[Senate Hearing 113-149]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-149
ASSESSING THE TRANSITION
IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 11, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Chayes, Sarah, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 36
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 3
Dobbins, Hon. James, Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 52
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 54
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Jeff Flake................................................. 56
Hadley, Stephen, senior advisor for international affairs, U.S.
Institute of Peace, Washington, DC............................. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Lavoy, Dr. Peter R., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 58
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 61
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Jeff Flake................................................. 61
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Nadery, Ahmad Nader, founder and chairman, Fair and Free
Elections Foundation of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan........ 41
Prepared statement........................................... 42
(iii)
ASSESSING THE TRANSITION
IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 11, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Murphy, Kaine,
Corker, Risch, and Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, ``Assessing the Transition in
Afghanistan,'' will come to order.
Today's hearing on Afghanistan comes none too soon. With
63,000 U.S. troops still based there and the upcoming political
and security transitions in 2014 just around the corner, now is
the time to take stock of our efforts and make any necessary
changes. Most importantly, given recent speculation about our
intentions, this means the United States needs to make clear
once again that we are committed to a long-term partnership
with Afghanistan. Period.
Let me be clear because I believe this is a fundamental
point. As long as the Afghan people and their government want
the United States as a partner, we do not intend to leave
Afghanistan. Our goal, our clear intent is to stay committed
with both security and civilian assistance post-2014.
I am fully aware that there is a deep-seated anxiety in the
region about what the U.S. troop presence will look like post-
2014. I heard it firsthand when I was in Afghanistan and
Pakistan earlier this year, and I know Senator Corker heard it
on his travels to the region just last week.
As President Obama has said repeatedly, the United States
is planning on leaving behind a United States force presence to
support the Afghan security forces if the Afghan Government
wants it. But we need a workable bilateral security agreement
acceptable to the United States. President Karzai must now
decide whether his government is willing to accept a longer
term U.S. troop presence by coming back to the negotiating
table with acceptable terms. The ball is in his court, but he
and the Afghan people should understand that if we fail to
reach an agreement, it will not be for lack of trying on
America's end.
For our part, I believe that President Obama should signal
to the Afghans and our allies what the post-2014 U.S. troop
presence will look like governed by a security agreement. The
lack of clarity on this point has led to too much hedging in
the region. Afghans who may otherwise be interested in building
a fledgling democracy want to know that they will not be
abandoned by the United States as the Taliban claims they will
be.
These are the very Afghan allies we need, those committed
to democracy, people like Lt. Islam Bibi, the most senior
Afghan female police officer in Helmand province who survived
three death attempts by her own brother for enlisting and who
was tragically shot dead last week by assailants. Afghans like
her are counting on us to support a successful and inclusive
political transition next year so that the country does not
return to civil war.
So I want to reiterate that from my perspective, the ball
is in President Karzai's hands, and I hope he does not think
that this is a question of simply leverage for him. If he does,
then he is sadly mistaken.
The other most important piece of this puzzle is getting
the 2014 elections right because ultimately it is the political
transition that will determine whether we have a successful
security and economic transition.
I am very pleased that Senate Resolution 151 that I
sponsored with Senators Casey and McCain passed this week
urging the Afghan Government to ensure transparent and credible
elections. Many of us here in Congress are concerned that the
window for establishing a successful election framework for
next April's vote is closing. There is little time left to get
a credible preelection process off the ground. Delays in
approving new electoral laws and new appointments to the
Independent Election Commission, Complaints Commission, and
Supreme Court could undermine the entire process. Afghan
political stakeholders must come together and agree to fair
rules governing the elections to ensure that the process and
outcome is accepted by all parties. And now is the time for the
United States, the United Nations, and all our allies to speak
with one unified voice about what is really at stake here. We
must convince the Afghan people that having credible and fair
elections on April 5, 2014, is our No. 1 priority in
Afghanistan. And President Karzai should understand in clear
terms that his legacy of leaving behind a stable Afghanistan
that is supported by the international community will be in
serious jeopardy with a flawed election outcome.
Already the Obama administration has requested $3.4 billion
in civilian assistance for Afghanistan in 2014, more than it
has requested for any other nation, bringing total United
States civilian aid to about $20 billion. But before Congress
approves additional funding, we need to know that the Afghan
Government is serious about holding credible elections in April
2014 and upholding the reform commitments it made in Tokyo last
year.
Congress also needs to hear from the Obama administration
about how it is addressing serious problems raised by the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Though many of our aid programs have helped raise the quality
of life for many Afghans, some of them are ironically working
against our collective interests. I am baffled, for instance,
that the Pentagon purchased about 800 million dollars' worth of
aircraft, including 30 Russian helicopters, when the Afghan air
unit lacks basic capacity to operate them. I am also skeptical
about some of our INL programs relating to counternarcotics and
rule of law efforts in Afghanistan and have asked SIGAR to
fully investigate if our multibillion dollar investments in
this area make sense.
As we draw down in Afghanistan and move to third-party
monitoring of our civilian assistance programs, this committee
wants assurances from the State Department, USAID, and Defense
Department that they are making real oversight reforms as laid
out by SIGAR and others and are making oversight a priority
during and after the transition. With billions of dollars at
stake, we cannot afford to keep doing business as usual.
There are a lot more areas I would like to cover, including
Pakistan's role in the transition and whether we have made
lasting security gains, but for now, let me save that for the
questions and answers and turn to my distinguished ranking
colleague, Senator Corker, who has just returned from the
region, for his own opening statements.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this
hearing. And I do want to say that I appreciate working with
you. I think that it has always been the hope that foreign
policy and partisanship dissipate at the shoreline. And I think
the way we work together on this committee has demonstrated
that, and I very much appreciate your comments. I am going to
take a slightly different take, but I think your concerns about
Afghanistan and Pakistan are similar. And I look forward to
working with you as we try to craft policies. And I thank you
for doing that on Syria.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses today, both the
first and second panels. We have a little bit of an issue that
has arisen that is going to be brewing next week, and at 11
o'clock I am likely to have to depart. But I know that we had a
classified briefing earlier this week, and we have had a chance
to talk with you all as well. I know the second panel is made
up of people that I very much respect, and if I miss you, I
apologize.
But I want to say that this last week I spent a good part
of a day in south Waziristan and saw the roadways that we are
building with U.S. dollars, the dams that we are building with
U.S. dollars, the transmission lines that we are building with
U.S. dollars in an area that was, let us face it, not very long
ago the center of al-Qaeda activities. And I saw the benefits
of that. There is no question that bringing civilization to
that part of the world and the chance for economic growth
certainly changes the dynamic. And so I want to applaud--I know
the chairman was involved in that and others have been too.
On the other hand, as Admiral Mullen testified here 2 years
ago, we know, for a fact, that the ISI, the intelligence arm of
the Pakistani military, is helping coordinate directly
activities with the Haqqani network in Afghanistan in
conducting high profile activities that are designed to kill
and maim Americans and destabilize the country. And we know
that.
And I say to the two of you--you have a difficult job. It
is complex. But we have got to rectify that problem. And as we
move ahead with looking at aid, I have a feeling the chairman
is going to be looking at those issues in a similar light. But
we have got to rectify this bipolar activity that is taking
place that is not in our U.S. interest.
Now, Pakistan has security problems within the country.
Candidly, down the road I have a feeling we are going to be
worried about Pakistan being a stable country and a country
with a lot of nuclear weapons on mobile launchers. Certainly
that is a problem.
But let me move to Afghanistan, and I am going to say some
things that are a little bit out of my character but I am going
to say them. Look, I think that everybody knows over the next 6
months, actually between now and April, it is a very important
time in Afghanistan. The bilateral agreement we know needs to
be done by October, and I know that you all are working toward
that end. And I know that you know the election being free and
fair, generally speaking per Afghanistan standards, is
something that is very important and I know that there are
people there on the ground both on the Afghan side and our side
trying to make that happen.
This administration, though, has tremendous difficulty
making decisions. This administration has multiple voices
within it that keep it from having clarity. And I have to tell
you, as the chairman mentioned, I think the administration has
got to quit looking at its navel and make a decision on what
the force structure is going to be in Afghanistan. Our allies
are going to have difficulty planning and provisioning if we
wait much longer. Capital outflows out of Afghanistan are
increasing dramatically which is causing the economy to be less
than it could because we have yet to state what we are going to
do, generally speaking, as it relates to force structure. And I
know that we will not do anything if we do not end up with a
bilat--agreement.
But I think the fact is that we have got to go ahead and
tell our allies, tell the people in Afghanistan what we are
going to do, generally speaking, as it relates to force
structure. And I am telling you this continued looking at our
navel, trying to make a decision, having competing forces at
the White House is hurting us. It is hurting our efforts in
Afghanistan. It is hurting our military and it is hurting our
allies.
Now, Karzai. Karzai is the most frustrating world leader we
have probably dealt with in a long time. He is irrational. It
is hard to believe that he believes the things that he
believes. But he truly believes today that we are in cahoots
with Pakistan and trying to destabilize the country, as crazy
as that is. The fact that we have spent hundreds of billions of
dollars there, we have lost American lives and limbs, and the
fact that he today believes that somehow or another we are
coordinating with Pakistan to destabilize it is almost beyond
belief. But the reason he does is because he knows the first
fact that I just mentioned and that we have noticed here in
this committee for a long time.
I think he also believes--I do not think he believes this
with all his heart. I think he thinks--I do not believe this,
by the way, and I want to make this clear to anybody listening.
I do not believe this. I think he believes there are some
people within the administration that because of previous
political issues, almost want Afghanistan to fail. I do not. He
is a strange person.
I will say--and this is a minor detail--I think we have
helped create the kind of relationship that we have with him.
Since no one at the administration will talk with me about some
of the questions I have asked about our support of him
personally, I would not be surprised if we were supporting him
personally prior to him even being President of Afghanistan.
But I think we have helped create a monster here.
So I would just say to the two of you, that you have a
tough job. I am not speaking to you specifically as I say this,
I am speaking to the administration. I know that we have a
tough and difficult and frustrating person to deal with on this
bilateral agreement, but I hope that this administration is not
going to personalize it. I know that Karzai has embarrassed the
President publicly by talking about the fact that he believes
that he is working with Pakistan to destabilize the country,
and I know that we have a lot of problems with Karzai. I am
asking this administration to look beyond Karzai--he is going
to be gone in April--to look at our national interests, to make
some decisions with clarity and show some world leadership and
do the things that we need to do as a nation to support these
outstanding men and women in uniform that have sacrificed life
and limb, the taxpayers that have sacrificed precious dollars
and move on with this. I am very, very frustrated with this
administration and its lack of ability to lead on this issue
and to provide clarity.
I hope your testimony helps us with that. I look forward to
working with you. I thank you for being public servants. I know
it is a frustrating job, but it is time to move on this issue.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
With that, let me turn to our witnesses and thank them for
their participation today. On our first panel, we have the
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Jim
Dobbins, and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs, Dr. Peter Lavoy.
And let me note that while Ambassador Dobbins has only been
on this particular job for 2 months, he was the first senior
American civilian into Afghanistan back in 2001 and raised the
flag over the newly reopened U.S. Embassy in Kabul. So he is no
stranger to the region.
We look forward to your testimony. We ask you to summarize
it in about 5 minutes or so so we can have a question and
answer session. Your entire statements will be included in the
record. And with that, Ambassador Dobbins.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Dobbins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Corker. Thanks for giving both Peter Lavoy and
me an opportunity to appear before you, and thank you for your
constructive opening remarks and your advice which we will
certainly take to heart and make sure others in the
administration are aware of.
As you noted, I have only been in my current position for a
couple of months, having come back essentially to the same job
I had 12 years ago with respect to Afghanistan just after 9/11.
And this may give me a somewhat different perspective than
those of you who have been following Afghanistan from day to
day.
I know we tend to look at the efficacy of our efforts in
Afghanistan day to day, project by project, measuring it
largely in terms of inputs and outputs. But the true measure of
our efforts in Afghanistan is not either what we put into it or
the direct outputs, but rather the outcomes. The best measure
of education assistance is not schools built or even students
instructed, but literacy rates. The best measure of health
assistance is not the number of hospitals built or even
patients treated, but increases in longevity. Of course, it
takes a long time to measure outcomes like this, but we have
been in Afghanistan and helping Afghanistan for a long time
now.
By measures of this sort, outcome measures, and on the
basis of some research that I completed with some colleagues at
RAND just a few months before taking up my current job, I
believe Afghanistan may actually be the most successful
international effort at reconstruction in a conflict or post-
conflict country over the last quarter century.
In a study that we did at the RAND Corporation, we looked
at 20 cases over the last 25 years where there were civil and
military interventions in a conflict or post-conflict
environment. This included all the big United States efforts in
Somalia and Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and
about a dozen smaller U.N. and other efforts of this sort. And
we tried to measure the outcomes in these efforts over a 10-
year period using statistics and indices that were kept by
Freedom House, the IMF, the World Bank, and UNDP.
Afghanistan rated quite high on most of those indexes, but
rather remarkably in the category of human development, it
showed the best rate of improvement of all 20 of these
countries. The human development is an index kept by UNDP and
it measures a combination of health, education, and standard of
living outcomes. And as I said, Afghanistan rated top of all
20.
Now, this is not just because it was the poorest to start
with because some of the others were actually poorer. And it is
not just because it got a lot of assistance because a couple of
the others actually got more assistance on a per capita basis.
What does this mean in practical terms? In Afghanistan, it
means life expectancy has gone from 44 years to 60 years, and
that is in a country that is still at civil war.
What does it mean in terms of literacy? It means that
Afghanistan has gone from having the worst rate of literacy in
the entire world, maybe 15 percent back in 2001, to 33 percent
literacy today and to 60 percent literacy by 2025, if the kids
that are in school today stay in school.
It means going from one TV station that was owned by the
government to 75 nearly all independent TV stations.
It means going from 40,000 telephones to 18 million
telephones. It means cell phone coverage going from 0 to 90
percent of the country.
These are pretty remarkable outcomes. In fact, taken as a
whole, they may be unmatched outcomes in a conflict or post-
conflict society.
Now, this is a pivotal time. NATO and the United States are
transitioning from a combat to an advisory and assistance role.
As I think both of you stressed, the United States is committed
to continuing to support a fully sovereign, democratic, and
united Afghanistan. We do not intend to repeat the mistakes we
made in the 1980s and 1990s. As the Afghans stand up, they will
not stand alone. We remain committed to a long-term strategic
partnership with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people.
As the President said in January, along with President
Karzai, the United States has two goals: Number one, to train,
assist, and advise Afghan forces so they can maintain
Afghanistan's security; and number two, making sure that we can
continue to go after remnants of al-Qaeda or its affiliates.
At the NATO defense ministerial this year in June, NATO
allies and partners endorsed a detailed concept of the new
mission for Afghanistan after 2014.
Regarding the number of American troops to remain in
Afghanistan--that is to say, the number of troops that would
remain 18 months from now--the President is still reviewing his
options. We are, at the same time, continuing our conversation
with the Afghans about how we can carry out those missions. We
have made significant progress on the text of a new bilateral
security agreement. Of course, without an agreement on our
presence in Afghanistan, we would not remain, but we do not
believe that that is the likely outcome of these negotiations.
Unlike Iraq to which comparisons are often made, the
Afghans actually need us to stay. Most Afghans want us to stay,
and we have promised to stay. None of these three things were
true in Iraq, and all of these three things are true with
respect to Afghanistan.
While we continue to help Afghans take responsibility for
their own security, we are also continuing to support an
Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process designed to
find a political solution to conflict with the Taliban. At the
same time, we must be clear that our main priority for the
coming year is neither the military transition nor the
reconciliation process, but rather the political transition
that will occur when Afghan people choose a new President and a
new President takes office next year. The future stability of
Afghanistan rests on the peaceful transition of political
authority in the course of 2014, and if this occurs, then I
believe these other problems and challenges will resolve
themselves quite satisfactorily.
The first steps in this process is already underway, and we
will continue to work with the Afghan Government to support
their electoral process and achieve a successful and unifying
political transition.
Like any developing country emerging from conflict,
Afghanistan will require international support for some time.
We should, however, recognize that a country that a little more
than a decade ago provided a haven from which the 9/11 attacks
were planned has already become a staunch partner in the fight
against international terrorism. There is much the Afghan
people can be proud of, and we can be proud of, in the work we
have done over the last decade and more.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador James F. Dobbins
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
progress of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
Although I have been in my current position for less than 2 months,
I did briefly occupy a similar position nearly 12 years ago, when, in
the aftermath of 9/11, I was appointed the Bush administration's first
special envoy for Afghanistan. In that capacity I represented the
United States in the early diplomacy after 9/11 which led to the Bonn
Conference and the establishment of an interim government in
Afghanistan. The Bonn Conference set in motion the political process
that produced a new constitution for Afghanistan and its first
democratically elected government.
Afghanistan is a remarkably changed place in 2013 as compared to
2001. In 2001, fewer than 900,000 children--almost all boys--were in
school. Today, that number is 8 million, more than one-third of whom
are girls. Life expectancy has soared from 44 years in 2001 to over 60
today. While maternal mortality rates remain too high in Afghanistan,
women and children are far more likely to survive childbirth than they
were 11 years ago. In 2001, Afghanistan had one state-run television
station. Today, the media landscape is among the region's freest and
most vibrant, with over 45 percent of Afghans owning televisions and 75
television stations and 175 radio stations available. Afghans are more
connected than ever with more than 18 million active cell phone
subscribers and a combined phone network that covers 90 percent of the
population. Remarkably, 80 percent of Afghan women have access to a
cell phone today.
To understand the significance of these types of changes, it is
useful to put them in a broader perspective. A study I published with
colleagues at the RAND Corporation just before taking this position
looked at the 20 major post-cold-war civil-military interventions
conducted by the United States, the United Nations, and others in
conflict and post-conflict states. The study compared outcomes in those
countries over the 10 years after each intervention. We found that
Afghanistan--even though it was one of only four of the 20 countries
still experiencing violent conflict--had by far the greatest
improvement of all 20 in its Human Development Index score (measured by
the United Nations Development Program), the second-greatest cumulative
growth in per capita gross domestic product (based on International
Monetary Fund data), and the third-best improvement in its government
effectiveness score (measured by the World Bank).
The Human Development Index is an especially useful indicator of
Afghanistan's advancement. It is a composite measure of socioeconomic
well-being that takes account of health, education, and income. Since
2001, Afghanistan's Human Development Index score has improved faster
than the world average, the South Asia regional average, and the
average for countries with low human development. These objective
advancements in Afghanistan cannot be explained simply by the low base
from which progress has been made since 2001. Several of the other 20
countries we studied were poorer to begin with and improved less
rapidly over 10 years after intervention. Nor are these improvements
just a manifestation of international aid, as Afghanistan was not the
largest foreign aid recipient of the 20 countries on a per capita
basis. These changes are real and can be expected to be durable.
Afghanistan is still, of course, a poor country, and one that has
suffered decades of conflict; it has a long way yet to go in its
political and economic development. No society, whether it has been
affected by conflict or not, can be lifted out of poverty, cleansed of
corruption, and endowed with fully effective and resilient institutions
in the short span of a decade. This is why it is most useful to assess
progress against a realistic set of expectations.
In this light, the outcomes produced by American, Afghan, and
coalition efforts have been impressive, and color the prospects for
Afghanistan's future in many ways. Crucially, the people of Afghanistan
now have a strong interest in seeing the improvements in their country
sustained and even further advanced. Hopes and expectations have risen
for peace, for economic development, and for what the government
delivers to the people. Afghanistan will not return to the conditions
of 2001 as the U.S. role shifts in line with the transition processes
and shifts in the security realm to supporting and assisting the
Afghans.
I am pleased to once again be working to advance U.S. efforts in a
now vastly changed Afghanistan. This is a pivotal time: NATO and the
United States are transitioning from a combat to an advisory and
assistance role in Afghanistan; Afghan authorities are assuming
responsibility for their country's security; and, most importantly for
Afghanistan's future stability, next year's Presidential election
presents an opportunity for the first transfer of power from one freely
elected government to another in the country's history.
Fifteen months ago, speaking at Bagram Air Base, President Obama
discussed the five lines of effort that underpin U.S. policy in
Afghanistan, all of which we continue to pursue: (1) successfully
implementing the 2014 security, economic, and political transition; (2)
strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces; (3) building a
strong partnership with Afghanistan; (4) supporting an Afghan peace
process; and (5) enhancing regional cooperation. The steady commitment
of the United States, and the sacrifices the American people have made
in lives and treasure, have resulted in progress in Afghanistan that is
both significant and likely to endure.
Against this backdrop our partnership with Afghanistan has
continued to mature. The United States is committed to continuing to
support a fully sovereign, democratic, and united Afghanistan. We have
been clear in public and in private, as have many of our allies and
partners in ISAF and in the broader international community, that we do
not intend to repeat the mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s and that as
the Afghans stand up, they won't stand alone. Through our Strategic
Partnership Agreement, our robust civilian assistance within the mutual
accountability framework, and our support to the ANSF, we remain
committed to a long-term strategic partnership with the Afghan
Government and the Afghan people.
As the President said in January with President Karzai, the United
States has two goals: Number one, to train, assist, and advise Afghan
forces so that they can maintain their own security; and number two,
making sure that we can continue to go after remnants of al-Qaeda or
other affiliates that might threaten our homeland. That is a very
limited mission, and it is not one that would require the same kind of
footprint, obviously, that we've had over the last 10 years in
Afghanistan.
At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on 5 June, NATO allies and
partners endorsed a detailed concept of the new mission for Afghanistan
after 2014.
With respect to troop numbers, the President is still reviewing a
range of options from his national security team and has not made a
decision about the size of a U.S. military presence after 2014.
We are continuing our conversations with the Afghans on how we can
carry out those missions and have made significant progress on the text
of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). Before the suspension of the
last round of negotiations by President Karzai, we felt we were nearing
the completion of the technical aspects in the BSA and were very
pleased with the productive negotiations to develop an agreement that
served both countries' interest. Since the suspension, we continue to
make clear that we remain prepared to negotiate and conclude the BSA.
Of course without such an agreement, there could be no such presence,
but we do not believe that the likely outcome of these negotiations.
