[Senate Hearing 112-182]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-182
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS RELATING TO COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTERNARCOTICS, AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 12, 2011
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
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71-959 WASHINGTON : 2012
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina, Chairman
JACK REED, Rhode Island ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Department of Defense Plans and Programs Relating to Counterterrorism,
Counternarcotics, and Building Partnership Capacity
april 12, 2011
Page
Reid, Garry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combatting Terrorism............................ 4
Schear, James A., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.............. 12
Wechsler, William F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats............................ 19
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS RELATING TO COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTERNARCOTICS, AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY
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TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Brown, and
Portman.
Committee staff member present: Mary J. Kyle, legislative
clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority
investigative counsel; and Michael J. Sistak, research
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and
Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Tyler Stephens,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to
Senator Brown; Gordon Gray, assistant to Senator Portman; Dave
Hanke, Grace Smitham, and Russ Thomasson, assistants to Senator
Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Hagan. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will now come to order. I appreciate my colleague
the Ranking Member Senator Portman for also joining us, and our
witnesses here today.
This afternoon, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee is actually holding its first hearing of the 112th
Congress and, as its name indicates, this subcommittee focuses
on new and non-traditional threats to our security and on the
capabilities we need to address those threats. This includes
threats ranging from terrorism to the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) to improvised explosive devices
(IED). We also oversee the development and use of the spectrum
of responses to these threats, from the most basic research to
the most advanced technologies, and the policies and programs
to counter these threats.
Today we will examine the plans and programs of the
Department of Defense (DOD) to counter a number of irregular
threats that fall under the oversight of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict (ASD-SOLIC), and Interdependent Capabilities, a very
long mouthful, better known as ASD-SOLIC.
Our witnesses this afternoon have responsibility for a wide
range of issues and the subcommittee looks forward to hearing
your views on current and emerging threats, as well as DOD's
plans and programs designed to respond to them. In particular,
these include counterterrorism, building political partnership
capacity, counternarcotics, stability operations, information
operations, and security assistance programs.
Mr. Garry Reid is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism and is
currently the acting Assistant Secretary for SOLIC. In this
position Mr. Reid has responsibility for DOD's plans and
programs for combatting terrorism, counterinsurgency, and other
aspects of irregular warfare.
Among these programs is the section 1206 train and equip
program for building the counterterrorism and stability
operations capabilities of partner foreign nations, which DOD
and the Department of State (DOS) jointly manage under an
innovative dual-key arrangement. Mr. Reid also oversees the
development and employment of special operations capabilities
as they relate to foreign internal defense, military
information support, and other indirect approaches to
countering transnational threats.
The United States and our allies continue to be threatened
by al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. As we
have seen in recent years, this threat emanates not only from
the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also
from al Qaeda franchises in Yemen, Somalia, and northwest
Africa. These groups have made clear their desire to strike
western and U.S. targets. We must remain mindful of the
potential for these groups to execute attacks with significant
and destabilizing effects, often with limited planning and at a
very low cost. The 2009 Christmas Day airliner bombing attempt
over Detroit is a chilling reminder of that fact.
The subcommittee looks forward to hearing of DOD's efforts
to counter these violent extremist groups, both indirectly
through training, advising, informational and other means, and
when necessary directly, through offensive military operations.
Dr. James Schear is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. Dr.
Schear has responsibility for DOD's role in global
stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign disaster
relief, humanitarian assistance, and international
peacekeeping. He also oversees DOD efforts to work with partner
nations to improve security and governments in areas of current
or potential conflict. These activities are an important part
of our efforts to reduce threats to our security and that of
our partners.
The activities overseen by Dr. Schear inherently involve
other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, and
I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will discuss DOD efforts as part
of the broader U.S. whole-of-government approach to improve the
stability and security of vulnerable populations and regions,
thereby reducing the ability of violent extremist groups to
take root, spread their message, recruit, and plan attacks
against the United States and our allies.
I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will also speak to U.S.
contributions to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations,
such as the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the form of military observers
and staff officers.
Mr. William Wechsler is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. Among other
things, Mr. Wechsler leads the development of DOD policies and
plans to disrupt the flow of illegal narcotics, counter the
threat from piracy, and interrupt the financing of violent
extremist groups. In terms of that counternarcotics mission,
one of the key authorities to provide assistance to domestic
and foreign law enforcement agencies will expire at the end of
this fiscal year. We look forward to hearing whether DOD
intends to request an extension of this authority and whether
any modifications are needed.
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that
disrupting the flow of money, the lifeblood of violent
extremist organizations and Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCO), could have a substantial impact on their
ability to recruit, sustain, and conduct operations.
Confronting the formal and informal networks that move illicit
goods requires a global effort involving interagency and
international partners. We look forward to hearing from Mr.
Wechsler regarding DOD's efforts to identify and counter these
networks and what more needs to be done as we move forward.
I am proud to note that many of the DOD efforts we will
discuss this afternoon are being carried out around the world
by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), many of whom I have to
say call North Carolina home. As always, we owe them and their
families a debt of gratitude for their sacrifice and service to
our country.
I'd like to now turn to my colleague and ranking member of
this subcommittee, Senator Portman, for his opening remarks.
Senator Portman.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate being
here with you for our first hearing and I look forward to
working with you and other members of the subcommittee on these
critical issues.
You just outlined some very difficult and complex
challenges we face, our military faces, our Nation faces, and I
join you in thanking these gentlemen for joining us and for
your service and for the service of so many men and women who
are today serving under you and serving in our military.
The determined and increasingly adaptive foes we have out
there continue to threaten our stability and safety of the
world, of certainly American citizens, here at home and abroad.
Again as Senator Hagan has outlined, we have huge challenges
ahead of us.
At the same time, we have a huge fiscal challenge here in
Washington. So as the world becomes more complex and more
difficult, we're also facing a looming fiscal crisis that all
of us know needs to be addressed. If it's not, it will only
further complicate our ability to navigate some of these
challenging issues that are raised today.
So part of what I think we'll look for in this subcommittee
will be to ensure that the threats that are out there are being
addressed, that the priorities of DOD are matched appropriately
with those threats, and to ensure that taxpayer dollars are
being used in the most efficient and cost-effective way
possible.
We've seen over the past couple of weeks and months that
it's difficult to predict what's going on around the world. If
anything, we've learned that it's mostly unpredictable. I don't
think any of us here would have expected the Arab spring to
have ushered in such big changes, going all the way from the
eastern Mediterranean to North Africa and down the Arabian
peninsula, over the past few months. These have enormous and I
think lasting implications for our security interests in the
area.
Sustained U.S. engagement in my view will be required,
particularly during this period of great transition, and
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda will be trying to take
advantage of this as well. We need to ensure that they're
unable to establish new bases of operation.
Closer to home, since we're also talking about
counternarcotics today, we have these TCOs that continue to
expand their reach, multi-billion dollar networks, often
expanding it ruthlessly, and affecting our citizens more and
more. While the threat posed by these organizations is great, I
think we have seen some successes. I would think the success in
Colombia, for instance, in partnering with the United States
has led to greater security, stability, and partnership with
the Colombian people. So I think we know we can make a
difference and we must.
Madam Chair, I'll be brief in my statement to get to the
witnesses because we have some terrific knowledge here to be
passed along to the committee and for the record. Again, I look
forward to hearing what DOD views as the greatest threats
facing our Nation, to ensure that we are aligned properly to
address those threats, what you're doing to counter them, and
what you think in terms of our current resourcing and statutory
authorities, are they sufficient to meet those threats.
So again, thank you all for being here today.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
I know that our three witnesses have all submitted written
testimony, so I would like to now call on you to share with us
your comments today, and then we'll have some questions. Mr.
Reid, if you can begin.
STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATTING TERRORISM
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Chairman Hagan. I started my Special
Forces career about 34 years ago on the rolling sand hills of
your beautiful State, which we referred to as ``Pine Land,''
and it's a pleasure to be back here with you today; and with
you, Senator Portman, as well. To the whole group here, thank
you for inviting all of us here today to testify and for the
opportunity to share with you the plans, policies, and programs
we pursue to address these important security threats you both
identified.
In terms of the entire office, the responsibilities of the
ASD-SOLIC, and Interdependent Capabilities span a wide range of
issue areas, from counterterrorism and direct action to
security assistance, humanitarian assistance, support to
multinational peacekeeping operations, and countering narcotics
trafficking. Each of us will speak to our own perspectives on
the current and emerging threats from the vantage point of our
respective portfolios, noting that these issues complement one
another as we collectively work together to support our U.S.
military forces and our national security policy to address
these threats.
As I'm sure you know, the Office of the ASD-SOLIC was
established to provide senior civilian supervision of special
operations activities and low intensity conflict, including
oversight of special operations policy and resources. We are
the principal civilian advisers to the Secretary of Defense on
these matters and provide senior management for special
operations and low intensity conflict within DOD.
As a policy office, the responsibilities of the ASD-SOLIC
are unique in that they include service secretary-like roles,
such as providing overall supervision of the preparation and
justification of special operations program and budget, while
also including providing civilian oversight and supervisory
responsibilities, such as developing policy and reviewing plans
for the conduct of sensitive special operations and
coordinating those activities within the interagency and
overseeing their execution.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combatting Terrorism, I serve as the principal
adviser to the ASD-SOLIC for DOD policies, plans, authorities,
and resources related to special operations, irregular warfare,
with special emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,
unconventional warfare (UW), sensitive special operations, and
other activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
In addition, I serve as the principal crisis manager for
the Office of the ASD-SOLIC in response to international or
domestic activities related to special operations and
combatting terrorism. I was also recently assigned
responsibility for overseeing DOD information operations and
we're integrating those activities into our SOLIC-wide
portfolio.
Within this broad set of responsibilities, one core mission
of my office is to provide oversight of the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), which has grown significantly since
2001. Created by Congress in 1986, SOCOM is charged with
responsibility to organize, train, and equip SOFs. These forces
are a uniquely specialized component of our U.S. Armed Forces,
trained to conduct operations, including counterterrorism, UW,
direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, military information support
operations, and counterproliferation of WMD, in areas under
enemy control or politically sensitive environments.
My office works closely with Admiral Eric Olson, the
commander of SOCOM and his staff, to ensure these forces have
the equipment and resources they need to perform their
demanding missions.
Several key initiatives we are pursuing in fiscal year 2012
and building towards 2013 and beyond will enhance SOCOM's
flexibility and effectiveness. These include: modifying and
expanding our heavy lift helicopter fleet, the MH-47 Golf;
recapitalizing our medium-lift fleet, the MH-60, and the Kilo
and Lima platform variants; increasing the total production of
our tilt-rotor CV-22 Ospreys, which have proven themselves in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.
We have also been working with the command to recapitalize
SOCOM's Vietnam-era C-130 gunship fleet with newer C-130 Juliet
models and to advance the nonstandard aviation program to
deliver a variety of smaller aircraft that provide intra-
theater lift capability. Through these and many other
initiatives, we are ensuring our special operators have the
tools they need to prevail in current and future conflicts.
As Secretary Gates has mentioned on many occasions,
America's dominance in traditional warfighting has created
powerful incentives for our adversaries to use alternative
methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. For the
foreseeable future, the most likely contingencies the United
States will face involve what we term irregular warfare.
Since 2006, our office has been central to the support of
this strategic shift in DOD to improve capabilities and expand
DOD capacity for irregular warfare. For example, we have issued
guidance and implemented policy on irregular warfare
capabilities. We sponsored and I led the DOD 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review team on irregular warfare. We've strengthened
our conventional force capabilities for key enablers such as
security force assistance, expanded our manned and unmanned
aircraft systems for intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance, and improved our counter-IED capabilities.
We've also worked to enhance language and cultural focus
within the general purpose forces, focused on building up
regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular,
as well as working across the Department to increase
counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism
competency in our conventional forces.
Another core mission that has grown demanding in the last
several years is our role in providing oversight of DOD's
global operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates,
including in Iraq and Afghanistan. I represent the Secretary of
Defense on various working groups in the interagency and
maintain active liaison with those agencies that have
responsibility for national security policy as it relates to
special operations and combatting terrorism.
In line with the President's and the Secretary's
priorities, a significant degree of our attention is providing
oversight for sensitive operations. I oversee development of
these operations and others for policies for CT, including
combatting terrorism technology and capability development, and
I assist, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, with the
administration and implementation of our section 1206 global
train and equip authorities and our section 1208 support to
special operations authorities, both of which are important
tools in the CT fight and for which we appreciate this
committee's continued support.
These are among the force development and policy activities
that are brought to bear in executing the President's and the
Secretary's priorities, including prevailing in today's
conflicts in Afghanistan and defeating al Qaeda and affiliated
groups around the world.
My office has provided extensive support on the
counterterrorism and special operations and overall operational
aspects of three administration-wide reviews of strategy
towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our current assessment is
that strategy is working and we believe we've constrained al
Qaeda significantly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and
degraded their capability to plan and conduct operations
externally.
We've devoted considerable resources to bringing our U.S.
and partner nations counterinsurgency capabilities to bear, and
especially by working to rapidly field capabilities to support
them, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), counter-IED, and
increased rotary wing capabilities.
Our efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan
have forced them to diversify into other regions.
This network they have established is a broad syndicate of
affiliate organizations in places such as the Arabian
Peninsula, East Africa, and elsewhere, and these are of great
concern to us as well.
In the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda poses the most immediate
terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the homeland outside
Afghanistan-Pakistan. Accordingly, we are working closely with
our Yemeni security partners to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, deny them sanctuary, degrade
their capability to plan, organize, and train for attacks
against the U.S. Homeland and our interests.
In East Africa, we're supporting our regional partners to
counter the terrorist threat posed by Al-Shabaab, an Islamic
terrorist group with nationalist roots but global aspirations
and visible alignments with al Qaeda core. Our approach
recognizes that a U.S. military presence in this region would
be counterproductive and we work very closely through the
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter Al-Shabaab, to
provide the TFG, the Somali Government, with the time and space
it needs to develop its own institutions, and to support the
AMISOM mission of a peacekeeping and disengagement force in
Somalia.
Elsewhere in Africa, such as in Mali and other trans-
Saharan countries, we're working closely with security partners
in these areas to counter the growing threat posed by al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb.
Just a last look around the world, in Southeast Asia, the
Philippines has been and remains an important and capable
military partner of the United States and they have worked
aggressively with us to counter the threat from al Qaeda and
its affiliates in the region. Over the last 9 years our
military efforts have successfully contained the threat posed
by terrorist groups in the Philippines and prevented al Qaeda
from strengthening their foothold in Southeast Asia.
Through their ability to execute high-end lethal strikes,
as well as their competence in preventing festering problems
from turning into far-reaching and expensive crises, our U.S.
SOF have proven their immeasurable value for securing our
national interests. The wars we have been engaged in over the
last decade have amply demonstrated how much more valuable
those critical skills and competencies will be in the future.
We appreciate this committee's continued support for our
work to support these extraordinary men and women who undertake
some of the Nation's most demanding missions. Thank you again,
Madam Chairman and Senator Portman, for your inviting us here
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Garry Reid
Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting us to testify at this hearing today and for the
opportunity to share with you the core plans, policies, and programs we
pursue to address global security threats. The missions of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities ASD(SOLIC&IC) span a wide
range of issue areas, from counterterrorism and direct action to
security assistance and humanitarian assistance; from support to
multinational peacekeeping operations to countering narcotics
trafficking. We will each speak to our perspectives on current and
emerging threats from the vantage point of our respective portfolios,
noting that these issue areas complement one another as we collectively
work to support U.S. military forces and address these threats.
I. OUR MISSION
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a uniquely specialized
component of our U.S. Armed Forces trained to conduct operations,
including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action,
special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs,
military information support operations, and counterproliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, in areas under enemy control or in
politically sensitive environments. Over the last half century, these
forces have repeatedly proven their ability to act with speed, agility,
and precision, making them an invaluable asset for national strategic
missions of an extremely sensitive nature. Trained particularly to work
by, with, and through local partners, at the same time SOF have
historically executed the lion's share of indirect and unconventional
U.S. military missions, such as training and advising foreign
militaries or providing support to civilian authorities abroad.
Since September 11, the critical need for these core capabilities
has increased exponentially. Furthermore, as the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have demonstrated, these skill sets can no longer be
thought of as capabilities reserved for SOF but must also be inculcated
in our conventional forces as well. Key trends shaping the future
security environment, such as the growth and power of non-state actors,
increasing instability in already fragile states, and lowered barriers
for entry to develop and acquire advanced technologies, suggest that
the skill sets that SOF bring to bear will likely continue to increase
in importance for the foreseeable future.
As mandated by section 138 of title 10, U.S.C., the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict ASD(SOLIC) was established to provide senior civilian
supervision of special operations activities and low intensity
conflict, including oversight of special operations policy and
resources. We are the principal civilian advisors to the Secretary of
Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters, and
after the Deputy Secretary of Defense, provide senior management for
special operations and low intensity conflict within the Department of
Defense. As a policy office, the responsibilities of ASD(SOLIC) are
unique in that they include Service Secretary-like roles, such as
providing overall supervision of the preparation and justification of
SOF programs and budget, while also including civilian oversight and
supervisory responsibilities, such as developing policy and reviewing
plans for the conduct of sensitive special operations, coordinating
those activities within the interagency, and overseeing their
execution.
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Combating Terrorism, I serve as the principal advisor to the
ASD(SOLIC&IC) for DOD policies, plans, authorities, and resources
related to special operations and irregular warfare, with special
emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional
warfare, sensitive special operations, and other activities as
specified by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, I serve as the
principal crisis manager for the Office of the ASD(SOLIC&IC) in
response to international and/or domestic activities related to special
operations and combating terrorism. I was also recently assigned
responsibility for overseeing Department of Defense Information
Operations.
Special Operations Policy
Within this broad set of responsibilities, one core mission of my
office is to provide oversight of the Special Operations Command, which
has grown significantly since 2001. Created by Congress in 1986, SOCOM
is charged with responsibilities to organize, train, and equip SOF,
including those that comprise the U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
the Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare
Command, and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. Each
component ensures SOF are highly trained, properly equipped, and
capable of rapid global deployment. In 2001, the Department of Defense
gave SOCOM the mission to synchronize planning of the department's
global campaign against violent extremists. On average more than 12,000
SOF and support personnel are deployed around the world, with a
significant majority assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Since 2006, we've increased the baseline budget for SOCOM by about 50
percent and in fiscal year 2012, SOCOM will grow by 2,209 military and
civilian authorizations. We created five additional Special Forces
Battalions and Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations/Military
Information Support Operations units in order to provide additional
support for SOF and the regular Army.
Several key initiatives we are pursuing in fiscal year 2012 will
enhance SOCOM's flexibility and effectiveness. This year, the last of
the originally planned 61 MH-47Gs began modification, and procurement
of eight additional MH-47Gs is underway. As part of the
recapitalization of MH-60 K/L platforms, SOCOM will also field the
first of 72 planned MH-60M helicopters. We would like to bring the
total production of the tilt-rotor CV-22, which provides long-range,
high-speed infiltration, extraction, and resupply to Special Operations
teams in hostile, denied, and politically sensitive areas, to 43
aircraft. We have also been working with the command to recapitalize
SOCOM's Vietnam-era AC-130 gunship fleet with AC-130J models. My office
continues to play a critical role in advancing the Non-Standard
Aviation Program and delivering a variety of smaller aircraft to
provide intra-theater airlift capacity. A new Aviation Foreign Internal
Defense program starts in fiscal year 2012 to train, advise, and assist
partner nations in a variety of special operations missions and
capabilities. SOF Warrior line items consist of Small Arms and Weapons
for SOF warfighters; SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems
to provide day and night visual augmentation systems for SOF troops;
SOF Tactical Vehicles; and SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems
that provide specialized equipment to improve survivability and
mobility of SOF. To address shortfalls resulting from fielding new
capabilities, a growing force structure, and aging infrastructure that
was inherited without a future recapitalization budget, we are also
making a significant investment in Military Construction (MILCON),
raising the MILCON funding minimum from 4 to 6 percent to support this
priority in future budgets.
IW Capabilities
America's dominance in traditional warfighting has created powerful
incentives for adversaries to use alternative methods to counter U.S.
influence and interests. For the foreseeable future, the most likely
contingencies the United States will face will involve irregular
warfare. Since 2006, my office has also been principally involved in
supporting the strategic shift within the Department to improve
capabilities and expand DOD capacity for irregular warfare.
The 2010 QDR aimed to rebalance U.S. military capabilities to
emphasize flexibility of the force and investment in key enablers. My
office has helped to implement this strategic shift by issuing
directives and policy instructions, for example, on Irregular Warfare
(IW), and by providing guidance on a range of issues from Security
Force Assistance to counterinsurgency skills and training. We've also
focused on implementing key QDR initiatives, such as strengthening and
institutionalizing conventional force capabilities for Security Force
Assistance; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training
partner aviation forces; increasing the availability of Rotary Wing
assets; expanding and modernizing the AC-130 fleet; expanding Manned
and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance; and improving Counter-IED capabilities. We've also
worked to enhance linguistic and cultural abilities, focusing on
building regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular,
as well as worked across the Department to increase counterinsurgency,
Stability Operations and counterterrorism competency and capacity in
our conventional forces.
Oversight of Combating Terrorism
Another core mission that has grown more demanding in the last
several years is our role in assisting the ASD(SOLIC&IC) in providing
oversight of the Department's global operations against al Qaeda and
its affiliates, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. I represent the
Secretary of Defense on various working groups in the interagency arena
and maintain an active liaison with those agencies that have
responsibility for national security policy as it relates to special
operations and combating terrorism. In line with the President's and
Secretary's priorities, as well as the unprecedented scale and scope of
operations in which U.S. forces are involved, a significant degree of
our attention is devoted to providing the oversight required for
sensitive operations.
I also oversee development of special operations policies for
counterterrorism, including combating terrorism technology and
capabilities development, and assist with the administration of Section
1206 and 1208 authorities. One of our most important tools in the
counterterrorism fight has been Section 1206 authority. This authority
gives the Department the ability--with the concurrence of the Secretary
of State--to quickly respond to build our partners' capabilities to
confront urgent and emerging terrorism threats and support those
fighting alongside us in Coalition operations. Section 1208 authorities
allow SOF to provide support (including training, funding, and
equipment) to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups and individuals
supporting or facilitating military operations to combat terrorism.
Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a critical authority
for the war against al Qaeda and for counterterrorism and related
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We appreciate the
committee's continued support for both Section 1206 and 1208.
Information Operations
Over the past year, DOD has performed an intensive review of the
oversight and management of Information Operations (IO) and several
capabilities which support IO, including Military Information Support
Operations (MISO, formerly Psychological Operations). As a result of
the Secretary's directed study of the Department's expenditures and
management for IO, several changes have been made, including the
consolidation of oversight and management of IO and MISO together
within SOLIC. The Department also performed an exhaustive policy review
of all MISO programs and activities to ensure these activities adhered
to policy, were directly linked to military objectives, and were
coordinated with the State Department at both the DOD and COCOM levels.
As has been reflected in several reports this administration has
submitted to Congress over the past year, Combatant Command IO programs
and activities have matured over the past year enabling IO to be
utilized a component of every recent military operation, to include
Odyssey Dawn.
Counter Terrorism Technical Support Office
The Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) operates
as an interagency program office under the ASD(SOLIC&IC) to field rapid
combating terrorism solutions. Working closely with over 100 Government
Agencies, State, and local government, law enforcement organizations,
and national first responders, CTTSO leverages technical expertise,
operational objectives, and interagency sponsor funding. This
collective approach to resource and information sharing positions the
CTTSO to gather front line requirements that service multiple users--a
distinct advantage in the combating terrorism community.
II. ON THE GROUND
These force development and policy activities are brought to bear
in executing the President's and the Secretary's priorities, including
prevailing in today's conflict in Afghanistan and defeating al Qaeda
and affiliated groups around the world.
Support to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy
My office provided extensive support on the counterterrorism,
special operations, and overall operational aspects of three major
administration-wide reviews of strategy toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Upon taking office, President Obama committed tens of
thousands of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan, and an additional
30,000 surge forces in December 2009, to support our core goal in the
region: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, to deny it safe
haven in the region, and to prevent it from again threatening the
United States and our allies. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are still
largely aligned with al Qaeda, and al Qaeda leadership still enjoys a
sanctuary in adjacent Pakistan. Working with our interagency partners
through a range of counterterrorism efforts, we believe we have
constrained al Qaeda and their affiliated groups in the border region
of Afghanistan and Pakistan and have significantly degraded their
ability to plan and conduct operations throughout the theater.
Our office has also been extensively involved in the Secretary's
effort to bring counterinsurgency capabilities to bear on the current
Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. For example, the Department has made
considerable efforts to improve Security Force Assistance capabilities,
including adding 500 personnel to train-the-trainer units, in order to
enable the effective transition of security responsibilities to host
nation forces. We continue to work aggressively to implement the
Secretary's goal of fielding capabilities that support the
counterinsurgency and irregular conflicts we are currently in, such as
through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles programs, counter-Improvised Explosive
Device capabilities, and increasing funding for rotary wing lift. We've
also assisted the Joint Staff with the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands
program, an initiative that supports the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy
by identifying, selecting, and training a cadre of counterinsurgency
and regional experts to deploy to the region on a rotating basis, build
strategic relationships with local partners, and enhance the capacity
of local security institutions.
Global SOF Engagement
The al Qaeda core sanctuary in Pakistan is enabled and assisted by
a broad network of affiliates, including facilitators, financiers, and
training sites. The rise of these affiliate organizations in the
Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and elsewhere are of great concern to
us.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses the most immediate
terrorist threat to U.S. interests and the Homeland outside the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Accordingly, we work closely with Yemeni
security forces to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP in Yemen, deny
them sanctuary, and degrade their ability to plan, organize and train
for attacks against the U.S. Homeland and our interests. To counter
this threat, the United States adopted a balanced approach that
addresses both the short- to mid-term requirement to build Yemeni
counterterrorist (CT) capacity and capability and the long-term
requirement to address Yemen's fundamental needs across the security,
economic development, political, and social spectrums.
The current unrest and political upheaval in Yemen have obviously
forced us to look closely at our approach. We believe that the current
protracted political issues are having an adverse impact on the
security situation in Yemen. We're monitoring the situation closely. As
with every country, we regularly evaluate our assistance and CT
cooperation to ensure it is being used appropriately and is as
effective as possible. Our shared interest with the Yemeni Government
in fighting terrorism, particularly defeating AQAP, goes beyond
specific individuals. As such, our focus over the course of the last
several years of daily contact with the Yemeni CT apparatus has been to
professionalize their CT institutions, not to bolster individual
personalities.
In Somalia, we support our partners to counter the terrorist threat
posed by al-Shabaab, an Islamic terrorist group with nationalist roots
but global aspirations. The group shows increasing signs of affiliation
with al Qaeda and has made significant public overtures to Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda senior leadership. Al-Shabaab has also reached out
to Somali diaspora groups around the world, asking many Somalis with
western passports, like American Omar Hammami to join the jihad in
Somalia. Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks against Uganda last July showed
their desire to export terror across the region and threaten any
country that dares to attack them.
Countering al-Shabaab is not an easy task. Our interagency partners
have proven particularly effective in tracking Somali individuals of
concern and preventing them from staging attacks. Our policy recognizes
that a U.S. military presence would be counter-productive so we work
with and through the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter al-Shabaab and
give the TFG the time and space it needs to develop viable institutions
and security forces. The Department of State provides substantial
financial support to AMISOM and this year, DOD began providing U.S.
military trainers for Ugandan and Burundian predeployment training. In
addition, SOF forces regularly conduct military-to-military exercises
and training with Kenya, Uganda, and other regional partners. We have
also provided substantial Section 1206 CT assistance to East African
states. We continue to monitor al-Shabaab closely and employ our
various tools to counter this threat.
The Philippines is an important and capable military partner of the
United States and has worked aggressively with us to counter the threat
from al Qaeda in the region. Over the last 9 years, our military's
efforts have successfully contained the threat posed by terrorist
groups in the Philippines and prevented al Qaeda from establishing a
foothold in South East Asia. Initiated in 2001, Operation Enduring
Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) is spearheaded by the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Philippines which works side by side with the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to reduce the effectiveness of Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and deny these
organizations the use of Philippine territory as a safe haven. OEF-P
operations have been successful at hindering ASG/JI abilities to
conduct terrorist operations and eliminating numerous key terrorist
leaders. These activities also benefit the Philippines by facilitating
a safe environment for numerous civic action projects, such as Dental
Civil Action Programs and Medical Civil Action Programs, to provide
Philippine people in remote areas much needed health care assistance.
III. CLOSING
Through their ability to execute high-end lethal strikes, as well
as their competence in preventing festering problems from turning into
far-reaching and expensive crises, SOF have proven their immeasurable
value for securing our national interests. The wars we have been
engaged in over the last decade have amply demonstrated how much more
critical those skills and competencies will be in the future. We
appreciate the committee's continued support for our work to support
these extraordinary men and women who undertake some of the Nation's
most demanding missions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Reid. You certainly have a
lot to oversee for the special operations-combatting terrorism.
Dr. Schear, if you can give us your opening statement,
please.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. SCHEAR, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
Dr. Schear. Thank you so much. Madam Chair, Senator
Portman, thank you very much for the opportunity to join my
colleagues here today to testify about SOLIC's roles and
responsibilities in countering transnational threats to peace
and stability. I'd also like to underscore my appreciation for
the unwavering support this committee provides to our dedicated
service personnel in their performance of their diverse and
often dangerous missions.
Madam Chair, with your permission I'll submit my full
statement for the record.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Schear. Thank you.
As the chief steward of SOLIC's Office of Partnership
Strategy and Stability Operations, ``PSO'' for short, I oversee
a wide-ranging portfolio that spans both preventive,
responsive, and partner-focused activities aimed at bolstering
security and advancing U.S. interests in regions threatened by
extremist violence and natural disasters. My written statement
covers much of this ground in detail and I'd be happy to
explicate any aspect of it that you wish, including U.N.
peacekeeping, but in my brief prepared remarks I thought it
might be most useful for me to highlight PSO's coalition
support activities, our work on foreign disaster relief, our
Afghan-focused ministry of defense advisers program, and last
but not least, our proposal for a new global security
contingency fund, which is being advocated by Secretaries
Clinton and Gates.
In the area of coalition support, my team oversees and
implements specialized authorities and appropriations that
allow willing and able international partners to deploy and
operate with us, strengthening both our forces and our
international legitimacy. In Afghanistan, for example, over 26
nations receive lift and sustainment support as they serve
alongside the U.S. military. The importance of this assistance
cannot be overstated. The prospect of operating with 26 fewer
partners would dramatically change the complexion of our
Afghan-focused efforts.
With this support, our Services also benefit from deeper
ties with 26 foreign militaries that are now more capable. Most
recently, we have also provided some logistics and support
using our global lift and sustain authority to eligible
partners operating with us under the rubric of Operation
Unified Protector, which is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Libya-focused operation.
Our ability to forge effective coalitions is essential to
spreading the burdens of global security, but it does involve
some heavy lifting. For example, at one point we discovered
internally that we really had no well-developed system for
accepting a potential coalition partner's offer, based upon a
clear understanding of the likely costs and benefits of that
partner's participation. So our office created a review process
to ensure proper consideration of such offers so that we could
get the maximum return on our investment while also avoiding
excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not
match our combatant commander's needs.
We also have primary responsibility for oversight of our
military's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
missions. DOD is not the lead U.S. Government agency for
foreign disaster relief. We operate in support of the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), typically in
high-end disasters that overwhelm the response capability of
civilian relief providers.
What this means is that when, say, an earthquake hits Haiti
or a tsunami and earthquake hit Japan my team makes sure that
our military capabilities are used appropriately and with
proper authorization. Because we work on disasters in every
region, we strive to ensure that the right people from our
interagency community are involved, that our combatant
commanders are appropriately linked with USAID, that they know
what sort of support is permissible, and that they have
sufficient funding and authorities to carry out their mission.
To give you a better idea of our work, I'll proffer up a
few examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last October,
U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) helicopters were vital in
transporting civilian assessment teams to survey hard-to-reach
areas. More recently, in Japan we supported Secretary Gates and
Admiral Willard in expediting approval for the use of our
overseas humanitarian disaster and civic assistance account to
fund our relief operations, and we fast-tracked arrangements to
deploy U.S.-based urban search and rescue teams in support of
our Japanese allies.
Finally in the wake of the popular uprising in Libya we
have assisted a range of DOS-led activities supporting the
repatriation of foreign migrant workers fleeing the Qadhafi
regime's brutal crackdown.
Madam Chair, I would be remiss if I failed to underscore
our partner-focused contributions to the Afghan campaign. Both
my colleagues and I invest much time and effort to ensure that
U.S.-trained and equipped indigenous forces can operate
effectively and responsibly as we transition out, graceful
transition out of Afghanistan.
A key element of that effort is to strengthen Afghan
security ministries in a way that sustains our tactical-level
investment. For this reason, SOLIC launched the ministry of
advisory defense program--ministry of defense advisor (MODA)
program. Its mission is to generate high-quality, well-trained
civilian experts who can establish lasting links to their
partner ministries. MODA has been so successful that within 2
months after our first deployment of 17 advisers to Kabul,
General Petraeus quickly challenged us to recruit, train, and
deploy 100 more before the end of this year.
MODA's value added can be measured in very tangible,
straightforward ways. As Napoleon once observed, an army
marches on its stomach. When the Afghans last year were
wrestling with the issue of how best to reorganize and upgrade
their slaughterhouse, we dispatched an adviser from our Defense
Commissary Agency to assist our Afghan partners in that effort.
With his extensive background and skills, our field commanders
report that he's had an enormously positive impact.
Madam Chair, I've discussed briefly the work that we do in
support of ongoing operations. Our other main focus is on
providing capabilities to prevent the onset of recurrence of
conflict. We do this through our focus on stability operations
across DOD, as well as on targeted programs and policies
focused on partner capacity-building. Secretary Gates has
rightfully made partner capacity-building a high priority for
our Department. Doing so adroitly requires, however, that we
successfully navigate what the Secretary has dubbed a patchwork
of specialized authorities and funding sources, which has
evolved for the most part in a very different security
environment than the one we face today.
My team is a kind of navigation aid for our combatant
commanders and our regional offices in this effort. We've
developed and maintain an online information repository about
security cooperation tools that is used DOD-wide.
We're also working to better meet the challenges imposed
upon us by today's exceptionally volatile security environment,
which leads me to my final point, regarding our proposal for a
global security contingency fund. One of the key challenges we
face is how to react to threats and opportunities that emerge
within a given budget cycle and to recalibrate assistance as or
when situations change on the ground. We are challenged not
only by a multi-year planning, programming, and funding cycle,
but also by interagency structures that are not as agile as
they should be in the face of transnational threats that span
the portfolios of multiple agencies.
To address this challenge, Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates have launched a proposal for a pilot program called the
global security contingency fund. If enacted by Congress, the
two Departments would have a 3-year timeframe to demonstrate a
new business model and provide a much-needed tool for
responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.
Under this fund, the DOS and DOD would literally work side
by side to provide security assistance to foreign partners,
including the military, interior, border, maritime, and
counterterrorism security forces of those countries and their
governing institutions. This new fund could also provide
assistance for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization
programs when the capacity of civilian agencies is challenged
by conflict or instability.
A key feature of the fund is that it would be operated by a
small staff of DOS, DOD, and USAID employees working in the
same office. That staff would be supplemented by experts from
other U.S. Government agencies as appropriate. The fund would
be used to meet requirements that both secretaries identify as
critical and it would allow both Departments to provide
targeted funding for that purpose.
Perhaps most critical, the fund would give the U.S.
Government a tool to be more responsive to challenging real-
world situations. The United States is constantly striving to
become more agile and smarter in how we create stronger
partners in our common interests of building a more robust,
sustainable security environment. We hope you will support this
fund and look forward to continuing to work with you on its
development and to addressing the security challenges we face
today.
Again, my thanks for this opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. James Schear
Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the invitation to testify today about the global programs
and capabilities Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO)
brings to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Government.
I'll begin by giving you a brief overview of our policy
responsibilities, including both those that focus on supporting U.S.
military operations as well as those designed to mitigate or prevent
conflict that might otherwise draw in U.S. forces. I'll then turn to
one of the key capabilities we would like to have, the joint proposal
by the Secretaries of Defense and State for a Global Security
Contingency Fund, and another opportunity to enhance our capabilities.
I. SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS
Like my colleagues, a key priority for my office is supporting
ongoing military operations. Our work supports both kinetic and non-
kinetic operations, including coalition support for U.S. operations,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation
operations, international peacekeeping operations, explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD), and ministerial development in Afghanistan.
In the area of coalition support to U.S. operations, my office
oversees and implements specialized authorities and appropriations to
allow willing and capable international partners to deploy and operate
with us, strengthening both our forces and our international
legitimacy. For example, over 26 nations received lift and sustainment
support as they served alongside the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
Needless to say, the prospect of operating with 26 fewer partners would
change the complexion of the Afghanistan effort. It also has meant that
the U.S. military has deeper ties with 26 militaries that are now much
more capable. Most recently, we are also providing logistical support
using Global Lift and Sustain authority to eligible partners operating
with us under the rubric of Operation Unified Protector, NATO's Libya-
focused operation.
The ability to build coalitions is essential to spreading the
burden of global security. Our expertise not only ensures that funds
are optimized to assist the needs of our partners, it also allows us to
rationalize the provision of that assistance. For example, at one
point, we had no agreed-upon system for saying ``yes'' or ``no'' to
partners offering to join the coalition. So, we sometimes had officials
accepting a partner's offer without understanding the costs and
benefits of a given partner's participation. Our office created a
system to ensure proper review of such offers so that we could get the
maximum return on our investment in coalition partners while also
avoiding excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not
match the combatant commander's needs.
We have primary responsibility for the oversight of our military's
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) leads the government's response, so
we are always in a supporting role. What that means in real terms is
that when an earthquake hits Haiti or a tsunami hits Japan, my office
makes sure that military assets are used appropriately and with proper
authorization. We make sure that the U.S. military is prepared to be a
``responder of last resort'' when foreign disasters overwhelm the
capacity of the host nation and international first-responders to
manage. Because we work on disasters in every region, we are able to
ensure that the right people from DOD are involved in the interagency
process, that our combatant commanders are appropriately linked with
USAID, they know what sort of support is permissible, and they have
sufficient funding and authority to carry out their mission. While
every disaster is different, our knowledge of what military assets have
been helpful in various scenarios can be critical to quickly providing
effective assistance.
To give you a better idea of our work in this critical area, let me
give you some examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last
October, we were able to transport USAID's assessment team in PACOM
helicopters to survey hard-to-reach areas. This was critical to
determining what the total US government response should be and what
unique military assets should be provided. In Japan, we quickly worked
with Admiral Willard's team to get Secretary Gates' approval to use
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds for
assistance operations, including getting both Fairfax and Los Angeles
civilian urban search and rescue teams' heavy equipment on the ground
within 72 hours. In Libya, in order to address stabilization concerns
associated with democratizing governments in Egypt and Tunisia, we have
assisted with the airlift of third country nationals.
In addition to supporting ongoing operations, we also do the
steady-state work with partners so that their militaries are better
prepared to support their governments' disaster response needs. Not
only does this create real and lasting capabilities in partners, it
also is an area where we can build relationships in some countries
where other types of military engagement are not welcome. My team also
is integrated into crisis action planning meetings to ensure lessons
from previous disasters are learned and applied across the government.
The same team that does this work also plans for and ensures the
proper execution of military evacuations of Americans overseas. At the
request of the Department of State, DOD assists in the evacuation of
American citizens, allies, and third-country partners from unstable and
unsafe environments. Working with Crisis Operations at State, the Joint
Staff, and regional desks, PSO maintains resident expertise DOD
leadership requires, and PSO provides the crucial link between the two
Departments.
My office also provides policy advice on DOD support to U.N. and
multinational peacekeeping operations, oversees the execution of
peacekeeping support, and works with interagency partners to coordinate
overall U.S. Government support for peacekeeping. For example, we work
closely with the State Department as the joint manager of their Global
Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip more foreign
peacekeepers. Our Geographic Combatant Commanders are the implementers
for 50 percent of the program. We work with the State Department on
providing U.S. officers to key positions at U.N. headquarters and in
U.N. missions. We also provide critical expertise on realistic mandate
goals so that U.N. missions can succeed.
Another critical area of support to ongoing operations is our
oversight and coordination of EOD policy and capacity across DOD. In
addition, we provide policy and subject-matter expertise in support of
DOD efforts to support civilian authorities preventing and disrupting
attacks using explosives in the homeland. Recently, we worked with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Army (and General Counsel) to
provide EOD expertise and to loan specialized equipment to FBI agents
investigating a suspect in connection with a failed bomb attempt at a
Martin Luther King, Jr. parade in Spokane, WA. This support to local
authorities allowed Federal agents to safely secure the suspect in an
otherwise unpredictable and extremely dangerous situation.
Last, I want to point out a tool that we developed and fielded to
Afghanistan. Like both of my colleagues here today, we are constantly
trying to adapt to the urgent needs of our commanders in the field. In
our case, we help address the need to build functioning Afghan security
institutions so that the security forces we train can be sustained and
remain effective. It became clear in Iraq and Afghanistan that we
needed better tools to train these nascent security institutions. For
that reason, we created the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA)
program. It is a way of generating high-quality, effective civilian
advisors who establish lasting links to partner ministries. Some of the
key features of the program are the 7 weeks of pre-deployment training,
the ability to stay in Afghanistan from 1 to 2 years, the ability to
provide backfill personnel to home organizations when someone is
deployed as an advisor, and the enduring ministry-to-ministry
partnerships that are created because the program draws primarily from
senior civil servants. Prior to MoDA, untrained military personnel or
contractors did all of the U.S. Government's advisory work at the
Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. MoDA is the first program to
provide realistic and useful training for ministerial advisors. It has
been so successful that after the first 17 advisors served in Kabul for
a couple of months, Lieutenant General Caldwell, head of the NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan, asked to send some of his military
advisors to the training and General Petreaus requested at least 100
advisors before the end of the year.
In all of our support to current operations there is a recurring
theme of unique expertise and interagency collaboration. We support our
warfighters with real tools, with expertise on how to use those tools,
and by ensuring interagency agreement and alignment so that they and
the U.S. Government can be most effective.
II. SUPPORT TO PREVENTION
So far, I've discussed the work we do in support of ongoing
operations. Our other main focus is on providing capabilities to
prevent or recover from conflict. We do this both through our focus on
stability operations capabilities across the Department and targeted
programs and policies to build partner capacity.
When it comes to Stability Operations, we are future oriented. It
isn't just Operation Iraqi Freedom redux--it's broad ``stabilization''
in the sense of supporting civilian-led programs, targeting assistance
that stimulates local economies, marginalizing violent extremists,
preventing future conflict, and laying a foundation for longer term
governance and capacity building. A critical enabler to this effort is
the civilian-military working relationship across the interagency.
While every office works on interagency collaboration, we focus on its
necessity for successful stability operations from the strategic to the
tactical level. We are focused on moving beyond coordination meetings,
to coordinated interagency pre-deployment training and ensuring that
our doctrine and concepts prepare our military personnel to be
effective in interagency and multi-partner environments. For us,
stability operations are both a part of preventing escalating conflict
and a part of post-conflict recovery. In many cases, it also is
critical to building a successful exit strategy for current conflicts.
PSO's stability operations experts worked closely with and advised
Department of State counterparts who built the U.S. Government
Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, which will usher in
transition in its broadest sense, from military to civilian governance
across all sectors.
PSO also is incubating the DOD capability to sustain our train and
equip investments through ministerial level capacity-building programs,
specifically the relatively new Defense Institution Reform Initiative
(DIRI) and the MoDA program I mentioned earlier. DIRI supports the
development of partner defense ministries through regular engagements
with partner defense ministries that are aimed at identifying their
capability gaps and then working to fill them. DIRI provides teams of
subject matter experts to work with a partner nation on a periodic,
sustained basis. For example, we will meet with a partner to identify
the needs and establish a work plan. In one country we might be helping
them with their first realistic strategic defense plan and in another
it may be an effort to help them create a personnel system that tracks
the specialties and training of personnel so they can be used to best
effect. In all of these cases, both the goal of the work plan and the
process of achieving it create new capabilities in partners which often
have a multiplying effect on their overall military capacity.
