[Senate Hearing 112-103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-103
EVALUATING GOALS AND PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary R., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
John F. Kerry.............................................. 39
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 49
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
James M. Inhofe............................................ 53
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
(iii)
EVALUATING GOALS AND PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Shaheen, Coons, Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch,
Rubio, DeMint, Isakson, Barrasso, and Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please.
It's a terrific pleasure to welcome Secretary Clinton back
to the committee. I know, Madam Secretary, that you are
literally fresh back from South America, the Caribbean, and we
appreciate very much your willingness to take the time from an
incredibly hectic schedule to join us.
Your leadership in South Asia has been important in many
different ways and so we're particularly looking forward to
your assessments today of where we are. I know you had to
rearrange your schedule in order to be here, so I want to
express my gratitude to Cheryl Mills and your staff for helping
to make that happen and for your willingness to do this
notwithstanding just getting off the plane.
Before we begin, if I can just say that as soon as we have
10 members here we're going to quickly have a business meeting
to approve the nominations, hopefully approve, of Deputy
Secretary of State Bill Burns, and the Ambassadors to China and
Afghanistan, all important. Then we have another business
meeting scheduled for next Tuesday, you'll be pleased to hear,
which will take up other pending nominations. I think that will
pretty much clear our docket of key nominations.
Last night the President kept the commitment that he made
to the American people 18 months ago at West Point. Because of
the gains made in Afghanistan in the intervening months, and I
believe from a position of strength, the President was able to
lay out the next phase of our strategy, a transition to Afghan
control that begins by withdrawing a significant number of our
troops between next month and September 2012.
The ability to reap the surge dividend and to bring home
33,000 troops over the next months is I think--and I think
people will agree with me--a testament to the courage and the
sacrifices of our young men and women in uniform and their
civilian counterparts. Every time that I have visited the
region, from Kabul to Kandahar, Helmand to Khost, I am deeply
impressed by the commitment and ability of our troops. Some are
on their fourth or even fifth combat tour. Yet all remain
steadfast in performing their duty with honor and with
professionalism. I know you will agree, Madam Secretary, that
it is their efforts that have helped to bring us to this
historic transition point.
I think it's important also to acknowledge, notwithstanding
the criticisms that I hear from both right and left, that if
you really stop and think about it, we have met our major goals
in Afghanistan as articulated by the President. We
significantly disrupted
al-Qaeda and dramatically reduced its presence in the country.
The job is not finished, but we have come to the point where
this mission can transition.
Bin Laden's death last month was the capstone of the
President's original objective. Our strategy has given the
Afghans the opportunity to build and defend their own country,
something, incidentally, that they have done for centuries
without our help.
Senator Lugar and I hope that over these last months this
committee has contributed to the public dialogue on
Afghanistan. Since 2009 we have held 20 hearings and helped to
focus attention on critical issues. During that process, I
think it's fair to say that all the members of the committee
have developed conclusions that we believe will continue to
have an impact on the remaining challenges.
Obviously, the remaining challenges are significant. The
most important one, as I have said many times--I think the
Secretary agrees--is really Pakistan, where we have a
complicated relationship. We have to work with the Pakistanis
where our interests converge and, frankly, we have to
understand where they don't converge and work to try to bring
those interests together, to find the common ground where, even
if there are some different goals, we're able to overcome the
obstacles.
For sure, the Pakistanis have reacted very strongly to the
events of May 2. They have clamped down on visas, making it
difficult for military, intelligence, and civilian personnel to
do their jobs, although after the recent trip of Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta to Pakistan I think there has been some
improvement. But reducing our footprint in Afghanistan, coupled
with the kind of high-level diplomacy that Secretary Clinton
engaged in when she was there last month, should open the door
for new talks on a range of topics, from reconciliation to
shutting down extremist sanctuaries.
The bottom line with respect to our engagement in
Afghanistan is this: No number of troops will resolve the
challenge of Afghanistan. Every military leader has said there
is no military solution. So now is the time to work with all of
the parties and all of the neighbors to find the political
solution to this conflict.
We cannot do this in a vacuum. As we talk with the Taliban,
we have to pursue a vigorous diplomatic strategy with Pakistan,
India, Russia, China, and other nations in the region. And we
need to listen closely, especially to the Afghans and the
Pakistanis, and work with them to protect our national
interests.
The drawdown therefore should not just be about the number
of troops. We need to ensure that our diplomatic and
development strategies are aligned with our political and
military goals. The State Department and USAID have performed
admirably in a very tough environment, hostile to say the
least. But as we've said in our committee report earlier this
month, we want to work constructively with the administration
to ensure that our aid strategies are as effective as they can
be.
As Ambassador Karl Eikenberry winds up his tour in Kabul, I
want to personally thank him for his service to his country in
and out of uniform and for his willingness to tell the truth in
high-pressure situations. He's been enormously helpful to me
and to members of this committee on each of my visits and both
he and his wife, Ching, have really served the country and the
President well in my judgment.
Secretary Clinton, again I want to thank you very much for
being here. You have been deeply immersed in the challenges on
both sides of the Durand Line. I know you are enormously
respected in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and by the leaders
there, and so we particularly look forward to your comments
today.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Clinton, I join----
The Chairman. Could I just note, before you do your
opening, that we have our quorum? I thought we'd go to the
business meeting now.
[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the hearing was recessed and the
committee proceeded to other business, then reconvened the
hearing at 10:16 a.m.]
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. I congratulate the nominees and I look
forward to their service, and I join the chairman in welcoming
you, Secretary Clinton, once again. The Foreign Relations
Committee has undertaken a series of hearings on Afghanistan
and Pakistan during the last 2 months that have illuminated
many issues. We look forward today, for the first time in this
series, to hearing the administration's assessments of the
situations in those countries and its plans for moving forward.
Much of the discussion about United States policy in the
region has been focused on the specific question of how many
troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan. I believe troop
withdrawals are warranted at this stage, but our policy in
Afghanistan is in need of much more than troop reductions on a
political timetable.
The President should put forward a plan that includes a
more narrow definition of success in Afghanistan based on
United States vital interests and a sober analysis of what is
possible to achieve. It should eliminate ambiguity about U.S.
goals and make clear that we are not engaged in broad nation-
building. It should include an explanation of what metrics must
be satisfied to achieve the original intent of the mission,
namely to prevent Afghanistan territory from being used as a
terrorist safe haven. Such a plan should designate and
eliminate those activities that are not intrinsic to our core
counterterrorism objectives.
It is essential that Afghanistan be viewed in the broader
strategic context. If we set out to reapportion our worldwide
military and diplomatic assets without reference to where they
are now, no rational review would commit nearly 100,000 troops
and $100 billion a year to Afghanistan. An additional 31,000
troops are in the region supporting Afghanistan operations. The
country does not hold that level of strategic value for us,
especially at a time when our Nation is confronting a debt
crisis and our Armed Forces are being strained by repeated
combat deployments.
Administration officials have testified that Yemen is the
most likely source of a terrorist attack against American
interests in the short term. Further, we know that al-Qaeda has
a far more significant presence in Pakistan than in
Afghanistan. To the extent that our purpose in Afghanistan is
to confront the global terrorist threat, we should be
refocusing resources on Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, parts of
North Africa, and other locations. Neither political optics nor
inertia should compel us to persist in outsized missions that
have declined in strategic importance.
The military and civilian efforts of the coalition have
produced some notable progress that is measurable in relative
terms. But in many parts of Afghanistan, measuring success
according to relative progress has limited meaning.
Undoubtedly, we will make some progress when we are spending
over $100 billion per year on that country. The more important
question is whether we have an efficient strategy for
protecting our vital interests over the long term that does not
involve massive open-ended expenditures and does not require us
to have more faith than is justified in Afghan institutions.
The Pakistan side of the border has a fundamentally
different dynamic. Despite the death of Osama bin Laden, al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups maintain a strong presence.
There is no question that the threat of these groups, combined
with worries about state collapse, a Pakistani war with India,
the safety of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan's
intersection with other states in the region make it a
strategically vital country worth the cost of engagement. The
question is how the United States navigates the contradictions
inherent in dealing with the Pakistani Government and Pakistani
society to ensure that our resources and diplomacy advance our
objectives efficiently.
I appreciate Secretary Clinton's willingness to be with us
today, and I look forward to our discussion.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Madam Secretary, we welcome your testimony. As you know,
your whole testimony will be put in the record as if read in
full, and we look forward to a good dialogue with the
committee. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry and
Senator Lugar; and to all the members of the committee, it's a
pleasure to be back here with you in the Senate.
As the President said last night, the United States is
meeting the goals he set for our three-track strategy in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The military surge has ramped up
pressure on al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. The civilian surge
has bolstered the Afghan and Pakistani Governments, economies,
and civil societies, and undercut the pull of the insurgency.
The diplomatic surge is supporting Afghan-led efforts to reach
a political solution that will chart a more secure future.
All three surges--military, civilian, and diplomatic--are
part of the vision for transition that NATO endorsed in Lisbon
last December and that President Obama reaffirmed last night.
As he said, Afghans must take responsibility for their own
future.
Today I want to amplify on the President's statement and
update you specifically on our civilian efforts, and I also
look forward to answering your questions about the road ahead,
because, despite the progress, we have to stay focused on the
mission. As the President said, we have to put al-Qaeda on a
path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done.
First let me say a word about the military effort. Last
night the President explained his plan to begin drawing down
our forces next month and transitioning to Afghan
responsibility. I will leave it to my colleagues from the
Defense Department to discuss the specifics, but the bottom
line, as the President said, is that we have broken the
Taliban's momentum. So we do begin this drawdown from a
position of strength.
With respect to the civilian surge, we greatly appreciate
the attention that this committee has devoted to it, because
improving governance, creating economic opportunity, supporting
civil society, is vital to solidifying our military gains and
advancing our political and diplomatic goals. Since January
2009, we have tripled the number of diplomats, development
experts, and other civilian specialists on the ground in
Afghanistan and we have expanded our presence out in the field
nearly sixfold. These new civilians have changed the way we do
business, focusing on key ministries and sectors and holding
ourselves and our partners to higher standards.
There should be no doubt about the results of our
investment, despite the very difficult circumstances that you
all know so well. Economic growth is up, opium production is
down. Under the Taliban only 900,000 boys and no girls were
enrolled in schools. By 2010 7.1 million students were enrolled
and nearly 40 percent of them girls. Hundreds of thousands of
farmers have been trained and equipped with new seeds and other
techniques. Afghan women have used more than 100,000
microfinance loans. Infant mortality is down 22 percent.
Now, what do these numbers and others that I could quote
tell us? First, that, despite the many challenges that remain,
life is better for most Afghans. The Karzai government has many
failings, to be sure, but more people in every research
analysis we are privy to say they see progress in their
streets, their schools, their fields. And we remain committed
to fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law in a
very challenging environment.
The aim of the civilian surge was to give Afghans a stake
in their country's future and provide credible alternatives to
extremism and insurgency. It was not, nor was it ever designed,
to solve all of Afghanistan's development challenges. Measured
against the goals we set and considering the obstacles we face,
we are and should be encouraged by what we have accomplished.
Most important, the civilian surge helped advance our
military and political objectives. Let me just offer one
example. Last November, USAID began funding the reconstruction
of irrigation systems in Wardak province, providing jobs for
hundreds of workers and water to thousands of farmers. In
March, just a few months ago, insurgents demanded that the
people abandon the project and support the spring offensive.
The people refused. Why? Because, they asked themselves, should
we trade new opportunities for a better life for more violence
and chaos?
Frustrated, the insurgents threatened to attack the
project. Local shuras mobilized and sent back a clear message:
We want this work to continue; interfere and you will become
our enemy. And the insurgents backed down.
We have now reached the height of the civilian surge. Any
effort of this size and scope will face considerable logistical
challenges, and we have worked hard in the last 2\1/2\ years to
strengthen oversight and improve effectiveness. We have,
frankly, learned many lessons and we are applying them. The
efforts of our civilians on the ground, working in some of the
most different conditions imaginable, continues to be nothing
short of extraordinary.
Looking ahead, as the transition proceeds we are shifting
our efforts from short-term stabilization projects, largely as
part of the military strategy, to longer term sustainable
development that focuses on spurring growth and integrating
Afghanistan into South Central Asia's economy.
Now, the third surge is our diplomatic surge. It is
diplomatic efforts in support of an Afghan-led political
process that aims to shatter the alliance between the Taliban
and al-Qaeda and the insurgency and help to produce more
stability. To begin, we are working with the Afghans on a new
strategic partnership declaration that will provide a long-term
framework for bilateral cooperation and NATO cooperation, as
agreed to again at Lisbon. And it will bolster Afghan and
regional confidence that Afghanistan will not again become a
safe haven for terrorists and an arena for competing regional
interests.
As the President said last night, this will ensure we will
be able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a
sovereign Afghan Government. It will also provide a backdrop
for reconciliation with insurgents who must meet clear
redlines. They must renounce violence, they must abandon al-
Qaeda, and they must abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan,
including its protections for women. As I said in February in
the speech I gave outlining this strategy, those are the
necessary outcomes of any negotiation.
In the last 4 months, this Afghan-led political process has
gained momentum. Twenty-seven provincial peace councils have
been established in Afghanistan and the Afghan High Peace
Council has stepped up its efforts to engage civil society and
women even as it also begins reaching out to insurgents. Let me
underscore something which you will not be surprised to hear me
say, but I say it not because of my personal feelings, but
because of my strategic assessment. Including women and civil
society in this process is not just the right thing to do, it
is the smart and strategic thing to do as well. Any potential
for peace will be subverted if women or ethnic minorities are
marginalized or silenced, and the United States will not
abandon our values or support a political process that undoes
the social progress that has been made in the past decade.
But we believe that a political solution that meets these
conditions is possible. The United States has a broad range of
contacts at many levels across Afghanistan and the region that
we are leveraging to support this effort, including very
preliminary outreach to members of the Taliban. This is not a
pleasant business, but a necessary one, because history tells
us that a combination of military pressure, economic
opportunity, and an inclusive political and diplomatic process
is the best way to end insurgencies.
With bin Laden dead and al-Qaeda's remaining leadership
under enormous pressure, the choice facing the Taliban is
clear: Be part of Afghanistan's future or face unrelenting
assault. They cannot escape this choice.
Special Representative Marc Grossman is leading an active
diplomatic effort to build support for a political solution.
What we call the core group--Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the
United States--has met twice and will convene again next week.
At the same time, we are engaging the region around a common
vision of an independent, stable Afghanistan and a region free
of al-Qaeda. We believe we've made progress with all of the
neighbors, including India, Russia, and even Iran.
Just this past Friday, the United Nations Security Council
voted unanimously to support reconciliation by splitting its
sanctions on al-Qaeda and the Taliban into two separate lists,
underscoring that the door is open for the insurgents to
abandon the terrorists and choose a different path. We welcome
these steps and for the United States the key diplomatic
priority and indeed a linchpin of this entire effort is closing
the gap between Kabul and Islamabad. Pakistan must be part of
this process.
Earlier this month, the two countries launched a joint
peace commission and held substantive talks at the highest
levels. Also very significant was the full implementation on
June 12 of the Transit Trade Agreement, which will create new
economic opportunity on both sides of the Durand Line and lay
the foundation for a broader vision of regional economic
integration and cooperation. This agreement started being
negotiated in the early 1960s. It therefore took decades,
including great heroic effort by the late Richard Holbrooke and
his team. But the trucks are now rolling across the border.
I recently visited Pakistan and had, as we say in diplo
speak, very candid discussions with its leaders. The United
States has clear expectations for this relationship and, as
President Obama said last night, the United States will never
tolerate a safe haven for those who kill Americans.
We are looking to Pakistan to take concrete actions on the
goals we share: defeating violent extremism, which has also
taken so many innocent Pakistani lives; ending the conflict in
Afghanistan; and securing a stable, democratic, prosperous
future. Now, these are obviously tough questions to ask of the
Pakistanis and there are many causes for frustration. But we
should not overlook the positive steps of just recent weeks
since May 2. Counterterrorism cooperation continues and several
very key extremists have been killed or captured.
As I told the Pakistanis, America cannot and should not try
to solve Pakistan's problems. They have to eventually do that
themselves. But nor can we walk away from this relationship and
ignore the consequences, for all the reasons that Senator Lugar
outlined in his opening statement: Pakistan is a nuclear-armed
state sitting at the crossroads of a strategic region.
And we have seen this movie before. We have seen the cost
of disengaging from the region. As Secretary Gates, who was
there at that time, has stressed, we cannot repeat the mistakes
of 1989.
That's why it's important we have the resources to continue
implementing our strategy. The State Department is following
the Pentagon's model and creating a special emergency fund, an
overseas contingency operations account that separates normal
operating costs from extraordinary wartime expenses.
Now, I will hasten to say we are painfully aware of today's
fiscal realities, and I know that it is tempting for some to
peel off the civilian and diplomatic elements of our strategy.
They obviously make fewer headlines. People don't know as much
about them. And it would be a terrible mistake, and I'm not
saying that just for myself, but as our commanders on the
ground will tell you. The three surges work hand in hand. You
cannot cut or limit one and expect the other two to succeed.
Ultimately, I believe we are saving money and, much more
importantly, lives by investing now.
And let's not forget. An entire year of civilian assistance
in Afghanistan costs Americans the same amount as 10 days of
military operations.
So, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members, I thank you for
this opportunity to discuss our strategy. There have been a lot
of developments in the last months and I feel that what we are
doing is working, but it is obviously important that we ask the
hard questions, and I look forward to working with you to
improve the strategy and work together to implement it.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Thank you, Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar. It is always a
pleasure to see you.
