership can inevitably grow stronger.

Second, while this outcome will be decided by Pakistanis themselves, the United States and other allies cannot afford to sit on the sidelines. We can play a role in promoting stability and prosperity, but we have to, in doing that, appreciate how deep anti-American sentiments run and the limited space we have within which to make a difference.

So what does that mean for United States policy toward Pakistan?

First, we need to continue to make certain we have a strategy that actually reaches and speaks to the people of Pakistan. For years, we had a Musharraf-centric policy, not a Pakistan policy. We knew that that needed to change. Even now we have to acknowledge that the lion's share of our energy and attention remains focused on the government and military side of Pakistan. We began to change that through the efforts of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation which revived a tradition of United States assistance to Pakistan that goes back to the 1950s when we helped lay the foundation for Pakistan's future agricultural and industrial growth. We still face the challenge of demonstrating to the Pakistani people the positive difference the United States can actually make in their lives.

We also have to understand the impact of the war in Afghanistan on Pakistan. Too many in Pakistan are convinced that they will be encircled by India when coalition forces leave Afghanistan, and too many still speculate about the impact of a 350,000-person Afghan Army on their interests. As we discussed on Tuesday, Pakistanis, like too many Afghans, do not understand what the United States endgame in Afghanistan actually looks like, and they are hedging their bets in order to safeguard their perceived interests.

There is a lot to discuss here today, and I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses. I want to welcome Dr. Samina Ahmed who is the South Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group based in Islamabad. Moeed Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at the U.S. Institute of Peace who focuses on research on his native Pakistan, and Michael Krepon is the cofounder of the

Henry L. Stimson Center and an expert on nuclear proliferation issues, particularly in South Asia.

Senator Lugar.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing on Pakistan. I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses. I wanted to take a personal privilege of mentioning Dr. Samina Ahmed in particular because she has come from Islamabad to meet with Members of Congress at the Aspen Institute congressional conferences on several occasions, and our understanding has been enhanced substantially by her testimony and her friendship. We are delighted to have all of our witnesses with us today.

Much of what I have to say this morning tracks very closely with your analysis, Mr. Chairman. The circumstances surrounding this week's dramatic killing of Osama bin Laden—who was found by our forces near Islamabad in a well-populated area close to Pakistan's military academy—have raised questions about Pakistan's reliability as an ally. Pakistani officials have been accused of being complicit or incompetent, but in either case, some critics say it is time for us to wash our hands of the whole country.

Even before the discovery of bin Laden's compound, our relationship with Pakistan had suffered strains. Pakistan's political institutions are weak and democracy has not developed deep roots. It is facing an internal extremist insurgency that, in the view of some U.S. experts, poses a serious threat to the state. President Zardari himself acknowledged earlier this week, "The forces of modernity and moderation remain under serious threat."

Lately, terrorists trained in Pakistan have attempted to carry out attacks in the United States. A grand jury in Chicago last week indicted two alleged members of Pakistan's intelligence service for involvement in the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India. High-ranking Pakistani officials were reported last week to have urged Afghan leaders to distance themselves from the United States and build stronger relations with Pakistan and China, instead. United States drone strikes on Pakistani territory anger many in Pakistan, while the Americans have repeatedly accused elements in Pakistan's Government of supporting Afghan insurgent groups, charges that have gained resonance with the bin Laden operation.

Pakistan is not an easy partner. As Dr. Richard Haass testified before our committee on Tuesday, "It is hard to imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship." But distancing ourselves from Pakistan would be unwise and extremely dangerous. It would weaken our intelligence gathering, limit our ability to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan, further complicate military operations in Afghanistan, end cooperation on finding terrorists, and eliminate engagement with Islamabad on the security of its nuclear weapons.

Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state with missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. With more than 180 million people, it is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world and has five times the population of Afghanistan. It has a close working relationship

with China, which is seeking to extend its influence throughout Asia. It frequently has been in conflict with India, with whom the United States has close relations. Pakistan is a neighbor of Iran, a terrorist-supporting state with nuclear ambitions. What happens along the Afghan-Pakistan border deeply affects the fate of our operations in Afghanistan. In short, Pakistan is a strategically vital country with which we must engage for our own national security.

Acknowledging this fact, Congress supported, on a bipartisan basis, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, signed into law in 2009. This legislation sponsored by Chairman Kerry, myself, and Howard Berman in the House, attempts to expand United States-Pakistani ties beyond military matters and signals our country's willingness to engage with Pakistan over the long term.

I would point out, as we have heard, Mr. Chairman, from testimony from the State Department, despite these good intentions, maybe only \$179 million of the \$1.5 billion this year has been spent on four projects amid enormous controversy over the monitoring on the part of the United States and controversy within Pakistan about interference alleged with any such aid at all.

The United States has made some progress. President Zardari and other Pakistani leaders have lauded the bin Laden operation, and John Brennan, President Obama's counterterrorism adviser, said this week, "Pakistan has been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan than any country." Our diplomatic, security, and development ties are growing despite many difficulties.

We should not distance ourselves from a country that looms so large in our own strategic calculations. We should be clear-eyed about the limits of our relationship. All military and development assistance should be subject to careful review to make sure that it is serving our national security interests.

I hope our witnesses will offer specific suggestions on ways to improve the United States-Pakistani relationship, and I look forward very much to our discussion.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Indeed, we are parallel in our thinking without actually conversing about it.

We welcome your testimony. Each of you can submit your testimony in full and it will be placed in the record as if delivered in full. We would appreciate sort of a summary so we can—we have a number of Senators here and we would like to try to have as much of a dialogue as we can.

We will begin, Dr. Ahmed, with you. We will go from your left to right. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

Dr. AHMED. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry, for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group on an assessment of United States policy toward Pakistan and the challenges, indeed, in pursuing a con-

structive partnership. The killing of Osama bin Laden does not lessen the challenges but also offers new options for each side.

We in the Crisis Group—and Senator Lugar has repeatedly actually read our material and our recommendations. We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of broadening U.S. engagement with Pakistan beyond that narrow focus on military security and military cooperation to a broad-based, long-term approach, in particular by strengthening democratic institutions, democratic functioning, and economic development. It was precisely this core philosophy that we were pleased to see reflected in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, introduced by the chairman and the ranking member of the committee and now U.S. law.

The challenges, quite obviously, are multiple, in particular if we are going to be just narrowly focusing on the security aspects of the relationship.

We saw Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not that long before Osama bin Laden's killing talking to the Pakistani Government and the security agencies and asking them, warning them about the danger to U.S. national security and, indeed, to Pakistan itself from the syndicate of terror on Pakistani soil. It goes beyond just al-Qaeda. It includes organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba now renamed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa which has been responsible for attacks such as in Mumbai in which American citizens were also killed, which has global aspirations and shares al-Qaeda's philosophy. It includes the Haqqani Network responsible for the deaths of many American soldiers and their allies in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is a young democracy, a nascent democracy. Taking Pakistan back to its democratic moorings requires, at this point in time in particular, when there is a certain degree of concern and impatience about the inability of civilian institutions to deliver, to even more so strengthen that democracy because in that lies the answer to Pakistan's stability and also the promotion of vital U.S. national security interests.

My testimony has been placed before the house. Let me just highlight some of our policy recommendations.

And I think particularly in the context of what we have seen, the killing of Osama bin Laden so close to the main military academy and in a military cantonment—in a military town, I think it is absolutely essential now that the certification requirements included in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill be taken far more seriously than they were in the past.

We would advise and very strongly urge Congress to condition military assistance on demonstrable steps to combat violent extremists that go beyond just al-Qaeda, the foreign al-Qaeda, but also homegrown jihadis, in particular, organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Our concern about conflict between India and Pakistan is one of the reasons, but also the fact that this organization lends its support to violent extremist groups outside the region and within—targeting U.S. national security and U.S. citizens.

We would urge Congress to continue to insist on a certification requirement also of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill that the security agencies of Pakistan are not materially or substantively supporting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan and also to provide

strong support—much stronger support—to civilian law enforcement agencies in combating jihadi groups.

We would also urge Congress and the Obama administration to recognize that the Pakistan Government, not just the military alone, should be considered an essential partner not just in the context of combating extremism within Pakistan but also in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the transition plans for Afghanistan.

South Asia is, as you said, Chairman, a region where you have multiple challenges and multiple crises, not just the presence of violent jihadis but also nuclear-armed neighbors that have fought wars in the past. We would encourage the United States to play a more active role in supporting the efforts of the Pakistan and Indian Governments to achieve a long-term, stable, and sustainable peace.

We would also urge Congress and the Obama administration to support democratic reform that this elected government in Pakistan has actually taken—the first steps toward enacting, in particular, to end that status of a no man's land in FATA in the tribal belt. There is a political package of reform, agreed to by all political parties in Pakistan. Support for that package would advance the interests of the United States and the Pakistani people by denying sanctuary in this territory to violent extremist groups.

Finally, I would urge Congress and the Obama administration to recognize the fact that this is a very young democracy. Expecting results overnight is unrealistic, but in the long term, supporting the civilian transition, encouraging the military to demonstrate better behavior, ensuring that civilian law enforcement takes the lead in combating violent extremists. It is absolutely urgent that civilian assistance that has been pledged by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill should not become the casualty of these strains in the relationship. This for the Pakistani people, and a partnership between the Pakistani people and the American people would be the best partnership and the most sustainable partnership in broadening this relationship.

Finally, as far as security assistance is concerned, quite obviously, with the war in Afghanistan, you will have to take in some of the concerns that Chairman Kerry has identified, including the need for the military's cooperation in terms of providing supplies to United States forces in Afghanistan, but remembering that the threat of violent extremists, some of them jihadi proxies backed by the Pakistani military, remains quite obviously a major challenge. Certification should not be taken lightly, but economic assistance should be continued.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ahmed follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SAMINA AHMED

I want to thank Chairman John F. Kerry for holding this important hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group on an assessment of U.S. policy toward and challenges in pursuing a constructive partnership with Pakistan. The killing of Osama bin Laden does not lessen that challenge but may well offer new options for each side.

The Crisis Group has been in South Asia since December 2001, and has published reports on these issues. We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of broadening U.S. engagement with Pakistan beyond a narrow focus on counterterrorism

and security to a long-term all-encompassing approach, in particular by strengthening civilian institutions and democratic functions. Such an approach, we have argued in our reports, would help to stabilize a fragile state and a volatile, crisis-prone region critical to U.S. national security interests. It was precisely that core philosophy that we were pleased to see reflected in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act introduced by the chairman and the ranking member of the committee, and now U.S. law.

By emphasizing political and economic interests, as well as the security aspects of the relationship, the KLB legislation remains a welcome step forward. Pakistan-based Islamist militants are threatened by this policy because it delegitimizes their actions against the Pakistani state and their efforts to undermine U.S. military efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. These homegrown jihadis have demonstrated an interest—and are gaining capacity to threaten—the U.S. homeland. They are seeking, along with Pakistani political opportunists and spoilers, to use American strikes against violent extremists and intelligence gathering operations to turn Pakistani public opinion against the United States. Slow and uneven disbursement of U.S. assistance further undermines efforts to win over an increasingly skeptical Pakistani public.

However, the U.S. administration and Congress must not construe the failure to see immediate results on the ground as failure of the changed approach. Instead, sustaining the broad-based relationship over the short, medium, and long term, and exercising patience in its implementation will pay political and security dividends.

Let me summarize some of the key policy options that we believe the United States should pursue:

- Continue to condition military support on demonstrable steps to combat violent extremists and end the longstanding policy of support and sanctuary to such elements, Pakistan or foreign.
- Continue to require but also provide additional oversight on the State Department certification of Pakistani cooperation in dismantling nuclear supplier networks, combating terrorist groups, and ending support by the military or its intelligence arms to extremist groups.
- Continue to insist that the “security agencies of Pakistan are not materially or substantively subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan” and provide stronger support for civilian law enforcement agencies in combating jihadi groups including prosecuting the small percentage of madrassas that engage in jihadi terrorist training.
- Recognize that the Pakistani Government, not the military alone by any means, are critical interlocutors in the ongoing process of advancing a transition in Afghanistan, including an end game that includes political negotiations, while maintaining certain redlines which include breaking ties with al-Qaeda as well as Pakistani al-Qaeda linked extremist groups.
- The United States must play a more active role in supporting the efforts of the Pakistani and Indian Governments to achieve long-term stability and peace in South Asia.
- Support the civilian government and the combined political party reform effort to end the second class status of the FATA and provide its citizens both the full rights and civilian law enforcement protection of the Pakistani Constitution.

BACKDROP

The U.S. administration is understandably concerned about Pakistan, a country of some 170 million people with perhaps more than 100 nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda and affiliated Afghan insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network have an established presence on Pakistani territory. Over time, links between al-Qaeda, Pakistani jihadi groups and their Afghan counterparts have expanded and consolidated to create a nexus of terror threatening American security and interests at home, in the region, and globally.

After September 11, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan was adversarial at first, with Washington, DC, warning General Pervez Musharraf’s regime—partnered with the Afghan Taliban and oblivious to al-Qaeda’s presence on its territory—that Pakistan was either with or against the United States. As Musharraf’s regime started countering al-Qaeda’s presence, and scores of al-Qaeda leaders were killed, detained, or extradited to the United States, the United States decided to back Musharraf and his military in the misguided belief that they alone could deliver the counterterrorism goods. But in propping up Musharraf’s military regime, the United States alienated its natural partners, Pakistan’s moderate majority. Regaining the trust of the people of Pakistan has not been an easy task.

As the movement for democracy in Pakistan gained strength, the United States did attempt to make amends. Reaching out to the country's political leadership—particularly former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto—the United States also pressured Musharraf to step down and thus influenced the Pakistani generals' decision to distance themselves from their army chief. The United States can therefore claim some credit for Musharraf's decision to hold elections and transfer power to civilian hands.

With the Pakistani people winning their fight for democracy and elections resulting in the formal transfer of power to an elected civilian government, the U.S. Congress wisely decided it was in America's interest to support democracy and economic development in Pakistan through a multiyear partnership. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, signed into law by President Obama in October 2009, redefined U.S. priorities in Pakistan, including by making security-related assistance—including arms transfers—contingent on the security forces respecting political and judicial democratic processes.

Three years later, many in Pakistan appear skeptical about U.S. support for Pakistan's democracy; just as many in U.S. policy circles appear skeptical about the ability of Pakistan's civilian institutions to stabilize the Pakistani polity and prevent the spread of violent extremism. Undoubtedly the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government has failed thus far to curb violent extremism and civilian institutions have yet to meet the needs of an increasingly impatient public. However, the Obama administration and Congress must not expect a transitional democracy to deliver miracles overnight. Instead, the effectiveness of U.S. policy toward Pakistan must be assessed in the context of a young democracy that needs time to mature and stabilize, with incremental civilian control over national security policy taking Pakistan back to its moderate mooring.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE

For some observers, Pakistan stands at the edge of an abyss beset with internal turmoil, with a deadly countrywide militant presence and a floundering economy that undermines the state's ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Violent extremism, a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal and a history of war with neighbors is more than sufficient reason to worry about the country's future. The answer, some Pakistani watchers believe, lies in ensuring that security takes precedence over governance. In their thinking, the Pakistani military might not respect human rights and promote fundamental freedoms, but it is the only institution that is organized, capable, and strong enough to hold the country together. Yet the answer for Pakistan's ills does not lie in its praetorian past.

The military's repeated interventions have only widened internal fissures, straining a fragile federation almost to breaking point. The denial of democratic rights and freedoms by successive military rulers resulted in the dismemberment of the state in 1971. The social contract with the citizenry was painfully rebuilt by civilian rulers, with the basic law of the land—the 1973 constitution—helping to restore trust in the state. However, successive direct or indirect military interventions—the latest by General Musharraf—weakened the civilian edifice and the ability of civilian institutions to deliver good governance and development that is so badly needed today.

The military's perception of national interest has also starved the state of resources it requires for development. Instead, already inadequate fiscal resources have been diverted to sustain the eighth largest army in the world, one that boasts a massive array of conventional and nuclear weapons, primarily aimed at confronting India. By cultivating jihadi proxies to weaken India and to dominate Afghanistan, Pakistan's military is also responsible for a countrywide jihadi blowback that could, if not countered now, become more and more difficult to contain. These military-backed homegrown extremists have also forged links with transnational terrorist groups—including al-Qaeda—and with regional insurgents such as the Haqqani network. The resultant terror nexus is linked to terror plots aimed at the United States and bears direct responsibility for the deaths of U.S. soldiers and American allies in Afghanistan. Finding Osama bin Laden behind a 200-foot-long walled compound very close to the Pakistan military academy also should raise additional questions about the Pakistan military's quite differentiated policy of counterterrorism.

