[Senate Hearing 112-365]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-365
U.S. POLICY IN SYRIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MIKE LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MARCO RUBIO, Florida
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Bronin, Luke A., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Washington, DC....................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Feltman, Hon. Jeffrey D., Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Richard J. Durbin.......................................... 48
Risch, James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement...... 4
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement of Mark Dubowitz, Esq., Executive Director,
Foundation for Defense of Democracies.......................... 34
Discussion Paper jointly produced by the Foundation for
Defense of Democracy and the Foreign Policy Initiative..... 35
Prepared statement of Andrew J. Tabler, Next Generation Fellow,
Program on Arab Politics, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy......................................................... 43
Prepared statement of Maria McFarland, Deputy Washington
Director, Human Rights Watch................................... 44
(iii)
U.S. POLICY IN SYRIA
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Boxer, Shaheen, Durbin, Risch,
Lugar, Corker, and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing will come to order.
We will get started. I want to thank everyone for being
here today. I will have an opening statement, and then we will
go to the statement from our witnesses and then go to
questions.
I want to thank everyone for being here today.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today and our
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs meets to examine U.S. policy toward Syria. We know that
Syrian men, women, and children have courageously--and that is
an understatement--engaged in demonstrations for more than 6
months in their country. They seek basic democratic reforms and
protection for human rights, but the Assad regime in Syria has
responded with terrible, unspeakable violence. The United
Nations estimates that more than 3,500 people have been killed
since the unrest began in March of this year.
Over the past week, Syria's third-largest city of Homs has
been engulfed in perhaps the worst violence we have seen in
Syria this year. In just a week, more than 100 people have
reportedly been killed, all of this coming during the Muslim
holiday of Eid al-Adha, and all of this coming after months and
months of repression and violence.
And perhaps most important of all, this violence comes 1
week after the Assad regime agreed to an Arab League deal for
reform. In direct violation of this agreement, Assad's forces
have not removed their tanks and armored vehicles from the
streets of towns across the country. Violence aimed at
demonstrators has not stopped or even slowed. Political
prisoners--and there are reportedly tens of thousands of them--
have not been released. Neither international journalists nor
human rights monitors have been admitted into Syria.
Assad made it clear to the world that he has no interest in
or no intention to pursue democratic reform. In fact, he has
proven to the world that democratic reform is now not possible
while he remains in power.
For months, I and others have spoken about this grave
situation in Syria. I have shared accounts of a regime whose
brutality affects 22 million Syrians, as well as my
constituents in Pennsylvania. I have told the story before of
Dr. Hazem Hallek, a Syrian American who lives in suburban
Philadelphia. He was visited by his brother Sakher earlier this
year. Sakher, who is also a doctor, was not engaged in politics
of any kind. Upon his return to Syria after visiting his
brother, he was tortured and killed by Assad's forces just for
having visited the United States of America.
The press has reported accounts of school children
arrested, parents and community members murdered,
disappearances and mutilations all across the country of Syria.
In an August Washington Post op-ed, I wrote that Mr. Assad
must step down from power. We, who recognize the horror in
Syria, have a responsibility to bear witness to the truth, the
truth of this slaughter, and to work against it.
Ambassador Robert Ford has taken on this critical task and
represented the United States with honor and distinction, and I
would also add with remarkable courage. I applaud the work of
the Ambassador and his top-notch Embassy staff. We are grateful
for their sacrifice and their service.
But we must continue to take specific and visible actions
to support democratic reform.
First, we need to make it clear to the regime's supporters
that their behavior will not be tolerated and they will be held
accountable just as the regime will be held accountable. The
administration, working with our European allies, should
sanction more individuals within the regime who are complicit
in the repression of protests. To date, 17 individuals and 18
entities have been sanctioned. The world needs to know their
names and they need to decide whether they, those who are
complicit, will continue to aid and abet a regime which has
killed thousands. This week, I will send a letter to the
Treasury Department to urge the administration to expand the
list of individuals to be sanctioned by the United States. The
administration can do this by Executive order and should do so
as soon as possible. That is first.
Second, the United States must play a constructive role in
isolating or, I should say, continuing to isolate the Assad
regime. In October, I called for the establishment of a Friends
of the Syrian People contact group. This contact group can
serve as a main point of international engagement for the
democratic opposition and the Syrian people. The Arab League,
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and others could form
the core of such a group, which would send a clear message of
international solidarity and support of democratic change in
Syria. I hope that this suggestion would be seriously
considered by the Arab League when it meets to discuss Syria
this Saturday. The United States should continue to fully
support these regional efforts to pressure the regime.
In its agreement with the Assad government, the Arab League
committed to sending international monitors to see firsthand
the situation in Syria. Those monitors are needed now, not days
or weeks from now, but now. The Arab League should send them
today. If Assad blocks the deployment of these monitors, the
Arab League should suspend Syria's membership in the
organization. The United States should also make another push
to pursue a resolution condemning the Assad regime at the
United Nations. Strong international opposition and commitment
to isolating the Assad regime is the key to bringing about
democratic reform.
The U.S. Senate as well should also support these efforts
to isolate the regime. Through our regular interaction with
embassies here in Washington, individual Senators can express
concern for the ongoing violence and show their support for
democratic change in Syria.
Third, the courageous Syrian political opposition must work
to communicate a unified vision for the future of Syria. This
opposition faces many disadvantages that other protesters from
across the region did not face. Syrians do not have a Tahrir
Square on which to gather in large numbers. They do not have
open borders through which they can leave at will and find safe
haven. They do not have the full attention of the international
media, which have been barred from the country.
Despite these challenges, I believe that the Syrian
opposition will be involved directly in the country's future.
It is imperative that the Syrian National Council answer
questions about its composition and its intent. Who are the
members of the Syrian National Council? Where does it stand on
the role of the international community in stopping the
violence and supporting democratic reform? And most
importantly, how will minorities be treated in a post-Assad
Syria? We have yet to hear a clear message from the opposition
on these most essential issues.
The Syrian National Council must be committed to protecting
all--all--of Syria's ethnic and religious groups, including
Christians and Alawites. The Syrian National Council must speak
with one voice and make it clear that it will advocate for
minority rights in the new government it hopes to create. The
Syrian people deserve answers to these key questions which
will, in large part determine the degree of support the
opposition has inside and outside the country.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech on
Monday that Assad ``cannot deny his people's legitimate demands
indefinitely. He must step down; and until he does, America and
the international community will continue to increase pressure
on him and his brutal regime.'' So said Secretary Clinton. My
questions today will center primarily on how we can and will
increase the pressure on this regime.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on a number of
key issues.
First, what can regional powers, including the Arab League
and Turkey, do to play a more constructive role in supporting
the democratic reform process in Syria?
Second, what is the impact of current U.S. sanctions on the
Assad regime?
Third, how is the United States working unilaterally and
with the European Union to strengthen sanctions on Syria?
Another question is, How does the United States assess the
current state of the Syrian National Council. What are the
criteria
by which this movement should be judged in order to gain
international legitimacy?
And finally, what are the assessments of our witnesses of
growing sectarianism in Syria and whether it could lead to
civil war?
We are fortunate today to have with us two witnesses who
can speak about U.S. policy in Syria: the Honorable Jeffrey
Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
at the Department of State--Mr. Feltman, we are grateful you
are here--and Luke Bronin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes at the Treasury
Department. We are grateful you are here as well. These
witnesses have extensive experience and expertise in the
region, and I look forward to their insights as to why our
policy has not yet produced the desired results and what more
we can do. We are grateful for their testimony today and
grateful for their service.
And I would say in conclusion, before turning to Senator
Risch if he has any opening comments, that this is a matter, I
think, of basic justice for the people of Syria. A long time
ago, St. Augustine said without justice, what are kingdoms but
great bands of robbers. And the people of Syria for a long
period of time, but especially over these last horrific number
of months have been robbed of a lot of things, robbed of their
dignity, robbed sometimes of their life and their freedoms. And
we have to speak out with one voice on a matter of basic
justice for this country. And I know that there are a lot of
Americans that are deeply concerned about this issue.
And we are grateful that we have so many people here to
listen today to this testimony and to listen to the questions
of our witnesses. And I am grateful for our colleagues being
here.
And I wanted to ask our ranking member, Senator Risch, if
he has any opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.
Welcome to all of you.
We have many, many issues that are important under the
purview of this committee that deals with the Near East and
North Africa. The questions and the issues surrounding Syria
certainly are at the top of that list. All of us have watched--
not only us in this committee, all Americans--the world has
watched as things have unfolded in the Middle East in the Arab
world this spring. We have watched them play out, and now
everything seems to be focused on Syria. That seems to be where
the current unresolved issues are.
There is a huge difference here, of course, between Syria
and what happened in Libya. The opposition in Syria is
essentially unarmed, and as a result of that, they do not have
the ability that the Libyan people had to do what they believed
needed to be done.
We, as the United States, need a policy that is very clear
that we will do everything we can to cut off the sources of
Assad's finances and also the flow of weapons and to do
everything we can to isolate this regime.
I agree with Senator Casey. Mr. Ford is the right person. I
disagreed with appointing an Ambassador because Assad had been
so brutal with his people. Having said that, I agree with the
President that Mr. Ford is the right person for the job.
I think it is in the interest of every American and,
indeed, the interest of the civilized world to isolate this
regime as much as possible. This is a bipartisan issue. It is
an American issue.
I am anxious to hear the suggestions that we get from the
panel and hear about the efforts that we are making in that
regard, and all of us can commit to move forward to do our best
to isolate the regime which hopefully will reach the results
that all of us want to see.
Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
So we will start with the opening statements, and then we
will go to questions. I spoke to both of our witnesses and they
have agreed to try to keep within 5 minutes if they can. Both
of your full statements, of course, will be made part of the
record for this hearing. And we will start with Assistant
Secretary Feltman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Feltman. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, Senator Lugar, thank
you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss our
goals with regard to Syria and the strategy that we are
implementing to achieve them.
Bashar al-Assad is destroying Syria and destabilizing the
region. As Secretary Clinton said 2 days ago, the greatest
source of instability in the region is not people's legitimate
demands for change. It is the refusal to change. An orderly
democratic transition that removes Assad from power and
restores stability is clearly in the United States interest, as
it is in the interest of the Syrian people. It will support our
goals of promoting democracy and human rights, contribute to
greater stability in the region, and undermine Iran's
influence.
Our message to President Assad can be summed up briefly.
Step aside and allow your people to begin a transition to
democracy.
Though we would like to see this transition proceed as
quickly as possible, we should be prepared for the process,
unfortunately, to be long and difficult. Much has already
changed since the unrest began 8 months ago. Internally a large
and growing number of Syrians have concluded that Assad must
go. Protests that started in the remote village of Daraa now
take place in nearly every city and major town in the country.
For the regime to retain power, the Syrian Army has had to
occupy its own country, but the regime's overwhelming use of
force has not been able to suppress Syria's courageous street
protesters demanding their universal rights.
And internationally, Syria is increasingly isolated as the
international community loses patience with Assad's brutality
and broken promises. Nearly all of Syria's neighbors now
recognize that Assad is dangerously fomenting instability, and
that is why we see this unusual Arab League leadership on a
country that is considered to be very important politically and
strategically in the Arab world. The Arabs want Assad to stop
destroying Syria.
The Gulf Cooperation Council described the regime as, ``a
killing machine.'' After several years of strengthening ties
with Syria, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said, ``those who
repress their own people in Syria will not survive.''
Totalitarian regimes are disappearing. The rule of the people
is coming.
The coverage of the regime's brutality in pan-Arab media
has also destroyed Assad's standing in the Arab street. He has
become a pariah in the Arab world. Almost all the Arab leaders,
the Foreign Ministers who I talk to, say the same thing.
Assad's rule is coming to an end. It is inevitable. Some of
these Arabs have even begun to offer Assad safe haven to
encourage him to leave quickly.
We welcome the efforts of the Arab League to stop the
violence, but the regime must be judged by its actions not by
its words. The killing, as you said, Mr. Chairman, has
continued unabated, and we urge our Arab partners to condemn
the regime and assume a greater role in building international
pressure, including at the United Nations.
Economically tough United States and European Union
sanctions and financial mismanagement by the Syrian regime are
changing the calculus of Syria's business elite. Oil revenue is
now almost nonexistent. The regime's assets in the United
States and European banks have been frozen. And Syria is cut
off from most of the international financial system. As cash
starts to dry up, the more Syrians see that the regime is not
sustainable.
Complementing our international efforts, Ambassador Ford,
as both of you mentioned, and his team are doing courageous
work. And thank you to this committee for confirming him. He is
currently in the United States on leave and we expect him to
return to post soon.
Overall, we are following a deliberative course that takes
into account Syria's unique circumstances. We do not want to
see the situation descend into further violence. The best way
forward is to continue support for the nonviolent opposition
while working with international partners to further isolate,
to further pressure the regime. This creates an environment in
which the Syrians can take control of their own future.
You mentioned the Syrian National Council. We welcome the
establishment of the Syrian National Council, a broad coalition
of opposition groups from inside and outside Syria. When you
consider the past 40 years Syrians have been prevented from
engaging in any political activity, what the opposition has
already achieved is truly remarkable. We, the United States,
have not endorsed any particular opposition group. The Syrian
people alone will decide who can legitimately represent them.
The opposition must continue to expand and consolidate its base
within Syria by convincing more Syrians of the legitimacy of
its vision and its transition plan which demonstrates that
there is a better alternative to Assad.
While we understand the Syrian people's need to protect
themselves, violent resistance is counterproductive. It will
play into the regime's hands. It will divide the opposition. It
will undermine international consensus. To create better
protection for civilians in the near term, we are pressing for
access to human rights monitors and journalists. We will
relentlessly pursue our strategy of supporting the opposition
and diplomatically and financially pressuring the regime until
Assad is gone and until the Syrians are able to complete their
democratic transition.
Assad may, through his brutality, be able to delay or
impede this transition, but he cannot stop it.
We look forward to working with the Syrian people as they
chart a new and democratic future.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
discuss our goals with regard to Syria and the strategy we are
implementing to achieve them.
Much has changed both within Syria and in the international
response to what is happening inside Syria since the unrest began 8
months ago. Protests that started in the provincial village of Dara'a
have spread to every city and every major town in the country. The
Syrian people have demonstrated an irrepressible hunger for a change in
the way their country is governed. They are no longer willing to
tolerate the blatant denial of their universal rights and trampling of
their dignity. They are no longer willing to remain quiet about the
rampant corruption, brutality, and ineptitude of the mafia-like Assad
clique that has hijacked the Syrian state and transformed it into an
instrument whose sole purpose is to retain power in the hands of a
small group of self-interested elites.
The protestors in Syria have overcome the barrier of fear. They are
out on the streets of cities and towns all over Syria every single day
despite the relentless and indiscriminate violence that the regime has
deployed against them. According to the estimates of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, over 3,500 Syrians have been killed
since the protests began. Tens of thousands have been detained, and
many of those have been tortured. In a report of her findings in
August, the High Commissioner noted ``a pattern of human rights
violations that constitutes widespread or systemic attacks against the
civilian population, which may amount to crimes against humanity.'' The
violations included murder, forced disappearances, summary executions,
torture, deprivation of liberty, and persecution. But the regime's
overwhelming use of force has not been able to suppress the street
protests. Peaceful street protestors have passed the point of no
return. They will not stop until Bashar al-Assad and his clique are
gone.
The Syrian army has been forced to occupy its own country. Even
small towns are continuously occupied by tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and battalions of foot soldiers along with plain-clothes
intelligence personnel and regime-sponsored armed groups who do much of
the dirty work. The pressure is starting to wear on the army. It is not
just the fast, unsustainable tempo of operations and unending
redeployments ordered to quell every manifestation of dissent--the
soldiers of the Syrian Army are increasingly rejecting a mission that
calls for them to kill and brutally repress their own countrymen, in
some cases people from their own tribes and hometowns. Military
defections, primarily by conscripts and junior officers, are on the
rise, and the pressure on senior officers continues to mount.
The violence is still continuing. In its desperation, the regime is
executing a deliberate and bloody strategy of channeling peaceful
protest into armed insurrection. It is stoking the fears of Syria's
minority communities with blatant propaganda about foreign conspiracies
and domestic terrorism while cynically claiming that the regime is
their only protection from sectarian violence. Make no mistake: the
regime is driving the cycle of violence and sectarianism. The Syrian
people are resisting it, but the regime is working diligently to
fulfill its own prophecy of intercommunal violence.
Assad and his inner circle know they cannot contain or manage
peaceful opposition, so they assault it with violence and with terror.
They believe they can handle a violent resistance because violence is a
medium they know well. Mass arrests, shabiha thuggery and outright
regime violence have forced peaceful protestors to adapt their methods.
They now arrange gatherings of smaller groups on short notice and
disperse before security forces are able to respond. And as they are
literally beaten off the streets, protestors are learning new forms of
peaceful resistance such as boycotts and strikes. Security forces have
responded to civil disobedience such as last week's general strike in
Dara'a with intimidation and vandalism.
While, for the most part, the opposition has thus far refused to be
baited into responding with violence, armed resistance to the regime is
on the rise, with some taking up arms in self-defense. This is not
surprising given that they are faced with increasingly brutal
repression and are still denied the political space to organize and
make their voices heard peacefully. But it is potentially disastrous to
their cause. Forcing the opposition to become violent is the deliberate
strategy of the Assad government. The regime is confounded by
protestors chanting ``peaceful, peaceful'' and shopkeepers who shutter
their stores in solidarity with those killed and arrested, but it knows
precisely how to handle armed insurrection: with brutal and
overwhelming force. By working diligently to channel nonviolent
opposition into a protoinsurgency, the regime seeks to discredit the
opposition, scare minorities into submission, unite security forces
against a common enemy, fragment international consensus and tear Syria
apart along sectarian lines. This must be resisted.