By contrast, MoDA supplies dedicated and experienced DOD civilians
who can forge long-term professional relationships with their
international defense-ministry counterparts in similar specialties.
Again, MoDA sends senior defense civilians who are trained to be
advisors. For example, when the Afghans were struggling with how best
to feed their troops and how to run and organize a slaughter house, we
were able to send out an advisor from the Defense Commissary Agency.
With his extensive background and skills together with the advisor
training, he was effective immediately in country.
We're a ``solution provider'' in other ways. Secretary Gates
rightfully makes developing the capabilities of our partners a high
priority for the Department. As he stated in our most recent
Quadrennial Defense Review, ``U.S. security is inextricably tied to the
effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their
own security capacity.'' That said, DOD is attempting to execute the
security cooperation mission with what the Secretary terms a
``patchwork'' of specialized legislative authorities and funding
sources that evolved in a very different security environment. For the
security cooperation planner at a geographic Combatant Command who will
serve for 1 to 2 years and then go back to more traditional military
work, it is very challenging to understand the tools and funding
available to work with our partners. Even once they have a good sense
of the tools and funding, actually accessing those tools and funding
for a given partner can take years.
My office assists the combatant commanders and our regional office
colleagues to navigate this patchwork. We also work on improving our
planning efforts and strategies so that they include realistic
requirements or clearly identified gaps in our ability to build
dependable and effective partner militaries. To give you an example,
under different leadership, this office identified a critical gap in
our counter terrorism strategies and pursued what is now called the
``1206'' legislation. As you know, 1206 has been a vital tool in our
counter terrorism and building partnership efforts. After working with
Congress to establish the tool and its operations, it is now overseen
by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Reid, in coordination with the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, as
part of our broader counter terrorism work. Today, we are working with
the Joint Staff to create network-based information tools to track
security cooperation activities in countries from the bottom-up. We
have already implemented an online information repository about
security cooperation tools that is used DOD-wide. We also are working
to create an office to better evaluate the impact of our security
cooperation tools. We are trying to fill new gaps that have emerged by
creating new tools or improving existing tools.
III. OPPORTUNITIES
This leads me to my final points, the opportunities we have today
to enhance our capabilities. Let me mention one relatively simple fix
and then discuss a more overarching tool we'd like to create.
The simple fix I'd like to bring to your attention regards
Humanitarian Mine Action. The goal of the DOD Humanitarian Mine Action
program is to relieve human suffering and the adverse effects of
landmines and explosive remnants of war on noncombatants while
advancing the combatant commanders' security cooperation strategies and
U.S. national security objectives. Through the Humanitarian Mine Action
Training Program, DOD executes ``train-the-trainer'' programs of
instruction designed to develop international partners' capabilities
for a wide range of HMA activities including demining training. Over
the past decade, we have seen a number of casualties and deaths linked
to the improper storage of munitions. This is particularly distressing
when it occurs in densely populated areas as we saw recently in
Tanzania and Albania. Rather than use our programs solely to help clean
up the ordnance once it has exploded and harmed innocent civilians, we
would like to modestly include training on how to safely stockpile
conventional munitions so we can work to prevent those disasters. To do
this, no new funding is required as we can accomplish this mission
within existing OHDACA funding.
One of the key challenges we face is reacting to threats and
opportunities that emerge within the budget cycle and recalibrating
assistance as situations change on the ground. We are challenged not
only by the lengthy budget cycle but also by an interagency structure
that does not incentivize whole-of-government approaches, even though
we know they are usually the most effective. The fact is that many of
the security challenges we see today can most effectively be addressed
if we improve partner governance, justice sector capacity, border
security, and basic functioning. This requires civilians at DOD and the
interagency working with the military as seamlessly as possible.
We all recognize how important this is in Afghanistan to ultimately
reaching our objectives and withdrawing from that war-torn nation
leaving behind a government that can secure its borders, enforce the
law, and serve the population. The concept transfers to other
circumstances where a security situation may be ambiguous and an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
To address these needs and gaps, Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates developed a pilot program called the Global Security Contingency
Fund. If enacted by Congress, the two Departments would have 3 years to
demonstrate a new business model and provide a much-needed tool for
responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.
Under the Fund, the Departments of State and Defense would
literally work side-by-side to provide security assistance to partner
governments, including military, interior, border, maritime, and
counterterrorism security forces, and their governing institutions.
This new Fund also could provide assistance for the justice sector,
rule of law, and stabilization when the capacity of civilian agencies
is challenged by conflict or instability. A key feature of the Fund is
that it would be operated by a small staff of State Department, USAID,
and DOD employees working in the same office and would be accountable
to both Departments. That staff would be supplemented by other
interagency experts depending on the requirements that need to be met.
The Fund would be used to meet requirements both Secretaries identify
as critical and allow both Departments to provide funding for the work
agreed upon. Perhaps most critical, the Fund would give the U.S.
Government a tool to be more effective in its assistance by allowing
for within budget cycle commitments that are responsive to fluid real-
world situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States is constantly striving to become more agile and
smarter about how we create stronger partners and lasting security.
This means having tools that are better adapted to today's security
environment and having a strong partner in Congress to ensure that the
tools meet America's needs. We hope that you will support the Fund and
look forward to continuing to work with you to address today's new
security challenges and opportunities. Thank you, again for this
opportunity to testify about the capabilities we provide, including
those that focus on supporting U.S. operations and those designed to
prevent the obligation of U.S. military forces and some of the key
capabilities we would like to have. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Dr. Schear. I do want to say to
all of you that your written statements will be included in the
record in full.
Now, Mr. Wechsler, for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS
Mr. Wechsler. Thank you very much. I'll try to be brief.
Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, like my colleagues, I
really do appreciate the opportunity to be here. It's quite an
important subject on which you called this hearing.
I want you to know that all of our efforts working together
really do have a significant impact on our efforts in
Afghanistan and where we confront other transnational threats.
My job, as you noted, is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. We support the
national counterdrug control strategy and the national security
strategy by providing assistance to local, State, Federal, and
foreign agencies to confront the drug trade and narcoterrorism.
DOD supports law enforcement through detection and
monitoring of drug trafficking, sharing information, and
helping countries build their own capacity. Our
counternarcotics efforts are focused on maintaining force
readiness through drug screening for the armed services and
outreach to DOD families and their communities.
I give Congress credit for having had the vision to
recognize the important role DOD can and should play to counter
the threat of drug trafficking. This was an initiative led by
Congress in the late 1980s and one that in many respects was
visionary, considering the types of threats that we have
confronted since then.
The legislative authorities that you mentioned in your
opening statement are absolutely critical to continuing this
mission set for DOD. They have been adjusted slightly over the
years as the threat itself has developed, and I look forward to
working with you and your staff to continuing that progress in
the years ahead.
In Afghanistan, our efforts support the warfighter by
building Afghan capacity through information-sharing. In many
ways, counternarcotics authorities and funding act as a bridge
between law enforcement efforts and more traditional military
operations. While DOD has traditionally provided military
support to law enforcement activities going back years, in
Afghanistan the expertise and authorities of our law
enforcement partners are really supporting our military
mission. This is quite critical because the reality is that
we're not going to win this war on the basis of legal
authorities and expertise that exists within DOD alone. We're
only going to win this by bringing together the whole of
government, all of our expertise, and doing what we can do in
DOD to support our interagency partners.
Narcotics account for a large proportion of Afghanistan's
economy and contribute to insecurity, corruption, poor
governance, and stagnation of economic development.
Approximately 84 percent of all Afghanistan's poppy production
is concentrated in the south and southwest provinces, areas
under primary Taliban control. Our revised counternarcotics
strategy for Afghanistan is incorporated into the overall
counterinsurgency strategy and places greater emphasis on
interdiction efforts, those joint military-law enforcement
operations, and on alternative livelihoods.
Closer to home, as was mentioned by Senator Portman, Mexico
continues to confront escalating drug-fueled violence,
particularly along its northern border with the United States.
Our counternarcotics support to Mexico is implemented primarily
through U.S. Northern Command and includes subject matter
exchanges, training, equipment, and information-sharing. Most
of DOD cooperation with Mexico falls under our counternarcotics
program.
When I entered office we were spending very close to zero
in this area and now we are allocating over $50 million every
year in this area. I would consider this to be one of those
emerging issues that you discussed.
Central America as well continues to face an increasing
pressure from drug trafficking and related violent crime,
largely as a result of the progress that has been made by the
governments of Mexico and Colombia in confronting these
organizations. Colombia is a special case, as was mentioned by
Senator Portman, in my mind indeed perhaps the greatest success
of U.S. national security policy in the last 10 years, a
bipartisan success, a very cost-effective success, a
counterinsurgency success, and one from which I believe a great
many important lessons can be drawn for our wider efforts
around the world.
I recently traveled to West Africa, another emerging area.
to get a first-hand look at the region where weak governance is
increasingly being exploited by drug traffickers as they target
the lucrative and growing European market for cocaine. This
trend has a number of important national security implications,
such as undermining governance and stability in the region and
providing a funding stream to western hemisphere criminal
organizations that traffic drugs to the United States. This
will be a subject for the G-8 under French leadership, after
which the Lisbon Conference. We're doing an awful lot more in
this area compared to what we had been doing in years past.
The globalization of the legitimate economy has benefited
the illicit economy in many of the same ways. Today nearly
every country in the world now suffers to some degree from the
illicit, illegal drug trade. Make no mistake, the drug trade is
by far and away the largest illegal activity that happens
around the world. Indeed, the networks that are built on the
foundation of the drug trade around the world are the very same
networks that all sorts of other transnational threats sit
upon, use, and employ. We have to be able to go against this
criminal nexus in order to go against the other aspects of the
transnational crime.
Indeed, we see this, the TCOs themselves, diversifying into
other criminal activities. One of the issues that we need to
work on together with you is the fact that our bureaucracies,
our legal authorities, are all designed--many of them are
designed on single-issue threats when in fact the threat that
we're facing around the world is a nexus of all these threats
that come together. That's what we see out there in the world
and that's what we have to build our bureaucracies and our
legal authorities around.
Our counternarcotics activities in DOD employ two principal
force multipliers to make the best use of finite resources
available, and we are aware of the finite resources that are
available. We're proud to say that I believe that if you go
back over the decades in the DOD counternarcotics program what
you'll see is it's one of the most cost-effective programs that
we have.
Our two principal force multipliers are: first and
foremost, building partner capacity among our international
partners, so we enhance their ability to work with their U.S.
counterparts to maximize the value of taxpayer dollars as a
force multiplier.
Second, we stress intelligent and information-driven
operations. Targeting based on cued intelligence is much more
cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas of air or
maritime or other assets. Part of this queued intelligence is
something we're spending an awful lot more time on and
hopefully will be able to talk about more today, our counter-
threat finance efforts, because it's the money, as you
mentioned, Madam Chairman, that is really driving a lot of
these transnational threats.
It's important to recognize, just to conclude, that when we
discuss the transnational nature of this threat that does also
include criminal activities that take place inside the United
States as well. For instance, the influence of Mexican TCOs
extends well beyond the Southwest border to cities across the
country, including Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit. All of your
constituencies are confronted by this threat.
Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international
activities can be especially challenging inside the executive
branch. Once again, here DOD can play an important supporting
role to facilitate coordination and information-sharing
throughout mechanisms such as a Joint Interagency Task Force
South in Key West, which I believe is really one of the best
models of interagency coordination in the last couple of
decades.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wechsler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. William F. Wechsler
Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and other distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
Department's counternarcotics (CN) efforts alongside my colleagues
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Reid and DASD Schear. I am
convinced that the complementary efforts across Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC) are
having a significant impact on our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and on a wide range of other transnational threats around the world.
Before discussing some of the latest trends we are seeing in the
threat of transnational organized crime, I would like to provide you
with a brief overview of our organization, strategy, budget, and
programs.
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the administration's
National Drug Control Strategy by providing assistance to local, State,
Federal, and foreign agencies to confront the drug trade and narco-
terrorism. DOD support for law enforcement includes detecting and
monitoring drug trafficking, sharing information, and helping countries
build their capacity to confront drug trafficking. DOD counternarcotics
efforts are also focused on maintaining force readiness through demand
reduction programs for the armed services.
Through its combatant commands, the military departments, and the
defense agencies, DOD provides unique military platforms, personnel,
systems, and capabilities that support Federal law enforcement agencies
and foreign security forces involved in counternarcotics missions. The
DOD counternarcotics mission targets those terrorist groups worldwide
that use narcotics trafficking to support terrorist activities by
deploying counternarcotics assets, in cooperation with foreign
governments, in regions where terrorists benefit from illicit drug
revenue or use drug smuggling systems.
The Office of DASD for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (CN>)
is the single focal point for DOD's CN activities, reporting to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. The office of the DASD(CN>) was established to
ensure that DOD develops and implements a focused counternarcotics
program with clear priorities and measured results. Consistent with
applicable laws, authorities, regulations, and funding, the office
ensures that sufficient resources are allocated to the counternarcotics
mission to achieve high-impact results.
All DOD counternarcotics programs, with the exception of Active
Duty military pay and Service operations tempo, are funded through the
DOD Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA). The CTA was
established by the fiscal year 1989 Defense Appropriations Act and
designed to allow for maximum flexibility to respond to ever-changing
drug trafficking patterns. In fiscal year 2012, the Department has
requested $1.16 billion for CN efforts through the CTA. Of this total,
approximately 13 percent would go to support demand reduction, 20
percent to support domestic law enforcement assistance, 18 percent to
support intelligence and technology programs, and 48 percent to support
international counternarcotics activities.
We take pride in our efforts to reduce drug abuse in the Armed
Forces and Defense workforce and in providing outreach to DOD families
and their communities. The DOD role in illegal drug demand reduction
concentrates principally on eliminating drug abuse in the U.S. Armed
Forces and Defense civilian workforce as well as reaching out to DOD
families and their communities to reduce drug abuse. To address rising
prescription drug abuse rates, DOD plans to implement recommendations
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its Drug Demand
Reduction Program to expand testing to include commonly abused
prescription drugs, establish random unannounced drug testing in-
theater, establish mobile collection teams, complete the prescription
drug verification portal, and make drug prosecution statistics part of
readiness reporting. The National Guard, acting under the authority of
the State and territorial governors, also plays an especially important
role through community outreach and helping at-risk youth resist drug-
related temptation. These programs are consistent with the President's
National Drug Control Strategy, which points out:
The demand for drugs can be further decreased by
comprehensive, evidence-based prevention programs focused on
the adolescent years, which science confirms is the peak period
for substance use initiation and escalation into addiction. We
have a shared responsibility to educate our young people about
the risks of drug use, and we must do so not only at home, but
also in schools, sports leagues, faith communities, places of
work, and other settings and activities that attract youth.
We are in the final stages of developing a DOD Counternarcotics and
Global Threats Strategy that will more clearly align our efforts with
President's National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control
Strategy, as well as with the Quadrennial Defense Review's four
priority objectives: (1) Prevail in Today's Wars, (2) Prevent and Deter
Conflict, (3) Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and succeed in a wide range
of contingencies, and (4) Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force.
This Strategy will be based on national-level guidance and will
establish an integrated set of strategic goals and objectives to
address the national security implications of drug trafficking and
other forms of organized crime and to help prioritize programs and
activities. The Strategy will outline where Defense capabilities can be
brought to bear in support of a whole-of-government approach to address
this national security concern. I would welcome the opportunity to
brief you or your staff on the Strategy as soon as it is made
available.
EFFORTS IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
In Afghanistan, DOD's counternarcotics efforts are focused on
building Afghan capacity, through information sharing, training and
equipping, and infrastructure. While DOD has provided military support,
as needed, to counternarcotics law enforcement activities, in
Afghanistan the opposite is also true. In Afghanistan, the expertise
and authorities of our law enforcement partners also contributes to
advancing essential national security objectives. While relatively
little of the heroin produced in Afghanistan is ultimately bound for
the United States today, U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the Drug
Enforcement Agency have been at the forefront of our counternarcotics
efforts in support of broader U.S. national security interests.
Narcotics account for a large proportion of Afghanistan's economy,
and they contribute to insecurity, corruption, poor governance, and
stagnation of economic development. It is essential to address the drug
trade and its effects in order to conduct a successful counter-
insurgency campaign. Approximately 84 percent of all Afghanistan's
poppy production is concentrated in the south and southwestern
provinces. These areas are primarily controlled by the Taliban, which
benefits financially from this trade.
Building on what worked in Colombia, while recognizing regional
differences, our revised counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan
emphasizes support for a ``whole-of-government'' approach that is
incorporated into the overall stabilization strategy and places greater
emphasis on interdiction and agriculture and rural development. In
2010, Afghan National Security Forces conducted approximately 300
operations supported by DOD, primarily in the south. These operations
led to the destruction of approximately 55 tons of opium, 2 tons of
morphine, 12 tons of heroin, 74 tons of hashish, 34 tons of chemicals
used to produce heroin, and numerous weapons and munitions. In Pakistan
and Central Asia, DOD counternarcotics activities focus on containing
the flow of narcotics emanating from Afghanistan by supporting improved
border security and interdiction capacity and improved information
sharing.
CN>'s efforts in the region complement other SO/LIC&IC activities
to support the warfighter. In many ways, CN authorities and funding act
as a bridge between law enforcement efforts and more traditional
military operations. For instance, CN> programs also support counter-
narcoterrorism training provided by U.S. Special Operations Forces in
the region that directly support counter-terrorism (CT) and
counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives. In fiscal year 2009, CN>
provided counternarcotics-funded helicopters in support of broader CT/
COIN objectives in Pakistan. CN> also joins the Department of
Homeland Security (CBP/ICE) in providing critical support for Operation
Global Shield, a World Customs Organization (WCO) effort to combat the
illicit transport and use of precursor chemicals by terrorist and other
criminal organizations some of which are used to manufacture improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
Where Partnership Strategy and Security Operations' Ministry of
Defense Advisors (MODA) program provides support to the Ministry of
Defense, CN> efforts are focused on building capacity of law
enforcement units within the Ministry of Interior such as the
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the National
Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), and
Aviation Interdiction Unit (AIU).
CN efforts in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility
complement counter-terrorism, DOD's partnership strategy, and stability
operations. All three of these pillars need to be coordinated for
greater effect. Often, as in the case of Pakistan, CN efforts allow DOD
to establish a base for follow-on CT/COIN and stability operations. In
2006, CN funding was used to begin building-up Pakistan's border
security forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region based
on the amount of drugs transiting this region headed to the Makron
Coast from Afghanistan. The drug trade is inherently associated with
creating instability and is often a localized funding source for
insurgent and criminal groups.
CN> coordinates with SO/CT on 1206 reporting requirements. This
annual review of CT funding by CN experts helps to eliminate overlaps
and identify areas for improved coordination. Leveraging the expertise
of the Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office and its
relationship with CN>, SO/CT was able to procure a utility aircraft
for Yemeni security forces with Section 1206 funding at the end of
fiscal year 2010.
Emerging Threats
Closer to home, Mexico continues to confront escalating drug-fueled
violence particularly along its northern border with the U.S. Gunmen
associated with drug trafficking organizations routinely carry out
sophisticated attacks against Mexican law enforcement and military
personnel. The Department of Defense's counternarcotics support to
Mexico is implemented primarily through U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM)and includes training, equipment, and information sharing as
well as indirect support to units of the Mexican armed forces with
counter-narcoterrorism missions. We are also working with U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) and NORTHCOM to develop a joint security effort in
the border region of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. Most of DOD's
cooperation with Mexico falls under the Department's counternarcotics
program, and we expect to allocate approximately $51 million in fiscal
year 2011 to support Mexico. This allocation is a dramatic increase
from previous funding levels for Mexico. Before 2009, for example,
funding for Mexico was closer to $3 million a year.
Central America continues to face increasing pressure from drug
trafficking and related violent crime, largely as a result of the
progress that has been made by the Governments of Mexico and Colombia
in confronting these organizations. A Congressional Research Service
report published this March illustrated this graphically by mentioning
that, despite the incredible drug-fueled violence in Mexico, the
homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants for all Central American nations
is significantly higher (with the exception of Costa Rica). These
trends are directly attributable to illicit trafficking of all forms of
contraband such as drugs, weapons, bulk cash, counterfeit and stolen
goods, and persons. These law enforcement issues have important
ramifications for the national security of Mexico, the Nations of
Central America, and the United States. The Central American Citizen
Security Partnership, announced by President Obama in El Salvador last
month, seeks to ``address the social and economic forces that drive
young people toward criminality.'' The implication for DOD is that we
will work even harder to broaden and deepen our interagency and
international partnership approach and take a holistic view of
security. As always, DOD will play a supporting role to the overall
strategy, led by the White House and the State Department, avoiding any
over-emphasis on military responses.
I recently traveled to West Africa to get a first-hand look at a
region where weak governance is increasingly being exploited by drug
traffickers as they target the lucrative and growing European market
for cocaine. This trend has a number of important national security
implications, such as undermining governance and stability in the
region and providing a funding stream to Western Hemisphere criminal
organizations that traffic drugs to the United States.
Drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime have become a
truly global phenomenon. The globalization of the legitimate economy
has benefitted the illicit economy in many of the same ways. Today,
nearly every country in the world now suffers to some degree from
illegal drug consumption, production, or drug-related corruption and
violence. Where once DOD's counternarcotics efforts were focused in the
Western Hemisphere, today we are supporting counternarcotics activities
worldwide--most notably in Afghanistan and with its neighbors, but also
in places such as West Africa and Central and Southeast Asia.
Transnational criminal organizations (TCO), are becoming
increasingly networked as they form relationships with each other and
at times with insurgent or terrorist groups. These relationships range
from tactical, episodic interactions at one end of the spectrum, to
full narcoterrorism on the other. This ``threat networking'' also
undermines legitimate institutions in ways that create opportunities
for other threats. TCOs are increasingly diversifying into other forms
of criminal activity in order to spread risk and maximize potential
profit. In some regions, for example, drug trafficking TCOs also engage
in kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, financial crime and other
activities.
It is important to note that DOD counternarcotics support
activities are carried out at the request of and in coordination with
U.S. or foreign law enforcement officials. DOD support includes
training, equipment, information sharing, communications, intelligence
analysis, and other cooperation. I give Congress the credit for having
had the vision to recognize the important role DOD can and should play
to counter the threat of drug trafficking, and particularly in
supporting broader law enforcement efforts.