To bolster our partnership, over the past 2 years we have
undertaken an active diplomatic campaign to rally regional and
international support for Afghanistan through what we call the
Transformation Decade after 2014. From Lisbon to Bonn to Chicago to
Tokyo, the international community, together with Afghanistan, has
built a framework that will help support Afghanistan through this
formative period. A year ago, we agreed at Tokyo to put the
relationship between Afghanistan and its partners on a foundation of
mutual accountability; to pursue continued political, economic, and
social development; and to support a secure, stable, democratic, and
prosperous Afghanistan.
The Afghan Government and donors met in Kabul last week for frank
conversations focused on priority actions that were specified in the
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and that are required to achieve
our shared goals. These actions include ensuring inclusive,
transparent, and credible Presidential and provincial council elections
next year; respecting and upholding human rights commitments,
especially maintaining and improving the rights of women; combating
corruption; transitioning from a donor-driven to private sector-led
economy; improving governance; and ensuring continued development.
We know that Afghanistan takes seriously the reform commitments
made in Tokyo last year. These Tokyo commitments reflect Afghanistan's
sincere desire to achieve self-sufficiency and economic sovereignty. In
Kabul last week, we urged the Afghan Government to continue to press
for the legislation and regulations required to strengthen electoral
institutions, combat corruption, and facilitate economic growth. We
also discussed the need to further improve the way international
assistance is delivered. As part of our broader effort to enhance
Afghan capacity and increase Afghan accountability, we continue to work
hard with our Afghan partners to increase the amount of direct
assistance provided through the Afghan Government. This decision
reflects our bilateral commitments to align our programming with Afghan
priorities as well as our strategic desire to strengthen the Afghan
state and promote Afghanistan's sustainable development.
At the same time, in order to further encourage the Afghan
Government to meet agreed goals, the United States announced on July 3
the establishment of a new $175 million bilateral incentive program to
encourage progress on the full range of Tokyo reforms. The United
States plans to set aside up to $75 million in incentive funding
available this year, and up to an additional $100 million of planned
funding available next year. The new program will promote Afghan reform
progress with flexible funding to be used for development projects or
other needs prioritized by the Afghan Government. But the funds will
only be available if specific and concrete progress is made toward the
Tokyo goals, including on elections, anticorruption, and women's
rights. We look forward to further discussions with the Afghan
Government on how we can best implement this new incentive program to
promote the reforms, which we agree are critical to Afghanistan's
future.
Over the last year the United States has reoriented its civilian
assistance programs to better support Afghan needs during the upcoming
transitions and to maximize sustainability. The revised program being
put in place now focuses on maintaining the social gains of the last
decade (focusing on health, education, and women's rights), building
the civilian capacity of the Afghan Government, and mitigating the
negative economic impact of troop withdrawal. The new strategy takes
into account input from the Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction and other inspectors general, and will consolidate
programming along key economic corridors, phase out stabilization
programs, decrease spending on new infrastructure, and focus on
building capacity to maintain prior investments. While new spending in
the infrastructure sector will focus on commercializing existing
services and building Afghan capacity to maintain and operate existing
infrastructure, we will continue to support completion of existing
projects proposed under the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). The
AIF will not be used to support new projects that would further
increase the future financial burden on the Afghan Government.The
Department of State, USAID and DOD are working closely together to
ensure that Afghan ministries have the necessary capacity and
authorities to sustainably maintain these investments in the future.
While our bilateral assistance is an important part of our economic
relationship, we have also endeavored to promote economic cooperation
between Afghanistan and its neighbors. We believe that the best way to
enable the Afghan people to achieve sustained economic progress beyond
2014 is to enable this increased regional connectivity--to help the
countries of the region dismantle trade barriers, promote investment,
and support the development of regional energy, transportation, and
communications links. This is at the very heart of the New Silk Road
vision. Our support for the Istanbul Process, in particular, promotes a
regionally led effort to build trust and regional leadership post-2014.
My colleague Peter Lavoy will speak in more detail about the
progress we and our Afghan partners have made in developing the Afghan
National Security Forces over the past 2 years and what we are doing
together to ensure continued progress, but I want to highlight a few
important points on these issues.
We are in the final stages of transition to Afghan lead for
security, realizing commitments that we, our allies, and Afghanistan
made at Lisbon in 2010 and reaffirmed at Chicago last year. On June 18,
we marked the milestone of transition to full Afghan lead for security
and ISAF's shift from combat operations to support of the Afghan
National Security Forces. In concert with reaching the milestone,
President Karzai announced the fifth and final stage of transition to
full Afghan lead on security throughout the country, which will begin
later this summer and put us on track to complete a process begun 2
years ago. While the Taliban remain capable of staging dramatic
attacks, Afghan forces are demonstrating their growing capabilities
during this fighting season, taking on the Taliban across Afghanistan
even as ISAF forces gradually leave the field. But as our forces pull
back, we remain committed to ensuring that the ANSF is as strong as it
can be. We continue to train ANSF units and improve the capacity of the
security ministries, a mission that will last beyond 2014 as part of
NATO's longer term train, advise, and assist plans. And as we work with
the Afghans to build a stronger ANSF, we will also partner with them on
our post-2014 counterterrorism mission that will prevent al-Qaeda from
again using Afghanistan as a safe haven.
While helping the Afghans take responsibility for their own
security, we are also working to support an Afghan-led reconciliation
process designed to find a political solution to conflict with the
Taliban. To that end, in January, President Obama and President Karzai
called for the establishment of an office in Doha for the purpose of
enabling negotiations between the Afghan High Peace Council and
authorized representatives of the Taliban. We appreciate the efforts of
the Government of Qatar to encourage this process, and the public
statements of support from the international community, including
Pakistan and others. We are appreciative of Pakistan's efforts to
further Afghan-led reconciliation, including Pakistan's call to Taliban
leaders and insurgents to join talks with the High Peace Council. We
continue to encourage consultations between the Afghan and Pakistani
Governments in support of reconciliation efforts.
Talking peace means talking to your enemy. The first steps are
always hard, and a final settlement may be a long time coming. Our goal
remains for Afghans to be talking to Afghans about how they can move
forward, end the violence, and continue rebuilding their country. From
the start, we have made clear that, as part of any outcome, the Taliban
and other insurgent groups must end violence, break ties with
international terrorism, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including
its protections for women and minorities. We have also made clear that
while the United States will try to help facilitate a peace process,
negotiations about the future of Afghanistan must be Afghan-led and
Afghan-owned.
We will continue to work to promote a peace process, but this
cannot distract from the main priority in the coming year--the
political transition that will occur when the Afghan people choose a
new President next April. I cannot stress enough the importance of a
successful and democratic political transition next year and, as an
essential part of that, a credible and timely election process that
reflects the will of the Afghan people. Next April's election will be a
momentous occasion in Afghanistan's national history. The future
stability of Afghanistan rests on a peaceful transition of political
authority from President Karzai to his successor in 2014 through an
election that Afghans themselves accept as credible. Afghans know that
inclusive elections are critical to their country's stability, as well
as to sustaining international commitments to Afghanistan.
The first steps in the process have already been taken. We urge the
Afghan Government and Parliament to take the next critical steps and
pass electoral legislation that provides for appointments of electoral
officials and an independent complaints process, and for President
Karzai to sign them into law, as he has promised to do, in order to
ensure the credibility of the elections processes. A successful and
unifying political transition based on a transparent, inclusive, free,
and fair election will reaffirm to the Afghan people and the
international community that Afghanistan's commitment to democracy,
peace, and prosperity remains strong and unwavering.
The Afghans have already taken significant steps to prepare for
this historic process. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has
created a timeline for the elections, designed a public education
campaign for voters, and developed a comprehensive operational plan to
combat fraud and expand participation, including of women. Political
leaders have been meeting to clarify a common understanding of how
elections should be conducted, who should run and on what platform, and
how to ensure that influential political factions respect the result.
It is encouraging that Afghans understand that nothing will strengthen
Afghanistan more than an election that serves to unify their country. I
want to reaffirm that the United States will not endorse any single
party or candidate. However, we along with the international community
will be paying close attention to the election process as it unfolds.
We will continue to encourage all political figures to play a positive
and unifying role, irrespective of their differences, to help ensure a
transparent, peaceful, and democratic political process that fulfills
the aspirations of Afghans. The Afghan people deserve nothing less
given their sacrifices over the past three decades.
We are providing significant financial and program assistance to
help Afghans build credible and independent electoral institutions. In
doing so, we emphasize the importance of expanding voter participation,
particularly for women, and of ensuring the independence of the
election commission, as well as the need for an independent complaints
commission and consultative procedures for selecting commissioners. We
are engaging intensively with Afghan officials, civil society, and
political leaders to support their efforts to establish effective
elections processes. We also are coordinating closely with the U.N. and
with other donors on training, public information campaigns, fraud
mitigation, domestic observation efforts, and improved ways to identify
eligible voters.
The U.S. Government provided $179 million in assistance for 2009-
2013 for programs focusing on effective voter registration, civic and
voter education, electoral reform and legislation, and expanding
political participation. For the 2014 Presidential and provincial
council elections, USAID plans to contribute an additional $110
million. Of this amount, about $75 million directly supports the UNDP-
ELECT project working with the two main Afghan electoral bodies, the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints
Commission (ECC). An additional $15-20 million has been budgeted to
assist civil society actors that are stakeholders in the democratic
process (e.g., women's groups, media, youth, political party capacity-
building, and election observers). For the 2015 parliamentary election
USAID is budgeting additional funding for democratic stakeholders that
has yet to be determined.
Afghanistan has made impressive progress since 2001. Afghanistan is
freer and more prosperous, people are better educated, healthier, and
enjoy much greater economic opportunity. Like any developing country
emerging from conflict, Afghanistan will require international support
for some time, but Afghans are determined to stand up. A country that a
little more than a decade ago provided the haven from which the 9/11
attacks were planned has become a staunch partner against international
terrorism. There is much the Afghan people can be proud of, and we can
be proud to stand at their side, working together to ensure that these
tremendous accomplishments are not reversed.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Dr. Lavoy.
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER R. LAVOY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Lavoy. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss
with you today the present status and future course of our
military engagement in Afghanistan. It is an honor to be here
with Ambassador Dobbins to discuss both the significant
progress we are making and the very real challenges we continue
to face in the country.
Our fundamental objectives in Afghanistan have not changed.
Our goal remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the
Afghan Government. Over the past 4 years, due to the
dedication, hard work, and sacrifices of our forces, our
coalition partners, and the Afghan security forces and
population, we have made significant progress in advancing
those objectives.
Today the Afghan people have greater economic opportunity
and greater access to health care, better and more education,
and more freedoms and individual rights, especially for women,
than ever before. As committed to in Chicago last year and
reaffirmed at the Presidential summit this January, the Afghan
National Security Forces, or ANSF, last month took the lead
countrywide for providing security to the people of
Afghanistan.
This important milestone also signaled a shift in the
International Security Assistance Forces' primary mission from
combat to assisting the ANSF. The combat leadership shift from
ISAF to ANSF demonstrates the capability and resolve of the
Afghan Army and police to secure their people and their nation.
It also enables the United States and other ISAF nations to
continue reducing the presence of their combat forces. The 2013
security milestone and final tranche of the transition process
will mark the fulfillment of the pledges our leaders made in
Lisbon and Chicago.
The ANSF are being tested this fighting season but are
performing admirably. Afghan forces now plan and conduct the
overwhelming majority of combat operations and are also taking
the vast majority of casualties. However, despite heavy
fighting, the Afghans are holding the gains of recent years and
the Taliban must come to grips with the fact that they cannot
defeat the Afghan National Security Forces militarily.
The United States is transitioning in Afghanistan, not
leaving. We are on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close
by the end of 2014 and transition to Operation Resolute
Support, a new train, advise, and assist mission under a NATO
umbrella. Beyond this NATO mission, the United States also
plans to conduct a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission.
The United States and Afghanistan are already negotiating a
bilateral security agreement to provide the necessary framework
to support the presence of U.S. forces to accomplish these
missions. NATO is also preparing to negotiate such a framework
with Afghanistan.
While the United States has not made a decision on the size
of the post-2014 military presence, our planning and our
ultimate United States presence will be guided by a number of
factors to include: progress toward our core goal of defeating
al-Qaeda in the region; second, the potential for peace talks
between the Afghan Government and the Taliban; third, continued
progress with the ANSF; fourth, Afghanistan's political
transition centered on the elections in April 2014; fifth, the
regional setting; and finally, concluding the United States-
Afghanistan bilateral security agreement and the NATO-
Afghanistan status of forces agreement.
We will keep Congress informed of any post-2014 U.S.
presence decisions and developments in other areas such as the
BSA.
This is a critical time for our shared effort in
Afghanistan. After more than a decade of war and tremendous
sacrifices by the people of the United States, our coalition
partners, and Afghans, we can see the prospect for peace and
stability in Afghanistan.
Thank you for your continuing support to the mission in
Afghanistan and to our men and women in uniform, without which
none of this would be possible. Thank you and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lavoy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Peter R. Lavoy
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to
discuss the present status and future course of our military engagement
in Afghanistan. It's an honor to be here with Ambassador Dobbins to
discuss both the progress we are making and the challenges we continue
to face.
Our fundamental objectives in Afghanistan have not changed. Our
goal remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to
deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. Over
the past 4 years, due to the dedication and sacrifice of our forces,
our coalition partners, and the Afghan security forces and people, we
have made significant progress in advancing those objectives.
Today, the Afghan people have greater economic opportunity, greater
access to health care, better and more education and more freedoms and
individual rights, especially for women, than ever before. As committed
to in Chicago last year and reaffirmed at the Presidential summit this
January, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) last month took the
lead countrywide for providing security for the people of Afghanistan.
This important milestone also signaled a shift in the International
Security Assistance Force's primary mission from combat to assisting
the ANSF. The combat leadership shift from ISAF to the ANSF
demonstrates the capability and resolve of the Afghan army and police
to secure their people and their nation. It also enables the United
States and other ISAF nations to continue reducing the presence of
their combat forces. The 2013 security milestone and final tranche of
the transition process will mark the fulfillment of the pledges our
leaders made in Lisbon and Chicago.
The ANSF are being tested this fighting season, but are performing
admirably. Afghan forces now plan and conduct the overwhelming majority
of combat operations and are also taking the vast majority of
casualties. However, despite heavy fighting, the Afghans are holding
the gains of recent years and the Taliban must come to grips with the
fact that they cannot defeat the ANSF militarily.
The United States is transitioning in Afghanistan, not leaving. We
are on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end of 2014,
and transition to Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT, a new train, advise, and
assist mission under a NATO umbrella. Beyond this NATO mission, the
United States also plans to conduct a narrowly focused counterterrorism
mission.
The United States and Afghanistan are already negotiating on a
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to provide the necessary framework
to support the presence of U.S. forces to accomplish these missions.
NATO is also preparing to negotiate such a framework with Afghanistan.
While the United States has not made a decision on the size of the
post-2014 military presence, our planning and our ultimate U.S.
presence will be guided by a number of factors, to include:
Progress toward our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda in the
region;
The potential for peace talks between the Afghan Government
and the Taliban;
Continued progress with the ANSF;
Afghan political transition, centered on the elections in
April 2014;
The regional setting; and
Concluding the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement
and the NATO- Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement.
We will keep Congress informed of any post-2014 U.S. presence
decisions and developments in other areas such as the Bilateral
Security Agreement.
This is a critical time for our shared effort in Afghanistan. After
more than a decade of war, and tremendous sacrifices by the people of
the United States, our coalition partners, and Afghanistan, we can see
the prospect for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Thank you for your continuing support to the mission in Afghanistan
and our men and women in uniform, without which none of this would be
possible. I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony.
There is a lot of ground to cover here, so let me start.
Ambassador Dobbins, we seem to have spent, from my
perspective, an enormous amount of time on this reconciliation
effort. I am not sure that the Taliban, looking at the Karzai
government leaving next year, looking at the reduction of
international forces, really believes that it is the right
negotiating moment for them.
But the one thing that is very important from my
perspective is the elections. And I am trying to understand. We
hear very little about our efforts with the elections. We have
a witness from our second panel who flew in from Afghanistan,
for which we are very grateful, Mr. Ahmad Nader Nadery of the
Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan. I was
reading his testimony. He has a series of items that are
critical toward elections that are ultimately fair,
transparent, and for which there can be confidence of the
Afghan people as we move forward, which in the longer term
process is going to be a critical part of any reconciliation
effort that, as you described, is led by the Afghans at the end
of the day.
What are we doing to ensure these elections are taking
place in a successful way? In 2009, we appointed a senior
official to coordinate support for the elections at the Embassy
in Kabul to signify how important a priority this was for the
United States. Why do we not do this again?
Ambassador Dobbins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, on the reconciliation issue, I mean, we are
determined to move forward on this in lockstep with the
Government of Afghanistan. The objective here is not for us to
negotiate peace in Afghanistan. The objective is for us to
promote an Afghan process, a process between the insurgency and
the government and the high peace council of government is
formed to address these issues. We do not expect it to progress
quickly. We are not sure it will start at all over the next
year. And we are certainly not going to let it distract us from
these other priorities, as you correctly suggest.
On elections, the United States, through both State and AID
financing, is joining a large-scale international effort to
fund both the election process in terms of the machinery and
also the ``get out the vote'' type education process that can
assist in ensuring that this is a satisfactory election.
I will take aboard the suggestion that somebody at a
significantly senior level be appointed specifically for this
in the Embassy. That may be helpful. I am sure the Embassy is
devoting a great deal of attention to it.
The Chairman. I do not want to get all the time on the--I
know the facts, and I know that we have moneys ascribed.
My problem is I do not get the sense that in our focus in
Afghanistan that one of our critical focuses is getting the
Afghan Government to make the appointments to the Election
Commission, to make the other appointments to the Supreme
Court, to create the structure that all the money in the world
bringing out to vote will not guarantee unless we have a
structure at the end of the day that can have disputes settled
in a fair, honest, transparent way.
And so are we engaging through our Embassy there, through
the State Department, through your own representation with
President Karzai to make it crystal clear that it is very
important to make these appointments, that we will look at this
as part of our overall assistance? Because from my perspective,
if we do not have elections that are fair and transparent, we
are going to have a huge challenge in addition to the security
question ahead. And I think we have lost sight of that as a
major part of what we should be doing.
Ambassador Dobbins. I agree with you entirely.
The Chairman. Well, that is not good news. If you agree
with me entirely that we have lost sight of it, that is not
good news. The question is, How do we change the course here
because we are talking about April of next year? That is months
away.
Ambassador Dobbins. I agree with you entirely on the
importance, indeed, the priority that is given to this. In
fact, I think every time I have spoken to any audience on
Afghanistan, I have made clear that among all of the major
transitions that are taking place, this is the most critical
one.
There are two pieces of legislation that are the critical
inputs to creating the Electoral Commission and a Complaints
Commission that are currently in their Parliament. They are
moving through their Parliament. They have passed Houses. They
are in the process of negotiation between the two Houses. As
you know, legislative processes are not subject to, you know,
light switch type influence, but the President has said that he
will keep the Parliament in session through Ramadan, if
necessary, in order to get this legislation out, and he has
promised me and he has promised everybody else who has visited,
probably Senator Corker, too, when he saw him. He has promised
to sign this legislation as soon as it is out.
The Chairman. Well, I think there are appointments to be
made. Those appointments are executive powers. We need to see
those appointments made. It is not about a legislative process
at the end of the day. So I think there are very clear
benchmarks here that we are not reaching that ultimately are
going to provide a problem for us next April. And I hope that I
am wrong, but what we need is a fair and open, transparent
election that all parties in Afghanistan can ultimately believe
that their future is dictated by an honest election. And if we
do not get that, then everything else we are talking about is
going to fall apart.
Let me ask Dr. Lavoy. Today the Washington Post in an
article says the Afghan army struggles with lack of reach, and
it talks about a realization by many commanders that, ``part of
Afghanistan will probably remain in the enemy's hands.'' And it
talks about the challenges of that Afghan army.
Now, after spending a small fortune in trying to build this
army, what are our abilities to help them move in a direction--
I have heard all the testimony. I honor their leading the fight
and losing lives. But I am looking at what this article and
other information suggests, and it seems to me that there are
critical gaps here that even the most courageous soldiers in
the Afghan army and their commanders are going to face moving
forward. Are we looking at how we deal in a support role to
helping the Afghans be able to achieve their own security?
Dr. Lavoy. Thank you for that question, Chairman. It is a
very important issue.
I think the story of the Afghan National Security Forces is
really one of success and really a remarkable success. If you
look back 5 or 6 years ago, there were only 70,000 Afghan
National Security Forces. Today there is an authorized ceiling
of 352,000 forces and an actual amount of somewhere over
340,000. Not only the quantitative change but the qualitative
change of this capability, the army and the police, has been
amazing. These forces are now, as I said in my prepared
remarks, out there leading combat operations throughout the
country. They are encountering a lot of resistance. They are
taking a lot of casualties, but they are standing up to that
resistance. They are an increasingly professional force that is
getting the job done and doing a better job each and every day.
You asked, specifically, are there gaps. Yes, there are
gaps. Today the Afghan National Army and the police are not
totally self-sustainable entities capable of doing everything.
We are providing critical support and assistance to them. ISAF
is. That enables them to do the jobs. But I think one of the
most remarkable features in the last 2 years is the ability for
the army and the police to do more and more of the job
themselves. They are increasingly planning operations
themselves. They are pulling in intelligence, identifying where
adversaries are, identifying threats to populations, and they
are going after those threats successfully. They are clearing
routes. They are providing for their own enabling capabilities.
Where we find the biggest gaps today is really at the
ministerial level, at the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of
the Interior where they need critical, basically, support to
the army and the police that are out there operating. They need
a human capital strategy. They need to manage contracts,
payrolls, food, fuel, other logistics, planning, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, et cetera. So as the Afghan army
and police are increasingly capable operationally in getting
the job done, the focus of our assistance is shifting now to
higher echelons and to support that supportive structure.
Now, you specifically asked, Are they capable of getting
out to the parts of the country where that is threatened by the
insurgency? Afghanistan, as you know, sir--and all of you have
been to Afghanistan--is a difficult country to get around. The
communication network is not very well established. It is a
mountainous country. It is hard to access different places. So
that is a challenge for any military force inside Afghanistan
to access the remote parts of that country. And that is the
challenge that the army and the police will continue to face.