On the economic front, the regime's financial situation is growing
increasingly dire. Tough, targeted sanctions from the United States and
the European Union have squeezed the regime's cash-flow. Oil revenue,
which used to make up about a third of government revenue, is drying
up. Europe used to buy more than 90 percent of Syria's crude. Today it
buys none. As a result, the Syrian Government has had to dramatically
cut oil production. All its storage tanks are filled to capacity.
Despite months of desperate efforts to entice potential new buyers with
offers of deep discounts, the regime has been unable to find
alternative customers.
Meanwhile, we have required U.S. persons to block Syrian regime
property and the EU has frozen assets of two Syrian banks for their
role in facilitating the regime's access to the international financial
system. Even non-U.S. and non-European companies that are not directly
affected by our sanctions have come to the conclusion that it is not in
their interest to do business with this regime. And it is not just the
United States and EU that are tightening the financial noose around the
regime. Canada and Japan have deployed sanctions of their own.
But more than sanctions, it is the financial ineptitude of the
Syrian Government that is driving Syria's economy over a cliff. The
Syrian economy was already in a precarious state before this crisis.
The regime's mismanagement and attempts to buy its way back into
political favor have vastly exacerbated the problem. This is why we
have urged our Arab and European partners to increase their pressure on
the regime now, before Bashar al-Assad precipitates a complete collapse
of the Syrian economy.
Turning to the Syrian opposition, one of the more promising recent
developments is the establishment of the Syrian National Council, a
coalition including secularists, Christians, Islamists, Druze, Alawis,
Kurds and other groups from both inside and outside Syria who have
joined together to form a united front against the Assad regime. When
you consider that for the past 40 years, the Syrian people have been
prevented from engaging in any political activity or even political
discussion, it is truly remarkable that in a matter of just a few
months, the SNC has managed to bring together such a broad array of
groups into a united coalition, despite the regime's relentless
attempts to thwart their efforts. We have not endorsed any specific
opposition group--only the Syrian people can decide who can
legitimately represent them. But we take the advent of the SNC very
seriously, and we support the broader opposition's efforts to focus on
the critical task of expanding and consolidating its base of support
within Syria by articulating a clear and common vision and developing a
concrete and credible post-Assad transition plan.
There are still many Syrians who, while they are appalled by Bashar
al-Assad, see his continued rule as preferable to alternatives they
fear will be worse. It is up to the opposition to convince those
Syrians that a credible alternative exists and that Assad's departure
will not mean chaos, civil war, or a new form of tyranny, but rather a
representative, pluralistic, secular and accountable government that
will operate by rule of law, respond to the needs of its people, and
uphold and protect the rights and interests of all Syrians, regardless
of sect, ethnicity, gender or class. The United States understands
Syrians will determine their own formula for government by the consent
of the governed, but we will not support an outcome that replaces one
form of tyranny or repression with another.
We continue to meet regularly with members of the opposition,
including, but not exclusively, many SNC members, and we encourage
other governments to do the same.
The positions of Syria's neighbors have changed dramatically since
March. Whereas, the initial inclination of many leaders in the region
was to support Assad as the ``devil they knew'' and putative guarantor
of stability, nearly all of the regional leaders with whom I engage now
recognize that Assad and his regime are driving the instability. They
recognize that Assad is part of the problem, not the solution and--some
quietly, some not so quietly--admit to wanting him gone. They recognize
that if Assad is allowed to continue, he will precipitate their worst
nightmare: the collapse of the Syrian state with violence spilling over
into the rest of the region. This crisis could easily spread beyond
Syria's borders; Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon already host thousands of
refugees.
The Gulf Cooperation Council has described the Syrian regime as a
killing machine. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said
he believes the opposition will be successful in their ``glorious''
resistance to the ongoing government crackdown. During a September
visit to Libya, he said, ``Those who repress their own people in Syria
will not survive. The time of autocracies is over. Totalitarian regimes
are disappearing. The rule of the people is coming.''
The continuous coverage of the Assad regime's brutality in the pan-
Arab media has decimated Assad's standing on the Arab street. A recent
poll by the Arab American Institute suggests that Assad has become a
pariah in the Arab world. The poll, conducted in early October surveyed
over 4,000 Arabs in six countries. Just 3 years ago, a regionwide poll
of the same six countries asked respondents to name a leader, not from
their own country, that they most respected. Bashar al-Assad scored
higher than any other Arab head of state. Today, however, the
overwhelming majority of Arabs side with those Syrians demonstrating
against the government (with support for them ranging from 83 percent
in Morocco to 100 percent in Jordan). When asked whether Bashar al-
Assad can continue to govern, the highest affirmative ratings he
receives are a mere 15 percent in Morocco and 14 percent in Egypt, with
the rest in low single digits.
The Arab League has repeatedly condemned the regime's violence and
called for a peaceful political solution while insisting that the
Syrian regime meet a set of reasonable conditions before any
negotiations begin. The League dispatched its Secretary General to
Damascus on September 10 and a ministerial-level delegation on October
26. After strenuous efforts to wiggle out of or dilute the League's
conditions, on November 2, the Syrian Government accepted the terms of
an Arab League plan that includes:
A cessation of violence;
The release of political prisoners;
The withdrawal of security forces from populated areas;
Free access for journalists and Arab League monitors; and
An Arab League-hosted national dialogue between the Syrian
Government and the opposition.
We welcome the efforts of the Arab League to stop the Assad
regime's assaults on the Syrian people, but success of the Arab League
mission will depend not on what the regime says, but on what it does.
The regime must comply with each of these obligations fully--not within
weeks but within days. It must not be allowed to exploit this process
to buy time through half measures, token gestures, and endless
discussion of technicalities, while more Syrians are killed and
imprisoned. We strongly support free and unfettered access to Arab
League monitors throughout Syria, but they should be complemented by
internationally recognized professional human rights monitors as well
as journalists. Syria needs credible witnesses throughout the country
that can document and deter the regime's violent excesses.
As for dialogue, it is up to the opposition to decide whether or
not it wishes to discuss with the regime the terms of Syria's
transition from dictatorship to democracy. Under no circumstances
should a dialogue be a precondition for ending regime violence against
Syrian citizens. Nor should the regime be able to dictate which
oppositionists should take part in discussions or where those
discussions should take place.
Since the Syrian regime ``agreed'' to the League's conditions on
November 2, scores of innocent Syrians have been killed. Security
forces remain deployed in most cities and towns. Tanks and artillery
continue to fire into residential areas in Homs. Thousands of peaceful
protestors remain in detention. Arrests continued unabated. If the
regime continues to spurn this most recent ``last chance,'' we hope
that the Arab League will take additional, clear measures to express
its condemnation of the Syrian regime and solidarity with the Syrian
people while taking a leading role in building international pressure
for a political transition in Syria, including at the United Nations.
The topic of Syria is consistently raised in diplomatic
conversations with Arab leaders. And in those conversations, almost all
the Arab leaders say the same thing: Assad's rule is coming to an end.
Change in Syria is now inevitable. It is only a question of how long
Assad will fight to hold onto power and how many more innocent Syrians
have to die before his rule ends. Some Arab leaders already have begun
to offer Assad safe-haven in an effort to encourage him to leave
peaceably and quickly.
Iran continues to be complicit in the violence in Syria, providing
material support to the regime's brutal campaign against the Syrian
people. Cynically capitalizing on the Syrian Government's growing
alienation from its Arab neighbors, Iran is seeking to increase its
influence in Syria and help Assad remain in power as a vital conduit to
Hezbollah in Lebanon. But public statements last month by President
Ahmadinejad calling for Assad to stop the violence and enact reforms
might indicate that even the Iranians doubt the sustainability of
Assad's rule. Still, Iran has provided political, financial, and
material assistance in support of the regime's brutal crackdown against
the Syrian people.
We remain actively engaged in ratcheting up the pressure on Assad
bilaterally and multilaterally. Following President Obama's statement
on August 18, governments from every continent echoed the President's
call for Assad to step aside. Since the beginning of the Syrian unrest,
we have pursued targeted financial measures to increase pressure on the
Syrian regime and its enablers. We have specifically targeted those
responsible for human rights abuses, senior officials of the Syrian
Government, and the regime's corrupt business cronies. The Executive
order signed by the President in August blocks the property of the
Syrian Government, bans U.S. persons from new investments in or
exporting services to Syria, and bans U.S. imports of, and other
transactions or dealings in, Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum
products. These measures represent some of the strongest sanctions the
U.S. Government has imposed against any country in the world.
In addition, European sanctions banning the purchase of Syrian
petroleum products--the regime's most important source of foreign
exchange--and freezing the assets of select Syrian banks in Europe have
had an arguably greater impact given the larger volume of Syrian trade
with Europe. We are also working with our international partners,
including our Arab allies, to block efforts by the Syrian regime to
circumvent American and European sanctions. The United States and
European Union will continue to deploy new sanctions against key regime
figures, regime enablers (including the regime's corrupt businessmen
cronies), and companies and organizations that support the regime.
These sanctions include asset freezes and travel bans targeted to
affect the regime while sparing the broader economy to the greatest
extent possible.
We have led the effort to hold two special sessions of the U.N.
Human Rights Council on the situation in Syria. At the second special
session, we worked closely with many of Syria's Arab neighbors,
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan, to ensure unified
regional condemnation of the Syrian regime and to establish a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the ongoing human rights
violations. We expect the Commission of Inquiry to be permitted to
carry out its mission without restrictions. We believe that the
introduction of more witnesses will play a critical role in proving to
the world what is really happening in Syria and mobilizing fence-
sitting nations to join us in bringing greater pressure to bear on the
regime.
Despite the October 4 veto of the EU-sponsored draft resolution on
Syria, we remain committed to pursuing multilateral sanctions at the
Security Council. But if Russia and China cynically continue to stand
in the way of international efforts to end the violence in Syria, the
United States and other allies of the Syrian people will consider other
steps to ensure the Syrian people are protected. The U.N. is one
important channel but not the only one. Nevertheless, we will continue
our efforts to convince Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa
to change their positions regarding sanctions against Syria, and we
will encourage our Arab allies and the Syrian opposition to
aggressively engage with those countries as well.
In the meantime, we would suggest that these countries ask and
answer some basic questions. Does the regime permit peaceful protest?
Does it allow the peaceful opposition to organize, discuss, and
deliberate without fear of assassination or arrest? Does the regime
permit the U.N. Commission of Inquiry to enter Syria and do its
internationally mandated work? Does it allow human rights monitors and
journalists to witness the situation on the ground? Has the regime met
any of its self-imposed deadlines for reform or for ending violence
against civilians? The answer to all of these questions is obviously
no.
Complementing our international efforts, Ambassador Ford has been
doing exceptional work in providing Washington policymakers with a
clear perspective of what is happening in Syria. Thank you for
confirming him. He has boldly delivered strong messages to the Syrian
regime and met repeatedly with opposition figures and civil society.
His courageous efforts show our resolve to pressure the Syrian regime
to end its senseless killing, demonstrate our solidarity with the
Syrian people, and help to shine an international spotlight on the
gross abuses of the Assad regime. This administration's principled
stand against Assad's brutality, and the Ambassador's own actions to
show solidarity with the Syrian people, have led to attacks and
intimidation by the regime against Embassy Damascus and Ambassador Ford
himself. He is currently in the United States on leave, and we expect
that he will return to his post before long. For as long as we are
able, we will maintain an Embassy and an Ambassador in Damascus. Robert
Ford will continue to interact with the Syrian people and the Syrian
Government.
Overall, the administration is following a careful but deliberate
and principled course. This is necessary given Syria's complex and
unique circumstances. We do not seek further militarization of this
conflict. Syria is not Libya. Nor, for that matter, is it Tunisia,
Egypt, or Yemen. The way forward includes supporting the opposition
while working with our international partners to further isolate and
pressure the regime through diplomatic and financial means. We will
work with the Syrian people and our international partners to do what
we must to ensure that Assad and his regime are prevented from
murdering Syrian citizens and tearing the Syrian state apart.
The Syrian people are entitled to freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly, and association, basic rights enshrined in the U.N.'s
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Syrian republic is
a signatory. The Syrian people are seeking a government that abides by
these principles, and which governs only with the consent of its
citizens. The emergence of such a government in Syria is in the
interest of the Syrian people and in the interest of the United States.
We ideally seek a peaceful Syrian-led political transition that
includes the end of Bashar al-Assad's rule and the replacement of the
corrupt, incompetent, and violent regime he built and tolerated with
one responsive to the needs of the Syrian people. One thing I have
learned from the events of the Arab world in the past year is humility
regarding my own ability to predict the outcomes or timelines of these
convulsive and transformational processes. I cannot tell you exactly
how long it will take to achieve this outcome in Syria. It has the
potential to be a long, difficult process, but the sooner the better
for Syria and the region.
While the United States sympathizes with Syrian military defectors
and average citizens attempting to protect themselves, we urge them to
think strategically about how best to accomplish their goals. We still
believe that violent resistance is counterproductive. It will play into
the regime's hands, divide the opposition, and undermine international
consensus against the regime. We urge the opposition, and our regional
allies, to continue to reject violence. To do otherwise would, frankly,
make the regime's job of brutal repression easier. At the same time,
all Syrians must know that they have the support of the international
community.
How do we stop spiraling violence? As a means of creating greater
protection for civilians, documenting human rights abuses, and ensuring
that undecided governments have a clearer view of what is really
happening inside Syria, we continue to press for immediate, unfettered,
and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights
monitors, the U.N. Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry, and
independent journalists. If skeptics on the Security Council still
believe Assad's propaganda about armed gangs, let them join the call
for monitors and journalists who could prove it. The introduction of
credible witnesses throughout Syria would both deter and ensure
documentation of the regime's worst excesses. And it would diminish the
temptation for protestors to put down their placards and pick up
weapons. The Arab League has already insisted that Syria accept
monitors as part of its plan to end the violence. The United States
strongly supports European-led efforts to introduce a resolution in the
U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee that would insist on the same.
Bashar al-Assad is desperate to convince himself and others that
Syria is fine. In the relative calm of central Damascus, he may
actually believe it. But when the money runs out, he and his inner
circle will be forced to face the desperate reality of their situation
and ideally will head for the exits voluntarily.
What we have to say to President Assad can be summed up very
briefly: step aside and allow your people to begin the peaceful,
orderly transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Bashar al-Assad
has proven that he is incapable of reform. Our advice is to President
Assad is that he leave now. He may want to study the recent examples of
other Arab autocrats who have been confronted by populations that have
overcome the barrier of fear to demand their universal rights. If Assad
truly has Syria's interests at heart, he will leave now. We will
relentlessly pursue our two-track strategy of supporting the opposition
and diplomatically and financially strangling the regime until that
outcome is achieved.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Mr. Bronin.
STATEMENT OF LUKE A. BRONIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
TERRORIST FINANCING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bronin. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I am pleased to join
Assistant Secretary of State Feltman. We have a great
partnership with the State Department and the State
Department's Syria team.
In my testimony today, I would like to review the role of
financial sanctions in our Syria strategy.
Since the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, President
Obama has issued three new Executive orders. The first, signed
in April, targets those responsible for human rights abuses in
Syria. The second, signed in May, directly sanctions President
Assad and senior members of his regime. And the third, signed
in August, imposes a full government blocking program
prohibiting all transactions with the Government of Syria,
freezing regime assets, banning the export of services to and
investment in Syria, and banning dealings in Syrian-origin
petroleum.
Each Executive order delegates to Treasury the authority to
designate additional individuals and entities, and we have made
full use of that authority to target regime insiders and to
deny the regime the resources it needs to sustain its continued
repression.
Since the uprising began, we have designated more than
three dozen individuals and entities. Our actions have targeted
insiders and officials such as Assad advisor Buthaina Shaaban,
Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem, and Mohammed Hamsho, a
prominent businessman and front man for corrupt officials. We
have imposed sanctions on Syriatel, the largest mobile phone
operator in Syria owned by Assad crony Rami Makhluf. We have
designated Hamsho International Group. We have designated
Syrian military intelligence, the Syrian National Security
Bureau, and Syrian Air Force intelligence, all deeply complicit
in the brutal use of violence against peaceful protesters.
Demonstrating the full range of Syria's illicit conduct, we
used preexisting authority to target the Commercial Bank of
Syria for providing financial services to Syrian and North
Korean entities that facilitate weapons of mass destruction
proliferation.
And we have used our authorities to highlight the role of
Iran, designating the head and deputy head of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard's Qods Force and Iran's law enforcement
forces for assisting the regime's brutality. Iran claims
solidarity with the popular movement sweeping the Arab world
today, but Iran's real policy is plain: to export to Syria the
same repressive tactics employed by the Iranian Government
against its own people.
As we have steadily increased the pressure on the Assad
regime, we have done so in close coordination with our allies
in Europe and around the world. Like the United States, the EU
has designated numerous regime officials and insiders,
prohibited new investment in the Syrian energy sector, frozen
the assets of the Commercial Bank of Syria, and most
significant, implemented a ban on the importation of Syrian oil
and gas to Europe.
The impact of these coordinated, multilateral measures has
been profound. Today, the Government of Syria finds it
increasingly difficult to access the international financial
system. Its ability to conduct trade in dollars has been
severely constrained, and it has been deprived of its most
significant source of revenue.
The EU previously accounted for more than 90 percent of
Syria's crude exports. As a result of the EU's ban, that market
has effectively been eliminated, and despite Syria's aggressive
efforts to find new markets, there appear at present to be few
willing buyers. And while Iran may seek to provide financial
assistance to Damascus, Iran itself is under pressure from
wide-ranging international sanctions.
In short, working in concert with our allies, we have used
our sanctions tools to send Assad and his regime this clear
message: your reprehensible actions have consequences.
Continued repression of popular dissent will only deepen your
isolation.
