

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN (PART I)

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN (PART I)

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ROYCE. The hearing will come to order.

I will ask all the members to take their seats at this time. Today the committee continues to examine the Obama administration's nuclear diplomacy with Iran as we get set for a congressional review of a possible, and hugely consequential, agreement.

As we speak, U.S. negotiators in Vienna face another deadline. While we don't have an agreement in front of us, we know the troubling outline taking shape. Just a few months ago, 367 Members of Congress signed a letter, Ranking Member Engel and I led stating that any final agreement must last for multiple decades and include full disclosure of Iran's past efforts to build a nuclear weapon, must include a dramatic reduction in the number of centrifuges, and, most importantly, intrusive inspection and verification measures.

A few weeks ago, several of President Obama's former advisers signed an open letter echoing these same concerns and warned that these negotiations may fall short of meeting the administration's own standard of a "good" agreement. Indeed, one witness with us today wrote back when these negotiations began, that a "good enough" agreement would have Iran giving up "all but a minimal enrichment capacity," agree to intrusive inspections, and would be an agreement that could guarantee the reimposition of sanctions.

But that is not even close to where the negotiations are right now. The "most robust and intensive inspections," and this was the original goal, "the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history," has morphed instead into an agreement of what is now discussed as "managed access" with the Iranians having a big say in where international inspectors can go, where international inspectors cannot go. "Managed access" is a big back away from the "anywhere, anytime" terms that the administration once demanded.

But to be clear, under this agreement, Iran doesn't even have to cheat to be a few steps away from the bomb. Iran is not required to dismantle key bomb-making technology; it is permitted a vast

enrichment capacity and it is allowed to continue its research and development to gain an industrialized nuclear program once the agreement begins to expire in as little as 10 years. That is hardly the original concept of “decades” of a long-range agreement. And, frankly, it is hardly “all but minimal enrichment” that was the original goal as well.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities. After Iran’s Supreme Leader called demands to restrict its missile program a “stupid, idiotic expectation,” in his words, U.S. negotiators backed off this key demand. Instead, Iran is still able to “mass produce” its ballistic missiles as the Supreme Leader has ordered. If you will recall his quote at the time, he said it is the responsibility of every military man to figure out how to help mass produce ICBMs. We ought to be concerned, really concerned about that attitude, and some of his additional suggestions about what he would like to do to the United States. One witness told the committee last month that, “no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain” a costly, long-range missile program. Already, U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the entire Middle East. Simply put, countries build ICBMs to have the capability to deliver nukes.

Not to mention that the terrorist state of Iran will be flush with cash. Reportedly, Iran will receive somewhere in the range of \$50 billion under this agreement upfront; \$150 billion over the entire length of the agreement. Now, that would be 25 times the annual budget of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Such a huge amount will breathe life into Iran’s economy, but it will also fund a new generation of terrorism in the region and beyond. We should be worried when Iran announces, as they recently did, that they will help rebuild the tunnels in Gaza, that they will transfer missiles to Hamas, and recently that they will provide 100,000 rockets and missiles for Hezbollah with new technology which will allow precision guidance systems so that those rockets and missiles can hit targets across Israel.

At every step in this process, whether it is enrichment capacity, missile development, or sanctions relief, the Obama administration has discounted the fundamental nature of the regime in Iran. “Death to America” isn’t domestic spin in Iran—it is the regime’s rallying cry. And tomorrow, on Friday, they will once again celebrate Quds Day. Since 1979, since the foundation of the revolution, that is the day they set aside to celebrate for the destruction of Israel.

As one witness concludes, “President Obama is agreeing to dismantle of sanctions regime—permanently. In return, Iran is agreeing to slow the development of its nuclear program—temporarily.” That is a bad deal for us: Permanent concessions in exchange for temporary benefits, and that is only if Iran doesn’t cheat, like North Korea cheated. So Iran is left a few steps away from the bomb and more able to dominate the region. This is my take on this. How does that make us and our allies more secure or conflict less likely? That is the bottom line this committee will continue to look at. Few issues are more important. I now turn to the ranking member for any opening comments that he may have.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank for your calling this hearing. And thank you for your steady leadership as we confront the problems of Iran's nuclear program. To our witnesses, thank you. Welcome. It is important that members hear views from across the spectrum as we play our part and weigh a potential deal.

I have said from day one the devil is in the details. And until I know exactly what is in the deal, it is hard to comment on whether it deserves support or not. I have been troubled as I have said many times on the outset of these negotiations. Firstly, I have been very troubled that Iran was allowed to enrich and spin centrifuges while we are talking. I think it would have been a heck of a lot better if Iran was told if you want to have serious negotiations with us, while we talk, you stop enriching. But that wasn't done. And that is disappointing. I am told that Iran wouldn't agree to it. Well, does that tell you something about their motives at the outset? I am also disturbed that we are talking about Iran's nuclear capability. We are not talking about, as the chairman pointed out, all the destructive roles they play around the world as the world's leading sponsor of terrorism. Somehow or other, we are not really talking about that in these negotiations. We have four Americans in prison there. We had a hearing in this committee not long ago. I don't know, are they in limbo? What is the story? I think it is preposterous that our people are held hostage while we are negotiating with them.

And the rhetoric still continues to come out. Syria, where hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed and maimed, the Iranians prop up the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, you name it, Yemen, they have played negative roles. And so it is very, very troubling. And, again, the devil is in the details. I am glad that the reports are coming out that the administration is digging in its heels. A lot of people said that they would cave at the last minute on some of these issues because they wanted a deal very badly. I think that is being shown that it is not the case, and the Iranians are going to have to make some tough choices or else we are prepared to walk away. I have said from day one that we couldn't want a deal more than the Iranians. If that is the case, then they will just, again, dig in their heels.

And so they need to want a deal, and they need to be ready to make tough concessions. The chairman pointed out some of the troubling aspects of this. There are a few potential implications of a deal I would like to touch on this morning. One of my serious concerns throughout this process is sanctions relief. Even if sanctions relief is gradual and conditioned on Iran's compliance with the deal, easing sanctions will eventually, as the chairman said, translate into a major financial windfall for Iran's leaders. Let's think about what that means.

Even with sanctions in place, even with sanctions in place, Iran is still the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. Even with a crumbling economy, Iran spreads its destabilizing influence in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and among our Gulf allies. Iran's leaders have said they will use sanctions relief to help their people and shore up their economy. I will believe it when I see it. So Congress will need to play a role here. The House has already

passed legislation to curb funding to Hezbollah, which is wreaking havoc in Lebanon and helping Assad cling to power in Syria. I hope the Senate will act on this measure. And however sanctions relief plays out in the Iran deal, Congress needs to make sure that our sanctions against terrorist groups remain robust and effective. That way, no matter what Iran chooses to do with its resources, we will have other measures to keep funding out of terrorist hands.

The other issue I would like to address is how other countries across the region may respond to a deal. Iran is a nuclear threshold state. This leaves our ally Israel in a constant state of insecurity. Israel must always know we will have their back to deal with that challenge. We need to work with the Israelis, take a hard look at any outstanding concerns tied to this deal, and do whatever is necessary to ensure Israel's security.

Likewise, for our friends in the Gulf, a nuclear arms race would create tremendous volatility in the region. Recently at Camp David, the administration heard from our Sunni Gulf allies about their concerns over Iran's behavior. This summit was a good start but more needs to be done. I hope our witnesses can shed some light on what steps might help shore up stability in the region in the wake of a deal. But I think we also have to consider, and I want to raise a question that I have asked again and again: If we don't get a deal, what are the alternatives? At this point, we all know the refrain, no deal is better than a bad deal.

But let's see what the alternative would be. The alternative to a deal would surely mean some kind of military strikes on Iran's nuclear plants and would also involve sanctions. I think when we weigh whatever final deal there is, we have to weigh it with the alternative and see which alternative we like better. There are no good choices. But it is very, very troubling that Iran continues to do what it has been doing and that we hear negative things from the Supreme Leader talking about all kinds of nonsense that we could not accept in any kind of a deal.

So we need to consider where we will find ourselves if these negotiations fail. We cannot accept a bad deal again, but we need to weigh the P5+1 proposal versus the alternatives. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' insights on these issues. And I thank them again for their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

This morning, we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished group of experts. Dr. Michael Doran is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Senior Director at the National Security Council. He is currently a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institution.

Mr. Stephen Rademaker is former Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Department of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Mr. Rademaker is an adviser at the Bipartisan Policy Center and formally served as chief counsel at this committee. And we welcome him back.

Dr. Michael Makovsky also served in the Pentagon where he advised senior officials on defense and energy policy in the Middle

East. He currently heads the Iran Task Force at the Institute for National Security Affairs.

Dr. Ken Pollack is a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. Dr. Pollack served twice on the National Security Council where he focused on Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

Without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements will be made part of the record. And members will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements or questions or extraneous materials for the record.

And, Mr. Doran, please summarize your remarks if you will.

**STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DORAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
HUDSON INSTITUTE**

Mr. DORAN. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss the strategic implications of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. With your permission, I will focus my remarks on the perceptions of America's Middle Eastern allies.

For decades, our partners in the region have been divided among themselves on many consequential issues. But on one point they have all agreed: The importance of the United States as the guarantor of the regional order. They have also traditionally assumed that a primary duty of the guarantor was to orchestrate the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

However, President Obama's pursuit of the nuclear accord has convinced our allies that he has shed that duty. None of them believe that he has any inclination to contain the expansionist Iran. And some of them even fear that he supports Iran's ascendancy.

Of course, the President is well acquainted with these fears. In recent months, therefore, he and his staff have labored intensively to convince the allies that the nuclear accord is, in fact, consistent with their defense needs. The Gulf Cooperation Council Summit at Camp David in May was a prime example of these efforts. Our allies, however, have found the administration's arguments utterly unpersuasive.

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention here to do three things: To sketch some of the key concerns of our allies; to describe some of the arguments that the administration has made to meet those concerns; and then to explain why those arguments fall flat.

Our Middle Eastern allies passed judgment on the Iran deal a long time ago. It is in their eyes a very bad deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been uniquely vocal in expressing his disapproval. But his view is widely shared by his neighbors who, like Netanyahu, feel abandoned and betrayed by the United States. In my written testimony, I go into greater detail about the sources of those feelings. For the purpose of brevity here, suffice it to say that over the course of the nuclear negotiations, the allies have seen U.S. relations with Iran become increasingly friendly. They are certainly disturbed by President Obama's willingness to bless Iran as a nuclear threshold state. But they are equally unnerved by the lack of concern that he has demonstrated as Iran has flexed its muscles in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. When viewed from capitals, such as Riyadh and Jerusalem, it appears that there is a hidden

price to the nuclear deal, a price that will be paid by the allies more than anyone else.

The United States appears to be tacitly recognizing an Iranian sphere of interest in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Indeed, Washington has at times even publicly approved of Iran's expansionism. When, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry characterized Iranian combat sorties in Iraq as "a good thing," his words were greeted with shock and anger throughout the Gulf. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon thus spoke for all of America's allies last week when he lamented that the United States now sees Iran as part of the solution, not the problem.

Of course, President Obama is well aware of the fears that his policies are generating. And he and his advisers have crafted a number of arguments to quell them. These arguments, which my written testimony covers in some detail, all work in support of a simple thesis, that the comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran will not undermine an American commitment to the allies' security. In fact, the administration is now claiming the deal can function as the first step in a new comprehensive regional strategy. The Camp David Summit, so the story goes, laid the groundwork for a new strategic partnership with the GCC states, a partnership that will speed arms transfers and increase cooperation on counterterrorism, ballistic missiles, and a host of other cooperative security ventures.

In truth, America's Gulf allies have no confidence that President Obama will actually deliver on what they consider to be their vital needs. They are intensely aware that his understanding of the phrase "Iran containment" and their understanding of the phrase are entirely different. What they desire from the United States is a policy of rollback, a set of initiatives designed to drive Iran from Syria and Yemen, to challenge Hezbollah's monopoly over politics in Lebanon, and to weaken the role of Shiite militias in Iraq. They want the United States to lead a regional security system that will counter the Revolutionary Guard Corps at its favored game, subversion.

By contrast, President Obama is offering tools and initiatives that will help the GCC states maintain stability at home and mount a collective defense against a conventional attack from Iran. The America approach, in other words, simply does not meet the threat as the allies actually experience it. In their eyes, President Obama is like a doctor who is prescribing heart medicine to a cancer patient.

At the close of the GCC summit, President Obama went out of his way to make sure that his approach to containment would not be misunderstood. I want to be very clear, he said, the purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran.

Our allies got the President's message loud and clear: The United States is out of the business of Iran containment as it has been understood in Washington for the last 36 years.

Unlike the Israelis, our Gulf allies have chosen not to advertise their sense of abandonment and betrayal. Instead, they have chosen simply to go their own way, quietly. For example, Riyadh organized a coalition of Sunni allies that intervened in Yemen in order

to counter the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in that country. But the intervention was also meant to send a message to President Obama: If you won't organize the region to contain Iran, we will.

To drive home the point, the Saudis gave Washington only an hour's notice before their intervention began. The Saudis and their closest allies will remain dedicated to contesting Obama's policies, albeit quietly. And they will continue to fight back against Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

Meanwhile, the Iranians, flush with cash from the nuclear deal, will grow bolder and richer and more prone to intervention. The President's Iran policy, therefore, will deliver disequilibrium to the Middle East, the exact opposite of what the administration is claiming.

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. It is an honor to speak before this committee on such a consequential topic.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:]

Hudson Institute

Prepared statement by
Michael Doran
Senior Fellow
Hudson Institute

Before the
 Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives
Thursday, July 9, 2015

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss the strategic implications of the Obama administration's efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran. With your permission, I will focus my remarks on the perceptions of America's Middle Eastern allies.

For decades, our partners in the region have been divided among themselves on many consequential issues, but on one fundamental point they have all agreed: the importance of the United States as the guarantor of the regional order. For the last thirty-six years, they have also assumed that a primary duty of the guarantor was to orchestrate the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, President Obama's pursuit of the nuclear accord has convinced our allies that he has shed that duty. They believe not only that he has no inclination to contain an expansionist Iran, but even worse, that he might be supportive of Iran's ascendancy.

Of course the president is well acquainted with the sore feelings of the allies. In recent months, therefore, he and his staff have labored intensively to convince them that the nuclear accord is in fact in their interests—the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at Camp David being the prime example of these efforts. Our allies, however, have found the administration's arguments utterly unpersuasive.

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention here to do three things: to sketch some of the key concerns of our allies; to describe some of the arguments that the administration has made to meet those concerns; and then to explain why those arguments fall flat.

While many actors on the American domestic scene are claiming that we can't evaluate the agreement until we see every detail, our Middle Eastern allies passed judgment on it a long time ago. It is, in their eyes, a very bad deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been uniquely vocal in expressing his disapproval, but his view is widely shared by his neighbors, who also feel abandoned and betrayed. One can argue that their feelings are an overreaction, but one cannot deny that they are based on a reading of four very real trends in President Obama's Iran diplomacy. Those trends are as follows.

First, our allies complain about the persistent failure of the United States to stand its ground in the face of Iranian intransigence. At every stage of the negotiations, the Obama administration has retreated: on the number of centrifuges, on the underground bunker at Fordow, on "anytime, anywhere" inspections at military facilities—on all of these issues and many more. For our allies, the American concessions have certainly resulted in a bad agreement, but equally disturbing to them is the spectacle of retreat itself. The sight of a backpedaling America raises fears that the United States will not be there in a pinch. The allies ask themselves, "If the Americans are prepared to whittle away their own demands, how will they behave when one of us gets into a fight with Iran? Will they rush to our side? Or will they whittle us down too?"



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Second, by agreeing from the beginning to insert a “sunset clause” in the nuclear agreement, President Obama has signaled his belief in the inevitable rise of Iran as a nuclear-capable state. This belief, when held by the leader of the world’s only superpower, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. When all is said and done, President Obama is agreeing to dismantle the sanctions regime—permanently. In return, Tehran is agreeing to slow the development of its nuclear program—temporarily. Seeing that the United States has opted to manage Iran’s rise rather than to contain it, many other countries are now jockeying for position so that they, too, can benefit from Iran’s ascendance. From the perspective of our allies, Tehran is growing stronger by the minute, even before the deal has been signed. Much to their disappointment, America is helping Iran gain momentum.

Third, U.S. relations with close allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia have grown increasingly strained over the last year; meanwhile, relations with Iran have become surprisingly friendly. Insisting that the nuclear negotiations are nothing more than an initiative to reach an arms control agreement, the Obama administration denies that it is seeking a broader détente with Tehran. Yet thanks to the nuclear negotiations, the scope of engagement between the two has increased significantly. It has become commonplace to hear of backchannel discussions about problems such as combatting the Islamic State or stabilizing Syria and Yemen. The positive tone that has crept into this engagement unnerves America’s allies. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon spoke for all of them when he recently lamented that the United States sees Iran as part of the solution, not the problem.

Finally, our allies have noted the lack of concern in Washington as Iran has flexed its muscles in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Not only have President Obama and his advisors shown no inclination to impose costs on Iran for this behavior, they have often seemed to welcome Iranian intervention in regional wars. When, for example, Secretary of State John Kerry characterized Iranian combat sorties in Iraq as “a good thing,” his words were greeted with shock and anger throughout the Gulf.

Taken together, these four trends paint a picture that is susceptible to two interpretations. Either President Obama is inaugurating a new friendship with Iran, or he is pulling the United States back from the Middle East while Iran fills the resulting power vacuum. Both interpretations play on the worst fears of allies, regardless of whether we are talking about Saudi Arabia and Israel, who see Iran as an existential threat, or about Turkey and Jordan, who strongly oppose the role that Iran is playing in Iraq and Syria.

Of course President Obama is well aware of the fears that his policies are generating, and he and his advisors have crafted a number of arguments to quell them. These arguments, however, fail to address the primary concerns of the allies.

The president’s best argument is that the deal itself will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon for ten to fifteen years—an advantageous outcome for everyone. The allies, however, do not believe this claim. They supported President Obama’s engagement of Iran when they thought it might force Iran to make a stark choice: either give up your nuclear aspirations, or face economic ruin—or worse. President Obama, however, has allowed the Iranians to avoid making a clear choice. He has agreed to provide Iran with sanctions relief while allowing it to remain a nuclear threshold power. The allies believe, therefore, that the Iranians will pocket the enormous benefits that are frontloaded into the agreement and then, two years from now, they will renew their march toward a bomb. The next president of the United States, the allies believe, will be forced to buy the pony all over again.

President Obama counters such skepticism by claiming that, despite the ambiguity, Iran is indeed making a strategic choice to moderate its behavior. He points to the election of President Hassan Rouhani in June 2013 as the key that opened the door to negotiations. As President Obama put it recently, “I think the election of Rouhani indicated that there was an appetite among the Iranian people

for a rejoining with the international community ... It's not a radical break, but it's one that I think offers us the chance for a different type of relationship, and this nuclear deal, I think, is a potential expression of that."

The allies, however, see the Americans, not the Iranians, as the party that is truly itching for a deal. They believe that President Obama has established a set of perverse incentives that would convince even the most strident of hardliners in Tehran to sit down at the table and agree to temporary restrictions on the nuclear program. For example, the U.S. is effectively paying Iran to negotiate. Since the signing of the interim agreement in November 2013, it has given Iran \$700 million in sanctions relief per month. And it is now enticing the Iranians to seal the deal by offering it a signing bonus of between \$100 and \$150 billion. A readiness to pocket sums of this magnitude, our allies argue, does not indicate that hardliners are going soft.

President Obama responds by saying that, nevertheless, the deal is indeed a poison pill for Iran's hardliners. As the president himself explained, "It is possible that if we sign this nuclear deal, we strengthen the hand of those more moderate forces inside of Iran." Even if the deal seems disadvantageous to the U.S. today, in the long run it will unlock a new relationship. Once international investment begins to flow, and the benefits of cooperation grow tangible, Tehran's hardliners will find themselves enmeshed in a policy of engagement.

Our allies characterize this sort of argument as the worst kind of wishful thinking. Their attitude is much more in tune with Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz who recently asked, "What gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran's domestic course than Vietnam's, Afghanistan's, Iraq's, Syria's, Egypt's or Libya's?" The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, oversees a ruthless security state that has endured countless challenges, including an eight-year war with Iraq and the Green Revolution of 2009. Time after time, it has squelched domestic dissent. It is highly implausible to believe that the flooding of the country with cash will simply wash the regime away.

In fact, our allies say, it makes much greater sense to assume that the nuclear agreement's actual, tangible benefits will immediately prop-up Iran's hardliners. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—which acts as the custodian of the 1979 Revolution, both at home and abroad—commands an economic empire whose tentacles reach into the key sectors of the Iranian economy. It will certainly benefit greatly from the lifting of sanctions and the rush of international investments that will follow a nuclear accord. In fact, it is so deeply entrenched in Iran's economy that it will probably profit more than anyone else from the new era of international investment.

In response to this claim, the Obama administration baldly asserts that Iran's terror machine simply will not benefit from the influx of cash. Colin Kahl, the vice president's national security advisor, recently went so far as to say that the Iranians "are not going to spend the vast majority of the money on guns, most of it will go to butter."

This argument is absurd on its face. Over the course of the last thirty-six years, the Islamic Republic has consistently sacrificed a very significant portion of its potential earnings in order to support its terror machine and build a nuclear program. The butter-not-guns argument asks our allies to believe that Iran will suddenly drop its support for terror even though doing so is not a condition of sanctions relief. The guiding assumption here appears to be that neither Iranian rhetoric nor behavior from 1979 up until yesterday has any connection whatsoever to what Iranian leaders will do tomorrow. Who in their right mind would swallow such an assumption? When, in the course of human history, did getting \$100 billion at the stroke of a pen ever convince anyone that they have been wrong all along?