As the President said last night, the United States is meeting the
goals he set for our three-track strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The military surge has ramped up pressure on al-Qaida terrorists and
Taliban insurgents. The civilian surge has bolstered the Afghan and
Pakistani Governments, economies, and civil societies and undercut the
pull of the insurgency. The diplomatic surge is supporting Afghan-led
efforts to reach a political solution that will chart a more secure
future for the region. All three surges are part of the vision for
transition that NATO endorsed in Lisbon and that President Obama
reaffirmed last night. As he said, Afghans have to take responsibility
for their own future.
Today I want to echo the President's statement and update you on
our civilian efforts. I also want to answer your questions about the
road ahead. Because, despite this progress, we have to stay focused on
our mission. As the President said, ``We have put al-Qaida on a path to
defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done.''
First, let me say a word about the military effort. Last night the
President explained his plan to begin drawing down our forces next
month and transitioning to Afghan responsibility. I will leave it to my
colleagues from the Defense Department to discuss the specifics. But
the bottom line, as the President said, is that we have broken the
Taliban's momentum. So we begin this drawdown from a position of
strength.
Now, let me turn to the civilian surge. We appreciate the attention
you have devoted to this, because improving governance, creating
economic opportunity, and supporting civil society is vital to
solidifying our military gains and advancing our political goals.
Since January 2009, we have more than tripled the number of
diplomats, development experts, and other civilian specialists on the
ground in Afghanistan, and we have expanded our presence in the field
nearly sixfold. Those new civilians have changed the way we do
business, focusing on key ministries and sectors, and holding ourselves
and our partners to higher standards.
There should be no doubt about the results, despite very difficult
circumstances: Economic growth is up, and opium production is down.
Under the Taliban, only 900,000 boys and no girls were enrolled in
schools. By 2010, 7.1 million students were enrolled, 37 percent of
them girls. Hundreds of thousands of farmers have been trained and
equipped with new seeds. Afghan women have used more than 100,000
microfinance loans. Infant mortality is down 22 percent.
What do all these numbers tell us?
First, that despite all the many challenges that remain, life is
better for most Afghans. The Karzai government has many failings, to be
sure. But more and more people can see progress in their streets,
schools, and fields. And we remain committed to fighting corruption and
strengthening the rule of law.
The aim of our civilian surge was to give Afghans a stake in their
country's future and provide credible alternatives to extremism and
insurgency--it was not, nor was it ever designed, to solve all of
Afghanistan's development challenges. Measured against these goals, and
considering the obstacles we face, we are and should be encouraged by
how much has been accomplished.
Most important, the civilian surge has helped advance our military
and political objectives. Let me offer an example.
Last November, USAID began funding the reconstruction of irrigation
systems in Wardak province, providing jobs for hundreds of workers and
water to thousands of farmers. In March, insurgents demanded that the
people abandon the project and support their spring offensive. The
people refused. Why should they trade new opportunities for more
violence and chaos? Frustrated, the insurgents threatened to attack the
project. Local shuras mobilized and sent back a clear message: We want
this work to continue; interfere and you will become our enemy. The
insurgents backed down.
We have now reached the height of the civilian surge. Any effort of
this size and scope will face considerable logistical challenges, and
we are working hard to strengthen oversight and improve effectiveness.
We have learned many lessons, and we are applying them. And the efforts
of our civilians on the ground, working in some of the most difficult
conditions imaginable, continue to be nothing short of extraordinary.
Looking ahead, as transition proceeds, we will shift our efforts
from short-term stabilization projects to longer term sustainable
development that focuses on spurring growth and integrating Afghanistan
into South Central Asia's economy.
Now, the third surge is our diplomatic effort in support of an
Afghan-led political process that aims to shatter the alliance between
the Taliban and al-Qaida, end the insurgency, and help to produce a
more peaceful and prosperous region.
To begin, we are working with the Afghans on a new Strategic
Partnership Declaration that will provide a long-term framework for our
bilateral cooperation and bolster Afghan and regional confidence that
we will not abandon Afghanistan. As the President said last night, this
will ensure that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists and
supporting a sovereign Afghan Government.
It will provide a backdrop for reconciliation with insurgents who
meet clear redlines. They must renounce violence; abandon al-Qaida; and
abide by the constitution of Afghanistan, including its protections for
the rights of women. As I said in February, those are necessary
outcomes of any negotiation.
In the last 4 months, this Afghan-led political process has gained
momentum.
Twenty-seven Provincial Peace Councils have been established in
Afghanistan, and the Afghan High Peace Council has stepped up its
efforts to engage civil society and women, even as it also begins
reaching out to insurgents.
Including women and civil society in this process is not just the
right thing to do--it is also the smart and strategic thing to do. Any
potential for peace will be subverted if women are marginalized or
silenced. And the United States will not abandon our values or support
a political process that undoes the social progress that has been made
in the past decade.
But we believe that a political solution that meets these
conditions is possible. The United States has a broad range of contacts
at many levels across Afghanistan and the region that we are leveraging
to support this effort, including very preliminary outreach to members
of the Taliban. This is not a pleasant business. But history tells us
that a combination of military pressure, economic opportunity, and an
inclusive political and diplomatic process is the best way to end
insurgencies.
With bin Laden dead and al-Qaida's remaining leadership under
enormous pressure, the choice facing the Taliban is clear: Be part of
Afghanistan's future or face unrelenting assault. They cannot wait us
out. They cannot defeat us. And they cannot escape this choice.
Special Representative Marc Grossman is leading an active
diplomatic effort to build support for a political solution. What we
call the ``Core Group,'' of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United
States, has met twice and will convene again next week. At the same
time, we are engaging the region around a common vision of an
independent, stable Afghanistan and a region free of al-Qaida. And this
effort is paying off. India, Russia, and even Iran are now on board.
Just this past Friday, the United Nations Security Council voted
unanimously to support reconciliation by splitting its sanctions on al-
Qaida and the Taliban, underscoring that the door is open for the
insurgents to abandon the terrorists and seek a better path.
We welcome these steps. And for the United States, the key
diplomatic priority--and indeed a lynchpin of this entire effort--is
closing the gap between Kabul and Islamabad. Pakistan simply must be
part of this process.
Earlier this month the two countries launched a Joint Peace
Commission, with substantive talks at the highest levels. Also
significant was the full implementation on June 12 of the Transit Trade
Agreement, which will create new economic opportunity on both sides and
lay the foundation for a broader vision of regional economic
integration and cooperation. It took decades to negotiate this
agreement, including great effort by the late Richard Holbrooke, but
trucks are now rolling across the border.
I recently visited Pakistan and had very candid discussions with
its leaders. The United States has clear expectations for this
relationship. As President Obama said last night, the United States
will never tolerate a safe haven for those who would kill our citizens.
We are looking to Pakistan to take concrete action on the goals we
share: defeating violent extremism, which has taken so many innocent
Pakistani lives; ending the conflict in Afghanistan; and ensuring a
secure, stable, democratic, prosperous future for Pakistan and the
region.
There are obviously tough questions to ask. And many causes for
frustration. But we should not overlook the positive steps of recent
weeks. Counterterrorism cooperation continues, and several key
extremists have been killed or captured.
As I told the Pakistanis, America cannot and should not solve
Pakistan's problems. They have to do that themselves. But nor can we
just walk away from this relationship and ignore the consequences.
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state sitting at the crossroads of a
strategic region. And we have seen the cost of disengaging from this
region before. As Secretary Gates has stressed, we cannot repeat the
mistakes of 1989.
That is why it is so important that we have the resources to
continue implementing our strategy. The State Department is following
the Pentagon's model and creating a special emergency fund--an Overseas
Contingency Operations account--that separates normal operating costs
from these extraordinary war-time expenses.
Now, we are painfully aware of today's fiscal reality. And I know
it may be tempting to peel off the civilian elements of our strategy
that make fewer headlines. But as our commanders on the ground will
tell you, that would be a serious mistake. The three surges are
designed to work hand in hand. You cannot slash one and expect the
other two to succeed. And ultimately, we are saving money--and lives--
by investing now in getting this right.
And let's not forget: An entire year of civilian assistance in
Afghanistan costs Americans the same amount as just 10 days of military
operations.
So Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I thank you for this opportunity to
explain our strategy and why we feel it is so vital to America's
national security. I hope we can work together to implement and improve
it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Clinton. We
really appreciate those opening comments and the opportunity
now to ask some questions.
Let me follow up on the Pakistan side of things. Yesterday
the results of a Pew poll were announced that found most
Pakistanis consider us an enemy, extraordinarily, I think. Many
Americans react appropriately with a huge question mark to
that. Only 12 percent of Pakistanis express a positive view of
the United States, notwithstanding what we're doing there.
Balancing that, it's interesting that only 12 percent have
a positive view of al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
Now, in many ways the Afghanistan war--and I don't mean to
insult Afghanistan or say anything pejorative about the efforts
and what is at stake there--but in many ways the Afghanistan
war is a side show to the main event, if you will, that is next
door. Pakistan has 187 million people, Afghanistan 30 million.
Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal estimated at more than 100
weapons, which has doubled since 2007, according to public
unclassified statistics. It has a much more combustible brew of
terrorist extremists groups than Afghanistan. And its territory
is being used today to plot attacks against neighbors, as well
as against America and Europe.
It is judged that perhaps there are 50 or 60 al-Qaeda
fighters of some kind--it's hard to really measure that--in
Afghanistan, versus countless numbers of foreign fighters of
various nationalities and other terrorists in Pakistan.
Yet it seems that Pakistan has received less attention in
regular interagency reviews and strategic planning sessions
compared to Afghanistan and, more importantly, we have about
$120 billion a year going into Afghanistan compared to about
$2.8 billion that went into Pakistan last year, notwithstanding
the fact it is in economic extremis and has enormous capacity
needs on several levels.
I know you're aware of the sensitivity of Pakistanis to
this disparity--so I wonder if you would share with us the
impressions you took away from your most recent meetings and
what you see as a more effective approach--it's fair to say
that every member of the Senate is asking questions about this
relationship, and the appropriations people are particularly
troubled as they try to figure out what's real here in the
relationship.
So if you could share with the committee your perceptions
of the way forward, I think it would be very helpful.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Chairman Kerry, I think the
dilemma we face is one well known to you and other members of
this committee. We have had over many years a difficult
relationship with Pakistan, in part because starting with
President Kennedy and the extraordinary feting of the then-
President of Pakistan at Mount Vernon, all the way to the
present day, we have had a difficult challenge in staying on
any single course with the Pakistanis.
As you remember very well, because of their nuclear program
and other reasons, Congress passed what was called the Pressler
amendment and we cut off all contact with them and we cut off
particularly military contact with them. That meant we were not
involved with their military training and the relationship-
building with their military officers. We also have seen using
aid on the one hand to try to influence behavior, withdrawing
it in the face of our disapproval.
So if a Pakistani official were sitting here, he--and they
would most likely be he, although I think they are about to
name a woman Foreign Minister--he would say: ``We don't know
what you want of us; we don't know what to expect from you; and
we can't count on you because you're here today and gone
tomorrow.''
Now, I would argue that is only part of the story, because
clearly there is at work in Pakistani society, and particularly
among the elite, which let us remember manipulate public
opinion to a great extent to further what they view as either
national or sectoral or even personal interests--so I think we
have to recognize that the overriding strategic framework in
which Pakistan thinks of itself is its relationship with India.
Every time we make a move toward improving our relationship
with India, which we started in a great commitment to back in
the 1990s and it's been bipartisan, with both President Clinton
and President Obama and President Bush, the Pakistanis find
that creates a lot of cognitive dissonance. So are you our
friend or are you their friend? It's all a zero-sum game to
them.
What we tried to do in the Obama administration from the
beginning of the President's term was to look at Afghanistan
and Pakistan and the entire region as a whole, and not just
Afghanistan or just Pakistan, but also to try to understand
what the drivers of certain behaviors were and how we could
develop a more strategic partnership with Pakistan.
I remember testifying here back in early 2009, and let's
remember where we were at that time. The Pakistani Government
had made basically a deal with the Pakistani Taliban to cede
territory. They were literally abdicating governmental
responsibility over large swaths of territory, Swat Valley,
Bihar, moving toward Islamabad. I remember saying to this
committee it was just unimaginable to me that a government
would do that, and we publicly and privately urged them to get
into the fight, which they did.
So from their perspective, they have had extraordinary
losses in the military and in the civilian attacks that have
occurred by the Taliban. And they are trying to figure out, as
people do when they feel their survival is somehow at risk, how
to manage many different factors coming at them all at once.
That's not to make any excuses for their behavior, but it
is to try to put it into some explanatory context, because we
would not disagree at all with Senator Lugar's comment that
this is a very strategic situation for us, for the United
States, and we have to do more to get it right. So we're going
to continue to make clear our expectations. We're going to
continue to try to work with them across the entire political
spectrum. We're going to demand more from them. But we are not
going to expect any miracles overnight. This is a long-term,
frustrating, frankly sometimes very outraging kind of
experience, which you know firsthand, chairman. And yet I don't
see any alternative if you look at vital American national
interests.
The final point I would make is I see our involvement in
Afghanistan, obviously, also as a vital national security
interest, but I also see it as part of our relationship with
Pakistan. You know, they would be perfectly happy if we picked
up and left tomorrow, but what would we get for it and what
would they do with it? I think the answers to those two
questions mean that the President's approach, which is this
steady, careful transition while we try to work the diplomatic
and political piece of this, which includes Pakistan, is
exactly the right way to go.
The Chairman. Well, I think your last point is really the
principal focus and I think an area where we need to really be
very intense and focused. I really look forward to following up
with you personally on that subject, because I think that's
critical for our withdrawal process for Afghanistan and
obviously for the stability. I know you know that. So I look
forward to working with you
on it.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Clinton, it was a fortuitous
coincidence, but the Aspen Institute Congressional group had a
breakfast this morning with Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, our former
Ambassador to Afghanistan. He could make the case better than I
could, but you have already----
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, I apologize for interrupting
you. I just asked one question and obviously we took a fair
amount of time to answer it and I appreciate that. But I'm just
reminded that the Secretary needs to be at the White House for
a debrief there at about 12:15. So if colleagues are OK with
the idea, we'd probably have to limit the questioning to about
6 minutes each, if that meets everybody's approval.
Senator Lugar. Fine.
The Chairman. Thanks. I appreciate it. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Lugar. The Ambassador strongly commended the
initiative that you and the President took to create the office
of Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
appointment of the late Richard Holbrooke to fill that role,
and likewise now the appointment of Marc Grossman to undertake
that position.
Beyond that, he suggested--and I think you have touched
upon this in your testimony--that Afghanistan is a part of a
much larger diplomatic pattern and set of relationships. For
example, whether it be comparable to the Congress of Vienna or
however one wants to characterize this, you and the President
might very well try to pull together, not overnight but over
the course of time, not only the United States, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan into a congress of sorts, but include also India,
Russia, and perhaps even Saudi Arabia.
Maybe that's not the exhaustive list, but it indicates that
each of these countries for a variety of reasons have an
interest in each other, and an interest in us. Let's say, for
example, that at the end of the day, without making
predictions, the United States was to have a residual force in
Afghanistan. That would be irritating perhaps to some, maybe
even to all of the above parties, although for a variety of
reasons some might find that to be fortuitous.
But as it stands, our advantage would come really from
enhancing our relationships with all of the above actors. Not
only in addition to working simply on the Afghanistan or
Afghanistan-Pakistan problem from our own standpoint, but
because there are these unresolved issues of India and
Pakistan, both nuclear powers, quite apart from Russia and
China as nuclear powers, and for a variety of additional
reasons, and finally I would mention Saudi Arabia. Because of
this reality, maintaining ties with all of these actors is
important.
I mention this as, and perhaps you could give a different
figure, but my understanding is that because the Pakistanis
have now been more difficult in terms of their cooperation with
us, only about 60 percent of our supplies for Afghanistan can
get across Pakistan, as opposed to maybe 90 percent a few
months ago. We have become more reliant upon Russia and other
central Asian actors as a region through which we can transport
goods and services to Afghanistan.
In short, this is a regional problem that is going to have
a correspondingly broad diplomatic solution. This doesn't
obviate the fact that fighting is still going on. As the
President has pointed out, we still have a lot of work to do
with our military in the field. You have mentioned the
military, civilian, and diplomatic surges.
So I'm not arguing against any of the above, although I
would suggest, as we all have today, that probably the
resources of our Nation are not unlimited in this respect. I
believe it is important to remain cognizant of this as we seek
solutions to our own budget problems and review our
relationship not just with Afghanistan, but also Pakistan and
the other countries that I mentioned. In this context, we need
to really begin to stress this regional diplomacy idea.
Do you have any thoughts beyond that to reflect on this
morning?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I agree completely with that. I
think that the Congress of Vienna is an interesting historical
example because there was a pact made among regional powers
that in effect left the Benelux countries as a free zone, so to
speak. Certainly if we could get to that point with the
regional powers in South Asia that would not recommence with
the great game in Afghanistan, that would be a very worthy
outcome.
To that end, we have formed exactly the kind of group that
Ambassador Khalilzad recommended. We do have this so called
core group of the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It
has met twice. It will meet again next week. Richard Holbrooke
first and Marc Grossman second have been working very hard over
the last 2\1/2\ years to create this regional approach toward
solving the problems in Afghanistan.
I think that the countries you named--India, Russia, Saudi
Arabia--are all ones that are at the table. In fact, the most
recent meeting of all of the countries that had an interest was
actually hosted in Saudi Arabia. So we are bringing many of
these countries to the broad negotiations about the way
forward.
Now, there will be some other actors who you cannot ignore,
including Iran. Iran is a big player in the region and has a
long border with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. How they are
involved and what they're willing to do we don't, obviously, at
this point know.
Uzbekistan has a lot of worries about what goes on in
Afghanistan, and you're well aware that one of the issues we're
all watching for is how the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and others
respond to the diplomatic outreach. I was in Uzbekistan a few
months ago and the government there is very worried about what
happens.