As long as Assad maintains his illegitimate hold on power,
we will continue to identify individuals and entities that are
complicit in the Assad regime's abuses. We will expose, target,
and disrupt the regime's sources of revenue and support, and we
will continue to engage our partners around the world urging
them to block Syria's access to alternative oil markets, asking
governments and the private sector to join us in imposing
aggressive and comprehensive measures against the Assad regime.
I look forward to continuing our work with this committee,
and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bronin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Luke A. Bronin
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I
look forward to discussing the Department of the Treasury's role in
supporting the Obama administration's efforts to end the Assad regime's
violent repression of the Syrian people. I am pleased to join Assistant
Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman today. Treasury values greatly our
very close, collaborative relationship with the State Department and
the State Department's Syria team.
In my testimony today, I would like to review the role of financial
sanctions in our Syria strategy; to assess, as far as possible, the
current impact of multilateral sanctions; and to outline briefly our
continuing priorities and next steps.
syria sanctions regime
Since the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, President Obama has
issued three Executive orders, each imposing new sanctions in response
to the violence in Syria.
On April 29, President Obama signed E.O. 13572, imposing sanctions
on certain persons and providing for the imposition of sanctions on
persons determined to be responsible for human rights abuses in Syria,
including those related to repression. On May 18, in response to the
continued escalation of violence against the Syrian people, the
President signed E.O. 13573, sanctioning Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad and senior officials of Assad's government. Most recently, on
August 17, the President issued E.O. 13582, which imposed a full
blocking program on the Government of Syria, and followed with a call
on Assad to step aside. E.O. 13582 prohibits all transactions between
U.S. persons and the Government of Syria, bans the export of U.S.
services to and new investment in Syria, and takes aim at a crucial
revenue stream for the Syrian Government by banning the importation
into the United States of, and transactions or dealings by U.S. persons
in, Syrian-origin petroleum and petroleum products.
These three new Executive orders rapidly and significantly expanded
the tools we have available for responding to the crisis in Syria. Each
Executive order delegates to Treasury the authority to designate
additional individuals or entities. Working closely with our colleagues
at the State Department, in the intelligence community, and throughout
the U.S. Government, as well as with our counterparts in Europe,
Canada, and elsewhere, we have made full use of our authorities to
isolate the Assad regime and key regime supporters. To the fullest
extent possible, we have worked to deny the regime the resources it
needs to fund its continued repression of the Syrian people.
Since the uprising began, we have designated more than three dozen
individuals and entities pursuant to these new Executive orders.
Treasury actions have targeted, among others, regime insiders and
officials such as Buthaina Shaaban, Presidential and Media Advisor to
President Assad; Walid al-Moallem, the Foreign Minister; the
President's brother, Maher al-Assad; and Mohammed Hamsho, a prominent
businessman and member of the Syrian Parliament who serves as a front
man for many of the corrupt and illicit dealings of Syrian officials.
In addition to the individuals targeted by our sanctions, we have
also targeted key Syrian entities under these new Executive orders. To
date, we have imposed sanctions on Syriatel, the largest mobile phone
operator in Syria, which was designated for being controlled by Rami
Makhluf, a powerful Syrian businessman and regime insider designated
under E.O. 13460 in February 2008 for improperly benefiting from and
aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials; Hamsho
International Group, for being controlled by Muhammed Hamsho; Syrian
Military Intelligence, which has used force against and arrested
demonstrators participating in the unrest; Syrian National Security
Bureau, which directed Syrian security forces to use extreme force
against demonstrators; and Syrian Air Force Intelligence, which in late
April 2011 fired tear gas and live ammunition to disperse crowds of
demonstrators who took to the streets in Damascus and other cities,
killing at least 43 people in 1 day.
We have also used our authorities to highlight Iranian support for
the Syrian regime, designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-
Qods Force and Iran's Law Enforcement Forces for providing material
support to the Syrian regime's violent response to peaceful protests.
We also targeted Ismail Ahmadi Moghadam and Ahmad-Reza Radan, the top
two officials of Iran's Law Enforcement Forces, and Qasem Soleimani,
the head of the IRGC-Qods Force, under E.O. 13572. These actions
demonstrate that, despite the Iranian Government's public rhetoric
claiming solidarity with the popular movements sweeping the Arab world
today, Iran's official policy is in fact to export the same brutal and
repressive tactics employed by the Iranian Government in Tehran in
2009.
In addition to the actions taken under the three most recent Syria
Executive orders, Treasury has used preexisting authorities to target
the full spectrum of the Assad regime's illicit activities, including
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On August 10, we
designated the Commercial Bank of Syria, a Syrian state-owned financial
institution based in Damascus, for its provision of financial services
to Syrian and North Korean entities previously sanctioned by the United
States for facilitating WMD proliferation.
Coordination with allies
As outlined thus far, we have been aggressive in the application of
both targeted and broad-based measures against the Assad regime. Our
actions have had an impact. The government blocking program, imposed
under E.O. 13582, complicates Syrian oil sales globally by prohibiting
dollar clearing for the Syrian Central Bank. The designation of the
Commercial Bank of Syria has helped constrain the regime's primary
facilitator of foreign transactions. Our targeted designations of
regime insiders have boosted the morale of those courageously
protesting against the regime.
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that, had we been
acting alone, our actions would likely have had only a modest impact on
the Syrian regime's ability to finance its campaign of violence.
Economic relationships between the United States and Syria were limited
even before the current crisis. The most significant aspect of our
efforts to isolate the Assad regime is that we have not acted alone. We
have pursued our strategy in the context of especially close
coordination with international counterparts. Our steady escalation of
pressure against the Assad regime and its supporters has been conceived
of and implemented in concert with our allies.
Like the United States, the EU has designated numerous regime
officials and insiders, making it clear to both Syrian Government
officials and the Syrian business community alike that association with
Assad's regime carries a personal cost. On August 18, when President
Obama called for Assad to step down, his call was echoed by our
British, French, and German counterparts. The EU prohibited new
investment in the Syrian energy sector and issued a ban on the export
of Syrian bank notes and coins produced in the EU. Following the U.S.
designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria for proliferation activity,
the EU last month froze all Commercial Bank of Syria assets in Europe,
citing the bank's critical role in facilitating financial transactions
on behalf of the Syrian regime. Most significantly, the EU implemented
a ban on the importation of Syrian oil and gas, depriving the Syrian
Government of its largest and most important energy export market.
Canada, too, has moved arm in arm with the United States and
Europe. Japan, Switzerland, and Australia have also taken a stand with
the international community. Japan announced an asset freeze for Bashar
al-Assad and 20 connected individuals and entities, Switzerland has
imposed measures similar to those of the EU, while Australia has
implemented an arms embargo, a travel ban, and targeted financial
measures against the Bashar al-Assad and regime insiders, as well as an
arms embargo against Syria. We are engaging additional countries in
Europe and Asia, urging them to deny Syria alternative markets for its
crude oil exports or alternative ways to access the international
financial system. We have and will continue to consult closely with our
counterparts in Turkey, where the Turkish Government has made strong
statements condemning the Syrian regime.
the impact of sanctions on syria
As a result of this robust multilateral effort, the impact on the
Assad regime has been profound. Since the implementation of U.S. and EU
sanctions on the Syrian petroleum industry, the regime has struggled to
find alternative markets for selling its heavy crude. Since the EU
previously accounted for more than 90 percent of Syria's crude exports,
the EU actions blocking the purchase of Syria-origin petroleum products
and banning new investment in the Syrian petroleum industry have had a
massive impact. Prior to the imposition of sanctions, the Assad regime
generated one-third of its revenue from the oil sector. That source of
revenue has been effectively been eliminated.
Though Syrian officials initially indicated their belief that
finding alternative markets for Syrian oil would be easy, recent
statements from high-ranking government officials paint a different
picture. The Syrian Oil Minister, speaking on state-owned television
late last month, noted that the government had initially believed that
they would be able to shift their crude oil exports to markets in the
East immediately, but that that assumption had been wrong. There appear
to be few buyers willing to import Syrian crude oil in the short term.
In late September, the Syrian Government was forced to cut domestic oil
production because it was unable to find buyers for its oil and lacked
domestic storage for the newly extracted crude.
In late September, in an apparent effort to preserve foreign
currency reserves, the Syrian Government imposed a ban on the
importation of a broad range of products, including household
appliances and food items. The policy quickly backfired, as inflation
spiked and the business elite of the country expressed their anger at
the regime. Assad was forced to roll back the ban to maintain support
from businessmen, an influential domestic constituency. The episode
demonstrated the regime's increasing financial vulnerability and,
importantly, focused popular anger on the regime.
We have seen indications that Iran, one of Syria's last remaining
supporters, appears to be taking steps to provide financial assistance
to Damascus. However, given the pressure that Iran is under from wide-
ranging international sanctions, it is unlikely that Iran will be
successful in helping mitigate the impact of financial sanctions on the
Syrian regime.
The U.S. and EU programs are only a few months old. We have yet to
see the full impact of sanctions. However, we have sent to the Syrian
Government, and to the Syrian businessmen who have chosen to ally
themselves with the regime, this clear message: your reprehensible
actions have consequences. Continued repression of popular dissent will
only deepen your isolation.
the continuing challenge and way forward
As long as Assad maintains his illegitimate hold on power, Treasury
will continue to work with our colleagues across the administration,
including our Embassy in Damascus and our colleagues at the State
Department, to identify individuals and entities that are complicit in
the Assad regime's repression and deny them access to the United States
and international financial systems through targeted sanctions. We will
expose the sources of regime support. We will encourage our partners in
the international community and private commercial institutions to take
parallel actions.
As financial pressure on the Assad regime increases, we know that
Syria will look for ways to circumvent sanctions. We are cognizant of
this reality and we are closely monitoring the situation to close down
any such activity. We will continue to engage foreign governments and
appropriate private sector counterparts to block Syrian Government
efforts to develop workarounds. As part of our efforts, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has already issued two advisories
to U.S. financial institutions highlighting the risk of flight of
proceeds of public corruption and regime assets, and possible attempts
by the Commercial Bank of Syria to use nested accounts to maintain
access to U.S. dollars. We are urging other financial sector regulators
to issue similar guidance to their financial institutions.
Most important, we will continue to engage our foreign partners,
working closely with the State Department, in an effort to broaden and
deepen the coalition taking action against Syria. Treasury officials
engage regularly in jurisdictions that might serve as possible outlets
for Syrian financial activity. We will caution our partners to remain
vigilant, ask governments and regulators to issue appropriate guidance
to their financial sectors, and encourage them to join us in our
aggressive and comprehensive application of measures to increase the
pressure on the Assad regime.
As we continue to engage internationally, Treasury will also
continue to pursue new and innovative ways to use our financial tools
to advance U.S. national security objectives.
I look forward to continuing our work with this subcommittee, and I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
We will start with one round of questioning.
Mr. Feltman, I wanted to ask you, first of all, about the
region and, in particular, maybe we can review a couple of
countries in the region that can and will and should play a
role in this. But let me start with Turkey.
In your full statement, you mentioned some of the parts of
the statements that Prime Minister Erdogan has made. You said
in your statement that he has said he believes the opposition
will be successful in ``their glorious'' resistance to the
ongoing government crackdown. Certainly that is helpful when
you have a neighbor saying that. And then what he has said in
September in a visit to Libya, those who repress their own
people in Syria will not survive, and he goes on from there.
I guess I would ask you maybe a broad question and then
more specifically. No. 1, on this idea of a contact group, how
do you assess that and is there any effort to be undertaken by
the State Department or the administration to move that
forward--a contact group. That is the broad question.
The second, more specific question is what about the role
that Turkey has played and can play. What can we do to move
them from being somewhat constructive so far to being even more
helpful to put pressure on the regime and to help in the
region? Does that make sense? I know that second question is
not as specific as you may want it.
Ambassador Feltman. Chairman, thanks. We welcome your
proposal for a contact group for friends of the Syrian people.
In fact, we are running with this idea. We are talking with
others about it. I have a very senior colleague who is working
on coordination with our European allies pretty much full-time,
Fred Hoff. I am in touch with the Arabs.
What we would like to do is to try to get the Arabs
themselves to play a leadership role in this. One of Assad's
propaganda tools is, oh, this is just an outside plot, and he
needs to see that his brother Arabs are also participating in
such a contact group. So we are exploring, we are pushing. We
take the idea as a very positive one.
Senator Casey. Let me just interject there. I think the
fact that the Arab League has now made an attempt that he seems
to be kind of thumbing his nose at--for lack of a better
description--
I realize that a couple weeks ago or months ago there might
have been a sequencing problem, but I think now that the Arab
League has taken some action, I would hope that that would set
the table for what could be a broader effort. But that is just
an opinion I am interjecting.
Ambassador Feltman. We agree with you, Senator Casey. The
Arab League's committee that is dealing with the Syria issue
headed by the Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassin includes
several Arab States. They are meeting on Friday, a day before
the Arab League is meeting on Saturday, to discuss Syria. So
the committee on Friday will be discussing a number of options
to present to the Ministers on Saturday, and we hope that--I
mean, we are encouraging them to look at issues such as the
Friends of Libya contact group. We would very much hope that
given Assad's clear rejection of their proposal, that they will
help us with the Security Council, things like that. So we
agree with you that the Arab League is playing an important
role and now is the time for the Arab League to actually take
some action.
On Turkey, you raise a really important issue. And it is
worth remembering that one of, I think, the Assad family's
foreign policy successes probably, from their own view, would
be the rapprochement that first the father, then the son, were
able to have with Turkey from 1998 moving forward. You know, if
you looked at the Turkish-Syrian relationship a year ago, they
were close friends. They had developed economic ties, political
ties, diplomatic ties. It was a very positive relationship, I
think, from the Syrian perspective. That is in tatters at this
point. When you have statements from the Prime Minister of
Turkey such as the ones that I quoted and you described, you
can see what has happened.
And Turkey has played an important role in a couple of
areas. First, they have provided, basically, safe haven on
Turkish soil for Syrian refugees. Turkey is hosting somewhere
between 7,500 and 8,000 refugees, roughly, on Turkish soil now,
protecting them from the brutality of the Assad regime that
they fled.
Second, Turkey is providing facilitation space for
opposition to organize, for the opposition to talk to
themselves. There is very little ability for these courageous
activists inside Syria to get together because they clearly
have no rights for peaceful protest. Their rights for speech,
freedom of expression are not being at all respected. And so
Turkey is providing some space for the opposition forces to
meet to discuss, to try to lay out a vision. So it is an
extremely important role that Turkey is playing.
And Turkey has, in essence, put on a de facto arms embargo
to make sure that arms are not flowing through Turkey back to
the clique around Bashar al-Assad to use against his own
people.
So we think Turkey is playing an extremely positive,
important role here.
In the past, there was a lot of trade between the two
countries, a lot of Turkish merchants going across the border
to buy things in Syria to trade. That has all dried up just
because of the instability in Syria, but we are in close
contact with Turkey on all these issues.
Senator Casey. I guess I would ask you as a followup to
that question on Turkey, what would you hope that they could do
in the next couple of weeks to be constructive.
Ambassador Feltman. First of all, continue what they are
doing because it is having a real impact. The opposition's
ability to come together, because of the Turkish facilitation,
is a tremendous accomplishment.
Also, given the fact that the economic trade between the
two countries is dropping, we would like to encourage them to
join the European Union, to join Japan, to join Canada, to join
us in formalizing some economic sanctions between Turkey and
Syria.
Senator Casey. That is very helpful.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Mr. Feltman, in your comments, I guess at least the hint
was that we need to all buckle up and get ready for the long
haul here. Is that a result of the assessment that the people
are going to have a difficult time inasmuch as they are
essentially unarmed in their attempt to overthrow the
government?
Ambassador Feltman. Well, part of it, Senator, is just my
own humility. I have been NEA Assistant Secretary during this
year, and I have learned not to predict things based on what
has happened in the Arab world this year. So part of it is just
based on my own awareness that predictions about what is going
to happen in the Arab world do not always pan out.
But part of it is this question of the unarmed protests
that you mentioned. It is incredibly courageous what these
Syrian opposition figures--the protesters--are doing every day.
They are facing incredible brutality from a government that is
basically a family-led mafia that has hijacked the state, and
yet they come out every day, day in and day out. There are more
demonstrations now than there were at the beginning of this.
They are in every town, every city across Syria.
But what Bashar al-Assad is trying to do is to turn this
peaceful protest movement into an insurgency. He knows how to
deal with violence. He just uses violence against violence.
What confounds him is this phenomenon of protesters yelling
``peaceful, peaceful,'' of shopkeepers closing their shops in
solidarity with the protesters. That is what really puts Bashar
al-Assad in a bind. And that is why we have been encouraging
the opposition, despite the tremendous brutality they are
facing, to keep to the peaceful principles to which they have
subscribed.
Right now, if the opposition were to turn into a largely
armed movement, we think it would, first of all, frighten the
minorities. It would frighten the minorities in Syria to
believe that Bashar
al-Assad's propaganda about chaos after him would come true. It
would probably divide the international community.
There is no consensus even among the opposition themselves
on the question of arms. None of us question the desire by the
Syrians to exercise in self-defense against the kind of
brutality that they are facing, but we believe that right now
their strength is in this peaceful protest, that they deny
Bashar the ability to claim that he is really facing an armed
insurrection because he is not. He is facing people who are
demanding their legitimate rights through great courage.
Senator Risch. How long can they hold on?
Ambassador Feltman. I do not know. It goes back to my
crystal ball thing. I do not know.
But it is one of the reasons why I think that the Arab
leaders have started taking such an active role because they do
not want to see him destroy Syria. He is not going to remain.
He cannot last. He cannot survive when you have the sort of
isolation that Luke described, when you see the pariah he has
become. But he can certainly cause a lot more deaths. He can
certainly do a lot more damage before he has finally exited
from the scene. The best thing for him to do right now would be
to exit the scene, and that is what we are trying to find the
way to do.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Mr. Bronin, how would you compare the sanctions we have in
place on Syria to the sanctions we have in place on Iran on a
scale of 1 to 10? Compare the two so we can get a feel as to
how those two match each other.