Pakistan's democratic transition faces many challenges but it also offers the United States important opportunities to craft policies that advance U.S. goals in a sustainable and strategic manner. Rather than reverting to another exclusive and short-sighted partnership with Pakistan's military establishment, the Enhanced

Partnership with Pakistan Act's strategically comprehensive approach must continue to guide U.S. policy.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

With the right policy choices, the United States could play a major role in helping stabilize Pakistan's democratic transition which would in turn help to stabilize the volatile region in which it is situated. In making these policy choices, the U.S. administration must bear in mind that the democratic transition is still in its nascent stages, and will, at least in the near future, also place limitations on the pursuance of policies and strategies that would advance U.S. goals.

Soon after the PPP-led government was formed under Asif Ali Zardari's leadership following the 18 February 2008 elections, domestic and international observers believed that it would be short-lived. Although the government has stumbled from crisis to crisis, it has survived against all odds, and is now in its fourth year in office. With the support of its parliamentary opposition, the ruling party has also spearheaded reforms that have set Pakistan back on the democratic path. Key among these is the 18th constitutional amendment, passed unanimously in Parliament and signed by the President into law on 18 April 2010. A landmark bill, which restores parliamentary supremacy by removing the constitutional distortions of military rule, the amendment also strengthens federal democracy by meeting longstanding demands for the devolution of power from the center to the federal units. Other major democratic reforms include the passage of the National Finance Commission award on redistributing financial resources by the federation to the provinces, the first such award agreed upon by all stakeholders since 1997.

For the ruling party, one of the greatest challenges to enacting democratic reforms lies in its dependence on an unwieldy coalition. With a slim majority in Parliament, it has been forced to include some unreliable partners in the federal and provincial governments, including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a former member of Musharraf's military regime. This lack of a stable parliamentary majority, combined with resistance to economic reform from coalition partners and the parliamentary opposition alike, has resulted in the failure thus far to gain legislative approval for enacting many pressing reforms. Under IMF pressure, the government is reducing subsidies (e.g., on energy consumption), fuelling domestic discontent. As the 2011–12 budget approaches, the government will be between a rock and a hard place: pressured by the IFIs to enact pressing economic reforms and pressured by the opposition to make concessions that could further weaken a fragile economy.

The United States should continue to urge the Government of Pakistan on economic reforms but the United States should not make economic support contingent on such measures. Indeed, strings related to transparency and efficacy should be attached to U.S. assistance, to ensure that taxpayers' money is well spent and accounted for. However, the Obama administration must also step up the disbursement of congressionally appropriated funds provided for by the KLB law to help to shore up a young democracy by supporting economic freedom and development.

Currently, the pace of disbursing the \$7.5 billion over a 5-year period has fallen far behind schedule. The Pakistani Finance Minister recently disclosed that Pakistan had not even received \$300 million of the \$1.514 billion allocated for FY 2010. The multiagency quarterly and oversight report of the civilian assistance program (December 2010) identified ongoing security threats as impediments to monitoring and implementation—while substantive sums were reallocated to target flood recovery and assistance. Yet USAID must push the pace, understanding that the failure to meet raised expectations only benefits spoilers. At the same time, the generous funds allocated for Pakistan's conflict-hit tribal agencies—such as for the South Waziristan or Malakand Agency's quick impact programs—is money ill-spent. USAID-funded programs in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) work through an unaccountable military and civil bureaucracy and local elites, severely limiting aid effectiveness. Rather than encourage, this assistance impedes democratization by empowering the very forces opposed to the extension of full constitutional and political rights to FATA.

The absence of state institutions and the Frontier Crimes Regulations 1901 (FCR), a colonial-era law, has isolated the region from the rest of the country, giving it an ambiguous constitutional status, denying political freedoms and opportunities to the population, and allowing militants to exploit the resultant vacuum to gain significant power. On 14 August 2009, President Zardari announced a FATA reform package, which would have lifted restrictions on political party activity, curtailed arbitrary detention and arrests under FCR and audited funds for FATA. This first basic step to bring FATA into the mainstream was stymied by the military. One of the clearest signs of a policy that supports civilian democratic institutions would be

for the United States to endorse the combined political party reform measure that would end the colonial status of FATA, providing its citizens with all the rights of constitutional protection, with civilian law enforcement agencies allowed to protect those citizens and to confront the full range of domestic and international jihadi forces which still find sanctuary in North Waziristan.

The military has also undermined the government's reconciliation efforts in Balochistan, bordering on southern Afghanistan, where grievances against the center's exploitation of provincial resources and indiscriminate use of force have resulted in a provincewide insurgency. Instead, continued military operations—including targeted killings and disappearances of political dissidents—have further alienated the secular and moderate Baloch, who could play an invaluable role in helping to counter the extremist forces that are bent on destabilizing the state. Should the democratic transition stabilize, there is real potential to bring the Baloch back into the political fold and to enact meaningful democratic reform in FATA, thereby strengthening the federation and marginalizing extremists.

Should the democratic transition stabilize, democratically elected civilian governments could also assert greater control over national security and defense policy. The two largest political parties, the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), support peace with India and Afghanistan. At present, however, Pakistan's generals exercise considerable control over all sensitive areas of policy, which is shaped in accordance with the military's perceptions of national interest. Therefore the military continues to back Islamist proxies to undermine Indian security and to promote perceived interests in Afghanistan. That still raises the most serious threat for generating a full-scale war in South Asia.

The United States is concerned about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal but there is a far greater risk in a conventional conflict between India and Pakistan escalating to the nuclear level. When Pakistan-based jihadis attacked Mumbai in 2008, India exercised considerable restraint. However, New Delhi could opt for a far more robust military response should another such attack occur, a likely prospect because of the Pakistani high command's continued support for al-Qaeda-linked groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JD), and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the former supported by the Pakistani military and the latter actually formed by that military through its intelligence arm, the ISI. It is unlikely that Osama bin Laden's death will affect those ties since these organizations share al-Qaeda's international goals.

Army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani claims that his military is committed to eliminating violent extremists and has broken their backbone. But Admiral Mullen's recent publicly stated concerns are accurate and well-founded; Pakistan's continuing terror attacks, which claimed more than 2,500 Pakistani lives in some 67 suicide attacks in 2010, show that militant organizations continue to flourish. Nor is there any proof that the tribal borderlands are now firmly under the state's control. On the contrary, ongoing operations in FATA agencies against some tribal militants have been accompanied by peace deals with equally violent extremist groups such as the Pakistani Taliban's Gul Bahadur group in North and the Maulvi Nazir group in South Waziristan agencies. Linked to the Haqqani network, these Pakistani militants are actively involved in attacks against American troops in Afghanistan as indeed are the Punjab-based al-Qaeda affiliates.

India-oriented jihadi organizations in Pakistan's heartland, particularly the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, now have global ambitions and an increasing global reach, posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Despite billions of dollars of U.S. security assistance, the Pakistan high command still sees the LeT/JD as an asset in its proxy war with India. The controversy over a CIA contractor killing two Pakistanis, reportedly low level operatives of the military's intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directive (ISI) in Lahore, stemmed in large part from the military's sensitivity about U.S. intelligence activities in the Pakistani heartland, where the LeT/JD and other al-Qaeda linked India-oriented jihadis are based.

Despite a partnership with the United States, of which the military, since September 11, has been the main financial and political beneficiary, the Pakistani generals appear willing to use elements of the media to whip up anti-U.S. sentiment. The military high command is also strongly critical of U.S. drone attacks when its tribal allies are the targets. On 27 March, for instance, Army Chief Kayani, for the very first time publicly condemned a U.S. drone attack, most likely because it targeted the military-backed Haqqani-linked Gul Bahadur group.

This shaping of anti-American sentiment through public pronouncements or the media, especially influential broadcast media, is part of the military's strategy to redraw redlines in the relationship. Drone attacks, in short, are acceptable but not when jihadi proxies such as the LeT or chosen Pakistani or Afghan Taliban allies are targeted.

The United States has belatedly drawn its own redlines. Admiral Robert Willard, for instance, expressed concern about the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba's expanding reach and ambitions in testimony before the Senate's Armed Services Committee. The White House Quarterly report on Afghanistan and Pakistan in April assessed: "there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan." In a far more explicit and for the very first time public criticism of the Pakistan military's support for homegrown and Afghan jihadi proxies, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen called for an end for Pakistani backing of the Haqqani network and its local allies. Drawing Pakistan's attention, though media interviews, to the presence of al-Qaeda's leadership in the borderlands and Haqqani's continued presence on Pakistani soil, Admiral Mullen stressed that the two countries must work together to eliminate this threat by sharing intelligence. He pointed out that the syndicate of terror on Pakistan soil, including the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Pakistani Taliban threatened U.S. national security and the lives of U.S. citizens.

The Pakistani military leadership has pushed back strongly, with Kayani rejecting, in the words of his spokesperson, U.S. "negative propaganda." Reiterating opposition to drone strikes and U.S. intelligence operations within Pakistan, using the media to propagate anti-American sentiment, the high command appears to believe that the United States will back down, particularly since it needs the military's cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan militarily and politically. To change the military's behavior and to protect U.S. national security interests, and indeed those of the Pakistani people who are victims of extremist violence, the United States must follow its advice to Pakistan with action.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS: LOOKING AHEAD

To continue security-related assistance, the KLB Act requires the Secretary of State to certify Pakistani cooperation in dismantling nuclear supplier networks, combating terrorist groups, and ending support by the military or its intelligence arms to extremist groups. Rather than give in to the high command's pressure tactics, the United States should condition military support on demonstrable steps to combat violent extremists and end the longstanding policy of support and sanctuary to such elements, Pakistan or foreign.

The Act also requires certification that the "security agencies of Pakistan are not materially or substantively subverting the political and judicial processes of Pakistan." The military should be reminded that future security assistance would also depend on such certification, particularly since the threat of another covert intervention cannot be ruled out.

President Zardari's personal differences with the army chief aside, the military's opposition to the PPP is rooted in a long history of distrust and discord, with a former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, executed by a military dictator and Benazir Bhutto's government twice ousted through military-devised interventions during the 1990s. The current government too could be dismissed through a military-manipulated intervention. The MQM, a former coalition partner of Musharraf's military government, could be persuaded to quit the PPP-led coalition, thus depriving the government of a stable parliamentary majority; and/or encouraging the PML-N to support a vote of no confidence in Parliament. The superior court's ongoing tussle with the executive could also provide the military the lever it needs to remove the government, replacing it with a puppet regime, which would allow it to rule from behind the scenes.

Signals from Washington, DC, will play a major role in the military's cost-benefit analysis of intervening. The United States must resist the temptation of reverting to a reliance on quick fixes which would amount to falling back on a failed policy of engaging with the Pakistani military at the cost of Pakistan's young democracy. A sustained democratic transition will go a long way in stabilizing Pakistan though meaningful political, economic, and security-sector reform. The assertion of civilian authority over security policy will also result in a reassessment of the domestic costs of supporting jihadi proxies and a realignment of domestic priorities from military to human security. By strengthening the new civilian order, both the United States and Pakistan stand to gain.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Ahmed.
Mr. Krepon.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, COFOUNDER AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE, SOUTH ASIA, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, the United States-Pakistan relationship could not have survived this long without the presence of vital common interests. But we are now very close to another divorce. It would be a serious error in judgment in my view to conclude that this relationship cannot be salvaged. Pakistanis have great resilience and their military leaders are capable of making good as well as bad decisions. This relationship will not be salvaged unless Pakistan gets its house in order and unless we are clearer amongst ourselves about what we can and cannot expect from Pakistan.

Pakistan is a weak country with strong powers to resist United States pressures. Our reliance on Pakistan for logistical support for our many troops in Afghanistan is a great source of friction. We argue over compensation. We argue over the extent of the United States presence in Pakistan, and we argue over the ground rules under which we operate there.

United States and Pakistani interests diverge on nuclear, on India, and on Afghanistan. Pakistan's sense of insecurity is growing, which translates into increased reliance on nuclear weapons and continued links to the groups that Samina has mentioned; groups that carry out deadly attacks in Afghanistan and in India.

On Afghanistan, we both seek a negotiated settlement, but we are backing different horses. Our military forces in Afghanistan—God bless them—are performing in an exceptional manner, but every one of us knows that their sacrifices will be in vain unless tactical gains can be handed off to competent Afghan authorities. If a lasting political settlement can be found in Afghanistan, it will require extraordinarily difficult internal and regional dealmaking. I doubt whether this heroic undertaking is worthy of an annual U.S. military commitment in excess of \$100 billion. Dealmaking will continue within Afghanistan and with Afghanistan's neighbors at a fraction of this cost and sacrifice. The results may well be modest or ephemeral no matter how much we spend there.

The future of Pakistan matters a whole lot more than the future of Afghanistan. Pakistan, unlike Afghanistan, is a hinge state in the Islamic world. United States military and diplomatic investments do not remotely correspond to the relative importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan to vital United States national security interests. And some of our policies are increasing stress fractures within Pakistan.

It will require, in my judgment, a four-cornered bank shot to leave Afghanistan as a reasonably functioning country. Pakistan may also become lost to its own pathologies regardless of what we do there. But it would be immensely tragic if the loss of United States blood and treasure in this theater results in little better than the usual state of affairs in Afghanistan, alongside far greater deterioration within Pakistan and in United States-Pakistan relations.

At best, we will continue to have a checkered track record with Pakistan. Its security apparatus will continue to seek to influence Afghanistan's future no matter what carrots and sticks we apply.

Pakistan is not going to give up nuclear weapons, but we can actually work with them, I believe, to increase nuclear risk reduction in the region.

United States ties with India are going to continue to get better, as they should, and Pakistan's national security establishment is going to feel more insecure as a result. We cannot convince Pakistan's military to befriend India. We can work with them to have a more normal relationship with India, especially in the areas of trade and regional development.

The biggest challenge facing Pakistan's national security establishment is to recognize how growing links to extremist groups mortgage that country's future. The ISI still does not get this. Outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba are the leading edge of Pakistan's national demise. If Pakistan's military leaders cannot rethink the fundamentals of their anti-India policy and their increased reliance on nuclear weapons, they will never know true security. I do not expect a change in Pakistan's ties to the Afghan Taliban, but this would be a very good time for Pakistan's military leaders to rethink any lingering ties they may have to the remnants of al-Qaeda within their country. A rethink of their ties to the LeT, Lashkar, would also be helpful.

We might also reconsider our present course. In my view, our Afghan policies hurt rather than help Pakistan to find its own balance. If authorities in Afghanistan are unable to safeguard our military's hard-won gains, we are obligated to ask how much more blood and treasure ought to be devoted to this cause. I acknowledge that there are risks in accelerating reductions in the United States level of effort in Afghanistan. In my view, there are greater risks and costs by remaining on our current glide path.

I, therefore, respectfully suggest that this committee consider accelerating efforts to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan alongside steeper reductions in our level of military effort there.

Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify about Pakistan. I have been working on national security issues relating to Pakistan at the Stimson Center for almost 20 years. Pakistan is a very confusing place, but one thing is unmistakably clear: there are no simple solutions to what ails Pakistan or United States-Pakistan relations.

Osama bin Laden's death is a landmark in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The failure of this operation would likely have had horrific consequences for United States-Pakistan relations. Instead, its success will result in an even more trying bilateral relationship, but not a divorce.

Pakistan's leaders had little choice but to put a positive gloss on bin Laden's death, as Washington had put them on notice many times that military action would result if we had strong intelligence of his whereabouts. That Pakistan's security apparatus was kept in the dark about this operation speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of this partnership.

Less than 2 weeks ago, the Pakistani chief of army staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, visited Pakistan's premier military academy to congratulate the cadets. General Kayani claimed that Pakistani security forces "have broken the back of terrorists" and that the Pakistan Army "was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country." Osama bin Laden's compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.

General Kayani and the director general of interservices intelligence, Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, were rewarded with term extensions by the current Pakistani Government because of their competence in dealing Pakistan's profound internal and exter-

nal threats. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan reflects very poorly on both of these officers. The No. 2 ranking al-Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan are also widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.

Hard times lie ahead for United States-Pakistan relations. The interests of our two countries in Afghanistan diverge as well as converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained, and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by Pakistan's security apparatus.

Osama bin Laden's violent demise comes at a time when U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan are reaching the half-trillion dollar mark. It is far from clear that the hard-earned tactical achievements of U.S. forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even more apparent that Pakistan can only lose by being a safe haven for violent extremists. Bin Laden's death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and U.S. authorities to reconsider our complicated and unsatisfactory relationship.

Pakistan is a weak country with strong powers to resist U.S. pressures. Pakistani leaders usually do not "just say no" to Washington. Instead, they often use circumlocution, delay, and work-arounds when they believe that U.S. demands are inimical to Pakistani national security and domestic political interests.

The very large U.S. military presence in Afghanistan which is dependent on Pakistani logistical support is a great source of friction between our two countries. We argue over compensation, the extent of the U.S. presence on Pakistani soil and the ground rules under which U.S. personnel operate. U.S. reliance on Pakistan for logistical support provides Rawalpindi with unusually strong leverage to resist U.S. demands. But even if the United States greatly reduces our footprint in Afghanistan, Pakistani military leaders would still be able to deflect our demands when they run counter to their perceived interests.

