[Senate Hearing 112-419]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 112-419

 
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON. 
 LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, 
 USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ; 
  ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN. 
 WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN 
   W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B. 
CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN 
                               A. OHLSON

                               ----------                              

 FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13; 
                           NOVEMBER 17, 2011

                               ----------                              

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS





                                                        S. Hrg. 112-419

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 
                             112TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   on

                             NOMINATIONS OF

MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON. 
 LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, 
 USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ; 
  ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN. 
 WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN 
   W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B. 
CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN 
                               A. OHLSON

                               __________

 FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13; 
                           NOVEMBER 17, 2011

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services




        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                               __________


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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado                 ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

                   Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

               David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)
?

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                    CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                                                                   Page

                           february 15, 2011

Nominations of Hon. Michael G. Vickers to be Under Secretary of 
  Defense for Intelligence; and Dr. Jo Ann Rooney to be Principal 
  Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness..     1

Statements of:

Hon. Michael G. Vickers, Nominated to be Under Secretary of 
  Defense for Intelligence.......................................     4
Rooney, Ph.D., Jo Ann, Nominated to be Principal Deputy Under 
  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness...............     6

                             march 3, 2011

Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.......    93

Statements of:

Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island.....    98
Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....................   100

                              june 9, 2011

Nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense....   181

Statements of:

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from the State of California   187
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California...   188
Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Nominated to be Secretary of Defense......   190

                             june 28, 2011

Nominations of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations 
  Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces-Korea; VADM William 
  H. McRaven, USN, to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Special 
  Operations Command; and LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, to be 
  General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/
  Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.............................   353

Statement of:

Thurman, GEN James D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined 
  Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea...............................   358
McRaven, VADM William H., USN, Nominated to be Admiral and 
  Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.....................   359
Allen, LtGen John R., USMC, Nominated to be General and 
  Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, 
  U.S. Forces-Afghanistan........................................   360

                                  iii
                             july 19, 2011

Nominations of Madelyn R. Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and Alan F. Estevez to be 
  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 
  Readiness......................................................   505

Statement of:

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana...   508
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico...   513
Creedon, Madelyn R., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Global Strategic Affairs...........................   513
Estevez, Alan F., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for Logistics and Materiel Readiness...........................   515

                             july 21, 2011

Nominations of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, for 
  Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman 
  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for 
  Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, 
  U.S. Army; and Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, for 
  Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. 
  Transportation Command.........................................   575

Statements of:

Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade 
  of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff   581
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....................   582
Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the 
  Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation 
  Command........................................................   584
Annex A..........................................................   764

                             july 26, 2011

Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to 
  the Grade of General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
  Staff..........................................................   783

Statements of:

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........   788

                             july 28, 2011

Nominations of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, for Reappointment 
  to the Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations; 
  and LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, to be General and to be 
  Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American 
  Aerospace Defense Command......................................   909

Statements of:

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of 
  Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations....................   913
Jacoby, LTG Charles H., Jr., USA, Nominated to be General and to 
  be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American 
  Aerospace Defense Command......................................   915

                           september 13, 2011

Nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter to be Deputy Secretary of 
  Defense........................................................  1007

Statements of:

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of 
  Connecticut....................................................  1008
Carter, Hon. Ashton, Ph.D., Nominated to be Deputy Secretary of 
  Defense........................................................  1013

                           november 17, 2011

Nominations of Michael A. Sheehan to be Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Mark 
  W. Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 
  Pacific Security Affairs; Brad R. Carson to be General Counsel 
  of the Department of the Army; and Kevin A. Ohlson to be a 
  Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces........  1173

Statements of:

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma...  1181
Leahy, Hon. Patrick, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont......  1182
Sheehan, Michael A., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict......  1184
Lippert, Mark W., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.........................  1185
Carson, Brad R., Nominated to be General Counsel of the 
  Department of the Army.........................................  1186
Ohlson, Kevin A., Nominated to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of 
  Appeals for the Armed Forces...................................  1186

APPENDIX.........................................................  1321


NOMINATIONS OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
 FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND DR. JO ANN ROONEY TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER 
            SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Webb, 
Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, and Ayotte.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional 
staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael 
J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, 
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, 
counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; 
William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 
staff member; and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority 
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John 
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. 
Lerner, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, 
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority 
counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Hannah I. 
Lloyd.
    Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, 
assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to 
Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; 
Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, 
assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to 
Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator 
Shaheen; Jordan Baugh and Elana Broitman, assistants to Senator 
Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to 
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 
Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; and Brad 
Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee 
meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officials 
to serve in important positions within the Department of 
Defense (DOD). Dr. Michael Vickers has been nominated to be the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He is currently 
serving in that position on an acting basis while continuing 
his duties as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent 
Capabilities (SOLIC&IC). Dr. Vickers has served ably in that 
position, guiding and overseeing major elements of our 
operations against terrorists and insurgents across the globe.
    Dr. Vickers has had a long and distinguished career in 
Government service, much of which is relevant to the position 
for which he has been nominated by the President.
    In his present position as Assistant Secretary of Defense-
SOLIC, he has been deeply involved in intelligence matters 
across the Government as a policymaker, as a consumer of 
intelligence, and as a producer of intelligence. He served 
previously as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations 
officer in multiple divisions, spanning the Near East, South 
Asia, and Latin America, and including involvement in covert 
actions. He also served as an Army Special Forces soldier and 
officer.
    Congress created the position of Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence (USD(I)) in 2002 in recognition of the growing 
importance of intelligence to our military forces, especially 
in conducting operations after the events of September 11. The 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal 
staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, 
counterintelligence, security, and other sensitive matters. In 
this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the Secretary's authority 
over the intelligence components of DOD and is responsible for 
intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, policy 
formulation, and oversight.
    The USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring that DOD 
intelligence components are responsive to the direction and 
requirements of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 
Indeed, by formal agreement between the DNI and the Secretary 
of Defense, the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the Director of 
Defense Intelligence on the DNI's staff.
    Dr. Jo Ann Rooney has been nominated to be the Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
the Department's number two position for military and civilian 
personnel issues, including recruitment, retention, pay and 
benefits, health care, readiness, and the quality of life of 
the members of our Armed Forces and their families. Dr. Rooney 
comes to us from academia, where she most recently served as 
the President of Mount Ida College and has served as an 
instructor at various colleges since 1994.
    Dr. Rooney also serves on the board of trustees for the 
Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Health Care, a nonprofit health 
care system in Louisville, KY, experience that could serve her 
well in her new position should she be confirmed.
    The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness position is vitally important as the 
Department and Congress continue to wrestle with many 
challenges, including vastly growing personnel and health care 
budgets and the proper size of the force. The Department is 
actively planning a reduction in its ground forces, depending 
on conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2012 budget 
request includes modest reductions in the Army and Navy, while 
the Department plans greater reductions in future years.
    In evaluating the size of the force, we must be mindful of 
the stress on the force, including inadequate dwell time for 
many soldiers and a deeply concerning suicide rate.
    Finally, the Department is continuing its deliberate 
progress in implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
    We welcome both our nominees. We thank them. We thank their 
families for their distinguished public and private service and 
willingness to serve our Nation in these important positions. 
When we call upon them for their opening statements, we will 
ask them to introduce the family members and their friends who 
are with them as they give those statements.
    Senator McCain.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

    Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in 
welcoming our nominees and their families and friends who are 
here today, especially our two youngest there [pointing to the 
audience], who have been working on paperwork in preparation 
for this hearing. We thank you for that. [Laughter.]
    Secretary Vickers has had a distinguished and storied 
record of service to this country. He served as an Army Special 
Forces soldier, as a CIA case officer, and since August 2007 as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.
    Dr. Vickers, you must be prepared to streamline the size 
and cost of the organizations which you'll oversee. Secretary 
Gates has announced his initiative to cut costs, eliminate 
waste and redundancies, and focus defense dollars on the most 
vital programs. With the rollout of the fiscal year 2012 budget 
yesterday, we will want to know what parts of the defense 
intelligence enterprise will be affected.
    In the face of an unacceptably high and increasing deficit, 
we must examine all aspects of defense spending. I hope we can 
learn from you how you would apply these efficiencies for cost 
savings for other vital defense priorities. For example, which 
intelligence functions are redundant and can be eliminated; 
which intelligence organizations that are bloated can be cut; 
are there senior civilian positions that could be transferred 
or eliminated; which contracts for services could be 
terminated; and which major acquisition programs should be 
restructured or eliminated to save money?
    My questions, however, should not be interpreted as 
reflecting a lack of concern or support for our ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obviously, failure is not 
an option in achieving our goals in both Operation New Dawn and 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and robust intelligence-gathering 
and analysis are critical to our success.
    The list of imperatives for the defense intelligence 
enterprise is lengthy. We must be able to continue to locate 
and track America's most relentless enemies on the battlefield, 
to include former Guantanamo detainees who have made their way 
back into the fight. We must safeguard our Nation's vital 
secrets to prevent another Wikileaks episode and any further 
neutralization of our lawful intelligence collection methods. 
Through sound acquisition practices, we have to ensure our 
troops and our Nation have the overhead surveillance required 
for national security and mission accomplishments.
    Dr. Rooney, you've had a distinguished career in law, 
education, and health administration. I expect you'll be called 
on very quickly to assist Secretary Gates and Under Secretary 
of Defense Stanley in making progress in several key areas that 
demand attention. Foremost among these is identifying ways to 
improve the well-being and quality of life of servicemembers 
and their families. After 9 years of combat operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, our forces, particularly the ground forces, 
special operators, and the combat support personnel who 
mobilize and sustain them through multiple deployments, are 
stressed.
    While recruiting is strong and retention levels for 
experienced noncommissioned officers and officers remain 
historically high, the Department must continue to ensure that 
the resources, policies, and programs are in place to guarantee 
that deploying troops are trained, ready, and focused. For our 
wounded or injured, there must continue to be world-class care 
on the battlefield, and when they return home that the 
procedures for helping them and their families transition 
seamlessly to the next stages of their military service or 
civilian life work as rapidly and fairly as possible.
    I look forward to hearing your testimony and I wish to 
congratulate you on your nominations and I look forward to 
confirming you as quickly as possible.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    Let me now call on you for your opening statement, 
Secretary Vickers.

  STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, NOMINATED TO BE UNDER 
             SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

    Dr. Vickers. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished 
members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you 
here today. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination. 
I am profoundly grateful for the confidence President Obama has 
shown in me by nominating me for the position of Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in designating me as 
the Acting USD(I) on 28 January. In the brief period I have 
been Acting USD(I), I have gained a further appreciation of the 
immense responsibilities of this office.
    I am also deeply grateful to Secretary Gates for his 
support. I had the great privilege of serving with Secretary 
Gates in the CIA during the 1980s and he has been the model for 
me ever since of what a professional intelligence officer 
should aspire to.
    The USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense 
Intelligence. I have had the great honor of serving with 
Director Clapper for the past 3\1/2\ years and I am grateful 
for his support for my nomination.
    I would also like to thank my family for their love and 
support. It is a great honor, Mr. Chairman, to introduce them 
to the committee today. With me here today are my wife, Melana, 
and our daughters Alexandra, Sophia, Oksana, and Kalyna. I 
would be a very poor dad if I did not also introduce in 
absentia our fifth daughter, Natasha, who is busily studying 
for her midterms at Ohio State and thus could not be with us 
today.
    Chairman Levin. Which is the youngest of your daughters who 
are here today, by the way?
    Dr. Vickers. Kalyna is our kindergartener, who is 6 years 
old on February 8th.
    Chairman Levin. I was trying to win her vote here by asking 
which is the youngest. Thank you. [Laughter.]
    Dr. Vickers. I'd like to also add that Oksana has the same 
birthday as President Obama. [Laughter.]
    Also with me here today are my mother-in-law, Oksana 
Hepburn, my brother-in-law, Roman Gila, and his son and my 
nephew Muletti Gila, and numerous friends and colleagues from 
the Pentagon.
    It has been a great privilege and honor for the past 3\1/2\ 
years to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC&IC 
under both President Bush and President Obama. Our special 
operators do much to keep us safe and I am immensely proud of 
them.
    We face many challenges as a Nation, from the war with al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by rogue 
states, the development of asymmetric capabilities by rising 
and resurgent powers, and the continued effects of the global 
financial crisis. I am confident we'll be more than equal to 
these challenges, as Americans before us were to the challenges 
that confronted them.
    Our intelligence capabilities constitute an increasingly 
critical source of advantage for our Nation. Recent events in 
the Middle East remind us of the importance of intelligence, 
but also of the unpredictable and rapid turns developments can 
take. Our warriors in the field and our policymakers here at 
home are better served by U.S. intelligence today than at any 
time since I began my service nearly 4 decades ago. We owe them 
the best intelligence we can provide. If confirmed as USD(I), I 
will do my best to ensure that this continues to be the case.
    As a CIA officer in the 1980s, I learned first-hand about 
the importance of congressional oversight of intelligence. Even 
more important, I learned what an indispensable partner 
Congress can be.
    I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Secretary Vickers, we thank you very much 
for that opening statement.
    Dr. Rooney.

 STATEMENT OF JO ANN ROONEY, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE PRINCIPAL 
 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

    Dr. Rooney. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 
and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am grateful 
for the confidence that President Obama has shown in me by 
nominating me for the position of Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I also want 
to thank Secretary Gates for his support of my nomination. If 
confirmed, I will be honored to serve.
    I want to thank my family and extended family for their 
support and it's my pleasure to introduce them now. My mom, 
Patricia Rooney, is with me today and I want to offer her my 
heartfelt and special thanks. It is because of her support and 
that of my late dad, John, that I'm here with you today. My 
dad, an Army veteran, and my mom, a retired public school 
elementary teacher, taught me that anything is possible, but 
that I must embrace opportunities to use my experience and 
talent to help others and leave an organization and people 
better for my efforts.
    I'm also fortunate to have several other people very 
special in my life here today. My dearest friend of over 30 
years and true sister of the heart, Linda Pizzorni, is here. 
Her daughter Alessia, a high school senior, is also here with 
us today. She and her sister Veronica, who is home because she 
has to be in school and she's with her dad, are truly my nieces 
in many ways.
    Father Al Faretra, who is like my big brother, is 
representing the rest of the extended family in the Boston 
area. Prior to becoming a priest, Al served in the Navy and 
spent time aboard the USS Forrestal.
    Finally, Father Jim Rafferty, a very dear friend and 
someone who I've had the pleasure of logging many nautical 
miles sailing the waters throughout New England, is here 
lending support.
    I have not had the opportunity to serve our Nation in 
uniform, as did my dad, my uncles, my godfather, and many 
members of my extended family. They served in peacetime and in 
wartime, including World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. But like 
many Americans, I'm aware of the myriad of challenges members 
of our military, the civilian force, and their families face in 
supporting their service to our country. It is my desire to 
serve our country and, if confirmed, I pledge to bring all of 
my experience, knowledge, energy, and passion to the role.
    The responsibilities and functions of the Principal Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness are vast 
and challenging. They encompass advising and assisting the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and 
advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in 
matters relating to manpower, force management, planning, 
program integration, readiness, Reserve component affairs, 
health affairs, training, civilian and military personnel 
requirements and management, commissary and exchange, morale, 
welfare, and recreation, quality of life matters, spousal and 
family support, and dependent education.
    By nature, as the needs of our military and civilian 
members of DOD and their families change the responsibilities 
of the role must also evolve.
    My background in law, finance, business, strategy, 
organizational change, education, and health care provide me 
with a broad range of experiences and perspectives to bring to 
this role, if confirmed.
    All of us face daunting challenges, not only within DOD, 
but throughout the country, in areas of health care, cost 
containment, efficient use of resources, assessments, and 
accountability. Yet the goal is to balance these issues in a 
way to ensure we have the necessary resources so that the men 
and women in the Department are able to meet our Nation's 
requirements for national security.
    I understand the importance of working with this committee, 
the entire Congress, other governmental departments and 
agencies, and civilian and educational institutions in order to 
accomplish this goal. I understand the longstanding and 
daunting challenges associated with these and other aspects of 
DOD personnel and readiness, enabling the effective 
recruitment, retention, and training of the people we need. I 
will take all these responsibilities seriously and, if 
confirmed, I pledge my best efforts to work with this committee 
and many others to meet these challenges.
    In closing, I would like to again thank President Obama and 
Secretary Gates for selecting me as the nominee for this 
position. If the Senate confirms me, I will make every effort 
to live up to the confidence they and all of you have placed in 
me.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Rooney.
    We give a warm welcome to your families and friends, who 
are such an important part of who you are and your being here 
today.
    We have standard questions which we ask our nominees, which 
we'll ask each of you now. You can answer together. Have you 
adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts 
of interest?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process?
    Dr. Vickers. No.
    Dr. Rooney. No.
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established or requested communications, including 
questions for the record in hearings?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes.
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes.
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Dr. Vickers. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify upon request before this committee?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes.
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or 
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good 
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes.
    Dr. Vickers. Yes.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    I think we'll try a 7-minute round of questions.
    Dr. Vickers, we've been making efforts over the years, this 
committee, to expand the budgets, the production rate, the 
planned number of orbits, for major unmanned aerial vehicles 
that have been so critical to our forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and elsewhere, including the Predator and the Reaper. Our 
current objective is 65 orbits for these aircraft. The budget 
for fiscal year 2012 that we just received funds these aircraft 
at the maximum current production rate.
    However, the fact is that our troops need more and are 
asking for more of these assets right now. They're living with 
significant unfulfilled requirements every day. Now, we were 
recently told that the limiting factor for accelerating the 
expansion of that force is operators and linguists rather than 
the production capacity at factories. My question is, why can't 
the Services accelerate the recruitment and the training of 
operators and linguists?
    Dr. Vickers. Mr. Chairman, our Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) task force, under Secretary Gates' 
direction, has been working very hard since 2008 to provide the 
intelligence capabilities our warriors in the field require. 
Nevertheless, demand has continually outstripped supply, which 
is one reason during the recent Quadrennial Defense Review we 
raised the requirement for Predator and Reaper combat air 
patrols or for orbits from 50 to 65, and it's not clear at this 
point that 65, which we'll reach in 2013, will still meet our 
demand.
    To supplement that, we've been adding manned aircraft of 
various kinds, variations of C-12 aircraft, Project Liberty by 
the Air Force, and medium altitude reconnaissance and 
surveillance systems by the ground forces, to address this 
shortfall.
    As you noted, buying the aircraft is not enough. We also 
have to have operators, linguists, bandwidth, across the 
intelligence cycle. The Air Force in particular has been 
working very hard at converting operators to these functions. 
In fact, there are now more pilots involved in unmanned 
aircraft in the Air Force than there are flying manned 
aircraft. But we still have work to do.
    Chairman Levin. I recently wrote Secretary Gates about the 
current requirements for ISR support in the Horn of Africa and 
about the Department's current acquisition plans for additional 
ISR assets to support the geographic combatant commands. Now, 
I've not received a reply to this letter, but I would ask, 
since less than 10 percent of the requirements are being filled 
right now, that you pay some very urgent attention to that and 
that you get a response to that as quickly as possible. Would 
you do that?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Dr. Vickers, in your current position as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense-SOLIC, I think you understand 
very well how our Special Forces have discovered how to tightly 
integrate the different sensors to achieve unprecedented 
capabilities to identify high-value enemy personnel, to locate 
them, to track them, to identify their broader networks, and 
attack them.
    Signals intelligence, sensors are used to cue airborne 
video cameras where to look. Radars that can detect moving 
vehicles or even people walking are used as tipoffs to begin 
focused collection, and so on.
    Now, it's proven a lot more difficult for the regular 
conventional forces of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to 
achieve the degree of ISR system integration necessary to 
replicate U.S. Special Operations Command's success because the 
ISR assets are not under unified control. It's my understanding 
that the ISR task force and the Joint Staff are focused now on 
this problem. Do you have any ideas as to how the 
organizational obstacles can be removed in order to truly 
integrate our ISR assets operationally?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do. As you noted, the technique 
that our Special Operations Forces have pioneered, which we 
call ``find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze''--to have a 
recurring intelligence cycle to lead to successive operations 
to take down an enemy network is something that has been 
progressively transmitted from our national Special Operations 
Forces to our theater forces and progressively to our general 
purpose or conventional forces.
    General Petraeus is working this problem with his J-2 very 
hard in Afghanistan and we're seeing results in that area.
    I would add as well that we're providing additional 
capabilities in Afghanistan that we only had in very limited 
numbers in Iraq, for example, very persistent aerostats over 
all our conventional force positions to provide the kind of 
persistent surveillance that our forces need, particularly 
against improvised explosive devices.
    There is still some work that needs to be done. If you 
compare the different organizations, national, Special 
Operations Forces, theater, and conventional forces, in their 
ability to rapidly exploit this kind of information, but the 
gap is narrowing.
    When we used to describe a goal in the Department of trying 
to make conventional forces more special operations-like, we 
used to mean operating in small groups like special operators. 
Now we mean the ability to exploit intelligence across the 
cycle in the manner you described.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Dr. Vickers, General Petraeus in a recent interview 
discussed what he called the growing friction between local 
Taliban fighters living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban 
leadership who phone in orders that the local insurgents should 
continue to fight against Afghan and coalition forces through 
the winter, while the leadership remains safely in the 
sanctuaries in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan.
    According to General Petraeus, Taliban leadership is eager 
to keep up the fight through the winter because they know 
they've suffered losses over the last year. He also said that 
we're seeing a degree of discord among the Afghan Taliban 
leaders and between them and the lower level fighters, and a 
level of discord that we have not seen in the past. Do you 
agree with General Petraeus' assessment that there is friction 
and discord between local Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and 
the Taliban leadership in Pakistan as the leadership phones in 
those orders while they keep safely somewhere else, and is this 
level of friction something that we've not seen in the past?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do agree with General Petraeus' 
assessment. I'd be happy to provide more detail in a classified 
session, but let me say now that this discord as operational 
commanders from Afghanistan go back to sanctuary in Pakistan 
for the winter has increased over the past year, particularly 
as the effects of the surge of forces the President ordered in 
December 2009 really began to be felt at the end of this past 
2010 fighting season, from September to November.
    The situation that General Petraeus was describing, where 
the Taliban senior leadership wants to continue the fight 
during the winter months--a lot of local commanders have been 
voting with their feet, essentially, and saying, ``I've had 
enough of this,'' to the effects of our increasingly effective 
operations, but also because of multiple competing interests 
within the insurgency. The insurgency is not a monolithic 
group. A lot of fighters fight for very different reasons, 
including economic ones. So there's naturally a lot of 
frictions induced there. But the leadership-warrior divide is a 
big part of it.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Before I call on Senator McCain, let me just quickly 
mention that I hope we'll get a quorum here this morning, and 
when we do we will offer the committee budget to be approved.
    I'm going to turn the gavel now over to Senator Reed and 
call upon Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the witnesses. Secretary Vickers, we've 
recently heard some rather guardedly optimistic assessments of 
the situation in Afghanistan. Do you agree with those 
assessments?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.
    Senator McCain. The main problems still being corruption 
and Pakistan?
    Dr. Vickers. The strategic problem, sir, as you identified, 
are the continued presence of a sanctuary in Pakistan and then 
the governance challenge.
    Senator McCain. On the issue of Wikileaks, what's your 
understanding of the status of investigations into the cause of 
Wikileaks?
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence has mainly been focused on assessing 
the damage, which they've done a very good job on, and remedial 
measures with our chief information officer in the lead. My 
understanding of the investigation is that it is ongoing, but 
that's about all I can say at this time.
    Senator McCain. I've been interested to hear some in the 
media and others say that Wikileaks was a good thing, and that 
it didn't damage our national security or our ability to carry 
out our missions.
    Yet isn't it true that in Wikileaks some individuals who 
were cooperating with us were identified?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is true.
    Senator McCain. That puts their lives in danger?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it does.
    Senator McCain. I'm curious about your assessment of the 
damage that Wikileaks did to your abilities, and particularly 
in the area of getting people to cooperate with us in the vital 
aspect of human intelligence.
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, I think it's had implications from the 
foreign policy level about governments wanting to ensure that 
their confidential relationships with the United States are 
protected, down to operational issues, as you mentioned, of 
assets that would cooperate with us. Fortunately, we are able 
to attract the intelligence assets that we require to serve our 
policymakers and warriors, but the damage should not be 
understated and the Department has learned many lessons about 
how to prevent this from ever happening again.
    Senator McCain. But the damage especially has been on the 
operational level. If we disclose an ambassador's candid 
assessment of a foreign leader, that's one thing. But to have 
operations and individuals disclosed in my view--and more 
importantly, what is your view--this can be very damaging, and 
some local individual may think twice before agreeing to 
cooperate with us if that person's name is going to be 
publicized.
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct. As a former 
CIA operations officer, your first responsibility is to protect 
the security of those who would cooperate with the United 
States through tradecraft and proper information security, and 
they depend on us to do that.
    Senator McCain. Do you have a good sense of how former 
detainees are making their way back into the battlefield? I saw 
a news report this morning that another one was apparently 
killed, just reported today. Do you have a sense on how they're 
making their way back to the battlefield?
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, approximately 20 to 25 percent have made 
their way back in one form or another.
    Senator McCain. That we know of.
    Dr. Vickers. That we know of. Some of those have 
subsequently been killed or recaptured. Others are out there 
fighting against us as well. The routes that they take depend 
on the circumstances of their release. But needless to say, 
it's been in multiple countries and multiple routes, and I'd be 
happy to discuss that in more detail at a classified session.
    Senator McCain. You would agree it is a problem?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it is.
    Senator McCain. Because now it seems to be a status symbol 
for those that return to the battlefield with their 
compatriots.
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. That's a very good point, that some 
mid-level operatives have been elevated to leadership positions 
by this conferral of status.
    Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, we intend to confirm you, and 
obviously I believe you're well-qualified, but you don't have a 
depth of experience with the men and women in the military. If 
I could suggest--and suggestions are a very cheap commodity 
around here--that you spend some time traveling around, not 
only to the bases here in the continental United States, but 
also our overseas bases and areas, if you can, even forward 
deployed, so to give you a better depth and understanding of 
the challenges, particularly of the repeated deployments that 
our men and women in the military have been making and the 
strain and stress that puts on their families, I hope you will 
do that as a very high priority.
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. If confirmed, that would be an 
immediate priority.
    Senator McCain. Last year, in a contentious markup, this 
committee voted 15 to 12 to allow servicemembers, their 
dependents, and retirees to obtain privately paid abortions at 
military hospitals. Do you support the administration's 
position that abortions should be provided in military 
hospitals?
    Dr. Rooney. My position, sir, is to support the law and 
enforce the law. But I also understand that the abortions are 
voluntary, they would be outpatient services, and it's not 
mandatory that any physicians there actually perform the 
abortions, but it's making the health care available. I would 
comply to the law.
    Senator McCain. Thank you.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join both the chairman and Senator McCain in 
thanking you, Secretary Vickers, for your service in the past, 
very distinguished service, and thank you, Dr. Rooney, for 
undertaking this very challenging, but critically important, 
assignment.
    Secretary Vickers, I'd like to ask about one of the answers 
that you gave in the advance policy questions about a very 
important area that I know has concerned the committee in the 
past regarding the sharing of information, raw intelligence 
data, where you observed in the past there have been cultural 
barriers to the full access to this information.
    I wonder if you could please describe for the committee 
what steps you would take to increase the sharing and 
availability of this data to special operations personnel and 
others in the field who need it?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my answers to the 
committee's advance policy questions, the Intelligence 
Community was raised throughout the Cold War on the principle 
of need-to-know, and increasingly in the war with al Qaeda and 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the responsibility to share is 
imperative for our forces on the battlefield. That means not 
only sharing with our own forces, but in Afghanistan we have 49 
nations fighting alongside us and sharing with them as well.
    This requires technical solutions to the problem. Until 
recently in Afghanistan we had 26 different networks, that 
we're standardizing to facilitate the movement of information 
into a common network. But it also requires changes in the way 
we operate and what information can be provided at what level. 
Particularly, as Chairman Levin noted, some of the sensitive 
information we get in signals intelligence and others, that has 
typically been very compartmented, is critical on a time-
sensitive basis to operators, both to kill or capture their 
adversary, but also to protect from attack.
    We have been working that very hard. There is an inherent 
tension, however, between the responsibility to share and need-
to-know that we always have to weigh to protect sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure, while making sure we get 
timely information in the hands of our warfighters.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you feel that the barriers, as has 
been observed before, are still primarily cultural, or do you 
think there are procedural barriers that need to be overcome?
    Dr. Vickers. I think there's a mix, sir. I think some of it 
is cultural legacy, but others, as I said, are technical 
challenges, or also, as Chairman Levin noted earlier, having 
the intelligence structures to rapidly process and move the 
information. Not all elements of the force are equally equipped 
in that area and it's something we're working to address.
    Senator Blumenthal. Going to another line of questioning, I 
wonder if you could give us a more precise view about the 
extent of the discord and perhaps the magnitude of the 
phenomenon of these perhaps dissatisfied enemy combatants 
voting with their feet, as you have put it?
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, you mean those going back into combat?
    Senator Blumenthal. Exactly.
    Dr. Vickers. There are different perspectives on this, sir. 
Some are inherently repeat offenders, in the way that some 
portion of those from the criminal justice system do the same, 
particularly if they're going back into an area where they're 
surrounded by those engaged in terrorism, and there are certain 
ungoverned areas that they've made their way back to in Yemen, 
in Pakistan, that are very conducive to this. I wouldn't want 
to ascribe a single motivation, but looking at a number of 
these cases over the past several years and the recidivism, 
some have chosen a life of terrorism and their associates have.
    In some cases it's a family business that we've seen, that 
a lot of relatives are all engaged in the same line of work. I 
think that creates a greater propensity for them to go back. 
It's hard to know a priori necessarily which ones will and 
won't.
    There are those that we have very clear indications that 
would and therefore they're not released. But there are others 
that are in that grey ground that we need to do more to fix.
    Senator Blumenthal. Are there specific steps being 
contemplated to do more in that area, as you suggested?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. We have a Department of Justice-led 
initiative, with interagency participation, to review release 
of detainees at the highest levels or to transfer them to 
another country, and then we have task forces in the field 
working with local governments to review cases in the zones of 
armed conflict as well.
    Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Rooney, you may have seen recent 
reports about the very unfortunate and tragic perils of perhaps 
overuse of combinations of pharmaceutical drugs in treating 
young men and women coming back and suffering from post-
traumatic stress and other psychological phenomena. Are you 
aware of these reports and do you have thoughts about what can 
be done to address this problem?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I am aware of the reports and the 
issue of particularly psychotropic drugs, whether it's on the 
military side or the civilian side, absolutely shares some 
common factors. I think the lesson that we're all learning is 
that--and I'm not a medical doctor--the use of drugs and not 
understanding the interactions of the drugs actually at times 
exacerbates the problem. I think we're getting a lot more 
intelligent about that. We're starting to get a lot more 
research about where those drugs are effective and where 
they're not, and also understanding that at times it's critical 
to link--sometimes our service people are going outside to 
civilian providers and then also having service inside the 
military, and we're not necessarily connecting and 
understanding the drugs that have been prescribed by both.
    Because of that awareness, there is now much more emphasis 
on trying to destigmatize the treatment, so that we can have a 
coordinated basis of care. But it is an ongoing issue.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I thank you both 
for your answers and for your very distinguished service.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, I first of 
all want to commend both of you for your career histories. 
Secretary Vickers, thank you so much for your service to our 
country. You're both eminently qualified. I also want to 
commend your families and thank them for their support for both 
of you.
    Secretary Vickers, I wanted to ask you again; you had cited 
a statistic in response to Senator McCain that 20 to 25 percent 
of the Guantanamo detainees have been released and have 
returned to the conflict. Is that the correct number?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, ma'am. In the case of Guantanamo it's 
closer to 25 percent. Of the approximately 600 that have been 
released, about 150, we either know that they've returned or we 
strongly suspect that they've returned. In the case of other 
detainees that have been released on the battlefield, the 
number is between 20 and 25.
    Senator Ayotte. How is that fact informing release 
decisions going forward?
    Dr. Vickers. It has a strong impact on it, in the sense 
that remaining cases are scrutinized not just for recidivism, 
but also the ability in the case of third countries to continue 
to detain them if they're transferred. A lot of detainees can't 
be transferred because there's no assurance that they'll be 
properly detained and not released.
    Part of the recidivism problem breaks down when they're 
transferred to another country and then they're quickly 
released. So part of it is, as I said, is looking at the 
transfer problem in itself.
    In zones of hostilities, it may be local politics in some 
cases. Someone with connections is getting someone released and 
then again there's a high probability that they'll be 
recidivists, but the political system has intervened in the 
past. We've learned from this experience and are trying to 
address it, but it's not a foolproof system.
    Senator Ayotte. Given the President's Executive order 
advocating for the closure of Guantanamo, if tomorrow we 
capture a high-value target in Pakistan or overseas, or perhaps 
someone you would deem a repeat offender, what are we doing 
with them?
    Dr. Vickers. The administration is in the final stages of 
establishing its detention policy. But there is a challenge 
with those picked up outside zones of hostilities. In zones of 
hostilities, in Afghanistan principally now, there are well-
established procedures and mechanisms to detain them for the 
period as required. If a terrorist were picked up in Somalia, 
for example--one example of a very ungoverned space--that has 
been a vexing challenge for both administrations, I would add, 
both the Bush administration and the Obama administration, 
there's not an obvious solution that presents itself.
    But the USD(I)'s responsibility in this is to work on the 
intelligence aspects and not the detainee policy. I would defer 
to my policy colleagues in the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy's Office of Detainee Affairs to address your question 
more fully.
    Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, I fully appreciate that 
there are others that will have more direct impact on this. But 
given the breadth of experience that you have in this area and 
the vexing challenges that you've identified, what 
recommendations would you have to your colleagues in the 
administration on how we can best address this issue to make 
sure that if we capture a high-value target in one of these 
areas that we can make sure that we have the ability to 
interrogate that individual and also, if they present a 
continuing threat, that we can detain them?
    Dr. Vickers. On the interrogation side, the first step to 
extract intelligence, the administration has established a 
high-value interrogation group led by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, with participation from Defense and the CIA as 
well. That group has deployed several times and that mechanism 
should work well for interrogation and debriefing of detainees.
    Options range from transferring to another country, 
provided human rights assurances and access to the detainee and 
others can be met. But given the problem that many countries 
are either incapable or unwilling of taking some of these 
detainees, we require some mechanism to be able to detain them 
ourselves. That again, others in the administration are working 
that very hard.
    Senator Ayotte. When we transfer to another country, 
Secretary Vickers, aren't we in a position in which we don't 
have full control over the situation, even if we get assurances 
from the country? The level of control we have is much less 
than if we had them, for example, in a Guantanamo-type 
facility?
    Dr. Vickers. Before we transfer anyone, we want assurances 
that, in a number of areas, as I said, if they need to be 
detained the country in question is capable of detaining them; 
if there is intelligence value to the detainee, that we would 
have access to that detainee. But countries are sovereign and 
we do our best to ensure that these conditions are met; they're 
not always met 100 percent in some of these areas. Again, 
that's part of the challenge.
    Senator Ayotte. How can Congress help with this issue, 
because it's obviously of deep concern if we are in a position 
where we capture a high-value target or a repeat offender and 
that person still remains a danger, or we need to have them in 
a position where we can gather important information from them?
    Dr. Vickers. It is critical to have the option of capturing 
for laws of war, but also for intelligence value as well. 
Again, this is something that my colleagues in the inter-agency 
and within DOD are working, and I'm sure they will come to 
Congress for help on this.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate your 
answers today. Thank you, Dr. Rooney.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Senator Hagan.
    Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank Secretary Vickers for your past service to 
our country; and, to Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney, thank 
you for your agreeing to be nominated to these positions and 
your willingness to serve. Also, kudos to the families and 
extended families. Thank you for being here and supporting 
these very well-qualified individuals.
    I did want to ask, Secretary Vickers, when confirmed you 
will be responsible for implementing Secretary Gates' 
efficiency initiative as it relates to defense intelligence. In 
particular, you will need to downsize and consolidate the 
intelligence workforce and ensure that we avoid duplication of 
work among the respective intelligence agencies. What is your 
plan to address and implement this plan while still ensuring 
the timely development of actionable intelligence for our 
warfighters?
    Dr. Vickers. During the efficiencies process, the principal 
focus of eliminating redundancies was to look at Service, 
meaning Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps intelligence 
organizations and those of the combatant commands. So we have 
developed an organization called Joint Intelligence Operations 
Centers (JIOC), that every combatant command has, and they've 
all grown rather large, in the thousands of staff.
    We have developed a standardized model, after some 
experience now, that resulted in the major warfighting command, 
or Central Command, to have a large JIOC, as we describe it, 
and Pacific Command, which has a lot of challenges in its 
region, to also have a very large JIOC. But the other combatant 
commands have been reduced in some cases or had contractors 
eliminated to a more standardized model appropriate to their 
theaters, that is Africa Command, Southern Command, Northern 
Command, and European Command. There have been some savings in 
that area.
    We've also consolidated missions. The counter-threat 
finance mission has been, on the intelligence side, assigned to 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), so this will develop 
more focused intelligence to support Treasury and other 
policymakers who have the lead in this area, but also eliminate 
some redundancies. We had a lot of counter-threat finance 
intelligence across the Department.
    We've also done the same in counterterrorism intelligence 
in the Department in empowering our Joint Intelligence Task 
Force for Counterterrorism in DIA to be the lead.
    I would add that we've reduced senior executive service 
ranks, contractors, and others. I would add that Secretary 
Gates has been very clear that these rounds of efficiencies are 
really the first step in looking at eliminating redundancy. 
Intelligence is increasingly important to our policymakers and 
to our operators, but it's also an area in which the American 
people and Congress invest a lot of treasure and we have to 
make sure it's as efficient as possible. If confirmed as 
USD(I), it's something that will be on the top list of my 
priorities.
    Senator Hagan. You've said that a lot of these efficiencies 
have taken place, but you'll also work to ensure that more 
efficiencies will go forward in these same areas?
    Dr. Vickers. Let me clarify, Senator Hagan. The decisions 
have been made to standardize these intelligence organizations. 
There is an implementation plan that will occur. But yes, 
additional efficiencies might well be sought. Senator Levin 
mentioned in his opening comments about intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and Senator McCain as 
well, that we probably still have some homework to do down the 
road.
    Right now we're trying to give all the support we can to 
our warfighters in Afghanistan, but over time we will 
rationalize those as we move forward.
    Senator Hagan. Obviously, we do want to support them in 
every fashion possible.
    Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has addressed the 
Department's cybersecurity strategy, which I understand 
involves five pillars: the first, recognition that cyberspace 
is a new domain of warfare; two, proactive defenses, avoiding a 
fortress mentality; three, ensure the safety of critical 
infrastructure; four, undertake collective defense; and five, 
sustained technological advantage.
    Dr. Vickers, within these pillars, which do you see as the 
most challenging to facilitate, and why? Just the whole pillars 
of cybersecurity.
    Dr. Vickers. Let me say, cyber is an increasingly important 
domain of warfare or competition, used both for intelligence 
purposes as well as potentially destructive purposes or 
warfighting purposes. The U.S. Cyber Command is overseen by our 
Policy Under Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
while the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence really oversees the intelligence aspects of this.
    But let me try to address your question in saying that the 
reason Cyber Command was established was because of the need to 
have a command for this emerging domain that is so important to 
our national economy and infrastructure, as well as our 
warfighting, but also someone to have an organization and a 
commander that had responsibility for both offense and defense, 
protecting our networks as well as potentially using this tool.
    That integration of offense and defense I think will be 
very critical to our future, supported by appropriate 
intelligence in this new area.
    Senator Hagan. Thank you.
    Dr. Rooney, let me ask you. When confirmed, you will play 
an integral role in implementing Secretary Gates' efficiencies 
initiatives also related to personnel, namely the Army and 
Marine Corps end strength reductions, freeze in civilian hire, 
reduction in contractors in the administration of TRICARE. What 
do you believe will be the impact of these initiatives?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, the efficiencies initiatives, as you've 
suggested, cut across many of the areas under personnel and 
readiness. The first one, from the human resource side, gives 
an opportunity to really take a look at that mixture of Active 
Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contractors, and looks at the 
roles, contractors and civilians, are playing in support 
services. Are some of those same programs still viable? Do they 
need to be administered differently? I think I've seen the term 
used, ``good business practices,'' and that's really just 
another way of saying, ``should we be doing the same thing, and 
if so should it be done maybe a little bit differently?''
    That would be the personnel side and are there ways to cut 
some of those costs and combine, really assess, programs. If 
they're not working, then at that point they need to be 
eliminated and resources shifted to more critical, mission 
critical-type initiatives.
    The health care side again is a myriad of possible 
initiatives, everything from a slight increase in the premiums, 
because that hasn't been changed since the mid-1990s, but also 
changing behaviors--prescription drugs, using mail order 
instead of the current system ends up saving a tremendous 
amount over the years. What we call supply chain, which is as 
you're purchasing, doing similar purchasing and look at how 
you're purchasing supplies for a hospital setting. You get 
great efficiencies in that. Contracting, another way that you 
can also look at your contracts, make sure you're getting not 
only the best prices, but coordination in those areas.
    Then there's some other, longer-term initiatives that end 
up eventually impacting efficiency, and that would be looking 
at practice plans. Are there ways to use urgent care facilities 
so that we're not forcing people to go to emergency rooms? 
That's also an issue on the civilian side. So there are some 
opportunities there, and using primary care physicians 
differently in terms of practice focus, and then also those 
types of things I've seen also working in mental health areas. 
It would be those types of things, taking the current proposals 
and expanding on them.
    Senator Hagan. You certainly do have a full plate in front 
of you. I will say, please look at TRICARE. So many of the 
individuals are having trouble having TRICARE accepted in 
places that are outside the actual bases.
    My time is up. Once again, I thank both of you for your 
commitment to our country. Thank you.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Webb.
    Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Vickers, you're eminently qualified by virtue of 
your military background, your operational experience, your 
educational enhancement, and your policy experience. I think 
this is a great fit and I will be a very strong supporter and 
hope to be working with you on some of these issues in the near 
future.
    Dr. Rooney, I congratulate you on a very strong career to 
date, particularly in the academic area, and your willingness 
to serve. At the same time, I would like to learn more from you 
about how you have prepared yourself to take the experiences 
that you have had and apply them to this position. It's my 
understanding from reading your bio that you have not worked 
with DOD before; is that correct?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, that's correct.
    Senator Webb. This is an extremely important under 
secretaryship. I would like to point out that I recommended the 
creation of this position in 1985 in a memorandum to Caspar 
Weinberger. I'm not the only person who's ever recommended this 
position, but at the time when I was serving as Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, we had 11 different stovepipes moving up 
to the Secretary, which was not a healthy management model. Cap 
Weinberger's hesitation at the time was that it was going to 
consolidate so much of the responsibilities, the day-to-day 
responsibilities of DOD, under one office, and if you're going 
to do that, you need to make sure that the people at the top 
comprehend the special nature of military service and of DOD.
    I'd like to point out, if I may--you may have come across 
this--that solutions in the military don't always compute on a 
traditional civilian model. There are a lot of different 
factors in military service and across the board. We have these 
situations in the acquisition side, too, as well, but 
particularly in the area of personnel.
    Your nomination has come forward very fast. It was sent on 
February 4, which was a Friday, and we've had 11 days, most of 
which last week we weren't here. I have not had the opportunity 
to meet with you. I'm the chairman of the Personnel 
Subcommittee, which is the subcommittee that would have policy 
jurisdiction over the issues that you're working on.
    Can you give me a better idea of how you have prepared 
yourself to understand the unique cultures that are involved in 
the United States military?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I'd be happy to do that. I will step 
back a bit and say that when I went from being a business 
executive with a background in finance and tax law into higher 
education, my first presidency at a doctoral-level institution, 
I had never been a higher education administrator. I had taught 
for a number of years, but never ran a college or university. 
The way I assimilated into that culture was to be a perpetual 
student, which is what I would also propose here: learned 
really what happened in the institution and walk around, talk 
to people, listen, understand. It turned out to be very 
effective, to the point where I, prior to this, have been at my 
second presidency.
    The same with hospitals. When I first started on a hospital 
board, quite frankly, the first meeting I sat in I didn't 
understand most of the acronyms that were put in front of me. 
Again, what I really did was took the time to study it, talk to 
the people, spend time in the traditional form, as they say, 
walk-around management.
    As Senator McCain pointed out earlier, one of the first 
things I would do would be to continue what have been 
tremendous briefings, but they have certainly been briefings, 
sir, and material I've been able to read and get a handle on, 
to understand more clearly the military culture, but also that 
connection between the military members that this role would 
have responsibility for overseeing, personnel and readiness, 
but also the civilian counterparts in many ways and how that 
system worked together, and the contractors.
    I think it would be the breadth of understanding all of 
that, and I think my experience in the past shows that I can 
definitely make that transformation and dive in with that 
passion and that lifelong education focus, would enable me to 
prepare and be very effective for this role.
    Senator Webb. There are military cultures and there are 
cultures within the military cultures, and there are 
expectations that have evolved based on service in different 
eras, and they all affect the area that you are sitting here 
waiting to be confirmed on.
    When I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs, we had all 4 Active Services, all 7 Guard and Reserve 
components, plus political civilians and career civilians, and 
at any staff meeting we had at least 11 different cultural 
traditions among the uniformed people sitting at that table, 
with different relationships, quite frankly, with the 
overarching policies of DOD.
    On issues of health care, you just mentioned the notion of 
increasing the premiums on TRICARE. Would you elaborate on 
that?
    Dr. Rooney. I mentioned that one of the efficiencies 
initiatives set out for us by the Secretary was a modest 
increase, and I believe that number was about $5 per month, in 
the premiums, understanding that we have the duty and 
obligation to support our Service people--it's what we said 
from the beginning, that we would take care of our Service 
people--but on the other hand trying to find a balance of 
supporting that, but also doing it in a fiscally sound and 
sustainable manner. I would support the Secretary's position in 
looking at those modest increases.
    Senator Webb. Here's something you want to remember. As 
someone who grew up in the military, served in the military, 
have family members in the military, health care--lifetime 
health care for career military people--was part of a moral 
contract. I grew up inside that moral contract. On the one 
hand, if you're applying a civilian model to a DOD medical 
program, you can say, ``well, if you compare a civilian health 
care plan, this is an incredibly good deal.'' On the other 
hand, these are people who have been told since the day they 
came into the military that they're going to have health care 
for the rest of their lives if they give a career to the U.S. 
military.
    It's a moral contract. I'm the chairman of the subcommittee 
that's going to have to evaluate this proposal, and I hope you 
will pay strong attention to--again, this is the abstract 
nature of military service that doesn't come out when you try 
to compare a model directly with civilian programs.
    There are a number of other areas like that. I'm going to 
ask you to do something. I'm going to ask you to come by and 
see me. I did not have the opportunity to talk to you, and we 
can discuss some of these things a bit more.
    Dr. Rooney. I would welcome the opportunity, sir.
    Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.
    I'm next in order, but let me recognize Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me too add to all of my colleagues, our thanks for your 
service, to both of you, and your willingness to serve. I think 
it's admirable.
    Dr. Vickers, first with you. I've read your bio and I've 
learned a little bit about you and I like everything I see. 
Also, I'm new. With some of my colleagues, we're new to this 
committee, but we're also new to this process of evaluating 
where we are in the world, where we're going and how we get 
there in the most efficient manner. You seem to have been part 
of an Afghanistan movement back with the Soviet Union and what 
you were able to witness, what you were able to be a part of, 
to see an outcome, and to see how we dropped the ball. I think 
that was very well-documented.
    We're in a situation now where, if you could for me 
identify who our enemy is in the Middle East, what the strength 
of our enemy is, what is the cost to our enemy, what they're 
financing their war with, and compared to what we as the United 
States Government and the people that are supporting our 
troops, which we will always do, and the comparison between 
what you saw in the outcome of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan to where we are today, and the predicted outcome--
it's the longest war we've ever been in and we're not seeing 
much change. If you could help me with that, sir, first, your 
evaluation, because I don't know of a better person that's had 
a bird's-eye view and can evaluate this than you.
    Dr. Vickers. Thank you, sir. As you alluded to, one of the 
tragedies at the end of the Cold War, one of the great 
tragedies, is that we, after winning the war in Afghanistan, 
driving the Red Army out, failed to win the peace and left a 
sanctuary in which al Qaeda could grow, in partnership with the 
Taliban, that then led to the events of September 11. Secretary 
Gates has said repeatedly that we will never make that mistake 
again.
    As part of your second question----
    Senator Manchin. I'm sorry to interrupt you on that, but if 
I could just ask for a further clarification. With that comment 
that Secretary Gates made and with the failure of before, of 
the Soviets, then what we're saying is that we need to have a 
presence, maybe a different type of a presence, but we will 
have to have a presence over there. The American people should 
understand, the citizens of this country should understand, we 
have to have a presence there.
    Dr. Vickers. What form that engagement takes, of course, 
will be determined based on conditions down the road. But 
unlike at the end of the Cold War, where we essentially 
disengaged from that region and allowed an ungoverned area to 
become very hostile to us and to provide a sanctuary for al 
Qaeda, it's something that we don't want to repeat. A core 
element of our counterterrorism policy is to deny any sanctuary 
to terrorists, so that they can't plan operations against the 
Homeland or our interests abroad.
    You asked about the enemy. Unlike the Cold War, which was a 
very daunting time for Americans of a previous generation, but 
it had one virtue, that we had a principal adversary that we 
could focus on for a long period of time, and we got very good 
at that by the last decade of the Cold War. Today we face a 
more complex environment with a number of challenges around the 
world.
    Foremost among those right now is the continued threat that 
violent extremism poses to us, and specifically al Qaeda. It's 
why the President and his topmost advisors have said we are at 
war with al Qaeda, and that war spans a number of areas. Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates do not depend on great sums of 
financial strength to be able to plot against us in the manner 
they do. The September 11 attacks, for example, were carried 
out with approximately $500,000 of investment.
    Our Treasury Department, working with our interagency 
partners and partners around the world, does everything they 
can to constrict the flow of funds to al Qaeda and other 
terrorist and insurgent groups, and has had a significant 
success. But there are still funds flowing to various groups 
and, as I said, funding is not the critical resource that they 
depend on. It's willing people to do these attacks.
    Senator Manchin. What's the strength of al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan?
    Dr. Vickers. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is largely confined 
now to mid-level operatives, no senior operatives.
    Senator Manchin. 10,000, 100,000?
    Dr. Vickers. No, sir. The Taliban insurgency is in the tens 
of thousands. Al Qaeda would be under 50,000 or so, 50,000 to 
75,000, and that is on a part-time basis. Al Qaeda is 
principally concentrated elsewhere, in Pakistan and then its 
affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere.
    Senator Manchin. We have how many troops in Afghanistan 
now?
    Dr. Vickers. We have just about 98,000 troops, just shy of 
100,000, and 40,000-some of our coalition partners, and 
building up a substantial Afghan National Security Force 
(ANSF).
    The principal challenge in Afghanistan is the Taliban which 
is still aligned with al Qaeda. They provided sanctuary to them 
in the past. It is adjacent to Pakistan, where al Qaeda's 
senior leadership resides currently. The President's stated 
goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and prevent 
their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. So Pakistan and 
Afghanistan are an integrated strategy for the United States. 
Even though Afghanistan is not principally where al Qaeda is, 
it could become a future safe haven if we were to repeat the 
errors we made after the Cold War.
    Senator Manchin. I think the hardest thing that I have to 
understand, I know the people in West Virginia have to 
understand, is the greatest army that history has ever known, 
the United States, and the greatest trained and equipped 
soldiers, we're at 100,000 and let's say that our enemy may be 
at 30,000 maximum, probably more 10,000 or 15,000, by every 
report that I'm receiving.
    I've also read in your bio that you have a different type 
of a procedure that you think would have worked there, or maybe 
you still think that or not, by an unconventional type of war 
with your special operations. I think that it sounds very 
intriguing and it seems like we're not going in that direction.
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, every counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency challenge has to be taken on its own merits 
and time. Ultimately, these are internal conflicts or 
transnational conflicts. We can't prevail in these wars 
without--in the counterterrorism case, it's a global 
challenge--a host of international partners. We simply couldn't 
do it by ourselves. In any intra-state conflict, in an 
insurgency, ultimately it's the locals that have to be able to 
secure their territory. Sometimes we have to create the time 
and space for them to be able to do that as we build them up.
    After our great success in 2001 of overthrowing the Taliban 
and kicking al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, we unfortunately did 
not build up ANSFs to a sufficient level where they could gain 
control or stabilize their country and secure it. We are 
rapidly addressing that in the past few years.
    Again, I would just caution that some of this is in the 
range of tactics specific to a portion in time, that may apply 
to one situation or one country and not another, or for this 
period of time and not a later period of time. But ultimately 
we have to empower locals to succeed.
    Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, if I may very quickly just 
follow up.
    If I may request that maybe I can meet with you personally 
and go into that in more detail, I would appreciate it very 
much, sir.
    Dr. Rooney, just very quickly. I have heard and I know that 
Senator Webb had mentioned and talked about some concerns he 
may have. That would be a valid concern when you see the 
resume, but the bottom line is I also see your private sector 
experience, too. Would you consider yourself a cost-cutter or 
efficiency expert?
    Dr. Rooney. I think if you ask those that have worked with 
me, they'd probably say yes.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Let me take my time and then recognize Senator Ayotte for a 
second round and, Senator Blumenthal, if you also want a second 
round.
    Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, welcome. Thank you for your 
service. I've had the privilege to work with Secretary Vickers 
before. Thank you very much.
    First of all, because of your extensive experience in your 
field of endeavor, if there's anything that you feel would be 
best held to comment on in a private, nonpublic session, let me 
know. Don't feel obliged to answer. But one question I think is 
obvious in the wake of the last several days. We have 
cooperated and collaborated with intelligence services 
throughout the Maghreb--Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, et cetera. 
What's your estimate of the status today of that cooperation 
going forward? Would that impose any complications on efforts 
under your jurisdiction?
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, the U.S. Government has intelligence 
relationships with scores of partners around the world, many 
scores of partners, including in North Africa and the Middle 
East. Each of those relationships is important in some right, 
but they vary in terms of the depth of intelligence sharing and 
the particular threat that emanates from that country. I would 
hesitate in this open session to give a general answer, other 
than it's very important.
    A number of al Qaeda plots are broken up every year and 
they are done by our local partners with intelligence 
assistance in some cases from us, in some cases intelligence 
provided by them. Our relationships with some of these 
countries that have had instability in recent weeks, we've had 
longstanding ties with them that will transcend this 
instability, both on the military side and on the civilian 
intelligence side. Sir, I'd be happy to talk to you about it in 
greater detail.
    Senator Reed. Let me open up another topic, which Senator 
Hagan alluded to. That's cyber security. History often suggests 
that we fight the last war and prepare for the last war. I 
think we all recognize now that, even in the context of low-
intensity conflict, that cyber activities are becoming 
increasingly more important. Let me pose some issues.
    How well do you think we're prepared for it, its coming, to 
what are the gaps, technological, institutional, and even legal 
gaps, in terms of your ability to actually deal with this new 
technology?
    Dr. Vickers. Sir, it is critically important and it's a 
domain that, as you indicated, is employed by both state and 
non-state actors in both forms of conflict, both for 
intelligence purposes as well as disruption and others. Cyber 
poses a number of challenges because it is inherently a global 
enterprise, so a lot of cyber traffic, of course, comes through 
the United States, which previous Congresses have addressed, 
which has been a tremendous help to U.S. intelligence.
    I would be guilty of practicing law without a license if I 
go too far----
    Senator Reed. You wouldn't be the first here. [Laughter.]
    Dr. Vickers. But in some cases it raises questions when the 
web site or server, for example, raises neutrality questions in 
law, of where that site is located. So it poses a number of 
unique challenges for us.
    Then of course, there's always intelligence gain-loss when 
we look at operations in these areas. Is it better to monitor 
someone or take down? There's always very difficult decisions 
for policymakers to weigh in that area as well.
    Senator Reed. I think this is again a topic that will 
consume us, indeed consume us going forward.
    Dr. Rooney, you've had an extraordinarily accomplished 
career. My colleagues with more experience have commented on 
the unique culture of the military, and it is unique. But my 
sense is that you have associated yourself and worked with 
people who share some of the same attributes as our military. 
They have vocations, not just jobs; and they're dedicated to 
selfless service, not just to personal ambition. I think in 
your service and your association you have those, so I think 
those might be touchstones going forward as you begin this job 
and I think they will be valuable touchstones.
    But let me ask two basic questions. You have a myriad of 
responsibilities, from the immediate you've spoken about, but 
there's one that's continuing, and that is to try to integrate 
not just the operations within DOD, but DOD and the Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA). I know VA Secretary Shinseki has been 
working very diligently on this.
    We have problems where soldiers, sailors, marines, and 
airmen are injured and then they had disability determinations 
and then they're transferred to the VA system and there's no 
continuity of care. Just whatever impressions you have today of 
how you're going to deal with more fully integrating what the 
VA does for our veterans with what DOD does for Active Duty and 
Reserve personnel?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. While I have not been able to have an 
entire deep dive, what I can say is what I've learned is you're 
absolutely correct that the timing--even with the new 
integrated system--there is the first phase of that's been put 
in; there's two more phases throughout this year. My 
understanding is that will proceed on the timeline outlined. 
But those timeframes are still approaching just under a year, 
340 days, I think was the last I saw.
    I think any of us sitting here, while we might not know 
what the exact answer is, if you're looking for those services 
a day is too long, a week is too long. There are clearly some 
opportunities where better coordination and being able to 
understand where that process is bogging down. My understanding 
is it's in three different areas. What can be done to ensure 
much better communication and cooperation, building on--yes, a 
technology infrastructure is one way, so you don't duplicate 
services, but it's not the only answer at this point.
    I concur that what I've seen really points out some 
improvement, but a dramatic need for some further coordination 
between all areas.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    One other area. Under the new financial reform legislation, 
we have created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and 
within that Bureau, there is an Office of Servicemember 
Affairs. In fact, Holly Petraeus is leading that up. I'm sure 
you will, but I urge you to ensure you link up, because some of 
the problems that military personnel face in terms of paying 
bills, in terms of getting appropriate resolution of their 
rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is a function 
not only of DOD, but this new bureau. A lot of what you can do 
and will do through the Services is educating young military 
personnel about their rights and their responsibilities. That's 
just some advice as you, I assume, prepare to take these 
responsibilities.
    Dr. Rooney. Thank you, sir. If confirmed, I will.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, doctor.
    Dr. Rooney. Thank you.
    Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Rooney, you were talking with Senator Webb about the 
health care system within the military and he mentioned to you 
the moral obligation that we have to the military. Appreciating 
that we're in a fiscal climate where we do need to look to do 
things differently, there are still some unmet needs. In my 
State of New Hampshire, we have approximately the fifth or 
seventh highest per capita rate of veterans in the country. 
Yet, effectively we're the only State in the Nation that does 
not have a full-service veterans hospital. Alaska is similarly 
situated, but there is an Active Duty military base in Alaska 
where there is full service available.
    I would ask you for a commitment to work with me to look at 
that need and to come up with a solution so that the needs of 
veterans in New Hampshire are met, and particularly since we 
have more and more deploying as well in the Guard and becoming 
veterans and serving our country.
    I would ask you to look at that very carefully, because it 
is a moral obligation that we have to fulfill and, 
unfortunately, my State is one where I don't believe that moral 
obligation is being fully met.
    Dr. Rooney. Absolutely. If confirmed, I would look forward 
to that.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
    The other question I have for you, we had talked briefly 
yesterday about this, but given the multiple deployments of our 
Guard and Reserve, what is it that you think that we can do to 
ensure that when our Guard and Reserve deploy and also when 
they return home that the services are in place to make sure 
that as they return to civilian life, both they and their 
families are getting the services that they need? Because with 
the multiple deployments in the Active Duty, there is usually a 
base where there is a much more robust set of programs 
available than in the Guard and Reserve. Yet we've asked so 
much of our Guard and Reserve with these deployments.
    I would ask you what thoughts you have on that to make sure 
that we are serving our Guard and Reserve and so when they come 
home that they can acclimate back into civilian life and we 
give them that support that they deserve?
    Dr. Rooney. You're right. I'm glad we had a brief 
opportunity to have that conversation. But really, the issue 
does come that this is the first time where we have relied on 
the Guard and Reserve and their families to the extent that we 
have with multiple deployments. One of the factors I think 
everyone is recognizing now is when these people go home it 
isn't to a base. They're scattering throughout their States, 
they're scattering throughout the country.
    The Department has not always been acutely aware of how to 
connect those people to services. At times--and we talked about 
it--there are some good examples where private sector 
nonprofits are brought in to be able to cover that. But that's 
not uniform across the country. So it would be a combination of 
looking at some of those States and those areas where those 
services are being connected better and seeing ways to do that 
across the country.
    The other thing would be to close some gaps, where there 
are benefits being given to Active Duty, but yet there's some 
that slip through for education, potentially, to make sure that 
those again extend to employers; to see how again that reentry 
process can be either streamlined and also involve the 
employers in that. Again, it's uniformity across the country, 
but there are some good examples out there to build on.
    Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate that, and also 
would point you to a New Hampshire program called the 
deployment cycle support program that is a partnership between 
State agencies and also the private sector, as a pilot or one 
that you could look to, that I think is very effective and one 
that other States could employ as well.
    Dr. Rooney. Absolutely.
    Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, we had testimony in 
February from General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey about Iraq 
and our withdrawal from Iraq in December. I wanted to get your 
assessment, the other day I saw a report of another terrorist 
incident in Iraq. My question to you is, do you have any 
concerns about our ability to transfer security as of December 
to the Iraqis? Also, we're going to leave a significant 
responsibility to protect our own people with the State 
Department, without the military support. What thoughts do you 
have on that?
    Dr. Vickers. I am confident that we're on the path toward 
this transition. There will be a robust civilian mission--as 
Iraq becomes a normal country, there will still be a large 
diplomatic mission, with military assistance, intelligence, a 
range of things to ensure that any threats to the stability of 
Iraq or threats external there are properly dealt with through 
our Iraqi partners.
    That transition has already been well underway since August 
2010 on a path to the end of 2011, and I have no reason to 
expect that it won't succeed. There is still violence in Iraq, 
but it is at very low levels compared to what it has been. Some 
of these attacks of course make news and they will continue to 
be a challenge for Iraq going forward, but it's something I 
have high confidence that the Iraqis can handle.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Reed. Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just a couple of quick questions. First, to pursue the very 
significant questions asked by Senator Reed, and more comment 
on them than question. If there are any legal impediments to 
your efforts in this cyber area, I would very much like to know 
about them and I hope that you will suggest them, because I 
think, as Senator Reed very importantly observed, this is the 
next war or it may be even the present war, and if there's 
anything that you need in that area, meaning you collectively, 
DOD, our defense efforts, I would appreciate your letting us 
know.
    Then to pursue an answer that you gave to Senator McCain. 
He asked about the corruption in Pakistan, which you very 
adroitly referred to as a governance challenge. Do we face the 
same kind of governance challenge in Afghanistan and, if so, to 
what extent, and what are we doing about it?
    Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. In any counterinsurgency, governance 
and development are essential lines of operation as much as 
security. Ultimately, of course, it's up to the people of a 
nation to determine how they'll be governed. Afghanistan's 
history has been one essentially of decentralized government, a 
central state that does some functions, but then the provinces 
and local areas have a lot of autonomy. When Afghanistan has 
been stable throughout its history, it's been with that model.
    The challenge is to make sure that there is governance that 
first and foremost meets the needs of the Afghan people, but, 
second, also does not undermine the international coalition's 
effort through corruption or other areas in providing 
assistance to the Government of Afghanistan. So governance is a 
central challenge in stability and it is in Afghanistan as it 
is in many countries around the world. But in Afghanistan, of 
course, we have 100,000 troops and so we care very dearly about 
it.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Dr. Rooney, just very briefly. You may be aware that in the 
past there have been difficulties in some of the treatment of 
our National Guard and our reservists in terms of recognizing 
that they have become in effect part of our Active-Duty Force 
and the failure to recognize that service in educational 
benefits and sometimes health care has been a problem. I've 
observed it in Connecticut, and I would appreciate your 
commitment that you will do everything possible to make sure 
that they are given the recognition they deserve in terms of 
those benefits and fair treatment and keeping faith with them.
    Dr. Rooney. Absolutely, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
    I want to thank Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney for your 
testimony today and, on behalf of Chairman Levin and the 
Ranking Member, Senator McCain, for your service and your 
prospective service.
    If there are no further questions, the hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael G. Vickers by 
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and 
the Special Operations reforms have endured for a generation. I do not 
see a need for any modifications at this time. If confirmed as the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), I will be alert 
to the need for any modifications.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. N/A.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of 
the USD(I)?
    Answer. The USD(I)'s primary responsibility is to support the 
Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related 
responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 U.S.C. 
This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on 
behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations 
within the Department of Defense (DOD); ensuring that intelligence 
organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to 
support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD 
components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are 
responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the 
execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant forces, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the 
Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring 
that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and 
managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive 
activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and 
managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department 
personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military 
Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD components funded by 
the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in 
compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring 
that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-
related information sufficient to execute its oversight 
responsibilities.
    Question. What background and experience do you possess that you 
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
    Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the background and 
experience to perform the duties of the USD(I). My qualifications 
include: my training, operational experience, duties, and 
accomplishments as a Special Forces soldier and officer, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, and Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and 
Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)); my experience as a 
producer and consumer of intelligence at both the tactical/operational 
and national levels; my experience executing and overseeing clandestine 
operations and covert action programs; and my regular interaction and 
close relationships with the Office of the USD(I), the leadership of 
the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the leadership of several key 
foreign intelligence services.
    For the past 3\1/2\ years as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had 
responsibility for overseeing the global operations of DOD, including 
the war with al Qaeda, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sensitive 
counterproliferation and counternarcotics operations. I have had 
responsibility for overseeing a wide-range of intelligence operations, 
spanning the full range of intelligence priorities and capabilities, 
and have had responsibility for overseeing and supporting the full-
range of special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S. 
Government. As a member of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, I have 
participated in the major resource allocation decisions of the 
Department, including many involving national and military 
intelligence. I have had access to all of the Department's special 
access programs.
    As a senior policy official, I have participated extensively in 
Deputies' Committee Meetings, and occasionally, Principals' Committee 
Meetings and meetings of the National Security Council chaired by the 
President, and through this experience, I have developed a keen 
appreciation for how intelligence supports policy. As a result of my 
oversight of global operations and the operational capabilities of the 
Department, I have developed a deep understanding of intelligence-
driven operations and the Department's intelligence capabilities, 
including those in the cyber domain.
    I am a graduate of the CIA's Career Training Program and a CIA-
certified Operations Officer. I have served operationally in three CIA 
Divisions: Latin America, Special Activities, and Near East and South 
Asia. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship 
with the Director and Deputy Directors of the CIA, as well as the 
Chiefs of CIA Centers, Divisions, Offices, and Stations and Bases. I 
have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the 
DNI and the staff and components of Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI). I have had extensive interaction with and have a 
deep understanding of the intelligence organizations of DOD. I have had 
frequent interaction and have close relationships with the heads of 
several foreign intelligence services.
    Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to 
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?
    Answer. If confirmed, I believe there are actions I would need to 
take to strengthen OUSD(I)'s oversight of the military intelligence 
program and clandestine activities and support for the national 
intelligence program. I also believe there are actions I could take 
that could achieve further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do 
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
    Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary would expect me to 
discharge the duties and functions--both explicit and implicit--as 
outlined above. I believe the Secretary would expect me to ensure full 
intelligence support for ongoing operations; to ensure that 
intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective and in 
compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and 
policies; to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is 
postured to prevent strategic surprise; to ensure, without abrogating 
the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility 
and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the 
Department; and to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is 
as efficient as possible. The Secretary may also assign me other duties 
as his priorities and my background and experience warrant.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide my full support to 
the Secretary of Defense in carrying out my duties as his principal 
advisor on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep 
him informed, seek his guidance and direction, exercise his oversight 
authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related 
matters throughout the Department, and attempt to relieve him of as 
many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will keep the Deputy Secretary 
fully informed of my activities and will afford him the same support 
provided the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
    Answer. Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry 
out. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of them. A 
close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
and the USD(I) is particularly important. In my current position as 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a close relationship between 
Defense Policy and Defense Intelligence and between Policy and the 
broader Intelligence Community. I have also worked closely with 
components of the IC on major collection systems. If confirmed as 
USD(I), I would to continue to build on these relationships.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and 
Information Integration (ASD(NII))/Successor Organization.
    Answer. ASD(NII) has had oversight of enabling capabilities which 
are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related 
activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the successor 
organization to ASD(NII) to ensure that this support remains robust.
    Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee 
Policy.
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for 
Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and 
operations.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities 
(ASD(SO/LIC&IC)).
    Answer. USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) interact on several important 
matters, and this interaction has grown substantially during my tenure 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC). As the previous ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will be well-placed, 
if confirmed, to ensure that this close interaction continues. If 
confirmed, I would seek to further expand the already close 
relationships that exist between Defense Intelligence and Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) and between the broader Intelligence Community 
and SOF.
    Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence 
Directors.
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the Program Executive for the 
Military Intelligence Program, I will work with the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure 
their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments 
and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the 
current and future security environment, and that the intelligence 
organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their 
respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the 
Department, and the Nation.
    Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the 
General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue 
to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice on the 
myriad legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.
    Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Chairman 
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a wide range of 
issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I would continue this close 
relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence 
Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and combatant 
commands.
    Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, including U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had policy oversight of SOCOM, 
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. 
Transportation Command. I was involved in the initial planning for the 
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command. I have had close relationships 
with all of the geographic combatant commanders. If confirmed as 
USD(I), I will build on these relationships to ensure that the 
intelligence needs of the commanders of the combatant commands are met.
    Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Directors 
of the Defense intelligence agencies. If confirmed as USD(I), I will 
exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control 
over the National Security Agency (NSA), NGA, NRO, and DIA. In this 
capacity, I will provide planning, policy, and strategic oversight over 
the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans, and 
programs they execute. I will work with the Office of the DNI to ensure 
clear and unambiguous guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence 
agencies.
    Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Office of 
the DNI and its components, and have worked closely with the Director. 
If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to fully support the DNI in his goal 
of greater Intelligence Community integration. Dual-hatted as the DNI's 
Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI 
on Defense intelligence capabilities. I will exercise the Secretary of 
Defense's authority, direction, and control over the Directors of NSA, 
NGA, NRO and DIA, and I will consult with the DNI regarding national 
intelligence and related matters as appropriate.
    Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a particularly 
close relationship between the CIA and the Department. If confirmed as 
USD(I), I will strive to forge an even closer relationship with the 
Director of CIA, and will fully support him in his role as National 
Manager for Human Intelligence.
    Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the 
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. If confirmed as 
USD(I), I will build on this already close relationship, and provide 
policy, oversight, and guidance for all Defense intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and security support provided to the National 
Counterterrorism Center.
    Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National 
Intelligence.
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support the Deputy and 
Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure unity of effort 
in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
    Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with 
intelligence responsibilities.
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of 
Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
security matters for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I will 
work with DHS to expand our intelligence and law enforcement 
information-sharing initiatives with state and local authorities.

                     MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the USD(I)?
    Answer. The major challenges that, in my view, will confront the 
next USD(I) are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global 
operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-
driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence 
environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent 
strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the 
need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. 
Additionally, we must do a better job of protecting intelligence 
sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of 
information.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. If I am confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to 
ongoing operations, I would do my best to ensure that sufficient 
resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that 
intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that 
it is properly protected. I would also ensure that the clear priorities 
are established, that actions are taken to mitigate strategic risk, and 
that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient and adaptive 
as possible.
    Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems 
in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?
    Answer. One of the most serious problems currently confronting the 
USD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The 
spate of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive information places 
our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations at risk. 
It threatens to undermine senior leaders' confidence in the 
confidentiality of their deliberations, and the confidence our foreign 
partners have that classified information they share with us will be 
protected.
    Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines 
would you establish to address these problems?
    Answer. The Office of the USD(I) (OUSD(I)) recently led a 
comprehensive review of information security policy. If confirmed, I 
will work with the DOD Chief Information Officer to facilitate 
immediate implementation of the review's recommendations, as 
appropriate, and will take additional actions as required.

                               PRIORITIES

    Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were quoted as saying: ``I spend 
about 95 percent of my time on operations'' leaving the rest of your 
time for ``Service Secretary-like'' activities including policy, 
personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions 
impacting Special Operations Forces.
    Do you believe that division of time was appropriate in your 
position as ASD(SO/LIC&IC)?
    Answer. I have been assigned a very broad set of responsibilities 
during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). Per the statutory obligations of 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have oversight of Special Operations Forces. I also 
serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on Irregular Warfare matters 
across the Department. I help provide oversight of the Department's 
global operations, including the war with al Qaeda and its affiliates 
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have shared oversight of the 
Department's clandestine operations and sensitive activities, including 
several which have involved the collection of intelligence. I have 
regularly participated in the national security policy decisionmaking 
process at Deputies' Committee meetings, and serve as the Secretary's 
principal advisor on special activities conducted by other agencies of 
the U.S. Government. In my Interdependent Capabilities role, I have had 
oversight of the Department's strategic and conventional forces, in 
addition to the Department's Special Operations Forces. I also help 
oversee the Department's special access programs. I have oversight of 
the Department counternarcotics and counterthreat finance activities, 
stability operations, partnership strategy, and humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief, and was recently assigned responsibility for 
overseeing additional aspects of the Department's information 
operations (IO).
    The time I have personally devoted to each of these areas has 
varied, consistent with their importance to the Department's mission 
and the degree to which I could delegate oversight to my Principal 
Deputy. During the first 18 months of my tenure, I spent substantial 
amounts of time on capability and resource allocation decisions across 
strategic, conventional, and Special Operations Forces. During the 
2009-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, I focused intensely on the 
Special Operations and Irregular Warfare capabilities of the 
Department. The unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which 
U.S. forces are involved, and the strategic importance of and oversight 
required for sensitive activities conducted by the United States have 
required increasing amounts of my time since mid-2008. With the war 
with al Qaeda and its affiliates, the war in Afghanistan, and other 
sensitive operations for which I have oversight responsibilities, the 
preponderance of my time in 2010 has been devoted to oversight of 
operations. This has been in line with the President's and Secretary's 
priorities. Throughout my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), blessed with my 
exceptionally capable and willing partner in Admiral Eric Olson, I 
believe that I have provided the strong oversight of and advocacy for 
Special Operations Forces that Congress intended when it established 
the position of ASD(SO/LIC). I likewise believe I have been effective 
in fulfilling my duties across my entire portfolio. Accordingly, I 
believe that the allocation of my time has been appropriate.
    Question. How would you anticipate dividing your time as the 
USD(I)?
    Answer. Although there is some overlap, the duties and functions 
assigned to USD(I) are very different from those I currently have as 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC). That said, if confirmed, I would use a similar approach 
to allocating my time: focusing on the President's and Secretary's top 
priorities and on the most difficult challenges, and delegating other 
responsibilities where I can to my Principal Deputy or other senior 
staff. I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of 
intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, 
and other duties as the Secretary and the DNI may assign.
    Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish 
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I would establish the following 
broad priorities: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense 
intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the 
President's objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al 
Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department 
is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations 
conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all relevant 
statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic 
surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring 
that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I 
would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that we have the 
right collection and analytical priorities, that we have a robust ISR 
architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future, that 
the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those 
of the CIA and National Clandestine Service, that the President's 
highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced, that 
analysis addresses policymakers and operational commanders' needs, that 
intelligence is timely, accessible, and protected, and, where 
appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to 
improve our intelligence capabilities.