Mr. Bronin. Senator, I think in both cases we have imposed
comprehensive, broad measures to isolate the regimes.
Senator Risch. Would you say they are comparable?
Mr. Bronin. They are. I would say they are comparable.
Senator Risch. And how about comparing those then to what
we did in Libya when the chaos started there? Is it comparable
to what we did there?
Mr. Bronin. Also comparable. I would note that in Libya an
important distinction is that the action we took followed
action in the U.N. Security Council which meant that the action
we took in Libya was accompanied by action globally, which
amplified the impact in Libya dramatically, and obviously in
both the cases of Syria and Iran, we are seeking to develop as
broad a multilateral coalition to increase that pressure as we
can.
Senator Risch. What can you tell us about--and I am not
asking for anything classified, obviously, but what can you
tell us about your expectations? You know, we have all seen
year-after-year sanctions, for instance, on Iran, and you know,
a regime seems to be able to withstand a whole lot of pain in
order to hang onto power. How do you assess where we are headed
in Syria as far as the regime's ability to survive just as Iran
is?
Mr. Bronin. Like Assistant Secretary Feltman, I would
hesitate to speculate on a specific timeline, but I would say
that there are very clear indications that their financial
resources are strained. I mean, they are in financial dire
straights. Their revenues have been dramatically cut not only
as a result of the action against their energy sector, but also
the impact of the tourism industry in Syria as a result of the
violence. They have seen a dramatic drop in revenue, and I
think it is clear that they are having to draw down their
foreign exchange reserves much more rapidly than they would
like.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator Casey. Senator Risch,
thank you both for holding this important hearing. It really is
a moment in time that we need to be heard, and I hope that some
of our voices will be heard by the people of Syria who, as
Senator Shaheen just mentioned to me, are risking their lives
every single day to just keeping on this battle that they are
in.
In a show of his true colors, President Assad has
responded, as you have said, with vicious force instead of
respecting the voices of the Syrian people. The U.N. estimates
that more than 3,500 people have already lost their lives and
thousands more injured, imprisoned, forced to flee. The Syrian
Government has ordered Syrian troops to fire on their own
communities, orchestrated the torture of prisoners, some only
children.
And in August, President Obama rightfully said for the sake
of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to
step aside. That was an extraordinarily clear message from our
President.
The Obama administration has also moved to implement a
range of tough sanctions that we just discussed a moment ago. I
had teamed up with Senator DeMint to call for these sanctions,
prohibiting all transactions between Americans and the
Government of Syria, banning United States services to, and new
investments in, Syria, and banning the importation of Syrian
petroleum. And after our move, the EU moved to ban import of
petroleum, and since they purchase 90 percent of all Syrian
oil, that is a big deal.
Unfortunately, other members of the international community
have utterly failed to stand up against President Assad's
abuses. And I wanted to talk to you about one of those
countries, Russia. It is my understanding that despite vigorous
efforts, the U.S. Ambassador Rice was unable to secure a United
Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian
Government's crackdown because of a Russian and a Chinese veto.
And according to the news reports, Russia led the opposition,
and our Susan Rice said that the United States was ``outraged''
and she called the vote ``a cheap rouse by those who would
rather sell arms to the Syrian Government than stand with the
Syrian people.''
So I guess my question is, Would you speak, Mr. Feltman,
Secretary Feltman, to Russia's opposition to any condemnation
of the Assad regime. Is it that they want to sell weapons? Is
it something more than that? Is there something more we can do?
What is your take on it?
Ambassador Feltman. Senator Boxer, thanks for the question.
I am going to have to defer to the Bureau of European Affairs,
Assistant Secretary Phil Gordon, for better insights into
Russia's motivations because it is out of my area.
But what I can say is talking about Syria, what the
Russians say is, first, that they want a peaceful solution.
Fine. We want a peaceful solution. The Russians say we want the
violence to stop. Fine. We want the violence to stop. The
Syrian people want the violence to stop. So I would say, for
the purpose of this argument, let us try to take the Russians
at their word, that they are sincere for the purpose of this
argument. Therefore, they should join us in allowing monitors,
allowing media into the country because if they still pretend
to believe Bashar al-Assad's lies that what he is doing is
fighting bandits and terrorists, let the monitors in. The
monitors can report that. The monitors can tell the world what
is actually happening. The international media can say that. If
there are bandits and terrorists, the monitors and media will
show that.
I do not believe that the Russians will be able to sustain
their opposition to the Syrian people indefinitely.
Senator Boxer. I hear you. And let me just say I think this
is key. And, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we could all work
together to craft some kind of a message to the Russians
because this is critical. They are taking the lead on blocking
any type of resolution.
Now, I have a second point I want to make here. According
to an Amnesty International Report, the Syrian authorities--I
am reading this from the report. ``The Syrian authorities have
turned hospitals and medical staff into instruments of
repression in the course of their efforts to crush the
unprecedented mass protests and demonstrations. People wounded
in protests or other incidents related to the uprising have
been verbally abused and physically assaulted in state-run
hospitals, including by medical staff, and in some cases denied
medical care.''
The report cites experiences from a number of wounded
protesters, including one shooting victim who said that a
doctor at a state-run hospital told him--this is a doctor--``I
am not going to clean your wound.'' This is really hard to say.
``I am waiting for your foot to rot so that we can cut it
off.'' That is supposedly a quote from a doctor.
It also cites a doctor who was forced to flee Syria after
he reported a nurse was torturing a young protester. This is
what the doctor said. ``I remember hearing shrieks of pain,''
said the doctor, ``so I walked toward the voice and I saw a
male nurse hitting the boy hard on his injury and swearing at
him as he poured antiseptic on the injured foot in an act that
clearly intended to cause the boy additional pain.''
So I have three quick questions I think you can answer.
How much information are we receiving about the abuse and
denial of care to injured protesters, including by medical
staff?
Second, are the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent currently able to provide care
to the wounded?
And then last, in light of this, why have we not been able
to use this to turn around the policies of Russia and China?
Ambassador Feltman. The information we get, Senator, is
mixed. Because the media is not allowed, because there are
restrictions put on our diplomats, we get a lot of information,
but it could be very detailed in one area and very sketchy in
other details. So it is a very mixed picture, but it does
provide enough of a vision of what is happening in Syria to
confirm some of these horrific stories that you are describing.
I do not know the specific examples, but I am sure that Amnesty
was able to get eyewitness reports because information is
getting out despite the Syrian Government's best efforts to
operate in darkness, to operate in the shadows.
ICRC has had access in Syria. How effective they are able
to be inside medical facilities I do not know because ICRC
works very quietly. That is one of their goals.
But I think that the stories that you are describing
explain how it is that the Syrians can be so courageous that
day after day they are going out and protesting because they
know of family, of friends, of neighbors who have faced this
kind of brutality, and they simply do not want to face it
anymore. They are facing a regime that has hijacked the country
with the sole purpose of just protecting the elite of that
regime.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much. Again, I will not ask
you to answer the last point, but I would hope we would take
this information to the Russians and the Chinese. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thanks, Senator Boxer.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to focus on some of the comments you have made
on the international aspects of this as they pertain to Syria's
neighbors. You pointed out that Turkey has changed its position
and now harbors a segment of the Syrian opposition within its
borders. But the Lebanese essentially would still appear to be
very worried about the unrest spilling across the Syrian border
and upsetting their own domestic situation. This is
particularly true with regard to the Christians in Lebanon and
others fearing the coming of a Sunni regime if the Alawites in
Syria are not able to hang on.
In addition to that, there is the problem that is faced by
Israel, or at least as Israelis have themselves expressed, that
Syria was never a friend, but it was a so-called stable
antagonist that was not bound to attack Israel. However, some
in Israel now worry that under pressure Assad or others might
decide to attack in the hope of gaining some adherence from
other anti-Israeli elements in the Middle East, thus creating
an unstable situation on yet another front for Israel given the
Arab Spring difficulties with Egypt and with others.
Now, in the midst of all of this, the United States
understandably is concentrating upon the human rights dilemmas
of individuals who want their rights in the country. It has
been noted, at least by some of our staff members, in the
largest cities there have been very few demonstrations, but out
in the hustings, there have been many more. And this leads once
again to feelings about sectarian violence, particularly
between the Alawites and the Sunnis.
As you try to formulate policy, surely all of these things
are on your mind and the Secretary's. On the one hand, you have
each of us wanting you to do something to save people who are
in the streets indicating they would like to have better civil
rights, and we sympathize with that. On the other hand, it
could very well be that as we demand the departure of Assad or
the departure of Assad plus the people he is with, we tip the
scales in this Alawite/Sunni business, and this leads to
unintended consequences. After all, this was a Syrian problem.
But given the Arab Spring and the current volatile situation in
the Middle East, it has all sorts of other international
implications.
Now, under those circumstances, what is a policy that we
should adopt that tries to bring a degree of stability to the
situation even as we promote human rights and continue to
espouse those things that we believe are most important? Or are
we going to be a tipping force demanding action by the U.N. or
demanding action through sanctions of various sorts? Although
the economy of Syria appears to not be drying up, it has been
deprived of much of its oil revenue. So we have already had an
effect. How much of an effect do we want to have? And if we
were successful and Assad left, what would we be left with at
that point? What happens to all of the surrounding territories?
Ambassador Feltman. Extremely important points, and you are
right, that these play into all of our thinking on Syria policy
all the time.
I guess there are a couple of basic assumptions we have.
What worries the Lebanese is instability next door and how that
might spill over. What worries the Iraqis is the same thing.
What worries the Israelis is another variation of the same
thing. But what is causing the instability right now that they
fear is what Bashar al-Assad is doing to his own people.
And the President has been clear, as the chairman was
earlier as well, that it is time for Bashar to step aside.
Bashar is causing the instability that worries the neighbors.
Bashar has gone past the tipping point. He is past the point of
no return. The neighbors no longer look at him as the devil you
know and so will accept him. They are recognizing with
increasing vehemence that he is the cause of the instability
that most worries them.
Senator Lugar. Hypothetically let us say he does go
tomorrow. Who steps in and then what do they do?
Ambassador Feltman. That is one of the real challenges
because the opposition in Syria is still divided. We think that
more unites them than divides them because they are talking
about the need for Assad to go, the need for a more democratic,
secular future Syrians have equal rights under the law, but
there still are big organizational divisions between the
opposition people. We cannot pick out which opposition people
are the right ones to lead the country.
So one of the things that we are, in our discussions when
we meet with opposition figures, be they within the Syrian
National Council or outside the Syrian National Council, be
they inside Syria or outside Syria, are talking to them about
you have to be able to articulate a credible plan, a credible
vision that is practical, that shows people who maybe do not
like Assad, but are worried about what happens afterward that
you have a plan, that it is practical, that it is
implementable, that is positive, that is based on rule of law
where the government governs with the consent of those
governed.
And I think they are starting to do this. There have been
some vision papers put out, certain speeches given, but they
still have a long way to go, to be frank, on this.
Senator Lugar. Thank you. As this continues to play out, I
am hopeful that we are taking into account the potential for
chaos and the lack of people who have formulated what the new
plans are or come together at this point.
Ambassador Feltman. You are right to be concerned, Senator.
But right now, the impending chaos is happening because of what
Bashar is doing to his own people. So there needs to be an end
to the violence and an opposition that is inclusive, that is
able to articulate a practical, positive plan going forward.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
you and Senator Risch for holding the hearing.
Mr. Feltman, I wanted to begin by commenting on your points
about Ambassador Ford and the great work that he has done in
Syria and commend him for that. I know all of us very much
appreciate his courage and his working with the opposition
figures and certainly hope he will be back there very soon.
Can you talk about the current relationship between Iran
and Syria and how Iran is playing into what is going on there
right now? Are they supporting Assad and to what extent? And
how does the violence in Syria affect their view of what is
going on?
Ambassador Feltman. Senator, it is a very interesting topic
because the short answer is yes. Iran is definitely helping
Bashar, giving him the tools by which he represses his own
people, cracks down on them, et cetera. They are providing
expertise, advice, what we would call technical assistance to
do bad things. They are providing equipment by which he can
monitor opposition activities on the Internet, all that sort of
stuff. And it is one of the reasons why, as my colleague
mentioned, the IRGC was sanctioned in one of the three
Executive orders that the President has announced this year.
At the same time, Iran is embarrassed. You start to see
Iranian leaders, even people like Ahmadinejad, who talk about
the need to end violence in Syria. They talk about the need for
reform. Now, it is completely cynical on their part because
they do just as bad of things to their own people, but it
suggests to us that the Iranian leadership recognizes, A, that
they have lost credibility across the Arab world because of
their support of this brutal dictator and that, B, he might not
survive. And they have got to start positioning themselves for
the day after Bashar. So I think Iran is actually in a very
interesting bind right now. They are trying to save him without
losing what shreds of credibility they may still have in the
Arab world while also trying to signal to the Syrian people
that we know that he might not survive and we know that he
should not bring those bad things to you.
Senator Shaheen. And do we have any information about--is
there any information about how the Iranian people feel about
their government's support for Assad and what is happening
there?
Ambassador Feltman. I will have to plead ignorance,
Senator. I am not really sure. I have not seen polling on that.
But if I could use your question to pull up something else
that is interesting, which is Arab polling. There has been
enough Arab polling over the years to see a remarkable shift. A
year or so ago, there was a big poll done, thousands of people,
six different Arab countries, in which they were asked who is
the Arab leader, not from your own country, outside your own
country, who you most admire. Bashar al-Assad overwhelmingly
came out on top. Now the same countries were polled, the same
sort of data, and his numbers, shall we say, are rock bottom.
The highest is something like in Morocco like 15 percent think
he might survive. In Egypt, it is 14 percent. Everywhere else
it is single digits. So his own credibility in the Arab world
has suffered tremendously.
And this has, of course, influenced the Arab leadership
because Arab leaders have woken up that they need to be a
little attentive to their popular opinion this year. And I
think it helps explain why the Arab leaders are playing a much
stronger role in Syria than they would have a year ago.
Senator Shaheen. That does make sense. And given the Arab
League's effort to try and reduce the violence in Syria, is
there any belief that if the violence continues that the Arab
League will actually take any direct action? Will they sanction
Assad and the regime? Is there any further effort that we think
they might undertake?
Ambassador Feltman. I mentioned this a bit in my opening
statement. Syria is considered to be a very important part of
the Arab world for historic reasons, political reasons. I mean,
we do not always like what Syria has done, but Syria is a
heavyweight, shall we say, in the Arab world. And so I think
the Arab leaders are trying to show that they can deal with a
problem in their own back yard, that they can deal with this
rather than have to turn to the outside world to solve
everything. It would be an embarrassment for them if they are
unable to do something to protect the Syrian people at this
point.
So when I am talking to the Arab Foreign Ministers--and the
Secretary and the White House are engaged with the Arabs--there
are a lot of ideas that the Arabs are saying, like we are
talking about perhaps suspending their membership. Perhaps we,
as the Arab League could, ask the United Nations Security
Council for action. So there is recognition that Bashar has
basically lied to them. That is positive. There is recognition
quietly, not publicly, that his days are numbered.
I look at the contrast between, again, a year ago where
Qatar used to lend him a plane to fly around the world on state
visits because we had sanctioned the spare parts--he could not
have his own plane, and now Qatar is heading up the committee
that is trying to find ways to take action in light of Bashar
al-Assad's refusal to comply with their Arab League initiative.
Now, I do not want to be naive here. The Arab League
traditionally has lots of divisions inside it. So I do not know
what they can actually produce, but they do recognize that in a
very important way their own credibility with their own
population is now on the line.
Senator Shaheen. And to follow along with respect to
Turkey--Mr. Bronin, in about 40 seconds that I have left--
Turkey obviously has made some strong statements condemning
Assad and the violence in Syria. Are they prepared to undertake
any sanctions against Assad, economic sanctions or others?
Mr. Bronin. Well, Senator, as Secretary Feltman said, I
think it is hard to overstate the significance of Turkey's
break with Syria. They have, also as Secretary Feltman
mentioned, already imposed what is, in essence, an arms
embargo. We have seen remarks from Erdogan suggesting that they
are considering additional measures possibly including
financial sanctions. We would certainly welcome any such
measures and also will engage with them to encourage them to do
so.
Senator Shaheen. Are we already engaging with Turkey to
encourage them?
Mr. Bronin. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Secretary Feltman, I want to continue to explore the Iran
aspect of it. Clearly their ambitions in the region are known
and they are counter to not only our national interests, but
quite the safety of the world. And I do not think that argument
needs to be made any further.
If you could elaborate a little bit more as to how
important Syria is to Iran, how strategically important it is
to their economy, to their military aspirations, the land
bridge that it serves to the rest of the region, and how
devastating it would be to them if, indeed, Syria were outside
their sphere.
Ambassador Feltman. Senator, thanks for the question.
Syria is, I would say, essential to the extremely negative
role that Iran has been able to play in the region. Take
Hezbollah. The transit routes for the arms to Hezbollah are via
Syria. The facilitation that Iran gives to Hezbollah to
undermine the state of Lebanon, to put Israel at risk, to
basically destabilize the region comes via Syria.
Syria is basically Iran's only friend. Iran is Syria's best
friend. In fact, it is one of Syria's few remaining friends.
While we have talked earlier about how Russia and China vetoed
the Security Council resolution, the Russians and Chinese do
care about Arab attitudes. As I said earlier, I do not think
that we have seen the end of the story on Russia and China. But
if you look at Iran's friends or Syria's friends, they tend to
be each other and then a few misguided or purchased Lebanese
politicians.