One area of divergence relates to Afghanistan. We both seek a negotiated settlement there, but we are backing different horses. Pakistan's security establishment seeks an outcome that maximizes its influence in Kabul as well as in Afghan provinces adjacent to Pakistan against hostile influences, primarily from India. This helps to explain why Pakistan's security apparatus retains close links to the Afghan Taliban.

The United States-Pakistan relationship could not have survived this long without the presence of vital common interests. Foremost among them is our common goal of a stable Pakistan that is at peace with itself. With U.S. support, Pakistan's Armed Forces are engaged in selective efforts to increase domestic security, at significant cost. Washington has helped Pakistan increase the security of its nuclear assets. We also serve as an essential crisis manager and as a promoter of more normal ties with India.

It would be a serious error, in my judgment, to conclude that this relationship cannot be salvaged. Pakistanis have great resilience, and their military leaders are capable of good as well as bad decisions. In order to salvage this relationship, Pakistan needs to get its house in order, and we need to be clearer about what we can and cannot expect from Pakistan.

U.S. and Pakistani interests diverge on nuclear issues, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan's sense of insecurity is growing, which translates into increased reliance on nuclear weapons and continued links to groups that carry out deadly attacks across its borders.

Pakistan's national security managers have "just said no" with respect to the initiation of negotiations on a treaty to stop producing fissile material for weapons—one indicator of their sense of insecurity and anger at the United States—India civil nuclear deal. The Punjab-based Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has carried out mass casualty attacks in Kashmir, New Delhi, Mumbai, and elsewhere, is not greatly inconvenienced by Pakistan's security apparatus. The Haqqani network, which carries out cross-border attacks against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, seems to have few constraints on its operations. This track record reflects Rawalpindi's perceived interests to counter India's growing conventional military capabilities and to secure Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan.

The United States has given Pakistan economic and military assistance, assuming that Pakistan would pay greater heed to U.S. interests. This transactional relationship has been unsatisfactory to both parties. First, as noted above, U.S. and Pakistani security objectives are not always in alignment. Second, Pakistan's security culture has been deeply wedded to poor decisions. There is positive movement on some fronts—for example, since 2002, Kashmir has not been a "flashpoint" between Pakistan and India—but even when there is private acknowledgment of unwise choices, it's very hard for Pakistani authorities to change course. Third, U.S. economic assistance remains quite modest compared to Pakistan's budget outlays and

domestic needs. Fourth, U.S. military assistance to India is growing far more in qualitative and quantitative terms than is U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistani grievances with whatever level of military support we provide will also grow.

Sometimes Washington can quietly encourage helpful changes at the margins of Pakistani policies. Over time, course corrections can become increasingly significant with quiet U.S. encouragement and Pakistani recognition of unwise policies. But this ongoing process is frustrating, time consuming, and becoming more difficult as our estrangement grows.

The enlarged U.S. military commitment to facilitate a political settlement in Afghanistan greatly increases friction with Pakistan. I have reluctantly concluded that greater U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are unlikely to result in long-lasting gains. Our military forces in Afghanistan—God bless them—are performing in an exceptional manner. But we all know that their sacrifices will be in vain unless tactical gains can be handed over to competent Afghan political leaders and military units.

If a lasting political settlement can be found in Afghanistan, it will require extraordinarily difficult internal and regional deal making. I doubt whether this heroic undertaking is worthy of an annual U.S. military commitment in excess of \$100 billion. Deal making will continue to be pursued at a fraction of this cost and sacrifice. The results may well be modest or ephemeral, no matter how much we spend there.

The future of Pakistan matters far more than the future of Afghanistan. For the foreseeable future, militant groups with global reach are likely to reside in far greater number in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Pakistan has a growing nuclear arsenal and production capacity for weapons-grade fissile material. Pakistan, unlike Afghanistan, is a hinge state in the muslim world. U.S. military and diplomatic investments do not remotely correspond to the relative importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan to vital U.S. national security interests. Some U.S. policies are also increasing stress fractures in Pakistani society.

Take, for example, the highly emotive issue of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistani soil. I am obviously not privy to the profiles of those targeted. According to what limited information is publicly available, most of the targets of U.S. drone attacks are apparently not big difference makers in the region's strategic calculus. I trust that these attacks offer tactical gains, but they have very significant downside costs.

That Pakistani authorities have reportedly consented privately in the past to some attacks under some criteria is not particularly reassuring, since these practices have served to distance Pakistani citizens from their government as well as from the United States. It is particularly upsetting for most Pakistanis to bear witness to aerial attacks on their sovereign territory, whether by the Soviet Union during the 1980s or by the United States a quarter-century later.

To my way of thinking, the targets for these attacks need to matter a great deal in order to merit the adverse consequences they engender. I would not underestimate the resulting damage to United States-Pakistan relations from U.S. drone strikes—damage far greater than the tactical gains we seek along the Afghan border.

It will require a four-cornered bank shot to leave Afghanistan as a reasonably functioning country. Assuming this is possible, is this effort worth the hollowing out of United States-Pakistan relations? Granted, there are many reasons beside Afghanistan for Pakistan's current trajectory. And Pakistan may become lost to its own pathologies regardless of U.S. efforts there or in Afghanistan. But it would be immensely tragic if the loss of U.S. blood and treasure in this theater results in little better than the usual state of affairs in Afghanistan alongside far greater deterioration within Pakistan and in United States-Pakistan relations.

I realize how hard it is to get U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan "right." Indeed, one message that I have tried to convey in my testimony that it may well be impossible to get things anywhere near "right" in this part of the world. Even if the United States greatly reduces our level of effort in Afghanistan and removes Afghan war-related sources of friction with Pakistan, I do not expect significant dividends in United States-Pakistan relations. There will be other important matters on which we will continue to disagree.

Nonetheless, the removal of some sources of friction in bilateral relations remains a worthy objective, especially when friction widens and accelerates Pakistan's domestic fissures. The removal of tactical irritants in the pursuit of improbable objectives in Afghanistan could also facilitate constructive changes at the margins of Pakistan's national security policies. With patient and persistent engagement, we can help Rawalpindi reconsider policies that have manifestly weakened Pakistan. Our focus on Afghanistan is crowding out these important agenda items.

At best, we will have a checkered track record with Pakistan. Pakistan's security apparatus will seek to increase its chances to influence Afghanistan's future dis-

pensation no matter what carrots or sticks Washington chooses. We can also forget about convincing Pakistan to give up its nuclear weapons, but we may be able to persuade Rawalpindi that Pakistani security can be enhanced with more nuclear risk-reduction measures. U.S. ties with India will continue to improve, reflecting our substantial and growing common interests. Pakistan's national security establishment will feel more insecure as a result. Washington can't convince Pakistan's military leaders to befriend India, but we can promote more normal ties between Pakistan and India, especially in the areas of trade and regional development.

The biggest challenge facing Pakistan's national security establishment is to recognize how continuing links to extremist groups mortgage Pakistan's future. Outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba, which some view as a strategic reserve in the event of another war against India, are instead the leading edge of Pakistan's strategic demise. Every mass casualty attack that Lashka- e-Toiba carries out on Indian soil brands Pakistan as an exporter of terrorism. India rebounds from extremist attacks; Pakistan's economy and social cohesion do not rebound. If Pakistan's national security establishment cannot rethink the fundamentals of its anti-India policy and its increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, it will never know true security.

As for Afghanistan, the sooner we and Pakistan revisit painful questions, the better. Pakistan cannot break damning links with the past as long as senior leaders of al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban find safe havens there. I do not expect a change in Pakistan's ties to the Afghan Taliban, but Rawalpindi may now wish to rethink its passive relationship to what may remain of al-Qaeda's leadership within the country.

We might also reconsider our present course. Our Afghan policies hurt, rather than help, Pakistan to find its balance. If authorities in Afghanistan are unable to safeguard our military's hard-won gains, we need to ask how much more blood and treasure ought to be devoted to this cause. I acknowledge that there are risks in accelerating reductions in the U.S. level of effort in Afghanistan. In my view, greater risks and costs are incurred by remaining on our current glide path. I therefore suggest that this committee consider accelerating efforts to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan alongside reductions in our level of military effort there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Yusuf.

STATEMENT OF MOEED YUSUF, SOUTH ASIA ADVISER, CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. YUSUF. Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you today about United States policy toward Pakistan.

These views are my own but are influenced and informed by my work at the U.S. Institute of Peace where I am based. USIP not only conducts research and analysis on Pakistan but we have a sizable programmatic presence in the country, which takes me back to Pakistan on a very regular basis.

Osama bin Laden's presence and comfortable existence in a Pakistani garrison town was shocking, to say the least. In the wake of bin Laden's killing, many have understandably called for a reevaluation of the bilateral relationship with Pakistan.

I would, however, submit, Mr. Chairman, that retreating from a promise of long-term holistic support to Pakistan will be a grave error on the part of United States decisionmakers. The relations with Pakistan will never be good, but they are still necessary. With 180 million people, the world's fifth-largest nuclear arsenal, a global hub for Islamic militants, and recent evidence of fast-growing extremism in Pakistani society, a further destabilization of Pakistan would be nothing short of catastrophic in my view.

The decision by the U.S. Congress to allow a more broad-based relationship capable of reaching out to the Pakistani people, crystallized as it was through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

Act, was refreshing precisely because it understood the importance of a stable Pakistan for the United States. The beauty of that was that for once we were now thinking of Pakistan for Pakistan's sake.

We must be clear that the ultimate U.S. national security interest in Pakistan will be served only by ensuring stability of this country and nothing less. Afghanistan is a critical element of that but only one of them. Therefore, the tendency to tie this relationship's future solely to Afghanistan, in my view, is a flawed approach.

Taking a long-term view of the partnership, my written testimony, which has been submitted, provides a number of specific measures regarding America's security, economic, and political engagement that would help further this United States interest of assisting Pakistan become stable.

Very briefly on Afghanistan, which of course is the most urgent of our security interests, recent research that we have conducted at USIP suggests a much greater possibility of convergence between United States and Pakistani positions than is generally believed. The prerequisite to benefiting from this convergence, however, is a clearly laid-out reconciliation plan from the United States, followed by frank and specific discussions with Pakistan on the positive role they would be able to play as we try to reach out for a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. I think it should be fairly clear that there is no military solution possible, and a Pakistani role in the reconciliation phase remains indispensable to us.

Let me say a word about economic assistance. The irony here is that while continued economic assistance cannot guarantee success, withdrawing it at this moment would be tantamount to giving up on Pakistan. To optimize gains, economic assistance must be tailored to ensure maximum development benefits. There is a need to reconsider use of aid for short-term stabilization objectives, as I increasingly see being the case in Pakistan, because what this does is it risks diluting development gains while proving to be ineffective on the security front as well.

I would, however, recommend making civilian economic assistance conditional upon the Pakistani Government's ability to undertake structural tax reforms, which there is now a consensus both in Pakistan and outside is critical for Pakistan's fiscal revival.

Then, Mr. Chairman, there are things that money cannot buy, and in Pakistan's case it is their strategic mindset. Having worked on this issue very closely, I am convinced that no amount of United States aid will be able to deliver on that front. India-Pakistan normalization is critical for Pakistan, but it is not our aid that is going to do the trick. It would, therefore, be best to use America's economic leverage to ensure better development outcomes, and returns on the counterterrorism front should be linked only to security assistance.

I would add here, though, that the conditionalities, whatever they are, must be ones which can be proven and which are tangible. When there is such an acute trust deficit, it is very difficult to prove conditionalities which really go with one's word against the other, which has been the case so far in my view. We also need to keep in mind the Pakistan military's capacity constraints when we decide what conditionalities are going to be applied.

In terms of America's political engagement, the dilemma of who to work with in Pakistan will remain a real one for the foreseeable future. The temptation to waiver toward the relatively more organized and efficient military will be strong from time to time. However, we must not repeat the mistakes of the past. Political engagement with Pakistan should have one overriding objective. Whatever change occurs, it would have to come about democratically and constitutionally for it to be acceptable to Washington.

Let me close by reiterating that Pakistan's stability as a state is a critical U.S. national security interest, if not for any other reason than, unfortunately, purely for the country's destructive potential: one of the largest youth bulges, extremism, terrorism, nuclear weapons, and inability to hold India's, and indeed South Asia's, progress back. America's focus must remain on the long-term vision that I believe can still turn Pakistan around to help it become a moderate Muslim country with a middle-sized economy. There is still enough in the society which is pushing back against this onslaught of extremism. Failure, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, is simply not an option when it comes to Pakistan.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yusuf follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MOEED YUSUF

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views on U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Thank you for this opportunity.

My views are my own. They are informed by my work at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) which provides analysis, training and tools to help prevent, manage, and end violent international conflicts, promote stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding. USIP's work in Pakistan encompasses three interrelated areas: improving mutual understanding between United States and Pakistan; strengthening capacity to mitigate conflict; and promoting peacebuilding through education and civil society initiatives. Over several years, USIP has been involved in training conflict resolution facilitators, promoting peace education in Islamic seminaries, and conducting research and analysis on the ground in Pakistan. I travel frequently to Pakistan and have a broad network of contacts across the country.

Mr. Chairman, you could hardly have selected a more pressing moment to reflect upon the state of the Pakistan-United States relationship. Just 5 days ago, the world's most wanted man, Osama Bin Laden was killed inside Pakistan. There are multiple ways to absorb and analyze this development. The most obvious reaction, as we have witnessed in the wake of bin Laden's killing, is to question Pakistan's commitment as a partner in the fight against terrorism given that he was found living comfortably in a Pakistani garrison town. Understandably, many have suggested that Pakistan is not sincere, and thus Washington should contemplate breaking off ties.

I, however, believe the United States should see this extremely difficult moment as an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship. America has tried the "walk away" route before; it is primarily the reason for our presence in Afghanistan today. But this time, the outcome of a ruptured relationship with Pakistan is certain to be even more detrimental as its multiple faultlines have rendered the country much weaker and fragile than it was at the end of the Afghan Jihad.

While Pakistan has provided ample reasons for the United States to consider it untrustworthy, Pakistan's No. 1 complaint vis-a-vis the United States has always been, and is, that Washington has proven to be an undependable partner. It was not long after the news of bin Laden's death flashed across TV screens in Pakistan that commentators were asking if the United States would consider this as "mission accomplished" and abandon its partnership with Pakistan. Indeed, we have known for a long time that Islamabad is not convinced of U.S. promises to stick with Pakistan over the long haul. I believe that bin Laden's death provides an opportunity to convince them otherwise. A demonstration of U.S. resolve to persist with Pakistan even after al-Qaeda's leader and mastermind is gone will send an extremely positive message to the average Pakistani.

Let me return to the bin Laden episode later and instead focus on the United States-Pakistan relationship in a broader framework.

The bilateral relationship dates back to Pakistan's creation but never have the stakes been higher than over the last decade. Since 9/11, the relationship has had a discernible schizophrenic element to it. It has been both, good and bad; encouraging as well as frustrating; invaluable, and yet, at times counterproductive.

The oscillatory nature of the engagement has left few comfortable for too long. Even today, there is a heated debate among the policy and academic community on whether the United States-Pakistan engagement has been a net positive or negative from an American perspective. Increasingly, I find myself being asked the question: will the United States be able to achieve its objectives in Pakistan? And if not, why should Washington commit so much money and effort to a country that is unwilling or unable to deliver?

I want to take this opportunity to highlight why retreating from a promise of long-term, holistic support to Pakistan will be a grave error on the part of U.S. decisionmakers. I will also highlight specific measures with regard to the monetary, security, and political aspects of the engagement that would further what I consider to be a fundamental U.S. interest: assisting Pakistan in its quest for stability. In doing so, I will provide an assessment of U.S. policy and its limits in Pakistan—which is what I was asked to focus on today.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN

Recalling Charles Dodgson's 1865 novel, "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland," "if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there." This is not an entirely unfair characterization of U.S. policy toward Pakistan or, for that matter, Islamabad's outlook on Washington. The two countries have been partners for over a decade but the answer to "what they are ultimately after" remains ambiguous.

For the first 6-plus years of the post-9/11 relationship, Pakistan was viewed squarely through the Afghanistan prism. The relationship was transactional and was tied to America's engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation. The revision toward a more broad-based partnership capable of reaching out to the Pakistani people, crystallized through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, was a welcome one.

The Act, as I interpreted it, contained the necessary ingredients to make the Pakistan-United States relationship a lasting one. It was realistic in what it thought the much-enhanced civilian assistance could get Washington in return. No one claimed that the fresh assistance alone would be able to transform Pakistan or would be able to alter Pakistan's India-centric strategic paradigm. But it would, one hoped, contribute to economic stability, improved governance, and strengthened civilian institutions. It was to begin to convey the message that the American Government and people care about the well-being of the ordinary Pakistani. The beauty of this vision was that it was clear that the United States had begun to think about Pakistan for Pakistan's sake.