We are working with them to improve their mobility so they can
get out there, but that will be an enduring challenge that they
will face.
The Chairman. I have followup questions, but I will wait
for a second round.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your line of questioning.
Let me say to the witnesses again I do appreciate your
public service. I know that the leader of Afghanistan is a very
frustrating individual, and I will say this and you do not have
to agree. I know it is also frustrating trying to solve a
problem when we have an administration that has such difficulty
making a decision and providing clarity. So I know that you
guys are whipsawed. I hope that you can help the administration
soon have some clarity and make a decision. But I thank you for
your work.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the election. And I did sit
down with the chief election officer there, Mr. Amarkhil, I
believe, and I know you have worked with him. And I just want
to ask the witnesses, Is there any question that as people
begin to hedge their bets because they do not yet know what our
force structure is going to be and what kind of commitments we
and NATO are going to make--is there any question that the
hedging that is taking place, the capital outflows that are
occurring works against U.S. interest at present?
Ambassador Dobbins. I think it is important to reassure
Afghans that we are going to be committed to that long-term
security, stability, and prosperity. And I think to be fair, we
have gone a long way in doing that.
I take your point that more certainty on force levels would
be helpful. That is a decision that is still 18 months away,
and we will probably know a lot more about what is actually
necessary once we get through this fighting season with the
Afghans in the lead and we will know what they need and what
they do not need. But I take your point. I think it is
certainly a valid argument.
On the election process, just to go back to the chairman's
question, I mean, this is something that the President has
raised repeatedly with Karzai, including during his visit in
January and since. It is something that the Secretary raised
when he was last in Kabul. It is the only meeting he had
outside of meetings with the government was on this topic. And
it was the main issue at the recent donors conference that took
place in Kabul where they went through the various Afghan
performance and commitments, and the major emphasis in those
discussions was on the importance of meeting the election
targets to long-term assistance to the country.
Senator Corker. So the chairman has asked you a question
and you have pointed out that we really have not formalized a
structure to help make that happen. I sat down with several of
the people that may well run for President, and they are very
concerned about the fact that we are not doing the things yet
that we need to do to ensure that there is a free and fair
election. I agree with the chairman. If that does not exist or
at least by some standard, which may be a little different than
we have here, I think it is going to be the greatest
destabilizing thing that can possibly occur.
Let me just ask you another question relative to the
elections. Is people's perception about security within the
country an important factor as to whether we are going to have
a good election process?
Ambassador Dobbins. It will certainly be a factor in areas
with heightened insecurity, and indeed, there are some areas
where it may become difficult to vote. At the moment, the
responsible Afghan officials are pretty confident that they can
maintain adequate security throughout the vast majority of the
country to permit the election to go forward. So the answer, of
course, is yes, it is a factor.
I have not seen the latest statistics but by and large the
Afghans, while they continue to be concerned about security,
also continue to regard it as having improved in almost all of
the country almost all of the time, which is encouraging. And
they also have remarkably high confidence in the quality and
capabilities of their own armed forces. But I think you are
again, I think, making the point that we need to assure them
that our commitment to Afghanistan's development and security
is an enduring one.
Senator Corker. So if they take the risk of getting out and
getting involved in elections and they are not sure what our
commitments are--of course, I hope they will know by that time.
So I guess in many ways that issue hopefully will be decided by
the administration.
Let me move on to another issue. The chairman mentioned a
story that he read this morning about the capability of the
Afghan forces. I think all of you and everybody here that has
looked at the charts realizes that the Afghans are the ones
taking most of the casualties today. They are the ones that are
out in front. But there is a debate within the administration
right now about force levels.
And I would like for Mr. Lavoy, if he would, to speak to
this. I guess there is a corps in Kabul and then six corps
scattered around the country that are part of the Afghan
military. And one of the great factors that NATO--one of the
great assets that NATO represents to the Afghans right now is
the role of enabling them. In other words, we are able to cause
them to be far more effective if we have the ability to be
involved in all seven of those corps. And yet, for some reason
right now, it appears the administration is actually
considering not providing the very few thousand, maybe not even
that many, folks that would enable that to occur and for the
country to actually have much greater security. This is an
option for the administration, a decision for some reason,
despite all that Americans have done over the last 11 years.
Mr. Lavoy, I would like for you to speak to the importance
of our NATO force structure being such that we have the ability
to actually have people out scattered around the country
enabling the Afghans to secure their own country.
Dr. Lavoy. That is a very important issue, Ranking Member
Corker.
Today, as I indicated earlier, the Afghan National Army and
police are capable of performing operations on their own, but
we do continue to provide, assist, and support to them to
improve their effectiveness. Our desire, our objective is by
2015 for the Afghans to have all of the capabilities to be
largely self-sufficient in all aspects of security. So planning
operations, conducting the operations, withdrawing from
operations successfully, doing medevac, doing all the other
critical tasks.
So we are working very hard now to help them adopt and
integrate those enabling capabilities inside the army and
police structure today. That is a big challenge, as I
indicated. Just 6 years ago, there were only 70,000 ANSF. Today
it is a much bigger army, as you indicated, corps spread
throughout the country, and the police also have seen
commensurate growth and in adopting new qualitative aspects to
perform all aspects of their missions.
So this is an ongoing process, and I would agree with you
that the coalition is providing absolutely essential support
for the ANSF to become more sustainable and ultimately a more
self-sufficient force.
Senator Corker. And if we were to try to, for some reason
that would be unknown to me after all that has happened--if we
were to try to just shave a little bit for some reason, the
risk factors geometrically grow. Do they not?
Dr. Lavoy. Well, sir, I think as I indicated, the
administration has a process in place where we will be doing
periodic reviews of the performance of the ANSF and of other
indicators that I indicated, the political transition and other
factors that are critically important. So we will be assessing
how well the ANSF perform over the course of this fighting
season. And this is the first year that the ANSF are actually
in the lead in combat, this fighting season. And we will make
assessments and the necessary adjustments so that they have the
capacity and the enabling capability to continue to perform
admirably and provide that security for the population.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this
timely hearing. I actually think it is very timely. I think
decisions hopefully--hopefully--will be made soon. I do think
the lack of clarity is almost embarrassing and I think hurting
our effort.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I know that
you all are public servants that are very respected. I thank
you for giving us an opportunity to share our frustrations
publicly. I want to assure you I have done it privately also.
So thank you, and I look forward to hopefully a good outcome.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and let me thank both of our witnesses not only for being here
but for your service to our country.
I want to follow up on some of the questions that have been
asked. I certainly share the concern about clarity and
transparency with the Congress as we move forward on the
removal of our combat troops from Afghanistan.
The election issues are very important. Good governance is
important. Over these years, many of us have expressed concern,
frustration about the corruption of the Afghan Government. We
have seen over and over again countries' stability challenged
and overthrown as a result of corrupt regimes.
What steps are we taking, in addition to the election
process, to improve the governance in Afghanistan so that there
is confidence among the people of Afghanistan that they are
being treated fairly, which in turn gives us a much better
chance for a stable regime? In a way, the United States has
contributed to some of that corruption by the manner in which
aid has been made available. What are we doing? Can you assure
us that the way that we are proceeding will reduce the
corruption within the Afghan Government so that we can have
better governance as the United States transitions to the next
stage in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, we share your concern, Senator,
about corruption, and it is a major focus of not only our
efforts but the international community's efforts as a whole
both to police ourselves, in terms of the degree to which our
assistance efforts can be misused and to strengthen the
government.
I think we have to recognize, first of all, that
Afghanistan is in Central Asia, and so when we talk about
levels of corruption, we need to look at Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. We need to note that Afghanistan has a more
efficient tax collection system than Pakistan, only marginally
so, and it puts it in a little bit of perspective.
Senator Cardin. So some of your comparisons are not exactly
the best countries that we like to----
Ambassador Dobbins. No, they are the worst.
Senator Cardin [continuing]. Look at as model examples of
good governance.
Ambassador Dobbins. No. Exactly. They are the worst. But
that is the neighborhood that Afghanistan is in. And
Afghanistan was, first of all, the poorest of all those
countries to start with, and it had no government at all.
Senator Cardin. But the United States has been actively
engaged in the country now for 11 years.
Ambassador Dobbins. I agree with that.
Senator Cardin. So, you know, we should be able to have
some impact on what legacy we leave to the people of
Afghanistan.
Ambassador Dobbins. I agree entirely with you. And this is
a problem on which we need to continue to work in terms of our
own efforts. About 10 percent of our total civilian strength in
Afghanistan is dedicated to oversight and accountability of our
own programs. In terms of the effectiveness of our aid
programs, in my opening statement I think I mentioned that if
you look at outcomes, if you look at levels of literacy, levels
of longevity, the projection of health care, education, the
Afghan Government is actually providing services which have
historically never been provided before in Afghanistan to the
population, certainly not at current levels.
So despite the corruption, despite having had no government
at all 10 years ago when I last held this position or 12 years
ago, rather, when I last held this position, you have a
government that is performing by regional standards not very
badly and by standards compared to other conflict and post-
conflict societies, among the best in terms of actually
delivering services and producing outcomes that improve the
lives of the population.
Now, that does not mean that you are not absolutely right
to keep harping on corruption and keep insisting that we do
more about it.
Senator Cardin. For the Afghan people to have a reasonable
chance for a stable government--Senator Corker is right--they
have to have a secure country. The military issues are very,
very important. Governance is extremely important and the
corruption issue I would point out I think we have not taken
aggressive enough steps during these years to give a better
opportunity for good governance. And finally, economic
opportunity--the removal of the international military presence
is going to have a major impact on the economy of Afghanistan.
What steps are being taken in order to provide economic
opportunity for the people of Afghanistan as we transition to
the elimination of American combat troops?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think there is no doubt that
the
reductions in the NATO military presence there is going to have
some impact on the economy. I think the latest World Bank
assessment was that it would lead to not a negative growth but
a significant drop in positive growth. It is important that the
nonmilitary assistance flows continue beyond the departure date
for most U.S. troops, and I think that is one answer to your
question.
There is no doubt that the Afghan economy has undergone
considerable growth over the last decade. Indeed, I think the
increase in GDP on a per capita basis is about 130 percent over
that period, which is pretty substantial. Afghanistan has been
growing at a rate comparable to China for most of the period we
have been there, and that is probably not going to continue.
You are going to see some diminution in that growth, and it
will be important for our assistance and other forms of
international assistance to continue to flow in the post-2014
period.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Senator Corker
in regards to the need for the military security of
Afghanistan. I think I may come at it from a different
perspective as to the need for American troops to be there. But
I think every member of this committee wants to see more
clarity on how the decisions are being made on troop levels as
we go into this critical year. So I would just urge the
continued openness to this committee as those decisions are
being made. Americans expect Afghanistan to take responsibility
for its own country, and I think we need to know what continued
commitments are being made on behalf of America.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks
of both Senator Corker and Senator Cardin regarding the clarity
issue on those decisions. I think it is critical not only for
Congress but for the American people to have a much, much
better understanding, higher level of understanding than we do.
Having said that, those of us on this side have an
important meeting at 11 o'clock this morning, and I was just
called yesterday, which is unfortunate because this is a
critically important issue. We will obviously be watching the
transcript of this as we go forward. I was hoping to hear at
least part of panel two, but that is not going to be possible.
But in any event, I am going to yield back my time, again with
the thanks for holding this hearing, and we will review the
transcript after we are done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome you,
Mr. Ambassador, and Doctor, thank you for your public service.
I wanted to start by way of reiteration, harkening back to
what the chairman said about the elections and what happened in
our committee as it relates to the resolution which has now
been passed by unanimous consent in the Senate that you
reconsider the position the administration took with regard to
dedicating an ambassadorial level person to monitor the
elections and to make a much greater commitment because I
believe that if we do not have that kind of oversight or
involvement as it relates to the Afghan elections, our strategy
will be adversely impacted. So I will just make that point and
we can develop it further later.
I wanted to start, though, with a question as it relates to
women and girls in Afghanistan. We have had, over the last
decade or so, tremendous progress in the number of girls going
to school, literally millions now that were not going to school
before, a lot more participation by women in the political
process, even more involvement of women in the Afghan security
forces.
Unfortunately, though, we have at the same time a great
concern. We know that just recently in Helmand, Lt. Islam Bibi
was assassinated. She joined the police force 9 years ago when
it was particularly risky to do so. That is a grave
understatement. So we have had progress in some areas but
setbacks. An overarching concern is that when we draw down
completely, when our forces are out, when our focus is
elsewhere, that Afghanistan will go back to the old ways where
women are not just marginalized but really targeted for
discrimination and abuse and no effort or little effort will be
undertaken to either maintain the gains or to advance in the
direction of more political participation and more involvement
of women in the Afghan National Security Forces.
So because of that concern, I had introduced and got passed
an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act which requires
both of your Departments, State and Defense, to report on
efforts to improve both the recruitment of women, as well as
the retention of women, in the Afghan security forces. In
addition to that, the report has to speak to efforts made to
train male security personnel on gender sensitivity.
So I would ask you a two-part question. It is really for
both of you. Number one is, How do you assess progress on both
of those measures? And number two, When will the report be
submitted?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, let me just say a general word
and then turn to Peter on the more specific.
We share your priority on the role of women. We agree that
there has been remarkable progress particularly when you are
changing the social mores of an entire society. The role of
women and women's equality is a problem in societies that are
far more developed than Afghanistan. And so I think that we can
take some satisfaction to the degree that it has been made.
There is danger of rollback, and it is one of the reasons why a
continued American commitment, once we withdraw from combat
operations, is going to continue to be important.
Let me turn to Peter on the more specific question.
Dr. Lavoy. Thanks, Jim.
Yes, let me also speak to your general issue. The role of
women in the armed forces is a priority for us. What is a very
positive development to observe for the leadership of the
military, for the leadership of the army and the police,
incorporating more women, giving them more responsibility, and
treating them with the same dignity and respect as other
soldiers and police is a priority for that leadership now. They
are incorporating these norms and values in the leadership. So
I do believe this will be sustainable going forward.
And the statistics I think are impressive. I have here that
the Afghan Army--there are now over 400 women in the army, and
that is very significant from zero. The Afghan police--there
are over 1,500 women now serving in the police. And in
Afghanistan's very small air force, there are 44 women now
serving in this.
So I think that the strides have been made to have these
women in there. And I have met a number of these women in
Afghanistan. They are some of the most patriotic professional
people in the entire country, and I think that experience is
showing people that come from a different mindset, a different
cultural background that the role of women should be here to
stay in Afghanistan and it is important for Afghans to
recognize that. And I believe this is taking place. And I think
it is your support and others' that have pushed us in this
direction, the right direction, and it is working.
Sir, you asked about this particular report. I can tell you
right now that we are incorporating all the information that
you have asked for in the broader 1230 report on Afghan
National Security Forces, and I believe we have information
coming up to you very quickly on when this will be handed over
to you. But my understanding is that it will be coming up very,
very soon. But we are attentive to it, sir.
Senator Casey. Are we talking days or weeks?
Dr. Lavoy. It will be by the end of this month.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much. I appreciate that
because like any society, we will measure the progress in
Afghanistan, especially after we are disengaged, by one of
several measures. This will be one of them, women's
participation. It is extraordinary, as you know and as people
in the audience know that have had some interaction with women
in Afghanistan directly.
I had an opportunity back in 2011 to sit with women,
parliamentarians, people involved in the political process. One
in particular, both her father and her husband were killed
because of their political participation. Despite that horror,
she still went forward and ran for office and stayed involved.
So both on the political front and on the security front, it is
vitally important.
I am running low on time, but I will submit a question for
the record as well on the NRC Southwest, the $34 million
building, which I know has been raised as a taxpayer issue and
a taxpayer concern about waste. And I will submit one for the
record about the Pentagon's commitment on making sure that no
more money is wasted on that kind of a structure. But I know we
are out of time.
But thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
focus on this issue and for this hearing. Thank you to both of
you for being here today.
I recently returned from my fourth trip to Afghanistan, and
I guess I came back with sort of three top-level takeaways.
One, to agree in part with your assessment of our ability
to stand up the Afghan military. They have clearly made
significant gains. They certainly are able to fight on their
own in many parts of the country. I am not necessarily sure I
would share the same optimism or put them in the same boat as
the status of the police forces, but the military certainly
shows a lot of progress.
On the negative side two sort of connected takeaways, one
was a pretty surprising amount of diversity of opinion on
behalf of U.S. personnel there as to what is going to happen
once we significantly draw down and, second, the opinion that
comes from the Taliban that they are winning the fight there
today, that they are very optimistic about their ability to
take some significant control of portions of the country once
we leave. And as I was there right at the beginning of the
spring fighting season, there was a lot of talk about this
being a very decisive moment in terms of that impression on the
ground amongst the Taliban and many Afghan civilians that the
Taliban is doing very well.
So I guess, Ambassador Dobbins, I will just ask you this.
What do we know so far about the spring fighting season? What
do we know about the optimism of the Taliban? How has the
military performed? I mean, it seems like we say every single
year this is going to be a critical fighting season, but this
one certainly seems to be true. What do we know so far?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think Peter, I am sure, will
want to comment on this as well.
The Afghan forces are definitely in the lead. They are
taking, by far, the majority of casualties, and in our judgment
they are holding up well. But they are under significant
pressure. Clearly the insurgents are making every effort to
knock them off balance and to undermine their self-confidence
as they step out on their own.
In terms of the Taliban, our impression is that there is
something of a debate within the movement between those who see
the military route as the only route forward and are confident
of their ability to ultimately prevail and those who have a
broader recognition of the changes that have taken place in
Afghan society, the unwillingness of the population to return
to the conditions they were in a decade ago, and the
recognition that if the Taliban were to win a military victory,
the health clinics would close, the schools would close, the
cell phone towers would close, the roads would get potholed,
the TV stations would go off the air, they would be getting no
assistance, they would be recognized by no country in the
world. And even if they were successful militarily, they could
not govern that country for any length of time. And that is the
element that is arguing that they need to negotiate as well as
fight. I do not know that there are any of them who just think
they should negotiate, but there are those who think they
should justify it and those who think they should do both. So
that is the kind of division that we have seen so far.
But, Peter?
Dr. Lavoy. Yes, thank you, Senator Murphy.
As you witnessed yourself, the Afghan security forces are
doing a good job, and I think they are confident that they can
achieve their mission. They are taking a lot of casualties. I
think it is somewhere close to 400 killed in action every month
total between army and police. So the insurgents are going
after them. But this poses a threat, a threat to their
individual security, but operationally they have performed very
well and they continue to hold and secure the major population
centers in Afghanistan and the key routes of communication
throughout the entire country. So strategically the mission
seems to continue to be successful with the security forces in
the lead.
But you are right. There are a lot of questions about the
future and whether you talk to Americans or especially you talk
to Afghanistans there will be questions and uncertainties about
what happens in the future. Afghanistan will be going through
an unprecedented election where Hamid Karzai is not running.
The outcome of this election is not clear to anyone, and we are
doing, as Ambassador Dobbins indicated, everything we can to
ensure a successful, fair, and free and representative
election. But there is uncertainty.
In the security sector in particular where you have good
governance in the country, the security problem tends to be
easily manageable by the Afghan Army and police. Where you have
poor governance, where you have a district or provincial
governors that are not addressing the grievances and needs of
the population, the security problem is more pronounced and it
is more difficult for the army and the police.
So it gets to the point that I think the entire committee
is making and we hear very loudly that improvements in the
political transition need to go hand in hand with the ongoing
improvements in the security transition.
Senator Murphy. Dr. Lavoy, let me ask you a specific
question about the capabilities that we will need to continue
to lend to the Afghan military, and that is with respect to the
air capabilities of the Afghan military. It is very frustrating
10 years in to still see the status of the Afghan Air Force. We
are contemplating sending to them a bunch of Russian
helicopters that there are legitimate questions as to whether
they can even operate. As we take a look at what kind of
support we are going to need to provide them in the long run,
it seems hard to believe that we are going to be able to walk
away from providing them with medevac support or with close air
support as the ground forces, which clearly have made progress,
are out there doing the majority of the fighting. I walked away
not completely understanding how we were not going to have a
long-term military commitment above the ground.
Can you just talk to us a little bit about that?
Dr. Lavoy. Well, I think you are right, Senator. With the
terrain in Afghanistan and the difficulty to access remote
regions, air mobility is a critical asset. The Afghans
recognize this. The Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior--
they are looking to have their own air mobility, their own air
force capability. And we are working with them to provide that
capability.
We have gone from the security transition that is taking
place--in the past, we would perform all the air operations for
the Afghans and they would perform increasingly sophisticated
ground operations. We are now moving in this transition phase
where they are beginning to do more of the air operations
themselves, and we are trying to work with them so that they
will have this sustainable, self-sufficient air capability in
the future.
It is not clear to us like it is not clear to you, sir, how
long it will take for them to develop that capability. Training
pilots is a laborious process, but it is something that we are
prioritizing right now and also getting them the equipment and
helping them develop the means to maintain this equipment in a
sustainable manner.
As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, sir, the
administration is conducting regular assessments of the
performance of the Afghan security forces, including the air
force. So we will make the necessary adjustments to ensure that
they can have this capability going forward.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And to our witnesses, I was in Afghanistan last week with
five others--actually seven other Senators and had robust
discussions about the sort of midpoint in the fighting season
and there was some positive news I think in terms of our own
military leadership's reckoning of the performance, even
including the scale-up of some air capacity. More to tell.
Much of the discussion that we had was about this troop
number. We all recognize the troop number is not an end. It is
a means to an end. And so what is the end we are trying to
reach for the ability to train, assist, advise in an
appropriate way, the ability to provide some CT efficacy, and
we talked about that.
There has been public testimony before the SASC hearing,
where I sit, from General Mattis in February recommending a
troop level of about 13,600. General Dempsey in April publicly
talked about a total force of between 8,000 and 12,000. I am
not going to ask you about numbers, but I will say what we
heard from military leadership in Afghanistan was not at odds
at all with that general range.