So there are a lot of players who can act independently or
in concert with one another. But you are absolutely right,
Senator, the only way we're going to get a political resolution
is through this kind of intensive diplomatic outreach. That's
what we're engaged in. I know you understand it, but I do hope
that everybody in the Congress and the press and the public
understands that you don't end wars by talking only to people
with whom you agree or who are good actors. You end wars by,
unfortunately, but the fact is, talking with people whose
interests and values are often very much opposite of yours.
But what you've described is what we are in the midst of
working on.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
Madam Secretary, I predicted you'd be a great Secretary of
State. I want you to know that I think you are. We're proud of
you and we thank you for all your work. You're just giving this
all you have. The issues are so difficult.
I'm going to ask you about the pace of our drawdown from
Afghanistan and then I'm going to ask you a little bit about
the women. And I'm so glad you included them in your opening
remarks. So let me just lay this out.
Everyone at this table who was in the United States Senate
after we were attacked by al-Qaeda voted to go to war and get
bin Laden and decimate al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. I think it's
fair to say, with the incredible leadership of our President
and our amazing Special Forces, finally getting bin Laden was a
huge moment for us.
According to Leon Panetta--and it was reiterated by our
Chairman Kerry--we're down to about 50 al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
So as I look at it, before I vote to go to war, every one of us
here, that's the most difficult vote you ever make. I feel that
we did what we said we wanted to do. And now, as I hear the
President's words, I agree with everything he said, and you
reiterated today. You said, and he said yesterday, it's time
for Afghans to take control of their own future.
I think there's a big difference in doing that in 18 months
or 12 months and waiting until 2014. So I want to ask you a
question about that when I get to the end of this.
We have trained 290,000 security forces in Afghanistan, and
I could break it down: 126,000 police, 164,000 army. We have
spent $30 billion training them. Now, I'm the chairman of the
Environment and Public Works Committee. You served on that
proudly. We are desperately seeking $6 billion to keep the
highway program going for a year, and people are saying: Oh my
goodness, $6 billion. And we're spending, well, $12 billion a
month right now on Afghanistan, it's my understanding, and
Iraq, a month. I need $6 billion for a year to keep people
working.
So this issue of the drawdown, it's really a matter of not
only are the lives of our soldiers, but everything else, the
money, and the fact that Karzai has said on many occasions this
is a sovereign nation. He's said--his last quote I have is:
``The Afghan people's trust in the Afghan Army and police is
growing every day, and preservation of this land is the job of
Afghans.''
So you put it all together and you wonder why we're looking
at 2014. I was hopeful that this surge that was essentially
temporary, I was hopeful that 33,000 could be moved out this
year.
Having said that, I respect the President. I know he's got
everybody telling him their ideas and we have to be humble if
we don't agree. But I think it's important to state that I
think this is leaving 70,000 troops.
So my question to you is, What are those 70,000 troops
going to do? I thought since we have trained all these Afghans,
we'd turn it over to them and that we would shift to the
counterterrorism mission, which will help us with Pakistan,
which is so dangerous, as opposed to counterinsurgency. So
that's the first question.
The second question has to do with the women and then I'll
stop and have you answer. I had the distinct honor and
privilege of meeting with a delegation of Afghan women. You
know how amazing they are, how courageous they are, how brave
they are. They risk everything to come forward. We remember the
days of the forced burkas and all those things, and the Taliban
leading the country. Just, the women suffered. And yes, I'm so
proud of the progress they've made because of what we've done,
frankly, along with them.
So I said, what do you need from us? They were very clear.
They didn't ask for one more troop. They didn't even ask for
one more day of war. They don't want that. They want a seat at
that peace jirga, at that reconciliation. So I said: ``How many
seats do you have?'' They said: ``9 seats out of 70 slots.''
Now, I told them I'd do everything in my power, including
writing legislation, which actually Susan Davis in the House
wrote, to tie our aid to their seat at the table. How can we
have a situation that's fair? The people that got hurt the most
were those women and those girls. And to have so few of them at
the table is just not right.
So I would ask you, what are we doing to push forward to
get more women at the table? And also, can you explain to me
what are those 70,000 troops going to be doing until 2014?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, first on the troop
withdrawal. I think that, as the President explained last
night, the surge which you remember he announced in December of
2009 at West Point, was intended to provide additional military
support for the troops we already had there and to accelerate
certain aspects of the mission, like greater training of the
Afghans, which had been languishing and now has quite impressed
the trainers on the ground with the ability to get a force that
is going to be sufficient.
So when the surge leaves, as the President announced last
night, we will be back to where we were when he announced it. I
think it's a bit of a misnomer to say then we can do CT or
COIN, because in effect we've been doing counterterrorism the
whole time. We've been targeting high-value targets. We have
been going after Taliban leaders. And we have been using the
extra troops to hold territory that was finally taken back from
the Taliban.
So what the remaining troops will do for the remaining time
they're there, because remember we have a hard stop, along with
our NATO ISAF allies of 2014, is they will be continuing
training, they will be continuing mentoring the Afghans, who
are going to be taking the lead responsibility, they will
continue in combat to some extent, but in a much more limited
field.
It is the assessment of the President and those of us in
the administration, along with our military commanders, that
this is the right pace of withdrawal. As the Defense Department
will tell you, we're on a downward trajectory of military
spending because of the drawdown in Iraq and because of the
drawdown now in Afghanistan. So that the Defense Department
will be spending many billions of dollars less, even in the
next 18 to 24 months.
But I think that the way this has been laid out, along with
our allies, because remember the decision at Lisbon was agreed
to unanimously by everybody, is the right way to proceed, and
there will be continuing missions that will be important as we
transition to Afghan lead.
With respect to the women, I totally share your view that
the Afghan women I've met and worked with are just among some
of the most courageous people in the world. Some of them
withstood just horrific treatment during the Taliban and the
warlord years, never lost their spirit, kept educating girls,
kept providing health care, kept standing up in their own way
against the oppression.
I think it's important that they have more seats at the
table. It's something that I agree with and have been pushing
on. There are many different interests that have to be
accommodated in Afghanistan, and if you look just at the people
with the guns, the men with the guns, who have to have some
stake in the outcome, they are obviously a big concern to the
Afghan Government and to us. But we know from long work that
I've done over many years now and which was embodied in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, if women are not part
of the peacemaking the peace will not keep to the same extent
that it would have otherwise. We saw that in Central America.
We've seen that in African conflicts. And we will see it in
Afghanistan.
So it's not only because we admire these women that we want
them to have a place at the table. It's because they have to be
part of making a lasting resolution in Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I thank you for your service. I know we
had a nice conversation out back. Subject for another day, I
don't know how the administration could have purposely more so
created unnecessarily a conflict over Libya the way that it
has. But as usual, your frankness and transparency is
disarming, and I look forward to that conversation happening at
another time.
But I do appreciate your service and the way you handle
yourself and the tremendous effort you put out on behalf of our
country.
Let me ask you, do you 100 percent agree with what the
President had to say last night?
Secretary Clinton. Yes; I do.
Senator Corker. In every facet?
Senator Corker. Yes; I do, Senator. This was a very open,
candid discussion within the national security team. Obviously,
people forthrightly presented their own views. It will not
surprise you that the views ranged across the spectrum about
what should be done and what should not be done. But I think
that the President, with his decision has hit the mark. He has
answered what is a very legitimate concern, not only of this
Congress but of the American public, that this has been a very
long conflict for the United States. Our own internal domestic
needs are very pressing.
At the same time, we have made a difference in the last
2\1/2\ years. It's not been at all easy and it's been at the
loss of many young Americans. But he made the right decision.
Senator Corker. I got it. I don't want to be rude. I just
know I have a limited amount. So you agree.
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir.
Senator Corker. So the nature of--I think many of us were
concerned about, so what is the nature of what it is we're
going to be doing on the ground. I think what you've said today
is we're going to continue with lesser troops on a
counterinsurgency, not a counterterrorism effort.
Secretary Clinton. No; both. I was trying to make the point
that we've been doing both. Every night, special operators go
out. Every night we are targeting people in a counterterrorism
effort, and we're holding territory. So we'll continue doing
both.
Senator Corker. And those same Navy SEALs that we're so
proud of I know do an outstanding job every night doing the
counterterrorism piece. But the counterinsurgency piece leads
us continually toward a, quote--and I know this is an old term
in your perspective, but--it's continually doing the nation-
building, state-building kinds of things in Libya that I think
many of us are concerned about being able to sustain, not only
while we're there, but after we leave.
You're comfortable with continuing, quote, the ``nation
building''--I know you use a different term; it's the one I
understand--effort that is taking place in Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I am comfortable with our
continuing to interact with and support Afghan leadership at
all levels. For example, Senator, our assessment is that about
75 percent of the governors now that have been appointed in the
last year or two are actually performing well. That was not the
case 2\1/2\ years ago. Part of the reason we think they're
performing well is that they have been mentored by both
military and civilian personnel.
I don't think we--I know that so-called nation-building
rightly raises a lot of questions in people's minds. That's not
what we think we're doing and that's not our intention. But
what we are doing is, a young captain or a young Foreign
Service officer getting in there and helping these people know
what it means to actually run a government, make decisions, I
think is in our interests, because it gives them a stake then
in the kind of future we're building with our military efforts.
Senator Corker. I think we end up with a country, because
of the distortive cultural things that we're doing--some of
which are very good, and I thought you had a very nice
exchange; some of which, though, create a situation where
Afghanistan is a supplicant or Afghanistan doesn't exist ever
without United States involvement. I see that as what we're
doing there, and obviously that's concerning.
Let me move to the last point. I know I'm getting close on
time. I've been here 4 years and 5 months and our reasons for
being in Afghanistan have continued to evolve. One of the main
reasons we're there is because we're there, at this point.
There was a concern that the partnership--that our partners,
the Afghans, the Pakistanis, would not view us as a reliable
partner if we left. That was sort of the code a couple of years
ago, I think, about the time the Holbrooke doctrine, if you
will, came into play.
So we created this AfPak doctrine and we have this
partnership under way that you're talking about. One of the
reasons we continued to be there the way that we have is we
didn't want to destabilize Pakistan by leaving behind a
destabilized Afghanistan. But now we understand that--and of
course, there is no Pakistani voice. It's not a country that
speaks with one voice. It's not really ruled. It's ruled by
disparate entities, which is one of the problems we have with
them.
But now we're understanding that many of the leaders of
Pakistan really don't want to see a stabilized Afghanistan. So
our interests, while we've given them billions and billions of
dollars of aid, is different from ours.
Then what struck me was your last comment, and that is that
Pakistan would just as soon we leave Afghanistan immediately.
Now, that--from my perspective, that's 180 degrees from where
we were 2 years ago under the administration, which I'm not
criticizing. Everybody's had trouble with Afghanistan.
But if you will, reconcile that with me?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. Well, I'll start there and then I
want to circle back if I have time to the future in Afghanistan
and its present status as kind of a supplicant, in your words.
I think that Pakistan wants to be sure that whatever
happens in Afghanistan will not affect its strategic interests.
It wants what it calls strategic depth in Afghanistan. By that
it means, No. 1, it wants a regime in Kabul and it wants a
border that is not going to challenge its interests. So it's
particularly focused on having the Pashtun population on the
Afghan side of the Durand Line and the Pashtun population on
the Pakistani side of the Durand Line not coming together in
any way that threatens Islamabad.
So it has in the past invested in a certain amount of
instability in Afghanistan. It also does not want Afghanistan
to become a satellite of India. India and Afghanistan have a
historical affinity. Historically, Afghanistan has supported
elements within Afghanistan which Pakistan has seen as
inimicable to its own interests.
So if Pakistan could be assured that what would be left
would be favorable to and even in their view subservient to
Pakistani interests, that would be fine with them. The Indians
aren't going to sit around and accept that. The Uzbeks and the
Tajiks are not going to sit around and just accept that.
So part of what we have been doing is to try to build up
capacity within Afghanistan so it is strong enough to defend
itself against all comers, but without falling back into civil
war, because particularly the Northern Alliance constituents
believe that they are threatened by Pakistan and the Pashtuns.
So when I say, yes, they'd be happy if we left as long as
it ended up the way they wanted, I think that's just an obvious
statement. But it won't end up that way in the absence of some
kind of political resolution and without the strength of
ability within the Afghan Government to defend itself going
forward.
So you're right, Senator, this is a Rubik's Cube of
diplomatic and political complexity. I'm sure you do hear
different things from different members of the administration
or very well-informed Members of Congress, but I don't think
that they are necessarily contradictory. I think they are all
part of what is an incredibly complex situation that we're
trying to get our arms around, and attempting to move in a
direction that will leave a stable Afghanistan, not a perfect
nation state, but a stable Afghanistan, with the interests to
be able to defend itself against both overt and covert
challenges to its security.
Finally, I think it's important for us to maybe take a step
back and look at other countries that the United States made
investments in over long periods of time. There were different
historical reasons, we all know. But you look at the decades of
our investment in South Korea and you look at the coups that
took place. You look at the stop-and-start efforts of
democracy. You look at the massive corruption. You look at the
thousands of American troops that we kept there. And we not
only provided military protection against North Korea. We also
in effect helped to model and support what is now a vibrant
democracy and a very strong economy.
Can we look back and say, you know, we could have left in
1967 or 1979 or 1984 and let them fend for themselves, knowing
that they were in a very dangerous neighborhood? I think it's
been in America's strategic interests and in America's values
to have stood the test of time here. I think it's not a
comparable situation, but I do believe that looking at
historical examples to see where American investment persevered
is important.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. I do not want to diminish at all the amount
of time that we're able to apply to these answers because I
think it's very important and it's very interesting. But I do
have to note that we've got about 9 or 10 Senators left and at
6 minutes that takes us into the Secretary's White House
briefing time.
Most of the questions have taken around 10 minutes rather
than the 6 minutes on both sides.
Secretary Clinton. Well, that's my fault mostly.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, it's important to get these
on the record. I regret that we have the back end pressure. But
hopefully everybody can try to hold to 6 minutes.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, as a long-term supporter of yours, I think
you're an extraordinary Secretary of State at an incredibly
momentous time in history, where there are tectonic shifts
taking place
in different parts of the world. So I very much appreciate your
service.
But that does not assuage a deep and nagging set of
concerns I have on the course that we are on, both as it
relates to where we send the sons and daughters of America to
fight and sometimes die, and how we spend the national treasure
of the United States. So I want to express those concerns that
I have.
We went into Afghanistan for very clear reasons; reasons
that I supported when I was in the House of Representatives.
These were the perpetrators of September 11 that you and I
vividly understand from the number of citizens that we lost,
both as Americans and from our respective States. This is where
Osama bin Laden was at the time. This is where al-Qaeda was.
They were the perpetrators.
Bin Laden is dead. There are less than 100 al-Qaeda
fighters in Afghanistan. I look at this $10 billion a month in
a counterinsurgency effort to prop up a government that I
believe is corrupt, and the fact that we will have spent about
$38 billion by the end of the next fiscal year to prop up and
to train an Afghan security force that is composed of about
290,000 individuals to fight 20,000 Taliban fighters--that is a
14 to 1 ratio--in a country where we have spent $19 billion in
development assistance, which has come under criticism by a
staff report of this committee and by the Commission on Wartime
Contracting.
I listen to President Karzai talk about us as an occupying
force and I see a country sitting on a trillion dollars of
mineral deposits, including lithium that could fuel its own
prosperity, and take care of its own security. And when the
first contract is let out, it's let out to the Chinese, who
have not shed one drop of blood in behalf of Afghan freedom.
And I just say to myself, that while I appreciate where the
President started last night, we do not seem to be
transitioning out in a way that is in the national security
interest of the United States. I agree with Senator Lugar. If
we were to assess and redistribute our worldwide military and
diplomatic assets without reference to where they are today,
we'd be hard-pressed to say that we should spend $120 billion
in Afghanistan and have 100,000 troops.
Then I turn to Pakistan. And I just got an answer today
from Ambassador Grossman to a letter several colleagues and I
had sent you expressing concern, especially after bin Laden's
capture and killing in Pakistan. And the letter says we see no
evidence to indicate that anyone at the highest levels of the
Government of Pakistan knew that bin Laden was living in
Pakistan.
Now, that may be true, but I don't think there's an
American who believes that. And I look at it in the context of
assistance: Pakistan is now the third-largest recipient of U.S.
security assistance, $2.7 billion in 2010 alone. That's a 140-
percent increase since 2007. Someone had to know bin Laden was
there or at least a high-value target, and I am also concerned
with reports of Pakistan receiving intelligence that we
reportedly gave them in mid-May about insurgent bomb factories
in the tribal regions that was leaked and the facilities were
abandoned before military strikes could take place.
I wonder when I see the Pakistani Intelligence Service
arresting Pakistanis who provided information that led to our
finding bin Laden. And I say, wow, $2.7 billion of U.S.
taxpayer moneys.
Do we not see the need to alter the civil development
assistance and our security assistance, in a way that can have
me say to the fiduciary responsibility I have to the taxpayers
of my State and this country that we are going to have a much
better result?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I read the speech you gave
recently, I think it was on the floor, and you have echoed some
of the main concerns today. I can only tell you that those
concerns are ones that we take very seriously.
With respect specifically to bin Laden, we have looked very
hard and we have scrubbed all of the intelligence that we have.
Certainly, in a classified session we can go into greater
detail. But the conclusion Ambassador Grossman gave you in the
letter is the one we have reached. We did not start out there.
We were not sure what we would find. But we do believe that at
the highest levels.
However, I have said and I know other members of the
administration have said we do not in any way rule out or
absolve those who are at lower levels, who may very well have
been enablers and protectors.
Now, the fair question is, well, were they protecting their
higher ups? Could be. Was it one of these kind of a wink and a
nod? Maybe so. But in looking at every scrap of information we
have, we think that the highest levels of the government were
genuinely surprised. If they had reason to believe he was
there, they believed that he was certainly in the tribal areas,
protected by the Taliban or by the Haqqani Network, by
somebody. But they did not know and we have no reason to
believe that they are running some massive deception on us to
that point.