What is happening on the ground in Syria is quite
interesting because as our Embassy--and I thank you all for the
comments on Ambassador Ford which, of course, we certainly all
endorse. Our Embassy reports--it also comes in through other
channels--that these demonstrations across Syria have, among
other demands, an anti-Hezbollah, anti-Iran flavor to them. The
Syrian people know exactly who it is that is providing the
assistance to their government to kill them, arrest them, and
torture them. They know it is from Iran and from Hezbollah,
which means that a change in government that comes about where
you have a government in Syria that is governing by the consent
of the people is not going to be the asset for Iran that Syria
is today. It is in our strategic interest to see that this
change takes place quickly.
I will mention Iraq as well. There have been mixed press
reports about what do the Iraqis think about what is happening
in Syria right now, and they are concerned, as Senator Boxer
said, about instability in the region. But Iraq suffered
grievously from what this regime did to them. The Syrian regime
facilitated, allowed the use of Syrian territory, Syrian
airport for terrorists to get into Iraq and blow up thousands
of Iraqis, hundreds of our own servicemen. I do not think the
Iraqis have any illusions about Syria. It will also help Iraq
to have a different Syria next door.
Senator Rubio. Just in terms of the general policy goal of
limiting and containing and defeating Iran's ambitions, violent
ambitions, for the region and the world, the loss of the Assad
regime would be a devastating blow to Iran. Is that accurate?
Ambassador Feltman. Yes. I would--yes, yes. People talk
about there could be another sort of Alawite or not Alawite but
Assad in a palace coup inside, but I think that is very
unlikely. So, yes, the high probability is that a government
that comes in with the consent of the Syrian people will not be
an asset of Iran.
Senator Rubio. Now, one of the concerns that I think
Senator Lugar raised and I think some have, watching the
experiences in other parts of the region, is that if Assad's
regime were to fall, they were to leave, they would be replaced
by another form of radical government or one that would not
respect, for example, religious minorities in the country. We
know that there is concern about that.
What progress, in terms of the resistance, whether it is
the Syrian National Council or others, have they made in terms
of--or what is the potential for that being ameliorated, in
essence, lessened?
Ambassador Feltman. You know, it is a concern of everyone,
including the Syrian opposition themselves. The slogan of the
Syrian opposition is ``Syria is one people.'' They are trying
to show and practice that they recognize that the Syrian
national identity is composed of many, many diverse sects,
ethnic groups, et cetera. And in the various opposition groups,
including the Syrian National Council we have talked about, you
do see Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Druze, that are
participating. But the majority of this is still a Sunni-heavy
movement. In part, the country itself is heavily Sunni.
But it goes back to what we were talking about earlier,
that the opposition has started to articulate and needs to
continue to articulate why it is that Bashar's predictions of
what will happen after he leaves are wrong, that it will not be
chaos, that the minorities, members of the armed services,
members of the judiciary, that all parts of Syria will have a
proper role to play, will have their rights respected in the
future of Syria. The burden is on the Syrian opposition to be
talking to the same people.
I do not think that based on our own conversations with
Syrian minority groups, that there are any illusions about
Bashar or any love for Bashar. They may have once seen him as
the force of civility. They now recognize that he is driving
the country to ruin. But they are worried about what happens
afterward and that is what the opposition needs to work on.
Senator Rubio. My last question, Mr. Bronin, is on
sanctions. I have read the full menu of sanctions that we have
placed and that others have placed around the world, the
European Community, Canada. Japan I think recently did so as
well, others.
I have been aware for some time now there is a flight from
Damascus to Caracas that takes place about every 2 weeks or so.
Is there any evidence of nations in the Western Hemisphere,
Venezuela in particular, but others providing assistance to
evading any of these sanctions?
Mr. Bronin. Senator, thanks for the question.
I cannot speak to any specific examples of financial
support. Clearly the Assad regime is looking around the world
for support and also for alternative markets. I will say just
as a general matter they have not found much success to date.
Senator Rubio. The testimony is that as of now, we have not
found any willing, open participants in efforts to undermine
our efforts or other nations' efforts to aid them in
circumventing--
obviously, except for Iran--circumventing these sanctions.
Mr. Bronin. Again, I cannot speak directly to any specific
forms of financial support.
With respect to finding markets that might replace what
they have lost when they lost the European oil market, that is
correct. They have not found anything that would even begin to
replace what they have lost.
Senator Rubio. OK, thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
and the ranking member for allowing me to attend this
subcommittee, which I may not be a formal member of, but have
followed closely. And thank you for your leadership.
And I thank the witnesses for being here.
It was about 2 months ago that I had a meeting with a large
group of Muslim Americans in Chicago of Syrian descent, and
naturally they are following this very closely and are very
concerned about it. And they asked several questions which I
will ask.
First, Mr. Bronin, whether or not the sanctions which we
have imposed have gone far enough. And several things that they
asked about I told them I would follow through with, and that
is whether or not we are, for example, targeting Lebanese banks
involved in Syria and whether or not we have expanded our
sanctions regime where we are currently targeting oil exports
to include other elements of the oil and energy sector of
exploration and production and transport.
Mr. Bronin. Thanks very much, Senator. An important
question.
To the question of the Lebanese financial sector, we have
designated one Lebanese financial institution. It is a
subsidiary of the Commercial Bank of Syria, the Syrian-Lebanese
Commercial Bank.
We are also regularly engaged with our counterparts in
Lebanon to stress the importance of remaining vigilant and not
allowing their financial system to be exploited by the regime
or regime insiders. I think, in particular, after an action
that we took earlier this year in making a PATRIOT Act section
311 finding against the Lebanese Canadian Bank in Beirut, the
Lebanese are very alive to the risks that they run if they
allow their financial system to be exploited. But again, we
continue to engage very regularly with Lebanese counterparts.
Senator Durbin. And what about expanding the sanctions
pursuant to the suggestion of Senator Gillibrand, which I have
joined in, to go beyond oil exports into other aspects of the
oil and energy sector?
Mr. Bronin. Our sanctions currently already do prohibit and
investment in the Syrian oil sector. They prohibit all
transactions between United States persons and the Government
of Syria, and the Europeans have taken a similar action as
well.
Senator Durbin. That is good to know.
Mr. Feltman, a question was asked as to why we are not
pursuing at the U.N. Security Council the referral of Mr. Assad
to the International Criminal Court. Can you tell me?
Ambassador Feltman. Senator, Ambassador Rice and her team
in New York are extremely active looking at how we can use the
U.N. system in the best way to, first of all, raise attention
to what is actually happening in Syria and then to try to find
ways to stop the violence. We are looking for support with
Russia and China to see that we can get a Security Council
resolution on Syria. Right now, we are also working with
European and other partners on getting a General Assembly
resolution on Syria passed through the third committee that
would also call for the types of human rights monitors that we
think would give some protection to the Syrian people. There
have been two special sessions, that we have helped lead, of
the U.N. Human Rights Council. So we are looking at all the
ways that the U.N. system could help us achieve that goal of
stopping violence and moving toward a democratic transition in
Syria.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Feltman, I applaud what the
administration has done through Ambassador Rice, and I think
calling for the vote in early October in the United Nations,
even though it failed, it at least brought the issue to the
forefront and forced nations to stand up and vote. And the
question I am asking, since the Arab League has intervened and
that effort has clearly failed and we have pronounced that, why
are we not following up again at the United Nations Security
Council either with a similar resolution or specifically
directing the efforts of the International Criminal Court
toward Mr. Assad.
Ambassador Feltman. On the International Criminal Court,
since we are not members, I would look for the lead of others.
But on the Security Council, this is an option that we are
pursuing. We are looking for the right time. We are hoping that
something comes out of the Arab League on Saturday that will
help us with those on the Security Council who did not let the
resolution pass the last time. Definitely this is a matter that
the U.N. Security Council should be dealing with, and we would
hope that Russia and China, in looking at how the Assad clique
has just refused all attempts of mediation from others, would
now realize it is time for the Security Council to act.
Senator Durbin. I followed through a little bit on this
after thinking about it and working with my staff on the
question of the U.N. Security Council. And one can certainly
come up with a rationale for the Russian position that may have
something to do with arms sales, a rationale for the Chinese
position which is fairly consistent with their foreign policy.
But I have really struggled with Brazil, India, and South
Africa.
And I asked the Ambassador, Mrs. Rao, to come in my office
and talk about the Indian position on this. And she said to me
what I think others have said, and I would like you to comment
on it. She believes there is evidence--at least she told me
there is evidence--that the opposition in Syria is armed and
violent. And I have not heard that, not from any credible
source. Have you?
Ambassador Feltman. There are increasing incidents of the
opposition using arms. Some of this is in self-defense--I think
any of us would understand. For the large part, the opposition
movement is still peaceful. What Bashar wants is for the
opposition movement to turn entirely violent so he can say to
the world, look, it really is an insurgency. He does not know
how to deal with peaceful protesters.
First of all, thank you for seeing the Indian Ambassador.
That is a welcome initiative because we have been talking with
the Indians and others as well.
But what I would say to her is what the U.N. Security
Council is trying to do, what the Arab League is trying to do,
what the U.N. Human Rights Council is trying to do is to get
monitors in the country. If there are terrorists in the
country, they will either stop attacking because they do not
want to reveal their action or they will be revealed by these
monitors. We think it would put a check on the brutality that
the Assad regime has inflicted on its own people. But they can
use their own arguments to get themselves to the point of
supporting a Security Council resolution because if they truly
believe what she told you, if she truly believes that, she
should not be frightened to have monitors there.
Senator Durbin. I think that is a constructive suggestion.
Mr. Chairman, I really hope other colleagues on the
committee can join me in inviting the ambassadors from these
countries that are stymieing the efforts of the United Nations
Security Council to come and explain to us. Many of these are
our friends, historically our friends, South Africa, for
example, and India for that matter. And it would seem to me to
be at least valuable to note that we see their opposition and
would like some explanation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, witnesses.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
We will go to a second round. We may not all have
questions, but I wanted to raise at least two or three more
points.
Mr. Bronin, I wanted to raise with you--and today we
probably do not have enough time to cover all of this, but I
wanted to raise a question about an article that appeared in
the Wall Street Journal. It is dated October 29 of this year.
The title of the article is ``U.S. Firm Acknowledges Syria Uses
Its Gear to Block Web.'' I will just read two pertinent parts,
really the first two paragraphs, short paragraphs.
``A U.S. company that makes Internet blocking gear
acknowledges that Syria has been using at least 13 of its
devices to censor Web activity there, meaning Syria, an
admission that comes as the Syrian Government cracks down on
its citizens and silences their online activities.
``Blue Coat Systems, Incorporated of Sunnyvale, CA, says it
shipped the Internet, `filtering,' devices to Dubai late last
year believing they were destined for a department of the Iraqi
Government. However, the devices which can block Web sites or
record when people visit them made their way to Syria, a
country subject to strict U.S. trade embargos.''
And I will just read one more part. ``Blue Coat told the
Wall Street Journal the appliances were transmitting automatic
status messages back to the company as the devices censored the
Syrian Web. Blue Coat says it does not monitor where such
`heartbeat' messages originate from.'' And it goes on from
there.
I know that you and your team are familiar with this.
I guess the basic question I have--and I know I am putting
you on the spot, but if you have an answer, we would want to
hear it today. Has this company, Blue Coat Systems, Incorp.,
violated the U.S. trade embargo. That is the first question.
Mr. Bronin. Senator, with respect to--our export control
regime is administered by the Commerce Department and I would
have to refer you to the Commerce Department for specifics on
this particular instance, unless Secretary Feltman has anything
he would like to add.
Senator Casey. Secretary Feltman, I do not know if you have
either an answer or a comment.
Ambassador Feltman. Reinforcing what Luke said, this is
administered by the Department of Commerce. The Department of
Commerce is looking into this very specific case because there
was no license issued to send this stuff to Syria. Since the
export controls were put in place in 2004, any such item like
this that would be exported to Syria requires a case-by-case
examination and an export license. There were no export
licenses issued for this, and the Department of Commerce is
investigating it. I would defer to them on the state of the
investigation.
Senator Casey. Just for the record just so that we are
clear, I would suggest to the administration to make sure that
an answer is forthcoming, whether it comes from the Commerce
Department or from whatever agency the answer would emanate
because part of our responsibility here is not simply to point
fingers at other countries and impose sanctions that are kind
of far away. We got to make sure that our Government, our
companies are doing the right thing here as it relates to
Syria.
I wanted to ask a broader question that has been referred
to by a number of us, but I wanted to try to get it in a
summary form before we conclude about sanctions. We know and I
know that both of you have spoken to the issue of sanctions. In
fact, there was a recent CRS report that outlined--and I am
looking at a report that is rather recent, but the last two
pages of this report--this is a report dated November the 4th.
But they set forth a table where they listed all of the
sanctions and the individuals sanctioned.
I guess I would ask you two questions. No. 1 is how would
you assess the success or impact of sanctions to date--both
U.S. and other sanctions; EU and others. And No. 2, what if
anything can you tell us that is forthcoming by way of
sanctions? I have some ideas about whom should be sanctioned,
but I want to hear from you first about the assessment of where
we are and, second, where we could be headed with additional
sanctions. And it is really for both our witnesses.
Mr. Bronin. Thanks very much, Senator.
First, with respect to the impact that sanctions are
having, I would note that Syria has for a long time been among
the more sanctioned countries, and so the ties between the
Syrian and the United States financial system were limited. Our
actions have been comprehensive and aggressive, but there is
only so much we can do unilaterally. The real significance of
what has been done is that we have done it in concert with the
Europeans in particular, and the European actions have really
been dramatic. The impact has been profound.
Senator Casey. Mostly because of oil?
Mr. Bronin. Mostly because of oil. Their actions go beyond
oil. And you know, their actions like ours--I do not want to
diminish the importance of the symbolic nature of the actions
as well--by highlighting the activity of those complicit in the
human rights abuses and also by highlighting the Syrian
business community who support the Assad regime--you know, we
are sending an important message both to the protesters on the
streets in Syria that we stand by them, and I think we are
sending a message to the Syrian business community, an
important constituency, that there are severe personal costs to
associating one's self too closely with Assad.
Senator Casey. And just a quick followup. Would it be
accurate to say--and I guess I am getting this from a couple of
places, including your testimony. Let me rephrase the question.
You say in your testimony on page 4, prior to the imposition of
sanctions, the Assad regime generated one-third of its
revenue--that is total revenue--from the oil sector and that
has been effectively eliminated. Is that correct?
Mr. Bronin. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Casey. Mr. Feltman.
Ambassador Feltman. Yes, just quickly. It is worth noting
the contrast between today and not too far in the distant past,
which is that only recently Europe was looking at an
association agreement with Syria. Europe was in an advanced
state of negotiations with Syria about having an association
agreement with trade and all sorts of other benefits that would
have accrued to the Syrians. Today they have sanctioned Syria.
They have sanctioned two of the primary Syrian banks. They have
cut off the oil revenues, which we have talked about, but that
is over $4 billion a year in loss, and the Syrians have not
been able to find any other customers. So it is as if, with the
other subjects we have talked about--it is worth remembering
where we were not very long ago and where we are today, which
helps gives us the sense of inevitability that basically Bashar
is finished.
Senator Casey. What can you tell me--maybe you do not know
the answer to this. It is a tough one to answer I guess.
Sanctions as it relates to Turkey--why do you not think they
have taken that step and can they, will they?
Ambassador Feltman. I do not know. All of us have been in
discussions with the Turkish officials, as have, of course, our
bosses at the Cabinet level and the White House, with the Turks
because the Turks have played an important role. The Turks have
played the essential role in terms of providing space for the
opposition. The effective arms embargo that they have put in
place has had an impact on the regime's ability. And in
practice, much of the economic ties between the two countries
has already dried up, just as a matter of course.
But as I said earlier, we would like to see them take the
additional step of actually putting some legal sanctions in
place that parallel the sanctions that the EU, the United
States, Japan, and Canada have done.
Senator Casey. I do not know if any of our colleagues have
more questions, but I just have one comment. I was asking our
staff not too long ago when you consider the number of people
slaughtered here, by one estimate now more than 3,500, if you
do the math in terms of population proportionally, it is the
equivalent of more than 43,000 Americans being killed by our
Government. I know it is a different world. It is not
necessarily comparable in terms of the way we have
traditionally responded to our own challenges here. But it is
hard to comprehend that that kind of a slaughter is taking
place, and it does not get near enough attention in this town.
So we are going to keep at it.
Unless Ranking Member Risch or Senator Lugar have any other
questions--Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask about the
food situation in Syria. The reason I ask is that over in the
Agriculture Committee from time to time we get reports about
the changes in exports or imports in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya
after the Arab Spring. Without going into all the details, the
facts are that the expense of importing grains that were a part
of the diets of those countries has increased significantly.
Beyond that, the capacity to pay and to exchange moneys, given
problems in the banking system, have created a situation in
which in these countries there may be as much as a 40-percent
decline in the amount of food being consumed by the people.
That is a very large change. And some have pointed out in the
past that leaders in these countries retain their power through
so-called food subsidies, in other words, if people were very
unhappy in the hustings, somehow they were pacified by money
coming out that they use for food.
What I am not clear about is how this applies to Syria,
because I really have not heard anything on any nutrition and
food supply impacts resulting from the sanctions or the loss of
export money or exchange. Has there been an impact there?
Ambassador Feltman. Senator, in terms of sanctions, of
course, even in our case, food and medicine are exempted from
sanctions. That is really the only examples of exemption from
sanctions. And we do not have reports of sanctions themselves
having an impact directly on the food supply. In fact, the only
reports we have had of shortages of food in Syria so far are
places that are sort of under siege, places where it has been
hard to get food in because the army and the security services
are occupying the outskirts. But we have not had reports of
widespread malnutrition, widespread food shortages in Syria.
But you touch on a very important point, which is the
subsidy question. Even before this all started, Syria's economy
was heavily subsidized, mismanaged one would say. They have
suddenly had a drop of revenue from the oil, from the tourism
revenues, from trade with Turkey at the same time that Bashar
and his clique are trying to maintain some semblance of control
and some semblance of loyalty through the subsidy program.