                          COMBATING TERRORISM

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the 
Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism (CT), both 
at home and abroad?
    Answer. The Department's counterterrorism strategy directly 
supports the President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
al Qaeda and its affiliates, first operationally and regionally, and 
then strategically and globally. Operationally defeating al Qaeda and 
its affiliates requires actions that render the organization incapable 
of planning and conducting attacks. Doing this requires, among other 
things, that the relationship between al Qaeda and groups that support 
al Qaeda and provide it sanctuary be severed. Strategically defeating 
al Qaeda requires preventing al Qaeda's resurgence. Achieving these 
aims requires a sustained global CT campaign involving several mutually 
reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. These include 
preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by 
terrorist groups, conducting operations to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat terrorist organizations and deny them sanctuary, building the 
capacity of our partners, and countering radicalization. Within zones 
of hostilities, the Department has a lead role, along with our 
international partners. Outside such zones and those areas where named 
operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the 
Department plays a supporting role. While al Qaeda and its affiliates 
remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is 
that we--the Department, the U.S. Government, and our international 
partners--have the correct strategy, and it is increasingly working, 
particularly since mid-2008.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities 
related to combating terrorism?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will build on the work of my predecessors 
to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged and 
supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda and combat terrorism. I 
will work closely with the Military Departments and Services, the 
Defense intelligence agencies, the combatant commanders, the 
Intelligence Community, and our international partners to ensure that 
we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve our CT 
objectives.
    Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure 
that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?
    Answer. During my tenure as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), it has become 
increasingly clear to me that close collaboration among U.S. 
departments and agencies and with our international partners is 
essential to CT success. Within DOD, we have restructured our 
organization to ensure full interagency contributions to the fight, 
through the establishment, for example, of Joint Interagency Task 
Forces (JIATF). We have forged an extremely close operational 
partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and we have 
substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts. 
We have also given top priority to the rapid development of CT and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. I believe these actions posture 
the Department to effectively combat terrorism.
    Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better 
coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal 
agencies?
    Answer. During my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), we have worked hard to 
achieve unity of effort in CT operations across the U.S. national and 
homeland security establishment. This has included significant efforts 
to improve coordination of operations and interagency concurrence. If 
confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to build on this by moving, for 
example, from coordination of intelligence operations to integration.

                        SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

    Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had oversight of all section 1208 
activities by Special Operations Forces to provide support (including 
training, funding, and equipment) to foreign regular forces, irregular 
forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations 
to combat terrorism.
    What is your assessment of this authority?
    Answer. Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a 
critical authority for the war with al Qaeda and for counterterrorism 
and related COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the specific 
details of Section 1208 use are classified, it has enabled important 
human intelligence operations, operational preparation of the 
environment, advance force operations, unconventional warfare 
operations, and partnered CT operations.
    Question. Do you believe changes to the authority and/or funding 
restrictions are needed?
    Answer. I support the current request for additional funding 
authority, raising the annual funding level restriction from $40 
million to $50 million, and I support extending the authority for the 
duration of named counterterrorist operations and for other 
contingencies.

                      SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

    Question. During your time as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), Special Operations 
Forces expanded their role in a number of areas important to countering 
violent extremist organizations, including those related to information 
and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant 
changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the 
activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
    What changes, if any, would you recommend to SOCOM's title 10 
missions?
    Answer. The list of special operations activities in section 167 of 
title 10, U.S.C. could be updated to reflect SOCOM's current list of 
core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. 
The language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C. also includes ``such 
other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary 
of Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary the 
flexibility they need to meet changing circumstances.
    Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role of Special 
Operations Forces in the Department's IO?
    Answer. IOs are a core SOF task. They are a vital instrument in 
countering violent extremism and other transnational threats. They can 
greatly enable unconventional warfare operations. IO support special 
operations from the combatant command level to the tactical 
battlefield.
    Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out 
by special operations personnel different from those carried out by 
others in the Intelligence Community?
    Answer. Some intelligence operations conducted by special 
operations personnel have unique attributes which are a function of the 
background, training, and experience of special operators, the missions 
assigned to their organizations, the intelligence targets they pursue, 
and the collection methods they employ. Special operations intelligence 
activities primarily support SOF intelligence requirements. However, 
when directed, SOF intelligence operations also support Intelligence 
Community and combatant commander requirements. For certain national 
collection missions, SOF personnel receive the same training as 
officers in national intelligence organizations.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence 
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are adequately 
coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the 
Intelligence Community?
    Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence 
activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable 
law, policy, and agreements, including Intelligence Community Directive 
Number 304 and the Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and CIA 
Concerning Operational Activities, July 20, 2005. If confirmed, I would 
further the operational integration between SOF and the Intelligence 
Community that has progressively been put in place during my tenure as 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC).

                MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

    Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have with 
respect to military information support operations (MISO)?
    Answer. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise plays a crucial role in 
support of MISOs. Collecting and analyzing the information required to 
understand complex foreign human environments is the foundation for 
effective IOs. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that military 
IOs are properly coordinated and operationally integrated with the IOs 
of other organizations within the Intelligence Community.
    Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of 
the term ``psychological operations'' in favor of the term ``military 
information support operations.''
    Why do you believe such a terminology change was necessary?
    Answer. Psychological operations as a term had become increasingly 
anachronistic, and had taken on avoidable, negative connotations. MISO 
is a more accurate description of the purpose of these operations.
    Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe 
such a change will have?
    Answer. I believe it will have positive operational and doctrinal 
impacts.
    Question. In your experience as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), do you believe the 
Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the 
range of military information support missions being asked of them?
    Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and as a senior advisor to the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review before that, I strongly supported 
significant growth in our psychological operations/MISOs force 
structure. MISO forces remain in high demand across our combatant 
commands. MISOs require specially trained personnel and unique 
capabilities, and such personnel are important assets not only for the 
Department, but for other departments and agencies of the U.S. 
Government as well. Given the rapid rate of change in the information 
environment and the diverse character of this environment, sustained 
modernization and a diverse portfolio of capabilities is required. Our 
long-term goal is measured growth and significant quality improvements 
for this force.

                      COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

    Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number 
of psychological operations and influence programs under the rubric of 
strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have 
any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government 
Accountability Office reports that DOD ``spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars each year'' to support these operations, including initiatives 
funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and 
the geographic combatant commands. Many of these programs support 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support 
Teams from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of 
particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the 
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
In your capacity as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had limited oversight of a 
number of these programs. In the position for which you have been 
nominated, you will continue to play a role in these programs.
    What are your views on DOD's strategic communications, 
psychological operations and influence programs, and their integration 
into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?
    Answer. The effectiveness of Department IOs in the rapidly evolving 
global information environment is an increasingly important determinant 
of our ability to achieve U.S. military objectives. DOD has an 
important role in IOs, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in 
zones of armed conflict. DOD IOs must be integrated with other U.S. 
Government efforts--those by the Department of State and other 
government agencies--to shape information environments to our 
advantage. They must also reduce our adversaries' abilities to do the 
same.
    Question. In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second-in-command, 
declared that ``We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking 
place in the battlefield of the media.'' Earlier this year, a non-
partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter 
radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-
Jihadism).
    As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), what did you do to further DOD's strategic 
appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda and its affiliates?
    Answer. DOD fully recognizes the importance of al Qaeda's ideology 
and the extent to which it underpins the al Qaeda movement. As ASD(SO/
LIC&IC), I worked to advance this strategic appreciation within DOD and 
across the interagency. I have strongly advocated for programs and 
activities, many of which are conducted by other departments and 
agencies of the U.S. Government, to deal with the ideological challenge 
posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the unclassified realm, my 
office was recently involved in the establishment of the Department of 
State-led Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which 
will serve as the interagency focal point for U.S. Government counter-
radicalization efforts.
    Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that 
foment violence?
    Answer. The most effective counter will be within the affected 
population and the radical groups themselves.
    Question. What do you understand to be the role of the Intelligence 
Community, as opposed to DOD and the State Department?
    Answer. The Intelligence Community has special authorities and 
capabilities that can be brought to bear. Intelligence collection and 
analysis informs all IOs.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to utilize the results 
of research being conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural 
Behavioral Modeling programs?
    Answer. Research from the Minerva program and the applications 
developed as part of Human Social Cultural Behavioral (HSCB) Modeling 
program are components of the overall Defense Intelligence effort to 
improve socio-cultural information. As currently envisioned by OUSD(I), 
the socio-cultural analytic effort will integrate social science 
research, all-source analysis, and regional expertise into fused 
intelligence products. The modeling capabilities in HSCB will help 
analysts manage and visualize large volumes of data on economics, 
infrastructure, demographics, et cetera. Insights developed as a result 
of enhanced capabilities could also improve the Intelligence 
Community's ability to provide warning on emerging crises.

                         INFORMATION OPERATIONS

    Question. IOs, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic 
warfare, operational security, computer network operations, 
psychological operations, and military deception--each of these lines 
of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, interwoven.
    What do you understand to be the roles of the OUSD(I) in overseeing 
DOD IOs?
    Answer. The roles and missions for IOs are being addressed by a 
Front End Assessment. I would expect that the OUSD(I) will continue to 
play an appropriate role in the oversight of several of these areas.
    Question. What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to IOs, and 
particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what 
changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of 
Defense?
    Answer. The Front End Assessment is addressing this question. Some 
aspects of IO, as currently defined, will likely migrate to Policy, 
while others will likely remain in USD(I). I would expect that the 
USD(I) will continue to play an important role in overseeing computer 
network operations.
    Question. Given the formation of a separate U.S. Cyber Command, 
what are your views on retaining computer network operations as a core 
competency with IOs?
    Answer. IOs, as currently defined, refer to the integration of 
various information activities to achieve effects across the 
information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The formation 
of U.S. Cyber Command will not change the relationship of computer 
network operations to the other capabilities necessary for DOD to 
conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, 
enhance our ability to conduct IOs in the cyber domain. As noted above, 
oversight of IO and its components, as currently defined, is being 
addressed in a Front End Assessment.

                         COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

    Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence 
Community have called for applying significantly more resources and 
attention to identifying, tracking, and halting the flow of money 
associated with the terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade. 
Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and 
components supporting the construction and employment of improvised 
explosive devices.
    What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into 
identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorism 
and narcotics, especially in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Engaging all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the 
flow of money associated with terrorist networks, the illegal narcotics 
trade, and other threats to the U.S. Government is critical. The narco-
insurgent nexus is a key enabler, for example, of the insurgency in 
Afghanistan. While DOD is not the U.S. Government lead in counter 
threat finance (CTF), it does have a role to play. We are in the 
process of building an appropriate CTF capability within DOD, and will 
be alert to the need for additional resources.
    Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were responsible for a portion of 
the CTF duties in the Department. What is your assessment of DOD's 
current CTF organizational structure?
    Answer. DOD's threat finance structure is still developing, but it 
is headed in the right direction. In August 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn 
approved the DOD Directive on CTF Policy, which formalizes CTF as a DOD 
mission. CTF Interagency Task Forces are making important contributions 
to our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. A critical element of 
success in the CTF area will be DOD's ability to support the Department 
of Treasury, which has the CTF lead for the U.S. Government. The ODNI 
is also working to strengthen the Treasury Department's capabilities 
with respect to CTF intelligence.

                          INFORMATION SHARING

    Question. There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing 
access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included 
in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within 
the Intelligence Community. As long as these barriers exist, DNI 
Clapper's vision of an integrated repository with analytic tools able 
to connect-the-dots cannot be achieved. The implication is that the 
Nation will remain more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than it could 
be. The reasons cited to justify these information access barriers are 
the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S. 
persons.
    What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater 
access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while 
adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing 
exposure of U.S. persons' information?
    Answer. I believe it is possible to provide greater access to 
counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately 
protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of 
U.S. persons' information. While cognizant of the problem we face with 
respect to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, if 
confirmed, I will seek, in concert with the DNI, to enable better, 
faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data. We have already 
made significant progress in this area. Until very recently, multiple 
U.S. military, civil, and coalition networks in Afghanistan were unable 
to communicate with one another. We have moved to a common, integrated 
network--the Afghan Mission Network--and one common database--Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange--that supports intelligence, military 
operations, command and control, and logistics across all U.S. entities 
and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network 
and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable 
national, tactical, and commercially available data from across the DOD 
and IC is available and discoverable.
    Question. Do you agree with DNI Clapper that these barriers are 
mainly cultural in nature?
    Answer. Yes, I agree with the DNI. Reflecting upon my own 
operational experiences and the intelligence support I have received 
over the years, it is clear that the IC has produced multiple 
generations of intelligence analysts and leaders inculcated with the 
philosophy that need-to-know had to be proven before information could 
be shared. Under that approach, the first and foremost rule was to 
protect sources and methods, or the result would be loss of sensitive 
capabilities and lives. While protecting sources and methods must 
remain a critical concern and need-to-share cannot trump need-to-know, 
there can be an even greater risk to mission or potential loss of life 
if information is not shared between government agencies and with our 
allies. As USD(I), Mr. Clapper initiated and, if confirmed, I will 
continue to foster policy changes and make investments in training and 
capability development that will make Responsibility-to-Provide the 
mindset for the entire DOD enterprise. This is already underway in our 
schoolhouses where Write-for-Release is part of the curriculum, and in 
our acquisition programs where federated information sharing via common 
protocols is an integral part of all fielding efforts at the enterprise 
intelligence architecture level, the combatant commands and the 
military departments.
    Question. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue, 
if confirmed, to be USD(I)?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI to ensure 
that as we build out our information-sharing capability, we do it in 
full synchronization with the IC. I will also ensure that we have 
appropriate controls in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
information.

                            HOMELAND DEFENSE

    Question. With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, DOD has 
been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland 
defense mission.
    In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the 
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of 
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local 
agencies?
    Answer. Two of the longstanding challenges to integrating the 
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of 
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local 
agencies have been IT compatibility and guidance on sharing classified 
information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified 
National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and 
Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress in 
the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between 
sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of 
homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for 
protecting information from unauthorized disclosure. OUSD(I) is 
currently assisting DHS and other agencies in the development of 
implementation policy, and will have an ongoing role in supporting an 
integrated approach.
    Question. Does DOD's existing requirements-setting process 
adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for 
the homeland defense mission?
    Answer. The technical solutions needed to inject homeland defense 
intelligence requirements into the overall DOD requirements-setting 
process now exist or are in development. Dividing finite resources 
among existing DOD intelligence requirements, while ensuring adequate 
support for requirements unique to the homeland defense mission, will 
present a significant challenge. Adequate intelligence support must be 
provided, however. Al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the 
American Homeland, and for at least a decade, intelligence 
professionals have recognized that the foreign-domestic divide has been 
shattered by transnational terrorist groups.

                        EFFECTIVENESS OF USD(I)

    Question. The Secretary of Defense took the extraordinary step of 
establishing an independent ISR Task Force in early 2008 to rectify 
major shortfalls in support to ongoing military and counterterrorism 
operations. The Secretary determined that the Military Services had not 
sufficiently deployed innovative solutions to meet the requirements of 
combatant commanders. Responsibility for this problem lay not only with 
the Military Services but also the functional manager for 
intelligence--the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
    Do you believe that the Secretary's initiative suggests that the 
OUSD(I) lacks expertise, initiative, or clout, or some combination 
thereof, or do you think that other factors prevented appropriate 
action?
    Answer. The ISR Task Force was established by Secretary Gates to 
assess and propose options for maximizing and optimizing deployed ISR 
capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has 
been led by an OUSD(I) Deputy Under Secretary, and is primarily staffed 
by OUSD(I) personnel, though it is also comprised of personnel from 
OSD(AT&L), the Services, Joint Staff, and Combat Support Agencies. The 
establishment of the ISR Task Force does not reflect a unique shortfall 
within OUSD(I). Rather, gaps exist in the ability of the Department to 
quickly meet the urgent near-term needs of our warfighters, 
particularly when facing a rapidly evolving threat. This gap is not 
just confined to ISR or intelligence. The same extraordinary process 
was required, for example, to rapidly procure mine-resistant ambush 
protected vehicles and develop additional counter-IED capabilities for 
Afghanistan. The establishment of the ISR Task Force provided the focus 
and resources necessary to pursue rapid acquisition of ISR assets. Its 
efforts are part of a larger departmental effort to expand and 
institutionalize a rapid acquisition capability led by the USD(AT&L). 
As a result of the ISR Task Force's success, it was determined that 
there is an enduring need for the focus and effectiveness the Task 
Force has brought to integrating ISR systems into Joint Operations. 
Accordingly, the Secretary notified Congress on September 16, 2010, 
that he was institutionalizing the responsibilities of the ISR Task 
Force within the OUSD(I).

              DUAL HAT AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

    Question. In May 2007, Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement designating the USD(I) as the Director of 
Defense Intelligence under the DNI.
    What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities 
of this office under the DNI?
    Answer. The position of the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) 
was established within the ODNI to assist the DNI in the execution of 
DNI responsibilities for the oversight of Defense intelligence matters. 
As the principal advisor to the DNI and ODNI for defense intelligence, 
the DDI is responsible for requirements, intelligence activities, and 
advice and assistance. This includes:

         Overseeing the development of DOD's national 
        intelligence requirements on behalf of the DNI;
         Facilitating alignment, coordination, and 
        deconfliction between National and Defense Intelligence 
        activities; and
         Advising and assisting the DNI by synchronizing and 
        integrating Defense intelligence functions with other IC 
        elements.

    By creating this dual-hat arrangement, the DDI can exercise 
authority on behalf of the DNI, while the USD(I) exercises authorities 
delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. What is your assessment of the relevance or importance of 
this dual designation, and whether it should be continued?
    Answer. I believe strongly in the DDI/USD(I) dual-hat arrangement, 
and strongly support its continuation. I believe it is the most 
effective way to serve the Defense intelligence needs of both the 
Secretary of Defense and the DNI, and it is a key instrument for 
achieving greater integration of U.S. intelligence. The DDI/USD(I) 
attends all National Intelligence Boards, all DNI Executive Committee 
meetings, and all senior ODNI staff meetings. The DDI/USD(I) meets 
weekly with the DNI in a one-on-one session. A full-time senior liaison 
officer resides in each staff in an effort to enhance communication and 
coordination. If confirmed, I would plan to build on and expand the 
collaboration between the OUSD(I) and ODNI staffs through this 
arrangement.
     usd(i) role in intelligence personnel, acquisition, and policy
    Question. DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible 
for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I) 
includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they 
apply to the intelligence mission.
    In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the 
functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?
    Answer. I do not view the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative, 
but rather complementary. The Intelligence components of the Department 
operate under the authority of the Secretary of Defense in title 10 of 
the U.S.C. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the DNI, the OUSD(I) staff provides 
oversight on behalf of the USD(I) to ensure these programs are aligned 
both within the Department and the broader Intelligence Community. The 
USD(I) is uniquely positioned to provide oversight of sensitive DOD 
programs that are integral to the Intelligence Community, including 
those exercised clandestinely, and to ensure that those programs 
complement the activities of the entire Department and the DNI. These 
efforts ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated 
National Intelligence and Defense Intelligence programs.
    The USD(I) is the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for 
promulgation of intelligence policies within DOD (DODD 5143.01). In 
this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the authorities to ensure efficient 
use of resources for the intelligence mission set. DOD routinely 
interacts with the Intelligence Community, and those interactions 
require special consideration in order to preserve the necessary 
division between national and military intelligence activities. The 
USD(I) provides oversight of training, education, and career 
development for all Defense intelligence personnel. This oversight 
enables the Department to develop a cadre of well rounded and 
experienced intelligence experts and to horizontally integrate existing 
and new capabilities for warfighters. Without this focused oversight, 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD Intelligence Enterprise 
would be put at risk. The Department also has responsibility to provide 
specialized oversight of all Military Intelligence Program funding. 
Congress has recognized the importance of this oversight in the areas 
of acquisition, security, personnel, and resources.
    OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning 
acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense 
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. 
Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on 
programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and 
executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to 
OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace 
Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.
    Question. What is your understanding and view of the military 
departments' initiatives with respect to their tactical, operational, 
and strategic intelligence collection and analysis force structure and 
technologies?
    Answer. The military departments understand that we are operating 
in a resource-constrained environment, and they are developing 
initiatives and strategies to field comprehensive capabilities 
providing optimized intelligence to full-spectrum operations. If I am 
confirmed as USD(I), they will have my full support. These strategies 
provide a range of investment options to realign and reinvest in 
existing capabilities, while still providing timely, fused, and 
actionable intelligence to the Joint Force. I support the Secretary of 
Defense's effort to maximize production of ISR capabilities in support 
of U.S. forces in combat, as evidenced by the ISR Task Force 
Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with the Intelligence Community, 
the military departments, and the combat support agencies to ensure an 
integrated effort. I will meet with the Service Intelligence Chiefs, 
the Joint Staff J2, the Combat Support Agency Directors, and the 
combatant commands to ensure I have a clear understanding of their 
highest priority initiatives.
    Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities among these 
initiatives and how would you propose to provide policy and program 
oversight and support them with appropriate resources?
    Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be nested with the 
Secretary of Defense's Planning Guidance and the DNI's National 
Intelligence Strategy. I would ensure that the initiatives and 
strategies of the military departments were also nested with Secretary 
of Defense priorities, and through my office of Joint and Coalition 
Warfighter Support, would provide the necessary oversight of their 
plans and programs. My top priority is to support our forces engaged in 
combat operations with the best intelligence available. To do that, we 
need to balance our capabilities at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war. We would improve innovation and pursue 
technological advances in support of information sharing--from policy 
to hardware to analysts; improving collection and exploitation, 
countering current and emerging threats, strengthening 
counterintelligence, and improving our security processes.

                          EFFICIENCIES ISSUES

    Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced his intention to 
eliminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 
and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) and the J-6 from the Joint Staff 
on the grounds that other organizations in the Department perform 
similar functions, particularly the Defense Information Systems Agency 
and U.S. Cyber Command. Similarly, the Department has a number of 
combat support defense agencies that are totally engaged in 
intelligence--such as NSA, DIA, NGA, and NRO. There is also the DNI who 
manages intelligence, including all the national intelligence agencies 
within the Department. Each Military Service has an intelligence chief 
as well. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the 
other combatant commands have major intelligence components and 
missions.
    In your view, does the logic that led to the decision to eliminate 
NII and the J-6 imply that USD(I) and the J-2 should also be eliminated 
in view of the role played by DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, U.S. Cyber Command, 
and U.S. Strategic Command? Why or why not?
    Answer. The Secretary of Defense is examining the Department's 
intelligence organization, responsibilities, and authorities as part of 
his efficiency effort. That endeavor is ongoing, and at this point the 
Secretary has not made any final decisions. Key members of the OUSD(I) 
staff are participating in the efficiency effort to inform the larger 
efficiency team about the intricacies of the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise. In my view, there is a radical difference between 
streamlining oversight and management of command, control, and 
communications functions and those of a diverse intelligence 
enterprise. The USD(I), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, 
coordinates, oversees and orchestrates the multidiscipline components 
of the global Defense Intelligence Enterprise and its interaction with 
the Intelligence Community. I believe the creation of the position of 
USD(I) was a major step forward in the oversight of defense 
intelligence, and that the dual-hatting of USD(I) as the DNI Director 
of Defense Intelligence ensures that Defense Intelligence is fully 
integrated into the U.S. Intelligence Community. I would not support 
its elimination. I likewise believe that the J-2 provides critical 
intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Combatant 
Commands.
    Question. Do you see an opportunity for the elimination of 
redundant layers of bureaucracy and greater efficiency in the operation 
and management of the Defense Intelligence Community, including the 
combatant commands and the Service component commands?
    Answer. The Secretary of Defense initiated an efficiency effort 
that includes the review of the organizations and functions of Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise components to identify overlaps and 
inefficiencies. This effort includes a review of the entire enterprise 
to include the Defense intelligence agencies, Service intelligence 
components, and all of the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence 
Operations Centers. I anticipate that the efficiency effort will 
identify some redundancies, and if confirmed, I will work to carry out 
any decisions made by the Secretary.

              NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONSOLIDATION

    Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 is the most recent legislative attempt to calibrate the need to 
centralize management of intelligence across the Federal Government 
with the need to sustain the benefits of departmental intelligence 
answerable to cabinet secretaries. General Clapper, while serving as 
USD(I), initiated a proposal to separate out the National Intelligence 
Program (NIP) portion of the Defense budget, establish a new 
appropriations account within the 050 Defense Function, and expand the 
ODNI comptroller function to enable ODNI to execute these funds 
independent of the DOD Comptroller organization.
    Does this proposal weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense 
over the intelligence components of the DOD?
    Answer. This proposal should not weaken the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of DOD. 
Separation of the NIP portion of the Defense budget, as conceptually 
proposed, is an administrative action. Thus, it will not affect the 
Secretary of Defense's ``authority, direction, and control over the 
Department of Defense.'' 10 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). It will not affect how 
the Secretary ``prescribe[s] regulations for the government of his 
department, the conduct of its employees, [and] the distribution and 
performance of its business.'' 5 U.S.C. sec. 301.
    Question. Is this proposal consistent with the Secretary's 
efficiencies initiative, which seeks to avoid duplication and to reduce 
the overhead burden, by creating a second large financial control 
system operating within the Department?
    Answer. The proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense 
budget was not intended to be an efficiency initiative, but to provide 
greater visibility and oversight of NIP resources, as well as improve 
NIP financial management practices. ODNI is leading a collaborative 
study effort to determine the feasibility of the conceptual proposal, 
with DOD stakeholders participating. The study team is still assessing 
possible approaches and implications. No final decisions have been made 
on removing the NIP from the DOD budget. If approved, I believe the 
proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget would not be 
incompatible with the Secretary's efficiencies initiative.

                     SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

    Question. In late 2009, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, who 
was serving as Chief, CJ2, International Security Assistance Force and 
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, published an article that criticized the 
Intelligence Community broadly for focusing excessively on support for 
kinetic operations against adversary forces in Afghanistan and failing 
to devote sufficient attention to the counterinsurgency strategy and 
its emphasis on population protection, tribal dynamics, cultural 
insight, the rule of law, and the like.
    Do you think that General Flynn's criticism was accurate, and if 
so, has this imbalance been corrected?
    Answer. Major General Flynn was correct in his assessment that in a 
counterinsurgency environment, focusing our intelligence assets solely 
on the insurgent forces is not effective. A comprehensive understanding 
of the socio-cultural environment is absolutely critical to developing 
and implementing effective strategies to separate the insurgency from 
any viable base of support in the general population. Developing this 
comprehensive understanding is clearly an intelligence responsibility 
as laid out in Service and Joint doctrine within the Department. 
Mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability 
operations has become a critical element of our strategy in 
Afghanistan, one that is already showing major gains on the 
battlefield. Tribal engagement is increasingly central to U.S. strategy 
in other countries as well. Thus, a detailed understanding of tribal 
dynamics is a critical intelligence task, and will likely remain so for 
the foreseeable future.
    The Intelligence Community has worked hard to implement Major 
General Flynn's recommendations. The Stability Operations Information 
Centers he called for have been created and manned by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and Service intelligence analysts who are doing the 
integration and analysis work necessary to generate the comprehensive 
District Assessment reports that were the cornerstone of Major General 
Flynn's approach. Significant challenges remain in developing the 
integrated information-sharing environment envisioned by Major General 
Flynn, but the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Task Force and the U.S. Central Command have been doing tremendous work 
in this area as well. Additionally, the former USD(I) commissioned the 
Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board in March 2010 to 
evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support 
counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its 
findings and recommendations and is scheduled to brief the results in 
the first quarter of calendar year 2011.
    I believe the Intelligence Community has responded well to the 
challenges laid out by Major General Flynn. One of my first actions, if 
confirmed, will be to confer with Brigadier General Fogarty, who has 
replaced Major General Flynn, to get his assessment of the support 
currently being provided by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the 
Intelligence Community to determine if additional enhancements are 
required.
    Question. In your opinion, has the Intelligence Community devoted 
enough resources to provide policymakers and combatant commanders with 
the information on the cultural, social, political, and economic 
dynamics needed to formulate sound strategies for other critical 
regions, like Yemen and Somalia?
    Answer. As noted above, tribal engagement is an increasingly 
critical tool in U.S. irregular warfare strategy. It was central to our 
success in overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 
2001, it has been a major factor in our success in Iraq (Anbar 
Awakening), it is again becoming a critical element of our 
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and it offers U.S. 
policymakers important options in other countries of concern. 
Information on cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics is 
likewise needed for effective IOs, as well as enhanced options to deal 
with power brokers in urban areas. I believe we have made good progress 
regarding intelligence support in this area, but additional 
improvements are required. A key part of the required investment is the 
development of operators--within both the intelligence and the special 
operations communities--with the requisite language skills. 
Effectiveness in this area also requires intelligence analysts with 
very different backgrounds. If confirmed, I would engage the DNI, the 
Director of CIA, the relevant components of the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise, and the Commander of SOCOM to ensure that we continue to 
develop the required capabilities.
    Question. Is collection and analysis on these subjects in these 
geographical areas a tier one priority for the Intelligence Community 
or is it classified as lower-priority general background intelligence 
information? Do you agree with this prioritization?
    Answer. As the committee is aware, our National Intelligence 
Priorities are classified. As noted above, however, intelligence 
support in this area is increasingly central to effective strategy and 
operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that it is accorded 
appropriate priority within both the Intelligence Community and the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

               NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

    Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of 
political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a 
conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
    If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts 
within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not 
part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such 
pressure?
    Answer. In my experience, I have found the intelligence analysis 
that holds up best under scrutiny are those assessments that were 
reached impartially and independently, using all sources of information 
available, and which highlight the intelligence gaps that limit the 
judgments that can be reached by current analysis. Intelligence 
analysts are inculcated with the importance of ``speaking truth to 
power.'' As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have interacted regularly with 
intelligence analysts across the Intelligence Community, and have found 
them to be professionals who apply rigorous tradecraft standards to 
their products. The quality of analysis provided to policymakers today, 
in my judgment, is substantially better than it was in the Cold War. I 
have spoken to analysts as they attend their career training programs 
about the importance of what they do, and the need for objectivity and 
independence. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the importance of 
objective and independent analysis from the frontline analyst, to the 
Directors of analytical organizations, to senior policymakers. There 
will be zero tolerance for political pressure on analysts to reach 
certain conclusions.
    Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think 
intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to 
Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive 
intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration 
positions?
    Answer. If Congress requires testimony on a substantive 
intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts 
with an administration position.

              CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN DOD

    Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and 
execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of 
national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained 
language asserting that nothing in the act should be construed so as to 
impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the 
Secretary of Defense has delegated ``direction, control, and 
authority''--the highest form of authority in the executive branch--
over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the 
USD(I).
    What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA 
to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of 
Defense?
    Answer. IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities, in my view, 
in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence 
functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting 
requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and 
managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while 
leaving the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities 
to the Secretary of Defense, and assigning primary responsibility for 
leadership and management functions such as inspector general 
activities, personnel, information technology, financial management 
systems, and acquisition within the IC elements outside of ODNI and CIA 
to the heads of the departments in which those elements are located. 
The recently-enacted Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 significantly increased the authorities of ODNI over leadership 
and management functions in the IC elements, and I expect that DOD and 
the DNI will together devote considerable time and attention to 
implementing these new ODNI authorities in a manner that gives full 
effect to the act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and 
preserving the Secretary of Defense's ability to execute his statutory 
responsibilities over DOD's intelligence components.
    Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of 
``direction, control, and authority'' to the USD(I) over DOD national 
intelligence organizations?
    Answer. Statutory provisions in both title 10 and title 50 of the 
U.S.C. assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of 
Defense over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department, 
consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this 
balance of authorities is appropriate.
    Question. What type of relationship would you strive to establish, 
if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in 
national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the 
DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense 
intelligence agencies are properly managed?
    Answer. With the former USD(I) now in place as the DNI, with his 
extensive experience in both DOD and the Intelligence Community, with 
the close personal partnership we have forged during my tenure as 
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and with the close relationships we both have with the 
Secretary of Defense and with the leaders of the Intelligence 
Community, I believe there is an unprecedented opportunity to further 
strengthen the relationship between DOD and the DNI. If confirmed, I 
expect that together we will look for additional ways to build on the 
arrangement established by the Secretary of Defense and the DNI under 
which the USD(I) serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence within 
ODNI.
    Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities, 
processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide 
sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence 
capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct 
military operations will be developed and acquired through the National 
Intelligence Program?
    Answer. Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities, 
processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI have 
produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military 
operations.

                    ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS

    Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have 
in the requirements process for, and in oversight of the acquisition 
of, space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision 
authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for 
Space?
    Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the principal staff assistant to 
the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, my role in space 
system acquisition will be to ensure the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. I will ensure 
that we've balanced our investments towards delivering the right mix of 
intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commanders to 
accomplish their missions. DOD space systems are one component of a 
broader architecture of sensors, systems, and capabilities.
    As the DOD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program 
(MIP), the USD(I) role is to ensure all parts of the ISR architecture, 
to include space, air, and ground, are integrated into an overall 
architecture optimized to meet the warfighters' needs. If confirmed, I 
will work closely with the DNI to ensure that the DOD intelligence 
architecture, including space intelligence capabilities, is integrated 
with the national architecture, and that we have a mission-focused 
space enterprise that is affordable, responsive, efficient, flexible, 
and fully supportive of military operations and national security 
needs.
    As the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager, if 
confirmed, I will participate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) requirements and acquisition oversight process by providing 
intelligence input into the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) requirements process, the Functional 
Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), and the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as well as provide input 
into the DOD acquisition process on the Defense Acquisition Board.

                 DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS POLICY

    Question. DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I) 
responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations, 
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall 
development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of DOD policies 
and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations, 
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.
    Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum 
issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant 
DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must 
fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. Yes, I fully support this policy.
    Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment 
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the 
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
    Answer. Yes, I fully support these standards.
    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies 
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence 
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply 
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field 
Manual on Interrogations?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies 
and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international 
obligations, including Common Article 3.
    Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee 
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that 
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat 
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be 
captured in future conflicts?
    Answer. Yes, I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the 
United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S. 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated in future conflicts. 
I believe it has broader national security and foreign policy 
ramifications as well.
    Question. Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is 
responsible for developing policies and procedures, in coordination 
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD components, 
to ensure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation 
operations include the obligation to comply with the standards of DOD 
Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude performance of inherently 
governmental functions in accordance with DOD Directive 1100.4 and that 
all contractor employees are properly trained.
    What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in 
intelligence interrogation operations?
    Answer. Consistent with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28, 
2009, I believe that in areas where adequate security is available and 
is expected to continue, contractor personnel with proper training and 
security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters, report 
writers, information technology technicians, and other employees 
filling ancillary positions (including as trainers of, and advisors to, 
interrogators) in the interrogation of individuals who are in the 
custody or under the effective control of DOD or otherwise under 
detention in a DOD facilities.
    Contractors may be used as interrogators only if the Secretary of 
Defense determines that it is in the interests of the national security 
to do so and grants a waiver for a 60-day period, and for an additional 
30 days if a renewal is approved. If a waiver is granted, contract 
interrogators must be properly trained and certified to DOD standards, 
and they must be supervised and closely monitored by properly trained 
and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to ensure 
that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-
approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently 
governmental function.
    Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that 
intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner 
consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that 
contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently 
governmental functions?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies 
and plans comply with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28, 2009, 
which delineates the functions that contractors may perform in support 
of intelligence interrogations. If the Secretary of Defense grants a 
waiver permitting the use of contractors as interrogators, I will 
ensure that they are properly trained and certified to DOD standards, 
and that they are supervised and closely monitored by properly trained 
and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to make 
certain that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the 
government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any 
inherently governmental function.

         INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT

    Question. Over the last 5 years or so, the approved requirement for 
24-hour orbits of ISR aircraft has grown from approximately 10 to 65. 
U.S. Central Command, and specifically the Iraq and Afghanistan areas 
of operation, has received the overwhelming share of these assets. The 
other combatant commands, as well as such critically important regions 
as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, have received little or no additional 
assets. Even within U.S. Central Command, demand exceeds supply.
    Secretary Gates established the independent ISR Task Force partly 
because the normal requirements and acquisition processes in the 
Department favored long-term investments in capabilities for waging 
conventional military operations rather than the needs of deployed 
forces engaged in irregular warfare.
    In your view, is DOD allocating sufficient resources to airborne 
ISR to protect long-term force modernization preferences?
    Answer. I believe the Department is now allocating sufficient 
resources to airborne ISR. Working closely with Congress, the 
Department has greatly expanded airborne ISR capabilities during 
Secretary Gates' tenure. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have consistently and 
strongly advocated for additional Predator/Reaper CAPs (orbits). These 
assets are absolutely critical to U.S. strategy in several areas, and 
demand continues to exceed supply. This is why in the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, the Secretary made the decision to expand the 
authorized U.S. Air Force force structure goal further by another 15 
CAPs/orbits (from 50 to 65). We continue to upgrade the capabilities of 
our airborne ISR systems as well. The introduction of high definition 
video capabilities, for example, provides resolution that was not 
possible just 5 years ago. Combining this capability with recently 
developed SIGINT capabilities has dramatically improved the 
effectiveness of our ISR orbits. Other airborne ISR systems are having 
an equally dramatic impact on the battlefield.
    The Secretary has provided very clear guidance. His first defense 
strategy objective is to ``Prevail in Today's Wars,'' and that is where 
the preponderance of our attention and effort is focused. His strategy 
also makes it clear that we must continue to ``Prevent Future 
Conflict'' and ``Prepare to Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies.'' 
Maintaining an appropriate balance between winning today and preparing 
for the future requires tough choices, but they are being made. The 
President's budget for 2011 has the balance right, in my view.
    Question. Is the current focus an appropriate one?
    Answer. Yes.

   REPORTING OF CYBER OPERATIONS IN THE CLANDESTINE QUARTERLY REPORT

    Question. The USD(I) coordinates preparation of the quarterly 
report on clandestine military operations (Clandestine Quarterly 
Report) to Congress. In discussions with the Department about actions 
to establish the U.S. Cyber Command, it became apparent that the 
Department may have failed to report certain cyber activities in the 
Quarterly Report that should have been included, since they would 
legitimately fit the accepted definition of clandestine military 
activities.
    What is your understanding of whether the Department failed to 
report these activities in the regular Clandestine Quarterly Reports, 
and why?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the congressional language 
directing provision of the Clandestine Quarterly Report specifically 
calls for reporting on clandestine HUMINT activity. Former USD(I) 
Clapper, in an effort to keep Congress better apprised of activities 
within his purview, expanded the report to routinely include a wide 
range of activities that exceeded the congressional reporting 
requirements. I fully support this expanded approach, and, if 
confirmed, will review the status and process for reporting DOD cyber 
activities. I am committed to appropriate reporting of all intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities to Congress.
    Question. Setting aside the issue of advance notice of certain 
significant cyber activities, what is your view on the appropriateness 
of reporting cyber activities that fit the definition of a clandestine 
military operation in the Clandestine Quarterly Report?
    Answer. The USD(I) is charged with keeping the appropriate 
committees of Congress fully and currently informed on all DOD 
intelligence and intelligence related activities. It would be my 
intent, if confirmed, to fully comply with that responsibility, to 
include cyber activities.

                         SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

    Question. What technical challenges does the Intelligence Community 
face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately 
by DOD science and technology efforts?
    Answer. I believe an ``Intelligence Revolution'' has been underway 
for some time, and that technological change is the principal driver of 
this revolution. This revolution has already posed, and will continue 
to pose, significant challenges as well as opportunities for the U.S. 
Intelligence Community. I believe that DOD science and technology 
programs are enabling the IC to keep ahead of the rapidly-changing 
intelligence environment.
    One challenge that we continue to face is making the best use of 
existing and planned sensors and then exploiting data coming from those 
sensors. Although we are continuing to push the envelope on new and 
better sensing technologies, the real challenge has shifted towards 
integrating data from platforms and sensors into a common framework. 
Related technical challenges include layering the data, developing 
advanced analytical tools that make sense of the data, and developing 
tools that automatically alert analysts or cross-cue other sensors to 
focus on unique and potentially dangerous activity. Other challenges 
include the protection of critical space systems and data networks.
    Question. Recently, DOD has been exploring a wide range of airship-
related technologies for ISR purposes, including those for long-
duration, high-altitude flight.
    What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of 
operation, technical viability, and affordability of airships as long-
duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?
    Answer. I believe these technologies will have an immediate, 
positive impact on our operations in Afghanistan, and could play an 
even greater role in future operations as the capability continues to 
evolve. An ``unblinking eye and ear'' is central to our ISR strategy 
for the modern battlefield. Over the last decade, the Department has 
significantly expanded our ability to dwell over the battlefield with 
ISR platforms. We have done this predominantly through procurement of 
aircraft systems and sensors. With the advent of long-endurance 
platforms, the Department is expanding the paradigm of battlefield 
dwell by developing ``game-changing'' persistent capabilities that 
enable satellite-like endurance at a much lower cost and have the 
flexibility to reposition anywhere in the world. These developments 
will greatly increase the amount of valuable information available to 
the warfighter. The development of long-endurance airborne 
capabilities, I would add, is much broader than just airships. DOD is 
also pursuing other long-endurance fixed-wing medium- and high-altitude 
capabilities that can linger for weeks and even months at a time.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(I)?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                           WIKILEAKS REMEDIES

    1. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the imperative after September 
11 was a paradigm shift from ``need-to-know'' to ``need-to-share'' 
intelligence and law enforcement information. The Wikileaks fiasco 
illustrates some of the dangers that can accompany information-sharing 
practices that are not wisely structured. It seems to me that we have 
to be smart about this. We can't go back to the old practice of 
hoarding information, but we also cannot be wantonly posting sensitive 
material to hundreds of thousands of people who have no reason to see 
it. The committee is examining technologies and processes to achieve 
this balance, and I know that Secretary Gates and his staff have 
already taken actions and are engaged in longer-term planning. What are 
your views on how we can finally achieve our information-sharing goals 
while better protecting information from insider threats?
    Secretary Vickers. The Department of Defense (DOD) works to manage 
the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information through 
good security practices. For example, we vet our personnel for 
suitability and trustworthiness in the security clearance process. We 
establish and uphold rules for physical access to secure facilities and 
to classified information. We also have rules about the use of 
networked systems and conduct annual training to educate and remind 
employees about the rules. Security policy and processes are generally 
effective deterrents when everyone understands and implements them.
    The unauthorized transfer of classified information to WikiLeaks 
was made possible in part because standard security procedures were 
relaxed in a war zone in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of 
information critical to operations. In the aftermath of WikiLeaks, the 
Department is taking a number of mitigation steps, including possible 
disciplinary action. We are examining technologies that would improve 
our ability to identify and thwart a threat from inside the Department 
as well as strengthen information-sharing governance. Some actions were 
already under way before the WikiLeaks disclosures. For example, the 
Department has planned and resourced the development of a public key 
infrastructure that would authenticate users of the Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) so we would know exactly who is on 
the SIPRNet at any given time. Technical subject matter experts in the 
office of the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) are also reviewing 
options for developing role-based or attribute-based access control 
capabilities that would more effectively control who has access to what 
data--a very large and complex task given the Department's size and the 
scope of its responsibilities.
    To summarize, we can and must responsibly balance information 
security and information sharing by managing risk using a number of 
security and security-related protocols that act together to thwart 
both intentional and unintentional violations.

    2. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your answers to the 
committee's advance policy questions, you stated that the office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) had recently 
completed a comprehensive review. What are the main recommendations of 
that review, and will you make it available to the committee?
    Secretary Vickers. Immediately following the WikiLeaks disclosures, 
the Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I), in concert with the Joint 
Staff and the DOD CIO, to review DOD information security policy and 
procedures for handling classified information in forward-deployed 
areas. The Secretary was particularly concerned over the appropriate 
balance between the need to share and the responsibility to safeguard 
classified information. The report was completed and provided to the 
Secretary in December 2010. The report itself is an internal DOD 
deliberative document, but some of the principal findings include the 
following:

         Adequate security policy and procedures exist, but 
        compliance must be better enforced. Forward-deployed units 
        maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage 
        media.
         Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing 
        with an insider threat must be better defined.
         Processes for reporting security incidents need 
        improvement.
         Limited capability currently exists to detect and 
        monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.

    USD(I) Security staff will continue to work closely with the DOD 
CIO, elements of the Joint Staff and U.S. Cyber Command to address 
these issues in the months ahead. We stand ready to provide the 
committee with further details on the report's main recommendations, if 
requested.

                          INFORMATION SHARING

    3. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, on a closely related topic, 
since September 11 the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland 
security communities have struggled to develop effective means to 
connect and correlate fragmentary information held by multiple 
departments and agencies to thwart terrorist threats. As we learned in 
the aftermath of the Christmas bombing attempt, achieving this so-
called connect-the-dots capability is not so much a technical 
challenge; the hardest part is overcoming the resistance of agencies to 
sharing their sensitive information and resolving the important policy 
and legal concerns regarding protection of privacy and sources and 
methods.
    This challenge of finding and correlating the proverbial needles in 
haystacks is not confined to the national-level threat from terrorism. 
It turns out that our troops face identical types of challenges in 
discovering the people and networks of the terrorist and insurgent 
groups they are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere 
around the world.
    The committee's examination of this situation reveals that almost 
every agency and department is developing large-scale search, 
discovery, and correlation systems, but they are able to apply these 
tools only to their own data--in their own stovepipes. In other words, 
there is a lot of duplication going on but no interagency solution. 
Indeed, there is no enterprise-wide search capability even within DOD. 
Do you have an appreciation of this situation, and how do you think it 
can be fixed, both within DOD and throughout the Government?
    Secretary Vickers. Many DOD and Intelligence Community 
organizations have leaned forward to provide improved and impressive 
services rapidly for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This challenge 
has been increased significantly by the breadth of our modern 
coalitions, by the need to update intelligence disclosure and release 
policies, and by the need for technology solutions to assist in marking 
data for release and moving it down to non-traditional networks to 
support coalition operations. We expect this trend to continue in 
future contingency operations. I share your view that there is a need 
to better coordinate and integrate these various contingency efforts, 
and we are addressing this challenge aggressively in numerous ways.
    The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Team of the 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force has, 
over the past year, fielded a number of improvements to intelligence 
architectures in theater and to data dissemination, discovery, access, 
and retrieval capabilities. This group has also been focused on 
identifying gaps, overlaps, and integration opportunities among the 
Quick Response Capabilities delivered to theater, and on ensuring that 
sustainment and upgrade decisions are made within the context of 
integrating duplicative efforts, and migrating capabilities to common 
enterprise standards. The ISC Team is working to ensure these quick-
turn-around efforts are designed and upgraded in ways that increase 
their interoperability across the intelligence enterprise, and that 
these investments will work toward enduring long-term solutions that 
can be applied to global operations and will be reusable in future 
contingency operations. Specific examples of these efforts include: 
ensuring any upgrades or expansion of the CENTCOM's Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange database and search capabilities are 
migrated to global enterprise standards; and a just-initiated review of 
all DOD and Intelligence Community ``cloud'' efforts to highlight gaps, 
overlaps, and an enterprise integration way ahead.
    Yet another important organization is the Intelligence Community's 
Information Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC). DOD participates in the 
ISSC along with representatives from all Intelligence Community 
elements to align common information-sharing needs, priorities, 
solutions, and architectures.
    Our approach to accomplishing improvements in information sharing 
requires that we implement a multi-faceted, layered approach. We 
recognize explicitly that technology alone will not resolve 
information-sharing shortfalls. The need to implement improvements in 
an enterprise approach has led us to develop oversight processes 
designed to effectively manage and synchronize the many information-
sharing initiatives we have underway into one well-orchestrated effort. 
This focus has led to the establishment of a new Information Sharing 
and Partner Engagement Directorate within USD(I). This newly created 
directorate is engaging in a broad range of efforts specifically 
designed to improve information sharing by addressing policy, foreign 
relationship management, enterprise architectures, international 
intelligence sharing architectures and mechanisms, and training and 
education, and is ensuring we place the appropriate high-level of 
attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on this 
subject. Among its duties, this new Directorate will support a 
governance structure to guide Intelligence Community-wide enterprise 
solutions. It will reconstitute and support the Defense Intelligence 
Information Enterprise (DI\2\E) Council, and will guide and oversee 
development of the associated DI\2\E Framework. A Charter for the new 
DI\2\E Council and Terms of Reference for the DI\2\E Framework have 
both been drafted and are in review.

                   U.S. CYBER COMMAND AND CYBERSPACE

    4. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, U.S. Cyber Command's mission 
is to defend networks and, when directed, conduct offensive operations 
in cyberspace. Both of these missions are heavily dependent upon 
intelligence support. From a policy perspective, USD(I) is not 
responsible for the mission of defending cyberspace, nor for offensive 
military operations. Those oversight roles are the province of the CIO 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
    However, as we have come to learn, gaining access in cyberspace to 
adversaries' networks to collect intelligence is tantamount to 
establishing a foundation for offensive actions. Thus, the intelligence 
activities that you oversee inherently have a relationship to potential 
offensive military operations. These intelligence operations in 
cyberspace can take on an extraordinarily sensitive cast, since 
adversaries could or likely would interpret a penetration of important 
targets as a potentially hostile act if or when they are discovered. 
How are you planning to monitor cyber intelligence collection 
operations under title 50 authorities and to coordinate with the USD(P) 
and the CIO?
    Secretary Vickers. Because the cyber mission transcends the various 
OSD offices which execute a principal staff advisor role, it is 
imperative that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Intelligence) (OUSD(I)) coordinates and consults with these offices in 
order to ensure the integration and synchronization of cyber efforts 
amongst the military and the Intelligence Community to satisfy the 
requirements of the warfighter. USD(I) oversight of any cyber 
intelligence collection operations under title 50 authorities is 
conducted in accordance with applicable laws on reporting requirements 
for intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities. 
Oversight is executed in order to promote better cooperation and 
collaboration amongst the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to ensure 
efficient and effective use of our limited resources to achieve the 
Nation's highest priorities in accordance with the National Security 
Strategy, the Defense Intelligence Strategy, and the CIO's priorities.

    5. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are the USD(P) and the CIO 
going to be consulted about sensitive intelligence operations in 
cyberspace?
    Secretary Vickers. As stated in a previous response, USD(I) 
consults and coordinates with USD(P) and CIO on significant 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities in accordance with 
current DOD policy. Because of the sensitivities that such operations 
could have across the Department, it is critical that OUSD(I) 
coordinates and consults with the various OSD offices which execute a 
principal staff advisory role pertaining to the cyber mission such as 
USD(P) and CIO. This close cooperation within the Department and within 
the Intelligence Community has empowered the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise to support U.S. national objectives while maximizing our 
effectiveness.

    6. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the National Security Strategy 
states that the United States will enhance deterrence in cyberspace by 
``improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems 
or supporting infrastructure.'' If confirmed as USD(I), what role will 
you play in identifying an effective deterrence strategy and 
declaratory policy for cyberspace?
    Secretary Vickers. USD(I) is a primary stakeholder in Department-
wide efforts to define an effective deterrence strategy and declaratory 
policy for cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P) 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will participate in 
National Security Council (NSC)-led fora related to this matter.

    7. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what are the 
elements of an effective deterrence posture for cyberspace that could 
attribute and defeat attacks?
    Secretary Vickers. An effective deterrence posture is one that 
would deny aggressors any benefit of an attack through a blend of 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools to influence 
behavior.

    8. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are those two elements alone 
really enough to deter attacks, or is it also necessary to have a 
counter-attack component?
    Secretary Vickers. As we define our deterrence strategy, the 
challenge is to make our defense effective enough to deny an aggressor 
the benefit of an attack. In cyberspace, as with other areas, the 
United States reserves the right to respond using the full range of 
diplomatic, economic, and military tools at its disposal. Response to a 
cyber attack, if necessary, does not require a response in like kind.

     INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

    9. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the committee's 
advance policy questions, you advocate for a robust DOD presence in 
conducting information operations and strategic communications programs 
more broadly in both theaters of war and globally. According to the 
Government Accountability Office, DOD spends ``hundreds of millions of 
dollars each year'' conducting these operations. This committee and 
Congress have repeatedly questioned DOD's ability to measure the 
effectiveness of the dollars spent supporting these operations. In your 
view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures of effectiveness for 
these programs?
    Secretary Vickers. The rapidly expanding pace of change in the 
information environment made global and instantaneous communications 
possible in ways that were unimaginable just a decade ago. Across the 
globe, our friends and our adversaries are constantly producing and 
consuming information that influences their decisions and their 
actions. Drawing a causal link between a discrete action in today's 
information environment and an individual or group decision is very 
challenging. We continue to place great emphasis on obtaining good 
measures of effectiveness and conducting thorough assessments of all of 
our information operations. Leveraging lessons learned from commercial 
enterprises, academia, and our interagency partners, we have made some 
progress to improve our ability to measure effects in our information 
programs. That said, we must continue to do much more in this area. As 
the information environment continues to evolve and its complexity 
grows, DOD must continue to press for new and innovative ways both to 
communicate with intended audiences and to measure the effects of 
communications and engagements.

    10. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe the programs 
you authorized while you were Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have had a measurable 
impact?
    Secretary Vickers. Yes, although drawing a causal link between 
discrete acts in today's information environment and an individual or 
group response is very challenging, we continue to refine and improve 
our abilities to measure the impact of our operations. We must continue 
to invest both resources and intellectual energies to meet this 
challenge. Our measurement efforts routinely demonstrate our impact. 
Our COCOM-sponsored websites have ever increasing readership, providing 
frequent and robust feedback. Our small teams supporting embassies 
abroad are lauded both by the U.S. embassies they support and the 
partner nations with whom they interact. Advertising for our rewards 
programs has significantly increased the number and frequency of 
reports of high value targets and terrorist supporting materials.
    As the information environment continues to evolve, and its 
complexity grows, DOD will continue to press for new and innovative 
ways both to communicate with its intended audiences and to measure the 
effects of our communications and engagements.

    11. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the 
committee's advance policy questions, you suggest that DOD's 
information operations and strategic communications programs should 
support more robustly other government departments and agencies in 
countering the message of violent extremists. Given the clear lines of 
authority that each government department and agency are given by 
Congress, how do you foresee DOD increasing its support of the 
Department of State (DOS) and/or the Central Intelligence Agency?
    Secretary Vickers. The purpose of DOD Information Operations is to 
support our military objectives. The global nature of modern 
communications has blurred, however, traditional lines between agency-
specific communications programs, increasing the need for mutual 
reinforcement among them. Messages promulgated by one department or 
agency which might previously have had effects limited to a single 
geographic region or audience now find immediate global resonance. This 
new communications paradigm makes cooperation and collaboration within 
and among the various departments critical to ensure consistency and 
efficacy of the U.S. global message. DOD maintains unique capabilities 
to reach audiences in denied areas or to promulgate information in ways 
that can support our military objectives. Those capabilities can also 
contribute, where appropriate, to the larger U.S. Government 
communications and public diplomacy strategies, in furtherance of U.S. 
national security objectives. We will continue to strive to provide 
transparency of our operations within the interagency environment, but 
more importantly, we will make our capabilities available to support 
other departments and agencies in areas where those capabilities 
provide additional options for effective communications and engagement.

    12. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe DOD has the 
authority for expanded support operations?
    Secretary Vickers. We have the authorities to support where and 
when required. We will continue to leverage long-established processes 
and mechanisms for planning, deconfliction, and partnered efforts to 
enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency partners.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall

                              1208 FUNDING

    13. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, the committee has expressed 
concern that U.S. Special Operations Command may be using section 1208 
funding, which is intended to support counterterrorism operations, for 
long-term engagement with partner nations. Is this still the case or 
has it been corrected?
    Secretary Vickers. Section 1208 funds must be used for specific 
counterterrorism operations, not long-term engagement. Improved 
reporting procedures and increased coordination with and notifications 
to Congress have helped address past concerns regarding DOD section 
1208 programs. Reviews conducted as part of our annual process by 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Special Operations 
Command, and the Geographic Combatant Commands, have resulted in the 
termination of several operations over the last 3 fiscal years. 
Beginning in 2010, SOLIC&IC began notifying the congressional 
committees with a list of approved continuing operations for the next 
fiscal year, along with any cost estimate changes. This information is 
also provided in the annual report to Congress in accordance with 
section 1208.

                          ZONES OF HOSTILITIES

    14. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, in your advance policy 
questions, you state that outside zones of hostilities, DOD plays a 
supporting role in combating terrorism. Does that mean that outside of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the concurrence of our ambassadors is required?
    Secretary Vickers. We work closely with our DOS and other 
government agency colleagues to support whole-of-government approaches 
to terrorism challenges both inside and outside zones of hostilities. 
When directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, geographic 
combatant commanders conduct counterterrorism operations in support of 
U.S. Government objectives while ensuring appropriate Chiefs of Mission 
are consulted and kept informed of all U.S. military activities.

    15. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, how does DOD define zones of 
hostilities in this context?
    Secretary Vickers. In the context of my response, this term refers 
to Iraq and Afghanistan.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                 INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

    16. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what 
challenges will you face in integrating intelligence capabilities of 
DOD with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal, 
State, and local agencies?
    Secretary Vickers. DOD enjoys a very positive relationship with 
DHS. Our commitment to DHS expands far beyond intelligence integration.
    I believe one of our greatest challenges to integrating 
intelligence capabilities between DHS and DOD is the important policy 
and legal balance regarding the protection of privacy rights and civil 
liberties. In fact, this challenge expands beyond the DHS and the DOD 
relationship and is indicative of the greater information-sharing 
issues facing the whole-of-government. The protection of privacy and 
other legal rights of Americans while defending our Homeland is no easy 
task. As we develop solutions, this protection of civil liberties is a 
core principle that must be kept in mind.
    I recognize the imperative for efficient integration between DOD, 
DHS, and other Federal, State, and local agencies and believe 
collaboration is a key driver of effective integration. As such, I am 
in the process of considering a first of its kind Joint Duty Assignment 
of a DHS representative to serve as a full-time liaison between DHS's 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office, 
and the OUSD(I).
    In their mission to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, State, local, and tribal 
agencies depend on the relationship between DHS and DOD. This 
relationship literally provides a critical link to actionable 
intelligence information. For example, allowing select State and major 
urban area fusion center personnel with appropriate security clearances 
access to appropriate classified terrorism-related information residing 
on DOD's classified networks is a major step forward. This information 
will contribute significantly to improving their mission processes 
supporting Suspicious Activity Reports and Alerts, Warning, and 
Notifications of potential attacks on our Homeland. This example of a 
joint initiative has bolstered increased collaboration between DHS, 
DOD, and other Federal departments and agencies, enabling the trusted 
and secure exchange of terrorism-related information in order to 
detect, deter, prevent, and respond to Homeland security threats.

    17. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, are there steps DOD can take 
to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with other 
agencies?
    Secretary Vickers. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to 
combat terrorism with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission, 
Chiefs of Station, relevant departments and agencies, and field 
activities to enable the broadest interagency collaboration consistent 
with maintaining the security of our efforts. We recognize that this is 
a constant process that requires regular and routine interface at 
multiple levels within the respective organizations. We have made wide 
use of the ``Joint-Interagency Task Force'' model to bring our 
interagency colleagues into a collaborative planning and execution 
forum, and are always vigilant for ways to share best practices and 
make adjustments to the process.
    It is critically important that DOD's counterterrorism activities 
be fully synchronized and integrated with those of other agencies to 
develop an optimal whole-of-government response to this vital national 
security issue. Nowhere is this need for integration more important 
than in our intelligence and information-sharing activities across the 
entire Intelligence Community. To support this objective, the DOD focal 
point for counterterrorism intelligence, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency's (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, 
has recently assigned a senior representative to work at the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as a means of improving coordination 
between Defense and Intelligence Community counterterrorism analytic 
efforts. Finally, as part of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies 
Initiatives, we have directed DIA to conduct a review of the overall 
Defense relationship with NCTC and develop an appropriate course of 
action and implementation plan to maximize the integration of analytic 
capabilities and information-sharing across the national and defense 
counterterrorism intelligence missions.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of Hon. Michael G. Vickers 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                   January 5, 2011.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    Michael Vickers, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, vice James R. Clapper.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of Hon. Michael G. Vickers, which 
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]

                    Biography of Michael G. Vickers

Education:
         Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (attended 
        Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC)

                 Doctor of Philosophy, International Relations-
                Strategic Studies
                 1991-2010 (non-resident since 1995); degree 
                awarded August 2010

         The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 
        Philadelphia, PA

                 Master of Business Administration
                 1986-1988; degree awarded May 1988

         University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL

                 Bachelor of Arts, International Relations
                 1980-1983 (New College - External Degree 
                Program); degree awarded June 1983

Employment Record:
         Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and 
        Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low 
        Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities

                 2011-Present

         Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/
        Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities

                 2007-Present

         Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

                 Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies
                 1996-2007

         Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced 
        International Studies

                 Acting Co-Director, Strategic Studies, and 
                Professorial Lecturer (part-time)
                 1996-1997

         Department of Defense

                 Special Government Employee (paid), Defense 
                Science Board Task Force (part-time), 1996
                 Unpaid member, Defense Science Board Task 
                Force (part-time), 1998, 1999

         Independent Consultant

                 Principal clients: Science Applications 
                International (contract work for the Department of 
                Defense); Defense Budget Project (predecessor 
                organization of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
                Assessments)
                 1994-1996

         Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

                 Strategic Studies Fellow (part-time)
                 1993-1994

         News America Publishing (New York, NY)

                 Editor and Managing Director, The Daily 
                Intelligence Brief (start-up)
                 1990-1991

         BioAutomation, Inc (Bridgeport, PA)

                 Vice President and Chief Financial Officer 
                (start-up)
                 1988-1990

         Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc. (Bridgeport, PA)

                 Vice President, Finance and Strategy
                 1986-1988; 1992-1994

         Central Intelligence Agency

                 Operations Officer
                 1983-1986

         U.S. Army

                 Special Forces Officer (Captain) and 
                Noncommissioned Officer (Staff Sergeant)
                 1973-1983

Honors and awards:
         Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment, 
        U.S. Army (2010)
         Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson 
        Foundation) (1993)
         Certification of Distinction, Central Intelligence 
        Agency (1984)
         Honors graduate (cum laude), University of Alabama 
        (1983)
         Meritorious Service Medal (1976, 1983)
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals 
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain 
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to 
complete a form that details the biographical, financial and 
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. 
Michael G. Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871

                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Michael George Vickers.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

    3. Date of nomination:
    Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5, 
2011.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Melana Zyla Vickers.
    Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Alexandra Novakovic Vickers, age 22.
    Natasha Novakovic Vickers, age 19.
    Sophia Novakovic Vickers, age 17.
    Oksana Elizabeth Vickers, age 9.
    Kalyna Cecilia Vickers, age 5.

    8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, 
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
    Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1991-2010, Doctor of 
Philosophy, International Relations, degree conferred August 2010.
    University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 1986-1988, Master of 
Business Administration, degree conferred May 1988.
    University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1980-1983. Bachelor of Arts, 
International Relations, degree conferred 1983.
    Hollywood High School, Hollywood, CA, 1968-1971, High School 
diploma.

    9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the 
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of 
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity 
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities); 2500 Defense Pentagon, Room 
3C852A; August 3, 2007 to Present (confirmed July 23, 2007).
    Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments; 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC; 
September 1996 to August 2007.

    10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, 
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, 
or local governments, other than those listed above.
    Classified and unclassified contract consulting work for the 
Department of Defense, 1994 to 2007 while employed by the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (1996 to 2007) and as a self-
employed consultant (1994 to 1996).
    Part-time employment (paid) as a special government employee as a 
member of a Defense Science Board Task Force, 1996; unpaid service as a 
member of Defense Science Board Task Forces, 1998, 1999.
    Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983 to March 
1986.
    Commissioned Officer, U.S. Army, December 1978 to June 1983.
    Enlisted, U.S. Army, June 1973 to December 1978.

    11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    Trustee, Vickers Family Revocable Trust since December 2004; Melana 
Zyla Vickers (wife), co-trustee.

    12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    None.

    13. Political affiliations and activities:
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or 
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered 
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 
years.
    None.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign 
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar 
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
    None.

    14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, military medals, and any other special 
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    Meritorious Service Medal (U.S. Army); two awards, 1976, 1983.
    Certificate of Distinction, Central Intelligence Agency, 1984.
    Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.
    Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson Foundation), 1993.
    Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment, U.S. Army, 2010.

    15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of 
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have 
written.
    My most recent publication is my Ph.D. dissertation, ``The 
Structure of Military Revolutions'' (Johns Hopkins University, July 
2010), which is available through University Microfilms (UMI).
    I am the author of two book chapters: ``The Revolution in Military 
Affairs and Military Capabilities,'' in Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard 
Shultz, eds., War in the Information Age (Brassey's, 1997); and 
``Revolution Deferred: Kosovo and the Transformation of War,'' in 
Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds., War Over Kosovo: Politics and 
Strategy in a Global Age (Columbia University Press, 2001).
    I am the author or co-author of five Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments monographs: ``War in 2020--A Primer'' (1996); 
``The Military Revolution and Intrastate Conflict'' (1997); ``The 
Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment'' (1997); ``Strategy for a 
Long Peace'' (2001); and ``The Revolution in War'' (2004). I am also 
the author co-author of four CSBA Backgrounders: ``Intelligence Reform 
and the Next CIA Director'' (2004); ``The 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Budget Request and the Way Ahead 
for Transformation'' (2002); ``The Hart-Rudman Commission Report: A 
Critique'' (2000); and ``Perspectives on the Revolution in Military 
Affairs'' (1996).
    I have had three opinion-editorials published by USA Today: ``For 
Guidance on Iraq, Look to Afghanistan'' (June 2004); ``Will We Heed 
Lessons of War in Kosovo?'' (June 1999); and ``Ground Troops, Yes, But 
Whose?'' (April 1999). I have had one opinion-editorial published by 
the Washington Post: ``Ground War: Doing More With Less'' (April 2003). 
I have had two book reviews published by the Wall Street Journal: ``The 
Destiny of Combat'' (Review of Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweitzer, 
The Next War, and George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, 
March 1997) and ``The Future of Force'' (Review of Frederick Kagan, 
Finding the Target, November 2006). I have had one book review 
published by the Journal of Military History: The Making of Strategy: 
Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin 
Bernstein, eds. (October 1997). I have also had an article published by 
Armed Forces Journal: ``What the QDR Should Say?'' (2006).

    16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal 
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have 
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have 
been nominated.
    None.

    17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
    (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 
conflicts of interest?
    Yes.
    (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
    No.
    (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions 
for the record in hearings?
    Yes.
    (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in 
response to congressional requests?
    Yes.
    (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their 
testimony or briefings?
    Yes.
    (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request 
before this committee?
    Yes.
    (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                Michael G. Vickers.
    This 12th day of January, 2011.

    [The nomination of Hon. Michael G. Vickers was reported to 
the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on March 17, 2011.]
                              ----------                              

    [Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jo Ann Rooney by 
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]
                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. Not at this time.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. N/A.

                             QUALIFICATIONS

    Question. What background and experience do you have that you 
believe qualifies you for this position?
    Answer. My broad professional experiences, educational credentials, 
and lifelong commitment to service provide a solid background for me to 
recognize and contribute positively to myriads of formidable challenges 
and tasks facing DOD and, in particular, Personnel and Readiness. 
During my 8 years as president of a doctoral level university, we 
successfully addressed not only difficult financial challenges, 
enabling the institution to realize significant operating surpluses 
after years of deficits, but developed an innovative educational model 
that directly impacted retention, graduation rates, and student 
success. By offering courses in a variety of delivery modalities, 
including blocks sessions, accelerated, low residency, and traditional 
semesters, we were able to deliver a unique, sustainable solution to 
the educational needs of traditional, nontraditional, and graduate 
students while at the same time creating a new business and human 
resource model for the university. My work on the Jewish Hospital Saint 
Mary's Healthcare System Board of Trustees in a leadership role has 
allowed me to be directly involved in developing policies and 
procedures impacting patient care, safety, operating efficiencies, and 
human resource policies across a system encompassing ambulatory, 
community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient 
psychiatric hospital, a comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and 
clinical research. My current work as president of Mount Ida College 
and being a member of the Board of Trustees of Regis University have 
given me additional opportunities to lead an organization through a 
period of significant transition and be at the forefront of educational 
innovation. Other corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to 
lead organizations through dynamic structural and financial changes 
enabling them to better serve their constituents. My many years of 
experience outside of post secondary education in tax law, business, 
and finance provide me with a solid foundation and breadth of knowledge 
to deal with complex legal, financial, and policy issues.

                            MAJOR CHALLENGES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting 
the next Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness (P&R)?
    Answer. There are a number of challenges facing P&R to ensure the 
human resource systems for civilian and military personnel, Active and 
Reserve, provide the level of training and high level skills needed to 
support current as well as potential future engagements. This includes 
evaluating and providing appropriate compensation and personnel 
policies commensurate with the skills and sacrifices being made by 
those in service to our country; ensuring quality, world-class health 
care, including mental health support, to ill and injured 
servicemembers; and providing comprehensive support services to 
families of servicemembers. In addition, there needs to be ongoing 
evaluation of current policies and procedures to identify opportunities 
for enhanced efficiencies without impacting service delivery.
    Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these 
challenges?
    Answer. Although I do not have specific recommendations at this 
time, if confirmed, I would review the plans currently in place to 
address these challenges and determine what modifications, if any, need 
to be made. I would look for opportunities to enhance communication and 
collaboration with my colleagues throughout DOD to improve 
effectiveness in delivering programs supporting Personnel and 
Readiness.

                                 DUTIES
 
   Question. Section 136a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
in the performance of his or her duties.
    Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be 
assigned to you?
    Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to assign 
me my duties, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, functions, and responsibilities currently mandated by law 
and specified in the Department's directives for the position of 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness.
    Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your 
relationship with the following officials:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Secretary as his advisor 
and advocate for the management of human resources in the Department.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Deputy Secretary as his 
advisor and advocate for the management of human resources in the 
Department.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 
(ASD(HA)).
    Answer. If confirmed, ASD(HA) would be my principal advisor for all 
DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.
    Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
(ASD(RA)).
    Answer. If I am confirmed, ASD(RA) would be my principal advisor 
for all Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).
    Question. The DOD General Counsel.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication, 
coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel 
and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel and readiness policy 
matters. I would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General 
Counsel on legal, policy, and procedural matters pertaining to the 
policies promulgated from the USD(P&R).
    Question. The DOD Inspector General.
    Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting 
integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs, 
and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public 
interest. If confirmed, I would fully assist in any investigations or 
issues that relate to personnel and readiness.
    Question. The Service Secretaries.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of 
the Military Departments on all matters relating to the management and 
well-being of military and civilian personnel in the DOD Total Force 
structure.
    Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
    Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to 
the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and 
on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. If 
confirmed, I would work through ASD(RA) to ensure effective integration 
of National Guard capabilities into a cohesive Total Force.
    Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would work with these officials as partners 
in carrying out the human resource obligations of the Services.
    Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for 
Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of 
the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with these officers to 
ensure that DOD attracts, motivates, and retains the quality people it 
needs.
    Question. The combatant commanders.
    Answer. If confirmed, I would foster mutually respectful working 
relationships that translate into providing the Total Force 
capabilities needed to complete combat missions.
    Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower 
and Personnel (J-1).
    Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a close coordinating 
relationship and open channels of communication with the Joint Staff 
regarding personnel and readiness policy issues.

                SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

    Question. Servicemembers who are wounded and injured performing 
duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn 
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, 
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to 
duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and 
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the 
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 
illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of 
returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation 
and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.
    What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the 
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously 
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
    Answer. While I do not have enough information at this time to make 
a full assessment, I am aware that medical, benefit, and transitional 
assistance improvements have been made since 2007 to ensure our 
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers receive the care and support 
necessary to either return to Active Duty or to civilian life. However, 
it is a continually evolving process with ever increasing demands and 
the Department must regularly evaluate its Wounded Warrior programs and 
constantly strive to improve.
    Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress 
should be based?
    Answer. A significant strength, in my opinion, is the highest level 
priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors 
and their families. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of 
the wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers will allow the Department 
to continue its progress in caring for these members.
    Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
    Answer. The Department should better identify opportunities for 
improvement by putting in place a proactive assessment and evaluation 
process that corrects weaknesses.
    Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and 
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded 
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in 
returning to duty or to civilian life?
    Answer. Although I do not have any specific recommendations at this 
time, if confirmed, I would ensure that current programs and policies 
are regularly evaluated and outcome assessments conducted with 
adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place 
to take care of our recovering wounded warriors and their families.
    Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC 
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A 
DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been 
established to improve processing of servicemembers.
    What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and 
improve the Integrated DES?
    Answer. There are always opportunities for improvements. I believe 
the Department has an obligation to our servicemembers participating in 
the Integrated DES to proactively evaluate the program and proactively 
apply lessons learned.
    Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
    Answer. The Integrated DES is a collaborative effort between DOD 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs. If confirmed, I would work in 
close collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs to 
continually evaluate the process and apply unified solutions to correct 
identified deficiencies.

 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

    Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs Shinseki have pledged their support for improving and 
increasing collaboration between their respective departments to 
support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, 
in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and 
compensation.
    If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that 
DOD and Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's objectives in DOD 
and VA collaboration?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in the 
collaborative efforts between DOD and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. I share the vision of a model interagency partnership that 
delivers seamless, high quality, and cost-effective services to 
beneficiaries and value to our Nation. I will do my utmost to provide 
leadership that enables the interagency effort and facilitate the 
completion of those goals. Together with USD(P&R), I will ensure that 
DOD continues to work closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs 
to ensure that transitioning servicemembers receive the benefits, care, 
and transition support they deserve.

                        DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

    Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced 
severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted 
from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for 
disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in 
a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in combat-
related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In 
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of 
a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). 
Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a 
more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that 
the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
    If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department's definition of 
combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance 
pay and deduction of severance pay from VA disability compensation?
    Answer. Although I do not know the details, it is my understanding 
that a review of the policy implementing section 1646 of the Wounded 
Warrior Act is currently underway. If confirmed, I would look into the 
status of this review to ensure that any policy change relating to the 
definition, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress and is 
consistent with the governing statute.

                       HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

    Question. The current Homosexual Conduct Policy, commonly referred 
to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' went into effect in February 1994 
after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the 
enactment of a Federal statute. Although there have been some changes 
in how this policy has been implemented, the basic policy has not 
changed. President Obama made it clear that he intends to work with the 
military and with Congress to repeal the policy. Following their 
February 2, 2010, testimony recommending repeal of the policy, 
Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Admiral Mullen, initiated a high-level, comprehensive review of the 
impact of repealing the current law.
    What is your view on repealing or changing this policy?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(P&R) to work closely 
with the Military Department Secretaries and the Service Chiefs to 
provide the Secretary of Defense the best advice possible on the way 
forward regarding this issue.
    Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you anticipate 
playing in efforts to repeal or change this policy?
    Answer. If Congress changes the law and if confirmed, I would 
assist USD(P&R) in leading the implementation of the change in the 
policy within DOD. I would work closely with the Services to ensure the 
revising of this policy is done in a way that maintains our highest 
state of military readiness.

                          RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

    Question. What is your understanding of current policies and 
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
    Answer. The Department does not endorse the establishment of 
religion, but it does guarantee its free exercise. The Department and 
the Military Services ensure servicemembers may observe the tenets of 
their respective religions, including the right to hold no specific 
religious conviction or affiliation.
    Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate 
religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles 
of faith?
    Answer. My understanding is that wearing particular articles of 
faith are permissible so long as the articles are neat and 
conservative; do not negatively impact the readiness, good order, or 
discipline of the unit; and the mission is not jeopardized. If 
confirmed, I would continue to monitor and evaluate this issue.
    Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate 
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on 
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices 
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of 
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a 
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious 
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, 
including no religious beliefs?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the military chaplaincy has 
done an admirable job in ministering amidst the pluralistic environment 
of the military. Even as chaplains express their faith, they and their 
commanders also are asked to be as inclusive as possible when 
ministering to an interfaith group. I believe that as a group, military 
chaplains work to balance these responsibilities well.
    Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that 
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity 
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious 
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or 
self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations 
urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for 
religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to 
task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary 
study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
radicalization . . . ''.
    What is your view of this recommendation?
    Answer. I cannot make an assessment at this time, but if confirmed, 
evaluating the adequacy of current policies concerning the safeguarding 
of our servicemembers would be a top priority.
    Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based 
approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's 
relevant policies on this topic?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would review the plans that are currently 
in place to address these challenges, and determine what, if any, 
changes should be made to them to address this critical issue. I would 
intend to collaborate with my colleagues in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff in charting the 
right course for the Department.

           PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

    Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded 
during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army medical 
corps officer. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 
concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against 
internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
    What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at 
Fort Hood?
    Answer. It is my understanding that while the first responders and 
initial response teams were well-prepared to react to this incident, 
the proceeding warning signals were not properly recognized and 
therefore, this tragedy was not prevented. If confirmed, I would work 
with the USD(P&R) to gain a comprehensive understanding of the lessons 
learned, corrective actions taken, and the plan moving forward in order 
to increase our force protection on our installations.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DOD leadership to 
strengthen the areas identified by the Fort Hood Independent Review to 
include mitigating violence in the workplace, ensuring commanders/
supervisors have access to appropriate personnel records, and 
integrating and strengthening force protection policies. Furthermore, I 
will work closely with our medical community to give commanders a 
better understanding of how to identify violence indicators.

                      MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

    Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead 
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
    Answer. Every servicemember has a right to practice their religious 
faith without fear of persecution or retribution. If confirmed, I will 
review policies to ensure that they are adequate to provide physical 
and emotional safety from religious harassment and will take 
appropriate action, if needed.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the 
U.S. military?
    In order to safeguard the rights of servicemembers, there must be 
both formal and informal feedback procedures that quickly identify and 
assess any harassment, should it occur. Responses to grievances, or any 
identified shortcomings in command climate assessments, must be quick, 
thoughtful, and effective. If confirmed, I would review the viability 
of these feedback systems, and take measures to correct them, as 
appropriate.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

    Question. The Department has in recent years developed 
comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and 
response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing 
appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, 
numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in 
combat areas of operation are still being reported. Victims and their 
advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in 
their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for 
the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond 
appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate 
investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants 
accountable.
    Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, 
particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has put 
considerable effort into the development of policies and programs 
designed to address sexual assault. If confirmed, I would review those 
policies to ensure the Department provides the appropriate care to 
victims and hold offenders accountable.
    Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in 
which this new confidential reporting procedure has been put into 
operation?
    Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the 
implementation of the confidential reporting option, called restricted 
reporting. I am aware that the restriction of no investigation when a 
victim chooses restricted reporting has concerned commanders 
responsible for the actions of their unit members. I believe that the 
Department must find a balance between victim care and offender 
accountability but of the utmost importance is that victims come 
forward and obtain support they need following an assault.
    Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to 
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including 
assaults against contractor personnel?
    Answer. I do not have enough information to make a detailed 
assessment at this time, but I am aware the Department has focused on 
educating servicemembers deploying to combat zones about how to prevent 
sexual assault and what to do should it occur. That said, it has been 
made clear to me that if anyone shows up at a military treatment 
facility following a sexual assault, he or she will receive care.
    Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and 
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to 
allegations of sexual assault?
    Answer. I know that all Services have been directed to establish 
guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day per week sexual assault response 
capability for all locations, including deployed areas. At this time, I 
cannot make an assessment of the effectiveness of those guidelines, but 
if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy of training and resources 
allocated to sexual assault investigation and response would be a top 
priority.
    Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the 
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
    Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault 
in the military needs to know that they will be held accountable. That 
is how DOD removes perpetrators from our ranks and, at the same time, 
show victims that taking the difficult step of assisting with an 
investigation will help their fellow servicemembers. I understand that 
the Services are working towards increasing the subject matter 
expertise of those investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults. If 
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that accountability remains a key 
priority.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior 
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to 
sexual assaults?
    Answer. Sexual assault reaches across the Department, and as such, 
outreach and accountability efforts need to have the same reach. If 
confirmed, I would ensure that the Department has the correct structure 
in place to engage the departmental leadership, and the leadership of 
other agencies such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Health and 
Human Services, and Justice, in planning, guiding, and evaluating our 
efforts.

                           SERVICE ACADEMIES

    Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural 
elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in 
order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and 
sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?
    Answer. I believe the Department's sexual assault and sexual 
harassment policies provide a foundation for combating sexual 
misconduct at the Service Academies. There must be policies and 
procedures that encourage victims to come forward and that hold 
offenders accountable, as well as effective training programs. It is my 
understanding that the academies have institutionalized prevention and 
response programs. I further understand that the Department reviews the 
efforts of the academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that 
oversight and determine whether additional measures need to be taken.
    Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service 
Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent 
sexual assaults and sexual harassment?
    Answer. Regarding religious tolerance, I do not have enough 
information to make an assessment at this time. I believe it is 
imperative that leaders, at all levels, must continue to ensure that 
every member of the DOD respects the spirit and intent of laws and 
policies surrounding the free exercise of religion.
    On the topic of sexual assault, it is my understanding that the 
academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs. I 
further understand that the Department reviews the efforts of the 
academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that oversight and 
determine whether additional measures need to be taken.

                         WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

    Question. The Navy recently opened service on submarines to women 
and the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women 
in intelligence specialties. The issue of the appropriate combat role 
of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to 
Congress and the American public.
    Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for 
service by women?
    Answer. In my opinion, DOD has sufficient flexibility under current 
law to make assignment policy for women, if needed. DOD should continue 
to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding deployment 
roles for women.
    Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy 
regarding women in combat are needed?
    Answer. I am not aware of any changes necessary at this time. It is 
my understanding that Department policy and practices are reviewed on a 
recurring basis to ensure compliance and effective use of manpower. If 
confirmed, I would take my responsibility to review each proposed 
policy change very seriously and ensure changes to existing policy move 
forward only when accompanied by a thorough plan for implementation.

                      RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

    Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the 
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that 
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth 
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.'' 
In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force 
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.''
    What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical 
costs on future DOD plans?
    Answer. I am informed that government estimates indicate these 
costs could rise to over 10 percent of the DOD budget in just a few 
years. If confirmed, I would research means to ensure that DOD provides 
quality care, and it does so in the most cost-effective way that 
provides the best value for our servicemembers and their families.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or 
recommend to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such 
costs on the DOD top-line?
    Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. 
However, if confirmed, I would work closely with our healthcare 
leadership in DOD to examine every opportunity to assure military 
beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while 
managing cost growth and to provide that advice to the Secretary of 
Defense.
    Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit 
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control 
the costs of military health care?
    Answer. I believe that to control the costs of military health 
care, DOD needs to research all possibilities. If confirmed, I would 
examine the costs of the direct care facilities, determining where 
efficiencies can be gained and investing wisely in infrastructure 
requirements. I would look at the efficiencies in procuring health care 
services in the civilian market, and, I would evaluate the benefit 
structure to see where reasonable changes could occur. In the long 
term, the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention among our 
beneficiaries will also help greatly reduce the demand for health 
services.

                    PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

    Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related 
entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever 
increasing portion of the DOD budget.
    What actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in 
personnel costs and entitlement spending?
    Answer. I am aware that personnel-related costs are consuming an 
increasing proportion of the Department's finite resources. At the same 
time, I believe DOD cannot fail to adequately provide for and support 
our All-Volunteer Force and their families. This includes maintaining a 
sufficient rotation base for both our Active and Reserve personnel. If 
confirmed, I know achieving a right-sized mix of Active Duty, Reserve, 
civilians, and contractors is imperative. A key part of this challenge 
will be striking the optimum balance between personnel, 
recapitalization, and operational and support costs, while ensuring 
that related entitlements are appropriate and well-reasoned.
    Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services 
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high 
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the 
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for others?
    Answer. Although I do not have a detailed knowledge of the 
Department's and the Services' special pay programs at this time, I 
believe the use of targeted pays and bonuses can be effectively and 
efficiently used in recruiting and retaining specific skills and 
specialties.

                             MENTAL HEALTH

    Question. Senior military leaders, including the Secretary of 
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increasingly 
recognize the need to reduce the stigma for military personnel and 
their families and veterans in seeking mental health care.
    If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in expanding 
breadth of this message to military personnel and their families?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that existing DOD 
efforts to combat stigma toward help-seeking behavior among 
servicemembers be supported and, if necessary, would expand the breadth 
of the outreach efforts. I fully support the Department's efforts to 
improve health and mental health care services, and reduce the stigma 
of mental health care.

                           SUICIDE PREVENTION

    Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has 
increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that 
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing 
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors.
    If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to 
help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase 
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
    Answer. I believe DOD must support a culture to promote health and 
resiliency, and reduce high-risk behavior in the force. This requires 
both military and civilian leaders to be active participants in this 
effort and have essential roles in providing the requisite support. If 
confirmed, I will assure that proper emphasis on suicide prevention is 
placed through training, reducing stigma, increasing resilience, and 
increasing access to care. I will focus on providing standardization, 
integration of best practices, and general oversight, serving as a 
change agent and providing guidance from which the Services can operate 
their suicide prevention programs.
    Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense is taking in response to the June 2010 Army 
report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
    Answer. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the 
causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in 
drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors. If confirmed, 
I will ensure that the Army is enforcing existing regulations and 
policies and has implemented risk mitigation strategies in suicide 
prevention for the substance abuse and behavior issues (disciplinary 
and high risk) they identified. In addition, I would support ongoing 
assessment and monitoring of the impact of these policies and 
regulations on the suicide rate.

                       READINESS RESPONSIBILITIES

    Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain 
responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that 
affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel 
readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under 
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
    What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in ensuring military 
readiness?
    Answer. I view the responsibilities of the USD(P&R) as to advise 
the Secretary on all matters related to readiness. These include 
oversight of civilian and military training and education, personnel 
and medical readiness, and the analysis of broad mission assessments 
from the combatant commanders regarding the readiness of key units in 
support of the Secretary's deployment decisions. As for readiness 
responsibilities across the Department, if confirmed, I will work 
collaboratively with my colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the 
Services to ensure our forces are ready to execute the National 
Military Strategy, and I will sustain the readiness synergism and 
linkages that exist today across the Department, the other Federal 
Agencies, our coalition partners, and local governments and 
communities.
    Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve 
readiness reporting and monitoring of the Military Forces, and if 
confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as 
other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices to achieve them?
    Answer. I believe the Department needs accurate and timely 
readiness assessments of our military forces. These are the gauge by 
which DOD should measure our ability to execute the missions assigned 
by the President and Secretary of Defense. Accurate assessments allow 
the Department to effectively plan and manage its forces, and signal 
where there are capability shortfalls or assets are needed. It is my 
understanding that the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) 
provides the means to capture these assessments from our military 
commanders, and provides a holistic and important view of the 
Department's readiness to the senior leadership. If confirmed, I would 
personally review DRRS implementation to ensure the Department is 
meeting the needs of the senior leadership and a unity of effort across 
the Department to drive this important effort to a fully operational 
capability.

                        ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

    Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010, Congress authorized higher Active Duty end strengths for all the 
Services.
    In your view, what is the appropriate Active Duty end strength for 
each of the Services?
    Answer. While I cannot make an informed assessment at this time, I 
believe strongly that our forces, both Active and Reserve, must be 
large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also have a 
rotation base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and 
their families. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to 
this important issue.
    Question. What challenges will the Services face in maintaining 
these higher end strengths?
    Answer. The foremost challenge will be monitoring and responding to 
retention and recruiting trends, especially as the economy improves.

               MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

    Question. DOD continues to face significant shortages in critically 
needed military medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve 
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support 
requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in 
recruitment and retention of military medical, dental, nurse, and 
behavioral health personnel.
    What is your understanding of the shortages of health care 
professionals currently being experienced in DOD and the sufficiency of 
the plans to meet recruiting and retention goals?
    Answer. Regarding military healthcare servicemembers, it is my 
understanding the current overall manning of the health professions is 
at or above manning requirements. If confirmed, one of my goals will be 
to improve the recruitment and retention of health professional 
specialties which currently fall below manning requirements. To retain 
our health professionals, Congress has provided DOD broad authority to 
provide special and incentive pays for all health professional 
officers. I believe there is an increased need for civilian healthcare 
providers and DOD must remain competitive to recruit from the civilian 
labor market.
    Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including 
bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that 
the Military Services can continue to meet medical support 
requirements?
    Answer. In regard to legislative and policy initiatives for the 
Military Services, I do not have any specific recommendations at this 
time. However, I believe there may be a need for more flexible 
recruiting and retention strategies such as the recently granted 
authority to use bonuses and special pays as needed to recruit, hire, 
and retain medical specialties.

                               DWELL TIME

    Question. Even though dwell time is improving as our forces draw 
down in Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not 
experiencing the ideal dwell time of 2 years at home for every year 
deployed.
    In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be 
met?
    Answer. From my perspective, the largest impact to dwell time will 
come from the balance of the drawdown in Iraq and the President's 
decisions regarding Afghanistan. Increases in end strength for the 
Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces over the past several 
years should translate into dwell times increasing.
    The Iraq drawdown will also serve to increase the dwell time for 
our units as fewer forces will need to be deployed. How much this will 
increase dwell time depends on the level of forces needed for 
Afghanistan. In all cases, however, DOD must carefully manage our 
forces across the Department. This involves careful assessment of where 
and when military forces are needed, and how to structure the force to 
best meet the projected demands.
    Question. In your view, would additional Army end strength in 2011 
or 2012 improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force, and 
if so, what numbers of Active and Reserve component members would be 
necessary?
    Answer. I do not have enough information to make an assessment at 
this time. I defer to the analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review as 
to whether current end strength increases are sufficient in light of 
anticipated strategy and projected needs.

     MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

    Question. Over the past 9 years, the National Guard and Reserves 
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since 
World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures 
for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening 
and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited 
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access 
to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management 
policies and systems have been characterized in the past as inefficient 
and rigid and readiness levels have been adversely affected by 
equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
    What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve 
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas 
do problems still exist?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has focused on 
increasing the alert and mobilization times prior to mobilization; DOD 
needs to ensure that we provide predictability to servicemembers, their 
families, and employers. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of 
the Department to monitor this issue closely, as we know that 
predictability is a major factor for all those affected, and I believe 
strongly that National Guard and Reserve personnel deserve first-class 
mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and 
transition assistance programs.
    Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring 
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at 
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
    Answer. It is my understanding the most significant enduring 
changes are in the implementation of service force generation plans, 
which have been created to provide a defined cycle to prepare Reserve 
component units for employment as an operational force. This enables 
units to train for a mission prior to mobilization and deploy and 
redeploy on a predictable time line.
    Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities 
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing authorities and 
proposed legislation to ensure that the Department has appropriate 
authorities in light of the role of the Guard and Reserves in our force 
deployment plans.

              MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

    Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component 
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, 
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for 
improved policy oversight and accountability.
    If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate 
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
    Answer. It is essential for DOD and all the Service components to 
have a single repository of data which accurately reflects the medical 
and dental readiness of the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will 
work with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and 
Reserve Affairs in bringing the appropriate parties, including 
information management, medical, and line personnel, together to 
examine the reporting processes in detail, to agree on the necessary 
definitions of what and who should be monitored, and to fill any gaps 
in the reporting processes.
    Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to 
produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the significant 
progress in improvement that I understand has been made in medical and 
dental readiness for the Reserve component and identify what still 
needs to be accomplished to achieve the goal of a healthy and fit 
Reserve component force.

                        MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

    Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second 
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of 
key quality-of-life factors for military families, such as family 
support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and 
recreation services.
    How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment 
and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own top 
priorities for the Armed Forces?
    Answer. Quality-of-life efforts impact the recruitment and 
retention of military personnel and are key to maintaining the All-
Volunteer Force. A servicemember's satisfaction with various aspects of 
military life as well as the servicemember's family experience 
influences members' decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I would review 
how effectively our programs meet the needs of servicemembers and their 
families, and ensure that they are contributing positively to 
recruitment and retention.
    Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military 
qualify-of-life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision 
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy 
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
    Answer. I would aggressively pursue the Department's priorities to 
promote the well-being and resilience of servicemembers and their 
families. I would focus on understanding the needs of our force and 
their families and expand assistance such as access to counseling, 
fitness opportunities, and childcare support to help minimize stress on 
the force. The Department leadership should work together with advocacy 
groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in 
programs and to communicate effectively to ensure that families know 
how to access available support when they need it.

                             FAMILY SUPPORT

    Question. Military members and their families in both the Active 
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous 
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military 
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a 
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations 
that go with them.
    What do you consider to be the most important family readiness 
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how 
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and 
adequately resourced?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would make family readiness issues one of 
my top priorities. I would support, prioritize, and appropriately 
resource quality physical and mental healthcare, spouse career 
assistance, childcare, other elements of dependent support, and 
education needs.
    Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in 
light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end 
strength?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's current 
approach to identify and address family readiness needs, to gather 
information from the Services, commands, servicemembers and families, 
professional organizations, and researchers about how to best prepare 
families for rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and other stressful aspects 
of military life.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve 
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family 
readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a 
military installation?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department's Yellow 
Ribbon Program is properly focused and funded to address the issues 
faced by members of the Active, Guard, and Reserve and their families. 
The program should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach 
to military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten 
by a coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, 
State, local, non-profit, and private providers. My goal would be to 
provide a full range of services for Active, Guard, and Reserve members 
and their families.
    Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to 
enhance family support?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of 
flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our 
servicemembers and their families, whether they live on military 
installations, near military installations, or far from military 
installations.

                          ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

    Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is 
access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the healthcare 
system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not 
have access to adequate care.
    If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access 
to healthcare for the families of servicemembers?
    Answer. I agree that access to care for family members is an 
important concern and, if confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate 
access to care is a key feature of our TRICARE program and will 
continually explore ways to ensure all beneficiaries are provided the 
appropriate level of care within the established TRICARE Access to Care 
Standards.

  OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

    Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 (section 563), Congress required the establishment of an Office of 
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 
The purpose of this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for 
military families with special needs, be they educational or medical in 
nature.
    In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of 
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
    Answer. I believe the priorities of this office include medical and 
educational programs to strengthen military families with special 
needs. If confirmed, I would support the critical efforts of this 
office to establish consistent policy and monitor its implementation 
across the Services. I would identify programs already in existence 
that can provide special services to military families.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those 
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get 
the support they need?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure increased communication 
efforts to reach families with special needs through the use of 
webinars, social media outlets, base newspapers, commissaries and 
exchanges, childcare centers and youth facilities, DOD schools and a 
variety of DOD and Services' websites. In addition, I would emphasize 
collaboration with civilian community resources.

                 MY CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM

    Question. The Department established the My Career Advancement 
Accounts (MyCAA) program, a demonstration project that provides 
military spouses with funds through ``career advancement accounts'' to 
help enable them to pursue portable careers. In February 2010, the 
Department became overwhelmed by the numbers of program applicants, 
subsequently ran out of funds, and then temporarily halted the program. 
The program has now restarted, but the funds, as well as the number of 
spouses who would be eligible for the program, will be more limited.
    What is your understanding of the current focus and objectives of 
the program?
    Answer. I believe the objective of the MyCAA program is to ensure 
that military spouses have opportunities to pursue and sustain a career 
while supporting their servicemembers. It is my understanding that the 
current MyCAA is available only to spouses of Active Duty members in 
the pay grades of E1-E5, W1-W2, and O1-O2. MyCAA is restricted to 
$4,000 per eligible spouse and must be used over a 3-year period for an 
Associate's degree, a license, or a credential leading to a portable 
career. I believe these financial parameters will allow the Department 
to sustain the program. It is my understanding that DOD continues to 
offer robust career counseling programs to all our spouses.
    Question. If confirmed, what would be your objectives for the MyCAA 
program and other spouse employment initiatives or programs?
    Answer. My objective would be to assist, support, and empower them 
in making informed decisions through offering them an opportunity to 
obtain comprehensive information on high-growth, high-demand, portable 
occupations that can move with them as they relocate. This would 
include occupational information on education, license, and credential 
requirements, how to access other Federal, State, and private 
opportunities for financial assistance in achieving these requirements, 
as well as understanding earnings potential. I would also promote the 
outstanding pipeline of talent that military spouses represent to 
America's employers. Military spouses are talented, diverse, motivated, 
and bring strong values to the workplace.

                       MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS

    Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research 
investment areas for DOD?
    Answer. I believe the highest priorities are to address critical 
research capability gaps related to the treatment and recovery of 
wounded warriors, such as the diagnosis and treatment of Traumatic 
Brain Injury (TBI), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other 
elements of combat related stress, development of improved prosthetics, 
treatment of eye injury, and other deployment and battlefield-related 
injuries.
    Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in 
these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD 
goals and requirements?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current research portfolio 
to ensure it prioritizes and resources research appropriate to the 
requirements of the Department.
    Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are 
well coordinated with similar research programs within the private 
sector, academia, the Services, DARPA, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and the National Institutes of Health?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would support coordination efforts to 
ensure that research is being conducted jointly, building on and 
partnering with industry, academia, and other government agencies to 
ensure the greatest return to our warfighters. I am aware that joint 
program committees have been established to engage with Federal 
partners to ensure that our research reflects the best interests of our 
service personnel.
    Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies 
(including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested 
before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department applies 
the highest standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
ensure new medical technologies, drugs, and vaccines are safe and 
effective before they are adopted for use in the Department.
    Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns 
raised about the use of on-line social networks for medical research 
purposes.
    How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking 
media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and 
security of patients?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure active application of the 
Department's policy, which states that the rights and welfare of human 
subjects in research supported or conducted by the DOD components will 
be protected. This protection is based on the ethical principles of 
respect for persons and beneficence, and encompasses requirements to 
obtain informed consent and to do no harm. In implementing this policy, 
the Department will adhere to the applicable statutory provisions for 
human protections in research as well as supporting Department 
policies.
    Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical 
research enterprise?
    Answer. Although I do not have detailed knowledge of the entire 
research portfolio, I am especially interested in ensuring the 
responsiveness of the research program to medical readiness and our 
warfighters' medical needs. This will be accomplished by assuring that 
DOD has a balanced investment in medical science and technology and in 
medical advanced development leading to timely incorporation into 
clinical practice in the Military Health System.

                    MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

    Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are 
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their 
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. 
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, 
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
    What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs 
(particularly in view of the Secretary's efficiencies initiatives) and, 
if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the benefits of strong MWR 
programs are critical to esprit de corps, stress reduction, and 
personal health and well-being. Although there are very extensive 
installation MWR facilities and programs, I believe there is an 
immediate challenge in ensuring that MWR programs for our deployed 
forces meet their needs, especially free access to the Internet to 
communicate with family and friends back home and fitness and 
recreation activities to keep forces fit to fight. Recreation support 
for our wounded warriors is also critical. In the longer term, I 
believe the Department needs to understand what programs are valued by 
servicemembers and their families in order to make wise investments. In 
addition, the MWR customers need to be involved in expressing their 
needs and satisfaction with our programs and policies; I understand the 
Department will conduct the second MWR customer satisfaction survey in 
fiscal year 2011. If confirmed, these are all areas I would 
aggressively pursue.

                COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

    Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant 
quality of life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces 
and their families.
    What is your view of the need for modernization of business 
policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what 
do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve 
modernization goals?
    Answer. I understand that commissary and exchange programs and 
policies must continue to evolve to meet the needs and expectations of 
our changing force and a changing marketplace. I believe efforts should 
be aimed at reducing overhead and pursuing new avenues to reach our 
military families who do not live on military installations. The 
commissary system should deliver customer savings and also achieve high 
satisfaction ratings. The military exchange resale community must 
continue to work, individually and collaboratively, to adapt marketing 
and selling practices, invest in technologies, and improve merchandise 
availability to be more responsive to military customers.
    Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to 
establish an executive governing body for the commissary and exchange 
systems to ensure the complementary operation of the two systems.
    What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the 
executive governing body?
    Answer. I am aware the Department established the DOD Executive 
Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the USD(P&R) 
regarding the complementary operation of the commissary and exchange 
systems. I have been informed that the Board works to resolve issues 
and has been instrumental in pursuing matters of mutual benefit to the 
elements of the military resale system. The Board is chaired by the 
PDUSD(P&R), and members include both the senior military officers and 
civilians who oversee and manage the commissary and exchange systems.
    Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the 
governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
    Answer. The Secretary designated the PDUSD(P&R) as the chairperson 
of the Executive Resale Board. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board 
would continue to meet regularly to review operational areas of mutual 
interest to the commissary and exchange systems.

                       CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

    Question. Section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 repealed the statutory authority for the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS), and required that all NSPS employees 
be converted to other personnel systems by no later than January 1, 
2012.
    What is your understanding of the Department's progress in 
converting its civilian employees from NSPS?
    Answer. I understand during fiscal year 2010, 172,000 employees 
representing approximately 76 percent of the NSPS population were 
transitioned from NSPS to the Government-wide General Schedule system. 
I also understand the transition of all remaining NSPS employees to the 
appropriate statutory pay and personnel system will be completed by the 
statutory deadline of January 1, 2012.
    Question. Section 1113 also provides DOD with extensive personnel 
flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to 
other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as 
added by section 1113, directs the Department to establish a new 
performance management system for all of its employees. Section 9902(b) 
directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that 
is designed to better fulfill DOD's mission needs, produce high-quality 
applicants, and support timely personnel decisions.
    Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays a vital 
role in the functioning of the Department?
    Answer. Yes, DOD's civilian employee workforce plays an 
instrumental role in the functioning of the Department.
    Question. What is your view of the personnel flexibilities provided 
by section 1113?
    Answer. I understand Congress provided these flexibilities to allow 
the Department to better meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I 
will support the work that I understand is under way to develop the 
flexibilities.
    Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement 
these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the 
Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian 
workforce?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department to develop a Defense 
Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to recruit, train, and advance a new 
generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112 
provides the Department with the full range of authorities available 
for demonstration programs under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C., 
including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of 
qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These flexibilities 
are not otherwise available to DOD.
    Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified 
civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition, 
technical, business, and financial communities?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process 
been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
    Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly 
talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to 
streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. There is much work 
to be done in this area, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the 
Department actively engages in the Government-wide initiative to reform 
civilian hiring and aggressively pursues improvements within the 
Department.
    Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement 
the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the 
needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's 
civilian workforce?
    Answer. Yes.

                         HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

    Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section 
1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 requires the 
Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human 
capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's 
civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section 
115b requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing 
the Department's senior management, functional, and technical workforce 
and the Department's acquisition workforce.
    Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies 
gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key 
step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and 
capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements 
for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?
    Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations. If confirmed, I 
would review the strategic human capital planning that the Department 
has conducted over the past years against the section 115b requirements 
to determine if any changes may be needed to improve the Department's 
overall workforce planning effort.
    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies 
with these requirements?
    Answer. Yes.

      BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

    Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on 
services provided by contractors. Over the past 8 years, DOD's civilian 
workforce has remained essentially unchanged in size. Over the same 
period, the Department's spending on contract services has more than 
doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for 
the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in fiscal year 2000 
to an estimated 1,550,000 in fiscal year 2007. As a result of the 
explosive growth in service contracts, contractors now play an integral 
role in the performance of functions that were once performed 
exclusively by government employees, including the management and 
oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the 
development of public relations strategies, and even the collection and 
analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in 
the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and 
perform many of the same functions as Federal employees.
    Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees 
and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?
    Answer. I support the Secretary's initiative announced with the 
fiscal year 2010 budget to reduce the Department's reliance on 
contracted services contractors. I believe the desired outcome of the 
Department's in-sourcing initiative is a balanced total workforce of 
military, government civilians, and contracted services that 
appropriately align functions to the public and private sector, and 
results in the best value for the taxpayer.
    Question. In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors 
to perform its basic functions?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's ongoing 
efforts to critically examine currently contracted functions. Striking 
a balance between government and contractor performance that ensures 
uncompromising government control of critical functions, while 
providing best value to the taxpayer, is imperative.

               SECRETARY GATES' EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES

    Question. In May 2010, Secretary Gates launched an initiative to 
strengthen and modernize our fighting forces by eliminating inefficient 
or duplicative programs. In an August 16, 2010, memo to DOD components, 
the Secretary directed 20 specific initiatives, many involving military 
and civilian personnel and DOD contractors.
    What is your assessment of the efficiencies announced by the 
Secretary to date, and if confirmed, what criteria would you use to 
identify and justify additional opportunities for efficiency in 
programs within the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness?
    Answer. I understand that Secretary Gates is attempting to identify 
efficiencies and redundancies within DOD and, if confirmed, I would 
support the implementation and continuation of this effort. I would use 
the Secretary's criteria to divest the Department of missions that are 
not appropriate or part of our core mission. I would also build on the 
Secretary of Defense's work of finding greater efficiencies, with the 
goal of applying those resources toward higher priority efforts within 
the Department. From shared services to other process improvements, I 
would strive to ensure Personnel and Readiness is on the leading edge 
of efficiencies while still maintaining effectiveness for the 
Department.

                         ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

    Question. Over the past 15 years, DOD has dramatically reduced the 
size of its acquisition workforce, without undertaking any systematic 
planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills 
and competencies needed to meet current and future needs. Since 
September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have 
substantially increased. Section 852 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition 
Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its 
acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of $3 billion 
over 6 years for this purpose.
    Do you believe that DOD acquisition workforce is large enough and 
has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?
    Answer. While I cannot make an assessment of the size of the 
workforce at this time, I fully support the Secretary's goals of 
increasing the capacity and capability of the acquisition workforce 
through reducing reliance on contracted services in key acquisition 
support functions.
    Question. Do you support the use of the DOD Acquisition Workforce 
Development Fund to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees 
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost 
effective manner for the taxpayers?
    Answer. Yes.

               LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

    Question. The laboratory demonstration program founded in section 
342 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 as 
amended by section 1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001, section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1108 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and section 1105 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, paved the way 
for personnel management initiatives and new flexibilities at the 
defense laboratories. These innovations have been adopted in various 
forms throughout other DOD personnel systems.
    If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration 
program and the authorities under these provisions?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the 
defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel 
flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?
    Answer. Yes.

                      FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

    Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by 
the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at 
transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include 
revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based 
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for 
both military and civilian personnel.
    In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal 
Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and 
military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language 
programs and activities among the Federal agencies?
    Answer. The priorities of the Federal Government to expanding the 
foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and 
improving coordination between foreign language programs and activities 
among the Federal agencies should be an integrated, holistic, whole-of-
nation approach to developing these skills beginning in pre-school and 
continuing through high school and college graduation. The shortage of 
language and cultural skills is a national shortfall, not just an 
isolated DOD problem. If confirmed, I will support and build upon DOD 
efforts to ensure the education of a broader pool of Americans with 
skills in critical languages. Early education and skill development in 
critical foreign languages is paramount and must begin in pre-school 
and continue through the high school and college years. Educating our 
children beginning in pre-school and continuing throughout their 
educational journey in critical languages will result in globally 
competitive citizenry from which DOD, other Federal Government 
agencies, and the private sector can recruit.

                            GI BILL BENEFITS

    Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational 
Assistance Act in 2008 that created enhanced educational benefits for 
servicemembers who have served at least 90 days on Active Duty since 
September 11. The maximum benefit would roughly cover the cost of a 
college education at any public university in the country.
    What unresolved issues related to implementation of the post-9/11 
Veterans Educational Assistance Act (e.g., coverage of additional 
military personnel) do you consider most important to be addressed?
    Answer. It is my understanding that there are two technical fixes 
needed in the current statute. First, the original statute 
inadvertently left out some National Guard Active Duty as qualifying 
time for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Second, although the statute 
authorized the Services to offer a supplemental payment for enlistments 
in critical skills (commonly called ``kickers''), it did not include 
the specific language required to allow the Services to use the 
Education Trust Fund to pay for these kickers. Both of these provisions 
are rectified in the current version of S. 3447, recently introduced in 
the Senate.

                          MILITARY RETIREMENT

    Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the 
benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than 
the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for 
retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending 
accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business Board Task 
Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style benefits'' 
describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-volunteer force 
retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-subsidized grocery 
chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs.''
    What is your view of the adequacy of the current military 
retirement benefit?
    Answer. I have not yet formed an opinion on the adequacy of the 
current military retirement benefit. However, it is only one component 
of the entire military compensation system. I believe it will be 
important to consider the impacts of making changes to one part of the 
system so that DOD maintains their current high quality military force.
    Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new 
generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of 
the government?
    Answer. I don't have a recommendation at this time, but if 
confirmed, I would review this issue carefully.
    Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view 
of military benefits?
    Answer. I have not reviewed this report in detail, but I know that 
one of its major recommendations was changing the military retirement 
system.
    It is my understanding that the Defense Business Board is 
considering alternatives to the current military retirement system and 
alternatives for the Department to consider. If confirmed, I look 
forward to reviewing these and other proposals with the military 
departments.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                           TRICARE IN ALASKA

    1. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, there are over 89,000 TRICARE 
beneficiaries in the State of Alaska. Active Duty military, their 
families, and retirees face many challenges accessing health care in 
Alaska. The Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) at Fort Wainwright and 
Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) are top quality and provide many 
services to military members and their families. However, many 
specialties are neither available at the MTFs or at capacity and cannot 
accommodate all customers. Many civilian specialists in Alaska do not 
participate in the TRICARE network. I've worked extensively with 
TRICARE Management Activity and the Services to improve access to care. 
I commissioned an interagency working group which identified the need 
for regulatory flexibility and a single reimbursement rate to improve 
access to care in Alaska. Are you aware of these challenges? If 
confirmed, what steps would you take to improve access to healthcare in 
Alaska?
    Dr. Rooney. I am aware of these challenges. I have been advised 
that throughout Alaska there are roughly 1,783 non-Federal physicians 
of whom 1,566 are TRICARE Participating Providers. Of the 1,566 TRICARE 
participating providers, 793 are primary care physicians with 
specialties in family practice, general practice, internal medicine, 
and pediatrics. The TRICARE Management Activity's strong support in 
approving 12 locality-based waivers ranging from 125 percent to 565 
percent of the CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge (CMAC) for critical 
specialty providers, coupled with an existing Rate Reimbursement/Rate 
Demonstration which sets rates in Alaska at 1.4 times the CMAC 
allowable charges, has greatly increased acceptance of TRICARE by non-
Federal providers. A significant change was noted from early 2008 to 
February 2011, when the TRICARE Preferred Provider Network increased 
from 465 to 845 providers.
    If confirmed, I would continue to support the TRICARE Management 
Activity's efforts in this regard. While I was pleased to learn that 
the Rate Reimbursement Demonstration initially set to expire in 
December 2010 was extended until December 2012, I will ensure that 
future changes to the rate structure are done collaboratively with the 
various Federal agencies that are also exploring options resulting from 
the Interagency Task Force's recommendation for regulatory flexibility 
and a single Federal reimbursement rate.

    2. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, please describe how 
you would work with the Army and the Air Force to ensure the MTFs in 
Alaska meet health care requirements of Active Duty military and their 
families, especially as the Army increases personnel stationed at Fort 
Wainwright.
    Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with the Surgeons 
General of the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs to discuss provider and ancillary support staffing gaps 
in the three Alaska MTFs. I will encourage support of the MTFs to the 
maximum extent possible given the high operational tempo and associated 
deployments. I have been advised that, in all forums, there appears to 
be a strong interest in ensuring access for all. This guided the 
TRICARE Management Activity's recently approved TRICARE Expansion Plan 
favorably endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs and the Services' Surgeons General in collaboration with the 
Alaska community leadership. The focus of the Expansion Plan is on 
improved access for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries without 
displacing non-DOD beneficiaries. In the context of improving access 
and protecting non-DOD beneficiaries from DOD overflow, I will 
encourage the Services' Surgeons General and the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs to explore opportunities for partnerships 
with the Alaska community for such programs as Graduate Medical 
Education, thereby facilitating mutual positive outcomes. In addition, 
Elmendorf AFB already supports internships in dental, pharmacy lab, 
physician assistants, medical assistants, Doctor of Osteopathy, and a 
physician residency. State-wide recruiting efforts are being initiated 
by the State, hospitals, and our healthcare support contractor.

    3. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, please describe how you would work 
with TRICARE Management Activity as they work to increase the TRICARE 
network in Alaska to provide for better access to health care for our 
servicemembers and their families.
    Dr. Rooney. Access to care issues in Alaska cannot be addressed 
merely in terms of access to purchased care services in the community 
(network or non-network). As the interagency working group which you 
commissioned confirmed in their Report to Congress of September 2010, I 
have been advised that some of the issues are not under the control of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) 
or the Federal Government. These include licensure and certification 
rules, recruitment of primary care and specialty services, and 
apprehension on the part of private practitioners regarding changes in 
the reimbursement environment related to healthcare reform. Similarly, 
access challenges faced by TRICARE beneficiaries are no different from 
challenges faced by other beneficiaries covered by the Federal 
Government health plans or by many Alaskans covered by private pay 
plans. I was pleased to learn of the TRICARE Management Activity's 
recent initiatives in the State of Alaska, which include:

         Establishing a TRICARE Civilian Preferred Provider 
        Network requiring the West Region's Health Care Support 
        Contractor to develop and operate such a network in designated 
        Prime Service Areas.
         Permitting eligible TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in 
        Prime with assignment to MTF Primary Care Managers, or, as an 
        alternative, assignment to a civilian Primary Care Manager 
        within the TRICARE civilian preferred provider network. This 
        will allow approximately 250 to 300 beneficiaries to transfer 
        to a civilian Primary Care Manager. This will include family 
        practice, pediatrics, and internal medicine providers.
         Offering this new program, first, to the Prime Service 
        Areas surrounding Fort Wainwright Army Base and Eielson AFB in 
        Fairbanks and then, second, evaluating whether to expand it 
        further into Anchorage surrounding the Joint Base Elmendorf 
        Richardson.

    Working jointly with the political leadership, the Services, and 
the community, the TRICARE Management Activity's 18-month effort in 
bringing these initiatives to fruition is notable. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support these ongoing efforts while closely monitoring the 
impact these programs have on improving access to health care for our 
servicemembers and their families.

                       FAMILY DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

    4. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, one of my priorities is support for 
our military families, especially those in Alaska. The 1st Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division will deploy to Afghanistan 
in May and I want to make sure their families are taken care of as 
their loved ones face yet another deployment. What do you consider to 
be the most important family readiness issue for servicemembers and 
their families?
    Dr. Rooney. I share your priority of supporting our military 
families. The impact of a deployment or multiple deployments on 
military families is the most significant family readiness issue for 
servicemembers and their families. The challenges to military family 
readiness and resiliency are numerous stressors related to separation, 
deployment, geographic isolation, high operational tempo, and financial 
worries.
    The Department has a network of Family Support Programs at all DOD 
installations worldwide that provide resources to prepare military 
families to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living 
experienced in the unique context of military service. Family Support 
Programs provide information and referral, education and training, and 
counseling services to educate families about the potential challenges 
they may face. The goal is to equip them with the skills needed to 
competently function in the face of such challenges and to increase 
their awareness of the supportive resources available to them. The 
focus of the support is to assist families with deployment, relocation, 
spousal employment, family life education (including parenting skills), 
personal financial management, volunteer opportunities, and non-medical 
counseling.
    The Family Support Programs are designed to provide training and 
support to servicemembers and families during all phases of deployment. 
In particular, to address the impact of deployment on children and 
youth, the Department augments Family Support Programs with licensed 
counselors placed in child development centers, schools, and State 
family programs. The counselors provide specialized non-medical 
counseling education, and training for parents, teachers, child 
development staff, and with parental permission, children and youth. 
Given the frequency and length of deployments, and the impact those 
separations can have on military children, the support provided by the 
child and youth counselors throughout the deployment cycle is very 
important.

    5. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, how would you ensure 
those needs are adequately resourced?
    Dr. Rooney. I will ensure funding and trained personnel are 
provided to support the ongoing needs of the families. I share the 
Department's strong commitment to providing assistance to 
servicemembers and their families, particularly in light of the 
unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. Family assistance 
programs serve a critical need in direct mission support for the 
mobilization and deployment of both the Active Duty and the Reserve 
components and I would work closely with the Services to ensure 
resources are adequate to meet the identified needs.
    In meeting the direction and goals of the Secretary of Defense to 
create a more efficient and effective organization, we will continue to 
review and assess where we can take offsets from existing programs to 
meet the high priority requirements and needs of the servicemembers and 
their families.

    6. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, what additional steps will you take 
to enhance family support?
    Dr. Rooney. I will ensure that existing as well as any new programs 
that serve families are continually assessed so that only those 
programs that add value and enhance family readiness and resilience are 
given resources and continued. I will insist that we integrate programs 
into a delivery system that is easily accessible and that ongoing 
evaluations focused on obtaining evidence of successful outcomes are 
developed. Successful support programs are those that respond directly 
to the needs identified by members and their families.
    The promotion and publicizing of these support programs to 
servicemembers and their families are also priorities. It is critical 
to make sure the breadth and depth of the programs are known, that they 
are being used to their full potential, and that they are being 
recognized as valuable to helping servicemembers and their families 
cope with the challenges of daily living experienced in the context of 
military service.
    In summary, it is important that:

    A.  Programs that support our servicemembers and their families 
which are regularly evaluated and have been shown to add value and 
enhance family readiness are resourced and continued;
    B.  Programs that are evidence-based are integrated into a delivery 
system that is easily accessible and those outcomes that respond to 
identified support needs of members and families are measured for 
effectiveness;
    C.  The support programs are adequately promoted and publicized; 
and
    D.  Innovative and effective programs are identified and presented 
as best practices for others to emulate.

                     OUTSOURCING VERSUS INSOURCING

    7. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, regarding DOD's outsourcing and 
insourcing efforts, it seems that the pendulum swings one way and then 
the other. I recently read an article which indicated the Army put 
their insourcing efforts on hold, and Secretary Gates has indicated the 
insourcing is not saving as much money as initially thought. In your 
opinion, how can DOD strike a balance between civilian and contractor 
employees that is in the best interest of DOD and the taxpayers?
    Dr. Rooney. When issues of sourcing are discussed within DOD, the 
goal is to consider it from the perspective of Total Force Management. 
Across the entire Department, it is recognized that continuous 
improvement to the Total Force Management of Active and Reserve 
military, government civilians, and contracts for services are 
critical. We must ensure that our military is not considered a free 
source of labor by organizations within the Department who rely on the 
Services to finance their recruitment, training, and development. 
Rather, the true cost of military, government civilians, and/or 
contracted support should be determined depending on individual facts 
and circumstances. To that end, the strategic view of the Total Force 
continues to evolve as the mission and plan across the FYDP are 
executed.
    Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and 
prioritization of the work to be done. It requires identification of 
and investment in the most effective and efficient component of the 
workforce to best accomplish the tasks to deliver the required 
capabilities and level of readiness. The separate decisions that affect 
each component of the Total Force must be synchronized to achieve the 
desired outcomes and balance operational, fiscal, and acquisition 
risks.
    The challenge faced with Total Force Management is that it is 
dynamic and requires judgment informed by sound analysis. This not only 
includes the development and promulgation of policies, but also 
requires the Department to provide managers with the tools, resources, 
training, and information necessary to achieve the desired outcomes, 
all of which must occur in a difficult fiscal environment. Current 
business processes must be synchronized to ensure the risks associated 
with decisions made in the context of Total Force Management are fully 
considered.
    There is work being undertaken to improve the Department's 
Inventory of Contracts for Services, as recommended by the most recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of DOD processes and in 
compliance with changes to the governing statute as directed in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The tools and 
processes that inform the Department's inventory of military and 
civilian workload, the Inherently Governmental and Commercial 
Activities Inventory, are also being reviewed. Improvements to these 
tools are critical to achieve a more appropriate balance in the 
workforce, aligning inherently governmental activities to military and 
civilian workforces and commercial activities to the most cost 
effective service provider, whether military, civilian, or contracted 
support.

    8. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, how will you approach this issue?
    Dr. Rooney. I will approach this issue by recognizing that there 
has been a focus over the past few years on insourcing. The Department 
is committed to meeting the statutory obligations under title 10, which 
require an annual review of contracted services and identification of 
those services that are more appropriately performed by the government 
workforce and should be insourced.
    There is no prescribed solution, and neither all insourcing nor all 
outsourcing is ideal. The private sector and contracted support are, 
and will continue to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and 
support to the Department's Total Force.
    We also acknowledge the concern express by Congress as related to 
the A-76 public-private competition program, and the opportunity in the 
past year to review related policies, tools, and processes. We believe 
that the A-76 public-private competition process along with insourcing 
are critical tools for commanders and managers to have available to 
them for the purposes of validating manpower and other requirements; 
driving more consistent delivery of mission critical support and 
services to warfighters and families; and delivering required readiness 
levels while minimizing fiscal opportunity costs to meet the compelling 
needs of the Department.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

                        NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMS

    9. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, the United States has come to rely 
heavily on our National Guard members. Our Guard has experienced the 
largest and most sustained deployment since World War II. In New 
Hampshire, we have seen the largest Guard deployments in the history of 
our State. You mention in your advance policy questions that you 
believe that National Guard and Reserve personnel ``deserve first-class 
mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and 
transition assistance programs.'' If confirmed, what role would you 
play in ensuring our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are 
extended first-class support benefits--before, during, and after their 
deployments?
    Dr. Rooney. I share Congress' sentiment that our National Guard and 
Reserve servicemembers deserve first-class mobilization and 
demobilization procedures, medical and dental screening, and transition 
assistance programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to 
ensure that they comply with departmental activation policy and that 
the policy is balanced and effective. I would support current 
departmental initiatives aimed at providing as much advanced notice to 
deploying servicemembers and units as possible. This will ensure that 
servicemembers receive their entitlements in a timely fashion. I also 
believe that it is imperative that transition assistance be made 
possible to all redeploying servicemembers of the Reserve component. I 
will work with the Services to ensure that pre- and post-deployment 
health assessments are conducted, and any identified medical issues are 
dealt with as soon as possible and in a compassionate manner. I support 
the current policy which authorizes medical benefits to our National 
Guard and Reserve servicemembers before, during, and after their 
activation. In addition, I fully support the Yellow Ribbon 
Reintegration Program that provides access to services and information 
for our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families 
throughout the deployment cycle. I am aware that there are a number of 
State-sponsored programs that exemplify innovative and effective 
support programs for National Guard and Reserve members throughout the 
cycle. I am interested in learning more about these initiatives and 
finding ways to emulate and integrate these best practices on a wider 
scale. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure 
that our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers receive the benefits 
they deserve as they are activated in support of the defense of this 
Nation.

    10. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, I'm especially concerned about the 
unique challenges and factors that affect our returning National Guard 
members as they reintegrate back to their jobs, homes, and families. 
Oftentimes, our State's National Guard leadership has a better 
understanding of the unique support needed on a State-by-State basis, 
and--in some States like New Hampshire--they have developed their own 
effective full-cycle deployment support programs. Will you commit to 
working closely with individual States and their National Guard 
leadership in order to develop the most effective, first-class programs 
you mention in your testimony?
    Dr. Rooney. Yes. Understanding the unique needs and ensuring the 
effective reintegration of our National Guard and Reserve 
servicemembers back into their families, communities, and jobs is one 
of our most important responsibilities. The Department's Yellow Ribbon 
Reintegration Program has been effective at addressing many of the 
issues that confront our returning warriors and their families and I am 
aware of some of the successful programs developed by individual 
States. I am committed to working with the broad array of Federal, 
State, and community programs and services to most effectively meet the 
needs of our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their 
families.

                           SUICIDE PREVENTION

    11. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, each of the Services has reported 
increasing numbers of suicides in recent years. If confirmed, what role 
would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent suicides not 
only to Active Duty personnel, but also to National Guard and Reserve 
servicemembers and their families?
    Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I would play a very active role. I have 
read the DOD Task Force Report on Suicide Prevention and found it to be 
thorough. I am impressed with the quality of the programs that each of 
the Services is currently employing and the active role that the 
Services' senior leaders play in the effort to prevent suicides among 
their respective members. There is still more that can be done, 
however. I believe that a single entity in the Department that would 
serve as a consistent policy and oversight authority DOD-wide, which 
would include the National Guard and Reserve, could disseminate 
information and interact with other departments, agencies, or 
organizations. This could also accelerate the implementation of key 
policy initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the 
recommendations which could have the most impact, as outlined in the 
report, were implemented in a timely and effective manner.

    12. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are you content with the programs 
as they are currently structured?
    Dr. Rooney. While I believe the current suicide prevention programs 
among the Services as a whole are effective, there is clearly more that 
can be done. In early 2000, the overall DOD suicide rate was well below 
the rate of a comparable sample of the civilian population by almost 
half. One of the most promising avenues currently being pursued is our 
increasing emphasis on resilience across the Department highlighted by 
programs such as the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF). CSF is 
a structured, long-term assessment and development program to build 
resilience and enhance performance of every soldier, family member, and 
civilian employee. It incorporates the principles of Total Force 
Fitness that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have populated across the 
Services. These concepts have also been embraced by the National Guard 
and Reserve Forces so training has been modified to meet the needs of 
this population. I believe the Department's focus on getting out ahead 
of this issue will pay dividends in the future and go a long way 
towards building a formula for resistance, resilience, and recovery.

    13. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can we do to reduce the 
number of these tragedies?
    Dr. Rooney. There are two other areas in which I believe we can 
make some progress. The first is data collection and standardization of 
reporting. I believe that more accurate and timely data can help us 
gain a further understanding of the complex issues and identify key 
leading indicators that we can use to take action before a potential 
suicide occurs. The second area is peer-to-peer programs that use the 
skills of our many veterans to directly interact with those in 
distress. I think this type of personal intervention program has 
significant potential to reach out to servicemembers particularly in 
the National Guard and Reserve where recent data has indicated a 
disturbing increase in suicide rates. Across the States, there are many 
great examples of National Guard and Reserve suicide prevention 
programs, self-assessment programs, and other web-based tools. I 
believe that it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure that we are 
aware of these State-led programs and share the information across 
States so that others can build on their successes.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

    14. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, in a February 15 Federal class-
action lawsuit, more than a dozen female and two male current and 
former U.S. military servicemembers allege that incidents of sexual 
assault and misconduct were not adequately investigated or pursued. 
Sexual assault is an extremely grave concern, and all allegations 
should be taken seriously and investigated immediately. What is your 
response to this lawsuit and allegations that commanders are failing to 
respond appropriately to allegations of sexual assaults?
    Dr. Rooney. I cannot comment directly on current litigation. 
However, clearly, sexual assaults have no place in the U.S. Armed 
Forces. One sexual assault is one too many, and leadership throughout 
DOD has expressed this as well. However, when an assault does occur, 
victims are encouraged to come forward using one of the two reporting 
options available to get the help and services they need.
    The Department reviewed pre-command training and has proposed 
revised training standards for the Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response (SAPR) policy that will be reissued this spring. In addition, 
all of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments 
have aggressively championed the SAPR program at Service summits and 
through a variety of communication channels. We have and will continue 
to make it clear that commanders have a duty to take every allegation 
of sexual assault seriously, to see to the safety and care of the 
parties involved, and to hold offenders accountable in each and every 
case where evidence supports such action. There is progress being made. 
In cases where there was sufficient evidence for commanders to take 
action and the victim has chosen unrestricted reporting, the percentage 
of subjects who had court-martial charges initiated against them 
increased from 30 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2010.

    15. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what specific levels and kinds of 
training are provided to officers and commanders in the field to 
respond in an appropriate way to allegations of sexual assault and 
misconduct?
    Dr. Rooney. DOD Instruction (DODI) 6495.02, SAPR Program 
Procedures, requires the Military Services to provide periodic, 
mandatory education at installation and fleet unit commands, during 
pre-commissioning programs and initial-entry training, and throughout 
the professional military education (PME) systems. All servicemembers 
are also required to receive SAPR training when they deploy to 
locations outside the United States that includes specific information 
addressing the location's customs, mores, and religious practices.
    The Department conducted Policy Assistance Team (PAT) visits in 
2009 to review commander training across the Services. Overall, the 
observed training met the requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs 
found the training to be implemented in accordance with Department 
policy. However, the PATs recommended revisions to strengthen commander 
training by including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the 
program and the chance to practice skills or answer questions.
    The Services have also worked to ensure SAPR commander training is 
instituted. For example, the Army embedded SAPR training in 
professional military education at training institutions, including 
specific training support packages for pre-command courses and senior 
leaders. Work with Training and Education Command's Ground Training 
Branch produced an Interactive Media Instruction module on SAPR, 
targeting mid-level Marine Corps leaders who may be unable to 
physically attend annual training. The Navy briefs new installation and 
regional Commanding Officers on SAPR at the Navy's Senior Shore Station 
Leaders course a minimum of four times a year. The Air Force provides 
training to all new wing and group commanders five times a year and 
squadron commanders also receive training during their new commanders' 
orientation training. All of these meet DODI 6495.02 requirements.

    16. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are the levels of training 
currently in place adequate to address this issue?
    Dr. Rooney. As my response to the previous question indicated, the 
Department conducted PAT visits in 2009 to review commander training 
across the Services. Overall, the observed training met the 
requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs found the training to be 
implemented in accordance with Department policy. However, the PATs 
recommended policy revisions to strengthen commander training by 
including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the SAPR program 
and the chance to practice skills or answer questions. These revisions 
will appear in the reissuance of DODI 6495.02 scheduled for later in 
2011. However, the Services incorporated most of these revisions into 
their commander training programs in fiscal year 2010, as briefly 
described below:

         In fiscal year 2010, the Army developed training 
        specifically for senior leaders. During fiscal year 2010, the 
        U.S. Army School of Command Preparation (Pre-Command Course) 
        trained 197 brigade commanders, 542 battalion commanders, and 
        195 command sergeants major. In addition, the Army Reserve 
        reported training 400 brigade and battalion commanders.
         In fiscal year 2010, the Navy revised key SAPR command 
        personnel training to improve response to sexual assaults. Navy 
        installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) 
        reported training on roles and responsibilities for 1,807 
        commanders in fiscal year 2010, as well as training for 805 new 
        command SAPR program points of contacts, 484 new command 
        liaisons, and 681 new SAPR data collection coordinators.
         Marine Corps provided command team training on SAPR 
        roles and responsibilities to 258 commanders in fiscal year 
        2010, which included how to perform commander-led discussions 
        during installation orientation for newcomers.
         In the Air Force, senior pre-command training is 
        conducted at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. In fiscal year 
        2010, 122 wing and vice wing commanders and 270 group 
        commanders received SAPR training as part of this training. 
        Installation SARCs also provided SAPR-specific training to 
        3,342 squadron commanders and first sergeants.

    The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is 
currently working with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management 
Institute to develop questions for the Defense Equal Opportunity 
Climate Survey (DEOCS) that address SAPR. The DEOCS is a commander's 
management tool that allows him or her to proactively assess critical 
organizational climate dimensions that impact the organization's 
effectiveness. These questions are being formulated to specifically 
assess the extent of knowledge, impact of messaging, and levels of 
skill associated with SAPR policy within military units. While survey 
responses for individual units will be provided back to commanders for 
their use, Service-wide response trends will be analyzed for Service 
strengths and potential gaps in training effectiveness. These 
cumulative survey results will be used to improve DOD training 
requirements for both servicemembers as well as commanders. In 
addition, commander training will continue to receive attention by 
SAPRO in its program oversight role. The Services also review commander 
training as part of their Service Inspector General assessments of the 
SAPR program at military installations.

    17. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
would you recommend in order to more effectively respond to allegations 
of sexual assault in the field?
    Dr. Rooney. At this time, the Department is continuing to implement 
the recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the 
Military Services--many of which were legislated in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. To date, 26 
recommendations have been completed or closed, 61 are in progress, and 
only 4 cannot move forward or are outside the Department's control.
    Some of the 26 recommendations that have been completed include:

         Including the SAPR program in the Department Program 
        Objective Memorandum budgeting process to ensure a separate 
        line of funding be allocated to the Services.
         Setting forth clear guidance to all commanders that 
        their leadership of their commands' SAPR program is a non-
        delegable responsibility.
         Ensuring that Sexual Assault Forensic Examination 
        (SAFE) kits are either available or accessible in sufficient 
        time to preserve evidence.

    Some of the 61 recommendations that are in progress include:

         Developing standardized SARC and Deployable SARC duty 
        descriptions in the SAPR DOD Instruction to ensure qualified 
        personnel are appointed to fill these critical positions and to 
        clarify roles and responsibilities.
         Directing SAPRO to develop training policies and 
        exercise oversight of Military Service SAPR training programs.

                 Note: The Training Subcommittee of the Sexual 
                Assault Advisory Council developed training 
                requirements for servicemembers, commanders, senior 
                enlisted members, and first responders, and are 
                included in the SAPR policy scheduled for reissuance in 
                spring/summer 2011. A Working Integrated Product Team 
                has been established to discuss and address this 
                recommendation in regards to SAPR training for Equal 
                Opportunity Advisors.

         Enacting a comprehensive military justice privilege 
        for communications between a victim advocate and a victim of 
        sexual assault.

                 Note: The Department has submitted a proposed 
                Executive order that would create a Victim Advocate 
                Privilege to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
                for formal coordination. This Executive order is 
                currently under OMB Federal Agency review and signature 
                is expected in the coming months. Once signed, it will 
                become part of the Manual for Courts-Martial Military 
                Rules of Evidence and will be included in the Federal 
                Register as a policy change that will extend privileged 
                communication to include all victims of sexual or 
                violent offenses, including domestic violence in all 
                cases arising under the Uniform Code of Military 
                Justice.

    The four recommendations that cannot move forward or are outside 
the Department's control are:

         Establish a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) 
        protocol. At a minimum, this protocol should include that the 
        SART convene within 24 hours of a reported sexual assault.

                 Under further review. The Department altered 
                this recommendation to meet the intent. It is 
                impractical to mandate a SART meeting within 24 hours 
                of a reported sexual assault especially in a deployed 
                environment.

         Ensure that victims of sexual assault in training 
        environments are provided confidential access to victim support 
        services and afforded time for recovery.

                 On hold. All victims are provided confidential 
                access to victim support services. However, further 
                analysis needs to be given to restricted reporting in 
                the training environment and the impact it may have on 
                an individual's progress. The Department developed an 
                action plan to implement this recommendation at a later 
                date.

         Enact a law exempting Federal medical personnel from 
        State provisions requiring them to report sexual assaults to 
        civilian law enforcement to ensure all servicemembers have the 
        restricted reporting option.

                 This recommendation lies with Congress. 
                However, the Department is exploring options on how to 
                otherwise implement this recommendation.

         Ensure the Services consistently implement the titling 
        standard.

                 On hold. Military law enforcement 
                organizations already adhere to DOD Instruction 5505.7, 
                ``Titling and Indexing of Subjects of Criminal 
                Investigations in the Department of Defense.'' The 
                Department developed an action plan to further 
                implement this recommendation at a later date.

    In addition to the above, we have received approval to conduct a 
survey of victim experience with the SAPR program. This survey is 
expected to produce a measure of victim satisfaction that can be used 
to assess program effectiveness. This survey is expected to be 
completed in the fall of 2011. Also, as the Task Force was extremely 
thorough in its review of the SAPR program, the Department continues to 
believe greater program effectiveness will be achieved through these 
recommendations.

    18. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that reporting 
procedures and policies currently in place are effective?
    Dr. Rooney. The reporting procedures and policies enacted in 2005 
have been effective in bringing additional victims forward for 
assistance and care. While there are many victims that still do not 
report the crime, more sexual assault victims are coming forward to 
make a report and get assistance than at any time in the Department's 
history. However, as more information is gathered, current policies and 
procedures can continue to evolve, further improving victim response 
and prevention of sexual assault.
    Most sexual assaults in civilian and military communities alike go 
unreported because of victim concerns about the stigma associated with 
the crime and loss of privacy. However, civilian research shows that 
when victims report the crime, they are more likely to get care. In 
2010, Department policy, training, and messaging brought forward 105 
percent more victims than what was received in 2004. Restricted Reports 
now account for nearly 30 percent of all initial reporting and increase 
on average by about 8 percent each year. Unrestricted Reports have 
increased on average by about 5 percent each year. The Department 
believes that much of this increase in reports is due to its reporting 
policy and training. In 2010, more than 93 percent of Active Duty 
members received training on sexual assault reporting options, how to 
report, and to whom reports should be made.
    Increased reports of sexual assault do not mean that more assaults 
are occurring. Given the historical underreporting of sexual assault, 
the Department believes that its policies are providing the support 
necessary to bring a greater proportion of victims forward and to 
establish a culture of prevention. This belief is supported by 
Department research in 2010 that found that the incidence rate of 
sexual assault during the year prior to the survey decreased by one 
third since 2006, while the number of reports made by victims actually 
increased. As a result, the Department now has greater visibility over 
the sexual assaults that occur against servicemembers. We believe that 
greater visibility leads to improved victim response, more 
opportunities to provide care, and heightened offender accountability.

    19. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can DOD do in order to 
improve its responsiveness to these serious allegations?
    Dr. Rooney. When the Department enacted its current SAPR policy in 
2005, it created new resources for victims and required specialized 
training for all first responders, including healthcare providers, 
investigators, military attorneys, and chaplains. Currently:

         Over 700 SARCs and over 11,000 victim advocates were 
        trained in fiscal year 2010 to assist victims of sexual assault 
        all over the world.
         All first responders get annual and other specialized 
        training on how to assist and treat victims, including unit 
        commanders who receive SAPR program training prior to taking 
        command.
         Victims today have greater access to SAFEs, trained 
        personnel, and follow-up care than before the policy.
         Most victims who make Unrestricted Reports of sexual 
        assault contribute to legal action against the alleged 
        offender. However, a few hundred victims each year decline to 
        participate in the military justice process.

    While the Department has improved its response system substantially 
by establishing a 24/7 response capability at every military 
installation worldwide, it must continue to improve the 
professionalism, capabilities, and resources of all who support victims 
seeking support. In addition, we must continue to create a culture 
where victims of crime are treated fairly by those with whom they 
serve. This includes our current policy of training all deployed 
personnel, including Guard and Reserve. These efforts take continuous 
time, attention, and resources, as well as patience and resolve, such 
that widespread victim support becomes a permanent feature of military 
culture. The Department believes that its current efforts to improve 
the confidentiality of victim communication with SAPR personnel sends 
an important message that victim privacy will be respected. In 
addition, ongoing efforts to teach commanders how to champion the SAPR 
program will further improve the professionalism of DOD's response to 
this crime. Ultimately, these efforts contribute to the Department's 
strategic priority of establishing a climate of confidence such that 
more victims will want to report the crime.

    20. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, sexual assault has been a 
particular risk in combat areas. In your advance policy questions, you 
suggested that you ``did not have enough information to make a detailed 
assessment'' about steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond 
to sexual assaults in combat zones. Can you provide a more thorough 
assessment of the steps the Services have taken in order to prevent and 
respond to sexual assaults in combat zones?
    Dr. Rooney. The Department has been diligent in addressing SAPR in 
combat zones and must be ready for any eventuality when it deploys 
people into these areas. Over the past 7 years, it has responded 
directly to the special circumstances that impact sexual assault in 
combat zones. A number of specific steps have been taken by the 
Department.
    In 2004, the Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force was 
begun and its recommendations became the framework for the Department's 
SAPR policy enacted in 2005. Both of these efforts focused intently on 
the special circumstances that impact sexual assaults in combat zones. 
Deployable SARC and Unit Victim Advocate positions were created to 
ensure that SAPR services were available wherever servicemembers 
deployed. In addition, a special training requirement was developed to 
give pre-deployment training to individuals before they arrived in 
theater. This training addresses reporting procedures in theater, local 
customs and mores, and prevention skills.
    Following a 2008 GAO recommendation, the Department drafted changes 
to existing directives detailing responsibilities for the commanders of 
the combatant commands in deployed and joint environments.
    In 2009, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military 
Services visited forward deployed installations that support Operation 
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Task Force 
recommended that the Department improve access to qualified medical 
personnel to conduct evidence collection, especially in deployed and 
remote environments. The Services implemented this recommendation in 
fiscal year 2010. DOD is also in the process of fulfilling additional 
Task Force recommendations to improve the training of Deployable SARCs 
and establish Deployable Victim Advocate positions.
    In fiscal year 2010, the Department was tasked by Congress to 
report on the current availability and adequacy of comprehensive and 
proper medical care for victims of sexual assault in combat zones, as 
well as the availability and adequacy of post-mobilization medical and 
mental health care for victims of sexual assault in the Reserve 
components. The results of this review were forwarded to Congress in 
2010 and the three lines of action identified from this review are 
currently being pursued.
    OSD SAPRO and the Military Services continue to focus on these 
challenges. In fiscal year 2010, none of the Military Services reported 
any gaps in supplies, trained personnel, or transportation resources; 
reported any cases in which lack of an available SAFE kit or other 
medical supplies hindered care; or had any verifiable reports of 
victims for whom timely access of laboratory testing resources hindered 
care. The Marine Corps reported one case in which a victim had to be 
transported 90 minutes to undergo a SAFE and was addressing the matter 
at the end of fiscal year 2010. Department research since the SAPR 
policy was enacted in 2005 has found that, while most sexual assaults 
occur at one's home station, 25 percent of women and 27 percent of men 
indicated the unwanted sexual contact occurred while they were deployed 
to a combat zone or to an area where they drew imminent danger pay or 
hostile fire pay. This dictates that SAPR in combat zones must remain a 
focus of concern.
    Prevention of sexual assault in combat zones is challenging. 
However, the Department's strategy has been to teach skills and 
techniques that apply universally, regardless of location. The Services 
have all enacted programs that teach Active Bystander Intervention 
skills that enable members to identify situations that are at risk for 
sexual assault and safely intervene before the crime occurs. These 
programs mesh well with the battlefield ethos of ensuring the safety of 
fellow servicemembers, and the Department believes these strategies 
have contributed to a reduction of the sexual assault incident rate by 
one-third since 2006.
    When sexual assaults do occur, the delivery of comprehensive care 
to victims, wherever they are located, requires training care providers 
with the right skills and having the appropriate equipment at the right 
time and place. The unique and unpredictable circumstances in deployed 
environments can make it difficult for SAPR responders to deliver 
comprehensive and consistent care to victims. Tracking victim services 
accurately and consistently can also be challenging in deployed 
environments. Unit rotations and redeployment make it difficult to 
provide consistent assistance once a report has been made.
    The work on both prevention techniques and response effectiveness 
continues. Most recently, at the request of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, U.S. Central Command recommended changes to the policies and 
procedures of the OSD and Military Departments that they believed may 
hinder theater operations in a deployed environment. One of its 
recommendations was for the USD(P&R) to issue enduring guidance 
describing the SAPR services a combatant command must provide to 
contractor staff when contractors deploy with U.S. Armed Forces. OSD 
SAPRO proposed revisions to the SAPR Policy that will fulfill this 
recommendation when the SAPR Policy is reissued in 2011.

    21. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
will you recommend in order to more effectively prevent sexual assaults 
in combat zones?
    Dr. Rooney. DOD prevention programs appear to be working and have 
contributed, at least in part, to a decrease in sexual assaults 
occurring annually against Active Duty servicemembers. The incidence 
rate of sexual assault has decreased substantially, according to the 
Defense Manpower Data Center Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of 
the Active Duty:

         In 2006, 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent of men 
        on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual 
        assault in the year prior to being surveyed.
         In 2010, 4.4 percent of women and 0.9 percent of men 
        on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual 
        assault in the year prior to being surveyed.

    This decrease in incidence rate suggests that there were nearly 
one-third fewer incidents of sexual assault in 2010 than in 2006. The 
decrease also reflects the fact that prevention concepts are well 
understood throughout the military community:

         93 percent of Active Duty received prevention training 
        in 2010 (up from 88 percent in 2006).
         93 percent of Active Duty believe it their duty to 
        prevent harm to a fellow servicemember.

    The Department plans to continue its prevention training 
initiatives as well as its predeployment briefings to servicemembers 
traveling to combat areas about prevention and response procedures 
specific to the area. However, prevention programs used by the 
Department are universal--the concepts taught apply anytime, anywhere 
servicemembers are stationed. The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault 
in the Military Services also recommended that each installation and 
operational commander assess the adequacy of installation measure to 
ensure the safest and most secure living and working environments. This 
includes installations and forward operating bases in combat zones. 
Implementation of this recommendation is ongoing, and, if confirmed, I 
would continue to support these initiatives.
                                 ______
                                 
               Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

                 NATIONAL GUARD YOUTH CHALLENGE PROGRAM

    22. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rooney, the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe 
Program (NGYCP) works to intervene in and reclaim the lives of at-risk 
youth by transforming their values and enhancing their skills, 
education, and self-discipline. The program has distinguished itself as 
an effective intervention in the lives of troubled youths. Despite this 
track record of success, I understand that the National Guard Bureau is 
considering a significant reduction in the national training program 
for the NGYCP. What is your assessment of the program and what is DOD's 
plan to fund this program going forward?
    Dr. Rooney. The NGYCP training and education program is a direct 
investment in the ChalleNGe program staff. The aim of the training and 
education program is to improve the performance of NGYCP staff and 
provide a cumulative effect of individual staff performance on cadet 
recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and a positive 
placement following graduation.
    Course attendees consistently agree that the course offerings are 
of great value and benefit. Over 93 percent of the attendees report an 
increase in their performance and 85 percent of the attendees' 
supervisors report the performance for those who complete training and 
educational offerings as excellent. In summary, trained and educated 
staff members improve ChalleNGe program's overall performance in cadet 
recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and positive 
placement following graduation.
    For fiscal year 2011, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs provided funding and budget guidance for 
the NGYCP to operate under the ongoing Continuing Resolution. This 
guidance stated that the priority during the continuing resolution 
period is to make the necessary funds available to fully support the 
ChalleNGe programs at the cost share percentage authorized under 32 
U.S.C. 509, and to provide funds to increase enrollment at current 
programs in States that have the fiscal resources to meet the cost 
share funding requirements. Travel and training for the NGYCP staff 
should be considered after core NGYCP requirements were funded. While 
under the continuing resolution, the Department is limited to fiscal 
year 2010 spending levels which are less than the fiscal year 2011 
President's budget request. If and when the continuing resolution is 
resolved, then we plan to review the entire fiscal year 2011 
appropriation for the NGYCP. If the amount appropriated supports the 
President's budget request, then additional funding to support training 
for the rest of fiscal year 2011 will be available.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney follows:]

                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                   January 5, 2011.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    Jo Ann Rooney, of Massachusetts, to be Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Michael L. 
Dominguez.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, which was 
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was 
referred, follows:]
                     Biography of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
Education:
         Boston University School of Management

                 September 1979-May 1983
                 B.S. Business Administration, Finance 
                Concentration, Summa Cum Laude, awarded May 1983

         Suffolk University Law School

                 September 1984-February 1987
                 Juris Doctorate Degree awarded February 1987

         Boston University School of Law

                 August 1989-May 1991
                 LL.M. (Master of Laws) in Taxation awarded May 
                1991

         University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of 
        Education

                 August 2003-May 2005
                 Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) in Higher 
                Education Management
Employment Record:
         Jewish Hospital & St. Mary's HealthCare 
        (uncompensated)

                 Member, Board of Trustees (2007-present)
                 Vice Chair (July 2008-present)

                         System includes primary, ambulatory, 
                        in-patient psychiatric, inpatient 
                        rehabilitation center, et cetera

                           Approximately $1 billion in revenue

                         Committees:

                           Environment of Care (2006-present)
                           Strategic Planning (2007-present)
                           Investment (2007-present)
                           Management Review (2008-present)
                           Transition Committee (2009-present)
                           Benefits Measurement Committee (2009-
                        present)
                           CEO Search Co-Chair (2009-present)

         Regis University (uncompensated)

                 Member, Board of Trustees
                 2004-present

                         Executive Committee and Standing 
                        Committee Chair (2008-present)

         Mount Ida College

                 President
                 July 2010-December 2010

         Mount Ida College

                 Professor of Business Administration
                 July 2010-December 2010

         Spalding University

                 President
                 August 2002-June 2010

         Spalding University

                 Professor of Business Administration
                 August 2002-June 2010

         The Housing Partnership (uncompensated)

                 Member, Board of Directors
                 2003-June 2010

                         Chair of the Board (June 2008-June 
                        2010)
                         Chair Elect (2006-2008)
                         Executive Committee-Treasurer (2005-
                        2006)

         Emmanuel College

                 Adjunct Faculty
                 August 1994-August 2002

         The Lyons Companies, LLC (and affiliated companies)

                 Corporate General Counsel
                 Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
                 Chief Operating Officer (COO)
                 Partner
                 September 1994-August 2002

         Maselan & Jones, PC

                 Tax Attorney
                 July 1993-September 1994

         Steams, Rooney & Associates

                 Partner
                 July 1992-December 1993

         CIGNA Companies - IFSD

                 Staff Attorney
                 Technical Manager
                 June 1991-July 1993

         Caprio Law Offices

                 Attorney
                 September 1990-May 1991

         The Codman Company

                 Vice President

                         Senior Property Manager
                         Regional Marketing Director
                         Director of Residential Market 
                        Research

                 June 1984-September 1990

         Boston University Metropolitan College

                 Senior Lecturer
                 September 1986-December 1987
Honors and Awards:
         Beta Gamma Sigma (1983)
         Lock Honorary Society (1983)
         Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of 
        Louisville, KY (2010)
         Scholar House, Lucy Award (2009)
         Business First, Partners in Health Care Award (2006, 
        2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)
         Today's Woman Magazine, Most Admired Woman in 
        Education (2006)
         Business and Professional Women/River City, Woman of 
        Achievement (2006)
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals 
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions 
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a 
form that details the biographical, financial, and other 
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Jo Ann 
Rooney in connection with her nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.

                    Part A--Biographical Information

    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Jo Ann Rooney.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness.

    3. Date of nomination:
    Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5, 
2011.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    March 23, 1961; Hazleton, PA.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Single.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    None.

    8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, 
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
    University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education, August 
2003-May 2005, Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) Higher Education 
Management, May 2005.
    Boston University School of Law, August 1989-May 1991, LL.M. 
(Master of Laws) in Taxation, May 1991.
    Suffolk University Law School, September 1984-February 1987, J.D. 
(Juris Doctorate), February 1987.
    Boston University School of Management, September 1979-May 1983, 
B.S. Business Administration, Finance Concentration, Summa Cum Laude, 
May 1983.
    West Hazleton High School, September 1975-June 1979, High School 
Diploma, June 1979.

    9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the 
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of 
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
    7/2010-12/2010, President of Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
    7/2010-12/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Mount Ida 
College, Newton, MA
    8/2002-6/2010, President of Spalding University, Louisville, KY
    8/2002-6/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Spalding 
University, Louisville, KY
    8/1994-8/2002, Adjunct Faculty, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA
    9/1994-8/2002, Corporate General Counsel/Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO)/Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Partner, The Lyons Companies, LLC. 
(and affiliated companies) - Waltham, MA

    10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, 
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, 
or local governments, other than those listed above.
    None.

    11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    Jewish Hospital Saint Mary's Healthcare (JHSMH), Louisville, KY - 
Vice Chair, Board of Trustees.
    Regis University, Denver, CO - Board of Trustees.

    12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    American Bar Association Massachusetts Bar Association and 
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
    Rhode Island Bar Association
    Florida Bar Association
    Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society
    Member - Trustees of the Reservations (MA)
    Member - Boat U.S.
    Member - U.S. Rowing
    Member - Hull Lifesaving Museum
    Penn Alumni Association
    Suffolk University Alumni Association
    Boston University Alumni Association
    St. Paul Parish (Hingham, MA)

    13. Political affiliations and activities:
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or 
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered 
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 
years.
    None.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign 
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar 
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
    None.