Perhaps because it recognizes the inherent weakness of this argument, the Obama administration has developed a secondary line of attack. It claims that a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran is

not inconsistent with a policy of countering Iran. In fact, the deal can function as the first step in a new, comprehensive containment strategy. The Camp David summit last month, so the story goes, laid the groundwork for a new strategic partnership with the GCC states—a partnership that will speed arms transfers, and increase cooperation on counter-terrorism, ballistic missile defense, and a host of other cooperative security ventures.

America's Gulf allies have humored President Obama as he has inaugurated a new strategic dialogue, but they have no confidence that he will actually deliver on what they consider to be their vital needs. They are fully aware that his understanding of "Iran containment" and their understanding are entirely different. What they fervently desire from the United States is a policy of rollback—a set of initiatives designed to drive Iran from Syria and Yemen, to challenge Hezbollah's monopoly over politics in Lebanon, and to weaken the role of the Shiite militias in Iraq. They want the United States to lead a regional security system that will counter the IRGC at its favorite game: subversion. By contrast, President Obama is offering tools and initiatives that will help the GCC states maintain stability at home and mount a collective defense against a conventional attack from Iran. The American approach, in other words, simply does not meet the problem as our allies define it. In their eyes, President Obama is like a doctor who is prescribing heart medicine to a patient suffering from cancer.

At the close of the GCC summit, President Obama went out of his way to make sure that his approach to "containment" would not be misunderstood. "I want to be very clear. The purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran." Our allies got the president's message loud and clear: the United States is out of the business of Iran containment as it has been understood in Washington for the last thirty-six years.

Unlike the Israelis, our Gulf allies have chosen not to advertise their sense of abandonment and betrayal. Instead, they have chosen simply to go their own way quietly. For example, Riyadh organized a coalition of Sunni allies and intervened in Yemen in order to counter the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels there. But the intervention was also meant to send a message to President Obama: if you won't organize the region to contain Iran, we will. To drive home the point, the Saudis gave Washington only an hour's notice before commencing the operation.

The Saudis and their closest allies will remain dedicated to contesting Obama's policy, albeit quietly. And they will continue to fight back against Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—not to mention new conflicts that will appear over time. Meanwhile, the Iranians will grow bolder and richer and more prone to intervention. Obama's Iran policy, therefore, will deliver disequilibrium to the Middle East, the exact opposite of what the administration is claiming.

Thank you again for inviting me to testify. It is an honor to speak before this committee on such a consequential topic.

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Rademaker.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER,
FOREIGN POLICY PROJECT ADVISOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY
CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
ARMS CONTROL & BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)**

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Engel, members of the committee.

It is a pleasure to be here again to testify on this issue. And it is a special pleasure for me to be here with Dr. Makovsky, with whom I have worked on this issue on two Iran task forces at this point. We haven't coordinated our testimony, but I am sure I am going to agree with what he says.

I will summarize my testimony. At the moment, we are all focused, because the press is focused, on the remaining issues in disagreement in negotiations. But one of my points is we shouldn't allow that focus on issues like inspections and the possible military dimensions to divert our attention from the more fundamental problems with this agreement, which I think are basically baked in. The first point I make in my testimony is that even if all the issues that are in dispute today, the ones we are reading about in the newspapers, are resolved on favorable terms to the United States, this is still a bad deal. And I would refer you to the testimony I presented previously as to why I think it is a bad deal.

But among all the reasons that I have put forward in the past, the single most important one to my mind is the sunset clause. And the point I have made in the past and I repeat in my testimony today is that if it is dangerous for the United States to face an Iran today that in 2 to 3 months is able to produce a nuclear weapon, if that is dangerous and it is so important to extend that to a 1-year breakout time, that we are prepared to eliminate all the sanctions that we put in place, why isn't it going to be even more dangerous in 10 years for Iran to have a much shorter breakout time with which they will be able to produce a much larger number of nuclear weapons than is the case today?

If 2 to 3 months is dangerous today, isn't it going to be vastly more dangerous to have a breakout time that measures in days or weeks starting 10 years from now? That is fundamentally what this deal provides to Iran. And to me, that is what is most alarming about it.

I spent a lot of time in my testimony focusing on the statement that was put out by the group of bipartisan American diplomats, leaders, and experts at the Washington Institute, a very distinguished group, including some of President Obama's former advisers on the Iran issue, including Howard Berman, the former chairman of this committee. It is a very useful statement, and I expect it will figure importantly in the congressional debate that takes place because of the stature of these individuals. They identify a number of concerns. They make a number of recommendations for modifications to the agreement. I agree with their comments. I hope those modifications are made.

But less noted is the fact that they are also concerned about the sunset clause. They don't use that term, but it is in the statement.

And they come up with what I think is actually a radical solution to the sunset clause problem. And I want to draw your attention to it because I think it speaks to the question of what Congress should do and what situation is this deal putting the United States in and what do we do about it.

I quote the relevant language from their statement, beginning at the bottom of page 2 of my testimony, but what they say is it needs to be U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile material—that is material to produce a nuclear weapon—sufficient material for a single nuclear weapon, both during the agreement and after the agreement expires. So that “after the agreement expires,” they are talking about the sunset clause. We need to make sure they can’t produce enough material for a nuclear weapon either now or after the agreement expires. And they say: The United States must go on record now that it is committed to using all means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. The President should declare this to be U.S. policy, and Congress should formally endorse it.

So they are basically saying you, the Congress, should authorize the use of military force if Iran at any point, either during the agreement or afterwards, produces enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Now, the reason that is a radical proposal is, of course, the proposed agreement, in fact, permits Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Basically what they are saying is if this agreement comes into force, the United States concedes to Iran the right to produce fissile material and lots of it if they decide they need to do that, but we should then bomb them if they exercise this right that we are giving to them. And I think that is a pretty sobering recommendation because this debate is often cast in terms of we either need this deal, or we are going to have to go to war. It is the deal or war. But if you read what all these experts are telling you, they are saying: Well, actually there may be war even if we give them this deal because the deal is going to authorize them or permit them to do things that would require us to use military force in any event.

I mean, these are not random people. These are very serious people, including President Obama’s top advisers. And the point I make at the very end of my testimony is that, as distinguished as these people are, I don’t think that recommendation makes a lot of sense. If we are going to bomb Iran, let’s do it in defense of the existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Let’s not do it in defiance of this agreement that the President is about to sign because this agreement permits Iran to do things that they are saying if Iran does, we need to bomb them. I think we will find ourselves without many friends if we disregard this agreement and then proceed to use military force against Iran.

So that is one of the key points of my testimony. I also do comment on some of these issues in dispute, the possible military dimensions issue, which is a question of the history of the Iranian nuclear program. I think it is very important. Secretary Kerry said we know enough; we don’t need to get into this. I think the International Atomic Energy Agency deserves the support of the United States to get to the bottom of that question. We know how to require countries—we required North Korea to cooperate with the

IAEA. They have never required, they have never conditioned any of the benefits in this agreement on cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. They call for it, but they don't condition anything on it. So that is not serious support to the IAEA in its effort to get to the bottom of the matter.

One of the other issues that has just emerged in the last week is Iran is suddenly saying, contrary to what was in the fact sheet that was released on April 2 that described the proposed deal, that fact sheet said sanctions on ballistic missiles and conventional arms transfers from Iran would be kept in place. The Iranians are now saying they want all those sanctions to be ended. The intelligence community assesses that with foreign assistance, Iran this year could test a ballistic missile capable of striking the United States. Understand that what Iran is saying is they want the prohibitions on receiving that kind of foreign assistance to go away. They are saying: We want to be able to get the foreign assistance we need to be able to produce a ballistic missile to strike the United States this year.

And as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, their whole ballistic missile program makes no sense in the absence of a nuclear weapon. To strike the United States with a conventionally armed ballistic missile makes no sense. With a nuclear weapon, it is a serious threat. And the idea that these two are unrelated is simply illogical. And, in fact, it is part of the possible military dimensions issue that the IAEA wants to dig into. They want to look at the links between the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program. And that is why the United States needs to support them on that issue.

I think I am out of time. So I will end. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER
National Security Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center
Principal, The Podesta Group

“Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran”
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
July 9, 2015

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear again before you to discuss the implications of the emerging nuclear agreement with Iran. At the time I prepared this testimony, no final agreement had yet been announced, though the Administration was working very hard to wrap up the negotiations before a self-imposed deadline of this week.

As you know, I’ve previously appeared twice before you to discuss this issue. In my testimony on June 10, 2014, I focused most importantly on the proposed agreement’s so-called sunset clause, which provides for the expiration of almost all the agreed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program after 10-15 years. My basic point was that *if it is dangerous today for Iran to be able to produce a single nuclear weapon in just two or three months, why won’t it be even more dangerous for them to be able to produce a much larger number of nuclear weapons in a much shorter period of time beginning just ten years from now?*

In my testimony on April 22, 2015, I elaborated on this concern based on the more detailed description of the agreed restrictions contained in the April 2nd State Department fact sheet on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I pointed out that the emerging agreement will represent acceptance by the international community of Iran as a nuclear weapons threshold state. I noted that even President Obama concedes that beginning by about the 13th year of the agreement, Iran’s nuclear weapons breakout time will have “shrunk down almost to zero.” I also emphasized how the sanctions relief outlined in this document—including the so-called “signing bonus” that by itself could make substantially more than \$100 billion in cash available directly to the Iranian government—is unlikely to induce Iran to moderate its behavior. Rather, I predicted that the combination of a radically reduced breakout time and relieved economic pressure on Iran will likely induce some of Iran’s neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, to want to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The upshot is likely to be a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East—something experts have long predicted will occur if Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions are not constrained.

In recent weeks, as the negotiations have come down to the wire, public attention has naturally focused on the remaining issues in dispute. These include, for example, whether international inspectors charged with verifying the agreement will have “anytime, anywhere”

access to relevant sites in Iran, including military facilities. There is also the question whether Iran will be required once and for all to adequately respond to the concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. Additionally, important questions remain about the timing of sanctions relief—whether it will become before or after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the necessary steps to comply with the agreement—and whether the sanctions snapback mechanism will be automatic in the event of Iranian violations, or will be subject to a veto by Russia, China, or some other body. And just within the last few days Iran has injected the additional demand that existing UN prohibitions on the transfer to or from Iran of ballistic missile technology and conventional arms be lifted as part of any nuclear agreement.

These are important issues, and I will address them in a moment. But we should not let any of these issues obscure our attention to the more fundamental defects of the JCPOA, such as the sunset clause, the likely regional implications of the deal, and the threat that a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will pose to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. *Even if all the issues that reportedly remain in dispute are resolved on favorable terms—and it is unlikely that they will be—the agreement in its current form will remain a very bad deal for the United States, for the reasons outlined in my previous testimony.*

What to Do About the Sunset Clause?

Before leaving the issue of the sunset clause, I want to draw your attention to the treatment of the issue in the “Public Statement on U.S. Policy toward the Iran Nuclear Negotiations” issued on June 24th by the “Bipartisan Group of American Diplomats, Legislators, and Experts” convened by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which includes prominent former officials of the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations, as well as the distinguished former chairman of this Committee, Howard Berman.

Because of the prominence of its authors, this statement is sure to figure importantly in the congressional debate over any deal that is reached with Iran. It is a very useful statement that identifies a number of problems with the JCPOA as it currently stands, and describes modifications to the agreement that members of the Bipartisan Group say will be necessary before they can support it. The statement also makes clear that they are deeply troubled by the sunset clause. Interestingly, however, they do not call for the sunset clause to be fundamentally renegotiated in the agreement. Rather, they propose what I regard as an even more radical solution.

Here is what they say on the subject:

Most importantly, it is vital for the United States to affirm that it is U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon—or otherwise acquiring or building one—both during the agreement **and after it expires**. Precisely because Iran will be left as a nuclear threshold state (and has clearly preserved the option

of becoming a nuclear weapon state), the United States must go on record now that it is committed to using all means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. The President should declare this to be U.S. policy and Congress should formally endorse it. (Emphasis added)

This is a breathtaking recommendation when one considers that, *by operation of the sunset clause, the United States will be agreeing in the JCPOA that Iran can produce fissile material (specifically highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium) after 15 years, without any agreed limitation on the amount of such material that Iran may produce or possess.* As a reminder, fissile material is, by definition, nuclear material that can be used to build a nuclear weapon.

According to the State Department's April 2nd fact sheet on the JCPOA, "Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years." Implicit in this statement is that after 15 years Iran will be permitted to enrich to higher levels. There is no suggestion in the fact sheet that there will be any limit on the level to which Iran may enrich after 15 years, or the amount of highly enriched material that it may accumulate. To the contrary, the fact sheet implies that Iran will be free to produce fissile material after 15 years. This is crystal clear from a separate sentence in the fact sheet, which states "Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years." Again, the clear implication is that after 15 years Iran may produce and possess highly enriched uranium, certainly at Fordow, and presumably at other locations as well.

All of us would like to believe that a decision by Iran after 15 years to begin producing lots of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium will universally be seen as clear a decision to begin producing nuclear weapons, thereby justifying the kind of U.S. military action that the Bipartisan Group wants Congress and the President to endorse today. But things are not that simple. The reality is that there are non-weapons related reasons why a country might decide to produce highly enriched uranium, potentially in large quantities. Highly enriched uranium is often used to produce the isotopes used in nuclear medicine, for example. Highly enriched uranium is also used to fuel the nuclear reactors of naval vessels. The American, British and Russian nuclear navies, for example, all run on highly enriched uranium. So all Iran will need to say in 15 years if it begins producing large quantities of highly enriched uranium is that it has decided to build a nuclear navy too.

Will that be a pretext designed to get Iran inches from the goal line in its decades-long quest acquire nuclear weapons? Of course. Will the rest of the international community be prepared to join us in declaring it to be a pretext? Don't count on it. And will Iran be justified as a legal matter in protesting that, by demanding that they not produce such material, we are renegeing on the solemn commitments we made to them under the JCPOA? Sadly, I fear the answer will be yes.

So what does this mean for the recommendation of the Bipartisan Group that, irrespective of the rights we will be conceding to Iran under the JCPOA, we should threaten to use military force if Iran proceeds to exercise some of those rights? I think it means we will be on a very weak legal footing, and probably very much alone, in threatening to use force. It would take a very bold President to actually use military force in such circumstances, meaning that the threat to do so is likely to be seen as a bluff.

It would be far better, in my opinion, not to concede to Iran the right to produce highly enriched uranium after 15 years than to concede that right and then threaten to bomb them if they exercise it. So if the choice before Congress is to approve the JCPOA and also authorize military strikes on Iran if they fully exercise rights the agreement concedes to them, or reject the agreement so long as it concedes such rights, my recommendation would be that you reject the agreement.

The Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) Issue

I have a number of observations about the issues that have emerged as sticking points in the final phases of the negotiation.

With regard to the so-called PMD issue, I disagree with Secretary Kerry's June 16th statement that it is not important for the IAEA to get to the bottom of its suspicions that Iran has, in the past, done research and development work on nuclear weapons. Secretary Kerry stated that the United States has "absolute knowledge" about what Iran has done in this regard, and therefore it is an issue the Obama Administration "is not fixated on."

In fact, this appears to be a bizarre case in which the IAEA's suspicions of Iran run deeper than the officially expressed positions of the U.S. government. To see the difference, one need only compare the findings of the infamous 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran ("We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program") with the findings of the IAEA in its November 2011 safeguards report ("There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing").

Perhaps for this reason, the consistent position of the Obama Administration throughout these negotiations has been that the PMD issue is the IAEA's problem, not America's problem, and it is up to the IAEA to resolve its concerns with Iran. Not surprisingly, without the full diplomatic support of the United States, Iran has successfully stonewalled the IAEA on this issue for years, including throughout the ongoing negotiations.

It is not as if the United States doesn't know how to make the provision of benefits to a nuclear proliferator contingent on fully addressing the concerns of the IAEA. The 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, for example, did precisely that. That agreement specified that key nuclear components to be provided to North Korea pursuant to the agreement would not be

delivered until North Korea had taken “all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA” to answer the IAEA’s questions about the history of North Korea’s nuclear program. At no point in the current negotiations has the delivery of a concrete benefit to Iran been made conditional on Iran satisfying the IAEA on the PMD issue. That is what happens when our government decides that it “is not fixated on” an issue.

Why does the PMD issue matter? Clearly it sends a very dangerous signal to Iran to allow them to get away with stonewalling the IAEA. It would be only natural for them to conclude that future stonewalling on verification of their compliance with the JCPOA ultimately will be tolerated as well. In that sense, looking the other way now on the PMD issue is an inducement to future cheating.

Moreover, getting to the bottom of the PMD issue is key to knowing what Iran’s nuclear breakout time really is. The Administration’s main selling point for the JCPOA is that it will increase Iran’s breakout time from two or three months to one year. But these are merely estimates. The estimates depend on two variables: the rate at which Iran can produce fissile material, and the amount of fissile material they need to produce a bomb. The first of these variables is measurable, and relatively verifiable by the IAEA. Generally speaking, thanks to the IAEA, we know how many centrifuges Iran is operating, what their production rate is, how much enriched material they already have, and therefore how quickly Iran can produce fissile material.

But the amount of material they need for a bomb depends on assumptions about their bomb design. Depending on their design, and the amount of progress they’ve made on warhead miniaturization, the quantity of material they need could vary widely. To say we don’t need to know more about the PMD issue is to say we would prefer to work off of estimates of Iran’s breakout time than hard facts. Loose numbers may make it easier to sell the agreement to Congress, but that is not a sound basis for making decisions about our national security.

Ballistic Missile and Conventional Arms Sanctions

Just in the last few days, it has emerged that Iran is now demanding that in addition to ending the UN Security Council’s existing nuclear-related sanctions, UN sanctions on the transfer to or from Iran of ballistic missile technology and conventional arms must also be ended. It is important to note that this demand is a departure from the agreement with Iran that was announced in April. According to the State Department’s April 2nd fact sheet, the final JCPOA will be endorsed in a new UN Security Council resolution that will lift the UN’s nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The statement clarifies, however, that:

core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions—those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities—will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA . . . Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

In view of this explicit language describing the April agreement, it speaks volumes about Iran's respect for the firmness of the P5+1 that they would now be reopening this issue.

Particularly with regard to Iran's ballistic missile program, it would make more sense in the context of the JCPOA to require Iran to suspend its ballistic missile program than to require us to suspend international restrictions on it. Iran has the most robust ballistic missile program in the Middle East, which it has pursued for years in defiance of UN Security Council demands. Iran is believed to already possess medium range missiles capable of striking Europe. It is to defend against this threat that the Obama Administration is proceeding with the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense in Europe. Iran has successfully launched four satellites in recent years, which involves many of the same technologies required to launch ICBMs capable of hitting the United States. Indeed, the Intelligence Community reportedly assess that Iran could, with foreign assistance, test a missile capable of hitting the United States this year. By demanding that UN restrictions on the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Iran be ended, Iran indisputably is asking that it be made eligible to receive such assistance.

It would, of course, be completely illogical for Iran to attack Europe or the United States with conventionally armed missiles. They simply cannot achieve the accuracy necessary for such missiles to achieve military effect at such ranges. Rather, Iran's ballistic missile programs only make sense as an element of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Armed with nuclear warheads, Iranian ballistic missiles would pose a meaningful threat to our European allies and us. The relationship between Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs is one of the issues the IAEA wishes to explore as part of the PMD issue. The Obama Administration needs to hold firm on this issue in the ongoing negotiations.

The Larger Problem

The fact that Iran would not hesitate to reopen such an important issue at this late stage in the negotiations demonstrates their confidence that they have the upper hand, and their conviction that the Obama Administration needs this deal more than they do. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times commented eloquently on this phenomenon just last week:

it is stunning to me how well the Iranians, sitting alone on their side of the table, have played a weak hand against the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany and Britain on their side of the table. When the time comes, I'm hiring Ali Khamenei to sell my house. . . . for the past year every time there is a sticking point—like whether Iran should have to ship its enriched uranium out of the country or account for its previous nuclear bomb-making activities—it keeps feeling as if it's always our side looking to accommodate Iran's needs. I wish we had walked out just once. When you signal to the guy on the other side of the table that you're not willing to either blow him up or blow him off—to get up and walk away—you reduce yourself to just an equal and get the best bad deal nonviolence can buy.

Consistent with Friedman's observations, I do not believe a good deal can be achieved with Iran until the Obama Administration displays the same tenacity in the negotiations that Iran has displayed. The reality is that Iran needs this deal more than the United States needs it. They are the weaker party and have much more to lose.

The Obama Administration therefore must insist on America's original red lines. And just as the Iranians have not hesitated to reopen issues that were previously agreed on terms disadvantageous to them, the Obama Administration should reopen some issues that were tentatively agreed on terms disadvantageous to us.

Most importantly, the sunset clause needs to be fixed. Iran has agreed to some indefinite restrictions on its nuclear program. According to the April 2nd fact sheet, for example, "Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel." This is an important concession that, if adhered to by Iran, will close off one of two possible pathways to the production of fissile material. As suggested by the Washington Institute's Bipartisan Group, a similar, meaningful restriction of indefinite duration needs to be imposed on Iran's second pathway for producing fissile material—uranium enrichment.

I know some will say that we cannot allow this negotiation to fail, because the only alternative to a deal is military conflict. But as the Bipartisan Group's statement makes clear, there is no reason to assume that a deal will preclude the need use force. And *if the use force were to become necessary—as they say it may—we would certainly be in a stronger position acting in defense of the existing UN Security Council resolutions than in defiance of a badly negotiated JCPOA.*

I thank you for your attention and look forward to your questions.

Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Makovsky.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MAKOVSKY, PH.D., CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, JINSA GERMUNDER CENTER IRAN TASK FORCE

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me this morning to discuss the emerging Iran deal. I also am very honored to be on the panel with Steve Rademaker. We have worked together on Iran, on the task force, since 2007. Based on what we know today, the emerging comprehensive Iran deal is deeply flawed and with historically severe implications for U.S. standing in national security. So I believe every day the deal isn't concluded is a good day.