DOD counternarcotics activities employ two principal ``force
multipliers'' to make the best use of finite resources available. These
are particularly important in the current fiscal environment. First, we
emphasize networked partnership, both with other countries and among
U.S. institutions. Through building capacity among our international
partners, we enhance their ability to work with their U.S. counterparts
and maximize the value of taxpayer dollars.
Second, we stress intelligence and information-driven operations.
For example, DOD increasingly provides detection, monitoring, and law
enforcement ``end game'' support, based on ``cued'' intelligence. Such
targeting is more cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas with
limited air, maritime, or other assets.
It is important to recognize that when we discuss the transnational
nature of this threat, this includes criminal activities that take
place outside as well as within the United States. For instance, the
influence of Mexican TCOs extends well beyond the Southwest border to
cities across the country such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit.
Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international activities
can be especially challenging. Such coordination is, however, also
increasingly important in an age when criminal globalization, threat
networking, and diversification are making distance and borders less
important. In this regard, DOD can play an important role in
facilitating coordination and information sharing through mechanisms
such as Joint Task Force-North in El Paso and Joint Interagency Task
Force-South in Key West--both of which are models of interagency and
international cooperation.
CONCLUSION
The transnational illicit drug trade is a multi-faceted national
security concern for the United States. The drug trade is a powerful
corrosive force that weakens the rule of law in affected countries,
preventing governments from effectively addressing other transnational
threats, such as terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, weapons
trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. Many of
the global and regional terrorists who threaten interests of the United
States finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics
trafficking. The inability of many nations to police themselves
effectively and to work with their neighbors to ensure regional
security represents a challenge to global security. Extremists and
international criminal networks frequently exploit local geographical,
political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which
they can operate with impunity.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions
and comments.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear,
and Mr. Wechsler.
We will now have 8 minutes to do questions. Mr. Wechsler,
counter-threat finance activities, which you've just been
discussing, fall into your portfolio. I understand that your
office has been active in setting up threat finance cells in
Afghanistan and Iraq. A number of administration officials have
indicated, however, that the most significant source of money
funding terrorism comes from our Gulf States. What is your
organization doing to identify and counter the flow of money
from these nations? I hear there's actually some points of the
year called the ``funding season.''
Mr. Wechsler. You're indeed correct, Madam Chairman. One of
the challenges in this area is exactly what you said, that the
fundraising networks are global in nature. So when we create
mechanisms to facilitate coordination in Iraq and in
Afghanistan, those aren't enough. We need to go outside of
those areas to really deal with it.
It's very important to recognize the work that we have done
inside those war zones in order to collect the right kind of
information, in order to bring it together, to map the
networks, to identify the key nodes, and then, most
importantly, to identify the key aspect of U.S. power that is
most relevant for attacking that particular node. Sometimes it
may be military activities--our friends in the Special Forces.
Sometimes it will be a law enforcement operation. Sometimes it
will be a host country law enforcement operation. Sometimes it
will be an influence operation. Sometimes a Treasury
designation. Sometimes diplomatic activity.
We have to have the mechanisms that can make those
decisions, and that's what we're building up in the war zones.
Outside the war zones, you take one of these action arms
completely off the table as far as DOD, so we need to rely on
our interagency partners. But even there, there are roles that
DOD can do because, in some cases our interagency partners,
according to the tasks that they've been given by Congress,
don't necessarily see it directly in their interest.
Just as an example, the folks at the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) do an absolutely fantastic job at meeting their
mission of keeping drugs out of the United States. Very little
of the drugs that come out of Afghanistan and go through the
Gulf and are part of those networks that end up funding our
enemies come to the United States. So if you just look at their
mission set, they wouldn't have a lot of people in the Gulf.
Indeed, when I went out there last January they had, DEA, had
one person in Cairo that covers 14 countries and the Gulf.
So what we said is: We have a mission and we need your
authorities. So what they have done, the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and, most recently, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, have gotten together and come up with a plan to
have greater staffing in the Gulf, so that they can use their
authorities to go after these financial networks with those
host countries. We in DOD can support them with resources, but
also with planning and analytical skills. So that's how we go
about dealing with that problem.
Senator Hagan. Do you actually pay the Treasury for their
personnel and providing them with intelligence?
Mr. Wechsler. We do, not in providing them directly with
intelligence, but we do make sure that we can provide the kind
of resources that are necessary, whether that is physical space
in buildings and in computers and those kind of tools that they
use. In some cases we provide resources for TDY and travel and
efforts like that. There are limitations on exactly what we're
able to pay for legally and we don't go across those lines. But
we want to make sure that in this relatively small amount of
money that we can provide, which is hugely cost-effective for
us to have Treasury as part of the war effort, that that's not
the reason why we fail in this area.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Mr. Reid, let me ask you a question on Afghanistan
counterterrorism operations. According to published reports,
the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S.
and the Afghan SOFs has increased dramatically in recent months
and demonstrated significant results. General Rodriguez stated
that the Afghan people are playing an interestingly important
role in the success of these operations by helping to provide
significantly more tips because they see the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) out among them more than they ever had
because of the increase in the number.
Do you agree with General Rodriguez that the increased
presence of ANSF has resulted in better intelligence because
the population is more likely to come forward with information?
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Madam Chair. In short, yes, I do agree
with that assessment, and we are into a period now where it's
logical we would see an increase in the pace of activity, given
our uplift in forces as the President authorized in the last
review and the weather, climate factors in Afghanistan in the
so-called spring and summer fighting season kicking off. So
there is a logical increase.
With respect to the support of the population, again
fundamental to our strategy is to put the Afghan forces in the
lead. As we build toward a responsible transition, we will see
more and more of Afghan forces in the lead. That does engender
greater support by the local populace. We see this in our
village stability operations, in our Afghan Local Police (ALP)
Program, which has taken off rapidly, is building up beyond
5,000 forces that are involved in the ALP. It's a village
security, non-Kabul-driven local governance, local security
apparatus that fits in with the ANSF in the big picture, but on
the village level it is their own actions to push back on
Taliban influence. This creates an information network. It
creates an operational capacity that spreads the reach of the
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to achieve
this exact effect, which is a shifting of public sentiment
towards an anti-Taliban position that is vital to the success
in the counterinsurgency.
Senator Hagan. I was in Afghanistan in January and had an
opportunity to go to the training center there for the ANSF and
was quite impressed with the group that we saw.
There's also reportedly 85 percent, I think what you're
talking about, of counterterrorism operations that take place
without a shot being fired. In light of disagreement between
NATO and the Afghan Government over civilian casualties, what
actions have been taken by the counterterrorism forces to avoid
civilian casualties in Afghanistan? Do you believe it is
accurate to say that 85 percent of these counterterrorism
operations are conducted successfully without a shot being
fired?
Mr. Reid. That's true, and I believe that came across at a
briefing and we went back and said, is that a footnote anecdote
or is that supportable? The facts are--and it's a difference,
and I'm sure in previous times--you've been down at Fort Bragg
and seen the counterterrorism demonstrations with the
explosions and the breaching and everything. It's still a very
valuable skill.
But what we have learned in this war, and particularly in
these type of operations, is just going out there and calling
them out is effective, and that's what you've seen. That's what
we talk about, without shots being fired.
It's also been optimized in Afghanistan by the use of the
Afghan forces as well, so now they have their own folks calling
them out. They know what happens if they don't come out, so
they tend to do that.
With respect to civilian casualties, clearly just a
horrible, horrible incident when it does occur. We've taken
many steps to minimize this with our strike policies, our call
for fire policies, our verifications of the targets. It is an
ugly, unfortunate aspect of warfare, and among the population,
that I would say we will never completely eliminate, but the
target control, fire control systems, have been strengthened to
the point where we have greatly reduced them, and we will
continue to do so.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen. You raise so many
issues and there are lots to get further information on. I
would say that, based on your responses to the chair's
questions, your two worlds kind of coincide on the issue of
counter-drug programs and narcotics, because I assume you would
agree that not just with regard to the Taliban, but generally
with regard to terrorist groups, narcotics often plays a role
in terms of the funding.
Do you have any sense of what part of the Taliban's
resources, for instance, come from the trafficking of
narcotics?
Mr. Wechsler. Senator, I've seen a lot of estimates that
try to get to those exact percentages and I wouldn't stand
behind any of them. But what I can say is that it is without
question that a very significant proportion of the Taliban's
resources come from the narcotics trade and various elements of
the narcotics trade. Sometimes it is direct involvement.
Sometimes it is taxing it. Sometimes it is facilitating it.
Sometimes it's using the drug trafficking organizations
themselves as mechanisms to move people, IEDs, other materials,
into war zones. There is a mutually supportive relationship in
many places that requires us to take down those networks.
Senator Portman. The Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction tells us that we have spent as American
taxpayers $1.5 billion between 2002 and last year on
counterdrug activities in Afghanistan alone, $1.5 billion. This
year's budget request from the President I see includes nearly
$400 million in the overseas contingency operations area for
these same efforts.
You've talked a little about this, but what's our objective
and is it working? That's a lot of money and there's still a
lot of trafficking.
Mr. Wechsler. Yes. The objective is--there are short-term
objectives and long-term objectives. The long-term objectives
are counternarcotics objectives, that we want to return
Afghanistan to what it was in the 70s when it was not the
world's leading source of opium.
The short-term objectives, though, are integrated into our
counterinsurgency objectives, and those are not
counternarcotics for counternarcotics' sake directed, but they
are counternarcotics in order to help break the nexus of the
Taliban and the drug trafficking organizations. It's
interdiction-related and it's also to support the individual
farmers.
You may recall that a couple of years ago the U.S.
Government--mostly DOS, not DOD--spent an awful lot of money on
eradication programs. What we've done is we've halted those
efforts and said that if there are going to be eradication
programs, they're going to be governor, local governor-led
eradication programs, because what we found is that in many
cases those were not only not productive, but they were
counterproductive. What you ended up doing was making enemies
out of all the farmers that have lost their livelihood, not
impacted the Taliban's finance, and just created more recruits
for them.
So what we are doing instead of targeting the farmers,
we're targeting the illicit networks behind the Taliban and the
drug trafficking organizations. To that respect, they have been
quite effective. Just a couple of things--and they've really
been effective in this year as the capacities that we built
over time, including Afghan capacities, it must be stressed,
have really come into, working together with our military
capacities.
So in 2010, for instance, ANSF conducted 298 DOD-supported
CN interdiction operations. The majority of these operations
were in the south, resulting in the destruction of 56 tons of
opium, 2 tons of morphine, 11 tons of heroin, and 74 tons of
hashish. These are incredible numbers. It's an amazing amount,
and every one of those are things that are taken away from our
enemy, and we're starting to see evidence that it is having an
effect on them at a strategic level.
Senator Portman. I would just make an editorial comment.
You talked earlier about your work and it's very important and
I appreciate what you do, Mr. Wechsler. But you focused all on
the supply side and not on the demand side, and you should take
credit for some of the work that the Guard, the Reserves, and
some of your active duty are doing on the demand side, too.
Ultimately that's going to be the way to get at this in my
view. So tons of narcotics we're talking about apprehending or
finding in the Taliban context, that's terrific news. I hope
they're not all back next year. As long as there's a market
that seems to materialize. I understand most of that opium goes
to Europe, but in terms of what you do here in this country I
think it's incredibly important vis-a-vis Mexico and other
problems. So add your demand side accolades to what your team
is doing.
Just quickly on U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). You
talked about the interagency coordination and you talked about
Colombia as being an example. You said that you thought that
what I said about it earlier was accurate, that it's an example
where something worked. Can I ask you something a little off
DOD's radar screen, but something very topical for us. Recently
General Fraser, SOUTHCOM commander, talked about the potential
trade-opening agreement with Colombia as ``a very positive,
beneficial aspect for our cooperation because of the growing
capacity to support the capabilities of the armed forces and
law enforcement.'' Do you see a connection between us finally
agreeing with Colombia and moving forward on this trade-opening
agreement, which as you know was negotiated with President
Uribe 4\1/2\ years ago, as being beneficial to I guess all of
your objectives with regard to fighting the narcotics trade in
Colombia and with regard to the other geopolitical benefits of
a strong ally in Latin America?
Mr. Wechsler. I do indeed, Senator. It's important to
recognize how far Colombia has come. I remember I was working
at the White House at the end of the Clinton administration.
I'll always remember this number: In 1999 two-thirds of the
Colombian public believed that the FARC was going to take
Bogota. That's incredible. Two-thirds of the people in
Afghanistan do not believe that the Taliban is going to take
Kabul right now. That's where Colombia was.
In 10 years time, they have gone from a major exporter of
insecurity in the region to a major exporter of security in the
region, helping the Mexicans, and helping their Central
American partners. They have a new government that still has a
war that they're fighting. That must be stressed. It has not
been won yet. There's been great progress, but it's not been
won.
They are looking to the United States to try to understand
what the relationship continues to be, and a key part of that
relationship is going to be the free trade agreement.
Senator Portman. Do you think it would strengthen President
Santos' hand vis-a-vis the FARC and other illicit organizations
operating in Colombia?
Mr. Wechsler. I think it will strengthen the hand of
President Santos and everybody else who, in Colombia, who is
talking about a strong Colombian-U.S. relationship.
Senator Portman. I don't know how much time I have, Madam
Chairman. My clock's not working, which is really a dangerous
thing for a Senator.
Senator Hagan. One more question.
Senator Portman. Dr. Schear, thank you for your testimony.
You talked about coalition-building. I loved your quote. You
said it requires some heavy lifting, literally and
figuratively, right? So we do have some capabilities that other
countries don't have.
We hear a lot about the close air support in Libya, for
instance, being essential to continuing to make progress and
that when we pulled out and NATO took the lead we lost some of
that capability. How do you respond to that?
Dr. Schear. Sir, I wouldn't dispute the point, but I would
probably defer to my colleagues who are more in the----
Senator Portman. You're the coalitions guy, though.
Dr. Schear. I'm the coalitions guy, and we're seized with
the opportunity to build coalitions to find the best fit. In a
case such as Libya, as you quite rightly infer, there are a
range of missions and missions like close air support probably
are somewhat more on the high end of capacity and issues of
discriminating targets from surrounding civilian areas is a big
challenge.
Senator Portman. Just quickly, a follow-on question. Japan:
Are we doing everything that we can be doing and have we
responded to everything the Japanese have asked us to do?
Dr. Schear. We have made an enormously positive
contribution to the response to a very complex situation, which
continues to unfold, I have to say. The Fukushima Daiichi
reactor facility is stabilizing, but I would say Japan has
certainly got a ways to go before we can put that fully behind
them.
Senator Portman. Do you feel like we're responding to the
requests from the Japanese Government?
Dr. Schear. Yes, we are. We have an incredible team out
there, U.S. Forces Japan supported by PACOM, with more than 20
ships and 14,000 service personnel engaged, with many aircraft
providing lift into the areas. Our foreign consequence
management capabilities are being deployed out there for both
training and direct response purposes.
Senator Portman. Our UAVs are being used, I understand?
Dr. Schear. UAVs are part of the repertoire. We're also
conscious of the fact we have a force protection requirement,
given the numbers of service personnel and American citizens in
the Honshu, northern areas of Japan. So we're very cognizant of
that.
But I would say thus far we've been doing a fairly strong
response in a very positive way, sir.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair.
When I went to Afghanistan I was amazed. A quarter mile
outside the forward operating base you have farmers with poppy
plants right there, and we're flying over them every single
day. They're up waving at us. The whole eradication thing, I
get it, but the cost-benefit analysis--we lose a farmer, and
the amount of money that's being derived, just the numbers that
you just said of the actual product that we've destroyed, it's
mind-boggling.
I mean, I'm hopeful that there's a way to strike a good
balance so we don't have to have our pilots flying out and
seeing all the poppy plants that are just there and the farmers
waving at us.
That being said, I wanted to shift gears a little bit,
because that was kind of the nature of what the chairman and
the ranking member were talking about. But according to Iranian
state-owned press--and this will be to Mr. Reid--the commander
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) indicated that
the IRGC units in his mission would undergo a structural change
or reform to align with recent regional developments. Have you
noticed or anticipate a change in regional strategy to take
advantage of the instability in the region?
Mr. Reid. I think the details of a good response to you,
Senator, would probably be better in a closed conversation.
Senator Brown. Great. Let's do that, then. We'll make a
point to do that.
Mr. Reid. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. So noted. Thank you.
I'll just then follow up. What's your assessment then--and
it can be to Dr. Schear as well. There's been a lot of
investment in training and equipping of Iraqi special
operations forces. These forces have been effective in planning
and carrying out operations against al Qaeda in Iraq. What's
your assessment on the capability of the Iraqi SOF and how will
this significant progress be affected if all the U.S. military
forces are withdrawn from Iraq by the end of the year?
Mr. Reid. We think the Iraqi special forces were an early
sign of our success in training the Iraqi military and they
were very responsive and engaged from early on in the conflict.
The organizations have matured over the years and they are
currently and have been for some time now sufficiently
planning, leading, and conducting effective counterterrorism
operations in Iraq, albeit however with continued U.S. support.
Looking forward, of course, some details to be filled in
about next year in Iraq and what our capabilities will be, but
I can say that we are planning an Office of Security
Cooperation in Iraq that will have room within that for
advising and assisting and equipping functions, as other
security cooperation offices do, and we will build upon that as
a basis for continued assistance and oversight of Iraqi
capabilities, including the SOFs.
Senator Brown. So do you think the Iraqi Government will
request a limited presence beyond next year aside from that?
Mr. Reid. I think it's to be determined what President
Maliki will ask for. We hear reports and discussions of
different things being considered, but I think that remains to
be seen, Senator.
Senator Brown. If we in fact leave altogether, what do you
think the likelihood of them to be able to maintain stability
is? Low, medium, high? Do you have any sense on that?
Mr. Reid. Well, I think the evidence is they're currently
doing the bulk of the security and we're confident that they
can shoulder the load going forward. But again, we do intend to
have a robust security cooperation office in U.S. Embassy
Baghdad.
Senator Brown. Mr. Wechsler, the National Guard plays an
important role in the conduct of DOD counterdrug activities.
How is the National Guard being utilized in ongoing and planned
DOD counterdrug programs, number one? Number two, any
additional requests for authority in terms of rules of
engagement, or rules of interdiction at all?
Mr. Wechsler. The National Guard has done an extremely good
job through the State plan process at supporting State and
local law enforcement under the direction of the governors. I
don't foresee any change in legal authorities required because
they do have the legal authorities to provide that support.
What I am hopeful for is as we develop--as the Department
of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security develop
greater mechanisms and strategies to combat the efforts inside
the United States that I was discussing previously that relate
to the threats that are outside the United States, that our
National Guard efforts can be increasingly deployed against
those problem sets.
Senator Brown. Mr. Reid, I have a question about Somalia
that I think is probably a closed session one as well, if we
could maybe deal with that at some point and I'll have Bo on my
staff connect with you. But talking about al Qaeda's ability to
use 21st century technology to spread its message and recruit
terrorist candidates, what's DOD doing to counter that
propaganda effort? Not only that, but other organizations. What
are you trying to do to that kind of combat?
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Senator. We do have a wide range of
programs in this area in DOD. We work very closely with our DOS
colleagues and their global strategic communications effort. I
agree with you, the details of some of those we should probably
talk about in a closed session.
Senator Brown. Great, great. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Senator Brown, Senator Portman and I both
are interested in having a closed session. So when you look at
the title of this committee, being the ``Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,'' I think we obviously will ask for a closed
session, and we'll try to schedule that together.
I might ask a few more questions and then Senator Portman.
I want to go back to Libya. Mr. Reid, how would you
characterize the situation in Libya? Given your
responsibilities for unconventional warfare, have you had any
involvement in assessing the training and equipping
requirements of the Libyan rebels? Just sort of a series of
questions and thoughts on Libya.
Mr. Reid. I'll take the first part. It's a little bit
easier to talk open here, just based on my own experience and
assessment. Obviously, as an opposition movement they are
dealing with an uphill battle with a longstanding oppressive
regime that makes little distinctions about attacking
civilians, civilian targets. So a very difficult situation for
any opposition.
Again just speaking in the abstract, they have some
advantages based on the geography of the situation and they
have shown great strength and motivation as a group. Difficult
for them. Again, if you look at this in the context of history,
you would probably have wanted to start off with a much longer
lead of developing your uprising. This sort of was spontaneous
to some extent based on events in the region. So I think that
clearly posed some challenges for the group.
With respect to the details of things, of course, as a
Defense official and working with our special operations,
clearly we have no U.S. forces on the ground in Libya and the
strength of the U.S. support to the opposition, as noted by
Senator Portman, was through the air and now continued by our
NATO partners.
I would just go back and say, with respect to the
differences in U.S. air power and that posed by the current
effort, not to take anything away from our NATO partners, but
we've been saying for quite a while the reason our enemies seek
to avoid direct confrontation is because of the overwhelming
firepower of the U.S. military and I think that's what you saw
happening. I wouldn't recommend anybody mess with the U.S. Navy
or the U.S. Air Force in that type of environment, because
their capabilities are clearly overpowering and precise.
Going forward, obviously we have some nascent engagements
on the diplomatic side. The United States continues to support
the NATO effort, and what you see on a day-to-day basis is a
back and forth now where neither side seems to be able to
dominate the other. There's been a shifting back and forth
between Ajdabiya and Misurata. Brega in the middle seems to be
a balance point. When the rebels--when the opposition gets the
Brega, the government kind of gets on its heels, and then they
regroup and come back. It's just a day-by-day situation right
now.
Senator Hagan. There's been discussion about arming the
rebels or not arming the rebels. Certainly I think a lot of
people are concerned about exactly who the rebels are. What are
your thoughts on that?
Mr. Reid. I think that's a great point, and we would always
have to be careful in any situation that we knew upfront
clearly who we're dealing with, and it has been much discussed
by the Secretary of State and others that we're in that process
right now of trying to get a further understanding before we
take further steps.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Wechsler, on counter-piracy efforts off
Somalia: Despite a significant and concerted international
effort which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S.
military, piracy in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the
approaches to the vital sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden
continues largely unabated. The tragic deaths of the four
Americans recently aboard the sailing vessel Quest was yet
another vivid reminder of how dangerous these waters have
become and the need to find ways to bring the piracy under
control and hopefully defeat it.
We're interested in your assessment of the overall counter-
piracy efforts to date and what changes you think are necessary
in our policies and approaches to better drive the pirates out
of business?