    14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, military medals, and any other special 
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    Beta Gamma Sigma
    Lock Honorary Society
    Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
    Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of 
Achievement
    Business First, Partners in Health Care Award 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, and 2010
    Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting 
educational opportunities for women and families)
    Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville, 
February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service 
to the City of Louisville)

    15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of 
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have 
written.
    Dissertation Spring 2005 - Navigating in a Building Sea of Change: 
Successful Growth Strategies of Two Private Higher Education 
Institutions, Author: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
    April 2009, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National 
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Board Engagement in Major Academic 
Change,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and Dr. L. Randy 
Strickland.
    May 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE) 8th 
Annual Conference on the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning - 
Challenging Student to Think Critically and Learn Deeply, Keynote 
Address ``Boomers vs. X vs. Y: Educating Across Generations,'' Prepared 
and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
    April 2008, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National 
Conference on Trusteeship, ``Fostering Active Board Participation in 
Academic Governance,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and 
Dr. L. Randy Strickland.
    February 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE) 
Adult Learner Summit, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated 
Programs,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
    December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``Reaffirmation 101: A 
Case Study of Spalding University'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo 
Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette, and Victoria 
Murden McClure.
    December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``General Education 
Assessment ASAP'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. 
Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
    November 2007, Council for Accelerated and Experiential Learning 
(CAEL) International Conference, ``Demonstrating the Effectiveness of 
Accelerated Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, 
Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
    November 2007, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP) Annual 
Meeting Plenary Session, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated 
Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy 
Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
    May 2007, Educational Policy Institute RETENTION 2007, ``How to Use 
Assessment Data and Accreditation to Develop a QEP focused on Improving 
Students' Math Skills and Increasing Retention'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo 
Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
    April 2007, N.C. State Undergraduate Assessment Symposium, ``From 
Assessing for Accreditation to Assessing for Improvement - The Case of 
Spalding University'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy 
Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
    January 2006, CIC President's Institute, ``Restoring the Luster to 
Good Places: Institutional Turn-around Stories'' Prepared and Presented 
By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
    November 2005, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP), 
``Teaching Accelerated Courses or Achieving Successful Outcomes with 
Adult Learners in Accelerated Courses'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. 
Jo Ann Rooney.

    16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal 
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have 
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have 
been nominated.
    See attached list.

    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
    (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing 
conflicts of interest?
    Yes.
    (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which 
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
    No.
    (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions 
for the record in hearings?
    Yes.
    (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in 
response to congressional requests?
    Yes.
    (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their 
testimony or briefings?
    Yes.
    (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request 
before this committee?
    Yes.
    (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely mannerwhen requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                     Jo Ann Rooney.
    This 20th day of January, 2011.

    [The nomination of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney was reported to the 
Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2011.]


  NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE 
          GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain, 
Inhofe, Chambliss, Brown, and Ayotte.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research 
assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, 
counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and 
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority 
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John 
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. 
Lerner, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, 
minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine 
G. Lang.
    Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin, 
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 
Jennifer Barrett and Casey Howard, assistants to Senator Udall; 
Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne 
McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, 
assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to 
Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator 
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde 
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, 
assistant to Senator Brown; Pam Thiessen, assistant to Senator 
Portman; and Grace Smitham, assistant to Senator Cornyn.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee 
meets today to consider the nomination of General Martin 
Dempsey to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
    General Dempsey, we welcome you here today, along with 
members of your family. We look forward to your testimony and 
to your continuing service.
    America's Army today is as great as it has ever been in its 
235 years of service to our Nation. As we are reminded every 
day, this service continues to come with great sacrifice.
    Our Army remains globally committed and overstretched by 
nearly 10 years of continuous combat. The Army has met the 
challenges of the last decade with courage, determination, and 
professionalism for which they and all of us are justifiably 
proud and profoundly grateful.
    The challenges of the decade ahead, however, will be no 
less daunting. Over the next 4 years, under General Dempsey's 
leadership, the Army must deal with many enduring and new 
challenges. First and foremost, the Army must continue to meet 
the demand for trained and ready forces in support of 
operations in Afghanistan and, for a short while, longer in 
Iraq.
    Thankfully, the U.S. drawdown of forces in Iraq has begun. 
But, nearly 40,000 American soldiers remain there, contributing 
to the continued strain on our troops and their families.
    At the same time, over 60,000 Army troops are committed to 
operations in Afghanistan. Hard fighting will continue, even as 
we and our allies continue to build the Afghan security forces 
so that they may take more and more responsibility for their 
security.
    As adaptable and well prepared as our soldiers are today to 
support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the future beyond 
these operations holds real questions about what we will need 
the Army to do and how it will be structured to do it. In a 
speech to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy last week, 
Secretary of Defense Gates outlined what he considers the 
greatest challenges facing the Army as it takes on board the 
lessons of the last decade and prepares for the uncertain and 
dangerous world that lies ahead. Secretary Gates argued that it 
is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to 
future conflicts and that the Army must ``confront the reality 
that the most plausible high-end scenarios for the U.S. 
military will be primarily naval and air engagements.'' He 
cautioned that in a strategic environment where we are unlikely 
to fight an enemy employing large armored formations the Army 
will find if difficult to justify the number, size, and cost of 
its heavy armored brigades.
    In a press interview last week, General George Casey, the 
Army's current Chief of Staff, seemed to go in a different 
direction when he said that he expects that over the next 10 
years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in 
combat.
    We look forward to hearing General Dempsey's views on these 
perspectives and how they may shape the Army's plans and 
priorities in the coming years.
    In his speech at West Point, Secretary Gates also said that 
his first concern is how the Army will structure itself--that 
is, its size and the number and composition of its deployable 
units, such as combat brigades--how it will structure itself 
for the missions it is most likely to perform. In restructuring 
itself, the Army must find ways, he said, to maintain its hard-
won combat-proven current capabilities and invest in the right 
future capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.
    Budget pressures are already being felt throughout the 
Defense Department. The Department's sufficiency initiative is 
intended to take funds away from less important or inefficient 
programs or activities and give them to higher, more relevant 
current and future modernization priorities.
    As the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dempsey 
will need to find ways to deal with the spiraling growth of 
personnel costs. In the face of these challenges, additional 
budget reductions, although still being debated, are more 
likely than not. We are interested to hear General Dempsey's 
assessment of the efficiency initiative and any ideas that he 
may already have for improving processes and systems to ensure 
that we get the most out of every dollar the Army spends.
    More directly related to its force structure, the Army 
needs to begin planning for the end strength reductions 
announced by Secretary Gates in January. The Army intends to 
begin drawing down 22,000 soldiers of temporary excess end 
strength, which was approved by Secretary Gates in the summer 
of 2009, and needs to do that between now and 2013. This 
reduction should not impact Army force structure, as this 
additional end strength was always temporary and intended to 
allow the Army to fill its deploying units and to end the use 
of stop loss that is holding soldiers beyond their enlistment. 
However, the Army also plans to reduce permanent end strength 
by another 27,000 people between 2015 and 2017, assuming 
security conditions are on track with current strategic plans.
    This second part of the drawdown plan should result in some 
reduction of the Army's force structure, likely including the 
elimination of some combat brigades. Although this reduction is 
not planned to begin until after 2014, which would be at the 
back end of General Dempsey's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he 
will nonetheless be responsible, at a minimum, for the 
analysis, planning, and the initial implementation of these end 
strength and force-structure changes.
    The Army needs to rebuild its strategic depth--that is, the 
desired readiness in the nondeployed force--such that it is 
capable of responding to any unforeseen contingency. Strategic 
depth has been sacrificed over the last 10 years by the 
consuming force requirements of operations in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq. In order to gain and maintain the necessary higher 
readiness levels in our deployed forces, the readiness of our 
nondeployed forces has been at historic lows. Although the Army 
continues to meet the demand for counterinsurgency and support 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and 
despite the amazing resilience of our troops and their 
families, the Army remains stressed in many ways. Given the 
planned Army drawdown, budget pressures, and force demands for 
operations in Afghanistan, we continue to face substantial 
risk, should we need the Army to respond to another 
contingency.
    As the next Chief of Staff, General Dempsey will have the 
opportunity, as commitments in Iraq are concluded, to rebuild 
some degree of strategic depth. We're interested to hear 
General Dempsey's assessment of Army readiness and his views on 
the prospects for its improvements over time.
    The Army needs to continue to rationalize and stabilize its 
near- and long-range modernization strategies and programs. In 
general, major Army modernization efforts have not been 
successful over the last decade or more. But, over the last 2 
years, under the leadership of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Peter Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army, 
Dr. Joseph Westphal, the Army has worked diligently, through an 
objective and detailed series of capability portfolio reviews 
that has started it on a path towards achieving rational, 
stable, and affordable Army modernization strategies and 
programs. As a result of this analytical process, the Army has 
terminated over-ambitious, redundant, or unaffordable weapons 
systems. We're interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment 
of this review process and to share with the committee what 
role he might play in sustaining the momentum achieved over the 
last 2 years.
    Finally, the Army must work as long and as hard as possible 
to deal with the human cost to soldiers and their families of 
the pressures and consequences of an Army in continuous combat 
for 10 years. A high priority of the Army's leadership over the 
last 4 years has been dealing with the stress of multiple 
combat rotations and long separations, the stress on soldiers 
and their families.
    The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army set a goal 
that soldiers in units would have twice as much time at home as 
they would deployed, and that Army families would enjoy greater 
stability and less stress. Also, the Army has instituted 
significant programs for the improved care of our wounded 
soldiers and their families. Despite the efforts of the Army 
and leaders throughout the chain of command, heartbreaking 
incidents of suicide continue in the Active-Duty Force, and are 
now increasing in the National Guard and Reserves, as well. The 
committee is interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment of 
the Army's efforts in these areas.
    General Dempsey, the Nation could not be more proud of our 
Army, its soldiers, and their families. We are grateful for 
your leadership and for your willingness to assume 
responsibility for the readiness and the care of our 
magnificent Army. You are extraordinarily well qualified to 
undertake the position to which you have been nominated.
    We are also grateful for the service and sacrifices of your 
family in supporting you over the years. When we call upon you 
for your opening statement, we would be delighted if you would 
introduce your family who are with you here today.
    Senator McCain.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, welcome, and congratulations on your nomination. 
I'm grateful for your extraordinary service and personal 
sacrifices throughout your career. I'm very appreciative of 
your family and the support they've given to you.
    Since the attacks of September 11, soldiers and their 
families have served under the stressful conditions of active 
combat for nearly 10 years as the Army has transformed itself 
into a modular expeditionary force while simultaneously meeting 
the demands of two wars. We're enormously grateful for the 
sacrifices soldiers and their families have made for their 
Nation, for their units, and for one another. The human costs 
of combat have been great. But, I applaud the efforts of senior 
military leaders in DOD and the Army to provide the best 
medical care possible to respond to the needs of wounded 
soldiers and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you're 
confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing 
this work.
    While the cost of defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, and 
those who would attack us again if they could, has been great, 
Army leaders at every level can take pride in their 
accomplishments. Four years ago, how different the situation 
was in Iraq. I described it then as dire and deteriorating, and 
there were those who declared that the war was lost and we 
should accept defeat. I shudder to think of how the Middle East 
would look today and what condition the Armed Forces would be 
in today if the Army had not surged troops to Iraq and not been 
so decisive in providing the security needed to turn the tide 
there.
    Winning the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan must 
continue to be the Army's priority, and the next Chief of Staff 
must ensure that soldiers have what they need to succeed. As 
Chief of Staff, you will have to develop and justify your 
vision of what the Army should look like in the future.
    In his speech last week to the cadets at the U.S. Military 
Academy, Secretary Gates expressed his predictions about what 
their future service in the Army would look like. He discounted 
the likelihood of another land campaign like Operations Iraqi 
Freedom or Enduring Freedom, and forecast an Army, in coming 
years, that would most likely engage in short-duration, low-
intensity operations engaged in counterterrorism, rapid 
reactions, disaster response, and stability security-force 
assistance missions. I'm interested in how much you share 
Secretary Gates' views.
    The budget plan for the Future Years Defense Plan through 
2016 also calls for reducing Active-Duty strength by 47,000 
soldiers. I'd like your views on whether such manpower 
reductions are consistent with the Army's focus on full-
spectrum operations and readiness to conduct missions of any 
kind.
    Debate about the future missions of the Army is a necessary 
predicate for the weaponry the Army will need to succeed. I am 
deeply concerned by the Army's inability to manage successfully 
its major defense acquisition programs; most prominently, the 
Future Combat System (FCS). With the arguable exception of the 
Stryker, the Army has not successfully brought a major system 
from research and development, through full production since 
the so-called ``big five,'' the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting 
vehicle, Patriot missile, and Blackhawk and Apache Helicopters, 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To my knowledge, the Army 
has yet to negotiate the termination cost for the FCS contract. 
As such, the total cost of FCS has yet to be fully determined. 
Unfortunately, this failed 11-year investment in a 
``modernization program'' has served only to set the Army and 
the American taxpayer back. I'd be interested to hear from you 
how we intend to improve the management and oversight of major 
Army acquisition programs so that something like FCS doesn't 
happen again.
    On balance, the Army can take great pride in its record of 
accomplishment, particularly those of its troops and its 
transformation from a garrison force to an expeditionary, 
mobile, and highly adaptable fighting force. Many challenges 
lie ahead, and the fiscal environment we are in will be very 
unforgiving if we repeat the mistakes of the recent past.
    I thank you for your willingness to take this assignment 
on, and look forward to your testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    We're delighted that Senator Reed is going to be 
introducing our nominee.
    You couldn't have anyone better to be introducing you. I 
want you to know that, General. You're very well served by the 
person we're going to hear from next.
    Senator Reed.

  STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF 
                          RHODE ISLAND

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator 
McCain, my colleagues on the committee.
    It is a pleasure and a privilege to have the opportunity to 
formally introduce General Martin Dempsey to this committee as 
we consider his nomination as the 37th Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army.
    I recognize that many, if not all, of you have had the 
opportunity to meet and to work with General Dempsey in the 
various challenging assignments he's held in recent years in 
our Army, particularly his command of the 1st Armored Division 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom, taking a force into the country and 
then being suddenly told to stay longer than expected, and 
doing it with superb professionalism; and then his succeeding 
command as the leader of the Multi-National Security Transition 
Command in Iraq, responsible for the training, support, and 
establishment of the Iraqi security forces.
    Throughout his more than 36 years of Active service, 
General Dempsey has demonstrated the professional skill and 
personal character to lead our Army in challenging times. Our 
soldiers are engaged in two major operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Army has been engaged, since 2003, in the 
longest sustained combat operations in this history of our 
country. General Dempsey recognizes this. He also recognizes 
that his first priority is to support our soldiers in the 
fight. This support requires the continued training, equipment, 
and leadership that has made our Army the superb force that it 
is today.
    Support for our soldiers also means support for their 
families, and General Dempsey knows about Army families. 
Throughout his career, his lovely wife, Deanie, has been 
serving with him, by his side, and together they have raised 
Major Christopher Dempsey, who's currently assigned to the 
Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point, and daughters, Megan and Caitlin, both veterans of the 
U.S. Army. The Army is indeed a family affair with the Dempsey 
family.
    But, General Dempsey also has the daunting challenge of 
shaping a force for the future in a time of increasingly 
constrained budgets. Dynamic change in technology, in 
international economic forces, in international institutions--
indeed, even the notion of national sovereignty--all of these 
forces, and more, will shape the future and must, indeed, shape 
the Army. They must be responded to with innovative and 
creative proposals, and I am absolutely confident that General 
Dempsey will meet these challenges as we go forward.
    He is superbly prepared to provide this critical leadership 
at this challenging moment. I would urge my colleagues to 
confirm him speedily so he can assume these responsibilities.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
    A couple of our colleagues have asked their statements be 
submitted for the record, I will insert them here.
    [The prepared statements of Senator Begich and Senator 
Gillibrand follow:]
               Prepared Statement by Senator Mark Begich
    General Dempsey, the Small Business 8(a) Business Development 
Program is a vital economic tool for Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, 
and Native American Tribes in the lower 48. This program provides for 
education opportunities, cultural preservation, infrastructure 
development, and other opportunity for tribal members. The program is 
directly tied to the U.S. Government's commitment and policy of the 
right of self-determination to our first people.
    Recently, the 8(a) program has unfairly been subject to criticism. 
Although some participants have pushed the limits of the opportunity 
provided to them, the majority of companies in the program have sound 
business practices and offer critical services and advantages to the 
Government. Additionally, to address loopholes that undermine the 
intent of the program, the Small Business Administration recently 
released the most comprehensive and thorough regulatory reform on the 
8(a) program in its history.
    A few 8(a) Army contracts have been subject to public scrutiny and 
criticism in the press. Addressing criticism, valid or not, can result 
in restrictive guidance undermining the 8(a) program, or a reluctance 
by contracting officers to contract with 8(a) Alaska Native 
Corporations, Native Hawaii Organizations, and tribal entities. 
However, the program itself is still a valid and important tool for 
Native peoples and for the Government.
    Collectively, contract performance for the services rendered by 
8(a) companies to their customers, including the Army, has been 
commendable. In addition, the contracting flexibility provided to the 
Army under this program has allowed it to address requirements for 
services in a timely and inefficient manner that could not otherwise be 
achieved.
    If confirmed, I request you continue to utilize this program to 
contract for appropriate services required by the Army.
                                 ______
                                 
          Prepared Statement by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

    Admirals Row, built in the 19th century, consists of 11 brick 
buildings built to house high ranking Navy officers located in 
Brooklyn, NY. The buildings, which are architecturally distinguished 
and of historical importance, have been left mostly abandoned since the 
mid-1970s and are severely deteriorated and in dire need of repair. The 
Army National Guard currently controls the property, and has identified 
the Timber Shed and Building B for preservation. The Brooklyn Navy Yard 
Development Corporation (BNYDC), the non-profit corporation that 
manages the Navy Yard under a contract with New York City, has 
expressed its willingness to execute an emergency stabilization of 
these buildings prior to the property transfer between the National 
Guard and the city. The BNYDC would like to begin construction on the 
buildings at Admirals Row immediately, but is currently prohibited from 
starting work because the National Guard will not allow access to the 
site.
    I have written to Secretary McHugh to request that the Army take 
quick action to allow emergency stabilization of the Timber Shed and 
Building B in advance of the planned property transfer, while also 
completing the transfer expeditiously. I appreciate Colonel Presnell's 
response to BNYDC with a promise to expedite the environmental review. 
I want to reiterate my belief that the Army's flexibility in allowing 
the BNYDC to stabilize the buildings coupled with an expeditious review 
and transfer is in the best interest of both the Defense Department and 
the local community.

    Chairman Levin. General Dempsey, the committee has a series 
of standard questions that we ask all of our nominees, and I 
will ask them of you now.
    Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest?
    General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked to give your 
personal views, even if those views differ from the 
administration in power?
    General Dempsey. I do.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation process?
    General Dempsey. I have not.
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including 
questions for the record in hearings?
    General Dempsey. I will, Senator.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    General Dempsey. I will.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    General Dempsey. They will.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify, upon request, before this committee?
    General Dempsey. I do, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, 
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any 
good-faith delay or denial in providing such document?
    General Dempsey. I do.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Dempsey.
    Now we're ready for your statement.

 STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO 
    THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

    General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
    I do this at my great peril, but I'd like to stray from my 
prepared remarks, just at the beginning here, because I was 
struck by the, I hope, intended symbolism of having Senator 
Reed sit next to me during his introduction, because I've 
always felt as though this body, in particular, was a wingman 
of the Army's. Senator Reed has always been a great wingman; 
that is to say, someone who watches out for you and who helps 
you see yourself in ways that perhaps you're unable to see. I'd 
like to have that relationship with this committee and with the 
Congress of the United States, because, Mr. Chairman, I think 
you and the Ranking Member have mentioned the challenges we 
have before us, and articulated them very well, and we're going 
to have to work together to settle those.
    Chairman Levin. We look forward to working with you, 
General, on that basis, as a matter of fact. Very eloquently 
and aptly put.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this 
committee today in support of my nomination as the 37th Chief 
of Staff for the U.S. Army.
    Senator Reed, thank you again, and the members of this 
committee, for allowing me to be part of this process. Thank 
you for your unwavering support and commitment to the soldiers 
of the U.S. Army and their families.
    I've known some of you for a decade or more, and I've met 
some of you only recently, in the last few days. I always 
welcome the chance to discuss our national security challenges 
with you, and I sincerely admire what the members of this 
committee and your professional staffs have done to support 
those who courageously serve and are resilient in the service 
of their Nation.
    I'd like to take a moment, as you suggested, Chairman 
Levin, to introduce my wife, Deanie, to you. I know she 
appreciates your kind words about her, too. We've been married, 
as you noted, for almost 35 years. She has joined me in 
commissioning all three of our children as officers in the 
Army, and she's sent two of them off to war. One of them, our 
son, Major Chris Dempsey, is here today.
    Deanie and I have built our lives both within and around 
the Army, and I can report to you that there is no greater 
champion for soldiers and their families than Deanie. If I am 
confirmed, the Army will receive the great gift of her 
continued service with, I must be honest, the occasional break 
to care for our three grandchildren, and soon-to-be five 
grandchildren. She is my hero, and I love her for many reasons, 
not least of which is her shared commitment to the U.S. Army.
    I'd also like to congratulate my predecessor, General 
George Casey, who will soon complete 41 years of distinguished 
service to our Nation.
    I've always considered service in the Army to be a 
privilege. That privilege is even more apparent when our way of 
life is challenged as it has been over these past 10 years. I 
sit before you today with confidence that whatever challenges 
confront us in the future, your Army will respond with the same 
courage and resolve that has characterized it for the past 235 
years.
    You have seen firsthand the superb performance of our 
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less visible, but equally 
important, are the contributions of soldiers currently deployed 
in over 150 nations around the globe. These men and women are 
fulfilling tasks assigned to us in the National Security 
Strategy to seek to prevent conflict by representing our Nation 
and its values and by increasing the capabilities of our 
international military partners. They are Active, Guard, and 
Reserve. We are truly one Army, and we serve America proudly.
    Here at home, we partner with local communities, schools, 
and colleges. Each year, 75,000 of America's sons and daughters 
make a commitment to leave their homes and serve their Nation 
in the uniform of the U.S. Army. In return, we make a 
commitment to develop them as soldiers and as leaders. As 
Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), I've met with soldiers serving in the very center and 
at the very edges of freedom. I've met with their families, 
living both at home and abroad. I've met with our wounded and 
with their families.
    They are inspirational. They understand the challenges that 
we face as an Army and as a Nation. Their expectations of us 
are as simple as they are profound. They trust that we will 
provide the resources necessary for them to succeed in the 
fights in which we are currently engaged, and they trust that 
we will have the wisdom and resolve necessary to prepare them 
for the missions unknown to us today, but which surely await 
us.
    If you confirm me as the Army's 37th Chief of Staff, you 
can be sure that I will act to earn their trust every day. I 
will work to match their drive, their sacrifice, and their 
resolve. I will partner with the Congress of the United States, 
and this committee in particular, to ensure we remain worthy of 
the title ``America's Army.''
    Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the members of this 
committee that I understand the gravity of the task at hand. 
The position to which I have been nominated carries daunting 
responsibilities. I embrace the challenge.
    I want to thank President Obama, Secretary Gates, and 
Secretary McHugh for their trust and their confidence in 
nominating me. I want to thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today.
    I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
    Let's try a 7-minute first round for questions.
    I made reference to Secretary Gates' West Point speech, and 
quoted from it. I wonder if you could give us your reaction to 
his remarks, both the ones that I quoted and any other part of 
that speech that you might like to refer to.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Gates, in his speech at West Point, pulled 
together themes that he's been discussing with us for some 
time. It's an aggregate, if you will, of the professional 
conversations we've had about the current state and the future 
state of our Armed Forces. It's not a conversation he's had 
uniquely with the Army. He's challenged the other Services, as 
well.
    It seems to me that, in terms of the reference you made to 
his discussions about the heavy force, in particular, what he's 
challenging us to do is to reconsider the way we've 
proportioned our force--the force mix, if you will--and 
determine if that's the force mix that best suits our needs 
today. I don't think he's predisposed to the answer to that 
question. I think he's encouraging us to confront it. As we 
confront it, I think he is challenging us equally to look at 
the institution that supports it and the leaders that we 
develop. My personal, professional judgment, where I sit today, 
in TRADOC, is that we have to become an institution that 
accepts adaptation as an imperative. It has to be part of our 
fabric. Where that takes you is, we might develop an Army 
suitable for 2020 that, consciously, we know will not be 
exactly the Army we need in 2030, because the current and 
future operating environments, as we anticipate them, will 
require an institution that provides what the Nation needs when 
it needs it. I think that the key to that, actually, is the 
development of leaders; so, leader development is job one. 
Systems and processes have to become more responsive to change 
and allow for the introduction, laterally, of changes to 
technology, for example. Organizations, which always change in 
our Army, have to be prepared and embrace change. I think we 
understand the signal we're receiving, and I think we can find 
the answer.
    Chairman Levin. One of the points that he made at West 
Point was his identification of ``ongoing and prospective 
requirements to train, equip, and advise foreign armies and 
police.'' That raised the question, he said, as to how the Army 
should ``institutionalize security force assistance into the 
Army's regular force structure and make the related experience 
and skill set a career-enhancing pursuit.'' He flagged the 
importance of the Army's doctrine on this new advise-and-assist 
brigades, which he said have played the role that they've 
played in the last couple years, which is a ``key role in the 
successful transition to full Iraqi security responsibility.''
    Now, building the security forces of foreign forces has 
traditionally been a Special Operation Forces mission. But, in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, our general-purpose forces have been 
performing that mission for some time, in the form of those 
Advise and Assist Brigades. I'm wondering what your reaction is 
to the possibility of adding that as a required fundamental 
capability for general-purpose forces, which would require 
additional education, training, and readiness challenges for 
the Army to meet.
    General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I do think it becomes a core competency for our force in 
the future, as part of our effort to prevent conflict. I think 
that we've made some dramatic and very successful adaptations 
at the tactical level in understanding what it takes to partner 
with indigenous forces and partners. I think where we probably 
have room to grow and room to learn is in how we partner with 
institutions, how we accomplish what we formerly called 
security sector reform at the ministerial level, because it's 
not simply enough to partner with international partners at the 
tactical level; we have to ensure that they have the systems 
and the institutions that support them so they become viable 
partners into the future. I do think, if confirmed, that will 
be an area that I would pay particular attention to.
    Chairman Levin. There were plans, some years ago--when 
Secretary Gates became Defense Secretary, there had been plans 
to restation two Army brigades currently in Europe back to the 
United States. Those plans were put on hold when Secretary 
Gates came into office. The Department has now started a global 
posture review to reexamine the purposes, locations, and costs 
of U.S. forces stationed around the world, including the Army's 
combat brigades in Europe.
    Can you give us your understanding of the status of that 
review--I believe you're a part of that review, maybe a major 
part of it--and give us the status of the review and whether or 
not that will include an assessment of Army forces stationed in 
Europe, as to whether we should continue them in the current 
numbers and configurations that they're at?
    General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The study that you refer to, of 
which TRADOC is part, is essentially the force mix and force 
design--how many types of each brigade and what are the 
internal capabilities of them. We are involved in that.
    We haven't made any decisions, because the recent 
announcement of the additional 27,000 has put us back to the 
drawing board, if you will, on trying to understand the 
implications of that and the assumptions we're making about the 
demand on us into the future.
    But, to your point, if I could knit your previous question 
and this one together, the issue at hand for us will be, 
whenever we decide our force structure and its location, is, 
what purpose does it serve, where it sits? I'm a product of 12 
years of the U.S. Army-Europe, and found great benefit in being 
immersed into that culture. I think that there will always be 
reason for us to have a forward-deployed force, both for the 
benefit of our partners, but also for our own benefit. But, I 
think that the size of that forward presence will be reexamined 
as we determine what our future force structure will look like.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, congratulations, General Dempsey.
    Prior to the Iraq war, there was a no-fly zone imposed as a 
result of the cease-fire agreement. That went on for, I 
believe, a decade. Isn't that correct?
    General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
    Senator McCain. We did not take out the Iraqi air defenses?
    General Dempsey. Actually, we did, Senator.
    Senator McCain. From all parts of Iraq?
    General Dempsey. This predates my time at U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM). I was back in Germany, as it turns out 
during those years.
    Senator McCain. Yes.
    General Dempsey. But, I do recall working on the Joint 
Staff. When there would be issues with Iraqis positioning air 
defense elements south of the latitude that we had established, 
we would attack them.
    Senator McCain. But, we didn't take out all Iraqi air 
defenses?
    General Dempsey. No, sir.
    Senator McCain. Our aircraft were within range of those 
defenses?
    General Dempsey. When they moved into a position that they 
were in range, we would attack them.
    Senator McCain. That wasn't too hard to do.
    General Dempsey. Not being part of it, Senator, I can't 
speak to the difficulty of it.
    Senator McCain. Have you seen media reports that Gaddafi is 
using some of his air assets to attack, or attempt to attack, 
the pro-revolutionary forces?
    General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
    Senator McCain. You have seen that. You might tell Admiral 
Mullen that you've seen that.
    Do you believe that the Arab League and the people on the 
ground in Libya that are being attacked by Gaddafi's air assets 
should be listened to when they are asking for us to see that 
it is stopped?
    General Dempsey. I think that they will have voice, and are 
having voice, inside the government.
    Senator McCain. As a veteran of several conflicts, isn't it 
true that if you tell the enemy that if they take certain 
measures, there will be reprisals--what I'm trying to say, if 
we tell the Libyans and Gaddafi that we are imposing a no-fly 
zone, that is a strong deterrence to many of their pilots as to 
whether to fly or not. We've already seen pilots defect. We've 
already seen a couple of them land in Malta. Wouldn't that have 
a certain deterrent effect on them, psychologically?
    General Dempsey. Deterrence is always one of the options 
that we should have available to the national command 
authority. I will say, of course, that my own personal 
experience is, sometimes the way our potential adversaries 
interpret our deterrent actions is not exactly as we've planned 
it. But, deterrence is a valid option.
    Senator McCain. The perception of Libyan pilots who now 
take off and land and attack pro-revolutionary forces might 
prove rather cautionary to them if they think that we will stop 
them and shoot them down if they carry out those missions.
    General Dempsey. We have the finest air force in the world, 
Senator.
    Senator McCain. May I just say, personally, I don't think 
it's loose talk on the part of the people on the ground in 
Libya, nor the Arab League, nor others, including the Prime 
Minister of England, that this option should be given the 
strongest consideration.
    I'm very concerned about Wikileaks. Almost daily, we see 
some additional revelation of the Wikileaks situation. First of 
all, how did this happen? Second of all, who has been held 
responsible for this greatest disclosure, frankly, of 
classified information in the history of this country?
    General Dempsey. Senator, I can't answer the question, 
``How did it happen?'' I have been made aware that there's an 
ongoing--you know it as a 15-6 investigation--essentially, a 
commander's inquiry--commissioned by the Secretary of the Army, 
to answer that exact question. I know that the individual 
responsible for the investigation has had a series of meetings 
with Secretary McHugh. I'm looking forward to learning more 
about that, as well.
    To your point about the protection of information, I think 
that this will be a wake-up call for us. We have to go forward, 
but we have to balance our protection of information with the 
competing requirement to continue to collaborate with 
interagency partners on information so that we can be as agile 
as the networks that we fight.
    Senator McCain. To my knowledge, no one besides Private 
First Class Manning has been held responsible for Wikileaks. Is 
that correct?
    General Dempsey. To this point, that is correct, Senator. I 
don't know that that'll be the outcome.
    Senator McCain. One of your major responsibilities will be 
the issues of acquisition. A recently completed Decker-Wagner 
Army acquisition review paints a rather gloomy picture. 
According to this report, between $3.3 and $3.8 billion of the 
Army's research and development budget has been wasted per 
year, since 2004, on programs that were subsequently canceled.
    Do you believe those figures to be accurate?
    General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
    Senator McCain. Let me specifically mention one program to 
you, as I conclude my questioning, that I don't understand, and 
maybe you could provide us with some written response, because 
you may not know a great deal about it. But, the title is, 
``U.S. to spend $800 million as it leaves MEADS program.'' It 
goes on to say, ``Over the next 3 years, the U.S. Government 
plans to spend more than $800 million on a missile defense 
proof of concept that Army Secretary John McHugh has little 
confidence will even work.'' In this article, it says the 
termination costs would be very high. I still don't quite 
understand why we would negotiate a contract that, if a 
contractor fails to meet its goals and we have to cancel the 
contract, we have to pay off the contractor. Do you know very 
much about this particular program, General?
    General Dempsey. I do not, Senator.
    Senator McCain. Good. Maybe you could provide us with a 
written response after you are sworn in.
    But, this kind of thing--I don't think there are stronger 
advocates in support of our defense spending and our need to 
equip and train our men and women who are serving, but when our 
constituents read stories like this--and it may not be totally 
accurate--but, when they read stories titled, ``U.S. to spend 
$800 million as it leaves the MEADS program,'' I think they 
deserve better, or at least a better explanation, at best.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), not the contract, established the terms by which 
the international parties negotiated that the withdrawing partner would 
bear the responsibility for contract termination. These terms on 
withdrawal are normal for international agreements. According to the 
MEADS MOU that we have with Italy and Germany, the Department of 
Defense (as the withdrawing participant) would be required to pay all 
contract modification or termination costs that would not otherwise 
have been incurred but for its decision to withdraw, up to its share of 
the cost ceiling for its financial contributions. The purpose of 
including this provision, during the negotiations, is to make it more 
difficult for a country to withdraw from a multilateral agreement--a 
withdrawal that could really leave the remaining countries in a 
difficult and costly position. This provision provides all MOU 
participants with positive incentive to stay in MOU programs that have 
awarded substantial MOU-related contracts to implement the MOU scope. 
This provision is value neutral in its applicability and protects the 
United States (normally the largest partner nation) from potential 
withdrawals by other partner nations that could have major negative 
impacts on the United States.
    If the United States unilaterally terminated its participation in 
the MEADS program, we estimate our cost would be as high as the MOU 
ceiling amount of $846 million for the United States. Allowing the 
contractor to proceed to ``Proof of Concept'' avoids the expense of 
termination and allows the best use of remaining funds while maximizing 
return on investment.
    Conversely, if the United States and its partners pursue the 
proposed Proof of Concept effort using the remaining MEADS MOU funding 
our cost would be limited to the current MOU commitment of $804 
million. In addition to saving money, the United States and its 
partners would derive substantial benefit in terms of hardware, 
software, or intellectual property deliverables from the MEADS prime 
contractor. This would allow Germany and Italy to proceed into 
production and provide the United States with an expanded array of 
future choices with regard to future Air and Missile Defense system-of-
systems capability.

    Senator McCain. I thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    General, you, then, will supply an assessment of that 
program and of that issue that Senator McCain has just raised, 
after you are confirmed.
    General Dempsey. If I could clarify. The Senator said, 
``when sworn in.'' So, sometime after April 11, I will 
dutifully respond.
    Chairman Levin. I will stand corrected.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Levin. After you are sworn in, then we would 
expect an answer.
    General Dempsey. Actually I should say, ``if I'm sworn 
in.''
    Chairman Levin. You are correct.
    General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Levin. We assume that. I'm glad you also do not 
assume that.
    Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think it's a good assumption.
    I thank you, General Dempsey, for your career of service. 
It has impressed me, as I've had the honor to get to know 
people in our military, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
recent years, that the quality of leadership, really, from top 
down, is quite remarkable. I would set--and I particularly mean 
it in your case--the level of capacity against leadership in 
any other sector of our society. We're very lucky to have had 
you rise to the position that you've been nominated for by the 
President. I look forward to working with you in the years 
ahead.
    I wanted to ask you one question about the ongoing 
situation in Libya, following up with what Senator McCain said. 
I, too, have felt that the no-fly zone ought to be under active 
consideration, premised on a request from the opposition, once 
it established a provisional government, which now seems to 
have happened. Second, of course, hoping that we would have 
allies in that effort.
    I want to ask you about another alternative here, because 
this is an ongoing situation and its outcome will determine, I 
think, not only how the lives of the people of Libya are, and 
whether more blood is shed there at the hands of a truly 
maniacal leader, Gaddafi, but also has an impact on the 
succession or transition to democracy in the rest of the Arab 
world. That's why we're all focused on it.
    Another alternative, obviously, is to try to help the 
opposition and stop Gaddafi, is to provide them with air 
defense systems, and train them in those systems. The question 
of whether we do that is not what I want to ask you about, 
because that has to be determined at a higher level. But, am I 
correct in saying that the Army has had experience in training 
militaries around the world in the use of air defense systems?
    General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. If I can respond to that, 
recalling my experience as the Acting CENTCOM Commander, the 
answer to that is yes.
    Senator Lieberman. Right. While we're considering the no-
fly zone--and I hear all the concerns about how it would be--
how difficult it would be to implement another alternative that 
we might provide the Libyan opposition with the capacity to 
defend themselves from Gaddafi's aircraft. I assume that, if 
directed to do so, the Army would be prepared, in your opinion, 
to carry out that mission, to train the opposition in Libya, to 
Gaddafi, in the use of better air defense systems.
    General Dempsey. Internal to TRADOC, we do have coursework 
and expertise in air defense.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
    You're not going to be surprised to hear that I'm concerned 
about the proposals to reduce the Army's end strength, although 
when Secretary Gates was before us, and when he made the 
announcement, it was very clear that this is conditions-based, 
depending on what the demands on the Army are, as we head into 
2015, which is the date when the reduction is supposed to 
occur. All of us are haunted by the phrase ``hollow Army''. We 
don't want to go through that again. We fought hard, side by 
side, in the spirit that you suggested earlier, to increase the 
end strength.
    I want to read to you an answer that you gave to one of the 
advance policy questions submitted to you by the committee. You 
were asked about the possible impact of decreasing Army end 
strength, and the Service's ability particularly to achieve the 
dwell ratio of 2 years at home for every year our soldiers are 
deployed. That was a big motivator for the statutory 
authorization of increased end strength. Your answer was, ``The 
decreases in Army end strength are condition-based, and I'm not 
in a position, at this time, to assess whether there will be an 
impact on the dwell goal of 1-to-2, based on these 
reductions.''
    I want to ask you whether you would say that one of the 
conditions that should be met, before the Army is asked to 
reduce its current end strength, would be a judgment that the 
2-to-1 or 1-to-2 dwell ratio for our Active-Duty Army will not 
be jeopardized by that reduction in end strength.
    General Dempsey. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
    Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that very much.
    We don't know now whether the Government of Iraq will 
request that any of our Armed Forces remain in Iraq after the 
end of the current Status of Forces Agreement, at the end of 
this year. I hope they do, because I think it's necessary to 
protect all that we've given there to achieve what has been 
achieved. But, just assuming, for a moment, that the Iraqi 
Government did ask us to maintain some number of our Armed 
Forces in Iraq after December 31st of this year, and we decided 
to do so, I assume that would have an impact on dwell ratios 
for our Army and on proposals for reducing U.S. Army end 
strength.
    General Dempsey. It may, Senator. It would turn on the 
depth of that commitment they were asking us to make and our 
assessment of what common interests we have in doing so. At 
some point, there is a bit of science to it. We know how big 
the Army is. We know what we're asking it to do. We know we 
want to have it on a 1-to-2 boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell, 
because of the human dimension, and we can figure it out.
    Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
    One part of Secretary Gates' speech at West Point that's 
received less attention than other parts--and it was a very 
important and thoughtful speech--was his focus, not on the 
Army's hardware, but on the software of training, professional 
military education, doctrine, career management, and 
promotions, so much of which you've had a leadership role in, 
in recent years and overall in your career in the Army.
    I wanted to ask you--I know you've been leading a study on 
the Army as a profession of arms, in your current capacity--
whether you could give us any of your initial thoughts on how 
the Army can best rise to what I describe as the software 
challenge, particularly the element of leadership, which you 
referred to in your excellent opening statement.
    General Dempsey. Yes. Thanks, Senator.
    It won't surprise you, I get a little advice, on occasion, 
in that regard from the junior officers and noncommissioned 
officers (NCO) among us. Incidentally, in my office calls, over 
here with many of you, I tend to have time to chat with your 
fellows, who, by the way, are just a remarkable bunch. That's 
across the Services. The question I always ask them is, how are 
you doing? How are we doing? What are you doing? What do you 
want to do? Some of your military legislative assistants are 
recently retired or resigned military. I ask them, was there 
something we could have done to keep you in the ranks? I get a 
lot of inputs.
    I like the problem we have. We talked about all the 
challenges we have. But, I'll tell you, I really like the 
problem we have, in terms of the leaders, and even the 
individual soldiers; because 10 years ago, Senator, we didn't 
really know whether we were a courageous, resilient, resolute, 
inquisitive, adaptable force. We didn't know. We hadn't been 
tested. We certainly have been tested over the past 10 years. 
That's the foundation on which we now have to build the future 
Army.
    Our challenge will be that these young men and women have 
had capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities, as 
captains, that I didn't have as a two-star general. I'm not 
exaggerating a bit when I say that. So, continuing their 
development, from that point, a much higher entry level than I 
had, is our challenge. We think there are different 
attributes--inquisitiveness--we think, the ability to adapt. We 
have to line up our evaluation system with these attributes. We 
have to relook at our professional military education, how much 
in the brick-and-mortar schoolhouse, how much can be done 
through these mobile learning devices. We have to find ways to 
broaden these young men and women at places like these 
fellowships.
    We can figure this out. But, what we can't do--and I think 
the message that the Secretary of Defense is sending us is, we 
can't simply--if I can use probably a poorly phrased metaphor 
here--but, if we were a rubber band and have been stretched 
over the last 10 years, we can't let ourselves simply contract 
back to our previous shape, because they won't stand for that.
    Senator Lieberman. Very well said.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
    We are setting up a briefing on Libya that we will have 
tomorrow. It will be a classified briefing. We will share with 
the members of the committee, as soon as we have it, the time 
of that briefing.
    Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate Senator Lieberman talking about the end 
strength and the fellowship program. I was going to ask about 
that, and I appreciate your answers.
    The fellowship program, I see a guy sitting, two seats to 
your left, who was a part of that--the only problem with that 
program: you learn to love these guys and gals and then they're 
gone. I don't know how we can correct that, though. I 
appreciate the fact that we started limiting that program, 
here, about 15 years ago, and it's been increasing since then. 
I would encourage you to keep that trend up.
    Let me say this. Your predecessor, General Casey--one of 
the things I liked and appreciated about him--and I know you 
have those same characteristics, because I've already been 
exposed to them--and that is, he's very hands-on. He wanted to 
know for himself what was going on. Of course, you're 
interested in the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System 
(JFETS) Program and Air Defense Artillery and some of these 
things that are going on today. I hope that we can continue 
with that. I'm sure that we can. I appreciate the fact that you 
have, in our Fires Center of Excellence and all these things.
    It's a whole new concept, this simulation level that we've 
gotten to right now. People are in shock when they come from 
other countries and see and witness this thing. I'm hoping that 
you would keep that up.
    Do you have any comments about the JFETS program?
    General Dempsey. I think it's game-changing.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes.
    General Dempsey. For the other members, it's a simulation, 
where we can link several different locations around the 
country. For that matter, we can link forward-deployed forces 
and have a common, live, virtual, and constructive environment 
in which leaders can grapple with complex problems, some of 
which are military, some of which are not.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes.
    General Dempsey. We're working to actually impose that 
model on the rest of the Army, at least in the institutional 
force. I think, eventually, though, the next training 
revolution in our Army will be what occurs at home station, 
because we have to raise the bar at home station. But, JFETS is 
groundbreaking.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, I agree with that.
    Just one quick thing on some of the problems we're having 
that are health-related. We know, of course, with the strain, 
the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and all of this, the suicide 
rates, divorces, and all of this stuff that have gone on--and I 
know that we are addressing these but, I'd specifically talk 
about one of them, this traumatic brain injury (TBI). I've been 
interested in this for some time. In fact, the Chairman was 
good enough, at my request, to hold a hearing. We've made 
another request to hold a hearing that would include not just 
the vice chiefs, which is what we had the first hearing, but 
also the medical people, civilians, some of the troops 
themselves. I would like to be able to have such a hearing. 
Would you encourage us to get into the TBI and some of the 
other related problems, health problems that our troops are 
having?
    General Dempsey. Senator, anything that this committee will 
do to remain teamed with us on the issue of care for wounded 
warriors, I will deeply appreciate and completely support.
    We all saw that Frank Buckles, our last World War I 
veteran, passed away, just a few days ago, at 110. The scars of 
this war will be with us for the next 90 to 100 years. Shame on 
us if we forget, when the conflicts dissipate a bit. Shame on 
us if we reflect that this is a long-term issue for our Army, 
but also for our Nation.
    Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I don't mean to imply 
that this is having that negative an effect on individuals. I 
spent New Year's Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and then 
again last week. It's just shocking to me. I was a product of 
the draft, and so I'd never thought an All-Volunteer Army would 
be what this is. But, the spirits are so high, and it just 
seems that, even when the OPTEMPO is high, the spirits are 
high, and we've done a good job. I know you'll carry that on.
    Senator McCain talked about some of the aging equipment 
that we have. General Casey and General Chiarelli have stated 
that we're burning up equipment as soon as we can field them. 
This is something that is a concern of mine. There was a 
statement that was actually in the press, and I'll read it. The 
study of the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, Gilbert Decker, and retired General 
Louis Wagner, found that the Army has spent $3.3 to $3.8 
billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been 
cancelled. I am concerned, and you wouldn't know now, but for 
the record, I want to see if that has stopped by now. If not, 
maybe we can address and find out why.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Army Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February 
2011, which includes 76 recommendations in 4 broad areas that extend 
across various Army organizations. Those broad areas address 
requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and 
resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 
(ASA(ALT)) to assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide 
specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the 
report which are judged to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Army's Acquisition process. That initial assessment is due to the 
Secretary in April. Following that, the Army will determine the path 
forward on implementation of the recommendations.

    Senator Inhofe. On the equipment, and the aging equipment, 
specifically, I've been concerned, as time has gone by--and I 
think Senator McCain mentioned this--and a good example would 
have been the Crusader. We needed to increase that non-line-of-
sight capacity that we had. The Paladin, that we're using 
today, is the same technology that was there 50-some years ago, 
when I was in the U.S. Army. Now we have a Paladin Integrated 
Management (PIM) program. But, we went through the FCS and--as 
has been stated before--we get down the road to these things, 
then someone comes along and we whack them and start something 
new.
    I hope, and I believe, that you will do all you can--now 
that we have the PIM program--down the road a little ways, that 
we can continue to do that. It's just remarkable that our 
capability with the old Paladin, there are five countries, 
including South Africa, that make a better artillery piece than 
what we're using now.
    Do you have any comments about where we're going to go in 
the future and what you're going to try to keep the 
discontinuation from happening again?
    General Dempsey. Simply my commitment, Senator, to work 
that. I am familiar with the work of Dr. Decker and General 
Wagner. I think it's good work. My own professional view is 
that some of the programs that we aspire to field fail because 
of the time horizon we establish for them. I have been vocal, 
within TRADOC, that requirements determination and the 
acquisition solution to those requirements and capabilities 
need to be taken on a shorter timeline, a 5- to 7-year time 
horizon instead of a 10- to 15-year horizon, because if we try 
to project our needs 10 or 15 years in the future, it's almost 
certain we won't get it right. I think we have some good ideas 
in that report to work on. You have my commitment, Senator.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. I'm sure that's right. My time has 
expired, but I would only tell you that--I remember the last 
year that I served on the House Armed Services Committee was 
1994--we had a witness that came in that said, ``In 10 years, 
we'll no longer need ground troops.'' You're right. As smart as 
all the generals are, we don't know what's out there in the 
future. But, I would like to get to the point where, no matter 
what is there, our kids have the best that there is out there, 
and I'm sure you feel the same way.
    I look forward to serving with you.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dempsey, welcome.
    Let me follow up on a point that you responded to, to 
Senator Inhofe, in that this 100-year burden for soldiers and 
marines and sailors and airmen who are bearing the fight now, 
it has to reflect not only in the DOD budget, but the Veterans 
Affairs budget. I think you concur. I just want that for the 
record.
    General Dempsey. Absolutely.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    We're talking, now, about the future. That is being shaped, 
or thought about, in terms of several different dimensions. One 
is a changing context: new technologies, social networking, 
climate change affecting the natural resources and will be the 
struggles. That has to be factored in.
    But, the other fact is the traditional threat; what other 
countries or non-state actors have, in terms of weapon 
capabilities and intentions. Can you talk about that aspect, as 
you go forward, of how you're trying to weigh that threat? Does 
it synchronize well with Secretary Gates' speech at West Point?
    General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I will speak to that. It gets at 
the reason--I don't think the Secretary was saying, ``Shed the 
heavy force and invest entirely in the light force and special 
forces,'' because he and I have had conversations, for example, 
about the Israeli experience in southern Lebanon in 2006, where 
a non-state actor, a terrorist organization, was as well 
organized, trained, and equipped as the traditional Israeli 
defense force that was confronting it: shore-to-ship missiles, 
air defense weapons, electronic warfare, advanced anti-armor 
capabilities. I mean really remarkable stuff. So, as the 
Secretary and I--and this is mostly in my job as acting CENTCOM 
commander--but, as we talked about the future of conflict, we 
generally believe that the future will be more a series of 
hybrid threats, where you have to be prepared to confront your 
adversary wherever he chooses to confront you.
    Sometimes it'll be very irregular and decentralized, and 
sometimes it will look a lot like a conventional conflict. So, 
what we owe the Nation is a force that has capabilities 
proportional to what we believe we'll confront but has all 
those capabilities. We need an institution that's adaptable 
enough that if we get it wrong--and, as we've said here 
earlier, we are likely to get it wrong--we have to have an 
institution that is adaptable enough to rebalance itself on a 
far more frequent basis than we have in the past. I think the 
world is a far more dangerous place today than it's ever been, 
and we owe the Nation an agile force that can adapt to the 
future, whatever it finds in that future.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Let me go to another point that was raised in the West 
Point speech; that is, developing, not just an officer corps, 
but NCO corps of expertise and flexibility and agility. Part of 
that goes as a reward structure. Do you have any thoughts or 
comments now about how you're going to think about changing the 
reward structure so that you find people at the upper levels of 
both the commissioned officer corps and noncommissioned corps 
who have a cultural awareness, who have a range of skills that 
are not the traditional tactical operational skills that have 
in the past been the gate to get into the upper ranks?
    General Dempsey. Yes. I will say, Senator, that's really 
been my life's work for the last 2 years, has been looking at 
leader development, really, all four cohorts; and I'll define 
the cohorts as officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and civilians 
as well, working a great deal with the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on civilian 
development.
    I think we've done some very good work, in particular, in 
the NCO corps. When I came in the Army in 1974, a NCO was very 
likely not to have a high school education. Now, it's the 
expectation that, if a soldier rises to the rank of sergeant 
major, he'll have a bachelor's degree before he gets there. By 
the time he retires, he'll have a master's degree.
    We haven't actually adjusted how we use them yet to account 
for that additional capability. Someone approached me yesterday 
about the possibility of having NCO fellows here in the 
Congress of the United States. You kind of slap your forehead 
and say, ``Why didn't I think of that?'' We haven't really 
adjusted the way we use them. But, I have great faith, and I 
applaud the selection that General Casey made of the new 
Sergeant Major of the Army, Ray Chandler, who will push us in 
that regard, in development of the NCOs.
    On the officer side, and others, we're looking at a new 
personnel management model. You may have heard of the Blue 
Pages in IBM. We have a prototype, on a thing we call the Green 
Pages, that allow an individual officer to actually collaborate 
more on their career development, allows us to understand what 
they're interested in, not just the classes we've given them, 
but we might have somebody who worked in Outward Bound as a 
child or as a military child, spent 18 years in the Pacific 
Rim. We wouldn't know that today, but we'd like to know that. 
There's a number of programs that are out there. Technology 
provides huge opportunities to use them.
    What I will tell you, in closing this question, is, I am 
deeply committed to the development of our leaders, because we 
are likely to get the equipment, sort of right, but not 
perfect, and the organization sort of right, but not perfect. 
We're probably going to give guidance a little late, I've 
found. The person that pulls it together is that leader on the 
ground, and we have to keep committing to their development.
    Senator Reed. Just let me follow up on that and second your 
comment about the NCOs; they are the heart and soul of any 
military force, particularly the U.S. Army. In 1971, when I 
came on Active Duty, the same comment could be made about the 
NCOs' education level, and now they're superbly trained. I 
think you're absolutely on target.
    Second is that, with the advent of social networking--and 
this is not going to be a social network--but I was extremely 
impressed, years ago, when some enterprising young officers set 
up, sort of, Company Commander, Inc. or CompanyCommander----
    General Dempsey. Dot com.
    Senator Reed.--dot com. Is that informal learning--how are 
you going to integrate that into our plans?
    General Dempsey. That's the question that provides the 
greatest opportunities for us, I think, in terms of leader 
development.
    I have to just back up a second and tell you, when I took 
the job at TRADOC, Senator, I found a CD of General Donn 
Starry. Now, he's a name familiar to you.
    Senator Reed. I know.
    General Dempsey. But, Donn Starry was considered to be one 
of the great thinkers of our Army in the 1970s, and helped the 
Army, under other leaders, build to what it became in 1991, and 
even what it is today. But, he had a video--it was one of the 
first VCR tapes ever made in the Army--and it showed him 
walking into a mall in Hampton, VA, and looking at young men 
and women playing video games. He turned to the camera and 
said, ``We know they're in there. They're in there playing 
these games. They're paying for the opportunity to play. 
They're learning something. What we don't know is what they're 
learning.'' That was in 1981.
    I feel the same way today about social networking. We have 
young men and women playing massive multiplayer online role-
playing games, MMOs as they call them, World of Warcraft and 
others--I mean, millions of children playing these interactive 
games. They're learning something about developing as leaders, 
believe it or not, because of the way these games structure, 
and you have to impose your own leadership into the game.
    We can figure out how to leverage a game like that for 
leader development, linking schoolhouses across the country--
I'm talking about military schoolhouses. I think we'd be onto 
something in helping these young men and women collaborate, 
meet their desire to social network, and also facilitate the 
kind of learning we're going to need by introducing complex 
problems in that environment, that we can't replicate 
physically at places like Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and Fort 
Carson. I think social networking has enormous opportunities 
for us.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General.
    Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think I recognize General Gordon 
Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army is in the 
audience today. His distinguished service must be applauded.
    Thank you, General Sullivan.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. Thank you for 
making that reference to General Sullivan.
    We are very much intrigued by your answers here, I must 
tell you, General Dempsey. It's really mind-opening.
    Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dempsey, let me echo the sentiments of my 
colleagues in congratulating you on this nomination, and also 
to thank you and your family for your service to our country 
and your continued commitment to freedom and democracy around 
the world.
    Also, I want to commend you, likewise, on this fellowship 
program, and I appreciate your comments and strong support of 
that. I have been blessed, going back to my days in the House, 
with outstanding young men and women serving in my office. It's 
been a privilege to have a chance to dialogue with those folks, 
one on one, about what really is happening out there which, in 
addition to the great service they provide from a information 
standpoint, personal-wise, they're just such an asset. It's a 
very valuable program.
    I want to go back to the question that Chairman Levin asked 
you about, on this decision regarding personnel serving in 
Europe. You'll recall, a couple years ago, a decision was made 
to put three brigades back in the continental United States, 
one at Fort Bliss, one at Fort Carson, one at Fort Stewart. I'm 
not sure how the decision can be characterized as a reversal, 
putting on hold, or whatever. But, I'd like for you to 
characterize exactly where that is. What kind of importance is 
that decision being given in your current discussions, relative 
to what's going to happen, as far as bringing troops back from 
Europe? Lastly, what's your timetable on that study?
    General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
    We, at one point, were going to build 76 brigade combat 
teams. We took a decision--the Department did--that we would 
build only out to 73, and we held the 4 brigades in Europe, 
pending the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
because we had them--all of the Army, on such a 1-to-1 BOG-
dwell ratio that it would have been too disruptive to move 
them, under that situation.
    Now we're looking at absorbing, potentially, the 27,000 
reduction, and it is inevitable, as Chairman Levin said, that 
there will have to be some structural changes to account for 
that 27,000. The analysis is just really beginning on that, and 
I haven't been made privy to it.
    If confirmed, of course, that will come to the Chief and to 
the Secretary of the Army to determine which brigades are 
essentially the billpayers for that 27,000 end strength. I'm 
not suggesting it will be all brigade combat teams. It'll have 
to be some portion of the entire Army, to include the 
generating force. I think the timeline for that is probably the 
analysis over the next 6 months, because it'll be executed in 
the--in Program Objective Memorandum 13-17 and the timeline for 
our submission of 13-17 is on or about July 1. That's about the 
timeframe for this analysis.
    Senator Chambliss. Okay. While impressive gains in security 
have been made throughout the country of Iraq, Iraq still 
remains a very dangerous place to live, travel, and work in 
2011. Targeted assassinations, corruption, and Iraqi security 
force, medical, logistical, planning, and transportation 
shortcomings continue to undermine the Iraqi Government 
security and infrastructure improvement efforts throughout the 
country. The security of their oil fields, pipelines, and 
terminals, while also much improved, remain a critical 
vulnerability and a prime target of insurgent forces.
    As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, the Department of State 
will have to act quickly to significantly increase their 
security footprint in Iraq so that their diplomats can maintain 
a significant construction presence in Iraq for years to come, 
a job required sustained oversight engagement to watch over 
what remains of the $58 billion in U.S. construction programs. 
While that ability to find, vet, and hire so many professional 
security personnel in such a short period is by no means a 
certainty, neither is continued stability in Iraq. As we're 
seeing throughout the Middle East right now, there is all kinds 
of instability regarding neighbors to Iraq.
    My question is, with this sustained instability throughout 
the Muslim world, is the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces 
from Iraq at the end of this year still the right thing to do?
    General Dempsey. I can't speak to whether it's the right 
thing to do for Iraq. I think that's the piece of this, 
Senator, that we would have to examine.
    We certainly have interests in Iraq and in the broader 
region. It will have to be determined whether Iraq's interests 
and ours will be matched, and that part of that match will be 
additional force structure remaining in Iraq. I mean, that's 
very much a negotiation that will have to occur between the two 
sovereign nations.
    I will say that some forward presence--U.S. military 
presence, but, even more specifically, U.S. Army presence--in 
that region is important to me. I think that's a very important 
region of the world, and will be, for the foreseeable future, 
and I am advocate of a forward presence there.
    Senator Chambliss. There's also been some preliminary 
discussion and conversation about, when it becomes time to 
leave Afghanistan, that we may leave that country from a combat 
standpoint, but that we will establish at least one base in 
Afghanistan. What's your thought, with reference to that issue?
    General Dempsey. I haven't been made aware of that 
planning. I'm not surprised that someone is--someone should be, 
in fact, looking beyond the date 2014, which is the commitment 
we've made with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies 
to provide the kind of support, and to be in the lead. I'm not 
surprised folks are beginning to look beyond that to determine 
what is our long-term interest there.
    I think the answer to that question, Senator, very similar 
to the one I gave vis-a-vis the Arabian Peninsula. We are very 
closely partnered with Pakistan and have some shared interests. 
We are currently in Afghanistan and have shared interests. How 
those interests are managed over time, I think, will be 
dependent upon how the situation on the ground plays out in the 
next 3 or 4 years.
    Senator Chambliss. As my time has expired, General, thanks 
again for your service. We look forward to continuing to work 
with you in your new role.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, General Dempsey, thank you for your service, and 
your family, for their service, as well.
    On a visit to Iraq, you and I spent time talking about how 
you were able to take the processes and procedures of 
acquisition of the U.S. military and use that to make 
acquisitions for the Iraqi military, recognizing that, in the 
absence of those processes and procedures--acquisition 
procedures in the Iraqi Government--they were basically 
incapable of getting all the money spent in the right way, 100 
percent for the acquisitions. By doing that, using Iraqi money, 
you were able to acquire their military material for their 
needs. I thought that was novel at the time. It also showed me 
that there was a recognition by the Iraqi Government that their 
responsibility was clearly theirs, not just simply the United 
States, to provide for the cost of their defense.
    As we look toward leaving in December 2011, there is a 
possibility that we're going, as you and I discussed, that the 
Iraqis are able to provide for their own defense, but they 
might decide that they need continuing support for their 
defense. We understand. If they can't defend, they can't 
govern. Self-defense and self-governance go hand-in-glove.
    What I'm getting to is, they're facing deficits in their 
budgets, as we're facing deficits in our budgets. On a relative 
basis, I would take theirs over ours. My point is, can we look 
to ways in negotiating anything, if we're going to stay and 
provide assistance, where they can pick up a bigger share of 
the cost so that the American taxpayer doesn't end up picking 
up a bigger share of the cost?
    General Dempsey. Senator, I think General Lloyd Austin, 
who's in Iraq--would be better positioned to answer whether 
they----
    Senator Nelson. Well, I asked him, too.
    General Dempsey. Oh, you did?
    Senator Nelson. Yes.
    General Dempsey. I probably should have read their answer 
before I tried to hazard a guess at my own.
    As I said in an earlier answer, Senator, I think this is 
all about identifying our common interests, and then 
challenging each of us to invest in those common interests. I 
think that the proposal would be absolutely appropriate.
    Senator Nelson. You may very well be, in your new position, 
when not only the Iraqi war winds down, but also perhaps, if 
we're so fortunate, that we would see a reduction in the level 
of activity and the costs associated with Afghanistan.
    While the Army is always engaged in planning, do you 
believe that we will be in a position to start looking towards 
some planning for a reduction in forces in Afghanistan? I know 
this is something we're going to ask General Petraeus, when 
he's here. But, from your standpoint, if that decision is made, 
that we are going to reduce forces, that you will take that 
into consideration, looking at our continuing end strength 
needs, as well as the rest of the military needs, to support 
the kind of defense that Secretary Gates has been talking 
about.
    General Dempsey. Senator, you will consider me for 
confirmation both as the Chief of Staff of the Army, but also 
as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that last point 
there is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs, to balance our 
commitments around the world for our national security. If 
confirmed, I'll absolutely take that obligation to heart.
    Senator Nelson. If we do that, how will this affect the 
current situation, where we're looking to draw down 27,000 
troops from the Army? By 2014, will that be reevaluated, do you 
believe? Will that have constant reevaluation, or is that a 
date set and a goal that just must be achieved, or will that 
have to be constantly reevaluated in the days ahead?
    General Dempsey. I consider it to be the latter case, 
Senator, where the assumptions on which those decisions were 
made need to be reevaluated as we see what occurs with Iraq, 
post-December 11, and what occurs with Afghanistan post-2014.
    Senator Nelson. Now I'm really going to test you on what 
our Chairman said at the beginning, about giving your opinion, 
no matter how it might shape up with other opinions with your 
colleagues.
    Chairman Levin. He's not confirmed yet, though. [Laughter.]
    Senator Nelson. That's true. You can tell me anything----
    Chairman Levin. But, we still expect that of you.
    Senator Nelson. We still expect it.
    Chairman Levin. Yes, I support Senator Nelson.
    General Dempsey. Thank you for your first response, 
Chairman Levin. [Laughter.]
    Senator Nelson. If confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff, 
can we expect that you would be a very strong advocate for our 
National Guard?
    General Dempsey. That's an easy one, Senator. Absolutely.
    Senator Nelson. Now the tough one. Do you believe that the 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau should become a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff? That's the tougher one.
    General Dempsey. Yes. It's tough, only because I haven't 
thought about it. I have learned, long ago, not to render an 
opinion about something I haven't thought about. What you can 
count on me to be is openminded about that.
    Senator Nelson. I hope that you will be openminded about 
it. The Guard has established itself as an operational force, 
no longer as a supply force. It's operational. It's not on the 
shelf, ready to go. It's active, as active as the Active Duty 
military. I would hope that you would consider that. Keep an 
open mind, but consider it. I'm going to keep pushing for it, 
because I think the importance of the role that the Guard has 
now taken is something that needs to be at the table all the 
time. Getting a four-star in charge of it was step number one. 
But, step number two, as a full partner, I think, involves 
being a member of the Joint Chiefs. I know it's touchy, but I 
hope that you and your colleagues will look very carefully at 
that.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Nelson. Thank you, and good luck.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your distinguished 
service to our country.
    I also want to thank your wife, Deanie, and your son, 
Christopher. It's wonderful to have a military family here. The 
sacrifices that your entire family has made, we're deeply 
appreciative of.
    I welcomed the opportunity, also, to sit down with you 
yesterday.
    I want to take this moment just to express my deep 
condolences to the families of the Air Force members who were 
killed yesterday in Germany on their way to Afghanistan. I 
think it reminds us that we continue to be at war with 
terrorists, and the difficulties that we face, and also the 
sacrifices that our servicemen are making across the branches 
on behalf of our freedom and democracy in the world.
    General Dempsey, in your answers to the advance policy 
questions, you state that the significant increase in the 
number of soldier suicides is of greatest concern to you, and I 
share your concerns. With the number of suicides in the 
National Guard rising to especially troubling levels, I share 
your goal of reducing those suicides. In particular, as we 
discussed yesterday, in New Hampshire we have the National 
Guard's Deployment Cycle Program which I believe is the model 
program, because we not only need to make sure that programs 
are in place for the full deployment cycle for our Active Duty 
members, but also, we've asked so much of our guardsmen and -
women in the Reserve to make sure that we are taking care of 
our soldiers when they come home from the Guard, as well. This 
program is a highly effective and fiscally responsible 
initiative. It's really a public-private partnership that I 
think is unique across the country.
    Yesterday, Senator Shaheen and I wrote a letter to Admiral 
Mullen, urging him to take a close look at this program, and 
also to support this program. We have seen the program work to 
help on retention, to help with the many issues and challenges 
that our guardsmen and -women face when they return from duty, 
and also when they are going to duty, as well their families. I 
would ask you--and I will provide you with a copy of this 
letter--for your support for this program, and for you to take 
a close look at it. I think it's a model for other States 
across the country, and very important that we not lose sight 
of our soldiers when they come home. Particularly in the Guard, 
when we've asked so much more of the Guard, with multiple 
deployments, than we have historically, that we make sure that 
those programs are in place.
    I just wanted to get your thoughts on what you envision, 
going forward, in addressing our guardsmen and -women and the 
deployment cycle support for them.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for, by the 
way, your role as the spouse of an air national guardsman. I 
know you've been through a couple of deployments, as well.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
    General Dempsey. You speak with great authority and 
experience in that regard.
    I have already passed to my staff, as the TRADOC commander, 
the task to look at that program you mentioned to me yesterday.
    In general, though, I'll tell you that we continue to learn 
as we go. We've been reminded, recently by some of those 
statistics, other kinds of trends within the force, of the 
accruing effects of 10 years of war. The Guard presents a 
unique problem, because they don't come back to a central 
location. They come back, they spend a brief period of time, 
and then they dissipate, sometimes within a single State, 
sometimes within 10 or 15 States. I can assure you, at this 
point, that we are beginning to grapple with understanding the 
problem, and we will partner with you and others to solve the 
problem. Because, it's one, again, that will be with us for 
some time.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I very much appreciate that, and 
look forward to working with you on solving that problem, which 
is so important in supporting not only our Active Duty troops, 
but our guardsmen and -women, and Reserve, who we're asking so 
much of them at this time.
    General Dempsey, Chairman Mullen has also stated his belief 
that the national debt represents a preeminent threat to our 
national security. Do you share that concern?
    General Dempsey. I do, Senator. The instruments of national 
power--diplomatic, military, and economic--have to be in 
balance for us to be the power we need to be.
    Senator Ayotte. If we don't restore fiscal sanity to 
Washington and reduce our national debt, one of the concerns 
that I have is that the rising debt payments will begin to 
significantly crowd out the finances we have to be able to 
protect our Nation and its interests and, obviously, to fill 
our commitment to our Active Duty troops and to our veterans, 
who have sacrificed so much for us.
    I would ask you, as the--hopefully--new Chief of the Army, 
to look at two things, and also to get your thoughts on it. One 
is the recently released March Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report. In that report, the GAO found that there were 
instances of duplication and waste among the branches, where 
the branches could better coordinate, where there were 
redundancies on areas of equipment and areas where we could 
work together to reduce costs. Have you had a chance to review 
that report yet?
    General Dempsey. No, I haven't reviewed the actual report, 
but I have seen the reporting on it.
    Senator Ayotte. I would ask you to review that report and 
look for ways to implement some of the recommendations that are 
made in that report so that we can reduce those duplications 
and make sure that we are using taxpayer dollars as effectively 
as possible, given the great challenges that we face right now.
    General Dempsey. I will.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I also wanted to follow up on 
the comments that Senator McCain made about the acquisition 
programs in the Army. We've seen, in some instances, where 
there have been billions of dollars that programs have been 
canceled, programs have been broken. How do you plan to address 
acquisition in a way that uses taxpayer dollars more wisely? 
Hopefully we can see some cost savings from that, as well.
    General Dempsey. Senator, we have to. We can't continue to 
hemorrhage resources that you'll be increasingly challenged to 
help provide.
    I think that the Decker-Wagner report gives an aperture 
through which to look at this issue much more seriously.
    One of the earlier comments was about these things called 
``capability portfolio reviews''. I think you're familiar with 
them. The capability portfolio review process is really senior 
leadership of the Army, personified now as the Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army himself, Pete Chiarelli--bringing together 
the requirement side of the house and the acquisition side of 
the house periodically to do exactly what you're talking about. 
I think the first step, in answering your question, is to 
institutionalize those capability portfolio reviews and then to 
take the Decker-Wagner report and implement it, or at least 
determine which pieces of it should be implemented.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, General.
    My time is up. I want to again commend you and your family 
for your service. I look forward to working with you to make 
sure that you have the equipment that you need, but also on 
these issues of where we can save taxpayer dollars and do 
things more effectively and more efficiently.
    General Dempsey. Thank you.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Before, General, I direct some comments and questions your 
way, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator 
from New Hampshire. She's on point. The Senate, right now, 
seems to be the one institution here in Washington that's 
really working on a long-term deficit and debt-reduction plan. 
A broke country is a weak country. We have some serious work to 
do. DOD can help us get the job done.
    You've talked about dwell time, General, and you know that, 
under the current Army force generation cycle, we're not able 
to provide the goal of 2 years at home. My question is, since 
the quantity of time at home station is limited, what steps 
would you take, as Chief, to improve the quality of time at 
home for soldiers?
    General Dempsey. That's a interesting way to put it, 
Senator. I haven't heard it phrased that way, but it's worth 
thinking about.
    Senator Udall. I have great staff, General.
    General Dempsey. Any of them behind you?
    Senator Udall. Yes.
    General Dempsey. Okay. Good.
    Senator Udall. He's a retired Army helicopter pilot.
    General Dempsey. Ah, a retired helicopter pilot. I might 
have known. I'm surrounded by helicopter pilots here, it seems.
    Senator, just before I talk about the quality issue, I 
don't want to walk away from the absolute imperative of the 
quantity issue, because every study we can possibly get our 
hands on suggests that it takes at least 2 years to fully 
recover from the experience that a young man or woman will have 
in a forward-deployed combat environment. So, it is quantity. I 
have to remain firmly committed to it.
    In terms of the quality, the issue, for me, is to 
determine--it's back to this best practices. There are some 
remarkable practices out there, some of which, by the way, we 
saw in effect at Fort Carson, CO, in a recent visit there. We 
have centers of excellence in different programs. One program, 
in particular, ties it together, called the ``Comprehensive 
Soldier Fitness Program,'' that has to be extended, and is 
being extended, into families, how to make families more 
resilient, right from the start of their service, not waiting 
until some crisis comes their way.
    But, what we're trying to do is take the best of ideas out 
there, and share them and institutionalize them, because some 
of the family care programs have been like a thousand flowers 
blooming. With good intentions, we've wanted to do as much as 
we could. Now we're in a position where we've seen a thousand 
things; we need to decide which 50 of them actually have the 
impact we're seeking. We need to invest in those to get at the 
quality issue you're talking about. That work is ongoing, 
generally through our Installation Management Command, 
commanded by Lieutenant General Ricky Lynch, but also in 
partnership with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
    Senator Udall. I think that fits into, I don't know if 
you've put this in a doctrine or not, but I think you have the 
rule of 5 versus the lure of 55. I hear you voicing that same 
kind of an approach to this.
    If I might, let me turn to a question of Civ-Mil jointness, 
if you will. We're asking our soldiers to be diplomats, 
ambassadors, trainers, and negotiators--even have an eye for 
business cycles and dynamics--in all these theaters in which 
they're deployed. They come back as experts in areas we never 
could have envisioned a few years ago. I'm wondering how we can 
ensure that they share what they've learned with other agencies 
before and after future combat rotations. Is there any joint 
predeployment training with nonmilitary agencies, like the 
State Department, at the National Training Centers? Would you 
see any value in such training?
    General Dempsey. First of all, absolutely, Senator. We are 
doing a good bit of it now. We jointly train the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), for example, that are forward-
deployed. We train with them. To the extent we can, we try to 
get them, as well, to go through our mission readiness 
exercises with deploying brigades. Now, sometimes, because 
those other agencies of government are one deep at many of the 
skilled positions, unlike us, they can't make that training. 
But, we never deploy either a PRT or a brigade combat team 
without some of that training. Could and should we do more? 
Yes.
    Second, in the educational system of our Army, we have 
several programs. I'll mention one. We have a interagency 
fellowship program at the Command and General Staff College at 
Fort Leavenworth, KS, where we take young Army officers who 
have gone through an abbreviated Command and General Staff 
College course, and we'll put them into an agency of 
government--U.S. Agency for International Development, the 
Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of 
Transportation--displacing one of their folks; that allows that 
person, then, to come to Fort Leavenworth and go through the 
10-month Command and General Staff college experience. We have 
about 20 of them out there now. We have the capacity to take 
36.
    But, those are the kind of programs I think we need to take 
a look at in the future, as well.
    Senator Udall. That would be a fantastic way to take 
advantage of that investment we've made. I know those soldiers 
are keen to share what they've learned.
    By the way, I wanted to comment on your comments about the 
NCO-in-residence opportunity here. I had the great privilege of 
having Master Sergeant Rubio serve for a year in my office in 
the first year of the NCO fellowship. It was phenomenal. I want 
to just underline the importance of that approach.
    Let me, in my remaining time, move to energy. DOD's been 
leading the way in the development of renewable energy programs 
that will reduce the force's need for fossil fuels. It's first 
and foremost about security. We know that many of the grievous 
injuries in theater, delivered by improvised explosive devices, 
are aimed at supply convoys and the like.
    The Marine Corps has set up what they're calling an 
experimental forward operating base in California. They're 
working with private industry to develop and test solar cells, 
batteries, and other products. Then they've taken the most 
promising approaches to Afghanistan, and they've cut their fuel 
consumption in the process.
    Do you have plans, in the Army, to look at this 
Expeditionary Forward Operating Base model. If you don't, what 
can we do to help make that a reality?
    General Dempsey. No, we do, Senator.
    All the technological advances that we're introducing into 
the force all put an increasing demand on the generation of 
power. So, we have a capabilities-based assessment on the issue 
of power.
    There's sort of a joke in Afghanistan: You can follow a 
U.S. Army unit through the mountains of Afghanistan by the 
trail of batteries they shed, because of the power requirement 
that all of these systems require.
    We have a study in place--a capabilities-based assessment--
to try to determine how we can meet those power demands and 
become more self-sustaining. The aspiration is to eventually, 
in the out years, develop the capability to have a self-
sustaining brigade that can produce its own water, its own 
power, its own energy. We're a long way from that, but that's 
the right question to be asked to those that partner with us, 
like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Army 
Research, Development, and Engineering Command, even the 
private sector, to try to help us become more self-sustaining.
    Senator Udall. That's exciting news, and count on me to be 
an advocate for what you're doing.
    Thank you, again. When you're confirmed, I look forward to 
further working with you.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Udall. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thank you for 
raising the energy question. It's a critically important 
question for the Army. I also talked to General Dempsey about 
that, and the need for our security, in many ways, to address 
that issue which you have raised. Thank you for your ongoing 
interest in that piece.
    Senator Brown is next.
    Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm bouncing back and forth, between hearings, like many 
others.
    Sir, I met you yesterday. Obviously, I asked a lot of the 
questions. I appreciate your candor. I look forward to voting 
in support of you.
    I have a couple of questions. I think you know that I have 
an interest in Guard and Reserve troops, and I attended the 
first National Guard Caucus event this year. I agree with many 
of the priorities referenced by Senator Graham, a dear friend 
of mine. He drilled down on several key themes that, if 
implemented, I believe would have a positive impact on our 
Nation's operational service and security.
    He was in the Reserves and, I just found out, the Guard, as 
well. I look forward to hearing his perspective on a whole host 
of issues regarding the Guard and Reserves.
    I'm concerned with the fact that our depressed economy is 
having a terrible effect on our heroes that have served, 
especially the Guard and reservists. Over 30 percent of our 
young non-Active-Duty soldiers are unemployed. I'm wondering, 
what does this mean to you, in your efforts, if any? Is there 
anything that we can do, and you can help us with, to have 
employers not only hire, but keep onboard, members of the Guard 
and Reserves?
    General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, thanks. Thank you for your 
service in the Guard.
    We are partnered with the other agencies of government, 
notably the Veterans Administration, of course, but also with 
Governors across the country, in trying to raise the interest 
and awareness of the plight of the returning veteran, if you 
will.
    General Petraeus' wife, Holly, was appointed to look at the 
predatory practices of some on trying to take advantage of 
soldiers, with things like loans and so forth.
    Senator Brown. Senator Reed and I actually dealt with that 
in our Financial Regulation bill, to try to address those.
    General Dempsey. Yes.
    Senator Brown. I recognize that, as well.
    General Dempsey. That crosses all components--Active, 
Guard, and Reserve.
    Senator Brown. Right.
    General Dempsey. We've partnered with academia, to the 
extent we can, to find educational opportunities. I won't name 
them, but there's some remarkable initiatives out there, in 
academia, where they are reaching out to veterans to allow them 
to use their GI Bill in a way that is both financially vital 
for them, but also to account for their unique needs as 
veterans as they come back from a conflict.
    Those are the things we're doing. What I would say to you, 
in response to your question, is, if confirmed, we have to keep 
the fire burning in that regard.
    Senator Brown. Right.
    General Dempsey. Because, again, this is not a 2-year 
problem or challenge, this is a multiyear challenge.
    Senator Brown. Sir, also, I know that you're dealing with 
the real issue of not only Active-Duty suicide rates, but, the 
Guard and Reserves rate seem to be dramatically higher. I'm 
trusting that you'll continue on with that effort and try to 
address what the needs are and try to have more intervention.
    General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Brown. Thank you. I'd appreciate that.
    Also, I was wondering if you could give any insight as to 
the M-9 pistol competition, where that will stand in the new 
go-round. Anything you can share?
    General Dempsey. In TRADOC, most of my attention to date, 
in terms of personal weapons, has been on the individual 
carbine, because TRADOC was tasked by the Secretary of the Army 
to run an analysis of whether it was time to move away from the 
M-4.
    We're actually doing two things with regard to the carbine. 
One is, improving the M-4, both its performance, but also the 
performance of the ammunition. We're looking at whether we need 
an individual carbine beyond the M-4. That work is ongoing. I 
think the request for proposal (RFP), in draft, has been 
released. I think the final RFP will be issued sometime in the 
third quarter of this fiscal year.
    I have not been involved, to date, Senator, on the issue of 
the M-9. Based on our conversation yesterday, I will look 
forward to learning more about that, if I'm confirmed.
    Senator Brown. Great. Sir, just in conclusion, I know the 
challenges are huge. My concern is that we get the best value 
for our dollars, but also that we can provide the tools and 
resources to our men and women who are fighting to not only do 
the job, but come home safely.
    One of the issues we talked about yesterday was the rules-
of-engagement issue, and making sure that's revisited and 
updated so we can allow the soldiers to do the job without 
being handcuffed by attorneys. I'm one of them. But, obviously, 
I think that's important. Out of all the things I've heard 
about the morale, the issues, it's that one issue that always 
seems to come back with us, saying, ``You know what? I'd love 
to do A, B, C, and D, but the JAG says--or this person says--
the commander's guidance is''--and I think, in some respects, 
at times, we may be jeopardizing the safety of our soldiers.
    I know you said you were going to look into that, and I 
appreciate it. Good luck to you and your family.
    Thank you.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
    Senator Hagan is next.
    After Senator Hagan, Senator Shaheen, I believe, will be 
the last Senator, on this side at least, and she has agreed 
that she could stay on, if other Senators appear, and take the 
gavel at that point. I very much appreciate that.
    Senator Hagan.
    Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to welcome General Dempsey, and really appreciate 
your service to our country, and your continued service.
    I also wanted to welcome your wife, Deanie, and your 
family. It's obviously a family affair, when somebody spends 
the number of years that you have with our military. I want to 
thank you so much. To have three children also having been in 
the Army certainly is a testament to you and your wife. So, 
thank you both for that.
    I want to ask a question about the sexual assaults. I know 
you will take this seriously, but I did want to bring this up. 
Last month, a group of veterans and Active-Duty servicemembers 
sued the Pentagon, citing military commanders aren't doing 
enough to prosecute sexual assault cases. If these claims are 
founded, the failure to provide basic guarantees of safety to 
women, who now represent 15 percent of the Armed Forces, is not 
just a moral issue or a morale issue, it is a defining 
statement about the condition and the approach of our military.
    The Pentagon has issued a statement, saying the issue is a 
command priority and that it is working to make sure all troops 
are safe from sexual abuse.
    In the Army today, what do you foresee as the challenges in 
implementing a safe and timely reporting system for sexual 
assaults?
    General Dempsey. You have my commitment, as I expressed 
yesterday, that this issue is foremost in mind, and here's why, 
Senator. It rubs at the fabric of our profession. You may have 
heard that we're doing an analysis this year of, what have the 
last 10 years of war done to our profession? How are we 
different? How do we perceive ourselves to be different? How 
have some of the responsibilities we've pushed to the lower 
echelons--should they have changed the way we develop leaders? 
These things are all tied together. One of the things that has 
come out of the analysis already is that the core of our 
profession--if we're going to be a profession--and we can't 
take that for granted--is trust. The reason that an issue like 
sexual harassment is so important is not just because we should 
be protecting young men and women from sexual predators, but it 
tears at the very fabric of our profession. It breaks the bond 
of trust between leader and led. That's why it's important.
    We have made some inroads. You're well aware of our three-
phased program. We're well on the way to executing the program. 
Some of the reporting indicates, in the Active component, that 
it's steadied out. But, that's not good enough. It needs to 
nosedive, the number of incidents.
    You'll hear folks talk about whether it's better reporting 
or more incidents. I find that to be somewhat irrelevant, 
actually, because, again, it tears at the fabric of the 
profession. I do think the key is experts inside of brigade 
combat teams--and we're putting them there; education of our 
leaders about why it's important--not just because of the 
gender issues, but because of this issue of trust. We're doing 
that. But, what you have is my assurances that, if confirmed, I 
will press down even harder on the accelerator.
    Senator Hagan. I appreciate that. Thank you. I'm sure 
everybody will appreciate that.
    In the last decade, the Army has attempted to field the 
Crusader, the Comanche, the FCS, the non-light-of-sight 
missile, and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. This research 
and development adds up, I believe, to about over $10 billion 
of research and development for equipment that was actually 
never fielded.
    The ground combat vehicle (GCV) is the latest possibility 
that will be added to the Army vehicle fleet. Do you think the 
requirements for this vehicle are realistic in development? 
More importantly, is the use of research and development funds 
being spent on the ground combat vehicle going to transform the 
battlefield capabilities? Will the ground combat vehicle be 
superior to the Bradley enough to justify the costs associated 
with developing and fielding it?
    General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
    I am convinced that the requirements for the ground combat 
vehicle have been articulated in a way that actually begins to 
get at some of our aspiration for acquisition reform, meaning 
this: We collaborated, right from the start, among senior 
leaders, those who do the requirements determination and the 
acquisition community, on the requirements, as opposed to, 
potentially, some of the other programs you mentioned, where 
the requirements were determined, passed to the acquisition 
community, and the collaboration clearly wasn't adequate.
    The other thing we've done with the GCV is, we've said, 
``Look, if you can't give it to me in 5 to 7 years, I don't 
need it.'' Because, we know that if we shoot our aspirations 
beyond that technology we can see, generally speaking, we will 
be disappointed in the outcome.
    I think that the GCV is actually prototypical, not only of 
the next generation of ground combat vehicle, but of a process 
change. That's how we should look at it.
    The Bradley has been a venerable part of our inventory. 
But, it has reached its maximum capacity in weight and energy. 
As we continue to add technological advances, as we continue to 
learn more about what it means to protect, when we continue to 
learn more about the mobility required in urban areas, that's 
why we think the GCV is an important step in our modernization.
    Senator Hagan. Where are we on that timeline now?
    General Dempsey. The RFP is out, and I think we're 
approaching one of the milestones--I don't recall which--in the 
fall of this year.
    Senator Hagan. Okay. I think the collaboration is obviously 
very important to getting the right vehicle at the right time 
for the right price.
    As addressed in General Chiarelli's Suicide Awareness 
Report, published last July, in 2010, the life demands of a 
soldier today, when you look at the moving, the promotions, the 
combat stress, the exposure to trauma--all of these issues are 
disproportionately high, the suicides are comparatively high, 
compared to their civilian counterparts of the same age. The 
Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to 
institutionalize mental resiliency. Although the Army is 
treating the symptoms of deployments, the larger issue, I 
believe, is rebalancing the force to allow the soldiers and 
their families to reset.
    As the Army works to teach soldiers to be internally 
prepared to deal with the challenges of the Army at war, what 
is the Army doing to create balance within the force, in terms 
of shorter deployments and longer stability within the 
assignments? We spoke a little bit about this yesterday.
    General Dempsey. We did, Senator. But, I appreciate the 
opportunity to reinforce it.
    We must get to a position where we have a minimum of 2 
years at home with 1 year deployed in the Active component. 
It's 1-to-4 in the Reserve component. I'm not sure that's going 
to be enough, to tell you the truth. I don't know.
    As I sit here today, I'm confident that, if we can get to 
1-to-2, we will be doing our soldiers and families a great 
service, that they well deserve, in terms of helping them cope 
with these life demands that Pete Chiarelli, who, by the way, 
deserves every accolade we can possibly heap upon him for the 
work he's doing in this regard.
    As we see these conflicts extend--and again, we're making 
some assumptions about Iraq and Afghanistan; and if those 
assumptions prove true, then 1-to-2 might be adequate to the 
task. But, if we continue to deploy in the numbers we're 
deploying, then we might have to reconsider and seek an even 
different BOG-dwell ratio. It might have to be 1-to-3. But, I'm 
not in a position--none of us are, really--to say that, right 
now.
    You know this, Senator, but, we'll always do what the 
Nation needs. If we have to break our BOG-dwell because of an 
emergency for this Nation, we're there. But, as a routine 
matter, when these issues become prolonged, we need to have a 
standard of 1-to-2 so we can address the issues you're 
addressing.
    Senator Hagan. It's so important for the soldiers, as well 
as their families.
    I thank you for your testimony, and I look forward to your 
confirmation.
    General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Hagan. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Good morning. It's still 
``good morning''.
    General Dempsey, congratulations to you on your nomination. 
Thank you, to you and your family, for all of the service 
you've given to this country.
    I've been particularly impressed in the parts of your 
testimony, and questions that I've been able to hear this 
morning, about your work on leadership development. I would 
suggest that perhaps you could design a course for Members of 
Congress, because I think that would be helpful.
    General Dempsey. I think the appropriate response there is, 
``No comment,'' Senator. [Laughter.]
    Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Ayotte, in her 
remarks, mentioned New Hampshire's Deployment Cycle Support 
Program, which we have had in place for several years to help 
our deploying Guard and Reserves and their families. I would 
just like to reiterate how important this program is. I think 
it's a model for the rest of the country. There's some very 
impressive data on the successes of the program. People who 
have been part of it are four times more likely to stay married 
when they come back. They're four times more likely to stay in 
the military. They're five times less likely to become 
homeless. On the very critical issue of suicide prevention, 
that a number of people have raised this morning, 100 percent 
of those people considered at risk for suicide are in active 
prevention with licensed support personnel.
    It has been a hugely successful program. With the largest 
deployment in New Hampshire's history right now, we think it's 
very important. I hope, after you are confirmed, that you will 
help us figure out how we can continue this program, which had 
been supported primarily through congressionally directed 
spending. I hope you will take a look at this.
    General Dempsey. I will, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    This summer, I had the opportunity to visit Iraq for my 
first time, and Kuwait. We visited Camp Arifjan. I was truly 
amazed--and I think most people don't recognize that the 
deployment out of Iraq is the largest movement of people and 
materiel in the military since World War II. It was really 
quite amazing. General Patton, I know, would be proud of what 
General Webster and folks there have been able to accomplish.
    One of the things that impressed me the most was the way 
they had integrated savings into the entire operation there so 
that all of the men and women who were part of that effort are 
looking at how they can be more efficient in bringing people 
out and the operations of that unit.
    I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how you see 
integrating that kind of culture into the entire Army, and 
what's happening on that right now.
    General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator, because it gives 
me the opportunity to point out that I'm deeply committed to 
supporting the Secretary of the Army and what he's doing to 
inculcate that culture that you describe into our Army.
    Secretary McHugh has been very clear with us, with the 
four-stars as we assemble from time to time with him, on that 
issue. We both respect his judgments and the course that he's 
charted for us.
    I would also mention that one of those who has accepted 
that responsibility is General Ann Dunwoody, who, you probably 
know, is our Army Materiel Command Commander. I've often said 
to her that she is accomplishing this retrograde of equipment 
out of Iraq in a way that actually almost makes it invisible to 
the rest of us, and suggested maybe it shouldn't be. She's done 
a remarkable job.
    I think what you're reflecting is, you've seen, at the 
tactical level, the kind of adaptations and efficiencies that 
we're capable of. What you're suggesting is, we have to do the 
same thing as an institution, and you're exactly right.
    Senator Shaheen. How do you make that happen?
    General Dempsey. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, for 
the past few years, have pursued a thing that they call the 
``enterprise approach,'' which is a way of suggesting that the 
stovepipes of the Army--and, sad to say, but not surprising, I 
suppose, we do have our own stovepipes: TRADOC, Forces Command, 
Army Materiel Command, the forward-deployed forces--we tend to 
see things inside of our own, if you will silos.
    Senator Shaheen. Right.
    General Dempsey. What the approach encourages is cross-
collaboration. Now, I'd be disingenuous to suggest we're where 
we need to be. But, where we want to be, and where I think 
Secretary McHugh will guide us, is to an approach that allows 
us to see issues right from the start, with a resource-
sensitive eye, which, frankly, to our discredit in some ways, 
we haven't had to do that because the American people have been 
so generous with their resources over the last 10 years.
    We've done fairly well with those resources, by the way. As 
has been said earlier, today's Army is the best Army it's ever 
been. Thank you for that. But, we have to understand that we 
also share part of the Nation's responsibility to be viable and 
to support the economic instrument of power, not just the 
military instrument of power. We're prepared to do that. To do 
that, we have to be more resource-conscious. We will.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I want to also follow up on Senator Udall's question about 
how we reduce the dependency of our military on foreign oil and 
on how we are more efficient around energy use. You got into 
that a little bit, but I wonder if you could elaborate some 
more on the kinds of things that we're doing and what kind of 
support would be helpful from Congress as you're looking at 
what you need to do.
    General Dempsey. You know what I'd like to do, Senator, if 
confirmed, is take on board the opportunity to actually engage 
this committee--and you, in particular--on what we're doing 
with regard to this issue of power and energy, because we are 
doing a great deal. Much of it is really nascent. It's not 
really very well developed. But, we're looking at the same 
things that our civilian counterparts are looking at, in terms 
of solar and wind and the other noncarbon fuels that we might 
leverage to make ourselves more reliant. It's actually a matter 
of military necessity, because the more you're reliant on a 
fuel convoy, the more you're stuck to lines of communication; 
and you've what that's--happened to us in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Senator Shaheen. Right.
    General Dempsey. Let me take on board the opportunity to 
engage you on that more coherently or articulately to let you 
know what we're doing and to seek your advice on what more we 
might do.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. I will definitely take you up on 
that.
    General Dempsey. Okay.
    Senator Shaheen. At this point, my time has expired. Since 
I am the last remaining Senator, I would like to again thank 
you. Thank you for being here, for your candor in your 
responses, and for your willingness to continue to serve.
    At this point, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers 
supplied follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions?
    Answer. No.
    Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. None. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has worked quite well in 
making the armed services an integrated joint force.