The Obama administration has four primary arguments on behalf of this emerging deal: First, it will cut off every pathway to a nuclear weapon. But President Obama correctly acknowledged in April that in 10 or 15 years, Iran's "breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero."

The second argument is that it will delay a nuclear Iran for over a decade. Delay is, indeed, strategically very valuable, but only if Iran's nuclear program is truly frozen and Iran contained, which is not the case with this deal.

Third, that a military strike would create a much shorter delay than a deal. But Israeli strikes on Syrian and Iraqi nuclear facilities actually have pushed back their programs for many years and counting. And Israelis believe they could push back Iran's program for at least 3 years. The United States has obviously a lot more capability, and will likely push it back even further, especially with continued vigilance. We can't predict, of course, exactly what a military strike would delay the program. But I think it is safe to say that it would, could dissuade other countries from developing their own nuclear program.

Fourth, the only alternative to this deal is war. That is their fourth argument. President Obama claims that Iran came to the table because of sanctions. Yet he also contends that any further pressure would only cause it to restart its nuclear program, leading to war. In fact, as you all know, Iran has shown itself susceptible to military and economic pressure. And we obviously could do a lot more since we could cut off their oil exports. It wouldn't have any impact on the oil market, with prices having halved in the last year.

However, the administration does not avail itself of these other options; leaving itself only diplomacy without other levers simply becomes pleading. This empty holster, as Tom Friedman recently put it, has made war not the alternative but possibly the consequence of this deal. Let me discuss some of the strategic implications of this deal. Since at least Jimmy Carter was President, America has had three main interests in the Middle East; a secure Israel, a secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, and weakening of Islamic radicalism. These three interests have converged in containing the Islamic Republic of Iran. President Obama came into office seeking to reverse traditional U.S. foreign policy which he deemed wrong, often wrong, counterproductive, and a divergence

from domestic demands. That has led him to reach out and eventually to embrace Iran and align with it at the expense of our traditional allies. Hence, he did not support the 2009 uprising in Tehran and did not support Assad's opponents in Syria. And he didn't implement the 2013 Syrian red line. Yet he did support in 2011 the demonstrations against our allied regimes. He also initiated secret talks with Iran even when Ahmadinejad was President without consulting or informing our allies like the Saudis and the Israelis. As Mike Doran mentioned, he has also increased our alignment with Iran in other parts of the region.

This policy has culminated in what I believe is an overeagerness to accommodate Iran in the nuclear talks despite the fact that Iran, frankly, is a third-rate power. The result is questionable U.S. reliability and questionable American credibility. There are a number of great consequences to this policy. First, some of our Sunni allies will seek to develop nuclear programs or acquire nuclear weapons to ensure security. As Henry Kissinger and George Shultz wrote in April, do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region? The fact is nuclear contagion will regionalize this challenge so that we will no longer just have to monitor what Iran is doing and not doing with its nuclear program, but we will have to also be looking at what the Saudis and other countries in the region are doing with their nuclear program. This will increase the risks, the chances of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, whether through intent or miscalculation. And it could well draw in the United States.

Second, the radicals in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS, and the Muslim Brotherhood, will feel emboldened by this deal and what they perceive as American capitulation. There will also be continued realignment in the region. Other countries will seek closer relations in the region with Russia and China. Other countries, including net oil importers, will seek closer relations with Iranians. Of course, on the positive side, the Israelis and the Arabs, who share a sense of abandonment by the United States, will intensify their quiet collaboration.

Fourth, to counteract all the above, the United States will likely try to contain a nuclear Iran as we did in the Cold War. However, containment is based on deterrence. Deterrence, in turn, demands credibility, of which we will have little on this issue. It requires indefinite, dedicated, and expensive commitment. And it is unclear whether containment even applies and deterrence applies to the Iranian regime.

Fifth, Israel could well feel compelled to strike Iran. In short, rising tension and even war, including nuclear war, could result from this deal and is not its alternative.

In conclusion, as the chairman knows, I wrote a book on Winston Churchill. And he famously said to Neville Chamberlain, who, by the way, was his party leader, as well as the Prime Minister, in 1938 about the Munich Agreement: You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.

This is not to compare leaders or situations to today. But it is to make two points: First that the consequence of this deal will not

be peace but greater tension and the risk of conventional war and even nuclear conflict that can draw in the United States. Second, this issue transcends any administration or party. There could still be hope. But an acceptable diplomatic solution will require fully and truly employing, in President Obama's words of 2009, all elements of American power.

I urge Congress that if this deal is concluded to reject the emerging deal and reinvigorate American leverage and credibility to achieve an acceptable deal and prevent a nuclear Iran at all costs.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]



Michael Makovsky, Ph.D.

Chief Executive Officer of JINSA and its Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy
 Testimony for Hearing, "Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran"
 House Committee on Foreign Relations
 July 9, 2015

Introduction

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me this morning to discuss the emerging deal on Iran's nuclear program and the implications of the Obama Administration's policy.

In April 2011, in the early days of the Arab Awakening, I testified before your Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia that "preventing a nuclear Iran should remain our paramount goal and guide our policies amid the fog of events." I feel that even more so today.

The Iran nuclear talks in Vienna have been extended till tomorrow, July 10, with a chance of further extension. Any day the emerging deal isn't completed is a good day, because I believe it to be deeply flawed, with historically severe implications for American standing and national security. It would align ourselves closer with the Islamic Republic of Iran—the world's chief sponsor of terrorism and a fierce ideologically enemy of the United States and our Arab and Israeli allies – and grant it international legitimacy to become a threshold nuclear power in 10-15 years, even if it observes the deal. Iran would be enriched with tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and increased exports, thereby strengthening its radical regime and supercharging its nefarious activities. The deal would spur and accelerate other regional countries' pursuit of nuclear weapons. This will regionalize the issue, so that in subsequent years we won't only need to assess what Iran is doing in its nuclear program, but we'll also need to monitor what Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and our other traditional regional allies might doing on the nuclear front.

All this will make serious conventional or nuclear military conflict in the Middle East, whether sparked intentionally or through miscalculation, far more likely—unless Israel

or a new U.S. president steps in with military action against Iran's nuclear facilities to stop this nuclear contagion. Either way, war could well be a consequence of this deal, and not the alternative to it.

I urge Members of Congress to reject this deal and restore and reinvigorate American leverage to achieve an acceptable deal to prevent a nuclear Iran and reduce the chances of a nuclear contagion cascade and war.

I will focus my remarks on highlighting fatal flaws of the emerging deal, addressing the Obama Administration's arguments on the deal's behalf, and raising the strategic implications of such a deal being agreed and implemented. My remarks are based on information available as of July 8, when this testimony was submitted.

Deal's Flaws

Mr. Chairman, you and your Committee, as well as the Gemunder Center Iran Task Force at JINSA, of which I am CEO, have raised many of the shortcomings of the prospective agreement being finalized in Vienna. I highlight below a few, but not all, of the pivotal ones.

First, rather than forcing Iran's leaders to choose between guns and butter, it gives them much more of both. Sanctions relief will give Iran tens of billions of dollars from released funds and increased oil exports over the next year, which will strengthen this radical and repressive regime and supercharge its support for Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorism, regional mischief-making, as well as its spending on its own military buildup.

Second, in 10-15 years Iran will be permitted to expand its already robust nuclear program as it wishes. It will legally be treated like Japan.

Third, the deal might provide for greater inspections, but these will not be robust enough to detect or deter Iranian cheating. The deal apparently would at most require

Iran to adhere to the “Additional Protocol,” but no Additional Protocol contains the required “anytime, anywhere” inspections, including access to military sites, which is most likely where Iran would construct a nuclear weapon. Complicating proper and full inspections, Iran hasn’t yet come clean on the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program.

Fourth, even if inspections did detect Iranian violations, there’s serious reason to doubt that the Obama Administration would challenge Tehran over them. The Administration claims Iran has adhered to the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim deal of November 2013, yet Iran has violated it on several occasions. Most recently, Iran has been caught not converting enough enriched fuel to a form that would make it harder to be processed into nuclear weapon. Instead of challenging Iran, the Administration has acted as its defense attorney and attacked the independent American organization that made the finding. A *Washington Post* editorial this week referred to the White House’s “warped” “proclivity to respond to questions about Iran’s performance by attacking those who raise them.”¹

Fifth, and perhaps most puzzling, this deal would not require Iran to comply with legally binding U.N. Security Council resolutions against its ballistic missile programs.

Countering President Obama’s Arguments

The Obama Administration and its supporters have made five basic, somewhat conflicting, arguments on behalf of the deal: 1) it will prevent a nuclear Iran; 2) it will postpone a nuclear Iran; 3) it will set back Iran’s nuclear program longer than would military action; 4) the alternative is U.S. diplomatic isolation and a nuclear Iran; and 5) the alternative is war.

Prevent a Nuclear Iran?

President Obama stated on April 2, 2015, when announcing the Lausanne framework agreement, “This framework would cut off every pathway that Iran could take to develop a nuclear weapon.” Yet, five days later, on April 7, Obama undermined that

¹ *Washington Post*, editorial, “The U.S. response to Iran’s cheating is a worrying omen.” July 7, 2015.

claim when he acknowledged in an NPR interview “in year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point the breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero.”² Still, since then the Administration has insisted that the emerging deal will block all pathways to a nuclear Iran.

Just this week, a *Washington Post* editorial noted, “Iran’s emergence as a threshold nuclear power, with the ability to produce a weapon quickly, will not be prevented; it will be postponed, by 10 to 15 years.”³ Indeed, this trajectory was already spelled out in the November 2013 interim deal: “Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”⁴ The only question was how many years for those restrictions to sunset, even if Iran adheres to a deal. As Obama acknowledged on April 7, it would be only 10-15 years.

Therefore, it does not matter whether Iran has signed onto the Additional Protocol, how often international inspectors visit, or what facilities they have access to, when Iran will have a breakout time that is, in the president’s words, “almost down to zero.” By then, the United States and other countries will not have any time to react to any possible breakout, and Iran will become, with international blessing, a nuclear power.

Postpones a Nuclear Iran?

The more persuasive, yet still flawed, argument of the Administration and other deal supporters is that the deal will delay a nuclear Iran for over a decade.

Delay certainly has real strategic value. If a deal truly froze Iran’s nuclear program without any significant negative consequences, and was conducted within the context of a policy of restricting and containing Iran, which had been our policy the two

² NPR, “Transcript: President Obama’s Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal.” <http://www.npr.org/2015/04/07/397933577/transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview-on-iran-nuclear-deal>

³ *Washington Post*, editorial, “The U.S. response to Iran’s cheating is a worrying omen.” July 7, 2015.

⁴ A public version of the JPA is available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf

decades prior to the JPA, then such a deal could be valuable and welcomed. But that is not this deal.

This deal, instead, seems part of a broader policy to embrace Iran and effectively nourish its regime with tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and rejuvenated trade and exports. The result will not be greater Iranian moderation, as the Administration hopes, but will be a strengthening of its regime internally and a more aggressive posture abroad. A regime guilty of some of the world's worst human rights abuses – jailing political opponents and journalists, executing the most people per capita of any country, denying the Holocaust and threatening to annihilate Israel – and reeling from the pain of tough sanctions, will be taken out of intensive care and made healthy and immune to attack by this deal.

Set Back Iran's Nuclear Program Further than a Military Strike?

President Obama argued on April 2 that a military strike would delay "Iran's program by a few years ... a fraction of the time that this deal will set it back. Meanwhile we'd ensure Iran would race ahead to try and build a bomb."⁵ Such expressions of certainty seem out of place.

Israeli security experts have suggested an Israeli military strike could push back Iran's nuclear program three or so years. U.S. military action, with our greater capability and easier access, would likely push it back further. The brief history of strikes against nuclear facilities suggest the delay could be longer. Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak's reactor in 1981 was intended to set Iraq's program back only 1-3 years, and yet the program had not been completed a decade later by the time of the first Iraq War. (The 1981 attack did drive the Iraqi program underground, and it progressed a great deal by the time of its 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War.) Syria had not reconstituted a nuclear program when its civil war broke out in 2011 – four years after Israel's strike on a suspected reactor in 2007.

⁵ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon," April 2, 2015.

Iran, of course, has a much more extensive and hidden nuclear program than Iraq or Syria did. Still, a U.S. military strike on it could follow the same pattern. It has taken Tehran several decades and tens of billions of dollars to get this far with its nuclear program, and the government might well be reluctant to invest billions and decades more to recreate a program that could be destroyed again in a matter of days. Nuclear scientists – those who survived military action, and prospective new ones – might be reluctant to work in facilities that will be attacked again. This would especially be the case if it was clear U.S. military action wasn't confined to a few days or weeks, but was could be carried out over a period of time necessary to ensure all relevant facilities were disabled or destroyed. Military action would likely also serve as a warning to other countries not to pursue nuclear weapons.⁶

We should be careful in definitively predicting the possible outcomes of military action, recognizing the chances of various consequences. Most likely, military action would set back Iran's program for some significant period of time, and deter other countries from pursuing their own programs. The ultimate solution, though, is regime change.

Alternative is U.S. Diplomatic Isolation and a Nuclear Iran?

President Obama claimed on April 2, "we could pull out of negotiations ... and hope for the best – knowing that every time we have done so, Iran has not capitulated but instead has advanced its program, and that in very short order, the breakout timeline would be eliminated and a nuclear arms race in the region could be triggered because of that uncertainty."⁷

The argument is defeatist, and ignores the importance of U.S. leadership should we choose to exercise it. Indeed, it was the United States that took the lead on passing effective U.N. and unilateral sanctions against Iran, including the banking sanctions devised and passed by this body (which Obama initially opposed). Indeed, an

⁶ For analysis of the benefits and costs of U.S. military action, see: Bipartisan Policy Center, *Meeting the Challenge: Stopping the Clock* (February 2012); Wilson Center *Weighing the Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran* (September 2012).

⁷ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon," April 2, 2015.

inconsistency of President Obama's argument is that in his April 2 speech he also claimed that "sanctions ... did help bring Iran to the negotiating table."

We have far more options for influencing Iranian behavior than the Administration has been willing to exercise. Iran's leaders clearly want sanctions relief, which contributed to their agreeing to restrict elements of the nuclear program under the JPA. Since then oil prices collapsed, and remain about half of where they were a year ago. New sanctions that completely cut off Iranian oil exports would have little impact on the oil market, and could serve to pressure Iran into a better deal (and could boost American energy sector jobs). But tougher sanctions alone will not suffice to get us an acceptable outcome.

Alternative is War?

Nor are economic sanctions the only leverage the Administration has been ignoring. President Obama declared early in his first term that he would use "all elements of American power" to prevent a nuclear Iran, and he has asserted repeatedly that "all options are on the table."⁸ Now the Administration and its supporters claim the alternative is war.

In his second term, the Administration weakened virtually all elements of American power and took off almost all options off the table. It threatened to veto new sanctions, even though sanctions helped bring Iran to the table. It dismissed the military option, even though it was fear of U.S. military action that led Iran in 2003-4 to suspend crucial parts of its nuclear program. It distanced us from our regional allies, even though that has emboldened Tehran. And it has effectively aligned the United States strategically with the Islamic Republic, instead of supporting the internal opposition and confronting the regime and its terrorist proxies in the region. The Administration left itself only diplomacy, which without any credible levers has simply become pleading. And that in turn has only encouraged Iranian intransigence. This "empty holster," as

⁸ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks of President Obama on Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq," February 27, 2009; White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel," March 5, 2012.

Tom Friedman put it last week in the *New York Times*,⁹ has made war not the alternative but possibly the consequence of this deal.

Strategic Implications of a Bad Deal

The strategic implications of how the Obama Administration has handled the Iran talks so far are already significant, and if this emerging deal is concluded that will make the consequences far more damaging to America's national security interests and standing in the world.

President Obama came into office seeking to reverse traditional U.S. foreign policy, which he saw often to be wrong, counterproductive to our interests, and a diversion from tending to needs at home. That led him, in the Middle East, to reach out to and eventually embracing Iran.

Since at least the presidency of Jimmy Carter, administrations from both sides of the aisle have identified and focused on three main U.S. interests in the Middle East: a secure Israel; a secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf; and a weakening of Islamic radicalism. Those interests converged in containing the Islamic Republic of Iran since its inception in 1979. Iran threatens Israel and our Sunni Arab allies, especially those which produce oil, and is a global leader of Islamic radicalism – not only Shia extremism, but Hamas and other radical Sunnis groups as well.

As negotiations for a final nuclear deal have played out, the Obama Administration increasingly has aligned itself with Iran's interests in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. The result has been anger and dismay from our Arab and Israeli allies, who have increasingly questioned U.S. reliability and credibility, especially after we sympathized with the demonstrators and against allied regimes during the early days of the "Arab Spring" (after not supporting the uprising in Iran in 2009) and the non-enforcement of the Syrian red line. After two decades of American presidents, including this president, declaring that Iran needs to dismantle its nuclear program and that the United States will use all means to accomplish this, the Obama Administration initiated the last two-

⁹ Thomas Friedman, "A Good Bad Deal?" *New York Times*, July 1, 2015.

year stage of nuclear talks with Iran without even informing Saudi Arabia, Israel and our other close allies, and currently is advancing a deal to legitimize their arch-rival's nuclear program. The United States has kept them at a distance and not taken seriously enough their grave security concerns, and has been overeager to accommodate Iran, a second- or third-rate power. Our adversaries have observed this as well, which has only emboldened Russian actions in Ukraine and China's in the South China Sea. While the United States still possesses the capability of a superpower, many legitimately question whether we retain the will and credibility of one.

The price to pay for this erosion of credibility and departure from established U.S. policy and interests will be grave. If this deal is completed, it will: guarantee the emergence of Iran as a nuclear power; place Israel in existential danger from Iran and the aggression of its terrorist proxies; set off a proliferation cascade that will raise the potential for conflict in the Persian Gulf, which incidentally act as bullish factor for oil prices; and empower and inspire radical Islamists across the region. With its credibility severely eroded, the United States – even if led by a new, determined president – will have significant difficulty restoring order to the region.

The most immediate consequence of a deal will be a realignment of interests in the region. It widely perceived that we have aligned ourselves with Iran, and our regional allies will continue to seek closer relations with Russia and China and distance themselves from us. Some of our allies in the region and outside it – such as India and South Korea, which are heavily dependent on oil imports – will also seek closer ties with Iran. On the positive side, our Israeli and Arab allies, who share a sense of abandonment by the United States, will intensify their quiet collaboration with one another on regional matters.

But, more consequential, some of our traditional Arab allies will seek other means of ensuring their security, and will develop nuclear programs or acquire nuclear weapons of their own. President Obama recognized with much confidence this consequence in 2012: "It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get

their own nuclear weapons.”¹⁰ But now he dismisses it, stating in May about the Gulf Arabs, “They understand that ultimately their own security and defense is much better served by working with us.” In reality, Riyadh has good reason to question our reliability in defending them, as explained above. Though Obama warned the Saudis, “Their covert – presumably – pursuit of a nuclear program would greatly strain the relationship they’ve got with the United States,”¹¹ it is simply implausible to suggest the United States would punish the Saudis if they develop a nuclear program.

As former U.S. secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Schultz asked in their superb *Wall Street Journal* op-ed on April 8: “Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?”¹² In fact, this nuclear contagion will regionalize the challenge, so that we’ll have to monitor not just what Iran is doing on the nuclear front, but also Saudi Arabia and other countries. This will increase the chances of a nuclear conflict, whether through intent or miscalculation, among the countries that acquire the capability, and could well draw in the United States.

The radicals, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood, to name a few, will feel emboldened by this Iranian victory and what will be perceived as an American capitulation. Hezbollah could effectively become protected by an Iranian nuclear umbrella, severely limiting Israel’s freedom of maneuver in Lebanon and Syria.

In the lead-up to this deal, the United States has already felt compelled to deepen our commitments to our regional allies, perhaps move more troops and other assets to the region, and sell our allies more weaponry. The Obama Administration has already begun taking some of these steps – an interesting twist of fate, since the President entered office determined to reduce our commitments in the Middle East. Nevertheless,

¹⁰ Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,’” *The Atlantic*, March 2, 2012. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/>

¹¹ Jeffrey Goldberg, “‘Look ... It’s My Name on This’: Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal,” *The Atlantic*, May 21, 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/>

¹² Henry Kissinger and George P. Schultz, “The Iran Deal and its Consequences,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 2015.

some have argued that such renewed engagement might allow the United States to contain a nuclear Iran – and the potential cascade of instability in its wake – much like the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

In reality, the challenges would be manifold and intractable, and the costs and risks prohibitive. First, successful containment is premised on deterrence, which in turn demands credibility. The United States by definition would have minimal credibility after having spent years declaring a nuclear Iran was unacceptable. Second, containment is innately reactive – it draws a line in the sand and waits for the adversary to try crossing it. This would allow Iran to try to challenge the United States and its allies over time, by engaging in slightly and steadily more provocative behavior piecemeal. Third, even when successful, containment is an indefinite, long-term obligation, based on a willingness to prevail in a contest of wills over some indeterminate period, and there is little indication so far that we wish to prepared to endure this contest and pay the price in blood and treasure. A final concern is whether the nature of the regime in Tehran – and other regimes or entities that might acquire nuclear weapons – would even render it containable with nuclear capability. To again cite Kissinger and Schultz: “Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of non-state proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?”¹³

Given these challenges and threats, many have assumed that Israel would attack the nuclear facilities of Iran, as it did in Iraq and Syria. Very few now believe Israel will do so. I still believe Israel will, more likely than not, will feel compelled to act militarily – as it will feel no alternative – at the last feasible moment. If Israel doesn’t act, it will suffer a huge blow to its deterrent posture, after decades of warning it would not permit a nuclear Iran, and leave its fate to others.