I wanted to ask you a question, and I realize that one of
the next witnesses, Stephen Hadley, actually phrased it better
than I did. So I am just going to read a section and try to get
you to tell me whether or not you agree with it. And if I could
just hand the witnesses Stephen's testimony. It is on page 2,
and I just want to read this into the record.
``The unfortunate recent press accounts of a `zero
option'--even if ultimately disavowed--are extremely damaging
in this regard. The United States and its allies need to be
actively countering the narrative of abandonment that is
frequently heard in Afghanistan. The best way to do this would
be for the U.S. Government to make clear as soon as possible
its intention to have a robust troop presence in Afghanistan
well beyond 2014 and to announce the size of that troop
deployment now even before negotiations have concluded on the
Bilateral Security Agreement that will provide the legal
framework for this troop presence. The U.S. Government should
be clear that it is ready to negotiate an acceptable BSA with
the current Afghan Government or, if necessary, to leave that
negotiation to the post-2014 government. But the U.S. troop
commitment needs to be made clearly and it needs to be made
now. This will do three things:
``One, it will reassure Afghans that their votes in the
2014 election will count for something because the government
they elect will have the international support it will need to
succeed.
``Two, it will encourage candidates to come forward to
stand for election.
``And three, it will lessen the ability of some Afghan
elements to use the BSA negotiations as a political football in
service of other agendas.''
In your best independent professional judgment, do you
think the prompt announcement of the size of that security
force, leaving the size of it for military and the
administration to determine, would have the positive effects
that I referenced from Stephen Hadley's testimony?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, let me say a couple of things.
First, the best that I can determine--and I have spent some
time trying to determine it--the leak to the New York Times
about the zero option and what prompted the story was not
intended. It was not a negotiating ploy.
Secondly, I agree that the article was, on balance,
unhelpful, and the focus on this issue unhelpful.
I have already addressed, I think, the issue of the timing
of a decision on troop levels. But I will say that if you agree
with Steve Hadley that both your views and those of former
National Security Advisor Hadley are important and will
certainly be taken into consideration.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Lavoy.
Dr. Lavoy. Yes, Senator. Well, first of all, I take
everything that Steve Hadley says very seriously. I mean, he is
very, very thoughtful, and I think even in this regard as well,
that this does deserve really our fullest attention and we need
to consider what he is saying. And I look forward to his
testimony afterward.
I think right now, as I said, the Afghans are uncertain
about their future. Any statement of commitment of U.S. or
international support I think can mitigate some of that
uncertainty. But we need to recognize the uncertainty will be
there. Afghanistan is going through a democratic transition
that is really unprecedented in that country. Similarly in
Pakistan, the first-ever civilian government to be elected
after another government serving a full term. So the democratic
impulse is very, very strong, and we need to do everything we
can to support that and to provide the confidence that tomorrow
will be better than today, better than yesterday in Afghanistan
and in Pakistan as well.
We are, as you indicated, in negotiations with the Afghan
Government on the bilateral security agreement, which will be
the framework that will enable us to have a military presence
going forward. The negotiations have been rather successful. We
have come to agreement on many, many things and parameters for
that framework, but there still are some fundamental issues
remaining.
The Afghans are very good and shrewd negotiators and I
think they will use all leverage possible in this negotiation.
I would just say the one thing about not having made that
announcement, even though it might have contributed to some of
the uncertainty going forward in Afghanistan, is that it is
something that President Karzai and the Afghan Government needs
to take seriously. They cannot take it for granted, and they
need to have a very fair and balanced bilateral security
agreement.
Senator Kaine. Right. And I would think that there would be
bipartisan agreement not only on this committee but more
generally. If we cannot reach a bilateral security agreement
that protects our personnel, then that is a default zero
option, I mean, if they are not willing to do that.
In addition to the three benefits that Dr. Hadley
mentioned, would U.S. announcement of a force posture have an
additional benefit of encouraging NATO allies to do the same,
or is it likely that NATO allies will make hard commitments
before we do?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, several allies have made
generalized commitments, including the Germans, to take the
lead in providing the core of a force in the northern part of
the country, the Italians in the western part of the country.
Several other allies have indicated their intention to stay.
But, yes, they will measure their actual levels of commitment
by ours in every case.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Lavoy, do you agree with that?
Dr. Lavoy. I do. We have had a principle governing our
engagement in Afghanistan with the coalition: ``in together,
out together.'' We are making decisions. Coalition cohesion is
critically important, and I believe that will be a factor as we
go forward.
Senator Kaine. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Just very briefly, because I do want to get to our next
panel, but while I have you here, Ambassador Dobbins, I mean,
your title includes Pakistan.
Ambassador Dobbins. Yes.
The Chairman. And while this hearing is about Afghanistan,
you cannot talk about Afghanistan in part without looking at
the realities in Pakistan. So let me just put out one or two
observations, then ask you a question.
The last time I was in Pakistan, they obviously have their
own interests. They also have their own views about our Afghan
strategy, and they fear direct repercussions from instability
in Afghanistan. And despite our generous assistance to
Pakistan, which has been fraught with its own set of problems,
I think we have not convinced them that we have shared goals
and mutual interests in this regard.
So what realistically can we expect from Pakistan vis-a-vis
Afghanistan, and how is our own strategy informed by their
calculations? And finally, as we inevitably see a reduction in
these international troop presence, the insurgents will likely
make an even more forceful push to gain more ground before
December 2014 to further strengthen their bargaining position
and some would say with the support of the Pakistan backers.
Are there steps the United States is taking so that the
Pakistan military is not allowed to hijack a reconciliation
process to benefit its chosen Afghan proxies? What redlines are
we drawing with Pakistan to make clear that we all need to be
working from the same page here?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, like you, we are very concerned
that the insurgency enjoys effective sanctuary and draws
strength from that sanctuary in their operations in
Afghanistan. We also recognize that the terrorists and
insurgent groups within Pakistan operating against Pakistan are
closely linked to those operating in Afghanistan, and we keep
stressing to the Government of Pakistan that they cannot
distinguish between benign insurgents and benign militants and
malign militants, that to the extent militancy grows in their
country, to whomever it may be directed, it is in the end going
to destabilize their country, as well as that of their
neighbors. And I think that recognition is beginning to sink
in.
I think you have opened a large issue that probably
requires more discussion than we can do here. I think we do see
an opportunity with the new civilian government that has a
clear mandate----
The Chairman. Are you suggesting that to give me a full
answer, you need a classified session?
Ambassador Dobbins. That was not my intention, but the
answer is probably, ``Yes.''
The Chairman. I am looking for as much of a public answer
as I can. The question is--I have time. So I am ready to listen
to your full answer on Pakistan.
Ambassador Dobbins. I think we see an opportunity with the
new civilian government with a clear mandate, a majority in
Parliament. They are grappling with their own internal security
problem which is in some ways more acute than that of
Afghanistan. I do not know what the actual statistics are in
terms of civilian casualties, but I think they are probably
higher in Pakistan these days than in Afghanistan. And they are
also conducting very significant military operations against
militants, unfortunately not against the militants that are
operating in Afghanistan, but against the militants that are
operating in Pakistan. But they do have a substantial
proportion of their military that is now committed to
counterinsurgency operations in these border areas.
This is a continued area of dialogue. Pakistan has become
more cooperative and more helpful on the issue of
reconciliation. Now, you suggested that that may be with an
intention of hijacking the process. I think they, obviously,
would like to influence the process. That is to be assumed in
any case. But I do not think there is much likelihood that they
will hijack it. Neither we nor the Afghan Government have any
intention of allowing that to occur. And in any case, our
objective in these negotiations is not ourselves to negotiate
peace in Afghanistan but to initiate an intra-Afghan process.
So I think your concerns about Pakistan are understandable.
They are concerns that we have and discuss internally all the
time. They are concerns that we address with the Government of
Pakistan. I am hopeful that the Secretary of State will be able
to visit Pakistan sometime soon. I have been there twice in the
first 3 weeks in office and addressed many of these issues.
The Chairman. Well, I think we will bring you back just
maybe to start a discussion on Pakistan and move from there.
I want two yes-or-no responses to these two questions so we
can move on to the next panel.
Ambassador Dobbins, can you assure the committee that you
will work with INL to ensure that programs like the governor-
led eradication, the Justice Sector Support Program, and the
Correction Systems Support Program, for which INL has already
obligated over $400 million, will have adequate oversight and
evaluation mechanisms so we know they are actually working and
worthy of continued funding?
Ambassador Dobbins. Yes.
The Chairman. Dr. Lavoy, can you assure the committee that
DOD will look into whether it is worth pouring more money into
the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan, which has a series
of issues with it?
Dr. Lavoy. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. That is the most succinct answers
I have gotten in a long time.
Thank you both for your testimony. You have the thanks of
the committee, and we look forward to continuing to engage with
you.
Ambassador Dobbins. Thank you.
The Chairman. With that, let me call up our next panel. On
our second panel, we have a distinguished roster of private
witnesses. Stephen Hadley was President George W. Bush's
National Security Advisor. He is now a senior advisor for
International Affairs at the U.S. Institute of Peace where he
has worked closely with John Podesta and the Center for
American Progress, pushing for credible Afghan elections in
2014.
Ms. Sarah Chayes is with the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. She previously lived in Kandahar since
2001 working as a journalist running an NGO, an agricultural
cooperative, and advising U.S. military officials on Afghan
corruption in Pakistan.
And Mr. Nader Nadery wears many hats, including founding
the Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan. Again, I
appreciate that he just arrived in from Kabul, and I want to
thank him on behalf of the committee for flying in for this
hearing to provide views from Afghan civil society.
With that, again, we will include all of your testimony
into the record.
We ask our witnesses that are leaving if they can engage
the press outside so that we can continue with the hearing.
Your full statements will be entered into the record and,
Mr. Hadley, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HADLEY, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I want to express my appreciation for the
opportunity to offer my views on the status of the Afghan
transition. The views I express today are solely my own and do
not represent those of the United States Institute of Peace
which does not take policy positions.
As you mentioned, my recent involvement with Afghanistan
has mainly been as cochair with John Podesta of a bipartisan
expert senior working group convened in 2011 and 2012 by USIP
and the Center for American Progress.
Our CAP-USIP senior working group concluded that the United
States Government's objective in Afghanistan should be a
relatively stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into
civil war, destabilize its neighbors, or once again become a
haven for transnational terrorists.
But more than the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan is at
stake. A safe, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan is an
essential element to achieving stability, peace, and prosperity
in all of northwest Asia--Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the
Central Asian states, and even Iran and Russia--for this cannot
be a stable, prosperous region free from terror unless these
conditions can be achieved in Afghanistan.
The problems associated with achieving stability in
Afghanistan have been exacerbated by the general hedging
strategies among Afghans and their neighbors that are partly
the result of uncertainties regarding the extent to which the
United States is committed to Afghanistan post-2014. And that
is why I am very much in sympathy with Senator Kaine and the
portion he read from this testimony that we can solve this
clarity problem if we would be clear soon that we are going to
be in Afghanistan with a specific and significant number of
troops adequate to do the missions we need to perform. And I
think that word needs to get out very promptly, as we have
talked about earlier in this discussion.
Last month, full responsibility for security in all of
Afghanistan's districts was formally handed over to Afghan
forces. The army that the United States and its NATO allies
have spent a decade helping to build and train has become one
of the most trusted institutions in the country and now will
have an opportunity to prove its worth to the Afghan people.
The crucial question for the security transition is not
about tactics or firepower, but whether these forces are united
around the idea that they are a national force defending a
legitimate government supported by all elements of Afghan
society. At this point, the political transition is the most
critical of the three transitions that will occur in 2014, the
security, political, and economic. While the security
transition is well underway and good progress has been made, it
cannot succeed unless the 2014 elections are relatively free
and fair and produce a government viewed as legitimate and
supported by the Afghan people and accepted by Afghans'
neighbors and the international community.
If instead 2014 produces a corrupt and tainted election
discredited in the eyes of the Afghan people and causing either
the chaos of no coherent government or one viewed as
illegitimate by the Afghan people, then we will be
transitioning security responsibility to a government in a
political meltdown, one that is unlikely to be able to command
the support of the Afghan National Army and the other security
forces. And at that point, the force could splinter along
ethnic lines, contributing to instability and national
fragmentation, violence, and perhaps a return to civil war.
So the question is how can this legitimate government with
popular support and improved governance come about. An open,
free, and fair election with broad Afghan participation offers
the best opportunity to reconcile the whole of Afghan society
which currently feels largely excluded from the political
process. As part of an inclusive peace process, the United
States and Afghan Governments have tried to test the Taliban to
distinguish those who wish to reenter the political process
from those who wish to continue their war on Afghan society.
The efforts to date have failed, with the Taliban refusing to
participate in talks with the Afghan Government and now talking
of closing their Doha office.
While outreach to the Taliban should continue in a very
careful way during the preelection period, the best time to
test Taliban intentions will be after the conclusion of a
successful election by a government of renewed legitimacy and
popular support, backed by an army loyal to the government and
supported by a significant post-2014 U.S. and coalition
presence.
In the interim, efforts should be focused on ensuring a
successful election, which should include efforts to convince
the Taliban to reduce violence during the election period and
perhaps to agree to local cease-fires. The Pakistani Government
should be enlisted in this effort. There should also be a
robust communication plan by primarily Afghan voices to make
clear that those who seek to derail the elections through fraud
or violence are the true enemies of a peaceful and prosperous
future for the Afghan people.
Ultimately, the best prospect for achieving a stable
Afghanistan will be a peaceful transition to a new government
based on a free and fair Presidential election in 2014 that is
credible and produces an outcome that is acceptable by the
Afghan people. This outcome must be the U.S. Government's top
priority in Afghanistan for the coming year.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Hadley
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to offer my views on the
status of the Afghan transition. The views I express today are solely
my own and do not represent those of the United States Institute of
Peace (USIP), which does not take policy positions.
My recent involvement with Afghanistan has mainly been as a cochair
with John Podesta of a bipartisan expert senior working group convened
in 2011-2012 by USIP and the Center for American Progress (CAP). The
working group focused on U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and in particular on the need for a clear political strategy to guide
our security and economic strategies. We produced five policy white
papers, making recommendations on political and economic components of
U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and met multiple times
privately with senior administration officials to share our views. The
administration encouraged us also to share our views with congressional
leaders, which we did through a series of briefings in 2012. This year,
John and I have cochaired two ad hoc off-the-record meetings with
experts and senior administration officials to focus on Afghanistan's
political transition and specifically the 2014 Afghan elections.
Our CAP-USIP Senior Working Group (SWG) concluded that the U.S.
Government's objective in Afghanistan should be a relatively stable
Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war, destabilize its
neighbors, or once again become a haven for transnational terrorist
groups. While this outcome is desired by nearly all Afghans, it has
been thwarted by the Taliban and other armed insurgent groups,
neighboring countries, as well as the short-term concerns of powerful
Afghan actors who have undermined the consolidation of democratic
government institutions.
But more than the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan is at stake.
A safe, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan is an essential element to
achieving stability, peace, and prosperity in all of northwest Asia--
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Central Asian states, and even Iran
and Russia. For this cannot be a stable, prosperous region free from
terror unless these conditions can be achieved in Afghanistan.
The problems associated with achieving stability in Afghanistan
have been exacerbated by general hedging strategies among Afghans and
their neighbors that are partly the result of uncertainties regarding
the extent to which the United States is committed to Afghanistan post-
2014.
The unfortunate recent press accounts of a ``zero option''--even if
ultimately disavowed--are extremely damaging in this regard. The United
States and its allies need to be actively countering the narrative of
abandonment that is frequently heard in Afghanistan. The best way to do
this would be for the U.S. Government to make clear as soon as possible
its intention to have a robust troop presence in Afghanistan well
beyond 2014 and to announce the size of that troop deployment now even
before negotiations have concluded on the Bilateral Security Agreement
(BSA) that will provide the legal framework for this troop presence.
The U.S. Government should be clear that it is ready to negotiate an
acceptable BSA with the current Afghan Government or, if necessary, to
leave that negotiation to the post-2014 government. But the U.S. troop
commitment needs to be made clearly and it needs to be made now. This
will do three things:
1. It will reassure Afghans that their votes in the 2014
election will count for something because the government they
elect will have the international support it will need to
succeed;
2. It will encourage candidates to come forward to stand for
election;
3. And it will lessen the ability of some Afghan elements to
use the BSA negotiations as a political football in service of
other agendas.
security transition
Last month, full responsibility for security in all of
Afghanistan's districts was formally handed over to Afghan forces. The
army that the United States and its NATO allies have spent a decade
helping to build and train has become one of the most trusted
institutions in the country. Now it will have the opportunity to prove
its worth to the Afghan people. According to the NATO International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), at its current capability, the Afghan
National Army should be able to hold its own against the Taliban. Its
best units, especially its special forces, are excellent. Its main
deficiency is that it continues to suffer from high rates of attrition.
Under the right conditions, these problems can be solved if the
international community continues to provide the levels of support
promised at the Chicago NATO summit last year. At an operational level,
therefore, the security transition is on track.
The crucial question for the security transition is not about
tactics or firepower, but whether these forces are united around the
idea that they are a national force defending a legitimate government
supported by all elements of Afghan society. At this point, the
political transition is the most critical of the three transitions that
will occur in 2014--security, political, and economic. While the
security transition is well underway, and good progress has been made,
it cannot succeed unless the 2014 elections are relatively free and
fair and produce a government viewed as legitimate and supported by the
Afghan people and accepted by Afghanistan's neighbors and the
international community. If instead 2014 produces a corrupt and tainted
election discredited in the eyes of the Afghan people and causing
either the chaos of no coherent government or one viewed as
illegitimate by the Afghan people, then we will be transitioning
security responsibility to a government in political meltdown--one that
is unlikely to be able to command the support of the Afghan National
Army and the other security forces. At that point, the force could
splinter along ethnic lines, contributing to instability and national
fragmentation, violence, and perhaps a return to civil war.
economic transition
A successful political transition is also critical to the 2014
economic transition. Afghanistan's economy has demonstrated significant
growth over the past 12 years. The national currency has remained
remarkably stable, only beginning to slide recently as a result of
fears of instability beyond 2014. Much of this economic success has
been the result of billions of aid dollars that have flowed into
Afghanistan. As the transition continues, this funding will be reduced,
and Afghanistan will need to supplement it with its own resources. The
country has those resources, for example in vast potential mineral
wealth, but needs to develop them. This will require a level of
stability that allows construction and extraction, a regulatory
framework that encourages investment, and a government that is
effective enough to tackle corruption and ensure that the taxable
revenues from the private sector and foreign donors end up in the
national treasury, not in the pockets of politicians. The underlying
condition for all of the above is, again, a legitimate government after
2014 supported by the Afghan people and that can begin to put in place
the economic policies that will allow Afghanistan to achieve real
sovereignty by reducing its reliance on foreign donors.
political transition
The question is how can this legitimate government with popular
support and improved governance come about? An open, free, and fair
election with broad Afghan participation offers the best opportunity to
reconcile the whole of Afghan society which currently feels largely
excluded from the political process. As part of an inclusive peace
process, the U.S. and Afghan Governments have tried to test the Taliban
to distinguish those who wish to reenter the political process from
those who wish to continue their war on Afghan society. Efforts to date
have failed, with the Taliban refusing to participate in talks with the
Afghan Government and now talking of closing their Doha office.
While outreach to the Taliban should continue in a very careful way
during the preelection period, the best time to test Taliban intentions
will be after the conclusion of a successful election by a government
of renewed legitimacy and popular support, backed by an army loyal to
that government, and supported by a significant post-2014 U.S. and
coalition presence. In the interim, efforts should be focused on
ensuring a successful election, which should include efforts to
convince the Taliban to reduce violence levels during the election
period and perhaps even agree to local cease-fires. The Pakistani
Government should be enlisted in this effort. There should also be a
robust communication plan by which primarily Afghan voices make clear
that those who seek to derail the elections through fraud or violence
are the true enemies of a peaceful and prosperous future for the Afghan
people.
Ultimately, the best prospect for achieving a stable Afghanistan
will be a peaceful transition to a new government based on a free and
fair Presidential election in 2014 that is credible and produces an
outcome that is accepted by the Afghan people. This outcome must be the
U.S. Government's top priority in Afghanistan for the coming year.
Afghanistan's Constitution gives immense powers to the President,
especially the power to appoint the most important figures in
government, including Cabinet members, Supreme Court Judges, police
chiefs, as well as provincial and district governors. A new President
will offer the opportunity for a new governing team that is capable of
commanding support from throughout the country and making the necessary
political and economic reforms.
A government of renewed legitimacy and popular support, backed by
an army loyal to that government and supported by a significant post-
2014 U.S. and coalition presence, would be a powerful counterforce to
the Taliban. A more effective government that is able to administer
prompt justice even-handedly and increasingly deliver basic services to
Afghans would provide a stark and compelling contrast to the Taliban,
whose main strategy has been to deny Afghans access to government
services and whose main tactics have resulted increasingly in the
killing of innocent Afghans. Such a revitalized Afghan Government,
backed by long-term international support, and with a smaller but still
significant international military footprint, would undermine Taliban
efforts to represent themselves as legitimate national political
actors. And such a government would then be in a position to attract
into the political process those Taliban prepared to surrender arms and
turn to peace while leaving those that reject this offer to be dealt
with by the Afghan army.
While credible elections are clearly crucial to achieving stability
in Afghanistan, there are serious questions as to whether the 2014
elections will take place under conditions conducive to ensuring a
legitimate broadly supported outcome. As the Wall Street Journal
pointed out in an article on July 10, the failure of the Afghan
legislative and executive branches to produce two electoral laws
crucial to the effective conduct of the election would create real
operational and political problems. If Parliament fails to do so before
it adjourns, these electoral institutions would very likely be
established by Presidential decree without the political consensus that
parliamentary adoption would bring. The opposition has legitimate
concerns that an electoral playing field created by Presidential
decree, and with little consultation, will be tilted against them.
Operationally, there is not much time to set up these institutions,
adding to the serious logistical and security problems that will have
to be addressed prior to elections now scheduled for April 5, 2014.
Afghan political elites, representatives of the government, civil
society, and all friends of Afghanistan need to encourage Parliament
and the President to come together and adopt these necessary laws
before Parliament adjourns.