                             QUALIFICATIONS

    Question. What background and experience do you have that you 
believe qualifies you for this position?
    Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in Army, Joint, and 
Coalition organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels of 
command, all of which have allowed me to see our Army at work in a 
broad variety of capacities and missions. Some of my most relevant 
experiences have been during periods of deployment when we have faced 
significant threats to our Nation's security. I served as a field grade 
officer during Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm and then 
Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Commanding General of 1st Armored 
Division. Later as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security 
Transition Command-Iraq training Iraqi Security Forces, I experienced 
firsthand the importance of preparing our Army for joint and combined 
operations. Returning from Iraq, I served as Deputy and then Acting 
Commander of U.S. Central Command. Most recently, as the Commanding 
General for Training and Doctrine Command, I have had an opportunity to 
reinforce the training ethos of our Army as we look toward an uncertain 
future. I have travelled across our Army and at every turn have seen 
the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families. Our soldiers are the 
best the world has ever seen, and they remain fiercely dedicated to our 
Nation and its security. If confirmed by this Senate, I would be 
honored to serve as their Chief of Staff.

                                 DUTIES

    Question. Sections 601 and 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes 
the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
    What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief 
of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army serves as the senior military 
advisor to the Secretary of the Army in all matters and has 
responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of Army 
organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect 
that Secretary McHugh would prescribe for you?
    Answer. I expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe the 
following duties for me if I am confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the 
Army:

    (a)  Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all of its 
components;
    (b)  Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions, 
including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and 
budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
    (c)  Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, including 
directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and 
investigations as required;
    (d)  Preside over the Army staff and ensure the effective and 
efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating 
Reserve component matters into all aspects of Army business;
    (e)  Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide 
independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and 
Congress. To the extent that such action does not impair my 
independence as the Chief of Staff of the Army, in my performance as a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the 
Army informed of military advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
on matters affecting the Department of the Army. I would inform the 
Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his 
duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense;
    (f)  Represent Army capabilities, requirements, policy, plans, and 
programs in joint fora;
    (g)  Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and 
activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution 
of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
    (h)  Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army 
Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the 
Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

    Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign 
to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army would be responsible 
for providing advice and assistance in the execution of my 
responsibilities for those missions and functions related to manpower 
and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and 
programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and 
readiness.
    Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to 
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the 
Army?
    Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will continually 
assess my ability to perform my duties and, if necessary, implement 
measures aimed at improving my ability to lead our Army.

                             RELATIONSHIPS

    Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship 
with:
    The Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of 
Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters 
relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to 
the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the 
Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, 
for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser 
to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with 
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements 
the policies established by his office. In coordination with the 
Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense 
in articulating the views of the Army.
    Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and 
exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The 
Secretary of Defense also delegates to him full power and authority to 
act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the 
Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized 
to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the 
Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the 
Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. 
Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will 
communicate with the Deputy Secretary of Defense in articulating the 
views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the 
Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction 
issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
    Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under 
Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to 
time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the 
military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary 
of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in 
articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to 
ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance 
and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal 
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and 
the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman 
plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed 
forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and 
budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; 
develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports 
on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; 
provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff 
Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may 
be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
    In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the 
Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military 
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President, 
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If 
confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my 
duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to 
assist in his performance of these responsibilities. As appropriate, I 
will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of 
the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional 
relationship with the Chairman, and will communicate directly and 
openly on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a 
whole.
    Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the 
Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and 
the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my 
frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his 
responsibilities.
    Question. The Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the 
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of 
the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of Staff would be 
to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My 
responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's 
plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the 
Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands and agencies. In 
this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, 
and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately 
informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent such 
action does not impair independence in the performance of my duties as 
a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate that I would work 
closely and in concert with the Secretary to establish the best 
policies for the Army in light of national interests.
    Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
    Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's 
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises 
such powers as the Secretary prescribes. His responsibilities require 
him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army 
Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary, and to the 
Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such 
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure 
that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the 
Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly 
with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff, 
commands, and agencies.
    Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
    Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal 
advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will 
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Vice 
Chief of Staff, Army.
    Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
    Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional 
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of 
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I 
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each 
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative 
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal 
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning 
requirements facing the Army.
    Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
    Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the 
Department of the Army. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and 
policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of 
interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the 
Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice 
matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If 
confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional 
relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of 
these important duties.
    Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
    Answer. The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and 
certain investigations within the Department, such as inquiring into 
and reporting to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff regarding 
discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing 
assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative 
effectiveness; and serving as the Department of the Army focal point 
for Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal 
investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy. 
If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional 
relationship with the Inspector General to ensure effective 
accomplishment of these important duties.
    Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
    Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to 
the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the 
Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal 
advice directly to the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff in matters 
concerning military justice, environmental law; labor and civilian 
personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and 
the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff 
does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the 
personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate 
General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will 
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the TJAG 
as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his 
important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.
    Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
    Answer. The National Guard Bureau is a joint bureau of the 
Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. Appointed by 
the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of 
Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National 
Guard matters. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is also the principal 
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters 
relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and 
maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National 
Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between 
the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with 
the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing 
the Army.
    Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
    Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for 
assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Vice Chief, National 
Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard 
Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will 
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the 
Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative 
teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This 
will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management 
and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and 
improve Army National Guard's operational capabilities.
    Question. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
    Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justification 
and execution of the personnel, operation and maintenance, and 
construction budgets for the Army Reserve. As such, the Chief, Army 
Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made 
for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and 
maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army 
Reserve as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-
range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the 
Army Reserve operational capabilities.
    Question. The Chiefs of the Other Services.
    Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it 
would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and 
opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing 
strong working relationships with these colleagues.
    Question. The Combatant Commanders.
    Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant 
commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to 
the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to 
carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of 
Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their 
jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the 
U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to 
perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to 
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and 
the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.S.C., section 
164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and 
supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If 
confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in 
performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will 
establish close, professional relationships with the combatant 
commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on matters 
involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel 
assigned to or supporting these commands.

                         VISION FOR THE FUTURE

    Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
    Answer. The Army will remain a critical component of the Joint 
Force, providing an affordable mix of tailorable and networked 
organizations operating on a rotational cycle, providing a sustained 
flow of trained and ready land forces for full spectrum operations, 
prepared for unexpected contingencies and at a tempo that will sustain 
our All-Volunteer Force.
    Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in 
contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?
    Answer. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or 
stability operations, as directed by the President or Secretary of 
Defense, under the control of the appropriate Combatant Commander. We 
are also capable of assisting our international partners in building 
their own operational capacity. Through security force assistance, we 
can increase the ability of other nations to uphold the rule of law, 
ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters, 
and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military 
support.
    Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and 
Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light or 
medium weight divisions and Marine Corps divisions?
    Answer. No. We each have unique but complementary capabilities that 
provide the National Command Authority with options for dealing with 
emerging threats and contingencies.

                      ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

    Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to 
achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The 
Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military 
operations.
    How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint 
military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities 
and culture?
    Answer. The Army works our relationships with Sister Services 
diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture, and 
traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat 
operations on land as a component of the Joint Force. Through sustained 
operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the 
advantages gained by joint forces.

                    MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will 
confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. We have to win our current conflicts while simultaneously 
preparing for future security challenges. We must take care of our 
soldiers, our wounded, and their families. We must meet this challenge 
in an environment that demands more efficient use of limited resources.
    Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for 
addressing these challenges?
    Answer. The Army, with support from Congress, is already working to 
understand and address many of these challenges. Although we don't have 
all the answers yet, it is clear that to be prepared for an 
increasingly complex and unpredictable future, we need thinking, 
adaptable, and resilient leaders. Investments in our human capital, 
both uniformed and civilian, coupled with a sustainable rotational 
force structure model, will ensure we are postured to meet the 
challenges of the future.
    Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in 
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would 
impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
    Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines 
would you establish to address these problems?
    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that our management 
systems are maintained or refined to meet challenges facing the Army. I 
have not yet determined specific plans to modify systems currently in 
place or under revision but if confirmed will carefully assess how we 
execute our management functions to ensure appropriate stewardship of 
our resources.
    Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to talk 
with the Secretary of the Army, to develop priorities for our force. In 
my current position, I've asserted that we must be a learning 
organization, we must make training credible and relevant at home 
station so that it replicates more closely the challenges of the 
operational environment, and we must develop our leaders differently. 
It's also clear that we must work to preserve the All-Volunteer Force, 
care for our Wounded Warriors, continue to work to deliver Full 
Spectrum Capabilities, and transform systems and processes to build 
true adaptability into our institution.

                           ACQUISITION ISSUES

    Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of 
the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to 
funding and requirements instability.
    Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives 
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon 
systems?
    Answer. A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost 
increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies 
involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that 
the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on 
carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding 
stability.
    Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take 
to address funding and requirements instability?
    Answer. Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic 
and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of 
technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.
    Question. What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards 
required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?
    Answer. I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine 
requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition 
programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in 
oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to 
validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability 
Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army 
avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.
    Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if 
confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
    Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with 
the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight 
mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost 
and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC 
to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition 
strategies.
    Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often 
move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack 
clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies 
that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and 
production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at 
appropriate junctures in the development process.
    Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?
    Answer. I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some 
of the Army's past programs. However, the Army has already adopted 
different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I 
understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) 
Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's 
requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the 
RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and 
schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a 
new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between 
acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid 
program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the 
characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future 
programs.
    Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the 
Army should take to address these problems?
    Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking 
significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed 
emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition 
communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary 
McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process 
led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a 
blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the 
Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to 
implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must 
continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay 
in our programs.
    Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if 
confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
    Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work 
with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary 
changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in 
providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.
    Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of 
capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the 
rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in 
significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major 
weapons programs.
    What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's 
capabilities portfolio reviews and process?
    Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in 
identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system 
portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the 
capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional 
efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to 
institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?
    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to 
institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve 
further Army efficiencies.

                           ARMY MODERNIZATION

    Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not 
been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army 
modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved 
under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After 
Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and 
Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study 
done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the 
Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that 
the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on 
weapons programs that have been cancelled.
    What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization 
record?
    Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable 
degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection, 
increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to 
individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the 
modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to 
complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters 
to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate 
in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to 
studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we 
can improve.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to 
take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program 
for the Army?
    Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and 
program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to 
exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve 
this.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's 
current modernization investment strategy?
    Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization 
efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit 
that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled 
soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker 
vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment, 
soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High 
Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of 
medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous 
success in modernization.
    I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has 
both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously 
review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in 
progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am 
confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee 
my frank assessments.
    Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and 
sustainable?
    Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to 
ensure it is affordable and sustainable.
    Question. In your view does the Army's current modernization 
investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and 
future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or 
irregular conflict?
    Answer. From my current position, I believe the current 
modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance 
between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward 
to studying this further with the Army staff.
    Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately 
address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or 
near-peer enemy?
    Answer. From my current position, I believe the current 
modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately 
addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the 
peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year 
2012-2016 FYDP time horizon.
    Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, 
would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional 
capabilities?
    Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular 
to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are 
different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward 
to doing so, if confirmed.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to 
ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and 
projected Army budgets?
    Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army 
must continue to internalize a ``cost culture'' that considers 
``affordability'' as an essential element of all (not just 
modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with 
the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within 
current and projected budgets.
    Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely 
have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is 
planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
    Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I 
believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully 
considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

                      ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the 
following research, development, and acquisition programs?
    Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
    Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle--the 
replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle--the Army is 
fully committed to the ``Big Four'' imperatives: soldier protection; 
soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across 
the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first 
production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will 
be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to 
operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular 
armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on 
the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be 
designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to 
incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an 
incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first 
increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently 
reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
    Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
    Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband 
backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information 
Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began 
fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network 
down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial 
On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved 
capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more 
bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 
brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
    Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Network 
Integration Kit (NIK).
    Answer. The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will 
allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an 
opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's 
tactical network strategy.
    The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to 
continue evaluation and development of incorporated network 
technologies.
    Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground 
Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) 
radios.
    Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future 
deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army 
forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting 
the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding 
supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight 
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network 
requirements.
    The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability 
using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to 
meet tactical networking requirements.
    The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical 
Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. 
The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with 
legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 
Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio 
primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier 
Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information 
from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three 
radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.
    Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull 
initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker 
mobile gun variant.
    Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight 
and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and 
devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it 
is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH) 
Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection 
and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing 
integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-
wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED, 
drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, 
and digital communications and network integration.
    Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 
2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating 
the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.
    Non-Double V Hull and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker 
NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an 
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These 
vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a 
unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of 
Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.
    Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 
142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue 
additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide 
modernization.
    Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
    Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps, 
Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in 
the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital 
program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently 
satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will 
also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture 
gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a 
third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is 
currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it 
meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in 
terms of protection.
    Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
    Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed 
aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed 
Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.
    This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial 
Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release 
in third quarter fiscal year 2011.
    Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
    Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will 
initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide 
ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future 
modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, 
protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to 
maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and 
power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams 
modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 
If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program 
matures.
    Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
    Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be 
replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) 
modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to 
provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility 
and ability to integrate the emerging network.
    Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).
    Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.
    Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software 
technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply 
chain solution at the national level that improves overall 
synchronization of information.
    I concur with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end 
modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics 
enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that 
vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General 
Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support 
System-Army (GCSS-A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics 
environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the 
approved Army ERP Strategy.
    Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.
    Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 
program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-
propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the 
termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-
Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that 
allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the 
commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive 
components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and 
Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer 
related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection 
packages as add-on armor.
    Question. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.
    Answer. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based 
on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement 
Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic 
firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable ``heavy'' 
barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open 
competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. 
Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.

            MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

    Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's 
long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large 
MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
    Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of 
protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned 
during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP 
levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with 
the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.

                       QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

    Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in 
ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as 
well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter 
attacks or the emergence of other threats.
    What is your assessment of the Army's current size and structure to 
meet the QDR report's guidance?
    Answer. The Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet 
the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a 
very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for 
nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure, 
and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they 
change.
    Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you 
pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet 
these requirements?
    Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army 
to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's 
taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can 
reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we 
will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to 
maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the 
Nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.
    Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement 
for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.
    For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to 
provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?
    If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the 
Army's capabilities to support:
    Defense of the United States.
    Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility 
to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and 
if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both 
state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to 
enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker 
Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides 
us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination 
capability.
    Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
    Answer. The Army is well postured to provide support to civil 
authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and 
flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence 
management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD 
operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue 
to address the challenges associated with this mission set including 
unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the 
integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.
    Question. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and 
counterterrorism operations.
    Answer. We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability 
and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army 
for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons 
learned across the operating and generating force.
    Question. Build the security capacity of partner states (including 
your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the 
security force assistance role).
    Answer. General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building 
sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces 
and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best 
opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose 
Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security 
Force Assistance.
    Question. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
    Answer. The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-
access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the 
demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some 
tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our 
ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We 
work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct 
entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the 
improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by 
potential adversaries.
    Question. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass 
destruction.
    Answer. The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with 
capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities 
include operating effectively within a chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and 
neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational 
headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.
    Question. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
    Answer. We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber 
Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively 
in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star 
command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations 
and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-
spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of 
network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one 
operational level command to integrate and synchronize global 
operations for the first time.

                               MODULARITY

    Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental 
reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based 
structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades 
are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional 
brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of 
equipment--such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. 
To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned 
modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully 
equip this force as required by its design has slipped to 2019.
    What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity 
transformation strategy?
    Answer. The modular transformation strategy reorganizes Army 
brigades, divisions and corps headquarters, and theater armies and 
subordinate commands into standardized designs. 98 percent of all Army 
brigades have converted or are in the process of converting to modular 
design. The remaining 2 percent are projected to begin modular 
conversion by 2013. Modular transformation improves the Army's ability 
to meet combatant commander requirements and National Security Strategy 
objectives by providing tailorable formations and leaders who are 
accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements.
    Question. In your view, what are the greatest challenges in 
realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?
    Answer. The most significant challenge associated with modular 
transformation is the full fielding of authorized equipment. Although 
all units will be organized in a modular design by the end of fiscal 
year 2013, full fielding of some items of equipment will take longer.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you 
propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?
    Answer. If confirmed, we will continue to review Army plans and 
strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, to ensure 
the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of 
capabilities to prevail in today's wars, engage to build partner 
capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential 
adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess Army structure 
against current and potential threats to provide the best mix of 
capabilities and the highest levels of modernization possible.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the 
employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting 
units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?
    Answer. These modular capabilities increase the effectiveness of 
the Army by better supporting the needs of combatant commanders across 
the full spectrum of operations.
    Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular 
design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit 
employment to improve performance or reduce risk?
    Answer. At Training and Doctrine Command, we are currently working 
with current and former commanders, to examine our organizations to see 
if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at 
alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in 
both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure.
    Question. With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force 
structure design, press reports indicate that the Army is reassessing 
its heavy and infantry brigade structures and may add a third maneuver 
battalion to each where there are only two battalions now.
    If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add 
a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades?
    Answer. We are examining the current brigade designs and associated 
force mix including the number and type of brigades. This will produce 
alternatives to be analyzed. As the results of this analysis emerge, we 
will make appropriate decisions on the implementation of any of such 
proposals and their affect on our available resources. No decisions 
have been made regarding future force design or force structure 
changes.

                        ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

    Question. The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over 
the last several years to meet current and what was believed to be the 
demands of future operational requirements. Authorized active duty Army 
end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced 
Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year through 
2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015. 
The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400 
fewer soldiers.
    In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength 
needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase nondeployed 
readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and 
their families?
    Answer. We are continuously assessing the factors that affect end 
strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit 
readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability 
and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required 
Active-Duty end strength. Our Active-Duty end strength is adequate to 
meet current demand. As future demand is better understood, we will 
assess its impact.
    Question. In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty 
end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed 
forces, maintain nondeployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic 
depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?
    Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on 
future Army end strength.
    Question. Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that 
the cuts will be made gradually over several years.
    What, in your view, are the critical requirements of the management 
of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic 
circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary, 
reversed?
    Answer. End strength reductions are not automatic. They are 
conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I 
will work with Secretary McHugh and Army Leadership to develop a plan 
that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions, 
balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared 
to meet unforeseen operational demands.
    Question. The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge 
against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available 
Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be 
realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster 
implementation.
    What, in your view, are the most important advantages and 
disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?
    Answer. The Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will 
proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being 
of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource constraints 
and flexibility for unforeseen demands.
    The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to 
invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced 
flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the precision to 
maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.
    Question. End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers will 
also require force structure reductions as well.
    If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure, 
if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-
structured and undermanned?
    Answer. The Army is coordinating the end strength reductions with 
its deliberate Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force 
structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and 
future operational requirements within authorized end strength.
    Question. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the 
Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?
    Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine 
the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing.
    Question. The Army has had two other major post-conflict end 
strength reductions in the last 40 years after Vietnam and after 
Operation Desert Storm.
    What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and 
management of a major force reduction to ensure that the health of the 
Army as a whole is not crippled impacting ongoing operations or general 
readiness?
    Answer. End strength reductions are conditions based and must be 
deliberate and responsible. The Army's plan should ensure 
accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for 
future demands, compliance with directed resource constraints while 
treating soldiers and their families with the dignity and respect they 
deserve.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that 
the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimize the 
negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?
    Answer. Throughout my entire career, I have focused on taking care 
of soldiers and families. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the 
impact on soldiers and families.
    Question. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to 
properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?
    Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any additional legislative 
authority the Army needs to shape personnel drawdown. If confirmed, I 
will consult with Secretary McHugh and Senior Army personnel leadership 
to determine if additional authorities are necessary.

                             STRATEGIC RISK

    Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic 
risk for the United States based on the lack of availability of trained 
and ready forces for other contingencies?
    Answer. In my current position, I have not yet had the opportunity 
to examine strategic risk given our global demand. If confirmed as a 
member of the Joint Chiefs, I will have the opportunity to look closely 
at this issue.
    Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in 
strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy and 
employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of 
risk acceptable?
    Answer. As mentioned in the previous question, I have not yet had 
the opportunity to examine strategic risk.
    Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army 
forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security 
obligations in other parts of the world?
    Answer. The impact is manageable as we have available forces in the 
Train/Ready pool of forces to meet potential future requirements with 
an acceptable degree of risk. The Army is currently meeting all 
requirements and mitigates the Afghanistan additional commitment with 
forces made available commensurate with the drawdown in Iraq. The Army 
continuously balances meeting current requirements against building/
maintaining strategic depth and capacity for contingency, full spectrum 
operations.
    Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will 
reductions to Army end-strength increase or aggravate this risk?
    Answer. These projected reductions, as mentioned by the Secretary 
of Defense in his 6 January announcement, are based on the condition of 
a decrease in demand. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh 
to ensure our force structure is adequate to meet all future demands.
    Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if 
any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
    Answer. The Army has a mature planning process to determine force 
structure changes within the approved end strength for all Army 
components. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the full readiness of 
units generating to deploy to known operations in or in preparation for 
contingency operations.

          ``INSTITUTIONALIZING'' SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

    Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has 
been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, 
and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high 
premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a 
rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then 
sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department 
to ``institutionalize and finance'' the support necessary for the 
irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last 
few years and will be needed in the future.
    What, in your view, does it mean to ``institutionalize'' 
capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the 
Army?
    Answer. The Army views Irregular Warfare as an operational theme 
rather than a particular type of operation. We must be able to conduct 
Stability Operations, Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, and Foreign 
Internal Defense and support the Special Operations Forces in 
unconventional warfare. I understand ``institutionalize'' to mean that 
the Army's operating forces and generating forces view operations under 
the theme of Irregular Warfare as a core capability. We must be able to 
execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict, to include 
irregular warfare.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts 
to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
    Answer. The Army has institutionalized Irregular Warfare. We have 
an Irregular Warfare proponent within Training and Doctrine Command 
supported by an Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell that synthesizes Army 
Irregular Warfare efforts including those from the Army's Peacekeeping 
and Stability Operations Institute, Counter-Insurgency centers and 
others. The Army includes Irregular Warfare in our professional 
military education. The Army has built four Counter-Insurgency Centers, 
a Security Force Assistance training brigade, increased the military 
police, and significantly increased Special Operations and Civil 
Affairs forces.
    Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to 
institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to 
overcome them?
    Answer. I have not seen any particular obstacles to 
institutionalizing this kind of support. The Army has to balance risk 
across the range of missions it may be called on to perform.
    Question. While force structure and program changes may be 
necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full 
institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing 
Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for 
example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and 
personnel policies.
    In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that 
might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the 
further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in 
the Army?
    Answer. We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and 
agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended 
distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over 
wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.
    Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular, 
counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not 
mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and 
ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of 
operations.
    If confirmed, how would you propose to allocate the Army's efforts 
and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat 
while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for 
irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
    Answer. We are training and educating our soldiers and leaders to 
understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and 
wide area security. In training, we replicate the threats and 
conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For 10 years, 
that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area 
security role that supports counterinsurgency operations. As the demand 
for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is reduced, we will introduce 
threats and conditions in training common in the combined arms maneuver 
role. The goal however is to avoid the false dichotomy of ``regular or 
irregular'' warfare. The future battlefield will be populated with 
hybrid threats--combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and 
criminal groups--and we must train and educate our leaders and units to 
understand and prevail against them.
    Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train 
and equip general purpose force brigades for the ``advise and assist 
brigade (AAB)'' mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to 
an end?
    Answer. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for 
Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these 
brigades into the future. I believe building partnerships and partner 
capacity will be key roles for the Army in the future. If confirmed, I 
will continue to assess requirements and work with this Congress to 
ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to meet them.
    Question. If so, what mission essential task list changes do you 
plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general 
purpose force brigades?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to 
identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and 
incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task 
List.
    Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades will 
be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission?
    Answer. I believe it is too early to tell. I believe some brigades 
may be regionally aligned. The number and type of brigades will depend 
upon what we have available after the priority requirements in the 
CENTCOM AOR, and the other COCOM requirements. If confirmed I will work 
with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support 
operational requirements.
    Question. If so, what changes to training and equipping of the 
ARFORGEN model will be necessary for regional alignment?
    Answer. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited 
to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force 
assistance requirements in the future.

                            LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the 
Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its 
title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping 
the force?
    Answer. We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to 
fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another 
deployment. In addition, the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to 
success in the current and future operational environments. We have 
also learned that a fully integrated Reserve component is critical to 
meet force requirements.
    Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you 
address as a matter of urgent priority?
    Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed.

                       ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES

    Question. Although improving recently, the Active Army's ratio of 
time spent deployed to time at home station has remained fairly steady 
at 1:1--that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1 year at 
home station. The Active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can 
expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve 
component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5 
years for each year deployed.
    What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq to 
have on the so-called ``dwell time'' of Army soldiers? Is it possible 
that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow 
the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011?
    Answer. The proposed troop reductions in Iraq will allow the Army 
to gradually increase dwell if there is not a significant increase in 
demand in Afghanistan or in other contingencies. We do not believe that 
the reduction of demand in Iraq alone will allow the Army to meet the 
1:2 dwell goal.
    Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of the 
decision to decrease Army end-strength on the rotation schedule and 
meeting the dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces?
    Answer. With the proposed troop reduction in Iraq and projected 
decrease in Afghanistan, we will see improvement gradually in dwell, 
but the Army has not yet met its dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty 
Forces. The decreases in Army strength are conditions based and I am 
not in a position at this time to assess whether there will be an 
impact to the dwell goal of 1:2 based on these reductions.
    Question. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq 
impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to Homeland 
Defense and support to civil authorities?
    Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to state 
control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with 
increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These forces will be better 
trained and more experienced due to their Iraq combat deployments. 
Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief 
requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to 
accomplish local missions.

                         EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

    Question. Both deploying and nondeploying Active and Reserve 
component Army units are training without all their required equipment. 
Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in 
their predeployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.
    In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan 
increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce 
equipment availability for training?
    Answer. There have been some challenges with equipment being 
available for training when it has been fielded directly to theatre. 
We're beginning to overcome this challenge.
    Question. What is the impact of our drawdown from Iraq in this 
regard?
    Answer. The drawdown from Iraq should improve availability of 
equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. For some 
systems, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, it will have a larger 
positive impact. For other pieces of more high demand equipment in 
short supply across the Army, I anticipate it will have a lesser 
impact.
    Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough modern equipment 
to fully support the predeployment training and operations of deploying 
units?
    Answer. The Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units 
to their fully modernized capabilities. This means there are some 
instances in which the most modern equipment is not available until 
later in a unit's pre-deployment cycle or until it arrives in theater. 
However, the Army uses the force generation model to resource units 
with adequate levels of the available modernized equipment to conduct 
their pre-deployment training and assigned mission upon deployment.
    Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for 
training and operations?
    Answer. The Army is short unmanned aerial systems and some non-
line-of-sight communications equipment. Due to the nature of the 
warfare in Afghanistan, we face shortages in light infantry specific 
equipment. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we 
will see a steady improvement in on hand equipment for units training 
for contingency force missions.
    Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these 
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and 
operate?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio 
reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and 
adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike 
the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully 
support pre-deployment training and operations in theatre. If 
confirmed, I would support the Army Force Generation Model of phased 
equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-
hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have 
sufficient equipment for training and deployment.

                         EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

    Question. Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17 
billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and 
accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount 
of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to 
$11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.
    In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only 
prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve 
the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the $4.4 billion requested for 
reset in fiscal year 2012, though lower than requests in fiscal year 
2010 and fiscal year 2011, is adequate to replace equipment lost in 
combat and to repair equipment available for reset. If confirmed, I 
will closely examine this issue.
    Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are 
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for 
reset?
    Answer. My understanding is that repair depots are operating at 
required capacity but not at their full capacity.
    Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be 
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it 
available for operations and training?
    Answer. There are certain measures, such as contract augmentation 
or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase capacity at our 
facilities. At this time, I am not in a position to determine whether 
these measures are necessary or appropriate.
    Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army 
National Guard (ARNG) units to respond to Homeland Security and support 
to civil authorities missions?
    Answer. I understand that the reduction of reset funding for fiscal 
year 2012 is commensurate with the reduction of troop and equipment 
levels supporting Operation New Dawn. I believe that the ARNG will 
still be able to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide 
support to civil authorities.

                            MISSILE DEFENSE

    Question. The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate 
the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, 
and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national 
Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense 
systems.
    Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core 
missions?
    Answer. Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and 
Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces 
is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with 
our sister Services and coalition partners.
    Question. How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that 
result from these decisions?
    Answer. I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat 
and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide 
effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.
    Question. The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of 
its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA).
    In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army 
and the Missile Defense Agency?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to 
develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The 
Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant 
commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the 
Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.
    Question. The Army has recently completed a review of its air and 
missile defense portfolio.
    In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if 
any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile 
defense systems?
    Answer. The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile 
defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.

                                 SPACE

    Question. The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely 
with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to 
the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility 
of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last 
tactical mile from space.
    In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from 
space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated 
with OSD?
    Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed 
assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs 
continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to 
fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are 
appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the 
Army.
    Question. If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army 
space forces in the future?
    Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed 
assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the 
Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space 
systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.
    Question. The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in 
the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new 
satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just 
one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals 
will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.
    What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would 
you propose taking to resolve the lag?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more 
closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific 
requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army 
depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide 
an informed assessment.

                     LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

    Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Army's management 
of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military 
police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in 
this new strategic environment?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to 
identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to 
achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When 
requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are 
identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable 
risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should 
reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both. 
The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure 
availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of 
accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security 
environment.
    Question. Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve 
components that you believe should be made?
    Answer. I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be 
necessary.

                             ARMY READINESS

    Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed 
and non-deployed units?
    Answer. I have some concerns about the readiness levels of deployed 
and nondeployed units. In the ARFORGEN model, deployed and deploying 
Army units are given the highest priority for manning, equipping and 
training to achieve the combatant commander's wartime/mission 
requirements. Nondeployed Army units are used to provide the additive 
resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet 
mission requirements. This requires the Army to continue to do risk 
assessment so nondeployed units do not fall below an unacceptable level 
of risk.
    Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is 
acceptable?
    Answer. In my opinion, the Army is prepared to accomplish current 
missions.
    Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and the war in 
Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called 
upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?
    Answer. The current demand for Army forces coupled with the 
cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's 
flexibility to provide forces to other contingencies.

                    IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

    Question. Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth 
major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 
Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active 
component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to 
not longer than 12 months.
    What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of 
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young 
enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty 
obligated service has been completed?
    Answer. The Army monitors retention very closely, given the high 
operational demand and multiple deployments that soldiers are 
experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to 
Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention. Continuous 
improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances 
for wounded soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and 
additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our 
soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service 
periods.
    Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what 
do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In 
addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please 
discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and 
rates of indiscipline.
    Answer. The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks 
continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce, 
Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses, 
Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug Positives, Courts-Martial and 
suicides.
    I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including 
desertion, absence without leave, and courts-martial have remained 
steady or declined in the past year. Other indicators of stress on the 
force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased. 
However, the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is 
of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families continue to make 
significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. If confirmed, 
I am committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of 
life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to 
develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk 
behaviors and enhancing soldier and family fitness and resilience.
    Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments 
can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for 
the Army?
    Answer. I am concerned about the long-term health of the force if 
we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for 
the deploying soldier. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and 
invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will 
closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure 
that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues 
appropriately.
    Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey has stated 
that the Army is ``out of balance''.
    What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and 
efforts to achieve ``balance'' for the Army?
    Answer. I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain 
the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for 
success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the 
readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments 
and contingencies, and transform to meet the demands of the 21st 
century. With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress 
over the past 3 years to restore balance.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to 
achieve and sustain Army ``balance''?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army 
leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain 
balance. Building resilience among our forces will be one of my highest 
priorities.

              RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's 
Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its 
longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
    Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has 
required continuous use of Active component (AC) and Reserve component 
(RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The 
RC is no longer solely Strategic Reserve. Current and projected demand 
for Army forces will require continued access to the RC. Mobilization 
and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.
    Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to 
maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a 
relevant and capable Operational Reserve?
    Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the 
Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will 
work to ensure they have the necessary training equipment to accomplish 
all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the 
Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and 
recurring basis will be challenges for the Army.
    Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the 
Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
    Answer. In my view, Reserve component forces play a critical role 
in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. 
Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the 
Active component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve 
component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational 
requirements.
    Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign 
homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions 
exclusively to the Reserve?
    Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the 
first responder to these missions: however, the Army's Total Force must 
be able to execute homeland defense or other global or domestic support 
missions.
    Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year 
mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of 
the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?
    Answer. Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the 
force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures 
full recovery and training will support the viability and 
sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. I think the exact 
ratio--whether 1:4 or 1:5--requires further analysis.

     MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

    Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most 
sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the 
planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., 
inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors 
caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance 
programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and 
systems have been characterized in the past as ``inefficient and 
rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment 
stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
    What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve 
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas 
do problems still exist?
    Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its 
mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective 
and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve 
components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I 
will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are 
mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way 
possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and 
employers are met.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the 
sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
    Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies, 
the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the 
combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization 
every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6 
years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been 
greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent 
mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-
down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to 
dwell goals.
    Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring 
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at 
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
    Answer. The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the 
way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The 
ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a 
multi-year long cycle.
    Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities 
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
    Answer. At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current 
statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard 
and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review 
the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.

                        INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

    Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has 
found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war 
was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning 
is a failed concept.
    What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-
Volunteer Force?
    Answer. I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all 
Army components to support contingency operations around the world.
    Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army 
force management planning?
    Answer. The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-
skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade 
requirements.
    Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making 
to the Army's IRR recall policy?
    Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to 
recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input 
from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.
    Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in 
place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request 
a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in 
place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?
    Answer. While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I 
do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend 
changes.
    Question. Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among 
the IRR.
    What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?
    Answer. Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address 
because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I 
will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army's 
Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.

                    PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

    Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related 
entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming 
an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
    If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in 
the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?
    Answer. We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-
Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an 
Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with 
the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to 
achieve it.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a 
requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel 
costs?
    Answer. My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to 
meet current personnel costs.
    Question. What would be the impact of a year-long continuing 
resolution on Army personnel funding?
    Answer. If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total 
resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds) 
to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have 
minimal impact on military pay and allowances.

 MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE 
                               PERSONNEL

    Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component 
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, 
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for 
improved policy oversight and accountability.
    If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate 
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
    Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms 
to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve component medical 
readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the 
Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and 
the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively 
identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.
    Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce 
a healthy and fit Reserve component?
    Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the 
Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there 
are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine 
how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard 
soldiers.

         NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in 
the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard 
and the National Guard Bureau?
    Answer. The Army National Guard is a component of the Reserve and 
Total Force. It responds to emergencies within the United States and 
deploys to support contingency operations overseas. Throughout the last 
10 years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a Strategic 
Reserve to an operational Reserve. The National Guard, with the support 
of the National Guard Bureau, has proven critical to the Army's Total 
Force, and I believe it will continue to do so in the years ahead.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's 
commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment 
requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning, 
programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the 
National Guard?
    Answer. I understand efforts are underway to modernize the Reserve 
components and to ensure they are equipped to fulfill their missions. 
If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the National Guard to 
ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources to maintain its 
role as a vital component of the Total Force.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing 
needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced 
through the Army budget? In your view, what is the appropriate role for 
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National 
Guard Bureau, to ensure that Army National Guard requirements/needs are 
appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing 
strategy.
    Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of 
increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to 
General (O-10)?
    Answer. The increase in grade reflects the significant 
responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
    Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
    Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to 
consider this issue.
    Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of 
the Director of the Army National Guard?
    Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief 
of the National Guard Bureau, organizing and managing its personnel and 
other resources to accomplish the responsibilities and functions. The 
Director of the Army National Guard assists in carrying out the 
functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army.
    Question. In your view, should the Director of the Army National 
Guard be ``dual hatted'' as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?
    Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to see 
how these positions would function together and have not formed an 
opinion.

                   ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)

    Question. What do you see as the role that Army science and 
technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for 
current and future Army systems?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's science and 
technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention, 
innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and 
future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the 
flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through 
current operations.
    Question. What in your view have been the greatest contributions, 
if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?
    Answer. I believe the most significant contribution the Army 
science and technology community has offered to current operations is 
the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter 
capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid 
development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions 
that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing 
intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.
    Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the 
value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?
    Answer. To judge the value and investment level in Army science and 
technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved 
warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align 
technology development to warfighter requirements.
    Question. What new S&T areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for 
instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and 
combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and 
technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition 
community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders 
to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the ``art of the possible'' 
for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains 
the best equipped force in the world.

  ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS 
                                 (RDEC)

    Question. How will you balance the role of Army laboratories 
between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations 
and the development of new capabilities to support current and future 
Army missions?
    Answer. The Army laboratories are science and technology performing 
organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role 
in supporting current operations with best capabilities available. 
Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and 
technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for 
soldiers.
    Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army 
laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, 
laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can 
continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation 
capabilities?
    Answer. Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need 
to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and 
advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn 
more about their operations and support efforts to improve best 
practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

                    ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

    Question. In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did 
not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to 
identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and 
modernization.
    If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E 
infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies 
and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?
    Answer. Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's 
combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of 
testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the 
capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely 
with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately 
resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test 
capabilities.

               ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) PROGRAMS

    Question. What major improvements, if any, would you like to see 
made in the Army's development and deployment of major information 
technology systems?
    Answer. I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical 
standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-
COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces 
more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave 
us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.
    As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped 
establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX--the Army 
Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary 
test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from 
the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate 
new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to 
operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately 
provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.
    Question. How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under 
Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per 
user to the Army?
    Answer. I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill 
Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army 
data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce 
the cost of information technology support to the Army.

                         HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS

    Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to 
institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the 
proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your 
views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?
    Answer. The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as 
an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and 
funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is 
merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a 
Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-
cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. 
The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to 
determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop 
and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment 
are due in the spring of 2011.

                           OPERATIONAL ENERGY

    Question. Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number 
of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with 
operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy 
aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's 
five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative 
metrics against which to measure progress.
    If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its 
operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the 
immediate short-term?
    Answer. The most important issue with operational energy is the 
amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is 
used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and 
accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as 
microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more 
efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters 
and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, 
ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is 
addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and 
power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and 
Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy 
challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts 
currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in 
theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of 
command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.
    Question. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with 
respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?
    Answer. The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include 
industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our 
operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated 
tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also 
evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce 
the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to 
theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ 
energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as 
an operational advantage.
    Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking 
advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers 
to further its operational energy and security goals?
    Answer. The Army has integrated the national laboratories with 
Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a 
range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the 
initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of 
components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various 
emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will 
increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency 
bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual 
soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research 
conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the 
operational energy needs of the current and future Army.

                      INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

    Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years 
have testified that the military Services under-invest in their 
facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of 
facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working 
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies 
that could increase productivity.
    What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?
    Answer. Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow 
the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments 
in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the 
Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our 
infrastructure investments.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to 
increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
    Answer. Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the 
Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess 
facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out 
our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to 
support the mission.
    If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to 
include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and 
maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.

             ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

    Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with 
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of 
soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you 
agree with this policy?
    Answer. Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative 
separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, 
possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires 
initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or 
separate a soldier.
    I concur with this policy.
    Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with 
respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who 
have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or 
prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
    Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider 
a soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further 
military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol 
offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse 
counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders 
consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a 
soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention.
    I concur with this policy.
    Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient 
resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and 
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
    Answer. My personal experience at various command levels since 2001 
has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these 
objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level 
of resourcing for this important area.
    Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's 
performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
    Answer. Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by 
commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and 
alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its 
surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol 
abuse.
    The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to 
assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is 
also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression 
Teams.
    The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In 
addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the 
increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive 
Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is 
also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot 
program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by 
allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.

               MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

    Question. The Army continues to face significant shortages in 
critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve 
components.
    What is your understanding of the most significant personnel 
challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the 
Army?
    Answer. There continues to be a national shortage of medical 
professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain 
healthcare professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-
governmental agencies, as well as private healthcare organizations to 
attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers, 
in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate 
initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately 
compete in these areas.
    Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review 
of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new 
requirements for 2011 and beyond?
    Answer. I believe it is important to review medical support 
requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if 
confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a 
comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.
    Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, 
if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to 
fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?
    Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the 
changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative 
authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support 
requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will 
work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any 
additional authorities identified as necessarily to maintain this goal.

                            WOMEN IN COMBAT

    Question. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for 
female soldiers on the modern battlefield?
    Answer. Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral 
part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall 
readiness as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and 
positions open to them. Women are employed in units and positions and 
trained in theater--specific roles that often necessitate combat action 
such as defending themselves or their units from attack or accompanying 
patrols.
    Question. In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the 
assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in 
any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing 
nature of warfare?
    Answer. Existing Army policy is more restrictive than the 1994 
Department of Defense policy. If confirmed, I will assess Army policies 
against the evolving nature and realities of modern combat.
    Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers 
to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
    Answer. Yes. Women are serving in positions that expose them to 
combat today and continue to make tremendous contributions as well as 
demonstrate their selfless - service and sacrifices in roles and 
responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and 
to the readiness of the Army.

                      FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

    Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by 
the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions 
aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to 
include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based 
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for 
both military and civilian personnel.
    What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in 
increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine 
Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language 
capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its 
recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital 
interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the 
General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include 
Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training, 
the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally 
Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has 
introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which 
provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take 
foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these 
initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency 
operations and building partner capacity overseas.
    Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the 
Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the 
need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving 
coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal 
agencies?
    Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the 
Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense 
Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally 
Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense 
Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors, 
and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of 
Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices 
are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.

           PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

    Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded 
during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical 
Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded 
that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal 
threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
    What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at 
Fort Hood?
    Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive 
to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units 
against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the 
Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to 
address internal and external threats.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate 
and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our 
soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by 
ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools 
needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

                          RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

    Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed 
that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity 
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious 
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or 
self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
    What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding 
religious accommodation in the Army?
    Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are 
published in AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear 
and provide appropriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders 
regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and 
practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy 
and determine if further changes are necessary.
    Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead 
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?
    Answer. Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is 
a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand 
the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in 
ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army 
has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve 
proudly and where the many become one--a U.S. Army soldier.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the 
Army?
    Answer. The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all 
soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and 
respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.
    Question. Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the 
military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that 
require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles 
with religious significance?
    Answer. Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items 
are found in two regulations (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and AR 
670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy 
provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles 
if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these 
regulations.
    Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free 
exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who 
have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
    Answer. In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders 
with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious 
beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.
    Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices 
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of 
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a 
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious 
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, 
including no religious beliefs?
    Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by 
military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are 
encouraged to be considerate of the audience.

                             FAMILY SUPPORT

    Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in 
identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
    What do you consider to be the most important family readiness 
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to 
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately 
resourced?
    Answer. In my view the most pressing family readiness issues 
include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication 
and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and 
services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.
    In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality 
of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and 
family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has 
made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide 
soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality 
of their service.
    The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other 
studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the 
myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army 
is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers 
and families to the right service at the right time. This 
transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support 
structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation. 
The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates 
completion by October 2011.
    The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of 
support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the 
force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our 
support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of 
the soldiers and families who use them.
    Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in 
light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family 
programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of 
geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure 
that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a 
mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so 
services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve 
component families related to mobilization, deployment and family 
readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a 
military installation?
    Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain 
connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet, 
telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component. 
Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for 
information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource 
highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly 
accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and 
extended family members.
    The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of 
geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform 
projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG 
Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support 
Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve 
component families and Active component families that do not reside 
near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including 
Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care 
programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army 
population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to 
geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on 
installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and 
families are eligible to use.

                      MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

    Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of 
mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being 
experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated 
that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress 
and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and 
fourth deployment ``reported using medications for psychological or 
combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate,'' and that 
``soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems, 
high intent to leave the military and low morale.''
    Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased 
stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions 
would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health 
resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their 
return?
    Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying 
how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to 
provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of 
behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to 
improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers. 
Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel 
should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met. 
Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health 
personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider 
to augment their organic provider. This ``dual provider'' model was 
designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to 
remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger 
Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army 
continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of 
health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and 
services.
    Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of 
the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which 
can be applied to future deployments?
    Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been 
to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental 
health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III), 
and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable 
finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health 
problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times 
are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health 
problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment 
length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems 
and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall, 
the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care 
system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs 
such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the 
needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral healthcare 
delivery models.

                                SUICIDES

    Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the 
continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the sharp increase 
in Reserve component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a 
report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that 
analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and reported disturbing 
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. 
Chapter III of this report discussed the lost art of leadership in 
garrison.
    In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of 
suicides of Reserve Component members?
    Answer. The number of ARNG suicides for calendar year 2009 and 
calendar year 2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. The increase in 
suicides is due in part to improved reporting over the past 18 months 
for the Reserve components. This increase is not directly associated 
with deployments or unemployment as over 50 percent of ARNG suicides 
were soldiers who never deployed.
    Question. The Army is focusing attention on the differences between 
our Active-Duty (AD) and non-Active-Duty suicides because there are 
external variables at play. The Army believes that factors such as the 
economy (particularly a difficult labor market) are creating stress in 
our non-AD population. Data indicates that unemployment among our young 
non-AD soldiers is above 30 percent and we are experiencing an increase 
in requests for employment assistance through ESGR (Employer Support of 
the Guard and Reserve). Additionally, Reserve component soldiers do not 
have the same access to medical care as their AD counter parts.
    Answer. We continue to pull all accessible national data to better 
understand current trends. The CDC has a 3-year lag in reporting. So, 
while we have anecdotal indication of increased suicide in some 
civilian sectors, we don't have a clear picture of the national suicide 
rates for calendar year 2008-calendar year 2010. This is particularly 
important because these unreported years encapsulate the largest 
recession since WWII (Dec. 2007-June 2009). The Army is improving 
awareness of and access to training and resources; working with 
employers and private sector to mitigate economic stress; and improving 
the quality and access to health care for all Reserve component 
soldiers.
    Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response to the 
continuing increase in suicide rates?
    Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to 
improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem 
the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very tough 
issue and it is going to take consistent vigilance to fully understand 
the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement 
appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are 
working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and 
continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies, 
programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and 
Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the 
Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other 
strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to 
improve.
    Question. What is the Army doing to address the issues raised in 
the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?
    Answer. The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention 
(HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 months effort to better understand 
the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report 
informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and 
reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death, 
and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and 
treatment. Important issues raised in the HP/RR/SP Report include: gaps 
in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to 
mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army 
policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior 
including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an 
increased operational tempo.
    To address gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and 
programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken 
actions such as disseminating policy addressing the issues of 
polypharmacy, requiring a comprehensive medical review of any soldier 
who is receiving four or more medications when one or more of those is 
a psychotropic or antidepressant.
    To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and 
standards, the Army has issued commanders a compendium of Army policies 
emphasizing the Army's current policies and systems for surveillance, 
detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already 
increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven 
policies and processes.
    To address the increase in indicators of high risk behavior 
including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts, the Army 
has taken actions such as instituting a new online system giving 
Medical Review Officers improved access to drug and alcohol information 
systems resulting in enhanced identification of prescription/illicit 
drug use.
    To address stressors associated with an increased operational 
tempo, the Army has increased the number of Military Family Life 
Consultants. These consultants work with soldiers and their families to 
provide them support during transitions and separations. They are 
available to support soldiers both prior to deployment/mobilization and 
during reintegration upon return from deployment.
    Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Army's 
Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the 
Total Force?
    Answer. The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is a 
ground breaking way of addressing stress on the force. We have migrated 
from treating stress and stress-related outcomes to developing 
resiliency in our young soldiers to get ahead of the effects of this 
hazardous occupation. We are shifting our focus from intervention to 
prevention, from illness to wellness.
    It is my view the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is a critical 
component to the Army's holistic approach to the wellness of the Force. 
As part of our program we have fielded Master Resiliency Trainers into 
our training base to start early in developing resiliency among our 
recruits and trainees. We are gradually expanding this fielding to 
incorporate all units, particularly timed to our deploying forces 
during pre and post-deployment phases.
    Question. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently 
performing a 5-year study on suicides in the Army.
    Has the Army received any interim reports from this study that may 
influence Army suicide prevention programs?
    Answer. The Army has received several interim reports from the NIMH 
and is evaluating the findings. The Army continues to work with our 
national partners in academia to develop groundbreaking programs and 
initiatives, in particular the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience 
in Servicemembers being conducted by the NIMH.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose 
that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention 
program?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on 
this issue and its challenges. This is an enduring problem that 
requires enduring solutions.

                      SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

    Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi 
Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for 
support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation 
for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, 
and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the 
revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, 
the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded 
soldiers.
    In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior 
care since 2001?
    Answer. The quality of military medical care is in my opinion 
cutting edge and unequaled. In my opinion, at the outset of Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's infrastructure was 
lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for 
returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers received. Additionally, we 
identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic 
Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have 
invested significant research, resources and developed formal programs 
to improve warrior care.
    Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response?
    Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has addressed the 
issues of housing wounded and injured soldiers, developed well 
resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and effectively 
centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command.
    Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded 
personnel who have separated from active service?
    Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior Care program 
to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from 
service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to 
provide a continuum of care and support.
    Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
    Answer. With more than 170 Advocates stationed around the country 
in Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior 
Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside, 
the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program is where it needs to be to 
support those who have bravely served this great nation. As part of the 
Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the 
transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and 
support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today.
    Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and 
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for 
wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty 
or to civilian life?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and 
appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would 
implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the 
Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.
    Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to 
the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.
    What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability 
evaluation system?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the disability 
evaluation system to reveal any areas that need to be improved or that 
could be streamlined. I would also work with Army, DOD and VA 
stakeholders to decrease the length of time to complete these 
evaluations and facilitate the transition to civilian life for those 
determined to be not fit for duty.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to 
address any need for changes in this system?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would work with experts in this area and 
with the stakeholders in the Army, DOD and VA to identify elements of 
the current system that should be changed and develop a strategy for 
accomplishing those changes.

                ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM

    Question. The Pittburgh Tribune-Review recently published a series 
of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units 
had become ``a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope 
addicts'' creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical 
case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on 
combat deployment.
    Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those 
soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior 
Transition Units?
    Answer. I am concerned that Warrior Transition units maintain the 
focus on complex medical care management and support those soldiers 
with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess 
guidelines to ensure that only soldiers with qualifying needs are 
assigned to the WTUs.
    Question. In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the 
purpose for which they were created?
    Answer. Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition 
Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support 
soldiers and families have received.
    Question. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the 
criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?
    Answer. While I do not have plans to change the criteria for 
assignment to Warrior Training Units at this time, this is an issue I 
will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess 
the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure 
it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.
    Question. Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major 
issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying 
troops.
    In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with 
sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?
    Answer. I am not fully aware of the existing staffing levels in the 
Warrior Transition units. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this 
area and to ensure appropriate resourcing of Warrior Transition Units 
to support the soldiers under their care.
    implementation of the repeal of ``don't ask don't tell'' policy
    Question. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and 
capability to implement the repeal of the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell'' 
(DADT) policy?
    Answer. The Army is on track with its implementation plan in 
accordance with DOD guidance and timelines, and I believe the Army is 
fully capable of executing the implementation. Our plan includes 
periodic assessments to review and consider feedback from the field 
throughout the implementation.
    Question. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that 
could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If 
confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with 
these challenges?
    Answer. The most important challenge is that we educate our 
soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and 
risk. We are making every effort to train units prior to deploying. We 
will also provide the training to currently deployed units and we will 
follow up with these deployed units to ensure that all soldiers receive 
the required training upon their return from deployment.
    Question. What measures is the Army taking to focus training on 
combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the 
current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?
    Answer. The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each 
commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in 
turn train their Solders. Commanders and leaders will carefully manage 
deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army is 
making every effort to train units prior to deployment.
    Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you 
expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely 
affecting the Army?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I 
receive from commanders and leaders consistent with the requirements 
established by Congress and Department of Defense leadership. I would 
also seek to ensure that the Army completes training according to Army 
guidance.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

    Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in 
Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several 
years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were 
victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by 
unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the 
Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, 
including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges 
and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.
    What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army 
has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults 
the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
    Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault 
anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot 
tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres 
pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in 
deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support. 
The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the 
assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition 
of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's 
Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program 
includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services. 
This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a 
deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to 
appoint and train unit victim advocates.
    Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to 
prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as 
home stations?
    Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A.M. (Intervene, Act, 
Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign 
includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I. 
A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers' commitment to 
intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual 
assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places 
additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters 
sexual harassment and assault.
    Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and 
resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to 
allegations of sexual assault?
    Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before 
they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and 
response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and 
prosecution resources.
    The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies 
and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents 
of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require 
leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.
    Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault 
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, 
to be effective?
    Prior to implementation of the I. A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign, 
the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of 
that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting, 
or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to 
come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be 
associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue 
to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.
    Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in 
which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
    Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be 
challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the 
current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted 
reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal 
needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal 
investigation.
    Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior 
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in 
overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating 
to sexual assault?
    Answer. Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader 
is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational 
climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel 
free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure 
senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts 
on sexual assault prevention and response?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight 
and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and 
Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army 
leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the 
appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to 
drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.

                    MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

    Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are 
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their 
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. 
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, 
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family 
members.
    What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR 
programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to 
achieve?
    Answer. The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain 
Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include 
many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army 
leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized 
the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a 
quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation. 
The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to 
implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important 
programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach 
Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed, 
Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth 
and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center 
construction, and more.
    A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for 
these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers 
and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their 
needs.

                      DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

    Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating 
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and 
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. The U.S. military has always adhered to one simple, 
enduring principle regarding detainees: they are to be treated 
humanely, no matter what the circumstances of their capture, and no 
matter how the conflict is characterized.
    Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment 
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the 
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
    Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical 
guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues 
relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the 
interrogation of detainees.
    Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military 
operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. Yes. The requirements of Common Article 3 are nothing new 
to the U.S. military. The protections outlined in this article have 
been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war and the treatment of 
detainees for some time.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field 
Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and 
international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
    Answer. First and foremost, I would set the right tone for the 
force by taking every opportunity to talk about the importance of 
ethical conduct on the battlefield. I would stress that the Army earns 
the trust and respect of the American people by our actions, especially 
our actions in combat. I would tell them that by adhering to the laws 
of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and 
restraint, we prove to America and to the world that we are what we say 
we are: a disciplined, professional fighting force.
    Second, I would sustain and improve our existing systems for 
helping our soldiers understand and adhere to the proper standards for 
detainee treatment, detention operations, interrogations, et cetera.
    Finally, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and 
the humane treatment of detainees. When allegations of wrongdoing by 
soldiers surface, the Army must continue to fully investigate. If 
misconduct is substantiated, there are procedures in place to hold 
soldiers accountable.
    Question. In the past 2 years, significant changes have been made 
in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a 
counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of 
reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.
    What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the 
changes to detention operations in Iraq?
    Answer. The two primary lessons learned from detention operations 
in Iraq were the need for centralized command and control and the 
requirement to nest with the host nation's correctional system and rule 
of law.
    Centralized command and control of detainee operations is necessary 
to ensure uniform implementation of policy.
    The other lesson we learned from Iraq was that detainee operations 
cannot stand alone; it must nest with the host nation's correctional 
system and rule of law. Integration of detainee operations with host 
nation police, judiciary and penal systems is essential to a smooth 
transition to host nation control.
    Question. What is your understanding of how these lessons are being 
applied in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 in 
Afghanistan incorporated the above lessons learned. The CJIATF 
incorporates detainee operations, corrections, and rule-of-law concepts 
that provide assistance to the GIROA to assume full detention and 
correction responsibilities. The CJIATF works closely with the 
Department of State and the host nation.
    Question. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned 
into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for 
personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?
    Answer. As the DOD Executive Agent for detainee operations, the 
Army is working closely with DOD and the Services to incorporate these 
lessons learned into DOD-wide doctrine, procedures and training. The 
Army continues to compile and assess lessons learned to inform and 
update policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

                        CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

    Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight 
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other 
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, 
briefings, and other communications of information.
    Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before 
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, 
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this 
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide 
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, 
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the 
Army?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and 
other communications of information are provided to this committee and 
its staff and other appropriate committees?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of 
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by 
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee 
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing 
such documents?
    Answer. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                          FUTURE ARMY AIRLIFT

    1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, as the head of the Army's 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), you were responsible for 
studying the challenges to rapid deployment of ground forces to distant 
theaters from the Continental United States, and determining methods 
for increasing our responsiveness. Afghanistan is a case in point--a 
distant, landlocked theater that, like most of the Third World, has few 
airfields large enough to handle our long-range transport aircraft. 
Moreover, the few large airfields that do exist tend to have very 
limited space on the ground to park aircraft for unloading or staging 
personnel and equipment. This means that even when we can get to a 
region by air, the throughput is very limited. Moving even a single 
brigade in this fashion can take weeks or even months.
    In the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process for a 
replacement of the C-130, the Army's concern is that the large fleet of 
C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s has limited utility in the Third World, where 
airfields are scarce and restricted. In the AOA, the Army favors a 
replacement for the C-130 that has a vertical takeoff and landing 
(VTOL) capability much like that of the V-22. U.S. Transportation 
Command is also very interested in high-capacity alternatives to 
complement traditional fixed-wing lift assets. What are your views on 
the need for a C-130-sized VTOL capability to support the Army?
    General Dempsey. The Army has been actively collaborating with the 
U.S. Air Force for over 3 years to validate the Joint Future Theater 
Lift (JFTL) requirements and move to a Milestone A decision for a 
theater airlift capability with more payload and greatly improved 
access than a C-130. Our lessons learned from past and recent 
deployment experiences and studies support the need for a heavy-lift 
VTOL aircraft. This airframe will require the ability to operate in 
austere environments on unimproved landing areas within close proximity 
to objective areas and supported units. It will also require the 
ability to bypass known, prepared airfields, which an adversary can 
easily interdict or deny.

    2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, do you think this would be an 
important capability for the Army and worth the significant investment 
it would require from the Air Force to develop and produce?
    General Dempsey. The Army has in-depth studies substantiating the 
capability. The promise of the technology represented by the JFTL could 
address the need for an intra-theater VTOL airlifter for the entire 
Joint Force. The Army will continue to collaborate directly with the 
U.S. Air Force to complete the ongoing JFTL Joint Technology Study in 
order to continue to march toward a Milestone Decision Document and 
`Milestone A' decision. The development of the JFTL will be a challenge 
because of the technical and engineering requirements, the reality of 
rapid deploying expeditionary formations, the costs associated with 
developing and fielding a truly transformational lift platform coupled 
with today's fiscal realities--not to mention the challenge in 
balancing the need for ``lift'' with ``strike'' capability to our 
Sister Services.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                             ENERGY SOURCES

    3. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, energy is vital to the 
operational capability of the military. However, our current energy 
dependence puts lives at risk and undermines our operational 
capability. I know the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services 
understand how vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from 
foreign countries, has made us as a nation and are taking many steps to 
alleviate dependency. Nevertheless, the bottom line today is the 
military needs access to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those 
sources to be domestic instead of overseas to ensure access and 
strengthen our national security. Please describe your view of how 
reliance on oil for fuel impacts Army operations and personnel.
    General Dempsey. The Army's reliance on oil, from domestic and 
foreign sources, for essentially all operational energy needs impacts 
our operations and personnel by placing the Army at risk of not meeting 
fuel requirements when supply chain disruptions occur. The logistical 
burden of fuel and water convoy operations needed to supply contingency 
bases has lead to significant loss of personnel and equipment. To the 
extent we can use energy more efficiently or, in some cases, use 
alternative energy sources, we can reduce the number of shipments and 
lessen the risk to our soldiers.