¹³ Henry Kissinger and George P. Schultz, “The Iran Deal and its Consequences,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 2015.

Conclusion

Winston Churchill famously said in the House of Commons to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain about the Munich agreement in 1938, "You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war." This is not to compare President Obama to Chamberlain, and Iran to the Nazis, but to conclude by stressing two points.

First, that the consequence to this deal, however well-intentioned, would be much greater and longstanding Middle Eastern and global tension and higher risk of conventional war and even nuclear conflict that could draw in the United States. And, second, that this issue transcends any administration or party. It is often forgotten that Churchill was then a Conservative and he was defying his own Conservative Party and party leader in his gutsy stand, which has been celebrated over the decades by American leaders across the political spectrum.

Therefore, I urge an overwhelming bipartisan coalition in Congress to reject the emerging deal if it gets concluded.

If that happens, there could still be hope of an acceptable diplomatic solution, which is what we all seek. It would be predicated on, as JINSA's Gemunder Center Task Force has long argued, Iran believing it stands to lose the most from the failure of negotiations.¹⁴ And it would require fully, and truly, employing, in President Obama's words of 2009, "all elements of American power."

¹⁴JINSA Gemunder Center Iran Task Force, *Principles for Diplomacy with Iran*, October 2013.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Dr. Pollack.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Engel, distinguished members, thank you very much for inviting me to testify before you.

I don't know what the terms of the deal are going to look like. And those terms are important. As a result, I am going to reserve judgment for now on what I think about the actual deal until I have it before me. And although the details of the deal are important, not inconsequential, I think, like many of my panel members, that it is also important that we recognize that the details of the deal are not the only thing that needs to be thought about, that needs to be discussed, that needs to be debated with regard to the deal.

And I fear that we are drowning out other critical aspects of this issue in our fixation with the specific terms of the deal. In particular, we all need to constantly remember that our fears about the Iranian nuclear program are fears about how that program could exacerbate the circumstances in the region itself. Our fear has always been that Iran with nuclear weapons or even a threshold capability would be encouraged and enabled to act more aggressively in the region. In other words, any nuclear agreement with Iran needs to be seen as a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. It needs to be seen as a part of a wider American strategy toward the region. And we need to consider that entire strategy, not just the specific terms of the deal.

Obviously, the terms of the deal will be important in deciding how we should shape our strategy moving forward and in the context of a region changed by whatever happens in that deal. But we need to also recognize that our policies beyond the deal itself will have an equal if not greater impact on what happens in the region as a result of that deal.

Whatever it does to the Iranian nuclear program or doesn't do to the Iranian nuclear program, the deal can either hurt or help regional stability. But, again, it is only part of that puzzle. Another, potentially much bigger piece of that, is the question of what the United States does to prepare the groundwork once we have the deal in place. There is a great question mark out there that none of us can answer as to how Iran will behave in the aftermath of a deal. Will they become more aggressive, less aggressive, stay the same? All this matters a great deal. Proponents of the deal make the case that it may be possible after a deal for President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif, who clearly would like a better relationship with the rest of the world and the United States, to forge some kind of a rapprochement building on the political capital that they will accrue from a successful deal. That is a plausible scenario.

Unfortunately, an equally plausible scenario is one in which the Supreme Leader decides that he has got to either throw a sop to his hardliners or else demonstrate to his own constituency that he

has not abandoned Khomeini ideology and so becomes more aggressive to demonstrate that he has not lost his revolutionary mojo.

From my perspective, I think that, at least in the short term, it is most likely that Iran's behavior toward the region is going to remain basically the same. I think that over the last 4 years, Iran has put in place a series of policies toward the different countries and problems of the region that suit its interests, its politics, and its capabilities. I don't think that any of those policies were predicated on what did or didn't happen with the nuclear negotiations. And for that reason, I don't see a successful nuclear deal of any kind as fundamentally changing Iran's approach to any of those things. And, unfortunately, Iran's broad policy toward the Middle East is inimical to American interests. It is inimical because the Iranians define it as being inimical to our interests. And more than that, it is destabilizing in a number of very important places, although not all, in the Middle East.

As we are all well aware, and as my copanelists have described, many of our allies in the region, led by the Gulf Cooperation states, are very concerned about how Iran will behave after a deal. They fear that the Iranians will be more emboldened, will be more aggressive. They also fear how the United States will behave after a deal. They are deeply concerned, as Dr. Doran has eloquently pointed out on many occasions, that the United States is going to use a nuclear deal with Iran as a "get out of the Middle East free" card, that we will take the deal, announce that we have solved the greatest problem in the Middle East and walk away.

And the great danger is that what we have seen is that when our allies, particularly when the GCC feels frightened, when they feel that they cannot rely on us, their default option is not to accommodate Iran, as many people fear; it is, instead, to get in Iran's face and push back as hard as they can. And the problem there is that the GCC lacks the political and military capacity to do so. And it runs the risk of overstressing its own political and military capabilities with potentially dire repercussions for their own internal stability.

The Yemen war, the recent GCC intervention in Yemen, I think is an eloquent case in point there. It is unprecedented. We have never seen the GCC undertake so massive a unilateral military intervention. It is also incredibly dangerous. They don't know what they are doing. They don't have a plan. They don't know how to get out. They can't do a surge in Iraq, even though they have got themselves stuck in Yemen, exactly the way the United States had gotten itself stuck in Iraq back in 2005, 2006. And that is a very real problem, not just for them but for us.

As my copanelists have pointed out, they are not assuaged by the Camp David Summit or by the administration's statements. The administration continues to plead that they have not disengaged from the region and do not plan to further disengage. But here I have to agree with my GCC colleagues that me thinks the administration doth protest too much, to paraphrase Shakespeare. The administration said it would disengage from the region. It did do so. And it has only partially reengaged when circumstances forced it to do so. And it is now trying to do the minimal possible to sort out the situation.

I am concerned that in the wake of a deal, it is going to require a major American effort to convince the region that we are not walking away, to push back on the Iranians, to let them know that they will not have a free hand in the region, and to reassure our allies so that they do not feel that they need to take on the Iranians themselves in ways that they are simply incapable of doing so. Once again, I see ourselves faced with choosing among the least bad option. And I am reminded that it seems to me that, once again, the Middle East is teaching us the lesson, that whenever we try to minimize our commitments there, the problems of the region simply get worse. And they force us eventually to come back and do more than we had ever intended. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]

Testimony of
Kenneth M. Pollack
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Regional Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
The United States Senate

July 9, 2015

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Representatives, I am honored to be able to appear before you to discuss the implications of a possible nuclear agreement with Iran.

Obviously, at this moment in time, we do not have a nuclear deal and while it seems more likely than not that we will have one at some point this summer, it is certainly not a sure thing. Moreover, with any such agreement, the devil will be in the proverbial details and we simply do not know how such an agreement will treat key details such as the access rights of inspectors, the lifting of sanctions, and the process of reapplying sanctions (or other punitive action) if Iran is caught cheating on the terms of an accord. All of this makes me very wary of commenting on the advantages or disadvantages of a deal where so many key uncertainties remain.

More than that, I believe that the terms of such a deal are of less importance to America's national interests than how the nations of the Middle East respond to it. Since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran, I have believed that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, concluded that he did not need an actual nuclear arsenal because he calculated that there was little likelihood of either an American or Israeli attack and perhaps that Iran was far enough along toward being able to build a nuclear weapon as it needed to be given that threat environment. I also believe that Rouhani's election convinced him that relieving the pressure of the sanctions on Iran's economy was a higher priority than making further progress toward fielding a nuclear arsenal—so long as Iran did not have to give up its nuclear capability entirely and forever in return for the lifting of sanctions. Based on this analysis, I suspect that the Iranian government does not intend to cheat on any nuclear agreement or to use it as a cover to covertly acquire nuclear weapons as North Korea did, at least not for now or for the foreseeable future.

Consequently, I plan to focus my remarks primarily on the regional impact of an Iranian nuclear agreement, both because I see that as the issue where such a deal could have the greatest impact on American interests, and where its developments could ultimately shape the implementation of the deal—including Iran's willingness to abide by its terms.

Even here, the real questions are not those about regional proliferation which has dominated discussion of this matter to date, but about the civil and proxy wars currently roiling the Middle East, and the likely role of the United States in the region after a nuclear accord with Iran. It is

those issues that are likely to determine whether a nuclear deal with Iran leads to greater stability or greater instability in the Middle East, and thus whether it ultimately benefits or undermines American national security.

Iran

It is important to begin any assessment of regional dynamics in the wake of an Iranian nuclear agreement by asking how Iran itself is likely to behave. As always, we need to be very humble about our ability to predict Iran's future behavior. Iran has an opaque and convoluted political system, riven by factions and presided over by a Supreme Leader who has often made decisions by not making decisions or by splitting the Solomonic baby. Indeed, it seems most likely that following any nuclear deal there will be a debate in Tehran over Iranian foreign policy (as there always is) with moderates and reformists arguing for Iran to use the deal as the start of a larger process of re-opening to the world and even rapprochement with the United States, while various hardliners and conservatives argue that a deal makes such moves unnecessary and that instead Iran can and must redouble its efforts to export Khomeini's revolution and drive the U.S. and its allies out of the Middle East altogether.

Based on his various statements over the years, it seems most likely that Khamene'i's perspective on a nuclear deal is purely transactional. If he ultimately agrees to one, it seems likely that it will be solely to get the sanctions removed. Nothing more and nothing less. It seems unlikely he will countenance a wider rapprochement with the United States—whatever Foreign Minister Zarif and possibly President Rouhani may want.

Iran has always seemed to fashion discrete policies toward different states of the region. In each case, it has a certain set of interests in a country and engages in a policy debate over how to act toward that country—in which Iran's complicated domestic politics interact with various strategic perspectives to produce a policy toward that country. Right now, Iran probably has a Syria policy based on its interests and its politics as they relate to Syria. It appears to have an Iraq policy based on its interests and its politics as they relate to Iraq. And the same for Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc. Neither those interests nor those politics appear likely to change much, if at all, as a result of the nuclear deal. Instead, Iranian actions toward all of those places seem precisely calibrated to what Iran is trying to achieve there, and that is unlikely to be affected by the nuclear deal one way or the other.

It is also worth noting that, across the region, the Iranians seem pretty comfortable with the status quo. Their Shi'a allies are dominant in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. In Syria, the Asad regime is embattled and has suffered some setbacks, but it remains in power and Iran continues to commit its own resources and the troops of its Iraqi and Hizballah allies shore up the Alawi position there. Most reports indicate that the Iranians exert far greater control over Asad's rump Syrian state than they ever have in the past, Iran may feel its position has improved in Damascus, even if Damascus's control over Syria has taken a beating. Tehran may also feel it could be doing better in Bahrain, but of the countries in play in the region, that's the only one Iran cares about where Tehran may not believe it is "winning." So there is no particular reason to believe that Iran is looking to increase its aggressive involvement in any of these states but has been somehow constrained from doing so by the nuclear negotiations.

Moreover, while it is impossible to prove, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Khamene'i and the Iranian establishment believe they have far more at stake in Iraq and possibly Lebanon than they do in a nuclear deal. They have poured resources into Iraq over the years, which is deeply bound up with Iranian society economically, socially and politically—as well as having constituted a dire security threat in the past. Likewise, Iran's alliance with Hizballah is part of the bedrock of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, and brings Iran a coveted role in the events of the Levant. Because of Syria's relationship to both Iraq and Lebanon, it too might be more important to Tehran than a nuclear deal if the Iranian leadership were ever forced to choose between the two. The point I am making here is simply that I cannot see Iran changing its policy in any of these countries because of a nuclear deal because I don't think that Iran values a nuclear deal as much as it does its positions in these various countries.

In short, all other things being equal, it seems unlikely that Iranian policy toward the region will change merely as a result of a nuclear agreement with the P-5+1.

But all other things may not prove equal. It may be that Khamene'i will feel that a nuclear deal is a major concession to Rouhani and the Iranian Left, and so he may feel the need to demonstrate to the hardliners of the Iranian Right that a nuclear deal does not mean that Tehran has abandoned Khomeini's ideology by giving up its enmity with the United States. If that is the case, Iran may ratchet up some of its anti-status quo activities in certain selected venues.

- Israel is the obvious case in point: Iran may try to convince Hizballah, Hamas, PIJ and others to mount attacks on Israel. That's almost a "freebie" for Iran. Israel is unlikely to retaliate directly against Iran, everyone will know that Tehran is behind the attacks, and since the Netanyahu government has managed to isolate Israel in ways that the Palestinians never could, Tehran will be playing to a popular cause. The problem here is that Iran may not be able to pull the trigger on such a campaign. Hizballah and Hamas are both extremely wary of picking a fight with Israel, as demonstrated by the fact that neither has done so in the face of multiple Israeli provocations. The events of the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war has estranged Hamas from Iran, and tied Hizballah down in intense combat such that neither may be willing to heed a hypothetical Iranian call for new attacks on Israel. For their part, PIJ and other Palestinian proxy groups are weaker than in the past, and may have a hard time penetrating Israel's ever more sophisticated defenses.
- Bahrain is another possibility. Because Bahrain is a majority Shi'a state, whose people have been disenfranchised and oppressed by the regime—and their Saudi allies—it is another arena where Iran may be able to burnish its revolutionary credentials in a relatively popular international cause. But here too, there are limits. Some Bahraini Shi'a clearly accept aid from Iran, but the majority appear to prefer not to. They recognize that the more that they can be dismissed as Iranian agents the harder it is for them to get international pressure on the regime to reform. In addition, Bahrain is a very sensitive issue for the Saudis, and the Iranians have to worry that if they press on Bahrain, the Saudis might push back somewhere else where they are more vulnerable.

- A last possibility is Yemen. Iran has few direct stakes in Yemen and their nominal allies, the Houthis, are dominant at the moment. So Iran has little to lose there and a powerful (relatively) ally. But once again, Iran's ties to the Houthis have been exaggerated, and it is another very sensitive spot for the Saudis.

Consequently, it may prove difficult for Iran to make much mischief in any of these arenas—more difficult than it may be worth for them.

As this analysis suggests, I believe that Iran's most likely course after a nuclear agreement will be to continue to pursue the same regional strategy it has pursued over the past three years. That strategy is inimical to the interests of the United States and its allies in many ways. However, there is a much greater danger: the danger that Iran will interpret American behavior after a nuclear agreement as a sign of further disengagement from the Middle East. If that is the case, it is highly likely that Iranian goals will become more expansive and its policy more aggressive as it believes that the U.S. will not be as willing (or able) to block Iranian moves. Thus, the most important variable in Iranian regional behavior after a deal may well prove to be the U.S. reaction, rather than anything derived from Iranian strategy or politics itself.

Israel

Let me now turn to the question of likely Israeli responses to a nuclear deal. I think it important to address the elephant in the living room first: it is highly unlikely that Israel will mount a military attack against Iran after a nuclear deal has been struck between Iran and the P-5+1. (Or in the run up to one). As I have laid out in greater detail elsewhere, Israel does not have a good military option against Iran for both military-technical and political reasons.¹ That's why Israel has uncharacteristically abstained from a strike, despite repeated threats to do so since the late 1990s.

In this case, the political circumstances would be even worse. Consider the context: Iran will have just signed a deal with the United States and the other great powers agreeing to limits on its nuclear program, accepting more intrusive inspections than in the past, and reaffirming that it will not try to build a nuclear weapon. If the Israelis were to attack at that point, an already anti-Israeli international climate would almost certainly turn wholeheartedly against them.

That question is of more than academic interest to the Israelis. If Israel attacks Iran, there is a very real risk that Iran would respond by withdrawing from the deal, withdrawing from the NPT, evicting the inspectors and announcing that it will acquire nuclear weapons since its own conventional forces and the word of the international community were clearly inadequate to deter an unprovoked Israeli attack. The Iranians will doubtless also demand an end to the sanctions (and/or the imposition of sanctions on Israel), and if that is not forthcoming will set about busting the sanctions. And the problem for the Israelis is that in those circumstances, with the entire world furious at them for committing aggression and destroying a deal that most will see as having been the best way to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, there is likely to be very little will to preserve the sanctions on Iran. It's hard to imagine a scenario in which Iran has a better chance to break out of the sanctions cage than this one.

¹ See in particular, Kenneth M. Pollack, *Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2013), esp. pp. 183-223.

Thus, an Israeli military strike in these circumstances would be unlikely to help prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and regaining its freedom of maneuver. It is more likely to ensure an Iranian nuclear weapon and jeopardize the international containment of Iran.

While this set of problems makes an Israeli military response unlikely, that doesn't mean that Jerusalem will just roll over and accept the deal. First, I suspect that the Israelis will ramp up their covert campaign against Iran and its nuclear program. More Iranian scientists may get mysteriously assassinated in Tehran. More sensitive Iranian facilities might blow up. More computer viruses might plague Iranian networks. More money might find its way to Iranian democracy activists and ethnic minorities. Of course, even then, the Israelis may show some restraint: the Iranians are believed to have greatly improved their own cyberwar capabilities, and even a right-wing Israeli government might not want to provoke a harsh Iranian response that affected Israel's civilian economy.

Second, I think it pretty much a foregone conclusion that the Israelis will also seek greatly expanded U.S. aid in response to a nuclear deal with Iran. In particular, it will look to improve its capability to strike Iranian targets, to defeat retaliatory missile and rocket attacks by Iran or its allies, and to ensure that Israel has a secure second-strike capability. More F-35s, greater funding for Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile and Iron Dome anti-rocket systems, more capable bunker-busting munitions—these all seem like certain Israeli requests. But Jerusalem may well ask for other weapons and capabilities previously denied it, both because it may feel a strategic need for such enhanced capabilities and because it may believe that the U.S. will be more willing to provide them to secure Jerusalem's (grudging) acquiescence to the deal.

Finally, a nuclear deal with Iran could push Israel to become more aggressive in its own neighborhood—or to take advantage of the situation to do so. The Israelis will doubtless argue that the deal has made them feel less safe, and therefore less willing to take risks on other security matters, particularly developments with the Palestinians, but potentially in Syria and Lebanon as well. (The Israelis are very comfortable with the Egyptian and Jordanian governments and are unlikely to take actions that would undermine them or diminish their cooperation with Israel.) For instance, in the wake of a nuclear deal, Israel may look to smash Hezbollah and/or Hamas in Gaza again to convince them not to mount new attacks against Israel once their old Iranian allies (a strained relationship in the case of Hamas) begin coming out from under the sanctions and possibly flexing their muscles across the region.

It is worth noting that some Israelis may favor such actions out of a genuine belief that this is what is necessary to guarantee their security after what they will likely consider an imperfect Iran deal. Others may do so cynically, using their well-known unhappiness with a deal to justify doing a bunch of things that they believe that the U.S. and international communities would be loath to condone otherwise.

Saudi Arabia

Especially in light of these assessments of likely Iranian and Israeli behavior after a nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia is the real wild card we must consider. The Saudis aren't exactly fans of a nuclear deal with Iran. And certainly, Saudi Arabia is the most likely candidate to acquire nuclear

weapons if Iran were to do so.² In private, Saudi officials have repeatedly warned American officials (including this author) that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, Saudi Arabia will follow suit—and nothing will stop them—because they will not live in a world where Iran has a nuclear weapon and they do not. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi Intelligence Chief, has gone so far as to repeat that warning in public.³ For instance, in 2011, Turki commented that, “It is in our interest that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for its doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose foreign relations are now so fully measured and well assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.”⁴

Yet the Saudis are often far more subtle and creative than others give them credit for. Even if Iran were to acquire an actual weapon or a near-term breakout capability, the Saudis might not simply take the obvious path forward and buy a nuclear weapon itself. There are many ways that the Saudis could take actions that would create ambiguity and make Iran (and others) wonder whether the Saudis had acquired a nuclear capability without declaring that the Kingdom had joined the nuclear club. Riyadh could build a nuclear plant of its own and begin to enrich uranium, perhaps even hiring large numbers of Pakistanis and other foreigners to do so very quickly, in almost exactly the same manner that the Iranians have proceeded. A favorite Israeli scenario is that one day, satellite imagery of Saudi Arabia suddenly reveals the presence of a half-dozen nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16s at a Saudi air base. Pakistan has long contributed military support, equipment and even whole formations to Saudi defense, so this would not be anything extraordinary. Everyone would wonder whether the F-16s had brought nuclear weapons with them and the Saudis could studiously avoid answering the question. The Iranians, and the whole world, would not know. There would be no proof that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon and therefore no particular basis to impose sanctions on Riyadh. Yet overnight, the Iranians would have to calculate that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon, but it would be very difficult for anyone to punish the Saudis because there would be no evidence that they had.

But all of that lies in the realm of hypotheticals inappropriate to the current context. If Iran signs a nuclear agreement, it will be publicly pledging not to acquire a nuclear weapon—and it will have the entire international community (except Israel) giving them the benefit of the doubt. In that context, we should *not* expect the Saudis to acquire a nuclear weapon of their own in response.

The Saudis have had good reasons for not acquiring one all of these years (and the Paks good reasons for not giving it to them). More than that, the optics would be all wrong for the Saudis. Iran will have just signed a deal with the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia and China agreeing never to build a nuclear weapon and accepting limits on its enrichment program to reassure the world that it won't/can't get a nuclear weapon. In that context, if Saudi Arabia goes out and buys a bomb from the Pakistanis, suddenly both Riyadh and Islamabad will become the international pariahs. All of the sympathy will swing to Iran, which will be seen as having behaved well, whereas there will be worldwide demands to sanction the Saudis (and Paks) for

² For a concurring Israeli assessment, see Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, “A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?” *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October 2012), pp. 7-12.

³ “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race,” *The New York Times*, December 6, 2011.