You see signs--I mean, I will defer to the experts at
Treasury--of a little bit of a panic among the upper echelons
of this elite system. For example, they put a ban on the import
of luxury goods into Syria in order to try to save hard
currency probably to help buy the foodstuffs and help the
subsidy program going for the general population. But they had
to reverse because there was such popular outcry against this.
So you are seeing cracks in the system that suggest that they
really are concerned about their ability to keep the current
subsidy program going.
Senator Lugar. I just raise the question because many feel
that the problems for President Mubarak really came down to
this. There were the young people in Tahrir Square. There were
people demanding their rights. But Egypt is a country of 80
million people, and the millions that were usually getting the
subsidies from the Mubarak government were not getting the
subsidies. And so as a result, there was a whole pattern there
in terms of countrywide revolt which was maybe a major factor
in finally changing the government.
Mr. Bronin. I have not much to add to what Secretary
Feltman said. I would note that the ban on imports that the
Syrian Government posed at the end of September I think was
significant for a couple of reasons. I think it was imposed in
large part to protect their foreign exchange reserves, which is
a demonstration that the actions we have taken together have
had a significant impact. And importantly, I think the fact
that the ban was imposed and then subsequently revoked is just
one example of many examples of sort of erratic, inconsistent
policymaking by the Syrian regime which has really focused the
anger and dissatisfaction of the Syrian people on the Syrian
regime rather than on the international community.
Senator Casey. I want to thank both of our witnesses.
Let me just say for the record before we go that the record
will be kept open for 1 week for members of the committee.
Second, we have received testimony for the record from the
following organizations. They are three: No. 1, the Foundation
for the Defense of Democracy; No. 2, the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy; and No. 3, Human Rights Watch. So those
will be made part of the record as well.
Senator Casey. So if there is nothing further, we are
adjourned. We want to thank our witnesses and this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Mark Dubowitz, Esq., Executive Director,
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Central
Asian Affairs.
FDD formed a Syria Working Group comprised of scholars, experts,
former government officials, Syrian and Middle Eastern dissidents and
others to help inform the policy discussion surrounding developments in
Syria and supporting the Syrian people, who have suffered under a
repressive, violent, and radical regime for more than three decades. We
believe they deserve the chance to reject oppression, change their
government, and build a nation based on civil rights and human dignity.
We also believe that the current government in Syria does not have the
will or ability to lead a transition to democracy and must instead step
aside. Finally, we believe that the deplorable human rights conditions
in Syria demand international attention. Those outside of Syria must
hold the regime accountable for the violence committed against its
population and support those dissidents in Syria standing up for their
inalienable rights.
The Syria Working Group produced a discussion paper looking toward
a post-Assad era. It contains policy recommendations for consideration
by the administration and like-minded nations to further assist the
anti-regime Syrian opposition.
I am grateful for the opportunity to submit this discussion paper
as my testimony before the committee. I note that this document was
jointly produced by my colleagues at FDD including Reuel Marc Gerecht,
John Hannah, Tony Badran and Ammar Abdulhamid, as well as my colleagues
from Foreign Policy Initiative which include Jamie Fly and Robert
Zarate.
DISCUSSION PAPER
Toward a Post-Assad Syria: Options for the United States and Like-
Minded Nations to Further Assist the Anti-Regime Syrian Opposition
``Despite graphic media coverage, American policymakers,
journalists, and citizens are extremely slow to muster the imagination
needed to reckon with evil. Ahead of the killings, they assume rational
actors will not inflict seemingly gratuitous violence. They trust in
good-faith negotiations and traditional diplomacy. Once the killings
start, they assume that civilians who keep their heads down will be
left alone. They urge cease-fire and donate humanitarian aid.''--
Samantha Power, now Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Multilateral Affairs in the National Security Council, in
``A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide'' (Harper
Perennial, 2003).
With a long history of exporting terrorism beyond its borders, the
Syrian government is now waging a campaign of systematic, internal
terror against its own people. Officials at the United Nations
conservatively estimated in November 2011 that President Bashar al-
Assad's security forces and pro-government militias have killed over
3,500 civilians since the country's anti-regime protests started in
March 2011. In addition, the Assad regime has jailed at least 30,000
Syrians, with human rights groups reporting that nearly 100 detainees
have died in captivity.
The international community, however, remains unable to muster a
collective response, as recent proceedings in the U.N. Security Council
illustrated. This is unfortunately due in large part to the way in
which the United States and its allies secured Security Council support
for NATO's intervention in Libya. On October 4, 2011, Russia and China
vetoed a resolution that would have condemned the Syrian government for
its egregious human rights abuses, and demanded an end to its lethal
crackdown on the opposition. Months earlier, Russian and Chinese
diplomats similarly shielded the Assad regime from efforts by the
United States and Western governments to get the Security Council to
consider a resolution that would have censured Syria's controversial
nuclear program.
Given the deadlock in the international community, this memorandum
examines U.S. options for responding, either individually or in concert
with other nations, to the Assad regime's relentless murder of Syrian
civilians.
The current Syrian government is a dangerous enemy of the United
States. Over the past decade, the Assad regime has supported terrorist
groups across the Middle East, destabilized its neighbors, pursued a
secret nuclear program with North Korean assistance, aided foreign
militants that have killed American and allied soldiers in Iraq, and
served as a key regional ally to the Middle East's most dangerous
country, Iran. The United States certainly has a moral obligation to
work with others to try and halt the continuing humanitarian crisis in
Syria. But it also has a powerful strategic interest in seeing not only
the collapse of the Assad regime, but also the emergence of a post-
Assad Syria with moderate, representative government that respects
human rights, upholds the rule of law, promotes stability in the Middle
East, and dramatically weakens the region's Iranian-led anti-American
bloc.
This memo proceeds in three parts. Part one summarizes the response
of various foreign governments to the Assad regime's mass murder of
Syrian civilians and other human rights abuses. Part two highlights
statements by Syrian opposition groups calling for humanitarian
intervention in Syria. And part three offers a discussion of options
for the United States to respond to the Assad regime.
i. foreign governments condemn the assad regime
Inspired by ``Arab Spring'' revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya, Syrian citizens first began peaceful protests against the
authoritarian government of Bashar al-Assad in mid-March 2011. But what
first began as a small set of disparate, anti-regime assemblies
throughout the country quickly turned into a larger movement that has
increasingly begun to transcend class and ethnicities, and even gained
the support of a growing cadre of Syrian military defectors.
By mid-April 2011, the Assad regime sought to quell pro-democracy
demonstrations by promising to end emergency rule, enact political
reforms, and release detainees arrested during the prior month's
protests. Predictably, however, the regime's promises proved empty. On
April 22, 2011--one day after emergency rule was supposedly lifted by
the regime--security forces and pro-regime gunmen killed nearly 100
protestors across the country. One day later, government forces killed
at least 12 mourners at the funeral of pro-democracy protestors in the
city of Homs. Over the ensuing months, the Assad regime's systematic
targeting of civilians continued. As of October 2011, the U.N.
officials estimate that the Assad regime has killed in excess of 3,000
Syrian civilians and detained at least 30,000 more since the beginning
of the protests. However, the Syrian government has imposed a media
blackout that has severely constrained the flow of information, so the
actual death toll is likely much higher.
The Assad regime's murderous suppression of Syrian civilians has
triggered strong condemnation from countries in the Middle East. For
example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan described the
regime's attacks on civilians as ``savagery'' in June 2011. And the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called or serious political reforms in
Syria and ``an immediate end to the killing machine'' in September
2011.
Broader international condemnation has also been harsh. For
example, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe charged that ``[t]he
Syrian regime has committed crimes against humanity'' on August 8,
2011. Shortly thereafter, the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights
concluded in a report that the Assad regime was responsible for
ordering ``human rights abuses, including summary executions, arbitrary
arrests and torture.'' In one passage, the report stated:
. . . there were reports that on 1 May in Dar'a, about twenty-
six men were blindfolded and summarily executed by gunshots at
the football stadium, which had been transformed into the
security forces headquarters for that area. Executions also
occurred during the sieges of cities, and during house-to-house
searches.
In addition, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Navanethem Pillay, accused the Syrian government of perpetrating
``egregious violations of human rights'' in response to the pro-
democracy protests:
These include summary executions, excessive use of force in
quelling peaceful protests, arbitrary detentions, torture and
ill-treatment, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly,
expression, association and movement, and violations of the
rights to food and health, including medical treatment to
injured persons.
Although the United States repeatedly condemned the Syrian
government for these atrocities, it did not initially call for Assad's
removal. After much internal debate within the Executive Branch,
however, U.S. policy changed on August 18, 2011, when President Obama
demanded in a statement that Assad step down:
The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but
President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls
for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is
imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We
have consistently said that President Assad must lead a
democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led.
For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for
President Assad to step aside.
Reiterating the President's new posture towards the Assad regime,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on September 2, 2011:
The violence must stop, and [Assad] needs to step aside.
Syria must be allowed to move forward. Those who have joined us
in this call must now translate our rhetoric into concrete
actions to escalate the pressure on Assad and those around him,
including strong new sanctions targeting Syria's energy sector
to deny the regime the revenues that fund its campaign of
violence.
Nonetheless, the Assad regime's assaults on the Syrian protest
movement continued, even into the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In
response, President Obama said at a speech before the U.N. General
Assembly on September 21, 2011:
As we meet here today, men and women and children are being
tortured, detained and murdered by the Syrian regime. Thousands
have been killed, many during the holy time of Ramadan.
Thousands more have poured across Syria's borders. The Syrian
people have shown dignity and courage in their pursuit of
justice--protesting peacefully, standing silently in the
streets, dying for the same values that this institution is
supposed to stand for. And the question for us is clear: Will
we [at the United Nations] stand with the Syrian people, or
with their oppressors?
Despite U.S. calls for the United Nations to act, however, the
Security Council failed in a vote to pass a resolution on Syria on
October 4, 2011, due to Russian and Chinese vetoes. After the vote, the
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, said:
. . . the United States is outraged that this Council has
utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a
growing threat to regional peace and security. . . . For more
than six months, the Assad regime has deliberately unleashed
violence, torture, and persecution against peaceful protesters,
human rights defenders, and their families.
Russia's and China's support for the Assad regime should not come
as a surprise, however. Russia appears to have no interest in hampering
relations with Syria, its fifth-largest trading partner. Indeed,
Russia's military maintains a naval base in the port city of Tartus,
and its arms contracts with the Syrian military are currently worth $4
billion or more. For its part, China likely worries that further
uprisings across the Middle East could spur domestic unrest at home.
Moreover, Iran, a longtime ally of the Assad regime, has intervened
even more directly to prop up the Syrian government. In particular,
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has intensified financial and
military assistance to the Assad regime.
ii. syrians call for humanitarian intervention
In the absence of a strong international response to the Syrian
government's internal war on the pro-democracy opposition, some
previously peaceful protestors have begun to take up arms to defend
themselves against the Assad regime's security forces. In addition,
several thousand Syrian army troops have reportedly defected to join
with other dissident protestors and form a self-organized resistance
group now known as the Free Syrian Army. Armed clashes between
government forces and protestors are on the rise, as Syria appears
increasingly on the verge of a civil war.
Members of the Syrian opposition have also begun to call for the
international community to intervene and prevent further bloodshed by
the Assad regime. For example:
On September 27, 2011, leading Syrian opposition groups--
including the Syrian Revolution General Commission, the
Damascus Declaration, the Syrian Emergency Task Force, among
others--said that they ``seek international intervention in the
form of a peacekeeping mission with the intention of monitoring
the safety of the civilian population.''
On October 2, 2011, the Syrian National Council, an
opposition organization modeled after Libya's Transitional
National Council, said: ``The Council demands international
governments and organizations meet their responsibility to
support the Syrian people, protect them and stop the crimes and
gross human rights violations being committed by the
illegitimate current regime.''
On October 4, 2011, Syrian National Council member Radwan
Ziadeh said: ``The people inside Syria are calling for a no-fly
zone and an intervention, but not the activists outside Syria.
We on the outside know that the international community is not
there yet. But the people inside are very frustrated with the
international community.''
And on October 28, 2011, opposition groups throughout Syria
organized ``No-Fly Zone Friday,'' a series of coordinated
protest rallies to urge the international community to
intervene and halt the Assad regime's assault on civilians.
The Obama administration, however, has hesitated to answer these
and other calls for international humanitarian intervention in Syria.
During an interview with Fox News Sunday on October 23, 2011, Secretary
of State Clinton urged embattled Syrian civilians to remain peaceful
and inexplicably denied that opposition groups had called for
international intervention:
In Syria, we are strongly supporting the change from Assad
and also an opposition that only engages in peaceful
demonstrations. And you do not have from that opposition, as
you had in Libya, a call for any kind of outside intervention.
Administration officials have also counseled the Syrian opposition
to avoid militarizing the conflict--a morally questionable approach for
people facing lethal violence directed against themselves and their
families on a daily basis.
That said, regional actors have begun to take initial--albeit
limited--steps to respond to the Assad regime. For example, Turkey has
vocally criticized the Assad regime for its continuing assaults on
protestors; cut all arms shipments to Syria; and provided safe haven to
Syrian refugees and military defectors. Ankara has also long indicated
its openness to targeted sanctions on the Syrian government, but has
yet to impose them. In an interview with the Financial Times on
November 1, 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu did not rule
out more aggressive measures such as extending a buffer zone or a no-
fly zone into Syrian territory to protect civilians:
The Syrian regime is attacking the Syrian people which is
unacceptable. . . . When we see such an event next door to us
of course we will never be silent. . . . We hope that there
will be no need for these types of measures but of course
humanitarian issues are important. . . . There are certain
universal values all of us need to respect and protecting
citizens is the responsibility of every state.
In addition, the Arab League recently put out a proposal for the
Syrian government to halt the violence against civilians and begin a
dialogue for reforms with the opposition movements. Although the Assad
regime accepted this proposal on November 1, 2011, Syrian opposition
members have expressed deep skepticism. Indeed, Syrian security forces
subsequently renewed attacks on Homs, the country's third-largest city,
with The New York Times reporting on November 8, 2011, that an
estimated 111 people died over a five-day period.
iii. u.s. options in syria
Under the authoritarian rule of the Assad family, Syria has posed
and continues to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests. The
Syrian government is a state sponsor of terrorism; pursued programs
related to weapons of mass destruction; and strengthened ties with
rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The State Department reports
that the Assad regime, in addition to its atrocious human rights
record, has served as a ``key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq
and a safe haven for Iraqi Baathists expressing support for terrorist
attacks against Iraqi government interests and coalition forces.''
Syria has also served as a critical link between Iran and the Hezbollah
terrorist network. Indeed, the nonpartisan Congressional Research
Service quoted a U.S. official on background as saying: ``The Syrians
are doing things in terms of deepening their entanglement with Iran and
Hezbollah that truly are mind-boggling. They are integrating their
military/defense systems to unprecedented levels. Hafez al-Assad never
would have gone so far and it is becoming hard to see how they can
possibly extricate themselves.'' Furthermore, numerous Palestinian
terror groups--including those listed as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations by the State Department--continue to operate within
Syria's borders and maintain offices in Damascus.
Many thousands of lives are at risk if the Assad regime continues
its relentless assault on Syrian protestors. The Obama administration
has declared the violence in Syria a ``humanitarian crisis'' as
thousands of civilians have already fled to northern Turkey in efforts
to escape the Assad regime. As the situation deteriorates further, the
number of displaced persons and refugees is expected to rapidly
increase. Syrian security forces also have reportedly pursued Syrian
dissidents who have fled to Lebanon, and planted land mines along the
country's border with Lebanon to halt the further flow of refugees.
Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, now
calls Syria ``an urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to
regional peace and security.''
While President Obama has declined so far to call for direct
international involvement in Syria, the United States nonetheless has a
vested national interest in preventing the further slaughter and
displacement of innocent civilians in Syria. As the Presidential Study
Directive on Mass Atrocities of August 4, 2011, states, ``Preventing
mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a
core moral responsibility of the United States.'' It continues:
Our security is affected when masses of civilians are
slaughtered, refugees flow across borders, and murderers wreak
havoc on regional stability and livelihoods. America's
reputation suffers and our ability to bring about change is
constrained, when we are perceived as idle in the face of mass
atrocities and genocide. Unfortunately, history has taught us
that our pursuit of a world where states do not systematically
slaughter civilians will not come to fruition without concerted
and coordinated effort.
Given that a collective response from the U.N. Security Council is
unlikely, what options does the United States have for responding to
the Assad regime's continuing atrocities against the Syrian people? In
late August 2011, Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution
identified potential measures, including a maritime operation to
enforce stronger sanctions, a Kosovo-style air strike campaign, or even
a military invasion to carry out regime change. The United States
should not only keep all of those options on the table, but also
explore the following intermediate steps.
Option (1): Impose Crippling Sanctions on the Syrian Government
The United States should work to immediately expand the scope of
sanctions on the Assad regime for its mass murder of Syrian civilians
and other human rights abuses. So far, the Obama administration has
responded slowly to the Syrian government's violent crackdown on
protestors, imposing three incremental rounds of Executive Branch
sanctions on Syria:
Executive Order 13572, signed by President Obama on April
29, 2011, targets the property and interests not only of
several high-ranking Syrian officials and entities, but also of
the Qods Forces, a special unit of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps that is believed to be strongly aiding Syria's
anti-opposition activities.
Executive Order 13573, signed by the President on May 18,
2011, expands the list of Syrian officials sanctioned by the
United States for human rights abuses to include Bashar al-
Assad himself, as well as Syria's vice president, prime
minister, defense and interior ministers, and head of military
intelligence.