Unfortunately, the vision has been overwhelmed by an urge to retreat to the old model, a model which saw Pakistan from a purely security lens and in relation to the mission in Afghanistan. The discourse on Pakistan has, once again, shifted to tying U.S. assistance to results on the security front. This view has also filtered into decisions on the use of U.S. assistance in Pakistan. The USAID mission in Pakistan, much like in Afghanistan, is being asked to view aid as a stabilization tool, with short-term interests and politicized objectives which too often trump an effective, long-term development approach. Geographical and project priorities as well as the implementation models are often influenced by the need to generate security dividends rather than simply approaching development for the sake of development—the only tested way of creating stability and turning young minds to constructive endeavors over the long run. There is also an active effort to try and win the "hearts and minds" of Pakistanis, which again is, an overly ambitious goal with unclear utility.

I do not need to inform this committee that these returns have not been forthcoming from the Pakistani side. Pakistan has not eliminated the militant sanctuaries; nor has there been any notable decrease in the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. But what I do want to stress is that none of the strategic results mentioned above are likely to come at all—not in the timeframe that is in any way relevant to the mission in Afghanistan. If the benchmark to evaluate the efficacy of the broadened relationship, and indeed of the United States-Pakistan partnership overall, is Islamabad's behavior between now and 2014, I am afraid, the conclusion is foreknown.

But viewing the relationship through such a short-term prism is fraught with danger. It is this very desire to see ambitious expectations fulfilled quickly that sets one up for disappointment and which in turn feeds resentment toward Pakistan. And ultimately, one comes back full circle to the question: Why should we support a country that is not delivering? The conclusion, for many among the policy circles is already that we should not; that U.S. requires a “Plan B” which is stern and more aggressive—which seeks to “get the job done.” Unfortunately, such a “Plan B” is not possible; at least there is none that can produce the desired results without leaving Pakistan in more dire straits.

In Pakistan, this sentiment is interpreted as proof of the momentary nature of the partnership. Those Pakistanis who support a deeper and a more sincere engagement with the United States quickly lose out in favor of those who prefer that Pakistan work to extract maximum benefits from Washington before relations turn sour again—which they believe to be inevitable.

PAKISTAN’S IMPORTANCE

The impulse to keep Pakistani unwillingness to tackle militant sanctuaries in Pakistan at the forefront of the relationship is understandable when American troops are engaged in Afghanistan. However, this is only productive if the “end games” in Afghanistan and Pakistan are seen synonymously. It ignores the reality—which incidentally was behind the decision to broaden the relationship with Pakistan—that while Afghanistan may be the primary concern momentarily, it is Pakistan that holds far greater importance for future U.S. security, and its interests in the South Asian region. There is hardly any other country whose failure could have as serious and lasting repercussions for the world as Pakistan. And yet, a stable and prosperous Pakistan is the only hope for a peaceful South Asia and an ultimate defeat of terrorist forces in the region.

Pakistan is a country with 180 million people, a figure that will have surpassed 300 million by the middle of the century. Over 100 million of the current population is under the age of 24. It is a country which is believed to possess the fifth-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. It is now also the global magnet for Islamist militants. Moreover, recent events including street support for coldblooded murders and sloganeering against the United States for killing bin Laden show just how quickly extremism and intolerance is growing in Pakistani society. Were Pakistan to destabilize further over the next decade or so, its demographic dividend will transform into a timebomb; the state may begin to lose even more space to the extremist right; there would then be more opportunities for terrorists to operate and plot attacks against the West, India, and elsewhere; and ultimately, the concern about safety and security of nuclear weapons, to this point exaggerated, may become real. Should it come about, such a Pakistan would be a direct threat to the United States in multiple ways.

Pakistan simply cannot be cut loose without immensely hurting long-term American security interests. There is therefore an urgent need to pursue the spirit of the decision to broaden the bilateral relationship; to resist the temptation to view Pakistan on 2-to-3-year timelines; to want to achieve too much too soon. If the United States is truly interested in a stable Pakistan, it needs to approach the relationship through a long-term vision and determine priorities accordingly. This is not to say that immediate interests such as Afghanistan should be ignored. Of course not—but they should not be presented as the sum total of the relationship. It is the urge to seek quick quid pro quos that highlights the transactional nature of ties and prompts Pakistani decisionmakers to view U.S. commitment as momentary. It also leads them to make choices which are often directly opposed to U.S. interests but which they feel compelled to pursue because they lack confidence in U.S. support.

Let me now turn to policy options across the three main aspects of the relationship: (i) monetary assistance; (ii) security; and (iii) political developments.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is perhaps the first time that the United States has expressed an explicit interest to work through a democratically elected government in Pakistan for the betterment of the Pakistani people. Yet, the irony is that while U.S. civilian economic assistance may be critical to keep Pakistan from buckling under, it cannot, by itself, fix Pakistan’s development and security problems. Moreover, while continued economic assistance cannot guarantee success, withdrawing assistance would be tantamount to failure.

The civilian assistance promised to Pakistan is a substantial sum in absolute terms but remains only a portion when it comes to Pakistan’s requirements. This is not to say of course that \$1.5 billion per year cannot, if spent efficiently and

smartly, make a noticeable contribution to Pakistan's development and capacity uplift. Also, U.S. assistance amounts to more than what it seems on paper. It is an important signal for multilateral and other bilateral donors. U.S. assistance reflects Washington's determination to continue supporting Pakistan, and in turn allows other donors to remain buoyant. Private sector investors depend heavily on investment ratings which are directly affected by the donor outlook.

Moreover, at present, Pakistan's economy, with a ballooning fiscal deficit and poor prospects for the immediate future, remains externally dependent. Lack of support from the United States and other major donors at this point can quickly unravel the already-tenuous economy. This will, in turn, further discredit the state in the eyes of the Pakistani people and weaken its ability to control events to an even greater degree. Down the line, the downward spiral links up to frustration among the youth and generates greater susceptibility to militant recruitment.

Going forward, the following deserve attention:

- The task of spending \$1.5 billion a year efficiently is not an easy one. Foremost, there is a need to reconsider the belief that development aid and security benefits are tied through a linear relationship. Most literature points to the contrary: using aid for short-term stabilization objectives risks diluting development gains while proving to be ineffective on the security front.¹ Such outcomes will also keep Pakistanis unconvinced about U.S. interest in their long-term welfare. My frequent visits to Pakistan, and a forthcoming report by the Center for Global Development's study group on U.S. development strategy in Pakistan, of which I am a member, reflect a sense from the ground that this dynamic has already set in.²
- As much as possible, the primary focus of the civilian assistance should be sustainable development and capacity-building of the civilian sector over the long run. This is best managed by aligning programmatic and development assistance with the overall priorities of the Government of Pakistan. The U.S. Government should be receptive to new ideas originating from Pakistani planners. The Planning Commission of Pakistan has produced a new growth strategy for the country, which focuses on entrepreneurship and innovation among the private sector as the engine for growth, and in turn, job creation. If this translates into employment for the over 100 million youth of the country, the attendant benefits in terms of luring them away from crime and extremism will be forthcoming.
- Civilian assistance should be made conditional upon the Pakistani Government's ability to undertake domestic reforms needed to complement external support. Pakistan's perennial problem of a single digit tax-to-GDP ratio is well known. Their official reasoning aside, the fact is that the Pakistani state apparatus is captured by a small number of power-wielding elite that has stalled reform for personal gains. Yet, there is a virtual consensus that Pakistan's fiscal revival is tied to structural tax reform. Washington should use its economic leverage and declare tax reform a non-negotiable agenda point.
- More action is required on the "trade not aid" front. This involves addressing the U.S. reluctance to allow key Pakistani exports, particularly textiles, greater market access. U.S. legislators must comprehend the multiplier effect such an opening would have; that too, without having any structural impact on the U.S. textiles industry.
- The quest for winning hearts and minds is overly ambitious. Unfortunately, America may have set itself up for a failure of expectations in Pakistan. As explained, the development benefits from U.S. aid will be real if assistance is spent on key development priorities but they will not be able to transform the lives of ordinary Pakistanis across the board. Yet, the hype created around the U.S. assistance package has raised tremendous expectations in Pakistan. Aid should be accompanied not by promises of major transformation but by increased transparency on where, how, and why, aid is being spent. Moreover, the onus of responsibility of aid utilization needs to be transferred to the Pakistani Government. At least for all aid flowing through the government, the United States, through its public messaging should make clear to the Pakistani people that any success or failure is the home government's responsibility, not that of the United States. The Congress should continue to insist on accountability and

¹Andrew Wilder, "Aid and Stability in Pakistan: Lessons from the 2005 Earthquake Response," *Disasters*, 34 (S3), 2010.

²Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai, and Molly Kinder, "A Report of the Center for Global Development's Study Group on a U.S. Development Strategy in Pakistan," Center for Global Development (forthcoming, 2011).

transparency, but it should not allow a model that brings Washington blame for Pakistani mistakes.

- There are things money cannot buy. In Pakistan's case, it is their strategic mindset. For years, Pakistani leaders, civilian and military, have pretended that U.S. economic assistance and political support is the key to obtaining strategic deliverables. Washington has seemed too eager to go along. Every time, the outcome has been unsatisfactory. Indeed, expecting monetary assistance to alter Pakistan's strategic paradigm reflects a lack of understanding of just how deep rooted are Pakistan's concerns about India and an insecure neighborhood to its west.
- Finally, military aid is important in its own right and the desire to continue support at the present level is a positive one. Given the multitude of militant threats and the dwindling economy, the Pakistan military would require continued assistance from the United States just to keep up with its current challenges. However, the relationship should be transformed into a broad-based military-to-military partnership that seeks to build capacity and supports the needs of the Pakistani military in its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The quasi-rentier arrangement under the Coalition Support Fund harkens back to the transactional prism and needs to be discontinued in favor of an upgraded assistance package.

SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Osama Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad deep inside Pakistan was shocking to say the least. It raises questions about the competence, or worse yet, intentions of the Pakistani ISI. Not enough facts are available yet to decipher where the reality lies. On the one hand, one is hard pressed to find a rationale for the Pakistani state to harbor bin Laden. It defies all logic. After all, Pakistan and the United States have collaborated in previous operations/strikes against senior al-Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan. Indeed, President Obama's conciliatory mention of Pakistan in his speech on Sunday night and the Secretary of State's subsequent remarks in the same vein suggest a certain degree of confidence that the Pakistani state was not complicit. On the other hand, Pakistani security establishment's propensity for risk-taking is well known and this may just have been a major gamble gone wrong. At this stage, there are numerous questions with few answers. This chapter can surely not be closed on this note. Candid discussions need to take place with the Pakistani intelligence to determine the precise facts. Did the Pakistani security establishment help, remain irrelevant, or hinder? Were individuals from the ISI involved in harboring bin Laden, or was it a case of sheer incompetence on the part of Pakistan's spy agency?

Regardless, while bin Laden's killing will likely dent al-Qaeda globally, it neither reduces Pakistan's internal security challenges, nor completes the mission in Afghanistan.

The episode, itself, is a reminder that Pakistan has truly become the global hub for Islamist terrorists. The Pakistani state is challenged by multiple militant outfits with different agendas and capacities. This is a result of three decades of misplaced policies which saw militants as tools of foreign policy.

Broadly, four types of militant groups are situated on Pakistani soil: anti-Pakistan state; anti-U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan; anti-India; and sectarian. While the groups do not lend themselves to neat distinctions, and members frequently overlap, the Pakistani state has tended to see them in silos. The military has chosen a graduated response, going wholeheartedly only after the principal anti-Pakistan group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and some of the sectarian outfits. Against others, the state has employed a variety of law enforcement, coercion, appeasement, outsourcing, and ignoring tactics. The military remains concerned about spreading itself too thin by opening multiple fronts simultaneously. Even in areas like Swat and Buner where the military has scored impressive victories, the transition to civilian governance structures is missing and the military is forced to continue holding areas indefinitely.

Pakistan's graduated response may make sense at one level but it reflects a fundamental disconnect between Pakistani and U.S. strategic interests. Pakistan's refusal to target Afghan insurgent sanctuaries inside its territory, explained partly by capacity constraints and partly by its concerns about an antagonistic Kabul, is actively raising Western costs in Afghanistan. To date, Pakistan has been, in order of importance, both an invaluable lifeline and a hindrance to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. However, as the U.S. strategy moves toward the negotiations phase, Pakistani and U.S. strategic interests are likely to converge on the question of reconciliation.

At the U.S. Institute of Peace, we recently undertook a project, “The End Game in Afghanistan: View from Pakistan” aimed at better understanding Pakistani perceptions about the “end game” in Afghanistan.³ We involved over 50 Pakistani opinionmakers, analysts, political leaders, and officials in a series of round tables to draw out Pakistani views on U.S. strategy and how Pakistan plans to pursue its interests. The results provide important lessons on the way forward for the United States-Pakistan engagement on Afghanistan.

We were encouraged to find that Pakistani opinion seems unequivocally opposed to prolonged instability in Afghanistan. It also no longer favors a Taliban-led Afghanistan. Moreover, there is support for convincing the Taliban to divorce ties with al-Qaeda. Incidentally, this task will become easier after bin Laden’s death. For some time now, I have been of the view that the best case scenario for Afghanistan entails a negotiated settlement in which all Afghan groups guarantee a clean break from al-Qaeda and agree to return within the Afghan constitutional framework. Bin Laden’s death is likely to make the Taliban leadership more amenable to this demand.

In terms of the problem areas, our research clearly indicates that Pakistanis do not see an interest in targeting the Afghan Taliban. The primary reason, however, is not an active collusion to undermine U.S. efforts—although, as mentioned, de facto the policy does raise U.S. costs substantially; rather, it is a function of the lack of confidence in the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The predominant view in Pakistan, and indeed around the region, holds that the military surge will only have a marginally positive impact but that the absence of a clear American political strategy will undermine the military gains. Indeed, much has been said about the diplomatic surge and the plan for reconciliation talks in Washington but there is little evidence of a well thought-out plan.

Prompting Pakistan to change its mind about leaving the militant sanctuaries untargeted requires no less than a total military victory in Afghanistan. Short of that, no Pakistani expert or decisionmaker—largely deriving their view from the history of the region—believes that the United States will be able to decimate the opposition. The other option, a direct U.S. action inside Pakistan to target the sanctuaries will be detrimental, not only because it will rupture ties and unite Pakistani Islamists under an anti-U.S. platform, but also because tactically, little can be achieved without full Pakistani support.

Moving forward, I offer these recommendations:

- U.S. policymakers must lay out a clear plan for the reconciliation phase in Afghanistan. Incidentally, this is a desire shared not only by Pakistan but also by the Afghan Government, the relevant Central Asian Republics, Russia, and Iran. The clarity required is not necessarily about the end state since that will be an outcome of the process; it is about where Washington wants to start and how it foresees the process moving forward.
- There is little doubt that a positive Pakistani role in the reconciliation phase is all but necessary for a sustainable outcome. Therefore, in anticipation of the reconciliation talks, a frank and candid dialogue needs to be initiated with Pakistan’s security establishment to decipher what role they are able and willing to play. Just what exactly will Pakistan be able to offer in terms of negotiating with the Taliban? A simultaneous broader dialogue focusing on more strategic questions is also required: issues that are often brought up in Pakistan—U.S. military bases, future of the Afghan National Security Forces, guarantees of noninterference by India, and from U.S. perspective, guarantees of noninterference from Pakistan in a post-settlement phase—need to be part of the dialogue. It is surprising how little of this has happened to date; there have been plenty of discussions, but no serious structured negotiations that I am aware of, largely because of lack of clarity on how reconciliation will proceed.
- The most obvious stumbling block from Pakistan’s perspective is Indian presence in Afghanistan. Ideally, the United States should nudge both sides to initiate a dialogue specifically on Afghanistan. Two parallel tracks ought to be facilitated: (i) intelligence-to-intelligence dialogue to satisfy Pakistan’s concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan; and (ii) development-focused dialogue to chart out sectors/projects where Pakistan and India could work jointly.

THE SILVER BULLET: INDIA-PAKISTAN NORMALIZATION

If one were asked to identify the top two or three developments that could sow the seeds for sustained stability in Pakistan, and indeed peace in South Asia, all

³Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi, “The End Game in Afghanistan: View from Pakistan,” United States Institute of Peace and Jinnah Institute (forthcoming, 2011).

of them would be directly or indirectly linked to India-Pakistan normalization. Despite what has happened in Afghanistan since 9/11, including the backlash within Pakistan, it is my considered view that the road to a stable Pakistan, ultimately travels through New Delhi. There was even a prolonged window after 9/11 when reassuring Pakistan vis-a-vis India, especially its presence in Afghanistan, could have reflected in more conciliatory Pakistani policies in Afghanistan. That window is closed now.

Nonetheless, a proactive U.S. stance in nudging the two sides toward normalization is advisable, not only for Pakistan's stability but also for the sake of optimizing the Indo-U.S. alliance. Till India and Pakistan are at daggers drawn, India's ascendance to the global stage will remain constrained.