⁴ Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests ‘Squeezing’ Iran over Nuclear Ambitions,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 2011.

doing exactly what Iran had agreed not to. None of this makes sense for the Saudis and probably explains at least part of why Islamabad is already distancing itself from Riyadh on military matters.

That said, the Saudis may react in other ways. First, we should expect that soon after a nuclear deal with Iran, the Saudis will announce that they are going to build-up a nuclear program of their own to whatever levels Iran is allowed. So if, for instance, Iran is allowed to keep 6,500 first-generation centrifuges and 150 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent purity, then the Saudis are likely to announce that they will acquire 6,500 first-generation centrifuges and 150 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent purity. Doing so would be an important warning both to the Iranians (that the Saudis will match their nuclear capabilities at every step) and to the West (that they will have further proliferation in the Middle East if they do not force Iran to live up to its new commitments).

Second, the Saudis may choose to ramp up their support to various Sunni groups fighting Iran's allies and proxies around the region. The Saudis seem to agree with the Iranians that Tehran is "winning" in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Syria is a more uncertain affair, but Iran's allies are hardly defeated there and Iran is amping up its support for them. And the Saudis also seem to believe that Iran is making important inroads in Oman and with various Shi'a communities elsewhere in the Gulf. So while the Iranians may want to hold to a steady course, the Saudis may choose to double down, and they may choose to do so after a nuclear deal both to signal to the Iranians that they should not take advantage of it to inflict more damage on the "Sunni" side.

Unfortunately, there is a greater danger still. The Saudis and their Sunni Arab allies may fear that the U.S. intends to use a nuclear deal with Iran as a "Get Out of the Middle East Free" card. The Gulf states are convinced that is the Obama Administration's intent. Across the board in private, Gulf officials damn the Administration for its weak response to Iran, brought to a head at the May 2015 summit at Camp David, where they claim that the United States offered nothing new as reassurance that Washington would push back on Iran. The danger here is that, far from accommodating Tehran as some have feared, the Gulf states are far more likely to get in Tehran's face to try to deter the Iranians. The GCC air campaign in Yemen is a perfect example of this. It represents a stunning departure from past GCC practice—they never intervened directly with their own armed forces against another state, except behind a massive American force as in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91.

The ultimate problem is that the Gulf states are not strong enough to take on Iran alone, and if they act provocatively toward Iran, even if intended to deter Iranian aggression, they could easily provoke just such aggression and/or overstretch their own limited capabilities with potentially dire consequences for their own political stability. If the U.S. is not there to reassure the Gulf states and deter Iran, things could get very ugly.

The American Role

Inevitably with any question related to the geo-politics of the Middle East, the question eventually turns to the United States. The preceding analysis all points to the centrality of the American response to a nuclear agreement with Iran as potentially determining whether such a deal is beneficial or detrimental to regional stability, and thus to American interests themselves.

As always, the United States is master of its own fate to a much greater extent than any country on earth, even in the turbulent and unpredictable Middle East.

Two points seem to stand out to me from the preceding analysis and the modern history of the region. The first is that while Iranian strategy is anti-American, anti-status quo, anti-Semitic, aggressive and expansionist, it is not reckless and typically quite wary of American power. When the U.S. exerts itself, the Iranians typically retreat. The exception that proves the rule was in Iraq in 2007, when initially the Iranians did not back down from their support to various anti-American Iraqi militias, only to have those militias crushed and driven from Iraq particularly during Operation Charge of the Knights and subsequent Iraqi-American campaigns along the lower Tigris. As we see in Iraq today, the Iranians apparently recognize that they misjudged both America's will and its capacity to act then, and are once again content to battle Washington for political influence in Baghdad, but unwilling to challenge U.S. power militarily, even by proxy.

The second is the other side of the coin from the first. In the absence of American engagement, leadership and military involvement, the GCC states (led, as always, by the Saudis) become frightened and their tendency is to lash out and overextend themselves. Again, the unprecedented GCC air campaign in Yemen is a striking example of this. As the Gulf Arabs see it, they have never seen the United States so disengaged from the region—at least not in 35 years—and so they feel that they have had to take equally exceptional action to make up for it. I continue to see the GCC intervention in Yemen as a wholly unnecessary and unhelpful move, a rash decision meant to check what the GCC sees as a looming Iranian "conquest" of Yemen. In private, GCC officials make no bones in saying that they felt compelled to do so because the United States was embracing Iran rather than deterring or defeating it. While all of that is a set of overstatements and exaggerations, it drives home the point that in the absence of a strong American role in pushing back on Iran, the GCC's default mode is to attack on their own, and that only makes the situation worse, not better.

So, what the Obama Administration offered the Gulf states at Camp David failed to allay their fears or reassure them that the United States was ready to help them address their security concerns. That too is understandable: Washington did not offer a new defense pact or even an explicit nuclear umbrella—just more of the same. Some new weapons. Some new training. Nothing categorically different that was really likely to convince the Gulf states that the United States was making a qualitatively different commitment to Gulf security to ensure the region that a nuclear deal with Iran would not mean American abandonment of the region, let alone a shift toward Iran.

In truth, there is only one way that the United States is going to reassure the Gulf States that it does share their interests and is not going to leave the field open to the Iranians. Not coincidentally, it may be the only way to demonstrate to the Iranians that the U.S. is not abandoning the region—or too fearful of jeopardizing the nuclear agreement to block Iran's continued aggressive activities around the Middle East. Indeed, it is probably what will prove necessary to force Iran to abandon its aggressively opportunistic regional policy. And that, is to pick a place and take the Iranians on.

Here there are three possibilities, but ultimately only one conclusion. Yemen is the wrong place for the United States to confront Iran. Yemen is simply not consequential enough to justify making any American investment there; in fact, Washington should be doing everything it can to help the Saudis and the GCC end their own intervention in Yemen, not reinforcing it. Iraq is also the wrong choice. The Iranians are too strong in Iraq now, Iraq is too important to Iran, the Iraqis have a chance of solving their problems and regaining stability, but theirs is a fragile polity, one that probably could not survive a U.S.-Iranian war on their territory. Both we and the Iranians need the Iraqis to sort out their problems, and Iraq will probably need both of our help to do so. Thus, Iraq is also the wrong place at the wrong time.

That leaves Syria. If the U.S. is going to push back on Iran in the aftermath of a nuclear deal, to demonstrate to both Tehran and our regional allies that we are not abandoning the field and allowing (or enabling) the Iranians to make greater gains, Syria is unquestionably the place to do it. Iran's allies in Syria have been considerably weakened in recent months. Our Arab allies are eager to have the U.S. take the lead there, and President Obama has committed the U.S. to just such a course, even if his actions have fallen woefully short of his rhetoric. This is not the place to describe how the United States might mount such an effort, not the likelihood that it would succeed if the U.S. were willing to commit the necessary resources (which would likely include a heavier air campaign but not ground combat troops).⁵ It is simply to point out that in the aftermath of an Iranian nuclear deal, finally executing the Administration's proclaimed strategy for Syria, may be the best and only way to regain control over the dangerous confrontation escalating between Iran and America's Arab allies.

⁵ For the fullest explanation of the Administration's Syria strategy, see the testimony by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2014. A transcript is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/transcript-dempsey-testifies-to-the-senate-armed-services-committee-on-the-islamic-state/2014/09/16/a65b6aca-3da3-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html. For an outside assessment along similar lines, see Kenneth M. Pollack, "An Army to Defeat Assad: How to Turn Syria's Opposition Into a Real Fighting Force," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp. 110-124.

Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Pollack, your commentary there is interesting to me because there is this phenomenon, this morning the New York Times discusses it, the increasing strident nature of the regime against the United States.

I will just read the story from the New York Times:

“The chants of ‘Death to America’ and the burning of American flags on the streets are as familiar a part of life here as air pollution and traffic jams. With the United States and Iran on the verge of a potentially historic nuclear accord, there has been a distinct change in tone, however. The anti-Americanism is getting even more strident. The rising levels of vitriol have been on display this week in the buildup to the annual anti-Israel extravaganza coming this Friday.”

So the other part of this is that as we reach out to extend that “olive branch,” to quote the Secretary of State’s words, you have this reaction in Iran where the Ayatollah speaks even more fervently of the requirement, you know, to develop, to “mass produce,” in his words, ICBMs. And this is the aspect of this where I think we are a little disconnected from the reality of the way in which that system works and the individual who makes the decisions over there.

As a matter of fact, Rouhani today is meeting with Putin in Moscow. And what is the Russian demand? And this caught us by surprise this week, the demand from Iran now that we lift the arms embargo. And, of course, they will be getting this huge tranche—I have called it a signing bonus, but they will be getting this cash on the barrel head. And I think Russia is very, very interested in that because you see the stories in the last few weeks about the Russians selling weapons systems to Iran, including, you know, surface-to-air, which, frankly, would allow them maybe to cheat with impunity if they put up a vast enough system across Iran. Now, here is the new demand: Lift the arms embargo.

Dr. Pollack, your thoughts on that.

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with you. I saw Tom Erdbrink’s piece this morning as well. And I think that it does speak to exactly the issue that I have been concerned about for quite some time, which is we don’t know how the Iranians are going to react to their own deal. As I suggested, while I think it is clear that President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif would like to move in the direction of accommodation, there are forces pushing in the opposite direction. And what we have seen for the Ayatollah himself is he is deeply suspicious of the United States. And he may very well decide that he needs to tack back to the right to accommodate his hardliners. Because he just gave this big bone to Rouhani and the moderates in signing the agreement itself. I think this is a very real concern.

Chairman ROYCE. The only caveat I would make is when we are talking about Zarif, remember, we are talking about a man who placed a wreath on the grave of the individual who carried out or masterminded the attack on the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. He may seem moderate compared to the Ayatollah. But in terms of what he has called for and his past history running the security state and the torture and execution of people as a con-

sequence puts it in a little bit different perspective in terms of the background of some of these individuals.

But I wanted to ask Mr. Rademaker, as you note in your testimony, Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. So implicit in that statement is that after 15 years, Iran is going to be permitted to enrich to higher levels. There is no suggestion that there will be any limit on the level to which Iran may enrich after 10 or 15 years or the amount of highly enriched material that it may accumulate. So let us say Iran begins to enrich uranium very close to bomb-grade levels after the sunset, and they say it is to operate a submarine program. What is the world's response to that? I mean, do I understand correctly the way this is teed up here?

Mr. RADEMAKER. You are clearly grasping the point I made in my testimony, which is this agreement will concede to Iran the right after 15 years to produce highly enriched uranium, bomb-grade material, without any limitation on the amount of that material they may accumulate. Now, ordinarily, you would think if somebody is producing bomb-grade material in amounts in excess of what you need to build one or two or three nuclear bombs, that they must be on track to build a nuclear bomb.

But there are peaceful explanations one could put forward. One such explanation would be if they were to say, for example, we want to build a nuclear navy because, hey, you Americans, you have a nuclear navy and you use highly enriched uranium to fuel the nuclear reactors in your submarines; that is what we are doing. Now, if Iranians say that, are the people in this room going to believe them? Are we going to think that that is really what they are doing? Or are we going to suspect that what they are really doing is accumulating the material so that they can breakout overnight with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons. Personally, I am going to think it is a pretext.

But your question, Mr. Chairman, is, what is the rest of the world going to think.

Chairman ROYCE. Well, the other point I would make—

Mr. RADEMAKER. And, you know, I think a lot of the rest of the world is going to be prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt. And they will point to this agreement and say: Hey, you Americans, too late for you to object; you signed off on this.

Chairman ROYCE. Well, even the North Korean agreement did not have a sunset.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Correct.

Chairman ROYCE. Now, it had the loopholes in it because we couldn't go "anytime, anywhere," you know, anyplace with the international inspectors. It was only a matter of time before North Korea would figure out a way to cheat on that agreement and get a bomb. But at least it didn't have a sunset. That is the aspect of this I don't understand.

And the last point I would just ask Dr. Doran, you know, the administration says that they don't see, they are going to spend the vast majority of the money when we lift the sanctions, most of it is going to go to butter not to guns. However, the statement I saw was the statement by Iran that they were going to help—this was in *The Wall Street Journal*—that Iran was going to help rebuild

the tunnels—Mr. Engel and I were in one of those tunnels; there are 35 tunnels; they are expensive to build—for Hamas, you know, under Israel and that they were going to supply missiles to replace the inventory that were fired off by Hamas and then, the added story the next day, that they were also going to fund precision-guided rockets and missiles, 100,000 of them, to Hezbollah. That takes a little bit of cash to do that. How do we know that it is all going to butter and not to guns? I would just ask, Dr. Doran, what is your calculus on that?

Mr. DORAN. I think to believe this claim that it is going to go to butter and not guns is to discount everything that the Iranians have said and done over the last 36 years. And I can't think of any other endeavor of human prediction where we would say everything they did until yesterday has no relevance to what we think they are going to do, they are going to do tomorrow.

In addition to the concerns that you raise, personally, I am also very concerned about the ability of the Iranians to prop up the Assad regime. It wasn't that long ago that we thought the Assad regime might be toppled. And the greatest factor that changed the balance of power on the ground in favor of the Assad regime or that gave it a new lease on life was the Iranian intervention, direct intervention from Iranians themselves and also the sending of Iraqi militias trained in Iran.

Chairman ROYCE. I am glad you brought up that point because not only was the Assad regime on the ropes, but the Iranian regime was on the ropes. And Mr. Engel and I had legislation based on some of the work of Stuart Levey over at Treasury, to give the Aya-tollah an actual choice between economic collapse or real compromise on his nuclear program. It passed out of here unanimously in this committee, passed the floor 400 to 20. One of the reasons Iran is a little bit back in the game is because we partially lifted those sanctions. The suggestion in the House was that we double down and give us some real leverage in this negotiation. And the administration made the decision to sit on that legislation or at least, you know, orchestrated in the Senate the inability to bring that to the floor. And I think we lost a lot of leverage out of that.

My time has expired. I need to go to Mr. Engel. Thank you.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you on the panel for your good testimony.

Look, I have a lot of difficulty with some of these deals, these negotiations, as you do. But I think that, at this point, we are almost at the midnight hour, so to speak, we have to look at the choices that we have. The way I see it right now is that we have a choice to accept—Congress does—and support a deal that the administration negotiates, or we don't. And if we don't, then we need to look at the alternatives.

I share all of your concerns. There isn't anything that anybody has said that I really disagree with. I think it is a problem. But I do think that the alternative, as I mentioned before, would simply be, as the chairman and I have long felt, more sanctions on Iran but also an attack on their nuclear plant.

Now, if there is no deal, how long would the current sanctions regime hold? We are told time and time again that if there is no deal and the perception is that the United States walked away,

that the rest of the international community would abandon the sanctions, even including our allies, like the U.K. and France and countries that have been most supportive of us. So if we are unable to sustain the sanctions regime and have a bombing of their plant which sets them back 2 years or 3 years or whatever it is, is that really a viable alternative? Anybody care to answer?

Dr. Makovsky?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Engel.

I think when we think about the alternatives, again, as I mentioned, I think that we have to weigh, there is no good alternative here for sure. I just think that the alternative of this deal, the consequences of the deal are much worse than the consequences of no deal right now. And I would think about it in those terms.

For instance, as I said, I think one of the biggest problems with this deal is that the other countries in the region will pursue nuclear weapons. The Saudis have said that. President Obama said it only in 2012. He said it with great certainty. And then I think you really have a problem. And then this problem is not just about Iran, but it is about the region.

We don't really want the Saudis to get nuclear weapons. And we don't want other countries to. Then the region becomes a lot more dangerous. So even if the alternative to this deal is a military action—I don't think it has to be. I think we could boost our leverage as you indicated. But I think you could argue that even if there was a military strike, which we all hope it doesn't come to that, the consequence of that would be a lot less than what could be a nuclear contagion in the region and really, really serious conflict involving nuclear power.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, the point I am making is, while we all find aspects of these negotiations that we don't like—and I have been saying mine for over a year—it is not just accepting this deal or nothing. There are things that we are going to have to come to grips with. And I believe one of them is bombing the nuclear reactor.

The Europeans are seeking further economic ties with Iran. The Russians and Chinese are preparing to give up on the arms embargo and ballistic missile sanctions, as pointed out. Those are sanctions that are outside of the scope of the negotiations, clearly.

So to me, it says about the viability of sanctions enforcement, if a deal fails, we can see it eroding.

Let me also make another point. We have a Presidential election next year. One of the things that is always pointed out is that a new President is not necessarily bound by all the constraints of a deal that an administration negotiates. If the new President elected in 2016 feels that the Iranians are backtracking or not doing what they should be doing, then that President can move in a different direction.

One of the things that really disturbs me about this whole thing, and there are plenty of criticisms you can level at the administration or the President or the negotiations or whatever, but I want to go back to 2007, because I think there is blame here on a bipartisan basis, quite frankly. In 2007, when President Bush was President, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran told us that Iran had abandoned making weapons, and we all thought there would be some kind of strike.

We are in this position right now because 10 years ago, 8 years ago, 6 years ago, 12 years ago, when we had the ability to really destroy Iran's nuclear capability, we didn't do it. And so we waited till 1 minute to 12, and now it is an impossible situation, because they are almost at the breakout point.

Why didn't we move sooner? Why didn't we move during the Bush administration when we thought they were going to do something? Why didn't we move when Iran wasn't spinning centrifuges, and didn't have the sophisticated centrifuges? What do you think?

I just think it shows a failure all the way around the political spectrum, not one party, everybody, that we failed to grasp the fact that this regime, the dangerous regime, poses a threat to us and our allies, and there is plenty of blame to go around all the way.

Mr. Rademaker.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I guess the principle observation I would make in response to that last question is the military option didn't look any better in 2006 or 2007 than it does today.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, it looks better because they weren't as sophisticated. They didn't have all the centrifuges. It would have been easier to take out their nuclear capability way back when because it was a lot smaller.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, it has always been the same problem. You can destroy physical things that are on the ground, but you can't destroy technology. And they have the technology, they have the blueprints, they can replace—

Mr. ENGEL. That is true, and that is always pointed out by the administration when they tell us, well, you can't destroy technology. But I am saying it was a lot easier years ago when it was much smaller and easier to destroy than it is now. I mean, when Israel struck at Iraq, Iraq never recovered because their program was very, very small. The Iranian program was, obviously, much smaller 10 years ago, 6 years ago, than it is now.

Mr. RADEMAKER. The ability to reconstitute was always there. I think we could destroy what is on the ground today, but we understand that if we go down that road, we are going to have to come back every year or 2.

Mr. ENGEL. I think their program is much more sophisticated in terms of being buried under mountains and things like that, and wasn't necessarily the case 10 years ago.

Dr. Doran.

Mr. DORAN. I was in the Bush White House in 2007. And I agree with you that there is blame to go around. But I would like to share with you some of the thinking at the time, what we thought we were doing.

We looked at it as a disaster if the President got to a point where he was faced with the stark choice of either bombing Iran or Iran getting a bomb. And we were trying to create a third option, which was, I would say, coercive diplomacy. And it was with those thoughts in mind that we constructed, on the back of Stuart Levy's insights, the sanctions regime.

And I think that strategy came to fruition in 2012, 2013, especially with the central bank sanctions, which really did start to bite, and you started to see very severe concern in Iran about this. And, unfortunately, President Obama didn't have a coercive diplo-

macy approach to the question. And as Chairman Royce mentioned, when the regime was actually on the ropes, we let them up and made a massive concession to them in the form of a deal that included this sunset clause.

With the sunset clause, we have sent the world a message that we are no longer containing Iran, we are now managing its rise. And that has given rise to this—the rush that we see among the Europeans to go to prioritize their economic relations with Iran over the security concerns of the rest of us, that has actually been encouraged by the President's diplomacy.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I have been—and I am going to end, Mr. Chairman, because I am way over—but, look, I have been as critical as many of you about a lot of this stuff. But we were told that the Bush administration would never leave office and allow Iran's capability, nuclear capability, to continue unfettered, and that is actually what happened.

So I am just pointing out, plenty of blame to go around. I think this has been a failure, frankly, in American policy going back a couple of decades.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for excellent testimony.

The only good deal is one in which Iran ceases all enrichment and dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. That is the best way, the only way to ensure that Iran won't be able to create a nuclear weapon, ever. If a deal is signed based on this framework agreement, that means it allows Iran to keep in place every key element of its nuclear infrastructure, preserve its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and keep its equipment and research and development program.

Not only is this agreement, from what we know, a significant step back from what the U.N. Security Council and world powers were demanding from Iran just a few years ago—do we remember that, do we remember those resolutions?—but it is also significantly weaker than even what the President stated emphatically were his lines and his demands, just 1½ years ago. And I have his quotes here if we don't remember.

We don't know much about Iran's possible military dimension. That is frightening. And what about the Parchin military facility, which was the center of Iran's weaponization and military program? We need answers on that. But it is clear that the administration is willing to let that fly.

The Supreme Leader and his puppet Rouhani, because Rouhani will only do what the Supreme Leader says, they are saying that Iran will only sign the nuclear deal if sanctions are lifted the same day. What has the administration offered in terms of sanctions relief and at what scale? We hear a lot of talk about a signing bonus, as if it is the NFL draft, of \$50 billion before Iran even has to comply with anything. This is beyond irresponsible and incomprehensible.

And can the agreement be verified? In a word, no. The Iranian regime still controls access to its sites, and we know how good they have been on dodging, on stalling, on misleading, and blocking, and there is no reason to believe that they are going to change. Iran has said it won't allow inspections on its military sites. So guess what will be happening in its military sites?

This whole deal is a fanciful notion and is really a disaster waiting to happen for our national security, for our allies in the regions. And the sad reality is that the only way we are likely to not get this deal is if the Iranians can't take yes for an answer.

Similar to the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Israelis were offering them in many of these peace talks everything to the Palestinians. The Palestinians walked away from the deal. We are better off for it. The only way we are not going to get this deal if the Iranians walk away. Everything about this deal is my most serious concern.