Mr. Wechsler. Sure, thank you. The solution set for this
problem--first I want to say, your characterization of the
problem is exactly correct. It's been growing and left unabated
it will continue to grow.
Senator Hagan. How many ships are under hold right now, do
you know?
Mr. Wechsler. I don't know, but we can get you the answer
to that, because it does change from time to time.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of today (April 12, 2011), 26 vessels are currently being held--
25 of them for ransom--along with 542 crewmembers.
Mr. Wechsler. The solution will not be found on sea. The
solution to this problem, as has almost always historically
been the case for piracy, will take place on land. The area
that the pirates cover would not effectively be patrolled by
all of the ships of all of the navies of all of the countries
of the world, it is that vast. It cannot be patrolled in this
way.
But that is not to say that there aren't more things that
can be done at sea. One of the clearest conclusions from the
last couple of years about this is that the ships that abide by
all of the best practices and then those who go beyond the best
practices, they are the ones that are not successfully pirated.
Indeed, one of the most controversial elements is the
suggestion that many have made inside the United States that
all these ships carry armed personnel on them to protect
themselves against pirates. We see consistently that those with
armed personnel on side, not military personnel but privately
held armed personnel, do not get pirated. Then of course, if
you combine that with other best practices, such as traveling
fast, traveling high, traveling in bad weather, having citadels
that can protect you and control the ship and have radio
equipment, having barbed wire on the sides, if you follow these
practices you are not taken has been our history.
Senator Hagan. What was the part about the bad weather? I'm
sorry?
Mr. Wechsler. The pirates are in small ships that cannot
sail in bad weather. So if you are in a large ship and can go
in bad weather, you successfully avoid pirates.
But there's a whole series of these practices, and the vast
majority of ships that are taken are not abiding by these
practices. So that is the number one thing that we can do on
the water.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Mr. Reid, I don't want to get you in
trouble, so I'm sure you'll monitor yourself here. I just have
to follow up on your Libya comment and the fact that we do have
certain capabilities that other countries don't have, including
our NATO allies, as much as we appreciate them. Close air
support was something I asked about earlier. Forgetting the
decision to engage, once we did engage it seems like our close
air support, A-10s, AC-130s, our ability to, as you say,
inflict damage in a way that makes our enemies concerned about
taking us on, that was largely lost, as I understand it, when
the command was shifted to NATO. Is that accurate?
Mr. Reid. I apologize, Senator. I'm not sure I understood
the question.
Senator Portman. Well, my question is whether those unique
capabilities that our Air Force has as compared to France and
Britain and other NATO partners--it seems to me that was lost,
that capability, when the command shifted. Is that accurate?
Mr. Reid. I apologize again, but I think I'm out of facts
here for you.
Senator Portman. That's fine. I don't want to put you in a
situation, I really don't. But this is the concern that has
been expressed by many of us, that once you engage in order to
continue to make progress you have to continue to have that
capability you talked about earlier, and it seems as though our
NATO allies have not been able to make the same progress, and
in fact there have been some reversals. Today I'm understanding
once again there is some threat to some of the cities that the
rebels previously had held.
So anyway, I won't push you on it except to say that that's
something that I think ought to be a subject for your group and
others to look at.
Can I ask you about your thoughts on how what's going on,
the upheaval, the Arab spring, from again the eastern Med all
the way around North Africa and certainly the Arabian
Peninsula, how that's affected our fight against terrorism,
specifically al Qaeda? Has it made it more difficult for us? Do
you see any evidence of al Qaeda taking advantage of the
situation? I guess specifically, in Libya, do you see al Qaeda
taking advantage of the anti-Qadhafi efforts that are underway?
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Senator. I think it's a great question
and one that we have considered in many different fora. What's
most remarkable to me about the situation which you're
referring to is that al Qaeda has not found this to be a
springboard to increased resonance. I think it was Denis
McDonough that said this in a speech, that al Qaeda's number
two, Zawahiri, spent time in prison, exiled from his homeland,
dedicated his entire life to changing the government in Egypt,
and what he was incapable of doing the popular uprising did in
a very unorganized manner in a period of weeks, less than a
month.
It's a very powerful statement to consider, and what it
points to is the inability of the al Qaeda narrative to
resonate anywhere, including where we might have feared it
would resonate the most, which is in Arab countries, and the
facts don't support that. Al Qaeda has not found the uprising
in the Middle East or in Africa to be a springboard into
anything and they are largely on the sidelines, which is good.
Of course, with instability comes opportunity. As a special
operator myself, I know that, and they know that as well and
they certainly would like to try. You can see signs, and we can
give you details in a separate session, but you can see efforts
they make, and we can pick up on this. But they're largely
ineffective.
The Libya question can probably be more precisely scoped
dealing with the free access to weaponry than is the case with
Qadhafi's losing control of certain weapons and material, and
that has concerned us and there are some separate activities to
deal with those as well.
But throughout the region there is a great concern about
this very question, and again none of these countries want an
al Qaeda-dominated society or an al Qaeda-dominated government,
and I think that's what you see happening.
Now again, as you mentioned, Senator, no one can predict
from day to day, week to week, what's happening with some of
these places. But I think it's fair to say thus far this has
not created a wellspring of pro-al Qaeda sentiment in any of
the locations, and in fact the opposite being the case, that
the forces of democracy and self-determination are much more
powerful in these places where this has played out.
Senator Portman. Yemen is a place where there's a lot of
concern right now, specifically concern about al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula taking advantage of that unrest. But even
there, you don't see al Qaeda making gains?
Mr. Reid. Certainly in the remote areas they've had some
tactical success, and I think you could attribute much of that
to the diversion of military capabilities to Sana'a in the role
of regime protection, which is certainly a cause of concern for
us. It's also reflective of the problems that we are trying to
deal with in Yemen, which is extending the sufficiency and the
mandate of the Sana'a-based security forces in the provinces,
the opposite direction.
So as much as we have tried to work with the Yemeni armed
forces to establish a greater foothold in the tribal regions,
we were not to that point when this particular scenario
developed. So I think you see some shifting back. But I predict
they would be short-lived gains and when they get through this
political crisis--and there will be some resolution at some
point--we believe again that the will of the security forces
and the will of the population of the Yemeni people is against
a strong al Qaeda presence.
They certainly have exploited the safe haven areas, the
very remote regions, much similar in ways to what you see in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, they have never been
fully controlled by a central government, and they certainly
are opportunistic right now. But I believe that the security
mechanism will get its feet back under it when we get through
this political crisis that they're going through right now.
Senator Portman. That was a positive assessment; I
appreciate it. I hope that you're right in terms of Yemen.
In terms of Pakistan and Afghanistan, there has been very
little positive news. Yet we do hear some rumors about rifts
developing between the leadership in Pakistan, Taliban
leadership particularly, and the fighters who are actually in
the fight in Afghanistan. I don't know if you can comment on
this in the open record, but there is a report this morning,
for instance, that 15 members of the Taliban, including an
alleged provincial leader, defected to the Afghan Government in
the Kandahar Province. I don't know if you're aware of those
reports or if you think they're accurate or not.
My bigger question would be, is this a trend? Do you see
the possibility of more defections, and do you see that, again
this rumored delinkage between some of the leadership between
Pakistan and fighters on the ground?
Mr. Reid. I'd say two things about that. First of all, as
we mentioned earlier, they are just now beginning to feel the
full weight of the fully resourced counterinsurgency campaign
that the President committed to last year as we brought our
forces in over the winter and as we intensified our effort to
expand the ANSF. The Taliban is really right now--here we are
in April--feeling what the summer's going to look like and it's
not going to be a pleasant summer.
There will be violence in Afghanistan over the summer and
there will be----
Senator Portman. You don't expect the normal resurgence
that happens in the summer?
Mr. Reid. No, I do not, based on the resourcing and the
forces there. I think the signals you're seeing of
reintegration, reconciliation movements within these
populations of Taliban is exactly the effect that we intend to
create, and we've opened up those opportunities. We've expanded
the security forces, trying to bring people over to the other
side.
Recall too, the history of 2001. We didn't defeat the
Taliban in Afghanistan through total overwhelming firepower. We
created a situation where those fighters realized that it was
not productive to be on the losing side and they changed sides,
and many of them fled across the border. Many of them stayed
and took up the other side. So there is a reconcilable
population that we know about. It's clearly there, and we're
appealing to it and you're starting to see these shifts. As the
strategy plays out over the summer, I believe you'll see more
of that and we will be on track, as General Petraeus recently
testified and Secretary Flournoy, with this transition process
that we're involved in right now.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
My time's expired, but I want to thank all three of you and
I look forward to further conversations.
Senator Hagan. I might ask one or two questions, and also
if you have any more Senator Portman.
On the DRC, during the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing regarding AFRICOM last week, General Ham indicated that
his command has had limited success in working with the
security forces in the DRC. He cited issues of vetting, human
rights abuses, and the absence of a plan for sustained
engagement. I would like to have any of you who would want to
speak on this question have an opportunity to answer, as you
all have unique areas and tools to engage in a place like the
DRC. How could the United States build a strong and enduring
engagement strategy in this country, or is it better not to
engage in a country like the DRC because of corruption and
other longstanding issues?
Dr. Schear. Madam Chair, you're absolutely right. It's a
major challenge, both conceptually and practically. The armed
forces of the DRC include a range of formerly warring rebel
groups and disparate factions. Trying to integrate them and
right-size that organization and subject it to legitimate
command and control is a big challenge, and I underscore
General Ham's frustrations. He's reflecting on behalf of
AFRICOM that this has proved a challenge, both with respect to
gaining full partnerships with the government, working
effectively with other countries, including within the U.N.
grouping that has certain security duties, especially in the
east, and finding out what the best fit would be in terms of
both funding and authorities to achieve a desirable effect.
This is pushing a big boulder up a hill, quite frankly. DRC
is a huge country, riven by violence since the mid-1990s.
Senator Hagan. So much of that directed against women.
Dr. Schear. Absolutely. This has been a very intense focus
for our interagency colleagues writ large, and finding the best
mix of training, understanding both the culture and the
operational imperatives which gives rise to such awful violence
is part of it, and then figuring out exactly what level of
training could be delivered, imparted, if you will, to
Congolese service personnel and their institutional overseers,
is a huge challenge.
I can't offer you any panaceas or any solutions here, other
than to say it's a source of very active concern for us.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid or Mr. Wechsler?
Mr. Reid. I would just add, and actually borrow off of Dr.
Schear's opening comments, because if it came to me and my
office to deploy special operators to the Congo for a short-
term engagement we would immediately start looking at
authorities and resources, and that's what we do. What I have
is really confined into support to special operations and
support to counterterrorism.
What Jim talked about opening up here with the global
contingency fund is a perfect example, as he just talked about,
where this isn't all just a Defense problem, we need multiple
vectors of security assistance, reform applications to a DRC
situation. To do that effectively, we need a flexible authority
to work within and not something that's boxed into a very tight
requirement, that's only good for that year of execution, and
these other things.
This is why we're all jealous of Will here with the 1004
authority. It's multi-year, you can do other things with it.
We'd love to have something like that to deal with these kinds
of problems.
So, not making any excuse, we can do certain things on the
margins anywhere in the world and, given the right factors, we
can surge into anything. But we know--and I've been on many
deployments into Africa--where we get in there and get it
wrong, it's not going to fix anything.
It isn't always led with special operators or it isn't
always led with military forces, but a really tight package of
the right mix of interagency. I think that's where we are with
this other authority.
Thank you.
Mr. Wechsler. I'd just add one thing. It's a little outside
my lane, but, given the other conversations that you've had; I
was at the National Security Council working on peacekeeping
operations when late President Kabila was marching down from
Kisingani to take out the Mobutu regime. The Mobutu regime was
one of the more brutal in the world at the time and we were
very happy for that to go.
But at the same time, what happened since wasn't a period
of happiness for the people in that area. As we encounter these
volatile regions of the world, we always need to remember that
just getting rid of somebody bad isn't the end of the story,
and we have to make sure that we, as Secretary Reid was talking
about, understand who we're dealing with on the other side and
what the next steps are before we take action.
Senator Hagan. I want to follow up on the pooled fund
initiative and have a couple of questions on that. Are you
confident--this is for whomever again wants to answer this. Are
you confident that DOS is committed to making this initiative
work jointly? Do you have any concerns that the joint
arrangement would be too unwieldy? Are there benefits to having
a joint arrangement that offset the procedural challenges of
implementing this program jointly?
Then do you have any concern that this initiative is too
much of a militarization of foreign policy?
Dr. Schear. Madam Chair, by way of a quick set of
responses, we think the pooled initiative actually is a good
blending of the two Departments' equities. It reflects the
DOS's overall leading role in the provision of foreign
assistance, but it would be well lashed up with DOD's special
concerns about security and defense policy, especially in
volatile transnational threat-riven areas. So we think it would
be a good balance.
We think this proposal would help us in a very agile
fashion respond to emergent challenges within a budget year of
execution. We are not proposing to expand the amount of
resources going into countries that are already claiming very
large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, but it would help us
navigate between and among funding streams in an agile way.
We think, further, it would incentivize interagency
cooperation. If we have a joint team working together in a top-
down fashion, we wouldn't be just depending on nominations
coming up the chain and taking a fair amount of time to work
themselves out. We would reflect the top-level priorities, but
we would seek the advice and the input of the field both at the
embassy country team and at the combatant commands.
So it wouldn't just be the 3,000-mile screwdriver. We would
be looking for input. But we think that, because both
secretaries and their leadership teams are committed, that we
have a good chance. We absolutely believe the DOS is strongly
behind this. It will be a work in progress. We'll have to give
you updates, if we're fortunate enough to have the opportunity
to start this pilot, to work with Members of Congress on an
energetic engagement so we can consult with you and get
feedback.
But generally speaking, I think we would view this as a
very good opportunity to show how we can work collegially with
another very important department.
Thank you.
Senator Hagan. I had one other question and then I'll turn
it over to Senator Portman. That is, you mentioned, Dr. Schear,
about the humanitarian aid to Haiti during the earthquake and
then obviously Japan. What is going on in Haiti right now? How
involved are we?
Dr. Schear. SOUTHCOM continues to have a coordination cell
there resident. Very keenly aware that Haiti, with its large
displaced population still living essentially in tent cities in
and around Port au Prince, is very vulnerable.
Senator Hagan. I did have an opportunity to go there
recently.
Dr. Schear. So you've seen.
Senator Hagan. About 800,000 people in these tent cities.
Dr. Schear. Yes.
Senator Hagan. It was an incredible sight to see.
Dr. Schear. Tragically, we'd have to say that more than a
year after the earthquake Haiti is getting back to abnormal.
This is not a situation which would enable that country to
withstand another major hurricane hit. We were very fortunate
in the last season that we didn't have such a direct hit. But
we're very concerned about it.
Our USAID colleagues continue to be engaged. We nudge them
along occasionally on specific areas. But the key issue is
government rebuilding, and this is an internal challenge for
the Haitians. The tragedy was that the Government of Haiti took
a huge hit with that earthquake, and getting them back in the
wake of an election finally, with a result that we hope will
lend itself to further development, would get that country back
on its feet.
I continue to be impressed, as I suspect you were too, by
the ingenuity and creativity of individual Haitians. It's just
remarkable how well they can cope. But as a society and
certainly as a government, they've had big challenges. So we
remain attentive to their needs and are watching very carefully
to ensure that we can react in an expeditious way if there's a
further natural disaster.
Senator Hagan. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. I promise this will be my last round and
we'll let you guys go.
On this idea of the global security contingency fund, it's
certainly something we might be willing to take a look at. As I
said at the outset, we are working today within very different
budget constraints even than a few years ago. The deficit is 10
times bigger than it was 4 years ago, if you think about that,
and we must adjust accordingly. So it's our ability to project
force and it's our ability to play an active role even where
we're not directly involved as a military, but where the DOS,
USAID, and others are involved.
So as you're talking about this contingency fund I assume
you're talking about taking funds out of other areas, both DOD
and DOS. Of course, DOS would say that DOD has all the money,
which I used to hear at the Office of Management and Budget
quite a bit. But what is your proposal there, Dr. Schear? Where
do the funds come from?
Dr. Schear. Under the terms of the proposal that we're
putting forward, we would be requesting $50 million in actually
DOS appropriation and transfer authority for both Departments
to transfer up to an additional $450 million to cover urgent
needs.
Now, given your background, you well know that $450 million
would be a very large lift indeed, certainly for State, and I
will say also for DOD in the current budget climate. This is
not a proposal which is designed to spend a lot of money. We
are not going to try and spend up to any given threshold. It's
just to meet emergent requirements in a way that we think could
actually promote cost efficiencies. If we can transfer money
across funding streams in a way that better targets a specific
potential need, we don't have to come for niche authorities in
special cases or to otherwise find less optimal ways to fund
something.
But we will be looking hard within our own Defense-wide
funding for available resources as and when emergent needs come
up. This is clearly something on our radar. Our Secretary, our
Comptroller and policy offices are all scrutinizing this very
carefully.
Senator Portman. I'm sure they are, given the Secretary's
commitment to finding additional savings in the area of tens of
billions of dollars. This is less than that, but it's also--if
you want a little unsolicited advice, that's going to be worth
what you pay for it, it has to be, because there are
efficiencies specifically that DOS and DOD are now expending
funds that would not have to be spent because of the ability to
coordinate better and to be more preventive perhaps and more
involved in, as the Secretary talks about, soft power from the
DOD perspective.
So we'll be eager to see the request, but also the analysis
as to what its impact would be on the budgets going forward.
Quickly with regard to Mexico, obviously a huge concern
here in this country, as it should be. I think--Mr. Wechsler,
about 35,000 people or so have now died just in the Calderon
administration time period, and the brutality of the cartels is
breathtaking.
My question is, what is your assessment? I think I heard
earlier--Dr. Schear, did you say we are spending $50 million a
year, or Mr. Wechsler? How much are we spending? Is that the
actual total amount of our expenditures, including some of the
funding that's going through other channels than the DOS? Is it
working, and what are we doing that's effective and what should
we be doing that we're not doing?
Mr. Wechsler. Any discussion of Mexico has to begin,
Senator, with an acknowledgment of the real strength and
commitment of the Calderon administration in taking on this
fight and taking the fight to the TCOs in a way that hadn't
been done previously. There are elements of the fight that
they've been doing that have been quite successful and there
are elements of their fight that have been less successful, as
President Calderon himself says quite clearly.
The U.S. Government writ large effort has been under the
Merida Initiative, designed at the end of the Bush
administration to do a 3-year DOS-led, $1.3 billion program for
Mexican support. I should note that it differs in one important
respect from Plan Colombia, that in Plan Colombia it was a
fully whole-of-government integrated plan, including DOD as a
support organization. This was not the case with Merida. So our
efforts that we are doing, which was the $50 million that I was
referring to, are being designed to complement these efforts
that are DOS-led.
Everything that DOD does, which is not in any way the lead
for the U.S. Government, nor should it be, is done at the
request of the Mexican Government. That's important to stress.
We do absolutely nothing that is not at the request of the
Mexican Government. A great deal of the work that we do are
supporting civilian agencies as well as military organizations.
Senator Portman. On the funding for a second, adding these
numbers together, it looks like we're talking roughly $500
million when you add the DOD 50 plus roughly a third of the
1.3. Is that roughly what we're spending annually during this
time period of the Merida commitment?
Mr. Wechsler. There is a commitment--to be very blunt about
it, the first 2 years of the Merida commitment, DOS was unable
to expend the money during those years at a high enough level.
So this year the President has, and the Secretary of State,
have committed to delivering $500 million of DOS Merida funds
in this calendar year, which will be a wonderfully helpful
thing for the Mexicans.
At the same time, what we have done in these efficiencies
efforts that you describe is try to scrub as much of our CN
accounts and to close down programs that are not unsuccessful,
but are just less high on the priority list, in order to shift
money towards Mexico, and doing that in this year and going
forward across the Future Years Defense Program. Indeed, when I
took on this job one of my very first meetings was to have a
budget meeting, and I decided that we were only spending $3
million out of our budget on Mexico and that the U.S.
Government as a whole was spending very little on the area of
southern Mexico and northern Guatemala and Belize, which is a
really----
Senator Portman. Northern triangle.
Mr. Wechsler. Exactly. So we put forward a proposal to
increase the amount of money, and Congress thus far has
approved it, to increase the amount of money that we were
spending in that area, because that seemed to be an
underresourced area.
Senator Portman. By the way, in that area apparently
incredible violence. One of your commanders recently said that
outside of a war zone it was the most dangerous place he can
imagine.
Is that all about traffickers fighting for position coming
up from further in the south? Or what is it about the northern
triangle area that has become so dangerous?
Mr. Wechsler. It's a lack of full government control.
Senator Portman. This would be parts of Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Southern Mexico, I take it?
Mr. Wechsler. Exactly. It is in part a problem of those
countries themselves and their security control over there. But
what they are also being affected by is the Mexican TCOs that
are moving south. The Zetas, which are the most violent of and
have really moved the overall level of violence to a great
degree, abetted by the other TCOs in Mexico, they have moved
south into Guatemala and are contributing to the spike in
violence that we see there as well.
In part they're doing that as a result of the success that
President Calderon has had, but in part it's also just moving
to get greater control over different legs in the value-added
change from the farmer to our streets in America.
Senator Portman. How about Panama? Where does Panama fit in
this? We also are working on a trade-opening agreement with
Panama, and it has been a great partner on security and I
understand they have a good cooperative arrangement with us at
every level, including DOD.
Mr. Wechsler. They do indeed, although it needs to be said
that they're not--they have challenges themselves, challenges
that we need to work with them on. But there is a great level
of cooperation to work on those challenges, particularly in
individual areas.
Senator Portman. Can I get you on the record on that trade-
opening agreement also? Would that help by establishing a
better commercial relationship with Panama to strengthen their
hand in dealing with narcotraffickers and others who might use
that as a financial haven?
Mr. Wechsler. Anything that would help, that would
encourage, as this would, to encourage the Panamanians to make
further improvements on their anti-money-laundering regime and
their ability to go after the money, which is one of the
predominant challenges that exists in that country.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler,
thank you so much for your testimony today, your preparation,
the job that you're doing. I know that these are very difficult
times for so many places around the world and I really do
appreciate what you're doing.
I do want to say that we're going to keep the record open
for any colleagues that may have questions for the record,
until the close of business day on Friday. Also, we will be
having a closed session and staff will coordinate that schedule
with you.