But your larger concerns, Senator, are ones that are
totally legitimate. All I can tell you is that, despite the
difficulties that we face in our relationship with Pakistan, it
is our conclusion that we have to continue to try to pull and
push to get it more right than wrong. So for example, when it
comes to our military aid, which you pointed out is quite
significant, we are not prepared to continue providing that at
the pace we were providing it unless and until we see certain
steps taken.
So we're trying to play this orchestra the best we can,
where we look in one direction and say to those who we think
are largely responsible for the difficulties we know that exist
within Pakistan, you can't continue doing that, but on the
other hand we have a democratically elected government which
has made some courageous decisions despite the challenges.
They've made some courageous economic decisions. They have made
some courageous civil decisions in terms of pushing the
military to go after the Taliban. And in my very emotional
meeting with President Zardari, he basically said: ``Look, al-
Qaeda was in league with the people who killed my wife; I would
never have turned a blind eye if I had known anything.''
Now, is it a strong democratic government? No. But it is a
step in the right direction. Again, I go back to historical
precedent. We've been there before. We have supported
governments and supported countries that just drove us crazy
over a long period of time because they just didn't quite grasp
what we thought was necessary for democratic institution-
building and rule of law. Some of them have worked out well
over time, but it took a lot of patience.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, and I look forward to
following up with you on Afghanistan and how we're spending our
money.
Secretary Clinton. I would like to do that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, thank you so much for coming today. I
think everyone here is expressing frustrations. When I first
came here and looked at all this, I was struck by what a
Rubik's Cube this is, and perhaps a Rubik's Cube that you can't
ever totally resolve.
It's frustrating when you talk with the American people.
They ask me, well, explain our strategy, explain our
objectives. And it's very, very difficult to do. For one
reason, it's been changing. We are becoming more realistic. I
notice what's crept into our dialogue now has been that it'll
never be perfect, and thank goodness we've finally recognized
that. That clearly is a fact of life.
The frustrations with the two governments in both countries
is just overwhelming. We started in Afghanistan with motives,
as everyone said, that were great. And we always hear people
talk about winning in Afghanistan. Well, we won a long time
ago. Our objective there was to beat al-Qaeda. We did it.
Reference has been made that there's less than 100 of them left
in the country. So we're left fighting the Taliban, who will
fight us for centuries if we are so inclined. I mean, they
fight whoever is there.
So we've got to find--we've got to find a way to articulate
what the objective is and then move on.
My question that I'd like you to focus on--and please don't
take this as being argumentative or anything in that regard.
This is very, very pragmatic. When we leave Afghanistan--and we
will at some point in time--we're going to be left with the
Karzai government, I suppose, and a military and security
forces that should hold all this together. One of the problems
I have is, from a purely, purely pragmatic standpoint, the
just--just the salaries for those security people far exceeds
the gross national product of the country, and as I understand
it by multiples.
How is this going to work? Because clearly there's got to
be security forces. There's no possible way that Karzai can
hold on, or whoever it is that's his successor. There's no way
that you can keep the fragmented country like it is together
without very substantial payments to security forces. I just
don't see how that's possible.
I mean, you hear the talk about their natural resources and
what have you. Right now they seem to be relying on the poppy
for their income. From a purely pragmatic basis, what's your
vision of how they're going to keep enough security forces paid
and on the ground to hold this whole thing together?
Secretary Clinton. I think it's a very fair question,
Senator, and I'd answer it with the following points. First of
all, you're right that they are going to have to have a
security force to protect the country, and that's what we've
been trying to train up. It's not only the United States. We
have a number of partners who have been contributing to the
training and the paying of these security forces. So the formal
Afghan military and Afghan police forces will be a continuing
source of assistance provided by a number of countries, and it
will be something that is a lot cheaper than what we're doing
now and is going to be essentially continuing to try to
maintain a security presence there.
But there is a trust fund for paying the security forces
that countries like Japan that don't have any military on the
ground have contributed to. So that's one of the issues we're
going to be negotiating as we go forward.
Second, a lot of the security is going to be provided by
local militias, local police. General Petraeus has invested a
lot of effort in helping to create what are essentially village
patrols, so that people will be trained and armed to protect
themselves, not connected to the national military or police
force. We think that's a very good line of defense and that
doesn't really cost us anything once the initial investment is
made because people themselves will pick that up.
Third, we do think that there is an opportunity for
Afghanistan to fund some of its own security needs--the
reference to the mineral wealth and some other sources. So we
are discussing that right now with the Afghan Government. At
the present time, President Karzai has said he will not stay in
office, which we think is the appropriate decision, that he
will leave when his term is up. So there will be a great effort
made to ensure that there's a free and fair election and,
assuming there can be such an election, a lot of this
responsibility will fall to whoever succeeds him.
So we will continue to support Afghanistan and its
security, but we're going to be doing it on a conditions-based
analysis.
Senator Risch. I think that's probably the best answer
there is to that, and I really appreciate that. But I would
really urge someone to sit down with a pad and a pencil and
come up with some specific numbers, because the frustration
here is obvious. We're not going to continue to pour the money
in there for that.
The numbers I've seen, the estimates I've seen, are just
staggering. So I'd like to see somebody do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator
Risch.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, I think that there is total agreement on
this committee how proud we are that you represent our Nation
globally. You give great credibility to the position of
Secretary of State and the leadership. And we thank you for
your service.
I also want to applaud your efforts, working with Secretary
Obama and Secretary Gates, of understanding the importance of
national security being more than just our military, but also
including our civilian and diplomacy. I couldn't agree with you
more that these are three tools that are in our toolbox that
need to be deployed in a coordinated way.
But let me just get to the resources for one moment. The
amount of resources that we are currently expending on the
military aspects of Afghanistan is really draining our capacity
as a nation in so many different areas. As has been pointed out
by several members of this committee, that if we were using an
allocation today as to our greatest risk I don't think we would
be spending as much as we are in Afghanistan.
You make a very good point about 1 year of our civilian
efforts in Afghanistan is equal to 10 days of our military.
What a lot of us would like to do is free up more of that
military funds at a faster pace than the President announced
last night, to give you additional tools to be able to use our
civilian side to advance our objectives. So I think that's one
of the concerns that we have as to resources.
There's been discussion among many of us on both sides of
the aisle that, yes, we understand the deficit, we understand
we're going to have to make tough choices on the deficits, but
we also have to find a source of funds to move forward in areas
that are important. And if we can save money on the military
side, at least part of that could be invested in the civilian
side of our national security equation, which we think could be
used very effectively.
Which really brings me to the question of accountability.
You've addressed that several times in response to questions
and also in your statements. But I want to get to Pakistan for
one moment, because the chairman mentioned our 12 percent
popularity among the Pakistan people. I don't want to
overestimate the importance of being popular in the countries
that we operate, but I don't think we should underestimate
that.
If we're trying to advance values that are consistent with
America, that are universal, and there's such a low opinion of
the United States, it makes it difficult for our values to have
the ability to be effective in that country. So I think we need
to be concerned about it.
Also in Pakistan, we have the unusual issue that we're
supplying a lot of money to a country where there is clear
evidence that their intelligence agency, ISI, is assisting and
funding a terrorist group, LET, and that's inconsistent with
our laws.
So I guess my question to you is, as we share your vision
of a more robust U.S. involvement globally on the civilian side
to deal with our national security interests, we have to have
accountability, even with countries that we have strategic
interests, because if we don't I think it really affects our
credibility as a nation. So how do we reconcile that?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is, Senator Cardin, a very
difficult question to answer. From time to time, we do a lot of
business around the world with governments that don't meet our
values, don't share our interests, but with whom we believe we
have strategic security concerns. It is not easy to explain to
people and it is something that we're constantly evaluating.
There's nothing new about it in this administration. It goes
back to the founding of our country.
But I guess I would say that we do try to marry
accountability with our objectives, and we do it in a way that
tries to get the attention of the leaders whom we are working
with and trying to influence. There's always the tough
question, how far do you go? I think in retrospect many people
who know a lot about Pakistan would say the Pressler amendment
went too far. Now, at the time it seemed absolutely clear that
we needed to come down with a big hammer of accountability
because of the behavior that we disapproved of.
So trying to modulate this, to influence and manage
expectations and actions, is an ongoing part of the diplomatic
process. I guess I would just conclude by saying specifically
when it comes to Pakistan there is a ledger and on one side of
the ledger are a lot of actions that we really disapprove of
and find inimicable to our values and even our interests. Then
on the other side of the ledger there are actions that are very
much in line with what we're seeking and want. So we're
constantly balancing and weighing that.
We've made the assessment in this administration that,
despite the challenges, we have to continue to engage, we have
to continue to work with, and we have to continue to try to
influence Pakistani behavior.
Senator Cardin. I'll use my last 30 seconds to suggest that
I think all of us want to engage Pakistan. We're not asking to
isolate America from Pakistan. But I do think that our policies
have not been as effective as they need to be in developing the
type of partnership in that country that will advance our
values, and that the popularity issue speaks to whether we have
effectively used our civilian efforts in a way that will
advance more longstanding gains for the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. Good morning.
Senator Rubio. I understand and know and expect that our
military folks will be supportive of this decision and
implement it. But could you share with us, is it possible to
share with us, what was General Petraeus' recommendation with
regards to the timetable and the numbers?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I'm not going to be able to do
that, but I can tell you that the decision that the President
made was supported by the national security team. And I think
it would be totally understandable that a military commander
would want as many troops, for as long as he could get them.
But any military commander with the level of expertise and
experience that General Petraeus has also knows that what he
wants is just part of the overall decision matrix, and that
there are other factors at work.
So at the end of the day, I think the President made the
right decision. You've heard from colleagues here. Those voices
were heard within the national security apparatus: Out now, out
by the end of the year, out by the beginning of the year. Then
there were those who said let's wait until the end of the next
year. What the President decided was to get through the next
fighting season, in effect, which we think should be
sufficient.
Senator Rubio. That leads me to my next question. What was
the logic behind the September 2012 date for the full surge
pullback?
Secretary Clinton. I think the logic, as the President
explained last night, is that when he announced the surge he
said he would start withdrawing it in July 2011 and that he
would try to recover the surge within a period of time that
reflected the amount of time it took to put the surge in. It
took about 18 months to put the surge in. It'll take about 18
months to get the surge out. But that giving the commanders the
opportunity to stage the withdrawal in the midst of another
fighting season I think is what persuaded the President that
that was the right place for him to be, despite, frankly,
having lots of competing opinions coming at him from all sides.
I would also just add, Senator, because I do think it's
important to note, that when the President became President
there were waiting on his desk requests for additional troops.
At the time President Obama was inaugurated, there were, give
or take, about 30,000-plus American troops and there was no
doubt that our attention had shifted to Iraq in the preceding
years, and that in Iraq there had been a negotiated agreement
with the Iraqi Government by our government, the Bush
administration, as to when our troops would come out.
So the President looked at that and accelerated it to some
extent, but basically the framework was there.
With Afghanistan, there was nothing. There was an open-
ended commitment. There were evidence of our losing ground to
the Taliban. So he not only put in the surge; he put in an
additional 38,000 troops. So I think when all is said and done
we will still have more than twice as many troops as when he
took office in January 2009.
Senator Rubio. You discussed an open and frank discussion
process that took place in arriving at this decision. On one
hand, clearly we can't be there forever, and in fact there has
to be a strategy to begin to transition over to the Afghan
people and Afghan control increasingly so, and that's an
ongoing process that I think is always being weighed.
On the other hand, this is a region that I've heard best
described as a region where folks like to hedge their bets. I
think that's true within Afghanistan, with both tribal leaders,
local leaders, government leaders, who sometimes question how
committed the United States is, and so perhaps they hedge their
bets. And it's even more true, I think, with Pakistan. You
alluded to that earlier in some of your statements, where you
described that at least some of our difficulties in getting
Pakistan to commit to help us on some things can be explained
by their stated doubt about our commitment.
How did you weigh that? How was that weighed in the
decisionmaking process? In essence, how did we arrive at a
strategy to begin to transition without creating a situation
where people are afraid to work with us because they think the
Taliban's going to come back, or Pakistan decides they're not
going to work with us because they need to hedge their bets and
keep some of these people happy? How was that discussed? How
was that handled?
Secretary Clinton. Well, you're absolutely right, Senator.
That was a source of a lot of discussion, because clearly our
goal here is to further our objective of having an Afghanistan
that can defend itself and provide sufficient security to fend
off all of the regional and other players that wish to
influence it.
It was our assessment that we are balancing two competing
concerns. On the one hand, Afghanistan has to take its
responsibility seriously and it has to be prepared to really
instill in its own people the obligation of self-defense and
security. So the longer they felt that they didn't have to
accept that responsibility, the longer the timeline would be
pushed out. So the Lisbon decision of 2014 was the first
signal, agreed to by the Afghans, and the President's
assessment that we would have to begin to show our resolve to
withdraw in order to get them to really face up to their own
responsibilities is the second part of that.
At the same time, we believe that there will be some
continuing presence of NATO in Afghanistan following 2014,
which is in the process of being negotiated through the
strategic partnership declaration, so that there will be an
American presence to continue CT operations, to support the
Afghans when needed, to send a signal to the region that
there's not a free shot available here.
So we think we have tried to balance all these competing
concerns. But historically this is a region where hedging is an
art form, and what we're trying to do is to say through our
diplomatic efforts there's going to be a resolution here where
all the players are going to be watching each other, where
there's going to be--I'll just be very, very clear about this.
Pakistan knows that if Afghanistan gets too worried by what it
is or isn't doing, it will turn to India, and we know that
India supported the Northern Alliance in previous times.
So there are lots of moving parts here to try to put
together, so that everybody is checkmated from hedging that
could upset the Afghan security profile that we're trying to
leave them with.
The Chairman. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your testimony and your
extraordinary work, not only on these difficult issues, but on
so many others. Let me commend you as well on the work that you
have done with me and with others on focusing the Pakistani
leadership, their government, on a critically important issue
that involves the strategies to prevent the killing of our
troops by way of IEDs that come from and have their origin in
the ammonium nitrate which is flooding into Afghanistan from
Pakistan. So I appreciate your work on that and your reporting
back when you raised the issue with the Pakistani leadership.
I have just one basic question. It's a focused question on
the certification that you must provide pursuant to the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. We know it by the
common name ``Kerry-Lugar-Berman.'' Let me just set forth the
predicate for the answer. I'm just reading in pertinent part
with regard to the certification, section 203: ``The
certification required by this subsection is a certification by
the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President,
to the appropriate congressional committees that''--and then,
in pertinent part: That Pakistan has ``demonstrated a sustained
commitment to, and is making significant progress''--
``significant efforts,'' I should say--``toward combating
terrorist groups.'' That's where that section ends.
Then the second part: ``In defining what that progress is,
the following can be taken into consideration: No. 1, ceasing
support, including any element within the Pakistani military or
its intelligence agency, to extremists or terrorist groups.''
That's the pertinent part of No. 1.
No. 2: ``Preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
terrorist groups, such as LET and others, from operating in the
territory of Pakistan.''
So that's the basis of the certification. I just ask you a
fundamental question, even though I know the next certification
isn't due yet and you have made one I guess as of the end of
2010. But is it your current assessment that Pakistan, the
government of Pakistan, has met these criteria outlined in
section 203 for continued U.S. assistance?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, you're right, I provided
Congress with a certification on security-related assistance to
Pakistan in March, as required by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill.
And I will not be required to make another certification until
later when we look back on 2011. I will follow the rules that
the law sets forth and try again to balance and weigh what
they've done and what they have failed to do.
We did say after bin Laden's death that our close
counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan did help us in
tracking him down over many years. We also have seen some
significant actions that have led to unprecedented additional
pressure on al-Qaeda and the deaths of some top extremists. So
we will be once again trying to balance this.
I don't want to get ahead of myself, but I can assure you
that I will do my very best to follow the rules set out in the
laws passed by this body.
Senator Casey. If you were--I guess what I'm trying to get
to is, even though you don't have a current statutory
requirement, just to give people a sense of where we are in
that assessment, because you're hearing in this committee. You
have heard a lot about this topic, about the question of
accountability and how we justify support that the Pakistani
Government benefits from.
So I would urge you in any way you can, in addition to the
statutory certification, to be able to report back to the
American people.
I only have another minute or so, but I wanted to ask you
another question. It's broader and not as focused, but just in
terms of the question of governance in Afghanistan, which has
been one of the areas of real focus that we've got to make
continual assessments about, and in particular the Karzai
government. I and others have been critical over a long period
of time. There's still not just the perception, but I think the
irrefutable reality that there is corruption.
I wanted to get your sense of that challenge we have right
now. How would you grade them or how would you rate them or how
would you assess the Karzai government's efforts to root out
corruption, which is a problem throughout?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I would give them a grade of
incomplete, Senator. I think we have seen some progress, but
nothing like what we would either expect to see or want to see
from them. We have continued to keep the pressure on, and we of
course have learned a lot over the last decade about how better
to deliver the assistance we do, because it is fair to say that
a lot of the corruption is tied to contracts that come from the
United States, NATO partners, and others.
So we have been trying to get to what is a good enough
standard, because we are dealing with a society that has a very
old history of how to deal with people and how to get tribal
loyalties and family and clan loyalties. So I think we have to
recognize that we're in a very tough environment when it comes
to corruption, as it is in many other parts of the world that
we deal with.
We have been watching closely because of our own interests,
but we give military and civilian aid to a lot of countries
that hardly measure up to any high standard of enforcement
against corruption. It is one of the biggest problems we face
in the world right now, because it's a cancer and it undermines
good governance and the rule of law and so much else.
So it's an incomplete. We see some things that we think are
the right direction and then we see a lot that we're very
unhappy with.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, welcome. I have only got 6 minutes, so
I'm going to try to talk fast to make sure all our colleagues
get their chance to also make some comments.