President Karzai's role in this transition is central. Many
critical things have been said about him. I worked with him closely
when I was in government. I respect him as a leader facing incredible
challenges, who has not always received the respect or support he
deserved in seeking to meet those challenges. He has begun the process
of creating law-based, democratic institutions in his country. His
legacy can now be to ensure the continuation of this process and
setting his country on a course toward peace and prosperity. That
process begins by ensuring a free and fair election in 2014 that
produces a legitimate government supported by the vast majority of the
Afghan people. If President Karzai steps up to this historic role, it
behooves all Afghans to ensure that he can live in peace and honor in
his country after his Presidential term is complete.
recommendations
The following are recommendations on what needs to be done to
support the upcoming political transition in Afghanistan. The primary
responsibility for this transition--rightly--belongs to Afghans. Our
main responsibility is to help to advance and not to undermine their
efforts to hold a successful election and to achieve an effective
handover of power to the next elected governing team.
1. Credible elections are the top priority.--The U.S. Government
must send a clear and consistent message, in words and deeds, that the
elections are the top priority. We must be aware that there is a
credibility gap between our stated commitment to the 2014 elections and
the degree to which our commitment is believed by key Afghan actors.
Our regional allies and partners can help to reinforce this message.
2. Acts count as much as words.--We must be seen to invest
political capital in helping to ensure the election takes place. It has
been clear to Afghans that we have invested political capital in the
Doha process. They must see a similar investment of political capital
in the electoral process. The United States should also encourage
consensus-building efforts among Afghan political actors to facilitate
the emergence of electoral coalitions able to garner nationwide,
multiethnic support.
3. Logistics and security.--NATO ISAF forces should work with
Afghan security forces to begin planning for the security and
logistical challenges of the election. This can be part of the post-
security handover training and assistance mission. Support for an
impartial election is a way for the Afghan security forces to
demonstrate their capacity to act in the interest of the nation. Early
and consistent public education messages are also essential.
4. Support a dignified post-presidency role for President Karzai.--
The United States must allay any uncertainties that President Karzai
might have about the U.S. commitment to support him in a dignified and
secure post-Presidency.
5. Counter the abandonment narrative.--The uncertainty regarding
the future of the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is a major cause of
hedging strategies that undermine the current transition. The Bilateral
Security Agreement should be concluded as soon as possible, or failing
that, the United States should state publicly now its commitment to
maintaining a specified and significant number of U.S. troops post-
2014.
6. Protect the gains made by women.--One of the most important
achievements of the past decade has been the tremendous gains made in
protecting and promoting the rights of Afghan women. Afghanistan needs
the resources and inputs of all of its population to resolve its
problems and take advantage of its opportunities. The United States
must continue to press that these rights, currently guaranteed in the
Afghan Constitution, be both preserved and made real for more Afghan
women post-2014.
7. Look for opportunities presented by Pakistan's new government.--
The United States has an opportunity with the new Pakistani Government
to find ways in which Pakistan's legitimate security concerns can be
addressed through a framework in which Pakistan's and Afghanistan's
sovereignty are mutually reinforced, while the United States maintains
good relations with both.
The United States and the international community have 18 months in
which to align efforts behind an overriding objective of a successful
political transition. If this is done with clarity and purpose, there
is a strong chance of consolidating much of what has been achieved over
the past 12 years. It is clearly time to transition the U.S. engagement
in Afghanistan to a more sustainable level. But we must manage this
transition period extremely carefully to protect the gains that have
been achieved at such great cost.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to take questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Chayes.
STATEMENT OF SARAH CHAYES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Chayes. I thought we are going to go in the order we
were sitting.
Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez. Mr. Kaine, thank
you very much for this opportunity to discuss conditions in
Afghanistan and the implications for United States policy.
Just to remind you of my dual perspective, about 8 years in
downtown Kandahar and then serving for two COM ISAFs and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Of course, judgments are my own.
They got used to that, most of them.
Three topics dominate the Afghanistan debate: the security
situation and related to that, the size of a residual U.S.
force; the 2014 election; and though it has not really been
apparent here today, negotiations with the Taliban.
In each case, I think eyes are fixed on the formal process
while the real meaning lies beneath that surface. What is
missing is a political strategy within which the formalities
might add up to something. At this point, I think that strategy
must include a more broad-based reconciliation process that
could set the stage for credible elections and a new approach
to Pakistan.
On elections, I would really just like to second everything
that you, Mr. Chairman, said and Ranking Member Corker. Sadly,
what really matters in Afghan elections today is not votes, the
ability to mobilize them, but who controls the process. So last
weekend, the head of the Election Commission declared that
parliamentary debate on the legislation mentioned by Ambassador
Dobbins has dragged on for too long, and Karzai will just be
enacting regulations by decree. That is a really big issue.
Also, as I have mentioned here previously, U.S. payments to
the key political actor also matter.
Here is my recommendation. If the U.S. Government--and it
is going to echo a lot of what has been said here today--is
going to lend the moral authority of this country to the 2014
election, then words like ``credible'' have to mean something.
U.S. support for the vote must be contingent on some standards,
for example, an empowered Elections Commission whose members
are not appointed by the President. If Mr. Karzai wants to run
an election he can control, OK, but not on the U.S. dime and
not on the democratic reputation of the United States. And I am
not sure that another ambassador in Kabul really would change
these dynamics necessarily. It did not in 2009.
On security, again a lot of talk has been devoted to the
Afghan National Security Forces' tactical capabilities. There
have been real improvements though, as mentioned, the ANSF
casualty rate has spiked over any previous record, according to
ISAF officials, at more than 40 casualties per 10,000
servicemembers per month, which would be approximately a total
of 1,200 killed and wounded per month, higher than today's
Washington Post puts it.
But the technical skills of Afghan soldiers are really
beside the point. To echo Mr. Hadley in different words, an
army, the best army--it is only a tool in the hands of a
government. You can exercise it, take the arm to gym and do
exercises, lift some weights, but if the body to which that arm
is attached is nonviable, then it is not going to be able to
defend much. That is the substance that keeps getting missed.
On that and security in general, measures lack. ISAF
stopped reporting violence statistics in March. They were
disputable anyway--those statistics. So we are left with
anecdotes.
Madrasa students in Pakistan are being sent into the fight
in large numbers this year. Taliban are attacking in larger
groups than they have in years, but there have been
improvements in Kandahar, for example, which is my own
experience. Afghan colleagues there can visit areas the Taliban
controlled in 2009. The current police chief is keeping the
Taliban at bay, but at such a cost in extrajudicial killing
that he is turning much of the town against him. His name is
Raziq. I have known him for more than a decade, and this was to
be expected. I warned General Petraeus when he was COM ISAF
about this man's style and the potential Leahy amendment issues
that it raises. Meanwhile, northern Helmand, for example, is
reinfested with Taliban.
A point often missed is the Taliban strategy is to obtain
the maximum policy impact for the minimum investment of
resources. That is what asymmetric warfare is all about. So
note the recent attacks. The usefulness in that context of any
assessment of current security trends for predicting outcomes
is questionable.
As for residual U.S. troops, I am actually not sure that
10,000 would make much more of an impact on security and
stability in Afghanistan than zero. My reading of the signals
in this town is that zero is a pretty likely bet. And to be
honest, in the absence of a policy framework within which the
commitment and sacrifice would make sense, I am finding it
difficult to argue with that.
So how to get to zero without leaving a black hole behind,
how to get to zero responsibly honoring the efforts and losses
and preserving some potential for the Afghan people and for
regional stability.
Here is my recommendation. Do not look to security
structures to provide security amidst political meltdown. The
way to wind down United States involvement in Afghanistan
without the place unraveling behind us is not to focus on
military technicalities. It is to take a different approach to
the political context. A single negotiating track with the
Taliban leadership was never the right approach for a couple of
reasons. The ISI involvement with Taliban leadership may be
complex and fraught, but it is effective, as Ranking Member
Corker raised earlier. It is likely that the ISI started
reconstituting the Taliban in late 2002, and I watched them
doing that precisely with negotiations in mind. They, like us,
presumed an insurgency would end in negotiations, and they
wanted to drive us there and then control the outcome. The ISI
retains enough hold over Taliban leadership to choose who goes
to Doha and what they settle for. Ironically, we have been
practically begging Pakistani officials to play that role.
In other words, we would not be negotiating with autonomous
representatives of an Afghan movement in Doha. We would be
talking to the ISI by proxy. That carries a couple of
implications. It means we are effectively rewarding Pakistan
for the deliberate use of violent proxies as an instrument of
national policy, and it means the terms of any deal would
likely be unacceptable to most Afghans because they would
entail surrendering too much sovereignty, which brings me to my
next point.
It is not just the Taliban who are opposed to the way the
Karzai government has been operating. It is most Afghans. But
the others did not take up arms, and yet those Afghans have no
seat. We are, in effect, punishing the nonviolent opposition in
our rush to placate the violent opposition. This approach does
not line up with our values as a nation, and it is almost
guaranteed not to work but rather to lead to the next war.
Here is my recommendation. Two prongs. With respect to
Afghan reconciliation, make it much more inclusive like what
the French tested late last year in Chantilly. Involve all the
major constituencies including the Taliban and members of the
Karzai government.
With respect to Pakistan, first, raise the cost of using
violent proxies as an instrument of policy by an array of
leverage and smart sanctions do not ask Pakistani officials to
act as agents to help organize intra-Afghan talks.
Second, open a proper state-to-state channel through which
Pakistan can identify and address its legitimate strategic
aspirations and concerns with respect to its neighbor.
Mr. Chairman, I really think only such a change in our
political approach can offer a way to conclude military
involvement in Afghanistan without leaving the region more
dangerous than we found it in 2001.
Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chayes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sarah Chayes
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, committee members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you about conditions in
Afghanistan, and the implications for U.S. policy.
My analysis derives from a rare dual perspective: I lived in
downtown Kandahar for most of the past decade, among ordinary men and
women from the city and the surrounding villages, no guards or barbed
wire, no translator. And, from 2009 through 2011, I served as special
adviser to two ISAF commanders and then the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Of course, my judgments are my own. They got used to that--most of
them.
Three main topics dominate the current Afghanistan debate: the
security situation--and related to that, the size of a residual U.S.
military force--the 2014 Presidential election, and negotiations with
the Taliban. In each case, attention is fixed on the formal process,
while the real meaning lies beneath that surface. What is missing is an
overall political strategy within which technicalities might add up to
something. At this stage, that strategy must include a more broad-based
reconciliation process that would help set the stage for credible
elections, and a different approach to Pakistan.
On Elections
Some in Washington argue for making the 2014 exercise central to
U.S. policy. They focus on voter registration and other such
technicalities. I don't disagree with the sentiment.
But while we are all discussing the vital importance of a credible
election, moves are being made on the ground to ensure it will be no
such thing. Sadly, what matters in Afghan elections as they are
currently run is not who can mobilize the most votes, but who can
control the process. So President Karzai and his lieutenants in the
executive branch are grappling with some of your counterparts over the
makeup and duties of the election commission and the complaints body.
No surprise, Karzai is winning. As of this weekend, the head of the
election commission declared that the tussle over the electoral law had
gone on too long for the provisions to be implemented, and that Karzai
would be enacting regulations by legislative decree.
In this context, I've already spoken about the issues raised by
U.S. payments to the key political actor.
Recommendation: If the U.S. Government is going to lend the moral
authority of this country to the 2014 election, then words like
``credible'' have to mean something. U.S. financing and support for the
vote must be contingent on Kabul's adherence to some minimum standards.
A truly independent, empowered elections commission whose members are
not appointed by the President, for example, and a real complaints
mechanism, with teeth. If President Karzai wants to run an election he
can control, that's his right. But not on the U.S. dime, and not on the
democratic reputation of the United States.
On Security
Much attention has been devoted to the Afghan National Security
Forces' tactical capabilities. There have been improvements--though
vetting and discipline problems were devastating just a year ago. And
the ANSF casualty rate has spiked over last year's, according to U.K.
officials. Attrition is also up.
But the technical skills of Afghan soldiers are really beside the
point. The real meaning is this. An army--the best army--is only a tool
in the hands of a government. You can exercise that army, sort of like
taking an arm to a gym and lifting weights with it, but if the body to
which it's attached is nonviable, it won't be able to defend much. That
is the fundamental point that keeps getting missed in discussions about
ANSF capabilities.
Trying to get a meaningful read on the security situation is
elusive. ISAF stopped keeping violence statistics in March. And they
were disputable anyway. So only localized anecdotes are left. There are
clear improvements around Kandahar. Colleagues of mine are now able to
visit areas that were under deadly Taliban control in 2009. The current
police chief of Kandahar is keeping the Taliban at bay, but I'm hearing
at such a cost in extra-judicial killing that he's turning much of the
town against him. I have known him for more than a decade and this was
to be expected. I warned General David Petraeus, then commander of
ISAF, about the police chief's style and the potential Leahy amendment
issues it raises. Meanwhile, northern Helmand is already reinfested
with Taliban, according to both residents and U.S. military personnel.
A point often missed in assessments of security is that the
Taliban's strategy is to obtain the maximum policy impact for the
minimum investment of resources. That is what asymmetric warfare is all
about. Recent spectacular attacks in Kabul and elsewhere indicate
they're still doing a good job at that.
What local deals are being made between a given kandak and the
local Haqqani commander? Whose fighters are waiting for ISAF's final
departure? What depredations are the local police committing? No one
can claim to know, beyond a very localized understanding.
So any assessment of current security trends can only be a surface
impression. Its significance for predicting outcomes is minimal.
As for residual U.S. troops, 10,000 would not make much more of an
impact on security and stability in Afghanistan than zero. My reading
of the signals in this town is that zero is a likely bet. And to be
honest, in the absence of an overall policy framework within which the
commitment and sacrifice would make sense, I find it difficult to argue
otherwise.
But how to get to zero U.S. troops after 2014 without leaving a
black hole behind? How to get to zero responsibly, honoring the efforts
and losses of so many, and preserving some potential for the Afghan
people and for regional security? The obligation the United States
engaged by intervening in the first place--and the historical memory in
that region of the U.S. just leaving--imposes one last effort to think
that through.
Recommendation: Don't look to security structures to provide
security amidst political melt-down. The way to wind down U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan without the place unraveling behind us is
not to focus on military technicalities. It is to take a different
approach to the political context.
On Negotiations
The idea of a single negotiating track with Taliban leadership was
never the right approach to the political context--for several reasons.
The ISI involvement with Taliban leadership may be complex and fraught,
but it is deep and effective. It is likely that the ISI started
reconstituting the Taliban in late 2002--and I watched them doing it--
with precisely the aim of negotiations in mind. They, like us, presumed
an insurgency would end in negotiations, and they wanted to drive us
there, and then control the outcome. The aim was to regain a degree of
the proxy control over Afghanistan that they enjoyed under the Taliban
regime. Now, however the relationship may have evolved, the ISI
certainly retains enough hold over Taliban leadership to choose who
goes to Doha, and what they settle for. And ironically, we have been
practically begging Pakistani officials to play that role.
In other words, we would never be negotiating with autonomous
representatives of an Afghan movement in Doha, even if talks started.
We'd be talking to the ISI by proxy. That carries a couple of
implications. It means we are effectively rewarding Pakistan for the
deliberate use of violent proxies as an instrument of national policy.
Other countries, like Iran and North Korea, may take notice. And it
means that the terms of any deal that might result would likely be
unacceptable to most Afghans, because they would entail surrendering
too much sovereignty.
Which brings me to my next point: it's not just the Taliban who are
bitterly opposed to the way the Karzai Government has been operating.
Most Afghans are. But the others did not take up arms. Even though the
ballot box--due to fraud--has not been a recourse. And yet, those
Afghans have no seat at these negotiations. We are in effect punishing
the nonviolent opposition in our rush to placate the violent
opposition. This approach does not line up with our values as a nation.
And it is almost guaranteed not to work--but rather to lead directly to
the next war.
Recommendation: Two prongs. With respect to Afghan reconciliation,
make it much more inclusive, along the lines of what the French tested
in Chantilly late last year. Include all the major constituencies,
including the Taliban and members of the Karzai government, as coequal
participants. Choice of participants would necessarily be arbitrary and
imperfect at this late date, but it can easily be made more
representative than the Doha process. Talks should be facilitated by
talented international mediators, perhaps sponsored by one or more of
our NATO partners.
With respect to Pakistan, first and--in concert with our allies
including the U.K.--raise the cost of using violent proxies as an
instrument of policy, by means of an array of leverage and smart
sanctions. Certainly do not ask Pakistani officials to act as agents to
help organize intra-Afghan talks. Second, open a proper, formal, state-
to-state channel through which Pakistan can identify and address its
legitimate strategic aspirations and concerns with respect to its
neighbor. Again, this is the type of initiative international bodies
are well-placed to help facilitate.
Mr Chairman, only such a change in our political approach can offer
a way to conclude U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan without
leaving the region even more dangerous than we found it in 2001. Such
an adjustment would not require more material resources, just more
focus and attention, and the willingness to take some political risk.
Thank you for inviting me to share these thoughts.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Nadery.
STATEMENT OF AHMAD NADER NADERY, FOUNDER AND CHAIRMAN, FAIR AND
FREE ELECTIONS FOUNDATION OF AFGHANISTAN, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
Mr. Nadery. Chair Menendez, Senator Kaine, thank you very
much for the opportunity to speak before this committee at a
very critical time of our history in Afghanistan.
I will speak today about three issues, mainly political
transition, the talks in Doha, and generally the talks with the
Taliban, and the ongoing security transition.
I will also outline what is rarely reported in the media,
that Afghanistan is at a turning point with transformation made
in many spheres and newly found confidence in our state and
security forces. Personally, whenever I see the young women and
men in uniform, I feel proud in Afghanistan.
However, there are risks and fears. Many Afghans had their
confidence shaken by the recent events in Doha, which helped
legitimize terrorist groups and played into Pakistan's hand.
The news this week that President Obama was again
considering zero troops also shook confidence in Afghanistan.
We understand your frustration but, Respected Senator, your
real partners in Afghanistan are the Afghan people, not our
current officials alone. In less than a year, we will have a
new President and a year later, a new Parliament. At this
moment when the blood, sweat, and tears of these past 10 years
is finally starting to pay off, it would be a great mistake to
sacrifice our achievements to a hasty withdrawal or a bad deal.
Today life for most Afghans, particularly women and
children, has changed for the better. Democratic freedoms,
women's rights, and the media represent some of the greatest
achievements of the past 10 years of international engagement.
We have got 8 million children in school, more than 100
universities, a young population with real opportunities for
upward mobility. And with our security forces growing in
strength, transition has exceeded our expectation. That is why
it is vital to get the political transition right.
We welcome Secretary Kerry and General Dunford in today's
Washington Post calling for a free, fair, and transparent
election. There are huge challenges but continued U.S.
attention we believe can make a real difference.
The priorities are, therefore, first, President Karzai
needs to approve the electoral law, appoint a chair of the
Election Commission, and put a complaint process in place.
Second, the United States should promote a level playing
field and continue to insist elections are held on time and
according to the Afghan Constitution.
Moving to Doha, Doha really distracted, we believe, the
highest level of the U.S. Government for our political
transition and sidelined negotiations over the very critical
issue of the bilateral security agreement. It emboldened the
Taliban and played very easily into the hands of Pakistan. The
Taliban show little sign of being ready or able to negotiate or
respect our constitutional order or women's rights or
democracy. They have actually become more extreme in their
deliberate attacks against the civilian population. I lived
through their rule, so I know how brutal they are.
If we focus on political transition with a new government,
a fresh mandate, backed by a bilateral security agreement, we
can create incentives for the Taliban and for Pakistan for them
to rethink their strategy to one that is more conducive and
inclusive of peace.
On security, Mr. Chairman, the newfound strength and
courage of our security forces has been demonstrated by their
speed with which they have closed down recent attacks on our
capital with minimal loss of life. But we still face big
challenges. Our forces are already missing the coalition
enabler support. Senator Corker has spoken about that also. The
Afghani Air Force is not in place and while our people want to
serve in the air force, it will take more time to build.
Technical knowledge like counter-IED and military intelligence
is growing but slowly. On top of this, our brave forces are not
yet supported by a commander in chief that they deserve.
We know our forces are fighting bravely, being killed and
wounded for the defense of their own country, but they need
continued help. That means, first, a bilateral security
agreement to boost confidence. Second, fulfilling Chicago
commitments to the Afghan Air Force and maintain some
international air support until our Afghan air force can take
full responsibility. Finally, fulfill commitments for financial
and material support for the continued development of the
institutional strength of the Afghan army, police, and
intelligence.
We are in debt to the United States for all you have done
for our country. We know it is a burden. We do not seek an
open-ended support, but we are now so close to a turning point.
Soon we can become your trusted ally in an uncertain region.
I look forward to your questions and thank you all,
committee members, for your continued engagement and interest
in my country and for giving me this opportunity to speak.
Thank you very much.
Prepared Statement of Nader Nadery
introduction
Senator Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
committee at this critical time in Afghanistan's political transition.
I am the chairperson of the Free and Fair Elections Federation of
Afghanistan (FEFA) and the Director of the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU). From 2004 until last month I was a commissioner
of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
I will be speaking about three issues that can determine the course
of Afghanistan's future: The ongoing security transition; the upcoming
political transition and elections; and, finally the public perception
of the current efforts to start negotiations with the Taliban, and U.S.
role within it.
I will also outline for you what so rarely gets reported in the
media--that Afghanistan is at a turning point toward stability, with
our people beginning to have faith in a democratic system. The
investments of the last decade by Afghans and their partners, in
particular the United States, have transformed the country. We have
seen unprecedented progress made in many spheres, but perhaps what
makes me most proud is that on the eve of transition, Afghans are ready
and eager to stand on their own feet, with a newfound trust in the
abilities of their security forces.
However, alongside this new sense of determination, there are risks
and fears. Many Afghans had their confidence shaken by the recent
opening of a Taliban office in Doha. Even if the Taliban have
temporarily closed the office, the process helped to legitimize a group
that is terrorizing the Afghan people, and played directly into
Pakistan's hands. The United States involvement in that process gave
rise to conspiracies in Afghanistan about the real priorities of the
U.S. Government. It would be a tragedy if--at this moment--when so much
of the blood, sweat, and tears of these past 10 years is paying off--
the achievements that the United States has helped to win were
sacrificed for a deal that could destroy them. Particularly when we
stand less than a year away from elections which will bring a new
leader with a fresh mandate to govern, and to negotiate on behalf of
the Afghan people.