Executive Order 13582, signed by President Obama on August
17, 2011, freezes all Syrian assets under U.S. jurisdiction,
bars U.S. citizens and companies from participating directly or
indirectly in a broad range of transactions with Syrian
entities, and blacklists a new set of Syrian individuals and
companies.
The United States can and should do more to establish a stronger
set of sanctions capable of truly crippling the Syrian government.
Indeed, the Assad regime is already economically vulnerable, and could
be impacted quickly--perhaps decisively--by more comprehensive
sanctions. Thanks in part to existing sanctions, it appears that
Damascus has poor access to hard currency; is depleting its dollar
reserves in attempts to maintain its currency and pay its security
forces; and faces the prospect of hyperinflation, especially in the
absence of continuing financial aid from Iran. As The New York Times
reported on October 10, 2011: ``The Syrian economy is buckling under
the pressure of sanctions by the West and a continuing popular
uprising, posing a growing challenge to President Bashar al-Assad's
government as the pain is felt deeply by nearly every layer of Syrian
society.''
The President and Congress should therefore work to quickly pass
legislation for harsher U.S. sanctions on Syria, including
extraterritorial sanctions aimed at convincing Member States of the
European Union (E.U.), Turkey, and other countries to join the United
States in targeting Syria's energy industry, financial and banking
system, and other sectors that are funding the Assad regime. Pending
legislation relevant to this effort includes:
The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011 (S. 1472)--originally
introduced by Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Joe Lieberman
(ID-CT), and Mark Kirk (R-IL)--would penalize, for the first
time, foreign entities that aid, contribute to, or invest in
Syria's energy sector. Given that American companies are now
prohibited from conducting business in Syria, the Syria
Sanctions Act would impose extraterritorial sanctions to
persuade other countries to establish comparable prohibitions
by preventing foreign entities that hold financial stakes in
Syria's power industry, purchase Syrian petroleum, or export
gasoline to Syria, from having access to U.S. government
contracts and financial institutions.
The Syria Freedom Support Act of 2011 (H.R. 2106)--
originally introduced by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) and Eliot Engel (D-NY)--seeks to strengthen U.S.
sanctions on Syria, and targets the country's exports,
financial transactions, banking, and procurement activities. In
particular, the bill contains measures to impede the
development of Syria's petroleum resources, and the development
and export of its refined petroleum products. The bill also
imposes wide-ranging sanctions related to Syria's sponsorship
of international terrorism, as well as its weapons of mass
destruction and missile programs.
As Reuel Marc Gerecht and Mark Dubowitz, both of the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies (FDD), wrote in the Washington Post: ``Obama
wouldn't necessarily have to lead from the front'' in implementing more
comprehensive sanctions on Syria. They explain:
The European Union is slowly but surely developing tougher
sanctions. The E.U., which purchases most of Syria's oil, just
passed an embargo, effective November 15, on importation of
Syrian crude. Implementing further comprehensive measures
against Syria's energy sector and central bank and Iranian
commercial entities heavily invested in Syria may require the
presidential bully pulpit and some arm-twisting of European
allies and the Turks. But Bashar al-Assad's bloody oppression
gives Washington the high ground. What seemed impossible five
months ago is becoming practicable.
To that end, the United States should further press Turkey, E.U.
Member States, and other countries to impose unilateral sanctions on
the Syrian government for human rights abuses; to crack down on
Lebanese banks operating in Syria; and to target specific Syrian
businessman who collaborate with the regime, but value their ability
and that of their families to travel, study, and do business abroad.
Travel bans might also be imposed on certain Syrian officials, and
actions taken to stop Western airlines from flying to and from Syrian
airports.
In addition, Washington should work with like-minded nations to
multilateralize sanctions against Syria's controversial nuclear and
missile programs and designate the Syrian entities and individuals
involved in Syria's covert nuclear program with North Korea. As a first
step, the Obama administration should push E.U. Member States to join
the United States in targeting Syria's Scientific Studies and Research
Center (SSRC). The U.S. Treasury Department reports that the SSRC
``controls Syria's missile production facilities and oversees Syria's
facilities to develop unconventional weapons and their delivery
systems.'' The Bush administration sanctioned the SSRC under the
Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 2005. Indeed, given recent
revelations that the Syrian government had reportedly obtained nuclear
assistance from Pakistani proliferator A.Q. Khan related to uranium
enrichment, the United States should continue to work with
international partners to press the Assad regime both for its human
rights and nuclear transgressions.
Option (2): Provide Assistance to Syrian Opposition Groups
To begin with, Washington should immediately intensify its
political engagement with the various anti-regime groups both inside
and outside of Syria. A key objective would be to help empower the
moderate members of the Syrian opposition vis-a-vis the Islamist
elements. In parallel, the United States, in conjunction with
international partners, should work with the Syrian opposition to craft
a strategy for more effective and sustained messaging to key groups
(e.g., Alawis, Christians, and the Syrian business community), with the
aim of reassuring them and fracturing their ties to the Assad regime
and the untenable status quo in Syria.
Besides intensified political engagement with the Syrian
opposition, the United States and like-minded nations should explore
the full spectrum of options for direct assistance. At one end of the
assistance spectrum, is financial aid to the recently formed movements
of striking Syrian workers in Deraa and other towns. Indeed, the Assad
regime, fearful of the potential of the Syrian strike movements, has
taken aggressive measures to suppress them.
Washington should also work with partners should help opposition
groups to establish television and radio broadcasting capability into
Syria capable of circumventing the Assad regime's signal jamming. They
should also supply encryption-enabled portable communications equipment
to the protest movement within Syria. As Gerecht and Dubowitz wrote in
the Washington Post, Syrian opposition groups could greatly benefit
from a cross-border wireless Internet zone that stretches to the Syrian
city of Aleppo, a commercial center roughly 20 miles from Turkey. Such
a communications network will require Turkish acquiescence--no longer
unthinkable--and financial resources (depending on its range and speed,
between $50 and $200 million). However, if Washington is unwilling to
foot this bill alone, the Obama administration should consider tapping
into existing Pentagon and CIA covert funds, and soliciting the
remainder from our European and Arab partners.
In addition, the United States and European Union should
immediately take actions against telecommunications companies that have
reportedly assisted the Assad regime's efforts to monitor and intercept
the communications of the Syrian opposition. For example, Bloomberg
News reported on November 3, 2011, that an Italian-based company doing
just that:
Employees of Area SpA, a surveillance company based outside
Milan, are installing the system under the direction of Syrian
intelligence agents, who've pushed the Italians to finish,
saying they urgently need to track people, a person familiar
with the project says. The Area employees have flown into
Damascus in shifts this year as the violence has escalated,
says the person, who has worked on the system for Area.
At the other end of the assistance spectrum, the United States
could consider providing arms-related assistance--or encouraging the
provision of arms-related assistance by partners in the region--that
would enable members of the Syrian opposition to better defend
themselves against the Assad regime's relentless attacks. Although
Syria currently lacks the sort of unified opposition that emerged in
the early stages of protests in Libya, military defectors and
opposition forces are becoming self-organized and increasingly united.
At the forefront of Syria's armed opposition movement is the Free
Syrian Army, a group of thousands of military defectors led by former
Syrian Air Force Colonel Riad al-Asaad. Over the last few months, the
group has mounted formidable challenges to Syrian government forces in
several locations, including Homs, Jabal Zawiya, and Deir al-Zour.
Defectors have focused their attention on protecting civilians and
protestors in specific neighborhoods.
Precedents for providing self-defense assistance to anti-regime
Syrian groups may be found in U.S. efforts to help provide self-defense
arms to the Bosnian Muslims in the face of Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian
military forces in the 1990s and, more recently, to the Libyan
opposition in the face of aggression by the Qaddafi regime. As The New
York Times has reported, Turkey is now providing assistance to the Free
Syrian Army out of the refugee camp on its border with Syria.
It is critical that the United States become actively engaged and
involved in shaping this force, rather than exclusively ``subcontract''
the effort to regional actors. Indeed, if the Syrian protestors want to
arm themselves against the regime's depredations, it is morally tenuous
for the Obama administration to urge that the Syrian opposition remain
non-violent. Concerns about Syria's internecine strife are legitimate,
but they should not lead us to disparage those who are trying to
protect themselves and their families from the Assad regime's murderous
security forces--especially if no one in the international community
will come to their defense. Official American rhetoric on this issue
ought to change.
Option (3): Limited Retaliatory Air Strikes
The United States should examine options related to limited
retaliatory air strikes against select Syrian military targets. The air
strikes could be limited in duration and scope, surgically targeting
Syrian air defenses, command-and-control assets, training facilities,
and/or weapons depots. Each air strike would contain a narrow and
clearly defined military objective, and the United States could enact
such strikes intermittently or in response to severe actions by the
Assad regime against civilians.
In recent years, limited air strikes have been successfully
launched against Syrian assets. For example, several U.S. military
helicopters carrying Special Forces penetrated Syrian airspace
undetected in October 2008 to kill Abu Ghadiya, the Al Qaeda leader
responsible for funneling foreign fighters and money into Iraq. The
raid occurred five miles from the Iraq border in the eastern town of
Sukkariya. Also, Israel's Air Force penetrated Syrian airspace in
September 2007 and destroyed a secret nuclear reactor in the Dair
Alzour region built by the Assad regime with North Korean assistance.
Limited air strikes could potentially be a more palatable,
intermediate military option for the Obama administration and foreign
governments. This option would not require a sustained military
presence and would involve far fewer military resources. The immediate
goal of this option would be to rein in the regime's military
operations and make clear the United States and allies will no longer
tolerate the Assad regime's continued killing spree. Another goal could
be to encourage further defections from the Syrian military.
Limited air strikes pose short-term risks. President Assad has
already stated that the Syrian government would aggressively retaliate
if it came under attack by international forces. For example, Assad
could order either direct attacks--or indirect attacks through
Hezbollah proxies--against Israel. The Syrian government could increase
internal violence against the population in an effort to prevent
further defections from the military and demonstrate resolve against
international pressure. However, such retaliatory threats clearly
underscore the dangers of allowing a terrorist-supporting regime to
survive. Terrorism becomes a trump card that can be pulled out at
anytime against anyone, foreign or domestic, who threatens the Assad
regime.
Option (4): Impose No-Fly/No-Go Zones in Syria
The United States should also consider imposing no-fly or no-go
zones to protect Syria's population from further attacks by the Assad
regime's security forces. In recent months, opposition groups within
Syria have begun calling for an international intervention on
humanitarian grounds.
Efforts to impose no-fly or no-go zones in Syria, of course, will
benefit from strong international support. A no-fly zone will likely
require air support from both NATO and Arab allies. And as Michael
O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote, under a no-go zone--
perhaps in Syrian territory adjacent to its borders with Jordan or
Turkey--``[o]ne or two major parts of Syria might be protected in this
way, at least reasonably well, by a combination of outside airpower and
perhaps a limited number of boots on the ground.''
Syria's air defenses, however, will likely pose a more formidable
obstacle than those encountered by the United States and NATO in Libya.
Syria's Air Force is comprised of approximately 548 combat aircraft;
air defenses including Russian-made Pantsir S1E and Buk-M2E air-defense
systems; and other anti-aircraft weapons. The Syrian National Council
recently published a map displaying the location of Syria's Soviet-
designed surface-to-air missiles and air defenses.
Any such mission will likely require use of American military
assets to defeat Syria's extensive air defenses and air force. While
the 2007 Israeli air strike on Syria's secretly-built nuclear reactor
demonstrated that those systems can be overcome, they will nonetheless
need to be neutralized in order for large-scale air operations to be
conducted. The United States presently has two aircraft carriers in the
region that could assist with dismantling Syria's air defenses and
supporting a no-fly or no-go zone: the USS John C. Stennis and the USS
George H.W. Bush.
If NATO countries were to join in a no-fly or no-go zone effort,
Incirlik air base in Turkey could be used to support NATO air forces
(and American squadrons of F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s that are currently
based in Europe) in a potential coalition mission, as it was used to
support the Northern No-Fly Zone over Iraq during the 1990s. In
addition, the British Royal Air Force's Akrotiri base in Cyprus could
be utilized, as it was during the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector
in Libya in 2011.
Establishment of a no-go zone would strongly benefit from
diplomatic support from Middle Eastern governments, especially Turkey
and Jordan. As part of a no-go zone, the United States, NATO allies,
and regional partners could establish safe havens along the Jordanian
and Turkish borders. Already, thousands of Syrian refugees have fled
and sought refuge in Turkey. A portion of Syria's Idlib province, along
the northern border with Turkey, could provide a defendable option.
This would emulate U.N.-mandated safe havens implemented in Iraq
following the Gulf War in 1991.
To protect against future attacks the zone would require continuous
surveillance, credible retaliatory capabilities, and perhaps ground
forces. This level of intervention would require long-term political
will by coalition forces. The importance of international support in
this effort cannot be understated, as the Assad regime has repeatedly
shown its disdain for international boundaries. Syrian tanks and troops
have repeatedly crossed the border into Lebanon to abduct and kill
purported deserters. On October 6, 2011, Syrian troops--backed by tanks
and armored vehicles--killed a farmer and shelled an abandoned factory
in the Lebanese border town of Arsal. Further news reports show
repeated cross-border incursions by Syrian troops near Hnaider and
Mouanse.
Syrian opposition members say implementation of no-fly or no-go
zones in Syria could provide much-needed cover to opposition forces,
thereby encouraging mass defections from the Syrian military. In a
promising development, leading U.S. lawmakers are now discussing the
possibility of no-fly and no-go zones in Syria. For example, Senator
Joe Lieberman (ID-CT) first suggested looking at military options to
protect Syrian civilians in March 2011, and returned to the idea of no-
fly and no-go zones in October 2011. And during an October 23, 2011,
speech before a World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan, Senator John
McCain (R-AZ) discussed the possibility U.S. military involvement in
Syria:
Now that military operations in Libya are ending, there will be
renewed focus on what practical military operations might be
considered to protect civilian lives in Syria. . . . The Assad
regime should not consider that it can get away with mass
murder. [Libyan dictator Muammar] Gadhafi made that mistake and
it cost him everything.
However, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, told a reporter
on November 7, 2011, that alliance members are not currently
considering intervening militarily to stop the Assad regime: ``There
has been no planning, no thought, and no discussion about any
intervention into Syria. It just isn't part of the envelope of
thinking, among individual countries and certainly among the 28 [full
NATO members]. . . . If things change, things change. But as of today,
that's where the reality stands.
conclusion: time for the united states to lead from the front on syria
Despite gridlock in the U.N. Security Council, the United States
nonetheless has options for responding, individually and in concert
with others, to the Assad regime's continuing assault on the Syrian
people. After months of facing relentless violence, Syrian opposition
groups are now increasingly demanding decisive international action to
prevent further bloodshed. It's time for policymakers and lawmakers in
the United States, Europe, Turkey, and other countries to act.
The Syrian people have shown astonishing fortitude in withstanding
the regime's brutal security forces. The Assad regime is now trying to
kill its way back to internal ``stability.'' But such actions, of
course, will do the opposite of what the regime intends: Syria will
slide further toward civil war, thousands more will die, and the West
and Turkey will eventually be forced to intervene--except Syria's
ethnic and religious mosaic will likely by then be torn apart, making a
humane post-Assad Syria much more difficult to build. Foreign
intervention sooner offers Syria, the Middle East, and the West the
likelihood of a much better outcome.
______
Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Tabler, Next Generation Fellow, Program
on Arab Politics, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Mr. Chairman, the situation on the ground in Syria continues to
deteriorate. This week, the United Nations estimated that over 3,500
Syrians had been killed since anti-Asad-regime protests broke out on
March 15. Thousands more have been arrested in what now can be
described as the most brutal crackdown against civilians since Hafiz
al-Asad's genocidal massacre in Hama 29 years ago.
Protests in Syria have largely remained peaceful in nature, with
Asad-regime forces using live fire to disperse crowds. The hope of the
protestors, as well as the Syrian opposition in exile, was that the
protests, as in Egypt and Tunisia, would bring the masses onto the
streets, garner clear support from the international community, and
force the regime to choose between stepping aside or continuing to hold
onto power through brute force. Despite large protest numbers and
condemnation by Western and regional countries, Asad has apparently
decided to fight it out until the end.
The regime's strategy is simple: deploy military and security units
fully into restive areas around Der'a, Hama, Deir Ezzor, Idlib, and
Homs; use live fire to scare those ``on the fence'' from taking the
protests into the central squares of Damascus and Aleppo; rely on
vetoes of U.N. Security Council resolutions by Russia and China; point
to statements by Western and regional countries that a military
solution is ``off the table''; wear down the protestors so they return
home; and launch a ``reform'' initiative that the regime can pay lip
service to.
The gambit has worked thus far. The protestors continue to come out
in the streets daily, and intensively on Fridays, to demand the fall of
the Asad regime. But it is hard for them to see a light at the end of
this bloody tunnel. Frustrated, protestors are now calling for
international support via a no-fly zone or a buffer zone along Syria's
borders where those opposing the regime could seek safe haven, etc. But
with each announcement that such schemes are not in the making,
protestors face an increasingly grim future.
Increasing numbers in the Syrian opposition are seeking to take
matters into their own hands. Defectors from the Syrian military--who
fled their posts rather than obey orders to fire on protestors--are
aligning themselves with the ``Free Syrian Army''--an armed group whose
leadership is based in Turkey with active operations in and around
Homs, Idlib, and other Syrian locales. Added to this are two other
types of armed groups: unidentified Salafist elements and certain
criminal gangs whose members originate in Syria's brisk smuggling
trade. While all three groups continue to be well outgunned by the
security forces, many Syrians see the activities of such groups, absent
international action of some type, as the only way to ultimately
displace the regime.