I wanted to ask you in the little time I have remaining about breakout capability. Certainly, 1 year isn't sufficient. We have had many experts tell us it is nearly impossible to even tell when the clock begins, and even when it does, it is next to impossible for the administration to verify that Iran has started breaking out and then send it up to the U.N. Security Council to have that body act. Like most everything else related to this deal, it is just a pipe dream.

Is 10 years enough? And what can you tell us about the about the breakout capability that we are looking at?

Mr. Rademaker.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you. And nice to see you again, Congresswoman.

I have focused a lot of my criticism on the sunset clause, because it does essentially give them a radically enhanced breakout capability upon the expiration of the agreement. Even President Obama has conceded this. I quoted his statement where he said by the 13th year of the agreement their breakout time will have—and this is President Obama—it will have “shrunk down almost to zero.” That is the President. That is the best he can say about his own agreement.

The agreement does include an indefinite prohibition, a nonsunsetted prohibition on reprocessing. There are two ways that a country can get fissile material for a nuclear weapon, they can reprocess spent nuclear fuel, and that gets to plutonium, or it can enrich uranium. So they have agreed permanently not to reprocess. And that is a very useful, that is an important concession. And that one is not sunsetted. But on the enrichment side, which is the other pathway to fissile material, it sunsets beginning after 10 years.

And what is interesting to me is the Iranians have not hesitated to reopen issues in this negotiation. They did it just this week on the conventional arms embargo and the U.N. sanctions on ballistic missile transfers. That was something that was previously agreed, and they have just reopened it and said: No, actually, we don't like the deal we struck a few months ago, we want to renegotiate that.

I don't know why the U.S. side isn't equally tenacious in these negotiations. Why doesn't our team say: You know, this sunset

clause, we have looked at it, it is a problem for us, we need to renegotiate that. The Iranians are doing that today on the arms embargo. Why can't our negotiators do the same?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am having a subcommittee hearing with Mr. Deutch about the GCC countries and their reaction to a nuclear deal, and several of you were bringing that out. Are they going to let Tehran keep its nuclear infrastructure and offer billions of dollars of sanctions relief and they will do nothing? Of course, that is not going to be true. So we worry about their reaction to that, and they no longer think that we have their back.

But thank you. My time is up.

And I would like to recognize Ms. Robin Kelly of Illinois.

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

America's national security is an issue that those of us trusted by the public to serve in Congress must and do take seriously. It is going to take all of us on both sides. But I am going to be positive and think that we will get to a deal that most of us can support. I wanted to look forward.

Saudi Arabia has said that they want the same capabilities as Iran if a deal is reached. Jordan and Egypt have hinted the same as well. Some have cited these examples as the beginning of a nuclear arms race. How serious do you think the regional actors are in pursuing their own nuclear programs? And it is open to all of you.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Congresswoman, I think, as I said, we have to take that extremely seriously. If you were them and your patron, the United States, conducted these negotiations initially without even informing them and has shown a shift toward your arch-enemy, the Iranians, I think you wouldn't feel that comfortable. And therefore I think it would be perfectly natural for these countries to pursue that.

And I will add, it also complicates the issue of the military action and what we do, because, again, going forward, if that is the case, what you said, Congresswoman, this issue then regionalizes. It is no longer about just a nuclear Iran. It is about what these other countries are doing.

And we have to make sure we act, whatever way it is, to prevent this sort of genie spreading and getting out. Because once it gets out and a lot of countries have it, as George Shultz and Henry Kissinger raise, as I mentioned, how do you put together a policy that actually manages that? And I don't think you can, is the answer.

Ms. KELLY. Thank you.

Mr. POLLACK. Congresswoman, let me start by disagreeing with Mike, but I am going to come around and agree with him at the end, if you will follow me.

I think that the threat of proliferation is a very serious one, but we shouldn't necessarily assume that it is also an uncontrollable one. We all remember President Kennedy predicting that there would be 25 nuclear powers by 2000. We are still at nine and counting.

Historically, far fewer countries have actually pursued a nuclear weapon to its finish and acquired the arsenal than have started down that road. Far more stopped along the way. And we have a great deal of historical evidence indicating that there are all kinds

of different factors which caused these countries to stop, despite the fact that in many cases they do have compelling strategic reasons to acquire them.

My favorite example is Egypt. I always point out to people, you may remember it, although you may be a little too young for this, Tom Lehrer, his great song, right, "Who's Next?" Right? Talking about nuclear proliferation. One of his lines was that Egypt wants a bomb just to drop on you know who.

In the 1960s it was so axiomatic that Egypt was going to acquire a nuclear weapon that Tom Lehrer put it into a humorous folk song. They never got it. And that, again, is the history of this.

Where I want to agree with Mike is that he is absolutely right to focus on the critical variable. The reason that states stop is because they have compelling rationales not to, and because typically someone else, almost always the United States, removes the strategic threats. We step in, whether it be with South Korea or Taiwan or Australia, pick your favorite country, and say to them: You don't need it, we will deal with your security problems.

By the way, I just want to echo, Steve Rademaker is absolutely right to be focusing on the sunset clause. That is the most problematic aspect of this. It is the biggest unknown. It is the area where I think that we can have the greatest sympathy for our allies, particularly the Saudis. I will be honest, I am not worried about anybody else in the Middle East. I think the Saudis' proliferating is a very significant issue.

But I think that it is also very susceptible to what we do. It would be hard for the Saudis to proliferate. It seems clear the Pakistanis are not simply going to sell them a bomb. They do not have the scientific infrastructure to build one easily.

I think that there are lots of opportunities for the United States to step in and convince the Saudis they don't need to do so. But, again, that is why I focused my remarks on the importance of this regional context and on the United States remaining engaged, not walking away.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Could I just add one thing on that? Ken brings up a good point. I will just say, one of those countries was Ukraine. And they gave up their nukes with the Budapest agreement in 1994 based on assurances from the United States, the Russians, and the British that their sovereignty will be maintained. As we all have seen, of course, over the last 1½ years, those assurances were not honored, and that is, obviously, an incentive for other countries not to repeat the mistake the Ukrainians made.

Mr. DORAN. If I could just add one point. One of the arguments that is being made—Ken didn't make that argument, but he was moving in that direction—is that a nuclear guarantee from the United States would solve the problem. And I think that that is just wrong, because when the Saudis look at the whole nuclear question, they are not simply trying to match Iranian capability in a symmetric fashion.

One of the reasons why the Saudis would want to bomb is in order to get leverage over the United States, because they no longer trust the United States. Similar to what the French did when they developed their own independent nuclear capability so that they could negotiate with NATO about NATO's security policy.

So the fact that we are willing to—first of all, I have doubts about our own willingness to actually extend the nuclear umbrella to the Saudis, but I don't believe that they would feel secure at all because of that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. We will go now to Chris Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this, again, timely and important hearing.

Welcome to our witnesses.

Based on the outlines of the deal as we know it, President Obama's rush to sign what appears to be an egregiously flawed nuclear deal with Iran may make war more, not less likely, may trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, and surely makes Israel and our other friends and allies in the region and the United States itself less safe.

A sunset clause is one, but this deal appears to be riddled with Achilles' heels. And I think we will wake up too late to that fact because of this rush. It ought to be self-evident that any nuclear agreement must bar every Iranian path to nuclear weapons. This deal must last for decades, not for 15 years or whatever the sunset provision turns out to be. Iran must be compelled to dismantle its current nuclear infrastructure, not merely disconnect centrifuges, no enrichment.

And my friend and colleague from Florida, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, was right, all of the previous admonishments from the U.N. and Security Council resolutions were no enrichment. That is off the table now. IAEA inspectors must have unfettered access to any and all suspected sites, including military installations.

What a theater of the absurd when during these negotiations high-level people from the very top say: No access to nuclear inspections on military installations. I mean, that is where they will put them.

And let me also ask our distinguished panelists, if there is no deal, or if Iran fails to live up to a deal, say Congress were to go along with it, what happens when they fail to live up to it, which I think we can almost predict with near certainty will be the case.

We are in a position of worldwide comprehensive sanctions. Will they happen? Or will that coalition, is it being dismantled even as we talk? Again, there shouldn't be a lifeline to China for oil, which kept Tehran afloat.

Secretary Rademaker, you bring up a number of great points about the cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, which I think is the next step. How can they not build up their own deterrence capability in light of an aggressive country like Iran?

And I thought your including Thomas Friedman's comments about "it is stunning to me how well the Iranians, sitting alone on their side of the table, have played a weak hand against the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and Britain on their side of the table. When the time comes, I am hiring Ali Khamenei to sell my house. . . ." And you talk about how—quoting him—how they should have walked out, say: That is it, there are some bright lines. I mean, the future of millions of people's lives—and what is worse than nuclear bombs—hang in the balance.

And let me also finally ask about, given Iran's long history of supporting terrorist organizations, what is to restrain them from selling materials for dirty bombs to other rogue or to other terrorist organizations?

And, again, we still have four Americans, including Saeed Abedini, being cruelly mistreated while all of this is going on. I have chaired, myself, two hearings. The chairman had a hearing with relatives from each of the four. That too just begs the question of who it is that we are really dealing with. And as you said, the whole idea of those sanctions, especially when we went after the bank, that had a bite, and it should have had a longer bite to get a better deal.

Mr. Rademaker.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, you make many great points, and I can't possibly respond to all of them. But on the Thomas Friedman piece, I excerpted from it in my testimony. I mean, he makes the very insightful point that the Iranians have been much more effective negotiators, just as a technical matter, advancing their interests, refusing to budge, basically approaching these negotiations with the perspective of the United States and its allies need this agreement more than we do.

And Friedman points out, that is just fundamentally not true. Iran needs this more than we do. But the psychology of this negotiation is the opposite and the Iranians have taken full advantage of that. And I am with Tom Friedman, I want Khamenei to sell my house too, because he has proven a very effective negotiator.

I don't know why our team can't be as effective as they are. Just this week—I made this point already, but I want to reiterate it—just this week the Iranians reopened an issue that was agreed to previously. It had been agreed that the U.N. Security Council would leave in place the sanctions on ballistic missile transfers and on conventional arms transfers. That is in the April 2 State Department fact sheet. It just says these will be kept in place by the U.N. The Iranians here at the very end say: Oh, you know, actually, we want to change that, it is disadvantageous to us, we want to change it.

I don't know how that is going to come out. I really worry, though, that you are going to see some backsliding.

Why is it that only the Iranians can reopen issues? It seems to be consensus in this room that the sunset clause is a disaster, okay, it is just disastrous for our interests. It scares our allies. Why can't our negotiators reopen that issue? Why can't they say: Hey, we still want a deal, but, hey, Iran, you agreed to an indefinite ban on reprocessing of spent fuel, okay, so you can't—I mean, this thing doesn't have to sunset, you have agreed to some restrictions that are of indefinite duration.

We need that not just on plutonium. We also need that on enriched uranium. Let's go sit down and talk about that.

Mr. Engel, you made the point, what are the alternatives? I don't know that we need to walk away from the table. I mean, I think we can negotiate as aggressively as the Iranians are negotiating this week, reopening issues that were previously agreed. Why can't we do that?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. If I may add a point, Congressman, just to add to your point. I am not in a rush to hire the Supreme Leader as a real estate agent. But I think it is just more, frankly, that we have played an extremely strong hand unbelievably weakly.

In fact, historically, if you look back, obviously, Munich, people always cite Munich as always one of the worst diplomatic blunders in 1938. But in fairness to Neville Chamberlain, the Germans were a rising power, the British needed to rearm their RAF and so on, and they had no historical connections to Czechoslovakia.

We, on the other hand, have longstanding interests. We are a superpower. If we wanted to, we could certainly deliver an incredible military blow to the Iranians. We are the superpower, yet we are acting more like a supplicant.

And it gets to your first point, Mr. Congressman. You asked, what if they violate it? I will just cite a Washington Post editorial this week where they talked about the warped proclivity of the administration to respond to questions about Iran's performance by attacking those who raise them.

And the Iranians have violated the Joint Plan of Action, and each time it has been raised, including recent weeks about the oxidation issue, the administration not only has defended the Iranians or not reported it, but they have attacked, like, David Albright and others who have actually brought it to our attention.

So I fear that they will violate, as long as this administration is in power, they will try to minimize it or hide it or defend it, because then it will admit failure of their policy. So I think if they violate it, we will have to wait till the next President for that to be addressed more fully.

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Dr. Ami Bera of California.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. And I thank the panelists as well.

I am going to reserve judgment on a final deal until we actually see what is in that final deal. But my starting point and my concern is, I don't trust Iran. Right? In any final deal, verification has to be the starting point. I just don't know how you verify if you don't have unfettered access to places.

And, again, if you don't have that verification, as the chairman stated, there should be no signing bonus, right? I mean, you don't get a bonus just for signing the deal. You get a bonus after adhering to the terms of the deal, verifying that, and then over time perhaps you can gain trust. And that is what has me concerned.

I also have very legitimate concerns that as Iran's economy strengthens, what they do with that strength in terms of—many of the members, the ranking member and the chairman, have talked about the funding of terrorism, the funding of Hamas and Hezbollah, and that is a real concern. If we look at the nature of the Middle East and how things are changing dramatically, you can see a scenario where a revitalized Iran, a Shia-dominated Iraq, an Assad who stays in place, Hezbollah and Hamas creating this ring around our allies. And even without nuclear weapons, we see a very unstable Middle East, where I would never have thought that Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, the unlikeliest of allies, might actually ally against a common threat.

I certainly would be curious about this scenario, even without acquiring nuclear weapons, what a revitalized Iranian economy would look like and how they would use those.

Maybe, Mr. Rademaker, if you would like to.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it is clear that a lot of our friends, in fact, I think all of our friends in the region are concerned precisely about that, that this deal represents a shift in the balance of power and acquiescence by the United States to that shift. And it puts the question in their laps, what do they do? And some of my copanelists have commented on that.

But the signing bonus, \$100 billion, \$150 billion, the estimates vary, but when I testified here about 2 months ago I pointed out that their national budget, their government budget, is \$300 billion a year. So this is somewhere between a third and half the amount of money that their government spends every year.

If somebody were offering to hand that much cash to the United States Government, it would be Christmas Day and our birthday and every other holiday all wrapped up in one. I mean, you can imagine the kinds of proposals that would elicit about what we could do both domestically, but also in terms of foreign policy. With that kind of money, would we feel like we would need to retrench, or would we feel like we could be more assertive internationally?

It is not just the amount of money, it is the amount of money relative to the size of the Iranian economy.

Mr. BERA. Dr. Pollack, would you like to?

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much, Congressman.

I would start by saying that I tend to find myself very close to where Congressman Engel is, in fact, perhaps exactly where Congressman Engel is about this deal, which is to say that I think that we could have gotten a much better one. I wish that we had. I think that the chairman was actually summarizing my remarks at the beginning about the deal that we should have been shooting for.

And I agree that I think we had a much better chance of getting it, in part because—I want to give the administration credit—the administration did a great job getting the Iranians to the table, building that international coalition, putting in sanctions much better than I expected. But I agree, I was very disappointed in the way that they have handled the negotiations.

But it is why I think that your points about the region become more and more important. I think that this is the deal that we are going to get. What it will look like, like Steve, I suspect it will be at least more or less close to the framework agreement. That will not be the deal that I wanted, but it may be better than the alternatives. In fact, I suspect it is, and glad to talk about that more if you want to.

But the point that I really wanted to make is that I think that we need to be thinking about this regional issue. That is the point I keep harping on.

And I hear Dr. Doran tried to put words in my mouth. I am now going to take them out and give them back to him. I don't believe that American guarantees right now are going to be enough for our allies in the region. I think that they are going to want to see action. That is what was lacking in Camp David. I think they need

to see us pushing back on the Iranians. And, quite frankly, I think the Iranians need to see us pushing back on them in the region as well. If we don't, I think they are going to assume that we are going to use this deal as a get-out-of-the-Middle-East-free card and walk away.

That being the case, I think we need to think hard about where we do push back on them, and my candidate for that is Syria. Iraq is much too fragile. The Iranians have far too much influence. If we fight the Iranians over Iraq, we will break it, and we cannot afford that. Yemen is the wrong place. We shouldn't be getting into Yemen. We should be helping our allies to get out of it.

Syria is the place that makes the most sense. Iran has interests there. They are not all-consuming as in Iraq. We have important allies. We have regional states that want us to do so. There are clearly ways to handle Syria differently.

And, in fact, I will just close by saying, the policy that the President and that Chairman Dempsey outlined in September of last year is a perfectly reasonable, functional policy. It is exactly the policy I think we ought to be pursuing. The problem is we have walked away from it. In the context of a deal, I hope that the administration will go back to that policy and actually make it work.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.

Chairman ROYCE. I think we are out of time.

Shall we go to Joe Wilson, South Carolina.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here today on this extraordinarily important situation that is developing. And amazingly enough, I share the concerns expressed by the editorial of The Washington Post. To quote the Washington Post, and I quote, I want to quote it correctly:

"If it is reached in the coming days, a nuclear deal with Iran will be, at best, an unsatisfying and risky compromise. Iran's emergence as a threshold nuclear power with the ability to produce a weapon quickly will not be prevented. It will be postponed by 10 to 15 years. In exchange, Tehran will reap hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief it can use to revive its economy and fund the wars it is waging around the Middle East."

And, Dr. Makovsky, I sadly agree so much. This is worse than Munich. There might have been, as you were indicating, an explanation for Neville Chamberlain's actions. But I am just very concerned. The President's actions, the weakness that is being exhibited, is just bizarre. And for a President who has been fixated, properly, on not having nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East, it is creating a legacy of proliferation.

With that in mind, what are the consequences for regional stability if the administration does cave in to Iranian demands?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you, Congressman. By the way, I wasn't here to justify Neville Chamberlain's actions. I was just trying to explain them.

Mr. WILSON. You were showing a differentiation.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Right. Exactly.

I agree. I think the Washington Post editorial this week, I thought was excellent, and I commend you for quoting that. I think that I agree that this will—we talk about alternatives to the deal, as Ranking Member Engel is raising. I think these are bad choices, so you have got to figure out what is the least terrible choice, and there are going to be bad alternatives all around, there is no question about it.

So I think, again, one of the worst consequences of this deal—not the alternative—a consequence is rising tension in the region. When you have a weaker United States, I think we all agree on that, all the panelists agree that without a strong United States with credibility, the countries are going to take a lot of actions into their own hand, including on the nuclear front.

And, again, there is just going to be rising tension and a greater risk—I am not predicting it—but not only a major conventional war, but possibly at some point of a conflict, whether intentionally or through miscalculation, a nuclear conflict in the region because there will be a lot more countries with nuclear weapons, and it could draw us in as well.

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you raising the concern.

And, Dr. Doran, Mr. Rademaker, in a prior hearing, a former U.N. weapons inspector discussed the strategy that Saddam Hussein used to evade inspectors, both on the ground in Iraq and at the U.N., noting that “The inspectors reported they could do little of their job under the conditions Iraq permitted them to operate.”

Do you fear a similar outcome with Iran? Given the Iraq experience, what roadblocks do you anticipate inspectors would face, both on the ground and at the U.N.?

Mr. DORAN. I think that, as Steve pointed out, the Iranians keep reopening the issues. And we need to understand that behind that is their radical ideology of wanting to overturn the international system, which they regard as completely unjust. They don't ever feel bound—what I am trying to say is that their attitude toward this negotiation is indicative of a mindset where they don't feel bound by any commitment that they make to us because they feel that we represent an unjust system to begin with.

So I think that we can expect them to cheat at every opportunity. I think we can expect them to impede us at every opportunity. And I think that even if they came to this with good will, which they don't have, the system itself is one that is based on distrust and a coercive dictatorship. And so there isn't a culture of transparency and openness in it to begin with. We are being promised unprecedented openness and access and so on. The system itself just can't deliver that.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, there is a long, long history of determined aggressor states, determined cheaters flummoxing international inspectors. There is a wonderful Winston Churchill quote. I don't have it in front of me, but it is an absolutely wonderful quote describing how Hitler completely flummoxed the League of Nations weapons inspectors who, prior to World War II, had the mandate of inspecting whether Nazi Germany was deploying certain prohibited weapons in the Rhineland. And Hitler just ran circles around them, because he stumped them.

You mentioned the example of Iraq. I am speaking here as a legal matter. I was a commissioner of UNSCOM, which was the U.N. weapons inspection organization for Iraq. The legal authorities given to UNSCOM by the U.N. Security Council were vastly stronger than anything that the inspectors are going to have in Iran and anything that is under discussion. Iraq was a defeated state. Saddam Hussein had been defeated in the first gulf war.

The U.N. imposed a highly intrusive weapons inspection mechanism on him, and he still ran circles around it. And they had, talk about anywhere/anytime access, I mean, those guys could bust down doors, they could go anywhere they wanted; seize computers. I mean, it is inconceivable that the inspectors in Iran are going to have the same sort of legal authorities.

Saddam Hussein was still able to conceal things from them. I mean, if the Iranians wish to conceal, they are going to have ample opportunity to do that under any imaginable inspection mechanism.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you all. And, again, our concern too for the people of the Iran. And so I am just hoping that, indeed, the President will change course. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rademaker, I am not sure where you are going with that. By the way, the rearmament in Germany in World War II, as a student of history myself, I mean, had a lot more to do than Hitler running circles around inspectors. It had a lot more to do with the fact that the West was just tired and was not going to challenge them. Thus the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the remilitarization, they knew what was happening. He wasn't hiding the fact he was rebuilding an air force and expanding the military with universal conscription and the like, and, clearly, the Ruhr was up and running.

I mean, these were not secrets that were kept from inspectors. It was actually about political will. It was about whether you are going to turn a blind eye to all of that because you were weary of war. And World War I had been so traumatic, especially in France and Britain, that hopefully, wishful thinking would make it all go away, or there would be some modus vivendi we could all accept. They were wrong. Churchill on that one was right. He was wrong on most everything else, but he was right about that.