Let me begin by just saying I wouldn't want the record to
show that I was in total agreement with your analogy comparing
our situation in Korea, our long-term commitment to Korea, with
what might take place in Afghanistan. Our situation in Korea is
in one of the most vital areas commercially and in terms of
large powers in the world. The Korean Peninsula--Northeast
Asia--is the only place where the direct interests of the
United States, China, Japan, and Russia intersect. Korea is
kind of the bull's eye in the middle of that.
For all the questions that I have had about the engagements
in this other part of the world, I think you and I both know
how strongly I believe that this is a critical moment in East
Asia in terms of the potential volatility of our relations
there. In that regard I want to say again that I appreciate the
comment that you made last July relating to the sovereignty
issues in the South China Sea. As you know, this is a very live
issue today.
I also would like to just point out, I keep hearing this
analogy and I take the point to a certain extent with the
situation in 1989, where we could have done more in Afghanistan
and in that region and we didn't. But, we also should be
mindful that the geopolitical circumstances today are quite
different than they were in 1989, and the fact that we could
have done more in 1989, does not in and of itself justify the
methods that are being used today.
I have to express my agreement with Senator Lugar's comment
that if we were doing a military model right now, I don't think
any of us would be sitting up here saying, ``Oh, it would be
100,000 troops and spending $120 billion a year in
Afghanistan.'' It's almost like Groundhog Day. I keep coming
back to how we began this. If you really look at who defeated
the Taliban in 2001, the Afghanis defeated the Taliban with a
handful of very competent Americans, special operators, and
forward air controllers. But the Afghanis beat them.
If we look at the model that we're going to be moving
forward with in places like Somalia and Yemen, the model is a
much, much different model. So I think that the questions that
people are asking about on where this is going to go--what
Senator Corker calls nation-building and--I would tend to agree
with him, these are valid questions.
With respect to Pakistan, the word we haven't heard very
much today is ``China.'' The day that Chairman Kerry left
Pakistan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan went to China and
said: ``China is our No. 1 friend.'' I picked up the Washington
Post today; there's an article in there again where Pakistan
clearly is courting China.
This is one area where I think China seriously could do
more to legitimize the status that it now has in consonance
with the economic and military power that has grown, and in a
way that could be positive. They're going to be a great
beneficiary if this region does regain the stability and they
clearly need to be more overt. I would hope they would be more
overt in trying to bring about a solution.
Now, I want to say two things really quickly here and then
I'm afraid if I ask you a question I'm going to run out of
time. But the first is, in your statement you mention this new
strategic partnership declaration. I met with the Afghani
Ambassador yesterday. He mentioned this. He said that they are
seeing this as an executive agreement and that they, the
Afghanis, believe there will be some sort of a document within
the next couple of months.
You and I had many conversations with respect to the
strategic framework agreement that the previous administration
worked up with Iraq, where the Congress didn't have a chance to
really fully vet it. I hope we will get a chance to examine
this and give our input, because clearly the question, in terms
of what our long-term relationship in Afghanistan should look
like, is something we need to be talking about before this
agreement goes into place.
Then the final thing that I would say is, again with your
comment on page four of your testimony regarding this core
group that Special Representative Grossman is putting into
place in hopes of building political support, you have India,
Russia, and Iran. I hope you can get China.
With that, I have 9 seconds left and I yield back the
balance of my time to Senator Shaheen.
Secretary Clinton. In 5 seconds, Senator Webb, we are
working very hard to get China to play a more productive role
with Pakistan. We agree with that. Some day I'd love to talk to
you about analogies, whether or not we agree with them, but to
just kind of go through them. So I appreciate what you said.
Senator Webb. Any time. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen. Secretary Clinton, thank you for being
here. I join my colleagues in all of our appreciation for the
job that you're doing as Secretary of State.
A little earlier, in responding to Senator Rubio and the
decision about what happens after 2014, you talked about the
continuing presence of NATO. Shortly after the President's
speech last night, France announced that it too plans to begin
drawing down troops. Obviously, several weeks ago Secretary
Gates talked about the challenges with our NATO allies.
So, given that situation, do you believe that our allies in
NATO will continue to step up and to help us in Afghanistan
through 2014, and what assurances do we have that that will
happen?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, that was the agreement at
Lisbon and I think a number of our NATO ISAF allies will be
doing drawdowns proportionate to the troops that they have.
There is a planning process within NATO as to how to manage
that, because some are in areas where we have no U.S. presence.
But there certainly has been an agreement that following
2014 there will be some kind of continuing presence, and I
think that the President mentioned last night that the United
States will host the NATO heads of state next year in Chicago
and it will be the time where we will take stock of where we
are and the way forward.
Senator Shaheen. Given the operations in Libya and the
pressure that that's putting on both our capacity and the
capability of NATO, is there concern that that will in the
interim have an effect that will change our calculations for
what's happening on the ground in Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. I don't think so, Senator. I think that
certainly from NATO's perspective, they joined with us in the
Afghan mission and they were very anxious to have us join with
them in the Libyan mission. So I think that there's not
necessarily a connection, direct line between the two, but the
larger questions that Secretary Gates has been raising, which
are not Afghan-related or Libya-related specifically, about the
commitment of NATO are ones that are going to have to be
addressed.
Senator Shaheen. Looking at the potential for a negotiated
solution in Afghanistan, and I certainly understand and agree
with you that--and we've heard from everybody who's testified
before this committee that this is not a military solution;
it's got to be a political and negotiated solution.
But Ambassador Neumann testified before this committee that
he was skeptical of power-sharing agreements. He said they only
tend to last as long as it takes for one side to be strong
enough to break it. I'm paraphrasing his comments there. Do you
share this assessment and do you think that there really is the
possibility for any kind of an agreement with the Taliban?
Secretary Clinton. I think there is, but I think that we're
a long way from knowing what the realistic elements of such an
agreement would be. I think that Ambassador Neumann expresses a
very common view that power-sharing agreements are often just a
way station between fighting and a resumption of fighting if
parties cannot maneuver out their opposition.
I think it's too soon to say how this could play out in
Afghanistan. But I can only stress that we are committed to
pursuing it, because it is the only path forward. There is no
other path forward. Nobody is strong enough to really assert
control. They can go back to a civil war. They can go back to
all kinds of fighting between them. But I think a resolution is
in the interests of the parties as well. We just have to work
to determine what the elements would be.
Senator Shaheen. To go back to your discussion of the
civilian surge, obviously we're talking about the need to draw
down the military surge now. How do you look at the reduction
of that civilian surge that's happened?
Several weeks ago, I'm sure you're aware this committee
issued a report that talked about the false economy that's
being created in Afghanistan by the amount of money that is
available and what that's doing to the Afghan economy. So
looking at that and looking at the civilian efforts and the
economic efforts that we've put in there, how do you see that
being drawn down, or do you, as we get closer to 2014?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we do. I think that the
recommendations that the committee made are ones that we are
very, very seriously looking at. The committee recommended that
the administration and Congress should consider working
together on multiyear civilian assistance. Well, there's a big
problem with that. We don't get multiyears of civilian
assistance. We get multiyear military commitments, and we have
no disagreement that it would be great if we could, and Kerry-
Lugar-Berman was the first multiyear effort to commit to
Pakistan.
But we certainly are going to be looking at the programs
we're running that are in conflict zones. One of the other
points that the committee made was why 80 percent of the
funding is spent in COIN regions. It's because the military was
very insistent that there needed to be a marrying up of
civilian efforts. The example I gave in my testimony about the
Wardak region is a very good example.
Then finally, we need to focus on sustainability of our
programs so that the Afghans can continue them. We're looking
at that as well.
So we don't agree with all the recommendations or all the
conclusions of the committee report. But we wish we could get
multiyear programs that could be implemented and we had the
flexibility and the agility. I mean, the committee, for
example, talks about commander's response funds. Well, we don't
have those. I can't send a diplomat or a development expert out
with $50 or $100,000 in his back pocket. But young captains and
majors can do that.
We've learned a lot from this and we will do our very best
to try to implement those lessons. I certainly, working with
our team and Raj Shah over at AID, have been trying to wrestle
to the ground how we get more accountability and more
measurable outcomes from out assistance. So we're going to be
changing in light of the military changes, but also in light of
the lessons we've learned.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Madam Secretary, I just wanted to thank you
for your testimony here today. It's been engaging and
compelling and broad-ranging and very constructive, and I'm
grateful to Chairman Kerry for convening this whole series of
hearings on our policy toward Afghanistan. They've provided
some important insights, very helpful to me, and I know to
members of the committee.
After attending nearly all of the hearings and traveling to
Afghanistan and Pakistan for the first time in my life back in
February, continuing to attend deployment ceremonies for
Delaware National Guard units and a dignified transfer ceremony
at Dover Air Force Base, I've spent a lot of time wrestling
with what is the best path forward, as have all the members, I
know, of this committee, and concluded, with some real
hesitation and regret, ultimately that we need to make a change
in strategy in Afghanistan.
While I welcome the President's decision to redeploy all of
the surge troops by next summer, my view is that we shouldn't
really focus on the number of the troops as much as on the
strategy driving them. I think for a variety of reasons we have
heard discussed at great detail here today, a counterinsurgency
strategy is just not sustainable and is not likely, no matter
how many years we pursue it, to succeed in developing a truly
secure and stable Afghanistan.
So for a number of reasons, I've advocated for a change to
a counterterrorism strategy. One of the principal reasons is in
order to have the resources, the diplomatic and the military
and the development resources, the focus, the capacity for lots
of other important threats, to deal with Yemen and Somalia,
with an emerging nuclear Iran, and principally with Pakistan.
I do think that we see al-Qaeda beginning to emerge in
Yemen in a way that's really challenging for us. I am really
concerned about the points that have been raised by other
members here about the very destabilizing impact on Pakistan of
our role in Afghanistan and the lack of the resources to really
make the engagement with Pakistan successful.
So let me, if I could, move to three relatively brief
questions around this. First, I wonder about what additional
steps we can and should take to engage India more effectively
in stabilizing what I think you very compellingly describe as a
really difficult, complex relationship with Pakistan. I'd be
interested in hearing from you what you're doing in the
Department and what you are doing to successfully engage India.
Second, in the core group passage that Senator Webb
referred to I was struck to hear you make reference to Iran as
being one of the regional parties that's being engaged
successfully in the political resolution. Obviously, they did
work with us in overthrowing the Taliban. They have a real
shared interest with us in ending the narcotics trafficking out
of Afghanistan. But their emerging very real threat as a
nuclear power strikes me as one of the greatest challenges that
all of us face, not just for the region, but for the world and
for our critical ally Israel.
So I'd be interested in how you assess the degree to which
we actually could have aligned interests with Iran in
developing some political resolution in Afghanistan.
Then last, any input you'd like to offer about how we could
refocus our efforts to bring more vitality and energy to the
engagement with Pakistan, given the very troubling recent
developments there?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, those are all very excellent
and quite complex questions. Let me start by saying, I think
this debate between COIN and counterterrorism is to some extent
unfortunate, because there is no real contradiction between the
two insomuch as there is a phasing from one to the other. I
think that the President decided and I agreed back in 2009 that
if we didn't have a significant enough presence we would have
one-off CT victories, but we would not change the momentum of
the Taliban and we would be facing a situation that would have
been very difficult for us to control.
I think what the President has decided now, which I also
agree, is that we have made substantial progress in reversing
Taliban momentum and now we have to see how sustainable it is
by relying on the Afghans themselves and by not only
withdrawing our troops, but to begin to somewhat reshape their
mission.
So I don't think it's an either-or. I think it's a both-
and, which is why I made the point that we've been running CT
operations consistently. It's not like we have just had big
brigades of marines and soldiers. We've also had a very
aggressive effort against Taliban and al-Qaeda and their
allies.
With respect to India, we are working very hard on our
strategic partnership with India. You know, I think it's fair
to say that India looks at Pakistan and believes that their
continuing support for elements of insurgency against India in
Kashmir and across the border into India proper makes it very
difficult for them to know what path to choose. But I've been
encouraged by the cricket diplomacy between Prime Minister
Singh and Prime Minister Galani. I've been encouraged by the
resumption of talks that had broken off in 2008. And we have
certainly urged both sides to go as far as they could to build
more confidence and to try to be able to develop an atmosphere
of greater cooperation.
I don't want to be misunderstood about Iran. I'm not saying
that Iran is a partner in this process or is playing a
constructive role. I'm merely saying that Iran is a player. The
core group is strictly the core: Afghanistan, Pakistan, the
United States. But then there is a concentric circle and it
goes out and gets wider and wider, and in that have to be
China, have to be Iran, have to be Central Asia, et cetera.
One of the insights that Holbrooke brought to this was you
had to have a lot of buy-in from a large group of nations and
institutions in order to pull every lever possible. So for
example, the last so-called SRAM group was hosted by the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. That never would have
happened 2\1/2\ years ago. Why? Because all of a sudden they
think they have a stake in trying to help push toward some kind
of political resolution.
Finally, with respect to Pakistan, we're going to focus and
refocus and refocus again, because it's an important
relationship and it's one that requires a lot of effort and
there's no easy course forward, but there's many different
approaches that we are trying within the context of trying to
enlist them in a resolution in Afghanistan.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much for those answers.
Senator Durbin. Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
It's a pleasure to see you and I thank you for your service.
There was a week we shared in our public lives which we
will never forget. It began with the tragedy of 9/11. It ended
3 days later when we both joined in voting for the resolution
which authorized the President of the United States to find
those responsible and those who supported them and bring them
to justice.
I voted for that enthusiastically, as you did. I don't vote
for many war resolutions, but that was the right one. If
someone would have said to me on September 14, 2001, we're
still going to be the 10 years from now, in the longest war in
American history, we will have lost 1,600 American lives and
possibly more, not to mention the casualties and injuries, we
would be spending $120 billion a year, roughly four times as
much in military spending in Afghanistan as their gross
national product, their annual gross national product, and the
end would still be years away, I would have found it hard to
believe.
We were going after Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and the
people who made his evil opportunity possible. Now we are doing
something else.
I would have to join in what was said earlier by Senator
Menendez. I have a real skepticism about our mission in
Afghanistan at this moment. I do not have great confidence in
the leadership in Afghanistan, either in its competence or
honesty. I worry about the money that we are shoveling into
this country in sums that are unimaginable in this poor,
underdeveloped country.
I've gotten reports and seen the contractors we are paying
to go there to do things, and even this committee says the
accountability is very limited in what we are trying to
achieve. I've seen it firsthand. You talked about captains and
majors with thousands of dollars to spend. They took me to
Khost to show me a city hall and community building they had
built with those funds. It was empty. The Afghans weren't
looking for that, but we built it anyway.
So I come to this with some skepticism, and I bring another
element to it as well. If we cannot win this from a military
basis--Senator Kerry said no military solution. You said in
your Asia Society speech we will never kill enough insurgents
to win this war--we still have to acknowledge that 100,000
brave Americans are risking their lives as we sit here and tell
them: You can't win this, but perform your mission.
I go back to the point raised by Senator Shaheen. I want to
ask a few more questions about it. What is the likelihood that
we can use the standard you set out in your Asia Society speech
to engage the Taliban in a meaningful discussion that will come
up with a political solution?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, your comments took me
back to that very difficult time that we did share together as
Members of the Senate. I certainly agree with you that we
committed to going after al-Qaeda, but we also in my view did
not follow through the way we should have early on. That's not
meant as criticism. It's just a statement of fact.
I think that President Obama, who you know very well faced
an incredibly difficult choice--it was difficult politically,
it was difficult substantively, it was difficult personally.
But upon very careful reflection and review, he made the
decisions that I thought were the right decisions, given what
he had inherited. I think he is now on the right path toward
resolving our involvement in Afghanistan in the best way
possible out of a lot of very difficult choices.
So I would answer the question in this way. I don't think
it's a matter of winning or losing. I think it's a matter of
how we measure the success we are seeking in Afghanistan. I do
believe it is possible to construct a political and diplomatic
resolution.
I will know more about that at the end of this year than I
know now, because we were not in a position, frankly, to pursue
that until recently. Why? Because the Taliban were not
interested in talking to us because they thought they were
going to make a big comeback. I remember when President George
W. Bush basically said to Mullah Omar and the Taliban: Look,
turn over bin Laden and al-Qaeda and we're done; we're not
going to come after you. And they would not do it, and they
never have agreed to do it. And only now are we beginning to
see the kind of outreach that evidences a willingness to
discuss the future. I don't think we would have gotten there
absent President Obama's very difficult, tough assessment that
led to his decisions.
So good people and very smart people can disagree about the
way forward and that's what this hearing has demonstrated. I
have the highest regard for every member of this committee and
I know that every single man and woman wants to do what's best
for America, wants to do what's best for our troops, wants to
do what's best for our future. And it is our very reasoned
assessment, taking into account everything that we have all
discussed today, that we now have a chance to bring this to a
political and diplomatic end. But the President has started us
on a path that will lead to the bringing home of our troops
over the next years.
So it's a tough call, Senator, and there's no easy formula
that any of us can follow at this point. I wish it were 6
years, 7 years, 8 years ago and we had made different choices
then. But you know, we don't get that luxury. And it's deeply
regrettable, but Presidents have to make the tough calls and
this President has made it.
Senator Durbin. I'll just conclude by saying thank you and
urge you to use--and I know you will, because I know you--use
all of your skills to pursue the diplomatic end so that we can
bring our troops home more quickly than the President suggested
last night. I'll do everything I can to support that.
Thank you.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Clinton, for being here,
and thank you very much for your service to our country. I
can't emphasize that enough and I think all of our colleagues
here very much appreciate your service.
I don't want to repeat a lot of what was said, but I agree
very much with what Senator Durbin said about where we are
today. I really believe--and the President said this last
night--if you look at the situation we're in and why we went
in, the focus was on a government, as you have said in your
testimony, that was sheltering terrorists. There were training
camps, there were--they had organized this terrorist attack on
us.