With that, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned. Thank
you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
DOD POLICY ON BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY
1. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, a number
of the emerging, transnational threats the United States now faces are
rooted in states with weak governments or under-governed spaces, such
as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, whose governments lack
sufficient capacity to exercise governance and provide security
throughout their territory. While security assistance has traditionally
been a Department of State (DOS) function through such programs as
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program, in the last several years the
Department of Defense (DOD) has sought, and Congress has provided, a
number of new authorities for building our partners' capacities to meet
threats within their territories. Given the nature of the extremist
threats emerging in a number of weak states, how important in your view
are efforts to build the capacities of partner nations to provide
security and conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations?
Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler. In the decades to come, the
most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security are
likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves
or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing
states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. The
United States recognizes that the security sectors of at-risk countries
are really systems of systems tying together the military, the police,
the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms. As
such, building a partner's overall governance and security capacity is
a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the
U.S. Government, including DOD--and one that requires flexible,
responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation. In
particular, section 1206 train and equip authority, and sections 1004,
1033, and other DOD counternarcotics authorities continue to be
critical tools to meet DOD's building partner capacity needs.
In fiscal year 2012, the administration is seeking a new authority
called the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to respond more
effectively to emergent challenges and opportunities such as these. The
GSCF would allow DOD and DOS to provide assistance to security forces
as well as rule of law, judicial sector, and stabilization assistance
when civilians are challenged by a lack of security, and where the
provision of assistance can help prevent instability, or advance
regional security. Programs under this fund would be jointly formulated
by the DOS and DOD and would require approval by both Departments prior
to implementation. Through the GSCF, we aim to combine the strengths of
both Departments, and to call upon the expertise of the U.S. Agency for
International Development and other departments and agencies to devise
the most effective assistance programs possible to meet a particular
strategic need.
2. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Shear, and Mr. Wechsler, do you
believe that building the capacity of foreign security forces is a core
function of DOD?
Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler. Yes. Arguably the most
important military component in overseas operations is not the fighting
we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to
defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of
indigenous army and police--once the province of Special Operations
Forces (SOF)--is now a key mission for the military as a whole. As the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded, the United States is
likely to face future scenarios requiring a similar tool kit of
capabilities as that being implemented in current operations, albeit on
a smaller scale. In these situations, the effectiveness and credibility
of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness,
credibility, and sustainability of its local partners. This strategic
reality demands that the U.S. Government get better at building partner
capacity--helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary,
fight alongside U.S. forces by providing partner forces with equipment,
training, or other forms of support.
The President and Secretary of Defense have directed Combatant
Commanders to address security challenges in their regions, and DOD
assigns to them responsibilities that require building partner
capacity. Such efforts also can generate substantial dividends for U.S.
security outside major warfighting venues. In Colombia, for example, a
robust U.S. capacity-building effort, backed by bipartisan
congressional support, has weakened antigovernment insurgents, helped
free captive Americans, and promoted stability in our own hemisphere.
In turn, Colombia is partnering with the United States to provide
training to other countries; with cultural advantages they are also
effective at capacity building.
Improving how the United States builds partner capacity is an
essential national security requirement that will endure for the
foreseeable future. This is a cost-effective effort that requires
focused, efficient, predictable funding and adequate authorities to
provide the right training and equipment at the right time to the right
partner nation's forces. When DOD applies its resources to build
partner capacity in a manner that complements the efforts of the State
Department and other interagency counterparts, experience has
demonstrated that this is a valuable return on investment for the
American taxpayer and a worthwhile mission for DOD. Given the
importance of this issue to the United States and its partners and
allies, the solution requires a whole-of-government approach.
3. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, what
should be the respective roles of DOD and DOS in building partner
capacities?
Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler. One of the most important
lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is
not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and
the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance,
providing basic services to the people, training and equipping
indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and
more--these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-
term success. For this reason, building a partner's overall governance
and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple
agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus--and
one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives
for cooperation. Our execution of and any government decision regarding
building partner capacity should reinforce DOS's leading role in
crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, including the provision of
foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part.
Proper coordination procedures ensure that urgent requirements for
military capacity building do not undermine the United States'
overarching foreign policy priorities.
That said, DOD brings important expertise and capability for
building partner capacity, such as building up the operational capacity
of partner nations by training and equipping troops and mentoring them
in the field, building the institutional capacity of ministries of
defense, and providing military-unique support for counternarcotics.
Consistent with DOD and DOS's shared responsibility to build
partner capacity, for fiscal year 2012, DOD and DOS propose to create a
GSCF that would provide security and rule of law assistance when
civilians are challenged by a lack of security, and where the provision
of such assistance could help prevent instability, or advance regional
security. The GSCF would create a more robust capability to respond to
crises, emergent challenges, and new opportunities across a range of
assistance types to a range of entities in the security sector. This
proposal also would pilot a new business model for addressing security
challenges by incentivizing collaboration and multiplying the
effectiveness of U.S. Government security sector capabilities. Programs
under this fund would be jointly formulated by DOS and DOD and would
require approval by both departments prior to implementation.
4. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, in your
view, are there areas where DOD has an advantage over DOS in delivering
capacity-building assistance?
Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler. We should continue to
reinforce DOS's lead role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign
policy, including foreign assistance, of which building security
capacity is a key part. Proper coordination and concurrence procedures
ensure that urgent security capacity building requirements do not
undermine the United States' overarching foreign policy priorities.
That said, DOD has an advantage over DOS in providing certain
capacity-building assistance, such as building the operational capacity
of partner nations by training and equipping troops and mentoring them
in the field, building the institutional capacity of ministries of
defense, and providing military-unique support for counternarcotics.
DOD should take a lead role, subject to the procedures noted above, in
building partner security capacity in areas such as disrupting and
defeating transnational threats, supporting self-defense, and
contributing to coalition operations, although DOD should continue to
draw upon DOS and other departments and agencies' expertise to support
and synchronize such building partner capacity efforts.
The DOD-DOS fiscal year 2012 proposal to create a GSCF could help
both departments, with the input of all relevant U.S. departments and
agencies, develop innovative, effective assistance programs to provide
assistance across multiple security sectors and implement such programs
by leveraging the expertise of relevant U.S. departments and agencies.
5. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, are there
areas where DOS should take the lead with DOD in support?
Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler. Our execution of, and any
government decision regarding, building partner capacity should
reinforce the DOS's leading role in crafting and conducting U.S.
foreign policy, including the provision of foreign assistance, of which
building security capacity is a key part. Proper coordination
procedures ensure that urgent requirements for military capacity
building do not undermine the United States' overarching foreign policy
priorities.
DOS should continue to lead in efforts to build partner capacity in
a number of areas, such as improving governance, bolstering
development, strengthening legitimate and effective public safety and
justice, and promoting universal values, although DOS should continue
to draw upon DOD and other departments and agencies' expertise to
support and synchronize such building partner capacity efforts.
We also need to move beyond the old debates about what is in DOD's
``lane,'' what is in DOS's ``lane,'' and so on. Instead, we should
focus on the mission as a whole and how the U.S. Government can best
achieve our national objectives--how we can most effectively leverage
existing capabilities, resources, and expertise to achieve those
objectives, while simultaneously seeking new and more effective ways to
build partner capacity in the longer term.
Again, the DOD-DOS proposal to create a GSCF in fiscal year 2012
would provide the two departments with the flexibility to leverage the
expertise of DOS, DOD, or any other U.S. department or agency to
provide a certain type of assistance.
SECTION 1206 TRAIN-AND-EQUIP PROGRAM
6. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, in response to DOD's request for
additional authority to respond to urgent and emerging security threats
from ungoverned spaces, Congress established in 2006 the section 1206
train-and-equip program as a pilot program. The 1206 program currently
allows the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary
of State, to spend up to $350 million per year to build the capacity of
partner nations' military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations
or to conduct stability operations in conjunction with U.S. forces.
What is your assessment of the section 1206 dual-key process requiring
joint DOS and DOD approval of programs?
Mr. Reid. Program development and collaboration in the field
between the Chief of Mission and the combatant commander is the first
step in a rigorous inter-departmental process to target our section
1206 assistance toward appropriate military units within a country.
This collaboration is continued between DOD and DOS in Washington. We
have established a process where each regional and functional office in
DOS and DOD prioritizes projects according to that office's expertise.
This ``wisdom of crowds'' approach ensures the highest priority
proposals rise to the top, while giving both sides a veto if particular
projects run counter to particular mission objectives.
We believe the dual-key process makes section 1206 programs
stronger and more effective and has yielded significant dividends in
the form of high-quality programs.
7. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, how well is that DOD-DOS coordination
working?
Mr. Reid. We believe the dual-key process makes section 1206
programs stronger and more effective, and has yielded significant
dividends in the form of high-quality programs. The process is not
without occasional friction, but the vast majority of section 1206
programs are formulated and approved without contention.
8. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, is this a model for other security
assistance programs in your view?
Mr. Reid. Yes. Section 1206 has proven to be an effective authority
for conducting security cooperation in response to a changed security
environment in the wake of September 11. The dual-key concurrence
mechanism is a particularly important feature of section 1206 that
drives deliberate coordination between departments in the executive
branch, optimizing the value of our assistance programs to foreign
partners. The lessons we've learned through our experience in
developing, vetting, and implementing section 1206 programs help us as
we look for ways to improve our support to partners in combating
terrorism and contributing to multinational stability operations
efforts. These lessons are also relevant as the administration looks to
develop new security sector assistance tools to address emerging
problems that bear on U.S. security, such as the GSCF. Although the
GSCF differs from section 1206 in its top-down driven project
nomination and broad focus on security sector issues writ large, it
builds on the fundamental principle of joint formulation and
concurrence reflected in section 1206.
9. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, some foreign policy experts have
criticized the DOD section 1206 train-and-equip program as duplicating
existing DOS security assistance authorities such as FMF and
contributing to a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. How do you
respond to the criticism that DOD's section 1206 authority duplicates
traditional DOS authorities like the FMF program?
Mr. Reid. The FMF program is a critical tool for executing our
foreign policy; it is key to improving bilateral relationships,
encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and
influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests
align. Because many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their
military procurement budgets, the allocation of these resources is
affected by host-nation preferences and political engagement. Secretary
Gates has argued consistently for increased funding for Title 22
programs--including FMF--because our diplomats need additional
resources to advance U.S. interests. Such funding, however, does not
address all the combatant commanders' need for tools to build capable,
reliable, and interoperable partners as they prepare for--and seek to
minimize the necessity for--high priority missions in their areas of
responsibility (AORs).
On the other hand, we use the section 1206 authority as a
responsive and agile tool to meet urgent and emergent threats and
opportunities to build tangible partner capacity. It is not viewed as a
political tool to satisfy the desires of foreign governments, but
rather as a strategic way to address critical counterterrorism needs as
identified by the U.S. Government inside current budget cycles. There
has been no attempt to ensure that all regions are provided assistance
under this authority--or that all elements of a foreign military are
provided with equipment. To the contrary, section 1206 programs are
targeted at countries--and particular military units within countries-
where focused training and equipment will have the most significant
impact in achieving the objectives of the section 1206 authority.
Building partner capacity meets a vital and enduring military
requirement and we have been careful to avoid using section 1206 as a
tool of international politics precisely because military rather than
political needs define the appropriateness of funding particular
activities.
10. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, what safeguards are built into the
1206 program to prevent such duplication?
Mr. Reid. Each program proposal is jointly formulated by DOD and
DOS representatives in the field, and the submissions must describe why
the identified requirement should not be addressed using traditional
security assistance tools. Upon receipt of the proposals, they are
reviewed and evaluated by regional and functional offices across both
Departments; a critical part of that evaluation is a determination of
whether the use of other tools--such as FMF, counternarcotics, or
cooperative threat reduction authorities--are more appropriate for a
particular requirement.
This ``wisdom of crowds'' approach ensures the highest priority
proposals rise to the top, while giving both sides a veto if particular
projects run counter to particular mission objectives. The process
culminates with the approval by the Secretary of Defense and the
concurrence of the Secretary of State.
11. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, the 1206 program was designed to
provide a more flexible means to respond to emerging threats that may
not have been anticipated as part of the budget preparation cycle. Yet,
our ability to deliver equipment still lags behind, often taking 12 to
18 months after a 1206 assistance program is proposed, vetted, and
approved. How successful has the 1206 program been in delivering
equipment and training in response to emerging threats in a timelier
manner than traditional security assistance under FMF?
Mr. Reid. The flexibility of the section 1206 authority comes from
the speed and agility of its decisionmaking cycle. Each and every
section 1206 program is identified, vetted, and executed in a single
fiscal year. Put more simply, the authority allows the U.S. Government
to act in months rather than years.
In addition, we are always looking for ways to improve delivery
timelines. Based on lessons learned from previous years, and best
practices established though the provision of equipment under other DOD
authorities, we notified Congress earlier this year of our intent to
use $12 million in fiscal year 2011 section 1206 funding to ensure
section 1206 equipment is delivered as quickly as possible.
Specifically, these funds will be used in section 1206 programs to
provide pre-shipment consolidation and premium transportation services
in order to help expedite the provision of section 1206 equipment to
recipient units.
12. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, what remains the main impediment under
the 1206 program to delivering equipment when it is needed?
Mr. Reid. Meeting urgent and emerging requirements within the
existing contracting system and on the acquisition timelines of the
defense industrial base can be challenging. We continue to work with
our partners in the acquisition and contract community to find ways to
expedite the provision of section 1206 equipment.
We are working to increase the speed, agility, and responsiveness
of the FMS system. One such initiative is to recapitalize the Special
Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to reduce the amount of time that
partner countries have to wait to receive urgently needed defense
articles. Initially authorized in 1981, the fund provides the DOD with
a means to procure defense articles in anticipation of their future
transfer to foreign countries and international organizations. The DOD
will use the fund to purchase items that have long procurement lead-
times and will likely be needed by partner countries during future
contingencies. The SDAF will allow the U.S. Government to deliver the
urgently needed items in less time than would otherwise be possible. In
addition, the fund will help to maintain the readiness of U.S. forces
since it will reduce the need to divert critical assets from U.S.
service inventories to fulfill urgent foreign requirements. The
administration is requesting obligation authorization from Congress to
recapitalize the fund beginning in fiscal year 2012.
13. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, one criticism of the section 1206
train-and-equip program is that assistance is provided to address
emerging threats without sufficient assurances that the program will be
sustained over time. Because the vast majority of 1206 programs are
with lower income countries, sustainment of these programs may have to
be incorporated into FMF funding plans for subsequent years. How do you
address concerns over the sustainment of 1206 programs if the recipient
country lacks the resources to sustain the programs on its own?
Mr. Reid. We have articulated a clear approach to sustainment in
the past: Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical
programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify
national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in
FMF requests. Our annual guidance, issued jointly by DOD and DOS to our
combatant commands and embassies, stipulates that Security Assistance
Officers and the U.S. Embassy Country Teams identify the appropriate
approach for sustainment in each country. We have at times reduced
proposed programs when the size of the request would be difficult for
the host nation to sustain. We also seek to mitigate risk-of-
sustainment problems by including in section 1206 programs 2-year spare
parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including
train-the-trainer support. This approach supports effective near-term
use of the equipment and also helps minimize out-year costs. For
longer-term funding, this approach relies either on the host nation to
commit funds or on Congress appropriating the administration's FMF
funding requests.
14. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, once a 1206 program has provided
equipment or training in response to an emerging threat, when should
that security assistance be handed off to more traditional security
assistance programs like FMF?
Mr. Reid. We have articulated a clear approach to sustainment in
the past: Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical
programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify
national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in
FMF requests. Our annual guidance, issued jointly by DOD and DOS to our
combatant commands and embassies, stipulates that Security Assistance
Officers and the U.S. Embassy Country Teams identify the appropriate
approach for sustainment in each country. We have at times reduced
proposed programs when the size of the request would be difficult for
the host nation to sustain. We also seek to mitigate risk-of-
sustainment problems by including in section 1206 programs 2-year spare
parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including
train-the-trainer support. This approach supports effective near-term
use of the equipment and also helps minimize out-year costs. For
longer-term funding, this approach relies either on the host nation to
commit funds or on Congress appropriating the administration's full FMF
funding request.
15. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, what criteria do you use to determine
when a program should graduate out of the section 1206 program?
Mr. Reid. We use section 1206 authority to begin critical programs,
after which time we work with host nations to identify national funds
or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests.
This means we usually do not provide section 1206 to build a specific
capacity for more than 3 years. Such a window of time allows us to work
with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include
sustainment requirements in FMF requests. Although the urgency of a
particular threat may alter this calculus, we understand the view of
Congress--and this committee in particular--is that section 1206 is not
a substitute for traditional security assistance authorities such as
FMF.
16. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, has DOD developed plans for monitoring
the outcomes of these projects, as recommended by a 2010 Government
Accountability Office study?
Mr. Reid. Yes. As more section 1206 programs reach maturity, DOD is
initiating a more formal assessment effort. Such an effort will be
built on information collected in the program proposal process, which
includes baseline information, expected program milestones, and
quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the program's
effectiveness. As a first step in assessing section 1206 programs, DOD
contracted for the RAND Corporation to identify key stakeholders, their
roles, and sources of data in support of a comprehensive assessment of
the programs. Part of this step involves determining DOD's capacity to
implement an integrated assessment framework developed by RAND's
National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) in 2009. This integrated
framework includes preparatory elements, such as developing assessment
guidance, designing processes, and providing training, as well as the
actual conduct of assessments and the analysis of their results. The
capacity to implement such a framework includes, for example,
stakeholders at every level of a program who have access to data that
would support assessments, guidance to establish processes and to
govern the conduct of assessments, and the assessment skills possessed
by personnel within the stakeholder organizations. Determining this
capacity will enable the development of a framework to assess specific
programmatic efforts within the section 1206. This study is near
completion, and its conclusions will provide a foundation for a more
comprehensive assessment of individual programs from across different
fiscal years that DOD intends to begin in late fiscal year 2011.
PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
17. Senator Hagan. Dr. Schear, today, the United States has
military officers serving within the United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping
missions in Haiti, Liberia, and a few other peacekeeping missions. Many
of our partners in NATO also have officers deployed in support of these
missions. Can you discuss the pros and cons of these personnel
contributions?
Dr. Schear. The primary benefit of current U.S. military
contributions is the ability to improve the operational effectiveness
and management of their missions by filling key staff positions, and
the resulting insight into the mission that U.S. military participation
provides for U.S. Government policymakers. When evaluating whether or
not to provide staff officers to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, the
primary criteria include whether the country involved is a U.S.
Government policy priority, and whether the position to be filled can
affect the operational effectiveness and management of the mission.
The challenge to U.S. participation is the potential strain on high
demand/low density skill sets required for staff officers (i.e.,
intelligence, logistics, civil affairs (CA), et cetera) and ensuring
adequate force protection for military personnel. The use of both
Active Duty and Reserve component personnel helps to alleviate the
strain on specific skill sets while providing a broader pool of
candidates. The Department ensures that adequate force-protection
(secure housing, availability of sidearms, etc.) and appropriate legal
(Status of Forces Agreements or comparable legal safeguards) measures
are in place to protect U.S. military personnel assigned to U.N.
missions.
18. Senator Hagan. Dr. Schear, what would be the pros and cons of
the United States providing additional contributions to U.N.
peacekeeping missions?
Dr. Schear. Providing additional contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
missions would provide a number of benefits.
Increased U.S. contributions would provide additional
expertise and capabilities in support of U.N. peacekeeping
missions, help ensure the success of the mission, and support
stability in the affected country or region. For those missions
of particular interest to the United States, successful
peacekeeping operations reduce the risk of costlier U.S.
involvement in the event of renewed or continued conflict.
Increased U.S. contributions would also send a
political message both to host nations and U.N. member states
that the United States values and supports international
peacekeeping. With respect to the specific peacekeeping
mission, the increased contributions would indicate that the
United States views that mission as a priority.
Increased U.S. contributions could also encourage
other nations to contribute (or increase their contributions)
to peacekeeping operations.
Any decision to increase U.S. contributions--specifically in terms
of U.S. military personnel--must take into account, however, the impact
on the force. The U.S. military is stretched thin from extensive
deployments over the past decade. U.S. military personnel need time off
from multiple deployments, and the demand for some skill sets typically
exceeds the available capacity. The provision of large numbers of U.S.
personnel will be unfeasible in the near future in light of the
existing operational demands. However, the United States can continue
to place U.S. officers in key staff positions that can help improve the
performance of the mission, and can look to opportunities where U.S.
forces can contribute to the success of peacekeeping missions in other
ways (such as U.S. support for MINUSTAH in the wake of the Haiti
earthquake).
19. Senator Hagan. Dr. Schear, what would be the pros and cons of
personnel contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo?
Dr. Schear. The United States has two military personnel deployed
to the U.N. Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO), one deployed to Kinshasa, and one deployed to Goma.
Both are military intelligence officers serving in the mission G2
(information) division. These two officers are filling a critical
demand, for which U.S. assistance was specifically requested. The most
significant benefit of these officers' presence is their positive
impact on the way the mission collects, organizes, and analyzes
information, and their ability to draw on analytical support from
AFRICOM as appropriate. Improving the mission's information
capabilities supports the mission's operational and strategic planning,
particularly regarding MONUSCO efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance
Army.
Increasing the U.S. military contributions to MONUSCO could improve
the mission's operational capacity and would be in line with U.S.
Government policy priorities in the region. The MONUSCO military staff
currently has a full complement of officers, but DOD would consider
positions that come available (when countries decide that they will no
longer fill certain positions) in areas such as planning, operations,
logistics, CA and military justice.
The challenge to U.S. participation is the potential strain on high
demand/low density skill sets required for staff officers (i.e.,
intelligence, logistics, CA, et cetera), and ensuring adequate force
protection for military personnel. Additionally, certain positions in
this mission require French language capability, which limits the
number of potential candidates within the U.S. military. The MONUSCO
area of responsibility is a particularly challenging environment for
force protection given the periodic attacks on MONUSCO troops, and
sensitivities regarding the carrying of sidearms (sidearms are not
allowed in many areas in Kinshasa and Goma). However, MONUSCO has
implemented thorough security procedures to ensure the safety of its
officers, and DOD reviews the specific security concerns at each duty
location to ensure appropriate force-protection measures are in place.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES
20. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, some observers contend that the
national intelligence agencies focus their assistance on SOFs in
Afghanistan engaged in direct action, or kill/capture operations,
against terrorists and insurgents. As a consequence, it is alleged,
general purpose forces and SOFs engaged in indirect activities
including foreign internal defense and population protection, like
village stability operations, receive less intelligence support. Do you
believe the Intelligence Community (IC) is adequately focused on
supporting both direct and indirect lines of operation in Afghanistan
and elsewhere?