    4. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of 
steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current 
operations and what impact have those efforts had?
    General Dempsey. The Army is pursuing a comprehensive energy 
strategy that will reduce consumption across our installations and 
operational forces. We are developing and deploying advanced 
technologies and solutions to reduce fossil fuel demand and to increase 
energy efficiency across platforms, theater base camps, and 
installations. The Army is also adopting alternative and renewable 
energy systems, where life cycle cost effective, to expand operational 
alternatives and help reduce fossil fuel consumption. We're taking 
action to quantify and analyze the impacts of these initiatives. In the 
last year especially, the Army has taken definitive steps to more 
clearly articulate its energy security requirements and accelerate the 
development, integration, and deployment of capabilities to the field. 
If confirmed, I will continue to focus on this important area.

    5. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, in your view, what remains to 
be done?
    General Dempsey. I recognize that much more needs to be done. While 
the Army is already making positive strides, it must continue to pursue 
and field solutions in the areas of smart micro-grids, renewable energy 
technologies, and energy-efficient structures. As TRADOC Commander, I 
was a member of the Senior Energy and Sustainability Council. So I know 
that the Army's senior leaders are working these issues hard. Part of 
this effort is for Army leaders, at all levels, to understand the 
importance of operational energy considerations in mission success.

    6. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how does the price of oil 
impact the Army's budget during these times of constrained resources?
    General Dempsey. Oil price increases have a definite impact on the 
Army budget in the year of execution. Since 2007, the Army has spent an 
average of more than $3 billion per year on fuel and energy, with more 
than half supporting liquid fuels for operations and the remainder 
representing power and energy at our installations. Higher oil prices 
mean higher energy costs and a significant reallocation of financial 
resources, which could impact the Army's ability to support important 
mission priorities.

    7. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what steps will 
you take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and 
ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?
    General Dempsey. The Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy 
establishes principles that directly address this objective. If 
confirmed, I will continue to support and advocate for the Army's 
campaign to reduce consumption, expand energy alternatives, and improve 
management capabilities. We must curtail our reliance on oil and other 
imported sources of energy, in order to reduce our vulnerability 
associated with disruptions of supply or price fluctuations.

                           IRREGULAR WARFARE

    8. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Army units from Alaska have 
made a significant contribution to operations overseas. Last week, I 
visited the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at the National 
Training Center (NTC) in California during their predeployment training 
exercise. In May, they will deploy to Afghanistan. Due to the 
operational tempo, their training is focused on capabilities required 
for the mission in Afghanistan. It is my understanding in fiscal year 
2012 the Army will be able to begin full spectrum operations (FSO) 
training as dwell time increases. However, as Secretary Gates 
highlighted in a speech at West Point last week, it is imperative the 
capabilities required for these types of missions are 
institutionalized. Yet the force must also be trained for the many 
different types of threats we will face in the future. If confirmed, 
what action will you take to institutionalize irregular warfare?
    General Dempsey. We recently published Change 1 to our capstone 
operations manual, FM 3-0. This manual explicitly states that the 
Army's operational concept is FSOs. FSOs is a combination of offensive, 
defensive, and stability or civil support operations undertaken 
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, 
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create 
opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3-0 goes on to state that 
these operations are conducted amid populations, and that shaping the 
conditions with the civilian population is just as important to 
campaign success as are offensive and defensive combat operations.
    We are currently institutionalizing Irregular Warfare by 
highlighting it in our capstone doctrine, by inculcating it throughout 
our professional military education system, and by reshaping our 
training strategies to include stability and civil support operations 
in addition to standard offensive and defensive operations.
    At our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the scenarios are developed 
to enable commanders to train their units on FSO mission essential 
tasks. These tasks include offensive operations, defensive operations, 
and stability and civil-support operations. During a typical FSO 
rotation at a CTC, the training unit will conduct both Combined Arms 
Maneuver against regular forces, and Wide Area Security against 
irregular forces and criminal elements. The degree of focus on offense, 
defense, and stability operations will vary based on unit training 
objectives and potential missions for the training unit. This wide 
array of tasks in a very complex operational environment will ensure 
our forces possess the agility to succeed in FSOs, including irregular 
warfare.

    9. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how do you propose to sustain 
the capability currently at the NTC like role players and 
infrastructure that has been built up in recent years for irregular 
warfare?
    General Dempsey. The CTC Program, based on the TRADOC G-2's 
Operating Environment Master Plan and the Army Training Strategy, has 
identified enduring training enablers (including role players and 
infrastructure) that are required for training FSOs against hybrid 
threats. These enduring enablers will be prioritized based on the 
operational force needs, programmed in the Army's Program Objective 
Memorandum, and sustained in a resource-informed manner. For example, 
we currently use around 800 role players at each CTC per rotation 
through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to support 
Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation New Dawn counterinsurgency-focused 
mission rehearsal exercises. However, our initial estimate is that we 
will need 466 role players for FSOs training at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) 
and 296 role players at the NTC to conduct full-spectrum operations 
training against hybrid threats. We will also continue to maintain the 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) villages at the CTCs, 
though we'll only man them to the minimal degree required.

                        ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO

    10. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, the Alaska Land Mobile Radio 
(ALMR) system provides interoperable communications for Federal, State, 
and local government agencies consistent with national interoperability 
objectives set by the Department of Homeland Security. ALMR is 
maintained cooperatively through a cost share with all partners. ALMR 
is used for operational needs of the Army like installation security, 
radio communication for convoys, synchronization of personnel during 
deployments and redeployments, transportation management, training 
support, and communication with other agencies. I understand the Army 
will be divesting 41 roadway sites in Alaska over a 2-year period 
beginning this summer. I appreciate the Army's proposal to transfer the 
sites to the State of Alaska at no cost. If confirmed, will you fully 
examine the impact of the divestiture on all partners to ensure the 
system will remain viable until it is replaced or upgraded?
    General Dempsey. We will absolutely continue to examine the impact 
of our divestiture, as I think we have done to this point, and will do 
our best to ensure that ALMR remains viable within the limitations we 
have. The Army no longer has a sufficient ``business case'' for 
continuing to maintain those sites that do not directly support day-to-
day Army requirements. However, we remain fully committed to being good 
partners in this arrangement. To that end, we have offered to transfer 
the assets at our 41 sites, approximately $18 million in capital 
investment, to the State of Alaska at no cost. This will allow the 
State to continue to benefit from the Army's capital investment into 
ALMR that directly supports public safety and other State agency 
missions. We will also maintain our remaining sites in accordance with 
the ALMR Cooperative Agreement and will continue to share the use of 
Federal frequencies with the State, which is a key enabler of this 
system.

    11.Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, will you work 
with the other partners to ensure the divestiture timeline allows for 
all partners to make the necessary preparations to assume 
responsibility for the sites if they choose to do so?
    General Dempsey. We have worked closely with ALMR partners and will 
continue to do so as we go through the divestiture process. While the 
ALMR Cooperative Agreement requires a 12 month notification for 
termination, in this case we provided a 16 month notification through 
Alaskan Command (ALCOM), our DOD Representative to the ALMR Consortium. 
We also developed a 2-year phased transfer plan with only one-third of 
the sites being transferred in the first year in order to provide 
maximum fiscal planning opportunity. Additionally, Brigadier General 
Scott, U.S. Army Pacific G-6, personally traveled to Alaska in March to 
meet with Commissioner Becky Hultberg and her staff to see if there was 
a way to further assist. At that meeting, the Army proposed additional 
accommodations by delaying start date of the planned divestiture (first 
13 sites) until January 2012, with the Army maintaining the sites in a 
reduced maintenance (or break-fix) posture for an additional 6 months 
before transferring equipment. This allows ALMR partners a total of 22 
months of preparation time from our original notification. We are 
absolutely interested in being good partners and will continue to do 
all we can to enable this transition within our limitations.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                          ARMY TRANSFORMATION

    12. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) reinforced the focus on stability operations as an 
integral and co-equal element of FSOs. As such, the role of Civil 
Affairs (CA) forces as subject-matter experts for key stability tasks 
was elevated in two directives included in the Rebalancing the Force 
section of the QDR as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S. 
Armed Forces. The first of these--``expand CA capacity''--provides 
resources and potential, creates opportunity, and presents challenges. 
The second one--``increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and 
counterterrorism competency in general purpose forces''--is an 
important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and 
challenges.
    As the Commander, TRADOC, part of your mission was to: . . . 
design, develop, and integrate capabilities, concepts, and doctrine in 
order to build an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable, 
adaptable, and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle 
for FSOs. During your tenure there, part of TRADOC's web-based 
initiatives included the development or maintenance of a Capabilities 
Needs Assessment website, which documented CA capability requirements 
but never resolved the gaps in CA capabilities.
    How do you reconcile the status of these efforts to close the CA 
gaps and shortfalls while you were Commanding General, TRADOC, with the 
elevated status of stability operations, and by extension the 
importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR?
    General Dempsey. CA forces are an important part of Stability 
Operations. We identified through our Capability Needs Assessment 
process that the Army lacked sufficient resources, specifically CA 
capabilities, for Building Partner Capacity. Our analysis identified 
capability gaps. Our follow-on processes addressed those gaps, and we 
implemented solutions like resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training 
Brigade to prepare General Purpose Forces (GPF) for conducting 
Stability Operations. We have been expanding CA forces to provide the 
increased level of support required by both ongoing operations and 
anticipated future requirements in both the Reserves and the Active 
Force. In 2007 we had 29 CA Battalions with just 9 percent of the force 
in the Active component. By 2013 we will have 43 CA Battalions with 32 
percent of the force in the Active component. The continued growth and 
transformation of CA forces is a work in progress.

    13. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, in these tight financial 
times where we actively seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is 
creating additional CA force structure (military construction dollars, 
training dollars, etc.) the best use of taxpayer funds?
    General Dempsey. The Army regularly assesses its ability to meet 
the demands of the combatant commanders. We identified the need for 
additional CA capability in ongoing operations and see the need for 
these capabilities continuing beyond those operations. CA specialists 
bring unique capabilities to the force, not only in our current 
operations, but also in our engagements and activities to build partner 
capacity. Our growth and transformation of Civil Affairs forces is a 
work in progress that we will continually assess as part of the Army's 
ongoing force modernization and development processes.

    14. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, is creating additional CA 
capacity (soldiers/units) the proper way to solve a capability 
shortfall?
    General Dempsey. CA forces provide a unique capability to the whole 
force, enabling us to better meet the needs of our National Security 
Strategy. When deciding how to solve a capability shortfall, the Army 
conducts a formal Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process resulting 
in a recommendation of how to meet the need. In this instance the 
recommended solutions broadly included creating additional CA units as 
well as resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade to prepare GPFs 
to conduct Stability Operations. We continuously assess how to maximize 
our capabilities and reduce shortfalls as part of our strategic reviews 
and the Total Army Analysis.

    15. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, would embedding CA within 
the Army BCT help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while 
simultaneously conserving precious resources during an era of 
increasingly constrained budgets?
    General Dempsey. As we look beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, we see the 
need to maintain flexibility to task organize our CA forces, which we 
anticipate may include the ability to operate outside a BCT, in 
conjunction with other Special Operations Forces (SOF).

                     SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

    16. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, section 167, title 10, 
U.S.C., defines 10 activities as special operations (SO) activities 
insofar as each relates to SO. While there is a catchall proviso listed 
as well, designating ``such other activities as may be specified by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense'' as SO activities, given the 
2006 realignment of all Reserve CA and psychological operations/
military information-support operations (PO/MISO) forces from the U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where they supported both the GPF 
and SOF, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), where they now 
primarily support the GPF. Should CA and PO have remained on this list 
of SO activities?
    General Dempsey. Active component CA and Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO) should remain on the list of Special 
Operations Activities. However, Reserve component (RC) CA and MISO 
should be removed for two reasons. First, because RC CA and MISO 
support the GPF, they should be aligned with them to better facilitate 
their operational employment. Second, the complexities of managing a 
force the size and composition of the RC CA and MISO force are best 
handled by the USARC.
    Consistent with section 167, title 10, U.S.C., SOCOM is designated 
the joint CA Proponent. Within SOCOM, the Army SOCOM is the proponent 
for CA. It has long been acknowledged, in both design and practice, 
that CA is not an exclusively special operations discipline. The GPF 
has a longstanding history of employing CA that certainly extends to 
operations conducted abroad today.

    17. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, given this change of 
command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve 
component CA and PO/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is 
technically defined as a SO activity without commensurate authorities, 
training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of 
combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa?
    General Dempsey. Per section 167, title 10, U.S.C., ``For purposes 
of this section, special operations activities include each of the 
following insofar as it relates to special operations . . . Civil 
Affairs . . . Psychological Operations . . . ''. Based upon this 
definition, the CA and MISO missions conducted by the Reserve component 
(RC) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa are not Special 
Operations Activities because they are conducted in direct support of 
GPFs, not SOFs. The RC CA and MISO soldiers have the appropriate 
authorities (i.e. Commanders Emergency Relief Program), training (AC 
and RC CA and MISO forces are trained using the same Program of 
Instruction and Doctrine, with the exception of language training being 
optional for the RC), and Major Force Program 2 (MFP2) funding to 
support their combat operations and other operational employment.

    18. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, what can be done to clarify 
this statutory discrepancy?
    General Dempsey. If deemed necessary, a decision to clarify any 
perceived discrepancy would have to be in the form of a recommendation 
from the Secretary of Defense to Congress to address section 167, title 
10, U.S.C.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

                               M9 PISTOLS

    19. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, what is the future of the M9 in 
the Army?
    General Dempsey. It is undetermined at this time. The Army is 
reviewing a current Modular Hand Gun requirement developed by the U.S. 
Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army 
requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be 
premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time. The M9 Pistol 
has served the Army well over the past quarter century and has proven 
itself in numerous combat operations, including Panama, Desert Storm, 
Somalia, as well the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    20. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, does the Army plan to procure 
more M9s or to compete for a replacement pistol?
    General Dempsey. No, the Army is not currently planning to procure 
any more M9s to include sustainment quantities. Current Army policies 
allow for 100 percent replacement of parts to include receivers during 
reset if necessary to maintain the required quantity of pistols in the 
Army inventory. The M9 Pistol has served the Army well over the past 
quarter century and has proven itself in numerous combat operations, 
including Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, as well the current wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army does not have a current plan to 
compete for a replacement pistol, the Army is reviewing a current 
Modular Hand Gun Capabilities Production Document developed by the U.S. 
Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army 
requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be 
premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

                              ABRAMS TANK

    21. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, in your written answers to 
the advance policy questions posed by the committee regarding Army 
weapon system programs you stated, ``In my view, the Abrams 
modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the 
emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 
120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability 
improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and 
reliability intended to maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and 
restore space, weight and power margins to keep the tank relevant 
through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal 
year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an 
assessment as the program matures.'' Do you acknowledge that the fiscal 
year 2012 budget request ends U.S. production of the tank for the first 
time in modern history?
    General Dempsey. The Army has continuously built Abrams tanks since 
1979. The M1A2SEPv2 production ends in fiscal year 2013, last fielding 
in fiscal year 2014. M1A1AIM SA production ends in fiscal year 2011, 
last fielding in fiscal year 2014.

    22. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, are you willing to work with 
this committee to address alternatives that would continue production 
of Abrams tanks beyond 2012?
    General Dempsey. We share your concerns over the viability of the 
industrial base and recognize the challenges associated with starting 
and stopping production. Abrams upgrade production will continue 
fielding 18 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) equipped with M1A2SEPv2s 
and 6 HBCTs equipped with M1A1AIM SA by fiscal year 2014. Because of 
this effort, the Abrams tank will remain a critical part of the Army's 
combat vehicle force beyond 2014.

    23. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what is the impact on ending 
tank production on U.S. industrial capability in our depots, armor 
facilities, and private companies across our Nation?
    General Dempsey. There will be a production break for the Abrams 
tank in fiscal year 2013. This is the result of the Army completing its 
objective to field upgraded Abrams tanks to 18 HBCTs. The near-term 
plan for Abrams modernization sustains government and contractor System 
Engineering capability. It will not provide the production workload at 
Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, AL and the Joint Systems Manufacturing 
Facility in Lima, OH (formerly known as the Lima Army Tank Plant) that 
would adequately sustain these facilities and key suppliers and 
subcontractors after fiscal year 2013. We are seeking to minimize the 
impact of the break with the approval of the requirement for the next 
package of Abrams tank improvements. At a minimum, the Army anticipates 
the break to continue for at least 2 years.

    24. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the Army has acknowledged 
that the Abrams tank will remain in the inventory for the foreseeable 
future. What is the Army doing to upgrade the current fleet including 
the Abrams tank in terms of research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) and production?
    General Dempsey. The Abrams Program is moving towards a Materiel 
Development Decision in third quarter of fiscal year 2011 that will 
define the next package of improvements for the Abrams tank. Abrams 
near-term modernization will focus on leveraging mature technologies to 
increase power generation, power distribution and fuel efficiency. 
Long-term modernization will provide capability improvements in 
lethality, survivability, mobility and reliability intended to maintain 
the Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, 
and cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.

    25. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, I understand the Army intends 
to begin modernizing the Abrams tank with new capabilities including 
those directly tied to lessons learned from Iraq deployments, but the 
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes less than $10 million for 
Abrams RDT&E. How is $10 million sufficient in fiscal year 2012 
sufficient for this task?
    General Dempsey. The $9.7 million of RDT&E funds requested in the 
fiscal year 2012 President's budget is sufficient for Abrams 
modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the 
$107.5 million in fiscal year 2011 RDT&E funds will carry over to 
fiscal year 2012, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all 
anticipated fiscal year 2012 RDT&E efforts.

    26. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, will you please provide a 
detailed modernization plan for the Abrams tank?
    General Dempsey. Abrams tank modernization will be done in two 
phases: Near term, we will pursue Power Generation and Power 
Distribution Modernization to enable integration of the Army Directed 
Requirements along with the ability to fire the next generation of 
120mm ammunition. This will be done through field modifications and 
technical insertions as the vehicles are at the depots. Long term 
modernization will provide major capability improvements in lethality, 
survivability, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the 
Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, and 
cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                           WEST POINT SPEECH

    27. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in a speech at West Point on 
February 25, 2010, Secretary Gates stated, ``The Army also must 
confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for 
the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements--whether in 
Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . But in my opinion, any 
future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big 
American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 
`have his head examined'.'' The United States has sent 100,000 or more 
ground troops into these very regions five times over the last 6 
decades. Does our Nation need to maintain its ability to carry out 
large-scale ground campaigns in order to ensure our national security, 
or is the requirement for these types of land operations truly a thing 
of the past?
    General Dempsey. The Secretary clarified his statement a week later 
at the Air Force Academy, stating that it would be wrong to interpret 
his statement as ``questioning the need for the Army at all, or at 
least one its present size, the value of heavy armor generally, and 
even the wisdom of our involvement in Afghanistan.'' We believe that 
the intent is for all the Services to think harder about the entire 
range of missions and how to achieve the right balance of capabilities 
in an era of tight budgets, how to use the assets we have with the 
greatest possible flexibility, and how to truly take advantage of being 
part of the Joint Force. I agree with all of those goals. Most 
importantly we need to look at how we prepare ourselves for an 
uncertain future, since the challenges we will face are different than 
those we grew up with. We take our profession of arms seriously; at all 
levels we are continuously assessing and adapting to changing 
environments. Trends in the 21st century security environment continue 
to create conditions leading to increased instability. The combination 
of population growth, fragile states, demand for natural resources, 
rapid diffusion and access to technology, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction increase the likelihood of conflict. The 
Army mitigates these conditions through our engagements, exchanges, 
exercise programs, security force assistance activities, and by 
building partnership capacity. As such, we as professionals are working 
to ensure the full complement of Army capabilities are available when 
needed. To meet these requirements we need a consistent flow of forces 
provided by a balanced and affordable Army comprised of ``tailorable'' 
and networked organizations, operating on rotational cycles and capable 
of providing trained and available forces to conduct full-spectrum 
military operations.

    28. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, Secretary Gates also 
highlighted that the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan must be 
``incorporated into the Service's DNA and institutional memory.'' He 
went on to say that the Army has always needed ``entrepreneurial 
leaders with a broad perspective and a diverse range of skills.'' In a 
recent interview, you said that the Army needs to focus on mastering a 
few skills that will prepare it for whatever future missions it is 
given, rather than becoming a ``jack-of-all-trades'' in a postwar era. 
In your view, what lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are most important 
for the Army to carry forward?
    General Dempsey. Our Army is a learning organization--from the 
accumulation of all our experiences in peacetime and at war. Our 
Campaign of Learning is evidence of our commitment to learning. Within 
the Army, leadership remains the multiplying and unifying element of 
combat power. Our lessons learned garnered from 10 years of war for 
leader development clearly highlight the need for agile and adaptive 
leaders who are critical thinkers, innovative and can recognize and 
manage transitions to exploit opportunities for success on the 
battlefield. This also drives a requirement for learning systems that 
facilitate the education and training of our leaders.
    Continuation: As campaigns progressed over the last 10 years, U.S. 
Army forces learned the importance of counter-insurgency and other 
variations of stability and support operations. Leaders of all 
echelons, but especially leaders of squads and platoons, had to become 
masters of negotiation, persuasion and influence with local nationals. 
They had to bridge cultural barriers with local politicians, foreign 
security forces, spiritual leaders and citizens and had to learn ways 
to establish trust across these boundaries. They had to adapt their 
interpersonal skills to move others to the desired end state with 
indirect influence, instead of force or use of direct authority. They 
had to be prepared for rapid transitions between civil support missions 
to instantaneous response to attacks from insurgents and then back to 
peaceful interactions. With greater application of mission command, 
company and higher-level leaders had to learn to operate at greater 
levels of trust down the chain of command. Awareness of the importance 
of the alignment of intent and means across echelons was heightened.
    Army systems for leader development were required to adapt 
concurrently to meet the operational demands for more competent and 
agile leaders of character. This adaptation was deliberately aimed at 
developing critical and innovative thinkers prepared to meet the 
evolution of the Operational Environment. CTCs underwent significant 
adaptations to provide the conditions to train individuals and units in 
all aspects of deployed operations. Authentic native noncombatants were 
introduced in the mission rehearsal exercises, and opposing forces 
(OPFOR) role played the practices of terrorists and insurgents. 
Situational training exercises provided exposure to critical tasks and 
used increased variability to present soldiers with opportunities to 
practice adaptation. Leader development systems and management 
practices were updated to steward the effective development of leaders. 
Professional military education (PME) was modified to push senior- and 
mid-level learning outcomes down to lower ranks. Senior- and mid-level 
education addressed the broadened requirements for stability and 
support operations and operations with joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental and multinational forces. PME also adapted to the 
requirements of modularity and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in 
order to man deploying units with qualified leaders. We have learned 
that we must anticipate change early, to recognize the ``weak signals'' 
in order to maintain our learning advantage over our adversaries, and 
we have learned that we must have training, education and assignment 
systems in place to develop our leaders that are equally as adaptive as 
the leaders themselves.
    Our experiences have underscored the importance of the role of 
leadership at all levels in our Army, the Joint Force, and with our 
partners to accomplish our Nation's aims. Within the Army, leadership 
remains the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. 
Leadership requires influencing others to accomplish the mission while 
improving our organizations at all levels of the Army to maintain the 
successful edge as the Nation's premier land power force. Leadership 
doctrine, founded on the principle of competent leaders of character 
supporting and defending the Constitution, subordinate to civilian 
authority, set the foundation for Army leaders to adapt to the rapid 
onset of operational requirements following 9/11 and the global war on 
terrorism. Our leadership requirements model establishes the attributes 
and competencies expected of all Army leaders. Leaders are responsible 
for upholding Army values and exercising the discipline necessary in 
combat as well as garrison to reflect those values to one another, to 
our citizenry, and to the world. We have learned to emphasize the 
responsibility for all leaders to influence beyond the chain of 
command, to operate in a ``whole-of-government'' approach to the 
Operational Environment and with our international partners. Increased 
attention has also been given to the requirement for resilience in 
leaders and leaders helping others deal with the stresses stemming from 
complex operations and recurring overseas deployments.

    29. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what specific skills that have 
fallen by the wayside over the past decade are in need of further 
development?
    General Dempsey. To date, the Army has had the opportunity to only 
conduct one rotation at a CTC focused on FSOs against a Hybrid Threat, 
which is an insufficient number upon which to draw hard conclusions. 
However, that rotation indicates several areas within warfighting 
functions may need improvement. These warfighting functions include: 
Mission Command on the move, massing the effects of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver at a decisive 
point, optimizing use of engineering assets for mobility, counter-
mobility, and survivability, and operating away from protected fixed 
bases, such as Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts. Our next 
FSO rotations at CTCs are in August at the NTC, and in September at the 
JRTC. At these training rotations we'll aggressively work to both 
validate our initial impressions and gain new insights into skills that 
have atrophied over the past decade.

                           ARMY END STRENGTH

    30. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in your advance policy 
response to the committee, you stated that it has taken the Army ``10 
years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can 
reasonably describe as balanced.'' During this time, the Army has 
increased its Active-Duty end strength in order to meet current and 
future operational requirements. However, as part of his cost-saving 
initiatives, Secretary Gates has proposed reductions to the Army's 
Active-Duty end strength of 22,000 soldiers by 2014, followed by an 
additional 27,000 soldiers beginning in 2015. Over the last 40 years, 
the Army has conducted two major post-conflict end strength reductions, 
first after the Vietnam War and then again after Operation Desert 
Storm. Given that we live in what some senior military leaders, 
including the current Chief of Staff of the Army and the current 
Secretary of the Army, refer to as an ``era of persistent conflict,'' 
how risky is it to reduce our Army's end strength so soon?
    General Dempsey. Assumptions about future demand for Army forces 
are critical to assessing potential implications associated with both 
end strength and force structure adjustments. DOD's assumption is that 
the drawdown in Iraq will continue, and that it will be completed by 31 
December 2011. DOD also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will 
moderate to a sustainable level, in accordance with current 
administration policy. While we cannot predict with certainty when and 
where crises may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent 
conflict, Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of 
missions. The Army does not anticipate that near-term future demands 
will reach a level of commitment seen in recent years, and we are in 
the process of conducting deliberate analysis to determine how and when 
to implement directed reductions. The Army will continue to ensure 
accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness 
to meet future demands, and care for the well-being of its soldiers and 
their families.

    31. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, extended deployments and the 
high operational tempo have put a substantial strain on our All-
Volunteer Army, resulting in high rates of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, suicide, and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as other health 
issues within the force. The Army's increase in Active-Duty end 
strength was designed, in part, to mitigate these effects and allow for 
longer dwell-time between deployments. If conditions on the ground in 
Afghanistan do not allow for the administration's planned drawdown of 
U.S. troops by 2014, will the reduction of 22,000 soldiers to the 
Army's Active-Duty end strength have a negative impact on the quality 
and resiliency of our force?
    General Dempsey. The additional 22,000 end strength has been an 
integral part of the Army's ability to meet the manning requirements of 
deploying units. The planned reduction is based on the assumption that 
the demand for Army forces will decline by the end of 2013. If that 
assumption proves to be inaccurate, the Army will re-evaluate its 
ability to meet the new demand and engage with the Secretary of Defense 
to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy to meet the new demand 
signal.
    As far as quality and resiliency of the force, the Army will 
continue its efforts to retain soldiers with the greatest potential to 
serve and align them with our leadership development strategy. The 
Army's deliberate and responsible drawdown plans will take into 
consideration operational demands, individual and unit readiness, and 
sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.

                     ARMY COMBAT BRIGADES IN EUROPE

    32. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Pentagon reportedly 
intends to decide in the near future how many Army BCTs to keep in 
Europe, which could be as many as four or as few as two. Meanwhile, 
since 2002, two Germany-based BCTs have essentially been in limbo while 
the Pentagon debates their fate. It now appears unlikely that these 
units, which had been scheduled to return to the United States by 2013, 
will meet that deadline. One of these BCTs has been slated to relocate 
to Fort Bliss, TX, a post whose role in our national defense has 
increased greatly in recent years. At Fort Bliss, soldiers are afforded 
unparalleled training opportunities at its vast ranges, whose 
conditions accurately replicate those faced by soldiers in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. In addition, military quality of life at Fort Bliss is high, 
partly as a result of substantial Federal investment in its expansion. 
In your view, is delaying the return of these Army units from Europe 
the right course of action, given that our European allies have their 
own highly capable militaries?
    General Dempsey. The National Security Strategy and the QDR affirm 
the importance of investing in the capacity of strong and capable 
states. These efforts further U.S. objectives of securing a peaceful 
and cooperative international order. The Army's forces represent the 
Nation's enduring commitment to the defense of Europe specified in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Article 5, ensure a 
credible deterrent against all forms of aggression, and provide a 
robust capability to build Allied and partner capacity for coalition 
operations such as in Afghanistan. It must also be noted that the 
majority of nations contributing troops in support of the International 
Security Assistance Force, the NATO's largest and most complex out-of-
area operation, come from NATO members. The relationships needed to 
support these types of operations can only be developed through long-
term, sustained relationships achieved with American servicemembers 
stationed in Europe.

    33. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, why are these Army BCTs still 
permanently stationed in Europe, and when will the Army bring them 
home?
    General Dempsey. The Office of Secretary of Defense is currently 
reviewing the disposition of forces in Europe. A decision on the future 
posture in Europe is expected soon. Army forces in Europe will have 
better facilities for soldiers and families, access to better training 
facilities and ranges, and a consolidated footprint that will help U.S. 
Army Europe operate more cost effectively and efficiently.

                  PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION POLICIES

    34. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, current Army policy requires 
relatively frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves for most 
soldiers and their families. At a time when our military is being 
pressured to find ways to stretch each and every dollar and improve its 
fiscal stewardship, a thoughtful and sensible revision of the Army's 
PCS policies could potentially save millions of dollars annually, which 
the Army could use to meet other requirements. Requiring PCS moves 
every 5 or 6 years--instead of every 2 or 3--would also reduce the 
strain on military families. In so doing, you would enable many 
military spouses to pursue their own careers without facing frequent 
relocations, and you would ease the stress that frequent moves and 
school relocations puts on military children. Do you see any potential 
for the Army to rethink its current PCS policies to cut unnecessary 
expenses and improve the quality of life for military families?
    General Dempsey. As a general rule, the Army does not require 
soldiers to move simply because they have remained at one location for 
a set number of years. Overseas moves are an exception, by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense policy. They have established specific tour 
lengths based on environmental conditions in the overseas locations.
    Two-thirds of all Army PCS moves result from accessions, 
separations, and professional development. The remaining third are used 
to distribute soldiers internal to the Army. They are used to maintain 
an acceptable match of skills and grades in units to meet operational 
requirements. Over the past 10 years the requirements for moves has 
accelerated by the need to meet the demands of filling deploying units. 
As demand for Army units decreases, we will work to increase the time 
on station for soldiers and families while maintaining the critical 
match of skills and grades across the Army.
                                 ______
                                 
    [The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, 
follows:]
                    Nomination Reference and Report
                           As In Executive Session,
                               Senate of the United States,
                                                  February 7, 2011.
    Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee 
on Armed Services:
    The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff, 
U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a 
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., 
sections 601 and 2033:

                             To be General

    GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 8511
                                 ______
                                 
    [The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, 
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the 
nomination was referred, follows:]

           Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA

Educational degrees:
    U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
    Duke University - MA - English
    U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts 
and Sciences
    National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic 
Studies

Military schools attended:
    Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
    National War College
    U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Foreign language(s): French

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Promotions                       Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.......................................  5 Jun 74
1LT.......................................  5 Jun 76
CPT.......................................  8 Aug 78
MAJ.......................................  1 Sep 85
LTC.......................................  1 Apr 91
COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
BG........................................  1 Aug 01
MG........................................  1 Sep 04
LTG.......................................  8 Sep 05
GEN.......................................  8 Dec 08
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              From                        To              Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 75..........................  May 76............  Platoon Leader, B
                                                       Troop, 1st
                                                       Squadron, 2d
                                                       Armored Cavalry,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
May 76..........................  Sep 77............  Support Platoon
                                                       Leader, 1st
                                                       Squadron, 2d
                                                       Armored Cavalry,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Sep 77..........................  Jun 78............  S-1 (Personnel),
                                                       1st Squadron, 2d
                                                       Armored Cavalry,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jul 78..........................  Jan 79............  Student, Armor
                                                       Officer Advanced
                                                       Course, U.S. Army
                                                       Armor School,
                                                       Fort Knox, KY
Apr 79..........................  Jan 80............  Motor Officer, 1st
                                                       Squadron, 10th
                                                       Cavalry, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Carson, CO
Jan 80..........................  Oct 80............  Commander, A
                                                       Troop, 1st
                                                       Squadron, 10th
                                                       Cavalry, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Carson, CO
Oct 80..........................  Jun 81............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       1st Squadron,
                                                       10th Cavalry, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Carson, CO
Jun 81..........................  Jul 82............  Commander,
                                                       Headquarters and
                                                       Headquarters
                                                       Troop, 1st
                                                       Squadron, 10th
                                                       Cavalry, 4th
                                                       Infantry Division
                                                       (Mechanized),
                                                       Fort Carson, CO
Aug 82..........................  May 84............  Student, Duke
                                                       University,
                                                       Durham, NC
Jun 84..........................  Jul 87............  Instructor, later
                                                       Assistant
                                                       Professor,
                                                       Department of
                                                       English, U.S.
                                                       Military Academy,
                                                       West Point, NY
Aug 87..........................  Jun 88............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                       Command and
                                                       General Staff
                                                       College, Fort
                                                       Leavenworth, KS
Jul 88..........................  Sep 89............  Executive Officer,
                                                       4th Battalion,
                                                       67th Armor, 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Sep 89..........................  May 91............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                       later Executive
                                                       Officer, 3d
                                                       Brigade, 3d
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany and
                                                       Operations Desert
                                                       Shield/Storm,
                                                       Saudi Arabia
Jul 91..........................  Jun 93............  Commander, 4th
                                                       Battalion, 67th
                                                       Armor, 1st
                                                       Brigade, 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Jul 93..........................  Jun 95............  Chief, Armor
                                                       Branch, Combat
                                                       Arms Division,
                                                       Officer Personnel
                                                       Management
                                                       Directorate, U.S.
                                                       Total Army
                                                       Personnel
                                                       Command,
                                                       Alexandria, VA
Aug 95..........................  Jun 96............  Student, National
                                                       War College, Fort
                                                       Lesley J. McNair,
                                                       Washington, DC
Jul 96..........................  Jul 98............  Commander, 3d
                                                       Armored Cavalry
                                                       Regiment, Fort
                                                       Carson, CO
Jul 98..........................  Oct 99............  Assistant Deputy
                                                       Director for
                                                       Politico-Military
                                                       Affairs, Europe
                                                       and Africa, J-5,
                                                       The Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
Oct 99..........................  Aug 01............  Special Assistant
                                                       to the Chairman
                                                       of the Joint
                                                       Chiefs of Staff,
                                                       The Joint Staff,
                                                       Washington, DC
Sep 01..........................  Jun 03............  Program Manager,
                                                       Saudi Arabian
                                                       National Guard
                                                       Modernization
                                                       Program, Saudi
                                                       Arabia
Jun 03..........................  Oct 04............  Commanding
                                                       General, 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army
                                                       Operation Iraqi
                                                       Freedom, Iraq
Oct 04..........................  Jul 05............  Commanding
                                                       General, 1st
                                                       Armored Division,
                                                       U.S. Army Europe
                                                       and Seventh Army,
                                                       Germany
Aug 05..........................  May 07............  Commander, Multi-
                                                       National Security
                                                       Transition
                                                       Command-Iraq/
                                                       Commander, NATO
                                                       Training Mission-
                                                       Iraq, Operation
                                                       Iraqi Freedom,
                                                       Iraq
Aug 07..........................  Mar 08............  Deputy Commander,
                                                       U.S. Central
                                                       Command, MacDill
                                                       Air Force Base,
                                                       FL
Mar 08..........................  Oct 08............  Acting Commander,
                                                       U.S. Central
                                                       Command, MacDill
                                                       Air Force Base,
                                                       FL
Dec 08..........................  Present...........  Commanding
                                                       General, U.S.
                                                       Army Training and
                                                       Doctrine Command,
                                                       Fort Monroe, VA
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Assignments                    Date              Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistant Deputy Director for          Jul 98-Oct 99                   Colonel
 Politico-Military Affairs, Europe
 and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff,
 Washington, DC....................
Special Assistant to the Chairman      Oct 99-Aug 01                   Colonel
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
 Joint Staff, Washington, DC.......
Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
 Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
 NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
Deputy Commander, U.S. Central         Aug 07-Mar 08  Lieutenant General
 Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
 FL................................
Acting Commander, U.S. Central         Mar 08-Oct 08  Lieutenant General
 Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
 FL................................
Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d      Jan 91-Feb 91        Lieutenant Colonel
 Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe
 and Seventh Army, Operations
 Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
Commanding General, 1st Armored        Jun 03-Oct 04  Brigadier General/
 Division, U.S. Army Europe and                           Major General
 Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi
 Freedom, Iraq.....................
Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
 Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
 NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
------------------------------------------------------------------------


U.S. decorations and badges:
    Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Defense Superior Service Medal
    Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
    Bronze Star Medal
    Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
    Joint Service Commendation Medal
    Army Commendation Medal
    Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
    Combat Action Badge
    Parachutist Badge
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
                                 ______
                                 
    [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior 
military officers nominated by the President to positions 
requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form 
that details the biographical, financial, and other information 
of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 
USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              Room SR-228
                       Washington, DC 20510-6050
                             (202) 224-3871
                    COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
      BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

    Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If 
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the 
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation 
of your answer applies.
                    Part A--Biographical Information
    Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in 
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for 
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in 
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

    1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
    Martin E. Dempsey.

    2. Position to which nominated:
    Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

    3. Date of nomination:
    7 February 2011.

    4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
    [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the 
committee's executive files.]

    5. Date and place of birth:
    March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

    6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
    Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

    7. Names and ages of children:
    Christopher, 32.
    Megan, 31.
    Caitlan, 27.

    8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, 
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, 
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an 
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, 
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other 
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

    10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in 
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and 
other organizations.
    Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
    Member, Association of U.S. Army.

    11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary 
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding 
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record 
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

    12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees:
    I, Martin E. Dempsey agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify 
upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

    13. Personal views:
    I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted 
committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views 
differ from the administration in power.

                                 ______
                                 
    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the 
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set 
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to 
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                ------                                

                           Signature and Date
    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement 
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information 
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, 
and complete.
                                                 Martin E. Dempsey.
    This 1st day of February, 2011.

    [The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported 
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the 
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination 
was confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 2011.]


     NOMINATION OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 
Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, 
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 
Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, and 
Cornyn.
    Other Senators present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer.
    Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff 
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and 
Travis E. Smith, special assistant.
    Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, 
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; 
Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional 
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, 
professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and 
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
    Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority 
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; 
Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. 
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak, 
research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
    Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F. 
Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and Breon N. Wells.
    Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, 
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann 
Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant 
to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; 
Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant 
to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator 
Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad 
Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, 
assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Jeremy Bratt and Ethan Saxon, 
assistants to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant 
to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator 
Sessions; Tyler Stephens, assistant to Senator Chambliss; 
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; William Wright, 
assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator 
Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Taylor 
Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to 
Senator Cornyn; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
    This morning, the committee meets to consider the 
nomination of Leon Panetta to be Secretary of Defense. Director 
Panetta is no stranger to testifying before Congress over the 
course of his long and distinguished career in public service. 
We welcome you to the committee today, and we thank you, Mr. 
Panetta, for your decades of dedicated service to our Nation 
and your willingness to answer the call once again.
    We know your wife, Sylvia, is not able to be here with you 
today. She has made her own sacrifices over the last 50 years, 
supporting your efforts in both the public and private sector. 
I know that I speak for the committee when I say that we would 
love to thank her in person for the sacrifices that she has 
made. Director Panetta, please let your wife know of the 
committee's gratitude for her support and her sacrifice.
    If confirmed, Director Panetta will replace Secretary 
Robert Gates at the helm of the Department of Defense (DOD). 
When President Obama asked Secretary Gates, then-President 
Bush's Secretary of Defense, to stay on in that position, it 
provided welcomed continuity and experience in our defense 
leadership. Director Panetta's nomination to be Secretary of 
Defense represents change, but brings an impressive level of 
continuity as well.
    The next Secretary of Defense will face an extraordinarily 
complex set of demands on our Armed Forces. Foremost among them 
are the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between these 2 
conflicts, we continue to have approximately 150,000 troops 
deployed.
    The U.S. military is also providing support to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Libya. In 
addition, even after the extraordinary raid that killed Osama 
bin Laden, terrorist threats against our Homeland continue to 
emanate from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.
    The risk of a terrorist organization getting their hands on 
and detonating an improvised nuclear device or other weapon of 
mass destruction remains one of the gravest possible threats to 
the United States. To counter this threat, the Defense 
Department is working with the Departments of State, Energy, 
Homeland Security, and other U.S. Government agencies to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile 
materials, and dangerous technologies.
    A number of key national security decisions will have to be 
made in the coming weeks and months. Even as the drawdown of 
U.S. forces in Iraq is on track, recent signs of instability 
may lead Iraq's political leadership to ask for some kind of 
continuing U.S. military presence beyond the December 31st 
withdrawal deadline agreed to by President Bush and Prime 
Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement between our 
countries.
    Another key decision point is looming in Afghanistan 
regarding reductions in U.S. forces starting in July. President 
Obama said the other day that, ``It is now time for us to 
recognize that we have accomplished a big chunk of our mission 
and that it is time for Afghans to take more responsibility.''
    The President has also said that the reductions starting in 
July will be ``significant'' and not just ``a token gesture''. 
I support that decision. The more that Afghan leaders 
understand that we mean it when we say our commitment is not 
open-ended, the more serious they will be in preparing Afghan 
security forces to assume security responsibility for all of 
Afghanistan.
    I support the so-called ``transition strategy'', which 
calls for Afghan security forces to take more and more of the 
lead in providing for their country's security. The more that 
Afghan security forces do that, the better are the chances of 
success because the Taliban's biggest nightmare is a large, 
effective Afghan Army, an army already respected by the Afghan 
people, in control of Afghanistan's security.
    Having Afghan security forces in the lead would deprive the 
Taliban of their biggest propaganda target, the claim that 
foreign troops are occupiers of Afghanistan. There is nothing 
inconsistent between transitioning security responsibility to 
Afghan security forces and a long-term strategic relationship 
with Afghanistan, which is also important to sustaining a 
successful outcome.
    Another major issue facing the Department is the stress on 
our Armed Forces after 10 years of nonstop war. The repeated 
deployments of our military over the last decade has resulted 
in many of our servicemen and women being away from their 
families and homes for two, three, four, or more tours. It is 
not only our force which is stressed, so are our military 
families.
    Our incredible men and women in uniform continue to answer 
the call, but we must act to reduce the number of deployments 
and to increase the time between deployments.
    The next Secretary of Defense will be required to juggle 
the competing demands on our forces while Washington struggles 
with an extremely challenging fiscal environment. The defense 
budget will not, and should not, be exempt from cuts. But this 
will require Congress, working with the next Secretary of 
Defense, to scrub every program and expenditure in the defense 
budget and to make tough choices and tradeoffs between the 
requirements of our warfighters today and preparations for the 
threats of tomorrow.
    The administration in February submitted a defense budget 
for fiscal year 2012, which included some efficiency savings. 
But in April, President Obama announced he wanted to reduce 
security spending by $400 billion over 12 years, starting in 
the next fiscal year, presumably including under the umbrella 
of security spending the budgets of the Pentagon, Departments 
of State and Homeland Security.
    Now we have asked the administration what part of the $400 
billion reduction do they recommend be Pentagon cuts, and how 
many of those for fiscal year 2012? So far, we have received no 
answer.
    Hopefully, today we will get Mr. Panetta's understanding of 
that matter and his opinion on the central fiscal issues. His 
service as President Clinton's Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) is invaluable because he 
understands the inner workings of the budget process and 
because he shaped the decisions that helped achieve the budget 
surpluses of the late 1990s.
    Fortunately for the Nation, Director Panetta brings a 
compelling record of achievement and experiences well suited to 
the demands of the position for which he has been nominated.
    Leon Panetta has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to work 
across party lines. Since entering public service in 1966, he 
worked on the staff of the Republican Whip in the U.S. Senate, 
and headed the Office of Civil Rights in the Nixon 
administration. He later won election to the House of 
Representatives as a Democrat, where he served eight terms and 
became chairman of the House Budget Committee.
    Throughout his time in public service, Leon Panetta has 
been guided by a clear moral compass. He has said, ``In 
politics, there has to be a line beyond which you don't go--the 
line that marks the difference between right and wrong, what 
your conscience tells you is right. Too often,'' he said, 
``people don't know where the line is. My family, how I was 
raised, my education, all reinforced my being able to see that 
line.''
    Finally, Leon Panetta has been intimately involved in the 
most pressing national security issues of our time during his 
tenure as President Obama's Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). This includes his having personally 
overseen the manhunt for Osama bin Laden and the impressive 
operation that brought an end to al Qaeda's murderous leader.
    This operation epitomizes the way in which the CIA and the 
Defense Department are finally working together to support each 
other in the counterterrorism operations. The assault on bin 
Laden's hideout is the first significant instance, I believe, 
of an operation that could have been conducted under Defense 
Department authorities under U.S. Code title 10 but that was 
instead executed under the authorities of title 50, with the 
Director of the CIA exercising operational control over our 
elite military force.
    Now let me conclude by expressing, on behalf of this 
committee, our gratitude and our deep admiration for the man 
whose shoes Director Panetta has been nominated to fill, 
Secretary Robert Gates. Secretary Gates' service to the country 
has been extraordinary, having worked in the administration of 
eight Presidents.
    He left the comfort and rewards of private life, following 
a long career in Government, to serve his country again in the 
critical post of President Bush's Secretary of Defense at a 
difficult time in our history. Throughout his tenure across the 
Bush and Obama administrations, Secretary Gates' leadership, 
judgment, and candor have earned him the trust and respect of 
all who have worked with him.
    Secretary Gates has combined vision and thoughtfulness with 
toughness and clarity and courageous, firm decisionmaking. I 
would add that right from the start, Secretary Gates 
established a direct and open relationship with Congress, and 
this committee in particular, for which I am personally most 
grateful.
    I believe history will judge Secretary Gates' time as 
Secretary of Defense to have been truly exceptional.
    Senator McCain.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

    Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me welcome Director Panetta and congratulate him on his 
nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.
    I am grateful for his remarkable career of public service 
and his willingness to serve in this new and very important 
capacity. I am appreciative of your family and the support they 
have given to you.
    Let me also welcome our colleagues from California today, 
who will shortly underscore your extraordinary qualifications 
to assume the position of Secretary of Defense.
    Your successes as Director of the CIA over the last 2 
years, and there have been many, especially finding and 
eliminating Osama bin Laden, are a credit to you, and to the 
men and women of the Intelligence Community. At the same time, 
you and I know the director would be the first to admit that he 
has big shoes to fill, if confirmed, in the person of Robert 
Gates.
    I have seen many Secretaries of Defense in my years, and I 
believe that history will long remember Secretary Gates as one 
of America's finest, most effective, and most impactful 
Secretaries of Defense.
    One of the key criteria that we should be looking for in 
the next Secretary of Defense is continuity--the continuation 
of the wise judgment, policies, and decisionmaking that have 
characterized Secretary Gates' leadership of DOD. Thanks to the 
good work of Secretary Gates, his team, and our men and women 
in uniform, the next Secretary of Defense will take office with 
a great deal of positive momentum. But many consequential 
challenges remain.
    Indeed, over the next several years, our country faces 
decisions related to our national security and defense that 
will echo for decades to come, decisions that will determine 
whether we remain the world's leading global military power, 
able to meet our many commitments worldwide, or whether we will 
begin abandoning that role.
    What will have perhaps the most impact on this outcome is 
the President's stated goal of cutting $400 billion in defense 
spending by 2023, on top of the $178 billion in efficiencies in 
top line reductions that Secretary Gates has already announced.
    In recent weeks, Secretary Gates has been sounding the 
alarm against misguided and excessive reductions in defense 
spending that cut into the muscle of our military capabilities. 
I could not agree with him more. Defense spending is not what 
is sinking this country into fiscal crisis. If Congress and the 
President act on that flawed assumption, they will create a 
situation that is truly unaffordable--the decline of U.S. 
military power.
    I know there will be cuts to defense spending, and some 
reductions are no doubt necessary to improve the efficiency of 
DOD. But I also remember, and I think you do also, Director 
Panetta, when General ``Shy'' Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the 
Army, who warned in 1980 after draconian cuts were made, 
testified before this committee that we had a ``hollow army''.
    That is not an experience that we can or should repeat in 
the years to come. We must learn the lessons of history. I 
would welcome the nominee's opinion on this vital matter, 
including how the President's proposal could be implemented.
    Another major decision involves how we achieve our 
objectives in the three conflicts in which U.S. forces are now 
engaged--Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Iraq, the key 
question now is whether some presence of U.S. forces will 
remain in Iraq beyond the end of this year, pending Iraqi 
request and approval, to support Iraq's continuing needs and 
our enduring national interests. I believe such a presence is 
necessary, as Secretary Gates has argued.
    In Afghanistan, the main question is the size and scope of 
the drawdown of forces beginning this July. Here, too, I would 
agree with Secretary Gates that any drawdown should be modest, 
so as to maximize our ability to lock in the hard-won gains of 
our troops through the next fighting season.
    Finally, in Libya, there are signs that Gaddafi may be 
starting to crack, but the odds of a stalemate remain far too 
high. I believe U.S. strategy should be to reduce those odds as 
much as possible and quickly force Gaddafi to leave power, 
rather than hoping we achieve that objective with minimal 
effort.
    Another significant challenge facing the Defense Department 
is acquisition reform for its weapons and services. Secretary 
Gates has made some courageous decisions in attempting to get 
major weapons procurement programs on track. A similar focus 
needs to be brought to how the Defense Department chooses to 
buy billions of dollars in services to maintain the highest 
degree of readiness.
    In addition, especially in this budget environment, it will 
be important to continue to eliminate weapons programs that are 
over cost, behind schedule, and not providing improvements in 
combat power and capabilities. After 10 years of war, we must 
continue to eliminate every dollar in wasteful spending that 
siphons resources away from our most vital need--enabling our 
troops to succeed in combat.
    Director Panetta, you are nominated to lead our Armed 
Forces amid their 10th year of sustained overseas combat. Not 
surprisingly, this has placed a major strain on our forces and 
their families. Yet, our military is performing better today 
than at any time in our history.
    This is thanks to the thousands of brave young Americans in 
uniform who are writing a new chapter in the history of our 
great country. They have shown themselves to be the equals of 
the greatest generations before them.
    The calling that all of us must answer in our service is to 
be equal and forever faithful to the sacrifice of these amazing 
Americans.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe has to leave, and he would 
like to make just a very brief 10-second comment.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Senator McCain.
    I only want to say that because of an unavoidable conflict, 
I have to leave. But I was honored to serve for 8 years with 
then-Congressman Panetta, and I have always considered him to 
be a very close friend.
    I look forward to supporting his confirmation and serving 
with him in his new capacity.
    Thank you for the opportunity to say that.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
    We have our two wonderful colleagues from California here 
to introduce Director Panetta, and we are delighted to have 
both of you here and to have you as colleagues. It is a treat 
for all of us that you are with us.
    Senator Feinstein?
    Who, by the way, is also chair, may I say, of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, so she has a lot of very direct 
experience now and long before with Director Panetta.

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE 
                         OF CALIFORNIA

    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 
members of the committee.
    It is really a distinct pleasure for me to introduce the 
Director of the CIA and distinguished Californian, Leon 
Panetta, who was nominated by President Obama on April 28 to be 
the 23rd Secretary of Defense.
    As members of this committee well know, in his 47 years of 
public service, Director Panetta has held the positions of 
congressman, chairman of the House Budget Committee, Director 
of OMB, Chief of Staff to the White House, Co-Director with his 
wife of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public 
Policy--which I have had the pleasure of speaking before--
member of the Iraq Study Group, Director of the CIA, and from 
1964 to 1966, a second and then a first lieutenant in the U.S. 
Army as an intelligence officer.
    I would add to that list trusted adviser to the President 
and respected member of his national security team. In the 
course of 2 years as Director, he has mastered the intelligence 
field, led the CIA through a very tumultuous time, restored 
badly damaged relationships with Congress and with the Director 
of National Intelligence, and carried out President Obama's 
personal instruction to him to find Osama bin Laden.
    I have no doubt that his past experience and his 
capabilities prepare Leon Panetta to meet the major challenges 
before DOD. With knowledge of CIA operations and analysis, he 
will come to the Pentagon with a thorough understanding of the 
situation in Afghanistan, as well as the aggravating factors of 
our relationship with Pakistan. Through CIA analysis and 
operations, he is also well aware of the other contingencies 
around the globe where the U.S. military may be called to 
deploy.
    Director Panetta is also well positioned to guide the 
Department through the constrained budget environment, which 
the chairman spoke of, along with the rest of Government. He 
possesses the credentials and experience to make cuts where 
needed and where prudent. I am confident that he will do so in 
a way that keeps the military strong and capable and in a way 
that maintains the cohesion of the Department and its Services.
    Finally, let me recognize that there are many officials in 
the Government with the intellect and management skill to do 
this job. Leon brings something more. He has an interesting 
leadership style, with a deft personal touch that really 
matters to the people in his charge and that greatly benefits 
the oversight responsibility that we in Congress have.
    Let me give you an example. It was early in his tenure at 
the CIA in 2009 when Director Panetta requested an urgent 
meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee to brief us on a 
program that he had just learned of and that he had learned had 
never before been briefed to Congress. He found that 
unacceptable, and we very much appreciated his position.
    In the 2 years since, he has never declined to answer a 
question or provide us with his candid views. I believe the 
vice chairman of the committee, who is a member of this 
committee, Senator Chambliss, can testify to this. Leon has 
been completely forthright and motivated only by what is best 
for the CIA and, more importantly, this Nation.
    Let me conclude. A National Public Radio interview last 
week with Secretary Gates noted that the healthcare budget of 
DOD was bigger than the entire budget of the CIA and that no 
other position can fully prepare someone to be Secretary of 
Defense.
    I have great respect for Secretary Gates and praise him for 
his service to this country. Beyond all reasonable 
expectations, he has been an outstanding Secretary of Defense. 
But I would suggest to you that Leon Panetta, who has served 
honorably and successfully in Congress, at OMB, at the White 
House, and now the CIA, is prepared and uniquely qualified to 
be another outstanding Secretary of Defense in this very 
challenging time.
    I thank the committee.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, for 
a very strong introduction.
    Now, Senator Boxer?

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF 
                           CALIFORNIA

    Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
    I clearly appreciate every word that my colleague Senator 
Feinstein said about my friend Leon Panetta. What I am going to 
try to do is add a little bit more of a personal side because I 
have known this man and worked with him since 1982, when I was 
elected to Congress, and he became one of my mentors at that 
time.
    Eventually, I served on the House Budget Committee where he 
was the chairman, and I watched him very carefully reach out 
across every kind of line that would divide us--Republican, 
Democratic, liberal, conservative, moderate. We were facing at 
that time a lot of new, perplexing issues.
    One was the AIDS crisis. No one quite knew where this was 
headed, what it was about. I remember going to Leon and saying 
there is this new disease, and nobody quite understands it, and 
we haven't done anything about it. He said, ``You know, why 
don't you hold some hearings on it? It seems to really concern 
you, and bring in the Republicans,'' and we did.
    We were able to get the very first funding in that time for 
AIDS research because Leon was willing to listen. This is 
someone who is very smart, and he gets it. But he also was 
willing to listen to all sides, and I think we have seen that 
in every single job that he has fulfilled. This is a man who 
has dedicated himself to public service, and we are so grateful 
to him.
    I won't go through every job he has held. First of all, it 
would take too much time. Second of all, Senator Feinstein 
highlighted so many of those. But to be someone who could work 
as effectively behind the scenes as you can in front of a 
camera, to be someone who could be such a trusted adviser that 
two Presidents have chosen him.
    I could just go on about Leon. I am sure you don't want me 
to because you have a lot of work to do. Let me say for the 
people of California what he has meant to us.
    He has recognized the importance of our resources in our 
State, namely our coast and our ocean. He stepped out in front 
in the early years and said this is an economic issue for us, 
and he preserved that coast. That is forever. That Monterey 
sanctuary is forever. He is visionary.
    Then when we saw him move into the national security arena, 
as he did at the CIA, and the work he did in the latest 
achievement that he can talk about, and doesn't really do that 
much, in terms of making sure that Osama bin Laden was finally 
taken out. This was a brave mission by our military, and Leon 
Panetta was a part of the decisionmaking.
    I think at this time where we are engaged around the world 
in so many difficult conflicts, so many difficult conflicts, he 
is bringing now the intelligence perspective to the job.
    I would ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be 
printed in the record.
    I just want to turn to Leon at this time, just as a Senator 
from California and a friend, and say thanks so much for 
everything you have done throughout your career for this 
country. I know your origins. I know how proud your family is, 
and I think we all share that pride in you.
    Good luck, and I hope the committee confirms you quickly.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Boxer

    Mr. Chairman and colleagues--good morning.
    I am so very pleased to be here today to introduce my former 
colleague and fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama's 
nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
    I can think of no better person to fill this critical post at a 
time when our Nation continues to face threats to our national 
security.
    Mr. Panetta has devoted 4 decades of his life to public service. 
During that time, he has earned the trust and confidence of his 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
    The son of Italian immigrants, Mr. Panetta was born and raised in 
the city of Monterey, CA.
    Shortly after earning his bachelor and law degrees from Santa Clara 
University, Mr. Panetta joined the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer 
and went on to receive the Army Commendation Medal for his service.
    Mr. Panetta came to Washington in 1966 and rose to become the 
Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, where he fought for the 
desegregation of public schools even as other government officials were 
calling for slower enforcement of civil rights laws in the south.
    Mr. Panetta does what he thinks is right, and I saw him bring that 
same strength and passion to his work as a Member of the House of 
Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him.
    He was my chairman of the House Budget Committee and together we 
worked on the first ever funding to fight AIDS.
    Among his many accomplishments, Mr. Panetta authored the Hunger 
Prevention Act of 1988, worked to extend Medicare and Medicaid to cover 
hospice care for the terminally ill, and was a critical voice in 
protecting California coastlines.
    As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the 
Clinton administration, Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the 
Federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set 
and manage a budget.
    He also served as President Clinton's Chief of Staff, engaging at 
the highest levels on critical national security matters.
    For the past 2 years, Mr. Panetta has served as Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, where he has been responsible for 
protecting Americans around the world. Most recently, he oversaw the 
covert mission that located and killed Osama bin Laden, the founder of 
al Qaeda and mastermind behind the horrific attacks of September 11, 
2001.
    Bin Laden's death was the result of close coordination between our 
military and intelligence communities and Mr. Panetta's deep 
understanding of our Intelligence Community will be particularly 
beneficial in this new role.
    I think it is clear that Mr. Panetta has the unique experience 
needed to serve our Nation at this critical time and I know he will 
continue to work tirelessly to keep America safe.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of 
Mr. Panetta.
    I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for a very moving 
introduction and tribute.
    You are both welcome to stay or leave. I know you both have 
committee chairs that you have to fulfill responsibilities.
    Senator Boxer. I have a bill on the floor. By the way, we 
do have a bill on the floor about the Economic Development Act, 
and I want to remind everybody. So I will be going down on the 
floor.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. You never miss an opportunity to make your 
point effectively. [Laughter.]
    Thank you very much.
    Let me now call on Mr. Panetta. After your opening 
statement, we will ask you the usual questions and then turn to 
our questions.
    Thank you very much again for your service. Director 
Panetta?

STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, NOMINATED TO BE SECRETARY OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin, Ranking 
Member McCain, all of the distinguished members of the 
committee.
    I am deeply honored and deeply humbled to be here as the 
President's nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
    I also want to take this moment to thank my fellow 
Californians, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, who are not only 
distinguished Senators who have represented their State well, 
but are dear friends and dear colleagues.
    The role of Secretary of Defense, while, without question, 
it involves a very large responsibility in size alone, still in 
a very basic way is similar to the role of the CIA Director in 
that our first and foremost mission is to protect the country. 
If confirmed, my number one job will be to ensure that America 
continues to have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the 
strongest military in the world in order to make sure that we 
protect our country.
    As many of you know, I have devoted my career to public 
service. But it began a long time ago when I served as an 
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear the 
uniform of our country, and my respect and my admiration for 
our Nation's Armed Forces has only grown in the decades since.
    My youngest son, Jim, served in Afghanistan and received 
the Bronze Star. I have personally witnessed the tradition of 
service and sacrifice that drives each generation to fulfill a 
fundamental duty to our country.
    In addition to respecting that great tradition of duty, I 
have done a number of things to try and prepare for this very 
difficult and challenging job. First, in the weeks since my 
nomination, I spent a number of hours with Bob Gates. Bob is a 
dear friend, and he and I first got to know each other as we 
were building our careers in public service.
    We also served together on the Iraq Study Group, and we 
continue to serve together as members of the President's 
national security team. We share a common belief that the 
national security of this country is the responsibility of all 
Americans, regardless of party.
    I, too, believe that he will be remembered as one of the 
greatest Secretaries of Defense in our Nation's history for the 
way he led the Department during a time of war and for the 
crucial reforms that he has tried to put in place in the way 
the Pentagon does business. Those are reforms that I intend to 
carry on.
    Second, I talked with our Service Secretaries and the 
Service Chiefs. I believe it is important to have a candid, 
open line of communication between the Secretary and all of the 
Service Chiefs. They are the ones that are out there leading 
each of their Services, and I need to know what they are 
thinking, and I need to know what is important in terms of 
serving the interests of the troops that they directly lead.
    One of those chiefs told me for our troops, there has been 
no shortage of war. Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-
Volunteer Force has been stretched by combat that has lasted 
nearly a decade. We owe it to them, we owe it to their families 
to ensure that they have the best leadership, the best 
training, the best equipment, the best benefits, and the best 
healthcare that we can give them.
    I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every deployment 
decision that I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men 
and women in uniform and on their families.
    Third, I have reached out to the former Secretaries of 
Defense, both Democrat and Republican, and asked for their 
advice. To a person, they impressed upon me how important it 
was to stay focused on the management of the Pentagon. This is 
the biggest enterprise in our Government, and it requires 
focused, hands-on management, which is, frankly, the only way I 
know how to do business.
    Fourth, I have sat down with many of you and have known 
many of you throughout my career. Because I really do believe 
that Congress has to be a partner in this role in the 
protection of our country, I am a creature of Congress and I 
believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your oversight 
and by your guidance.
    As a young legislative assistant a long time ago here in 
the Senate, I had the honor of seeing firsthand the 
bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell and Henry Jackson, 
John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. As a Member of Congress, I 
saw that tradition carried on by other great leaders.
    I believe deeply in the tradition of strong, bipartisan 
national security leadership. You, Mr. Chairman, and you, 
Senator McCain, have carried on that tradition. I thank you for 
that.
    This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, 
when we had one main adversary, we face a multitude of 
challenges--al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks, 
places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, not just the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. 
Dangerous enemies spread out across the world.
    We face insurgents and militants who cross borders to 
conduct attacks. We face the proliferation of dangerous weapons 
in the hands of terrorists, in the hands of rogue nations. We 
face cyber attackers, a whole new arena of warfare that can 
take place not only now, but in the future, and something we 
have to pay attention to.
    We face the challenge of rising and changing powers and 
nations in turmoil, particularly in the Middle East, undergoing 
enormous political transformation. We are no longer in the Cold 
War. This is more like the ``blizzard war'', a blizzard of 
challenges that draw speed and intensity from terrorism, from 
rapidly developing technologies, and the rising number of 
powers on the world stage.
    But despite the times we live in, there is reason to be 
confident. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my 
view, has not only made clear to the world that we will do what 
we have to do, but it has also given us the greatest chance 
since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and to defeat al 
Qaeda.
    But to do that, to be able to finish the job, we have to 
keep our pressure up. If confirmed, my first task at DOD will 
be to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts that we are 
engaged in. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the 
Taliban. We have to train security forces. We have to help the 
government take ownership of their country so that they can 
govern and protect their country.
    In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and 
security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation so that 
it can become a stable democracy in a very important region of 
the world.
    As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly 
disciplined in how we spend the taxpayers' precious resources. 
This committee well knows that the days of large growth and 
unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to 
design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending 
while protecting those core elements that we absolutely need 
for our Nation's defense.
    I do not believe, based on my long experience in government 
and working with budgets, that we have to choose between strong 
fiscal discipline and strong national defense. I don't deny 
that there are going to be tough decisions that have to be made 
and tough choices that have to be made. But we owe it to our 
citizens to provide both strong fiscal discipline and a strong 
national defense.
    Finally, and most importantly, it is the job of Secretary 
of Defense to be a tireless advocate for our troops and for 
their families. It is their sacrifice and their dedication that 
have earned the respect of a grateful nation and inspired a new 
generation to volunteer to wear the uniform of our country.
    They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and 
I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who 
support and sustain them.
    As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than 
sending young people into harm's way to put their lives on the 
line. After we lost seven of our colleagues in Afghanistan in 
December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the military 
do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the 
ramp ceremony at Dover, offer a prayer at the side of an 
Arlington Cemetery gravesite for a patriot who left this world 
too young.
    Not one day will pass when I don't think of the brave souls 
who have fought and died and those who fight today for our 
freedom. As Secretary Gates emphasized in his last trip to the 
troops, they will always be in my thoughts and prayers.
    If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I will 
always keep our troops foremost in my mind, that I will be a 
careful, accountable steward of our Nation's precious 
resources, that we will have the strongest national defense in 
the world, and that you will always have my best and most 
candid advice, and that I will always, always seek yours.
    I am the son of Italian immigrants. My father used to say 
to me time and time again that to be free, we have to be 
secure. That is the pledge that I make to you, that I will do 
everything I can to keep America secure so that it can be free. 
I will do that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta

    Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of 
the committee.
    I am humbled to be here as the President's nominee to be Secretary 
of Defense. The role of the Secretary of Defense is similar to the role 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director--first and foremost 
to protect the country. If confirmed, my number one job will be to 
ensure that America continues to have the best-trained, best-equipped, 
and strongest military in the world.
    I have devoted my career to public service--and it began when I 
served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear 
the uniform of my country--and my respect and admiration for our 
Nation's Armed Forces have only grown in the decades since. My youngest 
son Jim served in Afghanistan and received the Bronze Star. So I have 
personally witnessed the tradition of service and sacrifice that drives 
the generations to fulfill a duty to our country.
    In addition, I have done a number of things to try and prepare for 
this job.
    First, in the weeks since my nomination, I have spent a number of 
hours with Bob Gates. Bob and I first got to know each other as we were 
building our careers in public service. We also served together on the 
Iraq Study Group. We share a common belief that national security is 
the responsibility of all Americans, regardless of party. I believe he 
will be remembered as one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense in our 
Nation's history for the way he led the Department during a time of 
war, and for the crucial reforms he made in the way the Pentagon does 
business--reforms that I intend to carry on.
    Second, I talked with the Service Secretaries and the Service 
Chiefs--I believe it is important to have candid, open lines of 
communication between the Secretary and the Services. One of those 
chiefs told me, ``For our troops, there is no shortage of war.''
    Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-Volunteer Force has been 
stretched by combat that has lasted nearly a decade. We owe it to them 
and their families to ensure that they have the best leadership, the 
best training, the best equipment, the best benefits and health care 
that we can give them. I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every 
deployment decision I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men 
and women in uniform and their families.
    Third, I reached out to every living former Secretary of Defense--
Democrat and Republican--and asked for their advice. To a person, they 
impressed upon me how important it was to stay focused on management of 
the Pentagon. This is the biggest enterprise in our government, and it 
requires focused, hands-on management--which is, frankly, the only way 
I know how to do business.
    Fourth, I sat down with many of you--because Congress is my partner 
in this role and in the protection of the country. I'm a creature of 
Congress and I believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your 
oversight. As a young legislative assistant, I had the honor of seeing 
firsthand the bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell, Henry 
Jackson, John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. I believe deeply in the 
tradition of strong bipartisan national security leadership that you 
and this committee carry on.
    This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, when we had 
one main adversary, today we face a multitude of challenges--al Qaeda 
and other global terrorist networks, insurgents and militants who cross 
borders, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, cyber attackers, 
rising and changing powers, and nations--particularly in the Middle 
East--undergoing enormous political transformation.
    We are no longer in the Cold War. This is the Blizzard War--a 
blizzard of challenges that draws speed and intensity from rapidly 
developing technologies and the rising number of powers on the world 
stage.
    But, despite the times we live in, there is reason to be confident. 
The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my view, has given us the 
greatest chance since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al 
Qaeda permanently. We must keep up the pressure.
    If confirmed, my first tasks at the Department of Defense will be 
to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in which we are now engaged. 
In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban, train the 
security forces, and help the government take ownership for the 
country's progress and security. In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi 
military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation.
    As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined 
in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. This committee well 
knows: the days of unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge 
will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative 
spending while protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's 
defense. I do not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal 
discipline and strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to 
provide both.
    Finally, it is the job of the Secretary of Defense to be a tireless 
advocate for our troops and their families. It is their sacrifice and 
dedication that have earned the respect of a grateful nation . . . and 
inspired a new generation to wear the uniform of our country. They put 
their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely 
fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.
    As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than sending 
young people into harm's way. After we lost seven of our colleagues in 
Afghanistan in December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the 
military do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the 
ramp ceremony at Dover, and offer a prayer at the side of an Arlington 
Cemetery grave for a patriot who left this world too young.
    Not one day will pass when I won't think of the brave souls who 
fight for our freedom.
    If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I'll always keep 
our troops foremost in my mind . . . that I will be a careful, 
accountable steward of our national resources . . . that we will have 
the strongest national defense in the world . . . and that you'll 
always have my best and candid advice. To be free, we must be secure. 
That is my pledge to you if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

    Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for a 
powerful, moving, and a very straightforward statement.
    We have standard questions, which we ask of nominees before 
we take turns at asking our own questions, and I will put those 
questions to you now.
    Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations 
governing conflicts of interest?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your 
personal views, even if those views differ from the 
administration in power?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken 
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the 
confirmation progress?
    Mr. Panetta. No, I have not.
    Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with 
deadlines established for requested communications, including 
questions for the record in hearings?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses 
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from 
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, they will.
    Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and 
testify upon request before this committee?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents, 
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a 
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or 
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    I think what we will do is we will be here all morning, and 
then we will have a break for lunch. Then we are going to go 
into a classified session this afternoon.
    Let us start with a 7-minute first round here for 
questions.
    Director Panetta, in answer to prehearing questions, you 
said that you support the July 2011 date set by President Obama 
for the beginning of a process of transferring increasing 
responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan 
security forces and of drawing down U.S. forces from 
Afghanistan. President Obama recently said that the size of 
U.S. troop reductions from Afghanistan will be significant.
    Director Panetta, do you agree that the U.S. troop 
reductions from Afghanistan beginning in July should be 
significant?
    Mr. Panetta. I agree with the President's statement.
    Chairman Levin. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan 
soldiers and police today than there were in December 2009. The 
NATO training mission in Afghanistan is ahead of schedule in 
meeting the target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by this 
fall.
    In addition, a new target of 352,000 Afghan security forces 
by 2012 has been set to ensure that these forces have the 
specialized skills needed to sustain these units over the long 
term, and I very much support that decision. Do you agree, 
Director Panetta, that training and partnering with the Afghan 
army and police and getting those forces in the lead on 
operations is key to the success of our counterinsurgency 
strategy in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
    Chairman Levin. Now, Pakistani leaders deny being aware of 
the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. It is 
counterintuitive to believe that none of their leaders knew of 
it. But nonetheless, that is not my question.
    Pakistan's leaders are well aware and acknowledge their 
awareness of the sanctuaries in Pakistan by the Haqqani network 
and the Afghan Taliban down in Quetta. Now those people are 
attacking our troops, Afghan troops, coalition troops across 
the border in Afghanistan and then go back to their sanctuary 
in Pakistan.
    A recent Defense Department report called the extremist 
Haqqani network ``the most significant threat in eastern 
Afghanistan,'' and yet the Haqqanis continue to enjoy open safe 
haven across the border in Pakistan. I think this is a totally 
unacceptable situation. I am wondering if you agree, and if so, 
what should be done about it?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I share your concern with regards to 
the safe haven in Pakistan, particularly as it relates to 
groups like the Haqqanis. I have strongly urged those in 
Pakistan to take steps to do whatever they can to prevent these 
kind of cross-border attacks and to prevent the safe havens 
that do exist on the Pakistani side of the border.
    This is a difficult challenge. The relationship with 
Pakistan is at the same time one of the most critical and yet 
one of the most complicated and frustrating relationships that 
we have. It is extremely critical in that we are conducting a 
war against our primary enemy in the FATA in their country.
    It is critical because supply lines, vital supply lines go 
through their country. It is critical because they are a 
nuclear power, and there is a danger that those nukes could 
wind up in the wrong hands.
    At the same time, it is very complicated, complicated by 
the fact that they maintain relationships with certain 
terrorist groups, that they continue to not take aggressive 
action with regards to these safe havens, and that their 
concern about the sovereignty results in criticism of the 
United States when, in fact, my view is that the terrorists in 
their country are probably the greatest threat to their 
sovereignty.
    Having said all of that, we have to maintain the 
relationship. We have to do everything we can to try to 
strengthen that relationship so that both of us can work to 
defend both of our countries.
    Chairman Levin. Director Panetta, as I mentioned in my 
opening statement, the President has called for $400 billion in 
reductions to national security spending over the next 12 
years. Now do you have any understanding of the proposed 
breakdown of that $400 billion as to how much he is proposing 
for reductions in Pentagon spending, how much in intelligence 
spending, the intelligence organizations, and how much he is 
proposing to reduce in the Homeland Security Department?
    Mr. Panetta. No, I do not.
    Chairman Levin. Can you try to find that out for us? 
Because we need to find that out, and give us an answer for the 
record.
    Mr. Panetta. I will certainly ask whether or not that 
decision has been made.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The administration has not made final decisions concerning the 
specific details on the $400 billion reduction.