That's all gone, and bin Laden has been brought to justice.
It just seems to me that we're at the point where we should be
looking at what many of our NATO allies--I remember over and
over again in the period when President Bush was there and
organizing the NATO allies, they would say over and over: This
needs to be Afghan-led in terms of security, this needs to be
Afghan-led.
I don't know how we get to that point on the Afghans
leading on security, unless you have some kind of deadline.
Senator Levin I know, our Armed Services chairman, has said
several times that a deadline focuses the mind. It obviously
lets us know when we pass off and it lets them know.
Do you think we have a deadline right now in terms of when
all of our combat forces will be out of Afghanistan and when
they will really take the lead on security?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I certainly do. I think that
has been the agreed-upon path that was adopted at Lisbon. We
have a final deadline of 2014. The Afghans accepted it. We made
it very clear that that was it. And we have a glide path to
2014 that the President promised in his West Point speech,
which he is now beginning to order the implementation of.
So I agree with you that we needed to set a deadline in
order to make it clear to the Afghans that there would be a
transition. I would also just underscore that 2\1/2\ years ago
when the President began this assessment there was so little to
the Afghan security forces. It just was not even credible. For
whatever reason, what had been done before had not worked.
But I think it is absolutely fair to say that it is
working. There is still a lot that has to be done in terms of
building up and professionalizing. But Afghans in some areas
now are in the lead. They've had the lead in Kabul for a year.
I remember talking to General Petraeus after he took command in
Afghanistan. He said: ``You know, Kabul is right now a lot more
peaceful than Baghdad was when we started.''
So I know how frustrating it is because we have been there
for 10 years and there are lots of factors that we can't really
hold accountable or manage the way we would like. But I also
think it's only fair to look at what has been accomplished, and
it has been accomplished in part against the backdrop of the
deadline.
So yes, we do have a deadline and we are acting upon it.
Senator Udall. And your sense is our deadline is at the end
of 2014, that all of the combat forces for the United States
will be out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. That was the agreement and that was the
agreement with NATO ISAF and the agreement with the Afghans.
Senator Udall. Now, you know, we use the term a lot and you
hear this about conditions on the ground. The thing that is
dependent here, if you use the term, you say, well, it's going
to depend on conditions on the ground, then we're going to talk
about how prepared their forces are to step up to the plate.
From all the reports I have heard--and you just mentioned this
a minute ago--they have come along, but they may not be ready.
I know that there was a U.N. official, a high U.N.
official, and he was a controversial one, and he left and he
gave a talk on 60 Minutes, an interview, and his opinion was it
would take 100 years to get the police, the Afghan police and
army, to the point where we would feel they were acceptable. So
I just hope that we're not going down a road where we're
saying, well, we do have a deadline, but it's going to be based
on conditions on the ground and we're going to change, we're
going to change direction based on the fact that the Afghan
army and police in our judgment aren't able to take this over.
As Senator Durbin said, ``I hope that we can quicken this.
I hope that we can move more quickly to an accelerated
transition to Afghan security. And if you're able to do that,
I'm going to be here to support you.''
I once again thank you for your service. And thank you,
Chairman Kerry, for holding these hearings and allowing all of
us to participate. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator
Udall.
Madam Secretary, thank you. I know that we've gone over a
little bit on the time. I know your staff has been sitting
there chafing and trying to get you down there. I apologize for
that.
But I also want to say to you I think it has been really
very constructive and very healthy to have this exchange and
for our colleagues to put their thoughts on the table, as you
remember well, and also to hear your answers. I want to thank
you for being as thorough and as generous in your answers as
you have been. I think it's been really constructive.
I would like to personally thank you for your many
courtesies. Also, I echo my colleagues in saying what a
terrific job you are doing, and we're grateful to you for your
seemingly endless reserve of energy. So thank you very, very
much. I look forward to following up on our other conversation.
Secretary Clinton. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question #1. In your testimony you said ``When it comes to our
military aid [to Pakistan], we are not prepared to continue providing
that at the pace we were providing it unless and until we see some
steps taken."
How will withholding certain forms of military aid for
Pakistan affect our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
efforts in Pakistan and in Afghanistan?
Answer. Pakistan remains a key ally in our common struggle against
terrorism and continues to proactively undertake counterterrorism
efforts. We believe that establishing a long-term partnership with
Pakistan is the best way to support both of our country's national
security interests.
We are working intensively with the Government of Pakistan to
establish a shared set of expectations that will permit us to
strengthen cooperation to successfully achieve our shared security
objectives. Our goal is to ensure that Pakistan understands the
importance of demonstrating--to the administration and to Congress--
that it is a vital and active partner in counterterrorism and is
helping us end the war in Afghanistan by pressing the Taliban into
reconciliation. At the same time, the Government of Pakistan has
requested a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in
Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has significantly limited the number of
visas it provides for U.S. military and contractor personnel involved
in implementing our assistance programs. Both of these actions have
inhibited implementation of security assistance programs in Pakistan at
this time, creating a de facto pause in our deliveries to Pakistan's
military.
The Department is continually reviewing its security assistance
programs to ensure that these programs are meeting our
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism goals and that there are minimal
disruptions to these objectives. We remain committed to helping
Pakistan build its counterterrorism capabilities in order to fight
extremists who carried out 1,400 terrorist attacks and caused more than
6,500 casualties in Pakistan in 2010 alone.
Question #2. The United States is seeking to help the Government of
Pakistan improveits capacity to deliver health services to its people
and to improve outcomes in that country, including reductions in infant
and child mortality. Vaccines are among the most cost-effective tools
in the health arsenal. Pakistan is also among only four countries in
the world in which wild polio continues to circulate. Helping Pakistan
eliminate polio could be a very tangible legacy of Kerry-Lugar-Berman
assistance, as part of integrated efforts to enhance health services
and improve outcomes.
(a) What are the funding levels for U.S. support for
immunization programs in Pakistan for FY 2009-10 and the
projected funding levels for FY 2011-12?
Answer. Unfortunately, despite the many campaigns over the years,
polio still exists in Pakistan, and the number of cases actually
increased in the last year. We recognize the benefit that polio
eradication would have for the Pakistani people and the world. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also support polio
eradication efforts in Pakistan. As you may know, the United States has
been the largest single donor to the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative, providing over $2 billion in support since 1985, including
$132 million in each of the last 2 years.
FUNDING LEVELS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY11 FY12
Budget Overview ($millions) FY09 FY10 (est.) (est.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polio eradication.............. 2 8 2 2
All Other Immunization (within 2 26.5 20 20
separate health programming)...
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please note that in attempting to balance the importance of polio
eradication efforts and the absorptive capacity of Pakistan, we believe
a total of $10 million for FY 2010 and FY 2011 to be the most effective
allocation of funds.
(b) Some have suggested that unobligated funds that were
previously appropriated might be available for expanding the
U.S. investment in immunization efforts. What are the current
levels of unobligated economic assistance funds for Pakistan
for FY 2009-10 and to what degree have those funds been
committed in agreements with the Pakistani Government although
not yet obligated?
Answer. There are no unprogrammed FY 2009 or FY 2010 funds for
Pakistan which are available for expanding health activities.
(c) What are the health opportunities that could be achieved
through greater investments either in U.S. bilateral support
for immunization or through the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunization (GAVI) in Pakistan?
Answer. Greater investments in either U.S. bilateral support for
immunization or through GAVI in Pakistan could further reduce and
prevent infant mortality and morbidity caused by common childhood
diseases and could help with efforts to eradicate polio. For example,
with the increased support for immunization in FY 2010, $7.5 million
was used to purchase 6.5 million doses of measles and 15 million doses
of tetanus vaccines; $7.5 million was used to purchase cold chain
equipment (refrigerators, coolers, storage rooms); and an additional $5
million will be used to purchase BCG (tuberculosis ) and pentavalent
vaccine--a five-in-one vaccine that protects against diphtheria,
tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), hepatitis B, and Haemophilus
influenzae type b (often known as Hib) which causes some severe forms
of pneumonia and meningitis. In FY 2009 and FY 2010, $5.5 million in
USAID funding supported 19 national and subnational polio campaigns,
which reached over 32 million children under 5 years of age with 250
million doses of polio vaccine each year.
(d) With India now making substantial progress in the fight
against polio, how can KLB help Pakistan to make similar gains
in eliminating this disease from within its borders? What are
the most significant obstacles to such an achievement?
Answer. Polio in Pakistan is fueled by a small number of geographic
areas (the majority of cases occurred in 15 chronically underperforming
districts) and by migrant groups. Major constraints include poor
supervision and management (poor performance during immunization
campaigns, routine immunization, and in community awareness and
surveillance) and lack of access (estimates indicate that more than 25
percent of children in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are
missed during the campaigns due to insecurity).
KLB funds are helping Pakistan to eradicate this disease. The
United States plays a low visibility but highly important role in polio
eradication in Pakistan. Our objective is to ensure that this is seen
as a Pakistani-led and implemented program, which builds local
ownership, provides safe passage for vaccinators, and avoids sparking
antivaccination rumors often linked to the United States. Through the
World Health Organization and UNICEF, the United States provides
funding and technical support for the implementation of the Pakistan
Emergency Action Plan and in collaboration with the World Bank and
other partners, the funding of oral polio vaccine.
In particular, the United States has focused its resources on
improved surveillance at the union council level, improved planning for
immunization campaigns, improved monitoring and evaluation, and
communication to increase community participation and demand for polio
and other vaccinations. These areas will be important as we strive for
nationwide population immunity to stop transmission and in the 3-year
minimum period needed to verify the absence of disease in advance of
certification.
We support immunization posts at 11 formal border crossings between
Pakistan and Afghanistan on both sides of the border. Further, the
United States provides technical support through surveillance training,
Center for Disease Control (CDC)-detailed personnel, U.S Agency for
International Development (USAID) participation on interagency
committees, and USAID and CDC participation in technical advisory
groups and program evaluations.
Question #3. A recent report from the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee entitled ``Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central
Asia's Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan''
commended the Obama administration and specifically the State
Department for its work to elevate water in terms of diplomacy and
national security, specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The report
also made recommendations and observations for large dam projects,
which hold vast potential for energy, irrigation and flood resistance,
but also can displace people and exacerbate domestic and international
tensions over water resources. The report found that ``[w]hile the
United States has appropriately begun to elevate its interest in
supporting water through `signature' projects in these regions, our
efforts still lack strategic clarity, unity of purpose, and a long-term
vision to support our national security interests.''
Please provide specific examples of how the United States
plans relating to water use, supply, or demand in Afghanistan
and Pakistan applies the comprehensive and sustainable approach
recommended in the committee report.
In Pakistan, please describe (1) water-related projects that
may or will be funded by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB)
legislation, and (2) how the U.S. Government plans to respond
to future flooding in Pakistan, which is expected by some
experts.
In Afghanistan, how has our agriculture strategy been
tailored toward long-term, sustainable productivity able to
withstand climate change, floods and potential water scarcity?
Answer. Despite significant economic and development problems
stemming from water scarcity, Pakistan is deadlocked on how to deal
with the complex challenges of its water sector. Competing demands for
water--among countries, provinces, localities, and domestic cross-
sector users--compound the stalemate. These concerns, along with
growing public awareness of an impending water crisis, prompted
Pakistan to request a Water Working Group under the U.S.-Pakistan
Strategic Dialogue.
Over the past year, the Water Working Group has become a key venue
for substantive discussion of Pakistan's pressing water needs. We have
encouraged Pakistan to adopt a water system that is based on
sustainable, efficient use of water with pricing established on a cost
recovery basis. Through our efforts, and in support of Pakistan's
goals, the Friends of Democratic and Pakistan (FODP) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) have commenced preparation of an integrated
water sector report and plan for Pakistan. The plan, due to be
completed in late 2011, will provide a detailed roadmap for reform of
Pakistan's water sector.
We also demonstrate support for Pakistan's water sector through the
Secretary's Signature Water Program. Announced in July 2010 and valued
at $270 million, the program focuses on seven major projects designed
to improve water systems across Pakistan: Gomal Zam Dam improvements
and irrigation project; Satpara Dam improvements and irrigation
project; Jacobabad and Peshawar Municipal Drinking Water Systems; a
portion of the Municipal Services Delivery Program; the High Efficiency
Irrigation Systems Program; and Water Storage Dams in Balochistan.
Implementation of these projects will result in near-term, tangible
improvements to Pakistan's water infrastructure.
The Government of Pakistan has also proposed a number of
hydroelectric projects for us to consider as candidates for assistance
funding, notably the Diamer Basha Dam in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-
Baltistan, and the Kurram Tangi project in North Waziristan. We are
evaluating our support for these projects in terms of their
contributions to sustainable energy and water sectors in Pakistan.
We stand ready to support the Government of Pakistan and the
Pakistani people in the event of additional flooding in Pakistan this
season.
In Afghanistan, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the National Guard Agribusiness
Development Teams are collaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Livestock to improve long-term sustainability and
resilience to climate change through increased water-use efficiency. We
are accomplishing this by improving on-farm water management, repairing
irrigation infrastructure, and improving watershed management. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers is evaluating potential sites for constructing
small dams that will increase water storage for irrigation during dry
seasons.
Question #4. I understand that the administration is considering
involvement in high-profile dam projects in Pakistan, including the
Diamer Bhasha project. With respect to the Diamer Bhasha project:
Please discuss what specific improvements you envision would
need to be made in surrounding areas to both irrigation and
electricity transmission to best realize the potential benefits
of the dam and to ensure that U.S. money was being spent to
maximum positive impact, if the United States were to
contribute funding to the project.
Please provide any detailed funding plans you have developed
or received for financing the Diamer Bhasha project.
What steps are being taken to address resettlement issues
resulting from Diamer Bhasha? Has contact been made with India
to discuss resettlement options? When seeking to learn best
practices from past mass resettlements due to dam construction,
what past examples do you think will be most helpful?
According to the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty gives
India the right to ``veto'' major dam projects in the disputed
territories, including, but not limited to, the Diamer Bhasha
project. In contrast, according to the Asian Development Bank,
the treaty only gives India the opportunity to raise concerns
that relate to rights to the disputed territory. Please
describe in detail the U.S. position on this issue, as well as
any strategy for securing Indian approval or acquiescence if it
proves necessary.
Who prepared the feasibility study for the project? Please
provide a copy of the study.
Answer. The Government of Pakistan has told us that construction of
Diamer Basha dam, valued over $12 billion, is one of its top
development priorities. We are currently considering how the U.S.
Government can support discrete, practical elements of the overall
project that will have tangible results--and will attract additional
funding from other donors. We believe that investing in projects that
support the overall construction of Diamer Basha would attract
recognition for U.S. assistance in Pakistan, and convince the Pakistani
public that we are here for the long haul.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is reviewing the Diamer Basha
project, including its environmental and social impact, as well as
other technical standards. This project would not need any special
review or consideration with regard to the Indus Water Treaty. The ADB
has its own internal policies when dealing with projects in or near
disputed territories, such as Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) has
commissioned noted international consulting engineering firms to
conduct a series of feasibility studies and reviews of alternative
designs for Diamer Basha Dam. These include:
Montreal Engineering Company (MONENCO of Canada), 1984.
``Basha Storage and Power Project--Feasibility.''
NEAC (a joint venture led by National Engineering Services--
Pakistan), 2002. ``Basha Diamer Dam Project--Feasibility
Report.''
Diamer Basha Consultants (a joint venture led by Lahmeyar
International of Germany), 2005. ``Review of Feasibility
Report, Engineering design and Tender Drawings/Documents.''
Question #5. What evidence do we have that U.S. stabilization
programs are promoting stability and extending the reach and legitimacy
of the Afghan Government?
Answer. Our stabilization goal in Afghanistan is to help the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) gain the
support of the Afghan population by reducing the conditions that give
rise to the insurgency, while also helping enable Afghan-led transition
by the end of 2014 by establishing a foundation for long-term
development assistance.
The United States has executed more than 5,325 community
stabilization activities, most of which were short-term and targeted at
sources of instability by connecting communities to nascent subnational
government in key areas. These programs have generated more than 14.5
million employment days through short-term income generation, as well
as provided livelihood assistance to more than 36,000 individuals
suffering losses because of military operations.
Progress on stabilization can be difficult to measure because the
concept is subjective and contextual, and monitoring and evaluation is
challenging in a fluid political-security environment such as
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, recent independent survey research
evaluating the impact of USAID stabilization programs is encouraging:
Research by Altai Consulting for USAID's Afghanistan
Stabilization Initiative found that in Kandahar's Argandhab and
Zari districts, where subnational government institutions have
only recently been reestablished, the vast majority of Afghan
respondents said they looked first to local government to help
solve their problems;
Research by the Afghanistan Center for Social Research for
USAID's Local Governance and Community Development program
found that the stabilizing impact of improved service delivery
increases significantly when GIRoA is seen as the provider
rather than an international agency or nongovernmental
organization.
Anecdotal evidence also supports these findings. For example, the
Taliban's recruitment campaign in the Jalriz district of Wardak
province this spring faltered for the first time when hundreds of
likely recruits employed in a USAID-funded reconstruction project
preferred repairing their own irrigation systems to fighting, and the
community stood by this decision, even when threatened with Taliban
reprisals.
Question #6. What percentage of FY11 and FY12 resources will be
spent on stabilization programs in Afghanistan by region?
Answer. In FY 2011, we have notionally allocated $241 million to
explicit stabilization programs, which is approximately 12 percent of
the total FY 2011 USAID budget. Stabilization programs are designed to
be flexible and responsive to needs on the ground, so it is difficult
to provide precise estimates of future stabilization resource
allocation by region. That said, a significant portion of stabilization
resources in FY 2011 and FY 2012 are likely to be allocated to the
relatively more kinetic areas of the south, southwest and east. Actual
resources spent will depend on a number of factors and will require
flexibility to respond to unstable areas in the north and west.