Similarly, the recent reports that the United States might be
seriously considering a rapid drawdown to ``Zero Troops'' sends a
terrible message to Afghans at this critical juncture. It would be a
waste if the very understandable frustrations with our leadership
should prompt a precipitous withdrawal during this delicate phase.
Drawing down to zero troops before transition is complete would shake
the confidence of your true partners in Afghanistan--the Afghan people.
And it would send a message to the Taliban that the United States is
giving up on all its good work here.
With a small residual force, increasingly tailored over time, all
the impressive work of the United States military in helping to build
our army and police force can be cemented. Combine this with a
Bilateral Security Agreement and a new government and Parliament, and
you have the outlines of a far more stable trajectory.
Many Afghans--particularly among our new generation, who constitute
the majority of the people--have genuine faith in the continued
development of a moderate, democratic Afghan Republic. The U.S.
Congress has rightly been concerned about the corruption in our
government, but most Afghans do not simply judge the state on the flaws
of individuals. It is the state institutions--in particular our armed
forces--that have earned the respect of the people. This stands in
absolute opposite to the Taliban-era Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
This is because beneath the dismal headlines that often dominate
the international media, life for most Afghans has changed for the
better. Educational and employment opportunities, women's rights and
democratic freedoms represent some of the greatest achievement of these
past 10 years of international engagement. As this ``Decade of
Transition,'' comes to an end, the highly anticipated ``Decade of
Transformation'' can be built on the gains of what was achieved in the
past 12 years.
But for all these achievements, the future of Afghanistan might
still be unstable at best or disastrous at worst without close
attention to the following three areas: one, the security transition;
two, the political transition, including the election of a new
President in less than a year; and three, public confidence in the
peace and reconciliation process.
Transition: Impact and Assessment
First allow me to briefly discuss how Afghanistan looks today, at
the end of the Transition decade:
In terms of social change:
--We've had a rapid demographic shift--with over 60 percent of the
population under the age of 20. This new generation benefits from
huge improvements in educational opportunities, urbanization, and
greater social mobility.
--We have some extraordinary women leaders in the public sphere,
including parliamentarians, doctors, lawyers, judges and civil
society leaders, with women's rights being articulated by men as
well as women activists. As a concrete example of their recent
gains--2 months ago Afghanistan adopted its first workplace
antiharassment regulation championed by two dynamic young
technocrats in government in partnership with civil society. It is
now enforced throughout local government.
--Human rights, including a commitment to the concept of human rights,
are becoming firmly established in public discourse.
--Over 8 million children are enrolled in schools of which 2.6 million
are girls. We have over 100 private and public universities
compared to only 5 in 2004.
--Improvements in primary health care have led to a sharp drop in
maternal and infant mortality rates.
Moving on to the security, democratic, and economic spheres:
--The security handover is now complete--and has fared much more
successfully than most had predicted. This has only further boosted
the confidence of Afghans on their own security forces. This might
not be the impression you get here, reading the endless bad news
about Afghanistan in the international media. But in Afghanistan we
highlight our successes as well as our failures. The June attack on
the Presidential Palace was a clear example of this: here in the
United States it was reported as a dramatic breach of security. In
Kabul reporters and analysts also commented on the ability of the
Afghan security forces to bring an end to the attack in just 90
minutes.
--Now, to complete what we see as a successful security transition, it
is time to finalize the Bilateral Security Agreement, which will
support the political and ensuing economic transition.
--In the democratic sphere: we've seen new maturity and development in
our political parties. New political movements and parties have
emerged that are not based on individual strongmen or ethnicities,
but represent the new generation. Consensus-building is now the
norm. For instance, last fall FEFA facilitated negotiations between
48 political parties and civil society organizations, which
resulted in the adoption of a 50-point ``Declaration of Principles
on Electoral Reform.'' So while our elections still face huge
challenges--these trends show democracy is taking root.
--The media--a prerequisite for any democracy--is one of our great
success stories. Today 95 percent of the Afghan population is
exposed to some form of mass media and almost 500,000 Afghans are
on Facebook compared to almost zero access to Internet 10 years
ago. We have 50 television stations, 150 radio stations, and 100s
of newspapers.
--While the fight against corruption remains challenging, as it is for
so many developing nations, the newfound courage of our media in
taking on high-level corruption and impunity gives me confidence
that we can begin to cure this cancer. Afghan journalists are
routinely putting themselves at risk to report on the crimes of
some of the most powerful, and in doing so starting to change the
culture of impunity.
--And it's not just the media that is pushing for better governance.
The Free and Fair Election Foundation, which I head, is pushing for
electoral transparency and demanding accountability of
parliamentarians to their constituencies. Afghan watchdog groups
like Afghan Anti-Corruption Network, Integrity Watch, and Equality
for Peace and Democracy have also become bold advocates for
cleaner, more transparent government. Their advocacy recently
triggered a parliamentary effort to impeach a minister accused of
corruption.
--In the economic and development sphere, hundreds of Afghan-owned
small and medium-sized enterprises have sprung up; 16,000 new
businesses were registered between 2004 and 2011, and thousands of
kilometers of roads have been paved. Our telecommunications
industry is thriving with around 20 million cell phone users (out
of a population of 35 million). And with significant reserves of
rare earth, minerals, gas, copper, and iron ore it is not too
outlandish a statement to say that Afghanistan has the capacity to
achieve economic autonomy.
--And last but not least--there's been unprecedented progress in sports
and athletics--we won two Olympic medals in 2012, our cricket team
made it into the international top 20, we have a newly created
football league which has jumped up the international rankings
after lying dormant for nearly 20 years. We have even nurtured a
strong women's football team.
Alongside these great gains, the reality is that today's
Afghanistan presents a dual picture: there are small but highly visible
groups of Taliban and other terrorists who are rooted in Afghanistan's
past--a past wracked by repression, lawlessness and a painful isolation
from the rest of the world.
But a growing majority of Afghans have left that past behind. While
suicide attacks and violence still make the headlines, most Afghans are
now focused on jobs, the rule of law, accountability and the coming
elections in 2014.
Our civil society has grown in confidence, diversity, and
strength--from emerging new political parties to women leaders, to our
courageous investigative reporters and dynamic entrepreneurs; we are
all invested in the same future, the same path to continued progress.
As 2014 rapidly approaches, we look back at the last decade of our
efforts that have born all these fruits with delight. I grew up during
the civil war and lived through the Taliban's brutal rule; I can attest
personally that the past decade has led to radical improvements for our
nation. But, cementing these achievements and paving the path for
future peace and progress is also on our minds, for these gains can be
quickly unraveled.
After this ``Decade of Transition,'' Afghans share a collective
sense of ownership with the process and faith in the system. With
international support, we are now leading the ``Decade of
Transformation.''
Political Transition: Free and Fair, Achievable and Effective Elections
At the heart of political transition are the upcoming elections in
2014 and 2015, which have the potential to redefine Afghanistan's
future as well as to cement the investments of the United States in our
emerging democracy. We welcome Secretary Kerry's commitment to
promoting a ``free, fair, and transparent elections in 2014.'' However,
for this to happen, the United States cannot afford to be sidetracked
by the likes of the Doha process. Such distractions have the potential
to jeopardize the political transition and the achievements made to
date. I would therefore urge Ambassador Dobbins and his team to keep
their focus on Afghanistan, not Doha, and make the political transition
and the elections, their first priority.
Of course, challenges remain, but a credible election is the first
step to building a credible government. There is still time to put in
place the proper legal framework and to develop the necessary electoral
institutions to ensure noninterference. Afghans are working hard to
hold their government to account, and ensure that Afghans have the
confidence and motivation to take part. The United States can also play
an important role in the process.
This upcoming election is already prompting robust campaigns and
debates all over Afghanistan. It is clear to anyone and everyone
involved with voting, elections, and government in Afghanistan that a
sound legal framework is required. There are lively national debates on
the progress of two laws that will create an improved legal framework
for our elections--both laws have been passed by the upper and lower
Houses of Parliament but still need Presidential approval.
If the President doesn't approve the election laws in the next few
days or weeks, the elections will go ahead according to the
Presidential Decree that was used in 2010. We know from bitter
experience how flawed that legislative decree is. Afghan civil society
and our international partners have worked hard to try to make sure we
have an improved legal framework, including an independent electoral
commission and an electoral complaints process. But time is running out
to ensure that happens.
One positive sign is that operational preparations are taking place
months earlier than in previous rounds--for example, the Afghan
security forces announcing their plans in good time, including polling
station locations. Voter registration is taking place--while initial
indicators reveal low women's participation, this is an area the Afghan
Government with the support of the international community can
prioritize and rectify.
One of the most pressing challenges is that the Presidential
elections will take place within a matter of months and the appointment
of the chairman for the Independent Elections Commission has yet to be
announced. The IEC is at the front and center of elections. Without a
credible leader in place, who has a proven independence and an
established record, and is driven, committed, and capable, the election
commission will struggle to build the necessary confidence with the
public.
To counter these challenges and to ensure Afghanistan is given the
fighting chance it deserves to hold free and fair elections, there are
a few actions to consider:
(1) All efforts should be made to make sure that appointment of the
IEC commissioners and in particular the chairperson are made through
transparent and consultative means so that the next IEC will be
perceived as credible and can perform independently of the executive.
(2) While the United States cannot support an individual candidate,
it should not shy away from supporting democratic parties, platforms,
and institutions so that there is a level playing field. It should
continue to stress the need for noninterference by the Afghan executive
in the electoral processes, and fair access to the media.
(3) The United States should continue to insist on the elections
being held on time and according to the Afghan Constitution, and
continue to support and strengthen the IEC's antifraud measures and
capacities so that they can manage a smooth post-election period.
(4) All efforts should be made to facilitate the deployment of
international election observers as well as supporting domestic
electoral observers like my group--the Free and Fair Elections
Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), not just through the 2014 elections,
but through the 2015 elections and beyond.
(5) By 2014 the Afghan security forces will have sole
responsibility for security, including the polling centers. With a
small contingency force NATO and U.S. forces can provide confidence,
and if required can assist with small but important tasks should an
emergency arise--such as providing the IEC logistical support for
deployment of electoral material.
Doha, the Threat of the Taliban Emirate, and a Real Path to Peace
The people of Afghanistan want peace, not appeasement. The United
States should not be giving any sense of false legitimacy or
credibility to a terrorist group, or to Pakistan's games. When the
``political office'' of the Taliban was opened in Doha it sent a signal
to Afghans that the United States was not committed to working with the
representative Government of Afghanistan.
This uncertainty about the position and priorities of the United
States is dangerous for a number of reasons. Firstly because it
distracts the highest levels of the U.S. Government from helping to
ensure a smooth and viable political transition, and sidelined
negotiations over the Bilateral Security Agreement. The message that
Doha sent can lead to hedging behavior by Afghans, which can be very
destabilizing.
Second, it emboldened the Taliban. The audacity of the Taliban
flying a flag of the ``Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'' was shocking
for Afghans, and exposed clearly their vision of themselves as the
rightful rulers of our people. They may have temporarily closed down
their office to protest demands that they stop calling themselves the
Emirate, but that again shows how central to their movement is this
notion of themselves as a ``government in waiting.''
The Taliban have not become a ``moderate'' group, they remain
draconian, highly ideological and are, in fact, becoming more and more
extreme in their attacks on innocent civilians. The Taliban have never
categorically said that they will respect human rights and women's
rights, or that they are committed to furthering the progress in this
field. Nor do they show any sign that they are ready to engage in the
political process--which would mean respecting a (man-made)
constitution, and accepting defeat at a ballot box.
U.S. actions in Doha, therefore, risk undermining the proud
sovereignty and fragile authority of the Afghan Government. As this
Afghan Government has been supported by the United States, it also
undermines the credibility of American foreign policy.
This is not to say that we in Afghanistan are against the Taliban
joining mainstream politics. We would welcome that with tears of joy--
there are one or two former Taliban who participate peacefully in our
Parliament--more would be welcome. However, we cannot entertain a
political process wherein the Taliban refuses to denounce violence,
rejects the constitution, and maintains relations with al-Qaeda and
other dangerous regional networks.
The United States should also be very wary of playing into
Pakistan's hands, in particular the designs of the Pakistani military,
which treats the Afghan people as expendable pawns in their bigger
contest with India.
Throughout the past decade there have been genuine efforts by the
Afghan Government and its international partners--including the United
States--to gain the support of the Pakistani Government in a peace
process, but hard facts suggest that elements in the Pakistani state
continue to prove that they are not faithful partners.
The Government of Afghanistan has also until recently failed to
provide a clear path toward peace. They do not seem to have a clear
sense of the end goal, they allow multiple tracks and institutions to
engage in the process, creating confusion among the people, and among
those elements within the Taliban that might be serious about peace.
The government has also failed to build a consensus among different
sectors of society about a path to peace--a precursor to an inclusive
and sustainable peace process.
Such a process is likely to take time and patience. Those who are
rushing to this track seem to feel that the alternative is civil war.
Most Afghans fear the shadow of civil war, but it is far from
inevitable. We must ask you not to look at Afghanistan with the lens of
the 1990s where the only contest is between the warlords and the
Taliban.
The new Afghanistan is changed--citizens want jobs for themselves
and schools to be built for their children. This Decade of Transition
has exposed even our warlords to far more attractive horizons--where
peace and prosperity have been made possible. The overwhelming majority
of Afghans does not identify with warlords or the Taliban--and will not
be carried by either group--but are forging new political identities
and platforms.
We need to focus on the great test of the constitution that lies
ahead of us in 2014--because really the political settlement is the
constitution. Building upon it, building upon the center, and upon the
wishes of the majority, is the real and the sustainable path to peace.
Anything else is short-lived and will not ensure lasting peace for the
people.
If we have a new government, which reaffirms our commitment to our
constitutional order, backed by the Strategic Partnership Agreement and
a new Bilateral Security Agreement, we create the right incentives for
the Taliban and Pakistan to rethink their strategy. I'm confident that
these conditions might lead to a Pakistani and Taliban strategy that is
more conducive to peace.
What can be done, at this point, when so many mistakes have been
made?
(1) The U.S.G--in particular the office of the Special
Representative, Ambassador Dobbins--should focus on political
transition in this critical moment. The next Afghan Government will
have a far stronger mandate and the energy to play this role.
(2) The United States should immediately halt any talks or
preliminary negotiations with the Taliban until the latter has
expressed firm commitment to engage with the Afghan Government.
(3) The United States should not engage in any talks or preliminary
negotiations until the Taliban cease their deliberate attacks on
civilians. ``Talking while fighting'' may be common in many peace
processes, it is not standard practice to talk while one side is
consistently carrying out what might amount to war crimes.
(4) If talks do begin in earnest, the U.S. priority should be
working with the government to secure firm commitments from the Taliban
that they would renounce violence and seek power through the democratic
system, they would respect the Afghan Constitution, respect human
rights, in particular women's rights, including women's right to work
and participate in the political system.
Cementing the Security Transition Will Preserve Gains and Provide
Lasting Stability
Let me now take a closer look at the achievements and challenges of
our security transition. In October 2012, Afghanistan exceeded its goal
of having a 350,000-troops strong Afghan National Security Forces. Many
Afghans want to join the ANSF to defend their own country. This is a
magnificent achievement--just 6 years ago the total ANSF was not even
80,000 and recruitment was a problem.
With this impressive force, Afghan leaders have been able to take
responsibility for leading security in Afghanistan, with less and less
reliance on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF). This shift toward Afghan leadership has not been accomplished
overnight and has not been easy. But as an Afghan whenever I see our
young men and some women in uniform I feel secure and proud, Mr.
Chairman. For most Afghans in their 30s and older are seeing this
uniformed national security force, carrying their country's flag, for
the first time in their lives. Our forces show steady improvements in
their capacity and their courage, as demonstrated by recent attacks in
our capital that were swiftly closed down with minimal disturbance for
our citizens.
The people of Afghanistan welcomed the successful completion of
transition. However, we recognize that these achievements come despite
enormous challenges that still need to be addressed. There is still
great doubt as to whether ANSF is capable of continuing this progress
after 2014, given the challenges we face. For example, without
``coalition enabler'' support, there is a risk that the ANSF are facing
severe limitations. The Afghan Air Force is not yet in place, and air
capacity is just at the beginning of development. Our people want to be
in the Air Force, but they need time to develop the technical skills
required. In addition, a basic essential service like medical
evacuation is not yet in place. With a high attrition rate and literacy
levels requiring time to improve, the ANSF is under great pressure.
There are also shortcomings in transportation, logistics, and
equipment. Technical knowledge, like counter-IED and military
intelligence is growing, but slowly.
On top of all this, our brave forces are not yet supported by a
commander in chief they deserve. A number of military officers told me
that morale is significantly affected because their commander in chief
still cannot define who the enemy is, and who his brother is. Mr.
Chairman, we are aware as Afghans that the task of choosing the right
commander in chief is solely ours, and I am confident that the nation
has learned hard lessons to be able to make the right decision in this
coming election. We Afghans know our forces are now fighting bravely,
sacrificing themselves, being killed and wounded, for the defense of
their own country. But they need continuing help. They need help not
just to keep fighting, but to make sure that they are a responsible,
accountable military that works for the good of the people, and that
dangers such as corruption, abuse of the people and seeking political
power do not arise. Both Afghans and Americans want an Afghan military
that we can be proud of.
Finalizing the Bilateral Security Agreement is of paramount
importance. It will give confidence in the political and ensuing
economic transition. It will mutually benefit Afghanistan and the
United States as the partnership against terrorism is cemented, and it
will preserve the gains we worked so hard for and sacrificed so much
for in the past decade. At this point, Afghans want to be assured of
the U.S. commitment to Afghan independence, security, and respect for
the constitution. In return, the Afghan people will partner with the
United States in building a country that is a productive part of the
world community and an ally in an uncertain region. The Afghan
Government will afford the United States access to military bases and
partner with the United States in necessary counterterror operations.
Afghans from different walks of life have echoed their endorsement of
the strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States,
including a Loya Jirga and the Afghan Parliament. The rhetoric, Mr.
Chairman, which you hear from some of our political leaders, is far
from what the majority of Afghans desire. Most of those I speak with--
not just the educated elites but average rural Afghans in remote
parts--are voicing their strong sense of anxiety, caused by delays in
signing of the BSA. We want to move forward with the United States as
our primary ally.
Based on this brief outline, there are a few steps to be taken to
support the security transition:
(1) Prioritize signing a Bilateral Security Agreement.
(2) As part of the Chicago Commitment, provide resources and
technical support to the Afghan Air Force for the time necessary.
(3) Maintain the minimum level of international air power support
until the Afghan Air Force and medical evacuation teams are ready to
take on the job themselves.
(4) Continue to provide the necessary advice, support, training and
capacity-building for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond from literacy
campaigns, to recruiting all ethnicities and women, to technical
vocations, so that the ANSF becomes and remains a professional and
responsible military.
(5) As committed to in the Strategic Partnership and by NATO in
Chicago last year, maintain the financial and material support
necessary for the continued development of the institution of the army,
police and intelligence.
In the last several years many Afghans like myself have been
enormously reassured to see the great strides our military has taken,
and remain indebted to the United States and our NATO allies for their
assistance in training and financing our security forces. We appreciate
that there must be a limit to this heavy burden for you, and this is
not a request for open ended support, but we humbly request that you
continue your support until the ANSF can not only manage, but truly
lead security across the country.
While I stress the importance of our military becoming a capable,
well-resourced and trusted institution, I recognize that we need an
equally capable and well-resourced civilian government, in order to
avoid the fate of some countries in our region.
After this decade-long strategic partnership, with all its
successes and sacrifices, now is not the moment to squander the
achievements and possibilities that are within reach today, because of
short-term frustrations or gains. Nor is it the moment to chase after
quick deals, when we're so close to getting a new government with a
fresh mandate, which will be capable of bringing all Afghans with it to
reach a lasting and inclusive peace.
Thank you, Senator Menendez and all the committee members for your
continued engagement and interest, and for giving me the opportunity to
provide frank testimony at this important time.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your testimony.
We have a universal agreement that these elections are very
important. Now, if you had the power, Mr. Hadley, to say this
is what the United States should be doing right now with the
Afghan Government to ensure the most honest, transparent, and
fair elections possible, what would your answer be?
Mr. Hadley. We need to put pressure on President Karzai but
really to encourage all aspects of the Afghan system to put
pressure on Karzai and the Parliament to get this legislation
enacted and to get the people appointed. That is point one.
Secondly, we in our statements have to make it clear that
this election is the top priority. I think a lot of Afghans
thought that reconciliation with the Taliban was our top
priority. This should be our top priority. It is our top
priority. We have not made that clear.
Third, I would agree the election needs to be part of a
broad-based reconciliation with all aspects of Afghan society
which largely feel alienated. That is what this election can
do. That will empower the Afghan Government. At that point
after the election, an empowered government supported by its
people, having international import, backed up by an army that
is willing to fight for that government, then you can talk
about having some conversation with Taliban to see those that
are willing to come out of the fight and give up violence and
then let the Afghan Army deal with the rest.
And I think at that point, Pakistan will accept that deal.
Pakistan, I think, has given up the notion that the Taliban are
going to take over in Afghanistan. I think Pakistan now feels
that an unstable Afghanistan threatens Pakistan which is seeing
a high level of violence, and I think that Pakistan will lower
its objective and accept some kind of outcome as long as there
is some kind of Taliban role.
But the critical thing will be to have, you said, an
empowered, fairly elected, legitimate government supported by
the Afghan people that can reconcile all of Afghan society.
That is the critical element to achieve the things that Mr.
Nadery has talked about.
The Chairman. Mr. Nadery, I appreciate hearing the words
``thank you'' because that is something President Karzai never
seems to be able to say.
With reference to your own view, what would you want the
United States to do to help you achieve the type of elections
that the Afghan people will have faith in?