    Chairman Levin. Do you know whether we are going to receive 
a budget amendment for the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget?
    Mr. Panetta. I do not know the answer to that.
    Chairman Levin. All right. On the question of torture, you, 
in your answers to the committee's prehearing policy questions, 
said the following, ``I will ensure that all interrogations 
conducted by DOD personnel are conducted consistent with the 
Army Field Manual and in accord with the Geneva Conventions.''
    My question, is waterboarding consistent with the Army 
Field Manual and the Geneva Conventions?
    Mr. Panetta. I have taken the same position as the 
President of the United States. I believe that waterboarding 
crosses the line, the use of that tactic with regards to 
interrogations. The President outlawed the use of that, plus 
other enhanced interrogation techniques, in an Executive order 
that he issued when he first came into the presidency.
    Chairman Levin. I need to switch gears here on you a lot 
because time requires that we do that. Senator Webb and I 
recently went to Okinawa, Guam, and Senator Webb was in Korea 
before. Senator McCain obviously has great personal experience 
in this area as well. Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I 
proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa and Guam. We urged 
a review of the plans in Korea because we believe that the 
current plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.
    Then, independently, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) concluded that the cost of these military realignments 
are higher than expected and in many cases largely unknown, a 
highly critical GAO report of this direction that we are 
currently moving. I am wondering whether or not you are 
familiar with this issue. If confirmed, in any event, whether 
you are familiar with these issues or not in those three 
places, will you agree to review this matter and work with us 
to find a solution that helps advance our strategic objectives 
in the region.
    Because we have strategic objectives in the region, but 
they are currently unaffordable. They are unknown in terms of 
cost. Would you be willing to review this matter and to work 
with us?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will, Senator. You discussed this with 
me when I met with you, and also Senator Webb discussed his 
concerns about that area. I agree with you that it is a very 
important strategic area for the United States. We do have to 
maintain a presence there.
    But there are a lot of issues to be resolved and worked on, 
and I look forward to working with you, Senator McCain, Senator 
Webb, and others to try to determine what the best and most 
cost-effective approach would be.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    Senator McCain.
    Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Director Panetta.
    What is your assessment of the battlefield situation in 
Afghanistan since we inaugurated the surge?
    Mr. Panetta. I think the assessment is that we have made 
progress with regards to security in that country. Albeit 
fragile and reversible, I nevertheless believe that progress 
has been made to try to advance security.
    We also have made good progress in training the forces 
there in Afghanistan, both their police and military force. I 
think the area where, frankly, greater progress needs to be 
made is on the governance side, to try to ensure that they 
improve their governance so that, ultimately, they can take 
responsibility for that country.
    Senator McCain. When you point out that it is fragile and 
reversible, I think that is absolutely accurate. So you would 
agree with Secretary Gates' repeated statements that 
withdrawals in July should be modest?
    Mr. Panetta. I agree that they should be conditions based, 
and I am going to leave it up to Secretary Gates, General 
Petraeus, and the President to decide what that number should 
be.
    Senator McCain. If you are the Secretary of Defense when 
that decision is made, obviously, you will have significant 
influence. You just came from a position where you have a very 
good assessment of the military situation. I think it is not 
inappropriate for you to answer when I ask if you agree with 
Secretary Gates' assessment that the withdrawal should be 
modest.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will have to, 
obviously, arrive at a decision myself that I will have to 
ultimately present to the President. But I am not in that 
position now, and that decision really does rest with General 
Petraeus, Secretary Gates, and the President.
    Obviously, I have tremendous admiration for Secretary 
Gates. He and I pretty much walk hand-in-hand on these issues. 
But with regards to specific numbers, I just am not going to--
--
    Senator McCain. I wasn't asking for specific numbers. On 
the subject of Iraq, if the Iraqi Government and all its 
elements agree that there should be a residual U.S. military 
presence in Iraq, particularly in three areas--air defenses, 
intelligence capability, and security in the areas around 
Kirkuk and that part of Iraq where there has been significant 
tensions--would you agree that that would be a wise thing for 
us to do?
    Mr. Panetta. I believe that if Prime Minister Maliki and 
the Iraqi Government requests that we maintain a presence 
there, that ought to be seriously considered by the President.
    Senator McCain. Do you think it would be in our interest to 
do that, given the situation?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have to tell you, there are 1,000 
al Qaeda that are still in Iraq. We saw the attack that was 
made just the other day. It, too, continues to be a fragile 
situation, and I believe that we should take whatever steps are 
necessary to make sure that we protect whatever progress we 
have made there.
    Senator McCain. Do you know of anyone of authority either 
in Congress or in the administration who believes that we 
should send ground troops into Libya?
    Mr. Panetta. I haven't met anybody yet who supports that. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator McCain. I haven't either. Nor do I. In fact, I 
think it would be a great mistake.
    Do you believe that it is a proper role of Congress to 
restrict the powers of the President of the United States to 
act? In other words, you and I were around when there was a 
vote for cutoff of funds for Vietnam. Whether that was right or 
wrong, that was the appropriate role of Congress.
    Does it worry you if Congress begins to tell the Commander 
in Chief as to exactly what he can or cannot do, what the 
President can or cannot do in any conflict?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I believe very strongly that the 
President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to 
take steps that he believes are necessary to protect this 
country and protect our national interests. Obviously, I think 
it is important for Presidents to consult, and to have the 
advice of Congress. But in the end, I believe he has the 
constitutional power to do what he has to do to protect this 
country.
    Senator McCain. I agree. In 2007, the last time we went 
through a very serious crisis, it was concerning whether we 
should withdraw from Iraq or not, and I see some parallels as 
the rising and understandable war-weariness of the American 
people continues to be manifested.
    One of the things that we did at that time was set up some 
benchmarks that we expected to be met by both the Iraqis and 
the United States. As I recall, there was 13 or a number of 
those. Over time, most of those benchmarks were met.
    Don't you think it would be appropriate for us to do the 
same thing as far as Afghanistan is concerned? We can measure 
progress by certain metrics, and I think it would be important 
in order to gain or keep the confidence of the American people 
that we should set up some benchmarks for progress, both in 
Afghanistan and as far as Pakistan is concerned, since we are 
sending billions of dollars of taxpayers' money to Pakistan as 
well.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we all know what the 
fundamental goal here is to try to develop a stable enough 
Afghanistan that it will never again become a safe haven for al 
Qaeda or----
    Senator McCain. My specific question is----
    Mr. Panetta.--for other terrorists.
    Senator McCain.--would you agree----
    Mr. Panetta. But with regards to achieving that goal, I 
think that working with the administration, working with the 
President, working with the Secretary of Defense, establishing 
some of those areas where we need to make progress and 
identifying those, I think that is something that would be 
worth pursuing.
    Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank you for your service, 
and I thank you for your willingness to continue to serve.
    My time has expired. But one of the biggest problems that I 
see--and I apologize, Mr. Chairman--but is this whole issue of 
acquisition. We have terrible out-of-control costs for 
literally every weapon system that we have acquired in the last 
10 years that I know of.
    I believe you have a good team there in the Pentagon. I 
think that Mr. Carter is doing a good job. But we are going to 
have to get our arms around this. We cannot afford aircraft 
that double and triple the original estimated costs and don't 
meet the timelines that are set up. The F-35 is just the most 
outstanding example.
    I know you will make this as one of your highest 
priorities. It is simply not affordable for us to continue 
business as usual the way we acquire weapons today. It may 
require some really fundamental changes in addition to the 
legislation that we have already passed to try to address this 
issue.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank you, sir.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you fully on 
that issue.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you. He speaks, I think, for our 
entire committee in saying that, and I think it is also clear 
you have the background to really do something about it and to 
dig into it.
    Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
    Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Panetta, thank you for answering the call to serve 
your country again. I have the greatest confidence in your 
ability and your principles.
    I love the quote from your father. Our fathers must have 
come out of the same cloth, which is to value the freedom that 
America provides is our unique and distinguishing contribution 
to governance, but to understand that without security, there 
is no freedom. I can't think of anything I would rather hear 
from a nominee for Secretary of Defense than that.
    I want to begin with a few quick questions about Iran. Do 
you agree that the Islamic Republic of Iran is working very 
hard to develop a nuclear weapons capability?
    Mr. Panetta. Our concern with Iran is that they continue to 
try to develop some kind of nuclear capability. As to whether 
or not they have made certain decisions as to how far they 
should go, those are questions that I would probably have to 
address in another forum. But there is no question that they 
continue to work to try to develop some kind of nuclear 
capability.
    Senator Lieberman. Right. Also, to the best of your 
knowledge, is the Islamic Republic of Iran working to develop 
increased capacities in intercontinental ballistic missile 
systems to deliver nuclear or other weapons?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Senator Lieberman. As I am sure you know, there has been a 
lot of both diplomatic and economic sanctions work being done 
to attempt to discourage Iran's nuclear ambitions and really to 
end them. However, as President Obama has said, all options 
have to remain on the table.
    I wanted to ask you whether, as Secretary of Defense, you 
will consider it to be one of your responsibilities to have 
credible military plans to strike and destroy Iran's nuclear 
facilities if the President, as Commander in Chief, decides 
that it is necessary to use that option?
    Mr. Panetta. I think in line with the President's statement 
that we should keep all options on the table, and that would 
obviously require appropriate planning.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
    Let me go to Afghanistan and see if I can approach it this 
way. I thought the President made not only a correct, but a 
courageous decision in 2009 in deciding to raise the number of 
our forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 plus, a so-called 
Afghanistan surge. At the time, the statement was made that we 
would begin to draw those troops down around July of this year, 
2011.
    There was a lot of anxiety in the region, particularly in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and beyond, about whether that was the 
beginning of a kind of early withdrawal and, again, a retreat 
from the region. Discussions were had, particularly between us 
and the Afghans, and President Obama settled with President 
Karzai, as you well know, on a plan that will begin the 
transition around July of this year. But the goal is to remove 
effectively all of our forces, unless there is a mutual 
agreement to the contrary before then, by the end of 2014.
    You have said today and in the answers to the questions we 
submitted earlier that you thought we were making measurable 
progress. The American military are making measurable progress 
in Afghanistan, but that the progress was reversible. Rather 
than asking you to adopt an adjective that someone else has put 
on it, is it fair to say that the standard you would apply to 
the drawdown of American forces that would begin in July of 
this year, is it that it not be so great as to risk the gains 
we have made, which, as you have said, are reversible?
    Mr. Panetta. There is no question we ought not to take any 
steps that risks the gains that have been made, and I have 
great confidence, frankly, that General Petraeus and Secretary 
Gates and the President will make the right decision in a 
transition that has to take place going towards 2014.
    Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say that if you are 
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, that the goal that you see 
is to turn responsibility for security of Afghanistan over to 
the Afghans at the end of 2014 and not to jeopardize our 
capacity to do that before then?
    Mr. Panetta. No, that is absolutely correct. At the Lisbon 
conference, 48 nations plus President Karzai made the decision 
that there would be a transition going towards 2014, and it 
would be then that, hopefully, we would be able to transfer 
responsibility. We ought to do nothing that jeopardizes that 
path.
    Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Let me just briefly 
read you what Secretary Gates said this weekend in Afghanistan. 
``I think that once you have committed, that success of the 
mission should override everything else because the most costly 
thing of all would be to fail.''
    Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
    Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answers to those 
questions.
    Let me move to another part of the world. I think at the 
end of the last century, if you asked most people up here and 
in the Defense Department, State Department, et cetera, CIA, 
what would be our focus in this century, they probably would 
have said that the Asia-Pacific region would be the strategic 
center of gravity of the 21st century.
    We were obviously and necessarily distracted by the attack 
on us on September 11, and I think we have responded with 
remarkable courage and effectiveness. But I think that the 
Asia-Pacific remains the strategic center of gravity for the 
21st century.
    As I think you know and those of us who have been there 
recently have found, there is an anxiety among our friends in 
Asia about, one, China's growing military capabilities and, 
two, about America's staying power and commitment to the 
region. I wanted to give you an opportunity to speak to that 
anxiety that, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, 
notwithstanding the budget pressures on the U.S. Government, 
would our strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, in 
your opinion, continue to be a national security priority?
    Mr. Panetta. Absolutely. I think that region is very 
important to us from a strategic point of view. We have to 
maintain a presence in the Pacific arena. I think we also, in 
line with that, have to maintain a relationship with China. 
Building that kind of relationship for the 21st century, I 
think, is extremely important.
    Obviously, there are concerns, concerns about some of the 
things they are doing in modernizing their military. At the 
same time, I think we have to be able to work with them in 
terms of scale and transparency so that we are working together 
and not in opposition to one another in order to make sure that 
we protect the security of that region.
    Senator Lieberman. But in your watch as Secretary of 
Defense, you certainly don't anticipate any withdrawal or 
retreat of America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and 
our allies there?
    Mr. Panetta. Not at all. Not at all.
    Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
    Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Panetta, thanks for your willingness to continue 
to exhibit great public service.
    As you and I have had the privilege of working together for 
many years now since I was a freshman member of the House, and 
you were a member of the Clinton administration. We don't need 
to talk about how many years that has been. But I respect your 
service and value our friendship.
    I would just say that I know you will be the first to 
credit the many hard-working and very professional men and 
women in the intelligence and military community that led to 
the successful takedown of bin Laden, and you would be right to 
do that. But the fact is without strong leadership at the top, 
that mission would not have been successful. I give a lot of 
the credit for that mission to you, and it is well deserved.
    You and I had the opportunity to talk about the issue of 
rising healthcare costs in the DOD budget when we visited a 
couple of weeks ago. I noticed you had several questions on 
that issue in your advance policy questions, and I appreciate 
your responses.
    I don't have a question on this. But as the chairman said 
earlier, you are going to have a very difficult job when it 
comes to trying to find savings and become more efficient at 
DOD. There is no bigger expense, at least from the standpoint 
of increasing annually, than the healthcare costs.
    I just want to reemphasize the fact that this is an 
extremely important issue, and we need to get our arms around 
it. I look forward to working with you. I encourage you to 
continue to think creatively about how we can bring these costs 
down without negatively impacting the quality of service to 
those who depend on that system.
    I want to go back to the line that Senator McCain was 
addressing on Afghanistan. Regarding the troop withdrawals, I 
think it is clear from an operational perspective that the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops at this point makes no sense. It may 
make sense from a domestic political perspective. It may make 
some level of sense in terms of waking up the Afghans to the 
fact that we are not going to be there forever, and they need 
to step up to the plate.
    But I am concerned that a significant withdrawal of U.S. 
forces will reverse the progress that we have made in 
Afghanistan and that the Afghans have made. I am glad to see 
you say in your responses to questions that you ``support a 
responsible, conditions-based withdrawal''. However, I would 
prefer there to be no withdrawal until it is clear that the 
gains that we have made will not be reversed.
    My question for you is, as we withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan, if it becomes clear from an operational 
perspective that the withdrawal is negatively affecting 
progress and stability, will you advise the President that the 
withdrawal should be stopped and that, if necessary, additional 
U.S. forces be sent back to Afghanistan?
    Mr. Panetta. As I have said and as the President has said, 
and the Secretary has emphasized, this has to be a conditions-
based withdrawal. That means you look at the conditions on the 
ground as it proceeds, obviously, we need to do everything we 
can to try to stay, hopefully, on target with regards to the 
2014 date.
    But again, it is conditions based, and I think based on 
what changes take place, then obviously the President and the 
Secretary would have to make adjustments.
    Senator Chambliss. I would hope that from a conditions-
based standpoint, Leon, that you would give strong 
consideration to the safety and security of our soldiers. I 
know they are of number one importance to you.
    If withdrawal of troops puts our men and women in greater 
harm's way, I hope that we would make it conditions based and 
that we would cease the withdrawal. I hope that would be your 
recommendation to the President.
    Mr. Panetta. Yes.
    Senator Chambliss. Another issue that I want to bring up 
with you that we have discussed is the issue of tactical 
aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. Let me just say that 
several years ago, Secretary Gates made a push to place the 
future of tactical aviation on basically one weapon system, and 
that is the F-35.
    He argued that it had stealth and other advanced 
capabilities that made it the airplane of the future. However, 
at a recent hearing, last month Secretary Carter indicated, in 
fact, that DOD has taken money out of the F-35 program to buy 
fourth-generation fighters.
    Not only are these fourth-generation fighters costing 
billions of dollars, but they are going to be in the inventory 
for probably 20, 30 years, and we are going to be paying to 
maintain them at even a greater cost. Yet their utility is 
greatly limited against any kind of modern threat, and in my 
view, this does not seem to be a very good way to expend 
taxpayer dollars.
    What is your perspective on this issue? If confirmed, will 
you absolutely be committed to preserving U.S. supremacy and 
air dominance and ensuring our resources are spent most wisely 
towards that end?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I want to make sure that 
we have the very best in terms of our fighter planes, and I 
know the F-35 is a plane that is being developed as the next-
generation fighter. But I also know that there are extensive 
costs associated with how that plane is being developed, and I 
think we have to watch it very carefully.
    I want to assure you that one of my responsibilities, in 
line with what Senator McCain said, is to take a very hard look 
at all weapon systems to make sure that they are cost effective 
and that they are, in the end, providing the very best 
equipment our forces need.
    Senator Chambliss. What really concerns me about where we 
are with that program is exactly what Senator McCain alluded 
to. That is that we just seem to be out of control and that we 
keep moving the goalpost with contractors and then blaming 
contractors for an increase in cost, when, frankly, part of it 
is due to our inefficient management of the systems.
    If we are going to spend the kind of money that we are 
committed to spend on that fifth-generation fighter, because 
that is where we are headed, and we all know that. We have to 
have that airplane in the inventory. The decisions that are 
going to be made by you, as Secretary of Defense, relative to 
procurement, to acquisition, as well as to the testing of that 
airplane, are going to be critical.
    You bring a wealth of knowledge from that perspective from 
your years at OMB, as well as where you are today. Again, we 
look forward to dialoguing with you, between you and this 
committee on that issue as well as our other acquisition issues 
that are going to be before you.
    Let me ask you one other matter relative to Libya. I notice 
that you agree that the Gaddafi regime must go. How are we 
going to do it? Based on what we are doing today, from our 
participation in the NATO operation, how are we going to make 
that happen?
    Mr. Panetta. That is, as the President has said, the 
objective. It has to be done by a number of means.
    Number one, we are bringing strong economic sanctions 
against them. Number two, we are bringing strong diplomatic 
pressure against them. We have implemented embargoes and, more 
importantly, the work that NATO is doing, pursuant to the 
United Nations (U.N.) resolution.
    The NATO forces that are there are bringing tremendous 
pressure, I believe, on them, not only fighting obviously to 
protect civilians, but to implement the no-fly zone. But in 
addition to that, target the command and control elements of 
the regime. I think all of those factors have to continue in 
order to put pressure on Gaddafi.
    Frankly, I think there are gains that have been made. We 
have seen the regime weakened significantly. We have seen the 
opposition make gains both in the east and the west. I think 
there are some signs that if we continue the pressure, if we 
stick with it, that ultimately Gaddafi will step down.
    Senator Chambliss. Again, thanks for your service, and I 
look forward to continuing to work with you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Director, for your extraordinary public service, 
particularly in the last few months for your decisive and 
courageous advice to the President, which led to the successful 
raid against bin Laden. It would not have been as successful or 
as effective without your participation.
    Thank you personally for your friendship over many years.
    Let me return to the topic of Afghanistan. We are looking 
at a decision shortly that will be based on conditions on the 
ground. But it strikes me, and I think implicit in what you 
said in your testimony, that those conditions on the ground 
might be more relevant vis-a-vis Pakistan than Afghanistan.
    That, in fact, as long as the Government of Pakistan at 
least appears to see some of these terrorist groups on their 
soil as strategic assets and not liabilities, that our 
operations in Afghanistan are going to be very difficult.
    Going to the real conditions on the ground, your comment on 
whether those conditions are really more about Pakistan than 
Afghanistan, and whether our effort, our strategy, our focus 
has to be there as much as Afghanistan. I would also include in 
this context some type of regional dialogue, including 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Your comments, Mr. Director?
    Mr. Panetta. I would agree with that, Senator. I think it 
is pretty clear we can't succeed in Afghanistan if we are not 
succeeding in Pakistan in terms of controlling the safe havens 
and the cross-border operations. We have to work at both in 
order to ensure that we are able to stay on path with what we 
would like to achieve in Afghanistan.
    In addition to that, I agree with you this is a regional 
issue. To the extent that the countries in that region can work 
together and relate to each other instead of being suspicious 
of each other and creating the kind of dynamic that, frankly, 
has not been very helpful, I think it would be in the interest 
of peace in that region if we could get all three to continue 
to work together to advance the same goals.
    Senator Reed. One of the points that I believe your 
predecessor made--I, too, will join my colleagues in commending 
him for exemplary service. Indeed, one of the challenges you 
have is following an extraordinarily talented, successful, and 
decent human being. You will do it, I know. But you have a 
challenge.
    Secretary Gates pointed out how important non-DOD 
operations were at the Department of State, and agricultural 
programs at the Department of Agriculture. Now we are getting 
also into the spectrum of these violent climate episodes 
throughout the globe of scientists in the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration and others. Yet there is a real 
danger here that those budgets might suffer.
    In terms of Afghanistan, my colleagues on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee yesterday released a report 
criticizing the build stage in the operation. Can you comment 
upon that partnership and how critical it is?
    Again, when we look ahead at the conditions on the ground, 
we could be successful interdicting terrorist groups, seizing 
caches of weapons, even interdicting transmissions from 
Pakistan. But if there is no political capacity or governmental 
capacity, healthcare, education, or anything, we are going to 
still have a population that is disgruntled and probably 
destructive towards us.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I agree with what you have said. It 
has to be a whole-of-government approach as we deal with these 
issues. Clearly, the State Department plays a very important 
role in providing assistance to individuals to ensure that an 
area remains secure: the education area. The Justice Department 
provides assistance. The area of agriculture also provides 
important assistance.
    I know DOD is our primary military weapon in terms of 
securing areas. But if we don't follow it up with these other 
important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these 
countries.
    Senator Reed. Let me change topics for a moment. It strikes 
me that I am old enough to remember when there were three 
dimensions of conflict--air, land, and sea. I did some land 
stuff and technically air because I jumped out of airplanes.
    But there is a whole new dimension, cyber. I don't think we 
know enough yet to be fully prepared, fully conversant. But can 
you comment briefly on the strategy that you will try to 
develop? I presume that strategy will involve some deterrence, 
preemption, offense, and defense. As was just indicated, there 
is a policy now within the context of the rules of war, what 
would constitute some type of casus belli?
    I think you are stepping in at a critical moment where we 
are just beginning to develop a strategy for a new dimension of 
warfare that we have never really confronted yet, and your 
leadership will be critical.
    Mr. Panetta. There is no question that the whole arena of 
cyber attacks, developing technologies in the information area 
represent potential battlefronts for the future. I have often 
said that there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl 
Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack that 
cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our 
financial systems, and our governmental systems.
    This is a real possibility in today's world. As a result, I 
think we have to aggressively be able to counter that. It is 
going to take both defensive measures as well as aggressive 
measures to deal with it. But most importantly, there has to be 
a comprehensive approach in Government to make sure that those 
attacks don't take place.
    I have a huge responsibility, if confirmed in this new 
position, in dealing with the cyber area through the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and others. My goal would be to work very 
closely with them and with others to develop not only the 
capability, but also the law that I think we need to have in 
order to determine how we approach this challenge in the 
future.
    Senator Reed. Just a final topic, and really echoing what 
Senator McCain said, Senator Chambliss, and others, is that 
there is an acquisition bow wave coming, as you recapitalize 
and innovate our military forces, and that has been pushed off 
a bit. It has been deferred a bit, but it is coming.
    One of the aspects, as Senator Chambliss pointed out, is 
that it is not simply the sheer number of systems that we have 
to buy--land, sea, air, and others--it is the price tag on each 
one of these systems. I know Secretary Carter has been working 
very hard to make affordability part of the design. But all of 
those efforts are going to be absolutely necessary because 
there will be no room within even a generous budget to do 
everything that has to be done unless we make significant 
progress in that area. Just your comments again, Mr. Director.
    Mr. Panetta. In the briefings that I have had, it is 
obvious that this is an area that we have to pay a lot of 
attention to because of the efficiencies, because of 
competition, because of the nature of expanding contracts that 
have taken place there.
    We have seen these weapon systems grow in cost. It takes an 
extraordinary amount of time to field a system--from the 
beginning of moving that kind of weapon system to the time it 
is finally developed, finally deployed, it almost becomes 
outdated. We have to improve that process.
    I know Congress has taken steps in that arena, but I look 
forward to working with you and with the members of this 
committee to take greater steps to make sure we are looking at 
every possible efficiency in the procurement arena in order not 
only to save dollars, but to make sure we are getting better 
equipment as a result of it.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Director.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Brown.
    Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good to see you again, sir. I appreciate you taking time 
with me yesterday, I look forward to voting to confirm you.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
    I echo a lot of the same thoughts that my colleagues do 
regarding the cross-border operations, the tremendous amount of 
aid we give to Pakistan, $4 billion, I think, give or take. I 
have deep concerns that as we try to move forward with 
completing our mission and bringing our men and women home from 
Afghanistan that we are having these areas where you have the 
safe havens, yet we are giving them billions of dollars in aid.
    It is either you are with us or you are not? Either you are 
helping or you are not. Is there an effort and/or what is your 
position with regard to carrying that message that people like 
me and others in Congress are getting a little bit frustrated 
with that duplicity?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I want to assure you that Secretary 
Clinton; Chairman Mike Mullen, who meets with them regularly; 
myself; my deputy, who was just there; have all made the same 
point that we need to have their cooperation, we need to have 
their partnership in confronting what, frankly, is a common 
enemy here.
    Terrorism just isn't our problem. It is their problem. They 
are the subject of attacks every day from terrorists. It is in 
their interest to try to take greater action to control 
terrorism within their borders, and I think they have to 
recognize that we expect in a relationship and a partnership 
that it is a two-way street, that it isn't just one way. It has 
to be two ways if we are going to protect both of our 
countries.
    Senator Brown. Right. I mean, the fact that bin Laden was 
there. Clearly, if they didn't know he was there then--I, quite 
frankly, don't believe them. But I am hopeful that message 
continues very strongly. I know when I went over there, I 
conveyed that same message as well.
    If you are walking down the hallway and a media group grabs 
you and says, ``Sir, what is the mission in Afghanistan?'' What 
is your response? When I go back home, what should I convey to 
the people back in Massachusetts as to now that, obviously, we 
have made progress there? We have done A, B, C, and D. What 
should I convey and what do you convey, sir, in your everyday 
conversations, what is the mission in Afghanistan right now?
    Mr. Panetta. The fundamental mission in Afghanistan is to 
provide sufficient stability so that country never again 
becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or al Qaeda's militant 
allies. I think that is the fundamental mission.
    Senator Brown. Is it your plan to achieve that mission by 
setting benchmarks that will hopefully be attained so we can 
step back and bring our men and women home? Let me ask you that 
first.
    Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that 
there are goals that we are continuing to work on. We need to 
weaken the Taliban. We need to develop the force structure in 
Afghanistan with the police and the army so they can assume 
these responsibilities, and we need to develop the governance 
system there so that it can provide greater security for the 
future. Each of these areas has to be focused on in order to 
arrive at our goal.
    Senator Brown. Is it your opinion that there is a will in 
Afghanistan with the people and the government folks there to 
do that, to ultimately be self-sufficient?
    Mr. Panetta. I think there is. I think in the discussions I 
have had there, I think they really do want their country to 
succeed. It is not always easy. This is a tribal society. It is 
not a simple thing to be able to work together.
    Senator Brown. You have the tribal society, then you have 
the central government. There is very little interaction.
    Mr. Panetta. It is not easy. It is difficult. Yet, I think 
they understand that, ultimately, this is their country, and 
they are going to have to provide the security in their 
country.
    Senator Brown. I am also deeply concerned and I am hopeful 
that you will look at it, we keep hearing reports that monies 
that we are providing are going ultimately to terrorists and 
ultimately being used against our men and women that are 
serving. Is that something you have a comment on?
    Mr. Panetta. I think we have to continually oversee that 
and make certain that doesn't happen. I don't deny that there 
has been corruption in that country, and I think we have to 
ensure that one of their responsibilities as a government is to 
make sure that doesn't happen.
    Senator Brown. Just to shift gears a little bit, what is 
happening in Egypt and that region of the world, obviously, 
people are hopeful that they are having an opportunity to share 
in the freedoms and privileges that we and other countries like 
us have. Yet there is also deep concern about voids that may be 
left after these transitional periods.
    For example, in Egypt, we have given them billions of 
dollars, and they have purchased billions of dollars of 
military equipment and the like. They have upcoming elections 
at some point. Depending on who gets in power, they still have 
the equipment. They still are receiving aid.
    I am concerned about Israel and its safety and security. I 
am concerned about other parts of that region. What are your 
thoughts on the relationship with Israel, the transition we are 
seeing over in the Middle East?
    Mr. Panetta. We will and have to continue to maintain a 
strong relationship with Israel and that part of the world, and 
we have to reach out to other nations in that part of the world 
as well if we are going to ultimately preserve peace in that 
region.
    This is an area that is in great turmoil now. I think you 
have just commented on that. A lot of these countries are going 
through turmoil--Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen. There 
are a number of countries that are dealing with uncertainty.
    I think the United States has to, on a case-by-case basis, 
work with each of these countries to ensure that they reduce 
the violence, to ensure that they are recognizing some degree 
of universal rights, and that they are implementing economic 
and political reform. That is not going to be easy. There are 
tremendous changes going on, but we have to play a role in what 
is developing in the so-called ``Arab spring''.
    I think the President spoke to that. The fact is that if we 
don't, there are other countries in that region like Iran that 
are going to try to influence what takes place. We can't afford 
for that to happen.
    Senator Brown. Thank you, sir. Good luck.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
    Senator Akaka.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to say aloha and welcome to Director Panetta, who is 
a dear friend and a former colleague. We have so many things 
that we can talk about, but I want to tell you, Director 
Panetta, that I am really impressed with your opening 
statement. What else can I say, as we consider a person who was 
nominated by the President to be Secretary of Defense who will 
be a tireless advocate of our military and will bring about 
support and sustain them?
    For me, this is great and that this will be in your 
thoughts and prayers and supported by your dad's principles of 
having a free country and a country that is secure and that you 
would continue to bring strong discipline and national defense 
for our country. With all of this, I want to wish you well and 
tell you that you certainly have my support.
    As we discussed, you will face significant challenges, if 
confirmed. The men and women of the Armed Forces have served 
with honor and resolve in two major conflicts that have taken a 
tremendous toll on our Armed Forces. We must do all we can to 
care for them. Fulfilling this sacred obligation is dependent 
on DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) cooperation.
    I am glad that you stated in your advance policy questions 
that you would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with 
the VA to support servicemembers and their families, and we 
talked about working on a seamless transition between DOD and 
the VA. With this, as you carry on into the position of 
Secretary, you certainly have my support.
    Director Panetta, if confirmed, what will be your top 
priorities as you look to care for men and women in uniform and 
their families?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, my first and foremost 
priority is to protect this country, but I can't do it unless 
we have good fighting men and women who are willing to put 
their lives on the line in order to defend this country. I 
think we owe it to them as a result of that, and we certainly 
owe it to their families, to make sure that we are doing 
everything possible to meet their needs.
    I think, obviously, providing the kind of healthcare, 
providing the benefits, providing the counseling that is 
necessary, particularly for wounded warriors, making sure that 
they can transition to the VA in a seamless way, all of these 
are areas that I have to pay attention to because I have seen 
it firsthand that these kids are out there. They are, indeed, 
putting their lives on the line, and we have asked them to go 
there time and time again.
    We have to make sure that they know that they are fully 
supported in this effort. It is going to be my job, if 
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to ensure that we are 
providing those benefits. Obviously, I want to work with people 
like yourselves that have been working at this for a long time 
to make sure that we are covering all of their needs.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you.
    I am impressed as you did tell us just about five steps of 
what you are planning to do and have social reforms. I thought 
it was unique where you want the Service Chiefs and the 
Secretaries to work together and share their concerns as well 
and that you want to work on the Pentagon management, which I 
think is so important as well. This is also important, to 
regard Congress as a partner and to work with Congress as well, 
and then to deal with the challenge of nations that are rising 
and changing, as you mentioned.
    Director Panetta, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 
required DOD to prepare financial statements, which were found 
ultimately unreliable. In 2010, the National Defense 
Authorization Act requires the Department to provide auditable 
financial statements by 2017. I believe in accountability, and 
I know you do, too. We owe the American people complete and 
accurate financial information from the Pentagon.
    Additionally, accurate books would allow Pentagon leaders 
to make better-informed decisions in a resource-limited 
environment. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the 
Department meets these requirements?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I was concerned in finding out that 
the Department would not be able to achieve full auditability 
until something like 2017. I understand how areas of the budget 
developed, the American people should know that, obviously, 
there is auditing that does go on within each of these areas. 
But as a department, we should be able to audit that 
department.
    If I am confirmed, one of the first things I am going to do 
is to try to see if we can't take steps to try to improve on 
that timetable so that we can say to the American taxpayer that 
what we are spending on national defense is being fully 
audited.
    Senator Akaka. Director Panetta, DOD is one of the few 
departments that has recognized the importance of developing 
and maintaining its language and cultural awareness 
capabilities. A number of steps have been taken to improve 
these skills within the Department and across the country, such 
as leading the National Language Service Corps and coordinating 
its activities with other Federal agencies.
    What are your thoughts on the importance of cultural and 
foreign language capabilities within DOD?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I am a big believer in language 
training and getting our people equipped with the ability not 
only to speak the language, but to understand the culture of 
the countries that we are dealing with. I say that not only 
because I think it is good for each individual to be able to 
have that capability, but I have to tell you it is important to 
our national defense to have that capability.
    At the CIA, I have developed a requirement for analysts, 
for those that are operations officers to have a language 
capability. It makes them not only a better individual, it 
makes them a better intelligence officer to have that 
capability.
    I think at DOD, I think we need to also encourage greater 
language training so that they understand not only the 
language, but the culture of the countries that they are 
involved with. Having that capability makes us much better at 
doing our job.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
    Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for your leadership 
and distinguished record of service to our country.
    I wanted to ask you, the President's proposal starting in 
2013 to cut $400 billion, do you agree with that proposal, and 
is it a realistic number in terms of preserving our national 
security?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I agree with the 
commitment of the President to try to take action to reduce the 
deficit and the number that he suggested. I do want to say that 
there is a comprehensive review that is going on that the 
President himself stated would take place, the Secretary has 
stated would take place.
    That comprehensive review is looking at a number of issues 
related to the Defense Department in order to determine what is 
the right pace, what are the right areas, what is the right 
transition in order to achieve that savings. I look forward to 
the results of that comprehensive review.
    Senator Ayotte. As a follow-up, you have certainly 
expressed your admiration for Secretary Gates, and I share that 
admiration for his service to our country. He has made some 
recent statements expressing concerns over the $400 billion 
proposal and I think, in fact, talked about it cutting into the 
meat, in terms of the muscle of our defense. Do you disagree 
with him on that front?
    Mr. Panetta. No, no. I share his concerns. I share his 
concerns about the possibility of hollowing out our force. I 
think that would be a terrible mistake. I share his concern 
about some kind of automatic, across-the-board cuts and just 
implementing some kind of formulaic approach to cutting defense 
when we have to look at each area and determine where we are 
going to achieve savings in order to protect defense.
    Obviously, I share those concerns. But what I want to do is 
to be able to look at that comprehensive review in order to 
make sure that none of the concerns that Secretary Gates has 
raised or that I am concerned about take place in seeking those 
reductions.
    Senator Ayotte. In conducting that review, when you get 
into the position of being the Secretary of Defense, if you 
disagree that $400 billion is a reasonable number and could 
jeopardize our national security, would you express your 
opposition to the President on that?
    Mr. Panetta. If the end result of that comprehensive review 
were to come to that conclusion, then obviously, I would share 
those concerns. I don't think it will, but I think that if 
there was something that indicated that our national defense 
would be impacted, obviously, I would share that with the 
President.
    Senator Ayotte. Director, I wanted to ask you about the CIA 
and interrogations. Does the CIA currently conduct 
interrogations of high-value targets or of terrorists or those 
that are captured?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, the way it works now is that when a 
high-value target is captured, there is a high-value detainee 
interrogation group (HIG) that comes together. That involves 
the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
CIA working as a team. They will go and interrogate an 
individual for intelligence as a team. It works pretty well, 
but that is the way it works now.
    Senator Ayotte. But just to clarify, does the CIA actually 
do the interrogations themselves? Meaning I understand what the 
HIG does, but as I understand it, the CIA has really--while 
participating in the HIG, has not been doing interrogations. Am 
I wrong on that?
    Mr. Panetta. Generally, the CIA individual there can ask 
questions. Generally, what is done is that they will share with 
each other what questions ought to be asked by the 
interrogator. That could be the Army individual. It could be 
the FBI. But every once in a while, the CIA individual asks 
questions as well.
    Senator Ayotte. Is there anything that prohibits the CIA 
from taking the lead in conducting interrogations under current 
policy?
    Mr. Panetta. The way the team works now is that, if it is 
someone where intelligence is the primary objective here, going 
after and trying to find that out, then the CIA individual 
becomes pretty central to the questions that are asked. That is 
the way it works now.
    In other words, if there is a real emphasis on that, that 
is one case. If it is an FBI case and they are looking at 
trying to prosecute that individual, then obviously FBI takes 
the lead. If it is a military case or individual that could 
involve follow-up on the military, then they would take the 
lead.
    It really works as a team. That is probably the best way to 
say it. It is a team, and they do it on a case-by-case basis.
    Senator Ayotte. Nothing currently prohibits the CIA from 
being the lead in conducting interrogations?
    Mr. Panetta. Nothing prohibits that from happening.
    Senator Ayotte. Okay. To your knowledge, does it happen 
now? I understand it is a team. But I am just trying to 
understand whether the CIA ever takes the lead.
    Mr. Panetta. It is not the direct interrogation that used 
to take place early on in this decade, but it is much more of a 
team approach right now, and that is the way it works.
    Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up with respect to the 
Detainee Treatment Act. Do you agree with all the provisions of 
the Detainee Treatment Act, including the provisions that 
provide legal authority regarding interrogations?
    Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I agree with the law, yes.
    Senator Ayotte. You talked about your view on 
waterboarding. Do you think that all of the enhanced 
interrogation techniques cross the line, I think, was what you 
used when you discussed waterboarding.
    Mr. Panetta. No, I don't have the same view with regards to 
all of the other enhanced techniques that I do with regards to 
waterboarding.
    Senator Ayotte. So, right now under the President's 
Executive Order, the interrogations are limited to the Army 
Field Manual. Is that right?
    Mr. Panetta. Correct.
    Senator Ayotte. You would agree that there are some 
enhanced interrogation techniques that don't necessarily cross 
the line but wouldn't be contained within the Army Field 
Manual. Is that right?
    Mr. Panetta. The enhanced techniques that were used early 
on have now been forbidden by the President's Executive order. 
It is the Army Field Manual that is the primary guide with 
regards to interrogations.
    Senator Ayotte. But to the extent that some of those 
techniques may be permitted under the Detainee Treatment Act, 
and would you necessarily disagree with the law contained 
within the Detainee Treatment Act?
    Mr. Panetta. If it is permitted under the Army Field 
Manual, then obviously, I would support that.
    Senator Ayotte. My time is up. I appreciate your answering 
my questions.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
    Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Panetta, thank you for your decades of public 
service and your willingness to step forward and extend that 
public service in this new position.
    You will inherit 10 years of war, budget belt-tightening, 
and two wars winding down, if confirmed. You will be tasked 
with reshaping DOD, including resetting its combat-weary units, 
drawing down the DOD budget, and taking care of the DOD members 
and their families. To say that is a set of tall orders is an 
understatement of giant proportions.
    With respect to Afghanistan, there has been quite a bit of 
discussion about the need for benchmarks to do authentic 
assessment of where we are in the transition to the Afghanistan 
capability of defending itself so that it can govern itself 
going forward. I have been a prime supporter of benchmarks, 
first with regard to Iraq and now with respect to Afghanistan 
as well.
    I am introducing legislation today that will require 
benchmarks to evaluate progress being made toward the 
transition of security responsibility to the Government of 
Afghanistan. The bill would call for the benchmarks on 
transition to be included as a part of the already-established 
reporting requirements for Afghanistan known by I think it was 
1230 and 1231 reports to make it consistent.
    I am encouraged by your discussion and your support of this 
method of evaluating progress by some form of metrics so that 
we are not in a gray area always about whether we are winning 
or we are losing or making progress. It gives us an opportunity 
to decide what level of progress have we made, what remains to 
be accomplished for us in that regard. I am encouraged by many 
of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle talking about the 
benchmarks as well.
    Because if we intend to transfer security responsibility to 
the Afghan Government by 2014, obviously, it is important to 
mark our progress. Do you have any preliminary thoughts as to 
the kinds of things you might look at as part of benchmarking 
that would help you evaluate conditions on the ground as to 
whether or not we are making satisfactory progress to where you 
can say we are 25 percent there, 50 percent there, or we have 
50 percent yet to go?
    Mr. Panetta. I think that to establish any metrics or 
guideposts here, it is very important that General Petraeus, 
that obviously our diplomatic leaders there, the administration 
participate in trying to identify those areas that are 
important.
    Levels of violence is an important area to look at. A 
district assessment that looks at each of the districts and 
tries to determine the stability in each of those areas. 
Clearly, an evaluation of the development of the Afghan army, 
police operation, and how they are performing. That is another 
important element. Obviously, the governance responsibilities 
within Afghanistan. I mean, those are all key areas that I 
think need to be evaluated.
    Senator Nelson. In your view, and it is obviously a unique 
view as Director of the CIA, can you give us some idea of what 
you think the impact of the death of Osama bin Laden might have 
on the campaign going forward in Afghanistan and keeping it 
from a safe haven for future al Qaeda operations?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, with regards to specific intelligence 
on that, that is probably more appropriate in another forum. 
But I think it is fair to say that the death of Osama bin 
Laden, there is no question that it impacted al Qaeda. He was 
the spiritual leader of al Qaeda, and I think it did impact on 
their capability. In addition to that, obviously, there are a 
number of operations that I think have impacted on their 
command and control capabilities as well.
    But having said that, they still remain dangerous, and they 
are dangerous with regards to the efforts they continue to work 
at in Pakistan. One of the concerns that I will share with you 
is that I think we do have to pay attention to these nodes that 
are developing where al Qaeda has moved some of its operations, 
places like Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Those are areas 
that I think we have to continue to focus on.
    So, yes, it has had an impact. Yes, I think it has weakened 
them. But they still remain dangerous, and we still have to go 
after them.
    Senator Nelson. I agree with you, and I appreciate that 
view.
    We have had a very touchy situation develop with respect to 
Pakistan in terms of what level of support Osama bin Laden may 
have had from anyone involved in the Pakistan Government. It is 
a complicated relationship, we understand. But the American 
people are really quite concerned about double dealing. You 
can't have a friend be your friend and your enemy at the same 
time. Your friend, but working against you.
    Do you think that the relationship with Pakistan is 
transparent enough at the present time? Is there something we 
can do so that the American public can make a better 
determination of that relationship that we share with the 
Government of Pakistan?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we have to continually work 
at that. We have to work at developing a relationship of trust 
with the Pakistanis. I don't know that we are totally there. I 
mean, there are some areas where, frankly, we have good 
discussions. We have good communications. But there are a 
number of areas where, frankly, we don't have that level of 
trust or communication capability.
    I think we have to work at that. We have to develop it 
because, as I have said, it is in the interest of both 
countries to have a trusting relationship because terrorism is 
an enemy not just for the United States. It is an enemy for 
Pakistan.
    Senator Nelson. Do you think that an internal investigation 
with some level of transparency within their government to try 
to determine responsibility for anyone who may have had 
involvement in trying to protect the presence of bin Laden in 
their country, that that will be fruitful? If it is fruitful, 
that it will be looked as credible by our Government first, but 
by the American people?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, at this point, we don't have any 
intelligence to indicate that there was any relationship here. 
But having said that, I do believe that the Pakistanis are 
conducting several investigations at different levels to try to 
investigate what took place, and I think probably would be 
important to see what the results of those investigations are.
    Senator Nelson. Thank you. Good luck in your new position, 
which you are about to achieve.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Director, I can't thank you enough for being willing to 
do this job after being CIA Director. I just think the 
President has put together an A-plus national security team, 
and you are one of the linchpins of that. So now, some hard 
questions. [Laughter.]
    You mentioned to Senator Nelson that you think the killing 
of bin Laden has created some momentum. I couldn't agree with 
you more. What to do with that momentum?
    The statement to me that it makes, there is no place you 
can go and no passage of time that will protect you from 
justice being delivered by the American people. I think that is 
a statement that needs to be made. But we also need to make 
another statement. You can count on America.
    My general belief is that this war is more complicated than 
killing terrorists. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes.
    Senator Graham. We have to make an equal investment in 
helping those who would fight the terrorists in their own 
backyard and be our partner. Don't you agree that takes more 
time, that it is more costly and, in many ways, more deadly to 
build up partnerships than just killing an individual?
    Mr. Panetta. It absolutely does take more time.
    Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the payoff is 
much more enormous if we can get it right?
    Mr. Panetta. Correct.
    Senator Graham. What happens if we lose in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Panetta. I think if we lose in Afghanistan, we not only 
create another safe haven for al Qaeda and for their militant 
allies, but I think the world becomes a much more threatened 
place because of that loss, particularly in that region.
    Senator Graham. I can't agree with you more. I think that 
is absolutely dead on.
    What do I tell a family in South Carolina who has lost a 
son or daughter in Afghanistan to an improvised explosive 
device (IED) that we know was made in Pakistan, and we can't do 
a damned thing about it? What do I tell them?
    Mr. Panetta. I think that is one of those situations that 
is frustrating and angering. One where we have to say to that 
family that we are not just walking away from that 
responsibility, but we are continuing to put pressure on those 
countries that are involved with that.
    Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I don't 
think, quite frankly, we are going to be able to sustain our 
efforts in Afghanistan until we deal with the safe havens. I 
trust you and General Petraeus to deliver that message.
    But on behalf of the people of South Carolina and I think 
most members of this committee, if you are listening in 
Pakistan, you need to choose. Because it is in your interest to 
help fight the people that would undermine Afghanistan, as well 
as Pakistan.
    I am all in for winning in Afghanistan and doing what we 
need to do in Iraq. But Pakistan needs to get with the program 
one way or the other.
    Now, the Pentagon itself. Do you agree that the general 
system we have today to buy weapons is that the longer it takes 
to develop a weapon and the more it costs, the more the 
contractor makes?
    Mr. Panetta. That is right.
    Senator Graham. Isn't that kind of stupid? [Laughter.]
    Mr. Panetta. Not for the contractor.
    Senator Graham. I mean, it really is. Yes, yes, yes. I 
don't blame the contractor. I blame us.
    What if we did this? What if we said to the contractors in 
the future, you are welcome to bid on major weapon systems, but 
why don't you share 25 percent of the development cost, and at 
the end of the day, we are going to have a fixed price, not a 
cost plus. If there are any overruns, you share in the 
overruns. Do you think that is some idea to at least consider?
    Mr. Panetta. I think that is a suggestion worth looking at.
    Senator Graham. Yes, I think it is, too. I think it would 
save us a lot of money. One thing I would like you to do is go 
back in the past, and if you had a cost-sharing arrangement, 
how much money would we have saved in the last 20 years if we 
had that arrangement versus the longer it takes, the more it 
costs, the more you make? I think it is a way to save money and 
actually get weapons done quicker.
    When it comes to Iraq, if the Iraqis ask us to provide some 
troops in 2012, Secretary Gates says he thinks that would be 
smart. Do you think that would be smart to say yes?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes.
    Senator Graham. Okay. Secretary Gates, do you agree that he 
has a pretty good view of what is going on in the world?
    Mr. Panetta. He sure does.
    Senator Graham. He has served our country in an 
extraordinary manner, I think. If he says 3,000 to 5,000 makes 
sense when it comes to July withdrawal in Afghanistan, would 
you give great consideration to that number?
    Mr. Panetta. I don't want to speculate on what the number 
is. But whatever Secretary Gates recommends----
    Senator Graham. Well, that is what he said. It is not 
speculation. He said 3,000 to 5,000 would be a wise move in 
July. Would you at least consider that request?
    Mr. Panetta. I think Secretary Gates' position, General 
Petraeus' position, obviously the President's position, all of 
that ought to be considered.
    Senator Graham. Would you agree that between all of us, 
that probably Gates and Petraeus have the best view of anybody 
that I know of, if I had to pick two people to ask?
    Mr. Panetta. They have a pretty good view.
    Senator Graham. I would put you on that list, too. Okay. 
Now, when it comes to Libya. If Gaddafi stays, what does that 
mean for our national security interests after we said he must 
go?
    Mr. Panetta. I think it impacts on our national security 
interests in the world if that happens.
    Senator Graham. Do you think it kills the Arab spring?
    Mr. Panetta. I think it sends a terrible signal to these 
other countries.
    Senator Graham. Do you think it tells the Iranians that you 
really don't have to fear America when it comes to developing 
nuclear weapons?
    Mr. Panetta. I think it tells them that our word isn't 
worth very much if we are not willing to stick to it.
    Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I can't 
wait to vote for you. [Laughter.]
    Now, when it comes to detainees, if we captured someone 
tomorrow in, say, Yemen or Somalia, some of these failed 
states, high-value target, where would we put them as far as a 
jail? Do we have a jail available to our Armed Forces?
    Mr. Panetta. Probably better than anyone here, the----
    Senator Graham. Can I tell you what Admiral Mullen said 
when I asked him that question?
    Mr. Panetta. Sure.
    Senator Graham. We don't have an answer for that question. 
Would you help me come up with an answer?
    Mr. Panetta. That is probably not a bad answer.
    Senator Graham. I think it is the truth. But do you think 
that is a smart policy, to be a nation without a jail in the 
war on terror?
    Mr. Panetta. I think we have to have facilities to be able 
to provide to detainment of these individuals. That is clear.
    Senator Graham. To the committee, we don't, and we need to 
find one. I think Guantanamo Bay is a good candidate because it 
is the only one left.
    Now, in 2014, everybody is focusing on a transition in 
Afghanistan. I think, if we do this smartly, we can transition. 
But I am very interested in making sure, as you said, 
Afghanistan never becomes a failed state.
    Secretary Gates said today, and he said in February when I 
asked him this question, that he believes that joint basing 
past 2014, where you would have American air power and 
counterterrorism units left behind in Afghanistan in a joint 
environment for training and counterterrorism, if the Afghans 
request it, would be a very good policy for us. Do you 
generally agree with that?
    Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that we 
have to make a long-term commitment to stability in that region 
not just now, but in the future.
    Senator Graham. Can I read you what Secretary Gates said to 
my question in February about joint basing?
    Mr. Panetta. Sure.
    Senator Graham. ``A security agreement with Afghanistan 
that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of 
joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism, 
and so on beyond 2014 I think would be very much in our 
interests.'' Do you think that is a reasoned statement?
    Mr. Panetta. I think that is worth looking at.
    Senator Graham. I do, too. Now, at the end of the day, you 
are taking over at a time when the budget for the Nation has 
never been more out of whack. We're in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Libya. You have a very big agenda to fulfill.
    At the end of the day, we are a war-weary Nation. What 
would you tell the American people in terms of the attitude we 
need to take as a country? Address their war weariness and tell 
them why, in your view, we should consider staying behind in 
Iraq, why we should consider a long-term relationship with 
Afghanistan. Why is it so important that we continue to stay in 
the fight after 10 years?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, it goes back to my father's 
statement. If you want to be free, you have to be secure. The 
only way to ensure that security is to be able to establish 
some kind of peaceful solution to these challenges abroad.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
    Senator McCaskill.
    Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I welcome you and thank you for your service and look 
forward to working and supporting you in every way possible.
    Obviously, part of our mission in counterinsurgency is to 
secure and stabilize and enhance the infrastructure, and I want 
to certainly commend to you and ask you to direct the folks 
that work with you to pay attention to some of the findings of 
the Commission on Wartime Contracting. They issued a report 
last Friday, and I think it is full of very basic common-sense 
information that seems to be escaping us in the area of 
contracting and contingency operations.
    That is two important factors. One on the front end is 
security, whether or not the security is available and 
appropriate in order to support the building of projects that 
we put a lot of money in. We saw this in Iraq over and over 
again, where we would build a power plant, we would work on an 
oil refinery, and then 2 months later it would be blown up. So, 
I think that security piece and, obviously, the cost of the 
security piece in order to build the projects needs to be taken 
into account.
    But the second one, and this report they came out with 
Friday is a really important report, Director, and that is 
sustainability. We have white elephants all over this part of 
the world, all brought to you courtesy of the American 
taxpayer. I will read you just one quote from this report. ``A 
project may be carefully planned, well executed, and 
economical, but become wasteful if the host nation cannot 
provide trained staff, afford parts or fuel, perform necessary 
maintenance, or produce intended outcomes.''
    We have one of these white elephants we spent $300 million 
on in Kabul, a power plant that was designed to be dual fuel, 
and Afghanistan made a commitment to us that they would fuel 
it. Now they say they can't afford the fuel. The fact that it 
is a dual fuel makes it complicated in terms of the technology. 
So, basically, it is now only being used as a backup, and 
Afghanistan is buying electricity from another country.
    This is a great example, but it can be replicated over and 
over again. I really think it is time--and I understand the 
mentality. I respect greatly General Petraeus and his 
strategies in terms of counterinsurgency, but what happens is 
there is this almost myopic focus. If we can build this 
project, we will put people to work. This is good. This is what 
counterinsurgency is all about.
    They don't think about what is it going to look like in 3 
or 4 years. Especially in Afghanistan, you and I discussed the 
sustainability questions in Afghanistan are particularly acute. 
This is not a nation that is ready to take over many things, 
including some of these projects that we are building.
    I really think that if we don't begin analyzing 
sustainability at the front end--and I am going to make a 
formal request to you that every project that is being built 
right now--whether it is a road, whether it is a healthcare 
center, whether it is a school--every project be analyzed right 
now for sustainability.
    If it is obvious it is not going to be sustained, I really 
believe you have to pull the plug. I mean, this is hundreds and 
tens upon billions of dollars have just gone down a rat hole 
because we didn't think about what happens when we are finished 
building it. I think it is really important.
    This is the hardest question, and you and I talked about 
this. What are the conversations that are ongoing and what is 
the planning that is ongoing about how Afghanistan, with their 
very meager gross national product (GNP), very meager GNP, how 
in the world do they afford what we are building them, both in 
the projects and, more importantly, this army that we are 
building for them?
    It is very difficult for me to figure out what happens to 
this army when we leave because they can't afford it.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, first of all, on your first point, I 
want you to know that if I am confirmed, I really do want to 
work with you closely with regards to the contracting issue in 
order to ensure sustainability. I share all of your concerns. I 
know why it has happened. I know how that has developed. But at 
the same time, I don't think we have paid enough attention to 
that issue, and I would like to work with you in trying to 
improve that whole aspect.
    With regards to the issue of Afghanistan, again, I share 
your concern about where are they going to draw the resources 
they need not only to sustain the army and the police force, 
but to be a country, to be able to carry on their 
responsibilities. I think that is going to be part of the 
governance challenge that we are going to face there is to 
ensure that, as a nation, they begin to develop the resources, 
develop the revenues that they need in order to be able to 
govern that country. That is going to be part of it. Otherwise, 
it is not going to work.
    Senator McCaskill. Is there a plan in place for short term 
and long term? Is there some kind of plan that is in the works 
that we will be putting I think it is $13 billion this year? 
What is the plan for 4, 5 years from now? Is there a plan that 
we will continue to spend upwards of $5 billion or $6 billion a 
year just keeping this army?
    We are building them an army with a size and scope that is 
beyond--they have never had an army, a national army in 
Afghanistan. So this is new, and is there planning going on, 
joint planning or anything else that would indicate how this is 
going to look 2, 3, 4 years down the line in terms of what we 
have built?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have not been fully briefed on what 
directly is being looked at in terms of that longer term. But 
let me get into that. If I am confirmed, I would like to look 
at that and then be able to give you a better answer.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The administration is working to ensure a successful transition to 
the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) having the lead 
responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
    We are making steady progress in developing the quantity, quality, 
and operational capacity of the ANSF. We remain on track to reach the 
envisioned end strength of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and 
157,000 Afghan National Police personnel. Our effort now include the 
development of logistical, engineering, communications, medical, and 
other enabling capabilities that the ANSF will need to support their 
own operations, as well as organic training and education capabilities 
they will need to sustain themselves by developing their future 
recruits. Our efforts also include the development of ministerial-level 
management and oversight capabilities necessary to lead and sustain the 
ANSF.
    Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing, 
active effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is 
collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF 
capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a 
continuing role for the United States and expect continued 
contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring, 
then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the 
International Security Assistance Force to contribute a combined 1 
billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
    Although international support for the ANSF will likely be required 
for some time to come, ultimately, Afghanistan must continue to 
increase its funding for its own security. This will depend on 
continued economic growth and governance in Afghanistan, which, in 
turn, will benefit from the security that a properly sustained ANSF can 
provide, as well as from the stabilizing effects that can result from a 
strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States and the 
continued presence of U.S. forces.
    As our plans evolve, we will engage you and congressional 
colleagues on the details of this challenging effort.