But what is it you are proposing? Should we therefore say we shouldn't have an inspections regime, we shouldn't have the ability to evaluate, because it is fruitless, people can run rings around them?

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, I was nearly responding to Congressman Wilson's question about whether we should take—what conclusions we should draw from the Iraq experience. And the Iraq experience was that, even with highly intrusive inspection authorities, it is possible for determined cheaters to withhold information.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. But where does that take us? Does that mean we should give up on—we shouldn't even bother because they can run rings around us?

Mr. RADEMAKER. I mean, it is a fair question. I think where it takes you is you negotiate to get the robust legal authority you can possibly get, you exercise that authority, but you still have to view the results with skepticism.

Mr. CONNOLLY. With skepticism.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Because it is possible for a determined cheater. And Iran has a long record of secretly proceeding with nuclear development activities that are only exposed by exile groups or foreign intelligence agencies.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right.

Mr. RADEMAKER. So we just have to approach the Iranians with great skepticism given their track record.

Mr. CONNOLLY. There seems to be precedent for it in the region.

Mr. MAKOVSKY, did you want to comment?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Just a quick thing, Mr. Congressman, just on that. I think the inspection issue that Steve raised is just further challenged by the fact that we are permitting in this emerging deal, based on what we know, an extensive infrastructure in Iran to remain in place. If we had demanded a U.N. Security Council resolution, like our policy had been until a couple years ago, a complete dismantlement of their infrastructure, it would have made inspections easier.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Makovsky, unfortunately, my time is limited. I agree with you, but I want to come back to Eliot Engel's question. What is the alternative?

The fact of the matter is we allowed this drift for 8 years. The previous administration, we started out with a handful of centrifuges, now we have 15,000, 16,000. They have hardened processing plants. They have significantly increased the amount of enriched uranium and other fissible material. And so we are where we are.

I wish we had done all of that, like Mr. Engel was saying, a long time ago so that we would have stopped it dead in its track. The Israelis could have done it too before things got hardened. Now they can't do it without us, not efficaciously. But if you turn the clock back, Prime Minister Netanyahu thought it was such an existential threat, why didn't he do then what Israel had done in Syria and had done in Iraq? Why did he not take the kinetic option, one wonders.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think it is an excellent point that you should raise to him when you see him.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I will.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. But I would say that I wouldn't discount, although many I think in Washington and certainly the administration believe the Israelis will no longer strike. I think there is still a decent likelihood that they still will at the last moment, that they feel compelled to, because they will feel no alternative. I am not predicting it, I am just saying—

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. And that could also be a consequence of this deal.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, one wonders, because they have had that option before and things got worse, not better.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is right.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just ask a final question of you, Mr. Makovsky. You indicated, and it is a perfectly fair proposition, that when you look at the military option versus a negotiated deal that may or may not be cheated against and so forth, maybe the military option actually is better. But we are going to have General Hayden here I think next week who has said if you exercise the military option, all it will do is accelerate the nuclear development in Iran and now you have no leverage, the West has no leverage. And unless you are prepared to do it every 2 years. And, of course, we are not even talking about diplomatic and terrorists and all kinds of other ancillary consequences that may flow from that.

Is that a fair proposition too, that actually, despite what we desire, the opposite could happen?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Very possible. I wasn't trying to say that it is a slam dunk, to use a common phrase, a famous phrase. I am just trying to give you the other side, is what I am trying to say. I have also spoken to Air Force generals and others who believe that actually we do have a viable strike. It has always been our policy, by the way, that we do have this capability, and it is possible that they could race. But it is also very possible—but I also think it is more likely that if they do—if we agree to a deal that allows them to get nuclear weapons at some point, that other countries in the region are going to race to it before that even happens.

So I think that is even a more likely outcome than you mentioned about the Iranians racing to a bomb. I think we can feel very confident other countries will get nuclear weapons if we don't stop this before it spreads in the region by whatever means. But there are bad consequences to anything we do here, there is no question about it.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, but it brings me back—and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman—but it brings us back to the ultimate proposition. We have got many unattractive options in front of us. The question is a negotiated deal that keeps the P5+1 together and that rolls back and freezes in place their nuclear development program for a period of time, we hope it can be renewed, versus exercising, saying, we give up on all that, we are going to exercise a military option and hope for the best.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, I think if you—you are together, but together in a terrible arrangement that is going to cause a lot more problems. I don't think that is a positive end. And I am not saying necessarily that we have to turn to a military option, but unless we at a minimum have a very credible one and ratchet up the sanctions, which I believe we could do, certainly with the oil market the way it is, I think if we did that, there is a chance of a better deal. But, again, I think we shouldn't just think about alternatives, we have to think about consequences.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly.

Now we go to Mr. Darrell Issa of California.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Well, I am going to pick up where Mr. Connolly left off, but he won't be surprised there may be a slight twist on how I hold the blade.

Mr. Rademaker, let me understand a premise that I think you have here, and tell me if I am off, the question of do we take the deal or don't take the deal. The fact is, if the deal is to allow the equivalent of the entire World War II Luftwaffe sitting on the ground with the promise that although the fuel tanks are right next to the planes, they won't fully load the planes and the bombs for 10 years, that is kind of where we are. We are letting them have all the weapon of war, the launch systems, the missiles, the fissile material. What we are saying is, the time it takes to load these aircraft and get them in the air is what we are counting on. Isn't that sort of the equivalent?

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yeah, I think that is a pretty good analogy. The administration is saying, today they could load one plane with one bomb in 2 to 3 months, and we want to extend that to 1 year for the next 10 years, but then after that it would be an entire fleet that they can load with dozens of bombs, and we will worry about that in 10 years.

And the question is, is that sort of a wise—I mean, if you are worried about the next 10 years, yeah, you have improved your situation for 10 years, but beyond that a vastly worse situation. And then if you want to do something about that in 10 years, you face the additional problem that the other side will say: But you are violating your agreements. You promised.

Mr. ISSA. The French, I think, said that for several hours in the beginning of World War II.

Mr. RADEMAKER. Right. It got them a long way, didn't it?

Mr. ISSA. Dr. Makovsky, I saw your head shaking yes, so I will take you next for obvious reasons.

But, Doctor, if we go, I think, to Mr. Rademaker's assumption, which is that trying to inspect a fleet of weapons of war and make sure they are not quite loaded and ready to fire at us, changing that to these weapons of war, you need to dispel them, you need to be away from them, you cannot have those, which was a position—and this is where Mr. Connolly, I am sorry he left.

The Bush administration said, you can't have weapons of war, and they were playing with the no 20 percent, no enrichment, no enriched there. Aren't we playing now only this last-minute game? And if so, does or can we get the world—and we are not talking about Israel, we are not talking about the United States, we are talking about mostly Europe—can we get them back to a point of understanding that the only way to have a verifiable deal is to have a deal in which there is zero tolerance for these weapons or near weapons of war?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. It is a good question, Mr. Congressman. Look, obviously, where we are, you are right. I guess, if we had to use a baseball analogy, we might be in the bottom of the ninth, I still believe with one strike left you still have a chance sometimes to win a ballgame, and I wouldn't want to give anything up. In fact, I am from St. Louis. That is exactly what we did in the 2011 World Series. And I would say that—

Mr. ISSA. I am a Clevelander. We cite all different years.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I apologize for that.

But I think we shouldn't underestimate—Ranking Member Engel had raised this before—we shouldn't underestimate two things.

That American leadership, it is your body, Congress, which led on sanctions, and that the administration on some issues, and this committee, certainly, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, you guys led on sanctions on banking, on a lot of things, and you got the world to go around with you. And by the way, the odds were great on that.

And I think that if there is a deal concluded and there is an overwhelming majority of the Members of Congress that oppose this deal, I think it sends a strong signal, and I think there is still a chance, then.

Mr. ISSA. So if I am going to summarize—and, Dr. Pollack, I want to hear from you for a moment, because we have given you a pass, and you need to get back to work—the fact is, we are negotiating a deal that is not verifiable, sustainable, and reliable, and it is not nearly the kind of oversight that we had against Saddam when, in fact, Saddam was shipping millions, hundreds of millions of gallons and barrels of oil, not even including the weapons program. It is very hard to take a large independent country and supervise it.

Dr. Pollack, getting back to something that is verifiable, that makes sense, that can, in fact, be restrained, how do you see us getting from where we are—let's assume for a moment that Congress rejects a deal or that the President doesn't come up with one—how do you see us getting to one that the other gentlemen at the table could support as defensible and verifiable?

Mr. POLLACK. Can my answer include the building of a time machine, Congressman?

Mr. ISSA. Yeah. Go for it.

Mr. POLLACK. That was a joke.

I am in agreement with all of my panelists. I think the administration did very well in getting the Iranians to the table. I give them a lot of credit for that. As I said, I have been disappointed in how they have handled the negotiations.

I think that it is theoretically possible perhaps to get a stronger deal even from where we are now. I think that it would require a willingness on the part of the United States to walk away from the table, but also to be able to make the case to our allies—and I think we have certainly got a number of them already onboard—and our co-negotiators in the P5+1 that what we are talking about now is simply a far cry from what is reasonable for us to accept.

That will be hard, because of how much history we have. We have gone this far, and, frankly, a number of the other P5+1 countries, I think, have been surprised at how willing the United States has been over the course of the last year to make some of these concessions that the Iranians wanted. It will be difficult to roll that back. Perhaps not impossible, but difficult.

But, again, my read of history, Congressman, is that it requires a remarkable degree of leadership to fundamentally change course on an issue where we have gone so far down the road, and I am skeptical that that is going to happen. I suspect that we are going to get a deal very much like the one that is being talked about, one more or less like the framework agreements.

And, unfortunately, I find myself much more in agreement with Congressman Engel, which is that I wish we weren't here. It is a

much weaker deal than I think we could have had. But, nevertheless, I still suspect—and as I said, I want to reserve judgment until I actually see it—I still suspect that it will be better than the alternatives, because as Congressman Engel and Congress Connolly pointed out, those alternatives are even worse.

Mr. ISSA. So we are going to take the Chamberlain deal, even though it is not the deal we should have, because it is the best deal he came back with?

Mr. POLLACK. I would object, obviously, to the analogy, sir.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We are going to go to Mr. Brad Sherman of California.

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I would ask the witnesses to give your advice to Congress. We want to control foreign policy, all of us in this room, one way or another. You would like to be advising the President. The President isn't listening to you. You at least have us. If you compare him to Neville Chamberlain, he certainly isn't listening to you. But whatever is going to happen in Vienna in the next 12 hours is going to happen.

So you posit a world in which we walk away from a bad deal, we sign a good, we do this. The President is going to do what he is going to do, and he isn't going to listen to us in the next 12 hours.

So your advice to us has to be: What should Congress do? Not in some mythical world where Dr. Pollack has a time machine, not in some mythical world where Ronald Reagan is resurrected and is the President of the United States on the day we vote on the deal, but rather what do we do if the President says, "This a reasonable deal, Iran has signed a reasonable deal, and Congress is being unreasonable"? Do we go on a codel to Rome, convince the Italians to prevent Eni from doing business with Iran on a very profitable basis, because, although the President thinks it is a good idea for them to make the profits, some of us think it is a bad idea?

I don't know if any of you want to join us on that codel. I don't think we would be successful. I realize you have comments, but I have got a limited amount of time.

I do want to set the record straight. The Bush administration refused to have sanctions on Iran. We passed a lot of them out of this committee. He blocked them in the United States Senate. And the Iran Sanctions Act was disregarded and violated again and again.

I join with Dr. Pollack in a fear that this is all about a pivot out of the Middle East. The Middle East is frustrating. Confrontation with China is exciting. The Middle East has un-uniformed terrorists. Confrontation with China over islands, that is the kind of war we have had great glory in, especially if we don't wage it, but rather just confront and win it the way we won the war against the Soviet Union.

And right now everything that the Pentagon is doing is figuring out a way to take money away from any forces that might be useful in the Middle East and design new weapons to shoot down Chinese planes over islands—no, they are really just rocks—that don't have any oil, but if they had any oil, the oil would belong to Japan, which by the way, is spending almost nothing on its national defense. That is where we are pivoting to.

This deal needs to be looked at in several phases. The first phase is that first year, where it has good and bad points. We get the stockpiles out of Iran, we get two-thirds of the centrifuges mothballed. And then, as Mr. Rademaker points out, you get to year 12 where it is an absolute disaster. So you have the good, the bad, and the ugly.

The good is those centrifuges and stockpiles. The bad is that they get that \$120 billion-plus signing bonus, which they will use for butter, which they will use for graft, they are very good at that, which they will use to kill Sunnis, some of whom deserve to be killed and some of whom definitely do not, and the remainder they will use to attack Israel and the United States.

But the issue before us is: What do we do as a Congress? And we actually shouldn't just say we—it is a very sophisticated question, because we have three possible votes. Do we vote to approve? Do we vote to disapprove? Do we vote to override a Presidential veto of a disapproval resolution? Those are three very different votes. And since the President isn't listening, perhaps you can give advice to us as to how we handle those three circumstances.

The first one is so easy, I won't ask the question, should we vote to approve? If we vote to approve then we have to the greatest extent possible locked the United States into a deal which in year 12 is a nuclear Iran. So we shouldn't do that. The question is, maybe we should vote to disapprove.

The question is, do we override a veto? If we override that veto, then those stockpiles are not shipped out of the country, those centrifuges are not mothballed, and we go to war with Iran in which Congress versus Tehran with the White House on one side or the other, I am not sure.

If the President is telling the world that Iran has signed a reasonable deal and deserves sanctions relief, what should Congress do? Dr. Pollack.

Mr. POLLACK. I was afraid you were going to call on me, Congressman.

First point, I think the time for Congress to make a difference is now, before the deal gets presented, because I think that once the deal is in hand, it is going to be very, very—

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Pollack, you don't have the time machine. The President gave his final instructions to his negotiators hours ago. No one in Vienna is watching this presentation right now. If they are, it is such a junior level foreign service officer that they are not being listened to. If the President heard from Congress or from you or from me, that was prior to this moment. No time machines.

Mr. POLLACK. I agree with you, Congressman. But if for some reason we can't come to agreement and we do—

Mr. SHERMAN. We will bring you back for that advice. Assume a deal is announced in 12 hours and it goes online—

Mr. POLLACK. I come back to the point that you and Congressman Engel and Congressman Connolly make, I think the deal is disappointing, but I certainly wouldn't—I would not advise you to override the veto because, again, I think that the alternatives are worse than this. But I do want to come back to the point—

Mr. SHERMAN. I wish you wouldn't say "this," because it is really three deals. It is the first year, it is the middle year, it is the 12th year.

Mr. POLLACK. We don't know exactly what the deal is going to look like. But if we assume that it is——

Mr. SHERMAN. The 12th year is ugly. We have got to override the deal by then.

Mr. Rademaker.

Mr. RADEMAKER. If the final deal looks like what we have been told it will look like, my advice to the Congress is use its independent judgment. The President can say he thinks it is a reasonable deal. But I think Congress needs to look at it independently——

Mr. SHERMAN. We——

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Dispassionately. I am not a Member of Congress, but if I were looking at that detail, I would have to vote no on it.

Mr. SHERMAN. Remember, we have got three separate votes. Obviously, if there is a resolution to vote for approval, you and I, and I think just about everybody, are going to vote no. If that is the advice you are giving us, you are giving us advice on an easy question.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I don't know whether in the Republican-controlled House a resolution of approval is actually going to be put forward.

Mr. SHERMAN. It will be put forward if the Speaker thinks it will be a good idea. And he will be getting advice from our chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. RADEMAKER. But if it is a resolution of disapproval, you know, my recommendation would be a no vote. We hear that the alternatives are worse. And it is usually described as either this deal or war. We have all these——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, no, no, no. With this President, you don't get war. This President isn't going to say: Oh, Congress was right; I was wrong. I am bombing.

Mr. RADEMAKER. But the point I want to make to you is you have all these wise men who, including President Obama's former Iran advisers, who are saying: Well, actually, it could be this deal and the war. And, in fact, Congress should vote to authorize use of force in the event not of Iranian cheating but actually in the event that Iran exercises some of the rights that are going to be granted to it under this agreement. That is what they say.

Mr. SHERMAN. That would be—I am not sure that is actually what they are proposing, knowing those individuals. But I think my time has expired.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can read you the language.

Mr. SHERMAN. But it is interesting, yes.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I quote it in my testimony.

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

We now proceed to Congressman Ted Poe of Texas.

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here.

If I understand, the policy of the U.S. goes back all the way to the Carter administration, that, as you said, Mr. Doran—or is it Doran?

Mr. DORAN. The Irish say Doran. I say Doran. So I go by either.

Mr. POE. To, the U.S. is going to be the guarantor of stability in the Middle East region. Is that a fair statement of what you said?

Mr. DORAN. Yes.

Mr. POE. And the Carter doctrine, as Mr. Rademaker talked about, was that the United States is committed to making sure that the Persian Gulf region is safe from outside influence, even using military force if necessary, something to that effect. As I see this whole situation, at the end of the day, the deal will be Iran will get nuclear weapons. They are also developing an intercontinental ballistic missiles, as we all know, to send nukes, not conventional weapons or bombs, in them.

At the end of the day, the deal will be that they will be able to export all of the oil that they have, oil revenue that is used, in my opinion, to fund their terrorist enterprises throughout the world since Iran is the number one terrorist sponsoring state in the world. What a deal this is. I mean, we are not dealing with nice people or honest people. The United States and the West is blissfully ignorant of who we are dealing with. We are dealing with a snake oil salesman, and he is going to be able to sell us the snake oil. And we are going to buy it and say we won because we got a deal.

The Ayatollah has said as recently as March, if I can find the quote, it is just three words, “Death to America.” Now, I don’t think he is going to change his mind about being the Supreme Leader and about his policy that he wants us all to die: Death to America. This is a very, very serious crisis that is taking place worldwide. And I am not so sure that we are really dealing with this as we should be because, at the end of the day, they are going to get what they want.

And I am concerned, just like some of my friends on the other side have said, about what is going to happen next. Next year, the year after next.

I say all that to say maybe our policy should be different. Why isn’t it our policy that we promote in Iran free elections, a regime change if that is the will of the people in Iran, to change who is running the show over there? Why isn’t that part of our policy? We had the opportunity in 2009 to help the Iranians, but we did not. So is that discussed—you four guys are the experts—is that discussed anywhere by anybody in the administration or the West, let’s have free elections and let the Iranian people decide who will be in charge? Anybody can answer that question.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I will just jump in real quickly and then turn it over to Mike Doran.

On your last point, Congressman, I don’t hear a lot of discussion. I do think that is the ultimate solution to this is not sanctions, not military option; it is regime change. But I think I can say with more confidence that if there is this deal, then it will strengthen the regime. And you will have less, it will be less likely that there will be regime change with this deal. This will be one of the consequences of this deal. Their policy will be vindicated. They will be

able to oppress. They will have a lot more money, not just for butter but to oppress their people internally. And they are one of the leading oppressors in the world. And they will essentially gain immunity from attack from outside once they achieve their nuclear weapons capability.

So I think this deal certainly strengthens the regime and makes what you are saying, regime change, which I think we all think would be much better, far less likely.

Mr. POE. Well, I agree with you. I think regime change is the answer, free elections. We should support a regime change with free elections and let the people of Iran make that decision.

And it will strengthen the Ayatollah and the mullahs who have an iron fist on the people, persecuting their own people, killing their own people; they are hanging throughout Tehran—almost daily—people that disagree with the government.

I hope we get there.

And I yield back because you are taking it back. I will yield back.

Mr. WILSON. Here, here. Thank you, Judge Poe. We appreciate your insight particularly on behalf of the people of Iran too.

And we now proceed to Congresswoman Lois Frankel.

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, Mr. Chair, I would just like to say thank you to Josh Cohen. This is his last full committee. He has been my adviser. He has done a great job. He is going off to Harvard, to the Kennedy School. And we wish him well.

Well, this has been a very troubling discussion. First of all, thank you all for sharing. I mean, you can't help but after listening to all this feel a lot of anxiety. So, first, I want to ask a hypothetical, if it is possible for you to answer, which is I think we went into this, the P5+1, I think it was November 2013 when they first agreed to the plan that is, this temporary plan that is currently in place, and then it began in January 2014. Had this joint plan not been in place, do you think by now we would have had to take military action to stop a nuclear weapon?

Mr. DORAN. I don't think that is true. And I also don't think that the—I also don't think that the alternative to this deal is necessarily war. And that is because of the point that Mike Makovsky made: Iran is a third-rate power and we are a superpower. And if we behave like a superpower, and we actually dedicate all instruments of national power toward a goal like preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it has an effect on the thinking of the Iranians.

I notice that when Prime Minister Netanyahu drew his red line, the Iranians were very careful to creep right up to it, but they never went over it. I suspect that if we made ourselves clear and we enhanced our credibility, that we would see that the Iranians would be much more circumspect. They are trumpeting their anti-Americanism right now because they know there is absolutely no consequence for it.

Ms. FRANKEL. Does this mean that you feel that the better alternative now would be to try to increase sanctions?

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely.

Ms. FRANKEL. Rather than take the deal?

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely. You have to disapprove the deal. And we have to step back from the negotiations. We have to show the Iranians that we are willing to negotiate in a much more aggressive fashion. And we need to take care to pull our allies together. It really isn't true that the P5+1 is abandoning us, and if we don't make this deal, we have lost them. We are pushing them away from a sensible policy. I had in my institution a couple weeks ago a delegation of French politicians who came through, people who had traditionally been very tough on Iran. And they said, and this is a paraphrase, but they said: Basically, you guys have played us for suckers. You have put us in the position now, we who want to hold out for a better deal, you have put us in the position of angering President Obama by not following his lead on an accommodationist policy and losing the possibility of good economic contracts in Iran because we are going to be punished by the Iranians as well. We are at the back of the line for the contracts. And so they said what suckers we are. So they are shifting now because of our policy. What we need to do is define a red line and get the P5+1 behind it, especially our European allies, and then stick to it.