Until now, U.S. policymakers have supported Syria's peaceful
protest movement, with Ambassador Robert Ford's visits to besieged
cities such as Hama spotlighting the regime's human rights abuses. The
Embassy has also met with Syrians on the ground to better gauge the
direction of the conflict. This effort has been augmented by a robust
sanctions regime. Following President Obama's announcement last August
that President Asad must ``step aside,'' Washington enacted the
remaining parts of the 2004 Syrian Accountability Act, broadened the
scope of Treasury Department designations of regime officials and
associates, and announced a ban on Syrian oil sales. The administration
also successfully enlisted the support of the European Union countries
to also call for Asad's departure and adopt similar measures.
With the regime using brute force to maintain its grip on power,
and Syrians increasingly pursuing parallel tracks of both peaceful and
armed resistance to the Asad regime, the United States now needs to
develop a concerted plan to prepare for all contingencies and bring
about the demise of the Asad regime. The longer the regime holds on,
the bloodier and more sectarian the conflict is likely to become and
spread to neighboring countries.
This plan should include the following action items:
Form a Syria contact group: Until now, the Obama
administration has been careful not to ``get out ahead'' of the
Syrian protest movement or regional allies, who are well poised
to exact pressure on the Asad regime. In the face of the Asad
regime's failure to implement the recent Arab League
initiative, the Obama administration should formally push for
the formation of a Syria contact group that would shepherd
concerted multilateral pressure--a method that historically
worked best with Damascus--and develop a strategy for ending
the Asad regime.
Develop a strategy for peeling away Asad regime supporters:
The Asad regime is a minority Alawite-dominated group whose
core consists of similar heterodox Shia offshoots (Alawites,
Druze, and Ismailies) who make up the command of the military
and security services. But the regime's stability also relies
on other communities with extensive familial and trade ties to
Western countries, most notably Christians and Sunni
businessmen. A plan to use targeted U.S., EU, and Turkish
sanctions against the regime's most egregious supporters will,
if used at key political junctures, substantially weaken the
Asad regime's grip on power.
Help the Syrian opposition plan ahead: The fear generated by
the regime crackdown, petty differences among opposition
figures, as well as over 40 years of authoritarian rule have
hobbled the Syrian opposition's ability to plan. It is
unrealistic to expect or require the Syrian opposition to come
up with civil resistance strategy like that used by opposition
protestors in Belgrade or Cairo to bring down regimes there.
Rather, the United States should assist the Syrian opposition
in developing a civil resistance strategy that broadens the
protests to include tactics such as boycotts and general
strikes. This will maximize the political power of the peaceful
protest movement.
Push for Human Rights monitors: The Asad regime literally
wants to bury its human rights violations. The United States
should facilitate, along with like-minded diplomats from allied
countries, the deployment of human rights monitors, including
people from Arab countries and Turkey, to keep the Asad
regime's crackdown in the spotlight.
Prepare for a militarization of the conflict: With Security
Council action blocked by Russia and China and increased
fighting by defectors around Homs and elsewhere, the chances
for sectarian war are increasing. Regional actors (individuals
and states), seeing a moral and strategic imperative, will
likely be drawn into what could be a proxy struggle. To this
end, the United States will need to explore with its allies the
possibility of the creation of ``no-fly'', ``no-go'', or
``buffer'' zones as ways to contain the conflict and help
garner support for the Syrian opposition.
Push for Security Council action: The failure of last week's
Arab League initiative to end the violence has opened the door
for the United States and the Europeans to return to the
Security Council for a resolution on Syria. While Russia and
China have vetoed past measures, they will find it increasingly
hard to do so as Arab efforts to negotiate a soft landing to
the crisis fail. Security Council resolutions will serve as the
basis for maximizing multilateral pressure, especially
comprehensive sanctions and possible future use of force.
______
Prepared Statement of Maria McFarland, Deputy Washington Director,
Human Rights Watch
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and committee members, thank
you for the opportunity to submit written testimony on U.S. policy and
the human rights crisis in Syria.
Since largely peaceful protests in Syria began on March 18, 2011,
the Syrian security forces, under the command of President Bashar al-
Assad, have been engaged in a relentless crackdown. According to the
United Nations, more than 3,500 people, largely civilians, have been
killed, while tens of thousands more have been arrested, detained,
forcibly disappeared, and tortured.
The government has also blocked access for most international human
rights monitors and foreign journalists, and has imposed a tight
information blockade. Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with
hundreds of residents who have escaped to neighboring countries and
spoke to many witnesses still inside Syria. We have documented
systematic, widespread, and gross violations of human rights by the
Syrian Government, which may amount to crimes against humanity.
Syria has blatantly flouted its commitments, under a recent Arab
League-sponsored deal, to cease the violence, withdraw all troops from
cities and towns, and allow access to journalists and Arab League
monitors. Due to ongoing restrictions on independent monitors, Human
Rights Watch has had difficulty verifying specific information on the
latest spate of killings. But it is clear that the last week has seen
an intensification of the violence, with reports of mounting deaths as
part of a renewed government crackdown, particularly on the city of
Homs.
Predictably, the Syrian Government has consistently denied the
abuses. Syrian officials accuse ``terrorist groups'' or ``armed gangs''
of causing the violence. They inconsistently and vaguely claim that the
armed gangs are responsible for the deaths of protesters, or that the
armed gangs have attacked security forces, leading the security forces
at times to kill residents by mistake.
Human Rights Watch research indicates that the protests have been
overwhelmingly peaceful. We have documented a few instances in which
civilians and armed defectors used force, including deadly violence
against security forces. But while these incidents should be fully
investigated, they can in no way justify the systematic violence of the
Syrian security forces against their own people.
The decision of some protesters and defectors to arm themselves and
fight back, shooting at security forces, shows that the strategy
adopted by Syria's authorities has dangerously provoked escalation in
the level of violence, and highlights the need for an immediate
cessation of lethal force against peaceful protests lest the country
slip into bloodier conflict. The protests themselves were sparked
partly by the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. But they are mostly a
local response to four decades of government repression, by a
population that could no longer tolerate the heavy hand of Syria's
security services. Despite the government's ongoing killings and
torture, the protests have continued to escalate throughout the
country, and they are unlikely to go away anytime soon.
That means that the international community, including the United
States, faces the difficult challenge of bringing pressure to bear on
the government of Assad to stop the abuses and ensure that civilians
are protected.
So far, the U.S. response has been largely positive and helpful. In
public statements, President Obama has condemned the Syrian
Government's brutality and clearly expressed support for ``a transfer
of power that is responsive to the Syrian people,'' most recently in
his September 21, 2001, speech before the U.N. General Assembly.
The United States has also taken direct action. The Treasury
Department has imposed targeted sanctions on senior Syrian officials,
including Syria's Foreign Minister, which ban Americans from doing
business with these individuals and block any assets they may have in
this country. The United States has also imposed sanctions on Syria's
oil sector, banning the importation of petroleum products from Syria.
Ambassador Robert Ford's performance within Syria has also been
very helpful, and sets an example for how U.S. Ambassadors should
conduct themselves in repressive societies: speaking out publicly,
engaging with civil society and opposition groups, and personally
traveling to areas affected by the crackdown to show solidarity with
Syrians who are asking for their human rights. We urge Congress to ask
why the State Department does not encourage its Ambassadors to other
comparable countries to adopt a similar approach.
international action on syria
U.N. Human Rights Council Resolutions
Internationally, the United States has played an important role in
pressing for action, including by sponsoring a special session on Syria
at the U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) in April, which called on the
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to
conduct a mission to investigate events in Syria. While OHCHR was not
granted access to Syria, it was able to release a report in August,
finding ``a pattern of human rights violations that constitutes
widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population, which
may amount to crimes against humanity.''
Also during the August session of the Human Rights Council, the
United States backed a European Union-sponsored resolution on Syria
that unequivocally condemns the Syrian Government abuses and calls for
them to end. The resolution also established a Commission of Inquiry
(Col) charged with investigating the abuses, identifying those
responsible, and reporting back to the HRC. The Col report will also be
transmitted to the U.N. General Assembly. This resolution was an
important political signal, as it received a much broader support at
the HRC than the April resolution. Only four states voted against the
resolution (Ecuador, China, Russia, and Cuba), while a broad majority
of 33 HRC members voted in favor of it.
The Commission of Inquiry, which has received no cooperation from
Syria so far, is required to publish its report by the end of November
2011 and to update it in March 2012.
Veto at U.N. Security Council
Unfortunately, other governments have succeeded in blocking
effective action at the U.N. Security Council.
On August 18, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Navi Pillai asked the Security Council to refer Syria to the
International Criminal Court for the investigation of alleged
atrocities against antigovernment protestors. Just before Pillai's
deposition, U.S. President Barack Obama and the European Union had
recommended sanctions and called on Assad to step down.
But despite these reports and statements, on October 4, after 7
months of near complete inaction, Russia and China vetoed a Security
Council resolution calling on Syria to end the violence against its
citizens.
India, Brazil, and South Africa abstained from the vote, invoking
concerns that the condemnatory resolution might lead to the imposition
of sanctions (and expressing concern over NATO action in Libya, which
they viewed as exceeding its mandate), while claiming to be deeply
concerned about the plight of the Syrian people. These three countries
have so far opted for a softer approach on Syria: in August, they sent
a delegation to Syria with the aim of encouraging the Syrian Government
to exercise restraint and to initiate talks with the opposition. In
later public statements they said they had called for an end to the
violence and respect for human rights.
Arab League Initiative
Yet more recently the League of Arab States has taken action. An
Arab League delegation led by Qatar and made up of the Foreign
Ministers of Egypt, Oman, Algeria, and Sudan as well as Nabil el-Araby,
the league's secretary general, visited Syria in October. Russia
expressed support for the initiative.
On November 2, the Arab League announced that it had reached a deal
with the Syrian Government that required Syria to halt all acts of
violence and protect Syrian citizens, release all those detained in
connection with the protests, remove security forces from cities and
residential neighborhoods, and grant field access to organizations of
the Arab League and to the international media to monitor the
situation.
If Syria had respected the deal, this would have represented an
important step forward. But after reportedly releasing about 500
detainees on the occasion of the holiday of Eid al-Adha, the Syrian
Government has continued its crackdown. According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, more than 60 people are reported to have
been killed by military and security forces since Syria signed the Arab
League deal. These include at least 19 on the Sunday that marked Eid
al-Adha.
next steps
The Arab League's response during an emergency meeting this
Saturday to Syria's failure to fulfill the terms of its deal may be an
important turning point. Depending on the position they take, it is
possible that not only the Arab League states but also countries like
India, Brazil, and South Africa, could be persuaded to support stronger
measures on Syria. Given Russia's support for the Arab League
initiative, it too, should support an escalation of international
pressure on Syria.
Human Rights Watch has called upon the General Assembly to take
action where the Security Council has failed to do so. Resolution 377A
of the U.N. General Assembly states that ``if the Security Council,
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security [...], the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately.'' We have urged the General Assembly
to also ask the U.N. Secretary General to name a special envoy for
Syria, as well as refer the upcoming report of the Commission of
Inquiry back to the U.N. Security Council for further consideration.
Aside from action at the United Nations, we have successfully urged
the European Union, to impose additional sanctions, including by
freezing the assets of the Syrian National Oil Company, Syrian National
Gas Company, and the Central Bank of Syria until the Syrian Government
ends gross human rights abuses against its citizens.\1\ The EU has also
frozen the assets of 35 Syrian officials and four entities in response
to Syria's widespread human rights abuses. The EU imposed similar
assets freezes against the Libyan oil sector and central bank in March.
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\1\ Under Syrian law the government is the major shareholder in the
oil and gas sector through its ownership of the Syrian National Gas and
Syrian National Oil companies. These two companies have a 50 percent
share in every oil and gas project in Syria. In a March 2010 report,
the International Monetary Fund estimated that the Syrian Government
earns approximately =2.1 billion from oil and gas revenues per year.
Most of Syria's oil and gas is used domestically, but it exports about
150,000 barrels per day, and around 95 percent of that goes to Europe,
primarily to Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. We have urged
the EU to conduct regular reviews of the impact of sanctions to assess
any potential humanitarian impact, and to tie the lifting of the
sanctions to measures that demonstrate a change of policy by the
government, such as an end to the use of excessive and lethal force
against peaceful demonstrators, releasing all detainees held merely for
participating in peaceful protests or for criticizing the Syrian
authorities, and full cooperation with the fact-finding mission
mandated by the United Nations Human Rights Council or other
international mechanisms tasked with investigating alleged human rights
violations.
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It may be that no amount of international pressure will have an
immediate effect. But over time, we believe that coordinated
international sanctions, including those that target specific
individuals, can weaken support for the government's abuses among key
political groups.
key recommendations
There are a number of concrete measures that the international
community, including the United States, can take to protect civilians
in Syria. We urge the United States to work with its allies,
particularly its allies in the Arab world, to achieve the following
goals:
Granting Unhindered Access to Independent Observers: As
reporting on Syria gets more difficult and countries interpret
events on the ground very differently, there is a need for
independent observers on the ground who can document and
publicize what is happening. The U.S. government and its allies
should push the Syrian Government to allow the Commission of
Inquiry appointed by the Human Rights Council to have access to
the country and ensure full cooperation from the Syrian
authorities in conducting its investigations.
Deployment of Monitors: Another step that could make a
difference on the ground immediately is the deployment of human
rights monitors in Syria. An independent monitoring presence
could help clarify the situation on the ground, ensure rapid
responses to violations reports, and provide reliable reporting
concerning ongoing violations, as well as addressing such
issues as the extent of use of force by protesters. In
addition, a monitoring presence in hotspots within Syria could
lead the security forces to use greater restraint and reduce
the level of violations itself.
Timetable for Implementing Reforms: President Assad's
promises of reform are not credible as long as security forces
are shooting at protesters and detaining activists. The
international community needs to set a timetable for reforms
and hold the Syrian authorities accountable for respecting the
timetable. Some reforms should be immediate, such as the
release of all detainees held merely for peaceful protest or
political activity, and an accounting for all those detained
and being held incommunicado.
Preventing Syria from Obtaining Surveillance Technologies:
Recent reports indicate that Syria is in the process of
constructing an elaborate surveillance network to track the
communications and activities of its citizens.\2\ To set up the
system, it needs to obtain specific surveillance technologies
from a number of Western countries, including the United
States. These countries should be actively looking for ways to
discourage or prevent the sale of such technologies to Syria.
The U.S. Congress should ensure that existing U.S. sanctions
and export controls are adequate to address this situation, and
urge other countries, particularly in the European Union, to
adopt similar restrictions on Syria. Going forward, the U.S.
Congress should examine U.S. export control laws and
regulations to ensure that surveillance and other technology
cannot be sold to governments likely to use it against their
citizens or to further repression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ``Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm's Aid with U.S.-Europe
Spy Gear,'' Bloomberg News, November 3, 2011 (available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-03/syria-crackdown-gets-italy-firm-s-
aid-with-u-s-europe-spy-gear.html).
Finally, we urge the U.S. Government to support U.N. General
Assembly action on Syria, including the establishment of a U.N. Special
Envoy on Syria and support referral of the Col report to the U.N.
Security Council for further action. We also hope the United States
will provide meaningful and public support for the work of the Human
Rights Council, its Commission of Inquiry, and the OHCHR in Syria, and
undertake to follow up on reports and recommendations emanating from
the U.N. human rights organs.
______
Response of Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman to Question
Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. There have been several recent disturbing reports that
U.S. manufactured technology is, despite sanctions, winding up in the
hands of the Assad regime in Syria where it is being used as an
instrument of suppression, preventing the Syrian people from
communicating with one another and with the outside world. Two
companies specifically cited in a November 14 Bloomberg article are Net
App, Inc. and Blue Coat Systems, Inc. both based in Sunnyvale, CA.
Given that we have sanctions in place and that there has
never been a more critical moment in history for supporting
opposition voices in Syria, what more can we do to prevent
this?
What evidence is there to indicate Net App and Blue Coat
products are, indeed, being used in Syria?
How will company officials be held accountable if: (a) it's
confirmed that their products are not being used in Syria and
(b) that they could have reasonably assumed that this was the
final destination for the products sold to a third party?
Background: Bloomberg reported on November 14 that the Italian
company Area SpA has been installing a wide-reaching Internet
surveillance system (Asfador) for the Syrians in a $17.9 million deal,
using equipment from the U.S. company NetApp Inc., France's Qosmos SA
and Germany's Utimaco Safeware AG.
Asfador, per Bloomberg, includes ``the capability to intercept,
scan, and catalog virtually all e-mail flowing through Syria . . . The
software and hardware for archiving e-mail came from NetApp, a
Sunnyvale, California-based company with a market value of about $15
billion and more than 10,000 employees.'' According to Bloomberg, ``
The story also indicates that ``at least some NetApp employees probably
knew who the end-user was.''NetApp has received U.S. Government
contracts worth more than $111 million since 2001, including one on
September 15. There are also reports that technology made by another
Sunnyvale-based company, Blue Coat Systems Inc., is being used by Syria
to censor the Internet. http://www.business
week.com/news/2011-11-14/companies-that-aid-syria-crackdown-deserve-
sanctions-slap-view.html.
Answer. The Department of State is both aware of and concerned
about recent reports regarding the use of U.S. technology by repressive
regimes in general, and Syria in particular, to target human rights
activists and dissidents. We take these reports very seriously. At this
time, the U. S. Department of State has no further evidence that Net
App or Blue Coat Systems' products are being used in Syria beyond what
has been publically disclosed by the respective companies.
The United States has maintained stringent controls on exports and
reexports to Syria since the implementation of the Syrian
Accountability Act in 2004. With very narrow exceptions, exports and
reexports of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations
require a license issued by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of
Industry & Security (BIS). Both U.S. and foreign companies that violate
U.S. export controls may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. In
addition to controls on exports, the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control maintains additional controls on the
export and reexport to Syria by U.S. Persons of goods and services. Our
export control policies are designed to assist ordinary citizens who
are exercising their fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly and
association, while preventing exports of goods and services that
repressive regimes can use against their people.