Table 1 provides a regional breakdown of the percentage of
estimated money disbursed on programs under our stabilization portfolio
for FY 2009 through the second quarter of FY 2011. This table reflects
data only for our programs explicitly designated for stabilization, but
does not reflect a range of other USAID programs that also contribute
to our stabilization goals, such as agriculture stabilization,
subnational governance programs, and health and education programs that
are implemented in Key Terrain Districts. This money was already
disbursed out of Spend Plans prior to the FY 2010 supplemental and
reflects the reported estimated disbursements made by USAID
implementing partners to implement the projects.
Table 2 shows the percentage of money disbursed in each region
allocated to stabilization from FY 2009 through the second quarter of
FY 2011.
Question #7. A recent report from the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee entitled ``Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to
Afghanistan'' noted ``with the upcoming transition to an Afghan
security lead in 2014 and the increased responsibilities our civilians
will absorb from the military, we have a critical planning window right
now to make any necessary changes to support a successful transition.''
According to World Bank data, the total aid to Afghanistan was 91
percent of GDP in 2010/2011 (private sector investment was only 4.3
percent). Even under optimistic scenarios, the Afghan budget will not
be fiscally sustainable in the medium term. Operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs will be the largest liability, accounting for twice as much
as domestic revenues by 2021. Under conservative estimates of declining
aid, the Afghan budget deficit will reach 30 percent of GDP by 2021
with additional O&M costs. By comparison, Greece's budget crisis took
place at a deficit of about 13 percent of GDP.
Please explain why we are continuing to fund new
infrastructure projects such as those proposed under the Afghan
Infrastructure Fund when the Afghan Government has limited to
no capability to sustain such projects, particularly operations
and maintenance costs.
Please describe the civilian transition planning that is
underway, with particular emphasis on how our assistance such
as ``foundational investments'' in economic growth,
infrastructure and human capital is sustainable under Afghan
control.
Answer. The administration recognizes that in order to achieve our
long-term infrastructure goals for Afghanistan, we need to build a
shared vision among the Afghans, the international community, and the
private sector on a prioritized list of infrastructure and energy
investments as well as develop Afghan capacity to sustain these
investments. The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), while designed
as a joint civil-military approach to meet the critical needs of the
war effort in Afghanistan, has also been designed to incorporate
elements that will contribute to the long-term sustainability of
Afghanistan's infrastructure. AIF funds will support USAID's work with
Afghanistan's national power utility, Da Afghan Breshna Sherkhat
(DABS), to extend the North East Power System (NEPS) into communities
in eastern Afghanistan. By working with DABS on this project, USAID
will build DABS capacity to oversee, implement, and manage such large-
scale infrastructure projects. Further, the long-term sustainability of
this and other AIF investments is linked with USAID's ongoing capacity-
building and commercialization efforts to increase DABS revenue and
management capacity. As a result of this ongoing support, the Kabul-
based division of DABS has already doubled revenues in just 2 years, an
amount equivalent to the total USAID investment in the utility. As the
program expands to seven additional cities, it will be complemented by
a new USAID program that will build capacity in engineering,
procurement, project management, and operations and maintenance. The
Afghans have already begun expanding DABS commercialization efforts
outside of Kabul without international assistance, another sign of
progress and increasing Afghan capacity.
The statement attributed to the World Bank, that ``total aid to
Afghanistan was 91 percent of GDP in 2010/2011 (private sector
investment was only 4.3 percent)'' is sometimes misinterpreted as
meaning that international aid constitutes 91 percent of the Afghan
GDP. That is incorrect. In fact, total international aid to Afghanistan
was roughly equivalent to 91 percent of Afghan GDP. At the same time,
we recognize that transition will affect Afghanistan's short to midterm
fiscal sustainability. To address this, we are working to attract
increased private sector investment, build the capacity of Afghan
institutions to collect and manage revenue (e.g., there has been a 200-
percent increase in customs revenues alone since 2006), and focus on
foundational investments in sectors most likely to drive mid- and long-
term economic growth, such as extractive industries.
Our continued support for Afghanistan as a development and
strategic partner will be important as the transition to Afghan-led
security gains momentum. This requires foundational investments that
promote economic growth and improve the government's capacity to
generate revenue, strengthen national and subnational governance,
enhance the capacity of the government to deliver rule of law and
justice, improve accountability, and support Afghan leadership,
sustainability, and capacity across our assistance program.
Foundational investments in infrastructure (energy and water) enable
the most promising economic growth sectors in agriculture and the
extractive industries. Complementary foundational investments in human
capacity development and financial inclusion will increase Afghan human
and institutional self-sufficiency and help build transparency in
Afghanistan's financial system. As Afghan capacity increases and as
transition progresses, USAID's role will shift away from stabilization
and services provision and move toward supporting the Afghan Government
and civil society as these institutions provide essential services,
engage the private sector, leverage donor support, and increasingly
integrate Afghanistan into the regional economy. In this support role,
the United States will have a much more conventional development
relationship with Afghanistan.
Question #8. Wage levels for Afghan Government staff such as
teachers, health workers and administrative staff can range from $50 to
$100 per month. By contrast, drivers, assistants and translators for
aid projects are paid upward of $1,000 per month. Based on
conversations with senior Embassy Kabul officials, my staff learned
that 40 Afghans working in professional positions within the government
received between $3,000 and $5,000 per month in salary supplements from
the U.S. Government under a program that ended in March. According to
SIGAR, many of these donor-supported positions fall outside the
government's budgeting process and staffing charts.
Please describe in detail the steps the administration is
taking to standardize Afghan salaries and operate within Afghan
Government staffing constraints.
Answer. As reported by SIGAR and the World Bank, the presence of
the international community in Afghanistan has had an impact on the
labor market, particularly related to salaries. The U.S. Government
recognizes the challenges this presents and has taken a number of steps
to address the situation. First, the United States, along with others
in the international community, have agreed to increasingly shift
technical assistance through the Civilian Technical Assistance Program
(CTAP), an innovative mechanism run through the Afghan Ministry of
Finance that allows donors to contribute funds to be used by the Afghan
Government to directly hire technical experts. The United States has
disbursed approximately $5.5 million to CTAP, but plans to increase
this to $30 million overall. Use of CTAP will help reduce salary
inflation by decreasing the number of expensive expatriate technical
advisors and allowing the Afghan Government to select its own technical
experts at reduced rates.
Second, the United States has supported the Afghan Government as it
implements a series of pay-and-grade reforms that will create the
groundwork for a more structured hiring and management process within
the civil service. Assistance in this area has supported analysis of
workforce roles, salary surveys to generate data from the private and
public sector for jobs, and development of a pay and classification
system for implementation of the new pay and grade system.
Question #9. Does the administration support a multiyear
authorization bill for U.S. civilian assistance to Afghanistan as
described in the committee's report ``Evaluating U.S. Foreign
Assistance to Afghanistan''? If so, please describe the steps you will
take to work with Congress and this committee to help shape such an
authorization.
Answer. One of the key recommendations of the May 2011 SFRC report
was to pursue the option of a multiyear authorization bill for U.S.
civilian assistance to Afghanistan. In the current resource-constrained
budget environment and in light of the uncertainties surrounding
security transition leading toward 2014, it is not clear that now is
the most opportune time to pursue this kind of multiyear agreement. The
example of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman multiyear assistance package for
Pakistan demonstrates the difficulty of fulfilling such commitments in
this constrained budget environment as well as under the changing
diplomatic and development conditions. That being said, the
administration is open to continued dialogue on the topic.
Question #10. Contractors are an important part of our strategy in
Afghanistan, as implementing partners for USAID projects, as support
personnel for the Embassy, and as experts who are helping build the
capacity of the Afghan Government. However, there are too many reports
of waste, fraud and abuse, and SIGAR, DOD and State Inspectors General
have raised concerns about the State Department's lack of sufficient
oversight. Contracting is difficult in the best of circumstances; it is
much more challenging in war zones, where the preference is to hire
local contractors and use local nationals, and where there is enormous
pressure to award contracts rapidly.
(a) Please describe the steps the INL Bureau is taking to
increase contractor oversight in Afghanistan, including
increasing the number and quality of contracting officer
representatives to oversee INL projects.
Answer. INL continues to strengthen contract oversight for
Afghanistan. Key among those improvements were increasing the INL
contract administration personnel in the field, refining Standard
Operating Procedures for ICORs operating in theater to be fully
implemented by September 30, 2011; increasing the number of staff for
conducting reconciliation on historical invoices; and establishing
remote field access to the Contracting Officer Representative's files
here in Washington, DC. The number of contract administration personnel
in the field fluctuates due to normal personnel transition schedules,
but currently 10 contract administration personnel are in Afghanistan,
three will begin predeployment training shortly, and four are going
through the clearance process. INL also increased the number of staff
conducting historical invoice reconciliation (those invoices prior to
2007) from a total of 10 staff in 2007 to the current total of 16 by
working on invoices for both Iraq and Afghanistan. The enhancement to
INL contract administration oversight resulted in a higher rejection
rate (31 percent) for all INL Afghanistan task order invoices. Beyond
that, the transfer of contract support for the Afghanistan National
Police training program to the Department of Defense means that INL
oversight can focus on other program areas, amplifying the impact of
the steps that we have already taken.
(b) Please describe the steps USAID is taking to increase
contractor oversight in Afghanistan, including increasing the
number and quality of contracting officer representatives to
oversee USAID projects.
Answer. USAID is taking a number of steps to increase oversight in
its assistance programs. First, USAID has created a new Division within
the Office of Acquisition and Assistance called Compliance and
Oversight of Partner Performance (COPP). The Division was formally
inaugurated in February 2011 and has already completed more than 40
suspension and debarment actions agencywide, based largely on referrals
from the OIG. Though the COPP Division is located in Washington, DC, it
works closely with our Kabul Mission.
More specific to Afghanistan, USAID has 71 staff in Kabul working
in oversight capacities in auditing, contracting, and financial
management. USAID/Afghanistan also has 84 certified Contracting
Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs). In addition, in 2010 USAID
developed the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (A3) to
help prevent assistance directly or inadvertently supporting malign
groups or being diverted from their development purpose by extortion or
corruption. As a result of this initiative, USAID is implementing
safeguards in four areas, two of which strengthen our preaward
processes and two that strengthen our post-award process. For example,
USAID/ Afghanistan now includes a subcontractor clause in new awards
that permits USAID to restrict the number of subcontract tiers,
requires the prime contractor to perform a certain percentage of the
work and prohibits subcontractors from passing the work to another
party, thereby reducing the risk for corruption. Another example is
that USAID is increasing its financial controls through a joint program
with the USAID Inspector General to audit all locally incurred costs of
program-funded implementing partners. Audits will be performed by
internationally accredited regionally based audit firms and checked by
the Inspector General. Oversight will all be increased through the
establishment of On-Site Monitors (OSMs) in USAID field offices for
project monitoring. Each USAID project will be assigned an OSM that
will provide real time data to contract staff in Kabul on project
performance and accountability. Finally, in an effort to make projects
more manageable and to improve program oversight, in some cases USAID
has moved from larger contracts to smaller, more regional based
contracts with durations of 1 year, with an option for extension years.
This model enables us to assume more flexibility in terminating poorly
performing contractors from long-term projects.
Question #11. While the World Bank's ARTF is a valuable instrument
through which the United States can and should disburse aid, we believe
the administration should push for more robust supervision from the
World Bank on the ARTF, including greater field oversight and more
consistent application of the metrics and benchmarks of the ARTF
Incentive Program. While the World Bank has strengthened its oversight
for the Recurrent Window, by requiring provincial site visits to ensure
comprehensive M&E, and for the Investment Window, by recruiting a
Monitoring Agent, additional Kabul-based World Bank staff would further
strengthen program management, particularly as increasing demands are
placed on the ARTF by donors and by GIRoA to support the critical
period of Afghanistan's transition. The administration should also
consider using the ARTF for a smaller number of big ``national
programs'' like the National Solidarity Program to improve focus and
oversight.
What steps is the administration taking to push for more
robust supervision from the World Bank on the ARTF?
How many programs is the ARTF currently sponsoring? Please
list all the programs.
Answer. As a significant contributor to the World Bank's ARTF, the
United States has played a prominent role in guiding the World Bank's
management and supervision of funds. The United States actively
participates in the ARTF Management Committee meetings and working
groups including: Financial Strategy; Program Strategy, and Incentive
Program working groups. Recent financial, strategy and incentive
program working group discussions have reviewed the financial status of
the ARTF, assessed the Afghan Government's performance in meeting the
incentive program benchmarks, proposed increased oversight of the
Recurrent Window (salaries and O&M), and considered donor action
related to the lack of an Afghanistan IMF program.
Quarterly, ARTF Donors meet to discuss broader ARTF strategy with
the Afghan Government and with the ARTF Management Committee which
includes the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the U.N. This oversight combined with rigorous
independent audit mechanisms required of the ARTF (including GAO,
SIGAR, and other donor audits) ensures robust supervision.
At the technical level, weekly reports (and sometimes daily
updates) are provided by the ARTF program managers and by key project
managers, including in particular the National Solidarity Program.
Specific details of ARTF programs are covered in quarterly and
annual reports. The most recent annual report is located: http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanistan-
Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/Quartely_Report_Mar2010_Mar2011.pdf.
Current Investment Window projects of the ARTF are as follows:
Question #12. We are concerned about the implications of the IMF
negotiations with the Afghan Government on the ARTF.
What are the consequences on our aid disbursements through
the ARTF if the Afghan Government and IMF cannot agree on a
program?
Answer. The United States has set aside $400 million in FY 2010
supplemental funds to support the ARTF, of which $250 million is
designated for the Investment Window, specifically to the National
Solidarity Program (NSP). We have yet to distribute any of those funds
to the ARTF. This is due in part to the lack of resolution over an IMF
agreement. Some programs and windows within the ARTF are bound by the
presence of an IMF country program or extended credit facility. The
absence of an IMF country program has already prevented the
disbursement of $70 million in Incentive Program discretionary funds to
the Afghan Government and had a strong influence on the World Bank's
position not to disburse quarterly $50 million payments to the ARTF
Recurrent Costs Window--a position that the U.S. supports.
The World Bank has asked donors to consider ``delinking''
Investment Window contributions from resolution of the IMF impasse. In
doing so, the World Bank is seeking to create the conditions that would
allow critical development projects such as NSP, higher education,
skills development, irrigation, governance, and justice projects, to
continue operating. This would also prevent new national programs
outlined in the ARTF Financing Strategy for this year from being
postponed, in the absence of additional ARTF funding. Regardless of the
donor decision on continued support to the Investment Window, the
absence of additional disbursements to the Recurrent Cost Window may
lead the Afghan Government to reprioritize its discretionary spending
towards paying civil servant salaries.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. Please comment on the issue of the tax that U.S.
contractors pay to the Government of Afghanistan. Are there any efforts
to overturn this policy? Evidently, the Afghan Government has been
sending past-due tax bills to U.S.-based companies in direct
contravention of existing bilateral agreements that prohibit such
taxation. Many of these companies are delivering stabilization and
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan funded through American taxes.
Taxing such U.S. foreign assistance diverts it from its intended
purpose and hampers its effectiveness. Further, is there any
information on different standards for treatment of local contractors
or U.S. or other coalition contractors?
Answer. The taxation of foreign contractors operating in
Afghanistan, as in most countries, is a complex issue and one that is
complicated by the variety of tax exemptions related to the U.S.
Government and its contractors. ISAF is governed by the Military
Technical Agreement (MTA); DOD is governed by the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA); USAID and State's International Narcotics and Law
(INL) assistance programs are governed by program-specific bilateral
agreements; and, the U.S. Embassy's tax and duty exemptions are based
on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).
You expressed concern that the Afghan Government is presenting tax
bills in contravention of existing agreements. We are aware that some
foreign contractors have received tax bills from the Afghan Government.
In a number of cases, the tax bill was for income derived from
activities that were not tax exempt, for income mistakenly reported by
the contractor as taxable instead of tax exempt, or resulted from the
contractor's failure to properly register its activities as tax exempt.
In other cases, however, taxes may have been assessed on activities
that were properly exempt from taxes where the contractor sought to
register them as such. In some of these cases, the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul has worked with the contractor and with the Afghan Government to
resolve the matter. Other contractors, on their own, have worked with
the Afghan Government to reduce their tax bills and ensure their
compliance with applicable law.
The Afghanistan Country Commercial Guide issued by the U.S.
Commercial Service at U.S. Embassy Kabul includes a description of the
tax treatment of a range of U.S. agency contractors. It is available
online at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/afghanistan/231771/PDFs/
2011ccg_afghanistan-final.pdf and http://trade.gov/static/
2011CCG_Afghan.pdf. USAID has also made available detailed information
on tax issues related to USAID assistance to Afghanistan, including an
information sheet specific to its implementing partners, which can be
found at http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/legal/taxation/.
Additionally, lawyers and contracting officers from both the U.S.
Embassy and DOD have formed a working group to coordinate responses to
USG implementing partners with concerns about improper taxation
(including back taxes) to ensure consistent messaging and
responsiveness. In addition, the Embassy has consistently recommended
that U.S. companies retain local counsel specializing in taxation
matters.
Regarding local contractors, the Afghan Government does assert its
authority to tax its own nationals, which is consistent with the
position taken by the U.S. Government with respect to U.S. nationals
and as is commonly recognized in bilateral assistance agreements.
Question. In your statement, with regard to the civilian surge of
personnel in Afghanistan, you stated that ``improving governance,
creating economic opportunity, and supporting civil society is vital to
solidifying our military gains and advancing our political goals.''
While the President asserted that the military would begin to drawdown
in July and complete the withdrawal of at least 10,000 by the end of
2011 and another 23,000 no later than September 2012.
a. What number of civilians do you expect to be withdrawn
over the same time period?