Washington finds itself in an extremely awkward situation as a third party. In Islamabad, the United States is now popularly viewed as having shifted camps, leaning toward India as a long-term partner and maintaining tactical ties with Pakistan for the time being. While Washington always reacts to this sentiment by negating this structural shift, the fact is that the shift is real and a positive one from an American point of view. Rather than being defensive, this fact should be acknowledged and instead, Washington's leverage with both South Asian countries ought to be used to keep the two sides at the negotiating table.

Three avenues for U.S. facilitation stand out:

- Terrorism from Pakistan-based militants has become the single most important sticking point in bilateral ties. Anti-India militant organizations no longer require active Pakistani state support to operate but matters are made worse by the state's seeming indifference, as is reflected in its handling of the Mumbai attack suspects. While pushing Pakistan to launch a forceful offensive against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in the Pakistani heartland of Punjab can backfire, Pakistan will have to show extreme political will and sincerity in its law enforcement measures against groups like LeT to make its efforts credible. Simultaneously, the two sides will have to show resolve to work together in defeating this menace. The existing "joint terrorism mechanism" provides the most obvious mechanism to do so.
- Kashmir still remains the ultimate game changer. The motivations for anti-India terrorism, all directly or indirectly link up with Kashmir. There was unprecedented progress on the issue during the India-Pakistan peace process between 2003–07; both sides had, at the time, a fair understanding of the broad contours of the solution. Political hurdles in both countries aside, the leaderships have repeatedly expressed their desire to move forward on Kashmir. If it cannot actively facilitate, the United States can certainly ensure that bilateral negotiations on the issue do not break down. One could point to a number of moments in the past where a more proactive U.S. role could have been pivotal. The most recent example is 2007–08 when after making substantial progress, the dialogue on Kashmir hit a roadblock. Had Washington been more involved all along, it may well have been able to step in and prevent the process from being derailed completely. As the bilateral dialogue resumes, U.S. vigilance would be advisable.
- Facilitating a fundamentally transformed economic relationship is another hitherto ignored avenue. Pakistan's traditional stance that trade and investment will follow the resolution of the Kashmir issue has been inherently counter-productive and has stifled regional development. Should a freer trade and investment regime be instituted between the two countries, the extent of economic and human interdependence it is expected to create will by itself make the security-dominated narrative in Pakistan difficult to uphold. Washington could use its diplomatic offices to nudge both sides toward greater liberalization and, to overcome Pakistani hesitance, consider monetary incentives to Pakistan to offset some of the initial losses due to the inflow of Indian goods. It could also contemplate industrial investment packages to help expand and upgrade specific Pakistani industries capable of exporting to India. Some of the funding authorized under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act can be used for this purpose.
- Finally, the United States should also be cognizant of the unintended consequences of its regional policies. Dehyphenation of the India-Pakistan relationship along with a civil nuclear deal to India created a sense of discrimination—of being boxed in—in Pakistan. Pakistan went on a nuclear buildup spree and viewed this as the only long-term guarantee against growing Indian might. The Indo-U.S. deal also pushed Pakistan to seek a deal from China. The dynamic of Indian military modernization, periodic terrorist attacks from Pakistan, and Pakistan's nuclear buildup will also make escalation control in South Asian crises a much greater challenge. Again, reassuring Pakistan by setting pre-

conditions for initiation of talks on a nuclear deal and finding ways to bring Pakistan and India into the legal ambit of the nonproliferation regime, with all its responsibilities, may be beneficial in this regard.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Throughout the history of the United States-Pakistan relationship, Washington has faced the dilemma of who to deal with in Pakistan. The anomalous civil-military relations have meant that the Pakistani civilians have often been subordinated by the military, and despite the obvious consequences for democracy in Pakistan, Washington has worked directly with the military. Today is no different, except in one regard: the military is in charge of the security policy but it is more a case of the civilians having abdicated this responsibility than the military having usurped the space.

In February 2008, when the present Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led coalition took over, Pakistan had a great opportunity to rebalance the civil-military equation. The PPP government was riding on a sympathy wave after the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto, the two largest political parties were in a coalition, the Army was both tied up in the antiterrorism effort and discredited after General Musharraf's prolonged rule, and the new Army Chief seemed committed to pulling the Army back into the barracks. However, gradually, the military's footprint has enlarged again, with a number of instances in the last 3 years suggesting an over-reach into civilian affairs.

At present, the United States has little choice but to work within the framework offered by Pakistan. The Pakistan military therefore is likely to remain the point of contact on Afghanistan. On nonsecurity cooperation, the U.S. Government is already making a commendable effort to prop up the civilian set up which must be continued over the long run.

The toughest test in terms of persisting with support for democracy in the country however is likely to come over the next few years. Politically, Pakistan is moving toward a phase where coalitions are likely to replace hegemonic parties. As coalition politics becomes the norm, it will bring with it all the messiness, uncertainty, and superficiality inherent in it. Pakistan will see repeated political tensions: coalition partners will switch sides regularly to up the ante; oppositions will support the ruling alliance in times of distress and create hurdles on other occasions; smaller parties will piggyback on the larger ones at times and oppose the same when they see fit, etc. Even coalition governments may form and break relatively frequently.

It is only by going through repeated iterations of such politicking that the political elite may develop a spirit of "consociationalism": indigenous mechanisms that will allow them to coexist; to bargain keeping the country's long-term interests in mind even as they protect their own short-term gains; and ultimately to arrive at a consensus on certain national issues that they deem too important to hold hostage to political expediency. At this point, Pakistani politics will resemble that in India today. Individual politicians would not have changed (although some new, dynamic ones would have arrived on the scene), nor would their desire for short-term gains have disappeared. But they would have forged a grand, elite consensus around certain national interests they agree must not be undermined at any cost.

The interim however will be inefficient, tense, and relatively unstable. The United States will have to show patience with the civilian set ups; it may have to continue support despite inefficiency, lack of accountability, inability to deliver on promises, and similar shortcomings. The temptation to waver toward the more organized, relatively efficient military will be strong, especially as security concerns are set to remain prominent. However, it is imperative that U.S. policy continue to work within the system—and not repeat the mistakes of the past.

Political engagement with Pakistan should have one overriding objective: change must come about democratically and constitutionally. There is nothing sacrosanct about a 5-year term for a government in a parliamentary system. But any premature change must come from within the parliamentary structure. Moreover, at this point, there is no danger of Islamist parties gaining power through the ballot. However, a perception of constant U.S. involvement and interference in political developments in Pakistan may well, in a decade's time, allow them to ride on an anti-American wave to stake a claim from within the system. There is a need for a lower American profile in political outreach along with greater transparency on the purpose of frequent meetings between U.S. officials and Pakistani politicians.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's stability as a state is a critical U.S. national security interest. I will be the first one to admit that this message runs contrary to the natural impulse,

especially at a time when questions continue to be raised about Pakistan's sincerity in the wake of Osama Bin Laden's killing inside the country.

Indeed, the relationship will continue to give ample opportunities for finger pointing; tempers will run high; and often, frustrations with Pakistan may boil over. The Pakistani leadership will also remain inefficient and U.S. aid will seldom get the short-term returns that lawmakers desire. And yet, losing Pakistan and letting it destabilize will have systemic implications, if not for any other reason, then purely for its destructive potential: one of the largest youth bulges; extremism; terrorism; and nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, well-crafted U.S. policies with a long-term vision can still turn Pakistan around and help it become a moderate Muslim country with a middle-sized economy. The silver lining is that much of the present strategic divergence of interest between the two sides is Afghanistan-specific. Should Pakistan and the United States manage to work together and find a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, a sustained relationship beyond that would by definition be for Pakistan's sake alone. The basis for Pakistani perceptions about fickleness of the U.S. partnership, transactional nature of the relationship, and even anti-American sentiment would have disappeared. Presuming that the flow of economic and security assistance is uninterrupted throughout and that Pakistan's democratic process has not been disrupted, the returns on U.S. investment will be greater and swifter beyond that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for a very effective framing of the issues. There are so many issues, obviously the issues of India and Pakistan, United States-Pakistan, internal strife, the attitudes that are conditioning their strategic perceptions particularly with respect to Afghanistan.

Let me just begin by saying I have had this conversation with General Kayani, with Prime Minister Gilani, with President Zardari, with General Pasha, and others. The Pakistani strategic view and posture vis-a-vis India, at least in this Senator's judgment, and I think for many people who talk about it, is absurd in this modern context: both nuclear nations, both with much bigger interests that would take them under good reasoning to a very different conclusion. But there just seems to be a kind of automatic historical/cultural desire to keep focusing on India, and it is depleting their ability to focus on their own economy, on their own needs. To learn that they have increased their nuclear arsenal when by most people's judgment they already had a bigger one than India and an absolutely adequate capacity to deter as well as to destroy within the region simply does not make sense. So we have to measure the strategic capacity of Pakistan to understand its real interests correctly.

And I particularly was struck, Mr. Krepon, by your comment that our Afghan policies in fact hurt the Pakistani ability to reach equilibrium and to move in the right direction. So could you respond both to this problem of Pakistani perception of India and misallocation of resources and effort, and also to the ways in which Afghanistan and our policies there now may be complicating and reducing the ability of Pakistanis to see things differently?

Mr. KREPON. When I visit Pakistan, I get the sense that the Pakistani business community, the political classes get it, that they have no future if they are at constant war mentally with India. I think a lot of people get it now. But the national security establishment, which is a rather important part of Pakistan, still does not get it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, can I be blunt about that? Do they not get it because they have so many business interests that are actually dependent on the continuation of tensions with India and the flow

of money that comes with that? And recognizing the importance of the military as an institution in Pakistan, does that frame their needs?

Mr. KREPON. The tack I am taking when I am there is actually to flip it. Because the Pakistan Army is such a big player in the economy of that country, perhaps regrettably so, but they have an interest also in growing their economy, and there are ways to do this particularly across the Punjab Divide. If we can grow trade and help foster trade and development projects across the border—Punjab was divided during the birthing process of India and Pakistan—then I think that could unlock a lot. But it is a strategic mindset that Moeed was talking about that is very hard to shift. I think economics can be the way to shift it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that this crisis over the question of Osama bin Laden's hideaway, so to speak, in Abbottabad—does that present perhaps the possibility for the pushing of a reset button and for some new calculation which could actually expand the better side of the relationship rather than diminish it?

Mr. KREPON. Well, I will say clearly what I hinted at in my testimony, and that is the No. 2 al-Qaeda guy may well still be in Pakistan. And I think this is a real good opportunity for Pakistan's security apparatus to be of assistance in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Afghan piece of this that you mentioned. You said our Afghan's policies affect the Pakistani judgment. Now, we all know that they do not love the idea of a 350,000-person army on their border. They do not like the idea of India using Afghanistan to "encircle them within that larger context of their India fears." Are there things that we are doing or could be doing with respect to Afghanistan that might help change those calculations?

Mr. KREPON. Well, I am going to talk about the drone attacks, and I know this a very emotive subject. I have struggled with this myself because there are so many particulars that I do not know. But my understanding is that almost all of these attacks on Pakistani soil are not directed against big difference makers. And the political fallout within Pakistan of these attacks is very significant. It is manipulated for sure by the security apparatus, but the security apparatus has a lot to work with, with public opinion because folks in Pakistan do not like breaches of their sovereign territory.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask this of any of you. Why does the ISI not get the internal threat?

Mr. YUSUF. I think increasingly and much too slowly they are getting the fact that this is a Frankenstein that has gotten out of hand. The problem, of course, is that they are trying to balance the old strategic mindset with this new perception that they have to do something internally. And the approach they have taken is basically a graduated approach. We will go after those who are targeting us and then we will look at others who are not.

Now, you are really playing with fire. On the other hand, it is also true that the capacity constraints of the Pakistani military are real.

And what I have seen of the Pakistani establishment over the past 3 or 4 years, which I had never before, is that this is really

a petrified state, and every decision they take, they first calculate whether things may go worse if they do something.

The CHAIRMAN. Petrified in terms of fear?

Mr. YUSUF. In terms of fear of actually making more enemies. The problem, of course, is that even those who do not pretend to be enemies are helping those who are actually attacking the state. So I think it is a very difficult conundrum on that side as well.

But from what I can see, it is a very sequential approach. They want to go after the main groups first and then go to the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. All of you, in one form or another, have indicated that development aid provided by the United States is essential and that the realization of stability in Pakistan is a major objective of this aid. And as a matter of fact, you assert that if stability is not ultimately realized, the destructive consequences of the disintegration of the Pakistani state entail all sorts of ominous difficulties not only with regard to India, Afghanistan, Iran, or China, but also the 180 million people residing in Pakistan itself.

At the same time, even though you have testified that stability is essential and that our development aid would help to engender that, Mr. Krepon, you have indicated that we cannot ultimately affect Pakistan's strategic outlook and that whatever we may be doing in terms of development aid is an attempt to prevent the disintegration of the Pakistani state, which in itself is a valuable objective. That is an interesting question to begin with. As Americans look at this, we would say it is very important to us that we do affect the strategic outlook of Pakistan, and we are not certain that second prize, namely that we somehow keep Pakistan from disintegrating, is enough.

But even if we took the position that second prize here is adequate, officials from our own Government have testified repeatedly that the delivery of this assistance has been extremely difficult. As a matter of fact, it is not really clear to me to this day who in our Government is actually ultimately responsible for doing all of this in any concerted way. It is unclear to me where in the world decisions are made. The late Dick Holbrooke testified from time to time and claimed some of the responsibility and noted that of USAID, but not very much is getting done. Plans change, priorities shift, and both Pakistani and American officials bemoan the other's ambivalence.

And I remember Secretary Hillary Clinton testifying that she was involved in a community meeting in Pakistan with Pakistani citizens who were berating her about perceived interference that the distribution of this aid might entail. And finally, perhaps in exasperation, she asked whether they wanted the money or not. By and large, that group wanted the money.

This all brings to light the importance of the question of how we organize our own governmental apparatus and find common objectives. This question is extremely relevant even when we have the best intentions. Pakistanis who have come to coffee meetings given by the Foreign Relations Committee have suggested they are really interested in large infrastructure projects, as opposed to what they feel are more intrusive projects dealing with education, students, the building of democratic institutions, or initiatives that have to

do with facilitating the growth of private enterprise or the constructing of a market economy, which we here in the United States think would be very helpful for the future and the stability of the Pakistani people.

So do any of you have comments on these general questions? First of all, what should we be trying to do with the 5-year assistance program which the Congress has agreed to? I would note that this initiative was at first welcomed in Pakistan because of the important long-term commitment that it represented. But having said that, almost every aspect of this has been bitterly fought over with very little occurring. So what are steps that we ought to be taking in the United States to make any difference with regard to the broader situation that has been described?

Dr. AHMED. Senator, you are absolutely right. What happened with the decision on the part of Congress to provide this long-term 5-year assistance was expectations were certainly raised on the ground, but those expectations have yet to be met in terms of aid delivery.

There are a number of factors that U.S. agencies emphasize in what the problems that they see as effective aid delivery. They talk about the security environment. They talk about the difficulties of monitoring.

But part of the problem is how the U.S. agencies responsible for disbursing this aid also failed to put together a cohesive plan of delivery. First, identification of projects. You had plan after plan changed midway, abandoned, restarted from something that would aid democratization, health, education, all the good things that we expect today to deliver. We have got to have American visibility. We have got to be able to show the Pakistani people that we are delivering this assistance to high-profile, high-visibility projects.

It is problematic when plans are changed halfway. It is also problematic when assistance is provided in areas where there, indeed, cannot be any monitoring, but also not just the lack of monitoring.

And I have said this in my testimony as well. We are deeply concerned about the kind of assistance provided to FATA, to the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies. You cannot provide aid effectively in FATA without political reform. As long as you use the structures that exist, which is an unaccountable bureaucracy, civil and military, and local elites that have their own interests, the people of FATA will not see the results of that assistance. And because of insecurity in those areas, there cannot be any monitoring of that assistance.

Considering that FATA is a tiny little sliver of territory and should not even have been the focus of stabilization efforts, stabilization, even if we are talking specifically in terms of national security, needs to be the in Pakistani heartland, not in areas—and we have the Afghanistan example as well—not in areas where you cannot deliver assistance and where you know where it is going to go missing.

I will say this I do not agree with my colleague's comment that tax reform should be conditional on economic assistance provided to Pakistan. What you have at this point in time, as I said, a fragile coalition. The government, despite all its problems, is trying to

push for an economic reform agenda, but in weak coalitions—it is very, very difficult to actually enact pressing and large-scale economic reform.

I will say this that there have been hard choices made and not happy choices for a young democracy, as well for a democratically elected government. Removal of subsidies, for example, has increased popular discontent against the government but it was needed. It had to be done. So tax reform comes down the road. American conditionalities—you need to do A, B, and C—is not, I think, necessarily helpful.