Ms. FRANKEL. Do you other gentlemen agree with that? Or have a different opinion?

Mr. RADEMAKER. The only thing I would add is I do think we have to take a much firmer line. But I am not sure, people talk about walking out of the negotiations. I think what that really means is a willingness to not agree to terms that aren't acceptable. But I don't think we need to slam the door on diplomacy. I think in terms of alliance management, just our international, you know, maintaining international consensus, there should remain a willingness to achieve a negotiated solution. That would be the ideal solution. But it should be a negotiated solution on acceptable terms, not the terms that have been agreed to at this point and which apparently we are satisfied with the Iranians reopening questions where they are dissatisfied, but we—maybe the Iranians are right, maybe President Obama thinks we need this deal more than they do because he is not willing to reopen disadvantageous agreements that have already been reached. I don't know why that would be though. It seems to me we can reopen and try and get a better outcome on things like the sunset clause.

Ms. FRANKEL. Dr. Pollack, you may answer that but I just want to add something to that question, which is, do you see the potential—let's say we are at the negotiating table, and we just said, no, we can't, this is not the deal we are going to accept. Do you see the potential of Iran then again moving toward a nuclear weapon, taking further steps?

Mr. POLLACK. Congresswoman, first, I tend to be much more where Steve Rademaker is than my friend Mike Doran. I think what Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed of kill these negotiations, go back to sanctions, force them to come back to the table later, I do not think that will work. I think that it is highly unlikely that we will be able to hold the sanctions in place, that we will be able to hold international opinion. As the guy at the White House who tried to hold the Iraq sanctions together in the late 1990s, I was shocked and appalled at how quickly international opinion turned against those sanctions when people decided that

we were the problem, not Saddam Hussein, countries which previously had supported it legally and every way imaginable just disregarded them. I am fearful we will have something similar happen with Iran. I think the JPOA was worthwhile.

And, finally, to come back to a point that Steve was making, by the same token, I don't think that it is necessarily the case that we have to look at it and say we have to agree to something by tomorrow. I don't understand why we can't take more time. A willingness to play out these negotiations and insist on the best terms possible, even given what we have already put on the table, I think is fundamentally different from, again, what Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed.

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.

We now proceed to Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, here we are again. As usual, I have to spend some of my time—I wish Mr. Connolly were still here so, as a student of history, I could remind him of something because I am sure he knows it, but I am always amazed by what I hear here. One of the first things that amazed me was that George Bush is responsible, and he is responsible because we didn't go to war with Iran from the same people that complain daily bitterly that we went to a war with Iraq and Afghanistan.

And then I hear that a veto override by a Republican Congress is tantamount to a declaration of war with Iran. So I guess we can be prepared for that narrative.

And, finally, I would like to remind Mr. Connolly that it was the Clinton administration, as I remember, in May 1998 that waived the sanctions, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which resulted in an increase in Iran's terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and European investment in Iran. So I will have to remind him of that on the floor.

I do have a couple questions. If you can tell me, gentlemen, what are the consequences for regional stability if the administration were to cave to the Iranian demands to lift the U.N. arms embargo?

Go ahead, Mr. Doran.

Mr. DORAN. It is catastrophic. And I think we need to see already that the Russians are moving and see themselves in competition with us for Iran. This is a dimension of the thing that hasn't got much attention, which is that the, it is not just our allies that see us as tilting toward Iran, it is also the Russians as well. And the Russians would much prefer to have Iran in their sphere than in our sphere. So we can see them, I think, moving quite aggressively to establish a very strong military-to-military relationship with them.

There is another dimension of this thing as well that deserves note, and that is because of the sunset clause but also the very large amount of facilities that we are leaving in place, the fact that we are recognizing Iran as a threshold nuclear power. It means that the knife is never, we have never taken the knife away from our neck. So I think most people in the region, and I would include myself in this too, believe that the administration, without admit-

ting it, is already making calculations, tradeoffs in their mind of not willing to challenge Iran in Syria and in Iraq and Iranian interests in those areas for fear that it will tank the nuclear negotiations. That calculation never goes away.

The administration wants us to believe, oh, we pocket, we get this agreement, this nuclear negotiation, good, bad, whatever you think of it, and then we move toward regional stability. It doesn't work that way because the minute we start to challenge them, say, with Assad, they will threaten to—they will threaten to pull out of the agreement on the nukes. And that is especially true because we have front-loaded it with so many goodies—

Mr. PERRY. I personally cannot separate the two. I can, I guess, from a negotiation standpoint. But as a tenet of the negotiations themselves, I don't understand the nation that separates those issues.

Let me ask another question, what has the President and the administration been doing to maintain or strengthen the current sanctions regime regarding our international actors during this period of time? Because we understand that it is eroding away. That is yet another reason why we must accept this deal. What have they been doing to make sure that we have got that right there just in case?

Mr. DORAN. If I could just quickly, the administration wants the new economic relationship with Iran. Its calculation is that it wants to create a mutual dependency because that is the thing that ultimately is going to moderate the behavior.

Mr. PERRY. You got to say that in regular English. So they are not doing much to—

Mr. DORAN. They are not doing anything because they—

Mr. PERRY. Yeah.

Mr. DORAN [continuing]. Because they want to relax the pressure.

Mr. PERRY. Right. Okay. So, listen, I don't know the tenets of this deal. Rumor has it, it is imminent. That is the rumor around that town right now. I will tell you that I am personally disgusted with the platitudes, the moral relativism, the explaining away by people around here in this room, some of them, this, in my opinion, administration misunderstands, underestimates, and is being duped by the nonrational actor that is Iran that is a known liar, is a brutal regime, and will continue to be that.

To me, I liken this to giving a crocodile or a shark more teeth and somehow expecting it to do something different than it already does. I think it is just going to do more. I don't see any reason why it wouldn't. And going back further into history with the moral relativism, the platitudes, and the explaining away, I am sure you gentlemen can appreciate this, the United States did the same thing with the Soviet Union in World War II, who had a pact with Hitler before they were at war with each other, to do exactly what they did, which was divide up and conquer Europe. And while Hitler killed 6 million people, the Soviet Communists and their expansion, not only in Europe but into China and Vietnam and places all over the globe, are responsible for the deaths of 100 million people. And nobody says a thing about that. And that is exactly what

we are getting into right now by explaining this away in this person's opinion.

I thank you for your time, gentlemen. I yield back.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Perry.

We now proceed to Congressman Ted Yoho of Florida.

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. Let me start off with a question. Do you believe that in the wake of an agreement, the administration will push to delist the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a proliferator? Dr. Doran?

Mr. DORAN. I think we have already seen indications that they are moving away from, they are moving away from holding their feet to the fire on that issue. Whether they will actually move to delist, I don't know. But they will start to explain away behavior. And they will start to impute to the Iranians and even to the Revolutionary Guard intentions that they don't actually have like, for instance, building a multisectarian political system in Iraq.

Mr. YOHO. I am going to get to that. Given that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard at large is designated, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, as a proliferator, do you think the administration will delist them as part of an Iranian nuclear agreement? And the second part of that question is this would, in effect, legitimize many of the aspects of the Revolutionary Guard, creating a terrorist wing, being the Quds Force, and a political wing, the Revolutionary Guard, that would be open for business. Do you see that happening?

Mr. Rademaker?

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can't predict with confidence what the administration will do. But given that it is clear that the administration is committed to lifting nuclear-proliferation-related sanctions. It will be a definitional question: Is that particular listing related to nuclear proliferation, or is it something else?

Mr. YOHO. Nuclear proliferation.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think there is an issue of ballistic missile proliferation, conventional weapons proliferation.

Mr. YOHO. WMD.

Mr. RADEMAKER. But we understand those issues are now on the table too. So where this comes out, I don't know. But I guess what I am confident in predicting is it is going to be a pretty darn good deal for Iran.

Mr. YOHO. I agree with that. And what would be the regional effect? I think we know what that would be. It is not going to stabilize it. And I think it would increase the hegemony of Iran in the whole Middle Eastern area. You know, I am baffled by this whole nuclear negotiation.

Dr. Pollack, you said the administration did a good job of bringing Iran to the table. What was the purpose of that? Can you take us back—

Mr. POLLACK. The purpose, Congressman, was to try to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Mr. YOHO. Because I have right here that President Obama says, 28 times promised Iran wouldn't get a nuclear weapon. So we have moved from, and that is what I remember, this is to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Now we are at, we are going to try

to slow it down. Just real quickly, do all four of you think Iran will have a nuclear weapon, if they don't have one already, within the next 0 to 10 years? Just yes or no.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the answer to that, if your timeframe is the next 10 years, that is the duration of this agreement. So really you are asking are they going to cheat on the agreement. I don't know. They have cheated on a lot of things up until now. I think they are very comfortable with that idea. But one thing I have suggested in my past testimony is that rationally this is such a good deal for them that they shouldn't cheat. Rationally, they should let 10 years go by and then if they want to break out and produce nuclear weapons, they can produce a much more robust, much more serious nuclear force very quickly than they will be able to do covertly over the next 10 years. So, rationally, they shouldn't cheat. Rationally they should take advantage of the sunset clause and then emerge either as a nuclear weapons state or the other—I mentioned this the last time I appeared here—whether they actually produce nuclear weapons or whether they are a screwdriver turn away from having them, there is an important legal difference between those two—

Mr. YOHO. I have sat here for 2½ years—

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. You get a lot of the political and sort of national security advantages of having nuclear weapons if everybody knows you are a screwdriver turn away. So it is not clear to me they will necessarily go all the way. But if everyone knows they can do it overnight, they get treated as if they had nuclear weapons anyway.

Mr. YOHO. Right.

Mr. DORAN. I will make a very clear prediction, they will cheat. They are cheating already. It is in their DNA. If their lips move, they lie. There is absolute certainty they will cheat. And I also think it is a rational decision to cheat. They want to be at odds with the world. They want to, with the United States and the alliances.

Mr. YOHO. Right.

Mr. DORAN. It benefits them domestically. It benefits them internationally to be at odds.

Mr. YOHO. I am a veterinarian before I came here. I will always be a veterinarian. There was a simple thing we learned: If it looks, smells, runs, and smells like a skunk, it is probably a skunk. And this is a deal that is a skunk. And we, as Americans, need to run away from it. One last question, is it possible to put sanctions back on? And will the P5 nations back us up if we wanted to sanction and say we are walking away, actually running away—and I would spray deodorizer behind us as we left—is it possible that they would stand with us?

Mr. POLLACK. I will answer that by saying that I think it will depend on the circumstances of the breakdown. If the P5+1 believes it was the Iranians who were being unreasonable and that was the cause of the breakdown, yes, I think they would. If they conclude that it was the United States, no. I don't think so.

Mr. DORAN. But it is not that hard to imagine an American diplomacy—I agree with my colleagues on that point. I didn't want to suggest before that I think we should just slam the door, get up

and walk away. We need to make a reasoned explanation as to why we are doing that. And we can do that very easily by just holding to some of the very reasonable proposals that we have made and that the Iranians have rejected.

Mr. RADEMAKER. The one clarification I would add, you put the question in terms putting sanctions back on. The sanctions are still on. They have not yet been lifted. What this deal does is it begins to lift the sanctions.

Mr. YOHO. With just the minimal relaxation of those, you have seen what they have done. And they have propped up the Assad regime when we thought that he was going to fall. And I can only think that the help from Iran with the extra money coming in—it was supposed to be \$14 billion, now it is over \$40 billion or \$60 billion with just the relaxation—that that has prolonging the Syrian war, caused that many more deaths. And even today we hear there are more chlorine bombs being dropped on Aleppo. And we have a resolution and a bill to stop that. This is a disaster. This administration has not served America well, the Middle East, or world peace. I yield back.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.

We now proceed to Congressman David Trott of Michigan.

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all the panelists for your time this morning. And I appreciate you sticking around for, I think I am the last person. I have only been here 6 months, so I get to ask my questions last.

Mr. Sherman made a comment that no one in the White House is listening to us. I believe that is true. So, in many respects, this hearing is all about trying to draw attention through your insightful comments to the deal that is about to get done and draw the American public's attention to it.

And Mr. Yoho asked my question, so I will change it a little bit. If a deal gets done, isn't the 30-second sound bite headline, "A Done Deal: Iran Will Have a Nuclear Weapon in 10 or 12 Years"? Isn't that the takeaway from where we are at today? And Mr. Yoho, he said they are going to cheat. Let's assume they don't cheat. So, in 12 years, they are going to have a nuclear weapon. Isn't that the short summary for the evening news?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I don't think that's the summary that the administration will give, of course. I think that will be it. I would add that it is not just about Iran getting nuclear weapons. I think if this deal goes through, it is talking about now, it means a nuclear Middle East.

Mr. TROTT. I couldn't agree more.

One of the things that baffles me, and any of the panelists can answer this, it would be great, I can't figure out why the President is continuing to pursue the deal, why he doesn't step away. And I don't know if it is about saving face. I don't know if he genuinely believes that by being nice, that that is going to change behavior. Or if he is just determined not to act like a superpower, so whatever happens in the world really shouldn't concern us. Why not step back? We had 367 Members of Congress sign a letter. Every editorial says it is a bad deal. No one disagrees that they are the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world.

I take issue with one comment you made, Mr. Doran. They don't—when their lips move, they don't lie—they lie, except when they are saying “Death to America.” They mean that. So why not step away from this deal and say, I think everyone in the country would applaud the President and say: You made the right decision. Let's not close down discussions or diplomatic solutions. Let's try and find an alternative. But we can't move forward.

Why is the President determined to do this deal that I can guarantee will be unacceptable to Congress? There is no question about that.

Mr. DORAN. I think it is because, I think the most important decision the President ever made about the Middle East, he made before he walked into the Oval Office, and that was that he was going to go down in history as the President who ended wars and didn't start them and that he was going to pull the United States back from the region generally.

And the minute you say that your strategic goal is to pull back, then you run into this problem of, well, what about Iran? Am I still in the Iran containment business? And what about this nuclear program? And it puts a priority on solving that issue so that you don't have to be immeshed in this region where the challenge really isn't worth the outcome, as President Obama sees it.

Mr. TROTT. It is a world view you are saying?

Mr. DORAN. Yes.

Mr. RADEMAKER. I would add an additional observation. As you may know, part of my background is in arms control. In addition to following the Iran issue, I followed very closely President Obama's negotiations with Russia on the New START Treaty. And I see a lot of similarities between the way he negotiated with Russia at the beginning of his administration and the way he is negotiating with Iran here at the end of the administration. I would just make the observation that I think as a negotiator, President Obama is a man who thinks that demonstrating goodwill will elicit reciprocity by the other side. And he thinks goodwill gestures on our part will be met by goodwill gestures. And just by demonstrating goodwill, that mistrust can be overcome. It is sort of a nice feel-good way to approach the world. And I am sure there are situations where that is true. But I think when you are dealing with Vladimir Putin, as he learned in the New START negotiations, it wasn't true. The Russians sensed weakness, and they tried to take advantage. And I think the same is true dealing with the mullahs in Tehran. These are not men of goodwill. These are very hard-nosed individuals who have an agenda.

And I think Tom Friedman, I commend the piece to you, it is quoted in my testimony, the Iranians have read President Obama. They know he is determined to get this deal. It is now an issue of legacy in his mind as well. And they intend to leave nothing—they intend to leave absolutely nothing on the table. They are going to pick our pockets and then some.

Mr. MAKOVSKY. If I may just even step back a little more that Mike Doran did, I think he came into office, and this is, of course, speculative, believing that U.S. foreign policy for a long time had been a big mistake, that it had been counterproductive to our interest, that it had oftentimes even been immoral and diverted from

domestic needs. So I think he sought to really upend, to reverse our policy in a lot of parts of the world, whether it is in the Middle East, or Russia, as Steve talked about.

So I think what we are dealing with Iran is just the Middle East component of this general world view.

I would say just one other point is that President Obama at least hasn't shown, that I can tell, a great capacity to learn and to shift policy based on—I mean, Jimmy Carter, for instance, very famously came into office, talked about an inordinate fear of communism. But after Afghanistan, he recognized, he shifted. I haven't seen that sense, that ability at least in this White House to self-reflect and to shift accordingly. I hope I am wrong by the way.

Mr. TROTT. So the headline will be, "Deal Done: Iran Gets Nuclear Weapon in 12 Years, But Everyone Likes Us." Is that the summary?

Mr. MAKOVSKY. And have a nice day.

Mr. TROTT. Last question, and I am out of time.

Dr. Pollack, so before I came here, I was in business. And negotiating a deal in business, it always threw up a red flag when the other side was so focused on what happens if we breach the agreement, and we cheat. What happens if we default. And when folks are so focused on that, then, to me, that is telling me that I am, you can't do a good deal with a bad guy. So they are focused on cheating, arguing about anytime, anywhere inspections, arguing about the military basis. Isn't it a given they are going to cheat? Isn't it a foregone conclusion that the deal isn't going to be worth the paper it is printed on?

Mr. POLLACK. I don't know, Congressman. I have been working on Iran for 28 years. The Iranians are very unpredictable.

I will go back to a point that Steve Rademaker made earlier, which is that I think that there is every likelihood, as best we can tell now, maybe that is a better way to put it, in the 10 years to 15 years of the deal, it is hard to see why they would cheat. They have every reason not to do so. And I think there is a reasonable expectation that they won't. I think that the bigger question is about what happens after. The deal is in many way a bet. When I talk to the administration, when I—

Mr. TROTT. Pretty high-stakes bet, wouldn't you say?

Mr. POLLACK. Well, this is just it. It is an unknowable bet. The bet that the administration is taking is that in 10 or 15 years, we will have a kinder, gentler Iran. And they can point to evidence suggesting that this could happen. The people of Iran want to move Iran in a very different direction. It is plausible. It is just as plausible that we won't get that kinder, gentler Iran. And that is the bet we are taking.

Mr. TROTT. And I appreciate all of your time. And I will just close with I hope the bet doesn't result in Iran having an intercontinental ballistic missile that will be able to hit the President's library in Chicago.

Mr. POLLACK. Amen.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Trott, thank you very much for your fresh freshman approach.

And I want to thank each of the witnesses for being here today. I am really grateful that Chairman Ed Royce and Ranking Member

Eliot Engel were able to put this together. We can certainly see extraordinary concern about policies of moral relativism and concern about what we are facing.

At this time, we shall be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman

July 9, 2015

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at <http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov>):

DATE: Thursday, July 9, 2015

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part I)

WITNESSES: The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker
Foreign Policy Project Advisor
Bipartisan Policy Center
(Former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State.)

Michael Doran, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Hudson Institute

Michael Makovsky, Ph.D.
Chief Executive Officer
JINSA Germunder Center Iran Task Force

Kenneth M. Pollack, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5921 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day Thursday Date July 9, 2015 Room 2172

Starting Time 10:07 Ending Time 12:40

Recesses 0 (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Edward R. Royce, Rep. Heana Ros-Lehtinen, Rep. Joe Wilson

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

TITLE OF HEARING:

Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part I)

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

none

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)


STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

SFR - Rep. Gerald Connolly

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 12:40



Jean Marter, Director of Committee Operations

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

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Statement for the Record
Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia

This hearing on the implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran was scheduled last week after the deadline for the negotiations was pushed back to July 7. However, Congress does not have the text of an agreement in hand, and negotiations are now into an extended overtime.

Negotiators have been encouraged to disregard deadlines if it is in the interest of using diplomacy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Continuing negotiations is preferable to a bad deal or a complete collapse of diplomatic efforts. However, the U.S. cannot allow Iran to play for time if we suspect they are not negotiating in good faith and towards a final agreement that is acceptable to the P5+1.

Verification, transparency, and compliance are the foundation of any acceptable agreement. This begins with an intrusive inspections regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must have access to declared and undeclared nuclear sites including military facilities such as the Parchin military compound.

Nuclear programs shrouded in secrecy often indigenize program capabilities. During the IAEA's effort to verify the dismantlement of the South African nuclear program, international inspectors were surprised by the location of some manufacturing and storage facilities. In order to develop an inspections strategy for Iran that accounts for these undeclared sites, the IAEA will need to resolve questions about the past potential military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program and draw its own conclusions about the extent of the program.

Before negotiations conclude, these issues must be addressed along with other outstanding items such as the United Nations arms embargo and missiles sanctions, phased sanctions relief, and advanced centrifuge research and development.

Negotiations have been difficult, but the hard work will begin in earnest if an agreement is reached. The terms will need to be fully vetted and considered by Congress before the President can implement the deal. Implementation will involve a painstaking process of erecting and carrying out the monitoring regime. The P5+1 will be tasked with verifying Iranian compliance with the terms of a deal and strictly enforcing the snap back of sanctions if Iran is not living up to its end of the bargain. Our allies and partners in the region will have a vested interest in Iran's absolute compliance, and we should be cognizant of their need for security assurances.

While we should not diminish the significance of taking the nuclear issue off the table with Iran, we cannot disregard the myriad other challenges Iran poses to the security and stability of the Middle East. Iran's subversive activities in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen cannot be ignored. Additionally, the Islamic Republic remains one of the worst abusers of human rights in the world.

After decades of Iran's self-imposed isolation, the international community has the opportunity to collaboratively deny Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon through diplomatic means. However, concluding and enforcing a nuclear agreement with Iran will not be a panacea for regional conflict and instability. Those will remain challenges for the U.S. and our partners.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on constructive suggestions for the difficult work that lies ahead should we conclude a deal. We have heard enough from those who seek to undermine the talks. Even those Bush-era nonproliferation officials who chose to ignore this issue during their tenure can play a helpful role in the effective implementation of a potential nuclear deal with Iran.