Mr. Nadery. Well, I will endorse what Mr. Hadley said just
about the election, but to add on that is one of the critical
things is the type of messages that both the Afghan political
leadership and the public receives starting with raising the
bar higher than what was discussed in the past. It means
emphasize, as much as you can, on those processes and the
principle of those processes, which means what kind of a free
election and fair election you want to see being there. That
message needs to remain consistent throughout. We were grateful
to hear recently that Secretary Kerry changed the message from
``credible'' election to making it specific, ``free and fair.''
That matters especially before the election. So do not raise
the bar lower. Keep it high--as high as is possible before the
election so it can send the message to those who are preparing
for whatever possible end of the election to not be there.
Second, continue the technical assistance both to the
institution of the Election Commission, especially on the fraud
mitigation measures. There are a large number of expertise and
lessons learned in the past. That needs to be translated there
in action to those in institution, including make sure that you
are pressing for more international observers, including
support for domestic election observers on the ground, but the
election issue needs to remain a consistent priority and the
messages that go need to match those issues of priority coming
from your government to our government and our President. So no
preparation or plots that are being in some corner of our
government for a delay of the election or a cancelation of the
election to work.
The Chairman. I would like to ask this to all of you, more
of a comment. You know, I read the article in the New York
Times and I said this is certainly unfortunate and not
positive. By the same token, I think that President Karzai
somehow thinks that he has some leverage with us over this
issue. Somehow he thinks that a zero option is not a
possibility, so therefore we will have to somewhat be held over
the barrel at the end of the day to what is this final
negotiating opportunity. And I think the one thing that he
should understand is that that is not beyond the possibility if
we cannot get a bilateral security agreement.
How do we disabuse President Karzai of the belief that this
is something to negotiate with? I mean, negotiating an
agreement is understandable, but there is a difference between
negotiating an agreement and using the agreement as an effort
to leverage whatever he is seeking personally for his future,
his security living in Afghanistan, what comes along with his
influence, whatever. I get a sense that the flip side of this--
we talk about the United States not making it clear, and I
think we should make it all clear. I think we have made it very
clear that we intend to stay. By the same token, we cannot be
held hostage by President Karzai.
Mr. Hadley.
Mr. Hadley. It may have started by someone as an effort to
kind of negotiate with Karzai and to say, you know, we really
could pull them all out. The problem is the multiple audience
problem and it dismayed the rest of the country and caused a
loss of confidence. And so that I think was a terrible mistake.
I think he is using the bilateral security agreement, and
that is why my suggestion is to make a clear commitment of a
specific, substantial number, say this is what we are going to
do to reassure the rest of the country, and then say to Karzai,
and we would love to negotiate it with you, but if we cannot
negotiate it with you, we will negotiate it with the folks who
come in after the election. That takes the stick away from him
and takes the leverage away from him.
And I think the combination of those two things, in the end
of the day, will lead him to come to the table and negotiate an
agreement because I think he wants that to be part of his
legacy. I do not think he wants to leave it to the next
government.
So that is what I would try, but it is a very frustrating
situation, but that is what I would try.
The Chairman. Ms. Chayes.
Ms. Chayes. Yes, thank you and I am going to have to go in
just a minute.
I would just like to second that. In fact, I would not say
maybe we would do it after. I would just pause those
negotiations. I would do the same thing, say the intent of the
United States is to leave a troop presence after 2014 in the
order of X, but we will resume these negotiations after the
election.
Mr. Nadery. I fully agree with both of the speakers on that
front. But just to add again and reemphasize the point that you
hear an entirely different message from the rest of the
Afghans, including the Afghan Parliament, compared to what
President Karzai says. There is an overwhelming majority of
support for the bilateral security agreement endorsement and
adoption. And therefore, it needs to be a multilayer of
messaging and engagement both with the Afghan Parliament and
also with other stakeholders on the ground. And therefore, not
to pause the bilateral security agreement negotiation. It needs
to continue with the knowledge that a ``no'' answer should not
come, making a clear message and communication to the President
that if he is not signing it, the next administration with the
popular support of the public are going to achieve and it will
not be his legacy but will be a legacy of the next government
which will have the popular support of the public.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine, if you have a question for Ms.
Chayes, if you would give it to her first because she has got a
speaking engagement and she has been hanging in here.
Senator Kaine. I will. And, Mr. Chair, you asked all my
questions almost. But just a threshold one and maybe Ms. Chayes
could start first.
Just a threshold question. You know, what is your
perception about the degree of support in the Afghan population
for a United States residual force post-2014?
Ms. Chayes. I would agree with Mr. Nadery. Very high.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Nadery.
Mr. Nadery. Well, a good indication of looking into that
would be all the discussion that have happened when there was a
final decision was going to be made at the time on the strategy
partnership agreement. The overwhelming support on the floor in
the Afghan Parliament, the overwhelming discussion and support
throughout Afghan civil society and broader in the provinces in
support of the strategy partnership is a very clear indication
of a continued partnership with the United States.
Whenever there is a discussion about a zero troop option or
a withdrawal, you hear a higher degree and a higher sense of
anxiety and fear in the Afghan population. That creates further
uncertainty about their future, and that need itself makes and
drives a lot of support for a residual number of troops on the
ground. And that need to be looked in a way that it needs to
be--if the numbers are not coming right away, but at least it
need to be announced in a way that it is tailored to the needs
on the ground. If insecurity increases significantly and Afghan
forces are fighting hard but needs more support, that number of
troops will be tailored that way. And definitely we hope that
we take more responsibility. We are going to fight for our own
country and, therefore, the numbers will be corresponding to
those needs for the support role in those areas that we need.
At this stage, the numbers will definitely make a huge
psychological confidence-boosting and building role.
Senator Kaine. And the last question, Mr. Hadley, because
you have really already answered the question I just asked in
your written testimony. But in Afghanistan, sort of what I
heard was the two bad narratives would be United States
abandonment or United States occupation. And so what we are
doing is attempting to establish a residual force that is
clearly not an occupying force and that is clearly not an
abandonment strategy. From your professional judgment based on
what you are hearing in terms of the military leadership about
what the size of that force would be, which is sort of a
combined U.S.-NATO force, is the kind of range you are hearing
discussed a range that you generally feel is acceptable?
Mr. Hadley. I think the word is it is an ``enabling'' force
that
enables the Afghans to take full responsibility. That is how we
should see it.
I think it should be mission-driven, not just an abstract
number. Ron Neumann, who is our former Ambassador, tried to do
that. He did sort of a mission-driven.
I have a lot of respect for General Mattis, and my guess is
that if you do that mission-driven, which probably he did it,
you know, you are at a number that in the 15,000, not in the
9,000. And if you add 4,000 or 5,000 NATO troops, which is what
people are talking about, that gets you a 20,000 number. That
ought to be probably roughly adequate to do the mission. But
again, I am no mission planner, but you asked me to read the
tea leaves. That is kind of how I read them.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. It
was invaluable. Thank you for traveling all the way from
Afghanistan on short notice to be here. It was very helpful,
insightful.
The record will remain open till the close of business
tomorrow for any members who wish to submit questions.
And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of Special Representative James Dobbins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Afghanistan's elections in 2014 and the ensuing political
transition are a critical piece in the success of the security
transition to Afghan forces. Without free, fair, transparent, and
credible elections, many of the efforts and sacrifices made by so many
Americans and Afghans will have been for naught.
What can the United States do better to convince Afghans
that the 2014 elections and political transition is our top
priority in Afghanistan?
In your opinion, what would constitute a ``credible''
election to the Afghan people?
Answer. The 2014 elections are the top political priority for our
mission in Kabul and our diplomats understand that the 2014
Presidential election will determine the future stability of
Afghanistan and the region. The Embassy regularly consults with Afghans
throughout the country and stresses the importance of a successful
political transition. Assistant Chief of Mission Ambassador David
Robinson is the Embassy's primary point of contact on elections. He
meets almost daily with Afghan Government officials, political party
leaders, Afghan National Security Force commanders, civil society, and
international partners to assess progress on elections and deliver
consistent U.S. policy messages on all aspects of planning for this
historic event. Secretary Kerry, who has direct experience with
Afghanistan's 2009 Presidential election, has made the 2014 political
transition one of his top priorities. He has raised this issue in all
his conversations and meetings with President Karzai and other high-
level Afghan officials, most recently in Kabul in March and in Brussels
in May, as Deputy Secretary Burns did during his May visit to Kabul. I
also discussed the elections during my meeting with President Karzai on
May 29.
Ultimately, Afghans themselves will have to determine what
constitutes a ``credible'' election. However, the general sense we see
is that Afghans want a free, fair, inclusive and unifying election that
reflects the will of the people and reaffirms Afghanistan's democratic
progress and the Afghan people's strong desire for a future shaped by
democratic politics, not violence. Increased participation and reduced
fraud will help to ensure a credible result. It is up to the Afghan
people to elect a President they hope will best represent all of
Afghanistan.
Question. As we saw in Iraq, a coordinated interagency transition
strategy for Afghanistan will be critical to avoid the risk of
duplication or working at cross-purposes. Additionally, oversight of
U.S. reconstruction funding is a priority in transition planning. For
example, USAID intends to use third-party monitors to oversee its
programs and projects, although we don't have data to know whether this
would be a reliable mechanism.
Does the U.S. Government have a coordinated interagency
strategy for transition in Afghanistan? If so, who is in charge
of this planning effort? Is it coordinated with coalition
partners and the Afghan Government? Has it applied lessons
learned from Iraq?
Is oversight of civilian assistance being considered in
transition planning? If so, specifically how are the State
Department and USAID making oversight a priority?
Answer. The term ``transition'' in Afghanistan refers to a number
of separate but interrelated processes occurring over the next 2 years
and beyond. We often cite the security, political, and economic
transitions as the three key issues for U.S. foreign policy in
Afghanistan. In addition, the internal USG transition from a military-
led to a civilian-led effort in Afghanistan is a critical priority and
creates a large number of required actions and challenges, including
planning for ongoing operations, management of assistance, and
continuation of necessary diplomatic engagement. Given the broad and
complex nature of these transitions, no single strategic document
covers all aspects of the issue. Overarching strategic documents,
including the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership and the Civil-Military
Strategic Framework, provide guidance to our efforts in support of the
various transitions. In addition, the National Security Staff hosts
regular interagency policy meetings to develop strategic guidance on
transition issues.
Earlier this year, in order to consolidate the policy and
management aspects of the upcoming transitions into a single entity,
Embassy Kabul combined the existing Transition Office, which was under
the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, and the
Management Transition Office into a single Transition Office. The new
office, led by two Senior Foreign Service officers, reports directly to
the Ambassador and covers all aspects of transition including
coordination with other agencies, other countries, coalition military,
and the Afghan Government.
The implementation and oversight of civilian assistance programs is
a central part of our ongoing transition planning. The Embassy
Transition Office is working closely with all U.S. implementing
agencies and plans to systematically review existing assistance
programs to assess how they contribute to our foreign policy goals and
examine whether and how they will continue to operate after the 2014
security transition. A key question in this analysis is whether the
implementing agency will be able to provide adequate oversight and
monitoring with potentially less access to project sites outside of
Kabul. The Transition Office has developed, and the Ambassador set as
Embassy-wide policy, a forward-looking program monitoring and oversight
framework that envisions using third-party monitoring as a tool to
support, but not replace, inherently governmental oversight functions.
The Mission Policy on Monitoring and Evaluation directs agencies and
sections to establish clear mechanisms for effective monitoring post-
2014, and specific tripwires for deciding when projects should be
postponed, put on hold, or terminated. The Embassy continually
reevaluates projects and programs based on these criteria. USAID, INL,
and other offices are currently building their post-2014 portfolios
and, with the help of advanced planning, are integrating multilayered
and technological solutions to address the upcoming implementation and
monitoring challenges. For example, USAID has developed an innovative
remote monitoring policy that incorporates best practices from other
challenging operating environments, such as Iraq and Pakistan. The new
policy calls for a multilayered approach that uses third-party
monitors, technology including satellite imagery and mobile technology,
surveys, and other methods to augment the monitoring information
available to government oversight officials.
In addition, Embassy Kabul has merged the two coordination offices,
the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance
(CDDEA) and the Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law
Enforcement (CDROLLE) into one Coordination Directorate. This merger
will further enhance synergies between the multiple agencies and
sections working in Afghanistan and provide overarching policy
direction in a whole-of-government approach. It will further facilitate
and enhance the Embassy coordination with the military as security
transition proceeds through its final phase. This new office will also
coordinate oversight and monitoring across the various agencies in
accordance with the aforementioned Embassy-wide policy. While each
agency and section has unique authorities and responsibilities for
oversight of their programs, the Coordination Directorate will ensure
that maximum efficiencies and effectiveness are achieved across the
various programs.
Though the transition processes in Iraq and Afghanistan are
different in a number of significant ways, we agree that there are
lessons to be learned from our experiences during the transition in
Iraq. As such, we have facilitated regular conversations between the
offices covering Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of State and
USAID to identify best practices. For instance, we learned from our
Iraq experience to begin planning early and to establish clear
implementing roles for each agency. As a result we started major
planning for the Afghanistan transition early last year, more than 2
years in advance of the security transition, and we have defined a
clear mission for the Department of State, USAID and the Department of
Defense in the Strategic Partnership Agreement and in policy statements
from President Obama and other administration leadership. We also have
purposefully sought out veterans of the Iraq transition to fill key
positions in the Department and at USAID overseeing the transition
process in Afghanistan. In addition, we have increased collaboration
with the Afghan Government and civil society in the design of our
assistance programs to improve sustainability.
Question. In recent months, the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction has issued a number of troubling reports
about our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Through its audit and
inspection work, SIGAR has identified numerous examples in which the
United States created a program or built a facility without
consideration as to whether the Afghan Government could sustain it.
Which programs and projects funded by the State Department
and USAID are least likely to be sustained by the Afghan
Government?
What steps is your office taking to respond to the many
problems SIGAR has identified and increase oversight
responsibilities of civilian assistance in Afghanistan?
Answer. As we approach the 2014 security transition the emphasis of
all of our civilian assistance programs is shifting toward sustainable
development and away from the construction of infrastructure and quick
impact projects designed to achieve immediate stabilization impacts.
Our goal is to achieve sustainable, positive results in Afghanistan
without disproportionately increasing the future burden on the Afghan
Government. In fact, the majority of Department of State and many USAID
programs are not provided through the government and will not require
any sustainment effort from the government. For example, we are
investing in the empowerment of Afghan women and providing significant
support to the Afghan private sector. Of course, some of our previous
and future investments including work to improve infrastructure,
health, and education services, and other programs will require support
from the Afghan Government in order for the benefits to be sustained.
We work closely with the Afghan Government as programs are designed,
implemented, and completed to ensure the government has the necessary
capacity to maintain these programs, understands the costs associated
with them, and has committed to provide the necessary resources. It is
our goal to ensure that each major investment in civilian assistance is
followed up with the resources necessary to maintain the progress that
U.S. assistance has facilitated over the last decade.
We welcome the role played by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in identifying weaknesses in our
reconstruction programming and the potential for misuse of funds and
offering solutions. We appreciate the insightful recommendations
provided in SIGAR audit reports and in each case seriously review
recommendations and how we can best apply them. We respond to each
SIGAR audit report with specific comments on recommended actions and in
most cases describe how we will or have already implemented
recommendations. Additionally, when SIGAR provides actionable
information, we take action. We share SIGAR's goal of safeguarding U.S.
taxpayer resources from fraud, waste, and abuse, and are committed to
the most effective uses of those resources in advancing our Nation's
national security through assistance programs in Afghanistan.
______
Responses of Special Representative James Dobbins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. On July 9, the Senate unanimously passed S. Res. 151
which urges the Secretary of State to condition financial, logistical,
and political support for Afghanistan's 2014 elections based on the
implementation of reforms in Afghanistan including----
Increased efforts to encourage women's participation in the
electoral process, including provisions to ensure their full
access to and security at polling stations;
The implementation of measures to prevent fraudulent
registration and manipulation of the voting or counting
processes; and,
Prompt passage of legislation through the Parliament of
Afghanistan that codifies the authorities and independence of
the IEC and an independent and impartial election complaints
mechanism.
How would you assess progress on each of these measures?
Answer. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has made a
concerted effort to mainstream its gender strategy in its overall
operational plan for the 2014 elections. For example, in preparation
for the upcoming elections in 2014, the IEC Gender Unit has been
actively involved in ensuring that gender is taken into consideration
in all of IEC's electoral work. Despite challenges concerning the
capacity of the Gender Unit, the IEC has undertaken strategies to
encourage female voters to register, as well as to increase the female
staff at IEC headquarters and provinces to conduct voter registration.
The IEC continues to engage influential leaders, including religious
leaders and women's networks, to create awareness about the importance
of women's participation in the electoral process. The IEC has made
clear that it will develop targeted messages for female voters and that
it will ensure that gender is taken into account in all of its
messaging, in order to promote a gender-sensitive voter education
approach. This is intended to promote inclusiveness and transparency in
the electoral processes, and to safeguard the fundamental right to vote
for all eligible women voters. Similarly, with regards to staffing, the
IEC is putting into place measures to ensure women's active role in the
election administration structures, including: female trainers; female
voter educators; and voter registration and polling staff.
We are working closely with the Afghan authorities to support their
efforts to implement safeguards to prevent fraud, address fraud where
it occurs, and improve people's ability to cast their ballots freely.
The IEC's Operational Plan includes strengthened fraud mitigation
procedures, developed from lessons learned from past electoral cycles.
Some of these procedures, which the IEC is actively implementing,
include: improved monitoring and tracking of ballots and ballot boxes;
transparent vote counting and distribution of preliminary tally sheets
at polling centers, and; double-blind counting procedures.
A credible legal framework will help ensure a good election as well
as the full legal participation of all Afghans. The establishment of an
electoral framework through broad consultation and compromise is
critical. Separate joint committees of the two Houses of Parliament are
currently reconciling competing versions of the IEC Structure Law and
Electoral Law. Parliamentarians are confident that they will be able to
reconcile the laws and pass them for President Karzai's signature
before Parliament's July 23 recess. We look forward to President
Karzai's approval of both laws, and the swift implementation of these
laws. We will continue to support Afghanistan's independent electoral
institutions, civil society, and the people as they prepare for these
elections and take the necessary next steps to advance the electoral
process and ensure independent and credible appointments to the IEC and
Electoral Complaints Commission.
Question. Since the creation of the Special Representative's office
(SRAP), I have been concerned that we have been paying insufficient
attention to India-Pakistan dimensions in the region. Our bureaucracy
has created artificial silos so that the Afghanistan and Pakistan
offices at the State Department and USAID are separated from the rest
of South Asia, even though there are technically bureaucratic linkages
between them (i.e., dual-hatted positions).
What steps will you take to ensure greater coordination and
integration of efforts regarding our Pakistan and India
policies and personnel?
Answer. Our relationships with India and Pakistan are both vital
components of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The President has identified
our relationship with India as one of the defining partnerships for the
21st century, a partnership that is a key to our Rebalance in Asia. Our
relationship with Pakistan is also of prime importance to our efforts
to promote regional stability and economic prosperity. These two
relationships both stand on their own merits, and we seek to ensure
that productive engagements with each country do not come at the
expense of the other. Nevertheless, we also recognize that Pakistan and
India have their own bilateral relationship, and the progress of that
relationship is vital to U.S. interests in the region. We are
encouraged by the positive tone that has emerged in recent months
regarding relations between the two countries, and hope that this
progress continues, including on normalizing trade policies and
economic engagement, security issues, and people-to-people exchanges.
In order to advance our objectives in the region, SRAP works hand-
in-hand with colleagues in the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs (SCA) to shape policy and coordinate messaging. In fact, a
number of these officers have firsthand experience working with or in
both India and Pakistan. We also work closely with our interagency
colleagues, including the Department of Defense, the National Security
Staff, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to ensure a
diversity of viewpoints and analytical techniques enhances our ability
to address regional issues in a holistic manner.
______
Responses of Special Representative James Dobbins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question #1. The Washington Post reported on July 9 that, ``In
northern Afghanistan, the State Department last year abandoned plans to
occupy a large building it had intended to use as a consulate. After
spending more than $80 million and signing a 10-year lease, officials
determined the facility was too vulnerable to attacks.'' The report
also details a $34 million new military headquarters in Afghanistan
that ``commanders in the area, who insisted 3 years ago that they did
not need the building, now are in the process of withdrawing forces and
see no reason to move into the new facility.'' This example, in
addition to the other egregious examples of wasted taxpayer dollars
outlined in the report are unfortunately reminiscent of what we saw
with regard to Iraq reconstruction projects, as well.
a. After commanders in the area said 3 years ago that they
had no interest in the facility, why was construction continued
on it? Who foisted the building on those commanders? What was
the decisionmaking process on this and who was ultimately
responsible for approving construction of the facility?
Answer. This question is not within the purview of the Department
of State. The Department defers to the Department of Defense to
respond.
b. Three years ago when this facility began construction,
discussions about withdrawal from Afghanistan had already begun
inside the administration. What considerations were given to
any potential withdrawal when plans to construct this facility
began?
Answer. This question is not within the purview of the Department
of State. The Department of State defers to the Department of Defense
to respond.
c. How is the State Department using the lessons learned
from Iraq reconstruction to put a better, less expensive foot
forward in post-war Afghanistan?
Answer. The White House has not yet determined the scale and shape
of the post-2014 footprint. However, in developing the possible
options, the State Department has incorporated lessons learned from
Iraq to ensure we leverage existing U.S. Government capabilities where
possible. We have established an Executive Steering Group with the
Department of Defense to coordinate planning efforts, logistics
requirements, and possible solutions for potential areas of concern.
d. Are the Departments of Defense and State collaborating on
the use of existing infrastructure in Afghanistan to minimize
costs going forward?
Answer. Yes, the Department of State and Department of Defense
continue to work closely, including through the colocation of civilian
staff with military forces throughout Afghanistan. Post-2014 plans are
based on military support to the civilian mission, leveraging existing
infrastructure where possible for cost savings, in order to provide
those critical functions or services that civilian agencies cannot
perform themselves.
e. To what degree is the State Department consulting the
Government of Afghanistan over what its infrastructure needs
are and what it can support?
Answer. The State Department has no plans to transfer any of its
existing civilian facilities to the Government of Afghanistan; however,
the United States remains committed to ensuring the Afghans have the
required capacity to properly maintain facilities constructed by U.S.
development programs.