What is helpful is identifying the most appropriate projects and then following through, not changing midcourse. We have seen this happen again and again since the Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds were actually appropriated.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you for holding this hearing and thank you for the panel that we have before us.

As has been pointed out, all of you agree that we need to continue our engagement in Pakistan. You also indicate that the conditionality of aid needs to be strengthened and we need to have better oversight and enforcement on those conditionalities. Under those circumstances, we have to be prepared to cut off aid or at least to suspend aid if in fact the conditionalities are not being met.

And we have a responsibility to the taxpayers of this country. We have to make some tough decisions in our budget, and quite frankly, there is concern as to whether the value is being properly used as it relates to Pakistan. Of course, the bin Laden issue just puts a big spotlight on that.

I want to cover one point of this in relationship to bin Laden because it may give us a chance on a restart in Pakistan with the popularity of the people. You all talk about the sovereignty of Pakistan and we all know the political risks that we run when we do military missions within Pakistan because of the sovereignty concerns of the populace in a democratic state.

But recent reports show that the population of Pakistan might be equally concerned about the sovereignty of its country as a result of the terrorists using Pakistan as a safe haven. Do we have an opportunity as a result of bin Laden being so visible within the country and such a disappointment that the leadership was unable to discover his location? Does that give us an opportunity perhaps to have more popular support with the people of Pakistan as to the United States involvement to rid Pakistan of its extreme elements, particularly the terrorists who have used it as a safe-haven country?

Dr. AHMED. 2010—67 suicide attacks, more than 2,500 civilians killed. There is good reason why in poll after poll Pakistani citizens say the greatest threat to their security comes from violent extremists. So there is, indeed, an opportunity to forge that partnership because there is a common understanding of the threats. There is a common understanding of the challenges and the opportunities.

The problem lies—and I think Michael phrased it out very well—until and unless the leaders of national security policy are with those democratically elected institutions that represent the Pakistani people and unless and until the military and the security agencies understand the risks that they face, it is going to be a difficult task to implement policy in a way that will change perceptions, which is why it is important to take certification requirements seriously, whether it is a suspension or benchmarks that are identified.

I will give you one benchmark, for example. Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda-linked, a threat to U.S. national security, a threat to India, and indeed a threat to Pakistan. Making sure that there is action taken against this group which is banned, which is on the U.N. Security Council's list of banned organizations, to make sure that the security agencies end their support for it, but also to allow the civilian law enforcement agencies to take action against these groups. It does not necessarily have to be a cutoff of aid, but this is certainly an opportunity to press in that direction for action in terms of certification, not just certification given automatically.

Senator CARDIN. I think that is an excellent point.

I guess my main point here is that it is at least apparent to us that we have more understanding with the military as to the actions we need to take in order to deal with the terrorist activities, but we are confronted with the reality that there is a political issue whenever there is an incursion within Pakistan by the United States. And that is mainly because of the populace reaction more so than the military's understanding of what the United States needs to do in order to help Pakistan.

My point is, is there some way we can use the location of bin Laden as a way to get more understanding among the Pakistanis and their political establishment then responding to it that would allow us to have a better relationship on military maneuvers within the Pakistani territories?

Mr. YUSUF. I think the point is well taken. I mean, this is certainly an opportunity, and this is what I say in my testimony as well.

The onus of changing the narrative in Pakistan on extremism lies with the Pakistanis. We can only help, but it is them who have to do this.

The problem in some ways now has become that the popular sentiment is so charged and so anti-American, unfortunately, that it becomes very difficult politically for a weak government to come out and make this case. So while I completely agree with you I think there is an opportunity, we should be careful not to expect too much out of it either. But certainly this is something that is worth trying.

Dr. AHMED. Could I actually just go back to the point that you have raised—public opinion? Public opinion is shaped, and sometimes public opinion unfortunately is shaped quite deliberately to depict America as the enemy, in particular, through elements of the broadcast media. It has been done quite deliberately. This is not public opinion being shaped as such.

We know very little about the impact of these drone attacks in the territories where they are taking place because these are not

accessible either to the Pakistani population at large or, indeed, to the Pakistani media. So information is fed out of these areas is problematic in itself. So we have to be a little careful when we say Pakistani public opinion is enraged by the drone attacks. In actual fact, the Pakistani public at large does not know what happens in these areas where the drone attacks are—

Senator CARDIN. But we do know that there is anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. And the point that was raised by Senator Lugar and Senator Kerry about the refocusing of our economic assistance specifically so that we get not only the results within country, which are important for Pakistan's development, but also that the view of the United States is more favorably perceived within Pakistan, I think, are very important points. And yes, we have to have a game plan and stick to it, and yes, it is very important that the institutional changes be made within the country because if you do not have the institutional changes, you will not have the long-term stability and reliability that we need. But we also need to make sure that the type of projects are signature enough that the United States is recognized as being a partner with the Pakistani people for their economic future, and I do not think we have done that as effectively as we need to.

Mr. YUSUF. Could I just lend a word of caution here? I think the problem perhaps is that good development and winning hearts and minds do not always go together. So the decisions and the actions—I for one have a lot of sympathy for the U.S. organizations who are actually implementing this aid package. And the problem sometimes becomes that their focus is too short term, too stabilization dependent, rather than looking at development for the sake of development.

I think the hearts and minds argument perhaps is not going to be won by development in the next 3 or 4 years. This is a long-term process. But what we can do is perhaps bring much more transparency into this relationship, and I think both sides need to do that. If there is an understanding on drones, I think the Pakistani Government should be pushed to own up to it.

A lot of times what happens is that U.S. aid goes there. The money leaks because of problems on the Pakistani side, and then the United States is blamed for it. I think more transparency there.

But then also I think transparency on our side. Certain things which we may be dealing with the government on which either we should bring out in public or perhaps think not to do them if people are not going to accept that.

I will just add one other thing. I think there is a paradigm shift in Pakistan. The old paradigm was public opinion was always shaped. Now I would say much of it is actually coming out of the people and only some of it is shaped.

Mr. KREPON. Two things.

The targets of drone attacks ought to be worthy of the negative consequences they have for United States-Pakistan relations. That is No. 1.

With respect to aid, water, electricity, agriculture. These are the three keys. Pakistan's needs are so great in these areas. The delivery, if it is done well, is direct and has a humane impact.

My understanding is that \$50 million of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman money was redirected—\$50 million—to provide seeds for farmers whose land was inundated by those terrible floods. Somebody must have stamped a classification on the delivery of those seeds and the expenditure of those funds. It seems to be a secret.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Let me, as I pass the baton here to Senator Corker, just make two quick comments. We have raised this issue forcefully with the Embassy and with the State Department and others. There needs to be a much more effective communications strategy. It is just not happening sufficiently. And this is something I think a lot of people are well aware of now and hopefully that will change.

Second, I think, Mr. Krepon, you may have mentioned this in your comments, but something I have talked about with General Kayani and others—there is a powerful sense in Pakistan among many of the leaders of the complete discrepancy between allocation of resources and interests. And I share it, may I say. One hundred and twenty billion dollars is the budget for Afghanistan. But we have got a pittance going into Pakistan which, by all of our judgments, is infinitely more strategically important in terms of the nuclear weapons, the center of terror, and other things. And if we are going to make a difference to the people of Pakistan, in terms of their needs for energy, power, for the economy to turn around, to deal with their larger economic practices, we ought to try to put that into some better balance. And that is all I would say.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have really enjoyed today's hearing, and I thank each of you for your testimony.

Mr. Yusuf, I am one of those folks who thinks we need to alter our bilateral relationship, but not from the standpoint of just ending aid and that kind of thing. And by the way, I felt that for some time.

If you want to paraphrase what Senator Kerry said—he is not doing this. I am—basically Pakistan acts very irrational. I mean, I leave there almost feeling like I have had a Rodney Dangerfield moment whenever I am there. And so they do not act rationally as it relates to their own strategic interests. And so for some time, I have felt that we should alter and really focus this aid in a very different way. I really have. So I look at this as an opportunity.

For a long time, we have known they have not worked with us in a very cooperative way. I mean, we know of fertilizer plants that are not being used to make fertilizer. They are being used to kill our soldiers. We know they know that. We know that probably some of our resources are helping build their nuclear arsenal.

So I think this is an opportunity. I think this is a great opportunity. As has been said, either they are in cahoots or incompetent, but this gives us an opportunity now to sort of rearrange that relationship.

So talking about Afghanistan—and that is where I think the central issue in our relationship today is. We do have longer term issues there. And I agree that some of these energy issues, ag issues, water issues are far more important—far more important—than much of what we are doing there.

But at the end of the day, Afghanistan. We know that when we leave Afghanistan, we are going to make an accommodation with the Taliban. Everybody knows that. That is what is going to happen. Pakistan wants to make an accommodation. They are making an accommodation right now with the Taliban. So while it is hard to understand what the endgame is, we know that that is going to be an element of it. There is no question.

So the central relationship issue today is what is happening in the FATA areas. And, Mr. Krepon, I loved your testimony. And the fact is all we are doing is irritating people there. It is like we got a BB gun. We are just irritating people. And so the question is, can we use this opportunity that has come about—and I think the President showed great leadership. Our Navy SEALs showed great leadership—you know, outstanding opportunity now to actually fight the war where our enemy is. I mean, the most frustrating thing to our military leaders in Helmand and Kandahar and every place else, they are fighting a war where our enemies are not. Our enemies exist in FATA and Balochistan and the former Northwest areas.

So is there something about what has just happened to allow us to focus our efforts where our efforts need to be focused in a very different way? To me that is the central issue and that is hopefully an outcome that we can achieve. I would love to have any comments from you all.

Dr. AHMED. I think one of the things we need to recognize is the relationship between the insurgent groups in Afghanistan with the jihadi groups in Pakistan. It is not as simple as making accommodation with the Taliban alone because the Taliban is shorthand for many, many, many groups. Amongst the insurgent groups, we have the three which is the Hezb-e-Islami, Taliban, and the Haqqani Network. And one of the problems that we are going to face both sides of the border as we are going into transition mode in Afghanistan is how will this nexus, this relationship, this network affect United States national security interests and regional stability. I think it is important right now for us to understand who is it that we are going to negotiate with, how are we going to negotiate with them, and what are the redlines in negotiation, in particular—

Senator CORKER. If I could, that is not the point of my question. Is there something about what just happened in the last several days that will absolutely change the dynamic so we will focus on our enemies in FATA? I do not want to hear about negotiation. I am talking about the military piece of it where we can actually route out the folks that are directing the killing of American soldiers and move our soldiers from fighting criminality, which is what we are doing in Afghanistan—we are fighting criminality—when our real enemy is in Pakistan. That is my question. I am not focused on negotiations. I am focused on routing out the remnants of al-Qaeda and these other terrorist groups.

Dr. AHMED. Let me say this again and perhaps slightly differently. What you are absolutely fighting is an enemy but the enemy has a presence both sides of the border. The enemy is not necessarily linked or based only in the tribal borderlands. The enemy is based in the Pakistani heartland. So it goes a little beyond warfighting. You need strong diplomacy and strong signals

sent. We will not tolerate an organization which is linked to al-Qaeda that is killing American soldiers across the border in Afghanistan, that is posing threats to United States national security interests in the homeland. We will not allow you to continue to support this organization. So I think we are going a little beyond the tribal borderlands.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Krepon.

Mr. KREPON. I think there are some strategic issues where we can shape and even over time change Pakistan's perception of its national security. I will give you one example, and then I will get to where you want to go.

Senator CORKER. I cannot get any of you to go where I want to go for some reason. [Laughter.]

Mr. KREPON. But for the longest time in Pakistan, people were talking about Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint and it was the heart of every conversation. No more. So there has been a shift on Kashmir.

Will there be a shift with respect to what Pakistan's security establishment believes to be its strategic reserves for Afghanistan? I do not think so. I do not think so. I know you do not like this answer, but it is my analytical conclusion that Pakistan's security apparatus will do whatever it takes to increase the likelihood that the outcome, however ephemeral it is, in Afghanistan serves their interests. They do not want an Afghanistan that is unfriendly to its interests in Kabul and certainly along the provinces adjacent to FATA and even more so Balochistan. Balochistan is where they get half their natural gas. It is where their mineral deposits are. It is where their nuclear test site is. It has a restive population. It is also along the Iranian border. And Pakistan does not want India to do to it in Balochistan what it did to India in Kashmir.

So I do not see big adjustments over time in Pakistan's perceived interests in an Afghan settlement. So we are backing different horses here. It is going to take amazing diplomacy to make this work and to make this last, and the more level of effort our military applies to the heart of the problem, as you see it, I do not see that as making a big difference in outcomes. I do see—

Senator CORKER. Play that last three sentences again please. [Laughter.]

Mr. KREPON. Pakistani security forces know what they want in Afghanistan. It is going to be really hard to budge them from that, what they think they need in Afghanistan.

Senator CORKER. Which is?

Mr. KREPON. Which is a country that has got all kinds of fissures and divisions, but whose political leaders and whose provincial authorities are not antagonistic to Pakistan. And they have a lot to be antagonistic about. I do not see Pakistan and Afghanistan having a smooth relationship in the future. But Pakistan does not want folks in charge of these provinces and in Kabul that make their life more insecure. We cannot change that. And I do not think a greater level of military effort in FATA or in Afghanistan itself will make a large difference in political outcomes.

Senator CORKER. So if I could just say this, I am very concerned about a military effort in Afghanistan too, and I am willing to

allow this fighting season to go on because we have been asked to have patience. But I have the same concerns you have.

I will say that our reason for being in Afghanistan changes about every 6 months. I have been here 4 years. I do not know how many reasons we have had for being there. One of those, though, the most recent, was having a stabilized Afghanistan is good for Pakistan. And it is fascinating me to hear you saying today that Pakistan actually wants an unstable Afghanistan. So it seems to me our most recent reason for being there may be at odds with the very country we are there for.

And I just think, Mr. Chairman, I would say on the support, I think somehow or another Afghanistan and what is happening in the FATA areas has got to be a central element of why we are having foreign aid there. And I think all of us need to talk about that and look at that because it seems to me having those divergent views and us providing \$22 billion in aid since 2002 do not add up in the right way.

But I really thank you for this testimony and for this hearing. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. I think you are putting your finger on some very important questions and contradictions, and we have got to work through them.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all very much for being here.

You are here at what we all know is a very critical time. I know there have been a lot of references today to the questions that we have and the public has about how much Pakistanis and the government knew about where Osama bin Laden was and how he could have been living for so long within such close proximity to so much of their military establishment. So I believe that we should continue to ask those questions in the coming months and hopefully we will have some answers and they will be answers that will help address the public concerns here.

I appreciate what you are all saying about the need to continue our relationship with Pakistan and how important that is. So I do not think a knee-jerk reaction to what Pakistan knew or did not know is an appropriate response, but I do think it is important for us to get some of those questions answered.

I am going to try and ask the question that I think Senator Corker was alluding to in a little different way, and that is: Do you think that bin Laden's death affects the strategic calculation of Pakistan's military with respect to where the real threats or where there are internal threats to the country? And do you think they will reevaluate that or that this will have any impact on how they view those internal threats?

Mr. KREPON. I think it will have or it can have an impact on the security establishment's view of the remnants of al-Qaeda within the country. I have testified that I do not think it will have a big impact on their view about their proxies along the Afghan border.

Senator SHAHEEN. Can I just get you to explain a little more clearly what you mean by that?

Mr. KREPON. Yes. Al-Qaeda is now utterly peripheral to Pakistan's interests. They accepted fleeing al-Qaeda leadership in 2001,

and it might have served some purpose at the time. It no longer serves any purpose, so I think they can give these folks up.

But the Afghan Taliban, the folks who will, they believe, serve their interests in an Afghanistan after we leave, are a different category. There are links, but I think they will continue to be viewed as an essential part of Pakistan's national security.

Now, there is this third group of people. It is a very complicated people. A lot of folks have guns and shoot at one another. But Samina has mentioned this Punjabi-based set of groups, and the most important one is the one we call Lashkar-e-Taiba. These are the guys that are trained, equipped, and based in Pakistan, and every once in a while, they blow something up that is really important in India and create a big crisis, and we are the crisis manager. And these are the guys, in my judgment, who pose the biggest of all threats, bigger than al-Qaeda—what is left of al-Qaeda—and even bigger than these outfits we do not like along the Afghan border because these guys, the Punjabi-based extremist groups, can spark a big, ugly, uncontrolled conflict between India and Pakistan.

Senator SHAHEEN. Can I just ask Mr. Yusuf and Dr. Ahmed? Do you both agree with that assessment?