Mr. Reid. Yes. Over the last several years, the Department has
worked to drastically increase intelligence support to warfighters
across the board. In response to combat commanders' requests for
greater numbers of data-collecting systems, the Department created the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to
rapidly field ISR platforms. Through such efforts, the Department has
expanded Predator/Reaper orbits and upgraded the capabilities of our
airborne ISR systems, making a dramatic impact on the battlefield. Over
the past year, the IC has also provided significant support to the
surge of troops to Afghanistan through Attack the IED Network (AtN)
capabilities, addressing the leading cause of casualties to U.S. and
coalition partners. These capabilities include adding a significant
number of intelligence analyst, C-IED enablers, and Persistent
Surveillance systems to enable both general purpose and special
operating forces understand and attack IED networks.
As mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village
stability operations has become an increasingly critical element of our
strategy in Afghanistan, the IC has also put greater emphasis on
developing a comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural
environments within which terrorist networks and insurgent forces
operate. Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan are
now generating comprehensive District Assessment reports and the ISR
Task Force and the U.S. Central Command are working to develop an
integrated information sharing environment to support indirect lines of
operation in Afghanistan. In March 2010, USD(I) commissioned the
Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board to evaluate how
intelligence can most effectively support counterinsurgency operations.
The Board is currently compiling its findings and recommendations and
is scheduled to complete its work by the end of calendar year 2011.
SOMALIA
21. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid and Dr. Shear, during his testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 7, General Carter
Ham, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), suggested that DOD
needed to take a more regional approach to address the threat emanating
from Somalia. This would seem to indicate that more work should be done
with Somalia's neighbors--Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti--and perhaps
with the sub-regional governments in Somalia. If General Ham approached
your office indicating that he needed more support to counter the
growing terrorist threat in Somalia, what tools and authorities would
you propose using to help him address the situation through a regional
framework?
Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. General Ham has already begun to pursue a
number of promising initiatives, utilizing various tools and resources
for the challenges he faces. For capacity building, section 1206,
complemented by smaller programs such as IMET and the Combating
Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) allow AFRICOM to build regional CT
capabilities and relationships with key leaders in the international CT
community. Section 1208 provides resources for U.S.-partner combined CT
operations. AFRICOM is also increasing its operational collaboration
with regional partners to monitor and counter terrorist threats.
Persistent relationships with regional governments, complemented by
episodic mil-mil engagements (e.g., Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET)) have helped develop a level of interoperability that is
improving our ability to jointly combat terrorism. Finally, AFRICOM,
OSD, and the Joint Staff continue to work with State and other
interagency partners to develop an integrated CT strategy that
coordinates and leverages our various CT authorities and resources in
East Africa. AFRICOM has begun assisting the State Department with
identifying its security assistance priorities, and the Command
recently began supporting State-led training for the African Union
Mission in Somalia.
22. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, Somalia is a unique
problem set as it is a failed state. Is DOD's security assistance
program equipped to address the threats emanating from Somalia?
Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. Our security assistance authorities are
not ideal for addressing threats emanating from failed states. Most of
our security assistance tools require us to work with national military
forces, which is not possible in a failed state that the U.S.
Government does not recognize as a sovereign nation.
Given these challenges, we take a regional approach to countering
the threats emanating from Somalia. Section 1206 authority allows us to
build CT capacity in East African states to prevent the threat from
spilling out of Somalia. The section 1208 authority is available for
working with regional partners to conduct U.S.-led CT operations. Other
authorities, such as JCET and IMET, allow us to build relationships
with East African CT authorities. The State Department's Peacekeeping
Operations funding is somewhat more flexible and can be used to support
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Where appropriate, DOD
advises and coordinates with State on these programs assisting
entities, including the African Union Mission in Somalia and the TFG,
inside Somalia. Finally, we're increasingly collaborating with other
nations, such as the United Kingdom, which have different security
assistance authorities, to support Somaliland and other subnational
entities.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
23. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, al Qaeda and affiliated violent
extremist groups work hard to appeal to local populations. The
composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S.
Government permits them to make and implement policy decisions very
quickly. Do you believe DOD and other agencies within the U.S.
Government are appropriately organized to respond effectively to the
messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated
terrorist groups?
Mr. Reid. DOD MISO and influence programs and activities are
tailored for each audience they address. Depending upon the unit or the
organization being supported, MISO units are trained to develop
activities and products to influence the behavior of a single
individual or larger target audience. DOD adjusts its MISO units in
size and composition to the operation they must support based on
approved DOD programs and coordinated with the Interagency as required.
24. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, what do you believe is the appropriate
role for Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in relation to these
activities?
Mr. Reid. A MIST supports the achievement of military objectives in
both war and peace while working together with a country team and Chief
of Mission in any country where it works. While a MIST often works from
the U.S. Embassy, its role therein is to support the achievement of
objectives laid out by the combatant command and its subordinate
component commands. There are many instances in which MISTs work
collaboratively with the Embassy staff because mission objectives
overlap.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF COUNTRY TEAMS
25. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, I understand that U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) deploys personnel to work with country teams
in many priority countries where we are not in a shooting conflict, but
rather trying to stop the spread of extremist ideology. Please describe
the value you believe these special operations personnel bring to the
work of country teams. What is done to make sure the goals of special
operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned with those
of the ambassadors they are working with?
Mr. Reid. DOD, including SOCOM, leverages long-established
processes and mechanisms for planning, de-confliction, and partnered
efforts to enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency
partners. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to combat terrorism
with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission, Chiefs of Station,
relevant departments and agencies, and field activities to enable the
broadest interagency collaboration consistent with maintaining the
security of our efforts. We recognize that this is a constant process
that requires regular and routine interface at multiple levels within
the respective organizations. We have made wide use of the Joint-
Interagency Task Force model to bring our interagency colleagues into a
collaborative planning and execution forum, and vigilantly look for
ways to share best practices and make adjustments to the process.
26. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, given the high demand for special
operations personnel around the world, how is the decision made by
SOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) to deploy a special
operations team to a certain country and is that decision reevaluated
over time?
Mr. Reid. The decision to deploy special operations personnel in
support of country teams around the world is the result of
collaborative process undertaken between GCCs, country teams, SOCOM,
and DOD. Based on the President's National Security Strategy and the
Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy and Guidance for
Employment of the Force, the GCC draft Theater Campaign Plans to
accomplish U.S. policy goals and regional/country objectives. GCCs
develop requests for forces to conduct engagements in support of their
regional strategy, which are submitted to the Joint Staff for
validation. The Joint Staff assesses each request against priority
countries and strategic risks, and then tasks SOCOM with developing
sourcing solutions for validated requirements which are ultimately
approved by the Secretary and published annually in the Department-wide
Global Force Management Allocation Plan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY--NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
27. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, over the past 5 years,
DOD has constituted a capability to train-and-equip foreign militaries.
Correspondingly, the DOS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a number of programs targeted at capacity
building of their national law enforcement partners, but much of this
capacity building is done by contractors. DOD has expressed interest in
engaging with national law enforcement units focused on
counterterrorism, but, with the exception of counternarcotics training,
legal constraints prevent DOD from engaging in this activity. Do you
believe there should be more emphasis on building the capacity of our
partner's national law enforcement entities?
Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. Yes. One of the most important lessons
from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the
decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any
meaningful, long-term success. We need partners and allies who can
effectively secure their own borders, work with us to address
transnational threats like terrorism, and provide legitimate and
effective security and governance to their populations.
Although we only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement
agencies, we anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner
nations' law enforcement entities will continue to increase, and we
should improve interagency planning, coordination, and capacity to meet
such requirements. DOD Counternarcotics programs have developed a
successful model for supporting international law enforcement partners
in cooperation with DOS/INL, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and key agencies such as the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and FBI.
Again, the DOD-DOS proposal to create a GSCF in fiscal year 2012
could yield more effective programs for building law enforcement
capacity and integrating law enforcement capacity in a broader security
sector framework in a given country. The GSCF would provide the two
departments with the flexibility to leverage the expertise of DOS, DOD,
or any other U.S. department or agency to provide assistance for
militaries and other security forces as well as rule of law, judicial
sector, and stabilization assistance when civilians are challenged by a
lack of security. The GSCF would create a more robust capability to
respond to crises, emergent challenges, and new opportunities across a
range of assistance types to a range of entities in the security
sector. This proposal also would pilot a new business model for
addressing security challenges by incentivizing collaboration and
multiplying the effectiveness of U.S. Government security sector
investments.
28. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, what is your view of
giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or DEA the mandate and
funding to engage in these sorts of activities? Should DOD be engaged
in this mission?
Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. Building a partner's overall governance
and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple
agencies and departments of the U.S. Government--and one that requires
flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation.
Indeed one of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic
development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting
internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to
the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police
forces, strategic communications, and more--these, along with security,
are essential ingredients for long-term success.
Currently DOD cooperates with DEA and FBI (and other departments
and agencies) to help build partner capacity for counternarcotics, and
with FBI for counterterrorism and counter-WMD programs. Although we
only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement agencies, we
anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner nations' law
enforcement entities will continue to increase, and we should improve
interagency planning, coordination, and capacity to meet such
requirements. DOD should absolutely remain engaged in this activity,
and we support additional funding for the DOS, which also provides
funding for law enforcement and judicial sector programs executed by
DOJ, DHS, and other departments and agencies.
29. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, what is DOD's view of
this missing capacity to train law enforcement/gendarmerie training
capability? Are there specific areas where DOD is interested in
engaging?
Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. Building local capacity for law
enforcement is critical for transitioning from counterinsurgency and
counter terrorism operations to law enforcement activities. As such,
our own government's civilian capacity to assist developing nations is
critical to advancing U.S. security interests. Other agencies must be
given the resources needed to engage effectively around the globe.
DOD's efforts need to be complemented by other agencies with different
core competencies to assist developing partners as they create
effective and accountable government institutions.
Although we only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement
agencies, we anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner
nations' law enforcement entities including gendarmerie will continue
to increase, and we should improve interagency planning, coordination,
and capacity to meet such requirements. DOD Counternarcotics programs
have developed a successful model for providing training, equipping,
and other support to international law enforcement partners (including
foreign police, border guards, coast guards, etc.) in cooperation with
DOS/INL, DOJ, DHS, and key agencies such as DEA and FBI.
30. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid, the previous Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Mike
Vickers, advocated for DOD to support more robustly other departments
and agencies of government in countering the message of violent
extremists through information operations and strategic communications
programs. How do you foresee DOD increasing its support of DOS and/or
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?
Mr. Reid. The global media environment we are now in makes
cooperation and collaboration among different departments and agencies
critical to ensure consistency and efficacy of the U.S. global message.
DOD supports these interagency strategic communication efforts by
making our capabilities available to support other departments and
agencies and by maintaining operational transparency. DOD maintains
unique capabilities to reach audiences in denied areas, as well as to
promulgate information that supports military objectives and, where
appropriate, that contributes to the communication strategies of the
larger U.S. Government. DOD information activities, such as MISO and
public affairs, are coordinated with other agencies as appropriate.
When executed outside areas of military conflict, these activities
undergo review by the country teams, which include CIA and State
Department representatives. DOD also works closely with State's Office
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, and supports the newly established Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications.
31. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid, do you believe DOD has the authority
for expanded support operations?
Mr. Reid. Yes, our extant authorities, which allow us to ensure
regional stability and security through our combatant commands, grant
authority to provide expanded support where and when required. We will
continue to leverage long-established processes and mechanisms for
planning, de-confliction, and partnered efforts to enhance mutually
supporting objectives with our interagency partners.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
32. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid, I want to ask about information
operations. In your view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures
of effectiveness for these programs?
Mr. Reid. DOD's efforts to develop measures of effectiveness have
not, in the past, received the level of effort necessary, and we are
taking steps to correct that. One of the missions of the re-organized
Joint IO Warfare Center will be to develop these assessments in support
of COCOM missions. We also work closely with other departments and
agencies that are challenged with developing measures of effectiveness
for their own information programs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES
33. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, section 167, title 10, U.S.C.
defines 10 activities as special operations activities insofar as each
relates to special operations. While there is a catchall proviso listed
as well, designating such other activities, as may be specified by the
President or the Secretary of Defense as special operations activities,
given the 2006 realignment of all Reserve Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)/MISO forces from SOCOM where they
supported both the general purpose force and SOFs, to the U.S. Army
Reserve Command (USARC), where they now primarily support the general
purpose force. Should CA and PSYOP have remained on this list of
special operations activities?
Mr. Reid. The 2006 realignment migrated Reserve component U.S.
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (USACAPOC) forces from the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to the USARC. It did not
change longstanding force apportionment, training, and operational
support relationships. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA Brigades and PSYOP/
Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) Groups and Companies
continue to support general purpose force Corps, Joint Task Forces, and
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). USAR CA Battalions continue to support
General Purpose Force (GPF) Divisions as well as each Special Forces
Group. The USAR PSYOP/MISO force now provides exclusive support to the
GPF, while the active Component PSYOP/MISO force continues to support
GPF and SOF.
Over the course of our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
responsibilities of general purpose forces for population-centric
operations have expanded. Accordingly, CA units now provide significant
support to both special and conventional operations at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels. Nevertheless, CA can be considered a
special operations activity when Active component Civil Affairs Forces
assigned to USASOC are conducting special operations as section 167,
title 10, U.S.C. suggests.
34. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, given this change of command and
control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve component CA and
PSYOP/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is technically defined as
a Special Operations activities without commensurate authorities,
training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of
combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa? What
can be done to clarify this statutory discrepancy?
Mr. Reid. As section 167, title 10, U.S.C. suggests, CA and PSYOP/
MISO are special operations activities insofar as they relate to
special operations. Reserve component CA and PSYOP/MISO are not SOFs,
so there is no discrepancy.
Nevertheless, the majority of Army CA and PSYOP/MISO forces are
Reserve component forces and have operated in direct support of general
purpose forces during full spectrum operations. In acknowledgement of
this fact, the Secretary of the Army (Office of the Assistant Secretary
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is conducting analysis of
options to address responsibilities for the training and equipping of
CA forces. These options include possible amendment of Title 10 U.S.C.,
section 3013(c) to add lead agent responsibility for both CA and
Military Government to the Secretary of the Army's enumerated
responsibilities. This analysis seeks to alleviate the burden on the
special operations community to perform operational responsibilities
for GPF CA that would normally be performed by a Service headquarters.
The Army's review of CA is being carried over into the SOCOM (the
Joint Proponent for MISO) discussions regarding the PSYOP/MISO force.
As SOCOM looks at efficiencies and the future role of MISO, it is
working to determine the most effective method for providing continued
whole-of-DOD support. ASD(SO/LIC), in partnership with SOCOM, expects
to produce a comprehensive MISO report over the coming year that
provides a strategy proposal for the future MISO force.
CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPACITY
35. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, in your written statement to the
committee you mention creating additional CA and PSYOP/MISO units in
order to provide additional support for SOFs and the regular Army.
While Active and Reserve component CA and PSYOP/MISO forces are
certainly in high demand with lower than average dwell times, TRADOC
has clearly documented gaps--language skills, cultural acumen,
functional specialty, and planning expertise--in CA capabilities that
remain unresolved today. When coupled with a lack of habitual
relationships with BCTs and SOFs alike, is creating additional CA and
PSYOP/MISO capacity the proper way to solve a capability shortfall?
Mr. Reid. The current operational tempo to support requirements in
the CENTCOM Area of Operations has impacted sustainment of CA existing
habitual, regionally-oriented relationships with BCTs and SOF. DOD has
recognized this problem and has invested substantially in CA growth
over the past several years in order to address some of these gaps.
Army CA is programmed to grow to 187 CA companies (25 SOF, 30 Active
component (AC), 132 Reserve Component (RC)) by fiscal year 2013; up
from 76 CA companies (6 SOF, 70 RC) in fiscal year 2006. This increased
CA capacity will regenerate and enhance these habitual relationships
with BCTs and Special Operations units, thus improving the capability
shortfalls described. Additionally, a SOCOM/JFCOM co-sponsored
Capabilities Based Assessment of CA identified similar gaps at the
operational and strategic level. Detailed solution recommendations are
being forwarded for consideration to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Army.
The same language and cultural concerns have been cited for the
Active component (AC) PSYOP/MISO support to SOF and the combatant
commands. As such, the SOCOM Commander has proposed an internal
adjustment to reorganize the AC MISO force, the details of which are
still under consideration within DOD.
36. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, would embedding CA within Army
BCTs help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while also
conserving resources during an era of increasingly constrained budgets?
Mr. Reid. While we may gain tactical and operational benefit from
assigning CA companies to BCTs, there are currently not enough CA
companies in the current force structure to make this possible. By
contrast, the assignment of General Purpose Force CA Battalions and
their organic companies from the newly authorized Active component 85th
CA Brigade to the respective Army Service components of the geographic
combatant commands allows greater operational flexibility for the
combatant command commander and the Army Service component commander to
allocate CA forces to accomplish Theater Security Cooperation and civil
military engagement missions.
37. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, in these tight financial times
where we seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is creating
additional CA and PSYOP/MISO force structure the best use of taxpayer
funds?
Mr. Reid. Ineffective governance can create areas of instability
for terrorists and insurgents to exploit and for violent ideologies to
spread. Assessments of the future security environment demand that the
United States retain and enhance capabilities for succeeding against
these kinds of challenges. Current programmed growth within DOD's CA
and MISO communities has been based on existing non-OIF/OEF
requirements to support the execution of each Combatant Command's
Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Current and already programmed CA
force structure posses sufficient capacity to meet requirements for
execution of current Theater Security Cooperation Plan requirements.
38. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, in your view, is CA an Army or a
SOF capability?
Mr. Reid. CA is a capability that supports both conventional and
SOF. As part of DOD's overall rebalancing effort, the responsibilities
of conventional forces for population-centric operations have greatly
expanded. General Purpose Forces' access to and integration with CA
units is an important part of that overall strategic shift. Between
fiscal years 2001 and 2015, the CA community will have grown from 5,149
manpower authorizations to 11,702 personnel. This investment includes a
significant growth within the Active component, both for General
Purpose Forces and SOF, from 208 manpower authorizations in fiscal year
2001 to 3,224 authorizations in fiscal year 2015. SOCOM and the Army
are currently undertaking an examination of this evolution to determine
if CA has moved beyond a purely SOF capability. The results of this
examination will properly align the CA force to continue to provide the
required support to both communities.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
39. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, given the importance of PSYOP and
Information Operations and the well-publicized challenges we have in
executing these responsibilities in comparison to al Qaeda, the fact
that we have not selected a PSYOP/MISO officer as a general officer and
empowered him/her to lead our information efforts overseas puzzles me.
Special Forces are a critical enabler and they have general officer
billets. Would not the selection of someone who has devoted his/her
life to the profession of persuading, informing, and/or influencing
foreign target audiences overseas assist us in improving our
performance in this critical aspect of our efforts overseas?
Mr. Reid. The MISO community remains small and segmented by
component within the Army, which houses the majority of MISO forces.
Though still an exception, the Army recently promoted an information
operations officer to brigadier general. This officer commanded the
first Information Operations Command and now serves in the U.S. Cyber
Command as an operations officer. In addition, the SOCOM Commander has
submitted a Force Design Update requesting the establishment of a MISO
Command. As the request is processed through the Army Force Management
process, the Army will decide if a general officer is appropriate to
lead this new command.
40. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, why are there no general officer
billets in PSYOP/MISO?
Mr. Reid. The MISO community remains small and segmented by
component within the Army, which houses the majority of MISO forces.
Though still an exception, the Army recently promoted an Information
Operations officer to Brigadier General. This officer commanded the
first Information Operations Command and now serves in the U.S. Cyber
Command as an operations officer. In addition, the SOCOM Commander has
submitted a Force Design Update requesting the establishment of a
MISOC. As the request is processed through the Army Force Management
process, the Army will decide if a general officer is appropriate to
lead this new command.
INFORMATION DOMINANCE
41. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, shortly after their most recent
attempts to cripple international commerce by bringing down a
commercial aircraft enroute to America, al Qaeda was publishing their
efforts worldwide via their English-language online magazine, Inspire.
Too recent a change in strategy to have received much attention yet,
this dangerous new pronouncement is noteworthy precisely because it was
made publicly. More importantly, al Qaeda used this forum to announce a
marked shift from historically accepted terrorist dynamics to a clear-
cut strategy of attrition designed to economically cripple the west.
``Moving away from the expensive and carefully coordinated attacks
of September 11 on New York and the 7/7 London bombs, al Qaeda in Yemen
says it is now going to focus on smaller, cheaper strikes in an effort
to bleed the enemy to death through a strategy of a thousand cuts. One
article enlightens readers on how two Nokia mobiles, two HP printers,
cheap explosives and 3 months' work for a team of less than six, has
forced Barack Obama to frantically pump dollars into airport security,
further weakening the American economy. The publication says the
technical know-how of making parcel bombs will be disseminated to
militants in countries with looser security restrictions than in Yemen.
Is al Qaeda's dominance in the information arena an emerging threat to
our collective national security? If so, given the statutory and
regulatory limitations on U.S. strategic communications efforts, how
can we counter their efforts in this domain?
Mr. Reid. The information domain is global in scope and our enemies
will attempt to use this domain to achieve a comparative advantage. DOD
cannot be the sole responder to violent extremist activity in this
domain, and hence we work diligently with DOS and the IC to combat the
spread of propaganda, including the information in Inspire magazine. It
is also important that we not bring more attention to these efforts
simply by reacting to every piece of information that becomes
available. Doing so can inadvertently provide such announcements with a
wider audience. It may be appropriate to review and, where necessary,
update statutes written for a time when information was not as readily
and instantly available.