Question #2. The Inspectors General for Reconstruction in Iraq and
Afghanistan, respectively, have identified many projects that spent
millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and yet despite these investments,
the projects have failed or are near failure. In Iraq, for example, a
wastewater treatment plant built in Fallujah ``was constructed at great
cost but to little effect,'' according to the Inspector General,
serving, ``only a fraction of those intended.'' That project cost $99.8
million. In Afghanistan, the Inspector General found that an investment
of $18.5 million by USAID in two hospitals ``may not be the most
economical and practical use of funds,'' because ``USAID did not fully
assess the Ministry of Public Health's ability to operate and maintain
these new facilities once completed.''
a. To what degree is consideration given to the host
country's ability to maintain facilities such as these when the
United States turns them over?
Answer. As Afghanistan becomes more stable, assistance activities
in Afghanistan are shifting from shorter-term stabilization activities
to efforts increasingly focused on systematic, long-term improvements
that are Afghan-led and sustainable. The Department of State and USAID
are committed to ensuring that assistance programs achieve sustainable
results in Afghanistan. Likewise, we share the Afghan Government's goal
of increasing Afghanistan's self reliance and decreasing the country's
dependence on foreign aid. The ability of the recipient government to
maintain U.S. Government-constructed facilities is among the first
questions asked in the program design process and a required discussion
with recipient government counterparts. A number of laws, regulations
and guidance documents require project sustainability be considered
prior to project initiation. The international donor community and the
Afghan Government are taking more concerted steps to build capacity of
the Afghan Government to operate and maintain facilities. This includes
an initiative through the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund to incentivize policy and operational reforms and encourage
increased domestic spending on operations and maintenance (O&M). The
Ministry of Public Health is to be one of the first ministries to
benefit from this program, as it has made substantial progress to meet
O&M demands. This progress includes the development of a norms-based
O&M policy, an asset registry, and demonstrating increased O&M
spending. Although it was not in place at the time these hospitals were
conceived, we use the USAID Administrator's 2011 Sustainability
Guidance as an initial tool to ensure current U.S. Government programs
achieve sustainable results. In fact, the annual foreign operations
appropriation requires that the Secretary of State certify, prior to
the obligation of funding, that funds will be used to support programs
in accordance with the Administrator's Sustainability Guidance. In
addition, section 611 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the
recently enacted section 1273 of the FY 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act require a sustainability assessment and determination
prior to the obligation of foreign assistance funding for
infrastructure projects. As a result of these provisions and in
furtherance of our goal of reducing Afghan reliance on foreign aid, we
have incorporated sustainability into project design processes, and all
major infrastructure projects are now subject to a sustainability
audit.
b. Why didn't USAID fully assess the ability of the
Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health to manage this facility
before it was constructed? Is this typical of the way USAID
manages assistance projects?
Answer. In USAID's response to Audit 13-9 by the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) related to the
construction of health facilities in Afghanistan, we noted our
disagreement with the conclusion that the United States did not
adequately consult with the Afghan Government prior to the construction
of hospitals in Gardez and Khair Kot. The Afghan Ministry of Public
Health was consulted throughout the construction cycle for both
projects and has committed in writing to fund the operation and
maintenance of both facilities after they are completed later this
year. Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Health has made great strides
in recent years in building its management and operational capacity. It
successfully manages thousands of clinics around the country that
provide health services to millions of Afghan citizens. We have no
reason to believe the Ministry will not follow through on its pledge to
manage these facilities and will continue to monitor to ensure Afghan
officials are following through on their commitments.
c. The transition in Afghanistan will be operating during a
time of fiscal austerity in the United States. How do you
anticipate that the declining budgets of State and USAID will
affect these types of projects moving forward?
Answer. Following last year's comprehensive review of the U.S.
assistance portfolio in Afghanistan, it was decided that future
assistance funds would focus more intensively than in the past on
sustainable development, including inclusive economic growth and
ensuring the Afghan Government has the necessary capacity to maintain
the development gains achieved over the last 11 years. Examples of such
programs include helping the National Highway Administration establish
an operations and maintenance division. Health sector programs will
focus on maintaining the current level of nationwide health service
provision and health professional training. No construction of new
health facilities is planned.
d. Will these projects be paid for using overseas
contingency operations funds?
Answer. Per the draft FY 2013 653(a) allocations recently presented
to Congress, all Economic Support Funds (ESF) resources for
Afghanistan, except for programs in the family planning area, will come
from the Overseas Contingency Operations account. Therefore, the
administration will use these funds to support health and all other
development programming. Afghanistan will require international
assistance in the health sector for many years to come and we intend to
continue our support for the health sector.
e. Has there been any effort inside State and USAID to learn
from past mistakes and avoid making them in the future?
Answer. Yes. We are constantly reviewing the results of past and
current projects to derive lessons for our future operations. Every
year we review each of our projects in Afghanistan and produce a report
of performance and results. In addition, we conduct regular portfolio
reviews to ensure our programs are well aligned with our ongoing
mission and with the goals of the Afghan Government. We use the data
from these reviews and reports to evaluate the effectiveness of our
programs and to design better programs in the future. For example,
USAID has put in place a new policy restricting the type of mechanisms
that may be used for construction services to ensure maximum agency
oversight of construction projects as these require a greater level of
scrutiny in challenging security environments.
Question #3. Negotiations are underway for a bilateral security
agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that would provide
immunity for U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan in a post-2014
environment. According to CRS, ``observers report that negotiations
have bogged down over Afghan demands for guarantees that the United
States will adequately fund the ANSF for at least several years after
2014.''
a. What kinds of guarantees is President Karzai looking for
and what does he believe to be ``adequate'' funding for the
ANSF?
b. What is the administration's position on providing
funding for the ANSF and how much of a sticking point will that
be in any ultimate agreement?
Answer. The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is another step in
implementing our pledge to support a long-term partnership with
Afghanistan as outlined in the Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed
in May 2012, and evidenced through our statements at the Chicago NATO
summit in May 2012 and the Tokyo International Conference on
Afghanistan in July 2012. Since the launch of negotiations in November
2012, we have made significant progress on achieving agreement in order
to conclude the BSA. We will not comment publicly with regard to
ongoing negotiations as the positions evolve through discussions. Our
BSA lead negotiator, Ambassador Warlick, has provided regular briefings
to Members of Congress, and has plans to brief the Hill in the coming
days prior to the August recess. I or my team would be happy to provide
a briefing again at any point.
The United States supports the development of the capability and
capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide
security and stability for Afghanistan. The administration has sought
and Congress has provided annual appropriations through the Department
of Defense to support ANSF development. The BSA is expected to be
concluded as an executive agreement. As such, we are not discussing
specific funding commitments as part of the BSA negotiations. Beyond
2014, as agreed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the
administration will seek funds from Congress on a yearly basis--after
discussing needs with the Afghan authorities--in order to support the
agreed upon efforts.
These are not easy issues, but we continue to approach the
negotiation in the spirit of partnership evidenced by our Strategic
Partnership Agreement and our long-term commitment. We are working
closely with the Afghans to develop a BSA that meets the needs of both
our countries and confirms our enduring partnership for security and
defense cooperation.
______
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Peter Lavoy to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
bilateral security agreement
Question. There are two oversight issues that I feel should be
included in the final text of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).
First, U.S. Government personnel need to be allowed to oversee U.S.-
funded programs and projects in Afghanistan and to monitor the use of
direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan Government. If such
provisions are not included, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan will be
subject to significant risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. Second, U.S.
negotiators should incorporate into the BSA a consistent, unified
position on what the U.S. Government deems appropriate taxation of
contractors supporting U.S. Government efforts in Afghanistan. A recent
SIGAR audit report found that, since 2008, the Afghan Ministry of
Finance has levied over $921 million in business taxes, and associated
penalties, on 43 contractors that support U.S. Government efforts in
Afghanistan, even though the contractors should be exempt from most
taxation under U.S. bilateral agreements with the Afghan Government.
Are these oversight provisions being worked into the BSA,
and if not, why not?
Answer. The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) currently under
negotiation with Afghanistan, like the current U.S.-Afghanistan Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA), is an agreement that would provide a
framework for DOD activities in Afghanistan after 2014. It would not
cover the activities of any other U.S. department or agency. The BSA
would preserve DOD's ability to conduct its activities, including
provision and oversight of assistance to Afghanistan, in accordance
with relevant U.S. laws and regulations. DOD remains strongly committed
to its oversight responsibilities in Afghanistan, which include
ensuring that any funds (such as Afghan Security Forces Fund funding)
provided directly to the Government of Afghanistan by DOD are used
appropriately and effectively to advance U.S. national security
objectives.
United States global SOFA policy and practice are to seek and
enforce exemptions from taxation on all DOD activities, including that
no taxes or similar charges be assessed on articles and services
acquired in the host country by or on behalf of United States forces.
This flows directly from the principle that one sovereign nation does
not tax another sovereign nation when partnering for mutual benefit.
The BSA, like the 2003 SOFA, is being negotiated consistent with this
global SOFA policy and practice. Taxation issues related to other U.S.
Government contracts in Afghanistan, such as taxation of contractors
that support activities of the Department of State, are addressed in
other international agreements with the Afghan Government. We firmly
believe that it is important that exemptions available under applicable
international agreements are claimed for the benefit of the U.S.
Government and U.S. taxpayer.
metrics
Question. Even though the administration speaks positively about
the security transition, opinions vary greatly about whether Afghans
are actually safer. I hear from some contacts that security has
deteriorated countrywide, civilian casualty rates are rising, and the
insurgency is spreading.
What metrics is ISAF using to measure if the transition is
really working? Where can the committee find this information?
Is ISAF still collecting statistics on violence rates and
civilian casualties?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) assesses success in
Afghanistan by utilizing data from many sources, including reports from
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S.
intelligence agencies. Contrary to what you have heard, overall
violence is down compared to last year. Civilian casualties have
decreased significantly and insurgent influence over the populated
areas of Afghanistan continues to decline. Our most comprehensive
single metric for violence in Afghanistan is Enemy Initiated Attacks
(EIAs). As of June 30, 2013, EIAs had declined 6 percent when compared
to 2012. Additionally, as of June 30, 2013, improvised explosive device
events were down 10 percent, and suicide attacks were down 23 percent
compared to the previous year.
DOD's comprehensive assessment of the conflict in Afghanistan, the
semiannual report to Congress on ``Progress Toward Security and
Stability in Afghanistan,'' draws from an array of security,
governance, and economic metrics that provide an accurate and
comprehensive picture of the overall situation in Afghanistan. These
metrics include: improvised explosive device events, direct fire
attacks, high-profile attacks, complex attacks, indirect-fire attacks,
civilian casualties, Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capability
ratings, ANSF operational reporting, ANSF facilities construction and
maintenance, ANSF funding, ANSF recruitment, GDP growth rates,
population polling, international community donations to Afghanistan,
Afghan Government budget execution rates, school attendance, economic
infrastructure build, cell phone usage, counternarcotics indicators,
health indicators, and many other metrics and indicators. This report--
released July 30, 2013--is unclassified, publicly available on the
Department's Web site, and has been made available in printed form to
all Members of Congress.
ISAF collects statistics on civilian casualties (CIVCAS), which are
also included in the Department's report on ``Progress Toward Security
and Stability in Afghanistan.'' Between October 1, 2012, and March 31,
2013, CIVCAS from all sources decreased by 11 percent compared to the
same period a year ago. The majority of these CIVCAS were caused by
insurgents. ISAF-caused CIVCAS decreased by 72 percent, the results of
extensive ISAF mitigation actions. There was a 50 percent decrease in
ISAF-caused CIVCAS by precision-guided munitions from October 2012 to
March 2013. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS also decreased by 10 percent.
As our presence in Afghanistan is reduced, our ability to observe
and collect much of these data will also decline.
counternarcotics police of afghanistan
Question. I have serious concerns about U.S. planning for the
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A). While the CNP-A vetted
units have made significant progress, they have had limited success in
breaking the nexus between narcotics and the insurgency. More
troubling, however, are the CNP-A provincial units which seem to lack
any coherent strategy for their development. The Defense Department
(DOD) has been a major funder of the CNP-A, contributing some $40
million a year in operating costs, in addition to transportation,
logistics, and security support from DOD assets. As DOD and State
Department's INL funding dries up, there could be a significant impact
on CNP-A operations, causing manpower reductions and rendering many
operations unsustainable. The U.S. Government needs a coordinated
strategy and approach for the funding and development of the CNP-A,
beyond the vetted units; currently, responsibility is diffuse among
different agencies with no clear chain of command for making policy
decisions. The U.S. Government should assess whether the development of
the CNP-A, particularly the provincial units, is realistic, achievable,
and sustainable before the 2014 transition.
Does the U.S. Government have a coordinated strategy for the
development of the CNP-A provincial units? If so, please share
in detail with the Committee. If not, please justify why we
continue to spend money on CNP-A development.
Answer. DOD acknowledges the critical need to continue developing
the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The U.S. Government
has an interagency-coordinated strategy, approved by senior leadership
in December 2012, to address counternarcotics (CN) issues in
Afghanistan, an approach which includes the CNPA. This strategy calls
for continuing efforts to build the capacity of the CNPA, and proposes
the establishment of a roadmap to create a sustainable and accountable
Afghan-led police force by the end of 2014. The strategy also calls for
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics to develop incentives for provincial
governors to undertake more robust CN initiatives. In addition to these
efforts, DOD is developing a post-2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan and
plans to deliver this strategy to congressional defense committees by
late August 2013.
sigar
Question. In recent months, the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued a number of troubling
reports about our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Through its
audit and inspection work, SIGAR has identified numerous examples in
which the United States created a program or built a facility without
consideration as to whether the Afghan Government could sustain it.
a. Which programs and projects funded by the Defense
Department are least likely to be sustained by the Afghan
Government?
b. What steps is your office taking to respond to the many
problems SIGAR has identified and increase oversight
responsibilities of assistance in Afghanistan?
Answer. Facility maintenance remains a significant challenge for
the ANSF. As more than 3,900 projects come to completion, the ANSF will
need to fully develop its own organic capability to maintain
facilities. Due to the scale of the reconstruction effort and the
diversity of metrics used to determine facility sustainability, the
Department of Defense (DOD) does not maintain a list of at-risk
facilities. However, the United States and its coalition partners
remain committed to ensuring the long-term sustainability of these
facilities by the Afghans.
DOD has expanded its assessments of certain capital projects in
Afghanistan, as required by Section 1273 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, to help ensure that all the
projects we undertake are both needed and sustainable. In addition to
DOD initiatives, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has
focused on building facility stewardship by 2014, and is showing
continual progress in achieving this goal. The general approach to
building facility stewardship capacity is along four lines of effort:
(1) hiring facilities engineers; (2) training facility engineers; (3)
provision of tools and equipment; and (4) delegating appropriate
authorities and developing routine processes so maintenance is
consistently executed to high standards. NTM-A also remains committed
to constant review of ANSF infrastructure projects, to ensure that they
still meet valid requirements. This oversight has resulted in almost
100 projects being cancelled or descoped in size, reducing the total
cost of the ANSF program from the originally planned $11.38 billion to
$9.41 billion.
______
Response of Acting Assistant Secretary Peter Lavoy to Question
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
regional command southwest
Question. On July 10, the Washington Post reported that the U.S.
military spent $34 million building a massive command headquarters for
Regional Command Southwest (RC-Southwest), which was just completed.
Special Inspector General Sopko's report indicates the facility will
never be fully inhabited and will either be demolished or turned over
to the Afghan Government in 2014.
How would you explain to the American people that their
taxpayer dollars were spent on such a project, which will never
serve its intended purpose and may even be demolished within a
year of completion? Will you commit that no further money will
be spent on the construction and outfitting of this facility
until all of the Special Inspector General's questions in his
July 8 letter are answered? Will you commit to making your
response to his letter available to the public?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing
reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable.
Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing
the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to
ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and coalition forces
depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by
the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However,
due to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment,
there have been cases where projects initiated on one set of
assumptions encounter problems when circumstances change.
We have received the SIGAR letter and intend to provide a response
to the points that are raised in it. We cannot comment further on the
specifics at this time, as the matter is currently under investigation
by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
On June 23, 2013, Commander, USFOR-A, opened an investigation under
Army Regulation 15-6 to determine the facts and circumstances that led
to construction of the Command and Control (C2) facility in Regional
Command-Southwest, appointing a major general to lead the
investigation. This investigation is ongoing. No findings have been
approved, and no final determinations have yet been made as to
decisions, communications, or other actions by any particular
individual or organization. However, we are committed to sharing the
results of the investigation when it is completed.
______
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Peter Lavoy to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
washington post
Question. The Washington Post reported on July 9 that, ``In
northern Afghanistan, the State Department last year abandoned plans to
occupy a large building it had intended to use as a consulate. After
spending more than $80 million and signing a 10-year lease, officials
determined the facility was too vulnerable to attacks.'' The report
also details a $34 million new military headquarters in Afghanistan
that ``commanders in the area, who insisted 3 years ago that they did
not need the building, now are in the process of withdrawing forces and
see no reason to move into the new facility.'' This example, in
addition to the other egregious examples of wasted taxpayer dollars
outlined in the report are unfortunately reminiscent of what we saw
with regard to Iraq reconstruction projects, as well.
a. After commanders in the area said 3 years ago that they
had no interest in the facility, why was construction continued
on it? Who foisted the building on those commanders? What was
the decisionmaking process on this and who was ultimately
responsible for approving construction of the facility?
b. Three years ago when this facility began construction,
discussions about withdrawal from Afghanistan had already begun
inside the administration. What considerations were given to
any potential withdrawal when plans to construct this facility
began?
c. How is the State Department using the lessons learned
from Iraq reconstruction to put a better, less expensive foot
forward in post-war Afghanistan?
d. Are the Departments of Defense and State collaborating on
the use of existing infrastructure in Afghanistan to minimize
costs going forward?
e. To what degree is the State Department consulting the
Government of
Afghanistan over what its infrastructure needs are, and what it
can support?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing
reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable.
Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing
the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to
ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and coalition forces
depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by
the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However,
due to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment,
there have been cases where projects initiated on one set of
assumptions encounter problems when circumstances change.
On June 23, 2013, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
opened an investigation under Army Regulation 15-6 to determine the
facts and circumstances that led to construction of the Command and
Control (C2) facility in Regional Command-Southwest (RC-SW), appointing
a major general to lead the investigation. This investigation is
ongoing; no findings have been approved, and no final determinations
have yet been made as to decisions, communications, or other actions by
any particular individual or organization.
The Departments of Defense and State share a strong interest in
ensuring the appropriate use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Our agencies are
institutionalizing the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan (such
as enhanced program oversight, higher contractor performance standards,
and improved management processes) to ensure the highest levels of
interagency communication and collaboration.
For more specific information on the State Department's Mazar-e-
Sharif facility, the Department's consultations with the Government of
Afghanistan on infrastructure needs, or the applicability of lessons
learned from Iraq reconstruction on their efforts in post-war
Afghanistan, we refer you to the Department of State.
projects failed or near failure
Question. The Inspectors General for Reconstruction in Iraq and
Afghanistan, respectively, have identified many projects that spent
millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and yet despite these investments,
the projects have failed or are near failure. In Iraq, for example, a
wastewater treatment plant built in Fallujah ``was constructed at great
cost but to little effect,'' according to the inspector general,
serving, ``only a fraction of those intended.'' That project cost $99.8
million. In Afghanistan, the inspector general found that an investment
of $18.5 million by USAID in two hospitals ``may not be the most
economical and practical use of funds,'' because ``USAID did not fully
assess the Ministry of Public Health's ability to operate and maintain
these new facilities once completed.''
a. To what degree is consideration given to the host
country's ability to maintain facilities such as these when the
United States turns them over?
b. Why didn't USAID fully assess the ability of the
Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health to manage this facility
before it was constructed? Is this typical of the way USAID
manages assistance projects?
c. The transition in Afghanistan will be operating during a
time of fiscal austerity in the United States. How do you
anticipate that the declining budgets of State and USAID will
affect these types of projects moving forward?
d. Will these projects be paid for using overseas
contingency operations funds?
e. Has there been any effort inside State and USAID to learn
from past mistakes and avoid making them in the future?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing
reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable.
Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing
the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to
ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and coalition forces
depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by
the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However,
due to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment,
there have been cases where projects initiated on one set of
assumptions encounter problems when circumstances change.
Sustainability, specifically the ability of the Afghan Government
to maintain completed efforts, has been, and continues to be a factor
in DOD's project selection. DOD has expanded its assessments of certain
capital projects in Afghanistan, as required by Section 1273 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, to ensure that
these projects are both needed and sustainable. In response to your
direct questions regarding USAID, I respectfully defer to my colleagues
from the Department of State and USAID, Ambassador Dobbins.
immunity
Question. Negotiations are underway for a bilateral security
agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that would provide
immunity for U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan in a post-2014
environment. According to CRS, ``observers report that negotiations
have bogged down over Afghan demands for guarantees that the United
States will adequately fund the ANSD for at least several years after
2014.''
a. What kinds of guarantees is President Karzai looking for
and what does he believe to be ``adequate'' funding for the
ANSF?
b. What is the administration's position on providing
funding for the ANSF and how much of a sticking point will that
be in any ultimate agreement?
Answer. Negotiations between the United States and Afghanistan on
the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) are ongoing, and as a result we
will not discuss the negotiating positions of the Afghan Government.
However, the United States remains prepared to negotiate with
Afghanistan to conclude a BSA that supports our shared objectives. On
the question of guarantees, only the Afghans themselves can guarantee
the security of Afghanistan. The United States strongly supports
President Karzai's vision, as stated in his 2009 inaugural speech, of
an Afghanistan able to provide for its own security in 2014 and beyond.
This is the sovereign responsibility of the Afghan Government, and
Afghans will provide for their own defense, with support from the
international community.
The BSA will enable U.S. forces to continue to remain in
Afghanistan after 2014 to carry out a train, advise, and assist mission
and a narrow counterterrorism mission.
We strongly support continued U.S. funding of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) as a wise investment in achieving our objectives
in Afghanistan. A capable, sustainable ANSF is central to our strategic
objective of ensuring Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for
al-Qaeda or its affiliates.