Answer. Our civilian presence in Afghanistan is closely coordinated
with the U.S. military and our NATO allies and partners, and is an
integral part of the administration's strategy to disrupt, defeat, and
dismantle al-Qaeda. Civilians are partnering with the military on
District Support Teams, Regional Platforms and Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. As provinces are transferred to Afghan security
lead and as the military phases out these civilian-military field
platforms, our plan is to gradually reduce our civilian field presence
from our approved 1,227 positions--725 in Kabul and 405 in the field--
and fold the remaining personnel into enduring presence platforms:
Kabul, plus two to four regional outposts or consulates by 2015. These
changes would reduce the field number to about 200.
b. What specific programs and resources have been
identified, within the U.S. whole of government approach to
stabilization and reconstruction and development that the Obama
administration has taken in Afghanistan, for reduction to align
with the President's newly formulated strategy?
Answer. USAID and the State Department are currently undertaking
planning exercises for the civilian presence post-transition. These
exercises recognize that we will need to gradually reallocate civilian
assistance resources to more closely match long-term needs and
priorities as we move toward transition. Closer to 2014, we anticipate
a need for increased civilian resources in some sectors, as State and
USAID inherit some roles and responsibilities formerly funded by the
U.S. military that are essential to a responsible transition. For
example, as the U.S. military draws down, the State Department may need
additional funds to ensure the successful transition of U.S. military
detention facilities to Afghan control. At the same time, transition
offers the opportunity for the United States to shift to a more
``traditional'' assistance relationship with Afghanistan with a longer
term focus and a reduction in short-term stabilization and
counterinsurgency-focused programs.
We will continue to make priority/foundational investments in key
sectors identified in cooperation with the Afghan Government (such as
energy, infrastructure, and human capacity). Design and implementation
of these programs will focus intensely on sustainability and regional
integration as our programs transition away from stabilization and
focus more exclusively on long-term sustainable development.
c. Describe the limits of the narrower approach to achieving
more specific and achievable goals. Do you expect the next
budget request to reflect similar levels as the most recent or
should Congress expect to see significant reductions in
economic and security assistance requests?
Answer. The FY 2013 budget request is still being developed within
the Department of State and USAID, and final recommendations on overall
levels of assistance for Afghanistan have yet to be made by Secretary
Clinton. As the military draws down and more responsibilities
transition to an Afghan lead, some funding in sectors explicitly tied
to stabilization and counterinsurgency could be scaled back in parts of
Afghanistan. However, as we focus on transition and sustainable
foundational investments (such as infrastructure, economic growth, and
capacity-building), assistance levels may need to increase in some
areas to address these priorities. We have begun a multiagency review
of our economic strategy in Afghanistan as we move toward transition,
with a goal of prioritizing projects or foundational investments that
will allow Afghanistan to generate revenues, particularly from the
extractive industries, to minimize dependence on donor assistance.
Question. You and others have stated that Pakistan will play an
important role in a political resolution to the Afghanistan conflict.
Describe what role other neighbors or other nations will
play in a political resolution, including India, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Russia, and China.
Answer. To complement our efforts within Afghanistan, the United
States and Afghanistan are both actively engaged in regional diplomacy
to seek support for a political solution to the conflict. The Afghan
Government has engaged the Pakistani Government to secure its support
for reconciliation, and both countries agreed in January to form a
Joint Peace Commission, which had its first meeting on June 11. The
United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have established a core group
to support reconciliation, which has met twice since May 3. Special
Representative Grossman has begun regular consultations with interested
regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Turkey, and
India. Our diplomatic surge is building on and consolidating the gains
made by our military and civilian surges, and helping to make Afghan-
led reconciliation and reintegration achievable and sustainable.
Question. What if any role will the United Nations play in the
political resolution?
Answer. The U.N. plays an important role in the political
resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. The mandate of the U.N.
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) includes as one of its
priorities support to an Afghan-led process of peace and
reconciliation. Through the ``Salaam Support Group,'' UNAMA has been
supporting and advising the High Peace Council (HPC). In consultation
with the HPC, UNAMA has engaged provincial council representatives,
religious and community leaders, as well as civil society, youth,
women's groups, and emerging political groups to discuss peace and
reconciliation in an inclusive dialogue with all segments of the Afghan
population. UNAMA also plays an important role in the reintegration
process through the UNDP administered Afghan Peace and Reintegration
Fund (APRF). The Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) is
further mandated to support regional cooperation to work toward a
stable and prosperous Afghanistan.
Question. What specific roles are envisioned for the United Nations
as the individual partners and the broad coalition, including the
United States, depart Afghanistan?
Answer. As the military mission winds down during the transition
process, civilian assistance to Afghanistan will remain a high priority
for the United States and our international partners. The U.N. Security
Council in March 2011(UNSC Resolution 1974) asked the U.N. Secretary
General to review the scope of the mandate for UNAMA in the light of
the transition process and with the aim of strengthening Afghan
leadership and ownership, to make sure that the next mandate reflects
the changed environment. The review process is still in its early
stages.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will continue to be
an agent-partner in delivering development assistance, focusing mainly
capacity development for government ministries in areas of democratic
governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery. UNDP's
2010-13 Country Program for Afghanistan
was resources at USD 1.1 billion funded entirely through donors'
voluntary contributions.
Question. Please provide a list of the countries, by year, that
have received waivers to the national budget transparency requirement
enshrined in recent appropriations acts requiring that no ``funds
appropriated . . . may be made available for assistance for the central
government of any country that fails to make publicly available on an
annual basis its national budget, to include income and expenditures''
unless waived by the Secretary of State because it ``is in the national
interests of the United States.'' Please also indicate whether
Afghanistan and Pakistan have received waivers and, if so, what steps
they are taking to improve budget transparency.
Answer. Countries receiving fiscal transparency waivers from FY
2009-11 include:
FY 2011 *
East Asia and Pacific: Cambodia*
Near East: Algeria,* Egypt,* Lebanon,* Libya, Yemen
South & Central Asia: Afghanistan,* Kyrgyzstan,* Tajikistan,*
Turkmenistan,* Uzbekistan*
Western Hemisphere: Dominican Republic,* Nicaragua
Africa: Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar,** Niger,
Somalia, Swaziland*
FY 2010
East Asia and Pacific: Cambodia
Near East: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South & Central Asia: Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Western Hemisphere: Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua
Africa: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Cote
d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Madagascar, Senegal, Somalia, Swaziland
FY 2009
East Asia and Pacific: Cambodia
Near East: Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South & Central Asia: Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Western Hemisphere: Bolivia, D.R., Dominica, Nicaragua, St. Vincent
Africa: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo-B, Cote
d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Niger,
Somalia, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia
* Indicates that Deputy Secretary Nides has already signed the
transparency waiver.
In FY 2011 Afghanistan received a fiscal transparency waiver, as
its budget was not deemed to be sufficiently available to the public.
For example, it is difficult to find data on the external component of
Afghanistan's budget, including external assistance provided by donors.
Afghan budget numbers do not adequately reflect the low execution rate
for the development budget. U.S. support for strengthening the capacity
of Afghan institutions helps increase budget transparency. The Afghans
have taken positive steps in this direction. The Ministry of Finance
(MOF) drafted a Public Financial Framework in July 2010 to strengthen
budget execution and fiduciary controls.
The MOF also posts annual government budgets online, as it has
since 2004, in addition to mid-year reviews of the budget and
government execution and disbursement reports.
Pakistan did not receive a budget waiver in FY 2011, as its budget
was assessed as sufficiently transparent.
Question. On March 11, 2011, I wrote to you to seek answers to
questions about the administration's March 7 statement with regard to
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
On May 18, 2011, I received a letter signed by the Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs purporting to respond to my
questions. The information contained with this letter was not
responsive to my questions.
Will you review the response to my letter and ensure that I
receive responsive answers to my questions?
Answer. As noted in the Legal Advisor's responses to questions from
the June 28, 2011, hearing, the administration's statement of March 7,
2011, resulted from a comprehensive interagency review, including the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, of current U.S. law and
military practice. The statement also reflects the longstanding view of
the United States that Article 75 contains fundamental guarantees of
humane treatment (e.g., prohibitions against torture) to which all
persons in the power of a party to an international armed conflict are
entitled. In 1987, President Reagan informed the Senate that although
the United States had serious concerns with Additional Protocol I,
``this agreement has certain meritorious elements . . . that could be
of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to
international armed conflicts.'' For this reason, he noted, the United
States was in the process of developing appropriate methods for
``incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that govern
our military operations, and as customary international law.'' As a
general matter, the executive branch previously has taken the position
that certain norms, including those reflected in treaties to which the
United States is not a party (e.g., the Law of the Sea Convention, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), constitute customary
international law.
a. The Administration determined that existing U.S. treaty
obligations, domestic law, and regulations related to the treatment of
detainees in armed conflict substantially overlap with the obligations
that Article 75 imposes on States Party to Additional Protocol I.
Examples of where many of the provisions of Article 75 are already
reflected in existing U.S. law and regulations include: Common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; the War
Crimes Act of 1996, as amended; the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005; the
Military Commissions Act of 2009; the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
DOD Directive 2310.01E (``The Department of Defense Detainee
Program''); and Army Regulation 190-8 (``Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees'').
Consistent with this set of existing and overlapping requirements in
U.S. law, the administration also determined that current U.S. military
practices are fully consistent with the requirements of Article 75.
Accordingly, the administration considered it appropriate to state that
the United States will choose to abide by the principles set forth in
Article 75 applicable to detainees in international armed conflicts out
of a sense of legal obligation, and that we would expect other states
to do the same.
b. Following our March 7 statement, there was some speculation as
to why we referred to the application of Article 75 specifically in the
context of ``international armed conflict.'' The simple explanation is
that Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, like all of Additional
Protocol I, is intended by its terms to be applied to international
armed conflict. Our statement should not be taken to suggest that
similar protections should not apply in noninternational armed
conflict. It only reflects the fact that corresponding protections with
respect to noninternational armed conflict are memorialized elsewhere--
in particular, in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
Articles 4 through 6 of Additional Protocol II, both of which apply to
noninternational armed conflicts.
Although the United States is not yet party to Additional Protocol
II, as part of the review process described above, the administration,
including the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, also reviewed
its current practices with respect to Additional Protocol II, and found
them to be fully consistent with those provisions, subject to
reservations, understandings, and declarations that were submitted to
the Senate in 1987, along with refinements and additions that we will
submit. Accordingly, on March 7, 2011, the administration also
announced its intent to seek Senate advice and consent to ratification
of Additional Protocol II as soon as practicable. We believe that
ratification of Additional Protocol II will be an important complement
to the step we have taken with respect to Article 75. We look forward
to working with you, as ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, on this most important matter.
c. As a matter of international law, the administration's statement
is likely to be received as a statement of the U.S. Government's opinio
juris as well as a reaffirmation of U.S. practice in this area. The
statement is therefore also likely to be received as a significant
contribution to the crystallization of the principles contained in
Article 75 as rules of customary international law applicable in
international armed conflict.
Determining that a principle has become customary international law
requires a rigorous legal analysis to determine whether such principle
is supported by a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation. Although there is no precise
formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, one frequently
used standard is that state practice must be extensive and virtually
uniform, including among States particularly involved in the relevant
activity (i.e., specially affected States). The U.S. statement, coupled
with a sufficient density of State practice and opinio juris, would
contribute to creation of the principles reflected in Article 75 as
rules of customary international law, which all States would be
obligated to apply in international armed conflict. (The 168 States
that are party to Protocol I are of course already required to comply
with Article 75 as a matter of treaty law.)
d. As discussed above, the administration's statement followed from
a determination that existing U.S. law and regulations impose
requirements on U.S. officials that substantially overlap with the
requirements of Article 75. The statement does not alter those
statutory and regulatory requirements. If Article 75 were determined to
be customary international law, it would have the same effect on U.S.
law as other customary international legal norms. The United States has
long recognized customary international law, whether reflected in
treaty provisions or otherwise, as U.S. law (see, e.g., the Supreme
Court's discussion of customary international law in The Paquete Habana
175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
afghanistan
While in Afghanistan on June 6, 2011, Secretary Gates said that
pulling out of Afghanistan too fast would threaten the gains made in
the 18 months since the ``surge'' of 30,000 troops. Secretary Gates
told Marines in Afghanistan, ``If you guys and everybody keeps the
pressure on, we can hang onto everything we've gained over the last
year to 18 months, we can expand the security bubble beyond that. . . .
We have succeeded in stopping the Taliban's momentum . . . but we've
just kind of turned that corner and I think we need to keep the
pressure on.'' In Kabul, he appealed for patience and said that only
modest U.S. troop reductions would make sense this summer in a still
unstable Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition commanders I met on the ground
in Afghanistan have repeatedly told me that it's too early to make
major changes, and some believe it will take until the end of this
fighting season to get a true assessment of the conditions on the
ground in Afghanistan. I trust our military leadership to make the
right decision based on their assessment of the conditions on the
ground. Some argue that, with Osama bin Laden dead, our mission in
Afghanistan is complete. The killing of Osama bin Laden was a great
victory, but our mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that it can never
again become a staging area for terrorist attacks against the American
homeland.
Question. What specific conditions must be met to determine the
extent of a U.S. troop drawdown this year, next year, and in 2014?
Answer. As the President laid out in his June 22 speech, the United
States will withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of
2011; the remaining 23,000 ``surge'' troops he announced in December
2009 will leave Afghanistan by the end of summer 2012. Beyond this
initial reduction of the surge, the process of transition will continue
as Afghan security forces move into the lead, and our mission will
shift from combat to support. In line with the President's speech, the
commander on the ground will determine the pace and reinvestment of the
remaining security forces based on these comprehensive assessments. By
2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan
people will be responsible for their security.
Question. Which conditions have been met to date?
Answer. We have made substantial progress on the objectives the
President laid out in his December 2009 speech at West Point, where he
put forth a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan focusing on
disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and preventing its
capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. To
accomplish this, he said we would pursue three objectives: deny al-
Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the
capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and government so
that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. We
have exceeded expectations on the core goal of defeating al-Qaeda--
killing more than half of its top 30 leaders, including Osama Bin
Laden. We have broken the Taliban's momentum, particularly in their
traditional strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and trained
over 100,000 ANSF. Building on that progress, the United States and its
international partners are now working with the Afghans, through a
process approved by the international community, to restore Afghanistan
to full sovereignty and to assist them in resuming full responsibility
for both security and service delivery by 2014. The first tranche of
seven provinces and municipalities, which have been vetted and approved
for transition, will begin their transfer to Afghan lead July 20.
Question. What conditions would cause a delay in the withdrawal of
troops?
Answer. As the President stated in his speech, as a result of the
progress in Afghanistan 10,000 troops will depart Afghanistan by the
end of 2011 with 23,000 additional troops departing by September 2012.
The 68,000 troops that constituted the base force in place before the
surge will remain and then begin gradually coming home as Afghan
security forces move into the lead. Independent monthly provincial
assessments provided by ISAF and NATO track security and governance
across all Afghan provinces. In line with the President's speech, the
commander on the ground will determine the pace and reinvestment of the
remaining security forces based on these comprehensive assessments.
Question. What conditions must be met to transition to Afghan
control?
Answer. Transition is linked directly to and in the service of the
larger political process that was introduced by Secretary Clinton in
her Asia Society speech on February 18, 2011. In pursuit of this goal,
we are following a strategy with three mutually reinforcing tracks--
three surges: a military offensive against al-Qaeda and Taliban
insurgents, a civilian campaign to bolster the governments, economies,
and civil societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan to undercut the pull of
the insurgency, and an intensified diplomatic push to bring the Afghan
conflict to an end and chart a new and more secure future for the
region. The Afghan National Security Forces need to be equipped and
capable of sustaining achieved security gains with minimal overwatch
from coalition military partners. This will concurrently provide the
space for the Afghan Government to continue to build capacity within
local and provincial offices in order to provide basic services to the
people and opportunities for external private sector investment to
grow. As the first two surges transition, the final diplomatic surge
becomes the focus of our political efforts. It envisions a political
process operating on all levels, including the region and Afghanistan's
neighbors, and encouraging Afghans to address their own internal
political challenges.
Question. What are the minimum conditions that must be achieved in
Afghanistan in order for Afghans to be able to sustain stability with
relatively limited international assistance?
Answer. All provinces will have completed security transition by
the end of 2014. The timing of each province's transition will be
determined through a review process that has been established by the
Afghans and supported by the international community that will take
account of the capacity of local security forces to maintain security.
For all partners and allies, there will be issued guidance, but not a
template. Plans will be developed around each province's unique
circumstances that are not formulaic, or excessively prescriptive. The
Afghan National Security Forces need to be equipped and capable of
sustaining achieved security gains with minimal overwatch from
coalition military partners. This will concurrently provide the space
for the Afghan Government to continue to build capacity within local
and provincial offices in order to provide basic services to the people
and opportunities for external private sector investment to grow.
Question. What impact would a failure in Afghanistan have on U.S.
national security in the long term?
Answer. Our strategic objective in Afghanistan remains to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and to prevent its return to
Afghanistan, where it could once again threaten the United States and
our allies. We know the consequences of disengaging from this region
and letting despair and extremism take hold. Afghanistan is at the
heart of a region with over 2 billion people and two nuclear weapon
states. Long-term stability here is a vital U.S. national interest.
This is why even after our combat troops come home, we remain committed
to preserving their hard-won gains, and why our civilians will remain
engaged to help build and stabilize the region in the years to come.
Question. During my visit over the New Year's holiday, Afghan and
coalition personnel unanimously told me that setting the July 2011
timeline to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan had a
devastating effect on operations--it sent the wrong signal to the
Afghan people, our coalition partners, and the Taliban.
Do you believe the announcement of a July 2011 withdrawal
date negatively impacted operations?
Answer. No, the President's drawdown decision was based on the best
assessment of conditions on the ground. He has calibrated the drawdown
to match those conditions and his decision is in line with our
transition strategy. We are confident that we are on track and that the
drawdown he announced will unfold on the timelines set forth.