    Senator McCaskill. That is great. The only other topic is 
warning you that I will subject you to pop quizzes on the 
Wartime Contracting Commission's work. They have done some 
really good work. My colleague Senator Webb and I have worked 
very hard getting it established, and I think it is like many 
other commissions. Unfortunately, it is not getting enough 
attention, and really, where it needs to be front and center is 
going to be under your purview.
    I am hoping that you will make sure that your immediate 
staff is aware of its work and takes it to heart. Because we 
have an awful lot of lessons learned that we have never 
learned. I think it is really important, as we try to do things 
with less money.
    The only other issue I want to bring up with you today that 
I don't think has been discussed yet is just getting your 
commitment and your comments about what needs to be done and 
should be done as it relates to the problem of sexual assault 
within the military, women in the military that have had a 
great deal of difficulty accessing some sense of justice.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, we talked about that together in your 
office, and I totally share your concerns. We have to have zero 
tolerance for any kind of sexual assaults in the military, and 
we have to allow the victims of those sexual assaults the 
ability to be able to complain, to have those complaints 
listened to, and to have the evidence that is necessary to be 
able to establish those cases.
    There are a lot of steps that need to be taken, and I look 
forward to working with you and with others in the Department 
to make sure that we protect women, who have served so well in 
the military these days.
    Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much for your time here 
today. Most of all, thank you for loving your country so much 
that you are willing to take on this incredibly big, huge, and 
important responsibility.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
    Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
    Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Panetta, good to see you.
    Mr. Panetta. Nice to see you.
    Senator Cornyn. As you and I discussed in my office, and 
thank you for coming by recently to talk about some of my 
concerns with the financial management problems at DOD, I think 
most Americans would find it shocking that DOD is unable to 
produce timely, accurate, and complete information to support 
management decisions.
    As we also discussed, the law of the land requires DOD to 
be able to complete a clean audit by 2017. Again, I think that 
would be shocking to most people.
    But I appreciate your response on page 74 of your advance 
policy questions, the answers you submitted to our questions 
that you said achieving clean audit opinions would be one of 
your top management improvement priorities. Certainly, you have 
the background and experience to move the Department in that 
direction and to complete that requirement of the law.
    I am advised that the Marine Corps actually is doing a 
relatively good, compared to the other Services, job in this 
area, and they are experiencing a 3-to-1 return, on for every 
dollar they spend on improving financial management, actually 
getting a good return on that investment. I know that it may be 
the attitude, there may be strong institutional resistance at 
DOD--believe me, as many do and as I do--that their main job is 
to fight and win the Nation's wars, but that this is not a 
priority.
    But you know and I know, we all know, the budgetary 
pressures the Department and others are going to be under as we 
deal with this unsustainable debt and these huge deficits is 
important. I think this is important to me and I know important 
to you to make financial management reform one of your 
important priorities.
    Having said that, I would just ask you the straight-up 
question, do you agree with Secretary Gates when he said that 
the defense budget, however large it may be, is not the cause 
of the country's fiscal woes?
    Mr. Panetta. I agree with that. I think it isn't. It is by 
no means the cause of the deficits, the huge deficits that we 
are incurring today.
    Senator Cornyn. The President has requested $671 billion 
for fiscal year 2012. That is a lot of money, $671 billion. I 
know that there is going to be room for the Department to share 
in some of the budget cuts that are going to be on the table.
    But of course, as you and I have discussed, I hope that 
this is not seen as an opportunity for those who want to whack 
the Pentagon budget to do so in a way that will impair our 
ability to defend ourselves or protect our national security 
interests. I am sure you share that view as well, don't you?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
    Senator Cornyn. Let me just ask a question, you have the 
benefit of great experience and long experience with 
Government. But that also means you have a record that I want 
to ask you about. Of course, you were President Clinton's Chief 
of Staff and Director of OMB before that. You played a big role 
in the budget decisionmaking during the presidency of President 
Clinton, overseeing a major reduction in DOD procurement 
spending, including a 13.4 percent decline in fiscal year 1994.
    Some have called that a procurement holiday. Others have 
said we were cashing the peace dividend, even though we still 
had many threats to our country. I want to give you an 
opportunity, if you would, to explain your role in those cuts 
and whether you think they were deeper than they should have 
been or just please give us your perspective. Because, frankly, 
I hope we don't try to cash a peace dividend in 2012 while we 
are engaged in two and a half wars.
    Mr. Panetta. As Director of OMB, obviously, I was given the 
responsibility by the President to try to achieve significant 
savings as part of the economic plan that was adopted by 
Congress that, by the way, reduced the deficit by almost $500 
billion. I think that, plus other agreements that were made in 
the Bush administration and, ultimately, with the Republican 
Congress all contributed to our ability to achieve a balanced 
budget.
    Specifically, with regards to the defense area, my 
responsibility as OMB Director was to provide a number to the 
Defense Secretary and allow the Defense Secretary and those at 
the Defense Department to determine how best to try to achieve 
those savings. I do understand that was part of what they 
proposed.
    But looking at it in hindsight, it might not have been the 
best way to achieve those savings, but it was a decision that 
was made at the Defense Department.
    Senator Cornyn. Turning to Afghanistan, I know there is a 
lot of comment and favorable comment about your involvement, 
and I think you deserve credit for your part played in taking 
down Osama bin Laden. Congratulations to you and the 
President's national security team for that accomplishment.
    But I get the sense that people are sort of prematurely 
declaring that the fight is over because we have degraded al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan. I am glad to hear you point out that they 
have metastasized to other parts of North Africa and the 
region.
    But I just want to ask you in particular, I know there are 
other groups that may not be as familiar to Americans as al 
Qaeda, like Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups. Could you just 
talk a little bit about the Islamic jihadist groups that are 
out there that could easily morph into a threat as dangerous as 
al Qaeda?
    Mr. Panetta. There are a number of terrorist groups that 
are out there, Senator. Obviously, al Qaeda is the one that we 
are principally concerned about because they attacked this 
country, and they continue to plan to attack this country.
    But there are interrelationships that they have with other 
terrorist groups. The Haqqanis, for example, are a group that 
has relations with al Qaeda. They, in turn, obviously are 
conducting attacks in Afghanistan. There is a group called 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which is another group in the FATA 
that has relationships with al Qaeda that conduct attacks, not 
only plan attacks against us, but also have conducted attacks 
within Pakistan as well.
    There is Lashkar-e-Taiba which is a terrorist group that 
focuses on attacks largely in India but have been known to 
discuss attacks elsewhere as well.
    If you move to the area of Yemen, there, al Awlaki who is 
associated with al Qaeda, but nevertheless I think represents a 
real threat on his own because he is very computer oriented 
and, as a result of that, really does represent the potential 
to try to urge others, particularly in this country, to conduct 
attacks here. So that is a concern.
    We have Somalia, where al Shabaab operates in Somalia. 
Although it is primarily located in Somalia, we do have 
intelligence that indicates that they, too, are looking at 
targets beyond Somalia. Then if you add to that Hezbollah and 
Hamas, you can see that you have a pretty good array of 
terrorist groups to confront.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. My time is up. But I 
think it is important that the American people understand the 
threat to our country, our national interests, our interests of 
our allies and American citizens extends beyond solely al 
Qaeda. I appreciate your answer.
    Thank you. I look forward to working with you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Gillibrand.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this 
hearing.
    Thank you so much, Mr. Panetta, for your extraordinary 
public service to our country. I am extremely grateful.
    I want to touch upon three issues, if we have time. I want 
to explore a little more on Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), and then go to a little bit of cyber warfare.
    Chairman Mullen stated a few months ago that it is fairly 
well known that elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence had 
a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network. 
Obviously, addressing the Haqqani network is really important 
to reaching our goals in Afghanistan.
    Yet a week ago, he reported that Pakistan has agreed to go 
after the terrorist group. How will you judge the seriousness 
of Pakistan's commitment to that effort?
    Mr. Panetta. I think there is probably a simple test, which 
is whether or not the Haqqanis are continuing to go into 
Afghanistan and attacking our forces. It seems to me that if 
they have an influence over the Haqqanis, that they could urge 
them to cease fire and to stop those kinds of attacks.
    Senator Gillibrand. I appreciated your testimony earlier 
about the nature of al Qaeda, that it has fundamentally 
metastasized, and in fact, many believe that al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula is perhaps far more dangerous than any other 
aspect of al Qaeda today.
    You also mentioned that al Qaeda works in a very diffuse 
way, that oftentimes, it is inspiring groups like al-Shabaab in 
Africa and AQAP in Yemen. Of the three terrorist attempts on 
our homeland since September 11, the one on New York came out 
of Pakistan, the Christmas Day attempt on Chicago from Yemen, 
and the Fort Hood massacre motivated out of Yemen. Al Awlaki 
recruits online, including from Europe and the United States, 
and we need to focus on a smart strategy to address these 
threats.
    I support your view that we have to take these threats 
head-on and we have to make them very much part of our mission. 
I want to understand why in Yemen our approach is so different 
than that of Afghanistan. Perhaps not in this setting, but to 
talk a little bit about what some of your long-term strategies 
are to deal with the fact that al Qaeda has changed so much.
    Mr. Panetta. With regard to specific operations, I would 
have to do that in another forum. But just generally, I think 
our approach has been that because of these nodes that have 
developed, our approach has been to develop operations in each 
of these areas that will contain al Qaeda and go after them so 
that they have no place to escape.
    So that we are doing that in Yemen. It is obviously a 
dangerous and uncertain situation, but we continue to work with 
elements there to try to develop counterterrorism. We are 
working with Joint Special Operations Command as well in their 
operations. Same thing is true for Somalia and with regards to 
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, we are working 
with both the Spanish and the French to develop approaches 
there that will contain them as well.
    I think we have at the CIA tried to develop a more 
comprehensive strategy to kind of look at all of those nodes, 
look at all of those threats, and not just focus on the FATA or 
Pakistan, but focus on all of those threats in order to try to 
deal with it.
    Senator Gillibrand. Right. Now, obviously, Yemen is under 
substantial turmoil, and we don't know whether the government 
survives or not. Do we have strategies in place to make sure 
that if there is a transition that we are very knowledgeable 
about what military assets are there, what will happen to them? 
Have you engaged the Saudis or any other potential allies in 
what we can do there to protect against future growth of 
terrorism?
    Mr. Panetta. Again, with regards to specific operations, I 
really have to discuss that in another forum. But it is a very 
uncertain situation. It has been destabilized, and yet we are 
continuing to work with those individuals in their government 
to try to go after AQAP, and we are continuing to receive 
cooperation from them.
    At this point in time, I would have to say that while, 
obviously, it is a scary and an uncertain situation, with 
regards to counterterrorism, we are still very much continuing 
our operations.
    Senator Gillibrand. Last, if I still have time, Mr. 
Chairman, I appreciated the testimony you gave earlier, Senator 
Reed asked about it and others, about cyber terrorism, cyber 
crime, cyber attacks, and cyber warfare. I appreciated the fact 
that the statement was made that a cyber attack could well be a 
declaration of war, and you and I had a chance to talk about 
this in some respects.
    Can you share with us any of your vision, design, goals 
with regard to how we create a greater platform for 
cybersecurity and cyber defense? In particular, I have worked 
with Senator Hatch on creating some international protocols to 
create alliances and working relationships with both allies and 
nonallies on how to begin to have an ability to enforce laws 
against cyber attacks, cyber criminals, cyber terrorists, and 
any other form of cyber mischief. I would love your thoughts on 
what you can share with us.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, as we discussed in your office, this 
is an area of great concern for me because I think what I have 
witnessed at the CIA and elsewhere is that we are now the 
target of increasing attacks that go after our systems, and it 
is extremely important for us to do everything we can to 
confront that threat.
    Obviously, I have a great resource with the NSA that has 
tremendous expertise and tremendous knowledge in this area. 
What I would like to do is to develop an even more effective 
force to be able to confront cyber terrorism, and I would like 
to work with you on the effort to try to develop those kinds of 
relationship not only here, but abroad, so that other countries 
can work with us in this effort.
    We talk about nuclear. We talk about conventional warfare. 
We don't spend enough time talking about the threat of cyber 
war.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    Last, I just want to thank you for your testimony today 
about your priority to look out for the men and women serving 
in our armed services and their families. I think not only must 
that be one of your primary responsibilities, but I appreciate 
that it is in the forefront of your mind.
    My time has expired. I will just leave you with I hope you 
continue that focus and particularly focus on the issue of 
housing. Because a lot of troops are coming back from various 
missions, and Fort Drum and other places around the United 
States really have inadequate housing supply. I hope that you 
can address that in a perhaps more aggressive and more nuanced 
way.
    Thank you so much, very much for your testimony.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
    Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director, you certainly deserve the widespread accolades 
and expressions of gratitude that you are receiving from 
virtually every member of this committee today, and I want to 
add my own thanks for your willingness to continue to serve our 
country during such a difficult time.
    But like my colleagues Senator Graham and Senator Brown, 
now the hard questions start. I want to start with Libya.
    You have repeated today the administration's goal that 
Colonel Gaddafi must go. But what then? If there is any painful 
lesson that we have learned from our experience in Iraq, it is 
that if we do not have a plan in place after we have deposed a 
tyrant, that chaos and violence ensues.
    Do you have confidence that we have a plan for dealing with 
Libya post Gaddafi, and do we even really know who we are 
dealing with in the opposition?
    Mr. Panetta. I know that Secretary Clinton is spending a 
great deal of her time working with our allies to respond to 
that concern, to try to work with those in the opposition who 
have come together in the consuls that they have developed 
there, to try to work with them in terms of greater support so 
that if they do, in fact, have to take control of the country, 
that they will have that capability.
    What you have raised is a legitimate concern, and it is an 
area that we have a lot more work to do in order to ensure that 
if Gaddafi does step down that we can ensure that Libya will be 
a stable country.
    Senator Collins. It really concerns me, particularly when 
you look at the leadership of al Qaeda and the Libyan presence 
there, if you look at the number of foreign fighters in Iraq 
that have come from Libya. I just don't feel any confidence 
that we know what comes next.
    Mr. Panetta. The opposition, obviously, has been made up of 
various tribal groups that have come together, and there are 
concerns about some of the other influences that are now trying 
to impact on the opposition. It is something that we are 
watching very closely, but I do think that if we can get 
Gaddafi to step down that I am confident that there are enough 
leaders in the opposition who can provide, hopefully, that 
continuity.
    Senator Collins. Let me next turn to Afghanistan. No one 
wants to lose Afghanistan, and all of us are so mindful of the 
enormous sacrifices that our military men and women have made 
in Afghanistan and the enormous amount of taxpayer dollars that 
have been spent.
    Senator Brown asked you a key question today about what is 
our mission? You talked about the goal of having Afghanistan be 
a stable state, and that certainly is something that I want 
also. But to me, that seems to be a never-ending mission. I 
don't see how we get to a stable state in Afghanistan.
    Let me give you an example. A key to our transition in 
Afghanistan, the key to our troops being able to come home is 
the development of a competent, aggressive Afghan security 
force, and we have made a lot of progress in that area.
    But I look at the cost of maintaining the Afghan security 
force. In this year's presidential budget request, it is $12.8 
billion. The total Afghanistan gross domestic product (GDP) is 
about $30 billion, and 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is 
derived from spending related to international military and 
donor community presence.
    When I look at that imbalance, I don't see how Afghanistan 
is ever going to be able to even afford its own security 
forces. That says to me that we are going to have to continue 
to be a major contributor to paying for those security forces 
forever, virtually. Tell me how this ends. I just don't see how 
it ends.
    Mr. Panetta. I understand the concerns that you have 
raised, Senator, and I think we all share those concerns. I 
guess I can only say, having served on the Iraq Study Group, 
there was a moment in time when I had a lot of the same 
concerns about Iraq and whether or not Iraq would ever be 
stable enough to be able to draw down our forces there.
    While Afghanistan is a very different country and has a 
very different history, the fact is that over the last few 
years, I have seen progress made with regards to governance in 
some of the key areas, with regards to security, with regards 
to the role of the Afghans in participating with our forces to 
try to secure area. They have gotten better.
    Whether or not, in the end they are going to be able to 
develop the resources, develop the revenues, develop the 
governance that needs to be done, those are major questions. 
But I think if we stick with it, if we continue to provide help 
and assistance to them, that I think there is going to be a 
point where Afghanistan can control its own future. We have to 
operate on that hope.
    Senator Collins. Finally, let me echo the concerns that my 
colleagues have raised about whether the budget constraints, 
which are very real, are going to drive our military 
requirements rather than vice versa. This is an issue we 
discussed in my office.
    This year, when the independent panel looked at the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it concluded that the QDR had 
been molded by the budget rather than being what it is supposed 
to be, which is an unvarnished assessment of what our military 
requirements are. I am particularly concerned about the gap 
when I look at the Navy's shipbuilding budget. The Chief of 
Naval Operations has testified before our committee that we 
need, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, and we know the 313-ship 
goal is much smaller than the actual requirement that our 
combatant commanders have for ships.
    Indeed, there was a recent report just 2 months ago from 
the Navy on the ballistic missile defense (BMD) force structure 
requirements that states that the Navy currently does not have 
the capacity to meet the demands of our combatant commanders 
for BMD capable ships. I am very worried about that gap in this 
time of budget constraints. I am worried that the Navy has yet 
to complete the contracts on the DDG-1000, the second and third 
ships.
    What actions do you think need to be taken to help close 
the gap between the 285-ship Navy today and the, at a minimum, 
313-ship requirement?
    Mr. Panetta. I strongly believe that the Navy has to 
project our force throughout the world and that the Navy is 
obviously crucial to that mission. I agree with the ship 
numbers that have to be developed for the Navy in order to be 
able to do that.
    I think the key here is going to be something that has 
happened in your own State, which is that shipbuilding 
operations have to develop greater efficiencies. Yours is a 
great example of having developed those kinds of efficiencies 
that helps us on the cost control side and at the same time 
allows us to continue our shipbuilding capability.
    I do think that greater competition, greater presence of an 
industrial base here that deals with these issues will provide 
the kind of cost savings that we will need in order to fulfill 
that mission.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, and I look forward to working 
with you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I don't know if you are going to take 
a break. But I just----
    Chairman Levin. Yes. I think it sounds to me like we are 
going to take a break. [Laughter.]
    But this will not be a lunch break. This will just be a 
very brief 5-minute break, and Senator Blumenthal will be next. 
Just take a very quick break and then back here. We will finish 
the questions, and then we will have a lunch break.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. [Recess.]
    Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Panetta, thank you for answering all our questions, for 
your extraordinary service, and for your very powerful and 
eloquent testimony today and your very responsive answers to 
all of the issues that have been raised.
    I want to second the sentiment that has been expressed by 
Senator Graham, which is I can't wait to vote for your 
confirmation, and I appreciate your willingness and patriotism 
to take on this very tough assignment. Also to second Senator 
Graham's views, and I think they are widely shared, that we 
need fundamental and far-reaching reform in our methods of 
acquiring and terminating weapons programs.
    Would you agree with that?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
    Chairman Levin. I think, Senator Blumenthal, that probably 
Director Panetta would also agree that Secretary Gates can't 
wait for us to vote for Director Panetta's confirmation. 
[Laughter.]
    Mr. Panetta. I think that is fair to say.
    Chairman Levin. That will not be taken out of your time, by 
the way.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Speaking of Secretary Gates, I hope and assume you would 
agree with him that the second engine for the F-35 is 
unnecessary and should be terminated?
    Mr. Panetta. I support that position.
    Senator Blumenthal. Also that we need to continue the sub 
building program at the rate of two per year, which I think is 
fairly noncontroversial?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you also agree with Admiral 
Mullen that talking about a secure and thereby free America, 
that the greatest threat to our security today is the national 
deficit?
    Mr. Panetta. There is no question in my mind that the size 
of the deficit we are confronting represents a threat to our 
security.
    Senator Blumenthal. That we need to address that problem 
without excessive cost cutting in the defense budget?
    Mr. Panetta. Obviously, defense needs to play a role. But 
when you are facing that size deficit, everything has to play a 
role.
    Senator Blumenthal. I want to talk for a moment about one 
of the causes of those costs in both our defense budget and our 
veterans programs, and they are a cause of cost that is not 
necessarily in the headlines or even reported, and those costs 
have to do with tobacco use and tobacco addiction and the costs 
of tobacco-related diseases.
    I know that the Defense Department is very much aware of 
these costs because, as a matter of fact, it asked all military 
personnel last year to make their 2011 New Year's resolution to 
quit smoking. In fact, about $1.6 billion a year in DOD costs 
are related to medical care that is provided for tobacco-
related diseases. Among the retirees from our military for 
veterans, about 80 percent of the $5 billion in annual costs of 
treating pulmonary disease are directly attributable to 
smoking.
    The costs of smoking simply in dollar terms, medical 
treatment, are at least $5 billion a year, not to mention the 
impacts on readiness, which are, in effect, less fit, less 
physically able military personnel, more likely to sustain 
injuries, more likely to be stressed out, more likely to be 
dependent and addicted to nicotine. The stark fact is that 
military personnel are 50 percent more likely to smoke and more 
likely to use tobacco products than their civilian peers.
    My question to you is both an immediate and a longer-range 
one. First, whether you have any suggestions as to what can be 
done immediately? Second, would you be willing to commit the 
resources and interests of DOD to addressing the problems of 
nicotine addiction and tobacco use and the related medical 
impacts?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, one of the areas I 
have to focus on is the health costs that are impacting here. I 
think the area that you have just defined is one area that we 
do have to pay attention to in terms of its implications on 
health and its implications on cost. I would look forward to 
working with you to try to develop an approach that would allow 
us to, again, not only deal with smoking, but deal with other 
threats to healthcare that impact on not only our soldiers but, 
frankly, that impact on Americans.
    Senator Blumenthal. On the families of our soldiers and our 
veterans?
    Mr. Panetta. That is right.
    Senator Blumenthal. Because of not only the immediate 
effects of smoking or other kinds of health problems, but also 
the related impacts on families.
    Mr. Panetta. No, that is right. I think smoking, good 
nutrition, good exercise. I mean, there are a number of areas 
that I think need to be focused on as part of the solution to 
dealing with healthcare costs.
    Senator Blumenthal. I would welcome the opportunity to work 
with you on those issues.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me say while we are talking about 
veterans, I have offered a measure, a number of other Senators 
have, to broaden and deepen the commitment of our country to 
caring for issues relating to employment, homelessness, 
healthcare of our veterans and would hope that DOD would also 
increase its commitment in that area and hope under your 
leadership, it would, given your very moving and powerful 
remarks about the need to take better care of our military 
personnel.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I really do feel an obligation to 
those that served, and I don't treat this like a situation 
where once you have completed your service and you become a 
veteran that somehow you are somebody else's responsibility. I 
think we have an obligation to make sure that people are 
treated right once they have served this country not only now, 
but in the future.
    Senator Blumenthal. Finally, because my time is close to 
expiring, let me ask you one last question. The ammonium 
nitrate fertilizers that are the cause of probably the vast 
majority of the IED very tragic and unfortunate injuries to our 
troops are transported from Pakistan, and I wonder what can be 
done to stop that flow of fertilizer, the ammonium nitrate 
substances that are the basis for those explosive devices?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, that is a continuing concern for us, 
and it is not so much the transfer of the material, but it is 
actually the development of IEDs, the explosives themselves, 
that we see taking place in Pakistan that make their way into 
Afghanistan. We have to take a number of steps not only with 
the Pakistanis, but also trying to check at the border to make 
sure that we do everything possible to stop that flow of IEDs. 
It is a very real threat, and a lot of that is coming across 
the border.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, and I look forward 
to working with you. Thank you once again for your service to 
our Nation.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It is a pleasure to have you before the committee. As I 
told you, Mr. Panetta, when we had the opportunity to speak, I 
am delighted to see that a former OMB Director could actually 
make something of himself. You have done a great job as CIA 
Director, and I know that you have had the opportunity today to 
answer some tough questions, but also I am sure that the tone 
has been appreciative and respectful.
    I am most concerned on the budget front and particularly 
with regard to our major acquisitions programs. The cost 
growth, the time delays have been particularly troubling to me. 
On this committee over the 4 or 5 months, we have heard lots of 
testimony, and this is at the same time, of course, that we are 
talking about not just restraining spending but actually 
putting everything on the table to deal with our historic 
deficits and the debt overhang that is affecting our economy so 
directly and affecting our future.
    This concerns me greatly. It also, I think, impacts our 
national security because our men and women in uniform need the 
best equipment and they need it in a timely manner, and they 
are not getting it.
    A couple of data points, and you know them well. Cost 
overruns annually now are, in some years, over $300 billion a 
year. This is, as compared to just a decade ago, when annual 
overruns were on average about $40 billion year. The average 
delays almost 2 years in delivering initial capabilities for 
these programs.
    The reasons are varied. Sometimes it is internal DOD 
processes, I think. Sometimes it is these contracting processes 
that still aren't working, and these practices have been 
subject to a lot of GAO reports, directives, and public and 
private studies. There has been some good work done on it, and 
the chairman has done some good work on it, but we still have a 
long way to go.
    This would be one of my major concerns. Given your 
background and experience, I think you are well qualified to 
address it. I would like to hear a little about that.
    Senator Graham apparently talked earlier today about cost-
sharing arrangements and the potential for that. I think that 
is an interesting idea. On the Joint Strike Fighter program 
alone, we heard testimony before the committee that we are 80 
percent over cost from the original estimates. That is over 
$150 billion and 30 percent more than the current baseline that 
was just set in 2007.
    After 15 years of development and 2 years into operational 
production, we still don't have a stable design. Again, I think 
that impacts our warfighters as well. I realize the Defense 
Department is working on implementing the Systems Acquisition 
Reform Act, and the better buying power initiative is ongoing. 
But, frankly, there is a lot more that needs to be done.
    Could you talk a little about this and particularly the 
benefits of competition, as we talked about privately, and 
finding efficiencies?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, because we share a common background, 
I think we understand the costs that are involved in this area. 
I think we are dealing with a culture that has developed that 
somehow we have to change. I know during the period from 
September 11 there has been an awful lot of money that has been 
put into the defense budget, a lot of equipment that has been 
developed during that period. I think at the same time, a lot 
of it has certainly been worthwhile, been important to our 
national defense. But a lot of bad habits have developed during 
that period.
    I think there is an assumption that somehow this thing can 
play out and that the cost can increase as dramatically as you 
have pointed out in some of these areas and that somehow 
somebody is still going to pay the bill. I think what we have 
to do is to make clear that those who are involved--and they 
are great companies; they are good people; a lot of them do a 
great job--that they have a responsibility here to be able to 
work with us to develop better competition, to do some of the 
things that Senator Graham mentioned in terms of absorbing some 
of the costs of development.
    The work that they are doing is not just money in their 
pocket. What they are working on is important to the national 
security of this country, and I think what we have to do is 
work with them, work with contractors, work with others to try 
to develop approaches that can try to shape the costs that are 
involved and the delays that are involved here.
    I know this is tough. I know that some of this military 
technology is extremely intricate. It involves a lot of 
complicated work. But I am absolutely convinced that there has 
to be a way to achieve greater cost savings, and I hope to work 
with you and others to try to see what we can do to do that.
    Senator Portman. I am encouraged from our conversations and 
this testimony today that you are prioritizing that. 
Ultimately, if we don't fix it, we will be robbing from some of 
the fundamental responsibilities you would have as Secretary of 
Defense to protect our country. Because looking at some of 
these projections over the next decade or 2 decades, if we 
don't begin to figure out how to deal with these overruns on 
the acquisition programs, they will quickly take the entire 
current defense budget.
    We need to be sure that our men and women in uniform are 
getting what they need and be sure that this and the healthcare 
issue, which I know you have also addressed here today, is the 
other one where I think you look at the huge cost increases 
there, has to be handled in a way that, again, ensures that the 
focus is on our national security concerns.
    Quickly, on trade agreements, as you are aware, we are 
hoping soon to be reviewing proposed export opening agreements 
with the Republic of Korea, with Panama, and with Colombia. 
This has been increasingly clear in the post Cold War 
environment, all elements of our national power must be used to 
provide for our security and build effective allies, and these 
three countries are great allies.
    In response to prepared questions, you noted that the U.S.-
Republic of Korea alliance remains one of the cornerstones of 
U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. I found that interesting, 
and you have pledged to stay in close contact with your 
counterparts there and build on the relationships laid by 
Secretary Gates.
    You also noted the importance of the Government efforts to 
support DOD activities providing training, equipment, and so on 
to our Central American partners, including Panama, given the 
importance of the canal particularly and the U.S. Southern 
Command's (SOUTHCOM) work there.
    Also with regard to Colombia, in testimony earlier this 
year, the commander of SOUTHCOM described our trade agreement 
with Colombia as ``a very positive, beneficial aspect for our 
cooperation because of a growing capacity to support the 
capabilities of Armed Forces and law enforcement.''
    My question would be to you, how do you assess the value 
from a security standpoint of building upon these commercial 
ties through these trade opening agreements with these allies, 
and do you agree that these enhanced trade and investment 
agreements is one way to combat the threats that these states 
face to their security and to the broader region?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think that when it comes to 
protecting our security, there are a number of areas that have 
to be addressed, and one of those, obviously, it is not just 
the military responsibility, but there is an economic side of 
this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting 
better security.
    The ability of these other countries to develop trade with 
us, to develop their economies creates greater stability within 
those countries. I think that is a fact. To the extent that we 
can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that 
kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations 
in their ability to achieve stability.
    Colombia is a good example. They have done a great job 
going after narco-trafficking. If we can help, be able to help 
them develop their economy, that could become another added 
factor in providing greater security in that region. The same 
thing is obviously true for Korea.
    Senator Portman. Do you think ratification of these three 
agreements would be positive for our national security 
interests?
    Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would.
    Senator Portman. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
    Senator Webb.
    Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Panetta, again, I appreciate your having come by 
my office to have detailed conversations on a number of areas. 
Having had the honor and the privilege of meeting with Caspar 
Weinberger, when he was Secretary of Defense, on a daily basis 
for 4 years, I am well aware of the challenge of your job. I 
honestly believe that, other than the presidency itself, this 
is probably the most difficult and complicated job in our 
Federal Government, and I wish you the best.
    I also appreciate or was gratified to hear your response to 
Senator Collins with respect to the need to rebuild our Navy, 
to get the Navy's numbers up. I think as the situation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq allows us more leeway in terms of how we 
shape the DOD budget, we really do need to do that.
    If you are looking at the size of the Navy right now, I 
think it is about 282 ships, and the ground floor goal of 313 
and all of the interests, the vital national interests that we 
have with respect to the stability of East and Southeast Asia, 
it is going to be a very important thing for us to look at. In 
that regard, I would like to raise two points with respect to 
the situation in East Asia, and then I also would like to ask 
you a question about Libya.
    First, when we are looking at the tempo in East Asia, we 
see clearly that Chinese military activities have dramatically 
increased over the past 15 or 16 months. The two most glaring 
examples of that were the set-to with Japan in the Senkaku 
Islands about a year ago, and then most recently, the Chinese 
naval vessels actually cutting the cable of a Vietnamese ship 
that was exploring oil, the possibility of oil in the South 
China Sea.
    These incidents are basically related to sovereignty 
issues, and they are not only national security issues, they 
obviously have downstream economic consequences. But to me, 
they clearly talk to the commitments that we have for stability 
in this region.
    We have made these commitments. We are the key, I think, to 
the strategic balance in that region. I am wondering if you are 
of the same mind as Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates were 
last year, a year ago, when they pretty strongly stated that we 
are not going to be deterred from protecting the interests of 
countries in international waters in that part of the world?
    Mr. Panetta. Very much. That is an extremely important 
region. We have to have a presence there in order to protect 
our own interests and to work with other countries in that 
area. In order to do that, there has to be respect for 
international law, and there has to be freedom of the seas so 
that we can do our job.
    I think it is important to have a relationship with China, 
but they also need to understand that by trying to advance in 
the China Sea, they can't interfere with our ability to 
navigate in that part of the world.
    Senator Webb. Or to unilaterally address sovereignty issues 
with respect to other countries?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Senator Webb. Thank you.
    That also gets to the very important question of our basing 
system in this part of the world. I know Chairman Levin 
addressed this, and I heard your response to that. I think the 
timing of addressing these basing issues, particularly with 
respect to the Japanese, is vital. This has been going on for 
15 years, and we keep kicking the can down the road on it.
    We are not going to have stability in Asia if we don't have 
it in Northeast Asia. It is the only place in the world, as you 
well know, where the direct interests of Russia, China, Japan, 
the United States intersect, and the Korean Peninsula is right 
in the middle of all of that. I hope that we can work with you 
on the suggestions that Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and I 
brought forward in order to have a timely solution of that 
basing issue.
    Mr. Panetta. No, I really appreciated the conversation we 
had in your office. I know this isn't--it is not an easy issue. 
That is why the can has been kicked down the road, I guess, all 
of these years because of the cost and the politics and the 
diplomatic problems involved with each of these decisions.
    I think it absolutely has to be addressed. We have to 
establish a stable situation there. We can't have a situation 
in which we are just playing this year to year. I think we need 
a long-term solution, and I really want to work with you and 
the chairman and others to try to find a solution.
    Senator Webb. I thank you for saying that. Because I do 
believe this is fixable and have spent many years thinking 
about this. I believe what we were able to come up with is at 
least the right approach, and it could be done in a timely way 
if we could get people to work with us on doing that.
    With respect to the situation in Libya, I take your point 
during your exchange with Senator McCain that it is the 
President's responsibility to ensure national security. At the 
same time, we have a situation where when the President 
unilaterally decides to begin a military operation and then 
continues it, where, clearly, I think as a former Member of 
Congress, you would agree that Congress needs to be involved in 
shaping downstream when something like that occurs?
    Let me say it another way. No one would disagree that with 
the President's authority to unilaterally order military force 
if the country was under attack, under imminent threat of 
attack, invoking the inherent right of self-defense, which is 
actually I think what we are doing in a lot of these strikes, 
even places like Yemen. Or if we are coming to the aid of an 
ally based on a treaty commitment, or we are defending 
Americans, protecting Americans who are in distress.
    But when you have a situation like in this case where the 
justification is humanitarian, you can see the potential for a 
very broad definition of what a humanitarian crisis is. Once 
that decision is made unilaterally by the President, it needs 
to be subject to the review and the direction of Congress, in 
my view.
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, it has been my experience, both as a 
Member of Congress and member of administrations, while 
obviously that constitutional power does rest with the 
President, that once those decisions are made, in order for 
those decisions to be sustained, that it is very important to 
work with Congress, seek the best advice and counsel of 
Congress, and hopefully to get Congress' support for those 
actions.
    Senator Webb. I did hear you agree with Senator McCain or 
to his comment that nobody is thinking about putting American 
ground forces in Libya?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Senator Webb. I assume that also means after the fall of 
the Gaddafi regime?
    Mr. Panetta. As far as I know, no one is discussing any 
boots on the ground there--at any time.
    Senator Webb. The House passed a provision to that effect 
with 416 votes, and I have introduced a provision here. I just 
think we have our hands full, and it is not something we should 
be doing in the future in that part of the world.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We are almost done, Director Panetta. I was listening to 
Senator Nelson's litany of the challenges ahead of you once you 
get confirmed, and I certainly intend to vote for that. I think 
you will get confirmed. I wondered, ``Hmm, why does he want to 
do that?'' But like everyone on this committee, I am very 
grateful that you are willing to do that and appreciate your 
patriotism and commitment to the country. Thank you very much 
for that.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. I also very much appreciated the 
opportunity to sit down with you and your willingness to listen 
to some of our particular concerns in New Hampshire and was 
very pleased to hear that you are familiar with the work of the 
men and women at the Portsmouth naval shipyard and was pleased 
to hear your comments to Senator Collins about your commitment 
to address the backlog that both the shipyard and other 
shipyards around the country are facing.
    I was also very pleased that you were willing to listen to 
the good work that has been done by New Hampshire's National 
Guard deployment support program. Listening to your commitment 
today to better serve men and women after they get out of the 
military, I hope you will look at programs like New Hampshire's 
and some of the other States that have been so successful. 
Because not only are our National Guard and Reserves going to 
continue to play a greater role in our defense, but there is 
some very good data that shows how successful these programs 
have been.
    I think they serve as a good model for the rest of the 
Military Services to look at. I hope you will do that.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. One of the reasons that we have been so 
successful in developing the technology for our national 
security and have given us really our superiority in terms of 
our military might around the world is because of our national 
defense technology sector. New England and New Hampshire have 
been a knowledge center for that defense technology sector, and 
I wonder if you could speak to how DOD or what DOD is currently 
doing to ensure that there is a sustained commitment to that 
defense technology sector so they will continue to be there as 
we need them in the future?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, I haven't been fully briefed on all 
of the efforts to try to deal with preserving that kind of 
technology. But if I am confirmed, I just want you to know that 
I am a very strong believer that if we are going to have a 
strong defense in this country that we have to have industries 
here that are American. We have to have technology capabilities 
that are American. We have to be able to have a base of support 
in this country in order to maintain our defense systems.
    It doesn't mean that we don't deal with our allies. It 
doesn't mean that we try to negotiate agreements with them in 
certain areas. But if we are going to protect our national 
defense, we have to protect our industrial base. We have to 
protect our technological base. We have to be able to protect 
the capabilities that we need here in order to make that 
happen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that commitment. A 
piece of that is the research and development (R&D) needs, and 
obviously, DOD has been a very important part of ensuring that 
that R&D gets done. Given the budget constraints that we are 
facing, how do you see that affecting our ability to continue 
to ensure that the R&D that we need is done?
    Mr. Panetta. Again, I don't think we can do this job 
without investing in R&D as part of the process of making sure 
we are at the cutting edge for the future.
    I recognize that, obviously, as part of the effort to look 
at the entire budget in order to achieve savings that all of 
those areas will be looked at. But my view is that if we want 
to protect the weapons systems, if we want to protect our 
capabilities for the future, we have to be able to have good 
R&D at the same time.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    In talking to some of those New Hampshire and New England 
companies that are part of our national defense manufacturing 
base, one of the concerns that I often hear from them, because 
they are often doing commercial work as well as work for the 
military, is their frustration with our export control system. 
As I know you know, International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
restrictions are onerous. In many cases, they are out of date. 
They were really designed for a Cold War system that no longer 
exists, and I know that Secretary Gates has been a real 
proponent of addressing that system.
    I hope that you will be as committed, and I would ask how 
you see moving forward an agenda that updates our export 
control system in a way that both protects our national 
security, but also recognizes that we need to be competitive 
globally?
    Mr. Panetta. I want you to know, Senator, that I share 
Secretary Gates' attitude here. I think we have to be able to 
develop 21st century approaches to this kind of exchange in 
order for us to be able to make sure that the technologies we 
have are, in fact, technologies that we are working with others 
to assure and to have.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I know earlier you were asked about Iraq and whether we 
would continue to stay in Iraq if we are asked. Like others, I 
have been concerned about increasing violence in Iraq, about 
the recent casualties. We just lost someone from New Hampshire 
in the attack over the weekend. I wonder if you could talk to 
what we need to do to keep our focus on the efforts in Iraq, 
and assuming that we are not asked to stay, how we will deal 
with drawing down the remaining troops that are there?
    Mr. Panetta. We are, at the present time, on track to 
withdrawing our forces by the end of 2011. But I think that it 
is clear to me that Iraq is considering the possibility of 
making a request for some kind of presence to remain there. It 
really is dependent on the prime minister and on the Government 
of Iraq to present to us what is it that they need and over 
what period of time in order to make sure that the gains that 
we have made in Iraq are sustained.
    I have every confidence that a request like that is 
something that I think will be forthcoming at some point.
    Senator Shaheen. My time has expired. I would like to 
explore that more later.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Udall.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome, Mr. Director. I was going to say good morning, but 
I realize it is the afternoon. Thank you for your patience.
    I want to also, with everybody else on the committee, 
acknowledge your tremendous leadership, your personal 
friendship, and your willingness to take on yet another 
assignment, perhaps one of the biggest and most important in 
the Federal Government.
    I think you and I share a concern about the country's 
fiscal trajectory. Of course, Secretary of Defense Gates has 
pointed out that this is a key threat to our national security, 
as had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen.
    I know we are going to not support any cuts that will harm 
our capacity to secure our Nation or the well-being of our 
troops. But we are going to have to make some tough decisions. 
A broke country is a weak country. Conversely, a solvent 
country can be a strong country.
    You have had to deal with this at the agency. That is, how 
do you balance the needs and the resources? I think we have all 
said, hey, everything has to be on the table. But I am curious 
what your thoughts are about what the right size is of our 
military and how do we determine what our mission ought to be?
    I have two easy questions for you. What role do you believe 
that the American military should play in the world? As the 
senior military adviser-to-be to the President, when you are 
confirmed--I am going to be that optimistic--what would be a 
set of guidelines that you would use to recommend to the 
President whether military action is justified?
    Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I think that the United States 
exercises a unique role in the world by virtue of our 
leadership in the diplomatic arena, but also because of our 
military power, we are able to back that up. I think it is 
extremely important in today's world, where there are so many 
challenges and so many threats that we are confronting, that we 
maintain a strong military in order to deal with those kinds of 
threats.
    It is not only the fact that we are involved in wars, but 
clearly, we are facing increasing turmoil. We are facing 
terrorism. We are facing other challenges. In my view, the 
United States plays a very unique role in the world as far as 
providing the kind of leadership that tries to advance 
universal rights, a peaceful approach to dealing with the world 
that tries to advance good economic and political reform.
    That is a unique role for the United States, and I think we 
need to continue to send that message and to continue to exert 
that leadership. For that reason, I think having a strong 
military is essential to that larger role that the United 
States plays in today's world.
    We hope that others would work with us. We do, obviously, 
work with our allies. We work with NATO. We work with other 
nations. But there is no question in my mind that the United 
States is the fundamental leader right now in the world in a 
number of ways, and having the military strength to back up 
that kind of leadership is very important.
    With regards to how we approach the use of force, I think 
there are several important guidelines. Number one, what is the 
threat to our national interests? What is our capability to be 
able to respond, our military capability to respond to that 
kind of a threat? Have we exhausted all other remedies and 
options to the use of force? Lastly, what are the prospects to 
get the support of not only Congress, but the American people 
in that effort? I think all of those things are important 
considerations.
    Senator Udall. Thank you for those thoughts, Director 
Panetta. I think this will be a topic of ongoing conversations, 
obviously, as we work to consider how, if we need to 
reconfigure DOD and how we are prepared in a world of 
insurgencies and cybersecurity needs, satellite systems that 
are very important to all of us. There is a real change 
underway.
    I also hope that we will continue to do what we can to 
strengthen our relationship with China as it becomes more of an 
economic powerhouse. Hopefully, it will shoulder some of the 
responsibility on a worldwide basis because of its own self-
interest, frankly.
    Let me turn to energy. I think this has been an area of 
your interest as well. It is one of a deep concern, but I also 
think a great opportunity for us. Admiral Mullen has said 
saving energy saves lives. He recently pointed out that before 
we buy another airplane or a ship, we ought to look at what we 
can do to save the lives of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and 
sailors through our dependence on oil and other energy 
technologies.
    What are your thoughts on what DOD can do to continue to 
push alternative technologies and reducing our dependence on 
foreign oil?
    Mr. Panetta. Senator, this is an area that I want to learn 
a lot more about in terms of how the Defense Department is 
approaching this. At least from some of the briefings I have 
gotten, I think the Defense Department really is a leader in 
terms of trying to develop better energy efficiency, and we 
need to be because we use an awful lot of fuel.
    My hope is to continue those efforts and to work with you 
and others to try to determine what additional steps can we 
take, both in the development of weapons, the development of 
technologies, how we can better use clean energy, how we can 
better use some of the new forms of energy in order to reduce 
fuel costs at the Pentagon. But more importantly, in order to 
contribute to, hopefully, a cleaner environment.
    Senator Udall. I have just introduced a bill along with 
Congressman Giffords, I should say reintroduced a bill that we 
had put in the hopper in the last Congress, that would provide 
more direction to DOD. It has widespread support from 
particularly retired general officers and others, and I look 
forward to working with you and the chairman as we move to 
authorize the Defense Department's activities for 2012.
    You are right. DOD's energy bill is about $13 billion a 
year, and DOD uses more energy than most countries use, which 
stands out. But it is an opportunity. I don't see it as a 
burden. I see it as a real opportunity. I think you do, too.
    Mr. Panetta. I think it is.
    Senator Udall. I see my time has expired. But maybe for the 
record, I could ask one question and you could maybe give a 
brief response. Then if you want to expound on it for the 
record, that would be great.
    I know 2014 is our date for Afghanistan, the full handoff. 
I do worry about and you know all too well about the safe 
havens and the sanctuary they provide for the Taliban. If we 
can't reduce those safe havens or, at best, eliminate them, 
what are your thoughts on what that means for the hopes of a 
resolution of the situation in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Panetta. I think we can only win in Afghanistan if we 
can win in Pakistan by reducing those safe havens. I think the 
two go hand-in-hand. The ability to achieve stability in 
Afghanistan is dependent on whether or not we can limit and, 
hopefully, stop the transfer of terrorism across that border.
    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Director. You and both the 
chairman are my heroes because you have both been sitting here 
for some 4 hours and with great patience and articulate 
answers.
    Thank you. I look forward to serving with you. Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
    Let me just, before we break for lunch, try to clarify two 
parts of your testimony regarding the transition of security 
responsibility to the Afghan security forces.
    First, would you agree that security transition to Afghan 
security forces is to be completed by 2014, but that the 
process of transferring provinces and districts to an Afghan 
security force lead begins in July?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Chairman Levin. That President Karzai in March identified 
the first group of areas to begin transition this year, 
including a number of identified provinces, and that has 
already been presented and approved by NATO?
    Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
    Chairman Levin. Next, my staff tells me that they have not 
been able to find any statement of Secretary Gates in which he 
specifies a number of U.S. troops that he believes should be 
withdrawn from Afghanistan starting in July. Are you aware of 
any statement by Secretary Gates identifying such a number, 
whether it is 3,000 to 5,000 or any other number?
    Mr. Panetta. I have discussed this with the staff at DOD, 
and they are not aware of any statement that he has made that 
has indicated a number that would be involved.
    Chairman Levin. At this point?
    Mr. Panetta. At this point.
    Chairman Levin. Thank you.
    It looks like it is about 5 after 1 p.m. Is that right? We 
will meet at 2:30 p.m. in a classified session.
    Thank you all. Thank you again for your testimony and for 
your service.
    [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Leon E. Panetta by 
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied 
follow:]

                        Questions and Responses

                            DEFENSE REFORMS

    Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have 
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have 
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain 
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant 
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments 
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment 
to the combatant commanders.
    Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act 
provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to 
address in these modifications?
    Answer. It has been 25 years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation which has prepared the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
better meet today's challenges. At this time, I do not believe 
Goldwater-Nichols should be amended, but, if confirmed, I will continue 
to evaluate this issue and will work with the committee on this very 
important topic.

                   DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Secretary of 
Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters 
relating to DOD. Subject to the direction of the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, under section 113, has authority, direction, and 
control over DOD.
    Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your 
ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?
    Answer. Current authorities for the Secretary of Defense appear to 
be clear and appropriate.
    Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?
    Answer. At this time, I have no recommendation for changes to 
section 113. My view may change based on the perspectives I may gain 
while serving in the position of Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.

                               PRIORITIES

    Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical 
issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the 
Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.
    What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with 
respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?
    Answer. The top priority of the Secretary of Defense is to ensure 
the security of the American people.
    We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda; 
second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of 
terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future 
military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the 
world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth, 
continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be 
crucial in this time of budget constraints.

                  NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

    Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions 
to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, 
and has asked Secretary Gates to lead a review to provide 
recommendations on where to make those cuts.
    What is your understanding of the current status of that review?
    Answer. Secretary Gates has discussed with me his overall approach 
for the Comprehensive Review. It is my understanding that the process 
initiated focuses principally on driving program and budget decisions 
from choices about strategy and risks. Such a strategy-driven approach 
is essential to ensuring that we preserve a superb defense force to 
meet national security goals, even under fiscal pressure.
    Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding 
the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the 
defense budget?
    Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a large role in the 
Comprehensive Review and to have it completed in the fall.
    Question. Do you believe that a national security spending 
reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant 
adverse impact on our national security?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to make disciplined decisions in 
ways that minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be 
understood that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to 
be made.
    Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of: 
making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing 
requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
resetting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across 
the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the 
President?
    Answer. From my years of service in the public sector, I recognize 
the importance of balancing immediate and future needs. In national 
security matters, such a balance is essential to keeping America safe 
both today and tomorrow. Decisions on budget must be carefully made so 
that none of the listed objectives is compromised.
    If confirmed, I will work with both DOD's civilian and military 
leaders to seek the right balance and I will not hesitate to provide my 
views on the potential consequences of proposed future changes in the 
DOD's budget.

                            CHAIN OF COMMAND

    Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the 
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense 
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 
163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct 
communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the 
Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in 
performing their command function.
    Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and 
effective chain of command?
    Answer. Based on my understanding of the existing authorities and 
the practice I have personally observed while Director of the CIA, I 
believe there is currently a clear and effective chain of command. If 
confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure that the chain 
of command continues to be clear and effective.
    Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade 
civilian control of the military?
    Answer. I believe these provisions enhance civilian control of the 
military.
    Question. In your capacity as the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, you were reported to have been in charge of the 
recent operation against Osama bin Laden, an operation using military 
forces of DOD, presumably under the authorities in title 50, U.S.C.
    Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for 
U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of 
an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10, 
U.S.C.?
    Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is 
the appropriate mechanism for command and control of military 
operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in 
particular, I will state that in general there are instances in which 
military capabilities are temporarily made available to support an 
activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government department or agency. In those 
circumstances, it is appropriate for the head of such department or 
agency to direct the operations of the element providing that military 
support while working with the Secretary of Defense. In such 
situations, the President remains at the top of the chain of command 
and at all times has overall command and responsibility for the 
operation. The military units supporting such an operation are still 
governed by the laws of armed conflict. Military personnel remain 
accountable to the military chain of command, including the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.
    Question. Can you explain the chain of command for U.S. military 
forces in the operation against bin Laden, and what role, if any, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of 
Defense each had in that chain of command?
    Answer. I cannot comment publicly on the chain of command for the 
bin Laden operation, in particular. In general, see my answer above.
    Question. Please explain the pros and cons of utilizing U.S. 
military personnel for missions under the authorities contained in 
title 50, United Sates Code.
    Answer. Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying 
out their duties, occasionally require support that only the U.S. Armed 
Forces can provide. It is therefore sometimes preferable to make an 
appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the 
operations of other departments and agencies. A significant advantage 
of doing so is that it permits the robust operational capability of the 
U.S. Armed Forces to be applied when needed. A potential disadvantage 
is that the department or agency receiving the support may not be 
specifically organized or equipped to direct and control operations by 
military forces.
    Question. If the reports mentioned above are accurate, please 
describe the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow 
U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities 
contained in title 50, U.S.C. Do you believe any modifications to these 
authorities are necessary?
    Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the 
President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S. 
Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. I 
cannot comment publicly on any specific arrangements in this regard. As 
stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities 
remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a 
non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing 
authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing appropriate 
support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
    Question. Please explain your views on the preferred chain of 
command structure for counter terrorism operations conducted outside of 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Answer. My view is that the chain of command established under 
title 10 is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations, 
regardless of the location. The determination of whether a military 
counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on the nature of 
the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific to the time 
and place of that operation.

       ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

    Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides, in part, that 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military 
adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the 
Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs submits 
to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice 
or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman, the 
Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he 
provides his own advice to the President, the National Security 
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
    Answer. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant 
commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their 
commands.
    Question. What changes in law, if any, do you think may be 
necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and 
of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?
    Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If 
confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to 
determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as 
appropriate or necessary.
    Question. Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 
should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
    Answer. No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4 star 
general and attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and provides 
invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed 
services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
introduce inconsistencies among its members and will create the 
impression that the National Guard is a separate military service.

             GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY (POLICY)

    Question. Several groups and individuals have been calling for a 
Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government. They argue 
that the U.S. and allied militaries can prevail on the battlefield but 
that the global war on terror requires a concerted effort by a host of 
U.S. agencies.
    What are your views on the merits of instituting a Goldwater-
Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government?
    Answer. In the 25 years since Goldwater-Nichols much has changed. 
In the post-September 11th era, there have been significant benefits 
due to increased unity of effort and interagency cooperation. Civilian-
military collaboration has improved, and our military commanders expect 
to operate in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment. 
Diplomats, development experts, intelligence analysts, and law 
enforcement must work together in today's complex operations.
    At this time, I do not know that instituting such a change across 
the entire Federal Government is needed. However, there may be 
additional ways to develop more effective and inclusive approaches to 
our national security challenges that do not require legislation.
    If confirmed, I intend to reiterate to all civilian and military 
personnel in DOD the important role each interagency partner plays in 
supporting our Nation's security.

                         USE OF MILITARY FORCE

    Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should 
participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most 
important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities 
have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such 
situations.
    What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the 
President on the use of force?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would consider many of the same factors 
that previous Secretaries of Defense have evaluated in their 
recommendations to the President on the use of force, including the 
threat to our vital interests, the ability to employ non-military 
methods to respond to the threat, our capability to defeat that threat 
and improve our strategic situation through the use of military force, 
and the prospects for sustained public support for military action.
    Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend 
that the President employ preemptive force?
    Answer. As the 2010 National Security Strategy discusses, military 
force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or 
to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting 
civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis.
    While the use of force is sometimes necessary, if confirmed, we 
will continue to exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and 
carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and 
risks of inaction. When force is necessary, if confirmed, we will 
continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our 
legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with 
such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.
    The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if 
necessary to defend our Nation and our interests, yet we must also seek 
to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.
    Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary 
before the United States would use preemptive force?
    Answer. I believe the use of preemptive force should be based on 
the strongest evidence of the need. It is a decision that must not be 
taken lightly.
    Two years as CIA Director has made me realize that intelligence is 
often ambiguous. I believe the men and women in the Intelligence 
Community do their best to get the most reliable intelligence possible. 
Still, we need to be aware of the caveats that come with intelligence 
products. We need to continue to ask hard questions about the 
information presented to policymakers.
 department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
    Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and increase collaboration 
between the respective departments to support military servicemembers 
as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental 
health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.
    If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that 
DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's 
objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
    Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in 
DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years. If confirmed, I will 
continue the efforts made by Secretary Gates, and look forward to 
working with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate current timelines. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to 
support servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a 
seamless transition to veteran status will remain a top priority.

                        DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

    Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced 
severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted 
from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for 
disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in 
a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in a combat-
related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In 
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of 
a combat-related disability contained in 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). Rather 
than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a more 
limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that the 
disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
    If confirmed, would you review the interpretation of this provision 
by the Department's subject matter experts and reconsider the 
Department's definition of combat-related operations for purposes of 
awarding enhanced severance pay and deduction of severance pay from VA 
disability compensation?
    Answer. I understand this matter is currently being reviewed. If 
confirmed, I will continue that review and ensure that any policy 
change, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress.

                       HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

    Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,'' enacted 
on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy 
concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days 
after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD's comprehensive review 
on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional 
defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed 
plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and 
regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and 
that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with 
the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, 
and military recruiting and retention.
    What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?
    Answer. I support the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 and 
the certification process defined in the law.
    If confirmed, and in the event Secretary Gates does not sign such a 
certification prior to his departure from office, I will work closely 
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess whether the elements for 
certification in the law are met before signing it myself.

           PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

    Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier 
Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or 
injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010 
concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against 
internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
    What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at 
Fort Hood?
    Answer. I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in 
August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel 
policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty 
preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. I am told that 
DOD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.
    If confirmed, I intend to review all the lessons learned, 
recommendations for improvement, and progress made to date and work 
closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is prepared to 
defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DOD's 
military and civilian personnel.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
    Answer. I understand that the findings and recommendations of the 
Fort Hood Review are the foundation of DOD's current strategy and 
leadership and accountability are key. If confirmed, I will review this 
strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DOD's 
civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure 
that DOD implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate 
such threats in the future.

                          RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

    Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort 
Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks 
the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate 
religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for 
violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final 
Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify 
guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the 
Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and 
self-radicalization . . . .''
    What is your view of these recommendations?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-on Review 
prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these 
recommendations. If confirmed, I will review that report and the 
progress that has been made to ensure DOD policies, programs, and 
procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion 
while effectively protecting our servicemembers from harm.
    Question. What is your understanding of current policies and 
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
    Answer. It is my understanding that the military places a high 
value on the rights of servicemembers to observe their respective 
religious faiths and that policies and programs reflect this.
    Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate 
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on 
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
    Answer. I understand each Religious Ministry Professional has 
committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to 
supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion 
by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and 
other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If 
confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the 
military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that DOD 
appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.
    Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices 
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of 
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a 
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious 
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, 
including no religious beliefs?
    Answer. I understand current policy appears to strike the proper 
balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not 
participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions, 
while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such 
as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of 
the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will monitor these 
policies and practices.
    Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific 
fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the 
Department's relevant policies?
    Answer. I understand DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board 
study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional 
clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent 
behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will 
inform DOD's policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I 
intend to ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based 
approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.
    Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to 
military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and 
appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The 
Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly 
exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.
    In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious 
practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?
    Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that must 
be struck between accommodating religious practices that require 
adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the 
military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I 
will work with the leaders of the military services to achieve an 
appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming 
and appearance standards and approving requested religious 
accommodations.

                      MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

    Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead 
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
    Answer. I recognize the events related to the attack at Fort Hood 
are first and foremost a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible 
that such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of 
retaliation, I am informed that military leaders and supervisors at all 
levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good 
order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment will be 
tolerated.
    Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to 
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the 
U.S. military?
    Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate open communications, 
decisive action on the part of military leaders and supervisors, and 
command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order 
and discipline. More specifically, this would include safeguarding the 
rights of servicemembers by exercising the established procedures and 
processes for addressing all indications of harassment and complaints. 
If confirmed, I would review the effectiveness of these feedback 
systems, and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

    Question. The Department has in recent years developed 
comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and 
response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing 
appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, 
numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in 
combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being 
reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized 
twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive 
or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command 
fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an 
adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to 
hold assailants accountable.
    Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, 
particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be 
effective?
    Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD--and it will not be 
tolerated. DOD's zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right 
policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, 
and the Service Secretaries are continuously and directly engaged in 
emphasizing the importance of addressing sexual assault. DOD is deeply 
committed to broad and focused improvements in how it prevents and 
responds to sexual assault. Advancements in development of policies and 
programs, such as hiring additional investigators, field instructors, 
prosecutors, and lab examiners have been made. But there is still work 
to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DOD and 
the Services. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure DOD is committed 
to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner.
    Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in 
which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?
    Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the 
implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my 
understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to 
remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need 
following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most 
important concern in reviewing the reporting procedure should be to 
ensure that victims are coming forward. If confirmed, I will review 
DOD's program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future 
improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.
    Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to 
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including 
assaults against contractor personnel?
    Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any 
location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive 
assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our 
deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or 
she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care. It is 
also my understanding that individuals who commit sexual assault are 
appropriately punished. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure DOD is 
committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner across 
the Services in all locations. There is no tolerance in DOD for sexual 
assault in any location or for any personnel who serve in DOD.
    Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and 
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to 
allegations of sexual assault?
    Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a 
comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. It is my understanding 
that all Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-
hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for all 
locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the 
Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and 
prosecuting sexual assault cases. While, I cannot make a specific 
assessment at this time, if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy and 
efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual 
assault investigation will be a priority.
    Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the 
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
    Answer. DOD's policies emphasize the command's role in effective 
response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training 
for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for 
prosecutors and investigators. I understand that DOD's policies seek to 
balance victim care and appropriate command action against offenders, 
with one of the aims being to build the victim's confidence to assist 
in an investigation. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability, 
appropriately balanced with victim care, remains an important focus of 
DOD's sexual assault prevention and response efforts.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior 
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to 
sexual assaults?
    Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed 
Forces, and that DOD currently has a zero tolerance policy. I 
understand DOD has assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational 
experience to provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response Program office. This senior leader will facilitate and 
integrate a comprehensive and uniformed approach to sexual assault 
prevention and response policy across DOD. If confirmed, I will 
continue to make sexual assault prevention and response a priority for 
DOD and will work closely with the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD 
maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.
     mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
    Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National 
Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained 
employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time 
in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, 
e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-
connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited 
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient 
policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve 
Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the 
past as ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been 
adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset 
policies.
    What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve 
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas 
do problems still exist?
    Answer. I understand there have been many changes made in policies 
governing the utilization of the Guard. There is now a 180-day 
notification prior to mobilization, dwell ratio standard of no more 
than 1 year mobilized for 5 years not mobilized, and Guard and 
reservists can only be involuntary activated for 1 year.
    These changes have improved morale by providing a predictable cycle 
of active duty.
    A key problem that remains is there are over 30 different duty 
statuses for Guard and Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty status 
is cumbersome and results in mobilization and de-mobilization delays.

              MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

    Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component 
personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee, 
and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for 
improved policy oversight and accountability.
    If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate 
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
    Answer. In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve 
Force, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental 
readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over 
the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made 
across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the 
medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.
    Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized 
calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement 
goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness 
achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.
    While progress can be seen, the medical and dental readiness of the 
Reserve component remains a priority if I am confirmed.
    Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to 
maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
    Answer. It's my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and 
improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and 
Reserve to improve their overall readiness.
    Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve component 
requires more than access to health care--it also requires command 
emphasis and individual accountability.
    Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental 
readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Services to incorporate the 
findings and recommendations from the executive-level DOD Prevention, 
Safety and Health Promotion Council (PSHPC) recently created to advance 
health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy 
initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-
based research.

                               DWELL TIME

    Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in 
Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not experiencing the 
dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
    In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be 
met?
    Answer. I understand that the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on 
average, are meeting or exceeding DOD's dwell time goal of 1:2 for the 
Active component. The Army is now averaging 1:1 but expects to be 1:2 
by October 2011. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue 
closely.
    Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve 
components?
    Answer. I understand Reserve component dwell time is improving, but 
has not reached DOD's dwell time goal of 1 year of active duty and 5 
years at home, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward the 
goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve component.

                        ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

    Question. Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would 
reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 
7,000 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary 
increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to 
cease relying on ``stoploss'' and to make up for a growing population 
of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on 
conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce 
their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and 
at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
    Do you agree with this Active-Duty end strength reduction plan?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan, but it is my 
understanding, that based upon what we know today, and the well 
reasoned assumptions that have been made, that the current plan strikes 
a prudent balance between serving operational needs and ensuring the 
funds available for recapitalization which are critical to future 
readiness. However, I know that ensuring that commanders have the right 
numbers and right kinds of volunteers to perform their mission is of 
critical importance. As future national security circumstances could 
change, if confirmed, our plan will change accordingly.
    Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength 
reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
    Answer. The Army and Marine Corps end strength reductions, planned 
for fiscal year 2015, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down 
in Afghanistan. If this assumption holds true, the dwell ratio of 1:2 
should not be affected.
    Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives 
have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will take into consideration dwell time 
objectives and our ability to meet competing strategic objectives 
before implementing the planned end strength reductions.
    Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its 
planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse 
impact on national security?
    Answer. I am unable to express an opinion on this issue at this 
time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army on appropriate 
end strength.
    Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating 
the Army's force reduction plan?
    Answer. That would depend on the Army's deployment footprint and 
the period of acceleration. However, I would anticipate that the Army 
may not be able to achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 on its current 
schedule. This is an issue that I will need to evaluate, if confirmed.
    Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the 
ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 
to occur on time?
    Answer. Generally speaking, I would consider our progress against 
the established security objectives at the time. I would solicit the 
advice of DOD's senior military and civilian leaders to inform my 
judgment on such decisions.
    Question. The Navy and Air Force have requested congressional 
authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength 
limits and save money.
    In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get 
down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require 
Congressional authorization?
    Answer. I understand that some of the authorities used during 
previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is 
seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to 
size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use 
of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure 
those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If 
confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of 
both civilian and military professionals at the Department.

                          RECRUITING STANDARDS

    Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military 
service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents 
unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for 
relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with 
respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical 
fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal 
misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Army, G-1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17-24 year 
olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational 
requirements.
    What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards 
regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
    Answer. From my understanding, the current enlistment qualification 
standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are 
driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are 
prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance 
requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants, 
who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school diploma is 
the best single predictor of attrition. Some standards may change over 
time. Medical standards have been revised, for example, as pre-
enlistment treatments result in improved outcomes.
    Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of 
eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
    Answer. From my understanding, the Services are exploring ways to 
improve our ability to predict attrition. The Services may be able to 
augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures, 
such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt 
well to the military. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to 
continually find new ways to recruit.
    Question. Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that 
are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful 
military service?
    Answer. I am not aware that DOD assesses that military enlistment 
standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness, 
adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical, 
disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to 
succeed in the Armed Forces.
    Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers 
of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition 
during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?
    Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates 
of military recruits, by a variety of credential types, and traditional 
high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any 
other type of credential holder.

                         WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

    Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the 
Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in 
intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment 
policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women 
in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and 
the American public.
    Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for 
service by women?
    Answer. It is my understanding DOD believes it has sufficient 
flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for 
women. DOD will continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend 
expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress accordingly as 
required by statute (10 U.S.C., Sec. 652 and/or Sec. 6035). Any 
decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women 
should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission 
readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.
    Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy or 
legislation regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?
    Answer. I understand DOD policies and practices that restrict 
assigning female servicemembers are currently under review per section 
535 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. If 
confirmed, I will take my responsibility to thoroughly review any 
proposed policy change and ensure changes to existing policy move 
forward after appropriate notice to Congress.

                      RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

    Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the 
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that 
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth 
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.'' 
In April, 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force 
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.'' The 
administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly 
$8.0 billion through 2016.
    Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
    Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the 
proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD's 
health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also 
believe the modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares are 
reasonable.
    Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit 
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control 
the costs of military health care?
    Answer. While the proposals included in the fiscal year 2012 
President's budget are a significant first step, I believe that we need 
to continue to explore all possibilities to control the costs of 
military health care. In the long term, the promotion of healthy life 
styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce 
the demand for health services.
    Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising 
medical costs on future DOD plans?
    Answer. I understand that even with the estimated savings from the 
health care efficiencies proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the 
cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a 
percentage of the DOD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget 
in just a few years.
    During a period when there is heavy downward pressure on all 
Federal spending, including defense spending, we must make smart 
choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits 
and funding for equipment and readiness.
    If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be to ensure that 
DOD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides the 
best value for our servicemembers and their families, as well as the 
American taxpayer.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or 
recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
    Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. If 
confirmed, I would work closely with the health care leadership in DOD 
to examine every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are 
provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.

                    PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

    Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related 
entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever 
increasing portion of the DOD budget.
    What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to 
control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
    Answer. I am aware that an increasing portion of DOD's limited 
resources are devoted to personnel-related costs.
    I understand there have been many incremental adjustments to 
military pay and benefits over the years; however, much of the military 
compensation system remains rooted in structures established 
generations ago. If we are going to manage costs, I believe everything 
must be on the table. It may be appropriate to conduct a comprehensive 
review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where 
costs can be contained.
    I believe that it may be possible to restructure our military 
benefits in a way that reduces costs, but any such effort must continue 
to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families 
in a wide variety of situations.
    Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services 
efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high 
quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the 
Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of 
the force?
    Answer. I understand recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-
effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience 
objectives. However, we must continually monitor these tools to ensure 
they are being used efficiently as well as effectively. A review of the 
utilization and efficacy of bonuses should certainly be part of any 
comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure.

                          MILITARY RETIREMENT

    Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
(QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more 
resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement 
System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE 
fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible 
spending accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business 
Board Task Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style 
benefits'' describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-
volunteer force retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-
subsidized grocery chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs''.
    What is your view of the adequacy of the current military 
retirement benefit?
    Answer. I understand that the military retirement system was 
created in an earlier era and, in general, accomplishes the purpose for 
which it was designed; to provide a strong incentive to attain 20 years 
of service and then to leave shortly thereafter. To maintain the right 
military force structure, the comprehensive mix of pay and benefits, 
which includes military retirement, needs to be adequate. However, over 
time, the world has changed and private-sector compensation practices 
have changed, but the military retirement system has remained 
essentially the same. I believe it may be appropriate to also review 
the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies.
    Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new 
generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of 
the government?
    Answer. I understand there are many proposed alternatives to the 
current military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations 
at this time but will closely study proposals and their impact if 
confirmed.
    Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view 
of military benefits?
    Answer. I am aware that the Defense Business Board is reviewing 
military retirement, but I do not believe it has released their report. 
I look forward to reviewing it once it is made available. I agree that 
it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that 
reduces costs, but any such effort must continue to attract and support 
our men and women in uniform and their families.

             DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS

    Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and 
flexible spending benefits to Active-Duty servicemembers. Providing 
these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady 
Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It 
would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the 
Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their 
families.
    If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the active duty 
servicemembers and their families?
    Answer. I understand that in response to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, DOD examined and provided a 
report on the advantages and disadvantages of providing flexible 
spending accounts to military members. If confirmed, I will review 
whether flexible spending accounts should be extended to Active-Duty 
servicemembers and their families.

                SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

    Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing 
duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn 
deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, 
healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to 
duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and 
continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the 
revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 
illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of 
significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the 
enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain, 
including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability 
evaluation.
    What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the 
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously 
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
    Answer. Although I do not have sufficient information to make a 
full assessment at this time, I am aware that significant improvements 
in these areas have been made in the last 4 years. However, it is my 
opinion that more must be done. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure 
DOD regularly evaluates and seeks to improve its wounded warrior 
programs to ensure that the needs of our wounded warriors and their 
families are met.
    Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress 
should be based?
    Answer. In my opinion, one of the most significant strengths is the 
high priority which DOD has placed on caring for our wounded warriors 
and their families. In my view, next to the wars themselves, there is 
no higher priority, and if confirmed, I will continue to place the 
highest priority on these efforts.
    Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
    Answer. A challenge facing DOD in this area, as in other areas, is 
to ensure that in delivering the highest standard of care for our 
wounded, ill and injured, we do so in an effective and cost-efficient 
manner.
    Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and 
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded 
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in 
returning to duty or to civilian life?
    Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If 
confirmed, I will closely monitor and evaluate this issue to ensure 
necessary resources are in place to take care of our recovering 
wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.
    Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC 
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A 
DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been 
established to improve processing of servicemembers.
    What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and 
improve the Integrated DES?
    Answer. I have been told that a revised and improved disability 
evaluation system developed by the Departments of Defense and Veterans 
Affairs, known as the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, today 
serves over half of those in the system, and that its wide adoption is 
a priority of the VA and DOD leadership. I do not currently have any 
specific recommendations regarding the Integrated Disability Evaluation 
System, but I support these ongoing efforts and, if confirmed, will 
look for opportunities to further improve on them.
    Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change, 
particularly the Army's growing problem?
    Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time, but, 
if confirmed, I will work with DOD and VA to continually evaluate the 
system and identify opportunities for improvement.

             SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

    Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services has 
increased in recent years. The Army released a report in July 2010 that 
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing 
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In 
addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in 
theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in 
mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced 
multiple deployments.
    In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help 
prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the 
resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members 
of the Reserve components?
    Answer. The rise in suicides in the military and by veterans is 
tragic and DOD has a responsibility to address the factors that 
contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women 
whether they are deployed, at a military installation or in their home 
communities. I understand all of the Services have implemented 
prevention and resilience building programs. The Final Report of the 
Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by 
Members of the Armed Forces is being used as a vehicle to review all 
Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to improve suicide 
prevention policies and processes.
    Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the 
July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
    Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read Army Health 
Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention Report 2010, I know that 
sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has 
unexpected challenges. Some of those challenges include a rise in 
``high risk'' behaviors and suicides. It is my understanding the Army's 
report provided an introspective look at these issues and concluded 
that suicide and other high risk behaviors must be addressed with a 
more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. If confirmed, I will work 
to see the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk 
factors.
    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that 
sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in 
theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to 
home station?
    Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have 
sufficient access to the mental health resources that they need is 
critical to the wellness of our total force. I am advised that DOD is 
working to determine workforce requirements for mental health 
professionals, and utilizing all the medical, educational, and 
counseling resources available, but there is further room for 
improvement. If confirmed, I will monitor how well we are meeting these 
goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining 
ways in which we can leverage more resources for our servicemembers and 
their families.

                        MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

    Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second 
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of 
key quality of life factors for military families, such as family 
support, child care, education, health care and morale, welfare and 
recreation services.
    How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment 
and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top 
priorities for the Armed Forces?
    Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read the 
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, I know that quality of life 
factors, such as those highlighted in the report, contribute 
significantly to recruiting and retention are key to maintaining the 
All-Volunteer Force. It is well known that a servicemember's 
satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the 
servicemember's family's experience, has a strong influence on a 
member's decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I will monitor how 
effectively DOD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, meet 
the needs of servicemembers and their families, and ensure that they 
are contributing positively to recruitment and retention.
    Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military 
quality of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision 
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy 
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
    Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on 
the wellness of the total force as well as on recruiting and retention. 
If confirmed, I will study the key areas such as access to counseling, 
fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment 
opportunities. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and 
Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and 
to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how 
to access available support when they need it.

                             FAMILY SUPPORT

    Question. Military members and their families in both the Active 
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous 
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military 
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a 
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations 
that go with them.
    What do you consider to be the most important family readiness 
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how 
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and 
adequately resourced?
    Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue in great detail, but 
I believe that family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is 
DOD's responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet 
the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing 
on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of 
military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. I 
understand that great strides have been made in improving access to 
resources for families through such programs as Military One Source, 
the Yellow Ribbon Program, but DOD can always improve.
    Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in 
light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments, 
and growth in end strength?
    Answer. Given upcoming structural changes across the world, it is 
DOD's responsibility to ensure that all resources including those in 
health care, education and employment are available to families at the 
level they need wherever they may be located. In order to accurately 
address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is 
also critical to DOD's success to build community partnerships between 
all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-
profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful 
aspects of military life. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing 
needs of our military families closely.
    Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve 
component families related to mobilization, deployment and family 
readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a 
military installation?
    Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to 
quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should 
provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military 
members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a 
coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA, 
State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding 
that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing 
these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it 
is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active 
Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers and their families.
    Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to 
enhance family support?
    Answer. During my pre-hearing office calls, I heard about many 
excellent State programs that support servicemembers and their 
families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see 
if they can be expanded across all States.
    Question. In your view, are the recent increases in military family 
support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012 
President's budget) sustainable in future years?
    Answer. I believe family programs are sustainable in future years. 
It will be necessary to review family programs with respect to 
efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed 
against the overall needs of DOD. The focus should not merely be on 
more resources, but rather on the efficiency and quality of Family 
Support programs along with the leveraging community-level 
organizations and citizens who desire to help their military-connected 
neighbors. DOD efficiency, along with community partnerships and 
cooperation, are key to allowing DOD to meet the long-term needs of our 
military families in an ever-increasing fiscally constrained 
environment.

                       DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

    Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, 
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all 
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and 
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment 
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the 
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies 
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence 
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply 
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field 
Manual on Interrogations?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee 
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that 
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat 
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be 
captured in future conflicts?
    Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be 
mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for 
detainee treatment, including the risk that the manner in which we 
treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which 
U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be 
captured in future conflicts.
    Question. Do you consider waterboarding to be torture?
    Answer. As I stated at my February 2009 confirmation hearing and 
prior to that hearing, I believe that waterboarding crosses the line 
and should not be employed. Having said that, I also believe, as the 
President has indicated, that those individuals who operated pursuant 
to a legal opinion indicating that the technique was proper and legal 
ought not to be prosecuted or investigated. They were acting pursuant 
to the law as it was presented to them by the Attorney General at that 
time.
    Question. Do you believe that waterboarding is consistent with the 
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. As stated, I have expressed the view that I believe that 
waterboarding crosses the line and should not be employed. I therefore 
believe that waterboarding is inconsistent with the requirements of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
    Question. Do you believe that we have obtained intelligence through 
waterboarding that we would not have been able to obtain through other 
means?
    Answer. As I have stated previously, the Intelligence Community 
relies on many sources of information. Whether that technique is the 
only way to obtain certain information is an open question, as I have 
repeatedly said. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will ensure 
that all interrogations conducted by DOD personnel are conducted 
consistent with the Department of the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 and in 
accord with Geneva Conventions Common Article 3.
    Question. Do you believe that the intelligence we received through 
waterboarding was accurate, or did we receive false leads?
    Answer. I cannot generalize about the quality of the intelligence 
that has been obtained through any particular technique. I am aware of 
instances in which useful information has been obtained from detainees 
and other instances in which detainees sought to provide false 
information.
    Question. Are there any circumstances under which you believe the 
United States should resume waterboarding of detainees?
    Answer. As I testified at my February 2009 confirmation hearing, I 
fully support the President's decision to establish the Army Field 
Manual, which does not permit waterboarding, as the single standard 
applying to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel and have 
upheld this standard while I was CIA Director. I will continue to do so 
if confirmed as Secretary of Defense. I believe we should do everything 
possible to collect intelligence while remaining in compliance with the 
law.
    Question. Are you familiar with the ``enhanced interrogation 
techniques,'' other than waterboarding, that have been applied to so-
called ``high value detainees'' at Guantanamo and elsewhere?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. Do you believe that these enhanced interrogation 
techniques are consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions?
    Answer. I would refrain to offer a legal opinion on this question 
as the answer also depends upon the nature and extent of the technique 
employed.

         COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD 
established the U.S. Northern Command and an Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
    What is your assessment of the current situation regarding 
cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security 
matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are 
confirmed?
    Answer. I understand that DOD has established a strong relationship 
with DHS.
    I believe DOD and DHS have a common goal: the protection of the 
United States.
    Elements of DOD work very closely with a number of the operational 
components of DHS including the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the Secret Service, Customs and Boarder 
Protection, and others.
    DOD and DHS work hand in hand with the Council of Governors to 
reach common goals. I understand DOD has a number of liaison and 
coordination officers throughout DHS and its components. I also 
understand that there are a number of cyber security related issues on 
which the Departments are also in collaboration.
    If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong relationship 
and build upon a number of these important initiatives.
    Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD 
to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support--whether 
through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?
    Answer. I understand the mechanisms for DOD to respond to the needs 
of domestic agencies appear to be working effectively. During the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, DOD responded to 141 requests for 
assistance from DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard, by providing ships to 
skim surface oil, air traffic control capabilities, and other critical 
assets. DOD has responded to over 50 requests for assistance from FEMA 
in the past year for a variety of disasters. DOD also regularly assists 
other agencies in the homeland as well, including the Department of 
Agriculture for fighting wildfires, and the Secret Service for security 
during special events such as the Presidential Inaugural. If confirmed, 
I will work closely with domestic agencies to ensure DOD is prepared to 
continue to support civil authorities, when appropriate.

                          IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from 
the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
    Answer. One of the most important lessons is the U.S. Government 
must train and plan for post-combat operations. Conflict can occur 
along a spectrum. Our military must be prepared for combat, but also 
may have a role in shaping the political, cultural and economic factors 
that can fuel conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with 
civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases 
of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and 
economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.
    Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the 
Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force 
structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
    Answer. I understand that lessons learned from Iraq and other 
recent engagements have led to deep and wide-ranging changes in 
doctrine, organization, training, and policy. For example, the 
counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in 
the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The development 
of Advise and Assist Brigades and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance units are examples of force structure changes.
    Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you 
propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating 
concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in 
Iraq?
    Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific measures at 
this time. I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the 
process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are 
contributing to the effort in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will monitor 
this ongoing process closely.

                     LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ

    Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq 
is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State 
(DOS). By October 2011, DOS is supposed to achieve an initial operating 
capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by 
December.
    What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning 
and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your 
view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current 
plan and successful implementation of this transition?
    Answer. DOD, State Department, and other agencies and offices have 
undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the 
transition in Iraq. I understand that DOD has an excellent working 
relationship with DOS and that the two departments are working together 
at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect 
with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist and 
DOD is doing everything it can to help set up DOS for success.
    The biggest concern I am aware of is that the State Department may 
not receive the resources it needs for the transition.
    Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to 
the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?
    Answer. I believe the current plans are sufficient, based on what I 
have been briefed to date. If confirmed, I would review and assess the 
Iraq transition planning and make recommendations on any necessary 
changes.

                    STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

    Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the 
conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
conflict situations.
    In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities, 
if any, between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?
    Answer. As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for 
economic development, governance, and law enforcement experts who work 
for the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the Justice Department. As appropriate, I understand that 
DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for 
managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the 
deployment and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and 
resources. Ideally, I understand that DOD usually will be in a 
supporting role. But when no other options are available, and when 
directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish 
civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair 
and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, 
and then transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government 
agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international 
governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
    Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability 
operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S. 
Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from 
its ability to perform combat missions?
    Answer. I note DOD policy states that ``stability operations are a 
core U.S. military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct with 
proficiency equivalent to combat operations.'' This represents a 
significant cultural and programmatic shift in recent years. If 
confirmed, I intend to familiarize myself with the efforts of the 
Military Departments to enhance proficiency on these missions and will 
work with the Chairman, the Military Department Secretaries, and 
Service Chiefs to ensure appropriate adjustments are made.
    Question. Do you believe that the authorities provided under 
section 1206 (Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces) and 
section 1207 (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 contribute to a policy 
of military engagement?
    Answer. I believe the authorities provided under sections 1206 and 
1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 
have made the government more agile in its ability to respond to urgent 
and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization challenges. I am told 
that the ``dual-key'' processes established to manage these projects 
have fostered greater collaboration between the Departments of State 
and Defense. If confirmed, I intend to apply the lessons learned from 
our experience with these programs in future security and stabilization 
assistance efforts with Secretary Clinton and other interagency 
partners.
    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to 
establish new organizations or offices to manage stability operations? 
If so, why?
    Answer. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, my 
understanding is that the U.S. Government does not need to establish 
new organizations or offices to manage stability operations. If 
confirmed, however, I will be open to the advice of others on this 
issue.
    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to 
establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
    Answer. I think one area where we can improve is to strengthen our 
combined ability to conduct ``whole-of-government'' planning which will 
enhance the management and the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's 
stabilization and reconstruction activities. If confirmed, I will 
review how to make such planning a priority.
    Question. What role do you believe DOD should play in providing 
training and advocacy for ``rule of law'' development in Iraq and 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. Without fair and effective rule of law, neither Iraq nor 
Afghanistan will be able to prevent the return of terrorists. Both 
countries require U.S. Government assistance in rule of law capacity 
building in such areas as civilian police forces, attorneys, and 
judges. I strongly support the State Department's lead in this critical 
endeavor. However, in fragile security environments, my sense is that 
DOD rule of law practitioners can also play a major and useful role in 
providing training and assistance.

                       SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ

    Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation 
in Iraq?
    Answer. Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, but 
these enemies do not have the support of the Iraqi people. Although 
occasional high-profile attacks still occur, the underlying security 
situation in Iraq remains stable and these attacks have not sparked a 
return to widespread insurgency or civil war.
    Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in 
Iraq over the coming months?
    Answer. The main challenges to internal stability and security in 
Iraq are al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shia extremist groups. 
Moreover, the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan 
Regional Government has the potential to create fissures that can be 
exploited by extremist groups, and could even lead to an escalation of 
tension between Kurdish and central government forces. However, with 
sustained political engagement by Iraqi leaders and a strong U.S. 
support role, the ISF should be able to handle these challenges.

                            DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ

    Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. 
forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of 
2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?
    Answer. Yes.
    Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued 
presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you 
support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond 
the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
    Answer. Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have acknowledged that 
there will be gaps in Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities after 2011, 
especially in external defense. I believe the United States should 
consider a request from the Government of Iraq to remain in Iraq for a 
limited period of time to provide limited assistance to fill these 
gaps.

                    U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

    Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq 
strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?
    Answer. The nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship desired 
by both countries is articulated in the November 2008 Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA). The SFA establishes a structure for 
cooperation and collaboration across a variety of sectors, including 
commercial, education, cultural, political, energy, and defense.
    Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that 
relationship over the coming years?
    Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement 
and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the 
broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement 
and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on 
mutual interests and mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in 
order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the 
region.

                 AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

    Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for 
Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
    Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set 
forth and I believe it is the right strategy. We have the necessary 
resources and strategy in place to succeed in our focused 
counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy has reversed the insurgency's 
momentum and is helping the Afghans increase their governance capacity 
and build security forces that are capable of providing the security 
and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan 
that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. The gains made 
are fragile and reversible.
    Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to 
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an 
increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
    Answer. I believe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The 
administration tracks metrics of progress throughout the year and 
conducts annual reviews to determine whether adjustments are necessary. 
Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency 
strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an 
ongoing process.
    Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the 
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
    Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 18 months, 
establishing security and Afghan Government authority in former Taliban 
strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar, as well as building the 
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the gains are 
fragile and reversible, momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government, 
and they are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead 
security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer.
    Question. In your view, how significant an impact does the death of 
Osama bin Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
    Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant victory in 
our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which is the 
core goal of our efforts in Afghanistan. The successful operation does 
not mean we can rest, but rather we have a unique opportunity to make 
new gains on al Qaeda while it is in disarray. It is too early to 
assess the long-term impact of his death, but it clearly conveys our 
persistence, determination and capability to achieve our goals.

  TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP 
                               REDUCTIONS

    Question. Do you support the July 2011 date announced by President 
Obama to begin transferring more and more responsibility for 
Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces and to begin the 
drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, with the pace of reductions 
to be based on conditions on the ground?
    Answer. I support the July 2011 date to begin the process of 
transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) and to begin a responsible, conditions-based 
drawdown of U.S. forces. Over the preceding 18 months, the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its ANSF partners 
have made significant gains in the overall security environment. Their 
hard-earned gains have set the necessary conditions to begin the 
transition of responsibility.
    Question. Do you support a significant drawdown of U.S. troops 
starting in July of this year?
    Answer. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called 
for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to 
give the President meaningful options for his decision. Decisions 
regarding the size and pace of the drawdown will be based on 
commanders' assessment of conditions and warfighting requirements.
    Question. In your view, what impact, if any, does the death of 
Osama bin Laden have on the size or time table for the reduction of 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan?
    Answer. It is too early to know the implications of Osama bin 
Laden's death on the region and how it will affect the campaign. While 
bin Laden's death sends a clear message to other al Qaeda and Taliban 
senior leaders about U.S. resolve, there are no indications at this 
stage of what impact, if any, it might have for decisions regarding the 
size or time table for reducing forces in Afghanistan.
    Question. Do you support the goal of transitioning security 
responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
    Answer. Yes. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in ISAF 
endorsed President Karzai's goal of ANSF assuming lead responsibility 
for security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Although much work is 
still left, I am confident that this objective can be met.

                  AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

    Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a 
professional and effective ANSF?
    Answer. The ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality 
over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth 
targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in 
effectiveness and professionalism, although more remains to be 
achieved. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program 
has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. U.S. 
and NATO efforts to recruit, train, equip, and deploy these forces, in 
conjunction with very capable Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior, 
are paying real dividends on the ground in Afghanistan. These gains 
have set the ANSF on a path to be capable of assuming lead security 
responsibilities across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
    Question. Do you support the increase in the size of the ANSF 
beyond the level of 305,000 by the fall of 2012?
    Answer. Yes. Military commanders, who are closest to the problem 
and have expert knowledge, have conducted detailed studies on ANSF 
personnel and capabilities requirements. These requirements were 
developed by examining the terrain, the strength of the enemy, and the 
core goals in the DOD campaign plan. In order to ensure the Afghans 
have the capabilities they need to secure their country in the current 
threat environment, continued ANSF growth is needed. The President has 
endorsed growth to 352,000 and I support that decision.
    Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the 
capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, 
would you make for addressing those challenges?
    Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the 
ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan 
population which constrain the development of more advanced 
capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical and communications 
units. These are capabilities that will be necessary for the ANSF to 
ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. 
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put a lot of attention on, and 
resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the 
development of strong and capable leadership, which takes time and 
experience. If confirmed, I will work with military and civilian 
leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF 
capacity.

                   AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

    Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is a key 
component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success 
of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of 
Afghanistan's capacity to provide governance, better services and 
economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance 
of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan 
people and fighting corruption.
    What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the 
Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better 
governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. I strongly agree that improving governance and economic 
development is as crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan as is 
improving security. While DOS and USAID are the lead agencies within 
the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in 
Afghanistan, the DOD contributes to this effort and must cooperate 
closely with State and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects 
with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the 
military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term 
development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.
    In areas where civilians cannot operate independently due to an 
insecure environment, they regularly collaborate with military 
counterparts. Recognizing that corruption erodes the legitimacy of the 
Afghan state and fuels the insurgency, the Commander, ISAF, created 
Task Force Shafafiyat (``Transparency'') to foster a common 
understanding of the corruption problem and coordinate anti-corruption 
efforts among ISAF, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, and 
the international community. The task force has enabled ISAF to begin 
helping the Afghans address corruption and has improved U.S. 
contracting practices to ensure our funds are not being used in ways 
that contribute to the corruption that enables the insurgency

                             RECONCILIATION

    Question. Under what conditions should reconciliation talks with 
the Taliban leadership be pursued?
    Answer. The President has clearly outlined our support for an 
Afghan-led process to achieve a political resolution to the conflict in 
Afghanistan. I support Afghan Government efforts to achieve the 
reconciliation of groups and individuals who agree to cut ties with al 
Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.
    Question. What is your assessment of the likelihood that such 
conditions may be achieved in the near future?
    Answer. The clear successes we have seen in the military campaign 
are helping to create the conditions for reconciliation. The insurgency 
does not represent a clear hierarchy, and includes a variety of 
competing and affiliated groups. Resolution of the conflict in 
Afghanistan will likely require a process that includes both national 
and local dispute resolution. I am optimistic that the sustained 
combination of our military, governance, and diplomatic efforts is 
helping to set the conditions for the Afghan Government to build the 
political consensus that will ultimately bring about a resolution to 
the conflict.

               U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

    Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests 
with regard to Pakistan?
    Answer. Most importantly, the core national security goal remains, 
to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and 
eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies 
in the future. U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our 
relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign 
against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and other extremists use safe-havens in 
Pakistan to plot and prepare attacks against the U.S. and our allies 
and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to 
eliminate these safe havens.
    In addition, Pakistan's civilian-led government requires 
international support to maintain political stability and to work 
toward the ability to govern all of its territory effectively. The fact 
that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from 
extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements. 
Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in 
the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India 
conflict is another important and strategic interest. For these 
reasons, it is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to have a 
strong civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace 
and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets 
remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If 
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these 
strategic interests with Pakistan.
    Question. U.S. and Pakistan officials have been working together 
for years to counter the threat of terrorism. However, the revelation 
that Osama bin Laden has been hiding out apparently for years at a 
spacious, highly-secure compound in Pakistan, less than 35 miles from 
the capital, has raised disturbing questions about the nature of 
Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in the fight against 
terrorism.
    What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill 
Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
    Answer. The operation against Osama bin Laden was a vital element 
of the President's comprehensive strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat al Qaeda, but it is far from the only element in this strategy. 
One of the key lessons from this operation is that we have seen no 
clear evidence to indicate that senior Pakistani leaders were involved 
in harboring Osama bin Laden or knew of his whereabouts. Although the 
relationship with Pakistan is not always easy and we have our 
differences, continuing cooperation with Pakistan is critical to keep a 
tremendous amount of pressure on al Qaeda's leadership and the networks 
that provide it support and safe haven at a time when it is most 
vulnerable. The operation presents a historic opportunity not only for 
us, but also for Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and 
strengthen our cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that 
threaten both nations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our 
partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve our goal of 
eliminating terrorist networks that threaten the United States and our 
allies and partners and continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous support 
in the fight against al Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist 
networks.
    Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend 
for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
military relations?
    Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like 
our overall relationship, has featured ups and downs and is challenged 
by a long-term lack of trust within Pakistan about our intentions. If 
confirmed I will continue to focus on building the trust that is 
necessary for the effective partnership we need with Pakistan.

                      U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

    Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant 
military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing 
and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund 
to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States 
has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs 
associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection 
with Operation Enduring Freedom.
    How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving 
Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
    Answer. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, 
and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped 
enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has 
undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations 
in the northwest, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and 
Bajaur, with varying levels of success. Pakistan's level of commitment 
is reflected in the enormous casualties it has suffered as a result of 
terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military 
personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian 
causalities in recent years, most recently in significant attacks 
following the bin Laden operation. However, Pakistan continues to lack 
the necessary military and civilian capacities to ``hold'' and 
``build'' in cleared areas. If confirmed, I will work Congress to 
ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.

                      OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

    Question. What changes, if any, should the United States make to 
its security assistance policy regarding Pakistan in light of the 
revelation of Osama bin Laden's hideout within Pakistan?
    Answer. The current ``train-advise-and-equip'' programs with the 
Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important 
component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist 
sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however, 
that Pakistan live up to its end of the bargain, cooperating more fully 
in counterterrorism matters and ceasing to provide sanctuary to Afghan 
Taliban and other insurgent groups. Therefore, in the wake of the Osama 
bin Laden raid, we have asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete 
steps to demonstrate cooperation and counter-terrorism. Future requests 
for security assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to the 
counter-terrorism steps we have proposed.
    Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a 
significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
    Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al 
Qaeda and brings us closer to its strategic defeat. However, al Qaeda 
remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Its close allies, such 
as Pakistan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, have increasingly adopted 
al Qaeda's jihadist vision and, as core al Qaeda is weakened, there is 
a risk that decentralized affiliates may pose an increased threat to 
the United States. To achieve the President's objective of defeating al 
Qaeda and preventing its return to either Pakistan or Afghanistan, it 
is vital that we continue to aggressively pursue our accelerated 
counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
    Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda 
affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western 
interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
    Answer. Al Qaeda and its adherents are diverse, dispersed, and 
decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and 
East Africa, South Asia, Iraq, and elsewhere around the globe, 
including within the United States. Intent and ability to attack the 
United States varies by group, but such attacks are a common theme in 
their propaganda and planning. Bin Laden himself remained very focused 
on attacking the Homeland. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has 
already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct 
attacks against the United States. Despite the death of Bin Laden, core 
al Qaeda and its adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a 
very dangerous threat.

                              ARAB SPRING

    Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to 
change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for 
many years to come. These changes will require the United States to 
adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this 
region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce 
significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result 
of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up 
contact with our partners in this region.
    In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on 
military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
    Answer. The DOD's military-to-military and defense civilian 
relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa have 
played a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests: defeating 
extremists, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering 
terrorist organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, preventing 
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, disrupting smuggling and piracy, 
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and securing Israel. 
Engagement with our key Middle Eastern and North African partners' 
defense ministries and militaries, building partner capacity to meet 
common challenges, having a forward presence to enable operations and 
deter potential threats, and being able to access regions--if and when 
necessary for future contingencies--require considerable effort on the 
part of many organizations within DOD working in tandem with DOS. 
During this time of change and uncertainty in the region, I understand 
that DOD will