Dr. AHMED. I would say that I not only agree with this assessment but I think one needs to also remember that even as we are talking about the insurgency across the border, the network, the nexus that we are talking about are the Punjab-based jihadi groups, plus al-Qaeda or the remnants of al-Qaeda, what is left of it—and let us not forget there are many types of groups within al-Qaeda, and we see a lot of them passing through Pakistani territory—and the Haqqani Network. We are not just talking about one entity which is based on the tribal borderlands, and I think this is where the danger lies. We see too much of an emphasis in forming U.S. national security policies to look at FATA as the problem when you really need to be looking at the terror threats that have been posed to the security of the homeland. They do not come from the Pakistani Taliban or the Afghan Taliban. They are coming from groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Taking these groups with far greater seriousness is not just a matter of a threat in the region or even a possible attack that could lead to a confrontation between two nuclear-armed neighbors. I am talking about the potential, the real risk. And this, by the way, has been raised again and again now at levels of the U.S. Government, including in the national intelligence estimates, of the threat that this particular group and others linked to it pose to the U.S. heartland.

And to answer your question, let me also say this. It is absolutely essential to acknowledge that there is not one government in Pakistan. It is a democratic transition. As far as the arms of a democratic government are concerned, we are forgetting in all this discussion the legislature, the Pakistani Parliament. There is talk now amongst Pakistan parliamentarians about an inquiry. How did this happen? Who was responsible? Why did it happen? What are the implications for our national security? And there are deep concerns being voiced. And I think this is an opportunity again for the U.S. Congress to also reach out to those committees in the Pakistani Parliament that have expressed deep concern about this

incident and about the threats and the real threats that it poses to United States and Pakistani national security interests.

Mr. YUSUF. Thank you, Senator.

Let me first agree on the bin Laden issue. Al-Qaeda had become peripheral to Pakistan's Afghanistan calculus a long time back. And if bin Laden would have died, say, in 2001, the Afghan calculus would not have changed much. In fact, I think it is a bit of a worry for the Pakistanis to see that so many al-Qaeda remnants are still around.

As far as the question of extremists goes, I am convinced that this idea of good versus bad extremists is a very dangerous one. Ultimately every type of extremists and terrorists in Pakistan has to be dealt with. The real question to my mind is how do you do it. And there are two issues here.

The first issue is a capacity issue, and I do not think we have a clear answer on this. There is a debate on whether the Pakistani security establishment, civilian and military, have the capacity to open up any more military fronts at this moment. So that is one because it is very easy for things to backfire.

Second, I think there is an issue of the reasons why these groups continue to exist, and I think one has to be blunt about this. Pakistan used these proxies for a long, long time.

And if I were to look from the U.S. Congress' perspective, I would say capacity is one issue. Pushing them to change the strategic mindset, of course, is the other one. And the third is to see where these problems actually lie and perhaps be a bit more proactive to go out and look at it in a regional perspective to try and hit the very basis of why this is happening.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me say that I think all three of you have made reference to the fact that the incursions by the United States into Pakistani sovereign territory enrages the Pakistani people. And I think that that is understandable.

The question I have for you—and I would like this in executive summary, if you would, in a couple or few sentences please. Many elements of the U.S. Government, including myself, were surprised, even shocked by the lack of reaction by the Pakistani people to what we did on sovereign Pakistani territory in the middle of the night on May 1 within very short distance of the Pakistani capital, indeed in the heartland. And I have to say that I fully expected to pick up the paper and see the fires and the burnings and the protests and what have you the next day, and it did not happen. I have heard lots of theories. I have not reached a conclusion myself, and I do not know that there is even a consensus yet as to why that is. But I would like all three of your thoughts on that in a very summary fashion, if you would.

Mr. KREPON. Senator, my answer is because the operation succeeded. Had the operation failed, the consequences you envision I believe would have happened.

Senator RISCH. Failed because he was not there or failed because it fell apart?

Mr. KREPON. The security apparatus has been saying over and over again this guy is not here, and we made it clear that if he was and we had actionable intelligence, we would have acted on it regardless. We had actionable intelligence. The mission was a success. The cover story of the Pakistani security apparatus was clearly false. Therefore, the results were as you saw.

Senator RISCH. That is a legitimate theory. The only difficulty I see with that is, yes, we did say if we had actionable intelligence, we would act on it. And that may very well be a really good answer for ISI. I do not think that is a really good answer for the Pakistani people. I know it would not be here in this country.

So, anyway, you are next.

Dr. AHMED. I think there is way too much made about Pakistani public opinion being so anti-American. You know, when the Raymond Davis affair happened and everybody was predicting if he is freed, there will be demonstrations in the streets of Pakistan, the average Pakistani is concerned with a job, with making sure that he gets health services for his family. He is making sure that his government is capable of delivering basic services. And yes, you have the media and elements of the media whipping up public sentiment or attempting to, in particular, through the broadcast media. There is absolutely no doubt about it that there are attempts made to shape elite opinion in particular, which is what you will hear a lot more, but at the level of the Pakistani public, yes. Well, America is out there. We hear all these bad things about it through our journalists, but how does it affect me? Are they going to go out in the streets in absolute anger because a terrorist was killed? They were just surprised. How was—

Senator RISCH. Except this was not just a terrorist.

Dr. AHMED. Absolutely, but in their perceptions, Osama bin Laden in Pakistan? What is he doing here? It would have been far more that reaction.

Senator RISCH. We have the same question.

Dr. AHMED. Exactly.

Senator RISCH. Mr. Yusuf, your turn.

Mr. YUSUF. So let me say I think we do not give enough credit to the Pakistani people. Osama bin Laden found in Pakistan, one, a surprise, and second, I think the reaction I saw was good riddance. Thank God this is over.

Even when you have seen the Pakistani street come out in support—you know, there was a politician's murder where people came out in support. Quite frankly, that is the street value these people have. If you really go back and look how many Pakistanis were protesting and coming out, it is a minuscule number given the size of the country. So I am not surprised at all this did not happen.

I will not, though, downplay the anti-American sentiment. It is very much there. But bin Laden certainly did not feature in that sort of category where they should have come out and done something like that.

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much.

Going down another street and just very briefly, I guess I come at the financial issues and the aid a little different than other people do here. And this is probably above your pay grade, but in the very near future, there are going to be massive cuts in spending

by the U.S. Government. We are borrowing 40 cents out of every dollar we spend. We are borrowing about \$40 billion-\$50 billion a day in order to go in debt another \$4 billion to \$5 billion a day and refinance debt that we cannot pay. And things are going to change and they are going to change dramatically.

I have to tell you that my feeling is the American people are not stupid and they are not too red hot about doling out money to people who, No. 1, do not want it and are not particularly appreciative of it. They understand that every dollar that they spend in Pakistan—building a bridge, for instance, in the Swat Valley or anywhere where there were floods over there—is strapping their children and grandchildren with a horrendous debt when we need bridges right here at home.

So this is, like I say, probably a little beyond your pay grade, but you might start thinking about it because in the future there is going to be massive cuts in Federal spending, and I suspect this is one area that is going to get looked at pretty closely. You do not need to respond to that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this very constructive series of hearings, and thank you to the panel for your input.

I joined Senator Corker in a visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan a number of months ago and was really challenged by what we heard and what we saw, in particular, the enormous amount of investment and sacrifice we are making in Afghanistan and then its uneven impact on Pakistan and our relationship there. The comment that we heard from one analyst that has really hung with me is that Pakistan in many ways is both fire fighter and arsonist in our efforts to try and tackle extremism and terrorism.

Obviously, these events that we have all been speaking about have raised some real troubling questions for the folks who represent. At best, the ISI was unable to detect bin Laden's presence; at worst, was complicit in providing him a safe haven probably for 6 years. And in either way, it then challenges us to recalibrate our relationship.

So let me start with a few questions, if I might.

I also have Senator Corker's concern that the justification for the scale of our presence in Afghanistan, the analysis of its likely outcome seems to change every 6 months, and you have given a number of challenging points to that.

One of the reasons I have been given all along for this very large presence in Afghanistan and the need for us to continue significant investment in our relationship with Pakistan is because it is a nuclear-armed nation. It is a Muslim nation that is at a critical juncture point.

What does Pakistan's inability, just taking it at face value, to detect Osama bin Laden within Pakistan say about the security of its nuclear arsenal? It is one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals in the world. There is a widespread presumption that the Pakistani military is stable and capable of controlling its nuclear arsenal, but this raises some real concerns for me, just accepting for the

moment at face value, if you would, the idea that they had absolutely no idea that bin Laden was, I believe, less than a mile from their equivalent of West Point, I mean, not in some obscure cave in the FATA but right in the very center of the military establishment. A brief response to that, if you would.

Mr. KREPON. Senator, on October 10, 2009, 8 to 10 gunmen attacked army headquarters in Rawalpindi. They had automatic weapons. They seemed to have had some insider knowledge of the facility. It took 18 hours to subdue them. And I think you know where I am going.

The security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities has greatly improved. There was a time, believe it or not, when A.Q. Khan was in charge of security of Kahuta. And that changed. And there is now an outfit at joint staff headquarters that is responsible for security. And it is really no secret that this is one area where the United States and Pakistan have actually worked together to improve security. And there is now a very large security force that is devoted to this task, and the number that is thrown around is around 10,000 guards, plain-clothes as well as in uniform.

Senator COONS. Given my limited time, let me move to the main question I would really like to focus on.

United States aid to Pakistan takes two different basic forms, development and military. And, Dr. Yusuf, you made a comment about the winning of hearts and minds for, in some ways, strategic or diplomatic or military purposes is quite different from fundamental development. And one of the best things I think about the Kerry-Lugar-Berman assistance was an attempt to move from assistance government to government to assistance directly affects the Pakistani people.

One of my concerns is that I did not see that we were getting enough visibility or credit for what assistance we are providing. One of my concerns is that the timeline on which we operate as a nation does not necessarily lend itself toward long-term strategic development aid.

If we are going to get the Pakistani regime and intelligence and security apparatus to rethink their relationship vis-a-vis India, what advice would the three of you have about any conditioning of assistance. You suggested conditioning it on aggressive action against LeT. You have suggested conditioning it on real tax reform internally. How can we use our assistance to Pakistan most effectively to achieve both our long-term development interests and our shorter term strategic and military interests? Please.

Mr. YUSUF. I would say I would look at these in two different baskets. I think when I mentioned the tax reform, that is something Pakistanis have a consensus on. It is just that the vested interests are not allowing it to move forward.

I think the aid has to be looked at as a development tool, and I do not believe that any amount of money is going to change the India mindset. But there is something we can do to change the India mindset, and my written testimony talks about that and that does not have to do with money. But there are three things.

Both sides were fairly close to an understanding on a Kashmir solution themselves. I think we dropped the ball by not pushing

them hard enough to keep sitting on the table when they pulled back in 2007.

Second, terrorism is a serious issue, and I think Pakistan needs to be pushed as much as it can. There is a joint terrorism mechanism which we need to continue, both sides have agreed, but we want to make sure they do not pull out.

And third, I think equally important and overlooked is the economic relationship. If the United States can help Pakistan and India, once they open up trade, there will be an initial backlash. There will be vested interests. Maybe some of the money going toward industrial packaging, some incentive so that the backlash in Pakistan economically is assuaged in the beginning. But once you open up the economy and keep these two sides sitting on the table, I would argue for the next 5 years no more. You will see some change on the India front. But money may not do it.

Dr. AHMED. I would just say this. I think Michael raised this issue and I think we did not follow that through. In actual fact, there is a consensus in Pakistan on peace with India and peace with Afghanistan, a consensus amongst the major political parties, a consensus in civil society—and it is a vibrant civil society, by the way—a consensus amongst elected representatives. So in actual fact, here you have the entire civilian face of the government believing that crises in the region have undermined Pakistan's stability and security and development. And the only way forward is peace with their neighbors, peace with Kabul, peace with Delhi. The two major parties believe it. The smaller parties believe it, and indeed, civil society supports it, as do all the business houses. Talk to the business communities both sides of the border. Where do we see the problem?

And we need to be tackling the problem, as well as using the opportunities. We tend to look very narrowly only at tackling the problem, which is the military's perceptions of national security. How will they change? They are not going to change overnight. I agree they will not change overnight. But here is the thing. Pakistan has changed. It is, after all, a country—right now if you were to have a poll on peace with India in the holistic sense, you would get huge approval ratings for it.

It is a democracy, and this is one of the things we are not—the opportunity that we are not exploiting as fully as we should be, exploiting the fact that there are democratic institutions and a democratic people who want peace with their neighbors. You have a security establishment that has still got a mindset of the 1950s who wants a cold war with its neighbors or a hard war if need be. If you are going to factor in U.S. policy, just think of the opportunities that you have. You even have those opportunities in the budding movements for democracy in the Middle East that you have in Pakistan right now.

Mr. YUSUF. If I may just add one line, which is that the three ideas that I have put on the table must be worked through the democratic process. There is no doubt about that.

Senator COONS. Thank you all very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Durbin.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing and thank you to this panel.

I have three questions which I will try to ask and give you opportunities to answer.

I was struck by the letter from—pardon me—the column that came from President Zardari and appeared in the Washington Post earlier this week right after the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden. And it was rather straightforward in which he said that Pakistan joins the other targets of al-Qaeda in our satisfaction that the greatest evil of the new millennium has been silenced. He acknowledged it was not a joint operation but went on to say he thought that Pakistan had been helpful in what had occurred and then told the very personal story about the assassination of his wife by similar extremists.

Was this published in Pakistan?

Dr. AHMED. The Washington Post and the New York Times are now carried in a newspaper in Pakistan which is called the Express Tribune. So, yes, it would have been published.

Senator DURBIN. So the point I am getting to is whether or not his expression of sentiment is one that he is publicly expressing in his own country.

Mr. KREPON. Senator Durbin, after this momentous event, the Prime Minister of Pakistan got on a plane and went to Paris. And after this momentous event, the President wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post. Samina talks about Pakistan being a fledgling democracy with lots of deficits. Neither one of these political leaders addressed the people directly after this momentous event. It is stunning to me.

Senator DURBIN. It is to me as well.

Second question. I have been the easiest vote for development aid in the history of the U.S. Congress. [Laughter.]

I really have been. I believe in it. I think it is the right thing to do. But I would raise a question about, Mr. Krepon, your statements and yours too as well, Mr. Yusuf, because putting this in perspective, I remember a trip to South America where I went to a developing country, a very poor country, and said to their leaders, what is the evidence of foreign aid in your country? Well, the Cubans have sent in hundreds of doctors that opened clinics. And of course, Chavez has sent in hundreds, if not thousands, of teachers to go to village schools. And I said, what have we done? Oh, the United States has engaged in this massive infrastructure investment. We have built this fantastic road that is going to transform the economy of the region. And I said, how do the people know? And they said, there is a sign next to the road. In winning the hearts and minds, my guess is that the Cubans and the Venezuelans are going to have the upper hand.

Now let us look at Pakistan. A billion dollars in aid, which I know is off to a rocky start, but certainly has the best of intentions and some good goals to it. How likely is it that this billion dollars will translate into any credit for the United States in what we are trying to do? Does virtue have to be its own reward when it comes to development aid?

Mr. KREPON. One idea that I have been promoting that to my knowledge is not now part of the package is to create a Pakistani-

American service corps that includes doctors, optometrists, health care providers. It could be heavily recruited. I think there would be volunteers in the Chicago area and elsewhere to go over there and be very visible symbols of our country's commitment to Pakistani well-being.

Senator DURBIN. But you mentioned water, electricity, and agriculture. And all of those I have to say are not easily identifiable as to the source. We should do it because it is the right thing, but whether it is a politically effective thing is the question I am raising.

Third point. Zardari's column in the Washington Post said Pakistan has never been and never will be the hotbed of fanaticism often described by the media. Radical religious parties have never received more than 11 percent of the vote. Can you comment on that statement by Zardari in light of the reaction by the public as well as by the government leaders to the assassinations of Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti?

Dr. AHMED. Senator, could I just say this? When Zardari is actually talking about the 11-percent support in elections for the religious parties, it is actually the peak. That was in a rigged election, rigged by Musharraf. It normally is around 4 to 5 percent of the vote.

If you are talking about the reaction, the knee-jerk reaction to Salman Taseer's assassination, there was a pervasive atmosphere of fear, and this is what terrorism does to you—one high-profile attack.

After that and including Shahbaz Bhatti, you actually saw people saying, you know what? We are not going to be scared of the monsters that are keeping us in chains. And people came out in the streets. They risked their lives. They came out and demonstrated and supported the moderate voices that had been silenced by this atmosphere of fear.

Let me say, to answer your question about will the United States get credit for development, it depends on how you do it. It is as simple as that. Making a dam is not the same thing as providing a small hydroelectric plant. If you bring in the communities that are the recipients into the process, if you bring in the stakeholders who are the elected representatives, if you shape it in a way that goes beyond just the capital—we made the mistake in Afghanistan as well—beyond the capital into the provinces and into the districts, do you think people will not appreciate United States assistance? Most children in Pakistan under the age of 5 who die, die because of the lack of clean drinking water. Those families would appreciate it.

Senator DURBIN. And this great committee, before I was fortunate enough to become a part of it, has passed the Paul Simon Water for the World Program, and I hope we will do it again. It did not pass in the House of Representatives. They stopped it. We passed it on the floor, and I hope, following your example, that we will try again.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Durbin, thank you, and I hope we will likewise pass it, though obviously the House will remain difficult, but we have to do our part and we certainly will.