CIVIL AFFAIRS IN QDR STRATEGY
42. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Schear, the 2010 QDR reinforced the
focus on stability operations as an integral and co-equal element of
full spectrum operations. As such, the role of CA forces as subject-
matter experts for key stability tasks was elevated in two directives
included in the Rebalancing-the-Force section of the QDR and identified
as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. The first
directive--expand CA capacity--provides resources and potential,
creates opportunity, and presents challenges. The second directive--
``increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and
counterterrorism competency in general purpose forces''--is an
important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and
challenges. How do you reconcile the elevated status of stability
operations, and by extension the importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR
with the well-documented current gaps in CA capabilities? Do we have
the forces we need in this area, or is this an area we still need to
grow?
Dr. Schear. SOCOM and the Army have determined that current and
already programmed CA force structure possess sufficient capacity to
meet the requirements of current operations within CENTCOM AOR and the
COCOM generated demand signal for execution of current Theater Security
Cooperation (TSC) requirements. The capability shortfalls within the CA
force are being addressed in detail by the respective services and
SOCOM and solution sets are being provided through the CA Capabilities
Based Assessment. Implementation of those solutions, by the services,
will eliminate much of the existing capability gaps. The Department has
the correct force capacity to meet current requirements, and should
resist the temptation to create a ``new capability or increase
capacity'' when simply enhancing capabilities within current force
structure, through additional, enhanced, or new training; structure and
manning updates; and progressive equipping coupled with continued
evolution of the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the current
CA force, will suffice.
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS
43. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, regarding the threat of
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), you comment in your written
statement that, `` It is important to recognize that when we discuss
the transnational nature of this threat, this includes criminal
activities that take place outside as well as within the United States.
For instance, the influence of Mexican TCOs extends well beyond the
southwest border to cities across the country such as Atlanta, Chicago,
and Detroit. Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international
activities can be especially challenging.'' You go on to comment that,
``DOD can play an important role in facilitating coordination and
information sharing through mechanisms such as Joint Task Force-North
in El Paso and Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key West--both of
which are models of interagency and international cooperation. This
issue of information sharing has always concerned me because too often
there have been unnecessary barriers to organizations within the U.S.
Government receiving information crucial to their mission that another
organization in the U.S. Government already has. My question for you
regarding this issue is, are there barriers that are unnecessary, and
are you able to give and receive information with domestic agencies and
across DOD and the IC that you need to in order to best accomplish your
mission, and for the other agencies involved to best accomplish their
mission?
Mr. Wechsler. DOD develops, analyzes, and shares counternarcotics-
related information to the full extent permitted by law with other U.S.
Federal partners, as well as with State and local authorities and
foreign counterparts, utilizing a flexible web of agreements and task
forces. This may include DOD providing information to other U.S.
agencies, which then share the information with third parties under
those agencies' legal authorities and arrangements. Generally speaking,
these arrangements work well, in part because U.S. and foreign
authorities have been cooperating against transnational drug
trafficking for many years. The DOD counternarcotics program supports
several activities to facilitate information-sharing, including (but
not limited to):
Anti-Drug Network, which provides classified computer
links among Federal and State law enforcement agencies, as well
as secure but unclassified connections among Federal, State,
local, regional, tribal and foreign drug trafficking
interdiction mission partners;
Intelligence and information analysis and
dissemination training programs;
Multi-discipline intelligence analysis and linguistic
support to other agencies;
The Joint Narcotics Analysis Center in Afghanistan;
Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) supporting U.S.
Embassies in 18 countries; and
Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System
(CNIES) enabling graphical display of sanitized aerial and
maritime radar tracking information among U.S. and foreign
partners.
44. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, is there any assistance that
Congress may be able to provide?
Mr. Wechsler. I appreciate the question, Senator, and the
longstanding support the Congress has provided for the Department's
counternarcotics efforts. In the current challenging fiscal
environment, we understand that we are constantly competing for finite
Federal resources and believe we are providing excellent value for the
American taxpayer.
More specifically, several of the Department's key counternarcotics
authorities will expire at the end of fiscal year 2011. These
authorities include: (1) Section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, our
foundational authority to provide critical counterdrug support to
State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners; (2)
Section 1021 of the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, which
authorizes support for Colombia's unified counterdrug and
counterterrorism campaign; and (3) Section 1022 of the NDAA of Fiscal
Year 2004, as amended, which allows counterdrug funds to be used to
support counterterrorism activities worldwide. Over the years, these
authorities have been critical to the progress we have made in
detecting and monitoring drug trafficking through the Caribbean and
building counternarcotics capacity in Colombia and elsewhere in the
Western Hemisphere. Sections 1004 and 1022 are particularly important
to our efforts to confront narcotics production and trafficking in
Afghanistan--a key source of revenue for the Taliban. We look forward
to working with the committee to ensure these unique and flexible tools
are reauthorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
45. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, the twin border cities of
Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, TX, are a primary crossing point for drugs
smuggled into the United States. Control of drug routes in Chihuahua,
the State along New Mexico and West Texas where Juarez is located, is
vital to the continued growth of drug cartel operations. In recent
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Winnefeld,
Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), stated that: ``criminal
groups have killed more than 35,000 people since December 2006.'' While
some experts believe that drug violence will remain a significant
problem on both sides of the border for years to come, other U.S.
authorities now believe, based on information from confidential
informants with direct ties to Mexican drug gangs and other
intelligence, that Mexico's most powerful kingpin--Joaquin ``El Chapo''
Guzman--and the Sinaloa cartel is winning Mexico's drug war, edging out
the rival Juarez gang for control over the coveted trafficking routes
through Juarez. While that is one assessment, what is your assessment
of the status of the drug war between these rival drug cartels and,
more to the point, what else can we do to help stem the flow of drugs,
people, weapons, and money across our southern border?
Mr. Wechsler. Ciudad Juarez has suffered especially high rates of
violence in part because it is contested among several TCOs,
principally the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juarez Cartel (aka Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes Organization) and the Zetas as well as less-sophisticated
actors such as the Barrio Azteca gang. I would hesitate to say who is
winning or losing this struggle, except to make the point that all
Mexicans ultimately lose, not only when criminal organizations fight
one another but also if any criminal organization is able to gain
effective dominance over an area. I therefore applaud the courageous
efforts of the Mexican authorities to build rule of law throughout the
country, including in some of the most difficult locations.
The United States should certainly do more, in my opinion, to
provide training, equipment, and information to help Mexican efforts.
In particular, the United States can share some of its experience, and
that of other countries, in coordinating all aspects of national power
(including law enforcement, defense, intelligence, judicial, and
economic development efforts) to build campaigns to dismantle
transnationally-networked adversaries. In doing so, however, U.S.
authorities are careful to bear in mind that the situations in places
like Ciudad Juarez are very different from places where the United
States has been more directly involved. We must, therefore, adapt
lessons learned elsewhere, not try to adopt them outright. The United
States should also redouble its efforts to reduce the flow of both
firearms and drug money from the United States to Mexico, as well as to
diminish U.S. consumption of illegal drugs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
MEXICO
46. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wechsler, in your prepared testimony, you
note that DOD, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM are working to develop a joint
security effort in the border region of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize.
Please provide further details on this effort.
Mr. Wechsler. Starting in 2009, DOD realized that as Colombia and
Mexico brought more effective pressure on TCOs, the TCOs would disperse
into even more vulnerable countries in Central America. Powerful TCOs
interact with less sophisticated, but large-scale, street and prison
gangs, some of which maintain international networks, including in the
United States. An estimated 96 percent of cocaine that departs South
America for the United States first arrives in Central America, before
continuing through Mexico. Although Central American countries differ
significantly, weak rule of law and severe social inequality can
engender environments in which TCOs can operate with varying degrees of
``impunity.'' Violence in the region, which has long been high, has
increased dramatically in recent years.
DOD, therefore, worked with authorities from Mexico, Guatemala, and
Belize, as well as from several U.S. agencies, to design a set of
programs that are starting in 2011. In the meanwhile, the U.S. and
Central American Governments launched broader security cooperation
efforts, notably the Central American Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI), which the DOD counternarcotics program complements. The goals
of the U.S.-fostered effort are to help Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize
strengthen governmental control over remote border regions, improve
land, sea, and air domain awareness and response capabilities and
support regional security cooperation efforts. The program puts a
particular emphasis on helping the three countries improve controls
over their littoral waters, where most drug trafficking takes place.
Support includes patrol boats, night vision equipment, communications
equipment, maritime sensors, and associated training. DOD will also
provide infrastructure support in Guatemala and Belize. Specifically,
the DOD counternarcotics Mexico-Guatemala-Belize Border Region Program
helps:
Improve regional border (including airspace and
maritime) security through training, equipment, information
sharing, and infrastructure;
Enhance drug smuggling interdiction capacity and
capabilities by helping improve mobility and training for
partner country interdiction forces, including for combined
operations with the United States and/or each other;
Improve regional sea, air, and land domain awareness
by developing intelligence, command, and control capabilities
to integrate maritime and air operations. This emphasizes
leveraging Joint Interagency Task Force-South operations; and
Foster partnerships, including complementing the
Merida Initiative and CARSI.
47. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wechsler, what disparities have you found
between the current counter-trafficking approaches and capabilities of
NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM?
Mr. Wechsler. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM's respective geographic areas
of responsibility are very different in nature, since NORTHCOM covers
the United States, as well as Mexico, the Bahamas, and Canada, while
SOUTHCOM covers 31 fellow American countries and 10 territories. DOD's
counternarcotics (CN) and related support to law enforcement agencies
within the United States are governed by significantly different legal
authorities, as well as policy directives, as compared to DOD's
security cooperation with foreign countries. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM work very closely with each other to ensure that no ``seam''
emerges between their efforts, highlighted by implementation of a
special Mexico, Guatemala, Belize Border Region counternarcotics
program (see question #46.)
NORTHCOM's role in supporting the CN efforts of U.S. Federal, state
and local law enforcement agencies is carried out principally via Joint
Task Force-North (JTF-North). JTF-North provides active duty military
support to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor and support the
interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the
approaches to the continental United States. This includes fusing and
disseminating intelligence, contributing to a common operational
picture, coordinating support to other agencies, and supporting
NORTHCOM's cooperation with Mexico. Support mission categories include:
operational, intelligence, engineering and training. (The National
Guard also provides support to counterdrug law enforcement in the
United States. See question #58.) NORTHCOM's roles in supporting
Mexican security forces' counterdrug efforts include training,
equipment, and information sharing, and concentrate on helping Mexican
forces improve their tactical and operational proficiency, as well as
their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and
reconnaissance capacities. This includes an emphasis on intelligence-
driven and interagency operations as well as incorporating principles
of respect for human rights. (See question #46)
SOUTHCOM's efforts against drug trafficking and associated
transnational crime span a much greater geographic range, and vary
greatly in intensity from country to country. Some countries, such as
Colombia and Peru, continue to make admirable efforts to suppress drug
production and trafficking, while other countries' efforts (such as
those of Venezuela) have been disappointing in recent years. SOUTHCOM
(and its component Joint Interagency Task Force-South) conduct
substantial missions to detect and monitor drug trafficking, as well as
to support law enforcement interdiction of smuggling. Counterdrug
Forward Operating Locations in the Netherlands Antilles and El Salvador
provide critical support in these efforts. SOUTHCOM information-sharing
programs include the CNIES which shares radar track information among
participating countries, and the TAT program, which provides DOD
counterdrug intelligence analysts to support U.S. Embassies abroad.
SOUTHCOM counternarcotics partner capacity building efforts include
training in areas such as special operations, riverine and maritime
operations, leadership, maintenance, planning and other areas. SOUTHCOM
provides infrastructure and equipment to a variety of countries in the
Americas for counternarcotics purposes. Other categories of support to
U.S. and foreign counterdrug efforts in SOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility include airlift, engineering, and communications.
48. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wechsler, in your testimony, you also state
that DOD's counternarcotics program expects to allocate approximately
$51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico, representing a
dramatic increase over previous funding levels, which were closer to $3
million per year prior to 2009. Please elaborate on what this
additional funding will be used for.
Mr. Wechsler. DOD CN support to Mexican security forces includes
training, equipment, infrastructure, and information sharing and
concentrates on helping Mexican forces improve their tactical and
operational proficiency, as well as their air mobility, maritime law
enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD CN
support includes an emphasis on intelligence-driven and interagency
operations as well as incorporating principles of respect for human
rights.
Training examples include: air operations, safety, resources
management, maintenance, and mission planning; helicopter pilot
training (including at an expanded school in Colombia); transnational/
regional security issues; rule of law, human rights, and discipline of
military operations; tactics for urban and night operations; counter-
improvised explosive device techniques; force protection during
operations, as well as at staging and garrison locations; logistics/
resources management; maritime, littoral, riverine, and amphibious
operations, communications and planning; ship maintenance and repair;
search-and-rescue, medical and lifesaving; non-commissioned officer
leadership; intelligence and operational planning; and unmanned aerial
systems employment.
Equipment provided includes: aircraft avionics, sensor upgrades,
maintenance consumables, spare parts; helicopter repair and mission
system upgrades; aviation and surface night vision devices; non-
intrusive cargo inspection detectors; unattended ground sensor systems;
tactical, secure, GPS-equipped hand-held and vehicle-mounted radios;
point-to-point communications network consisting of microwave links,
towers, encryption equipment, and associated components; and maritime
automated information system transponders.
DOD CN operates or supports U.S. intelligence, radar,
communications, computer network, transportation, counterdrug detection
and monitoring, training, technology development, liaison, headquarters
support, and related activities, portions of which may be considered
indirect support to Mexico. This includes the work of Joint Task Force-
North, which supports U.S. drug law enforcement agencies in the United
States.
SOMALIA
49. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, some analysts speculate that
successfully denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan
might simply result in a relocation and reorganization of al Qaeda
leadership. In your prepared testimony, you note al-Shabaab's
increasing affiliation with al Qaeda. Reports indicate that al-Shabaab
now controls much of southern and central Somalia. Please elaborate on
the nature and scope of this threat and on al Qaeda's influence in the
region.
Mr. Reid. The relationship between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda is
complicated. We see increasing connections between al-Shabaab and al
Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership, but also divisions between al-
Shabaab and the remnants of the al Qaeda in East Africa cell. Parts of
al-Shabaab are committed to international terrorism while other parts
are regionally-aligned, clan-based militias that have been co-opted or
coerced into al-Shabaab's ranks. Regardless of the specifics of the
organizational relationship between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda, we're very
concerned about al-Shabaab's increasing interest in external attacks
and desire to leverage Somali diaspora communities.
We also remain concerned that if al-Shabaab were to take over
Somalia, al Qaeda could try to use it as a safe haven and staging base
in a key strategic area of the world. An al-Shabaab-led Somalia would
also pose a regional threat and perpetuate the instability and
humanitarian crises that have wracked the region for the past 2
decades.
50. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, what factors make Somalia a
particularly attractive place for al Qaeda to operate?
Mr. Reid. Somalia's lack of governance and relatively sparse
population make it appealing as a safe haven. However, Somalis'
historic distrust of outsiders could undermine al Qaeda's ability to
hide among the population. Its location along key shipping routes could
make Somalia a key staging area for transnational terrorist attacks.
But its long coast line could also allow the U.S. and allied nations to
conduct sea-based CT operations virtually anywhere in Somalia. We
continue to work with our interagency partners to create some
governance and security capacity in Somalia, bolster the ability of
neighboring countries to counter the threat, and prevent al Qaeda from
establishing a strong foothold there.
51. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, in your opinion, if al Qaeda is
effectively denied safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what is the
likelihood that they would relocate their leadership to Somalia?
Mr. Reid. There are a number of places where al Qaeda could
relocate, including Somalia. However, it would take al Qaeda some time
to establish the same operational infrastructure there and to
effectively hide among a population that has traditionally been very
resistant to outsiders. I defer to my colleagues in the IC for a more
thorough assessment of the likelihood of al Qaeda relocating its
leadership to Somalia.
LIBYA
52. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, Colonel Moammar Qadhafi recently
promised to carry out terrorist attacks against civilian ships and
airliners. If Qadhafi is allowed to remain in power, do you believe he
will make good on these threats?
Mr. Reid. In the complex security environment we are in, we cannot
afford to discount any leader's threats. Colonel Qaddafi has a history
of conducting terrorist attacks against Western states and could do so
again.
53. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, al Qaeda and its affiliates have
found safe havens around the world in failed or failing states. If the
situation in Libya becomes a protracted stalemate between Qadhafi and
rebel forces, what is the likelihood that al Qaeda or a like-minded
terrorist organization will establish itself somewhere in Libya?
Mr. Reid. Although we continue to monitor the actions of al Qaeda
and affiliated groups in Libya, the generally reformist, pro-democracy
orientation of the opposition movement is at odds with the aims of al
Qaeda. Further, for all of its shortcomings, the Qaddafi regime has
proven effective in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Far more
concerning is the possibility that al Qaeda and its affiliates will
exploit the current instability to obtain advanced Libyan military
weaponry, such as surface-to-air missiles.
AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
54. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, the anti-government movement in Yemen
to force President Saleh from power has further destabilized that
country. At the same time, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
remains a serious threat and has recently demonstrated its intent and
its capabilities. What is your assessment of the current anti-
government movement in Yemen and its impact on AQAP's reach,
operations, and capabilities?
Mr. Reid. The political instability in Yemen has allowed AQAP to
increase its operating space and to make some tactical gains in the
tribal areas--in several cases seizing and holding territory now
outside of Republic of Yemen Government control. Despite AQAP's limited
gains, it remains distant from, and largely counter to, the current
anti-government movement in Yemen. AQAP has not made any significant
gains in the urban areas nor has it been able to translate this into a
broader strategic success in Yemen or beyond.
55. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, although AQAP primarily targeted
western interests in Yemen, its attempted Christmas Day bombing of a
Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed October 2010 parcel plot
indicates that it has international aspirations. What is your
assessment of al Qaeda's current goals and objectives?
Mr. Reid. AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term
attack against the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist
threat to U.S. interests and the Homeland. The Christmas Day bombing of
the Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed package bombing
attempt in October 2010 are the more recent attempts by al Qaeda to
attack the U.S. Homeland. Despite recent setbacks, al Qaeda and its
affiliate AQAP are still actively plotting attacks, with the principal
aim of successfully striking the U.S. Homeland.
The rise of these affiliate organizations in the Arabian Peninsula
and elsewhere is of great concern, and highlights the importance of not
only disrupting al Qaeda's attacks against the United States and our
allies and partners, but also countering al Qaeda's ideology,
messaging, and resonance as well. Hence, both are administration
priorities.
LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA
56. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, PACOM Commander Admiral Robert
Willard testified before this committee that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
has ``spread their influence internationally and are no longer solely
focused in South Asia and on India.'' He went on to say that LeT has
declared jihad on America and has even carried out attacks on U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. What is your assessment of the threat LeT poses
to the United States and our interests?
Mr. Reid. Since its inception in the late 1980s, LeT has focused
its efforts primarily on combating India over the contested Jammu and
Kashmir regions. Like other militant groups however, there is evidence
that LeT has broadened its interests and could represent an emerging
threat to the West, particularly in Europe, as well as the broader
South Asia region. At this time however, we do not fully understand the
extent of the network's aspirations.
Regarding LeT's activities against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan,
we assess that these activities are likely done to gain both tactical
experience and legitimacy, to forge relationships with key insurgent
groups there, and to meet the group's goal of defending Islam from
perceived Western aggression. LeT's presence in Afghanistan has not
gone unnoticed. COMISAF is fully aware of the LeT threat and is
addressing it proportionately and responsibly. The DOD continues to
monitor LeT's potential for expanded operations that may target the
U.S. and our interests. We will continue to address this potential
threat as it presents itself and will remain supportive of broader U.S.
Government efforts to examine and combat LeT.
57. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Reid, what is the current relationship
between LeT and the Government of Pakistan as a whole, between LeT and
Pakistan's military, and between LeT and Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence?
Mr. Reid. Pakistan continues to view India as its greatest security
threat and, given India's military dominance in the region, may view
militant groups, like LeT as useful proxies to bridge the military
capability gap between it and its eastern neighbor. There are
widespread allegations that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence may
maintain a limited relationship with elements of LeT to both, provide
Pakistan with an asymmetric capability which would offset the
aforementioned gaps, and to moderate LeT's activities. However, our
insight into the details of the alleged relationship is minimal and
often fraught with contradictory information.
NATIONAL GUARD JOINT COUNTER-DRUG TASK FORCES
58. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Wechsler, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1989
authorizes the National Guard to provide support to law enforcement
counter-drug operations. The Texas National Guard Joint Counter-Drug
Task Force (JCDTF) has provided support to local, State, and Federal
law enforcement agencies for over 21 years, and it does extremely
important work along the Texas-Mexico border. Although the Texas-Mexico
border is over 1,250 miles long, comprising about 65 percent of the
overall U.S.-Mexico land border, the Texas National Guard JCDTF
receives only 10 percent of the Federal budget for Counterdrug State
Plans. In spite of this, the Texas National Guard JCDTF's operations
have resulted in over $54 billion in assisted seizures. In your
opinion, how important are the National Guard's JCDTF programs, and
what critical capabilities do they bring to the table to help our
Nation counter illicit trafficking?
Mr. Wechsler. Helping protect the U.S. border region with Mexico is
my top domestic priority, both with respect to National Guard programs
and Title 10 military support to law enforcement agencies, since the
border region is the principal theater through which illegal drugs
enter our country. We have to recognize, however, that TCOs operate
throughout the United States and that the worst violence associated
with such crime is generally not concentrated in the border region. In
fact, criminals with ties to Mexican TCOs operate in an estimated 235
U.S. cities. In view of these realities, the need to put scarce
resources toward the greatest threat, and the need to measure the
effects of our efforts, the National Guard Counterdrug Program has
developed a Threat Based Resourcing Plan to support law enforcement
counternarcotics operations in all States.
I consider each State's JCDTF to be extremely important. In fact,
the States can support one another in part through the networkable body
of capabilities the National Guard Counterdrug Program provides from
DOD's authorized mission list. How each State Governor meets specific
capability needs in counternarcotics activities varies considerably,
and flexibility as a hallmark of the National Guard Counterdrug
Program.
The authorized mission categories for the National Guard
Counterdrug Program are:
1. Program management;
2. Technical support (subcategories include: linguist support,
investigative case and analyst support, operational/investigative case
support, communications support, engineer support, and subsurface diver
support);
3. General support (including cannabis suppression and
transportation);
4. Reconnaissance/observation (ground and aerial); and
5. Illegal drug demand reduction support.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]