We are going to try and wrap up quickly here because I know we have some competing things. But I just want to ask you a couple things, if I can, and Senator Lugar may or may not have a couple questions.

What are we to make of the reports on Prime Minister Gilani's discussions in Afghanistan suggesting that they should pull away from the United States?

Mr. KREPON. My understanding is that Prime Minister Gilani works from talking points, and these talking points—parts of them ring true to me. Some of the tonality might have been different in the room, but Pakistan's security establishment is looking ahead to a time when the United States presence in Afghanistan is quite—our footprint is way smaller, and they are trying to maximize their positioning in the country. The notion of bringing China in seems to me to be pretty fanciful. China has got commercial interests which they will pursue, but to think of China as being part of a security troika for Afghanistan is completely fanciful.

The CHAIRMAN. What, do you believe—all of you—is the general Pakistani strategic view with respect to the FATA and Balochistan and Waziristan, the western part of the country, the Pashtun-populated part of the country? I have heard them, obviously, express a desire to have the Pashtun of Pakistan look toward Islamabad and folks talk fancifully about the Pashtun of Afghanistan looking toward Kabul. It seems like the Pashtun of both places want to look where they want to look, which is pretty much where they have looked for centuries. How is that really going to work out in this context?

Mr. YUSUF. Let me, Senator, first just mention—I mentioned this research project we have done at USIP, and we went across the board on opinionmakers and officials. I do not think there is anybody who seriously believes in Pakistan that any solution in Afghanistan can leave the United States out. So I have my doubts about this report.

They are certainly looking to expand the regional framework.

And the other thing I never found was this Chinese angle. They know exactly where the limits lie. So I am not sure what to make of this report.

As far as the Pashtun aspect is concerned, what we also found during this research was that the Pakistani establishment and the civilian government to my mind are overly worried about their Pashtuns being comfortable with whatever solution comes about in Afghanistan. They fear that if that is not the case, there will be a backlash within Pakistan. My view on this is that as long as the Afghans agree to whatever solution there is, I do not think there will be much of a problem, although I think the state is worried about that. They keep on talking about the Pashtun element on both sides being OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Ahmed.

Dr. AHMED. I would disagree with that statement. I think that the Pashtun boogey is used quite deliberately. The military has had no compunction in changing its allies. There always have been Pashtuns, but it has moved from the Hezb-e-Islami to the Taliban to the Haqqani Network. It is a useful way of trying to gain—by saying the Pashtuns in Afghanistan are alienated and so because

there is not a Pashtun presence, well, perhaps that was true 2002, 2003, but after that even the security organs of the state are now predominantly in Afghanistan under Pashtun control. It is not a matter of the Pashtuns. It is our Pashtuns, and this is the challenge you are going to face.

The CHAIRMAN. And to what degree do any of you believe that the Pakistanis have an ability to play a significant role in motivating a resolution among the Taliban with respect to either reintegration, reconciliation, or peace?

Mr. YUSUF. I think Pakistan will not be able to guarantee success. We need to be very clear about that. This idea that they can go and tell who to do what is no longer true. But at the same time, they perhaps are in the best position to try and bring these people on the table for a solution. Let me add, though, that while I think they are indispensable in trying to get this negotiation going, the spoiling power is even more, and so somehow this has to be balanced. But the Taliban are no longer the tools where the state can go—

The CHAIRMAN. Given the fairly significant description here of the diverging interests, Mr. Krepon has articulated we diverge on India, we diverge on nuclear, we diverge on Afghanistan itself. What motivation then do they actually have to engage constructively in making that happen? It seems to me all of those other interests are assisted by not, in fact, acting.

Mr. YUSUF. There were three things we came out with from what we learnt.

One, the Pakistanis are no longer looking for a complete Afghan Taliban domination in Afghanistan. They want a broad-based government. When they say “broad-based,” it really means Pashtun-heavy but not the old school.

Second, they are very worried about a civil war in Afghanistan, again going back to the 1990s, because they think they will not be able to manage the spillover.

These are two converging points, and that is why I said in my remarks—and it is in my written testimony—that as we move to reconciliation, which I think we should immediately as much as we can, we will find much more convergence than we think. This does not mean that the divergence is still not there, but I think there is a lot to work with.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any signs that there is anybody who really wants to reconcile?

Mr. YUSUF. You know, nobody has really seen the Afghan Taliban as a group for 10 years, and so this is a question we will only have an answer to once this moves forward. What I do know is I think there is an opportunity with bin Laden’s death because the idea of divorcing the Taliban links with al-Qaeda to my mind becomes easier now, and that is something that Pakistan will also want. They do not have an interest in these Taliban going back to what they were doing—

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Ahmed, I saw you smile on that.

Dr. AHMED. Let me put it this way. We keep on using the Taliban as shorthand for the Afghan insurgents, and that is a dangerous thing to do to begin with because it is not just Mullah Omar’s Shura. There are many commanders within Afghanistan,

as well as the Peshawar Shura, as well as, of course, the Haqqani Network. In some ways what we are talking about is can we bring Mullah Omar Shura into the process and then make sure that we can possibly either deal with the other groups militarily or otherwise? Can the Pakistanis deliver Mullah Omar Shura in short? If need be, they can but they want to make sure that the deal serves their interests in Kabul.

My concern about it? Fine, even if they manage to deliver Mullah Omar Shura, what does it matter? Because in Kabul right now, because I also cover Afghanistan—I have an office in Kabul—there is huge concern and anger that a deal is being cut possibly with folks who might undermine our national security, the security of our communities, and the security of the institutions that we have helped build. Remember that these were people who gave up the gun, joined the political process, and as a result, are now the voices also of the Afghan people.

So the real challenge is going to be how do you bring the Pakistani military in—let us be very clear about it, we are talking about the Pakistani military—into a process in which they are willing to agree on a settlement that will favor their people but which will be acceptable to the political opposition of President Karzai as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that hits the nail on the head. In my judgment, the key question coming out of this incident, this episode with the Osama bin Laden, is whether or not, Mr. Krepon, your pessimism about the capacity for a changed calculation can, in fact, be achieved. I do not think we know the answer to that, and I do not think anybody can. It is speculative. You have made powerful reasons for why you do not think it can be.

You know, it is interesting. The Pakistani press is displaying a very significant amount of public questioning and criticism of the military and the intelligence for the first time. That is unusual. And I think it is possible that out of this may come a recalibration of some of those interests, that they might be willing to engage in a different kind of discussion about the kind of settlement in Afghanistan which may have different equities than it did before this. So we do not know the answer to that. That is part of this potential for something good to come out of it and for a change. And we have to explore that, which is another reason why I think it is so important—and I think you all agree—that we do not go off in a knee-jerk way that simply shatters any capacity to try to test that or achieve it. And so that will be the test in the next days.

Senator Lugar, do you have additional comments, questions?

Senator LUGAR. I have just one question. In the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden, I have read at least two scholars indicating that although there do not appear to be many al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and the movement's members are at this point scattered in several nations, those in al-Qaeda who followed the guidance of Osama bin Laden saw the Taliban as a very special asset for several reasons, including their emphasis on Sharia law. There was a perceived element of purity with regard to the Taliban's governance. While al-Qaeda members were never interested in participating in the official structure of governance, the Taliban were perceived as a very useful instrument of doing that

which, at least in terms of their theological emphasis, was very important to al-Qaeda.

Now, I raise this because from time to time there may be superficial comments about some type of truce between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Additionally, some will say, well, there are different kinds of Taliban, some of which may adhere to Sharia law or affiliate themselves with al-Qaeda more stringently than others. You cannot really throw the whole group into one lump.

But I simply raise these thoughts in order to ask you as close observers of the region how serious of a problem is it to have peace with the Taliban if that means, in fact, potentially infecting the institutions of governance in Afghanistan with the legacy of Osama bin Laden?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you answer, I need to excuse myself because I have another meeting. Senator Lugar will close out the hearing.

I want to thank you all for being here. Thank you very much.

Dr. AHMED. Senator, it is so very important that in any negotiations, even in the earliest stages of that negotiation, there are certain redlines drawn, and we really do not see that happen. One of those redlines has to be—and I know this is now being seen as the end result of negotiations and not a redline at the start of negotiations—the protection of the fundamental freedoms that are provided by even an imperfect Afghan Constitution so that you do not have a return to Taliban rule. To assume that the Taliban have changed, well, whether they have or not, let us at least try and ensure that what was created and which is supported by the Afghan people in terms of democratic freedoms is not lost because of political or military expediency.

Mr. YUSUF. Senator, I would say that it is a huge problem. To me, this is one of the biggest problems. Under ideal circumstances, one would never want to do this. And I think there is a duplicity in the Pakistani position here even with the people. Well, the Taliban are great for Afghanistan. By the way, we do not want them here. And I think that has been there from day one, and that is a problem.

And I would completely agree. I think the redlines have to be there for the people of the region because we also need to remember that if Afghanistan goes back to the 1990s, it will engulf Pakistan in no time. This is not a Pakistan which will be able to handle that spillover anymore. So I think it is a very, very important point and one of the most difficult ones, I believe, to negotiate when the reconciliation process goes on.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you. Well, I thank you on behalf of the committee again and the chairman who has just mentioned our appreciation to all three of you for your leadership for many, many years and the specific wisdom you have given today in this public testimony.

Having said this, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Uzbekistan is an important partner in the Northern Distribution Network, which is a major strategic priority for the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The Navoi airbase in Uzbekistan provides a vital supply route for U.S. and NATO efforts to defeat al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and western Pakistan. The Uzbek Government also cooperates with U.S. security forces on counterterrorism and drug trafficking, two serious transnational threats.

The United States, however, must balance our strategic interests in Uzbekistan with the need to hold the government accountable for serious human rights abuses, including the use of force to oppress its own citizens, as demonstrated by the massacre in Andijon in 2005. According to the State Department's 2010 Human Rights Report, the Uzbek Government continues to commit serious human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and detention, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, and forced child labor in the cotton industry. I would like to especially acknowledge Senator Harkin's efforts to expose child labor in Uzbekistan, which remains of critical concern. I look forward to hearing how George Krol will encourage the Uzbek Government to abide by its international human rights commitments while maintaining our important security cooperation.

Ambassador Krol is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Belarus from 2003–06, and has served in several other challenging posts in Poland, India, Russia, and Ukraine. I am confident that his broad knowledge and experience working in the former Soviet Union will serve him well in this post if confirmed.

Algeria is an important strategic partner of the United States in the fight against al-Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa, most notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Algerian Government has taken an active leadership role in the African Union's effort to combat terrorism, and the recently announced U.S. and Algeria bilateral counterterrorism contact group will help to expand on our existing cooperation to ensure greater security, peace, and development in the region.

Algeria's protest movement has remained limited compared to other countries in the region, but economic factors and longstanding political grievances have contributed to a series of strikes and demonstrations. Algeria's decision in February to lift the 1992 state of emergency law was a welcome step, but more needs to be done to address human rights concerns such as freedom of assembly and association, prisoner abuse and violence against women. I look forward to hearing from Henry Ensher about how the United States can work with the Algerian Government to promote further democratic reforms while also strengthening our security relationship.

Mr. Ensher is currently serving as Advisor in the Office of Afghanistan Affairs. He recently returned from southern Afghanistan, where he served as the Senior U.S. Civilian Representative. He has also served in our Embassies in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Syria, Israel, and Iraq and was the Director of Political Affairs for Iraq in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in 2006. I would also like to welcome Mr. Ensher's wife, Mona, and two sons, Henry and Tariq, who are here with us today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Since the late-breaking announcement on Sunday evening that Osama bin Laden had been killed, the Nation has been riveted by the valor and courage displayed by our troops that led to his demise.

It took years of painstaking work to create the pivotal moments when U.S. forces descended upon bin Laden's compound and flawlessly executed their mission making the world a much safer place. In the aftermath, the public has learned how the fateful raid was made possible as the intelligence community has disclosed what clues allowed them to find bin Laden. Now is an appropriate time to review how that information was obtained in order to evaluate how the United States can continue to prevent terrorist attacks.

One thing is clear: Central Intelligence Agency interrogators used secret prisons, that have since been dismantled, and enhanced interrogation techniques, that are now prohibited, to glean information from detained terrorists that was used, in part, to find bin Laden.

According to U.S. officials, the path that ultimately led to bin Laden's door began with the nom de guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti that was revealed by detainees to CIA interrogators in secret prisons sometime after the deadly 9/11 attacks. After al-Qaeda's No. 3 leader and 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was captured, he was subjected to enhanced interrogation methods, including waterboarding, by CIA interrogators. Former CIA Director Mike Hayden has explained that these enhanced techniques are "designed to create a state of cooperation." This certainly seems to be the case with KSM, who following the use of enhanced interrogations, reportedly confirmed to the CIA that he knew the courier al-Kuwaiti that other detainees had discussed with the CIA—a sign this person had access to al-Qaeda's inner circle.

This was only a small piece of all the information KSM provided. After being subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM disclosed information about a "second wave" plot using an East Asian al-Qaeda group known as the Guraba cell to hijack and crash an airliner into the Library Tower in Los Angeles. KSM also gave interrogators information that led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, known as Hambali and leader of the Indonesian terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah.

KSM eventually became compliant, and conducted what U.S. intelligence officers called "terrorist tutorials" for U.S. officials, instructing them about the inner workings of al-Qaeda.

Enhanced interrogation methods were used on other top CIA terrorist detainees with success, including Abu Zubaydah and Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nishiri, the alleged mastermind of the October 2000 suicide bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen. Interrogations of Zubaydah, who was captured before KSM, identified KSM as the coordinator of the 9/11 attacks and assisted the intelligence community in finding KSM.

Those techniques, however, are no longer allowed to be used. In 2009, President Obama signed an executive order to shut down CIA detention centers and restrict all U.S. interrogators, across all agencies, to only 19 interrogation techniques contained in the Army Field Manual, all of which are available online.

Yet, there is no question the enhanced interrogation methods prohibited and the detainee centers shuttered under that executive order were effective.

Reflecting upon the use of enhanced interrogation techniques that were used on terrorist detainees who provided information about bin Laden's whereabouts current CIA Director Leon Panetta has said, "Obviously, there was some valuable information that were derived through those kinds of techniques."

This is consistent with the CIA's previous statements under the Bush administration. A May 30, 2005, Justice Department memo said: "In particular, the CIA believes that it would have been unable to obtain critical information from numerous detainees, including KSM and Abu Zubaydah, without these enhanced techniques . . . Indeed, before the CIA used enhanced techniques in its interrogation of KSM, KSM resisted giving any answers to questions about future attacks, simply noting, 'Soon, you will know.'"

The Justice memo continued, "As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to these enhanced techniques 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have reached the limit of their ability to withhold it in the face of psychological and physical hardships.'"

In 2005, KSM's successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi, was captured. The CIA again used the information that was obtained from the detainees in secret prisons. Al-Libi gave the CIA indications the courier al-Kuwaiti was an important figure.

Tracking down the courier was the key to finding bin Laden. Sometime last year the courier talked on the phone with a person who was being monitored by U.S. intelligence. From there, the United States was able to follow the courier to bin Laden's lair in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

There is no question the CIA's secret prisons and successful interrogation methods played a crucial role in finding bin Laden. Neither of those programs, however, is utilized today.

In fact, Attorney General Eric Holder is considering prosecuting the men and women of the CIA who produced this information from detainees.

Now is the time to honor the CIA's work. As we praise the courage and bravery of those who killed bin Laden and give thanks to the thousands of men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, we should also applaud members of the intelligence community who have done so much, under incredible political pressure, to keep the country safe.

While Americans can find relief in the fact that bin Laden is dead, we must remain vigilant. Our homeland continues to be threatened by radical Islamist terrorists intent upon killing Americans at home and abroad. Richard Reid's shoe

bombing plot, Jose Padilla's planned use of a dirty bomb against America, the Lackawanna Six, the Virginia Jihad Network, the 2007 Fort Dix conspiracy, the attempted Christmas Day bombing plot in 2009, the attack at Fort Hood in 2009, and the failed Times Square bombing plan are haunting reminders of this.

Many others have been arrested for plotting to bomb shopping malls, subway stations and train tunnels, domestic oil and gas refineries, conspiring to target the Capitol and World Bank, as well as making plans to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, the Sears Tower, and fuel tanks and pipelines at JFK International Airport. Twenty-four men were arrested in 2006 that sought to detonate liquid explosives on U.S.-bound commercial airlines. At least 30 planned terrorist attacks have been stopped since September 11. U.S. authorities stopped six in 2009 alone.

Thankfully, dedicated and relentless U.S. security forces averted all of those attacks.

Our Nation is fortunate to have so many men and women who volunteer to protect America. Although the United States made a great advance in winning the war on terror by killing Osama bin Laden, it is not over. Unfortunately, one of our most productive programs is now gone. Given its proven success, President Obama should consider restarting the program.

